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THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE NOMINATION OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

MAY 7, 8, 14, 15, 21, AND 22, AND JUNE 4, 1975

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 7, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. John Sparkman [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Clark, Case, Javits, and Percy.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

We are promised very good attendance today.

We are meeting today to open a series of hearings on the United States and the United Nations. The purpose of these hearings is to put into perspective what our original hopes and aims were, how the U.N. has developed, and what our future policies and attitudes should be.

I think it is fair to predict that recent world developments will focus greater attention on the United Nations. The question is whether the U.N. will be a constructive force in ameliorating difficult situations, such as in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, or whether it will be a destructive force in pitting the developing and third world nations against the developed, mostly Western countries, thereby further increasing the polarization evident at the U.N.

To start us off, the committee has invited a distinguished panel of past officials whose involvement with the United Nations spans the time of the signing of the Charter at San Francisco in 1945 to the Nixon administration.

We have with us the Honorable Harold E. Stassen, the only living U.S. signatory of the United Nations Charter; our former colleague, both in the Senate and on this committee, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who represented the United States at the United Nations from 1953 to 1960; Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, who held that post from 1965 to 1968; and Ambassador Charles S. Yost, who followed in 1969 and served until 1971. These gentlemen need no further introduction, but before calling on them I would like to ask Senator Percy, whom I hold responsible for these hearings, and have asked to act as co-chairman, to say a few words.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I hope you are not implying I am responsible for everything that is said at the hearings. [Laughter.]

I would like to say I was rather surprised when I finished my tour of duty as a delegate to the United Nations General Assembly last fall, to learn that it had been 20 years since the U.S. Senate had held hearings on the United Nations. In view of the U.N.'s potential to promote peace, and the misunderstanding at the U.N. today between the developed and developing worlds over many political, economic and social issues today, it seemed best to stand back now to see where we are and what our policies should be in regard to the U.N.

Certainly the hearings that begin this morning and will continue tomorrow, May 8, and on the 14th and 15th, 21st and 22d, will be quite comprehensive. I am most indebted, Mr. Chairman, to you for the decision that you have made to devote as much of the time of the Foreign Relations Committee to these hearings as you have.

We shall be hearing from those who made and executed U.S. policy at the United Nations over the years, from distinguished experts in international relations and from other prominent Americans who have important viewpoints to express.

I have a deep personal interest because in 1945 I was up in the peanut gallery at San Francisco—I was in the Navy then—the war was winding down, and with a little time on my hands, I watched the remarkable proceedings, as the U.N. was put together.

I think it rather remarkable that the four witnesses today have represented different branches of government—a Governor, a Senator, a Justice of the Supreme Court, an Ambassador—and two of them played more than one role during their government service. They certainly are among the four most knowledgeable and devoted Americans who could be testifying this morning.

I think it is an auspicious beginning for these hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

Senator Percy, you stated that you served last year, was it not, in the United Nations?

Senator PERCY. Yes, sir.

U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES SENT TO U.N. SINCE 1950

The CHAIRMAN. You know, ever since 1950 we have been sending two Congressional representatives to the United Nations for each session. The Senate one year and the House the next year—one Democrat; one Republican.

I want to say that Senator Lodge and I started that in 1950 when President Truman appointed us to go to the United Nations, and the practice has been followed ever since. It is a great experience, and I enjoyed it very much.

We are very glad to have all of you distinguished gentlemen with us, and if you will take the seats at the table, Governor Stassen, Senator Lodge, Justice Goldberg, Ambassador Yost.

That is quite an array of distinguished talent.

Charlie Yost was around the United Nations when I was there. I have known him through the years and the great work that he has done.

We will be glad to hear from you, gentlemen. I will ask Governor Stassen to lead off.

STATEMENT OF HAROLD E. STASSEN, MEMBER OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945

Mr. STASSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Responding to your invitation to testify at this hearing on the subject "The U.S. Role in the United Nations: The Vision and the Reality," may I first of all commend the committee for addressing itself to this subject at this critical hour in the conduct of our foreign relations.

The very serious adverse consequences in recent years, arising out of our foreign relations are, in my view, a direct result of an excess of unilateral, bilateral, and individualistic conduct of our foreign affairs.

These unfortunate results are causing some tendency to turn inward and to increase isolationist sentiments.

MULTILATERAL AND U.N. APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY URGED

What we need urgently is a turn toward a greater use of open multilateral and United Nations' centering of the conduct of our foreign policy.

These latter methods may at first seem more difficult, but in the modern world they are the only sound road toward true progress.

The unilateral, bilateral, and individualistic methods may at first seem easier and more productive, but they nearly always lead to tragedy and disaster.

The United States should take the lead in making the United Nations more adequate, rather than bypassing and downgrading it. We should think now of the next 30 years. We need that kind of approach at this juncture.

U.N. SHOULD BE MODERNIZED AND STRENGTHENED

When we drafted and signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco 30 years ago, we anticipated that it would need modernizing and strengthening in the future. Such improvement is overdue.

My own views in this respect were expressed in a national broadcast on NBC on July 5, 1945, immediately after the conclusion of the Charter.

Sometimes there are references by others that we then thought we had solved everything. We did not think we solved everything.

I said briefly, quoting from that address of July 5, 1945, which is in the printed volumes of my address: "Taken as a whole, the Charter is a human document. It is a realistic document. It is not perfect. It has weaknesses."

I said that it is important that the people of the world do not feel that they have automatically insured future peace, or that they have ipso facto solved the problems of war. I said further that even at its greatest significance, the Charter only establishes a framework, a machinery, a code. And then I said that is why our adherence to the

Charter is only one step in the whole field of our world policy for peace with justice and freedom.

The entire address, 30 years ago, was realistic in its analysis of the plusses and minuses, and the potential of where we were.

The late distinguished Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg, both former chairmen of this committee, and both also signers of the United Nations Charter, had similar realistic views, and expressed them at the time.

Permit me as the youngest then, and the only survivor now, to pay a word of tribute to all of those men and women who worked at San Francisco to draft and then sign the Charter, on behalf of the United States.

OVERALL PERSPECTIVE

Before proceeding to give my views on the needed improvement of the Charter, may I make a few concise points of overall perspective?

There will be a continuing need for the United States to be militarily very powerful and very alert.

The United Nations organization, as now established, is inadequate, but it nevertheless represents humanity's best hope for future world peace.

With the many far-reaching events of the past three decades, it is probable that if there had not been any United Nations organization, there would have been a catastrophic third world war before this date.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UPDATING AND IMPROVING U.N. CHARTER

May I now give a summary of my recommendations for modernizing, improving, and strengthening the United Nations Charter for the decades ahead? A few years ago I drafted a complete proposed charter for study purposes. It has now been updated, and I will provide a copy to the committee for review by its staff.

[The material referred to is on file with the committee.]

The major recommended revisions from the present Charter in outline are as follows:

1. Change the concept of the organization to universal inclusion of all humanity, and toward that end, revise the preamble, and open the membership. We must, in our advocacy, get in line with the aspirations and hopes of all mankind. There is a national tendency to think that the relationship between the three super powers is the main key to the future. It is not. It is important, but the main key to the future are the hopes and aspirations of all the peoples on this Earth, and that is the alinement that should control U.S. policy.

2. Set up a new Central Council of Ministers with weighted voting to effectively reflect and act for the world situation, and to stand between the veto power in the Security Council and the one-state, one-vote assembly. Weighted voting is very important for the future, in my judgment. It cannot be attacked by trying to change the Assembly to weighted vote. We must leave that as one vote, the town hall of the world. But by bringing, in effect, the sort of cabinet approach with the Secretary General, and introducing weighted voting in the functions of that new entity, we can achieve weighted voting in the future.

3. Create a new World Court of Equity, as an additional court, with

broader and special jurisdiction to add to the functioning of the judicial decision side of world affairs.

4. Add two additional organized methods for reaching settlements of international disputes, through the establishment of a World Board of Arbitration and a World Panel of Mediators, and provide for a notification of the Secretary General of all pending disputes.

5. Require the ratification of three-fourths of an expanded list of major permanent members to become effective. The expanded list includes Japan, India, Brazil, and the two German governments, as well as France, the United Kingdom, China, the U.S.S.R., and the United States of America.

6. Formally take sovereignty over those areas of the sea bed, and of outer space which are outside of national sovereign jurisdiction. Unless there is a movement in this direction, there is a great danger of a clash and confrontation in the decades ahead.

7. Initiate affirmative objectives and methods for the safeguarding of the environment against pollution, and for the fuller enjoyment of life by all humanity of all races.

8. Establish a new substantial regular method of financing the organization through a 1-percent duty on all international movement of tangible goods, materials, and machinery. Other methods may be suggested, but the great flow of goods depends upon a viable United Nations, if that is just taxed 1 percent, one-half to the seller and one-half to the buyer, you would have an adequate financing for the long-term future.

9. Provide for a United Nations peace force which is distinct, well-prepared, elite, and not composed of national units.

It will, of course, take several years to make such changes in the Charter, but even the beginning of the process will have a constructive effect.

U.S. LEADERSHIP ROLE IN STRENGTHENING, UPDATING U.N. URGED

It is urged, respectfully, that this committee take a leading role in bringing about a new U.S. leadership toward strengthening and modernizing the United Nations, and toward a larger use of multilateral methods and principles in the conduct of the foreign policy and foreign relations of the United States.

This committee, at other times in history, has taken a lead toward such a change and approach in American foreign policy.

May I also suggest that there should not be too deep a feeling of gloom about the present situation. In a very real sense, our country is continuing to suffer from the traumatic consequences of the tragic assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Such an event has a penetrating and pervasive effect upon our country. We will come through this period, but it takes time and understanding.

Our founding principles of individual freedom and of the worth and dignity of each person, are as valid today as they were two centuries ago, and their application with intelligence and integrity to all humanity on this Earth, under God, continues to be the best road to world peace with justice.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Governor Stassen.

Next, I will ask Senator Lodge for his statement.

[The biography of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY OF HENRY CABOT LODGE

Henry Cabot Lodge, former U.S. Senator, U.S. Representative to U.N., Ambassador (Vietnam, Germany, at large), reserve Major General, Harvard overseer, and Republican nominee for Vice President (1960). Member, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1947–1953. Served in U.S. Army in World War II. Managed campaign in 1951 and 1952 to win Republican nomination for General Eisenhower. Awarded Thayer Medal, West Point; 20 hon. degrees; military and foreign decorations. Author (1973, The Storm Has Many Eyes, W. W. Norton); lecturer; since 1970 special envoy to visit the Vatican from time to time.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. HENRY CABOT LODGE

Mr. LODGE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the honor of appearing before this distinguished committee which plays such a vital role in the foreign policy of our country.

One self-evident fact about the world is that its most difficult and dangerous problems—be they of health, or economics, or energy, or pollution, or, of course, of war and peace—can only be solved on an international basis. Individual nation-states—even as big as the United States and the Soviet Union—cannot successfully cope with these problems alone.

U.S. PUBLIC OPINION WARY OF U.N. EFFECTIVENESS

Yet, one self-evident paradox about the world is that the United Nations—the international organization created precisely for the purpose of finding international solutions—often receives a massive vote of no confidence in various American opinion polls, even though a majority does not want to abandon it.

Consider these figures: In 1951, only 43 percent of the American people, according to the Gallup poll, were satisfied with the progress of the United Nations. In 1959, the Gallup poll showed that an all-time high of 87 percent thought the United Nations was doing a good job. But in 1971, this had fallen to a low of 35 percent.

Ambassador Scali, in 1973, spoke of a poll indicating that only 34 percent of the American people thought the United Nations was doing an effective job. At United Nations headquarters in New York, the number of visitors fell from 1,116,000 in 1967 to 765,000 in 1972—a record low. And in 1973, the number was 13 percent lower.

A recent poll of the new 94th Congress by the United Nations Association shows that only 15 percent of our Congressmen thought that the United Nations was helpful to our international relations.

Senator CASE. Does that include Members of the Senate?

Mr. LODGE. It was Members of the House, I think.

This critical attitude of people in the world's biggest and most powerful country is a deadly serious threat to the United Nations—and to our hope for peace. And it amply justifies the sagacious decision of your committee to conduct this investigation.

It is, therefore, pertinent to consider the successes, failures, and future prospects of the United Nations.

FAVORABLE ASPECTS OF U.N.

Herewith my list of the United Nations plusses and minuses:

In the past 25 years, the United Nations has given important help in these situations: the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran in 1947; the communist withdrawal from Greece in 1949; resisting the aggression in Korea in 1950; the cease-fires and withdrawals in the Middle East in 1949, 1956, and 1957, and again in 1973; cease-fire or truces in Indonesia in 1949, Kashmir in 1965, and Cyprus; ending outside interference in Lebanon's internal affairs in 1958; preventing the Congo from becoming a cause of confrontation between the great powers in 1960; ushering the erstwhile colonies of Africa into the family of nations; and creating a new United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) on October 25, 1973, which was followed on October 27, by Egyptian-Israeli meetings for the first time in 17 years. The new UNEF differs from the one created in 1956 in that it can only be removed by a vote of the Security Council and that Poland, a communist power, is to be a member. These are improvements, even though the road is still full of boulders I add four major U.N. conferences in 1972–75, each of which made a start on four major world problems: environment, law of the sea, population, and food.

Now for another big plus: The first priority at the United Nations is peace and security. The second, far ahead of any other, should be economic and social development. Along these lines, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), by preinvestment surveys and technical education, has advanced the fundamentals of a good life: food, shelter, health, and education. Because it is done "multilaterally"—many nations working together—rather than "bilaterally"—the United States working with one country alone—$1 of input by the United States generates more than $6 worth of actual development work. Thus, our proportion gets smaller and the recipient nations' proportion gets greater because the United Nations Development Program—which includes such worthwhile "specialized agencies" as the World Health Organization and the Children's Fund—gets more and more people "into the act."

Much, but not all, of our own bilateral AID program for economic and social development abroad could, I believe, be channelled through the United Nations agencies, with advantage to us and to the recipient nation.

That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my summary of the plusses. And I ask how many of these plusses would have happened without the United Nations? And these are all things which have made the world a better place.

How many of these "plusses" would have happened without the U.N.?

UNFAVORABLE ASPECTS OF U.N.

Here are some undeniable minuses:

With the advantage of hindsight, one can now say that much trouble would have been avoided if, before the French left Indochina, we had used the United Nations in the early 1950's, somewhat as the United Nations acted in the Congo in 1960—as an international pres-

ence to prevent the area from becoming the cause of big power involvement. The United Nations later did nothing about Vietnam: because it lacked the tools and the will. Also, the communist powers, notably North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, opposed bringing the Vietnam question into the United Nations.

To go on with the minuses, in 1956 the Soviet aggression against Hungary could not be stopped by any method short of war. In 1968 Czechoslovakia could not be protected against a Soviet takeover. In 1971, the United Nations did not make a determined effort to persuade the Government of Pakistan to cease its brutal behavior toward East Pakistanis. Nor did the United Nations prevent—or try to prevent—India from invading East Pakistan. These are all United Nations failures. In all candor, can we doubt that these failures would have occurred even if there had been no United Nations?

There are other defects: voting does not correspond with the ability to carry out the things which are voted; there is an alarming tendency not to consider questions on their merits, but to vote as blocs; the lateness in starting the meetings; the windiness of the oratory; the lack of germaneness and the much too lengthy so-called debates all make a bad impression.

There can today in our United Nations of 138 members be little confidence that even if a clear and unambiguous case of aggression came before the Security Council or General Assembly, a majority of the members would treat it as such and would come to the aid of the victim.

To me, that is a terribly serious thing.

Finally, I cite the vote (105 to 4 with 20 abstentions) at the last session which recognized the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) as the sole representative of the Palestine people, and gave Mr. Arafat honors proper to a chief of state—an outrageous event which, understandably, infuriated so many people that some are talking about the United States withdrawing from the United Nations. I do not think it would be wise to withdraw. This suggestion reminds me of the man who stuck his head out of the window, found the weather was insufferably hot, and proceeded to break the thermometer. The cure for the United Nations' troubles is not to leave it, but to reform it.

PRESIDENT'S U.N. 25TH ANNIVERSARY COMMISSION REPORT PROPOSALS

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I submit that members of the United Nations should wholeheartedly work for a rapid growth in its effectiveness. They should change the United Nations so that voting more nearly corresponds with the ability to carry out the things which are voted. Many detailed changes are proposed in the report of the President's Commission on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, published in 1971.

I cite a few: Small states should renounce their right to vote and become associate members; if any state pays less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the United Nation's budget, it would become an associate member; the United Nations would submit itself in electing members of the Security Council to place primary emphasis on the contributions which the candidate can make; half of the 10 elected seats in the Se-

curity Council would be rotated among the larger states. A nation like Japan would always be a member of the Security Council.

The United States should be able to translate into political influence and power its status as a financial mainstay of the U.N. We should not show undue respect for the General Assembly, the decisions of which, after all, are purely hortatory, and do not have the force of law. A little of that treatment might be in order at the present time.

Members should rededicate themselves and strengthen their determination actually to suppress aggression—which, after all, is what the United Nations is all about, and which so many have forgotten. Remember Churchill's words that peace is not promoted by throwing small nations to the wolves. I have no illusions about the difficulty of bringing about these changes, but I believe that an eloquent effort to do so is very much worth making.

Since 1945, it is said, there have been 14 international and 24 civil wars—all with substantial casualties. The world is still a dangerous place. We need the United Nations.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I remember when Justice Goldberg was appointed to the United Nations position. I suppose he is the only Justice of the Supreme Court who ever left for another appointment, but he did leave that job, and performed excellently in the United Nations.

Mr. Justice, we are glad to have you, sir.

[Justice Arthur J. Goldberg's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

Arthur J. Goldberg has served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador, and Secretary of Labor.

Justice Goldberg was born in Chicago, Illinois, on August 8, 1908, the son of Joseph and Rebecca Goldberg.

He received his elementary education in Chicago Public Schools and was graduated from Benjamin Harrison High School in 1924. Mr. Goldberg attended Crane Junior College, a branch of the City College of Chicago. He received the Bachelor of Science in Law degree in 1929 and Doctor of Jurisprudence in 1930 from Northwestern University. He was Editor in Chief of the Illinois Law Review.

In 1929, Mr. Goldberg was admitted to practice before the Illinois bar. He qualified for practice before the Supreme Court of the United States in 1937.

He was engaged in private practice in Chicago from 1929 until 1948 and was the senior partner of the firm of Goldberg, Devoe, Shador and Mikva, Chicago, 1945 to 1961. Mr. Goldberg also practiced law with Goldberg, Feller and Bredhoff, Washington, D.C., 1952–1961, as the senior partner of that firm.

Mr. Goldberg was General Counsel of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 1948–1955, and United Steel Workers of America, 1948–1961. He was Special Counsel for the AFL–CIO, 1955–1961. He also was Legal Advisor to several international unions.

During World War II he served as Special Assistant with the rank of Captain and Major with the Office of Strategic Services.

He is author of articles in American legal publications and journals of opinion, and the author of several books, including "AFL–CIO: Labor United," "The Defenses of Freedom: The Public Papers of Arthur J. Goldberg," and "Equal Justice: The Warren Era of the Supreme Court."

Mr. Goldberg married Dorothy Kurgans, an artist, in 1931. They have two children, a daughter, Mrs. Barbara Cramer, a social worker in Chicago, and a son, Robert M. Goldberg, an Alaska lawyer.

Justice Goldberg is practicing law in Washington, D. C., and is also a University Professor of Law and Diplomacy at American University, Washington, D. C.

STATEMENT OF JUSTICE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, ATTORNEY AT LAW, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Senator Percy, Senator Case.

I thank you very much for the opportunity to present my views on what is an important and paramount subject, and I commend the committee very much for addressing itself interestingly enough after a long lapse of time to the United States and the United Nations and their respective roles. I am particularly gratified to participate in this committee's hearings with friends and colleagues of long standing, Governor Stassen, Senator Lodge, and Ambassador Yost.

My views perhaps are somewhat different from theirs, but you invited various views and I shall express my own.

U.S. EXPECTS TOO MUCH, DEMANDS TOO LITTLE OF U.N.

It is my considered opinion that the United States in relation to the U.N. expects too much and demands too little. This dichotomy requires an explanation.

The people of this country expected the U.N. to fulfill its great goal to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. This concept of unity of nations to keep the peace and achieve universal economic justice was born out of the optimism of victory in World War II.

Senator Percy, since you were sitting in the gallery at the opera house in San Francisco as a member of the Armed Forces at the birth of the United Nations I think you can bear out that statement. It reflected a conception that the World War II partners of different political systems and widely divergent ideologies would submerge their differences in the interest of international peace, security and progress and would yield enough of their sovereignty to enable the world organization to take effective and collective action to these ends.

Well, regrettably, the optimism of the Charter turned out to be excessive, despite the warnings by Governor Stassen and others that there would be problems that had to be coped with.

American expectations about the U.N. also were founded on a lack of appreciation of what was already underway when the victorious powers met at San Francisco to adopt the U.N. Charter—the end of colonialism and the emergence of more new nations than those assembled in the opera house.

If I remember correctly, there were then some 50 countries. Now there are 138 members.

The majority of the nations which met in San Francisco to adopt the Charter were of the West. The Communist Bloc was in the minority, and the third world was virtually nonexistent. In fact, that term was never employed at that time. It is of much more recent origin.

Thus, in the early days of the United Nations it is not too much to say that we and our Western allies ran the show. Now, we had advanced warning as a result of experience with the Soviet Union, even during World War II, that things were not going to be so easy, but nevertheless, we did not fully anticipate the hostile attitude of the Soviets and their satellites at the U.N., and we certainly did not foresee the intense resentment of the new nations to colonial powers, and

we never conceived the fact they would regard us to be one. After all, we were in the vanguard to free India from British rule, Indonesia from Dutch domination, and the same was true of our role with respect to other colonial powers and other colonial countries.

DECLINING INFLUENCE OF UNITED STATES IN UNITED NATIONS

Now, I need not detail what has been adverted to and what is a matter of record, the declining influence of the United States in the United Nations as a result of these developments. We lost our majority in the General Assembly to the third world and to the Communist Bloc, which has all too often exploited the grievances, justified or without warrant, of the new nations newly freed from colonialism.

As my colleagues who served at the U.N. can bear witness, and as I experienced, life at the U.N., therefore, has become increasingly difficult for the representatives of the United States to the United Nations.

Mr. Chairman, those Members of Congress who have contributed so much to the success of U.N. delegations, these also can bear witness to the same fact.

Anyone who represents the United States in an Ambassadorial capacity smarts under attack, whether justified or unjustified. And U.S. representatives at the U.N. are no different. All our representatives, the ambassadors, the congressional delegates, I am sure nostalgically recall the halcyon days when the United States and their allies were the U.N. majority. The result of this change is undertandable if not always wise, it invites responses to attacks if only out of a sense of frustration.

I recall that during my 3 years of tenure at the U.N. the members of my mission and Members of Congress, repeatedly returning after heated exchanges in the General Assembly and saying why should the United States be singled out for attacks which by our lights the Soviets on many counts deserved far more than we do?

Now, we like all nations are a proud country, and properly so; nations, like people, do not relish insults, even of a rhetorical kind.

Now we may console ourselves by the old saying, sticks and stones may break your bones but names will never hurt you—but we do not like to be called bad names. Nations, like persons, are human after all.

MOYNIHAN ARTICLE IN COMMENTARY MAGAZINE ON U.N. REBUTTED

Dr. Patrick Moynihan, who I see will appear before you, and who, according to press reports, will be our next representative to the U.N., has recently written a very provocative article for Commentary Magazine, in which he says, in effect, we have been delinquent in not facing up to these attacks forthrightly, rebutting them and putting our policies in proper context.

Dr. Moynihan was my Executive Assistant at the Department of Labor. He is also the editor of one of my books and I, therefore, make my comment about his statement with the greatest friendship. He is simply mistaken. Every American representative to the U.N. from its beginning has attempted to do precisely what Dr. Moynihan recommends in his article. Indeed the latest illustration was Ambassador Scali's speech at the U.N. which forthrightly addressed itself to the

Third World in relation to matters where our country conceived that the Third World took positions that were not warranted.

Senator PERCY. I am happy to say, Justice Goldberg, that Dr. Moynihan will be before us soon and we will put the question to him.

Mr. GOLDBERG. I am sure you will, and it will be helpful and you will receive some very enlightening answers. He is a very able and gifted man.

But to review my own reactions to attacks during my 3 years as American representative, I re-read my own speechmaking at the U.N. I found it a painful task in light of the number of speeches I delivered during 3 years of tenure.

Upon re-reading this record, I found that it is replete with the exercise by me of my right to reply—replies addressed not only to the Communist bloc but to a great many of the Third World nations as well.

But if the problem were just rhetorical exchange in the General Assembly, as Ambassador Lodge pointed out, these, however distasteful, can be lived with, particularly since the General Assembly constitutionally can only recommend. It is the Security Council which decides, and there we have a veto. And, of course, in all fairness some of the attacks that were made against us were justified and we frankly must concede that.

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD U.N.

But what concerns me, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, at the moment in addition to the concerns expressed by Governor Stassen and Senator Lodge, is that the General Assembly and some of the specialized agencies of the U.N., such as UNESCO—United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization—recently have gone beyond words. They have been taking actions in violation of the U.N. Charter, and this along with other failures of the U.N., as well as its substantial achievements—Ambassador Lodge and Governor Stassen correctly detailed some of these achievements—warrants reassessment by us of American attitudes toward the world organization.

I have come to the conclusion, expressed in my opening sentence, that we must moderate our expectations as to the U.N.'s capacity to make and keep the peace in this troubled world, and insure economic and social justice.

I think the polls show the declining support by the American people for the U.N. are based on or are the product of undue expectations.

We must accept the U.N. for what it is, a useful instrument to implement a political concensus by the superpowers in particular.

I would add to the achievements already mentioned, the final approval of the nonproliferation treaty and the guarantees that were made, by the Security Council relating thereto, and the consummation under U.N. auspices of the Space Treaty which was done under the general umbrella of the United Nations Committee on Outer Space.

The U.N. also is important as a forum to ventilate grievances by the Third World. In a great sense we get an expression of world opinion at the U.N. that we do not get in Washington. Washington Ambassadors of the Third World and other countries are here to promote friendly

relations. They understandably like to stand in well with the Secretary of State and the President, and while I do not say that they do not express the views of their country, they do not express it with the same vigor, intensity and candor as the delegates to the U.N. of the same countries.

And perhaps the expressions at the U.N., we thoughtfully must consider, are more reflective of the sentiments of those countries than expressions in Washington.

And, of course, as has been pointed out by my colleagues, the U.N. is an increasingly important agency to study and promote economic and social progress. What we continuously must bear in mind is that the United Nations is not a world government and the United States, for example, would not yield its sovereignty to make it a world government. I doubt that any nation today would.

And though the U.N. is helpful in keeping the peace and providing economic and social aid and assistance, its capacity even in these areas is limited. Congress has never been willing, and I think with considerable warrant, to transfer all of its aid to other countries to the U.N.

EXPANDING AID THROUGH MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATION

I am generally for expanding aid through multilateral organizations. I think we have perhaps reached the limit of the effectiveness of aid unilaterally supplied; but the people of this country, I think, understandably take the position that we cannot be the only giver and other countries have not responded in equal measure to the great generosity of the United States even with respect to the U.N.

Until recently we contributed through the budget contribution and through voluntary contributions 50 percent of U.N. expenditures. This led to reaction, and Congress responded to that reaction by reducing our contributions.

OBSERVANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS OF CHARTER

Now, while moderating undue expectations, it seems to me we must also insist upon observance by all nations of the fundamental provisions of the U.N. Charter. We must not demand too little in this respect of the U.N. and its specialized agencies. Specifically, I have in mind that we have the right to demand that all member states refrain from unconstitutional action, action contrary to fundamental provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and its agencies.

Let me illustrate. There is a movement underway to deny Israel its proper place in the General Assembly. Action of this kind is clearly and plainly unconstitutional and contrary to the Charter. The Charter is very specific on this point. Under chapter 2 of the Charter, a member of the United Nations may, and I quote, "may be expelled from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly [only] upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

That was written in very advisedly. Clearly the majority is not empowered to deny to any member state the most basic right of membership. Similar to the protection we accord to the basic rights of the citizen of a democracy to exercise the franchise.

There can be no doubt about the meaning of the provision of the U.N. Charter I have quoted. One does not have to be an international lawyer or jurist to interpret it.

The General Assembly is simply without the power to exclude a member from its deliberations unless the Security Council so recommends.

Senator CASE. Don't you think that applied to agencies of the U.N. also?

Mr. GOLDBERG. I do. Yes; I would say that there are comparable provisions in the mandates of the specialized and, furthermore, there is an additional inhibition upon the specialized agencies to the U.N. They are not created to be the political body that the United Nations itself is; they are created, the World Health Organization, the World Food Organization, UNESCO, and others to function not in the political area but in specific areas for which they were created.

The United States, therefore, has every right to insist that a decision to deny Israel the privileges of members not be taken by a majority at the Assembly. Now, the United States and a few Western powers did vote against the exclusion of South Africa at last year's General Assembly deliberations. Personally, I hold no brief for South Africa. Its apartheid policy is utterly abhorrent to me, as I made clear during my tenure at the United Nations, often to South Africa's great displeasure. But South Africa, notwithstanding, like all member states, is entitled to constitutional due process and it was denied this.

ISRAEL'S EXCLUSION FROM GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

In any event, Israel does not practice apartheid. The Security Council furthermore has made no finding that Israel has not complied with Resolution 242, the bedrock of a Middle East settlement. Resolution 242 was adopted by the Security Council during my tenure. It represents a basic decision and determination by the Security Council of the framework of a future peace settlement in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we have a particular responsibility for that Resolution 242. While the British offered it, the resolution is largely the result of American efforts and diplomacy. No grounds, therefore, exist for Israel's exclusion from the General Assembly or the specialized agencies of the U.N.

Therefore, I have a recommendation to make in this connection, an important one, and that is that the United States has a right to demand, and here I use the word advisedly—demand that the proposal to deny Israel its proper place in the Assembly or the specialized agencies be abandoned as unconstitutional. This is not a new concept of mine. When I was at the U.N. a majority of the General Assembly adopted a resolution dealing with important questions relating to war and peace. Under U.N. Charter important questions can only be decided by a two-thirds vote.

I stood on the rostrum of the U.N. General Assembly and said on behalf of our country, we would not comply or adhere to that resolution on the simple ground that it was unconstitutional. And I made it very clear, so there would be no misunderstanding, and I explained the reason why.

Now, to make a demand, a demand must be credible and cannot only consist of just a statement and I, therefore, believe the only way to make it credible and to abort this unconstitutional move is for our country to make it clear before this proposal to deny Israel its proper seat in the Assembly gains momentum, the United States will not only vote against this, as it did in the South Africa case, but if the Assembly persists that we will not participate in the Assembly deliberations.

Now, we ought not to follow the mistake of the Soviet Union, which walked out of the Security Council at the time of the Korean problem and, therefore, wasn't there to exercise a veto. We should keep our seat in the Security Council.

Now, I really believe that if we firmly declare to all capitals of the 138 nation states that this is the U.S. viewpoint, not by way of threat, by way simply a statement of intention, that this would suffice to bring home to all concerned that we are serious about observance of the Charter provisions about the rights of members, which goes to the very basis of the U.N. existence.

But I would even go as far that if such action by the United States does not appear likely to insure Charter compliance, we should also make it clear we are prepared to take the further step of freezing our prorated contribution to Assembly expenses if Israel is illegally denied its seat in the Assembly.

Now, I am not one who ordinarily subscribes to the view that our country ought to swing such a big stick, but the U.N. will not survive if its basic laws are violated by a majority in a matter of transcending importance such as the rights of members.

SECRETARY GENERAL SHOULD DECLARE AGAINST VIOLATIONS OF CHARTER

I think there is another thing we have a right to demand—the right to insist that the Secretary General forthrightly declare against this and other egregious violations of the Charter. The Secretary General is the principal executive officer of the United Nations. In a very realistic sense, he is its leader and, in a substantive sense, since he heads up the U.N.'s organization, he is the custodian of the Charter. A timely declaration by the Secretary General on occasion may offend the majority or the minority, depending upon the circumstances, but a Secretary General should not attempt to please the majority, or us, or anyone else where the integrity of the Charter is at issue.

It is far more likely that the U.N. will sustain irreparable harm from excessive caution on the part of the Secretary General than from insisting on compliance by all member states with the fundamental law of the organization.

This does not mean the Secretary General should declare himself about every problem of the U.N. and insist or urge that his viewpoint be accepted. I am talking about violations of the fundamental law of the Charter. I defended U Thant against vigorous protest by my colleagues in the State Department when he declared himself on Vietnam. It was not happily received in Washington but he had a right to declare himself as a world leader and as Secretary General. But this must be a two-way street. The Secretary General should not submit to a majority where it is plain that the Charter is being violated.

So I conclude by reiterating my thesis, American foreign policy

toward the U.N. should lower its sights about unrealistic objectives and raise them about essential demands. It is my conviction that both the U.N. and United States will be better served by such a policy on our part.

Thank you.

[Mr. Goldberg's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE U.N.: VISION AND REALITY

I thank this distinguished Committee for the opportunity to present my views on this important subject.

The United States in relation to the United Nations expects too much and demands too little. This dichotomy requires an explanation.

The people of this country expect the UN to fulfill its great goal—to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

This great concept of the unity of nations to keep the peace and achieve universal economic justice was born out of the optimism of history in World War II. It reflected the conception that the World War II partners of different political systems and widely diversified ideologies would submerge their differences in the interests of international peace, security, and progress and would yield enough of their sovereignty to enable the world organization to take effective and collective action to these ends.

Regrettably, the optimism of the Charter turned out to be excessive.

American expectations also were founded on a lack of appreciation of what what was already under way when the victorious powers met in San Francisco to adopt the UN Charter—the end of colonialism and the emergence of more new nations than those assembled in the Opera House.

The majority of the nations which met in San Francisco to adopt the UN Charter were of the West; the Communist bloc was in the minority, and the third world was virtually non-existent. Thus, in the early days of the United Nations, it is not too much to say that we and our Western allies ran the show.

Although we had advance warning as a result of experiences with the Soviet Union during World War II, we did not anticipate the hostile attitude of the Soviets and their satellites at the UN; and we certainly did not foresee the intense resentment of the new nations to colonial powers and the fact that they regarded us to be one. After all, we were in the vanguard to free India from British rule and Indonesia from Dutch domination, and the same was true of some other countries.

I need not detail what is a matter of record, the declining influence of the United States in the United Nations as a result of these developments.

We lost our majority in the General Assembly to the third world and to the Communist bloc, which has all too often exploited the grievances, justified or without warrant, of the new nations, newly freed from colonialism.

Life at the United Nations, therefore, has become increasingly difficult for the Representatives of the United States to the United Nations. All of them have smarted under attacks, some justified and some unjustified, against the United States. And all, I am sure, nostalgically recall the halcyon days when the United States and its allies were the UN majority.

Our response to this change is understandable, if not always wise. This response is the product of frustration. Why should the United States be singled out for attacks which, by our lights, the Soviets on many counts merit far more than we?

We, like all nations, are a proud country, and properly so; nations, like people, do not relish insults, even of a rhetorical kind. We may console ourselves by the old saying—sticks and stones may break your bones but words will never hurt you—but we do not like to be called bad names. Nations, like persons, are human after all.

Dr. Patrick Moynihan, who, according to press reports, will be our next Representative to the UN, has recently written an article for Community Magazine in which he says, in effect, that we have been delinquent in not facing up to

*Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, 1965–1968.

these attacks forthrightly, rebutting them and putting our policies in proper context. My friend and former colleague, Dr. Moynihan, is mistaken in this regard. Every American Representative to the UN from its beginnings has attempted to do this.

After reading Dr. Moynihan's article, I reviewed my own speech—made at the UN—a painful task in light of the number of the speeches I delivered during three years of tenure. Upon re-reading this record. I found that it is replete with the exercise by me of my right to reply—replies addressed not only to the Communist bloc but to a great many of the third world nations as well.

But the problem extends beyond rhetorical exchanges. These, however, distasteful, can be lived with, particularly since the General Assembly constitutionally can only recommend. It is the Security Council which decides and there we have a veto.

But the General Assembly and some of the specialized agencies of the UN, such as Unesco, recently have gone beyond words. They have been taking action in violation of the UN Charter and this, along with other shortcomings and failures of the UN, warrants a reassessment by us of American attitudes toward the world organization.

I have come to the conclusion, expressed in my opening sentence, that we must moderate our expectations as to the UN's capacities to make and keep the peace in this troubled world and ensure economic and social justice. We must accept the UN for what it is—a useful instrument to implement a political consensus, by the super-powers in particular; a forum to ventilate grievances by the third world; and an agency to study and promote economic and social progress. The United Nations is not a world government, and, though important and at times helpful in keeping the peace and providing economic and social aid and assistance, its capacities, even in these areas, are limited.

But while moderating undue expectations, we must also insist upon observance by all nations of the fundamental provisions of the UN Charter when action is taken.

We must not demand too little of the UN and its specialized agencies, while recognizing the limitations of the United Nations.

Specifically, we have the right to demand that all member states refrain from unconstitutional action—action contrary to the explicit provisions of the Charters of the United Nations and its agencies.

Let me illustrate by a simple example: There is a movement under way to deny Israel its proper place in the General Assembly and in the specialized agencies.

Action of this character is plainly unconstitutional and contrary to the Charter. Under Chapter Two of the Charter, a member of the United Nations "may be expelled from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly [only] upon the recommendation of the Security Council." This is a very plain provision. One need not be an international lawyer or jurist to interpret it. The General Assembly is simply without power to exclude a member from its deliberations until and unless the Security Council so recommends.

The United States, therefore, has every right to insist that this provision not be annulled by majority at the Assembly. The United States and a few Western powers did vote against the exclusion of South Africa from last year's General Assembly deliberations. I hold no brief for South Africa; its apartheid policy is utterly abhorent to me, as I made clear during my tenure at the UN. But South Africa, notwithstanding, like all member states, is entitled to constitutional due process, and it was denied.

In any event, Israel does not practice apartheid. The Security Council has made no finding that Israel has not complied with Resolution 242, the bedrock of a Middle East settlement. No ground, therefore, exists for Israel's exclusion from the General Assembly or the specialized agencies of the UN.

The United States, if it is faithful to the UN Charter, has the right, therefore, to demand that the proposal to deny Israel its proper place in the Assembly be abandoned as unconstitutional. And, to make this demand creditable, the United States should make it clear, before this proposal gains further momentum, that, if Israel is unlawfully denied its proper seat in the Assembly, the United States will not only vote against but, if the Assembly notwithstanding persists, will not participate in the Assembly deliberations. (It goes almost without saying that we should keep our Security Council seat, not repeating the great Soviet mistake at the time of the Korean conflict.)

I believe that a firm declaration to this effect by the United States, not by way of threat but by a simple statement of intention, would suffice to bring home to all concerned that we are serious about observance of the Charter provisions about the rights of members which, like the franchise in our democracy, goes to the very basis of the UN's existence. But if such action by the United States does not appear likely to ensure Charter compliance, we should also make it clear that we are prepared to take the further step of freezing our pro-rata contribution to Assembly expenses if Israel is illegally denied its seat in the Assembly.

Under ordinary circumstances, I am not a great advocate of swinging a big stick; but the United Nations will not survive if its basic law is violated by a majority in a matter of transcendent importance, such as the rights of members.

There is another thing we have a right to demand. We have a right to insist that the Secretary General forthrightly declare against this and other egregious violations of the Charter. The Secretary General is the principal executive officer of the United Nations. He is its leader and in a very real sense is the custodian of the Charter. A timely declaration by the Secretary General on occasion may offend the majority or the minority, depending upon the circumstances, but a Secretary General should attempt to please the majority, or us, or anyone else where the integrity of the Charter is at issue.

It is far more likely that the United Nations will sustain irreparable harm from excessive caution on the part of the Secretary General than from courage in insisting on compliance by all member states with the fundamental law of the organization.

I conclude by reiterating my thesis. American foreign policy towards the UN should lower its sights about unrealistic objectives and raise them about essential demands. Both the United Nations and the United States will be better served by such a policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Justice.

Now Ambassador Yost. Ambassador Yost has been connected with the U.N. a long, long time and we are delighted to have you here today.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. YOST, FORMER U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. YOST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a brief oral statement to make. I don't have a written statement but I would very much appreciate it if there might be placed in the record copies of two magazine articles which I recently wrote dealing with the present and future of the U.N., one in the Saturday Review and one in the New Republic.

The CHAIRMAN. We have those articles and without objection they will be printed in the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the New Republic, Dec. 28, 1974]

CLASH OF THE "TWO MAJORITIES"

(By Charles W. Yost*)

In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in December the U.S. representative John Scali spoke bitterly of the "tyranny of the majority," noted that "every majority must recognize that its authority does not extend beyond the point where the minority becomes so outraged that it is no longer willing to maintain the covenant which binds them," and concluded that in consequence of recent majority behavior in the Assembly, American support of the United Nations is eroding—in our Congress and among our people."

Somewhat similar speeches were made on the same day by representatives of France, Britain, West Germany, Italy, Sweden and Belgium.

*Charles W. Yost, former U.S. Ambassador to Syria and Morocco, served as chief U.S. representative to the United Nations, 1967–1971.

What occasioned this concerted outburst of indignation by the developed countries? Their frustrations have been building up for some time but were confirmed this year by actions of the majority on these subjects: international economic relations, South Africa and the Palestinians.

As to the first, the assembly adopted by a vote of 120 to 6 a "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" proposed by the President of Mexico. Among the handful of negative votes were those of the U.S., West Germany and Britain, and among the few abstainers Japan, France and Canada. In other words this is a charter that asserts the rights of the less developed countries and the duties of the developed but does not, in the view of the latter, adequately protect their rights or the interests of their private investors. As Ambassador Scali said: "the minority which is so often offended may in fact be a practical majority, in terms of its capacity to support this organization and implement its decisions."

On the second subject, a proposal to expel South Africa from the United Nations under procedures laid down in the UN charter was vetoed in the Security Council by the U.S., France and Britain. The Assembly majority thereupon proceeded to deny the South African delegate his seat in the current Assembly on very dubious procedural grounds.

Finally, and this action was the most provocative, the Assembly majority voted that, for the first time in the history of the organization, a spokesman not representing a member government might participate in an Assembly debate. This spokesman, moreover, Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was accorded the honors not merely of a delegate but of a chief of state. To add insult to injury the Israeli repesentative, who wished to rebut seriatim his numerous adversaries in the debate, was prevented from doing so by a ruling of the Algerian Assembly president, which when challenged was upheld by the majority.

Coincidentally, the same majority in UNESCO, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which is supposedly nonpolitical, cut off support for regional programs in Israel on the grounds that Israel, in definiance of UN injunctions, is altering the physical and cultural character of Jerusalem.

These were the actions that the Western ambassadors so rigorously attacked and that provoked such angry reactions among press and public in several countries. For example, Switzerland reduced its contribution to UNESCO by 10 percent, and on December 10, 71 U.S. Senators joined in declaring the PLO a "direct threat" to the foreign policy of the United States.

Were these strong reactions justified? To some extent they certainly were. But in fairness to the Third World majority their intemperate actions, rather than being matched by equally intemperate Western responses, should be examined dispassionately and with some perspective. In order to do so one needs to cast a glance at recent history.

First, as Ambassador Scali reminded his audience, the UN Assembly is not a legislative body. It cannot enact laws. Except in regard to internal procedural and budgetary matters, its resolutions are not binding on member states. What they are is a public expression of the opinions of a majority of member governments, in many though not in all cases representing a large majority of mankind. As Dag Hammarskjold used to say the Assembly is "a reflection of the world as it is" not as we might like it to be. In that sense it is worth listening to, if we wish not to deceive ourselves about the state of the real world. Adlai Stevenson once remarked in this connection that what the United States needs most is a hearing aid.

Second, we should not forget that from 1945 to 1960 the overwhelming majority in the United Nations consisted of Western Europeans and Latin Americans. Those were the days when the Soviet Union and the few nonaligned member states repeatedly protested "the tyranny of the majority." But we had then no qualms about passing resolutions over their strong objections. Now the shoe is on the other foot, and we are crying foul.

The history of the three issues that have provoked the present excitement also needs to be kept in mind.

Ever since the less developed countries became the majority they have been passing resolutions calling on the rich to assist much more substantially in their development, to improve the terms of trade that have until recently been heavily in their disfavor, and to police multinational corporations, which they believe have in many cases exploited them. The fact that there has been only a very modest response to these repeated appeals accounts in substantial part for the

recent quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC, for the wave of nationalizations of foreign properties, particularly in Latin America, and for the one-sided resolutions on these subjects adopted by the UN Assembly.

As to South Africa, it should be recalled that the Assembly and the Security Council have for many years been passing resolutions, which the U.S. has almost always supported and only two or three states have opposed, calling on South Africa to abandon its policy of apartheid or racial segregation.

Yet practically nothing has happened. Apartheid remains as firmly entrenched as ever. Efforts to impose sanctions on South Africa or to expel it legally are blocked by vetoes in the Security Council. The procedural device adopted to deprive South Africa's delegate of his seat in the present Assembly was, therefore, while legally improper and politically unwise, a symbolic expression of long pent-up frustration on an issue that deeply affronts the human dignity of all the non-white members of the United Nations.

The questions revolving around the Palestine Liberation Organization likewise raise issues carrying an enormous emotional charge; there is no doubt that, just as much of the world community experienced a deep sense of guilt for having failed to prevent the holocaust of the Jews, so have many, particularly in the Third World, felt a growing sense of guilt for having allowed two generations of Palestine refugees to pass their lives in economic squalor and a political vacuum. A very large majority of UN members now clearly feels that, just as Israel is entitled to self-determination, independence and secure sovereignty, so too are the Palestinians.

Had this problem been squarely faced and decisively dealt with some years ago, it might have been resolved within the framework of the Jordanian state. Having been neglected too long, the initiative passed, as has been the case in many other emerging nations, into the hands of ultra-nationalists and revolutionaries willing to use terror to achieve "liberation." Outrageous as terrorism is, we must not forget that it has been used in similar struggles by French revolutionaries, Russians, Yugoslavs, Israelis, Algerians and many others, and is even now a daily practice among both Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. This does not excuse it but helps explain why it is tolerated. To the great majority of UN members, Arafat is the fighting leader of an oppressed people, and it was in that capacity that he was recognized and honored.

Even the many who do not consider these explanations and parallels sufficient excuse for "irresponsible" behavior by the General Assembly would do well to recall the not insignificant accomplishments of the United Nations, not those of the distant past but those of 1974.

Valuable UN peacekeeping capabilities have again been demonstrated in the Middle East by the establishment of multinational forces in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights, forces that now play an important part in maintaining the fragile peace in the area and that, if there is to be a political settlement, will no doubt be an indispensible element in it. Moreover the Soviet Union has in this case for the first time joined in creating and paying for such a force and is co-chairing the UN-sponsored Geneva Conference. Through the UN, it is thus deeply and usefully involved in the peacemaking process. A similar UN force in Cyprus was helpful in preventing last summer's conflict from doing even more harm than it did and remains a partial barrier to further hostilities.

Even the General Assembly, so bitterly reproached for one-sidedness, has during the past month upheld the US position by narrow margins on two critical Asian issues: the representation of Cambodia and the maintenance of a UN command in Korea.

Of far more long-range significance were three UN conferences held this year on matters of profoundest import: the law of the sea conference in Caracas, the population conference in Bucharest and the food conference in Rome. It is true that none of these did more than begin to resolve these problems—by defining their magnitude, by proposing, and debating means of dealing with them, and by exposing clearly the disastrous consequences of failing to cope. But had the United Nations and its family of economic agencies not existed, it is doubtful that even this beginning would have been made.

It is indeed in this economic area of urgent international concern that the future indispensibility of the United Nations most probably lies, even more than in its traditional peacekeeping role. It is becoming ever clearer that the survival of organized and civilized human society into the 21st century depends on controlling population growth, assuring adequate and accessible supplies of food, fuel and fertilizer, developing and modernizing the underdeveloped two-

thirds of mankind, rationalizing and stabilizing our trade and financial systems, protecting our threatened environment.

All of these are problems that affect all nations and their solution will, in this age of accelerating interdependence, require the active cooperation of most of them. The focus of such cooperation can best be international organizations in which almost all nations are present. To quote Hammarskjold again, if the UN did not exist we would have to invent it. It will be simpler to preserve and improve it than to reinvent it. But it cannot be improved without patience, restraint, mutual accommodation and shared leadership on the part of all concerned.

These qualities will be required both from the numerical majority of Third World countries and what Ambassador Scali called the "practical majority" of those countries on whose economic, political or military power usually depends whether UN resolutions are mere empty gestures or lead to consequential action.

Rather than trying to reserve decision-making on these critical issues for a "rich man's club" of affluent states, the "practical majority" must, if it wishes the decisions to be carried out, submit them at an early stage to a forum of all concerned. To the same end the "numerical majority" must forego the symbolic "triumphs" that so provoke and alienate their powerful partners, must be less compliant to the small coterie of radical activists within their group, and must engage systematically in a far more persistent search for consensus among the two "majorities."

Finally, however, let it be clearly remembered what the General Assembly is and what it is not. It is a sounding board, a spectacular global opinion poll, a "face the world" talk show. It is not a parliament to pass laws or coerce its members. When *decisions* need to be taken by the United Nations they will be taken, in regard to the maintenance of peace, by the Security Council, where the US and four others have a veto, and in regard to the critical issues of economic interdependence, in the specialized agencies and conferences, few of whose decisions can in fact be implemented without the support of those possessing, in each case, the relevant economic resources.

My concluding piece of advice to both "majorities" would be that of Talleyrand to diplomats: *Surtout, pas trop de zèle*"—above all, not too much passion. The United Nations belongs to everyone, that is, everyone willing to live in peace with his neighbors.

[From the Saturday Review, January 1975]

The United Nations Was Never More Relevant Than Today

I

The outstanding fact about the United Nations today is that it is not being sufficiently used. It is our greatest underemployed international resource.

Our world is each year being drawn closer together by the reach of modern weapons, the nature of modern communications, the needs of expanding populations for food and fertilizer, and the demands of expanding consumption for energy and raw materials.

Even the strongest and richest nations, like the United States, are dependent on other nations for security and for maintenance of living standards. The poorest nations are dependent on others for bare survival.

Much of this interdependence, many of these requirements for greater security and assured supplies, could be satisfied through the United Nations if the capacities of its organs and agencies were adequately used. They never have been. In fact, during the past ten years they have been less used by the United States than ever before.

II

The United Nations was conceived in 1945 by Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull because they believed that American isolationism after World War I had proved contrary to US national interests. Our isolationism contributed to bringing on a second world war which we otherwise might have been able to prevent. Roosevelt and Hull did not want to repeat that mistake after World War II. They looked on a strong international organization as the best means of involving the US durably and constructively in world affairs.

Moreover, they knew that, while sovereign nations would long remain the main actors on the international scene, the old balance of power system had failed to

prevent two world wars and could not be counted on to prevent a third and a fourth. In a world exposed to nuclear weapons this prospect was wholly unacceptable.

III

The United Nations system Roosevelt and Hull established was also designed "to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character."

This design was fleshed out in succeeding years by the creation of a vast network of associated agencies in these fields: for example, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, the International Labor Office, the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the UN Development Program, the UN Environmental Program and the UN Population Program.

In so doing the founding fathers perhaps built better than they knew. Whether or not they foresaw that the world would thirty years later be caught up in a population crisis, a food crisis, an energy crisis, a monetary crisis, a raw materials crisis, they provided the instruments through which these crises could be dealt with internationally. The trouble is, as we have said, that these instruments are being only half used, and less used by the United States than by most other nations.

IV

That has not always been the case. During the first two decades of the UN, the United States provided much of the necessary inspiration, leadership and resources. Most of the agencies listed above were set up at our initiative. Even now we continue to have more influence in the UN than any other single nation.

However, during the past fifteen years UN membership has grown much more numerous and diverse. There are now 138 members of which over 90 are so-called non-aligned countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The US therefore is no longer able to obtain UN approval of action which does not have wide support among the non-aligned. Sometimes resolutions are pushed through the Assembly which we strongly disapprove. However, it is important in this connection to emphasize two points.

First, the United Nations is not a world government. Far from it. It is an association of sovereign states with significant but strictly limited powers. Its General Assembly acts by majority vote but, except in budgetary and administrative matters, can only recommend. Its Security Council can decide on action to counter threats to peace, but in the Council the US and four other permanent members have a veto. The UN cannot therefore dictate to the US—nor to anyone else.

Second, the United Nations reflects the world as it is. Whether or not this is a sensible arrangement, there are more than 130 independent nations. We cannot ignore them or get along without them. A war in the Middle East, for example, threatens peace between the US and the Soviet Union and leads to an embargo on our vital oil supplies.

Examples could be multiplied. We must in the interests of our own security deal with everyone else and we can usually do that best through an organization where most everyone else is represented.

Our Government in recent years has not seemed to understand this simple fact. It has talked a great deal about "a structure of peace" but has neglected the structure which is already there, the one we ourselves created.

What our Government has been talking about for the most part is the old balance of power. It has tried to pour the new wine of a global society into the old bottles that served Metternich and Bismarck in Victorian times. It has based its so-called "structure of peace" on fleeting personal relationships rather than on established and durable international institutions. That strategy simply will not work in the 1970's.

V

The members of the United Nations, when they signed and ratified its Charter, conferred upon its Security Council "primary responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security." Yet it has been the habit of most states, particularly the great powers, to seek security unilaterally or by military alliances, and to turn to the Security Council only at the last moment when war had already broken out or was imminent. Under those circumstances it is no wonder the Council sometimes "fails."

In 1971 the great powers, including the United States, resisted for months efforts of the Secretary General and others to bring the developing conflict between India and Pakistan before the Council. When war broke out, to no one's surprise, the US Government publicly blamed the UN for failing to stop it. By using the UN as a scapegoat for its own mistakes, our Government unjustly and irresponsibly damages the UN's public image and weakens its public support in the United States. There have unfortunately been far too many examples of such behavior.

The United Nations has not yet been provided by its members with the powers and resources to prevent all wars, but it has prevented many and it could prevent more. It can do so, however, only if the impending conflict is submitted to it for judgment and action in time, before public passions and military momentum have reached the point of no return. The Security Council needs a standing watchdog community, like the Environment Program's world weather watch, to survey accumulating storms threatening the peace, to conciliate and mediate among those nations responsible and, if necessary, to bring them to the Council before, not after, the bell tolls.

Similarly, when cease-fires have been imposed and wars temporarily stopped, members of the Council must not simply put the issue on ice and hope it will stay frozen. It rarely does. War has been stopped four times in the Middle East, three times in the Indian subcontinent, three times on Cyprus, but each time, since the basic issues had not been settled, it soon broke out again. Its members must enable the United Nations not only to stop wars but to make peace, peace that will be definitive and durable.

The US Government has displayed a similar inclination to deal with the new problems of economic interdependence through ad hoc blocs, in which only consumers are represented, rather than through UN bodies where everyone is. It practically ignored the special session of the UN General Assembly on raw materials last April, finally presenting a unilateral proposal the day before adjournment. It has used the rostrum of the UN to berate the oil producers but rarely its chambers to negotiate with them.

Our Government has during recent years systematically neglected the vital interests of the vast majority of nations in the Third World. Our aid program has been steadily declining in volume and scope, and what remains has been overwhelmingly for the benefit of a few client states like South Vietnam and South Korea. It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of poor nations at recent UN conferences, such as those on the law of the sea and on population, seemed unresponsive to *our* interests. Cooperation is a two-way street.

In general our Government has availed itself to a minimum degree of the opportunities which the UN system offers for dealing with global problems which critically concern our national interests. The following are some of the principal ways in which we could do so.

VII

1. The United Nations could and should play a much more active role in the peaceful settlement of international disputes which might otherwise lead to war. Significant means of doing so are provided in the Charter and have been further developed in UN practice over the past 25 years. Far too often these means have not been used at all or have been used too late to prevent war. Cease-fires are not enough. No conflict is ever settled until a durable peace, accepted in good faith by the parties, has been agreed and implemented.

2. The United Nations could and should, under US leadership, play a much more active role in peacekeeping, that is, in placing forces or observers between contending parties until pacific settlements can be made. When the UN has been authorized to engage in peacekeeping, as in the Congo, Cyprus and the Middle East, it has usually succeeded, but both large and small nations still too often prefer unilateral adventures to multilateral peacekeeping.

3. The proliferation and burden of armaments, both nuclear and conventional, is one of the greatest threats to global security and progress. The waste of resources is enormous and inexcusable. None of the big powers is sufficiently using the several UN conferences and bodies charged with negotiating limitation and reduction of armaments. Conventional arms control is being almost entirely neglected. These problems cannot be resolved exclusively inside the UN, but neither can they be resolved exclusively outside.

4. The second greatest threat to mankind's future is the pressure of growing population on finite and diminishing resources. Population growth is mainly

occurring in the underdeveloped countries and only they can control it, though developed countries can help. The UN has for several years had a Population Program and in 1974 has held a Population Conference. Progress at the Conference was meagre because of a debate among participants as to whether economic development or population control should come first. This was pointless. Each is essential to the other. They must go forward together.

5. The most vital natural resource is food. Critical shortages, leading to widespread famine are likely to occur within the next year or two. The UN has also held a World Food Conference this year. As the leading producer and consumer of many staple foods, the US has an interest in helping to expand food production in countries with rapid population growth and, as the nation with the largest food consumption and largest food surpluses, an obligation to contributing to alleviate famine when it occurs. Both of these tasks can best be carried out through impartial UN agencies.

6. At the special Assembly sessions this year the UN began to organize means of dealing with global raw materials problems. For the most part, however, production, marketing and consumption of such materials continues to be unplanned and unregulated, to leave producers and consumers alike at the mercy of ups and downs in supply and price, to risk widespread economic disaster and rapid depletion of exhaustible resources. Such problems can be effectively met only by international agreements in which all or most nations participate, such as those the UN can provide.

7. Substantial increments to essential world supplies may be found in the sea and seabeds. At the same time unrestricted national competition to exploit these resources could lead both to their early depletion and to serious international conflicts. The UN has held this year a conference on the Law of the Sea, which will be continued next year. Progress so far has been disappointing, partly because of a lapse of leadership on our part. It is in the vital interest of all nations, large and small, to ensure that the conference next year succeeds.

8. The world monetary system is in great disarray. There is no present assurance it can cope with the strains produced by global inflation and the sudden accumulation of huge new payments surpluses and deficits. Common action in and through the International Monetary Fund offers the best prospect of avoiding widespread economic depression.

9. It will be impossible to obtain the cooperation of the underdeveloped countries in resolving problems of population, food and raw materials unless the rich countries contribute much more substantially to their economic development. The experience of 25 years has shown that this contribution can be made with less political involvement and embarrassment through multilateral programs. The US must expand the volume of its development assistance and direct a larger proportion of it through such UN agencies as the World Bank and its affiliates, the regional development banks, the UN Development Program, and the relevant UN specialized agencies.

10. Mankind has only just learned that its environment is not indestructible and that irreversible damage to it is already occurring. Since much of the environment is international, its protection also must be. At the Stockholm Conference in 1972 the UN established an Environmental Program which monitors emerging dangers to the international environment, advises governments what is occurring and assists them in preventive action. This Program deserves strong U.S. support.

Finally, what is the cost of all of this to the US and others? The total annual budget of the UN and its whole family of agencies is only $1.3 billion, less than half of one percent of the US budget, no more than the cost of a single Trident submarine. The US contribution to the total UN budget is approximately $400 million, less than half the cost of the New York City police. This would hardly seem extravagant for an organization with these vast responsibilities, which Adlai Stevenson called "the last hope of mankind."

VIII

We live in a world of nations which are politically independent but otherwise more and more dependent on each other, in many cases for security and even survival, in all cases for economic stability and progress.

Under these circumstances a strong international organization, capable of peacemaking, peacekeeping and control of armaments, equipped to deal with global economic and environmental problems, is more and more in the national interest of every nation, including our own.

Such an international organization, the United Nations, has existed for nearly thirty years but has never been used to anywhere nearly its full capacities. There are many ways in which the UN can and should be improved, but it cannot be improved if it is ignored or neglected.

In this era of inescapable interdependence among all nations, rich and poor, strong and weak, right and left, an institution embracing all of them, given power and means to cope with problems and avert disasters threatening all of them, is more and more indispensable.

The United States, in the spirit of Franklin Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson, in association with all our fellow passengers on this small and fragile planet, must seize the opportunities the UN offers to meet those problems of the 1970's and 1980's which are insoluble by any other means.

MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY UNDEREMPHASIZED IN PAST

Mr. YOST. Thank you.

I should like to join my colleagues in commending the committee for undertaking this study. I agree with Governor Stassen that in the recent past we have underemphasized multilateral diplomacy in the way I think is contrary to our interests in an increasingly interdependent world. So I would think that the time has come to use many aspects of the United Nations in the way we did in the earlier years but have been less inclined to do recently.

As one who was, as you kindly recalled, Mr. Chairman, present at the creation at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco and have been 7 years at the U.N., I recall vividly its origins and the fact that the three principal objects for which it was created were to keep the peace, to promote economic and social developments, and to serve, in the words of the Charter, as a center for harmonizing the action of nations.

Now there was a great deal of idealism at the San Francisco conference but I don't think anyone ever expected that the U.N. was going to achieve any instant utopia or resolve all of these problems in any near future. It was intended that there be a gradual movement in this direction.

I think one could argue to a considerable extent that has taken place despite the fact that the cold war obviously slowed down progress remarkably.

But during the first 20 years of the U.N. both Democratic and Republican administrations gave it very firm support and tended to take a great many of the issues they considered paramount to the United Nations with some very successful results, which Ambassador Lodge has recounted, and I won't repeat. But that I think we should especially recall what has not received as much publicity as the political issues, and that is the U.N.'s economic contribution: The Development Fund, the World Bank, the Monetary Fund, the regional banks, the World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization and many others. These have not been heavily publicized until quite recently, yet we have been making substantial contributions almost since the beginning.

Now, there was substantial change in our attitude, both the attitude of our Government and the public, in the mid-1960's and continuing to the present day. The decline in U.S. leadership and the public support is a result, and I think the reasons are clear enough. We did become very preoccupied in Vietnam and Vietnam was not popular in the United Nations. We weren't, as Justice Goldberg well knows,

able to persuade the U.N. to take up this issue, for a number of reasons, but one because of general lack of sympathy with what we were undertaking there. That, since we were so preoccupied with it, had a correspondingly discouraging effect toward the U.N. in the United States. Then we had the long hassle about trying to enforce article 19, paying for the Congo operations by the Russians and the French, which was a legal argument and became a political one. Since we couldn't persuade a majority to go along with us, this disillusioned a lot of people.

THE "TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY" ANXIETY

But the basic reason was the one that has been cited, the substantial shift in the majority at the United Nations from the earlier period, when the Western Europeans and the Latin Americans felt mainly as we did, and voted mainly as we wished, and, therefore, our majority almost always prevailed. In the present situation there is an entirely different majority, 90-odd out of 138 members are so-called developing countries, and now even the Latin Americans have switched over to vote with the Africans and Asians on a great many issues. So we are confronted by what we now call the "tyranny of the majority." This produces wide anxiety in the United States, in the Government, among the Members of Congress and the public that our interests will be overridden.

Now, I would argue that these anxieties are exaggerated. There is an overemphasis on the actions of the General Assembly because its seems to get more publicity than the other organs. In fact, if you look at the U.N. power structure, the real decisions are made so far as the first objective I mentioned, peace, in the Security Council, in which we have a veto. While we can't always persuade the Council to do what we want it to do, we are fully protected against it doing things we don't want it to do.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RELATIONS ISSUE

The second broad function of economic development and relations is carried out by a whole series of economic agencies. In those, of course, while there can be a great deal of rhetoric that is unpleasant to us and, as Senator Percy knows, charters can be adopted that we don't like, in fact, very little of a constructive nature can be done without the economic support that only the devolped countries can provide. Therefore, we are protected on this score.

The General Assembly and the corresponding bodies in the other agencies can only recommend, they can't bind, they can't legislate, with the single exception of their own internal procedures and budgetary matters.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPRESENTS SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS IN WORLD OPINION

Now, as Justice Goldberg pointed out, the General Assembly does represent very substantial if not majority elements in world opinion. It is important to us to listen to what they are saying. It is loud and clear, often in a tone of voice which is too strident and of a character that is really counterproductive, but it reflects resentments and frus-

trations on such subjects as apartheid and development which have been building up for many years and are now bursting forth. It is not surprising but it is unpleasant.

I would also agree with him entirely that we have never hesitated to answer back when we were criticized. I am sure this was true of Senator Lodge and I can report that it certainly was true of Adlai Stevenson and Arthur Goldberg and it has been true since.

But it's worth listening to these voices. They are important. If there were no U.N., the same views would be held by the states concerned. We would have the same difficulties in relation to energy and other problems that we have today.

We must in all fairness, when speaking of the tyranny of the majority, recall that when we did have a majority we didn't hesitate to use it to override minorities on matters like Chinese representation. We tried it on article 19 but unsuccessfully.

U.N. UTILITY TO UNITED STATES AND OTHER MEMBERS

Now, turning to the present and future, and particularly the utility of the United Nations to the United States and other members.

If you will refer back to the original objectives I mentioned, first, keeping the peace, I don't think there is any question that the U.N.'s usefulness in the Middle East has been demonstrated in the last year or so. The forces that have been sent out there are playing a substantial part in preventing the situation there from getting a lot worse than it already is.

If one interprets what has happened in Vietnam, as many commentators are, as suggesting that the United States is going to be able and willing to play much less of a role, of a military role, as a world policeman in the future, it is going to be more and more important that there be another impartial policeman, that is, the United Nations and its peacekeeping forces.

Now on the second object of the U.N., economic and social development. We used to think of this as something that was in the interest of the developing countries and of lesser concern to us, but we have learned in the last 3 or 4 years a great deal about the word interdependence and its real meaning. We now know that these economic relations are going to be just as vital to the welfare of American citizens as to those of Senegal or India or any other place. It is important that a whole new effective international economic system, in which all or at least most states will participate, be brought into being. Fortunately we have in being an institution which is far from perfect, but which has a wide series of international agencies, which have been dealing in the last couple of years with food, population, environment law of the sea, international monetary arrangements. This is just the beginning of what needs to be done. The framework is there, the vehicles are there. If we inject a little more vigor, a little more resources, a little more leadership into them, it would seem to me that we are going to achieve our goal of a viable world economic system more quickly than if we try to scrap those and rebuild entirely new ones.

Finally, on the third object of harmonizing the actions of nations. Aside from the object of avoiding nuclear war, which makes our détente with the Soviet Union so important, the next most important

international issue is avoiding a confrontation between North and South, between the developed and the developing worlds, which we see brewing and building up. If such a confrontation should go to the lengths that the old cold war did, it would totally prevent the formation of this new global economic sysem which I have argued is so much in our interest. The U.N. is the proper framework and vehicle for avoiding this confrontation.

MOVE TOWARD CONSENSUS EFFORT BY THIRD WORLD

The old majority and new majority have to be brought together. There has got to be a much greater search for consensus of views, not only in the General Assembly, though it is important there, but in the Security Council, in all the economic agencies and in new economic agencies that will have to be created. Despite the bitter debates at the U.N., one does see an effort among some of the important responsible people in the Third World to move toward consensus. I think we should welcome and take advantage of that effort and reciprocate.

ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS BY MAJORITY

In this connection it is obviously, and I agree heartily with Justice Goldberg here, important to do everything we can to avoid illegal and unconstitutional actions by the majority. If the system is to work it has to work according to the rules, and the Charter is the constitution.

I think the exclusion of South Africa from the last Assembly was illegal and was a mistake and obviously the exclusion of Israel, if it should occur—I don't think it will—but if it should, would be illegal. We should take the strongest steps that seem effective to prevent it.

However, we must recall that, if we are going to take a very strong position on legality in the United Nations, we must be extremely careful to keep our own skirts clean. You will recall that our record is not entirely pure, on Rhodesian sanctions, for example. Those sanctions were voted by the Security Council with our concurrence. It is a binding action, binding on all members, and yet we are not fully complying with it. This is a violation of the Charter.

So, once again, if we don't pay the dues of an organization, the U.N. itself or one of its specialized agencies, we are acting illegally. We can always withdraw. But as long as we are a member, we are obligated to pay our dues. So I don't think this would be a proper response to illegality. On the other hand, there are other ways of dealing with it.

U.S. ROLE IN AFFECTING REFORMS

The U.N. needs a great many reforms. I won't try to spell them out now but I will say that we are obviously going to be able to play a role in affecting those reforms only if we are there. If we leave we won't have much to say.

I would like to see the leadership in the U.N., which we exercised so effectively in its early years, restored. It will, as my colleagues have pointed out, be much more difficult under present conditions. It is a more difficult and complicated world, but as Dag Hammerskjold said, if the U.N. didn't exist, it would have to be created. It seems to me the need for such an organization is greater than ever. We have security

problems. We have a whole broad range of economic problems. To scrap even imperfect existing institutions and try to start from scratch with new ones would be very foolish and unprofitable. I hope we will follow the other course.

Thank you.

SOUTH AFRICA'S EXCLUSION UNWISE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Yost, I am not sure I heard whether or not you agree with Justice Goldberg with reference to the U.N.'s exclusion of South Africa.

Mr. YOST. I think this exclusion was unwise and unconstitutional.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you agree with Justice Goldberg then?

Mr. YOST. Yes.

UNESCO EXCLUSION OF ISRAEL

The CHAIRMAN. And the same thing with reference to the UNESCO exclusion of Israel?

Mr. YOST. Yes, sir. They didn't exclude Israel in quite the same way, but they took certain action against Israel of which I disapprove.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the other members of the panel agree with that decision?

Senator Lodge?

Mr. LODGE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor Stassen.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, sir.

UNIVERSALITY OF MEMBERSHIP

The CHAIRMAN. You know, when I was more closely connected with the U.N., than I have been recently, I used to hear a lot about universality of membership. Has that gone by the board?

Mr. GOLDBERG. No; I think it is improving. It is making progress toward that objective. I agree with Ambassador Charles Yost that our skirts in this regard are not entirely clean. We should have brought Vietnam to the U.N. I doubt that we even then would have succeeded, but the additional factor which militated against it, in addition to what has been said, the U.N. wasn't a universal organization. Had North and South Vietnam been there, had China been there, it might have been a different story. Lacking universality I think militated against U.N. action, in addition to what Ambassador Yost properly said about consideration by the U.N.

I doubt that the United States, if it were an excluded nation, would submit to adjudication by the U.N. when it was not a member, even though the U.N. Charter contains a provision purporting to give U.N. jurisdiction over nonmembers.

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Chairman, I do feel very strongly that we should move to a clear concept of universality in the organization. We moved in that direction by recently bringing in the two Germanys, which I had long advocated and which had long been resisted. I also advocated the two Koreas for membership.

The CHAIRMAN. But we did show the same spirit with the two Chinas?

Mr. STASSEN. No; we flipped from one side to the other, which I think it is now a fact that you have to look at. I think it is also well to note Senator John Sherman Cooper and Senator Mansfield of this committee did advocate the approach of taking Vietnam to the United Nations in the very early days and having both Vietnams come into it. So there have been members of this committee who have been in the forefront of this, even though we now I think should very strongly resist the temptation to go back over things and rather concentrate and think of "where we go from here." But one of the steps I suggest from here, is toward real universality of membership. It will take time but it is a whole different juridical concept than the original one of the victors in the war forming the U.N. It is a big step, an important one. We should also move toward really thinking through and taking leadership for all the peoples of the world in these developing countries. We should be capable to give that kind of leadership. That leadership is very much needed in the approach of moving policy through the United Nations on behalf of the United States.

MEMBERSHIP IN THE U.N.

The CHAIRMAN. You said we have moved in that direction. When Cabot Lodge and I were in the U.N., we had 60 members. Now we have 132.

Mr. GOLDBERG. 138.

The CHAIRMAN. Still growing.

Senator CASE. Part of that has been done by division rather than by extension.

There is obviously a dichotomy here. Membership in the U.N. is supposed to have some imprimatur of goodness, of democracy, of taking care of people, entirely.

Mr. LODGE. "Peace loving" was the word.

Senator CASE. You really can't say that you can have everybody in if you are going to have any standards at all.

You do the best you can, I should think, in matters of this kind and not feel guilty, even if you don't achieve two impossible objectives at the same time.

Is that right, Dr. Yost?

Mr. YOST. Yes, unfortunately two-thirds, roughly, of the governments of the world are not democratic.

Senator CASE. So you can't pull something down from the sky as if it were the Tablet from Sinai and say everything is going to be referred to these precepts and get an answer that is automatic.

INTERPRETATION OF U.N. CHARTER

Mr. GOLDBERG. Senator Case, may I comment on that? The Charter just says peace-loving countries, and we didn't look particularly peace loving in the Vietnam situation, but isn't it similar to the whole concept of recognition of countries by traditional concepts of international law. You recognize the country in power. You didn't do it on the basis of a good conduct medal. And as I reflect upon international affairs, I think the interests of our country in recognition policy are far better served by recognizing any country that is in power. We

get advantages from doing this. We have people on the spot who can tell us what is happening. If we then apply the good conduct concept we should not accept half the nations of the world. And perhaps half of the nations of the world would not accept us.

Senator CASE. Then comes the point at which the average person in this country will say, "I will be damned if any of my hard-earned money is going to support those jerks."

Mr. GOLDBERG. Yes, I agree it is very difficult. But our national interest, and I think the world's interest, is served in doing what John Marshall did in interpreting the Constitution of the United States, by saying that the language of the Charter when it says peace loving really means the peoples of the world. It would not be too much of a gloss to say that the peoples of the world want peace. A government at any given moment may be a very bad-acting government but I think we can safely assume the peoples of the world want peace, and on that assumption interpret the Charter accordingly.

The CHAIRMAN. We used the term peace loving. Senator Vandenberg used to say you had to be peace living also.

Mr. STASSEN. Mr. Chairman, I think Senator Case's point is very good that we should have in mind that if they are universally accepted into membership it is on the basis that they then take the commitment of the Charter. That doesn't mean they are going to live up to it but that is the prerequisite. They agree to abide by the Charter and take that commitment. Then they are within the framework and structure, I did propose in my draft for study, that we say specifically membership in the United Nations through such acceptance of the obligations contained in this Charter by the effective governments of any state shall not constitute approval of such government by the United Nations or by the member states of either the form, or the personages or practices of such government. I think you do then have to add something like that, if you open up the universality.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. I would rather yield to Senator Case.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought he said he was through.

DANGER OF POLITICIZING OF WORLD'S PROBLEMS

Senator CASE. I just have one general line of question which has already been touched on by all of you, I think.

Dr. Moynihan has sort of expressed in various ways his very brilliant and anguished cry. I think there is more than just feelings of resentment that are involved here. Here is a real serious question as to whether the politicizing of the world's problems hasn't gone very far. As he suggests, India ought to go to work—instead of crying that we won't share our wheat with them—to deal with population problems, and to stop advising us about our moral conditions. That tendency is encouraged by the proliferation of the United Nation's effort through institutional means to deal with these problems under the political control of the present sort of arrangement that we have in the world. Everything that I know is affected by this. The Law of the Sea Conference ran into the question of trying to set up an arrangement for fair, wise mining of the deep to bring up these minerals and what not. But you run into problems of upland coun-

tries in the heart of the continents demanding not only a share of the profits but also the right to say, if their own mines happen to be in danger of being undercut or undersold, that the mining in the deep sea be stopped. And this determination would be made by a political body which has very selfish interests to manage. We move further away from the concept of a free market, which with all its faults and all its need for amelioration, nevertheless has never been surpassed.

I wish you would talk to this general point. Is there the danger of letting people think they can get free solutions. As that great Englishman said, there is no free lunch. But people believe there is, if they can get control of the machinery and force the boys that have it to cough it up. In your judgment, because you all had great experiences at the U.N. and other international operations, is there a danger of too great reliance upon international organizations of this sort?

Mr. YOST. May I comment?

Senator CASE. Please do. This is a serious question.

Mr. YOST. I quite agree with you that it is most unfortunate that the United Nations and indeed international political organizations are as politicized as they are and in the sense that they are, but I would argue that the situation would be just as bad or worse if we didn't have the United Nations. Take your example of the problem of the seas. If there were no U.N. we would still be confronted by these terrific problems of the depletion of the seas resources and so on, pollution of the seas, argument about jurisdiction. We would have to seek international agreements. Those international agreements, if they were arrived at, would have to be administered through some institutions which would have to be set up ad hoc. You would run the risk that those institutions would be politicized or some members would try to use them for political purposes. We probably would among others.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SANCTIONS

So it seems to me this is inherent in the nature of the beast, in the situation that confronts us. International economic problems, I think, have to be institutionalized up to a point, if they are to be dealt with effectively, just as they do at home.

Senator CASE. Isn't there something to be said for having a system in which the responsibility is clearly fixed?

Wouldn't it be better to have something that didn't put, as you said, Arthur, a gloss over this thing to make believe things weren't that way? When you have a clearly recognized system that the people with the power to do something are going to do it, then you can say to them this is your act and you did it and you have to be responsible. Let the people who have the power know in advance that they will be held to public account because this is in the end the only sanction—that is the opinion of the world plus a man's conscience and tradition and the rest of it. But institutionalizing this thing may often, it seems to me, blur the responsibility so that people can act with enormous selfishness and never be held to due account, at least by the world.

Mr. YOST. We are finding the power so fragmented now it is very difficult to achieve this responsibility.

For example, Ecuador which is a small State, has adopted the policy of the 200-mile limit, of seizing our fishing boats and so on.

Senator CASE. Now we are going to have a 200-mile economic zone which pretty much follows the lead of Ecuador. Maybe Ecuador is in the forefront of wise foresight in putting this thing out. You won't think so if you were a California tuna fisherman.

Mr. YOST. The point is we are going to be getting into more and more nasty controversy all over the world, all kinds of aspects of these maritime problems, unless we can reach some agreements.

MORALITY AT THE U.N.

Senator CASE. I don't mean to talk the U.N. down. I mean perhaps to change our concept about what we are doing. I think it does do good to have the rest of the world recognizing when the U.N. is being hypocritical.

Mr. LODGE. I applaud your desire, Senator Case, to get rid of some of the hypocrisy that is put out about morality and moral standards at the United Nations because due to the force of circumstances the United Nations has constantly been growing away from the moral standards that were in the charter to begin with and your contentions that that ought to be known and that the public shouldn't be under any illusions about it is I think a very sound thing.

I read an article by C. L. Sulzberger in the New York Times on November 16 last in connection with the suspension of South Africa, and it is very short, I would like to quote it. He said:

Right now, nevertheless, the black State of Uganda (which sits in the Assembly) is involved in one of the weirdest, most cruel patterns of government brutality. Chopping up opponents and feeding them to crocodiles is not a lesser sin than South African segregation. And Chad (which also voted) sometimes buries Christians alive in anthills.

When Stalin still ruled Russia, millions of its people were in prison camps or execution cellars. This was widely known even though Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago" had yet to be written. But Russia remained a pillar of the U.N.

While thousands of Rumanians were dying along the fevered Danube-Black Sea Canal, no one talked of "suspension". After Russia and its allies invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968—or Britain, France and Israel invaded Egypt in 1956—they stayed in the U.N. without more than a tut-tut.

Portugal ran a full-scale, three-pronged colonial war; Haiti was bullied by murderous *tontons macoutes* of Papa Doc Duvalier; and Indonesians (in 1965–66) slaughtered some 350,000 to 500,000 "Communists" (mostly Chinese minority), sometimes playing football with their heads. All stayed in the United Nations.

I am for the United Nations.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the New York Times, Nov. 16, 1974]

BENDING THE RULES OF THE U.N.

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

PARIS.—Twice this week the United Nations bent its traditions, if not its rules, first by inviting the head of a political movement, Yasir Arafat, to address its General Assembly as if he represented a government; and second by suspending South Africa's participation in the current session.

The chiefs of the Algerian, Cypriote and Mozambique guerrilla movements never were received—or even aspired to that honor. Yet Mr. Arafat staged a triumphant entry. A careful reading of the U.N. Charter shows no clause specifically barring participation—when invited—of a nonmember or a nonstate, but it hasn't occurred before.

The case of South Africa is different although the two examples are implicitly related. Both stem from the preponderant fact of today's Assembly composition: a heavy majority of votes from the underdeveloped "third world," actively endorsed (despite their own rivalry) by Russia and China.

Gone are the days when, as with Korea, a strong pro-U.S. bloc could swing the international organization behind it. United States diplomacy in the third world has been proven politically bankrupt.

American money helped put one after another former colony on its feet but American policy sought to compose so many contradictions and was often so ineptly expressed that its influence declined to virtually nil. Thus, for example, we are today in the position of being disliked in varying degree by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

There must be something wrong with our formulations if (while requesting more aid) so many nations oppose us. China, by contrast, has deliberately courted Afro-Asian favor and, with slight expenditure, has made great headway.

The United States opposition to Arafat's appearance at the U.N. came as no surprise because of our support for Israel. Washington also opposed the Assembly's suspension of South Africa.

In that action the U.N. ignored its constitution. Article Five stipulates that a suspension must be recommended by the Security Council. This was not done with South Africa. Moreover, one must review the roll of moral offenders during the U.N.'s history in order to judge this action.

I hasten to stress that, as anyone who has read my dispatches all these years must know, I have constantly opposed bigotry or racism in any form and specifically denounced Pretoria's policy of apartheid.

Right now, nevertheless, the black state of Uganda (which sits in the Assembly) is involved in one of the weirdest, most cruel patterns of government brutality. Chopping up opponents and feeding them to crocodiles is not a lesser sin than South African segregation. And Chad (which also voted) sometimes buries Christians alive in anthills.

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If an international organization intends to practice fair play—a basic objective of the U.N.—it should do so toward all. The dictates of a majority according to its prejudices one year should not automatically be embodied as a precedent for the future.

It might have been wiser to postpone Mr. Arafat's speech until he had formed a "government in exile." His global standing remains to be formalized and one may only pray (dubiously) that arguing his case before the Assembly may lessen the possibility of another Middle East war. If such proves true, it will seem unfortunate that similar appearances weren't encouraged for earlier de facto political leaders.

To "suspend" South Africa is unfair emotionalism and as segregationist on a world scale as the silly, cruel discrimination that country practices at home. Above all, it was not only illogical to oust the Pretoria Government at a moment when it is showing serious signs of reform but blatantly unjust in terms of all other transgressors, past and present, who have smilingly kept and still keep their seats in so-called respectability's greatest club.

Mr. LODGE. You have heard my testimony. I am for it as a practical utilitarian device which I believe can play a role and has played a very important role in preventing war, but you cannot say that the United Nations as it's presently constituted is run on the basis of a moral standard, and I think you are very right to bring that up.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Yes; that is precisely what I tried to say. We have too high expectations and I think Senator Case, perhaps that is why I made the concrete proposal I did, and I distinguish between actions that relate to the fundamental part of membership. That is why I made the proposal about Israel. It should have been made about South Africa, as much as I dislike the apartheid policy of its government.

Mr. LODGE. I think here I disagree with my colleague and friend Charles Yost, for whom I have the most enormous regard. When I said, for example, we ought to freeze our contribution I said freeze our contribution to General Assembly expenses if Israel, for example, were unconstitutionally excluded. That is different from the article 19 dispute. This involved a Russian decision that they didn't like a General Assembly budget which financed the Congo operation and, therefore, they weren't going to pay for that operation. One of the reasons I went to the U.N. was a great crisis as to whether it would fall apart.

RIGHTS OF MEMBERS IN RELATION TO CONTRIBUTIONS DISCUSSED

There is a concept in law which I think applies to the U.N. Charter like everything else. If there is a failure of consideration an aggrieved party is excused of performance of a contract. If a member of the U.N. is denied the right of membership there is a substantial failure of consideration relating to the rights of members. I merely said we should freeze our contribution to the expenses of a General Assembly which materially violates the Charter and its treaty commitments. This is a very narrow area.

When I had the function of putting to the U.N. the nonproliferation treaty to the General Assembly, I ran into a revolt by the third world. What was that revolt all about? The revolt was that we were putting inhibitions against them developing nuclear power. We fought it out. On a simple nonhypocritical principle, which I put to them. What is the great advantage of a developing country having nuclear military power? I sometimes doubt that our own security has been very much enhanced by it. But in any event I said developing countries simply cannot afford to develop nuclear weapons and what is the advantage in doing so. I said, will you feel more secure in the world if you do have it? We got some 91 nations finally to sign by this nonhypocritical approach. Space was the same way. We ran into objections by a lot of countries when we were trying to create a regime of law on space, on the ground that in some way we were depriving them of sovereignty over the Moon when we ourselves were ready to disclaim sovereignty over the Moon, as though there is anything on the Moon that could be commercially exploited.

Senator CASE. This is a most unusual experience—to have the men we have got here in one room talking to us and to each other.

INTERNATIONAL BANKS

Mr. GOLDBERG. The African Development Bank has never gotten anywhere. Why? Because the Africans adopted a rule that they would not permit capital from other parts of the world to participate in the bank by capital contributions and participation. Therefore, it has no capital. The World Bank and other developing banks operate dif-

ferently to the great advantage of the developing countries. It is better to say these things frankly and that is the type of thing I think that you have in mind.

WEIGHTED VOTING

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Mr. STASSEN. If I could make a one-sentence comment on Senator Case's point. That is, for the United Nations in future decades to move on these kinds of problems of the seabed and things like that I think we must introduce weighted voting, and that is why as I thought it through the only way to do it is in a new entity, a sort of central council of ministers, with weighted voting, between the Assembly and Security Council for this economic program, and then in that group be very forthright and not hypocritical and don't expect that we are immune from criticism either and try to really take the lead, which we ought to be able to take on the economic development of the world.

Mr. LODGE. Would you yield?

We have weighted voting now in the United Nations development program.

Mr. STASSEN. That should be expanded on the whole economic field.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy, before you start let me say that these hearings will be continued in the morning at 10 o'clock. The panel will be headed by our distinguished former chairman of the committee, Senator Fulbright. I hope that as many of you as can will attend.

Senator PERCY. I will be staying on—if the witnesses can—until 1 o'clock. If Senator Javits has to leave I will be happy to yield to him and then Senator Clark.

Senator JAVITS. Five minutes and I will appreciate it. I have just two points I want to pursue. They were put in mind by the incidents given here.

HARLAN CLEVELAND'S NONVOTING DOCTRINE, CAUCUS OF INDUSTRIAL NATIONS

The interesting thing about the third world is that it is very capable of cutting off its nose to spite its face. That is true in relations with the Arab States. It is true in the world economic development, it is true of multinational corporations, it is true of the African Development Bank, and for all I know it is true of a dozen other things. Under those circumstances, and because, of the unlikelihood that any basic change can be made in the constitutional organization of the United Nations, even perhaps the interjection of some new level, like Harold Stassen suggests, shouldn't we be thinking in different terms? I also join Senator Case in the great satisfaction that you have greatly distinguished yourselves as public servants. And so I would like to put two propositions to the panel:

One, what do you think of the nonvoting doctrine put forward by Harlan Cleveland? I think in the same vein that Senator Lodge referred to a little while ago; just trying to develop an actual consensus in the debate and then the nations that are part of the consensus going ahead and doing what that consensus determines?

And the corollary of the same question, should there be some caucus of the industrial nations like, for example, in the OECD—Organiza-

tion for Economic Cooperation and Development—which would in a considered and organized way say we are going to depend on the United Nations for the following things. We are not going to depend on the United Nations for the following other things. We are giving the third world fair notice. No use in our pretending that the United Nations is what it isn't. We need it, and we want it, but we realize that under existing circumstances its jurisdiction must be limited to the following area: peacekeeping forces, a very desirable activity, or any other item along the same line.

In other words, starting from where we are, what do we do? So two questions: One, the doctrine of consensus rather than trying to vote, which just seems to frustrate itself, in the General Assembly, and two the idea of some caucus of the industrialized nations of the world who are being outvoted but nothing happens.

Can we start with my former colleague, Senator Lodge?

Mr. LODGE. In your processing in the General Assembly, at least when I was there, the more stress you put on wording the less you accomplished and the further you got away from harmonizing the actions of nations. In a world organization you have frightful language problems anyway and the tendency to quibble and to split hairs is magnified by trying to run the thing as though it was the lower house of some State legislature because it isn't that at all. So I am very sympathetic with Mr. Cleveland's idea, which I read, stressing the importance of trying to get consensus, and during the 7 years I was there the U.S. delegation tried very often to get consensus. I believe that is the best way for that organization to move ahead.

Now on the second point, to limit the jurisdiction of the U.N., I would certainly favor taking the position that you don't think the U.N. ought to make moral judgments. When you remember reading about the meeting of the Cabinet where Theodore Roosevelt reported how he had fomented the revolution in the northern provinces of Columbia and then given them recognition and had the U.S. Navy appear in the harbor at the right time and created the Republic of Panama and then the Panama Canal Zone. He asked all of the different members of the Cabinet to comment and finally he came to the Attorney General Pilander C. Knox, and he said I would like to hear the opinion of the Attorney General on the legal phases of the question, and Knox said, "Mr. President, if I were you I would have no taint of legality about it."

Well, I think that applies in this case that you have raised, for the U.N. to make moral judgments is really a rather gruesome farce and I would be very happy to see the U.S. representative say at some appropriate time that he didn't think it was any of the job of the U.N. to make moral judgments.

U.N. SHOULD DEBATE MORAL VALUES

Mr. STASSEN. I have to disagree with my distinguished associate on that matter. I think inevitably and in fact for the lifting of any kind of outlook for the peoples of the world the moral values do have to be debated and considered. If you do not want hypocritical moral judgments, you have to come to grips with the facts in that process. Bringing these issues forward I think is a very important part of the

whole evolvement of the world in the next decade. I would emphasize, for example, right now, a discussion of the fact that too much of the inflow of substantial revenues in some countries do not go to their people at all. In other words, bring forward the matter of a return for the people of the economic situation is a very important aspect of frank world discussion at this point. I think we will come through more in leadership of the peoples of the world by being willing to debate these issues openly and bringing them up and taking a strong affirmative position, as Ambassador Goldberg referred to, than in closing it off.

FORUM OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mr. GOLDBERG. Senator Javits, I think every U.N. ambassador, U.S. ambassador has tried desperately to get a consensus in the General Assembly. We have been much more successful in the Security Council where we are largely responsible for adopting the concept that the business of debating and dividing is not sensible, without first consulting and seeking a consensus. To try for consensus, is very difficult in the General Assembly, as you well know, from your own experience. Now, I would be opposed to changing the forum of the General Assembly. Let people talk, let them state their point of view, but as I said in my statement, don't allow the assembly to exceed its powers. On this we must take a firm stand.

It is true, as Ambassador Yost said, that we did violate the U.N. Charter on Rhodesian embargo, since we had voted for it in the Security Council, and our vote was not disapproved by the Congress when we did. However, there are violations and violations and the most fundamental violation is the question of membership because that relates, as I said, to the right to vote, franchise. The General Assembly has a right to put anything on the agenda for discussion. We cannot exclude that.

So it seems to me that we can live with it but it also seems to me we have a right to take the stand on the basic principle that a member cannot be excluded from deliberations. That I think we have a right to do.

Senator JAVITS. Ambassador Yost.

SEEKING A CONSENSUS RATHER THAN VOTING

Mr. YOST. I would agree entirely with the suggestion that there be a substantial progress toward seeking consensus rather than voting. This is beginning to happen. These big conferences, like the Law of the Sea, population, food, are conducted on the basis of consensus. This is perhaps one reason why, on the one hand, they move slowly and on the other, they don't move as far as we would like to see them move. But still it is probably under the circumstances a proper procedure. And I think it will be used gradually, very gradually in the Assembly. It won't happen quickly but it is the right goal to pursue. Consensus of the developed countries does exist in a substantial degree. We see the developed countries dealing with problems of foreign aid and with energy problems and so on, more and more in cases where the U.N. isn't acting and action is required. I think the developed countries will work together.

Now, I think in many cases, and energy may be an example, if common action by developed countries is carried too far, it becomes

counterproductive because it provokes confrontation. It hardens, entrenches, the two sides in separate positions, though ultimately they are going to have to work together.

So I would agree there should be concensus. When it is absolutely impossible to get U.N. action on something that has to be acted on, let the developed countries move, but let them constantly try to extend the scope of U.N. action in order to include the wider membership, wider cooperation and greater concensus.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

FUND SUSPENSION BENEFITS TO UNITED STATES AND WORLD

Senator CLARK. Two questions.

First, to Justice Goldberg. Let me read just briefly from your testimony on pages 7 and 8 dealing with our possible boycott of the General Assembly. You say to make this demand credible the United States should make it clear before this proposal gains further momentum that if Israel is unlawfully denied its proper seat in the Assembly, the United States will not only vote against but if the Assembly, notwithstanding, persists, will not participate in the Assembly deliberations.

You go on to the next page to talk about the freeze of funds which you referred to just a moment ago.

My question is this.

If the majority continues to hold its position after having voted Israel out, I assume that you would recommend that we hold our position, that we not back down at that point. My question is this. What specific benefits to the United States and to the world will accrue from having made that decision?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Senator, in my opinion it will stop this attempt. The United States is a great power and its participation is essential, whether its viewpoint is agreed to or not, by the Assembly. The Assembly lacking the United States would not be a real Assembly and I think if that message is brought home, it will abort this movement to exclude Israel which is underway, stop it. The difficulty is with our policy. It seems to me that we are too hesitant about stating straightforwardly our position on the essential issue of membership. I emphasize membership. There are a lot of arguments whether one country has something or another country does something, in violation of the Charter, but with regard to the fundamental rights of a member state, that is a different story, and I think a clear position on our part will stop an attempt at the Assembly. I don't think we will have to go to the next step.

Senator CLARK. I think you are probably correct in that assumption if we made our position clear.

BENEFITS OF U.S. POSITION REGARDING THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

Let us suppose, as Senator Javits just said, that the Third World—I am not sure this is true but let's assume it is true—that the Third World sometimes is willing to cut off its nose to spite its face. Let's suppose they did, nevertheless, continue that action and we had to keep

our position. What would be the benefits to the United States and the world if that were the result?

Mr. GOLDBERG. I think, well, I would go the next step then, which is to say we will not pay our pro rata share of the expenses of an assembly which is improperly constituted, which to me is different from article 19. I think we have to be credible. If we say it we have to do it. Again, I can only assume, based upon my experience, if that were done it would stop it too.

Now, suppose the third world, and Senator Javits says OK, do it, well, I don't see much of a loss. We still are in the Security Council, so speeches will be made, recommendations will be made, as they are made now, you see, and we then await the day when the General Assembly rectifies its unconstitutional behavior.

CAN U.S. PROPOSALS BE SUPPORTED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAJORITY?

Senator CLARK. My other question really is addressed to all of you, to anyone that might want to answer it.

I wanted to ask whether it is practical to assume our Government could take positive positions, could propose innovative, imaginative resolutions in the next General Assembly, positions that actually would be supported by the majority in the General Assembly? Are we in fact so far from our own revolution or so affluent that we really no longer have anything in common with the majority?

My question specifically is what could we propose at this General Assembly by way of commodity programs, by way of positions on South Africa and Rhodesia, what can we do of a positive nature that really would have majority support? It seems to me that would be the right direction to go in.

Mr. STASSEN. I think, Senator, you have got your finger on morals exactly about what should be done. That is, we should think through on our part how we might really take leadership for all of the peoples of the world. I think one of the keys to it is the matter of taking leadership for the peoples, as distinguished from the governments, of other nations. One of the things, for example, we ought to be in the forefront on is that the peoples of the world should be getting more of the economic benefits of the resources of the world.

We can speak up on that. We can really go at the matter of the way many dictatorships in the world have been handling their governments and handling their people and really take a moral leadership that is also a sound economic and financial leadership and seeking to gain the leadership of these developing countries. Really we have more in the basics of the American system to offer them, to offer to the developing peoples as distinguished from their governments. There is a natural tendency to go too much with governments and not enough with advocacy of what are the results being obtained for the peoples in those countries. In that process we should recognize and emphasize that people under all forms of government ought to get better results for all of the people on an equality basis. You can say it is idealistic, but really the world has to move on an idealistic basis if it is to have its best chance of peace. I think you have raised a very important basic point of reanalysis of our approach.

Senator CLARK. We could really introduce the kind of resolution you are suggesting in the next Assembly that would get majority support,

that would be valuable in terms of identifying us with progressive movements in the world?

Mr. STASSEN. Right.

Mr. YOST. Senator, it seems to me the problem is that we as a government have been very slow in recognizing and adapting ourselves to this new global economic situation we face and working out an approved government program for coping with it. So far we have picked out pieces and dealt with them mainly among the developed countries, in order to stave off immediate crisis. Until we make up our own minds, it is difficult to present something to the U.N. and seek support. We have to pull our socks up here in Washington and reach conclusions as to what we want, how we expect to proceed. Then we have to work up public support because, as you well know, most of these programs will cost money and this is difficult, too, these days. So a good deal of preliminary spadework has to be done in order to make these proposals, which I heartily agree should be made.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

HEARING PROCEDURE

Senator PERCY (presiding). Thank you. Because of the number of questions I have in a number of areas, if it is possible to keep the answers as concise as possible, then anything you may want to expand on for the record can be added later.

VIEWS OF U.S. REBUTTAL TO U.N. ATTACKS

I was most interested in Justice Goldberg's comments on page 4 of his testimony relating to the Commentary magazine article in which Ambassador Moynihan said we have been delinquent in not facing up to attacks at the U.N., forthrightly rebutting them and putting our policies in proper context.

Justice Goldberg said that Dr. Monyihan is mistaken in this regard.

Do the other three of you believe he is mistaken in that regard as a result of your own U.N. experience and knowledge?

Mr. YOST. Yes, I do indeed. I, like Justice Goldberg, have responded very frequently myself and I know Senator Lodge has and I know Adlai Stevenson did. There was never any reluctance to do so. I don't know how Moynihan got under this misapprehension. I would differ from him only in the suggestion that crops up in one or two places in the article, that he would engage in rather abrasive personalities in responding to criticism. I see little advantage in that. There is too much in the U.N. already. If you contribute you merely provoke a similar response and you worsen the discourse rather than improve it. So I think one should respond very firmly and clearly and in defense of our positions but not in a strident or vicious tone.

Mr. LODGE. The General Assembly is a forum and a forum is there to be used and if only one side is using the forum then the whole thing is twisted out of shape. So I think Mr. Moynihan is very correct that there has got to be a really solid debating. I am not talking about attacks and merely vicious cleverness, I mean the point of view of the people who disagree with us and who attack us ought to be analyzed and exposed in the best debating tradition.

Now, I agree with Ambassador Yost that to my knowledge the U.S. representative has always done that and done quite a good job,

and when it wasn't possible to rebut or reply on the spot we have issued statements to the press or television so there would be something about the U.S. point of view.

RESTRAINT QUESTIONED ON U.S. POLICY ATTACKS REBUTTAL

Senator PERCY. Ambassador Lodge, during your tenure at the U.N. did you ever restrain yourself from rebutting and putting our policies in proper context, or were you ever restrained by the Department even though you personally might have wanted to have replied to attacks on us?

Mr. LODGE. I was never restrained by the State Department for the very simple reason that President Eisenhower wanted me to rebut on the very same day. He didn't want the day to go by without there being something from the United States because he felt that nothing could sicken American public opinion quicker than the idea that we were being used for a punching bag in the U.N. and he wanted me to rebut on the same day. That is what I always tried to do.

Senator PERCY. Governor Stassen, do you agree or disagree with Dr. Moynihan's statement?

MEDIA RESPONSE TO ATTACK AND REBUTTAL

Mr. STASSEN. I think basically I disagree. I think where he got his impression is that the tendency is natural for the media to give more attention to the extreme attacks on the United States than upon the prompt response that almost always has been given in the United Nations. I think perhaps in that sense Ambassador Lodge, and I think Ambassador Goldberg and Ambassador Yost here were especially effective in making the newsworthy kind of responses. It is not important only to respond but to do it in a way that the media will give some attention to it.

MORATORIUM ON MUTUAL RECRIMINATION

Senator PERCY. In my own report on my experience at the United Nations, I drew certain conclusions. One of them was that I observed a tendency on our part, in the spirit of détente, to avoid criticism of the Soviet Union, even in areas such as human rights and fundamental freedom, where we disagree so sharply. It seems to me there is a moratorium on mutual recrimination. When we do have such obvious differences of opinion, do you feel it is a good idea for us to artificially mute those differences of opinion at the United Nations.

Mr. GOLDBERG. My answer is no you don't mute differences.

Mr. YOST. I agree we should not. I think a great deal of time during the cold war was wasted in accusation, rebuttal, counterrebuttal, and so on. That sometimes went on too long and was counterproducitve in its effect on the rest of the Assembly. So I would favor reducing these exchanges but certainly not eliminating them.

Mr. LODGE. When I first went there Stalin was still alive and the Russian theory was that World War III will destroy the United States but won't affect them at all, and Mr. Vyshinsky was giving that type of speech extremely violent, extremely vituperative, and we felt it was necessary to keep the record straight and we tried to do it.

Senator PERCY. Governor Stassen.

Mr. STASSEN. The record should be kept straight. You do have a restraint on not indulging in personalities. I think that should be recognized.

WORLD RECOGNITION THAT COMMUNISM IS NOT MONOLITHIC BELIEF

Senator PERCY. I think there must be some balance, but it won't become our Nation to foster an artificial relationship like that. We have obvious differences of opinion which we express on Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and VOA (Voice of America), so why not at the United Nations?

For 20-some years there was a tremendous amount of effort expended in keeping China out of the United Nations. My own distinguished predecessor, who had a deep affection for the Chinese people, was a founder of the organization of a million Americans to keep China, the People's Republic, out of the United Nations.

Has it been a good thing, in your judgment, to have China a member of the United Nations, and a good thing for the world to see that the so-called Communist bloc is not monolithic? In 3 months at the U.N., I saw the sharpest disagreements between China and the Soviet Union. Isn't it a good thing that the world can see that?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator PERCY. Governor Stassen.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, I would have wished Taiwan also stayed in, but that didn't happen. The approach of the two Germanys coming in opened up the world that way. But unfortunately it didn't happen in China that way. But taken as the absolute, yes, it is good they are in.

Mr. LODGE. I like the two Chinas being in but I think this has been good.

Senator PERCY. There is the representation for Taiwan.

Mr. LODGE. I favored two Chinas.

Senator PERCY. I presume, that all of you would agree that Taiwan should be represented in the U.N.

Mr. LODGE. Taiwan is bigger than many U.N. members.

Mr. STASSEN. Both Koreas ought to be invited in.

REPRESENTATION FOR NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator PERCY. What is your expectation, Ambassador Yost, as to representation for North and South Vietnam?

Mr. YOST. I was going to say the problem of Taiwan, differs from the other divided countries. Both Chinas claim there is only one China. Under those circumstances it is very difficult to have two in the U.N.

It is either/or. And going to your other question, I would think that both Koreas, and both, if there are two Vietnams, both Vietnams should be represented.

TWO VOICES AND TWO VOTES FOR ONE COUNTRY

Senator PERCY. Does anyone care to comment on the situation that if North and South Vietnam are admitted, they would really be two voices and two votes for essentially one country?

Mr. LODGE. If you are going to make me guess, I am going to guess that within a few years they are going to be one country.

Mr. STASSEN. My guess would be, and it is purely a guess, that you will see a new civil war in South Vietnam between the people there and North Vietnam, it will go on for a number of years as part of a very unstable situation.

U.S. POSITION ON CHARTER ON ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Senator PERCY. Ambassador Yost mentioned that we had sharp differences with the developing world at the last session, and the United States voted against the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties.

At that time I insisted that in the Second Committee there be a separate rollcall vote on virtually every paragraph to demonstrate that we were in agreement with the developing world on most provisions. We had 73 rollcall votes and there were only four articles on which we had basic disagreements. Mainly the difference was over investment and—while no one questioned the right of sovereign nations to expropriate—there was an unwillingness to insert the words fair compensation or just compensation, and the developing countries insisted upon conditioning compensation on such factors as prior colonialism, neo-colonialism and racial discrimination, raising the concern that a nation could pay or withhold whatever it wanted to, taking into account what happened as long as 200 years ago. One of our major concerns was that this language might stop the very capital investment which is urgently needed.

Now, article 34 of that charter provides that in the 30th General Assembly it should be brought up again for possible revision.

Should we just let sleeping dogs lie and take no leadership or should we assert a degree of leadership by saying we would be quite willing to find a way to modify a few of the articles of the charter so we could vote for it and then have the developed and developing worlds in agreement? It is really not worth very much as it now stands.

Mr. YOST. I would certainly advocate the latter course would be most desirable.

Going back to the last session——

Senator PERCY. You mean to assert leadership?

Mr. YOST. Yes, trying to get modification.

I do think going back this is one of those cases that Senator Javits was talking about, where there should have been more search for concensus. The majority should have been willing to prolong the search another year or two or three in order to reach concensus.

Mr. GOLDBERG. Maybe, Senator, we also ought to take into cognizance what is really happening with respect to expropriation disputes because corporations are negotiating settlements and negotiating it on the basis of depreciated book value and corporations seemingly are prepared to live with that, multinational corporations. Perhaps we, as a government, can live with such settlements. Apparently, what multinational corporations really want is access to the resources. And judging by my own experience, I have had experience in this area, is that there is less and less argument about fair compensation, and more and more concern about access to resources at world

prices. Perhaps in the review we might consider what is actually happening in these settlements.

Mr. STASSEN. I think it should be kept under repeated review and repeated initiative by the United States.

Mr. LODGE. I would agree with Governor Stassen.

U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR DEALING WITH U.N.

Senator PERCY. Ambassador Yost, State Department officials testified before the House Government Operations Committee that the Bureau of International Organization had 38 fewer Foreign Service officers in 1972 than served the Bureau during the Eisenhower administration.

Would you comment on the present U.S. official structure for dealing with the United Nations? I am not saying necessarily the number of officers is an adequate measure, but could you take the question in its general framework? Do we have adequate resources to deal with the U.N. and other international agencies?

Mr. YOST. That is a long and complicated question. I do think that our mission in New York, and perhaps even more Geneva, has not been as well staffed as it should be. That is partly because of the overall governmental attitude toward the United Nations, that it doesn't rate as high in our priorities as other assignments and, therefore, less attention is paid to staffing those missions. It is less attractive to ambitious young foreign officers than other posts might be. Also there has in the past been great economic hardship involved in some of these assignments. That has been somewhat reduced but it is not wholly taken care of. This is, as I say, a factor of our whole governmental attitude. I would urge far higher priority should be given, in view of all of the circumstances we have been discussing, to our effective participation in the United States, reestablishing the leadership that we have had.

SECRETARY GENERAL'S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator PERCY. Ambassador Lodge, during 30 years there have been four Secretaries General who have served the U.N. and each has brought his individual views and concepts to the position. What are your own views on the role of the Secretary General in view of Justice Goldberg's comments?

Mr. LODGE. Well, I think the U.N. Secretary General is an enormously important figure. He should also be a man of the highest equality and a tremendous effort should be made to staff the United Nations with people of high quality. Because the U.N. isn't well established yet, it sort of caroms along from one crisis to another, and could very easily founder and disappear if it has mediocre personnel. So I think it is very important to have an able Secretary General and to staff the U.N. in an able way.

SECURITY COUNCIL REPRESENTATION

Senator PERCY. Governor Stassen, the Security Council has been enlarged once since 1945. The General Assembly has been increased a great deal.

Would you feel it useful to extend permanent nonveto membership in the Security Council to countries such as Japan, the Germanies and others and, if so, would you care to name other countries that you feel should be represented in the Security Council?

Mr. STASSEN. I think it would be good to extend that membership. I certainly would name Japan, India, and the two Germanys because of this division. I think I would also name Brazil. In other words, take a wider scope of substantial countries from both the psychological and the operational aspects when you think of decades ahead.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING RESPONSIBILITIES AND ITS ROLE IN MID-EAST

Senator PERCY. Justice Goldberg, in the past there have been very wide differences between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to U.N. peacekeeping responsibilities. Could you comment on the inherent limitations of the United Nations in the peacekeeping area? And would you care to comment on the forthcoming role of the United Nations in the Middle East in providing guarantees for the territorial integrity of Israel, which must be a cardinal principle of American foreign policy and has become inherent in the policy of many countries? The Soviet Union has taken initiatives lately, and has made offers of guarantees.

What do you foresee in that very critical area?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Peacekeeping forces are absolutely imperative until peace settlements are concluded in the Middle East and perhaps beyond. U.N. peacekeeping in the past have been based on the concept that peacekeeping forces are only established with the consent of the nations concerned, and may be withdrawn if the country withdraws its consent, as President Nasser withdrew his consent to peacekeeping forces in the Sinai in 1967 which precipitated the war.

Therefore, the future in the Middle East and elsewhere, if a peacekeeping force is put in, that it stays and that only the Security Council can remove it. This seems to be essential for a proper operation of a peacekeeping force as an instrument of peace.

SUGGESTIONS REGARDING STRENGTHENING OF STATE DEPARTMENT ECONOMIC FIELD

Senator PERCY. With the upcoming special session of the General Assembly focusing on a new economic order and on economic matters, it has reinforced my long-held feeling that the State Department had to strengthen itself in the economic field.

I introduced the legislation to create an Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and it is law and the post is filled now. But I am somewhat concerned that the Under Secretary has a very small staff and even the Bureau of Economic Affairs does not report to him, so that the Under Secretary has a staff relationship but not a line relationship.

Should we strengthen the State Department in the economic field? What suggestions would any of you have in that regard?

Mr. YOST. I think the whole U.S. Government needs to be much better organized for dealing with these international economic problems. I think, as you say, the State Department should be better or-

ganized, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs needs more authority. But I think also there has to be a good deal of strengthening at the White House level, because so many domestic problems are interwoven with the international economic problems. There have been various attempts to set up economic councils for this purpose in the White House and none of them have really been effective. I would think a new effort should be made under the President's direction, and with him taking a continuing interest, in establishing policymaking machinery in the White House and implementing machinery in the State Department.

SHOULD U.S. MISSION BE STRENGTHENED IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Senator PERCY. Should the U.S. Mission at the U.N. itself be strengthened in economic affairs?

Mr. YOST. Yes, sir.

Senator PERCY. Do all of you concur?

Mr. STASSEN. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. I think this is part of a very large question, and it reminds me of the fact that in the 1950's Congress established the two Hoover Commissions which dealt with the whole question of governmental reorganization and economy in government and saved about $10 billion, which is still a huge sum, and I would like to see the creation of another Hoover Commission new legislation and a new Hoover Commission which would go into all these relationships because what you are talking about is not only under the egis of the State Department and U.N. but it also goes all through the Government.

Mr. STASSEN. Yes, I would very much agree with that and with the need for very widespread strengthening. As far as the relative cost of staffing, that has to be evaluated against the tremendous costs of such things as the energy crisis. The cost of issues like this can run into billions for our people in a very short time.

EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE RELATIONSHIP TO BE STRENGTHENED

I recommend another step. I think there is a need, respectfully, that the staffs of Congress be strengthened in the committees, and that there be established a regular staff relationship between the staffs of the committees of Congress and the staffs of the executive branch to really exchange information and develop understanding prior to these issues reaching the point where a President submits it to the Congress for consideration. This goes across the whole field of foreign policy and economics. If you had each, with their own respective standing in the two branches of Government, but with communication between them on the issues, and regular work on a staff level relationship prior to the issues coming up between two branches, it would be very important in the modern world.

DRAWING ON U.N. SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE FOR DOMESTIC PROJECTS

Senator PERCY. In our country we seem to feel that we have a monopoly on expertise. I wonder if we are really taking advantage of the U.N. specialized agencies and drawing from them the expertise that might help us in some of our own domestic projects. For instance,

from my own observations abroad, some cities seem to be solving problems of urbanization better than we are in Chicago, Detroit, Watts, and other places. Mass transit in some other countries is far advanced over what we have in some parts of the United States.

Could we be drawing more upon U.N. agencies? We are paying 25 percent or more of the costs of those agencies. Would it strengthen our relationship with the United Nations and strengthen the attitude of Americans toward the U.N. if we used the expertise of the specialized agencies?

Mr. GOLDBERG. Yes.

Mr. LODGE. Well worth looking into.

Mr. STASSEN. A very good point.

MORE RESPONSIBLE INITIATIVE, LEADERSHIP TO MISSION AND OFFICERS RECOMMENDED

Senator PERCY. I noted in my report on the United Nations that I saw a tremendous amount of nitpicking going on, a terrific amount of cable traffic back and forth between New York and Washington on the minutest details of policy and speech material. In your judgment would we have a better policy if we gave a little more leeway to the mission? I took a position that I would initiate drafts of my own speeches and then send them down rather than respond to drafts prepared in the State Department, because usually what they sent was bland, almost meaningless sometimes, lacking in leadership, in fact no position that I could even figure out in some of these speeches, and that was apparently the intention.

Members of Congress on the delegation knew we did not have to take it or that we could at least argue back. In the end we were good soldiers and either gave the responsibility for the agenda item to a mission officer or conformed to the policy. We had a little input and I think the back and forth was good and healthy for the most part.

Would you care to comment on the possibility of giving a little more responsible initiative and leadership to the mission officers and have them feel that they are a stronger voice in establishing policy and not just spokesmen mouthing policy received from some faceless, nameless bureaucrat who always signs his name Kissinger, and you wonder whether it was even seen by the fifth layer under the Secretary much less the Secretary himself?

Mr. YOST. I would feel equally strongly, having suffered under it, I may say that the Department, or Washington in general, endeavors to second guess the mission far more than it does the average embassy. An ambassador in a post abroad in general has more discretion than the man in New York. I would certainly favor, as you suggest, writing one's own speeches to the extent one has time. There are occasions, of course, in the General Assembly when you are so rushed that you do not have time. Then input from either your own staff or Washington is helpful. But I think an ambassador and his staff should never hesitate to go right ahead and do their own writing and clear it. If Washington tries to gut it, protest strongly, and really try to say something substantive.

Mr. GOLDBERG. It depends upon the Ambassador. With the exception of the first speech I made, we drafted all of our own speeches and then submitted them for clearance.

Mr. STASSEN. I, of course have not seen any of the recent cables you speak of. I think the strength and ability and status and prestige of the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and his relationship in turn with the President and Secretary of State is the beginning of that kind of a situation that you speak of.

Mr. LODGE. Well, it stands to reason that a man like you can get a piece of paper from the State Department and, to the extent that you are willing to take the time to rewrite it will make it a much, much, much better speech. You know something about speech writing that people in the Government departments do not know.

When I was there I would take these State Department papers and look into it to see where the U.S. position on the issue was expressed and then I used to rewrite the whole thing in conformity with the policy because often the language was extremely turgent and would have just bored the journalists, and anybody, who is an ambassador to the U.N. is not engaged in trying to bore the journalists, he is engaged in trying to interest them.

Mr. YOST. I might add in the same connection that, because New York is so close to Washington, there is too much use of the telephone. People in Washington watch the TV of what is going on on the floor, and then telephone comments, do this, do that.

Mr. LODGE. That is right.

REDUCTION OF CABLE TRAFFIC BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK DISCUSSED

Senator PERCY. Is there any easy way that you can think of that we could reduce what I call paperitis, the cable traffic? You need a yardstick to measure it. It just seems to inundate the State Department. Can cables and telephone be put on a budget which would impose some sense of discipline? There must be some reductions—it is not just the writing of it all, but the reading of it, and it is generally a fairly high-priced person who has to read it. I don't know how they ever got any work done or have time to think. We have a Commission on Paperwork. I am tempted to ask that Commission, which is under the jurisdiction of the Government Operations Committee, to really look into this and work with the State Department to try to devise methods to reduce the flow of paper.

Did you find the paperwork a tremendous burden to you and your staffs at the U.S. mission?

Mr. LODGE. If you recreate the Hoover Commission this is one of the things a commission like that could study and come up with some very practical assistance.

Mr. YOST. The distribution of messages here in Washington, the most highly classified only go to about 300 people. Others may go to three thousand.

Senator PERCY. And "eyes only." That is the way to get everybody to read it.

Mr. LODGE. That is right.

Mr. GOLDBERG. A sensible ambassador and a good staff will not read all of that stuff that comes in. You have to rely upon the person.

Senator PERCY. One has to read it all in order to decide what to read and what not to read.

Mr. GOLDBERG. You have to have a very good assistant who screens the cables, so that the Ambassador reads what is only really important.

STRENGTHENING AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS

Senator PERCY. I have been critical in my comments of some of the material I received from the Department and the corrections that we received with which I disagreed. But in my report I also stated that I came back with a lot of notions changed, and I did get help from the Department and discovered that sometimes I had not taken everything into account. So it goes both ways. I do think that good public members and congressional Members, if they work hard at it, can make a contribution and can also learn a great deal.

Do you have any thoughts on how we can strengthen our public members and increase the effectiveness of the congressional Members?

I found myself in conflict, constantly, as to where I should be—at the U.N. or on the floor of the Senate. That decision had to be made almost every day. There ought to be some way to relieve 2 persons out of 535 of their congressional duties so they could stay on the job at the U.N. unless their votes would make a crucial difference. There can always be exceptions.

Your judgment on this would be helpful.

Mr. STASSEN. Just from long observation, I would make this observation. That if, as a policy, the Republicans and Democrats who are sent from the Senate would be someone who just had been reelected and did not have the pressure of an election coming up soon and someone who is really interested in the United Nations and, therefore, would give it time. And on the House side, if possible the Republicans and Democrats be individuals who did not face tough elections in the coming year so they would in effect be more able to give the kind of devoted attention they would like to give to the United Nations.

I think I would like to make one other comment on the matter. We have been rather critical of the State Department. I think there is another side to that. I would hope that in these various intense disputes we would get back to an earlier policy where a distinguished senior career diplomat is assigned to major problems in the world, like the Middle East, like Cyprus and so on, to stay with it and follow it through. That is really the way many of those most difficult problems were worked out in the time of Trieste and Austria, Finland, and Iran. There is a great career service there, if we use them in an effective sustained way.

IS POLITICAL SUPPORT WITHHELD?

Senator PERCY. Do you feel that the United States has a tendency to extol the virtues of international cooperation and pay the assessments, while withholding from the U.N. the full measure of the political support which the organization needs in order to become an effective instrument for peace and progress in the world?

Mr. YOST. I very strongly believe.

Mr. STASSEN. Vietnam affected all that in the last decade. Now I believe we are in a new chapter or new page or something or other, and that is why I think this committee's effort to reanalyze this at this particular juncture is a very fortuitous and hopeful scene.

U.N. EMPHASIS ON HUMAN RATHER THAN NATION'S RIGHTS?

Senator PERCY. At the time of the of the founding of the U.N., Governor Stassen, you said that the new organization should emphasize human rights rather than national rights.

Looking back over the last 30 years, do you feel the U.N. has done this?

Mr. STASSEN. Sometims it has and sometimes it has not. I think generally where it has, the best results have come from it.

U.N. ROLE IN THE ARMS CONTROL

Senator PERCY. Ambassador Yost, What role should the United Nations play in arms control today? An increasingly significant factor in the armament buildup is the transfer of arms from one country to another. Do you see any possible U.N. role in controlling the arms trade, and I am thinking especially of the Middle East, which is probably the most dangerous spot in the world today, and where our arms salesmen are moving the most sophisticated and dangerous nonnuclear weapons that we can devise to both sides?

What role should the U.N. play?

Mr. YOST. Well, I should very much like to see the United States take the leadership in trying to persuade the United Nations to take on a much broader job in the field of arms control particularly in the field of conventional arms control. Probably strategic arms have to be handled primarily in bilateral negotiations but the whole conventional arms field, including the transfer of arms, is woefully neglected. The U.N. has a Conference on Disarmament that meets annually in Geneva which has some good work in the limited fields of biological warfare, nonproliferation, planting of weapons on the seabed, and so on, but I think it should be given a much broader mandate to concentrate on the whole field of conventional arms.

Mr. GOLDBERG. In the Middle East we did offer such a proposal in 1967 as an element of insuring peace in the Middle East. It was turned down by the Soviets. I doubt that limitation of arms can be done unilaterally. The Russians do supply arms and our policy is a balance of arms. This is the only thing you can do until we can get some senseable mutual agreements between the arms suppliers. I think that is an element that must be considered.

ACTION REGARDING ISRAELI SITUATION

Senator PERCY. Is there anything you can think of that we should be doing now? I witnessed, with deep sadness, the anti-Israeli feeling at the United Nations, an isolation of Israel and the United States, but when I went through the Arab world there was an increasing willingness by Arab leaders to say that Israel is here to stay, it has the right to exist as a sovereign nation, and we are recognizing that; and the U.N. resolutions 242 and 338 recognize it. Yet we have this movement, as Justice Goldberg has pointed out, that is frightening and could do more to destroy the credibility of the United Nations in the eyes of the American people and fairminded people around the world than anything else. What should we be doing about this now?

Mr. GOLDBERG. I think we must make a sustained diplomatic effort to the capitals of the member states to get a more accurate reflection of world opinion at the U.N. We are not getting it now.

Senator PERCY. I want to thank all of you very much.

The committee is recessed until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon at 1 p.m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a.m. Tuesday, May 8, 1975.]

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. John Sparkman [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Symington, Clark, Biden, Case, and Percy.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order, please. Today we warmly welcome our good friend and former chairman of this committee, in fact he was chairman longer than anyone in the history of the committee—for 15 years—and a man by whose side I sat on two committees for 22 years.

Senator CASE. I was on Banking and Currency, too, when he was chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember.

Senator CASE. We suffered under him for a long time. [Laughter.]

It is nice that you are here. I want to say now so as not to interrupt you that if I leave in my 10 minutes it is because I have to go downtown for a very sad errand and not because I want to leave.

The CHAIRMAN. They are having the funeral this morning of our friend, Senator Keating. I had hoped to go, but I had to cancel out.

We are very glad to have Senator Fulbright before us this morning. I think it is only proper that we recall that when he was a freshman Congressman—Bill was elected first to the House in 1942—he introduced a significant resolution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was introduced in April 1943 and passed in September.

The CHAIRMAN. He introduced the famous Fulbright resolution that has been generally credited, and properly so, to being the real beginning of the movement for all the nations of the world to come together.

It was the first resolution putting the House of Congress on the record as agreeing to participate in accordance with constitutional processes in the postwar organization dedicated to the preservation of peace and security. That is the Fulbright resolution adopted by the House of Representatives, as I said in 1943. I was among the Representatives at that time who joined 359 of my colleagues in the House to vote for the Fulbright resolution. The vote was 360 for it and 19 against.

In more recent years Senator Fulbright has encouraged greater use of the United Nation's machinery for the dispensation of foreign assistance and for international lending, for channeling Peace Corps type activities through a multinational volunteer corps, and for playing a greater role in political settlements, especially in the Middle East. I could go on and name many things that Senator Fulbright has done. Probably one of the best known is the Fulbright scholarship program. Anywhere in the world you can hear about the Fulbright scholars.

Senator, Mr. Chairman, we are glad to have you with us. Do any one of you gentlemen have a statement to make before we let him start talking? You won't get to make one afterward. [Laughter.]

Senator CASE. You do him an injustice. You remember he talked a great deal when he was up there in your chair, but that was his prerogative then. He was never a man to let an opportunity go by. We are certainly glad to welcome you today and this won't be the last time.

SENATOR PERCY'S STATEMENT

Senator PERCY. I should like to join in welcoming our former colleague.

When we made up the list of prospective witnesses, Senator Fulbright's name was put at the head of the list because no one has put more emphasis on diplomacy rather than military force, to solve the real problems. We have wanted an excuse to have you back with us, Senator, and we welcome you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, you did not have the privilege of serving on the committee when Senator Fulbright was chairman. He was a great chairman. Senator Clark is a new member of the committee doing a very fine job.

Do you have any statement to make?

Senator CLARK. No. I did have the privilege of serving in the Senate for 2 years with Bill Fulbright and we are very happy to have you here again, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in the Senate but not on the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator CLARK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be very glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT, FORMER CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate very much this invitation to appear before this great committee. It does seem to me to be a most appropriate time just as we have demonstrated that military means are not as effective as some people thought they might be. The country and the committee ought to be on the move to consider the alternative which we are here to talk about today.

NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO U.N. PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

As you know, I have had a deep and continuing interest in the use of negotiations and discussions rather than force to resolve differences. That is what this is all about. The experiences which we have suf-

fered since the time referred to by the chairman, which is more than 30 years ago, have strengthened my conviction that there is no rational alternative to the principles and procedures of the United Nations. I might say, since you have mentioned it, that the impetus for that resolution, the reason the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House accepted it, unanimously, I believe, at that time, was because we were in the midst of a war, and the costs of that war were so evident to everyone that there was no question about their approval. It was, as you have demonstrated, almost unanimous in the House as a whole and it was unanimous in the committee.

The circumstances, I think, were very propitious at that time and so are they now, with a different twist, because the futility of the Vietnam war is now evident to everyone. I think it is a very appropriate time to be considering this matter.

It seems to me the development of the hydrogen bomb has removed any doubt from rational minds that the periodic breakdown of the old international system of sovereign States, precariously balanced in a chaotic and lawless arena, is no longer good enough. Incineration by nuclear weapons just is not glamorous or appealing, even to the most romantic of our cold warriors, so I again repeat there is no rational alternative to the U.N., or something like the United Nations.

COMMENDATION OF SENATORS SYMINGTON AND PERCY

I wish to commend Senators Symington and Percy for their reports to this committee on their service in the 29th session of the U.N. General Assembly. I was pleased that both of these distinguished Senators concluded that the U.N. should be supported more vigorously by the United States. I especially commend Senator Percy for suggesting this review by this committee of the United Nations and its work.

U.N. STILL FUNCTIONS TO U.S. ADVANTAGE

I should like to suggest that Americans especially should be patient and understanding with the U.N. Our own Congress is about as near or similar to the U.N. as any significant political institution in the world. For 200 years, it has survived some tough trials and many tribulations, but it still functions to our advantage. The analogy is not close, nor conclusive; it simply suggests that discussion and compromise is the only known alternative to oppression and bloodshed, so I hope we will not abandon the U.N. but on the contrary, we should seek to use it and to strengthen it.

U.N. UNIVERSITY TO BE ESTABLISHED IN JAPAN

One example of our neglect is our failure to respond in any way to the creation of the United Nations University to be established in Japan. I am reminded of this primarily because I recently had the privilege of visiting in Japan and only returned about 10 days ago. The Japanese Government, I am informed, has pledged $100 million to the University, but the United States has so far taken no action whatever. It so happens the Emperor of Japan is scheduled to come to the United States this fall. I think it would be a very fine thing

if this committee could persuade our Government to make some contribution to the project which the Japanese take to be very specially their responsibility. When you consider that the Japanese are still following our admonition not to rearm in any major way other than pure local defense, they deserve some consideration from us. For that reason, if no other, although there are many other reasons, we should support this project.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN U.N. CONCEPT AT FRAMING OF CHARTER AND TODAY

Mr. Chairman, if I may for a few minutes, by way of a clarification, say a few words before I give you my major statement. It is essential that we distinguish clearly between the U.N. as envisioned by the framers of the Charter in 1945 and the organization that actually functions in New York today. This is one reason that many people, as reflected in the press, have evidenced so much disaffection about it. The one represents the U.N. idea, the conception of a responsible, effective international peacekeeping organization. The other—the U.N. Assembly as it operates today—is something different. It represents in a sense the abandonment of the original idea of the U.N. I emphasize "abandonment" and not the failure of the original U.N. idea, because a plan cannot be said to have failed when no serious effort has been made to implement it. The essentially powerless and sometimes irresponsible, assemblage of nations, which is the U.N. Assembly today, is not the result of any inherent defect in the U.N. Charter or the conception on which it is based. It is rather the result of our deep mistrust of the U.N. idea, of our fear and refusal almost from the outset to put even a small measure of our trust in international institutions.

We are all aware of the contempt in which the Soviet Union held in the U.N. in the immediate aftermath of World War II, but we are less aware of the negative attitude of the Truman administration, which almost certainly would have given the world organization short shrift but for the automatic majorities which enabled us in those days to use the world body for our own purposes. Dean Acheson, who was perhaps the principal architect of American foreign policy in the early post-war years, told an interviewer in 1970, and I quote, "I never thought the United Nations was worth a damn. To a lot of people it was a Holy Grail, and those who set store by it had the misfortune to believe their own bunk."

REVIVING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ORIGINAL U.N. IDEA RECOMMENDED

As one who did then, and still does, believe that "bunk," I contend there is nothing more important in our foreign policy, nothing more essential to our national interest, than a renewed, belated effort to breath life into the now enfeebled world organization. This is not, I emphasize, to place our trust in the U.N. as it operates today; it is rather to make a concerted effort to revive and implement the original U.N. idea. The way to do this is by making the Security Council and other U.N. organs the central forum of our foreign relations, particularly on matters of pressing import like the middle East. I would

think it most important to conduct prospective Geneva conferences under clearly delineated U.N. auspices. But more important still the U.N. can play a central role in the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict—through use of permanent international forces to patrol demiliterized zones; U.N. teams to inspect and oversee compliances by both sides with the terms of the settlement and, finally, by providing appropriate guarantees of the overall settlement.

I am well aware of the low esteem in which the U.N. is held by Israel and perhaps others, but a U.N. guarantee would also be a great power guarantee, more specifically a Soviet-American guarantee, and that, one hopes, would inspire some measure of confidence. The point is the great nations can vest power in the U.N. by lending it a measure of their own.

Even without the immediate cooperation of others there is much else the United States could do to breathe life into the U.N. We could make it national policy to appoint men or women of emminence and power—with the prestige of the late Adlai Stevenson or the late Senator Robert Taft—as our representatives in the U.N. We could make it national policy to refrain from using our veto in the Security Council.

We could make it known to the other great powers that the U.N. is our preferred forum for negotiations on arms control and other crucial issues. We could take the lead in negotiating those long-neglected agreements called for by Article 43 of the Charter, under which members would and I quote, "Make available to the Security Council * * * armed forces, assistance and facilities" to deal with threats to and breaches of the peace.

NECESSITY OF EFFECTIVE WORLD PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION

There is very little in international affairs about which I feel certain, but there is one thing of which I am quite certain, the necessity of fundamental change in the way nations conduct their relations with each other. There is nothing in the human environment, as Adlai Stevenson once reminded us, to prevent us from bringing about some fundamental change. Even the great legal realist of the World War II period, Winston Churchill, recognized the importance of the U.N. idea. In his famous speech at Fulton, Mo., in 1946, remembered for its reference to the "iron curtain" which had rung down across the continent of Europe, Churchill called for a new, cooperative world order. He called for a "good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations organization," and he called, too, for the arming of a new world body with international force. Speaking of the U.N., he said, and I quote, "We must make sure that its work is fruitful, that it is a reality and not a sham, that it is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of words, that it is a true temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can some day be hung up, and not merely a cockpit in a Tower of Babel."

Churchill's call made sense in 1946, and it still makes sense. Now as then the idea of an effective world peacekeeping organization is something more than a visionary ideal, it is an immediate and practical necessity.

CHANGE IN UNITED STATES ATTITUDE TOWARD U.N., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS URGED

Mr. Chairman, it will not be my purpose this morning to suggest any sweeping changes in the United Nations Charter or any of our other international institutions.

Rather, it will be my purpose to urge a sweeping change in the U.S. Government's attitude toward, and its use of, these institutions.

Never before has it been clearer that the unilateral and bilateral diplomacy that has been our tool in recent years is not adequate to cope with regional and world-wide problems. The tragic catastrophe in Southeast Asia demonstrates vividly the limits of such action, hopefully for all times. As I have said so many times, the United States cannot be the policeman of the world. The only alternative is collective action and multilateral diplomacy—the principal arena for which is the United Nations.

This, of course, is what we had intended the U.N. to perform when we joined the United Nations. It is as hard to pinpoint just where or when we began to shun involving the U.N. in our problems as it is to fix a date for our involvement in Vietnam or the time of the shift of power from the legislative to the executive branch. But it seems to me to be of the same pattern. Just as the executive branch was gradually freezing the Congress out of the foreign policymaking process, so was it equally determined not to tolerate any scrutiny of its policies and actions by the United Nations.

This is a far cry from the late 1940's and early 1950's when foreign aid legislation contained provisions ending these programs whenever the United Nations could take over and when our mutual security treaties contained a standard article: "This Treaty does not affect . . . the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Some will argue that the coolness that has developed on our part toward the United Nations was a response to the growth and unmanageability of the institution, particularly the General Assembly. But that is somewhat like the chicken and egg argument. Did the General Assembly become what it has because its recommendations were being ignored or did we start ignoring it because it would not do our bidding and dared criticize our actions? I rather favor the former explanation because it opens the way to corrective action on our part through a change in our attitude toward the United Nations.

I may have become too insistent about the United States having to stop trying to remake the world in its own image but I believe this attitude was a factor leading to our present isolated stance in the United Nations.

As soon as we sensed that we were losing control over the United Nations and that member nations did not buy our view of the world and what should be done, we abandoned the U.N. as a major channel for American foreign policy and chose to take upon ourselves the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

What, however, would have happened if our attitude had been to try put ourselves in the shoes of the developing and nonalined countries? Could we not have avoided the polarization of the General Assembly and our subsequent isolation from the mainstream of world

opinion? Was "the tyranny of the majority" that is now so decried a product of our own making? A backward glance would seem to be in order.

The United Nations was intended to be the world's instrument for peaceful change but our nay-saying of recent times has thwarted that purpose.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' INABILITY TO PRODUCE CHANGE THROUGH U.N.

Long-time frustrations over the developing countries' inability to produce change through the United Nations in the areas of economic development, human rights and disarmament, no doubt played a role in producing the bloc voting now noted. When one recalls, for example, that questions relating to South Africa have been considered by the General Assembly since 1946 without an appreciable change in conditions there, one can understand the frustration of the majority that vented itself in the vote to suspend South Africa's membership. Perhaps the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties was a reaction to the developed countries' unwillingness and/or inability to devote even 1 percent of their gross national product to the development of others, and similar wealth-sharing proposals.

I personally wish to interject there that I do not regard the use of GNP as a reasonable criterion for these purposes, or for any other purpose, in my opinion, other than simple activity in many cases is of the meaningless kind.

But since it is used it is simply a very poor measure of our interest in it. But I also in saying this do not again wish to express approval of the bilateral assistance given the countries simply because I question its effectiveness. And I have for many years thought whatever should be done should be done through a multilateral organization.

The General Assembly has always served as a forum of world public opinion and an arena for moral judgments. Condemnation is a part of its functions. Indeed, the United States in the cold war days and at other times has used it in this fashion. The assumption, however, that the moral weight of world opinon expressed through the General Assembly, would have a moderating effect on the deplorable events and practices has not been borne out by events. As the United Nations ages and long-term problems continue on the agenda year after year without solution, the temptation to the majority to do something drastic just for the sake of "doing" may get progressively greater. The unenforceability of General Assembly resolutions is one member's protection but another member's frustration. In sum, after 30 years of resoluting to no avail the pressures for bending the provisions of the charter and the rules of procedure have temporarily become too great.

Perhaps as a result of their inexperience, the newly independent nations have a much more relaxed or liberal view of the charter than the Western bloc. The United States especially seems to be cast in the role of a "strict constructionalist." This was not always so, as the United States is now often and rightly being reminded. At the heighth of the Stalinist period of the cold war, frustrated by interminable Soviet vetoes in the Security Council, we took a very wide view of the charter and led to a move to shift power from the Security Council to the General Assembly through the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" of 1950 which stated that:

If the Security Council, because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility, for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

At that time, this resolution was questioned by some as being a disguised amendment to the United Nations Charter and every possible legal argument was advanced by the United States to support the position that the General Assembly did have the power to adopt such a far-reaching resolution. In a way, the shoe is on the other foot now, and it is not becoming of us to be holier than thou and self-righteous about the rules of procedure and the United Nations Charter generally. The Charter, as our own Constitution, should be regarded as a living charter.

Similarly, the shoe would seem to be on the other foot as far as the "automatic majority" is concerned. As Ambassador Malik was quick to point out the United States invented the automatic majority. "I was a victim of the tyranny of the majority during the cold war at the U.N." he said recently.

UNIVERSALITY OF U.N. CONCEPT

Aside from the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, the tyranny of the majority most deplored was the suspension of South Africa, the invitation to the Palestine Liberation Front to address the General Assembly and its subsequent acceptance as an "observer" at the U.N. These issues all involve in some way the concept of the universality of the United Nations. If the "town meeting of the world" view of the United Nations has any validity, then it should be acceptable to hear from representatives of liberation movements. And indeed, they have been heard for years in various General Assembly committees—from Puerto Rico to Southwest Africa to the Portuguese colonies and elsewhere.

The suspension of South Africa, on the other hand, flies in the face of the principle of universality and the charter. In this connection, I have to note with regret the vigorous battle waged by the United States last year at the General Assembly to keep the Lon Nol government seated and deny any role to the Khmer Rouge and Prince Sihanouk. We won our case by a vote of 56 to 54. What a phyrric victory. This exemplifies what I mean by changing our attitudes and adjusting to rising forces. We should view the United Nations as the forum where all sides can be heard and direct communcations between antagonists should be feasible. Nothing tragic would have occurred if Prince Sihanouk or his representatives had been heard at the General Assembly meeting. On the other hand, perhaps some good might have come out of trying to bring the parties together. But, we did not want anyone to interfere with us in Southeast Asia.

U.S. "POOR LOSER" IMAGE

Among other attitudes that I would like to see change is the image of the "poor loser" that we have acquired. We are taking ourselves too seriously at the United Nations. It seems to me that the great power role has gone to our head and we have not learned to take the brickbats

and setbacks philosophically and the tail-tweaking with good humor. When opposed, we pick up our marbles and go off to play by ourselves, making the situation only worse.

STRIVING FOR CONSENSUS

I am also favorably impressed by the advice of Harlan Cleveland in the recent article that we should strive for consensus in place of putting every question to a vote.

SOLVING PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL ARENA THROUGH U.N.

The change in attitude is all the more important now that the U.S. Government, or at any rate the legislative branch of it, is looking toward the United Nations to help deliver humanitarian assistance to Southeast Asia. This should be the first step in turning to the United Nations for the solution of other problems in the political arena, such as the Middle East, as I have long advocated.

The hour is most appropriate for a return to greater reliance on multilateral institutions and processes for easing the world's growing pains and bringing about peaceful change. The United States should seize the opportunity positively, constructively, and with a sensitive appreciation of other nations' needs and yearnings. After all, 200 years ago we were revolutionaries ourselves, committed to undoing the status quo.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for such a long statement but it was too good an opportunity to pass up.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a very fine statement. We thank you for it.

PANEL OF FORMER PERMANENT U.N. REPRESENTATIVES HEARD

I suppose you know the panel we had before us yesterday, Ambassador Yost, Justice Goldberg, Governor Stassen, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, they were the ones who had served in the U.N. as our permanent representatives over the years.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, sir.

ACTION AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The CHAIRMAN. You make reference in here to the action taken against South Africa. Justice Goldberg said that was contrary to the Charter.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with that, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And he also criticized the action that UNESCO took. He said that was contrary to the UNESCO constitution, too.

But, generally there was strong support by the whole panel for the United Nations. I think they made a very fine presentation and a very fine argument along the line that you make.

I gather from oblique reference in your statement that you feel there has been a loss of regard for the U.N. by the American people over the past few years.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; I do. There have been many statements by some public officials and others of disillusionment with it and there are people who advocate our getting out of the U.N.

SLOGANS REFERRING TO U.S. MEMBERSHIP IN U.N.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they say, "get the United States out of the U.N. and the U.N. out of the United States."

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a slogan they have developed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There are some slogans. This I think is a very short-sighted view, and this has grown from the frustrations that you have already mentioned.

When we dominated the U.N. in the early days when there were 51 members and could count on about 30 votes on nearly everything, we thought it was a better institution. This, of course, is a very childish attitude toward any institution. I think we can make it work if we give it the respect that it is entitled to.

CONSENSUS APPROACH APPLAUDED

May I say I mentioned only in passing the article by Mr. Cleveland. He is a very, very experienced man, and it appealed to me as purely a matter of conduct the way you approach the problems in the U.N. rather than putting everything to a vote, to seek a concensus, which is a very tiresome and troublesome approach but often much more rewarding. It doesn't happen to be the kind of procedure we have followed here in the Congress but it is a procedure that many countries follow—many more, I suspect, than follow our procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington has to go to an Armed Services Committee meeting. I yield to him at this time.

U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH OIL COUNTRIES URGED

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Fulbright, it is a great pleasure seeing you, sir, and I am sorry I do have to leave. We are marking up the arms budget presentation this morning and that is why I was late and that is why I have to leave now.

Because of my great respect for you and the fact that you have been a true prophet about so many things that occurred in the development of our foreign policy, and in the relationship that policy has to the United Nations, and because I was, along with my distinguished colleague from Illinois, a delegate to the U.N. this year, I just have one question to ask you at this point.

As you know, for sometime I have worried that the billions upon billions of dollars being poured into previously relatively poor oil-producing countries will enable them to either barter their oil for plutonium or buy it—and possibly become a nuclear power; and whatever the reasons for the United Nations in the past, would you not agree that today it is vitally important that we have a relationship with oil countries, regardless of size or gross national product?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; you are quite right. I appreciate the comments in the beginning and, of course, it is a privilege to appear here to discuss this. I was very pleased that you were at the U.N. this last year and understand how it works.

You are quite right. The basic concept of the universality of the U.N., if reduced to our concepts of votes is ridiculous, if we applied to that the same concept we applied to the Senate. That is what I mentioned. It is very important that we think of other ways to utilize that body. What you are suggesting is the significance of keeping them there.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SMALLER COUNTRIES U.N. MEMBERSHIP

Some people say it was ridiculous to have them there at all. They are not significant, these smaller countries. They ought to be there and they are there. It is now up to us to find ways to operate the machinery with them there and I think it can be done. We just haven't bothered to do it. We are impatient about procedures which other people not accustomed to our system have always engaged in.

I remember, if the Senator will allow me, during the war we had a monk from South Vietnam here to lunch. There were a number of Senators there, and we were discussing the fact that they didn't seem to appreciate our desire to give them self-determination, by which we meant elections. We asked, "Why aren't you more interested in elections?" He said, "The only elections they had to do with had all been rigged and they weren't interested in elections." I said, "How do you resolve things? How do you make decisions?" "We just get together," he said, "we just get together and talk about it." There are various groups, Buddhist monks, and they got together and did what Mr. Harlan Cleveland suggested. They arrived after a time at a consensus.

Many of these questions are so complex they can't be reduced to a simple yes or no proposal. All of you Senators, I am sure, have had my experience. When we vote on the Senate floor we rarely vote on something we are entirely in agreement with. We simply have to choose between the lesser of two evils. Much of that is because many of the problems do not lend themselves to being reduced to a simple proposition to which it is very easy to say yes, I am 100 percent for that. We can't make the U.N. work that way either. I think much can be done. We can be and are very persuasive if we allow ourselves to be. We should try to persuade rather than force people to do our will. When we try to force them, we become just as we have in Southeast Asia. I am not just referring to our physical resources, material resources. We have great prestige in the world that we have inherited from our history and from the nature of the society we have. This can be put to very good use if we do take the trouble and the time to use it. And it is worth doing it when we consider what the cost of the alternative is. We are just now recognizing the cost in Southeast Asia.

COMMENDATION OF SENATOR FULBRIGHT

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the Committee for yielding to me. I have been in the Government 30 years next month and of all of the true prophets I have known since I have been here, I would say the No. 1 prophet has been the distinguished Senator from Arkansas. If we had listened to him, we would be tens of billions

of dollars better off from the standpoint of our financial position as a country, and what is more important, there would be tens of thousands of young Americans who would still be alive.

I thank the Senator.

WOULD LONGER SECRETARY OF STATE PRESENCE STRENGTH U.S./U.N. RELATIONSHIP?

Senator PERCY. Before you leave I wonder if I could put to the Chairman the question you raised in your excellent report on your experience at the United Nations and get his judgment on it?

Senator Symington took the position that the Secretary of State, whoever he might be, might well spend more time in New York during the General Assembly session to show a real U.S. interest and to assure that important decisions are made by him and not by some bureaucrat down the line. It would lend greater prestige to the U.S. Mission in dealing with 127 other nations.

Would you concur that the presence of the Secretary, to the extent that he can be in New York during the General Assembly session, would help to strengthen our relationship with the U.N.?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do concur with what I am confident is the thrust of his suggestion. The Secretary would be most useful there and it is of such importance that I think his presence would be warranted whenever he can. But to go one step further, and I don't mean any reflection upon Mr. Scali, but Mr. Scali was not a man with a great political basis of his own comparable, say, to people such as I have already mentioned. I mean no reflection on Mr. Scali but he has been a journalist and journalists have their role, but they have not been of the same prestige in the area in which this organization operates as people like Cabot Lodge or Justice Goldberg or Adlai Stevenson. These are men of great stature in their own right and would to a great extent fulfill the purpose that the Senator from Missouri is suggesting that the Secretary would do. Of course, the Secretary would be best but second best would be someone who approaches him in prestige as being capable of speaking for the Government of the United States, someone who would be considered to be very close to the President and to the power of the country.

That is what I mean by my earlier statement, and I certainly agree with what I believe to be the purpose of the Senator from Missouri's statement.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTEND OPENING OF U.N. SESSIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Right along that same line, it is customary, isn't it, for foreign ministers from different countries to come to the opening of the United Nations and stay perhaps 2 or 3 days?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Then go back home?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct. But, of course, since we are the host country, there is a little difference in that it is here and, normally, in the old days Secretaries of State weren't always in the Middle East

or somewhere else. They were usually here in the early days. They spent a great deal of time in the country and in Washington. It was no problem going back and forth to New York. I gather from reading Senator Symington's report, it is a part of what I am trying to say. We ought to upgrade the significance of the U.N. and not denigrate it and make it appear we don't care anything about it. I agree with you. The Secretary can't stay there all the time but I don't think that is what Senator Symington meant. I do think he ought to stay here and be present to indicate our interest in making it an effective organization.

U.S. REPRESENTATIVES INDEPENDENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard this complaint though from some people who have represented us in the different meetings of the General Assembly, that every word they said had to be approved by officials in the State Department here in Washington, so generally they are "yes men." I believe Senator Symington broke away from that when you were all there this past fall.

Senator PERCY. He did and I followed his precedent.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think you were both right. I had that experience. The State Department can be extremely irritating in their concern about commas and words and distinctions without a difference. You have to be independent, and I think that is why Senators are put there. They are not dependent upon the State Department for their position. They have a right to say what they like and the State Department can't do anything about it. I am very glad you did.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you there?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. 1954, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. I was there in 1950. I will say this. My experience was that while we had advice from the State Department, they never supplied me with a speech. I had quite a free hand. I was serving on the Economic Committee and I don't believe I ever had a word from them as to what I should or should not say, but I have heard that complaint made.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, sir. I don't think this is peculiar to our State Department. I think all governments tend to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I can remember when some government representative had to postpone a speech because he hadn't heard from home.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. There are lots of questions I could ask, but I know the other members want to ask questions.

By the way, I mentioned some of the things awhile ago that Senator Fulbright is renowned for, but I didn't mention that he was an outstanding football player in college. [Laughter.] A Rhodes Scholar, and later, I believe, you taught law, didn't you?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Then became president of the university and got into a fight with the Governor. Did he fire you?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you had the pleasure of defeating him for the Senate?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. So, you have had quite a career. I believe you hold one record of service in the Senate. You had the longest period of being a junior Senator that we have ever had.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Never did work out of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was the most senior junior Senator in the Senate.

The CHAIRMAN. We certainly enjoyed your service with us. As I said, I served on both committees with him through the years.

Senator Clark, do you have any questions?

BYRD AMENDMENT VIOLATION OF U.N. CHARTER

Senator CLARK. Just two or three questions. You referred to violation of the Charter. Do you consider the Byrd amendment a violation of the United Nations Charter?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, I think our actions in not abiding by the decision in that case is a violation. We refused to abide by the rules, which I think is our undertaking when we join the U.N. I voted against it and opposed that, as you know.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN VIOLATIONS

Senator CLARK. Yes, I do remember that. How do you make a distinction, or how do we as a nation make a distinction between violation of the Charter with regard to the Byrd amendment on the one hand, and the recent suspension of South Africa or the steps taken against Israel? Would you try to make a distinction?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think we opposed the exclusion of South Africa, didn't we?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is a violation, I think, of the Charter. It is in the same fashion.

Senator CLARK. Same magnitude?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I also indicated I think the Uniting for Peace Resolution was a very dubious procedure which we adopted when we had the automatic majority back in the old days. I mentioned that only to show that when the shoe gets on the other foot we take a different view. As in our own Constitution, it is a very delicate line one can draw between strict constitutional and liberal constitutional in the Charter of the U.N. We can be as strict a constructionist as reason will allow, but this a subjective judgment in each case. I think you are right. We are inconsistent ourselves in violating it or refusing to abide by the decision of the U.N.

ACCEPTANCE OF POSITIVE U.S. PROPOSALS BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAJORITY

Senator CLARK. Senator Fulbright, you talked toward the end of your testimony about the United States making positive proposals or taking positive actions in the U.N. Is it possible for us, do you think, as we go into the next special session of the General Assembly, to come up with proposals with regard to the new world economic order, to make positive proposals with regard to Southern Africa, that could find acceptance with the majority? Is it feasible to think that we can come forward with proposals from this Government in resolution form

that will really be of a positive nature and could gain majority support in the General Assembly, or are we such an established nation, such a conservative nation, that we don't have any progressive ideas to offer?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is a very long process. It is a very difficult process. It will not be done in one or two sessions. This has been going on now nearly 30 years. As I have tried to outline, the way it has shifted and the nature of it, we find ourselves this last session very much isolated. I think the war in Vietnam was the greatest burden this country has had to bear since the Civil War and it prejudiced our influence in every other way, and especially in the U.N.

I myself always felt under restraint in spite of the fact I expressed my disapproval of the war rather early and vigorously. Still in trying to persuade people to what I would call more enlightened views, they were always in a position to respond concerning what we were doing in Vietnam, which I couldn't defend. I think we are in the process of being relieved of that. It is going to give us a posture from which we will be able to advocate a number of things with much greater persuasiveness than we could have heretofore regardless of the rhetoric of our leaders. I don't wish to quarrel about that. I think the world as we are now recognizes that we made a very serious political judgment. What we did in Vietnam was a serious mistake. I know lots of people reject that, but I think history will prove, that is true, and there is nothing to be particularly humiliated about. Everybody makes mistakes.

In Japan I could, very recently, say very truly you made a terrible mistake, but you recovered completely. You are now a very respected country and undertaking to show that a great country can be a great country without an enormous military machine. The Germans made a great mistake. They made a terrible mistake in their judgment of the situation and the world in 1914. They have recovered now and they are a very respected member of the community of nations. Why shouldn't we make a mistake. We have not after all, as far as I know, been given infallability by the Lord. We have assumed sometimes that we were. We are made up of people from Germany and many other countries who are just as fallable as we are. But now we start anew. I think it is a great opportunity. It is what I said in the beginning. I think it is very fortunate Senator Percy asked for this review because I believe it is possible to do what you say, not immediately and not next session, but by the virtue of persuasion and patience upon these countries. They have to be educated, many of them, as to where their interests lie. It is not in their interest to destroy the economy of this country. I think many of the countries are gradually beginning to see that now. It is not in the interest of the OPEC nations to destroy the international monetary system. It is a question of who is going to persuade them.

Nobody can be more persuasive in that than we can if we are willing to take the trouble and talk to them and reason with them and to demonstrate. There is a mutuality of interest in maintaining a viable international monetary system or a viable system of international trade. It is not going to do them any good to disrupt everything. Also, this business about food—it just is not reasonable that some of these countries have taken the position that population has no relation to

food. They feel we shouldn't raise the question of unlimited growth of population, but still expect us or somebody else to feed them. Those are utterly irreconcilable in my view and I think it is sufficiently valid. The case can be made if we are willing to make it. I don't think we ought to accept their view that they can go on with irresponsible expansion of population then we have the responsibility to feed them.

I don't believe we have. I am perfectly willing to cooperate with them if they will cooperate in taking measures that are reasonably calculated to reach an ultimate solution to it, but these things can all be decided by putting in a resolution and having a vote on it. You get beat. This is what I meant. The idea of consensus appeals to me, and is basically the concept of persuasion and, of course, the assumption being you have reason for your position. You can't expect to persuade them to an irrational position, but I believe this country has great powers of persuasion coupled with our economic and moral power. I say moral. I have hesitated to ever use that word until the war in Vietnam was over, now I think I can say it with better grace.

CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

Senator CLARK. Let me ask one last question which is on a somewhat philosophical level. The question has to do with your own view of whether or not we really are going to support the United Nations, not just this country, but people around the world. I think your statement says something about this, that history in the last 400 years has been primarily oriented toward the development of the nation-state; that this idea has been dominant in the Western World and in this century, all across the world. If we assume that national sovereignty is the highest goal, each secretary of state or minister of foreign relations pursues that goal, that if national sovereignty is so sanctified, what do we do to break down that kind of attitude in this country and around the world?

Do you have any hope that, after 400 years of development, this concept is suddenly going to be turned around?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have no hope it is suddenly going to turn around. I emphasize these don't change suddenly. The development of many things other than reason—trade, interdependence of people, the communications—economically has grown to such an extent that it creates a network of interests which subject these nation-states to the necessity of accommodating others. What you usually find is a gradual development of interests going on at the same time the rhetoric continues. The rhetoric still continues about sovereignty and so on simultaneously with the development of multinational corporations with various kinds of trade and communication systems. The development of one of the best examples of this is the question of pollution, which cannot be confined within any national boundary. Something has to be done. So they are confronted with the necessity of doing something about a problem that is beyond their control. This is the way it develops. It develops slowly and there is no way of getting around it developing slowly. The human mind does not adapt quickly. It always is very slow to change. But in my opinion it will change and these pressures develop along the way.

This question of what to do about the sea, the oceans, confronts us now with new problems. Who is going to do the exploration? Of course, we are more capable of doing it than anybody and we can take advantage of it and maybe we will do it, but it is a good opportunity to use to persuade the country to have respect in regard to the U.N. There are other examples of this that I think will bring pressure to bear upon us to do this.

I always keep in the back of my mind the idea that all of these measures will work. What we have to do is to give them time to work by the most urgent necessities to prevent a nuclear war, in particular; to look to disarmament; to arms control; and to ways to prevent the outbreak of war. That is why the Middle East is so important and it would be a great boost to the prestige of the United Nations if a settlement in the Middle East was brought about under the auspices of the United Nations. Inasmuch as Israel was created as a result of a resolution of the Security Council, what more appropriate thing than to have the Security Council guarantee its security. It seems to me we have always said around here we have respect for precedents. It seems to me this is a perfect example of an historical development that would add tremendously to the prestige of the U.N. and in the process to the future security of this country.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN'S POSSIBLE DESIGNATION AS U.N. REPRESENTATIVE

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Fulbright, you commented on Ambassador Scali and the leadership of our delegation. Mr. Joseph Segel is here and we both served on the delegation with Ambassador Scali, who has been a journalist specializing in foreign affairs. I think Ambassador Scali's experience in the White House added a dimension to his background and experience that was invaluable at the U.N., and we found him to be a fine leader, a solid supporter of fighting for what we felt were the right positions, sometimes fighting for them inside the State Department. So my own personal experience with him was a very gratifying one.

I presume that you have read or heard of the article by Ambassador Moynihan in Commentary magazine and are aware of the news report that he may be designated by the President as our next permanent representative at the United Nations.

Would you care to comment on the article or the appointment because the position is a very important one?

Would you care to comment on the possibility of Ambassador Moynihan going and offer any advice if he is designated by the President, and confirmed by the Senate, with respect to his attitude toward the United Nations as reported by the press?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I realized when that question first came up that it is always invidious. I suppose maybe I shouldn't have said what I did about Mr. Scali. I have known Mr. Scali and I thought I made it very clear I meant no reflection. It is a fact of life he doesn't have a great political standing in this country. He has never been elected to

anything, or held a high post. The post he held in the White House was of a relatively minor nature, if I am correctly informed. He wasn't comparable, say to Mr. Kissinger or to that type of position. My statement had nothing whatever to do with his personal qualities. I was speaking of his standing in the eyes of the world, and especially the prestige of the position and the way other countries would interpret this with regard to how we value the U.N. That is all I meant. I think that point is still valid, having nothing whatever to do with criticism of Mr. Scali.

Although I didn't particularly agree with his famous speech last December, I assume that speech was written in the State Department, I don't hold that against him either. That is the frustration of the Department which is reflected in more ways than one. I don't hold that against Mr. Scali at all. I don't mean any criticism of him.

Mr. Moynihan is an intellectual, has greater prestige, I would say, and has been an Ambassador. He is extremely articulate and received a great deal of notice in a period as the originator, or I guess the right word is innovator, of the family plan, what was it called?

Senator PERCY. Guaranteed minimum income or family assistance plan.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. He was supposed to have been one of the men who originated the family assistance plan.

He got a great deal of favorable publicity as a great liberal. This is, of course, in the realm of Republican politics and is not for me to say it is good or bad, but in any case he developed considerable prestige.

TERM "BENIGN NEGLECT" APPLIED TO U.N.

Senator PERCY. He is also identified with the term "benign neglect," which some people feel is our attitude toward the U.N.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right. I don't really know the article. It was just called to my attention yesterday. I read it very sketchily. It had a great deal to do, what little I read, about the sad and very unfortunate effects of the spread of Fabian socialism all round the world and that a very large number of these new nations in the U.N. are the heirs of British socialism, which has proven to be very effective as far as productivity is concerned. It is creating a real problem for all those countries and for us, and some kind of reform has got to be brought about on the special brand of socialism as has been spawned by Great Britain; is that not what he says?

Senator PERCY. Something like that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. You know him better than I do, I expect. I think the British are very aware of their shortcomings. They are having economic difficulties. They are a very old and resilient country, and I have an idea after it reaches a certain level of decay that they will bring about some reforms and correct their position. It is very sad. I understand, at the moment.

Senatory PERCY. I think Ambassador Moynihan would probably appreciate your personal observation directly.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, you know, it isn't my responsibility anymore, unless you question me here. I don't feel like interjecting my views into your deliberations unless I am asked about it. He hasn't asked me for anything. I sometimes find it difficult to restrain myself from saying things. [Laughter.]

SEEK CONSENSUS REGARDING EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT RESOLUTION URGED

Senator PERCY. Senator Fulbright, you have mentioned the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties which was an agenda item voted on by the General Assembly last year, a Mexican initiative. The United States cast a negative vote, and 16 essentially developed countries voted negatively or abstained, so we had a great separation between the developed and developing worlds on that issue.

Section 34 of that charter provides for it to be brought up again at the 30th General Assembly for revision, and modification, if necessary, and it is the U.S. position that with a few changes we could have concurrence.

Do you think it would be worthwhile for the United States to take a leadership position in trying to bring the two worlds together; or just let sleeping dogs lie and let it drop and be another resolution adopted by the U.N. which will not be given much attention?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would recommend, in accordance with what I have already said, that we go to great trouble to try to bring about a consensus on this and see if we cannot get them to adopt principles dealing with this subject that we could live with. It is a very difficult subject. Again it is self-defeating to these countries who feel that they can expropriate foreign investment. Of course, the immediate effect may be slightly beneficial, but if they were experienced enough, they would realize they are killing, as they say, the goose that lays the golden egg. Many of these things are highly beneficial to the country over the years. We ourselves benefited tremendously from foreign investment. We are a good example of that. There are many good examples.

Senator PERCY. Our country was built in part by foreign investment.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Our railroads in the West originally were built primarily, I believe, with foreign capital. We didn't expropriate and it continues to be good. Of course, generalizations are always subject to qualification, but this is a good illustration of what I meant. It is an opportunity for some educational work. It is boring, tiring, time consuming, and difficult. I still think it is worthwhile, because anytime you do that or take any other measure it tends to enhance the prestige of the U.N. The ultimate success of this, just like the ultimate success of the principle of détente, depends upon the confidence of the people in it that they will get fair treatment, that it is a fair and just operation. It would contribute something to each one of these.

Every time the U.N. successfully deals with anything it contributes to the prestige of that agency. It is worthwhile if you believe that the basic principle of the U.N. is a valid one and one which we seek to make effective. Of course, if you don't believe in it, or think it is all a mistake, these things fall to the ground. Your own report certainly evidences that you believe it is a sound concept that ought to be developed. That being so then every effort such as this is to its advantage.

U.N. UNIVERSITY SUPPORT AS WORTHWHILE INITIATIVE URGED

I felt that way. I referred, in my statement, at the last minute to the U.N. University. I don't wish to exaggerate that situation. It is

obviously not a tremendously significant thing, but it was approved by the U.N. and the Japanese have taken it up as their project. They have pledged $100 million payable over 5 years. There has been appointed an American, Mr. Hester, as the director or the president and the vice rector is a Japanese, who was the former president of the Tokyo University.

I have found this has become a matter of considerable pride on the part of the Japanese. It is extremely important to us for other reasons that we continue good relations with the Japanese. It is a very small thing for us to make a gesture of support and approval of that particular project if for no other reason than to please the Japanese. There are other reasons, and I think it is too bad that we have done nothing about it—absolutely nothing—and it was one of these little ideas that I think would be worthwhile. It won't remake the world. It would entail relatively small amounts of money but could have great influence upon the attitude of one of the most important communities in the world to us, and that is the Japanese nation.

Senator PERCY. Carl Marcy was here testifying for a $50 million grant over a period of years. He would take that small fraction of the $722 million requested for military aid to Vietnam, that we did not authorize, and provide it for the U.N. University.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I don't care from where you take it but it certainly is something worthwhile to be considered.

CONSUMER NATIONS SHOULD HAVE SAME RIGHTS AS PRODUCER CARTELS

Senator PERCY. One last question, because I would like to yield to Senator Biden.

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties provided in effect that producer cartels would be encouraged in all types of commodities but that consumer organizations would be discouraged and would be looked upon almost as an unfriendly act.

Is it realistic to feel that it is all right for producers to get together and fix prices but not all right for consumers to get together, because in oil, for example, the consumers are the only ones trying to exercise a little restraint on consumption which serves the interests of the producers by extending their reserves longer?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I don't think it is reasonable at all. I agree with you. They can't have it both ways. It is clear to me they can't expect that to be true. The consumers ought to get that same right.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

ASSESSMENT OF PROPOSED ACTION DENYING ISRAEL SEAT

Senator Fulbright, it is always a pleasure to listen to you and I sincerely regret not having had the opportunity to serve on this committee when you were its chairman. I always found you make a good deal of sense.

I just have a couple of specific questions. I know my senior colleagues would like to get back to some of the broader philosophical questions you have raised in your paper. Then I will yield.

One question I do have concerns what Justice Goldberg said yesterday, as reported, I believe in the Washington Post, "A movement is underway to deny Israel its proper place in the General Assembly and in specialized agencies". Mr. Goldberg said this would be unconstitutional as was the exclusion of South Africa from last year's General Assembly debate. To block the move Mr. Goldberg said "the U.S. should serve notice that it will vote against it and would take further steps of freezing our prorata contribution to the Assembly expenses if Israel is illegally denied its seat in the Assembly. We must be extremely careful to keep our record." Now, Senator Fulbright, assuming that the General Assembly does take that action, do you concur with the assessment of Ambassador Goldberg that we should, in fact, freeze our contribution—a step viewed by him as a punitive action?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I hesitate to recommend this business of refusing to participate if they don't do what we say. However, I would do whatever I could to prevent them taking the action with regard to Israel just as I said I disapprove and think we ought to do everything we can about the exclusion of South Africa, however we feel about the practice they are engaged in. According to recent reports in the paper, South Africa is beginning to respond by taking some minor action as a result of the criticism that has been leveled against them. This is a matter which, of course, I find very difficult to talk about having come from the South and been subject to criticisms which I think were unfair by many of my northern friends in the United States. This racial matter is a very difficult one. It has been very difficult in our own country. It is still difficult in Boston, for example. It all depends on where these things arise. People far off can be very magnanimous about it, but when it comes home—even to Boston, that jewel of our intellectual life—they have this reaction. I have great sympathy for the problems that have arisen in South Africa as a result of long history. I do not think they are barbarious people and something can be worked out that is mutually acceptable. That is why I think the U.N., when it goes so far as to exclude them, goes too far. As I said, and as Justice Goldberg said, it is unconstitutional.

The same way with Israel. If I understand it correctly, this was a regional problem in UNESCO that Israel was concerned with. I am not as well informed on the details of what happened there. It is absolutely different, yet I would not approve of its exclusion. We ought not accept it and we ought to use every means that is reasonable except withdrawal. I don't believe in an organization like this that you withdraw if it doesn't go to suit you. If you become a member you have to do the best you can and use every means you can to prevent their doing something unconstitutional or irregular, but I hasten to say that we should quit. The Russians did that. I forget what displeased them. I believe they did that at the time of the Korean affair. They soon learned better than to boycott it.

So that is about the only way I can respond to that. I would hesitate saying we won't play.

Senator BIDEN. I am sure that Mayor White of Boston will like your suggestion that the U.N. negotiate his problem in Boston.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We got lots of advice, too, from all over when we had problems in the South.

Senator BIDEN. And you're still getting it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Ours has settled down pretty well. They finally recognized we do a better job than they do in Boston.

I didn't really mean to inject Boston into this other than to illustrate that it is so easy for people to give advice in this area when it doesn't affect them.

NATIONALISM AND THE U.N. CONCEPT

Senator BIDEN. One last broad question or observation, I am not sure which it is.

Senator Clark raised the question or pointed out what we all, I think, agree to. The motivating force in international politics over the last 300 or 400 years has been the continuing growth of nationalism. Now, this is particularly evidenced in third world nations. I think this is understandable in most cases. These countries may be expressing these feelings more than larger countries have in the past. How do you think that the U.N., as envisioned by most, comports with the continuing growth of nationalism? Is it consistent, do you think, for us to expect that there would be any significant voluntary yielding of that national sentiment on the part of these emerging third world nations even through the remainder of this century, in the year 2000. When we are there it is easy, much easier, it seems to me, for we and the Western European nations and Russia to yield up some of our sovereignty than it is for nations who are emerging and have not acquired it yet to yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, this is an area which is very difficult from a semantic point of view. The nationalism as such is not a bad thing. I mean people should have pride in their customs and their country.

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting that it is, by the way.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But it isn't inconsistent in joining the U.N. and agreeing to abide by it. You are not negating it. You are exercising your power to voluntarily accept certain obligations. Every time a country makes a treaty of any kind, it is, in a sense, binding itself to a certain course of action which, if you want to be very precise about it, means it has given up its sovereignty. Countries make treaties all the time of one kind or another, treaties of amnity and friendship and trade, and they agree to give up this absolute freedom to do as they please under any circumstance. As I say, we get into very difficult, semantic problems. I don't see anything inconsistent with sovereignty of a nation that says there are certain areas which we cannot control anyway. What can these small countries do about developing the oceans or what can they do about preventing pollution or preventing oil spills off their coasts? What can little countries that do not border on the sea or Africa do about it. Their only hope to preserve, we will say, a very important part of their national assets is to utilize some international agency to prevent or to control the oil spills and so in. This is a rather complicated area to develop at the moment, although I do not see any difficulty or inconsistency between nationalism and agreeing and cooperating fully with the United Nations.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

OIL PROBLEMS AND INDEXATION OF COMMODITIES

Senator PERCY. Senator Fulbright, could you tell us whether you think the oil supply problem could be negotiated under U.N. auspices? Do you think the U.N. should take a greater role and would you care to comment on the demand made by developing nations for indexation of commodities to provide to them automatic price increases in their commodity exports, as their imports increase in price?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In response to the last part of your question, I didn't realize how far they have gone already in assuming jurisdiction in this area.

Senator PERCY. The charter that was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly for indexation is an extraordinarily complex subject.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. If they are going into that, certainly it would be appropriate to try to discuss it there if possible. Of course, I am for trying to negotiate with the oil producers in any area we can if that is possible. If the settlement in the Middle East can be brought about, I still think there is a possibility of a more gradual price adjustment rather than this tremendous increase so as to give the developing countries particularly the opportunity to adjust to the new price levels. The levels of prices will never go back to what they were. I am not really competent to go much further than to say if they brought this subject up, and as you say it is now being discussed and is part of that charter, I don't know why they didn't think it appropriate to suggest to these people that fuel and energy are just as much a part of the overall concern as food or anything else.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S CONTRIBUTION TO HEARING

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. We are grateful for your appearance today, and it has been very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Fulbright, we all join in extending our appreciation to you for this very capable handling of a difficult subject.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Thank you. This is my first return to the Hill, the first time I have been in a committee meeting, and it has made me very conscious of how long I was here and how much I miss being a member of this committee. When I see these new members I feel very sad that I am not going to have an opportunity to be with you more often.

I appreciate very much your asking me. I am very flattered you thought I might add something to this.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you a quick personal question. How is the law practice coming?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am in a very good firm, and if you need any legal advice, we are open for business. [Laughter.]

PANEL INTRODUCTION AND COMMENDATION

The CHAIRMAN. Now we have a panel, I will ask the panelists to come around, please.

Dr. Gardner, Henry L. Moses, professor of law and international organization, Columbia University; Mr. Abraham Yeselson, chair-

man, Political Science Department, Rutgers University, author, "A Dangerous Place: The United Nations as a Weapon in International Politics;" Mr. Joseph Segel, former chairman, board of governors, United Nations Association, U.S. Alternate Representative to the 29th General Assembly; and Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley, president of the Stanley Foundation.

Senator PERCY. I have not had the pleasure of knowing Dr. Yeselson and I am looking forward to hearing from him today, but I want the Chair to know that I have had the highest regard and close relationship with the other three witnesses. Dick Gardner is one of the most knowledgeable men we have on international organizations, and Joe Segel is a former chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.N. Association and a member of the U.S. delegation at the U.N., so he has seen it from the inside as well as the outside. Maxwell Stanley's seminars, which his foundation has sponsored around the world in an effort to foster world peace and strengthen international organizations have made an important contribution; he has devoted not just his financial resources but also his own personal time over a period of many years.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Gardner, we have your statement, which is very long.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. GARDNER, HENRY L. MOSES PROFESSOR OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Dr. GARDNER. I have no intention of reading it.

The CHAIRMAN. The statement will be printed in full in the record. We will be very glad if you will summarize and discuss it with us.

[Mr. Gardner's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE ON RICHARD N. GARDNER

Richard N. Gardner, Professor of Law and International Organization at Columbia University, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from 1961 to 1965. He is currently the United States member and the rapporteur of the Group of High Level Experts which Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim has appointed to propose structural changes in the United Nations system of economic cooperation.

Born in New York City, June 9, 1927, Professor Gardner is a veteran of World War II. He graduated from Harvard College, where he majored in economics and received a B.A. degree magna cum laude in 1948. In 1951 he received an LL.B. from the Yale Law School, where he served as Note Editor of the Yale Law Journal. Professor Gardner was awarded a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Economics in 1954 by Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar. He is a member of Phi Beta Kappa.

In 1953–54, Professor Gardner served as Teaching Fellow in International Legal Studies at Harvard Law School. He practiced law in New York City with the firm of Coudert Brothers from 1954 to 1957. In 1957 he joined the faculty of Columbia University as Associate Professor of Law, and he became a full Professor in 1960. Professor Gardner left his post as Professor of Law at the Columbia Law School to join the Kennedy Administration in April, 1961.

Professor Gardner received the Arthur S. Fleming Award for 1963 as one of the ten outstanding young men in the Federal Government. As Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, he was concerned with the international organization aspects of numerous foreign policy problems, including disarmament, outer space, trade, and aid to less developed countries. He served as a member of the U.S. delegation to sessions of the U.N. General Assembly and also as a U.S. delegate to meetings of various U.N. Specialized Agencies including the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization,

and the Food and Agriculture Organization. He was Vice-Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. After his return to Columbia University in 1965 he served as Senior Advisor to U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Arthur J. Goldberg.

From 1969–73 he was the U.S. member of the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and is currently a member of the U.S. Government's Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, in which capacity he is participating in the Law of the Sea Conference. In 1970–71 he served as a member of President Nixon's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy. He is a Vice President of the American Society of International Law. He served as a consultant to Maurice Strong, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Program. He participated as a member of the U.N. Secretariat at Stockholm in the drafting of the new U.N. machinery for environmental cooperation. He is also serving as the North-American director of a project on its "Energy Crisis and Relations with Developing Countries" for the Trilateral Commission, a group of leading citizens from Europe, Japan and North America.

Professor Gardner is the author of four books: *Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy; In Pursuit of World Order; Blueprint for Peace;* and *The Global Partnership: International Agencies and Economic Development.* He is currently on a Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship developing material for a book on "Strategies for the Development of International Organizations 1975–2000."

Dr. GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a great honor to follow Senator Fulbright's elegant statement. His basic diagnosis of our problem and his remedies seem to me fully persuasive. Rather than draw upon my statement in details I suggest it might be of greater interest to the committee if I attempt to deal with some of the issues that have been raised this morning in this extraordinarily interesting discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

MEMBERS SHOULD WORK HARDER TO MAKE U.N. MORE WORKABLE INSTITUTION

Dr. GARDNER. This morning you have asked us to answer the question. Is the U.N. working? My answer to that is a qualified yes—the United Nations is working in the sense that it is providing indispensable services to its member nations, including the United States, in peacekeeping and economic cooperation.

My qualification is that the United Nations is not working as well as it should, and that most of the explanation for this fact can be found in the behavior of its members.

As a former British Ambassador to the U.N., Lord Caradon, once said "There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the U.N. except its members."

So we should ask this morning not only whether the United Nations is working, but whether its members, including the United States, are working. I mean working as hard as they should to enable the world organization to perform the tasks assigned to it under the Charter.

I was deeply interested in the emphasis Senator Fulbright placed on negotiated solutions rather than on voting in the United Nations.

PROPOSED STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN U.N. SYSTEM REPORT

At this moment, Mr. Chairman, I am serving as the American member and also as the rapporteur of a so-called group of high level experts appointed by Secretary-General Waldheim to propose struc-

tural changes in the United Nations system. We are in the final stages of writing our report. We hope to complete it next week.

One of the central issues we are addressing is this very question of decisionmaking; and it would not be appropriate for me at this moment to state in a public forum what our conclusions will be, but I believe when the Senate of the United States has an opportunity to see the proposals we are making in this field, it will find they represent progress toward a more rational system of making decisions in the United Nations with emphasis on conciliation among the countries principally concerned, rather than on sterile debate in plenary forums of 138 countries.

ECONOMIC ISSUES OBSERVATIONS

Now, the question was raised by Senator Percy about the special session, the economic charter, and other economic issues. I would like to make an observation on that score.

One of our principal problems in the United Nations is the increasing isolation of the United States, and one reason for the increasing isolation of the United States from the majority of members of the world community is our failure to show a sufficient concern with the priorities of the developing nations.

Senator Percy, in his report on the last General Assembly session, very eloquently emphasized the need to try to strike a bargain with these countries. I would urge that we do a job of preparation for this special session, not merely, Senator Percy, to try to work out the difficulties on that economic charter, and I agree we should try to work those out; but large rhetorical statements are not going to solve our problems in the world. What we have to do is go beyond this economic charter and look at specific issues where we are divided from the developing countries—issues like commodity trade, issues like development assistance, issues like reform of the international monetary system, issues like the control of transnational companies, and finally the issue of restructuring of international agencies, not just the U.N. itself, but the Bank and the Fund and the GATT—General Agreement on Tariff and Trade—to provide a fairer sharing in decisionmaking power between all groups of nations.

If there were time, I would offer some specific ideas on all those subjects, but I am afraid that would take too much time and not be fair to my fellow panelists.

If you are interested, I would like to suggest at a later stage specific things the United States could do in each of these fields to deal with this great economic agenda.

In essence, my philosophy can be summed up in this sentence. We have to strike a new economic bargain with the developing countries in which access to supply, particularly to vital raw materials, energy, and other minerals which we want, is traded for access for the developing countries to markets at fair and remunerative prices for their products, and access to technology, to capital, and to a fairer share of decisionmaking in international economic forums, which up to now have been dominated by the developed countries.

MR. GARDNER'S DISAGREEMENT WITH MOYNIHAN ARTICLE IN "COMMENTARY MAGAZINE"

A third issue has been raised this morning, and that is Ambassador Moynihan and his article in "Commentary."

The article is a brilliant article, as is everything that Pat Moynihan turns his hand to. I would have to say, in all honesty, that I think in several respects it is very wrong. The basic fallacy is that it focuses on the the U.N. as a rhetorical system; but the U.N. is also an action system in which peacekeeping and economic cooperation programs of practical importance provide essential services to member countries.

I don't suggest the rhetoric is of no importance, but I suggest that we would have a better appreciation in this country of the importance of the U.N. if we looked at what is done by the U.N. as opposed to what is said at the U.N.

The issues emphasized by the Moynihan article represent only the tip of the iceberg.

For example, he says that the great global conferences on population, food, and environment were disasters, and in support of that proposition he cites some of the more ridiculous things that were said. But as Senator Clark can testify, the World Food Conference was not a disaster. Out of the World Food Conference, the Bucharest Conference on population, the Stockholm Conference on the Environment, came specific action proposals that are being implemented and that are demonstrably in the interests of the United States of America. And that is totally overlooked in the article.

It is said in the article that every time the United States takes a specific issue to a multilateral forum we lose. That is demonstrably not the fact.

Now, if Ambassador Moynihan does go to the U.N. I have sufficient confidence in his good sense and his brilliance that after he is exposed to the reality of the United Nations he will develop his views further and will turn out to be a very effective representative; but I must state that there are a number of things in the article that I think were most unfortunate and simply wrong factually and analytically.

RECOMMENDED REMEDIES FOR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES IN U.N.

Now, the final thing I would say in closing is that the remedy for our present difficulties in the U.N. is not to downgrade our U.N. participation, not to leave, not to get out of the General Assembly, not to do what columnist William Buckley has proposed, to sit in the General Assembly and not vote. These proposals haven't really been thought through. Leaving the U.N. or any part of it would be what one Israeli friend described to me as "abandoning the battlefield under fire." It would be a very stupid thing to do. We could not protect our national interests if we walked out. We could not vote on important issues in which we have an important stake—the Middle East, disarmament, Cyprus, the budget of the U.N., its personnel system, economic issues, and so on. So it would be very foolish to walk out.

What we need to do is not downgrade our participation but upgrade it. This would mean a new commitment to international institution-building at the top levels of the U.S. Government, the strengthening of our U.N. mission and Assembly delegations, much greater use of our diplomatic strength around the world in support of U.N. positions we believe in, involvement of our European allies and the Soviet Union in the search for a Middle East settlement which will guarantee Israel's security essentially within its 1967 borders, a more imaginative approach to the "world economic bargain" I have mentioned, and a serious search for new decisionmaking procedures in the U.N. in the direction of Senator Fulbright's suggestion which we are working on at this moment in New York in the committee to which I referred.

MORE PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO CONDUCT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY SUGGESTED

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would also say we need in this country a more principled approach to the conduct of our foreign policy. Instead of citing the U.N. Charter and other sources of international law when it suits our short-term interests and ignoring them when it does not, we should recognize our long-term national interests in strengthening the structures and processes of a civilized world community.

We should make a greater effort to use our armed force and economic power on a multilateral basis, submitting disputes wherever possible to third party settlement. We should resort to unilateral action only in very exceptional cases where multilateral processes are clearly unavailable. Any unilateral action on our part should be done in a manner calculated to promote the restoration of multilateral processes. We should abolish the CIA "dirty tricks" department, avoid the excesses of unilateralism that characterized our Vietnam and Dominican interventions, do more to strengthen multilateral processes in foreign economic policy, and show a really objective concern with human rights questions on a global basis—whether within the border of former adversaries, neutrals, allies, or even in our own society. This does not mean unilateral disarmament, and it doesn't mean ignoring valid concerns of national security. What it does mean is recognizing that national security can only be promoted from now on by achieving a better balance between traditional preoccupations with power relations and emerging requirements of global order.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Gardner's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. GARDNER

I am deeply grateful for this opportunity to testify in your hearings on "The United States and the United Nations," the first comprehensive hearings on the United Nations which this Committee has held in twenty years.

This morning you have asked us to answer your question "Is the United Nations Working?" My answer to that question is a qualified yes. The United Nations is working in the sense that it is providing indispensible services to its member nations, including the United States, in peacekeeping and economic cooperation.

My qualification is that the United Nations is not working as well as it should and that most of the explanation for this fact can be found in the behavior of its members. As a former British Ambassador to the United Nations once

remarked: "There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the United Nations—except its members." We should ask not only whether the United Nations is working, but whether its members, including the United States, are working as hard as they should to enable the world organization to perform the tasks assigned to it under the Charter.

I.

Before getting to these questions, it may be helpful to set down a few basic assumptions about the relation of the United Nations to the U.S. national interest. The ultimate objective of United States foreign policy is to promote the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" of the American people. It is increasingly clear that this objective can only be achieved in an international environment congenial to American interests. At the end of the Second World War the United States sought to promote such an environment by creating an institutionalized world order based on the United Nations, the Bretton Woods organizations and GATT. With the onset of the Cold War, the focus of American foreign policy became the creation of a new balance of power to contain the Soviet Union and Communist China. In the thirty years since World War II, "balance of power politics" and "world order politics" have contended for supremacy in U.S. foreign policy-making, with the former steadily gaining ground over the latter.

The capacity of the United States government to promote the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" of the American people still requires the maintenance of a power balance. But the greatest threat to our future security and welfare lies in the distintegration of the international order. We talk of a "structure of peace," yet seldom in history have so many existing structures fallen apart. The United Nations system of collective security has broken down, the Bretton Woods financial system has broken down, the GATT system of open and non-discriminatory trade has broken down, the established arrangements for supplying the world's food and energy needs have broken down, the traditional law of the sea has broken down, and essentially arrangements for population control and environmental protection have yet to be created.

As the world enters the last quarter of the twentieth century, it is more than ever necessary for the United States to re-examine its foreign policy priorities. In this decisive quarter century, the survival of human civilization as we have known it will depend on mankind's capacity to fashion a new international order—specifically, on improved international arrangements to cope with such interrelated problems as population, food, environment, energy, mass poverty, unemployment, inflation and depression, social and political instability, proliferating nuclear and conventional weapons and escalating terrorism and international conflict.

The collapse of the international order cannot be blamed on the United States or any single nation or group of nations. The clash of ideologies, the multiplication of sovereign states, the intensification of nationalism, the drastic changes in the economic balance, the revolutionary changes in science and technology—these developments have combined to shatter the old order before we have been able to build a new one. The United States has been neglectful of "world order politics," but the record of most other countries has been as bad or worse.

Yet the responsibility of the United States is a special one. Viet Nam and "covert operations" notwithstanding, the concept of a community of nations working within a framework of law to promote security, welfare and human rights is an important part of the American tradition. The U.S. contribution—political, economic, scientific and managerial—remains absolutely essential to the building of a global order. The creation of new international structures to replace the collapsing old ones will be impossible in the absence of United States leadership.

The central preoccupation of United States foreign policy from now on ought to be the building of effective international machinery to manage mankind's common problems. Unfortunately, in a divided world of competitive nation-states, we cannot dispense entirely with "balance of power politics" in favor of "world order politics." But we will need to demonstrate the same degree of commitment to "world order politics" that we have demonstrated to "balance of power politics" if we are to have any hope that the latter will one day prove unnecessary.

A commitment of this kind has been notably lacking in recent Administrations, both Republican and Democratic, despite much use of "world order" rhetoric.

U.S. foreign policy has favored short-term considerations over long-term interests, bilateral diplomacy over multilateral institution-building, and political and military responses over economic and functional cooperation. To mention but one example of distorted priorities, we spent thousands of lives and billions of dollars in defense of "national security" in Viet Nam, while neglecting the much greater threat to national security from our growing dependence on Middle East oil.

II.

Let us now look at the central question of today's hearings: "Is the United Nations Working?" To begin with, we need to distinguish between what is said at the United Nations and what is done by the United Nations. The United Nations is really two systems—a *rhetorical* system, in which delegates come to the General Assembly and other forums to debate and make policy recommendations which have no binding force, and an *action* system, in which peacekeeping and economic cooperation programs of practical importance provide essential services to member countries. I do not suggest that the rhetorical system is of no importance, but I do suggest that it is of much less importance than the action system and that the American people would have a more balanced appreciation of the United Nations if they focused more on the latter and less on the former.

Let us take peacekeeping in the Middle East as a specific example. Although recent debates in the United Nations have made many Americans wonder whether support for Israel and support for the United Nations are mutually compatible, the fact remains that the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in the Middle East are very important to Israel as well as to the United States. When Secretary of State Kissinger undertook his extraordinary bilateral diplomacy in the wake of the October 1973 war, he found out that there was literally no way of getting a disengagement of the opposing armies without the interposition of United Nations forces. When the negotiations took place on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force in Syria, it was Israel that wanted a more numerous force with a stronger mandate, and the final arrangements for the force ended up reflecting Israel's point of view much more than Syria's. The United Nations forces in Syria, I should add, have suffered a 10% casualty rate in the first year of operations. The members of the United Nations who are supplying these forces, countries with no direct interest in the Middle East, are thus making a very direct contribution to the maintenance of peace in the area for which we should all be grateful.

It should also be noted with respect to the United Nations forces in the Middle East that, for the first time, they include a contingent from Eastern Europe and that, also for the first time, the Soviet Union is paying its share of the cost. This also represents progress.

Looking toward the future, it seems overwhelmingly likely that a final Middle East settlement will have to involve demilitarized zones and United Nations forces to provide security for all the parties involved.

To generalize the peacekeeping point: in the foreseeable future, the world will need to make increasing use of United Nations peacekeeping forces to monitor ceasefire agreements, patrol borders, supervise elections, and generally to assure adherence to the non-use of force, self determination and non-intervention in internal affairs.

Now let me turn to the other major activity of the United Nations, which is in the field of economic and social cooperation.

In the world of 1975, with the rich nations facing double-digit inflation and rising unemployment, with the poorest nations facing economic stagnation and misery for increasing numbers of their population, and with the sharp confrontation between developed and developing countries over oil, over other vital raw materials, and over almost every economic issue, the cynic reviewing the past thirty years of UN economic experience might be tempted to ask whether ever in human history so many have negotiated over so much with such meager results.

Yet such a conclusion would not be entirely fair to the United Nations and its members. Preoccupation with present difficulties should not blind us to a number of solid achievements. It is too often forgotten that the principal preoccupation of economists at the end of the Second World War was that there would be massive depression and unemployment on the scale of 1929. Not only did this not occur, but the global product (in very round figures) grew from $400 billion a year to over $4 trillion between 1945 and 1975. Even allowing for inflation and population growth, this still represents on the average at least a doubling of real income per capita. To be sure, this increase has been very unevenly dis-

tributed—the citizens of Europe, North America and Japan (and of some more fortunate developing countries such as the major oil producers, Brazil, Turkey, Malaysia and South Korea) have seen their *per capita* real incomes grow by two to three times or more, while the peoples of the Indian sub-continent and of most of Africa have seen little, if any, improvement in their average condition. Moreover, the benefits of progress, as we all know, were very unevenly shared within as well as between countries.

Allowing for all the qualifications, however, the overall record of economic betterment is without precedent in the history of the world. While it would be an over-simplification to give all the credit to the United Nations system of economic institutions, it is clear that the "founding fathers" of the system must have done *something* right.

The International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,[1] to take only the most obvious examples, have provided vitally needed negotiating forums, rules of the game and (in the case of the first two) significant financial resources to cope with monetary, development and trade problems. The World Bank group alone is now providing close to $4 billion a year in resources to developing countries.

Similarly, the United Nations Development Program, together wtih related UN funds for population, environment, children, etc., have made an enormous difference in helping to develop the human and material resources of developing countries. The specialized and affiliated agencies of the United Nations system such as WHO, ILO, FAO and UNESCO have unquestionably been an aid to counties not only in their traditional research and standard-setting activities but in their roles as executing agencies for technical and pre-investment aid. Although the United Nations was originally established primarily as a peace and security agency, some 90% of the $1.5 billion annual budget of the UN system (exclusive of lending by the Fund and Bank) is now devoted to economic cooperation.

But the role of the United Nations as a catalyst for constructive change cannot be judged entirely in terms of technical negotiations and lending operations. One of the most important but least appreciated functions of the UN system is in influencing the political process within member states. The great global conferences held by the United Nations on environment, population, and food, for example, unquestionably helped to marshal scientific evidence, mobilize public opinion, focus the attention of political leaders on hitherto neglected problems and thus significantly influence national policies.

In general, the agencies of the United Nations system have helped articulate the common interest of nations and helped conciliate the adversary interests. They have encouraged governments to take a more international approach and have strengthened the hands of outward-looking leaders in dealing with domestic political opposition. They have taken responsibility for compromises in situations where national leaders could not have taken responsibility alone. Thanks to them, nations have followed better economic policies than they otherwise would have done. In short, these institutions, if not the agencies of world government, have certainly been instruments of a better world economic order.

It is a useful exercise to ask where we would be today had we had no United Nations economic system—no institutions for trade and monetary cooperation, for economic development aid, for agriculture, population and envirnment, for the establishment of safety standards in air and ocean transport, for exchanging weather information, for allocating radio frequencies. Bad as our situation now is, it would have been immeasurably worse—quite possibly beyond repair.

III.

Let me turn now to the problems that the United States and Israel faced at the last General Assembly. The first thing that has to be said about the last General Assembly is that the basic cause of our problem at the UN is not the UN itself. It is the increasing divergence between the United States and the majority of mankind on fundamental issues. I would not agree with those who say that the UN majority is always right—indeed its "double standard" on Middle East, economic and human rights questions is often deplorable—but it is an unhappy fact that United States leadership has been badly damaged by Viet Nam, Water-

[1] GATT is technically not a UN agency, but it was created as a result of a UN conference and functions in close cooperation with the other agencies of the United Nations system.

gate, economic mismanagement and neglect of Third World interests. So if that UN reflection is ugly, it's not the mirror that's to blame.

The PLO vote is an example. People have said to me, "Isn't it absurd what the United Nations did on the PLO; these two-bit countries, this one-nation, one-vote thing has to be stopped." Yet how many of these people realize that the invitation to Yasir Arafat was voted by 105 to 4 with 20 abstentions? In other words, on that vote the United States and Israel were only able to get two countries—Bolivia and the Dominican Republic—to support them. Bolivia and the Dominican Republic!

Some people propose a weighted voting system at the United Nations, based on population, economics, education or what have you. Yet a prorating of power by these criteria would not have altered the PLO vote in our and Israel's favor—if anything, it would have made it worse. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the United Nations mirror is that an overwhelming majority of governments representing an overwhelming majority of mankind is not sympathetic to Israel's diplomatic position and believes that the Palestine Liberation Organization should be associated in the United Nations with the search for a Middle East solution.

What was really damaging to Israel was not anything that happened at the United Nations in recent months—I daresay the publicity given those events and the UNESCO votes stirred worldwide opinion in her favor—but rather the support that the PLO had garnered before it got to the UN. Even the UN resolution recognizing the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people did not fundamentally change Israel's political situation—acceptance of the PLO had already been accomplished at the Arab summit in Rabat, partly as result of Israel's refusal to make a deal with Hussein.

The political isolation of the United States and Israel is one part of the problem at the United Nations; another is the fact that for the past six years—and some would argue it's been longer than that—the US Government has assigned precious little priority to strengthening the United Nations.

Of course, there have been notable exceptions—United States initiatives in the area of environment, population or narcotics have been impressive. But during the Nixon Administration the attitude at the highest levels was one of malign neglect, of weakening the UN rather than strengthening it as an institution. The tone was set early by President Nixon himself when he scrawled on one memo concerning a UN agency: "The hell with this outfit, let's gut it."

Now I don't mean to imply that the United Nations is above criticism. One need only look at the recent report on the deterioration of the Secretariat by former Ambassador Seymour M. Finger, at the lack of coordination between UN agencies and programs, and at the need for reforms in decision-making procedures (not by weighted voting, by the way, but by conciliation and use of small committees with weighted representation). But these and other cracks in the mirror are also due to faulty policies of member governments, including our own, and can be remedied by them. Let's not be like the father I know who neglected his son for years and then complained when the boy was booked on a narcotics charge: "I always knew that kid would never amount to anything."

Some people are now calling for U.S. withdrawal from the U.N. Former Senator Peter Dominick wants us to leave the General Assembly and columnist William Buckley says we should sit there but not vote. I submit that such proposals are unsatisfactory because they have not been thought through.

For the United States to withdraw from the United Nations would be, in the words of a friend from Israel, "desertion of the battlefield under fire." United States withdrawal certainly would not serve Israel's interests; it would leave Israel without the protection of a United States veto in the Security Council. Remember that those United Nations peacekeeping forces under the Council's direction are very important to Israel's interests.

It would be equally foolish to withdraw from the General Assembly or not to exercise our right to vote on items like the U.N. budget, U.N. personnel policy, Israel's right to exist, a Mideast settlement, the role of the Palestinians, the future of the U.N. presence in Korea, disarmament issues and human rights. The "Fortress Security Council" strategy simply won't work, for the simple reason that the ten elected seats are held mainly by developing countries. If we try to write off the Assembly, they have the votes to block action in the Council.

The remedy for our present U.N. difficulties is not to downgrade our U.N. participation but to upgrade it. We need a whole new approach to the U.N. system which would include the following elements:

A new commitment to international institution-building at the top levels of the U.S. Government;

The strengthening of our U.N. Mission and Assembly delegations;

Much greater use of our diplomatic strength in support of U.N. positions we believe in;

Involvement of our European allies and the Soviet Union in the search for a Middle East settlement which will guarantee Israel's security essentially within its 1967 borders;

A more imaginative approach to the "world economic bargain" that needs to be struck with the developing countries; and

And a serious search for U.N. decision-making reforms of the kind referred to earlier.

IV.

I suggested earlier that the need for multilateral agreement and multilateral management would be increasingly with us during the last quarter of the twentieth century. But of course, need along is not enough. Most national leaders around the world do not have to be persuaded that it would be much better to approach key problems on a multilateral basis, usually a global one; the question that troubles them is whether international rules and organizations can be made to work. Unless some major structural weaknesses can be dealt with more effectively, even the existing responsibilities of existing international agencies will slowly wither away, and new responsbility, however badly needed, will simply not be given either to old or new agencies.

Since the structural problems arè political in origin, to remedy them will require not just technical ingenuity but an act of political will on the part of key member-states. The deficiencies of international institutions that governments cite as reasons for bypassing them are of the government's own making. Some acts of creative statesmanship are needed to break out of the vicious circle. To paraphrase a slogan of the peace movement: "All we are saying is, give the international organizations a chance."

The most obvious structural problem is in the decision-making process. How to equiliberate voting power, not just with national sovereignty but with responsibility for implementing decisions, is a riddle that continues to plague the international agencies. It is understandable that large and middle-sized powers will not grant significant authority to a General Assembly where countries representing less than ten percent of the population of the total membership and less than four percent of the budget can take decisions by a two-thirds majority. It is equally obvious that the "principle of unanimity" under which any one country can veto action is not a recipe for progress.

Fortunately, there are a number of methods that have been developed to assure that influence in decision-making bears a reasonable relationship to power in the real world and to the responsibility for implementing decisions. Weighted voting is the most obvious, but the assigning of differential voting rights is often non-negotiable. Other approaches deserve greater attention: "double majorities" (requiring a majority of all the members plus a majority of specially defined categories of members); "weighted representation" (delegating decision-making to a small committee in which the countries that are most important in the particular subject matter have more than their normal proportion of seats); "bicameralism" (in which decisions must first be adopted by a small committee with weighted representation and then by the membership as a whole); and "conciliation" (deferring a vote for a "cooling-off period" of further negotiations at the request of a specified minority of countries).

Obviously no one decision-making formula will be applicable across the board. Different structures are required for different functions—what is appropriate in a new oceans agency may not be appropriate in multilateral development assistance. Moreover, the decision-making reforms that are needed will not always adjust power in the same direction. The United States will justifiably seek "a GATT within the GATT" where decisions can be taken by the key trading nations on some special voting basis rather than on one-nation one-vote formula among 86 contracting parties. At the same time, it can reasonably be asked to concede a greater voice in the IMF and World Bank to Japan and the Arab countries, whose voting power does not adequately reflect their financial power. To be sure, changes in outmoded or unreasonable decision-making arrangements may be opposed initially by the countries that presently have more than their fair share of influence. The challenge to multilateral diplomacy—

and one that has not been seriously faced so far—is to persuade the countries that are overendowed with power in a particular institution that a fairer sharing is needed to save the institution from creeping irrelevance and make it more effective on matters of interest to them.

A related but separate structural problem is how to improve present arrangements for creating, adapting, interpreting and enforcing international law—what some would call the "normative process." The development of new rules of law has become both more cumbersome and more politicized—we need only contrast the highly political 90-member preparatory committee that was used for the current Law of the Sea negotiations with the small and expert International Law Commission that prepared the texts for the Law of the Sea conventions of 1958. While the membership explosion of the U.N. system makes it politically impossible to return completely to the old ways of doing things, the common interest of all countries in the orderly development of new rules of international law suggests that greater use of small and expert bodies should be made in the preparatory stage of law-making conferences.

Once the rules have been created, we need better arrangements for adapting them in the light of rapid and possibly unforeseen changes in political, economic or scientific circumstances. The traditional amendment process is as unsatisfactory a means for modernizing treaties on oil pollution from tankers as it is for modernizing the GATT provisions on nontariff barriers. A possible formula here is the delegation of power to small and expert groups to promulgate changes in the rules, subject to an "opting out" privilege for countries that do not wish to accept the changes. With respect to interpretation and application of the rules, we will need to have greater resort, in such diverse contexts as trade and environmental protection, to fact-finding, conciliation and arbitration by disinterested third parties. Finally, we will need to find better ways of enforcing the rules, as by multilateral action that denies benefits and applies punishments. As has been noted, where essential community interests are threatened, as for example in hijacking, marine pollution or the withholding of vital raw materals, action may need to be taken not only against those who ratify the rules and then break them but against those who refuse to accept the rules at all.

A third structural problem that must be mentioned is the crisis in morale and effectiveness that now afflicts the international civil service. Though a few international agencies may be exempt from this generalization, in most of them the concepts of independence and efficiency have been badly eroded by political pressures, particularly the excessive emphasis given to the concept of "equitable geographical distribution." If the vitality of the international agencies is to be assured, more must be done to apply standards of excellence in recruitment, promotion and selection out. Greater efforts should be made to fill senior positions with outstanding persons from the professional, scientific and business worlds, rather than predominantly, as is now the case, with persons on loan from member-governments. As with the other structural problems, what is required here is a change in national behavior resulting from a new perception by key governments of their enlightened self-interest.

A final structural problem is how to coordinate and rationalize the fragmented system of international agencies. Governments are encountering increasing difficulties in coping with the proliferating conference schedule and the bewildering variety of secretariats that deal with separate pieces of a total problem. The need here is not just to cut overlapping and wasteful activities, but to clarify responsibility for taking and implementing decisions. It involves both functional coordination (e.g., the respective responsibilities for balance of payments adjustment between IMF, GATT and OECD), and regional coordination (e.g., the division of functions on air pollution between the U.N. institutions and agencies like NATO, OECD, and the Council of Europe). Once again, the problem is fundamentally political, since the proliferation is partly the result of "forum shopping" by governments which wish to promote a favorable outcome, and partly the result of the launching of special purpose programs (e.g., on population, environment, and narcotics) financed by voluntary contributions from governments which feel they cannot achieve their objectives within the U.N.'s central policy and budget process.

A generation ago the central problem was to create new institutions where none existed; today it is to get several hundred functional and regional commissions, boards, committees and secretariats to work together effectively. Perhaps the most difficult obstacle in the way of the objective is the projection into the international organizations of the fragmented system of "portfolio government" that still characterizes most of the major countries. Governments will have to do a

better job of coordinating themselves if the functional approach is to produce a coherent system of international institutions. The special session of the General Assembly on economic issues scheduled for September of this year provides a useful opportunity for governments to clarify their objectives and improve their internal processes for the achievement of this purpose.

V.

Now let me close by suggesting some fundamental things the United States should be doing in the United Nations and multilateral institutions generally.

One obvious and pressing need is to take a hard look at the way the American government is organized to cope with the present sweep of multilateral negotiations. Multilateral diplomacy increasingly cuts across the interests of many domestic departments. The effort to resolve foreign policy conflicts between agencies has led during the past decade to excessive concentration of power in the White House. The new practice of having cabinet officers like the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury double as assistants to the President, with responsibility for directing policy in certain areas, offers a new opportunity to coordinate our approach to different multilateral negotiations, achieve consistent solutions to structural problems, involve the necessary disciplines and interest groups in the policy process, and exploit potential "trade-offs" between different negotiating sectors. The staff of the National Security Council (NSC) could be used more than it has been to achieve these objectives. Alternatively, a new senior White House aide could be appointed to discharge this responsibility.

Moreover, for many of the multilateral negotiations discussed earlier, we could establish an interagency task force as a sub-group of the NSC, with a supporting staff in the executive department most directly concerned with the subject matter. The model could be the NSC interagency task force on the law of the sea and the new office established in the State Department for the law of the sea negotiations. It would also be useful for many of the ongoing negotiations to appoint an outstanding professional from within the government or from private life to serve as Ambassador-at-Large to direct the U.S. negotiating team. Regular congressional consultation and private-sector involvement through a working (not ceremonial) public advisory group—as is now the case on the law of the sea—could assure a more open and democratic policy-making process.

It is people, of course, not just boxes on organizational charts, that determine the effectiveness of a nation's policy process. Our ambassadors to the United Nations and other international agencies should be individuals with broad experience and deep substantive knowledge; their staffs should consist of the best talent our country can make available, not only from the foreign service but from the business, academic, professional and scientific communities. We will know we are serious about our "world order business" when we stop using positions in our missions and delegations to international agencies for political payoffs, and start applying the same requirements of excellence here that we apply in negotiations with the Russians and Chinese. Another test of our seriousness will be the extent to which we include in the very top structure of decision-making—in the White House and the key executive departments—persons experienced in and committed to the multilateral approach.

Third, we need to put a new emphasis on world order issues in our bilateral negotiations with former adversaries, nonaligned nations, and old allies. In particular, this would mean using our negotiating leverage to encourage the Russians and Chinese to take a more affirmative position on such matters as the law of the sea, international programs to curb population growth, U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. financing, and the reform of the decision-making processes along the lines mentioned earlier. This will be a difficult and long-term effort, but there will be a growing number of people in both countries who understand the necessity of tackling such issues in a cooperative and non-dogmatic way; we could strengthen their hand by the right kinds of initiatives. For example, we have created a dozen U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral commissions as the result of the summit meetings: we could use the SALT Commission to explore the possibilities of mutual nonintervention by the superpowers in Third-World areas and of limiting the spread of nuclear and conventional arms; we could seek support for global health and population programs in the bilateral health commission; and we could press in the environmental commission for Soviet cooperation in global efforts to curb whaling, protect ocean fisheries, and regulate land-based sources of marine pollution. We could place a similar priority on world order issues in our relations with the European countries and Japan both bilaterally and in

regional forums like NATO and OECD. And we could work harder to strike a "world order bargain" with the developing countries—showing more interest in their priorities in order to encourage their support for ours.

Most important of all, we need a more principled approach to the conduct of foreign policy. Instead of citing the U.N. Charter and other sources of international law when it suits our short-term interest and ignoring them when it does not, we would recognize our long-term interest in strengthening the norms and processes of a civilized world community. We would make a greater effort to use our armed force and economic power consistently with multilateral undertakings and with other sources of international law, submitting disputes wherever possible to third-party settlement. We would resort to unilateral action only in very exceptional circumstances where multilateral processes were clearly unavailable, and any unilateral action on our part would be carried out in a manner calculated to promote the restoration of multilateral processes. To be specific, we would abolish the CIA's "dirty tricks" department, avoid the excesses of unilateralism that characterized our Vietnam and Dominican interventions, do more to strengthen multilateral processes in foreign economic policy, and show a really objective concern with human rights questions on a global basis—whether within the borders of former adversaries, neutrals, allies or in our own society. This does not mean unilateral disarmament or ignoring valid concerns of national security. It does mean recognizing that national security can only be promoted from now on by achieving a better balance between traditional preoccupations with power relationships and emerging requirements of global order.

Implicit in all these recommendations is a redefinition of our foreign policy objectives. We would make it clear that a "structure of peace" cannot be achieved merely by maintaining a precarious balance between five power centers—that it requires strengthened international institutions at the global and regional levels in which all interested nations have a chance to participate. By making "world order business" our central preoccupation we could help rebuild support for our foreign policy at home and abroad by identifying our purposes more closely with those of the rest of mankind. By demonstrating a commitment to constructive internationalism, we could find common ground between generations as well as political parties.

Were we to commit ourselves fully to the multilateral approach, were we to enlist the energies of our Congress and our citizens, were we to exploit to the full what leverage we still have with other nations, we might begin, very gradually, to deflect the divisive tendencies of nationalism that are now emerging and to exploit the latent possibilities for strengthening the international system. Some may object that a generation of arduous and possibly futile negotiations on specific functional problems is not a very inspiring prospect to put before a democratic electorate. The road to world order is indeed a long and hard one, but since the short cuts do not lead anywhere we have no choice but to take it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, now we will hear from Dr. Yeselson. [Dr. Yeselson's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF DR. ABRAHAM YESELSON

Abraham Yeselson: 226 Grant Avenue; Highland Park, New Jersey 08904; Telephone: (201) 249-8232.

General data.—Born April 5, 1921, in New York City. World War II Veteran; Married; one daughter born June 5, 1960.

Degrees.—B.A., M.A., Rutgers University, 1946, 1947. Ph. D., Brown University, 1954.

Teaching experience.—Teaching Assistant, Brown University, 1948–50. Lecturer, Swarthmore College, 1950–51. Rutgers University, 1951 to present.

Ranks and titles.—Full Professor Political Science. Chairman, Political Science Department, University College, Rutgers—The State University. Chairman, Political Science Section (all 5 undergraduate colleges), Rutgers—The State University, 1966–68. Member, Graduate Faculty, Rutgers—The State University. Special Assistant to the Dean for Curricular Development and Long-Range Planning, 1969–70.

Courses taught in universities.—International Organization (graduate and undergraduates courses); World Politics; World Communist; U.S. Foreign Policy; American Government; American Political Parties and Pressure Groups.

University committees.—Have served on nearly all important College Committees and many University Committees, including the Presidential Search Committee, 1970–71.

Television series.—20 Half-hour lectures, "Communism: Evolution of a Revolution," on NBC–TV (series shown three times in New York City, 1964). 54 Half-hour lectures, "The Politics of Peace," on CBS–TV network, Summer, 1965. This is a historical treatment of the role of International Organization, emphasizing the United Nations. 54 Half-hour programs, "Eisenhower: America at Mid-Century," for CBS–TV network, Summer, 1970. An analysis of the Eisenhower Administration and of the United States in the 1950s. 54 Half-hour programs, "East against West: The Cold War and Beyond,' for CBS–TV network, Summer, 1972.

Teaching experience abroad.—Fulbright Professor, University of Helsinki in Finland, 1959–60. Summer School, Tampere, Finland, 1960. Seminar in Political and Social Science, Nice, France, Summer, 1960. Fulbright Professor, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, University of Toulouse, France, 1967–68.

Lectures at Universities or with University-U.S.I.A. sponsorship, 1967–68.—France: Institut d'Etudes Politiques ih Montpellier, Aix-en-Provence, Bordeaux and Paris. Germany: Frankfort, Cologne, Hannover, Kiel, Regensburg, Berlin. Panel member at Conference on "The Dimensions of Science in Politics" at Locum. Finland: Helsinki Summer Institute.

Planned and participated in first Rutgers Summer Program in Israel (1970), a seven-week program for college credit which utilized the land and people of Israel, as well as the resources of the Hebrew University. Director, Rutgers Junior Year in France, 1973–74. Taught course in International Organization in Tourse.

Publications and scholarship.—Books: United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations. 1883–1921, Rutgers University Press, 1956. (with Charles Blackmore, eds.) *The Fabric of Democracy,* American Book Company. Second edition, a complete and enlarged revision, appeared in 1969. (with Anthony G. Gaglione) *A Dangerous Place: United Nations as a Weapon in International Politics,* Viking, 1974.

Articles: (with David Knapp) "Finland's Manager Plan," *National Civic Review,* February 1961. "The Meaning of Israel in World Politics," *Jewish News,* September 8, 1961. "La Position Politique de la Cour Supreme Des Etats Unis," *La Justice* (Paris, 1961). "A Third Party for Labor," *Labor Education Viewpoints,* Fall, 1961. "The Assessments Crisis in the United Nations," in *The Fabric of Democracy* (New York, 1966). "American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age," in *National Council of the Social Sciences Yearbook* (New York, 1966). A revision of this article appeared in Blackmore and Yeselson, *The Fabric of Democracy,* Second Edition. Six articles on "The United Nations and the Middle East Crisis," *The Daily Home News,* New Brunswick, New Jersey, June 25–June 30, 1967. "Les rapports entre les aspirants a la Presidence americaine et la question vietnamienne." *La Revue des Sciences Politiques* (Toulouse), Summer, 1968. "Challenges To An Adult College," Rutgers—The State University, 1971–72. (with Anthony G. Gaglione) "The UN: A Dangerous Place," *Worldview,* January, 1975. (with Anthony G. Gaglione) "What Really Happened When Arafat Spoke at the UN," *Worldview,* March, 1975 (with Anthony G. Gaglione) "The Use of the United Nations in World Politics," *Intellect,* April, 1975.

Present Research: The Impact of Politicization of Human Rights at the United Nations (book). North Against South: The Future of the United Nations (book).

Reviews: In *American Political Science Review; Labor History; The Middle East Journal.*

Professional Societies and Activities.—Rutgers University delegate to U.S. Mission to United Nations for briefings on United Nations Policy, 1963 to present. Labor arbitrator on panel of American Arbitration Association and New Jersey State Board of Mediation.

Lecturing and Consultations: Has given over 150 lectures and/or short courses on political subjects, and especially problems concerning labor, labor in politics, labor history, etc. (e.g. fifteen consecutive years, 1950–1964, lecturer at the University of Rhode Island Steelworker Summer Institute). He also served as consultant on labor problems for labor and management groups. Lecturer-Consultant to U.S. Department of Labor on programs involving teams of trade-unionists from Europe Africa, and Latin America. *AT&T Seminar, 1969–1971.* Planned, headed, and taught in "World Around Us" section of Seminar for AT&T Long Lines

Division executives. This seminar lasted for two weeks of each month and involved about 600 AT&T executives.

Research Grant: Rutgers Research Council Grant for Spring Semester, 1967, to make a study of the Relevance of the United Nations to the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Faculty Study Leave, 1975–1976. To research materials on the role of the UN in respect to Human Rights and Economic and Social development.

STATEMENT OF DR. ABRAHAM YESELSON, CHAIRMAN, POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Dr. YESELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators.

I have a short statement and I will keep within the allotted time.

I feel a bit like the wicked witch in this distinguished company, especially after hearing the first two addresses by Senator Fulbright and Mr. Gardner.

I am especially unhappy to disagree so much with Senator Fulbright because I borrowed his name three times as a Fulbright Professor and I am certainly indebted to him, but I think I might precede my statement by presenting my motivation.

Like so much of my generation I came out of World War II as an idealist and believed that that war had a meaning and that we could build a better world. I wrote a Master's thesis on world federalism and went to Brown University to study with the man I considered to be the outstanding expert in international organization, Leland Goodrich.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of your war service and I just happened to think I served in World War I. You know that was the war to make the world safe for democracy.

Dr. YESELSON. Yes. Well, both of us may be suffering from disillusionment.

The CHAIRMAN. We must keep the faith.

"WHO BRINGS WHAT ISSUES TO THE U.N. AND WHY?"

Dr. YESELSON. In my case I am not here surfacing as a new Cord Meyer. What has happened to me is that over a long period of time I began to question the knowledge which had been imparted to me and the theories upon which they were based and I came out in a very funny place in a very uncomfortable place. I came out in a place which says in effect that the proper approach to the United Nations is not from the aspect of the ideals of the Charter or the principles of the organization, but that in order to understand what happens there and how the organization is used, and especially its impact on conflict, it's necessary to approach the organization from the point of view of the motivation of those who use the organization. It took me, perhaps because I am slow, some 15 years to ask a new question. The new question was, "who brings what issues to the United Nations and why?"

And from that perspective those explanations for what happened at the United Nations acquired a completely different meaning. I understood things better and I believe that I now have the basis for really analyzing how the United Nations contributes to conflict.

From this point of view I answer your fundamental question by saying, yes, the United Nations is working but it is not working for advancing the purposes of the Charter, the principles of the organization, and it is not working in the interests of American foreign policy.

INSTRUMENT FOR ADVANCEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY CONFLICT PURPOSES

I am not going to be presumptuous and try to advise you on what American foreign policy should be; but if we view the United Nations, we see clearly that it is now an instrument for the advancement of the foreign policy of those who can dominate it. The targets of attack are apartheid in South Africa, colonialism in Rhodesia and elsewhere such as Puerto Rico, Israel, and it is also used as a weapon for the advancement of particular economic approaches to the problems of north and south, rich against poor.

These are the issues which dominate the organization. They will continue to do so. Other issues will be added. The Panama Canal issue, the South Korean issue, retention of American troops there.

I think we can predict if relations become worse between the United States and China, and/or between China and the Soviet Union, that new issues involving China will be introduced—Chinese attacks on the Soviet Union in respect to border difficulties, on the United States in respect to Taiwan, perhaps the British in Hong Kong. In every instance, using various strategies which I cannot detail here, states advance national interests, introducing an issue into the United Nations is always for the achievement of a conflict purpose. The effect is always to embitter relations among the States and the impact on the conflict as a result of the introduction of this weapon is to widen the conflict and make it more difficult to solve peacefully and less likely that the dispute will be resolved.

EXAMPLES OF U.N. CONTRIBUTION TO CONFLICT

From my peculiar point of view I find, for example, that the Middle East conflict is in large part a result of the United Nations intervention, and that if peace will be achieved there it will be achieved in spite of the United Nations.

This was precisely what Mr. Kissinger's mediation mission was all about, and I know what I have to say here will have to be subject to questions and perhaps emotional attacks, or what have you, but I think we can go into that a bit later.

The same is true in respect to the Koreans. After 25 years of resolutions at the United Nations, essentially in support of South Korea, if and when any normalization of relations will be achieved in the Koreas, it will be accomplished in spite of what has happened at the United Nations and not because of what has happened.

The same is true in respect to Kashmir.

U.S. CAPACITY TO FIGHT RHETORIC ATTACKS

The United States is now a direct or indirect target of majorities at the United Nations; but unlike other States, such as, say, South Africa, or Israel, who do not have the capacity to fight back, because they do not have the national strength and influence to do so, the United States does retain considerable influence. We demonstrated this by winning narrow victories in the 29th Assembly in respect to what I call the status politics involving the attempt to have Prince Sihanouk replace Lon Nol, and in defeating the effort to have American troops removed from South Korea.

Now, when we are under attack, I think that it is a normal and instinctive reaction to retaliate, to reduce support for the organization which is being used in that way; and I think we have seen some steps in this direction to reduce the percentage of financial support, and so forth.

As I say here, it is hardly reasonable for a country to buy the club which is used to bash in its head, but we should keep in mind that our financial contributions to the United Nations are minimal. If we do not continue to pay what we have paid then that slack will be taken up by others, and especially the oil wealthy Arab states. And another way of responding to attack is by official denunciations of the organization.

In spite of this approach, and its implications, I do not suggest that we take such steps. I oppose such steps, and precisely for the reason that Professor Gardner mentioned, when he spoke of the Israeli who said that they should not abandon the battlefield when they are under fire. It is a battlefield.

The things which are most important to us and the peoples of the world are under fire at the United Nations, and it is precisely for that reason that we should support the United Nations by contributing maximum diplomatic coin. We must, I think, do this precisely because the organization is constantly used for conflict purposes. I think this is true for the reason which was stated basically by Senator Clark in his question to Senator Fulbright, because of nationalism and sovereignty. It is nationalism and sovereignty which prevent the establishment of a community.

NATIONALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY PREVENT ESTABLISHMENT OF COMMUNITY

You do not create a community by creating an organization and saying there are community objectives. If the community does not exist, they will use the organization for selfish purposes in the name of principles stated in the Charter, and that I think is precisely what has happened. The PLO issue, I think, we must recognize was as direct an attack upon the peace in the Middle East as the attack on the hotel in Tel Aviv. It had the same objective to make it more difficult, especially for the Egyptians, to negotiate. Those who support it, introducing the PLO issue into the United Nations, did so in order to stymie negotiation at Geneva, or by Secretary of State Kissinger. They made it that much more difficult for Egypt to defy what would now be regarded as the opinion of mankind, that only the Palestinian Arabs had rights throughout Palestine, which is where the ultimate resolution came out, since it did not mention Israel in that area, or Israeli rights.

SUPPORT FOR MORE REALISTIC VIEW OF UNITED NATIONS URGED

I say if it is our calculation that the attack on South Africa, let us say, through expulsion of South Africa, would result in a further repression of blacks in South Africa, by the white government, and if we believe that the attack on South Africa through the United Nations makes more likely racial war in Southern Africa, that is all the more reason for our presence in the organization and using our

influence there and outside the organization to prevent this from occurring.

There are very difficult tasks for the United States because we have a history in the organization. We did dominate the organization in the first 20 years. We were able to use it in support of American foreign policy. When we now attempt to take steps to minimize the use of the organization for conflict purposes, we will be accused of having changed only because the organization is no longer useful to us. Despite that, this is no reason, not to take this tack. What it does mean is that it is much more difficult for us to do so.

PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT NECESSARY

In other words, what I urge upon you, Ambassador Moynihan when he finally arrives in that place, and the Government generally, is that you support what I would regard as a more realistic view of the organization and make this view better known to the American people, a people who have been brought up on devotion to the principle of having such an organization. It is necessary in order to do these hard things that you obtain support from the American people, especially when you find it necessary to bypass the organization, to oppose the decisions taken in the organization.

You must help create an American public opinion which will be understanding of why those positions are taken, and which will support them.

It is not an easy task but I wish you godspeed in it.

Thank you.

[Mr. Yeselson's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM YESELSON

It is difficult for me to respond to the question of how well the United Nations is working in the 1970s without saying a few words about the perspective from which I approach the subject. I see the United Nations as an arena for combat. States use the Organization to advance national conflict positions, and their estimates of its utility depend upon the extent to which it serves those ends. The starting point of analysis, therefore, is: "Who brings what issue to the United Nations and why?"

From this viewpoint, I can state that the United Nations *is* working, but not in the interests of international peace or of the foreign policy of the United States. Generally speaking, the countries which now dominate the Organization use it against colonialism, Apartheid in South Africa, Israel, and to support certain approaches to the economic problems of the developing world. These issues, with some additions, such as Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal Zone and South Korea will continue to monopolize debate in the United Nations. That list may be supplemented in the future by Chinese attacks against the Soviet Union, Taiwan, or Hong Kong.

The purpose in all cases is national advantage and the effect is to embitter relations between the parties. Clearly, the United Nations is now an instrument useful primarily to the developing countries and Communist States although it will be less valuable for the Soviet Union than for China.

Although the United States is now a direct or indirect target of majority in the United Nations, this country retains considerable influence and is still capable of avoiding defeats on some issues. This was demonstrated on items concerning the status of troops in South Korea and the legitimacy of the Lon Nol government during the 29th General Assembly. Nevertheless, the speech by Ambassador John Scali on December 6, 1974 to the Assembly reflects real dilemmas for the United States in the United Nations.

A normal, instinctive reaction to assaults in the United Nations is to reduce support for the Organization. After all, it is hardly reasonable to buy the club

which is used to bash in one's head. But financial contributions are minimal in proportion to our wealth or national budget, and the void will be filled by others, especially the oil-wealthy Arab States. Retreat could also take the form of reducing the amount and quality of diplomatic input, and by official denunciations of the Organization.

I would oppose such steps. It is precisely because the United Nations is used as a weapon that we must invest important diplomatic capital there. When certain States used the Assembly during the last Special Session to define world economic issues as a confrontation between the wealthy industrialized nations and the developing world, the possibility of a cooperative approach to very real and tragic problems is diminished. We must counter such tactics while explaining publicly and privately the reasons behind the American position. The P.L.O. issue was raised to block peace negotiations in Geneva and by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It is imperative that we stand against such attacks against the peace and retain maximum flexibility of action. If it is our calculation that expulsion of South Africa will result in an even greater repression of blacks and contribute to the possibility of racial war in Africa, it is necessary to make those points while retaining the ability to use our influence constructively. On a less obvious level, some developing countries and especially Communist China are initiating issues and employing debating tactics in order to force the United States and the Soviet Union apart, thereby threatening the developing of détente .Only an alert and close attention to such maneuvers in the United Nations can frustrate these designs.

These are formidable tasks. As part of the new minority, we must attempt to prevent dangerous issues from being politicized in the United Nations. Inside and without the Organization we must exert our efforts to prevent adoption of resolutions which rigidify positions and create obstacles to negotiations. We must impress others with the dangers which flow from public polemics. It will be argued that the United States did not show this concern about abuse of the United Nations during the first twenty years of the Cold War. That charge was repeated again and again during the debate which followed Ambassador Scali's speech. This perception does not alter the necessity of acting in the manner I have described. It just makes the job that much more difficult.

Obviously, this government faces hard problems. We romanticized the role of the United Nations and majority rule, especially when the Organization implemented American foreign policy. It will be extraordinarily difficult now to rationalize continued involvement in an Organization which sponsors wars, passes one-sided or unenforceable resolutions, provides forums for international insult instead of diplomacy, and is guilty of the most outrageous examples of selective justice. Perhaps it will be impossible for the American people to overcome disillusion and they will demand withdrawal from the world body. Because such action is inimical to our interests and those of world peace, I urge you, Ambassador Daniel Moynihan, and other responsible officials to publilicize honestly and soberly the reasons for our continued participation. By recognizing the United Nations as a dangerous weapon, you will be better able to discount its pernicious effects. You will be less discouraged in your support for quiet diplomacy, mediation, efforts to avert nuclear or environmental catastrophes, and contribute better to social and economic justice for the peoples of the world. Clearer perception of the World Organization will facilitate the search for appropriate means of accomplishing these ends, which reality and good sense demand, and which must be pursued in spite of the uses made of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. Joseph Segel, former chairman of the Board of Governors, United Nations Association.

We are glad to have you with us.

[Mr. Segel's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JOSEPH M. SEGEL

Joseph M. Segel, founder of The Franklin Mint, retired as chairman of the corporation on December 31, 1973, and is now a consultant to the company. He is currently serving as Chairman of The Segel Foundation, a non-profit trust

engaged in research and education programs focused on the development of new approaches to international cooperation.

Mr. Segel was appointed by President Ford as a member of the United States delegation to the 29th General Assembly of the United Nations. During that session, which met from September, 1974, Mr. Segel was involved in reviewing and presenting the United States' position on six issues; peacekeeping guidelines, freedom of information, disaster relief, apartheid environmental modification and strengthening the role of the United Nations.

Mr. Segel also recently completed a two-year term as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. He declined to accept renomination as Chairman at the biennial convention of the UNA–USA in April 1975, but will continue as a member of the association's Board of Governors for the period 1975–1977.

EARLY HISTORY

Mr. Segel was born in Philadelphia on January 9, 1931.

After graduation from the University of Pennsylvania in 1951, Mr. Segel joined the faculty of the University's Wharton School of Finance and Commerce. During this period of time, he established The Advertising Specialty Institute, which grew into the central information service of the specialty advertising industry. He left the university in 1953 to devote full time to that business.

In 1961, The Advertising Specialty Institute and its affiliated companies were acquired by National Business Services, Inc. Mr. Segel continued as Chairman of the Board of Directors of National Business Services, Inc., for three additional years.

Then, in 1964, at age 33, he embarked on a new career in the numismatic field. He founded The National Commemorative Society, which introduced many new concepts to collectors of medallic art. In the same year he founded The Franklin Mint, which has since become the world's largest private minting organization—with operations in eleven countries, more than 2,000 employees and annual volume exceeding $150 million.

CURRENT ACTIVITIES—1975

Chairman, Board of Trustees, The Segel Foundation, Philadelphia; President, Le Mirador, S.A., Mont Pelerin, Switzerland; Board of Governors, United Nations Association of the United States of America; Board of Directors, World Affairs Council of Philadelphia; National Commission for the Observance of World Population Year, Department of State, Washington; Fine Arts Committee, Department of State, Washington; Founder Member, International Peace Academy, New York; Fellow, Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts, Philadelphia.

PAST ACTIVITIES

Chairman, Board of Governors, United Nations Association of the U.S.A., 1973–1975; Delegate (Alternate United States Representative) to the 29th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 1974; Chairman, Board of Trustees, The Franklin Foundation, 1969–1974; Chairman, Board of Directors, Franklin Mint Corporation, 1972–1973; President, The Franklin Mint, 1964–1971; Chairman, Board of Directors, National Business Services, Inc., 1962–1964; Chairman, Board of Trustees, Customer Relations Research Foundation, 1963–1964; President, Jordan Edwards Co., 1962–1964; Editor & Publisher, The Counselor Magazine, 1954–1963; President, The Advertising Specialty Institute, 1951–1962; Founder and Secretary Emeritus, Advertising Specialty Guild of America (Now Specialty Advertising Association), 1957–1960.

AWARDS AND HONORS

1974—Medal of Merit Award—American Numismatic Association; 1974—Super Achiever Award—Juvenile Diabetes Foundation; 1973—Man of the Year—Great Eastern Numismatic Association; 1973—Marketing Man of the Year Award—Direct Mail Advertising Association; 1972—William Hunt Eisman Award—Philadelphia Chapter of the American Society of Metals; 1971—Humanitarian Award—The Chapel of Four Chaplains; 1970—Industrial Progress Award—Delaware County Chamber of Commerce; 1969—Howard G. Ford Award—Sales and Marketing Executives of Philadelphia.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH M. SEGEL, FORMER CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF GOVERNORS, UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION; U.S. ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE 29TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mr. SEGEL. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I thank you very much for this invitation to appear before the committee and I will address myself directly to your question, "Is the U.N. working?"

I would have to answer yes, when its member nations allow it to work.

That, in a nutshell, is the problem with the U.N. It has no sovereignty. It has virtually no authority. It is simply a place where the representatives of 138 sovereign nations can either work together, or make trouble, as their governments so direct.

Fortunately, they work together more often than they make trouble.

Unfortunately, the public does not know this. It is the trouble that makes the front pages.

SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS DO CONSTRUCTIVE WORK

The constructive work of the U.N. is done mostly in the specialized agencies and voluntary organizations. There are about two dozen of them that are integral parts of the U.N. system—such as the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Environment Program, the Fund for Population Activities, UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund), etc. It is in these groups that men and women of good will, from all parts of the world, are allowed to work together with a minimum of interference from their national governments, and thus things get done.

This is the real U.N.—nations united, and people united, in cooperative work for the common good. It is a U.N. that very few people know about. But the economic, social and humanitarian organs of the U.N. actually are the areas in which about 80 to 90 percent of the U.N. budget is expended.

It is through these specialized agencies and voluntary organizations that many things have been accomplished, which we take for granted. Such as the elimination of vaccinations for smallpox, thanks to a U.N. program that has wiped out that dreaded disease in all but four countries. Being able to mail a letter with U.S. postage and have it delivered anywhere in the world. Expediting relief to victims of major earthquakes, floods and other natural disasters. Flying and landing safely in any country because a U.N. agency made English the common language for all commercial pilots and control towers around the world. Training farmers in developing countries to increase their agricultural production. Providing population control education where it is most needed. Coordinating worldwide research findings on cancer. And so forth.

This is indeed just a small sampling of what goes on at the U.N. The U.N. environment program alone, which is only about 3 years old, has 150 different projects underway. And many of these projects are vital to the future protection of the air and the seas we share with

the other nations of the world. International cooperation stifled by shortsighted attitudes of national governments.

The common ingredient in all of these activities is international cooperation. It flourishes in its natural habitat—the U.N. Yet all too often it is stifled by the shortsighted attitudes of national governments.

Take the International Court of Justice for example. It is hardly ever mentioned these days. I hope it is still in existence. Last time I heard of it, it was a body of excéptionally distinguished jurists who certainly could be depended upon to render a fair and impartial decision in any international dispute. The problem is that very few national leaders want a fair and impartial decision. They just want to win. And they have the power to do as they please.

And then we have the General Assembly. The General Assembly, which so many people refer to as "the U.N." When you read about the U.N. in the newspapers from September through December, it is really mostly the General Assembly that is being referred to. The General Assembly has become a big headache for the United States. We created the concept of one nation—one vote, and now it is coming back to haunt us. We made the most of the majority we virtually controlled during the early years of the U.N., often forcing the Soviet Union to cast a veto in the Security Council to protect its interests, and now the tables are turned. But, it is not really the Soviet bloc that is giving us our problems in the General Assembly. It is now the third world, in its various incarnations, treating us like a Gulliver rendered helpless by dozens of Lilliputians.

NEGOTIATION, CONCILIATION SUGGESTED AS PRACTICAL ANSWER TO PROBLEMS

So what shall we do? Walk away from the General Assembly as some suggest? Continue participating in the debate, but voluntarily suspend our voting? Or should we come out fighting and try to change the world with a new brand of fiery rhetoric?

I respectfully submit that none of these proposed solutions is a practical answer. Leaving the General Assembly or voluntarily suspending our voting would surely be cutting off our nose to spite our face. It would further isolate us in the world and do great damage to our relations with many countries. Moreover, although the General Assembly is still primarily an advisory body, there are many resolutions which we would want to support because they are harmonious with our interests and reflect positions and principles which are important to our society.

In fact, if you look at our votes in the last General Assembly, where Senator Percy and Senator Symington very ably served on the delegation representing the United States, it is interesting to note that we joined in adopting 125 resolutions (90 by consensus), while voting against only 17 resolutions and abstaining on 32 others. So, we were not always on the losing side. But the resolutions we voted against received the lion's share of the publicity. Most of the constructive actions we supported received virtually no attention from the press and thus are not known to the public.

Sure, we took some brickbats at that session, but it was nothing compared to what was experienced by the Soviets and China as a result

of their mutual vituperative attacks on each other. We conducted ourselves with restraint and actually succeeded in stimulating constructive debate on several issues.

In the case of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, for example, it is not very well known but Senator Percy spent an enormous amount of time behind the scenes trying to negotiate a common resolution, and he was successful in narrowing down the differences to just a few key points. When the vote was called on individual paragraphs in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, as a result of Senator Percy's efforts particularly, we were able to vote yes on almost every point.

There were about 60 points, and it was only a handful that we did not vote yes on. But generally it is thought of we voted against all points of the charter, which is not so.

There is an important value to negotiations and conciliation behind the scene, and this is what we should do more of.

Those who continually resorted to fiery rhetoric in the last session, for example Cuba, embarrassed their allies and hardened the positions of their adversaries.

No, the solution is not more confrontations. The only useful solution is conciliation. We have much to offer the rest of the world, and they have much to offer us. There is no need to belabor the concept of interdependence. It is now well understood by most national leaders. The time has come to sit down and seriously negotiate away our differences.

PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

This brings me to the Security Council.

The Security Council is working, and working well.

Yes, we have to cast a veto sometimes, but that underscores the fact that nothing gets done by the Security Council unless we approve. And of course, the same applies to the other four permanent members.

Thus our minority interest is more than adequately protected. This is a good system, because it forces compromise when something has to be done.

If nothing else is ever accomplished through the U.N., the value of the peacekeeping actions established by the Security Council have been worth the whole world's total investment in the U.N. for the past 30 years and perhaps for the next 100 years. That is just about what the war in Vietnam cost us, to say nothing about the tragic loss of life and other consequences. Imagine that—the monetary cost to the United States for the war in Vietnam would approximately equal the total cost, for all countries the whole world over, of supporting all parts of the U.N. system for about 130 years.

In both Cyprus and the Middle East, the alternatives to U.N. peacekeeping could easily have led to the ultimate tragedy, a nuclear conflict.

U.S. LEADERSHIP TO ACCOMPLISH U.N. PRINCIPLE

Of course, peacekeeping is not the same as peacemaking. Peacemaking is primarily what the U.N. was established for—preventing conflicts before they start. And when that can't be done, stopping the breach of peace by means of an internationally supervised peace force.

The U.N. provides the framework within which this can be accomplished. What is needed to bring it about is the political will and leadership which the United States is in a unique position to supply.

Can we afford not to move in this direction?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Now Mr. C. Maxwell Stanley, president of Stanley Foundation.

[Mr. Stanley's biography follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA OF C. MAXWELL STANLEY

Stanley, C. Maxwell, Consulting Engineer, Stanley Consultants, Inc., Stanley Building, Muscatine, Iowa 52761.

Born.—Corning, Iowa; June 16, 1904.

Parents.—Claude Maxwell and Laura Esther (Stephenson) Stanley (both deceased).

Spouse.—Elizabeth M. Holthues (married November 11, 1927; Memphis, Tenn.).

Children.—David M., Richard H., Jane S. Buckles.

Education.—University of Iowa—B.S. in General Engineering, 1926, and M.S. in Hydraulic Engineering, 1930.

Fraternities.—Theta Tau, Tau Beta Pi, Sigma Xi.

Professional Experience.—Structural designer—Byllesby Engineering & Management Corp., Chicago, 1926–27, and Department of Grounds and Buildings, University of Iowa, Iowa City, 1927–28. Hydraulic engineer—Management & Engineering Corp., Dubuque, Iowa, and Chicago, Illinois, 1928–32. Consulting engineer—Young & Stanley, Inc., 1932–39; partner and president, Stanley Engineering Company, 1939–66; president, Stanley Consultants, Inc., Muscatine, Iowa, 1966–71; chairman of board, 1971– . President, Stanley Consultants, Ltd./Liberia, 1959–71, director, 1971– . Managing director, Stanley Consultants, Ltd./Nigeria, 1960–67, director, 1967– .

Professional Societies.—Fellow—American Society of Civil Engineers, Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers, American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Member—American Institute of Consulting Engineers (Board of Governors, 1973–), National Society of Professional Engineers, American Water Works Association, National Planning Association, Illinois Society of Professional Engineers, CEC/Iowa, and Iowa Engineering Society (president 1949).

Professional Awards.—Alfred Noble prize (1933) and Collingwood prize (1935) from the American Society of Civil Engineers. John Dunlap award (1943), Anson Marston award (1947), and Distinguished Service award (1962) from the Iowa Engineering Society. The 1965 Award for outstanding service to the engineering profession from the National Society of Professional Engineers.

Professional Registrations.—Registered engineer in 20 states and the District of Columbia, and has National Council of Engineering Examiners Certificate.

Other Business Affiliations.—President of HON Industries Inc., 1944–64, chairman of board, 1964– .

Other Organizations.—President of The Stanley Foundation, 1956– . World Federalists, U.S.A., member Council, 1947– (president 1954–56 and 1964–66). Participated in Annual Assemblies, 1947 to date; chairman of several. World Association of World Federalists, member Council, 1954– (chairman 1958–65). Participated in several WAWF Congresses; chaired those in Vienna–1961, Tokyo–1963, and San Francisco–1965. United Nations Association, director, 1970– . Iowa Wesleyan College, trustee, 1951– (chairman 1963–65). Garrett Theological Seminary, trustee, 1972– . University of Iowa Foundation, president, 1971– (director 1966–). General Board of Christian Social Concerns, Methodist Church 1960–68. Wesley United Methodist Church, Muscatine, Iowa, honorary trustee. Muscatine Development Corporation, 1957– (president 1957–64).

Honors.—Doctor of Humane Letters from Iowa Wesleyan College, 1961. Doctor of Humanities Honoris Causa from University of Manila, 1970. Distinguished Service Award for 1967 and Hancher-Finkbine Medallion, 1971, from University of Iowa. Grand Commander, Star of Africa, 1963, and Grand Commander, Humane Order of African Redemption, 1967, from Government of Liberia. Edwin B. Lindsay Peace Award, UWF, 1966.

Books.—"Waging Peace," 1956, Macmillan, and "The Consulting Engineer," 1961, John Wiley (also published in Japanese).

Articles.—Over 60 professional articles. Articles regarding foreign policy including: Environmental Management by the United Nations, Occasional Paper 1, The Stanley Foundation, 1972; Who Will Control Ocean Space? War/Peace Report, March/April, 1973 and Southeast Asian Neutralization: The Time is Now, Occasional Paper 6, The Stanley Foundation, 1974.

Listings in Biographical Publications.—Blue Book. Dictionary of International Biography. Engineers of Distinction. International Businessmen's Who's Who. International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who. Leading Men in the U.S.A. National Register of Prominent Americans. Who's Who in America. Who's Who in Engineering. Who's Who in Finance and Industry. Who's Who in the Methodist Church. Who's Who in the Midwest.

Conferences Sponsored by The Stanley Foundation.—Strategy for Peace Conferences: Fifteen conferences from 1960 to 1974.

Co-chairman of the first three; chairman of the last twelve. Conferences on the United Nations of the Next Decade: Chairman, Conferences: San Francisco 1965; Burgenstock 1967; Dubrovnik 1968; Quebec 1969; Fredensborg, Denmark, 1970; Sinaia, Romania, 1971; Massachusetts, 1972; Italy, 1973; and Colorado, 1974. Proliferation Unlimited, March 1966. Non-Intervention and Self Determination, October 1966. The United Nations and Multipolarization, May 1967. Press Seminar at the United Nations, November 1967, 1970, 1971, 1972. Conferences on United Nations Procedures, May 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974. United Nations Information Seminar, March 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975. Southeast Asia: Post Vietnam, March 1973. Southeast Asian Peace and Security, September 1973. Conference on Ocean Management, January 1974. Conference on the Inter-American System and World Order, September 1974. Micro-States and the United Nations September 1974. Conference on the NPT and World Security, February 1975.

Participation in Other Conferences, Commissions, or Panels (partial list).—Gould House Conference, 1956. Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, 1960 to date. U.S. Army War College Seventh Annual Strategy Seminar, June 1961. White House Conference on International Cooperation, November 1965. UNA-USA National Policy Study, New York, Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1967. Canadian-American Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, Toronto, June 1967. Fifth Dartmouth Conference, Rye, New York, January 1969. Conference on the Role of Force in International Order and U.N. Peacekeeping, Ditchley Park, Oxford, England, May 1969. Conference on Taiwan and American Policy, Washington, D.C., March 1971. Conference on The Human Environment: Science and International Decision-Making, Aspen, Colorado, August 1971.

Congressional Testimony.—The Senate Committee on United Nations Charter Review, 1955. The Senate Committee on Disarmament, 1957. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1961 and 1965. The President's Commission for the Observance of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations, October 1970. The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Outer Continental Shelf Policy, April 1972. The House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Law of the Sea, April 1972. World Order Strategy Committee of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law on International Political Order, August 1972. The House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, House Concurrent Resolution 417, March 1974.

Travels.—Extensive travel, particularly in Europe and Africa and to a lesser extent to Asia and Latin America. Three-week visit to the Soviet Union in June, 1972, as a guest of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Clubs.—Rotary International.

Political Party.—Republican.

Denomination.—Methodist.

Residence.—115 Sunset Drive, Muscatine, Iowa 52761.

STATEMENT OF C. MAXWELL STANLEY, PRESIDENT, STANLEY FOUNDATION

Mr. STANLEY. Mr. Chairman and Senator Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say I am going to have to leave. Senator Percy will be able to stay.

Senator PERCY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy is the one who is really responsible for these hearings.

And after Mr. Stanley finishes, our next session will be next Wednesday, May 14. The hearings have been very good so far, and I anticipate they will continue to be.

I am grateful to all of you who have contributed to these hearings. Senator Percy, if you will take over.

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Stanley, go right ahead.

Mr. STANLEY. Mr. Charman, I address two of my friends; you, the Senator from Illinois, my neighboring State, and the senior Senator from my own State, Mr. Dick Clark.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE BASIS FOR TESTIMONY

Before answering the question that you have put to us, I would like to structure the basis on which I answer it against the historical perspective.

I consider that our world is in limbo between the battered century old nation-state political system, and a fledgling new world order that we are working toward more responsive to the demands of peace, security, justice, progress, and human dignity. In this stage of limbo the United Nations is our established world organization. Its 30 years of existence reflects both the need for international organization and all of the traumas of an increasingly interdependent world. I consider that the United Nations, as a bridge between the nation-state political system and some more effective political order, has dual roles. Its immediate role is aiding and abetting the cooperation of nation-states to manage international crises and solve global problems. This is a role that cannot be overemphasized because today's stakes are high. The longer range, but equally important role, is fostering an emerging international political system tailored for tomorrow.

U.N. SUCCESSFUL IN MORE AREAS THAN NOT

In applying your question, "Is the United Nations Working?" to its immediate role, my answer is a qualified but definite affirmative. Yes; because United Nations' work is successful in more areas than it is not. Yes; because its accomplishments are substantial even though its failures are more spectacular and thus more newsworthy. Yes; because its successes occur despite significant barriers: lack of independent authority, marginal funding and failure of many nations, including our own, to consistently assign high priority to the U.N.'s work.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL AREAS OF U.N. ACTIVITY

In the immediate role, there are three areas of the U.N. activity. One of these, that we have heard a good deal about, is the economic and social role. In the economic and social role, considering the funding that is available and taking cognizance of the mistakes that have been made, the aggregate performance has been worthwhile.

In the political role related to peace and security, the answer is more ambivalent. The United Nations has demonstrated the feasibility of third party intervention. There is a list of 120 cases where it played such a role. In the area of arms control and disarmament it has been notably unsuccessful due largely to the adamant opposition of the nuclear powers. Moreover, it has not demonstrated an ability to deal with peace and security in areas where there is any chance of confrontation between the major powers.

More recently the United Nations has performed an additional role through a series of conferences that have alerted and focused world attention upon pending global problems, and, to some extent, sensitized world opinion to cope with them. These include trade, environment, population, food, law of the sea, human settlements, and a more effective economic order. Such U.N. initiatives compel even reluctant nations to face up to these crucial issues, although they may react very slowly.

CRITICAL WORLD ISSUES FACED BY U.N.

It seems to me that the world community today, due to the impact of a technological revolution, and the collapse of Western colonialism, faces a half dozen very critical world issues. In addition to the ongoing one of peace and security I would add achieving a tolerable and workable resource population balance in the world, protecting and enhancing the environment, accelerating economic and social development, improving world economic order, and perhaps most fundamental of all, expanding human rights. None of these problems begins or ends at the national boundaries, all require international cooperation among the nations of the world.

CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING LONGER RANGE ROLE OF U.N.

If we look briefly to the longer range role of the United Nations, I would conclude that the U.N. is performing a useful service in five ways, despite the diversity and disunity among nation-states:

(1) Its continued existence demonstrates the need for an organization.

(2) The General Assembly provides a forum where any nation, large or small, powerful or weak, can voice its aspirations, concerns, and complaints. Even the United States and other major powers can be challenged to defend positions. This brings a healthy openness into international affairs.

(3) Alternative approaches to world problems are repeatedly offered. Multilateral action, nonmilitary initiative, third-party intervention.

(4) The U.N. Tests methods of cooperation among nation-states, demonstrates weakness, of which there are many, and points the way to needed reforms and improvements. This has led to an ongoing evolutionary process both of study and improvement of organizational procedures within the U.N.

(5) The U.N. on occasion serves as a vehicle for member states to rise above narrow national interests and act in the common long-term interests of the world community—the pattern that we trust will become more common as the world becomes more aware of its considerable interdependence.

NEED TO GIVE HIGHER PRIORITY TO U.N. EMPHASIZED

Thus, Mr. Chairman, I would say the U.N. is working tolerably well, but not nearly as well as we want it to, or as it would if it had broader support from the nations of the world. While we as individuals may not be able to influence the conduct of other nations, I sincerely hope we can emphasize the need for the United States to give higher priority to the United Nations, to use and strengthen it, and to develop cooperation within the United Nations.

I yearn for the day when I can listen to a national broadcast by the President of the United States in which he will mention, or at least give more than slighting mention, to the United Nations as an element of our foreign policy.

We have, it seems to me, very much downgraded our participation in the United Nations. We have flouted U.N. sanctions, reduced funding to specialized agencies, and thwarted U.N. efforts to bring attention to the need of limiting and reducing armaments by our opposition to the World Disarmament Conference, and lukewarm reaction to nuclear free zones. That in company with our continuing massive arms race convinces most of the world of our complete disinterest in lifting the burden of armaments from the backs of the people of the world and finding ways to peacefully resolve the differences that inevitably arises among nations.

Our State Department seems to bypass the U.N. until all other things fail, and then as a last resort go to it. We recently took an unfortunately hard position on matters that deal with resources and world economic order, at the Lima Conference and the ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council) sponsored Conference on Resources in Tokyo. Such action together with the low priority we assign to the U.N. tends to create a neoisolationist image and one that appears to oppose the legitimate efforts of developing countries.

We have certain things we want to see happen in the United Nations in the interests of the United States. We give high emphasis on peace and security, the curtailment of terrorism, and others. But we are not going to achieve them if we continue to give the back of our hand to the developing nations and their desires. Neither will the developing nations accomplish their aims regarding apartheid, the remnants of colonialism and above all, economic and social development. They may enact all the economic charters on economic rights and privileges they wish, but they stil need the backing and cooperation of the developed nations for technology, for financial help. In other words, it is a situation that above all calls for cooperation. This I trust is an area to which our Government will return to its earlier pattern.

We should remember that we have the heritage of contributing greatly to the formation of the U.N. and the writing of the Charter.

There are numerous opportunities for strengthening the United Nations over the years. One of the series of conferences our Stanley Foundation sponsors called the United Nations of the Next Decade, has dealt often with ways to make the U.N. more effective. Last summer our conference discussed the decisionmaking processes of the United Nations, which have been stressed here by Senator Fulbright and by Mr. Gardner. Among other sugestions that came forward from its participants, an international group, was the greater use of consensus in reaching decisions.

Mr. Chairman, it is my sincere hope and trust, along with a great many other people in this country, that the Congress and the administration will cooperate and provide strong leadership to the U.N. by deed as well as word. The priority given U.N. should be raised. Procedures within our Government to deal with U.N. matters should be improved; that could be a subject of a hearing all of its own.

I would close by saying you must not underestimate the interest and support that would surface around the country if our Government would give the United Nations the higher priority in foreign affairs that it deserves. Now is the time for this Nation to respond to the heritage that inspired us to play a leading role in creating a United Nations.

Thank you.

[Mr. Stanley's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF C. MAXWELL STANLEY

My name is C. Maxwell Stanley. I am a professional engineer and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Stanley Consultants, Inc., international consultants in engineering, architecture, planning and management, having over 500 employees. I am also a founder and now Chairman of the Board of Directors of HON INDUSTRIES, Inc., a leading manufacturer of metal office furniture and material handling equipment, having over 1,800 employees.

For more than a quarter of a century, I have been deeply concerned with the foreign policy of this country, particularly as it relates to the role of international organization in achieving world peace and security and managing serious problems confronting the world community. I have been actively involved in several private organizations urging a more enlightened U.S. foreign policy including expanded use and strengthening of the United Nations. I have traveled widely and have participated in a variety of international conferences concerned with world organization.

In addition, I am co-founder and President of The Stanley Foundation which, for years, has encouraged study and education on the strengthening of international organization. In this capacity, I have chaired over 40 national and international gatherings including 15 Strategy for Peace Conferences, 9 Conferences on the United Nations of the Next Decade, 6 Conferences on United Nations Procedures and numerous seminars. I have written and spoken extensively on these matters and have authored the book, WAGING PEACE, "A Businessman Looks at United States Foreign Policy."

These activities have involved formal and informal exchanges regarding international organizations, especially the United Nations, with diplomats, civil servants and elected officials of many governments and with concerned scholars and businessmen from the private sector. My testimony is based upon this background.

I speak as an individual. I am firmly committed to the belief that in today's world there must be effective mechanisms and organization on the world level to manage the critical problems we face: (1) assuring peace and security, (2) achieving a tolerable and workable resource/population balance, (3) protecting and enhancing the environment, (4) accelerating economic and social development, (5) improving the world economic order and (6) perhaps most fundamental of all, expanding human rights. None of these problems begins or ends at national boundaries.

Mr. Chairman, answers to your topical question, "Is the United Nations Working?" are dependent upon the appraiser's viewpoint and the criteria used to judge U.N. performance. They are also dependent upon the functions being appraised and upon the relative weight assigned to short-term and longer-term needs and objectives. You may receive both strong affirmative and strong negative replies to that simple question. But I believe an objective answer must be some mixutre of yes, no and maybe.

Appraisal of the United Nations is more credible and relevant if viewed in the evolving historical perspective. Ours is a world in limbo between a battered, centuries old political system and a fledgling new world order, more responsive to the demands of peace, security, justice, progress and human dignity. The system

that has served nations for centuries is beleaguered by its inability to adequately deal with the issues and problems of the post War II era. This nation-state political system originated long before the revolution of science and technology of the last half century and the overdue but sudden collapse of Western colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s. New and exceedingly complex international issues have been tabled; dealing with them is more difficult in a world crowded with over 140 nation-states. While the evolution of a new world order is apparent to most scholars, many statesmen and some politicians, its parameters are indistinct and its pace of emergence is highly speculative. Progress in no small measure depends upon the performance of the United Nations—our only major international organization.

The nation-state system model does not fully describe reality. While nation-states are still the leading actors on the world stage, the cast of characters is becoming more transnational. The actions or inactions of nations are no longer self-contained. The 30-year existence of the United Nations demonstrates that nations recognize the need for regional, multi-national and international institutions to facilitate cooperation. But the traumas of an increasingly interdependent world are also symbolized in the United Nations. Its inadequacies clearly reflect that the United Nations is an instrument of the nation-state system lacking institutional autonomy and authority and employed—sometimes eagerly, sometimes reluctantly—by nation-states to enhance national interests and international cooperation. Because the Charter fully protects members' sovereign rights, the United Nations acts only with their concurrence, particularly that of major powers.

The United Nations, serving as a primitive bridge between the nation-state political system and a more effective political order, has dual roles. Its immediate role is aiding and abetting the cooperation of nation-states to manage international crisis and solve global problems—a role that cannot be over-emphasized. Today's stakes are high, avoiding debilitating war and assuring quality of life—and perhaps survval. The longer range but equally important role of the United Nations is fostering an emerging international political system tailored for tomorrow.

APPRAISAL—IMMEDIATE ROLE

In applying your question, "Is the United Nations Working?" to its immediate role, my answer is a qualified but definite affirmative. Yes, because United Nations work is successful in more areas than it is not. Yes, because its accomplishments are substantial even though its failures are more spectacular and thus more newsworthy. Yes, because its successes occur despite significant barriers; lack of independent authority, marginal funding and failure of many nations, including our own, to consistently assign high priority to the U.N.'s work.

Normally, two functions of the United Nations are appraised, economic and political. I add a third role, the United Nations more recent focus upon the world's important transnational problems. How well is the United Nations working in these three areas?

For nearly three decades, the United Nations and its family of specialized agencies have performed immensely important and useful tasks in the areas of economic and social development. Although these activities only slightly touch our affluent country, they are vital to the deveolping nations. In the long run, world development is very important to every nation from an economic as well as security perspective. The long roster of U.N. activities includes the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), World Meteorology Organization (WMO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), International Labour Organization (ILO) and others. To these should be added ongoing and ad hoc units dealing with human rights, population, trade agreements, disaster relief and other matters. The significant contributions made by the United Nations through such organizations are well documented. The importance of these activities is generally recognized but poorly publicized. Valuable assistance has enabled many less developed countries, most of which are ex-colonial territories, to initiate the difficult processes of economic and social development. Despite fund limitations, errors of judgment and lack of coordination, U.N. activities in the economic area are working.

In the political area, the answer to your question is more ambivalent. The United Nations has not fulfilled the early dreams of its advocates. War has not

been avoided nor has security been assured universally. During nearly three decades, however, the General Assembly, the Security Council and/or the Secretary General of the United Nations have performed more than 120 tasks as a third party.[1] These have been endeavors to contain or resolve potential or actual disputes, provide the good office of the Secretary General or supervise and assure peaceful self-determination and decolonization activities. Well know actions include the posting of U.N. observers following the first Middle East war in 1948, supervising the cease-fire in the India-Pakistan conflict of 1949 and again in 1966, deploying the first U.N. Emergency Force in 1956 following the Suez crisis, dispatching observers to Lebanon in 1958, using military assistance to maintain order in the Congo in 1960, employing a U.N. force in Cyprus in 1964 and more recently, authorizing the UNEF and the U.N. disengagement observer force now helping to keep peace in the Middle East. While some of these actions have been controversial, each has served a useful peacekeeping or peacemaking purpose and demonstrated the U.N.'s ability to act when serious confrontations between the major powers are not involved.

The other half of the U.N. peace and security role relates to arms control and disarmament which the General Assembly consistently emphasizes. The United Nations in 1961, endorsed and continues to support, the Geneva disarmament talks-Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD)—and is now advocating the convening of a World Disarmament Conference (WDC) to focus attention, not only upon disarmament itself, but also upon revision of mechanism to deal with the problem. While U.N efforts to reduce armaments have been unsuccessful due to adamant opposition of the major nuclear powers, several significant treaties aimed at limiting extension of armaments, have come into force under U.N. sponsorship. These include: the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963); the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (1967); the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970); and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1972).

While the United Nations has made important contributions in the area of peacekeeping, peacemaking and arms control, its overall performance in these areas is far less than desired. The United Nations has not found a way to prevent or resolve conflicts involving any degree of potential great power confrontation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has not gained wide acceptance and efforts of the General Assembly to prod the superpowers towards arms reduction have been notably unsuccessful. Progress towards a World Disarmament Conference is strongly opposed by the United States and China. It is, therefore, unrealistic to say the United Nations is working well in the political area related to peace and security. Although the United Nations has only marginally performed this political role, the continuation and, hopefully expansion, of the role is essential to progress toward lifting the burden of heavy armaments from the backs of taxpayers, while advancing non-military procedures to deal with inevitable conflicts and controversies between nations.

The United Nations is now undertaking a third important function: focusing world attention upon pending global problems and sensitizing world opinion to cope with them. Periodic meetings of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) have emphasized the importance of better trade mechanisms. The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment initiated global action to protect and enhance the earth's environment. It also crystallized action in many nations to protect the biosphere and led to the establishment in Nairobi of the United Nations Environmental Programme. In 1974 both the World Population Conference in Bucharest and the World Food Conference in Rome emphasized the importance of resource/population balance. Population stabilization principles articulated in Bucharest are finding their way into the policies of many governments. The new World Food Council in Rome under the direction of John Hannah, former director of AID, focuses ongoing attention on world food supplies. Currently the resumed Third U.N. Cnference on the Law of the Seas is meeting in Geneva in an effort to reach accord on the complex and difficult problems of managing the oceans, man's common heritage. Resources were the concern at the Lima Conference of the United Nations Industrial Organization (UNIDO) and the Tokyo Conference sponsored by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Next year the United Nations will convene Habitat: A Conference on Human Settlements in Vancouver to consider the mounting problems of urbanization. The complex and controversial issue of a more effective economic order was emphasized at the Sixth Special and the

29th Regular Session of the General Assembly and will be considered again at the forthcoming 7th Special Session. United Nations commissions such as the Group of Eminent Persons investigating multinational enterprises are studying special problems. Such U.N. initiatives compel even reluctant nations to face crucial issues. The United Nations is serving the world community well by alerting and educating it to mounting global problems and by providing an opportunity for traditional diplomacy to function in conference settings.

On balance, the United Nations performs its immediate role reasonably well; its weakest area is political action concerned with peace and security. Effective international organization is essential today. If the United Nations were suddenly eliminated, some alternative institution would have to be created quickly. If the United Nations were given stronger economic and political support and higher priority by the powerful nations of the world—particularly the Soviet Union and the United States—its near term contributions would be even more significant.

APPRAISAL—LONGER RANGE ROLE

Evaluation of the longer range role of the United Nations—fostering a more adequate international political system—is less specific but on the whole, favorable for the following reasons:

1. Despite diversity and disunity among nation-states, the United Nations is now 30 years of age. It has outlived prior efforts to establish a universally accepted international body to facilitate the cooperation of nations. This continued existence demonstrates the need for it.

2. The General Assembly provides a forum where any nation, large or small, powerful or weak, can voice its aspirations, concerns and complaints. Even the superpowers are challenged to defend their positions. The United Nations debate brings a desirable and healthy openness to international affairs.

3. Alternative approaches to world problems are repeatedly offered by the U. N. system: multilateral action, non-military initiative and third party intervention. These are important alternatives to the traditional exercise of unlimited national sovereignty, divisive power balances and ultimate resort to armed force.

4. The United Nations, with its family of specialized agencies, promotes and in the final analysis, tests methods of cooperation among nation-states. By providing a wide range of experience, successful as well as frustrating, it demonstrates the weaknesses of the United Nations and points the way to needed reforms and improvements. The result has been an ongoing evolutionary process of study and improvement of organizational procedures within the United Nations.

5. Finally, the United Nations serves as a vehicle for member states to rise occasionally above narrow national interest and act in the common long-term interests of the world community.

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that the United Nations should be credited with performing both its immediate and longer range roles tolerably well and I have answered your question with a qualified but definite, yes.

MAKING THE UNITED NATIONS WORK BETTER

Before I close, however, I want to emphasize the importance of making the United Nations work better, and urge the United States to do more to make it work better.

Many citizens of the United States, including some in official positions, are disenchanted with the United Nations. We no longer commend, for our proposals to the General Assembly, the strong voting majority we marshalled in its early years. The enlarged United Nations now reflects world opinion: no nation or group can dominate. The "tyranny of the majority" became irresponsible in the 29th General Assembly when South Africa was deprived of a vote, Palestinian leader, Yassir Arafat was accorded Head of State honors and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States was adopted by an overwhelming vote despite protests and negative votes or abstention of many developed nations. Such events quite properly alarm and annoy most Americans.

But each of these explosive and widely publicized events was the result of a smoldering unresolved problem: degrading apartheid in South Africa, the festering Palestinian refugee situation and the futile and rebuffed efforts of the developing world to gain greater stake and voice in international economic affairs. Have we overlooked the fact that these events, however embarrassing, allowed Ambassador John Scali to set the stage for frank and fruitful debate regarding the United Nations in the closing days of the General Assembly?

Such experiences demonstrate again the importance of cooperation rather than confrontation if global problems are to be dealt with effectively. The United States and other developed nations cannot achieve desired objectives if they ignore, dismiss or neglect the major concerns of the developing world: development, the remnant of colonialism—Rhodesia and Namibia, for instance—and apartheid in South Africa. The United States and other industrial nations need the resources, the markets and the political support of the less developed nations. Nor can the developing nations gain greater benefits and participation in the world economic order if they disregard or scoff at such problems as resource/population balance, environmental protection and enhancement, terrorism and peace and security. They need the monetary and technological assistance of the developed countries. Without cooperation and compromise, verbal confrontation will rule the General Assembly and essential U. N. programs will stagnate.

Unfortunately, the last several administrations of the United States government, obsessively burdened by our tragic intervention in Vietnam, assigned a dangerously low priority to the United Nations. We flouted U. N. sanctions against Rhodesia by continued importation of chrome. We are reducing our funding of specialized agencies despite an implied commitment to them as our assessed contribution to the U. N. general budget was lowered from 31.2 to 25 percent. We thwart U. N. efforts to limit or reduce armaments by such actions as opposition to the World Disarmament Conference and lukewarm reaction to nuclear free zones. But we maintain, in company with the Soviet Union, a massive arms race that convinces the world of our complete disinterest in disarmament. Presidents, including Gerald Ford, make major foreign policy adresses with little or no mention of the United Nations. Our State Department has a studied practice of bypassing the United Nations as it implements our foreign policy. Exceptions occur only when all else seems to fail. Examples include the current U. N. Emergency Force in the Middle East and recent proposals to channel humanitarian aid to Vietnam through the United Nations.

Despite our leadership in the U. N. Law of the Seas Conference and World Population Conference, our posture at other recent U. N. conferences touching upon aspects of the world's economic order, has been one of blunt confrontation. Unfortunately, both the low priority assigned to the U. N. and this recent hard line, are creating a neo-isolationist image and one that appears to oppose the legitimate efforts of the developing world to upgrade itself.

Certainly U.S. economic interests must be protected. But this will not be accomplished by denying or disregarding political, economic and social changes in the world, including change in the very nature of power. It is time to recognize that even as a most powerful nation, we cannot control or dominate the world's economic and political developments. We can, however, greatly influence change by active participation and constructive cooperation.

In conclusion, the United Nations is working tolerably well considering that it is not a perfect institution, but rather an institution of 138 imperfect nations. The United Nations is what the nation-states made it and we should remember that the United States had a major role in writing the U.N. Charter. The United Nations as the only global organization we have today, must be allowed and helped to better perform its roles. To do this, it must be used and strengthened.

Along with a vast constituency across the country, I express the hope that the Congress and the Administration will cooperatively provide strong leadership to the United Nations by deed as well as word. The priority given the United Nations should be raised and procedures within our government to deal with U.N. matters should be improved. Do not underestimate the interest and the support that would surface if our government would give the United Nations the higher priority in foreign affairs that it deserves. Now is the time to press forward to achieve a United Nations that can better serve mankind. Now is the time to respond to the heritage that inspired us to play the leading role in creating the United Nations. Until we do this, there is little hope for a sane, sound world order capable of enhancing peace with freedom, justice and progress adequate to cope with the many threatening global problems.

Senator PERCY [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Stanley. I think this is a very fitting closing comment.

Senator Clark, I would be happy to divide the remaining time equally with you and suggest that you start right off.

Senator CLARK. That is very generous of you.

I will take not more than 5 minutes.

Senator PERCY. Go right ahead.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator CLARK. You said at the outset, Senator Percy, that three of these gentlemen were friends, and uniquely enough, I know three of the gentlemen as well and have had occasion to work with them recently. Since we have shared the same prejudices, I suspect, I was particularly happy with the statements that you made, and I thought they were most perceptive. I am particularly proud, of course, that Maxwell Stanley is from our State, and proud of the commitment, both financially and personally, that he has made to this cause.

I was also very happy to hear Professor Yeselson because it seems to me that one of the great problems in congressional hearings is that we tend to have only those people that we agree with. I was delighted that he made a statement which was different from the others, and which I thought provoked a good deal of thought.

As I understand the thesis, it is that the United Nations all too often has been a forum for conflict rather than for peace, that we ought to have a more realistic view of this institution and that we won't be as disappointed if we do.

I would like to take my brief time to ask Professor Yeselson two or three questions with regard to that thesis.

HAVE PEACEKEEPING ASPECTS BEEN CONFLICT PRODUCING RATHER THAN CONFLICT AVOIDING?

You addressed yourself, as I understood your statement, primarily to political issues—the peacemaking issues—rather than to other aspects. But, do you really feel that the peacekeeping aspects of the United Nations—I refer to the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East now, in Cyprus, the Congo, and Kashmir—do you really feel those have been conflict producing rather than conflict avoiding?

I don't mean by that that they were peacemaking. I don't think they created any peace at all; that wasn't their function.

But don't you think they did help to maintain the peace from time to time?

Mr. YESELSON. No.

Let me elaborate just a little on that.

For example, there is the widespread feeling that the United Nations since its separating Egyptian—Israeli and Syrian—Israeli forces, is making a positive contribution to peace. I think this is unrealistic. When the war ended the Israeli's were clearly in a winning position. The Arab side then was willing to negotiate the end of the war.

You will recall, of course, that you could not even get a meeting of the Security Council on a cease-fire prior to the change on the battlefield. Now, the Israelis opposed having a United Nations troop separating force but they were not sufficiently strong in their negotiating position to have a different force. Now, consider what happens when it is a United Nations force against the wishes of one of the parties in conflict. We have the force in being, not a force which is the result of agreement by both sides, whose composition, duration, and functions are the result of that kind of agreement, but the force which essentially reflected the ability of one side to get its kind of force there. There would have been a force in any case.

Now, that force, because it is a U.N. force, is subject to the authority of the Security Council. Its first period of duration was 6 months. You approach the 6-month period and tensions began to build, for one reason alone, only one side can use the U.N. as a weapon in this conflict. That is to say, when, as, and if Syria and/or Egypt decide that it is in their interest to remove the force, they can do so simply by having the veto, which is always available to them, apply and remove the force. The force has now been extended for 3 more months. We are now into the 3-month period. In both, actually, Sinai and Golan, we are now into the 3-month period. Again the tensions are going to build. Both sides will arm toward the 3-month period. They will prepare toward the 3-month period. Only the Arab side can say whether or not the force will be continued.

In other words, this is not a peacemaking force, it is an instrument of conflict for one side.

Senator CLARK. But it seems to me——

Mr. YESELSON. Although you do not have fighting, it was quite clear that once the United States and the Soviet Union decided in effect that this fighting had to stop, the fighting was going to stop. To stop it in this way was not the most constructive way of doing so, and I think I could apply a similar kind of analysis in other cases.

In other words, the existence of U.N. forces is often given credit for peace when in fact world political conditions required that certain action be taken.

After the 1956 war, for example, clearly Israel could not stay in the canal. If there had been a treaty between Israel and Egypt and not the U.N. Emergency Force which prevented really any discourse between the two parties.

Senator CLARK. A treaty would have occurred otherwise?

Mr. YESELSON. Something had to happen at that point. In other words, the Israelis might well have been willing at that point to sacrifice their territorial gains for what they continued to seek in their relations with Egypt—let us say the neutralization of Sinai which they didn't get. What they got was a force, and Mr. Hammarskjold did his best to interpret his mandate so that the force could not be removable simply upon the instruction of one side.

DISAGREEMENT REGARDING EFFECT OF PEACEKEEPING ASPECTS

Senator CLARK. I am going to cut down to one more question. I appreciate that, that is exactly the kind of opinion I wanted.

I wanted to ask Mr. Gardner if he agrees with Professor Yeselson on this point.

Mr. GARDNER. No; I don't agree and I think the statements we have just heard are manifestly contrary to historical fact.

The fact is that when Secretary of State Kissinger undertook his extraordinary bilateral diplomacy in the wake of the 1973 war, he found out that there was literally no way of getting a disengagement of opposing forces without the interposition of the U.N. forces; and when the negotiations took place on the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Syria, it was Israel that wanted a more numerous force with a stronger mandate and the final arrangements for that force ended up reflecting Israel's point of view much more than

Syria's. This will be confirmed, I believe, by the people who participated in the negotiation, Secretary of State Kissinger and Under Secretary of State Sisco.

The same can be pointed out with respect to the 1956 war, and the participants in that episode, the U.S. negotiators, Canadian Foreign Minister, Lester Pearson, U.N. Under Secretary General, Andrew Cordier, all have testified that U.N. was an essential ingredient for peace.

When I was in the Department of State in the Kennedy administration I had some involvement in the Congo operation. From my own experience I would say categorically that had the U.N. not been available to go into the Congo in the situation that existed in the summer of 1960, there was a clear and present threat of direct Soviet involvement and possibly, American involvement, in the heart of Africa, with unforeseeable consequences.

So I do not myself see how from these historical or other experiences one could make the statement that on balance the UN is a cause of conflict rather than a solver of conflict.

The basic fallacy in the statements we have heard from Professor Yeselson is that he mistakes the symptoms for the reality. When he sees friction in the U.N. he says the U.N. is causing it. The U.N. is not causing it, the U.N. is reflecting some of the problems of the world. Its capacity to take executive action through forces of interposition or border patrol is a resource for damping down conflict and separating the contending parties.

It has been said the U.N. hasn't brought the great powers together. But what the U.N. has done is keep the great powers apart—separated to some extent, at least from conflicts in the Third World, and that surely is a major historical contribution.

Senator CLARK. I will ask another question—did you want to comment further?

Mr. YESELSON. No; I think we would get into an academic quarrel about who has the better perception of history, and so forth.

I think we might resolve it in a weekend together if we are put into a room.

IS U.N. PROPER FORUM FOR GLOBAL MANAGEMENT?

Senator CLARK. The last question, Professor Yeselson. As we said at the beginning, you are talking really more about the political aspects of the U.N.

What about the other aspects, what about the activities Mr. Segel and Max Stanley mention, the social and economic and humanitarian programs. You seem to share the view that some kind of global management is necessary in the world.

Do you feel that the U.N. is the right kind of forum for that and, if so, do you think that might contribute to reducing conflict in the world?

Mr. YESELSON. No; I do not think the U.N. is the correct forum. The problems are very real, as stated by all of us. Myself I have stated it the least because I have concentrated on the political. What happens I think is that by politicizing issues through the use of the U.N. there is a spillover into essentially the same approach into the so-called func-

tional areas. Perhaps the most blatant would be in the area of human rights. We are now in the process of witnessing what for the U.N. might well be called the ultimate obscenity, that is to say, the Human Rights Commission will probably shortly condemn Israel for genocide and in the process of doing this one of the things they had to do or did do was rewrite history in order to eliminate references to historical genocide which, incidentally, outraged the Armenians because this eliminated references to their troubles following World War I in Turkey.

What happens when you have this kind of selective justice in the area of human rights, and it becomes impossible, really, for universal principles to be applied, except against particular targets, is that whatever moral restraint those principles had is destroyed. If you cannot condemn all states which violate human rights, whether it is Uganda, whether it is Sudanese treatment of blacks, whether it is Hutus against Tutsis in Burundi, whether it is the Ibos in Biafra, whether it is socialists in Chile, whether it is persons who oppose brainwashing in China, and so forth and so on. If you can only condemn particular targets then the principle of universal rights is very badly weakened.

In the economic area, you have participated in the last special session. I think if you think about it you will appreciate that this was a well-mounted attack by particular states about a particular approach to economic problems. Although Mexico was the principal sponsor, it was in Algeria that the strategy was devised, and it had to do essentially with the problem of the oil producers not wanting a particular forum with oil consumers but preferring this forum which was more satisfactory in terms of defining the economic interest in their favor.

POSITIVE PROPOSALS FOR GLOBAL MANAGEMENT

Senator CLARK. Let me interrupt to say my time is nearly up. What do you see of a positive nature by way of global management? What would you propose?

Mr. YESELSON. I would propose—again getting back to a point made by you originally—to the extent it is possible with global problems—reducing the nationalistic input, that is to say, where it is possible we emphasize the use of experts who do not have particular association with national causes in dealing with such things as pollution, population, economic problems.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I appreciate your comments.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Senator Clark and I would like to say we very much appreciate your participation in these hearings.

I would very much appreciate a sentence comment from each of you on two points.

DESIRABILITY OF SECRETARY OF STATE SPENDING MORE TIME AT SESSIONS

Senator Symington recommended that the Secretary of State spend more time in New York during the General Assembly session. I know from observation that the Secretary's participation was very much valued by foreign delegations as well as our own. I thought he put in quite a bit of time in New York.

Would you agree that the Secretary's participation is desirable?

Mr. SEGEL. Yes, sir.

Mr. GARDNER. I would like to say yes and cite in this connection, Senator Percy, article 28, paragraph 2 of the Charter, which is a neglected but very important paragraph—

> The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members if it so desires may be represented by a member of the government or by some other especially designated representative.

I would like to see this neglected article used to have Security Council meetings at the ministerial level, in which the Secretary of State and other foreign ministers could meet from time to time in closed session to discuss world problems.

Mr. YESELSON. I would support such a thing.

Mr. STANLEY. My answer is "Yes," provided it is backed by a higher priority, sincerely undertaken, to give greater emphasis to U.N. matters.

Senator PERCY. He also suggested that the Secretary to the extent possible, remain in the United States during the session so that his presence here, his decisionmaking powers, could be brought to bear on important matters. I think it probably would be desirable whenever possible.

U.S. INITIATIVE TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES IN ECONOMIC CHARTER QUESTIONED

I would like to ask each of you for your judgment on whether the United States should take the initiative now in attempting to resolve the remaining differences on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, or whether we should let sleeping dogs lie and do nothing further about the Charter now that we have voted against it?

Mr. SEGEL. Absolutely, we should take the leadership in that and all other matters where constructive leadership can bring about resolution through negotiation.

As you Senator Percy, have demonstrated during the last session of the General Assembly, many points of contention can be negotiated away. It is true that the few that remained were points that the third world felt very, very strongly about and our Government did also, but I think that those points too can be resolved. I think that there are possibilities of compromise between the present positions of our side and theirs, and it would very much be worth the effort to take an innovative approach to try to resolve the few remaining points so that we and the third world can work together to eliminate injustices and build a better world.

Mr. GARDNER. I would make the effort, Senator, but to be very frank, my experience in the last 5 weeks in this negotiating group at the U.N. does not encourage me to think that we will break through the ideological hangups, if I may put it that way, about the right to take foreign investment without regard to international commitments and the right to set up export cartels while denying us the right to have import associations. I do not see those ideological hangups giving way sufficiently in the months ahead to permit a resolution of this along the lines you and I could accept. What is essential is that we go into this seventh special session with specific proposals on the really important practical questions that matter, not the ideological issues

but practical questions like what do we do to stabilize commodity prices, what do we do to transfer more resources to the fourth world, the under-$200-per-capita LDC's—less-developed countries—who suffer from food and energy costs, things like that—that is what is going to make a difference.

EXPROPRIATION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Senator PERCY. Couldn't it be said, though, that 70 percent of all development funds in Latin America have been from the private sector? Won't it frighten such capital away when we adopt a charter which discourages investment in the countries that voted for it? Diplomats from OPEC countries said privately to me, "Throw it in the wastebasket, pay no attention to it, we would never think of investing if that is the attitude these countries are going to adopt. We are going to put our money where it is reasonably secure and get a little return on our investment, not where it can be seized and expropriated and nationalized and get nothing back for it, without regard for international law or for just compensation."

So in the light of that, isn't it really in the best interest of these countries that they not adopt principles which can discourage the very flow of technology, experience, and capital that they need?

Mr. GARDNER. It is in their best interests but the political pressures operating on their leadership are such that I do not see a renunciation of this dogma in the foreseeable future. Therefore, let's concentrate on making country-by-country and case-by-case accommodations to secure our private investors and the resource access we need around the world.

Mr. YESELSON. Yes, sir, I thank both of you for agreeing with me the Assembly was used for conflict purposes on this economic issue and that while we should at the U.N. attempt to avoid confrontations and support the cooperation, probably the best chance we have of accomplishing that is outside of that forum and in other forums and in other ways. I thank you both.

Mr. STANLEY. I would say that a reasonable effort should be made to reach acceptable compromise on those most obnoxious provisions of the charter. I would agree with Dick Gardner that more is required. At the same time let us take positive action to do those things needed to assure a world economic order more adequate to cope with the problems that it faces.

DIFFICULTIES AND REMEDIES CONFRONTING THE U.N. OUTLINED

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. I have just a few questions remaining.

Dr. Gardner, you have consistently written excellent articles on the problems confronting the U.N.

In a February 1975 article, you observed that resolving the difficulties of the U.N. will require a good deal of skill and hard work, the use of a scalpel and not a meat ax.

Can you identify a few of these difficulties as you see them and what remedies you would suggest?

Dr. GARDNER. Yes, sir, Senator, I will try to be brief.

First, I think we must come forward, as I said earlier, on some very specific economic issues. I would put at the top of the list commodity terms of trade. It really is an anomaly in the world today, to allow these tremendous fluctuations in commodity prices, harmful both to the producers and to the consumers. I think the time has come to think of buffer stocks with agreed floor and ceiling prices under international management for at least a number of key commodities. Let's try to negotiate that. If it fails we will have at least made a good faith try and we will get some credit for it.

Similarly, the opening up of a "Third Window" in the International Bank, using petrodollars in large quantities with the help of an interest-subsidy along the lines proposed recently by the Trilateral Commission.

As to the U.N. forum itself, there are some specific procedural reforms, some of which are under negotiation at this moment in the group of experts that I mentioned, which would promote conciliation rather than voting of disagreed resolutions.

A greater commitment on our part is also needed to put forward candidates of top quality for U.N. positions. The standards of excellence in the U.N. Secretariat are being compromised and we as well as the Russians and others bear some of the blame for it.

We should attempt to submit to third party settlement, whether in the World Court or through more informal fact-finding and conciliation procedures, some of our disputes with other countries.

Senator PERCY. Very good.

"VERBAL COMBAT" VALUABLE EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Professor Yeselson, you have indicated in your testimony that you see the United Nations as an arena for combat.

As I observed the combat, the most intensive combat this fall I saw was between China and the Soviet Union. They took every opportunity to whack at each other. I thought it was fairly healthy, and it was a tremendous educational experience for those who have maintained for 25 years that Communism is monolithic. I felt it was very valuable not only for hardliners in the State Department and Pentagon but also for the American people.

Would you concur with that?

Mr. YESELSON. Yes, sir, I would. The cause of international understanding was aided for those who did not know how deep the conflict was between China and the Soviet Union but let me just suggest on a different level how this debate, this conflict between these two Communist countries can be dangerous.

The Chinese Communists, and I have observed them at the U.N., use the organization to identify American and Soviet foreign policy as a kind of dual hegemony against the third world. By so doing they constantly force the Soviet Union into defending their position, as I see it. The objective of the Chinese Communists, whom I regard as extremely skilled diplomats, is to weaken the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

During the Arafat debate, for example, they charged the Russians with supplying Israel's manpower, not giving the Arabs enough guns and charging them too much money. They called them merchants of

death. The Russians were in the position of having to defend their policy towards the Arabs and by so doing separating themselves further from the United States.

On the Cambodian issue, the Chinese Communists initiated it and we won that really by one vote or two votes, according to the vote—but the New York Times reported that the Russians showed remarkable restraint, and this was the reason for our victory.

Well, I went to the Dag Hammerskjold Library and checked. They never participated in the debate. They had to vote for Sihanouk. What they were doing was defending themselves against a Chinese effort to force them into an opposing position against the United States, so there once again we look at the organization in terms of conflict. It is possible to analyze it on levels such as this as well, although I do agree with you that it certainly was a learning experience for those who heard the kind of vicious attacks that they make on one another.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

REACTION OF THIRD WORLD DELEGATES TO AMBASSADOR SCALI'S DECEMBER 6, 1974 SPEECH

Mr. Segel, during the press conference that you held at the United Nations on December 12, 1974, you commented on the December 6 "tyranny of the majority" statement by Ambassador Scali and observed that "some signs of the beginning of meaningful dialog between the United States and Delegates of the third world has been seen." When questioned further on this you demurred. Now that you are no longer a delegate would you comment on the reaction of the third world delegates to the December 6 statement? Was a group of 77 a monolithic entity? Did you receive opinions which varied substantially from the voting record?

Mr. SEGEL. If you read the statements by the third world ambassadors in response to Ambassador Scali's speech, you can see a definite sense of moderation there, and except for the most extreme positions, a strong desire to stimulate negotiations and conciliation rather than more confrontation.

I think Ambassador Scali's speech put the situation in very good perspective and was constructive.

What was reported in the press about the debate was very superficial.

EXTENT OF OPINION VARIATION FROM BLOC VOTING RECORD

On the second question, as I am sure you noticed also in your personal discussions with delegates from third world countries, there were often deviations from the bloc voting pattern, and the positions were often much more negotiable than reported by the press. Many of the opportunities to resolve both small and large issues were not taken up. But this goes to the very basic question of our foreign policy and our relationship with the third world, which we don't have time to get into right now, since you are about to adjourn for the day.

Senator PERCY. Thank you. Again I would like to say that it was an honor and a privilege to serve with you on the delegation.

PARTICIPANT ATTITUDE CHANGES OBSERVED TOWARD U.N. AS AN ORGANIZATION

Mr. Stanley, the Stanley Foundation since 1965 has sponsored nine conferences on the topic, "The U.N. in the Next Decade." Participants, who for the most part have been intimately involved with the U.N., have observed changes in the attitude of participants toward the U.N. as an organization. What are some of the most persistent defects and shortcomings of the U.N. as identified at your conferences through the years? Perhaps you would like to comment on one or two now and expand on the answer for the record.

Mr. STANLEY. I would like to expand on that because it covers quite a bit of ground. I would say among the people we have worked with at these conferences—they come from nations large and small—I have observed a continuing and growing recognition of the necessity of making the U.N. work, not only in its peacekeeping and security but also in the various economic areas, and in dealing with the several new global problems now facing us. I would like to expand by letter if I may.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY AND RESPONSES OF C. MAXWELL STANLEY

THE STANLEY FOUNDATION,
Muscatine, Iowa, May 15, 1975.

Hon. SENATOR CHARLES PERCY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: At the conclusion of my Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony on May 8, I was asked to respond to several written questions.

Your first question concerns the attitudes of participants at our United Nations of the Next Decade Conference towards the United Nations. It also concerns the defects and shortcomings consistently identified at our nine conferences of this series.

Participants at these conferences show an increasing awareness of the vital need for the United Nations to advance international coperation, particularly regarding the critical world issues mentioned in my testimony. There has been, in my opinion, a broadening consensus that the United Nations system should be strengthened and improved. There has been limited discussion of Charter revision but stronger emphasis has been placed on specific improvements in various functional areas.

The identification of defects and shortcomings of the United Nations depends, of course, upon the individual and national viewpoints of participants. Generally speaking, there is agreement that a major defect is the lack of willingness of the superpowers to make full use of the United Nations. Most participants feel the Soviet Union and the United States tend to bypass or ignore the United Nations in the urgent areas of arms control, peace and security. Broad agreement also exists that the decision-making and procedural practices of the United Nations need improvement. Inadequate funding is another recognized shortcoming. Many conference participants are disturbed by the Security Council veto, others by bloc voting in the General Assembly.

The Stanley Foundation's Ninth Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade focused upon "Decision-Making Processes of the United Nations." The enclosed Conference Report contains various recommendations. I call attention to the following:

1. Member states must recognize that there is a constellation of issues facing the world community. Ranking of these is dependent upon different national viewpoints. Harmonization will be achieved when nations recognize that few, if any, of these issues can be resolved independently of others. Cooperation, coupled with a conscientious effort toward mutual understanding and accommodation between all nations, is essential (page 5).

2. The General Assembly should elect its officers and constitute its General Committee at the close of the prior General Assembly, or at a brief session early in the calendar year (page 8).

3. Easily implemented change in committee operation and structure should be made such as:

A. Working committees with Main Committees should function on a year-round basis.

B. General debate within committees should be reduced to avoid repetition of General Assembly plenary debate.

C. Speeches in committees in explanation of votes should be severely limited in length.

D. The number and responsibilities of committees should be reviewed.

E. Steps should be taken to eliminate assignment of same subject matter to more than one committee and to minimize repetitious consideration.

F. Informal consultation and negotiations should be encouraged to resolve differences and avoid expensive committee debate. (See pages 9 and 10.)

4. For the longer range, many participants recommended that the present pattern of Committees of the Whole be replaced by smaller committees (page 11).

5. Use of decision by consensus should be encouraged cautiously and selectively (page 12).

6. Mini-states should have some form of Associate U.N. Membership as an optional alternate (page 14).

7. Since a trend towards gradual circumscription of the use of the veto in Security Council is visible, adoption of resolutions with abstention of one or more permanent members could be helpful (page 17).

8. A standing committee should be established in the Security Council to assist in monitoring potential trouble spots and bringing difficulties to the attention of the Security Council (page 18).

9. Better coordination between the General Assembly and ECOSOC is important to achieve a proper relationship (page 20).

It would be pure speculation to discuss what differences there might have been in actions of the 29th General Assembly if the recommendations of the Ninth Conference had been in effect. Thus, in response to your second question, I would only suggest that the recommendations from our Conference would improve the functioning of the General Assembly, allowing more time to deal with substantive issues and permitting better preparation before matters are discussed on the Assembly floor.

If a standing committee of the Security Council existed (Item 8 above), attention could be focused upon smoldering, unresolved problems such as those giving rise to the explosive and widely publicized events of the 29th General Assembly: degrading apartheid in South Africa, the festering Palestinian refugee situation and the repeatedly rebuffed efforts of the developing world to gain a greater stake and voice in international economic matters.

Trusting these answers may be helpful in the deliberations of your Committee and again expressing my thanks for the opportunity to testify, I remain

Sincerely yours,

C. MAXWELL STANLEY, *President.*

Senator PERCY. Certainly.

The committee thanks our distinguished panel very much. I think you have made an invaluable record that will help lay a foundation for the rest of these hearings.

The hearings are recessed until May 14.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 14, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Sparkman [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Humphrey, Clark, Case, Javits, Percy, and Baker.

Also present: Senator Buckley.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

Nine Senators have indicated they will be here. I suppose they will be coming in. I think we had better get started.

We today are continuing the hearings on the United States and the United Nations by discussing the impact of the détente and the impact of the Third World on the United Nations.

For the first topic the committee has invited Mr. William F. Buckley, Jr., who is not only a writer and editor-in-chief of the National Review but also a former U.S. delegate to the United Nations and Prof. Alexander Dallin of Stanford University, a distinguished authority on the Soviet Union, including author of a book on the Soviet Union at the United Nations.

We welcome you, gentlemen here and I invite you to take a seat at the table and we will begin with Mr. Buckley.

I understand you composed your statement on a flight from Israel and Greece yesterday and copies are now being made and should be available to the committee shortly; is that correct?

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR., EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, THE NATIONAL REVIEW

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to hear from you.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say, I ask you the question rather facetiously, if we were going to hear some firing line material this morning.

Mr. BUCKLEY. That depends on whether you provoke me, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, a communication from your committee——

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt. I believe you refer every once in a while to your sainted brother.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Sainted junior Senator.

He is here in case things get out of hand.

A communication from your committee, signed by the chairman, advises me in language most civil, but tilting rather toward sternness than permissiveness, that I am to address you for 10 minutes in a prepared statement.

Last night I gave some thought as to how I might best serve your purposes under these circumstances. Needless to say, I should be happy to answer any questions you subsequently put to me. But to compress an analysis of the impact of détente on the policy of the United States in the United Nations is taxing, and requires a most stringent economy of language. I have decided therefore to give you a pastiche. In order to introduce it I need very little commentary. In order to give you the connective tissue that brings the narrative together, I require only a sentence or two.

WITNESS' EXPERIENCE ON U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE

Accordingly, I begin. The preliminary data are that in 1973 I was appointed a public member of the U.S. Delegation to the 28th General Assembly during that summer in which, it is recorded, President Nixon made other, perhaps even graver, mistakes.

I was induced to accept this appointment by being advised that I would represent the United States in the so-called Third Committee—the Human Rights Committee.

I move without further ado in medias res. There I am, at my first Third Committee meeting. I go back to my office and address a memorandum to the U.S. Ambassador, copy to the Secretary of State. I excerpt from that memorandum.

> The policy of détente with the Soviet Union and with China governs the activity of the State Department, and the State Department obviously will move in ways consistent with that policy.
>
> United States participation in the United Nations is in part a direct expression of United States foreign policy, in part it is an expression of the United States' contribution to strategic ideals of peace, justice, and freedom. It is not, in my opinion, inconsistent for the United States to express itself cordially to the representatives of the Soviet Union in Washington and in Moscow—while at the same time representatives of the United States, in public debates on strategic questions having to do with human rights, maintain a dogged position seeking to reaffirm the ideals of the United Nations.
>
> . . . The purpose of the extra political agencies of the U.N. is ultimately diplomatic. When the Committee talks about the necessity for freedom of information, it votes for improved communications, which in turn should lead to the encouragement of democratic and libertarian impulse. When the Committee talks about the right of emigration, or the right to practice one's religion, it argues for preassures upon totalitarian entities which lure them towards the open society which is the most reliable friend of stability and equilibrium.
>
> . . . The genius of the committee system, and of the public member conception, lies surely in the effort slightly to distinguish between the direct agents of the State Department and the slightly detached agents that constitute the delegation.
>
> . . . Accordingly, unless I am instructed to do otherwise, I plan, as the U.S. member in the Committee on Human Rights, to feel free to discuss human rights even if the inference can be drawn from what I say that I also believe in human rights within the Soviet Union. . .

I concluded the memorandum with vows to a most tactful performance of my duties as I saw them, and was advised most tactfully the next day by the U.S. Ambassador, for whom I have the highest respect, that any such approach would in fact stand in the way of the tactical demands of détente.

EFFECT OF DÉTENTE ON HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSION

A second act—I choose arbitrarily from a number that would serve. I am, as public delegate, instructed to deliver a short speech on how the United Nations might appropriately celebrate the 25th anniversary of the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I wrote, attempting to conform to the State Department cabled instructions, a few paragraphs, the relevant ones of which I quote:

Mr. Chairman, on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, what is there to say this side of the cant which I hope to spare you? I plead inexperience in the art of saying nothing with much wind, and surely if we find, on meditating the thirty Articles in the Declaration, that there ought to be thirty-one, we should consider recommending an Article that declares that all men were born free of the weight of political rhetoric, but everywhere, man is, in respect of this freedom in chains.

My government desires to make one or two observations, some of them concrete, some ceremonial.

The Human Rights document is the best-known and therefore the preeminent catalogue of human rights in the world today.

. . . The Declaration has been useful to several countries that have sought to devise bills of rights of their own. By consulting the UN Declaration of Human Rights, they can at least count those rights they have left out.

My government desires to call attention, on the 25th Anniversary of the Declaration, to a few of the enumerated rights which are conspicuously transgressed upon—

[I proceeded to enumerate these, as suggested in the telegram from the State Department. And I concluded:]

Now, Mr. President, the world is divided not between those who say they do not believe in torture and those who say that they do believe in torture. Rather it is divided between those who practice torture and those who do not practice torture. Indeed, the world is divided not between those who say they believe in human rights and those who say they do not believe in human rights, but between those who grant human beings human rights and those who do not grant human beings human rights. . . . So that this organization is committed, for instance, to the proposition that there is a right to leave one's country. And yet we have not heard more profuse compliments paid to the Declaration of Human Rights than by some who maintain huge fortifications calculated to prevent precisely the exercise of that right.

The United Nations was not designated as a military juggernaut at the service of the Human Rights Committee to ensure that signatories practice those rights they praise. But, Mr. President, surely it would mark the solemnity of the occasion if, on the 25th Anniversary of the Declaration next December 10th, those nations that systematically deny the human rights associated with the United Nations Declarations should gracefully absent themselves from this chamber for one day?

I was advised, most gracefully and warmly, that my short analysis, whatever its great philosophical merits to the contrary notwithstanding, were inconsistent with détente and, accordingly, pleading the urgency of business elsewhere, I arranged for an aide to read a speech recalling in copious detail the exhalted oratory that had celebrated the promulgation of the United Nations Declaration 25 years ago.

UNITED NATIONS FANTASY

Mr. Chairman, the time having elapsed, I close with a paragraph, a fantasy from a journal I wrote. At the end of that I am at your disposal to draw out the implications of this statement.

I wrote:

Wednesday. While sitting at the chair of the plenary, attending to a few administrative details in the session following the day of the formal closing,

a bulletin came in, and the place was in pandemonium. It appears that the military attached to the U.N. to give technical advice on world disarmament have staged a successful coup and have taken over the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Secretariat. In due course the U.N. colonels will issue their instructions, but already it is disclosed that the Soviet Union will not be permitted to talk about disarming, without disarming; the Chinese may not speak about human rights without granting human rights; the Arabs will not be permitted to speak about the plight of the Less Developed Countries without forswearing the cartelization of their oil; the Africans may not talk about racism until after subduing the leaders of Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Burundi, for a starter; and just to prove that the colonels are not above a bill of attainer, Jamil Baroody may not speak at all, on any subject, for ninety days—after which he will be put on probation and permitted to increase the length of his speeches by one minute per month, until he reaches the maximum of ten minutes, except that at the first mention of Zionist responsibility for World War I, he has to start all over again. The countries of East Europe must wear red uniforms when they appear on the floor and before rising to speak, must seek explicit and public permission from the delegate of the Soviet Union. A scientific tabulation will be made, under the colonels' supervision, of the compliance of individual countries with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and each country's delegate will be required to wear on his lapel his national's ranking on that scale, which will range from 100 to 0. Any country with a ranking of less than 75 will not be permitted to speak on the subject of human rights.

Mr. Chairman, please forgive the unorthodox testimony. I hope you will see the purpose in my electing to address you in this form. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

All right, Mr. Dallin, we will be very glad to hear from you.

[Biographical sketch of Alexander Dallin follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ALEXANDER DALLIN

Professor of History and Political Science, Stanford University, and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace.

Born May 21, 1924; married, three children; Ph. D., Columbia University, 1953.

Research Associate, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1950–51; Associate Director, Research Program on the USSR, 1951–54; Director of Research, War Documentation Project, Alexandria, Va., 1954–55; Faculty member, Columbia University: Assistant Professor, 1956–58; Associate Professor, 1958–61; Professor, 1961–65; Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations, 1965–71; Director, Russian Institute, 1962–67; Acting Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs, 1966–68; Visiting Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, 1970; Professor of History and Political Science, Stanford University, and Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution, 1971–.

Publications include: *German Rule in Russia, 1941–45* (1957); ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (1960); *The Soviet Union at the United Nations* (1962); ed., *Diversity in International Communism* (1963); *The Soviet Union and Disarmament* (1965); ed. (with Alan F. Westin), *Politics in the Soviet Union* (1966); co-ed. (with Thomas B. Larson), *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev* (1968); (with George Breslauer) *Political Terror in Communist Systems* (1970); and approximately 50 articles, chapters, and monographs.

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STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER DALLIN, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT AND HISTORY, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Mr. DALLIN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to appear before your committee. Mr. Buckley's is a hard act to follow.

I have submitted a more comprehensive statement and will as instructed limit myself to 10 minutes orally.

The CHAIRMAN. Your entire statement will be printed in the record.
Mr. DALLIN. Thank you, sir.
[Mr. Dallin's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER DALLIN, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP

The change in Soviet-American relations which is suggested by the term, détente, did not come about thanks to the United Nations. Nor has it fundamentally affected the functioning of the UN. It is, however, one among several trends which have produced a new situation and new attitudes at the United Nations.

The following statement attempts to sketch the evolution of, first, United States, and second, Soviet attitudes and policies toward the UN; and then to identify some elements of symmetry and some major divergencies in the two powers' approach to the United Nations.

THE U.S. AND THE UN

American attitudes toward the UN have drifted from elation to frustration. The initial expectation that the United Nations would be an essential instrument for the maintenance of peace, seemed to be reinforced by the comfortable sense, during the early years, that the United States had the support of the majority of member states. Though even then the U.S. chose not to go through the UN with significant political initiatives (such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan), in its first decade the UN was a welcome instrument—first and foremost, in the pursuit of the "cold war." UN action in the Korean War was but the most dramatic example of this function. It also marked the end of an era in which the U.S. had a clearcut preponderance among the members of the General Assembly, the sympathy of the Secretary-General, and a majority of Security Council members—stymied only from time to time by the use, or the prospect of the use, of the veto by the Soviet Union.

From the mid-fifties on, American attitudes were affected by important changes on the world scene. Many of these—such as decolonization, development, and disarmament—were issues that found reflection at the UN. The balance of votes gradually became more uncertain, as new states were admitted to membership in considerable numbers, and some of the erstwhile followers of the American lead began to assert a more independent foreign policy.

American disillusionment was due perhaps, most of all, to the failure of the UN to play a part it had never been intended to perform. Its effectiveness as a collective security and peacekeeping organ was always predicated on agreement among the Permanent Members of the Security Council. It was not intended as an instrument that either superpower could wield against the other. It had no effective force of its own, and only modest authority.

As crisis after crisis arose, the UN proved unable to articulate—let alone enforce—its collective will; it was not centrally involved in the resolution of these crises; it served at times as a convenient forum, an intermediary, or a scapegoat for the protagonists. Thus, no meaningful action ensued from the UN debates on Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Similarly, American intervention in Cuba (the Bay of Pigs incident) and the Dominican Republic led to no UN action. In the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the United Nations had only a marginal role. In the Middle East, it was unable to secure implementation of its Resolution of November 22, 1967. In the Indochina fighting, the role of the United Nations was nil.

On the other hand, the major accomplishments of recent years in reducing international tensions, resolving great-power conflicts, and reaching agreements to limit the arms race and reduce the risks of war, have been achieved almost entirely outside the framework of the UN. The easing of the troublesome German problem (including the Soviet and Polish treaties with the FRG, and the Berlin accords) was the result of bilateral contacts. Similarly, the shift in United States policy toward the People's Republic of China came about without reference to the UN; the U.S. effort to seat the Republic of China, Taiwan) as a second Chinese delegation failed (1971).

The setback sustained by the United States in this connection illustrates the general weakening of American influence at the United Nations. Since 1970 the U.S. has occasionally chosen to use its veto power. The still unfamiliar role of

the U.S. as a loser—and at times, a poor loser, at that—may be expected to continue and may in turn reinforce domestic resentment of the UN. This is particularly likely to happen if the U.S. mission chooses to isolate itself, erroneously lumping together all "others" as if they constituted a homogeneous bloc, rather than seeking consensus and compromise on disputed issues, or even taking advantage of tensions among nations outside the U.S. alliance system.

It is a form of political color blindness to perceive an identity of interests and policies among all "Third World" nations or between Soviet Bloc and neutralist states. The temptation to pursue a policy of benign neglect toward the United Nations is likely to weaken, rather than to strengthen, the American position, and to play into the hands of its adversaries. But the recent drift does add poignancy to the warning once voiced by the late Adlai Stevenson, that "the crisis of our loyalty to the United Nations is still ahead of us."

It remains true, nonetheless, that the United Nations has been insignificant in the improvement of Soviet-American relations. This has been dramatized by the various "summit" meetings of the last three years. The "General Principles" and declarations adopted on these occasions make virtually no reference to the UN. Even where the accords have direct consequences for other powers or require their later concurrence, negotiations are conducted bilaterally between the Soviet Union and the United States. And where of necessity other powers must be involved in the negotiation of new accords (such as European Security and MBFR) conferences are scheduled outside the UN system. There is no reason to think that disputes between the United States and the USSR which cannot be resolved bilaterally could be more successfully negotiated at or through the UN.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UN

The Soviet attitude toward the United Nations was, from the outset, rooted in a more hardheaded assessment of its potential role in the postwar world. Experience and ideology reinforced each other in inducing considerable suspicion, to begin with. There was the backlog of bitter hostility to the League of Nations, which had always been perceived as an inimical agency. Soviet membership in the League (1934–39) scarcely increased Moscow's enthusiasm for a repeat performance: the fundamental aim of "collective security" was not served; and in 1939 the USSR found itself expelled from the League for its attack on Finland.

Still, as a principal partner of the victorious coalition in World War II, Stalin evidently concluded that (a) the price of refusing to join the new world organization would exceed the costs and risks of membership; (b) maximally, the UN could serve as a useful vehicle to gain friends and influence people; (c) minimally, the Soviet Union could make sure that there were structural guarantees (notably, the veto power in the Security Council, and the weakness of other UN organs) against possible UN action detrimental to the USSR. Since he expected the majority to be hostile to the Soviet Union, Stalin was intent on having an impotent UN.

Soviet expectations were validated by the experience of the first postwar decade, within the United Nations as well as outside it.[1] Soviet policy toward the UN has always tended to be a function of general Soviet foreign-policy perspectives. Thus, at the height of the "cold war," general Soviet self-isolation also meant a virtual withdrawal from UN activities. In turn, when Moscow adopted a strategy of "peaceful coexistence," the UN too appeared as one more promising arena for Soviet initiatives. Now it was Moscow's turn, for a time, to abandon realism for euphoria.

In broad strokes, Khrushchev's vision was a Soviet camp gaining in power and cohesion; a capitalist world rent by internal conflicts and crises; and the "Third World," as a matter of self-interest, aligning itself with the Soviet Union in an "anti-imperialist" coalition and gradually transforming itself in the Soviet image. While in many respects this forecast proved to be woefully erroneous, the emergence of the new nation-states did seem to confirm the vision. In terms of membership, issues, style, and structure, the new nations brought about the most basic changes the United Nations has experienced. But by 1960–64 the Soviet Union, though stronger than ever, found itself in considerable difficulties, in and out of the UN.

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[1] For an authoritative summary, dealing with the general topic of this statement, see Robert G. Wesson, "The United Nations in the World Outlook of the Soviet Union and the United States," in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburgs, eds., *Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations* (New York, 1971), ch. I. For an earlier and more detailed discussion, see Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations* (New York, 1962).

Khrushchev's improvized but insistent demand that the UN be reorganized so as to reflect the new realities—giving equal representation to the three blocs of states, Western, communist, and neutral—yielded nothing but frustration and failure. Moreover, experience showed that his underlying hope (the "neutrals" lining up with the USSR) was, at worst, a gross miscalculation and, at best, premature and only partly true. By the time Khrushchev was ousted from power, he had precipitated a major constitutional and financial crisis within the UN. He had brought about no organizational changes—other than an increasing instinct on the part of other powers not to raise issues at the UN that were apt to provoke a recurrence of such Soviet behavior.[2]

Since the mid-1960's, then, Soviet foreign policy (including the UN) has reverted to a less hectic mode of lesser risk-taking. The "troika" proposals were quietly shelved; indeed, current Soviet writings on the UN totally ignore them. There has been a significant Soviet retreat from the extravagant expectations regarding the "Third World." While Moscow need no longer fear the United Nations as an "imperialist" tool directed against the Soviet Union, the Organization offers the Soviet leaders scant prospect of assuming a commanding or controlling position. The result is a generally supportive but fairly modest and rigid Soviet estimate of the UN's potential. Moscow has been winning it more but enjoying it less.

The explicit Soviet approach to the UN is thoroughly conservative. Moscow seems more conscious than ever of its own status—as a major power, a part of the world "establishment," possessor of the veto, achiever of strategic parity with the U.S., model and mentor for one and all.[3] The Soviet Union makes clear that the UN is a voluntary association of sovereign states; it cannot "act as a kind of super-state." Hence Moscow rejects all arguments that point precisely to the lack of such authority as the source of the UN's ineffectiveness. By the same token, it rejects all calls for revision of the United Nations Charter. It seeks to refute all criticism of the veto; it insists on the prerogatives of the Security Council as the sole body empowered to find threats to peace, to determine the appropriate action, and if needed to direct and control UN peacekeeping operations. This leaves the door open for any of the Permanent Members to veto such a decision, but this is presumably a necessary price to pay for the Soviet Union's assurance that it can estop any action if and when this is deemed important.[4]

Moscow sees the UN as variable in its effects—at times welcome, at times embarrassing, and at times frustrating to the USSR. A new factor which has complicated the Soviet posture is the Chinese presence. If in recent years there has been a general "new civility" and frequently a measure of restraint at United Nations gatherings, the Sino-Soviet exchanges at the UN have been marked by striking vituperation, unmitigated accusations and countercharges. Moscow does not mind acknowledging that it finds the Chinese obstructive. It cannot respond to the challenge to demonstrate its revolutionary commitment before an assembly whose professed values are those of parliamentary give-and-take. It has also learned that it cannot afford to absent itself (as it did from the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment) lest it abandon the field to the Chinese. On occasion Soviet proposals seem calculated in large measure to show up the

[2] On the Khrushchev period as well as the policy of his successors, see particularly George A. Brinkley, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations: The Role of the Developing Countries," *Review of Politics*, January 1970, pp. 91–123. The Soviet treatment of the same problem is in A. Ia. Nekrasov, *SSSR i razvivaiushchiesia strany v OON* (Moscow, 1971).

[3] In most unrevolutionary fashion Soviet statements stress not only the prerogatives of national sovereignty but also the fact that the UN "does not replace traditional forms of interstate contacts." See, e.g., Anatoly Gromyko, "The United Nations: Ways to Increase its Effectiveness," in Edwin H. Fedder, ed., *The United Nations: Problems and Prospects* (St. Louis, 1971), pp. 1–3; and V. F. Petrovski, "Sovetskie uchenye o meste i roli OON v sovremennom mire," *Voprosy istorii*, 1972, no. 5, pp. 79–80.

[4] See, in addition, the authoritative collection, *OON: Itogi, tendentsii, perspektivy* (Moscow, 1970); Boris Prokof'ev, *OON—25 let* (Moscow, 1970); G. K. Efimov, *General'naia assambleia OON* (Moscow, 1969); V. Viktorov, "Worldwide Forum of Nations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1972, no. 10; N. Kapchenko, "World Developments and the United Nations," *ibid.*, 1973, no. 12; V. Fedorov, "The UN Charter and International Security," *ibid.*, 1974, no. 9. The official Soviet position is contained in the letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to the UN Secretary-General, July 4, 1972; reprinted in *ibid.*, 1972, no. 10, pp. 119–20.

Contrast, e.g., with Francis Wilcox and Carl Marcy, *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations* (Washington, D.C., 1955); President's Commission for the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations [Lodge Commission], *Report* (Washington, D.C., 1971); United Nations Association USA, *Controlling Conflicts in the 1970s* and *The United Nations in the 1970s* (New York, 1969, 1972); Richard N. Gardner, ed., *The United States and the United Nations: Can We Do Better?* (New York, 1972); Charles W. Yost, *The Insecurity of Nations* (New York, 1968).

Chinese, and their Albanian friends), to force them to take a public stand and thereby to isolate them from other member-states.

It is another unspoken Soviet axiom that the UN must be kept out of all Soviet Bloc affairs, internal as well as interstate. Hence a firm stand in defense of "domestic jurisdiction" (which, it is true, does not keep the USSR from voting for the condemnation of *apartheid*); its uncompromising opposition to all efforts to give greater stress to "human rights" within the UN framework; and insistence on controls, e.g., over foreign satellite television transmissions to the USSR.

There are evidently some areas of disagreement among Soviet observers and practitioners concerned with the UN. A close reading of Soviet comments, e.g., shows differences regarding the nonpolitical aspects of UN work. While some observers stress the socio-economic and scientific-technological programs and agencies, the traditional and still predominant Soviet view has been to insist that the principal aim of the UN is to strengthen peace and security; in this perspective, any effort to put more emphasis on or resources into other activities amounts to an attempt to sidetrack the political functions of the UN and must be resisted. It is likely that this disagreement relates to varying estimates of the "Third World." The dominant Soviet view apparently no longer puts great stock in the UN as a bridge to the underdeveloped nations, whereas some observers do see benefits from such a linkage.[5]

In its public pronouncements the Soviet Union has in recent years made itself a champion of the UN. There is reason to think that, given the multiple reservations it harbors, this is at least partly intended to dramatize the contrast between Soviet faith, optimism, and commitment, and the increasingly grudging and negative American stance. Soviet commentary has also stressed the adoption by the UN of various Soviet-sponsored declarations that amount to pious generalities, such as the condemnation of colonialism, the use of force, or the forcible seizure of territory—behavior already outlawed by the UN Charter or other sources of international law. Given the impossibility of enforcing such resolutions, such Soviet initiatives of purely declaratory pronouncements smack of "grandstanding."

Leaving aside tactical and ideological differences, however, the Soviet Union, not unlike the United States, sees the UN as a desirable but distinctly limited, "supplementary" or "subordinate" instrumentality in the pursuit of its national policies.

THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R.: THE PLACE OF THE UN

There has been a qualitative improvement in Soviet-American relations over the last several years. If one searches for reasons to explain this development, a variety of factors suggest themselves: the substantial growth in Soviet economic and strategic power; the change in outlook and priorities of the Soviet leadership; the Sino-Soviet conflict, with all its implications for Soviet security, ideology, and perception of friend and foe, and the opportunities for Sino-American *rapprochement*; a keener Soviet recognition of economic, technological, and managerial shortcomings, some of which may be remediable by increased intercourse with the West; a shared awareness of the common interest in reducing the risks of war and stabilizing the international environment; the increasing self-isolation of the United States from its estwhile friends and allies, and the effects of the Vietnam War. This list could be elaborated and extended; the point is merely to suggest that none of the relevant variables includes the United Nations. It is difficult to envisage scenarios in which the UN would play a major part in influencing the superpowers' relationship.

Soviet insistence on "strict construction" of the Charter, too, makes virtually certain that the UN will not significantly aid in the resolution of conflicts involving either or both superpowers. What is likely to be recognized as functional and desirable by both sides is the role of the UN as a forum for the airing of positions; as a locus of formal and informal meetings, explorations, and contacts (including those made through third parties); and as an impartial outsider whenever both parties to a conflict seek such a face-saving "out." In all these

[5] A Soviet discussion of foreign aid argues that "the socialist countries are in no position" fully to finance the development of certain African states, who consider such support essential. Forgetting about the traditional dogma that imperialist aid is *ipso facto* exploitative, Soviet writers now recommend that Western assistance be in fact stepped up, as it were supplementing communist aid programs. David Morison, "USSR and Third World, III," *Mizan*, XII, 135; cited in Morton Schwartz, "The USSR and Leftist Regimes in Less-Developed Countries," *Survey* (London), No. 87 (Spring 1973). The same point is made in Y. Tomilin, "The United Nations and International Détente," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1974, no. 3, p. 36.

cases the UN serves as an agency facilitating solution, agreement, or negotiation; in none does it make a significant autonomous input affecting either the Soviet Union or the United States.[6]

There is one area, however, in which the experience of the United Nations has come to exert an influence of its own, and to do so asymmetrically—far more on the USSR than on the U.S. It is one which neither side planned and which the Soviet delegates would in fact be likely to deny. This is the growing frequency with which the U.S. and the Soviet Union take similar or parallel positions on particular issues, or even jointly sponsor new programs or resolutions, or intuitively tend to respond to new situations in similar fashion.

The phenomenon has been particularly striking whenever large numbers of member states have lined up on the other side of the argument. And perhaps even to a greater extent than the facts warrant, some observers—earlier, the Yugoslaves; more recently, the Chinese—profess to see all manner of collusion or at least convergence between the two global rivals. As a Yugoslav observer reported on a General Assembly session, for instance, a few years ago:

> [. . . a series of proposals were advanced concerning ways of promoting the role of the United Nations. . . . Almost as a rule, the superpowers unanimously opposed all [such] proposals. . . . The latest General Assembly session has clearly outlined the contours of a new type of constellation in the present phase of activity of the UN, with the superpowers on one side and all the remaining world on the other.[7]

The New China News Agency routinely reports on the "Superpowers' collusion" and the "Small and Medium-Sized Countries [which] condemn the two superpowers."

In the perception of "Third-World" nations, it is particularly in connection with economic development programs that both Russia and America—whatever the differences between them—have shown rather identical reluctance to provide the kinds of quantities of assistance these nations demand. Both have sought to minimize or deny the political leverage and the economic claims of "developing" countries. The Secretary-General has remarked on "the contrast in the positions of the more developed and the less developed countries." It is often said that the global cleavage is no longer between East and West but rather between North and South; if so, then to the many have-nots the two superpowers symbolize the "have's."

This attitude is at times reciprocated, too. There is more symbolism than may be at first apparent in the anecdote which Lincoln P. Bloomfield relates. He recalls sitting in the UN. Delegates' Lounge with a senior Soviet delegate. "As the noise got louder and the crowd thicker, he suddenly looked up and burst out: 'We simply cannot do business in this place.'"[8]

One area in which common Soviet and American positions have invited comment and at times bitter criticism from other member states is arms control. In two instances in particular (the drafts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of the Seabed Treaty) the U.S. and the USSR faced the UN membership with a joint proposal, worked out directly between them, and then requiring considerable renegotiation, bargaining, and amendment to secure the support of other interested parties.

The Soviet Union has been especially sensitive to charges of "collusion" with the arch-imperialists. It has gone out of its way to denounce and dispell them. But one cannot escape the impression that in fact, over recent years, a *modus operandi* has evolved in which, despite their profound divergencies, Soviet and American UN representatives have come to know how to deal with each other, have (over some ten years) sought to avoid exacerbating verbal bouts, have in fact at times worked out compromises behind the scenes, and have probably quite unwittingly come to share certain likes and dislikes, as well as some general perceptions of the international scene.

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[6] The relative importance of informal contacts at the UN may in fact decrease over time, as (1) the détente makes for more direct contacts between the principals, and (2) other (bilateral and multilateral) institutions and conferences proliferating outside the United Nations make communication between the superpowers easier, regardless of the UN.

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A recent Soviet article recognizes that "some non-aligned countries have expressed the fear that an understanding between the two powers [U.S. and USSR] could be detrimental to the interests of the 'Third World.'" Their efforts, in effect, to monitor U.S.-Soviet talks "cannot be considered as constructive." (Tomilin, *loc. cit.*, p. 35.)

Some observers might go further and argue that both delegations have given evidence of a sort of acculturation or "adaptive behavior." They might point, e.g., to an abstention from voting in the Security Council rather than have a negative vote recorded as a veto; recourse to "consensus procedure" under which no formal vote is taken; and informal understandings not to speak on a given issue before the Security Council or the General Assembly. Such instances do illustrate the acceptance of tacit or explicit "rules of the game" by adversary participants. There is, however, no evidence that the styles of interaction at the UN have any tangible impact on Soviet or American policy-makers back home.

TRENDS AND PRIORITIES

The current priorities of both the U.S. and the USSR are, in different ways, being contested at home; and future reversals of their policies cannot be ruled out. Nonetheless, one may assume that in broad features a continuation of present trends is likely. If so, one may hazard the guess that the United Nations is unlikely to have any major influence on the relationship of the two major powers; and that they are unlikely to rely on the UN in the development of their mutual relations.

In this fundamental regard, then, the situation remains unchanged. What has changed, in addition to the balance of power, is the diminution of "ideological" elements in Soviet conduct. It is true that the Soviet approach to the UN is still officially justified in orthodox Leninist terms as a way of "continuing the worldwide class struggle by other means." But there is a remarkable hiatus between doctrinal rationalizations and revolutionary rhetoric, on the one hand, and Soviet insistence on the plenitude of national sovereignty and on various conventions of "bourgeois" diplomacy, on the other. Especially in the past decade, traditional communist categories such as the "two-camp" view of the world, so thoroughly at odds with the one-world conception of the UN, have been further confounded and empirically contradicted—most dramatically, by the Sino-Soviet split. The assumption of a reasonably pragmatic approach is increasingly likely to provide a realistic guide to Soviet behavior in the UN. This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union is likely to acknowledge such a trend; nor that there do not remain serious preconceptions and blinders impeding a fuller understanding.

The U.S. outlook has similarly lost some of its phobic qualities, with the Kissinger diplomacy in regard to both Moscow and Peking; the termination of the Vietnam War; the recognition of Soviet-American strategic parity; the perception of mutual benefit from various joint endeavors with the USSR; and Soviet rejection of the trade bill stipulating conditions for the award of most-favored-nation status to the USSR.

There are some elements of symmetry in the two powers' view of the United Nations. Both have sought to use, or refrain from using, the UN when it has suited their purposes. Both have adapted their conduct and policies to the changing mood and membership of the UN, but both have been frustrated by the numerical preponderance of small and underdeveloped nations. Both have viewed the United Nations as an instrument of limited utility. Authoritative texts on both sides ignore the UN as a significant agency for peace. Both have displayed mixed attitudes containing elements of self-righteousness as well as assertions of idealism. Both are dubious of the UN's ability to solve serious crises. Both have sought to keep down UN budgets, programs, and staffs. And both believe that things would be worse if there were no UN.

On the other hand, there are profound differences between Soviet and American perceptions and behavior. In style and rhetoric these are fairly self-evident. In recent years U.S. disillusionment with the UN has been more severe and the American response at times more hostile. And yet the Soviet Union goes further in its own determination to take no chances to let the UN be used against itself or its friends.

The United Nations is not prepared to assist significantly in the resolution of differences involving one or both superpowers. Its role, in this regard, is likely to be, at best, one of keeping the two apart or away from the foci of conflict, substituting its own presence. The UN can be expected to perform some constructive tasks in conflict-management—as a buffer, a scapegoat, a broker, or a receiver—assuming the principals seek a peaceful way out. If either of the superpowers does not, the UN cannot stop it.

The enforcement of UN decisions relating to war and peace remains a divisive yet critical issue. Effective efforts for collective security require a mechanism for the enforcement of decisions, and such procedures have never been fully regularized. UN action, such as the dispatch of observers or the raising of peacekeeping forces, has been essentially *ad hoc*, with varying degress of success and acrimony.

Action presupposes great-power consensus on what constitutes a threat to peace and who is at fault. Soviet spokesmen candidly acknowledge that the struggle between "the forces of progress and those of recation" still "underlies our analysis of UN activities in a particular situation of conflict." UN decisions therefore must "assist national liberation movements and promote social progress without . . . taking sides with reactionary forces [as defined by the USSR]."[9] In doctrine, this gap is unbridgeable. In practice, however, the Soviet Union has at times acquiesced in UN peacekeeping missions, though it has usually refused to contribute to their costs. Efforts to formulate rules for the supervision, operation, financing, and direction of UN forces have been stalled for many years.[10]

Soviet support of the peacekeeping operation in the Middle East after the October 1973 war may or may not be an indication of a change in outlook. Soviet commentators have in fact pointed out that the prior Soviet-American détente made possible the relatively rapid Security Council action ending the Middle Eastern conflict, which (they remark) would have been far more dangerous at the height of the "cold war."[11]

The adoption of groundrules governing the use of peacekeeping forces is a prerequisite for increased UN effectiveness in regard to conflicts not involving the Permanent Members themselves. Conditions for UN peacekeeping may be improving. Thus, not only the Middle Eastern precedent, but also the breakdown of the "tight bipolar system" of international alliances, and the reaction to the fighting in Indochina make more likely that in future local conflicts both the U.S. and the USSR will prefer to stay out and use third parties such as the UN. It remains true that even under such conditions the superpowers frequently back opposing parties or come to view the effects of UN action (as in the Congo) in opposite ways, leading to a drastic erosion of the original consensus that makes a UN mission possible. The attitude of the People's Republic of China may, in turn, make agreement more difficult if it suspects "Soviet-American collusion." In its entire history the UN has only rarely been able to constrain any combatant nation. It has never constrained any of the major powers. It must be recognized that it can do least where it would be needed most.

Moscow has evidently learned what may not be fully understood in this country: to turn one's back on the UN is precisely what one's worst enemies would wish. If the United States cannot "control" the UN, it cannot afford to ignore it either, in a world in which interdependence has become proverbial.

Détente may have led both American and Soviet delegates to the UN sometimes—not always—to tone down their remarks and to avoid some rought edges. This has meant some sacrifice in playing to the galleries or the public back home. Essentially this is a question of tactics. The real work at the UN is apt to be done behind the scenes. Ultimately, what is needed is not grandstanding but effectiveness. Politics is the art of the possible, and it would be a disservice to expect more of the UN that its structure allows. It would also be foolish to use it for less than it can provide.

Mr. DALLIN. I will try and show a more comprehensive picture of American and Soviet positions in the U.N. and their interaction there.

AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.N.

In recent years, American attitudes toward the U.N. have drifted, we have all observed, from elation to frustration. While in the early

[9] Gromyko, *loc. cit.*, p. 9; also Prokof'ev, p. 75; E. S. Krivchikova, *Vooruzhennye sily OON* (Moscow, 1965); and Iu. Ia. Mikheev, *Primenenie prinuditel'nykh mer po ustavu OON* (Moscow, 1967).

[10] One stumbling block is the relative role of the Secretary-General and the Security Council in the operational supervision of a peace-keeping force. See the letters of Soviet Ambassador Malik and U.S. Ambassador Bush to the Secretary-General, March 17 and 30, 1972 (Documents A/8669 and A/8676).

[11] See, e.g., Tomilin, *loc. cit.*, p. 36.

years this country had support of most member states there, from the mid 1950's on, the balance of votes became more uncertain as new states were admitted in considerable numbers. Moreover, in most international crises the U.N. proved unable to assert its will. This was true of, say, Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia; it was also true of American action in the Dominican Republic and in all the fighting in Indochina. In the Cuban missile crisis its role was marginal, and in the Middle East it has been unable to secure implementation of its resolutions.

On the other hand, the key accomplishments of recent years that we identify with the term "détente" have come about outside of the framework of the U.N. This is true of the shift in U.S. policy toward the People's Republic of China, arms control agreements negotiated in recent years, the various accords over Germany, and, of course, the summit meetings with the Soviet Union in the last 3 years. The declaration and statements of principles adopted in these ococasions made virtually no reference to the U.N. and there is no reason to think, I believe, that disputes between the United States and the Soviet Union which cannot be resolved bilaterally could be more successfully negotiated through or at the U.N.

One result of the changed situation at the U.N. has been the emergence of the U.S. with greater frequency as a loser and at times as a poor loser. This is likely to remain so, particularly if we choose to isolate ourselves erroneously lumping together all countries that do not agree with us, rather than seeking where possible compromise on disputed issues or taking advantage of tensions among nations outside the U.S. alliance system. It is, I believe, a form of political color blindness to perceive an identity of interests and policies among all "third world" nations or between Soviet bloc and neutralist states. The temptation to pursue a policy of benign neglect toward the United Nations is likely to weaken, rather than to strengthen, the American position, and to play into the hands of its adversaries. But the recent drift does add poignancy to the warning once voiced by the late Adlai Stevenson that "the crisis of our loyalty to the United Nations is still ahead of us."

EARLY SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS

The Soviet attitude toward the United Nations was, from the outset, rooted in a more hardheaded assessment of its potential role in the postwar world. Experience and ideology reinforced each other in inducing considerable suspicion, to begin with. There was the backlog of bitter hostility to the League of Nations, which had always been perceived as an inimical agency. Soviet membership in the League (1934–39) scarcely increased Moscow's enthusiasm for a repeat performance: the fundamental aim of "collective security" was not served; and in 1939 the U.S.S.R. found itself expelled from the League for its attack on Finland.

Still, as a principal partner of the victorious coalition in World War II, Stalin evidently concluded that (*a*) the price of refusing to join the new world organization would exceed the costs and risks of membership; (*b*) maximally, the U.N. could serve as a useful vehicle to gain friends and influence people; (*c*) minimally, the Soviet Union could

make sure that there were structural guarantees (notably, the veto power in the Security Council, and the weakness of other U.N. organs) against possible U.N. action detrimental to the U.S.S.R. Since he expected the majority to be hostile to the Soviet Union, Stalin was intent on having an impotent U.N.

Soviet expectations were validated by the experience of the first postwar decade, within the United Nations as well as outside it.[1]

SOVIET ATTITUDE DURING KHRUSHCHEV ERA

Soviet policy toward the U.N. has always tended to be a function of general Soviet foreign-policy perspectives. Thus, at the height of the "cold war," general Soviet self-isolation also meant a virtual withdrawal from U.N. activities. In turn, when Moscow adopted a strategy of "peaceful coexistence," the U.N., too, appeared as one more promising arena for Soviet initiatives. Now it was Moscow's turn, for a time, to abandon realism for euphoria.

In broad strokes, Khrushchev's vision was a Soviet camp gaining in power and cohesion; a capitalist world rent by internal conflicts and crises; and the third world as a matter of self-interest, alining itself with the Soviet Union in an "anti-imperialist" coalition and gradually transforming itself in the Soviet-image. While in many respects this forecast proved to be woefully erroneous, the emergence of the new nation-states did seem to confirm the vision. In terms of membership, issues, style, and structure, the new nations brought about the most basic changes the United Nations has experienced. But by 1960–64 the Soviet Union, though stronger than ever, found itself in considerable difficulties, in and out of the U.N.

Khrushchev's improvised but insistent demand that the U.N. be reorganized so as to reflect the new realities—giving equal representation to the three blocs of states, Western, Communist, and neutral—yielded nothing but frustration and failure. Moreover, experience showed that his underlying hope—the "neutrals" lining up with the U.S.S.R.—was, at worst a gross miscalculation and, at best, premature and only partly true. By the time Khrushchev was ousted from power, he had precipitated a major constitutional and financial crisis within the U.N. He had brought about no organizational changes—other than an increasing instinct on the part of the powers not to raise issues at the U.N. that were apt to provoke a recurrence of such Soviet behavior.[2]

RECENT SOVIET VIEWS OF THE U.N.

Since the mid-1960's, then, Soviet foreign policy—including the U.N.—has reverted to a less hectic mode of lesser risk taking. The "troika" proposals were quietly shelved; indeed, current Soviet writings on the U.N. totally ignore them. There has been a significant

[1] For an authoritative summary dealing with the general topic of this statement, see Robert G. Wesson, "The United Nations in the World Outlook of the Soviet Union and the United States," in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsburgs, eds., "Soviet and American Policies in the United Nations" (New York, 1971), ch. I. For an earlier and more detailed discussion, see Alexander Dallin, "The Soviet Union at the United Nations" (New York, 1962).

[2] On the Khrushchev period as well as the policy of his successors, see particularly George A. Brinkley, "The Soviet Union and the United Nations: The Role of the Developing Countries," "Review of Politics", January 1970, pp. 91–123. The Soviet treatment of the same problem is in A. Ia. Nekrasov, "SSSR i razvivaiushchiesia v. OON" (Moscow 1971). 1971).

Soviet retreat from the extravagant expectations regarding the third world. While Moscow need no longer fear the United Nations as an imperialist tool directed against the Soviet Union, the Organization offers the Soviet leaders scant prospect of assuming a commanding or controlling position. The result is a generally supportive but fairly modest and rigid Soviet estimate of the U.N.'s potential. Moscow has been winning more but enjoying it less.

The explicit Soviet approach to the U.N. is thoroughly conservative. Moscow seems more conscious than ever of its own status—as a major power, a part of the world establishment, possessor of the veto, achiever of strategic parity with the United States, model and mentor for one and all.[1]

The Soviet Union makes clear that the U.N. is a voluntary association of sovereign states; it cannot act as a kind of superstate. Hence Moscow rejects all arguments that point precisely to the lack of such authority as the source of the U.N.'s ineffectiveness. By the same token, it rejects all calls for revision of the United Nations Charter. It seeks to refute all criticism of the veto; it insists on the prerogatives of the Security Council as the sole body empowered to find threats to peace, to determine the appropriate action, and if needed to direct and control U.N. peacekeeping operations. This leaves the door open for any of the permanent members to veto such a decision, but this is presumably a necessary price to pay for the Soviet Union's assurance that it can estop any action if and when this is deemed important.[2]

EFFECT OF CHINESE PRESENCE ON SOVIET PARTICIPATION

Moscow sees the U.N. as variable in its effects—at times welcome, at times embarrassing, and at times frustrating to the U.S.S.R. A new factor which has complicated the Soviet posture is the Chinese presence. If in recent years there has been a general new civility and frequently a measure of restraint at United Nations gatherings, the Sino-Soviet exchanges at the U.N. have been marked by striking vituperation, unmitigated accusations and countercharges. Moscow does not mind acknowledging that it finds the Chinese obstructive. It cannot respond to the challenge to demonstrate its revolutionary commitment before an assembly whose professed values are those of parliamentary give-and-take. It has also learned that it cannot afford to absent itself,

[1] In most unrevolutionary fashion, Soviet statements stress not only the prerogatives of national sovereignty but also the fact that the U.N. "does not replace traditional forms of interstate contacts." See, e.g., Anatoly Gromyko, "The United Nations: Ways To Increase Its Effectiveness," in Edwin H. Fedder, ed., "The United Nations: Problems and Prospects" (St. Louis, 1971), pp. 1–3; and V. F. Petrovski, "Sovetskie uchenye o meste i roli OON v sovremennom mire," "Voprosy istorii," 1972, No. 5, pp. 79–80.

[2] See, in addition, the authoritative collection, "OON: Itogi, tendentsii, perspektivy" (Moscow, 1970); Boris Prokof'ev, "OON—25 let" (Moscow, 1970); G. K. Efimov, "General'naia assambleia OON" (Moscow, 1969); V. Viktorov, "Worldwide Forum of Nations," "International Affairs" (Moscow), 1972, No. 10; N. Kapchenko, "World Developments and the United Nations," ibid., 1973, No. 12; V. Fedorov, "The U.N. Charter and International Security," ibid., 1974, No. 9. The official Soviet position is contained in the letter from Foreign Minister Gromyko to the U.N. Secretary-General, July 4, 1972; reprinted in ibid., 1972, No. 10, pp. 119–120.

Contrast, e.g., with Francis Wilcox and Carl Marcy, "Proposals for Changes in the United Nations" (Washington, D.C., 1955); President's Commission for the Observance of the 25th Anniversary of the United States (Lodge Commission), Report (Washington, D.C. 1971); United Nations Association U.S.A., "Controlling Conflicts in the 1970's" and "The United Nations in the 1970's" (New York, 1969, 1972); Richard N. Gardner, ed., "The United States and the United Nations: Can We Do Better?" (New York, 1972); Charles W. Yost, "The Insecurity of Nations" (New York, 1968).

as it did from the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, lest it abandon the field to the Chinese. On occasion Soviet proposals seem calculated in large measure to show up the Chinese and their Albanian friends, to force them to take a public stand and thereby to isolate them from other member states.

OTHER FACTORS IN SOVIET VIEWS ON THE U.N.

It is another unspoken Soviet axiom that the U.N. must be kept out of all Soviet bloc affairs, internal as well as interstate. Hence a firm stand in defense of domestic jurisdiction—which, it is true, does not keep the U.S.S.R. from voting for the condemnation of apartheid—its uncompromising opposition to all efforts to give greater stress to human rights within the U.N. framework; and insistence on controls, for example, over foreign satellite television transmissions to the U.S.S.R.

There are evidently some areas of disagreement among Soviet observers and practitioners concerned with the U.N. A close reading of Soviet comments, for example, shows differences regarding the nonpolitical aspects of U.N. work. While some observers stress the socioeconomic and scientific technological programs and agencies, the traditional and still predominant Soviet view has been to insist that the principal aim of the U.N. is to strengthen peace and security; in this perspective, any effort to put more emphasis on or resources into other activities amounts to an attempt to sidetrack the political functions of the U.N. and must be resisted. It is likely that this disagreement relates to varying estimates of the Third World. The dominant Soviet view apparently no longer puts great stock in the U.N. as a bridge to the underdeveloped nations, whereas some observers do see benefits from such a linkage.[1]

In its public pronouncements the Soviet Union has in recent years made itself a champion of the U.N. There is reason to think that, given the multiple reservations it harbors, this is at least partly intended to dramatize the contrast between Soviet faith, optimism, and commitment, and the increasingly grudging and negative American stance. Soviet commentary has also stressed the adoption by the U.N. of various Soviet-sponsored declarations that amount to pious generalities, such as the condemnation of colonialism, the use of force, or the forcible seizure of territory—behavior already outlawed by the U.N. Charter or other sources of international law. Given the impossibility of enforcing such resolutions, such Soviet initiatives of purely declaratory pronouncements smack of grandstanding.

Leaving aside tactical and ideological differences, however, the Soviet Union, not unlike the United States, sees the U.N. as a desirable but distinctly limited, supplementary, or subordinate instrumentality in the pursuit of its national policies.

[1] A Soviet discussion of foreign aid argues that "the socialist countries are in no position" fully to finance the development of certain African States, who consider such support essential. Forgetting about the traditional dogma that imperialist aid is *ipso facto* exploitative, Soviet writers now occasionally recommend that Western assistance be in fact stepped up, as it were supplementing Communist aid programs. David Morison, "U.S.S.R. and Third World, III," "Mizan," XII, 135; cited in Morton Schwartz, "The U.S.S.R. and Leftist Regimes in Less Developed Countries," "Survey" (London), No. 87 (spring 1973). The same point is made in Y. Tomilin, "The United Nations and International Détente." "International Affairs" (Moscow), 1974, No. 3, p. 36.

There has been a qualitative improvement in Soviet-American relations over the last several years. If one searches for reasons to explain this development, a variety of factors suggest themselves: The substantial growth in Soviet economic and strategic power; the change in outlook and priorities of the Soviet leadership; the Sino-Soviet conflict, with all its implications for Soviet security, ideology, and perception of friend and foe, and the opportunities for Sino-American rapprochement; a keener Soviet recognition of economic, technological, and managerial shortcomings, some of which may be remediable by increased intercourse with the West; a shared awareness of the common interest in reducing the risks of war and stabilizing the international environment; the increasing self-isolation of the United States from its erstwhile friends and allies, and the effects of the Vietnam war. This list could be elaborated and extended; the point is merely to suggest that none of the relevant variables includes the United Nations. It is difficult to envisage scenarios in which the U.N. would play a major part in influencing the superpowers' relationship.

Soviet insistence on strict construction of the charter, too, makes virtually certain that the U.N. will not significantly aid in the resolution of conflicts involving either or both superpowers. What is likely to be recognized as functional and desirable by both sides is the role of the U.N. as a forum for the airing of positions; as a locus of formal and informal meetings, explorations, and contacts—including those made through third parties—and as an impartial outsider whenever both parties to a conflict see such a face-saving out. In all these cases the U.N. serves as an agency facilitating solution, agreement, or negotiation; in none does it make significant autonomous input affecting either the Soviet Union or the United States.[1]

PARALLEL U.S. AND U.S.S.R. POSITIONS

There is one area, however, in which the experience of the United Nations has come to exert an influence of its own, and to do so asymmetrically—far more on the U.S.S.R. than on the United States. It is one which neither side planned and which the Soviet delegates would in fact be likely to deny. This is the growing frequency with which the United States and the Soviet Union take similar or parallel positions on particular issues, or even jointly sponsor new programs or resolutions, or intuitively tend to respond to new situations in similar fashion.

The phenomenon has been particularly striking whenever large numbers of member states have lined up on the other side of the argument. And perhaps even to a greater extent than the facts warrant, some observers—earlier, the Yugoslavs; more recently, the Chinese—profess to see all manner of collusion or at least covergence between the two global rivals. As a Yugoslav observer reported on a General Assembly session, for instance, a few years ago:

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outlined the contours of a new type of constellation in the present phase of activity of the U.N., with the superpowers on one side and all the remaining world on the other.[1]

The New China News Agency routinely reports on the superpowers' "collusion," and the "small and medium-sized countries" which condemn the two superpowers.

In the perception of the "Third World" nations, it is particularly in connection with economic development programs that both Russia and America—whatever the differences between them—have shown rather identical reluctance to provide the kinds and quantities of assistance these nations demand. Both have sought to minimize or deny the political leverage and the economic claims of developing countries. The Secretary General has remarked on the contrast in the positions of the more developed and the less developed countries. It is often said that the global cleavage is no longer between East and West but rather between North and South; if so, then to the many have-nots the two superpowers symbolize the "have's".

This attitude is at times reciprocated, too. There is more symbolism than may be at first apparent in the anecdote which Lincoln P. Bloomfield relates. He recalls sitting in the U.N. delegates' lounge with a senior Soviet delegate. "As the noise got louder and the crowd thicker, he suddenly looked up and burst out: 'We simply cannot do business in this place.' "[2]

One area in which common Soviet and American positions have invited comment and at times bitter criticism from other member states is arms control. In two instances in particular—the drafts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and of the Seabed Treaty—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. faced the U.N. membership with a joint proposal, worked out directly between them, and then requiring considerable renegotiation, bargaining, and amendment to secure the support of other interested parties.

The Soviet Union has been especially sensitive to charges of collusion with the archimperialists. It has gone out of its way to denounce and dispell them. But one cannot escape the impression that in fact, over recent years, a modus operandi has evolved in which, despite their profound divergencies, Soviet and American U.N. representatives have come to know how to deal with each other, have, over some 10 years, sought to avoid exacerbating verbal bouts, have in fact at times worked out compromises behind the scenes, and have probably quite unwittingly come to share certain likes and dislikes, as well as some general perceptions of the international scene.

Some observers might go further and argue that both delegations have given evidence of a sort of acculturation or adaptive behavior. They might point, for example, to an abstention from voting in the Security Council rather than have a negative vote recorded as a veto; recourse to consensus procedure under which no formal vote is taken; and informal understandings not to speak on a given issue before the Security Council or the General Assembly. Such instances do illustrate

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A recent Soviet article recognizes that some nonalined countries have expressed the fear that an understanding between the two powers, United States and U.S.S.R., could be detrimental to the interests of the third world. Their efforts, in effect, to monitor United States-Soviet talks "cannot be considered as constructive." (Tomilin, loc. cit., p. 35.)

the acceptance of tacit or explicit rules of the game by adversary participants. There is, however, no evidence that the styles of interaction at the U.N. have any tangible impact on Soviet or American policymakers back home.

CURRENT PRIORITIES AND TRENDS

The current priorities of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are, in different ways, being contested at home; and future reversals of their policies cannot be ruled out. Nonetheless, one may assume that in broad features a continuation of present trends is likely. If so, one may hazard the guess that the United Nations is unlikely to have any major influence on the relationship of the two major powers; and that they are unlikely to rely on the U.N. in the development of their mutual relations.

In this fundamental regard, then, the situation remains unchanged. What has changed, in addition to the balance of power is the diminution of ideological elements in Soviet conduct. It is true that the Soviet approach to the U.N. is still officially justified in orthodox Leninist terms as a way of continuing the worldwide class struggle by other means. But there is a remarkable hiatus between doctrinal rationalizations and revolutionary rhetoric, on the one hand, and Soviet insistence on the plenitude of national sovereignty and on various conventions of bourgeois diplomacy, on the other. Especially in the past decade, traditional Communist categories such as the "two-camp" view of the world, so thoroughly at odds with the one-world conception of the U.N. have been further confounded and empirically contradicted most dramatically, by the Sino-Soviet split. The assumption of a reasonably pragmatic approach is increasingly likely to provide a realistic guide to Soviet behavior in the U.N. This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union is likely to acknowledge such a trend; nor that there do not remain serious preconceptions and blinders impeding a fuller understanding.

The U.S. outlook has similarly lost some of its phobic qualities, with the Kissinger diplomacy in regard to both Moscow and Peking; the termination of the Vietnam war; the recognition of Soviet-American strategic parity; the perception of mutual benefit from various joint endeavors with the U.S.S.R.; and Soviet rejection of the trade bill stipulating conditions for the award of most-favored-nation status to the U.S.S.R.

There are some elements of symmetry in the two powers' view of the United Nations. Both have sought to use, or refrain from using, the U.N. when it suited their purposes. Both have adapted their conduct and policies to the changing mood and membership of the U.N., but both have been frustrated by the numerical preponderance of small and underdeveloped nations. Both have viewed the United Nations as an instrument of limited utility. Authoritative texts on both sides ignore the U.N. as a significant agency for peace. Both have displayed mixed attitudes containing elements of self-righteousness as well as assertions of idealism. Both are dubious of the U.N.'s ability to solve serious crises. Both have sought to keep down U.N. budgets, programs, and staffs. And both believe that things would be worse if there were no U.N.

On the other hand, there are profound differences between Soviet and American perceptions and behavior. In style and rhetoric these are fairly self-evident. In recent years U.S. disillusionment with the U.N. has been more severe and the American response at times more hostile. And yet the Soviet Union goes further in its own determination to take no chances to let the U.N. be used against itself or its friends.

The United Nations is not prepared to assist significantly in the resolution of differences involving one or both superpowers. Its role, in this regard, is likely to be, at best, one of keeping the two apart or away from the foci of conflict, substituting its own presence. The U.N. can be expected to perform some constructive tasks in conflict-management—as a buffer, a scapegoat, a broker, or a receiver—assuming the principals seek a peaceful way out. If either of the superpowers does not, the U.N. cannot stop it.

The enforcement of U.N. decisions relating to war and peace remains a divisive yet critical issue. Effective efforts for collective security require a mechanism for the enforcement of decisions, and such procedures have never been fully regularized. U.N. action, such as the dispatch of observers or the raising of peacekeeping forces, has been essentially ad hoc, with varying degrees of success and acrimony.

Action presupposes great power consensus on what constitutes a threat to peace and who is at fault. Soviet spokesmen candidly acknowledge that the struggle between the forces of progress and those of reaction still underlies their analysis of U.N. activities in a particular situation of conflict. U.N. decisions therefore must "assist national liberation movements and promote social progress without taking sides with reactionary forces as defined by the U.S.S.R." [1]

In doctrine, this gap is unbridgeable. In practice, however, the Soviet Union has at times acquiesced in U.N. peacekeeping missions, though it has usually refused to contribute to their costs. Efforts to formulate rules for the supervision, operation, financing, and direction of U.N. forces have been stalled for many years.[2]

Soviet support of the peacekeeping operation in the Middle East after the October 1973 war may or may not be an indication of a change in outlook. Soviet commentators have in fact pointed out that the prior Soviet-American détente made possible the relatively rapid Security Council action ending the Middle Eastern conflict, which they remark, would have been far more dangerous at the height of the "cold war." [3]

The adoption of ground rules governing the use of peacekeeping forces is a prerequisite for increased U.N. effectiveness in regard to conflicts not involving the permanent members themselves. Conditions for U.N. peacekeeping may be improving. Thus, not only the Middle Eastern precedent, but also the breakdown of the tight bipolar system of international alliances, and the reaction to the fighting in Indochina make more likely that in future local conflicts both the United States and the Soviet Union will prefer to stay out and

[1] Gromyko, *loc. cit.*, p. 9; also Prokof'ev, p. 75; E. S. Krivchikova, "Vooruzhennye sily OON" (Moscow, 1965); and Iu. Ia. Mikheev, "Primenenie prinuditel' nykh mer po ustavu OON" (Moscow, 1967).

[2] One stumbling block is the relative role of the Secretary-General and the Security Council in the operational supervision of a peacekeeping force. See the letters of Soviet Ambassador Malik and U.S. Ambassador Bush to the Secretary-General, Mar. 17 and 30, 1972 (Documents A/8669 and A/8676).

[3] See, e.g., Tomilin, *loc. cit.*, p. 36.

use third parties such as the U.N. It remains true that even under such conditions the superpowers frequently back opposing parties or come to view the effects of U.N. action—as in the Congo—in opposite ways, leading to a drastic erosion of the original consensus that makes a U.N. mission possible. The attitude of the People's Republic of China may, in turn, make agreement more difficult if it suspects Soviet-American collusion. In its entire history the U.N. has only rarely been able to constrain any combatant nation. It has never constrained any of the major powers. It must be recognized that it can do least where it would be needed most.

Moscow has exidently learned what may not be fully understood in this country: To turn one's back on the U.N. is precisely what one's worst enemies would wish. If the United States cannot control the U.N., it cannot afford to ignore it either, in a world in which interdependence has become proverbial.

Détente may have led both American and Soviet delegates to the U.N. sometimes—not always—to tone down their remarks and to avoid some rough edges. This has meant some sacrifice in playing to the galleries or the public back home. Essentially this is a question of tactics. The real work at the U.N. is apt to be done behind the scenes. Ultimately, what is needed is not grandstanding but effectiveness. Politics is the art of the possible, and it would be a disservice to expect more of the U.N. that its structure allows. It would also be foolish to use it for less than it can provide.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Buckley let me ask you this question.

STATE DEPARTMENT INSTRUCTIONS TO U.S. DELEGATES

You made some reference to a speech that you were going to make and you were advised by the State Department that it was not the proper language, not the proper speech.

Did you go on and give it anyhow?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Oh, no, no.

The CHAIRMAN. You followed instructions from the State Department?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Public Law 357 of the 79th Congress says a public member is only authorized to pronounce those words that are authorized by the Secretary of State or whatever other representative the President designates. The only time that there is any room for extemporaneous commentary, as Senator Percy will confirm is during a right of reply when as an amicable matter there are no strings that attach you to the State Department. So that it is in moments like that, for instance, that Mr. Moynihan was able to address rather sharply 3 years ago some of the critics of the United States in an extemporaneous speech which almost certainly would not have been authorized had it been written out and sent in for validation.

The CHAIRMAN. I served as a delegate in the Fifth General Assembly. Yours was the 25th?

Mr. BUCKLEY. 28th.

The CHAIRMAN. I never received instructions from the State Department as to anything I should say.

Mr. BUCKLEY. They were probably frightened of you.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I just stayed in line.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, no doubt there has been an evolutionary process. My own wrong, looking back on it, is that when the original law was passed the President of the United States faced the awful prospect of Mrs. Roosevelt as a delegate to the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. She was a delegate while I was there.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, so he probably instructed the Congress to write as tight a law as could be written governing her tongue and——

The CHAIRMAN. Let us see, Who was President then?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Truman. I think the same law would have been written if Mr. Roosevelt would have been President, but in fact it was President Truman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said the 79th.

Mr. BUCKLEY. 79th Congress, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Truman was already President?

Mr. BUCKLEY. He had just become President.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I was there in 1950.

I said I never did get instructions. It may very well be that things have changed since that time. However, I do not think we had so many urbane questions to discuss in those days.

I was on the second committee, the Economic Committee, and the thing I remember the most was trying to work out a land policy. One of the snags we had was the use of the word "tenancy." We found a great many nations did not know what we meant by "tenancy."

UNIVERSALITY OF MEMBERSHIP

We use to hear a good bit about universality of membership.

Do you subscribe to that idea?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I tend to do so because it becomes impossible to apply criteria of civilized behavior in a situation that begins with Soviet membership. That is to say, to strain at a gnat having admitted that beam is impossible even for a highly juridical State Department polemicist. Under the circumstance I am impelled toward universality even though I recognize that it is in violation of the Charter itself which is theoretically hospitable only to peace loving states.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. What about the action of the present Assembly in forcing out South Africa?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, it is clearly unconstitutional viewed from the U.N. point of view. The General Assembly seized on a technicality on the basis of which it decided not to accept the Accreditation Committee's recommendations and, therefore, to exercise a de facto power reserved under the Charter to the Security Council. However, Mr. Chairman, we bear, I think Senator Percy would agree, a considerable joint responsibility for that perversion because it was we who induced the Uniting for Peace resolution on the basis of which we could gainsay the Security Council when the situation got tough and move on to the General Assembly, which at that time we clearly dominated when we needed some kind of ratification of American foreign policy.

Having opened that particular box, Pandora's box, it has stayed open and the General Assembly could very easily exercise the same techniques that were exposed by the Uniting For Peace Resolution, for

instance, and vote respectively to expel Israel next year and might very well do so.

The CHAIRMAN. That I believe was the handiwork of Secretary Dulles.

Mr. BUCKLEY. No, it was Acheson. It was the worst mistake he ever made.

The CHAIRMAN. It was. Mr. Dulles was a delegate at that time.

Mr. BUCKLEY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That happened during the time I was there.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Oh, it did?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and Mr. Dulles was a member of the delegation.

I asked Justice Goldberg when he was here recently about that. He cited the Charter and he was in full agreement with you on what you have said.

I also asked him about the action of the Assembly in admitting two Germanys and he thought it was the thing to do. Then I said why did you not admit two Chinas; they admitted one and expelled the other.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, I do not know what his answer was but I know what it should have been, which is that we voted to maintain Taiwan in the United Nations but were overruled.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Let me turn to Senator Percy first. Senator Percy, I may say, is the one who is primarily responsible for setting up these hearings.

All right, Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly welcome our distinguished witnesses today. We had asked Ambassador Patrick Moynihan also to be here this morning. Perhaps he is sitting by the telephone waiting to get the call about his much-rumored appointment. Or maybe he was concerned about being here before receiving official word on the appointment.

I do regret very much that he is not here. We think very highly of him. He has been very provocative in things he has had to say about the U.N., and I am sure we will have the benefit of his judgments soon.

Mr. Buckley, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve a part of my time for Senator Buckley to question Mr. Buckley.

The CHAIRMAN. I fully intended to call on him.

Senator PERCY. I thought that might be more interesting than our questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. It might give him a chance he does not have very much.

Senator PERCY. Before I became a delegate last fall I read a large amount of material about the U.N. In August I was in India and Ambassador Moynihan had an advance copy of your book, Mr. Buckley, and he lent it to me. Not only did I read it with great interest, but every member of my family read it.

MAYAGUEZ SEIZURE

I would like to ask you first if you feel that the U.N. has any role to play in the seizure of the cargo ship by the Cambodian Government? Senator Buckley has expressed himself very forthrightly

on the issue. What do you think we ought to do about this situation?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, it seems to me, Senator that clearly the United Nations has a theoretical role to play because the seizure of this ship is a threat to world peace and the U.N. is supposed to invoke the Security Council when there is a threat to world peace. We have, as I understand it, 800 marines landed in Thailand, obviously not as tourists, and under the circumstances the Security Council needs to be called. The probability, however, is, as we both know, that if it were summoned any resolution calling on Cambodia to free the ship would probably be vetoed either by the Chinese or by the Soviet member leaving us as usual to our own recourses.

You asked what would I do to prevent its happening. Forgive me if I answer that question ambiguously. The ship would never have been seized if we had followed a proper policy. * * * It's very difficult having tolerated abuses both rhetorical and military against the integrity of the United States suddenly to react convincingly. We are going to have to start in my judgment sometime and this may or may not be the ideal time to start but essentially we need, I think, a foreign policy in which it would be unthinkable for a major state let alone a ministate to wander 60 miles at sea and seize an American ship without a scintilla of legal authority. They don't even have the excuse that the North Koreans had who were alleging we were violating those waters. That allegation has not been made but I think it shows the state we are held in that port of the world, humiliation, however, which we vigorously invited.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Buckley, if I may just assume the role of an interrogator on Firing Line, we are faced with the situation right now. If you were, say, the President's permanent representative at the U.N., sitting in a cabinet meeting or sitting in the National Security Council last night, what would you have advised the United States to do and what do you think the reaction of the U.N. and world community would be to such advice?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, I think any effort to retrieve our ship and our men would be met, however grudgingly, with the sympathy of the Third World. There is, I think, an unanimity of sentiment against the ill health of that act. How best to do it is a tactical question and I would hope that there are people in the Pentagon better equipped than I to tell you how we can simultaneously capture the ship and not get our men killed.

I do know that if I were in the White House in charge of policy I think I would probably call up Comdr. Lloyd Bucher and ask him what he thought we should do.

STRONGER U.S. POSITION AT THE U.N.

Senator PERCY. I would like to move on to another area where there has been a great deal of discussion. What should our posture be at the U.N. with respect to actions taken which we feel are contrary to our national interest?

It's being suggested by Ambassador Moynihan that we speak out in much stronger terms against loose accusations and destructive rhetoric.

Do you share this view and how far could the U.S. delegation go before its own rhetoric might be somewhat counterproductive?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, I share those views very, very strenuously because it seems to me that under the existing arrangements we, in the first place do not succeed in maximizing human rights but we do succeed in corrupting the vocabulary by which human rights are defended to such an extent as to strategically to do great, great damage to any of the idealistic potentials of the U.N.

Under the circumstances I should think that the United States faces one of two choices. The first choice is to withdraw from the idealistic committees of the United Nations, specifically the Third Committee, on the grounds that we are subordinating intentionally all of our policies to the practical exogensis of diplomacy and we do not wish to participate in a debate in which we are constrained, for instance, to talk only about the loss of human rights in South Africa; and this I should think would be a wise strategic form. The United States ought to back a revision, the purpose of which would be to detach from the formal organization agencies that are idealistic in motivation, those that deal with, for instance, world hunger, with torture, with immigration, with all of the rights enumerated in the declaration.

I think that the Amnesty International for all its faults has accomplished a thousand times as much as universal declarations of human rights in actually succoring people whose rights are being violated.

If we could have an agency that was not subject to the discipline of the State Department, in which distinguished Americans with long records of the libertarian inclinations were representing the interests of the United States, I think we could accomplish a great deal more. These could be accredited to the U.N. without being a part of the U.S. delegation. Essentially, Mr. Percy, I think we tend to suffer from the Western inability to follow two lines of thought simultaneously. The Soviet Union has no difficulty at all pursuing détente in a practical level and pursuing with great philosophical aggressiveness its assault on the free world through its broadcasting facilities. We find it very difficult to do that which is at the root of the difficulties that you are up against with USIA. Given this Western inadaptability to two lines, you have to, I think, separate the personnel that are in charge of each of the two lines.

ARTIFICIALITY OF U.S.–U.S.S.R. RELATIONSHIP AT U.N.

Senator PERCY. With respect to the Soviet Union, I noticed the artificiality of our relationship at the U.N. We have obvious differences of opinion in many areas, human rights and others, and yet in the spirit of détente our speeches are almost devoid of criticism of any of the policies of the Soviet Union, and yet on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty—activities financed by the U.S. Government—we seem quite forthright.

Is it wise for us to have this sort of a policy at the U.N.? Would it be healthier if we were a little more forthright, and how much more forthright could we be without being destructive of détente? It would be more realistic if the U.N. mirrored the real differences that do exist between various systems in the world.

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think you put your finger right on the problem, Senator.

It is perfectly comprehensible to anyone to say we must subordinate all other matters to that of maintaining the peace. This makes sense even to morally evangelistic people. It does not make sense to say, although we are subordinating all other policies to the achievement of peace, we are also willing to endorse a corruption of the vocabulary by which freedom is pursued.

Under the circumstances, either the U.N., our delegates, ought to be free to reply vigorously to the Soviet Union when the matter of human rights is raised, or we ought to decline to participate in those discussions at all, which at least would symbolize our refusal to cooperate in travesty in which we are now engaged, where we are allowed to talk only about the violation of human rights in South Africa, Israel, and while I was there, Portugal.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

DANGERS OF NOT PARTICIPATING IN THE U.N.

The first question to Professor Dallin. Do you believe that the Soviet boycott of the Security Council in the early 1950's proved to be in the national interest of the Soviet Union?

Mr. DALLIN. No, sir, I don't believe it did. In fact the Soviet Union abandoned it ultimately. The price it paid when its representative was absent when the decision was taken on intervention in Korea, in June 1950, and as a result the Soviet Union was not able to exercise its veto. Hence, to boycott is to abandon the U.N. to the other side, and I think the Soviet Union has learned that.

Senator CLARK. Ambassador Goldberg has suggested that we should advise the members of the United Nations that if Israel is suspended from the General Assembly the United States would voluntarily suspend itself from the Assembly.

Do you see any comparisons between those two actions—is there any thing to be learned from the Soviet mistake, or are the two unrelated?

Mr. DALLIN. I think the situation would be different in the sense that we are dealing with the General Assembly rather than the Security Council in this instance. I think that a threat of American withdrawal or temporary absence could be effective under certain circumstances. I would think if used frequently it would obviously lose an awful lot of its potential impact. I think it should be reserved for very extreme instances. By and large, it seems to me, the experience is that it's far better to stay right in there and if necessary to argue it out and, if necessary, learn to lose on some occasions. I think there are probably extreme issues: if it came to the expulsion of Israel, I think this is something that would need to be considered seriously. I think it's ultimately a question of tactics and not principle, but it is something I believe should be considered.

Senator CLARK. Another question for you first and then Mr. Buckley.

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES OPERATE MORE THROUGH THE U.N.?

Many of the witnesses that have been here in the last several days have recommended that the United Nations become more of a central forum for the conduct of American foreign policy, that we go through the United Nations more often. Chairman Fulbright testified that he thought we should have been going through the U.N. much more with regard to the Middle East situation, and he mentioned some other examples. Senator Symington, who with Senator Percy was at the U.N. last year, recommended that we operate more through the U.N. A good many of the witnesses have said the same thing.

Do you agree? Do you think we use the U.N. too much or too little as a forum for our foreign policy?

Mr. DALLIN. Well, in terms of the relationship with the Soviet Union, which is my primary area of acquaintance, I would say that there is not an awful lot more that can be done through the U.N. I believe the U.N. is fairly secondary as an arena. As far as other areas are concerned, I believe it is quite possible to step up American involvement if it is presented on the basis of reciprocity. If the Soviet Union were to channel more of its economic and technical assistance to other areas through the U.N., the United States should be seriously prepared to consider doing the same.

Senator CLARK. Why couldn't we do it in any case, through the World Bank and other multilateral programs, even if the U.S.S.R. doesn't?

Mr. DALLIN. Certainly it is desirable in itself. The unfortunate fact, as you know, is that both sides, all sides, use assistance of all forms for political purposes, an objective that would be lost by channelling it through the U.N.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Buckley.

NOT VOTING IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, sir, I think that our participation in the General Assembly ought to be limited to participation in the debate. We should never vote in the General Assembly because by voting we implicitly grant a certain authority to majority. Which we ought not to do for reasons practical and ethical. Under the circumstances, that I think is the crucial and easiest reform that might be made. Always debate, always exchange information, entering into the spirit of the thing but never vote.

Senator CLARK. Do you agree with Harlan Cleveland's article in the New York Times a couple of weeks ago when he talked about this problem?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I didn't see it, no.

Senator CLARK. He talked a good deal about the same question saying we ought to work for consensus in the General Assembly rather than having votes.

Mr. BUCKLEY. That seems to me to make sense. As regards to using the mechanical facilities of the U.N. I am very much in favor of it. We have to recognize that they usually don't work if they run up against political questions.

For instance, the antihijacking covenant failed in the U.N. because we couldn't get the Third World on account of the Israeli question to

cooperate. So we went to Japan and did one covering these nations and went to Canada and one covering this hemisphere and we got about 85 percent of the countries in the world involved on the basis of bilateral exertion. But I think to the extent that the U.N. adapts itself for the purpose of common good we should go ahead and use it, but we should be very, very cautious, I think, about implicitly endorsing the General Assembly as a moral legislative authority.

SOUTH AFRICA AND RHODESIA

Senator CLARK. Do you feel, Mr. Buckley, that the action taken by the General Assembly, in suspending South Africa was a violation of the Charter?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Oh, clearly it was a violation of the Charter because only the Security Council can expel a member, and this was a de facto expulsion. Of what use is your General Assembly if you are not allowed to speak? Granted every time they spoke everybody left the room and granted nobody listens to anything in the General Assembly, but still there is that formalistic right.

Senator CLARK. Sounds a little like the Senate.

Tell me, do you believe the implementation of the Byrd amendment was a violation of the Charter?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I certainly do not, and I think that Dean Acheson's brief on the subject remains definitive.

Senator CLARK. You feel that was perfectly consistent with our staying in the U.N.?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Yes, I do.

Senator CLARK. And you would recommend, would you, to the Congress that that position be maintained?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I would with this qualification. It seems to be plain whatever is going on in Rhodesia is not a threat to the world peace, and, therefore, did not legitimately call up the sanctions that were imposed by the Security Council. At the same time I recognize that we in our dealings with Great Britain attempt to make common cause, and if I were myself a senator I would take the qualification in mind in deciding for or against the Byrd amendment, but I would not be governed exclusively and appeal to the fidelity to the Security Council resolution which in my judgment was based on an entirely illusory threat to the peace of the world.

Senator CLARK. Let me ask you one more question, then ask Professor Dallin to comment on it as well. I think my time will be up then.

FUTURE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS AND POLICIES

As you look, Mr. Buckley, toward the next session of the General Assembly, do you think that our Government should be prepared with any positive proposals with regard to the world economic situation or Southern Africa, for example? What could we do of a positive nature, in your judgment, that would be beneficial to our interests and perhaps those of the world in the General Assembly?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I should think what Senator Percy and I probably would agree to call the Moynihan approach is very definitely in order. It is an approach that is best described as saying that the United States

has not only the right but duty to argue its own ideals and its own self-interest. The notion that we entered the U.N. in order to facilitate the redirection of wealth is something of which too many of our authors have encouraged without by any means a clear plebiscite. In this incidentally we would find ourselves making common cause with Soviet Union, which is always thought it hilarious that anybody should go to the U.N. for the purpose of sharing Soviet wealth.

Senator CLARK. You would not make my specific economic proposals or proposals regarding South Africa in the next session; you don't have any particular proposals to make?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think, Senator, there are really ultra vires because the U.N. has no economic authority.

Senator CLARK. Except to pass resolutions.

Mr. BUCKLEY. They can pass resolutions, but those resolutions ought to be labeled as being as empty as in fact they are. A grand resolution to the effect that United States ought to give away a third of its grain harvest, at no cost, to countries that are short of grain is meaningless and ought not to be encouraged. To the extent that our delegates have even doubled it by suggesting that these resolutions have force, then I think you are correct, if I understand you, that they should instantly bring the U.N. back to reality on the question.

Senator CLARK. Professor Dallin.

Mr. DALLIN. I believe the United States should be selective about the issues about which its delegation chooses to speak out, as Mr. Buckley referred to a moment ago. I think there are cases certainly where principles, even on details, need to be affirmed, say, if the U.N. book store does not keep a Solzhenitsyn book as a matter of censorship, obviously this is the kind of detail that need not be tolerated.

On the other hand, we know from the reaction to Soviet and Chinese speeches how easy it is to antagonize other countries and often quite unnecessarily, by loud language that serves no purpose other than to satisfy one's own ego and one's audience back home. That is not effective in persuading others, which after all is the primary purpose of operating at the U.N.

I think we should have no illusions that on human rights the U.N. has not done much and will not do much. I think the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a good and worthy document to have. In fact, even dissidents within the Soviet Union do appeal to it, refer to it in some of their own statements. But just as I think, most people in this country would not want the U.N. to intervene to repair real or imaginary abuses of human rights, so other countries, too, can be expected to take such a position, and I believe that it is futile to expect great success.

It seems to me also that, either we accept the U.N. as an institution or we don't, and we don't play games like participating but not voting, not voting when we expect to lose. When somebody else does that kind of thing we react to it most negatively. Unfortunately when it comes to positive proposals, I think most of those that I could think of as desirable would clearly not be acceptable by the majority of the U.N. at the present time. Therefore, I am not the best person to suggest any concrete measures.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will not ask any questions now.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Baker, do you want to ask some questions?

LIMITATION ON U.N. PEACEKEEPING ABILITY

Senator BAKER. One or two general questions, if I may. I apologize to the witnesses for not being here at the beginning of their testimony. But even so I can't resist the temptation to ask you questions, even though general, that may already have been put.

I recall that when the Charter was first published, it was loudly proclaimed as an instrument for preserving the peace. It was clear to me, however, that the institutional arrangement was not calculated to preserve the peace, because there was no authority, there were no armed forces, there was not the might with which the peace could be kept. Rather it was a consortium authority to keep the peace.

I wonder if either or both of you can tell me whether you agree with that concept or not, and what effect, if any, America's unfolding new foreign policy, referred to today as detente, has had on that concept?

Mr. DALLIN. Yes; I think I would agree that that is generally correct. The U.N. can act in defense of peace or to secure peace when the major powers are in agreement. Even then, of course, there has been considerable difficulty in agreeing, as in the case of the Congo or Middle East, who should control peacekeeping forces, and the Soviet Union has been most adamant that the Security Council should have operational control—in other words, that the Soviet Union should be in a position to interpose a veto at any time it doesn't like the use of such forces—not the Secretary General as had previously been tried.

That of course limits the possible activity of such peacekeeping forces, and, when it comes to conflict among the major powers, the U.N. is powerless other than as intermediary or broker. Of course it was not intended to resolve that kind of conflict to begin with; it began with the assumption of agreement among the permanent members.

Senator BAKER. That is not quite the question.

What I am trying to say is that in the absence of a peacekeeping force on a permanent basis, the only authority for peacekeeping that the U.N. has, is the agreement of the major powers of the world. Today our effort at détente involves primarily the Soviet Union and infrequently at least the People's Republic of China. To what extent has that short-circuited the original U.N. peacekeeping concept and put something else in its place?

Mr. DALLIN. I believe it has not fundamentally changed the situation in which the U.N. has not had any permanent peacekeeping forces except in those special occasions where the powers have agreed on it. Détente may have facilitated that it has the present Middle Eastern arrangement in October–November 1973: at least that is the Soviet claim. They claim that it would have been harder to have arrived at that solution in the days of the cold war. Perhaps so. It does make a slight Soviet departure with regard to peacekeeping forces, but, fundamentally, I think, you are entirely correct, sir.

EFFECT OF DÉTENTE ON THE U.N.

Senator BAKER. Incidentally I think you should know I fully support the effort and concept and I think former President Nixon's initiative in this respect will be observed and studied by historians for a long time. But haven't we, in effect, acknowledged that there must be further elaboration of the right to reach bilateral agreements under the Charter at the same time that we pursue our growing aspirations for general worldwide détente.

Mr. DALLIN. Yes, indeed.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Buckley, do you have any observations in that respect?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Only this. I think that on the whole it is safe to generalize that touchy issues become touchier the moment they are proposed through the United Nations. The reason for this is that there is a linkage within the U.N. between countries and blocs of countries that is electrified as a result of a polemical statement of the case. For instance, there is no reason in the world for Chad, let's say, to be opposed to an antihijacking covenant, but the moment it is asked to endorse that covenant in the U.N. it consults the Organization of African Unity which in turn consults the Arab bloc which is dominated at this moment by its anti-Israel compulsions and under the circumstances Chad proceeds to vote against really its own best interests.

What I am saying, therefore, is that by running a problem through the United Nations you tend to polarize it and encourage a vote that is cast without reference to the intrinsic merits of the proposal before the House, whether it is a cease-fire or antiterrorist convention.

Senator BAKER. Do you think we have enhanced the prospect of the U.N. by our growing policy of détente, do you think we have diminished the prospect, or do you think it has any prospect at all?

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think you have to distinguish between two major functions of the U.N. and throw one away every term. That is the idealistic function.

Senator BAKER. What is that?

Mr. BUCKLEY. The idea of spreading human freedom. There is no question that the emphasis we have put on détente, and this is what we did in fact devote the first few minutes to, there is no question or emphasis on détente has committed us to a kind of verbal and ethical course necessary which has left the U.N. bloodied in respect of any potential to being an idealistic influence.

On the other hand, there is no question that the U.N. provides good mechanical facilities for the exchange of threats, inducements, bribes, collaborations, and the rest of it.

Senator BAKER. It is a good institution for those purposes.

To answer my own question, which I find sometimes irresistable, I think that on occassion the policy of détente of the United States, as it extends to other nations, to the People's Republic, and still others, is de facto parallelism to the creation of the original U.N. Charter concept; namely, that Russia, China, the United States, Great Britain, and France would get together and maintain the peace. Outside the U.N., it seems to me that we have begun to do that although not quite so rigidly structured.

My time has expired and I thank you for the opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Buckley, we would be very glad for you to——

Senator BUCKLEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. I am ready but I have no questions. I think the points of view are very well expressed. I think they respond to yearnings and understandings that a lot of us have.

Thank you very much.

Not all of us express them in quite that way but that is all right.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Thank God for that.

"GETTING THE UNITED STATES OUT OF THE U.N. AND THE U.N. OUT OF THE UNITED STATES"

The CHAIRMAN. We sometimes hear people say, "Get the United States out of the United Nations and the United Nations out of the United States." You wouldn't subscribe to that idea, would you, either one of you.

Mr. BUCKLEY. No, sir.

Mr. DALLIN. No, sir.

U.N. PEACEKEEPING

The CHAIRMAN. Let me go back to peacekeeping. Of course the Charter provides for a peacekeeping program, doesn't it?

Mr. BUCKLEY. It provides a procedure, that is right.

The CHAIRMAN. For setting up a peacekeeping force and utilizing that force?

Mr. BUCKLEY. It authorizes the Security Council if it detects a threat to world peace to recommend a procedure for coping with it, and that has been so-called peacekeeping force as, for instance the Sinai or right now again in the Middle East.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a peacekeeping force on different occasions and in every instance I feel it has done a very good job and is doing it. The one out now is doing a good job.

Mr. BUCKLEY. It only does a good job, Senator, when the parties involved are predisposed to accept its presence and to abide by its authority. It has absolutely no force at all. For instance, in 1967 when Egypt and Jordan decided to move, or Israel, depending on which version of history you accept, you will remember it was instantaneously withdrawn.

The CHAIRMAN. We had a peacekeeping force and unfortunately it was withdrawn. Very shortly thereafter came the outbreak; isn't that right?

Mr. BUCKLEY. That is right, it was withdrawn at the request of one of the parties. My point is the acquiesence of the parties.

The CHAIRMAN. Is necessary.

Mr. BUCKLEY. We shouldn't think of a peacekeeping force as having powers, it is in fact merely a symbolic presence that betokens the previous acquiesence of the contending powers.

ACTION THROUGH CONSENSUS

The CHAIRMAN. In last Sunday's New York Times Magazine Harlan Cleveland advocated fewer rollcall votes in the General Assembly and more action through consensus.

Does that idea appeal to you; either or both?

Mr. DALLIN. It is certainly worth a try, given the results of the rollcall votes. I would not be overly optimistic that consensus can result in the kind of decision that any of us or Mr. Cleveland would wish. I think it is a counsel, if not of despair, at least of frustration.

The CHAIRMAN. I wondered myself just how he was going to develop that consensus.

Senator CASE. After you discover it you tell us in the Senate and we will work it out later.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, first I will try to discover it in this committee. How about that?

Senator PERCY. Professor Dallin, we very much appreciate your being here. Your testimony was exceptionally good and your own work and that of your distinguished father, Prof. David Dallin, are well known to us.

REASON FOR THIRD WORLD BLOC VOTING

You stated that in the midfifties the nations which followed the U.S. lead at the U.N. began to assert a more independent policy and yet many of those countries, as I observed at the U.N., now seem to be veering toward, not an independent judgment, but a bloc vote and participating in the group of 77 so-called, which now numbers in excess of 100.

Would you care to comment on this and what has brought it about? Many will cast a vote they don't believe in at all, but they do it to go along with the boys, so to speak.

Mr. DALLIN. I quite agree with your observations. I am not sure that I am in a good position to explain how it came about. I think it is certainly true that many countries vote out of a mistaken sense of discipline and commitment to a common cause, which in fact doesn't exist, and it seems to me the United States along with some of its friends can perform a very useful role here in privately pointing out genuine differences of interest among some of these 77.

DR. MOYNIHAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD UNITED NATIONS

Senator PERCY. I would like to ask you about the phrase "benign neglect." You stated that the temptation to pursue a policy of benign neglect toward the United Nations is likely to weaken rather than strengthen the American position.

Dr. Moynihan was the author of the term "benign neglect" but I find it hard to believe that Dr. Moynihan would advocate such a policy at the United Nations. He, after all, was the author of the family assistance plan which indicated an inclination to try to meet a problem head on and to do something about it. He was also a very activist Ambassador in India.

Are you implying that you feel he might bring benign neglect to the U.S. Mission at the United Nations?

Dr. DALLIN. I fear I don't know his inclinations well enough to judge. I certainly borrowed the phrase from him; I do not necessarily mean to identify it with him. I think it is a sentiment that is expressed more widely in this country of late, but I do not mean to imply that he necessarily would himself apply it toward the United Nations.

ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS IN U.S.-U.S.S.R. RELATIONS

Senator PERCY. You mentioned that United Nations has been insignificant in Soviet-American relations, as dramatized by the last three summit meetings. Do you feel that the summit meetings should be brought under the umbrella of the United Nations and not done on a bilateral basis?

Mr. DALLIN. No, I don't believe so, sir. At present I think we are not at a stage where the summit meetings can usefully be handled through the United Nations. In fact, it would complicate things infinitely. The Soviet Union, too, has responded negatively to the demand of some of the third world countries to monitor negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and I suspect the State Department would take a similar position. I don't think at present the bilateral relationship can be placed within the United Nations.

Senator PERCY. Under Stalin the Soviet Union's intention was to have as impotent a United Nations as possible because they felt it would be hostile, and it was hostile, to the Soviet Union.

That policy continued to an extent under Khrushchev and the suggestion of a troika was really an organizational means of making it impotent.

I gather that a majority of the members are now less hostile to the Soviet Union. Do you believe that the Soviets are still satisfied to limit U.N. powers?

Mr. DALLIN. I believe that is correct. They have continued to insist on the sovereign prerogatives of the Soviet Union as of all other member states. The U.N. could not function anywhere within the Soviet Union or elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This has not kept them from condemning conditions in other countries. I believe the Soviet Union prefers to play it safe by maintaining the veto, the right to stop any U.N. action hostile to it, even if it means that it also gives the other permanent members the same right of preventing actions hostile to them.

Senator PERCY. Professor Dallin, you said that the Soviet Union goes further than the United States in its determination to take absolutely no chances that the U.N. will be used against itself or against its friends.

Can you give us an illustration of what you had in mind?

Mr. DALLIN. Well, for instance, the Soviet Union has been intent on minimizing the activities of all U.N. agencies within the Soviet Union. It was one of the first to insist that an individual citizen could not even file a complaint with a U.N. agency, say, a mailbox in Moscow, about a violation of human rights or anything of the sort, something which I think the United States might well be prepared to sanction if the question ever came up. The U.N. office in Moscow is hard to find for any Soviet citizen or even a foreigner with a map and driver.

In general, from the Soviet point of view, the U.N. has been something to use outside the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc but not something to permit a presence of inside the U.S.S.R.

FOUR-POINT QUESTION

Senator PERCY. Finally, a four-point question for my friend, Mr. Buckley.

Do you feel, first, that the United Nations should play a role in restraining trade in armaments, and we are certainly the largest arms supplier in the world.

Second, do you trust the process of détente?

Third, do you believe there should be any change in the law providing for public members as well as Members of Congress to serve in the U.S. delegation?

And, fourth, would you care to comment on a Reagan-Wallace ticket in 1976? [Laughter.]

Mr. BUCKLEY. Well, to answer the question in the order in which you put them I think——

Senator PERCY. You can reverse the order if you want.

U.N. ARMS CONTROL ROLE

Mr. BUCKLEY. I think that the U.N. would find it difficult, extremely difficult, to take an aggressive role in the matter of restraining the direction of arms because it would be too likely interpreted as encroachments on the sovereignty of the individual members. As Professor Dallin has pointed out, the assertion, discovery of nationalism, is one of the great dynamic discoveries of this generation and to suggest by U.N. that a particular country can't buy tanks is something which I think he would find it very difficult to get the U.N. to accept.

ATTITUDE TOWARD DÉTENTE

Do I have a confidence in détente? The answer is negative. Do I believe that there ought to be reform in respect of the public members? Yes, for the reasons I gave.

I think that the United Nations would be better off and the United States would be better off to encourage the detachment as I put it, of the idealistic agencies from the formal diplomatic agencies so that they could continue to pursue their goals, the maximization of human freedom most promptly among them, without reference to détente which is a diplomatic as distinguished from idealistic goals.

As regards your proposal for a ticket, it seems to me that the anxiety to co-opt Mr. Wallace would probably be one by the Democrats and I wouldn't be surprised, having observed the traffic of pilgrims from Washington, D.C., to Alabama, that a bill has been introduced providing for rapid transit.

Senator PERCY. Maybe I could propose a choice, a Buckley-Buckley ticket.

SHOULD UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION ACT BE CHANGED?

Finally, do you think there should be any change in the provision in the law requiring two Members of Congress and three public members on the Delegation?

Mr. BUCKLEY. Senator, I really think it makes not much difference. I don't like to disparage any public member, myself included. Mostly I think we are automatons and if the proposition before the House is,

do two Congressmen do less damage to Americans spending their time in New York than in Washington, I would say the question is moot.

Senator CASE. That can be turned against the writing profession, too.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say just this with reference to that question, Senator. I understand there is no law.

Senator PERCY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a custom.

Senator PERCY. I should not have said it's in law.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a custom. Senator Lodge and I happened to be the first to be appointed under the custom.

Any further questions?

Senator PERCY. I want to thank both of our guests very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen, both of you. We appreciate it and you have been most helpful.

Now we will hear from Mr. Richard A. Falk on the second topic that I mentioned a while ago, the impact of the third world on the United Nations.

He is professor of international law and practice at Princeton University, and writer on that subject. Among his books is the "Neutralization and World Order, Future of the International Legal Order," both of which are highly pertinent to our discussion of the third world.

I might say that we had arranged for former Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan to be on the panel with Dr. Falk but a funny thing happened to him on his way to the hearing.

Senator CASE. May I add a word of welcome. Dr. Falk is one of our distinguished citizens in New Jersey. I did not want any of my constituents to have any sense of my failing to recognize that.

Nice to have you here again.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD A. FALK, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Mr. FALK. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Falk, may I say we have your statement. I do not believe you can pack that into 10 minutes. It will be printed in full in the record, and if you will, summarize it or discuss it, any way you wish.

Mr. FALK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had not intended to inflict the entire statement on the committee and was going to request permission just to try to highlight what I think are the principal points that are made in the statement.

[Mr. Falk's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PROF. RICHARD A. FALK, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY*

There is no doubt that the United Nations has become something very different than what its founding members had in mind when they assembled in 1944 at San Francisco to draft the Charter of this new institutional attempt at overcoming the hazards of life in a world of sovereign states. Of course, by itself, the process of change that has occurred since 1944 is neither beneficial nor detrimental; it is, however, inevitable given the depth of change going on in the world as a

*This statement is a revise and expanded version of an essay scheduled to appear in the "Harvard Journal of International Law."

whole. Indeed, the capacity of the Charter to accommodate these changes within a global setting is an impressive achievement. As Secretary General Kurt Waldheim notes: "It is not surprising that the United Nations itself has been transformed—indeed, it is the fact that it has changed which demonstrates that the Founders were right to give us a framework for collective action and not a precise constitution. For the United Nations reflects the realities of the world. Many of these are unpleasant and even frightening. But it would be when the United Nations did not reflect these realities that we should become alarmed."[1] Not everyone agrees with the two-part analysis contained in Mr. Waldheim's statement: first, that the United Nations *does* indeed reflect the realities of the world it inhabits; second, that it *should* reflect these realities. And it is the lack of agreement on these points that has generated controversy, especially among Americans who had grown used to calling the tune in the early years of the United Nations but who in latter years have had progressively less influence over U.N. policy and actions. In recent years the United States Government has frequently seemed at odds with the substance of UN positions.

This change in the United States position within the Organization, although central to the concerns of this hearing, should not be exaggerated. Probably no nation other than the United States could have stopped the United Nations from taking an adverse position on a policy as widely and vigorously opposed as the U.S. involvement in Indochina. Only American opposition to the admission of China to the United Nations could have kept that issue unresolved for more than twenty years after an effective change in political power had taken place in Peking. The United States today continues to be the most influential and significant Member of the Organization, exerting a far more pervasive influence across the board of UN activities than any other state and playing an incomparably greater role than its main geopolitical rival, the Soviet Union. Therefore, in adjusting to our loss of influence, we should still appreciate its extent.

Sometimes, especially with regard to spectacular issues of the day, it is difficult to grasp the persistence of American leadership within the United Nations; it is also true that such leadership will not endure if we ourselves lose confidence in its existence. It is, indeed, in the context of Third World claims that the whole issue of America's role is most problematic, and deserves the closest scrutiny. These claims of Asian, African, and Latin American states are directed at reforming the international order as it has evolved over several centuries. If not asserted within the United Nations, these same claims would be asserted elsewhere, perhaps in a hasher, more destructive form.

The Indian nuclear explosion of May 1974 is an ominous warning, even if not so intended, of this possiblity. I believe that our interest as a nation lies not only in understanding these claims but in facilitating their orderly and peaceful satisfaction, through the promotion of fundamental reforms in the existing world system. Such a course of reform will require both a renewal of the vision of America as a benefactor of mankind and an assertion of domestic leadership that promotes an enlightened national self-interest based on the central truth of our age—that the security and prosperity of the United States depend increasingly on the attainment of justice and peace throughout the entire world. From this perspective, what's good for the world is good for the United States. However, to grasp such a reality from the apex of the geopolitical pyramid is no easy matter, and presupposes a larger measure of humility and empathy than our leaders have displayed in recent years. It is within this wider context that I would like to consider the impact of the Third World on the United Nations, and on the General Assembly in particular.

One should approach this topic with the standard caveat—namely, that the "Third World" label covers a whole range of economic, political, psychological, and cultural diversities, even antagonisms. In fact, for many purposes it is more misleading than illuminating to lump together the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At the same time, for a variety of purposes these countries do perceive themselves as a group, a perception made more impressive because it overcomes an underlying, undeniable diversity. It is, then, as a group that the Third World has mobilized its membership on a series of key issues that have appeared on the global agenda in the 1970's, the very issues that constitute the raison d'être for this session of these hearings.

Prior to the 1970's Americans were frequently disillusioned by the inability of the United Nations to implement the great purposes proclaimed in its Charter,

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especially those of keeping the peace and mobilizing the community of nations against military aggression. This disillusionment arose primarily because the United Nations was regarded as enfeebled. It could rarely act. It did little.

Defenders of the Organization pointed out that it was unrealistic to expect very much from the United Nations, given its miniscule budget, its lack of police or military capabiliites, and its dependence on Great Power unanimity to reach decisions in the Security Council. These realists argued, in effect, "Why blame the United Nations for being unable to accomplish more than it was intended to do," i.e. very little. Of course, the realists had a point. On the other hand, if so little was intended, then why did the Charter promise so much in the way of peace and justice? The answer is that the draftsmen wanted to have the best of both worlds: lofty rhetoric in response to world public opinion clamoring for a reliable peace system, but no significant dilution of sovereign prerogatives. Thus, the weakness of the United Nations as an independent actor was built into its very structure, as was inevitable disappointment for those who read the Charter as a series of promises to future generations on the great questions of war and peace. In earlier years, then, the liberals' dilemma was that the United Nations was a well-intentioned experiment, but one too feeble to maintain world peace. Hence, they sought to marshal public support for the United Nations in order to strengthen the organization's ability to realize its potential.

Toward the end of 1974, however, the direction of criticism suddenly swerved sharply. Now, far from complaining that the United Nations was doing too little, its former supporters were concerned that the Organization was doing too much, and that its activities were in fact doing harm to world order values. It seems important to take account of this harsh new line of criticism, to analyze its character and interpret its significance. First, however, let us appreciate the fact that the United Nations moves now being criticized falls primarily in the category of *symbolic* rather than *substantive* activity. The United Nations remains a weak actor when it comes to battalions, but it has an until now improperly understood capacity to shift the balance of legitimacy in ongoing international conflicts and controversies.[3] It is because this symbolic role does have a certain *potency* that there has been a sudden upsurge of serious concern in the United States over what the United Nations does and doesn't do. It can hardly be accidental that last November the largest demonstration in the history of New York City was occasioned by a symbolic event—namely, giving the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization a forum to reiterate within the halls of the General Assembly what he had repeatedly said in many other parts of the world, including Moscow—a locus of material power incomparably greater than that possessed by the United Nations. U.S. Ambassador John Scali, in a widely noticed speech delivered in the General Assembly on December 6, 1974, summed up the present mood when he noted that ". . . many Americans are questioning their belief in the United Nations. They are deeply disturbed."[3]

A series of actions taken by the 29th Session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1974 offended a broad spectrum of American public opinion. Among the most significant of these were:

The suspension of South Africa from all rights of participation in the General Assembly Session;

The invitation to the Palestinian Liberation Organization to take part in the General Assembly debate on the Middle East conflict, and the related treatment of its leader, Yasir Arafat, as virtually a Head of State;

A series of parliamentary rulings by the Algerian President of the Assembly that restricted Israel's right to fully present its case during the debate on the Middle East, as well as parallel actions in UNESCO that withheld funds from Israeli cultural projects; and

The adoption of a much heralded Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, despite vigorous opposition by the United States to several key provisions.[4]

Perhaps even more serious than this bill of particulars, however, was the growing American perception of the General Assembly as a generally hostile arena. For many Americans, this hostility had been epitomized several years ago by the sight of African delegates dancing in the aisles of the Assembly after the 1972 vote granting the People's Republic of China full rights to represent the state of China in the United Nations. While such feelings may be considered paranoid by some, these Americans, who apparently included President Nixon, were convinced that the joy of the Africans had less to do with the issue of

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Chinese representation than it did with the feelings of potency that came from gaining a Third World diplomatic victory over the United States. In fact, it does not seem unreasonable to imagine that such victory celebrations are made all the more ardent by the Third World's inability to challenge the United States in more direct geopolitical ways. In particular, the failure to protect the Indochinese peoples from the American military onslaught has over the years undoubtedly provoked a subconscious sense of guilt and powerlessness on the part of countries who themselves have struggled to assert a national identity after decades of colonial servitude. A further confirmation of this conjecture is the extent to which leaders of the South Vietnamese liberation forces, such as Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, have been hailed and cheered (reportedly more than any Head of State) at principal Third World conferences of the non-aligned bloc during the last three years.

It is worth noting that, even after all the years of the Cold War, the negative American reading of recent United Nations actions is directed not at the Soviet bloc or even at the socialist Members of the United Nations, but at the Third World. Clearly, the capacity of Asian, African, and Latin American countries to control the General Assembly agenda and to dominate the debate and resolution process is at the heart of American disenchantment. This disenchantment deepened as the Afro-Asian ranks at the United Nations swelled in the 1960's, and has intensified still further as Third World positions have solidified in opposition to American policy on such critical issues as the comparative equities in the Middle East, the status of foreign investment, the use of coordinated economic pressure on the developed world (e.g., OPEC actions since late 1973), and the overall insistence on a new international economic order that reflects the demands of the poorer, less industrialized countries. Ambassador Scali warned that "the pursuit of mathematical majorities can be a particularly sterile form of international activity" and, further, that "[p]aper triumphs are, in the end, expensive even for the voters."[5] In effect, Scali was arguing that without support from states with *actual* power, the formal claims of the General Assembly are rantings and ravings. However, I believe that a growing anxiety about a shift in *real* power was lurking in the background. The oil weapon employed by OPEC since 1973 had brought more than "a paper triumph" for the Third World, even if only a small portion of Asia, Africa, and Latin America received benefits from the confrontation. The shift in influence and wealth had been dramatic.

Third World solidarity had seemingly paid off both in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and with respect to prospects for restructuring the world economy. Therefore, just as the African dance after the China vote might have been partly bravado, Scali's denunciations of the Assembly seem more like a political gesture than an exercise in diplomacy. Although the Assembly has no aircraft carriers or missiles, its judgments increasingly represent more than mere rhetoric because of the increasingly formidable strength of the social forces that stand behind that rhetoric. Scali's speech appears to be associated with the threat diplomacy directed at OPEC by American leadership inside and outside of government, conjuring up military scenarios about seizing Arab oil in either the Persian Gulf or Libya.[6] Beneath the denunciations lies a growing American anxiety that "the barbarians are at the gates," that "the West" or "Western civilization" is under siege and the world is running out of critical resources needed to fuel growth-oriented market industrial economies.[7] Thus, the anger directed at the United Nations is part of a wider loss of confidence by American leadership in its capacity to cope with a series of difficult challenges. These American outbursts can be seen partly as expressions of frustration because the tide is turning, and partly as exhortations to stem the tide. Just as the Third World in general and the Palestinians in particular symbolize the barbarians at the gates, so the United Nations serves as a temporary scapegoat, along with OPEC, for focusing American anger and for distracting attention from more structural issues related to a crisis in world capitalism.[8]

A somewhat more academic and narrower critique of the United Nations, especially of the General Assembly, contends that the Organization is worse than nothing, that it is "a dangerous place" where the formal action consistently contravenes the high purposes of the Charter.[9] Indeed, the authors of one study assert that "the United Nations contributes about as much to peace as a battleship or an atomic bomb. Disputes are brought to the United Nations in order to weaken an opponent, strengthen one's side, prepare for war, and support a war effort."[10] This perception emerges, they argue, if one examines "the objectives of those who

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[have] used the organization." [11] Their evidence is drawn from a wide range of instances, but their argument seeks mainly to establish the extent to which the United Nations operates as an anti-Israeli force rather than as an objective organization bent on fulfilling the purposes of its Charter. Here, the main complaint against the United Nations is partly ideological, partly normative. On an ideological level the critique arises out of opposition to the pursuit of Third World goals in United Nations arenas; on a normative level the critique emphasizes the gap between the Charter as organic instrument and the United Nations as political actor.[12] On both counts, however, the complaint is irrelevant. The United Nations is inevitably a political actor that cannot be constrained by any underlying constitutional document, although its actions may be influenced, if not determined, by constitutional guidelines. To complain about the politicization of the United Nations represents either a confusion or, more likely, a substantive dissent from the kind of political positions that are ascendant at a given time. Who can seriously maintain that in the early Cold War years the United Nations was not every bit as much a political actor as it was during the 29th General Assembly? The United Nations political character in those earlier years was highlighted by the Korean operation. Indeed, at that time the United Nations provided a global cover for a military operation that was to all intents and purposes an American

I would argue that the main organs of the United Nations will either be truly *impotent* or they will actively pursue political ends. If those political ends are perceived as abhorrent to the purposes of peace and justice in the world, then it is reasonable to conclude that the Organization is a dangerous place. However, criteria of peace and justice must be set forth with some clarity and objectivity to enable such a judgment. In my view, the recent swing of sentiment on principal issues is cumulatively in the direction of peace and justice, although not necessarily on each and every issue in question. This judgment rests heavily on my assumption that the world's primary needs, at present, is for the redistribution of dignity and wealth, both to alleviate poverty and to build the kind of participatory system that can eventually design and carry out drastic global reforms.[13]

It should be understood that this approval of Assembly action is based on what I feel it is possible to expect within an intergovernmental context. Of course, many of the Third World governments that are the most progressive on an international stage pursue contradictory policies toward their own people. Therefore, there is an element of hypocrisy in such posturing and some mixed effects arising from so-called policies of redistribution. Is social justice really enhanced when purchasing power is transferred from taxpayers in industrial democracies to sheiks on the Persian Gulf? I think it is possible to endorse the progressive demands now being made on the international level, while calling attention to the failure of governments to implement these same demands within their own domestic societies.

The United States has a reputation for wild fluctuations of mood with respect to world policy.[14] In recent decades, these fluctuations often centered upon the two major post-war experiments to create global political institutions for maintaining world peace. In many respects, Woodrow Wilson was the prime champion of the League idea, and yet the United States Senate refused to ratify the treaty of participation. Similarly, with the United Nations, it was American promotion of the UN idea that accounted for holding the preparatory conference in San Francisco and locating the Organization itself in New York, rather than elsewhere. Other governments, as well, felt that in light of the League experience it was important to make the UN seem like a part of the United States, and not something remote and alien in character. Through the years the United States has been by far the largest single financial contributor to the work of the Organization. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that this positive attitude was partially contingent upon the existence and expectation of favorable political winds. Up through the Korean War, even until the early 1960's, the United States could command support in the United Nations for any position, or at least avoid an adverse decision about which it seriously cared. Thus, both the tenor of debate and the formal actions of the political organs accorded roughly with American foreign policy references.

The watershed of pro-American sentiment within the United Nations was perhaps the Stanleyville Operation of December 1964, the occasion of a joint American-United Kingdom-Belgium airlift in the Congo to rescue the thousands

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of Europeans and North Americans stranded in the midst of a civil war and held hostage by one side. In retrospect, what was most revealing was the depth of African suspicions about American intentions, and America's corresponding attitude of apparent disbelief that its proclaimed humanitarian motives could be seriously questioned in a public forum. The American delegate in the Security Council, then Adlai Stevenson, protested American innocence. ". . . the sole aim of my government has been and is to assist in the rescue of innocent civilians endangered by rebel activities in violation of international law." [15]

At that time there was a far greater tendency to accept Ambassador Stevenson's words at face value than would be the case today. By 1975, American credibility has been much more seriously damaged, especially by a decade of military intervention in Indochina and by a series of CIA disclosures substantiating allegations of covert operations ranging from assassination plots to the "destabilization" of constitutionally elected governments. Nevertheless, even in 1964 Africa's angry reaction suggested a deeper Third World opposition to any developed country's use of force in a Third World region, regardless of pretext. Also, and not unreasonably, the African participants in the dabate saw the operation as an attempt by Europeans and North Americans to tip the balance in an ongoing civil war in order to satisfy their own diplomatic goals and economic greed, as well as to remind recently independent African counrties that while colonialism may have collapsed as a formal system, new geopolitical forms of imperialism had emerged to take its place. My point is that in the years since Stanleyville there has been an intensification of these psychological trends, abetted by certain other factors such as the loss of American prestige as a consequence of defeat in Indochina, the rise of world social crises in relation to famine and poverty, the collapse of the liberal economic ideology based on prospects for indefinite economic growth, the increasing articulation of a Third World position that is anti-Soviet as well as anti-American, the success of OPEC strategy and the possibility of its extension to other sectors of North-South economic relations, the addition of India, another Third World country, to the nuclear club, and the political success achieved by the Palestinian Liberation Organization through recourse to international terroristic tactics. Although there are some counter-trends, these factors have all been components in the weakening of America's relative world position. This weakening has been underscored by severe economic setbacks for all advanced industrial countries including the United States and involves major issues such as inflation, rising unemployment, and declines in total economic output.

It is in this wider setting of world developments that we should appreciate the recent upsurge of negative American attitudes toward the United Nations. In China's first major address in the United Nations, delivered on 3 October 1972 by its chief delegate Ambassador Chiao Kuan-Hua, the following passage appears near the end:

> The World is at a crossroads and so is the United Nations. If the United Nations is to regain its prestige and play its due role, it must conform to the trend of the world, truly express the just demands of large numbers of its members and the people of the world, act strictly in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and free itself from the manipulation and control by the big powers.[16]

The events of the session of the General Assembly definitely move symbolically in the direction advocated by China and supported by the overwhelming majority of member governments. Mr. Chiao Kuan-Hua went on to warn that unless the United Nations did so move "it would be very difficult" for it "to avoid eventually taking the old path of The League of Nations." [17]

What is at stake, then, is very fundamental: first, how do we interpret the forces of history? Second, how do we understand the American relationship to these forces? Third, how should the United States Government express this understanding in its role as a leading member of the United Nations?

I would emphasize the close links between the questions posed in the United Nations arena, and other controversies involving America's political identity:

What do we do about the American covert operations program in foreign societies?

What do we do with our surplus food capacity in a world confronted by massive shortages and large-scale famine?

What do we do about the OPEC challenge?

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What do we do to safeguard our "security" in terms of defense spending, arms sales and transfers, and arms control?

The approaching Bicentennial year itself provides a convenient symbolic occasion to reconsider the whole issue of American political identity. It could be a time of national renewal and rediscovery. Our roots are progressive and revolutionary, dependent on the politics of change and conscious of the link between true independence and dignity. Such renewal and rediscovery would lead Americans, I am convinced, to celebrate rather than bemoan the cumulative drift of initiative in the United Nations. The choice narrows, I think, to girding ourselves to ward off the barbarians at the gates, or to joining those governments and social forces seeking a more equitable and durable system of world order.

Thus, I think the debate on United Nations activity is crucial for the posture we take toward the future of world order. As yet, the Third World itself, including the Chinese, have provided only a negative vision based on what Houari Boumedienne of Algeria has called "a dialectic of struggle." [18] But more than confrontation, more even than redistribution, is needed. A positive vision of how to construct an equitable system of world order must be shaped in the years ahead, and for this endeavor we must solicit the active participation of all major cultures and ideologies throughout the world.[19] The General Assembly can play a major positive role in this process by providing a forum within which the main lines of intergovernmental consensus on global reform can take shape. It may be naive to envisage such a role, at present, for governments are generally locked into the logic of the state system and are not likely to take the miliative in formulating the case for a post-statal system. The future is likely to mix many elements of the present, to become centrally guided for practical reasons despite the preferences of governments, and officials who rise to prominence in some countries may begin to be imbued with a sense of loyalty and identification that goes beyond the citizenry of their individual states. One day, national leaders may even find it "realistic" to believe that the future of their countries can only be secured by genuine commitments to the well-being of the world as a whole.[20]

Of course, this is a dream, but we desperately need dreams to awaken us from a dangerous form of sleep. On a more optimistic note, there seems to be some slight indication that the pendulum of official American perceptions may be swinging back from the strident denunciation of the Organization following the last session of the General Assembly. In this regard, it seems appropriate to call attention to a speech made by the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, to the World Affairs Council in San Diego on January 23, 1975:

> "We overestimated the potential of the United Nations at its birth in 1945. We tended to view the creation of this institution as synonymous with solutions to the problems. We know better today. At the same time, we must exercise care not to underestimate its positive contributions to peace. The United Nations is not an entity apart from its membership. The U.N.'s imperfections mirror the imperfections of the world in which the United Nations operates." [21]

It is only necessary to add that what constitutes an imperfection depends upon the eye of the beholder; Undersecretary Sisco's important point is the extent to which the political organs of the United Nations inevitably mirror the priorities of the majority of governments that comprise its 138 state membership. From this it follows that the more political the organ, the more direct the mirroring effect. Hence, of course, the General Assembly will reflect the sentiments of the Third World. And it is equally true that such political majorities are not coordinated with ratios of economic or military power in the world. Indeed, it is quite possible that this state of affairs provides a healthy compensation for such imbalances, especially if some controversies can be resolved on the terrain of symbolic action—legitimacy struggles—instead of on the battlefield.

A caveat is in order. It remains uncertain whether an assembly composed of the governments of sovereign states can develop a set of policies designed to promote human and planetary interests as a whole. As matters now stand, governments seem too short-sighted and selfish to cooperate for the general good, furthermore, many governments do not even represent their national citizenry as a whole, but pursue the interests of a dominant class, race, religion, ruling group, or sub-national region. Perhaps governments can be sufficiently reformed from

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within so as to represent both wider interests of humanity and the particular interests of their own society. However, the prospects are not now bright, and until such changes occur one must be skeptical about the positive potential for global reform that can be achieved within any intergovernmental framework, including even that of the United Nations.

Therefore, I am urging that this Committee see the United Nations in the broader setting of global concerns. It is partly a matter of appreciating its fundamental character as a forum for communication, where claims and controversies are aired, and partly a matter of grasping its growing stature as a quasi-legislative body that can mobilize public opinion around certain positions. Beyond this, the political organs of the United Nations, especially the General Assembly, may help build a global understanding of the need for longer-range planning and vastly augmented mechanisms for global coordination than presently exist. In reevaluating the role of the United Nations, let us not lose sight of these fundamental purposes served by the Organization, even if some of us find ourselves disappointed by some recent positions taken in the General Assembly with respect to particular controversies. Our most basic national interest is to strengthen the drift toward a global process of decision that the United Nations represents, and we should not be diverted from this priority. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim is surely correct when he says ". . . the *achievements* of the United Nations are nothing compared with its *potentialities*." [1]

FOOTNOTES

1. Kurt Waldheim, "The United Nations—A Reflection of the Realities of the Modern World," *Review of International Affairs*, No. 594, Jan. 5, 1975, pp. 3–4, at p. 3.

2. For discussion of this role see I. Claude, "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations," 20 *International Organization* 367 (1966).

3. American statement reprinted as Scali, "U.S. Warns that Present Voting Trends May Overshadow Positive Achievements of the United Nations," 72 *Bull. State Dep't* 114, at 116 (1975).

4. For an official explanation of the American position see speech by Sen. Charles Percy, also delivered on December 6, 1974, in his capacity as U.S. Representative to the General Assembly. Percy, "U.S. Votes Against Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States," 72 *Bull. State Dep't* 146 (1975).

5. Scali *supra* note 2, at 115, 116.

6. The most widely noticed argument in academic circles is that put forward by Professor Robert C. Tucker of Johns Hopkins University. See Tucker, "Oil: the Issue of American Intervention," 59 *Commentary* 21 (1975); the most direct official statement was a carefully qualified assertion by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the course of an interview with the editors of *Business Week Magazine*. "I'm not saying that there's no circumstance where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the case of a dispute over price; it's another where there is actual strangulation of the industrialized world." Interview text reprinted in "Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for *Business Week Magazine*," 72 *Bull. State Dep't* 97, 101 (1975).

7. As Kissinger put it in the same interview, "The political problem is that the whole Western world, with the possible exception perhaps of the United States, is suffering from political malaise, from inner uncertainty and a lack of direction." *Id.* at 99. Elsewhere Kissinger said, "[T]he aspect of contemporary life that worries me most is the lack of purpose and direction of so much of the Western world." "Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 'Bill Moyers' Journal," 72 *Bull. State Dep't* 165, at 166 (1975). The fragility of the West is also expressed by critics of a military approach to the OPEC challenge. For instance, Zbigniew Brzezinski writes: ". . . the threat of military action is simply not credible . . . an American failure, following an abortive intervention, could mean the disintegration of the West." Brzezinski, "Recognizing the Crisis," 17 *Foreign Policy* 63, at 69 (1974–75). Pro-interventionists argue to the exactly opposite effect.

8. On this theme see G. Barraclough, "The Great World Crisis I" in *The N.Y. Rev. of Books*, January 23, 1975, at 20–29; F. Ajami, "Scenarios of Doom: Scapegoating and Backlash Politics" (unpublishedmimeo., Jan. 1975).

9. A. Yeselson and A. Gaglione, *A Dangerous Place: The United Nations as a Weapon in World Politics* (1974).

10. *Id.* at X.

11. *Id.* at 196.
12. This argument is developed at some length in R. Falk, "The United Nations: Various Systems of Operations," *The United Nations in International Politics* 184–230 (L. Gordenker, ed., 1971).
13. R. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (1975).
14. See the rather intriguing conclusion that there is a predictable cycle of introversion (twenty-one years) and extroversion (twenty-seven years) in American foreign policy reached by Frank Klingberg, in "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," 4 *World Politics* 239 (1952).
15. As quoted in R. Falk, *Legal Order in a Violent World* at 331 (1968) for account of Stanleyville Operation see *id.* 324–335.
16. Text of speech reprinted in *Peking Review*, No. 41, Oct. 13, 1972, 4–10; quoted passage at 10.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Text of Boumedienne speech reprinted in "Petroleum, Raw Materials and Development," Algerian Memorandum to Special Session of U.N. General Assembly, April 1974, III, at VIII.
19. For some instances see F. S. C. Northrop, *The Taming of Nations* (1952); *On the Creation of a Just World Order* (S. Mendlovitz, ed., 1975).
20. See suggestion by the development economist, John P. Lewis, that the political energy for global reform is most likely to come from above, indeed, from within the bureaucracy itself. Lewis, "Oil, Other Scarcities and the Poor Countries," 27 *World Politics* 63, at 86 (1974); for an argument that reform will come from below, see F. Ajami, *The Global Populists: Third-World Nations and World-Order* (Princeton University, Center for International Studies, Research MoInograph No. 41, May 1974).
21. See J. Sisco, "America's Foreign Policy Agenda: Towards the Year 2000," 72 *State Department Bulletin* 182, at 186 (1975).
22. Waldheim, note 1, p. 4.

Mr. FALK. I also want to indicate my gratitude to the committee for giving me this opportunity to present my views and to participate in what I think are very important hearings on the United Nations, especially given a new sense of anxiety about the relationship of the United States to the United Nations that has grown in the last year or so.

And I think the center of that anxiety has very much to do with the perception of the Third World's role in the General Assembly.

I think it is this new role of the Third World that is causing a crisis of American loyalty toward the United Nations, a crisis that is deeper than any prior feeling of anxiety, forcing us to relinquish (at least formally) some of our sovereignty in the direction of international institutions.

THE "MOYNIHAN APPROACH"

I am sorry that Ambassador Moynihan could not be here today. I had initially been intimidated by the prospect of appearing opposite him and it would be too arrogant to presume that his absence is a reflection of his comparable intimidation. But I do think, and I would like to put it as clearly as I can, that endorsement this morning of what has been called the Moynihan approach to the Third World is in my view a very unfortunate kind of effort to alter the way in which the United States deals with the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the General Assembly and in the United Nations.

My main objection to what has come to be known as the Moynihan approach is that I think it is designed primarily to evoke a positive reception in domestic public opinion here in the United States, but would actually reduce the effectiveness of the United States within the United Nations itself. In other words, in my judgment, it is an

attempt to use the United Nations arena for purposes of generating a popular domestic view here in the United States, despite the fact that it would deepen very real antagonism toward the United States that exists within the General Assembly at the present time.

POLITICAL CHARACTER OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

What I would like to emphasize in these few minutes is that the United Nations and General Assembly in particular are inevitably political in their orientation. The General Assembly is a political actor that reflects the will of the majority of its members, and that the political character of the organization is one which is now reflecting wider changes that are taking place within international society. To act as if those changes are not real, and are not going to alter the general capacity of the United States to peacefully influence the attitudes of foreign governments, is to ignore one of the dominant political trends that is taking place in the world at the present time.

It follows from this political character of the General Assembly that the main potency of the organization depends on its playing a symbolic role in shifting what might be called the balance of legitimacy on controversial international issues. Although the General Assembly does not possess the ingredients of power that one associates with economic or political capabilities, at the same time it is a very important actor, and increasingly so because of its ability to provide a symbolic legitimacy that often is decisive in reshaping international public opinion on highly sensitive issues. It is for this reason, in my view, that such a furor was occasioned by giving Yassar Arafat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization a forum within the General Assembly to say what he said one hundred times outside the Organization. Why—one must ask—did that access cause such a tremor in American public opinion? Why did it trigger the largest demonstration in the history of New York City? And I would answer that the real reason is not the impotency of the United Nations but its potency with respect to symbolic issues of legitimacy.

And I believe that this potency is going to continue; this is almost inevitable in a complex world of 100 or 140 or more sovereign states, where there is some need for centralized forums in which various positions on international conflict of the day can be peacefully articulated.

In effect, what the United Nations and is various arenas provide are minimum channels of communication that enable the crystalization of world public opinion, and that do not collide with a rather opposite tendency, namely, the affirmation of intense nationalism on the part of the Third World countries.

So that in a sense one has two contradictory developments taking place simultaneously. The use of the General Assembly to generate global positions on controversial questions, and the very sensitivity and opposition on the part of the great majority of members to any positions or policies that would in any sense intrude on their post colonial sovereign prerogatives.

UNITED STATES AN IMPORTANT ACTOR IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Now, I think it is also important to emphasize that despite the recent drift of General Assembly opinion against preferred American

positions on some critical questions, the United States today remains by far the most important actor within the United Nations and is in fact the only member with a capacity to sustain otherwise highly unpopular positions.

To illustrate, I think that only the United States could have kept mainland China out of the United Nations for so long, and only the United States could have kept the United Nations from taking really adverse positions on its policy throughout the Indochina war; in both these contexts, it was the only primacy of American influence within the United Nations that overcame a set of very unpopular positions throughout the world. But I would argue that the primacy that the United States still enjoys has been eroded by the rearguard stance that the U.S. Government has in recent years taken on almost every issue of genuine concern to the Third World.

We increasingly give the impression to others and to our own people that we are afraid of change in the world, that we oppose what other governments feel will promote minimal sentiments of justice. And so I think it is terribly important not to lose sight of the main point, namely, that it is in the interest of the United States to try to understand how other governments view the issues of international justice at the present time and to reexamine our own policies before being so quick to affirm the irresponsibility of Third World majorities.

I think General Assembly attitude toward Israel and liberation movements, the main issues on which the United Nations has taken a position in recent years, reflect two prevalent kinds of sentiment.

First, with regard to specific international conflicts, the majority of the General Assembly feels that one side is pursuing a set of just demands and the other side is either resisting those demands totally or is taking an unreasonable position. In this context, I think the majority of non-Third World countries share the view that Israel has not since 1967 taken a position that accords with Security Council Resolution 242, and has not withdrawn from the conquered territories that were acquired in the 1967 war. I think it is generally the feeling that the General Assembly pressure in support of Palestinian self-determination and return of the conquered territories is necessary to offset the kind of geopolitical and military advantage that Israel gained in the 1967 war.

Similarly, I think that the General Assembly clearly takes the side of the liberation groups in the conflicts that are raging in southern Africa and I think history is on the side of those liberation groups. I think it is largely a legacy of the colonial period, it involves racism as well as colonialism and I think it is not in any sense in the interest of the American people as a whole—as distinguishing from some special interest groups within the United States—to continue to feel that the survival of these oppressive regimes in southern Africa is a matter that American national interest should be committed to.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

The second sentiment is the urgent need for a new international economic order, which is reflected in the attempt to evolve a new framework for international economic relations through peaceful means.

Now, I regard this as a constructive set of initiatives when one takes into account two salient facts of global political life. The first is

the objective conditions of inequality and poverty that exist in the world as a whole, and the other is the capacity of those who suffer from this inequality to cause grave danger to the stability of the international system. And I take the Indian nuclear explosion of May 1974 as a warning to the future, so to speak, that if we fail to grasp the opportunity for peaceful accommodation with respect to this set of very sensitive but very significant economic issues, I think we will simply drive the international community into deeper and deeper economic and political conflict, with grave threats of military conflicts as well. The world, in other words, is not safe enough to indulge present levels of inequities and inequalities. To argue against trying to rectify this situation peacefully, to turn our backs on the fact that this system is very unfairly structured, seems to me, to imply an extremely shortsighted view of American national interests.

U.S. REORIENTATION NEEDED

I would conclude by saying that the basic attitude toward the United Nations should not be one of seeking partisan advantage in a narrow sense, but in genuinely trying to figure out how to convince ourselves that what is good for the world is good for the United States. I think that is the essence of the reorientation that we need. It involves coming to an appreciation of the fact that we do live in a genuinely interdependent world in which no nation, however powerful and however rich, can effectively isolate itself and pursue a separate antagonistic course. But unfortunately, if one looks at the votes in the General Assembly on critical issues over the past 2 or 3 years, we find that the United States is increasingly isolated not only from the Third World but from many of its traditional allies as well. This, it seems to me, communicates a message not that others should listen to our perspectives on these questions, but that there is no road to peaceful exchange with respect to the world order system that we now have. To those who seriously seek to rectify current imbalances, it communicates the message that nuclear capabilities are much more important than appeals to international justice or voluntarism or gradualism.

Unless Americans and the official governmental institutions of our society can understand that for the rest of the world, repression and poverty are not just slogans, we are going to have a very difficult time in the decades ahead. It requires farsighted leadership to appreciate the fact that it is in our interest to work with other countries, including the Third World, to create adequate international mechanisms for dealing with both economic and political problems, and to show that we have enough confidence in peaceful processes of change to cooperate even when the majority of the United Nations opposes the particular position that we take at a particular time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CASE. The chairman has been called to the telephone, and he asked that I preside in his absence.

Senator Clark, do you have some questions?

Senator CLARK. After you.

WHERE DOES UNITED STATES COME OUT BY MAKING CONCESSIONS?

Senator CASE. I do not have any questions except the deepest kind of question. Dr. Falk is a well-known person with very deep convic-

tions and great intellectual capacity, and one hesitates to even raise any questions with a man like that.

I do have a question as to where we come out on the other side. Where do we go conceding that all of these problems can be dealt with in a matter of equality, whatever that is, a matter of justice, whatever that is, by a political absolution that involves nobody getting down to work except the people of the United States and of Western civilization? Obviously, they are going to take all foods that Americans can supply and spread it around the world and for a time it may help but not for long. It will do more harm than good in one sense, because we get a lot of people in the frame of mind that they can rely on this forever and not go at things the hard way. This is apart from a political question that if we backed out and said, "All right, boys, you take over," then we would not have anything left in the way of civility in the world. These are questions that very deeply trouble people that are bothered by the Marxist approach that you quite properly hold. I say that not in the condemnatory sense at all. I am trying to bring out some basic conceptions of how the world would be run if we listen to you as the chief exemplar. It is all right to say, take it step by step, which is probably what you will say, and yield slowly in the hope that responsibilities will develop as pressures ease on the other side, and they may. But up to now they have not very much. You have some of the worst dictatorships in these underdeveloped nations that you ever could possibly have—the worst kinds of treatments of individual human beings. I am not very encouraged by this or encouraged to believe that the Soviet approach that you do so deeply believe, and which we respect, is going to lead anywhere.

Mr. FALK. Well, I am grateful, Senator Case, for your question because I think it does go to the root of the controversy between people like Ambassador Moynihan and myself. The primary point I would make in response is that what we have been doing in the U.N., and in the world as a whole, is to create an overriding impression that we are not committed to the peaceful solution of the outstanding controversies in the world when we are on the minority side. That is why it is so fundamental to understand that we were very prepared to use the U.N. as a political arena so long as we were on the side of the majority, because that merely strengthened our dispositions. We can gain the most in the U.N. by conveying to others our sense that there are nonmilitary alternatives to the outstanding issues of the day. That does not mean that we have to say third world countries are necessarily pursuing enlightened policies toward their own populations. It does mean we must try to make clear, to ourselves and to the world at large, that we have enough faith in international procedures so that when they go against us on a particular issue, we need not automatically criticize the organization and might even go so far as to reconsider our own position. As a matter of fact if you look at the specific issues that have elicited this crisis of loyalty toward the United Nations, I think that the majority of the General Assembly has a rather strong case.

With regard to a new international economic order very little has been done over the past 20 years to rectify existing inequalities. What I fear we are witnessing is an extremely counterproductive effort, to convince the third world nations that they have exhausted their peace-

ful remedies. Americans who are genuinely concerned about eliminating war and eliminating violence could do much more for their country by listening to the claims for change that are being asserted throughout the world, than by trying to organize some kind of self-serving response to those claims.

I just do not feel our present posture is constructive. It may bring short-run domestic political gains here in the United States, but it will weaken our leverage within the U.N. and will mislead the American people as to the genuine opportunities to convert the U.N. into a constructive force for peacefully resolving key issues.

GIVING WEIGHT TO U.S. PUBLIC OPINION

Senator CASE. I want to express again my appreciation for your coming and I hope you keep talking until I understand better what you feel. But I would put to you this one point—that anything that the people of this country, the United States, feel very deeply about is something that has to be given thoughtful consideration by people like yourself, because the so-called middle class or hard-hat approach is not all bad. I do not say that you say it is. I am saying that there is a kind of a basic common sense in this country and in the West, generally. There is an instinctive reaction against knuckling under to bravado. People perceive us in that role as something we can recognize. At the same time we do not have to say we do not see it in others, too.

Senator JAVITS. I like what Senator Case has said. I would like to identify myself with that and add this one point.

Americans can be very indignant, which is sometimes a good quality, and can be very meddlesome in debate, which cannot be a good quality. Without necessarily pulling out of the U.N. or threatening to, should we not be quite so intimidated by the task that we do. We are a spirited people, so are these third world countries; we stand up to them and they stand up to us, but I think the preponderant sentiment is not to pull out but to give them hell, and that is not a bad idea.

Mr. FALK. Well, it may not be a bad idea, Senator, but with all respect that is what I am trying to argue against.

Senator JAVITS. I know you are.

Mr. FALK. I think it is a self-serving kind of posture that achieves no constructive result. I think the consequence would be to confuse the American people as to the genuine character of these issues that are so controversial in the United Nations. After all, if you look at a couple of the specific contexts you find that it is not only the Third World vote which has created America's isolation from world public opinion. The United States is pursuing positions which seem to me to be historically doomed. The positions we have tried to take in recent years with respect to southern Africa are ones that cannot possibly survive, and the longer we hold out as an apparent ally of reactionary forces in the world, the worst the eventual resolution of those issues will be.

I feel the same thing is true with respect to the new international economic order. To give them hell, as you put it, Senator, may bring a momentary sense of relief, but it does not meet the genuine objective

problems that are out there in the world—it does not meet the reality of India's nuclear capability, nor does it meet the very real prospect of an era of desperate politics with respect to economic redistribution.

I think we forget that Japan initiated World War II largely out of a sense that it had no peaceful alternative means through which to achieve a reasonable role in the international economy.

Senator CASE. When you refer to Japan, that was a group of militarists plus super capitalists. Yet there is no such thing as a Japan apart from its people and its people happened to be under domination of that group at that time and the situation there is quite differnt now.

SOUTH AFRICA AND HISTORIC INEVITABILITY

When you speak to historical necessity or historical inevitability, I am not sure that I can accept this. I cannot, for instance, see why there should not be a small white colony or white country, if you will, in South Africa? Why does it all have to be black? Inevitably why? I do not believe that you can talk about historical necessity and invoke that kind of thing as sanction for views that you hold very deeply, and I respect you on that. You must recognize, however, there are other people who hold contrary views here and they do not accept that historical inevitability. There is more than one solution to many problems.

Mr. FALK. But, Senator, when you talk about southern Africa as providing an opportunity for diversity in the world you have to realize that in Rhodesia, for instance, the white ruling minority is one-twentieth of the population of that country.

Senator CASE. I am not saying these things should not be readjusted in proper ways. I say that it does not necessarily mean wiping out the whites in order to give justice to the blacks other than wiping out an area in which whites have exclusive national control.

Mr. FALK. That has not been proposed by anyone.

Senator CASE. Of course not, because that is because of the way you insist on framing the issue.

Mr. FALK. No, it isn't. I simply think that the view you and Senator Javits have asserted makes the eventual outcome much more hazardous for the white minorities in these parts of the world because it does not allow the advocates of change any plausible prospect of peaceful reconciliation.

Senator CASE. That is not fair. Neither Senator Javits nor I for a moment would support a situation in which that prospect does not exist. If you would consent to that point you would find us most active in working out a kind of change, but not the kind of change that necessarily turns things completely upside down, because that will be just as much an injustice and wrong as anything else. And when you talk about being scared of India because she has atomic weapons, or anybody else—we cannot be scared; we have to do the thing we conceive to be right, whether it is going to pull the world down on top of us. That is absolutely true. You cannot let irresponsible people in charge of the great power of destruction govern the course of your actions.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if I may get a question in. It seems to me this dialog has gone far enough.

Senator CASE. I agree.

THE UNITED NATIONS AS A PLATFORM FOR VIEWS

The CHAIRMAN. Let me get back to the question of the United Nations. I have many questions but I am just going to ask you this question.

I have always had a feeling that if the United Nations did nothing in the world except to let the representatives of all of the nations that wanted to come there and talk, it would be well worthwhile. Would you agree?

Mr. FALK. Yes, Senator, very much. In fact one of the principal points in my prepared statement is that the United Nations performs an invaluable function and role by providing a way for governments to get feelings before world public opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Every nation in the world regardless of how small or how large has an equal opportunity to make their views known on that platform.

Mr. FALK. Yes. The most significant point here is that it provides them with a peaceful way of making their views known.

I think one of the things we have not understood is that the only option the Palestinians had to get onto the international agenda was by shooting their way on. That is why I think that the notion of listening to those who have claims giving them the opportunity to state those claims, is not a regressive but a progressive thing.

NONDISCRIMINATION AGAINST RICH AND POWERFUL

Senator JAVITS. One word in that regard. I think Senator Case and I are only pleading for nondiscrimination against us because we are rich and powerful. We have as great a tyranny of the weak as of the strong, and he and I exercise the idea of getting out of the U.N. as unthinkable, unthinkable, but within the U.N. let us have a good stirring, no holdbars debate, and we have the same privileges the Third World has in that regard. That is all we say. We do not have to be inhibited because the poor timid soul will run away because we are angry.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good way to say amen to this discussion.

Senator CLARK.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Professor Falk. I was interested in your comment about General Assembly actions being very significant in a symbolic way. You gave a number of examples of that and I think you are right.

POSITIVE ECONOMIC PROPOSALS FOR NEXT ASSEMBLY

Does that not mean, therefore, that if we are going to participate in that forum we have to be prepared, particularly when we go to the next General Assembly in September, to make some positive proposals, particularly in the economic area, particularly about such things as commodity agreements or, perhaps, with regard to Southern Africa? Do you not think that is going to be essential to successful U.S. participation in the Assembly?

Mr. FALK. Yes; I very much share that attitude toward American participation in the United Nations. I think the notion of getting back at the Third World will lead us nowhere. The only possibility of achieving a more stable and moderate international order is for us

to come forward with constructive and credible proposals that demonstrate a genuine interest in devising peaceful resolutions to these outstanding international disputes. That is really why I disagree with Senators Case and Javits, to put it differently, for us of all people to go in there and give them hell, is what I find particularly questionable at this stage of history.

We have to start from the realization that America's world prestige is at a low level at this time. We have come through the 10 years of the Indochina conflict, which—regardless of how it is viewed in the United States—has seriously discredited the United States in the eyes of the rest of the world. I think it is very important for our own people, as well as for our relations with the rest of the world, that we reinvigorate the genuine idealist roots that exist in this country, and that we come forward in this spirit with concrete constructive proposals.

WHY IS THE UNITED STATES IN THE MINORITY?

Senator CLARK. Why have we not done that, in your judgment? Increasingly the United States finds itself not only in the minority, but in a minority of only four or five nations. We are not even voting with the rest of the developed world, not to mention the group of 77. Why is it we have not been able to come forward with any positive proposal in those areas?

Mr. FALK. What I fear has happened, Senator Clark, is that we have gotten ourselves locked into an ideological position of opposition to the Third World and that we find ourselves increasingly eager to fight rhetorical battles to maintain certain positions that are politically obsolete. The issue of China's representation was perhaps the best illustration of this. That battle was, in my view, a symbolic struggle for the wrong principle, our insistence on hanging on until defeat—which was just a matter of time—merely conveyed to the rest of the world the degree to which we want to resist the active forces of international change, no matter how successful those forces may be. As I see it, the underlying issue is that we are not ideologically able to adjust to the fact that changes are taking place in the world and that they require a new posture and a new kind of realism, so to speak. In a peculiar way we are being negatively idealistic, we are being idealistic about things that no longer pertain to the world of reality, and we will suffer adverse consequences as a result.

Senator CLARK. I do not want to end on this note, but I think my time is about up. I hope that we have not come so far from our own beginnings—from our own revolution—that we have become such a "have" country that we are immune to those countries that are still struggling for majority rule, and I think particularly of southern Africa. I hope we have not become so affluent that we do not still have some sense of the nature of the problems in the Third World. Is there not some hope that, as we look to the future, we will be able to come forward with proposals with regard to southern Africa, with regard to the so-called new world economic order, that can put us in a position of at least understanding the aspirations of some of these countries?

Is that too pessimistic a view?

Mr. FALK. I would make a very big distinction between the American people and the executive branch of the Government. I think the

American people would support a program of constructive participation in the world if it were properly explained to them by the national leadership. And I think that the public opinion polls that have been done on attitudes toward foreign policy are much more encouraging than our official stand on many of these issues would indicate.

So that I think the challenge is one of trying to influence the official institutions to take more enlightened positions and then trying to build public support for those positions.

I think you did a great public service at the Rome Food Conference by really articulating a genuinely idealistic strain in American attitudes toward the hunger of other human beings, and it was really only through the kind of effort that you made, I think, that the Government was persuaded to come as far as it did. It did not come far enough, as you know, but I think that is the kind of illustration of an issue which obviously means a great deal to people throughout the world, and one which we could become more forthcoming and pursue a constructive policy that might reestablish our credibility as a global leader concerned with human development in the world.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey. I have an appointment, I am going to have to leave. Will you gentlemen carry on?

Senator HUMPHREY. I have just a couple of comments I want to make.

May I say first of all, Professor Falk, as a member of the committee, I am very grateful for your presence and also for all of the things that you have said and written about American foreign policy in the past, and particularly as it relates to the U.N.

I believe that you will find that most of the members of this committee, if not all, are essentially strong supporters of U.S. participation in the U.N. and of the United Nations as an international organization and instrument.

LEGITIMATE ARGUMENTS SUPPORTED

I believe what Senator Javits and Senator Case were trying to say, and I thought they said it quite well, was that there is no reason for the United States to back away from what it believes is a legitimate argument.

One of the things that has disturbed me in my many years of public life are people who think they are so right that they walk out. That is not what I call discussion or dialog or debate. That is another way of copping out when you ought to be staying in.

I do not want the U.S. delegation to walk out on someone who makes a speech, and I do not like to see other people walk out, even though I realize they have that right. It is immature, juvenile, irresponsible, and unacceptable it seems to me.

I believe that people should be willing to engage in rational discussion even if the rhetoric hits a rather high threshold and pitch. I think this is essentially what we are saying here.

I do not agree with many policies of our Government. I have been very, very much opposed to our so-called Africa policy because I think it has been essentially negative and a nonpolicy.

I served as chairman of the African Affairs Subcommittee and it is a lonely position, believe me. I tried to put some money in the assistance bill for Africa and was chastized for it because I thought we should be making an effort that ought to be made. I found no support for it. I must say that that did not bother me a bit because I have a lot of areas in which I found no support and it does not bother me. It generally makes me think I am most likely on the right track because people come around to support something after it becomes rather commonplace and acceptable.

I do believe that it is necessary for the United States to be an active participant in the U.N., and that does mean debate and that does mean standing up for our position even when our position at times may be proven wrong. That happens in the Senate. All of us Senators are in debates all the time and when we find that the majority does not agree with us, we have to accept that position. There are many times that we hold a position that is changed as a result of debate..

I think it is important, however, to recognize that it is a very, very different world. Many of these Third World countries are mislabeled. They are not going to be Third World, they are going to be First World, with commodities that are in scarce supply, and like many of the new rich they sometimes become a little flamboyant. That can happen. That has happened with us. We have gone through all of these experiences as a country. So I am not worried too much about that. And I have some sympathy for people who are the producers of raw materials. They have always been getting the short end of the stick. And many of them today want to get their fair share. So I understand that.

I believe in international agreements on trade and commodities and that the U.N. offers a good forum for it. I believe it is a place that American idealism can be started.

I could not agree with you more that the regrettable aspect of our foreign policy is finding ourselves, for whatever reason, over many years associated with less than progressive regimes, reactionaries.

IS BILATERAL AID TO DICTATORSHIP WORSE THAN UNILATERAL?

Having said that, some of my colleagues have been sitting where you are in the room saying we ought to stop all aid to any country that is a dictatorship.

That makes a good statement. But in the U.N., how many governments do you have—how many representatives are there—that really represent countries that have free elections, representative governments, and democratic institutions?

Is it wrong to put aid through our bilateral program to countries that are governed by a junta or military clique or some kind of particular dictatorship, half-baked, full-baked, or whatever it is may be. Is it any more wrong to do it that way than to give the money to the U.N. and let them do it?

Do not misunderstand me, I am for aid through the U.N. If you had to be in my position as chairman of the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee, and here comes a rather substantial number of my colleagues who say no more aid to any country that has a dictator, how would

you vote in this committee? What would be your advice to me? I am chairman of this subcommittee.

Mr. FALK. Well, Senator Humphrey, I think that is a very difficult question. Your comment raises several, I think, important and interesting issues. Let me respond directly to your question.

I think there are no easy answers in international politics. In general, I would say it is not desirable to take a flat position in terms of aid to dictatorships in general, but rather to examine each case on its own basis.

I do think that the guiding principle should be to see whether our aid is interfering with the dynamics of self-determination. I do think that where we have made a mistake over the years, with military assistance, particularly——

Senator HUMPHREY. I am not talking military aid; I am talking economic aid. I have very strong views about military assistance being scattered around the world.

Mr. FALK. I think I referred to military assistance only because it is the extreme case of economic assistance, but I think it applies equally well to economic assistance also.

I think that where we have concentrated our aid, our overriding purpose has been not to improve the quality of life in foreign societies, but rather to try to frustrate certain indigenous developments that were destined to take place were they not opposed by overwhelming external assistance.

I think Indochina is the most extreme example of this. But I think it is also characteristic of our policies toward some other Asian countries and toward some of the countries in Latin America. Therefore, I think the underlying question is whether America or the American Government is really still as afraid of change in these third world countries as it has shown itself to be in the past.

After all, our leaders go to Peking and Moscow and are feted by the most powerful Communist governments in the world, and yet we seem terribly nervous and anxious when the dynamics of change begin to surface in small countries throughout the third world. I think that that is the fundamental challenge to the kinds of positions we take both within our own Government and in international foums such as the U.N.

HOW TO PROMOTE POLITICAL CHANGE

Senator HUMPHREY. What always bothers me is that some people are perfectly willing to accept the excesses and abusiveness—in fact the outright tyranny—of certain forms of political order, on the excuse, that there had to be change, and you are supposed to go along with it. If you resist it in any way trying to help democratic forces it appears that you are standing in the way of progress.

Let me give you an example. I was in Germany just recently. I happen to be very close to the German Social Democrats in political orientation. The Social Democratic Party in Germany has made direct contributions to the Social Democrats in Portugal. They have tried to help them. Now this is denounced in some places as political interference by our own so-called American liberals and others in the academic community and elsewhere. Yet, it is a well-known secret that the Portuguese Communist Party has received external assistance.

How do you explain that? What besets us that highly educated and informed people get all upset if we, who believe in representative government with all of its limitations—and it surely has limitations—decide to help other people who want to have representative government? How does that get to be so bad? And then we have people who are critical of those who condone the kind of authoritarian activities I have described.

Mr. FALK. Well, I think that again is a very difficult and important question. Answering it on a relatively personal basis, I think this sort of assistance is opposed in America, at least, largely because people believe that it is not used primarily to help promote representative academic forces in foreign societies but just the reverse, that it is being used to help right wing forces prevail, particularly in Latin America, but elsewhere too. Therefore the general feeling is that it is best to oppose all such efforts to tip the domestic balance of forces in foreign societies, because these efforts so often turn out to be right wing interventions and not liberal democratic interventions.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that has happened in a number of cases but not everywhere. Take a look at Venezuela, for example. I used to go to that part of the world much more. When you stop and think of what happened in that country by right wing forcs and the effort on the part of the United States to be of help to the more liberal element, I think there is a good case of where we did the right thing.

Mr. FALK. I do not think it is impossible for the U.S. Government to do the right thing in the third world. I think it is highly unlikely. And I think the evidence pretty well in supports that proposition. If one examines the history and pattern of the CIA's covert operations, it doesn't take long to conclude that these activities have not sought to oppose authoritarian totalitarian developments in societies, but really to oppose left leaning political movements in many parts of the world.

Senator HUMPHREY. A left leaning political movement does not necessarily mean that it is democratic?

Mr. FALK. No.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think a good socialist is a leftist and a democratic socialist is a good leftist, but I do not consider a Communist who calls himself a leftist to be a democratic socialist.

Mr. FALK. Of course.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think it is important we get our language right.

What has happened here, the lexicon of democracy has been treated so shabbily. We talk about the peoples republic. If the people do not have anything to say about it, it is not a republic. And now it gets to be the democratic peoples republic.

There is no political opposition, there is no freedom of press, no bill of rights; but the language is usurped by those who, if you please, are not democratic and there is not even a republic. But we keep talking about those words.

I realize we have to live with that but I am a democrat with a small "d" and I believe in competition, as Senator Javits said here a while ago. I believe in a plain and good argument. That does not mean I want to fight. But I believe I have a right to state my case. I do not think I have to roll over like Rover and play dead to accommodate somebody because they say they are poor. They can be wrong and poor,

too, like we can be wrong and rich. And we are not that rich. One of the reasons we are not, we have given a lot of it away.

You mentioned China. I was on the other side of the China issue, not at first but I changed; namely, I thought that we had to recognize mainland China. I think there are certain facts of life you have to face.

ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES

Why was the U.S. policy what it was? Two reasons: Leadership on the one hand, and public opinion on the other hand. We do have the problem of public opinion in America. We have a President who says he knows what to do about the oil problem—that is to put on some tariffs. In some countries he would have gotten by with it. Here we said, "wait a minute, back up," we have public opinion here—we have Congressmen and Senators who do not agree with the President. We would get a lot of things done in this country if we did not have public opinion. Other countries do not have to worry much about public opinion. We are going to debate our defense policy here shortly. I am sure you have not heard much public debate in the Soviet Union about defense policy, or Eastern Germany.

I went to see the Ambassador, from East Germany. Well, and good, I am glad we now have those relationships. We do not have much debate about public policy in some parts of the world; therefore, our Government is in a sense moved by what seems to be at least a prevailing public opinion. I have lost some elections on this.

Mr. FALK. I agree that American public opinion is a relevant factor when we deal with these questions, with all respect Senator Humphrey, I think on some of these issues the public opinion is itself a product of national leadership.

Senator HUMPHREY. I think that is true.

Mr. FALK. I think the China issue could have been handled quite differently by American leaders and with quite positive results. Another thing that I think disturbs people like myself is the hypocrisy of so much of the rhetoric ostensibly concerned with the promotion of liberal democratic values abroad. We managed to live perfectly happily with Portuguese facism for 50 years.

Senator HUMPHREY. I do not agree with that. A lot of us were highly critical. It was accepted because of the fact it was there. Just like the Soviet Union and China were there, so was the Salazar dictatorship. It was there and so, therefore, we dealt with it.

Mr. FALK. When it was collapsed and was succeeded by what was in comparison a democratic movement rather than welcoming that change in Portugal, Vice President Rockefeller and others called it the most tragic development in recent international history.

Senator HUMPHREY. The people have choices in the election. You get what you buy. That goes for a lot of things and for all of us in public life. People have to know that. There are basic policy decisions that are made. I agree with you that the top leadership of a country has a great deal to do with formulating public opinion. A public political leader has to be an educator on the one hand and he has to be a person sensitive to what the public thinks on the other hand. He has to be an educator to help bring facts and information to the public.

There are people who have been on this committee for years. Some of us have fought against Portuguese colonialism for years. Some of us have been substantial voices in the country and have expressed ourselves time and time in opposition to Rhodesian policy. I lead the fight in the Senate to repeal the Byrd amendment. It did not get through the other body. They were elected by the people in all these congressional districts. Not enough people in this country are really interested as yet or not yet sufficiently aware of the interdependence of this world that we live in.

DIFFICULTIES OF GOVERNMENT

What you basically had to say I find refreshing and enlightening. There are times I feel people outside of government—and I have been in and out—do not understand the difficulties that there are in government. You sometimes have to work with what there is.

I was mayor of my city. There were certain elements in the city, let us say for example, even in the labor movement, that I personally did not like, but I had to work with them until there was a change made. And I worked with certain elements in the business community until changes could be made. And I think that is what happens sometimes in government. The same people who are critical of America for trying to meddle in everything military are the very same people who would like to have us meddle in everything political, only on the other side.

I think we have a real problem here today with our representation in the United Nations. How much do we really meddle? How much force do we really bring to bear? What would you think if the United States was overt, not covert, in the backing of certain liberation movements in countries which provoked revolution, which in turn projected disorder, which then resulted in war, and which finally got some of our people involved and got them killed again. This is a problem.

I happen to sympathize with Angola's desire for independence. I happen to be bitterly opposed to the regime that is in Rhodesia. I happen to believe that what President Kaunda in Zambia is trying to do is the right thing. I do not like apartheid, and said so, and said so even at the Organization of African unity during the time I was Vice President.

My point though, is how many students have you educated like that at the university? What are they doing around the country about it? We are like lonely sheep around here. I do not find anybody getting very excited about it. Would you help me a little bit? How do you get public opinion around to make a more constructive policy?

U.S. RIGHT TO SPEAK UP IN ITS OWN DEFENSE

Might I say quickly I was in Rome; and the reason we were there is because I promoted it, to be immodest; and it is a fact. I helped get that World Food Conference and to get our Government to sponsor the resolution at the U.N., but I listened to speakers from other countries, the Third World countries, who were sheer demagoges. They were not doing much about the food problems of their own people; they were buying airplanes and equipping armies and refusing to do anything about the feeding of their own people as they were standing

there and pointing their fingers at us and saying: "Look at you capitalists, you are not helping us."

I remember Secretary Butz was shocked when he heard this. I said, Mr. Secretary, you have not been at enough international conferences. We are going to have 3 days of abuse and then people are going to settle down and talk it out rationally, which is exactly what happened.

I have listened to the most vitriolic speeches about the United States from representatives of countries that refuse to do anything about family planning, refuse to do anything about agricultural development, refuse to feed their own people. Now that does not make us poor, but I am not about ready to roll over and play dead and say you are a nice fellow. I think we ought to stand up to them and say hey, buddy, before you start telling us how to run it why don't you clean your stables.

I think we have a right as Americans to argue our own stuff. I do not believe that I ought to stand up and, just to prove that I am a nice lovable human being filled with understanding, let somebody come up and hit me across the head with a two by four, and accuse me of discrimination and bigotry, and intolerance, and misinformation.

What is your response?

Mr. FALK. I am awed.

Senator HUMPHREY. After you have been through about 25 of these international conferences, I would like to know what you have to say about them. I have had to stay there and listen to this.

FORMULATING PUBLIC OPINION

Mr. FALK. I think that there are several separate questions that we are trying to deal with. One is how to get an American public opinion that supports more enlightened positions. And my contention, which I think is borne out by the most recent polls, is that on many issues the public would support positions far in advance of the Government's own "liberal" positions sufficiently popular that a national leadership could easily pursue them if it chose to do so. In other words, I am saying that sometimes public opinion is used as an excuse for pursuing a rather selfish interest that does not necessarily have a public mandate.

Senator HUMPHREY. I agree with that.

Mr. FALK. One has to look at the particular issue, see how the public feels about it, and then determining whether these feelings are based on a proper understanding of the real U.S. policy choices and their respective consequences.

Now as far as the hypocrisy of some Third World and other governments is concerned, I think that that certainly is a fact of international life. However, I do not think that it behooves the United States to try to set that right. At this point we do not ourselves have such credibility, moral or political to tell other societies how they should run their own society. And we will surely not enhance our own legitimacy by attacking foreign societies and making them a target of abuse.

Senator HUMPHREY. But I do not want them to tell us how to run ourselves all the time.

Mr. FALK. But that is not a question of parity. We have just been involved for a decade in a war that killed an awful lot of people.

Senator HUMPHREY. We were involved for two decades before that in efforts that saved the lives of millions of people. I am not going to forget the Marshall plan, our AID program, our food program. We drew down on our food reserves in this country in 1947 to less than 1 day's supply and gave it away, depending on God Almighty and weather to give us a good crop. I was involved in that. I come from the Midwest. We had 80 million tons of wheat left, which was not enough to feed chickens. We took a chance. I think we ought to get credit for some of the good things we have done. We get kicked around.

I have been a sharp critic of this Government—I do not mean this administration—I mean of this Government. I do believe that our Government does not play a proper role in the U.N. I do believe that we underestimate its potentials and I think we have helped weaken it. I must say again I get a little weary hearing just criticism. Might I also add, if you keep telling the American people all the time that we have always been wrong, we have done nothing right, they are not going to respond. They need to be told once in a while not only did we take lives, make a tragic mistake, but we have done some good things.

Mr. FALK. I think that is fine to tell the American people. That is not my point.

Senator HUMPHREY. And the world, too, needs to remember it.

Mr. FALK. I am trying to make a rather simple practical point, namely, that in my judgment at this stage in international relations the U.S. cannot effectively present itself to the world as a force for good independently of doing concrete things, and to lecture foreign governments or to point to the abuses that exist elsewhere in the world will be viewed as a diversionary maneuver. The most this approach can do is to give a warm feeling domestically. In my view this is the reason that Ambassador Moynihan's way of thinking about these issues has attracted a large following, but it is a very shortsighted attitude toward how to constructively and effectively participate in international institutions.

Senator HUMPHREY. You made a very valuable point. I think it is a matter of how it is done, more than the fact that it is done.

DEFENDING THE U.S. SYSTEM

I do think you are right—it does not do us much good to lecture them—but I am in politics. If someone makes a false charge at me and repeats it and repeats it, I do not consider it abrasive if I say to him, you do not speak the truth; here are the things are are true, if you can refute them, well and good.

I am not trying to tell some country over there how they should run their government. I think that is another matter. We need a sense of idealism. But idealism still includes free speech, freedom of press, the right of trial by jury. We still believe in these things, and I think we ought to say so. If other countries do not have them, we should not lecture but tell them we believe in them and practice them well.

Mr. FALK. Could I interrupt you for a second on that point? If you were to tell that to Chileans, what they would say is, "We would like to see you dismantle the covert operation's capability of the CIA, then tell us about your commitment to civil liberties."

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, I know, that is one place where they have some evidence. However, even in that instance, I still think it was hardly the best of government on the part of the Allende regime to suppress the press. I do not believe that you have to stand by and start making Allende look like an international hero. I was one of those who hoped we could cooperate, when he was elected. Other governments become repressive when opposition comes and they start cracking down. It was wrong for us to have a covert operation there, and we have exposed it, which is more than other countries do.

I do not want us to downgrade ourselves all the time. You are bright and intellectual, showing how wrong we are. We were wrong in many things but we also need to outline those things that are right. I have not seen any other countries being very concerned about refugees around the world. You cannot get a pittance, and there are countries that have billions and billions of dollars. When people are hungry and in trouble and sick they come to the United States.

I have to let you go. I will bet you are glad, too. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, the committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR PERCY AND ANSWERED BY PROFESSOR FALK

1. You have stated that many governments from the Third World which are most "progressive" on the international stage pursue contradictory policies toward their own people. Would you cite some examples of this?

2. Do you think delegates of the United States should point out these contradictions in the General Assembly?

3. What likelihood do you see that the developed and developing nations will be able to agree on programs increasing economic distribution to the poorer countries without causing serious economic dislocations in the richer countries?

4. Do you think the United States should modify its position of opposition to indexation, the price linkage between raw materials exported by the developing countries and manufactured goods imported by them from the developed countries?

5. I am puzzled, Professor Falk, by your reference in Footnote 4 in which you cite my speech on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties as, and I quote you, "an official attack", unquote. I have reread my speech, which was given in the Second Committee on Dec. 6th, and I don't see how you could characterize it as an attack. The strongest language that I used in the speech was the following: "Many of the unagreed provisions, the view of my Government, are fundamental and unacceptable in their present form. To cite a few: the treatment of foreign investment in terms which do not take fully into account respect for agreements and international obligations; and the endorsement of concepts of producer cartels and indexation of prices. As a result, Mr. Chairman, we have before us a draft Charter which is unbalanced and which fails to achieve the purpose of encouraging harmonious economic relations and needed development. Moreover, the provisions of the Charter would discourage rather than encourage the capital flow which is vital for development." I really don't see any attack in this language, which is a straightforward explanation of the American position.

ANSWERS TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO ME BY SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCY

1. The contradictions between foreign and domestic policy is not unique with the Third World. For instance, many critics of U.S. foreign policy would argue a reverse contradiction for the United States—that is, we are relatively progressive on domestic issues, but reactionary on many international questions. When it comees to identifying Third World countries which illustrate my proposition considerable analysis would be needed to justify a specific assertion. Let me take three examples of governments which champion Third World claims for a new international order, and yet fail, in my judgment, to embody even minimal principles of equity in their official domestic policies: Brazil, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. There are, unfortunately, many other examples throughout the Third

World, but I chose countries which clearly had the capabilities to reconcile their domestic and international postures if they chose to do so.

2. No, it would serve only rhetorical purposes to point out these contradictions, and it would seem rather imprudent as the examples I have given are geopolitically allied with the United States in other settings. Beyond this, I do not believe, except for limited circumstances, that it is helpful to discuss domestic policy in the General Assembly. The two kinds of limited circumstances I have in mind are, first, where an overwhelming global consensus exists as to the domestic policy (e.g. *apartheid* in South Africa) and, second, where a gross horror is being committed (e.g. genocide in Burundi, torture of political opposition).

3. I believe that constructive cooperation between developed and developing countries can occur without dislocation in rich countries, but only if firm and enlightened national leadership emerges, especially in the United States. Programs need to be explained to the American public and adjustments made, especially by large corporate interests. I believe the well-being of the American people and the poorer nations of the world can be simultaneously served by bringing real regulatory energies to bear upon agribusiness and the large oil companies so as to avoid excess profits and to relate productive priorities more closely to human needs.

4. Yes, I believe that indexing would help stabilize the terms of trade in a manner that would defuse many of the international economic controversies now active in world affairs and avoid some of the unevenness associated with present movements of commodiay prices.

5. I agree that my reference to your UN speech as "an official attack" on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties was unwarranted and have modified the language in my text to read "an official explanation." I hope such a change meets your concern.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 4221, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. John Sparkman [chairman], presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Pell, Humphrey, Clark, Javits, and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

I apologize for being late.

OPENING STATEMENT

We are very glad Senator Percy is here, because these hearings were initiated at his request. We have had very good hearings on the United Nations and we are glad to continue this morning.

Today we are hearing from distinguished private citizens who, for the most part, do not have a close identification with the United Nations. We started off with people who are directly connected with or indirectly concerned about the United Nations, but today, we have asked people who do not have a close identification with the United Nations. We have asked them to turn a nonprofessional eye on the United Nations and to share with us their version of what they would like to see that organization become. As I introduce them, I will ask them to take a seat at the witness table.

First is the distinguished architect, R. Buckminster Fuller, who hardly needs an introduction. He is best remembered perhaps by Americans for the U.S. Pavilion at Expo '67 in Montreal, Canada. Mr. Fuller, will you come around and take a seat at the table.

Next, we have Richard Scammon, director of the Elections Research Center, best known, probably, for his coauthorship of "This U.S.A.: The Real Majority." I have had the pleasure of hearing Mr. Scammon on different occasions discuss Democratic successes, and maybe sometimes Republican successes, but we are glad to have him with us.

Next will come Mr. Bruno V. Bitker, who is Chairman of the Wisconsin's Governor's Committee on the United Nations, and a member of the Wisconsin Revolution Bicentennial Commission.

And then we will hear from Mrs. Robbins, better known to us as Pauline Frederick. Pauline, I did know that was your name. Mrs. Robbins is an astute observer of the United Nations for NBC. She

made her observations from nongovernmental forum. I knew Pauline Frederick way back in the days of the U.N. You are a graduate of American University, are you not?

Miss FREDERICK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And a trustee of that school.

We are very glad to have all of you and we will start off with Mr. Fuller.

Senator Percy, you have a comment.

Senator PERCY. I just wanted to join with you, Mr. Chairman in welcoming four very distinguished and knowledgeable witnesses who have illuminated American life, each in his or her own field, and have made important contributions to American society.

I think it very appropriate for Mr. Buckminster Fuller to start off the hearing this morning. His thought processes are as wide as the world at 80 years young, and he still thinks new thoughts and is uninhibited by tradition. Dr. Fuller I believe you are here partly by courtesy of Southern Illinois University also.

We certainly welcome all of you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Mr. Fuller, we are very glad to hear from you. We have your paper that will be printed in full in the record. You may deliver as much of it as you see fit.

[Mr. R. Buckminster Fuller's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER

PREPARING FOR A SMALL ONE TOWN WORLD

In my lifetime of 80 years I have seen a great deal of change. I grew up in an era when 99% of humanity travelled only very locally on foot, horse, and bicycle and averaged 1100 miles per year of local linear motion plus 300 miles per year of riding on horses or in vehicles.

Figure 1. shows the pre-airplane and radio world with 88% of humanity consisting of Asia's 52%, Europe's 26%, Africa's 10% all very remote from the Americans' 12%. Seventy years ago, it took three months to get to India. My last trip to India, 1974, was quicker than either my first trip from Boston to New York as a child, or my first trip after World War I from New York City to Chicago on the then blue ribbon New York Central Railway's "Twentieth Century Limited". Now I reach India by telephone in a couple of minutes. I find present world affairs inherently integrated despite the hindering persistence of the 150 national sovereignties as our conditioned reflex heritage from all of the previous milleniums of inherent separation of interests. In 1961, three jet planes out-performed the Queen Mary in one third the time for one half the price. The oceans became obsolete as a means of getting humans from here to there. The era of water surface travel stopped without people realizing what had happened. We have been hurled by evolution into a one small world town within which average humans are travelling 11,000 miles annually . . . ten times their coverage of pre-World War I and many millions of worldians such as I cover 150,000 miles per year, and astronauts travel 3,000,000 miles per year.

The standard Mercator projection (Figure 2) was developed for the world oriented to the ocean communication. All the transoceanic nations were connected only by ship. The "Roaring South Forties" latitudes Antarctic winds and waters' west-to-east whirl-around, swiftly interconnecting the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans south of Good Hope, the Horn, and New Zealand's South Island, and the ocean's trade winds altogether formed a pattern of most advantageous voyaging of which the world-around trading ships took advantage. The masters of the seas were those who controlled the Antarctic interocean whirl-around by maintaining naval bases at the Southern tips of Africa, Aus-

tralia, New Zealand, and South America, near to which bases all ships had to pass to get from ocean to ocean unseen and unnoticed to the 90% of humanity living in the Northern Hemisphere. The masters of those Antarctic Ocean integrated shipping lanes controlled the wealth making of our Earth. The Mercator projection was appropriate enough when people sailed around Earth's middle latitudes which it distorts the least, but it is obsolete in air-borne world traffic considerations. The Mercator ignores the poles and distorts the polar regions, showing Greenland three times bigger than Australia.

My Dymaxion map (Figure 3) with the South Pole as its center presents an unfamiliar but most realistic picture of the British Empire's strategic mastery of World One—the pre-airplane and radio Earth. It shows Australia as the continent it is, four times as big as Greeland. With the Dymaxion projection you can see the whole world at once, with no visible distortion of the relative shape or size of any of the parts. If you show 100% of any data against this background, it will read properly, for my map's area and shape proportionality is uniform.

If you rearrange the pieces of the Dymaxion map (Figure 4) with the North Pole at the center, you will see World Two, a one world island. That is the map of our present era. 85% of all the land in the world is north of the equator. Less than 10% of humanity lives south of the equator. 90% of humanity can reach each other via the shortest great circle air routes over the Pole without going near the Atlantic, Pacific, or Indian oceans. The old east/west, north/south separations, with each nation looking out for itself, are no longer valid. The fragmentation of the world into nations that was logical yesterday, when men were inherently divided by time and space, is no longer valid nor socio-economically tenable.

We have utter intimacy of communication, and willynilly, we have complete integration of the interests of all humanity.

I no longer think of underdeveloped and small nations that need help, and big rich ones that must help them. I see all mankind being integrated into one world pattern despite the still operative sovereign nationalities which in fact are functionally extinct, and their continued presence is the world's number one pollutant. Both the world's political powers and monetary powers have had to go supranational. They leave only the individual humans passport control trapped in 150 national border controlled pens, subject to conscription, taxation, and the social cancer of non-thinking bureaucracy. The mobile young are beginning to live all around the world. As a half century's visiting professor at 420 universities around the world. I find that the natural tendency of students is to regard themselves as world citizens, which is what they are and want to be recognized as. Students from New Guinea and from Africa who go to Europe and America for training, want naturally to go back to their villages to help their people, but they are beginning to find that the village and the family at home want to become part of the greater world too. No doubt there will be a very long period of transition, but there has to be complete accommodation of the new way in which humanity is beginning to think and to live.

Economic Revolutions

I was born in a society where 90% of the people had to live on farms to grow their own food. I was a grown man when we learned ways of getting the food into cans, and refrigerated transport to reach people anywhere. After World War I we learned to handle great farms mechanically, almost without human labor. But we have not changed our economic accounting systems which are all based on a seasonal agrarian economy, even though the year no longer has anything to do with the industrial cycle. An industrial generation in 22 years brought about the rate at which the average bulk of all metals are melted out of old uses to be formed into the new. Every time they are recycled the interim 22 year gain in technological know-how has increased so greatly that on an average the same tons of metal serve four times as many humans with vastly improved performance. This brought about an incredible transition, all unexpected by humanity between 1900 and 1975 whereby 52% of humanity is now enjoying a standard of living superior to that of any monarch of 1900 as their life expectancy also doubled within that time. The tasks to be done in our industrial economies may run into thirty, forty, or fifty year cycles. Both business leaders and politicians have to make either monetary or popularity "profits" within three years or they lose their jobs. People don't comprehend or tolerate undertaking of something that is going to take forty or fifty years to develop. The kind

of permanent buildings we have were logical if humans stayed put on the land. but they are not doing so. Most of the 90% of humanity which before World War I was on the farm has come temporarily into the cities, hoping for employment and the good life. The cities were not designed to take care of them. Populations are continuing to shift only expediently from country to city, and city to mega-city with landlords reaping harvests of dollars at ever-escalating prices out of the entrapped population.

Cities in the Twentieth Century

Men came to cities in the past because there were harbors and warehouses, and that was the place to find jobs, but the jobs have deployed out from the cities, as far as physical production and retail commerce goes. Big cities, instead of being warehouses and centers for the exchange of physical goods, are developing into metaphysical exchanges. For example, New York City's ocean docks are empty as are the surrounding railroad freight yards. Obsolete except as a convention and amusement city, New York is being taken over by the great universities, the United Nations, and the like, for the interchange of ideas, or by wealth value exchanges like the banks and stock exchanges that deal in paper abstractions, bonds, stocks, money, and credit. The big cities are processing the metaphysical, and the physical is increasingly processed outside the cities.

The Greatest Revolution

We are entered upon the greatest revolution in the history of humanity: either it is going to be a bloody revolution of trying vindictively to pull the top down in which everybody loses or a technological design science revolution in which all humanity is elevated to higher standards of living than any have ever heretofore experienced.

It is not a matter of who is going to make the most money or political kudos, but how to make humanity a success. That is the challenge. There can be no compromise. We now know enough about how to make our world work to provide all humanity with the option of total and sustainable physical success.

If we are going to be able to take care of humanity, we must find out how most economically and satisfactorily to control our environment. The land building arts are 5000 years behind the ship building and aerospace ship design and production technology. What equipment do we need to do it? Humanity must achieve the success it was designed to be. But we are at the point where there could be a stillbirth. Nothing is so critical as birth, and whether the world survives birth into an entirely new world and universe relationship depends on our individual integrity, not on that of political representatives. We have enough technological know-how at our disposal to give everyone a decent life, and release humanity to do what it is supposed to be doing—that is, using our minds, accomplishing extraordinary things, not just coping with survival. You and I are given hunger so that we will be sure to take on fuel and regenerate our bodies; we are given a drive to procreate so that mankind will be regenerated; we are given brains with which to apprehend and recallably store information. We are also given minds with which to discover metaphysical principles. The function of mankind is to think, to discover and use principles. We are here to serve as local universe information harvesters and as local universe problem solvers employing human mind's unique access through science to some of the generalized principles governing eternally regenerative universe. We are going to have to exercise this responsibility within decades or perish.



POPULATION
Persons per square mile
unpopulated
less than 3
3 to 25
25 to 130
130 to 260
more than 260
Persons per square kilometer
unpopulated
less than 1
1 to 10
10 to 50
50 to 100
more than 100
• Urbanized areas of more than 1,000,000
PERCENTAGE OF WORLD POPULATION
CONTINENTS
COUNTRIES
ASIA 57.7%
China 21.6%
India 15.3%
EUROPE 18.3%
AMERICAS 13.9%
U.S. 6.1
AFRICA 9.6%

FIGURE 1



ARCTIC OCEAN
GREENLAND
NORTH AMERICA
UNITED STATES
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
SOUTH AMERICA
SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
THE WORLD

FIGURE 2

Figure-three, the water-ocean world (Pat. and © R. B. Fuller)




FIGURE 3

54-738—75——13




Figure four, the sky-ocean world (Pat. and © R. B. Fuller)

FIGURE 4

STATEMENT OF MR. R. BUCKMINSTER FULLER, ARCHITECT, PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. FULLER. In my lifetime of 80 years, I have seen a great deal of change. I grew up in an era when 99 percent of humanity traveled only very locally on foot, horse, and bicycle and averaged 1,100 miles per year of local linear motion, plus 300 miles per year of riding on horses or in vehicles. I would point out that I was 7 years of age when the first automobile came into Boston, and I was 8 when the Wright brothers first flew, so I am from the Victorian side of our present world technology.

CHANGING WORLD PATTERNS

I have a map of my own which can be unwrapped from the world and laid out in a variety of ways but always in one piece. I am going to show you two different patterns. The first has a propeller shape.

The CHAIRMAN. It looks like you have applied your architecture to the map of the world.

Mr. FULLER. This picture shows the world before air travel and radio. In its upper right-hand corner is what Kipling called "The East" when in 1895, he wrote, "East is east and west is west and never the twain shall meet." The east includes Asia and Australia and contains 52 percent of all humanity. In the upper left-hand corner of the picture is Kipling's west, combining Europe and Africa and containing 36 percent of humanity. At the bottommost of the propeller is the "New World" of North and South America containing 12 percent of humanity.

I was born and brought up in the New World's United States, whose 6 percent of humanity was very remote from the other 94 percent.

My father was in business in Boston importing leathers from India and the Argentine. At fastest, it took him or his mail 2 months to get to the Argentine, and 3 months to get to India—a 6 month round trip.

It was logical for Kipling to speak as he did of east and west. That is the way it seemed to everybody, and that is the way it had been for at least three and a half million years.

I have just completed a contract of designing three new airports in India—in New Delhi, Madras, and Bombay. This year I got to India quicker than I could get from New York to Chicago on the Twentieth Century Limited in 1922. I can reach India by telephone in a minute. The world yesterday was inherently divided and the world of today is inherently integrated.

I would like to look at the great Mercator world map behind you on your Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing room wall. There is Greenland, three times the size of Australia, whereas Australia is in fact three times the size of Greenland. The fact that Greenland appears to be bigger than Central America and Mexico combined is misinforming. I would ask you to look at my world maps as shown in two different arrangements—one: the waterocean world, and two: the airocean world. It is a complete world map in which there is no visible distortion of the relative shape or the relative size of any of the parts. Here you will find that Australia is indeed three times the

size of Greenland. Here there is an Antarctic continent not shown on the Mercator.

I was 12 when the first wireless S.O.S. was successfully broadcast. I was 14 when humans first got to the North Pole and 16 when men got to the South Pole. In my childhood I was told that it was inherently impossible for man to fly, and that humans would never reach the Poles, and that they would never do a hundred things they have since done.

I was 23 years of age when the human voice was first transmitted and received by radio; I was 27 when the first human voice and music broadcasting station was licensed. Though these impossible—to my parents—things have happened very recently, a whole new world of humanity has been growing up with them and is so familiar with them that the great majority do not realize that we have gone through a completely fundamental change in respect to foreign relations.

I grew in a world in which the whole criteria of our lives and adopted laws had been developed on the premise that we in America were inherently and eternally remote, and had to look out for ourselves in the wilderness.

STRATEGIC MAP OF THE WORLD

Suddenly we were absolutely intimate with all humanity. Let's look again at the first arrangement of my world map. While it looks absolutely unfamiliar to you, it was the grand strategy map of the British Empire; 90 percent of humanity lives north of the Equator. This arrangement of my map centers around the Antarctic and unites the Southern Hemisphere, but 90 percent of the world's people live in the Northern Hemisphere, out in the tips of these propeller blades. In the center of map 1, we have over 100 million square miles of open water—more than half of Earth—surrounding the Antarctic continent.

Here we have the world atmosphere's high altitude southern jet stream circling from west to east around the Antarctic at from 200 to 400 miles an hour, with the three ocean's southernmost waters also constantly encircling the Antarctic continent from west to east. This water and air carousel of nature takes a ship very rapidly from the Pacific into the Atlantic and from the Atlantic into the Indian Ocean and from the Indian back into the Pacific.

At these few points just below the Equator, we have 10 percent of humanity. In all the rest of this Southern Hemisphere there isn't one-tenth of one percent of humanity.

As a consequence, no one in this half of your world except a few sailors knew anything about it. By guarding the southern tip of South America, the southern tip of Africa, the southern tip of Australia and New Zealand, the British Navy was able to control the world traffic going from one ocean to another.

In our young United States of America days we went from our east coast ports to San Francisco the hard way, going against the "Roaring 40's" in a very perilous journey.

Seventy-five percent of our Earth is covered with water; the water flows everywhere. The water people were world people and the land people were local, isolated. The water people were the only people who were integrating the world's knowledge and physical resources. Inte-

gration of the great wealth of our planet was being conducted out of sight of the 99 percent of humanity living on the land with 90 percent in the Northern Hemisphere not knowing what was going on.

CONCENTRATION OF WEALTH IN MARITIME NATIONS

This is why the grand strategy world map of the British Empire was unfamiliar to you, though it is essential to understand how it happened that the great wealth of the Earth became concentrated in a relatively few but incredibly powerful hands. This is the world control power which was fought over by the great maritime nations of Europe, as to who was going to be the master of that waterocean world.

They were not interested in having you and I knowing about this strategic control. Historically, this is an important map, unfamiliar though it is to you.

It was also of prime strategic importance in that water world that it was impractical to try to transfer cargoes at sea. This had to be done in deep water harbors, and such harbors were relatively few. In the East-West Northern Hemisphere world that our history is most familiar with, there were and as yet are a score of good harbors on North America's east coast, but some froze over in some winters, such as those of Canada's St. Lawrence and those of Maine and Boston; no other harbors could compare with New York, with its vast mileage of deep watered shoreline all completely protected from but close to the open ocean. It was a long and badly shoaled way up the Chesapeake to Baltimore and a long way up the Delaware to Philadelphia and so forth.

On the U.S. west coast, both San Francisco and Seattle were magnificent harbors but there were no others. Soon the railroads connected the east and west coast harbors. Until after World War II the great traffic of the Earth went east and west. Just as we did not know in my father's youth that we were going to have a radio or an airplane, we mortals didn't know at the time of the founding of the United Nations that we were going to go suddenly into the jet age.

CHANGE FROM WATER-TO-AIR BORNE-WORLD

In the year 1961, three jet airplanes suddenly outperformed the trans-Atlantic passenger carrying capability of either the Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, or of the S.S. United States, which were the three best passenger ships of that era. Three jet airplanes transported an equal number of passengers per year across the Atlantic at a very much lower cost and at a very much higher speed. In 1961, completely unexpectedly, humans abruptly stopped using the water as a means of getting from here to there around the world. World passenger traffic went into the air. This was only 10 years after New York City was chosen as U.N. headquarters because it was the focus of all the world's steamship lines whose ships were the only means by which the U.N. delegates could then travel to world headquarters.

If you take a helicopter and fly slowly over greater New York's harbor frontier today (1975) you will find only 2 percent of the docks in use. The Jersey City railroad yards are empty. The world's harbor cities are almost obsolete as passenger and freighter terminals,

yet the great harbor cities represent an enormous investment in real estate and buildings. To maintain its value and keep their wealth earning, these cities are being promoted for conventions and so forth.

In the meantime, the 90 percent of humanity that, historically, had been living and working on the farms were suddenly displaced after World War II by mass produced farm machinery, and they no longer needed to be near the source of food growth because of successful canning, drying, freezing and refrigeration. Food became shippable to anybody anywhere around the world. Thus, the great majority of people left the farms and came into the cities, which cities themselves were obsolete, being no longer used for the purpose for which they were originally built—the great warehousing and trading of the world's east-west water-borne life support traffic.

In 1961, humanity changed abruptly from a water borne to an air borne world.

CHANGE FROM EAST-WEST WORLD TO NORTH-SOUTH WORLD

Now I want you to look once more at my nondistorted map of World Two, in which there is one world island and one world ocean. Map One—the British Empire—had the oceans integrated at the center, framed around by divided lands. In World Two the lands are integrated at the center and are surrounded by the waters. World One is an east-west circling water world. World Two is a north-south landing and take-off air strip world. Ninety percent of humanity can now reach each other on the shortest great circle air routes without going near the Atlantic, the Pacific, or the Indian Ocean. Enormous investments have been made in the East-West world in the form of real estate holdings, buildings, road building and all, but it is suddenly to be a North-South world, and that is what Nature's evolution is doing. This is all evolutionary. None of it was planned by man, but it is fantastically powerful and as yet almost unrecognized by humanity.

During the same 80-year period of my lifetime, we have gone from less than 1 percent to 52 percent of all humanity enjoying a higher standard of living than had ever been experienced by anyone, including the monarchs and millionaires before January 1, 1900 when I was 5 years of age. During this 52-percent gain of all humanity, the world population doubled, so there was actually a 104-folding of the life support production capability. During that same time, the life expectancy of that newly advantaged human crop approximately doubled, indicating the improvement of living experience. This was as unplanned and as unorganized as the shift from an East-West to a North-South world integration had been.

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF HUMAN AFFAIRS

All the time we have political organization of human affairs becoming evermore severely partisan, dividing the world into 150 sovereign nations which tend to divide into two main political camps on a basis that it is a fundamental law of Universe that there is not enough vital life support to go around and there never will be. In view of the assumption of lethal fundamental inadequancy of life support, each

ideology says: "You may not like our system, but we have the fairest and most effective way of coping. We assume that there must always be periodic trial by arms to find out which side is the fittest to survive." So the ultimate strength of all political power must be its armaments and skill in the art of killing. No political system has ever been able to consider taking care of everybody. This would be contradictory to the assumed fundamental reason for having a political system. At the opening of the 19th century, Thomas Malthus was political economist for the East India Company College in England whose East India Company itself manipulated the strings and spoke the words that seemed to come out of the lips of its great puppet, "The British Empire." All historical empires of history prior to the British Empire had been so relatively local on our planet Earth's 200 million square mile surface as to cover only about 10 million square miles, 5 percent of humans within those empires knew nought of the geography beyond the empire borders and thought of the world as a plane extended to infinity in every lateral direction. The British Empire was the first great watery empire and embraced a spherical closed-system planet. Informed by the vital statistics from around the whole Earth, Malthus discovered and announced that humanity was multiplying at a geometrical progression rate while increasing the production of all life support only at an arithmetical rate, wherefor the vast majority of humans clearly were designed to be economic failures. Darwin's dictum of "survival only of the fittest", characteristic of evolution, pronounced 40 years after that of Malthus, turned what was only an assumption of fundamental inadequacy of life support into a seemingly incontrovertible hard fact. "Pray as earnestly as you may but that's all there is and it's eternally inadequate. It is always going to be 'you and yours or me and mine' for there is not, never will be, enough for us both." Ergo, preparation for all-out war always has had prior consideration in all matters. This is the essence of our world's political confrontations and economic commitments.

FUNCTION OF GEODESIC DOMES

Because you introduced me as related to geodesic domes, I can tell you that there are now over 100,000 geodesic domes installed around the world. There are radomes, for instance, in all the places where no other structure can stand the structural stresses and yet be so delicate as to let through the electromagnetic microwaves. One such geodesic dome exactly covers our Earth's South Pole. Geodesic domes are in all such places where the conditions are too formidable for any other clear span enclosing structure. For a given weight of materials I can give you 300 clear span enclosing—earthquake-proof, fireproof, snow, rain and hurricane-proof tensegrity geodesic domes of a given floor area, size and other performance characteristics for every one equal capability building to be produced by the best known alternative structural engineering strategies other than tensegrity geodesic structures, and can erect those 300 domes with fewer man-hours than those necessary for the one conventional dome of equal capability. I therefore know what I am talking about when it comes to housing. All human activity requires housing, but I find that people don't know what buildings weigh nor think in the terms of performance

per pound in respect to buildings. Yet we know exactly what our ships and airplanes weigh; you know what our Boeing 747 weighs—about 150 tons fully loaded—and you know what her rate of climb, cruising range, ceiling, passenger capacity, cruising and top speed are, but we don't even know what buildings weigh, let alone what performance they are giving per pound of material, seconds of time, and ergs of energy invested either in producing or operating them.

PRIORITIES OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Because our highest priority of all political systems is the preparation for Armageddon, the opposed major nations of the Earth together have been spending an average of $200 billion each year for the last twenty years (a total of four trillion dollars) getting ready for the great showdown. Highest priority of use of the highest performance material resources and highest performance tools and highest technology are all committed to preparation for war. Not only does every action have a reaction, as engineering recognizes, but so too does all priority have equal and opposite anti-priority. The great historical anti-priority has to be the home front. Science has never been asked to look at the home front. No scientist has ever looked scientifically at the plumbing. It was for this reason that I committed myself in 1927 to just such scientific consideration of the home problems and their scientifically arrived solutions and scientific industry production, distribution and maintenance of the scientific results. I know now exactly what is needed and how to provide environment controls under all relevant conditions on our planet. I can state and prove that it is technically feasible to take care of all humanity at higher standards of living than any have ever experienced and do so by 1985, while employing only proven methods and resources. Not only does this statement include all environment-controlling services for humanity but also the energies required to produce and maintain those life support, protection, travel and communication accommodating services. Our World Game energy income studies make it perfectly clear that it is feasible to take care of all humanity with that higher standard of living than anybody has ever known, and do so by 1985 while concurrently phasing out all human use of fossil fuels and atomic energy.

ENOUGH LIFE SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR ALL

Therefore, I know that the fundamental vital life support inadequacy which is assumed by all the great political organizations on Earth is invalid and that there is indeed enough life support, protection and freedom of communications accommodating to go around for all. That humanity has been committed through the ages to a false premise is only because humanity had not as yet acquired enough experience to occasion its correction of its premises. Now that I really know all this, I realize that it does not have to be you or me and that Nature is quite clearly trying to make all humanity a success instead of a failure and that Nature is trying to integrate all humanity and integrate all its interests and thereby to provide universal recognition of the success for all that can only be realized by using all resources only for everyone.

EVOLUTION TOWARDS SUPRANATIONALISM

The whole of present socioeconomic direction which seeks to define even more sharply the separate interests of 150 sovereign nations in the United Nations is a trend exactly opposing what evolution is trying to do. All the world's great corporations have found sovereign nations' geographical confinement to be absolutely untenable wherefor they have all become supranational operations. So too have all the great political ideologies become supranational. Only the people are left locked into 150 national pens. They are locked in by their passports. They are subject to conscription, taxation and exploitation in an age of omni-mobilization. Humans are experiencing exactly the opposite of political freedom.

Personally I would say, the way I read the data—and my time is really now up—that it is perfectly clear to me that (1) Nature is trying very hard to integrate humanity, (2) she has humanity here in Universe and aboard our Spaceship Earth for a very important purpose, (3) that humans are not here just to be pleased or displeased with the experience. We now know of a billion galaxies of a hundred billion stars each. Universe is not just a decorative array of stars to please the eyes of little people on our planet. We are here for the Universe, not the other way, and (4) I am sure we are here to use our minds.

Humans have an extraordinary capability which is able to discover so far that there are a billion galaxies of a hundred billion stars each, and to take inventory of the relative abundances of all the chemical elements within a radius of eleven billion light years distance of Earth. Only the minds of humans have such capabilities. Human muscle is cosmically negligible, yet human muscle is still as yet in the saddle of world affairs. Therefore, I say humanity is now entered into its final cosmic examination.

The great intellectual integrity and wisdom manifest in the omni-interaccommodative inventory of generalized scientific principles discovered thus far by human mind to be eternally operative and responsible for the integrity of eternally regenerative physical universe deliberately designed us to be born naked, helpless and ignorant, yet hungry, thirsty, curious and procreatively excitable, ergo we were forced to find our way only by trial and error in order ultimately to discover the scientific principles and thereafter to use those principles such as leverage or metallic alloys in the development of artifacts which would so alter the environment of accomplished know-what and know-how as to permit us to graduate into functioning in the main affairs of regenerative Universe operating directly on cosmic principles.

USING OUR MINDS

So I say we are here for problem solving, for using our minds. But human minds are not in the command saddle of human affairs. Mindless, exclusively brain-centered muscle is still in the saddle. Mind is trying to master muscle. That is why you are having such a hearing as this one. I think we have no more than the next ten years within which to pass our final exam, by mounting mind into the command saddle of human affairs. Only mind can accomplish integration of all human affairs—which integration involves the dissolving of 150

sovereign nations and all of their respective "me first—or else" attitudes. No sovereignty relinquishment could be more difficult than that of the United States in which the President and all others are elected on the basis of supporting, above all, our national sovereignty. The President's oath of office commits him to looking out for this side above all others. In dictatorships, a dictator can agree with another dictator; that's up to them; or the controlling political party can commit its country to surrendering its sovereignty to others, but it is impossible for a whole democracy to agree unanimously on relinquishing any of its freedoms or its armaments. If any U.S. President said publicly that he advocated termination and renouncement of our sovereignty, he would soon be impeached or precipitate a civil war waged with the opposing political party of the nation.

UNIVERSAL DESOVEREIGNIZATION

So the most difficult conditions for effecting desovereignization and world integration exist in the U.S.A. That is why this could not be a more important occasion for a senatorial foreign policy committee hearing. I think universal desovereignization is at the crux of whether humanity is going to continue on our planet. With desovereignization comes omni-disarmament, which must be accomplished if mind is to take the saddle from muscle and we are to operate on the basis that there is sample life support to sustain support of all humanity for all foreseeable time. If we are to successfully pass our cosmic exam, all humanity must discover why we are here in the Universe.

All humanity is now coming out of the common womb of permitted ignorance, which gestation period was given an enormous cushion of resources to be squandered while learning only through trial and error. But now humanity has acquired all the knowledge of scientific principles and technical know-how to render all humanity continuingly successful. Humanity is now being born into a new relationship with Universe—a relationship in which 99 percent of the information resources necessary to sustain all humanity are only available within the invisible-to-human-frequency ranges of the electromagnetic spectrum, ergo, are available only through mind's organized exploration, discovery and use of the abstract generalized principles governing eternally regenerative Universe.

This comprehensive unitary birth of all humanity as a single organism into the new world of inherent physical success for all individuals may well be a still-birth. Birth is life's most critical moment. It will be a still-birth if humanity does not emerge with mind in permanent control of physical power.

I hope you realize how really critical I think your particular hearing is, this particular subject is. I wish there were more Senators behind that bench.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish that same thing, and I hope there will be more here soon.

Next, we will hear Mr. Richard Scammon, Elections Research Center, in Washington, D.C.

Mr. Scammon.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD SCAMMON, ELECTIONS RESEARCH CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SCAMMON. Mr. Chairman and Senators.

As you see, I have not prepared a formal statement for this hearing, because I would like to concentrate on just one subject, and I will move, if I may, from the very intriguing, wide-ranging thoughts of Mr. Fuller to a very specific concept within the larger compass which I believe the hearing is seeking to establish this morning when you so kindly invited those of us who are not in an institutional way involved with the United Nations, in the thought that we might be able, and I hope that we might be able, to offer some views to the committee unrelated to those who are professionally involved in international organization affairs.

THE U.N.—NOT A PARLIAMENT OF MAN BUT OF GOVERNMENTS

Briefly, under this heading of vision, what I personally would like to see in these next 5 years with respect to the United Nations would be a reinstallation of the diplomatic purpose of the United Nations as a meeting place, a forum, if you will, of governments. Unhappily, I am afraid that, as we speak in unreal terms, very unreal terms, of the United Nations as a parliament of man, we tend to forget that the majority of the states in the United Nations couldn't be called democratic, that in the majority of these states, less than freedom exists, if I may make an understatement. That basically, the General Assembly of the United Nations is set up on so undemocratic and unrepresentative a base that no state in this union and no democratic country could treat it except as that the U.N. is not a parliament of men. A parliament of men means freedom, it means democracy, it means voting, it means contest, it means discussion, it means a free press. This does not exist in many parts of the world.

But if I can suggest a word, it would be that the true value of the U.N. could better be seen in a depedestallization of the concept that we now have. I think a great deal of the withdrawal and dubiety that we find in the United States that I am sure gentlemen both of you find amongst your constituents, with respect to the U.N., comes from an unreal kind of institution we thought of it as some 30 years ago when it was first founded.

If we can view the U.N. in its most useful function as this parliament of governments without an unreal deification of its purpose, it can be most fruitful for the exercise of diplomacy and the search for world peace and world progress which we are all so concerned.

RETURNING THE U.N. TO ITS DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES

Some weeks ago, Mr. Harlan Cleveland wrote in the New York Times his views on the desirability of abandoning votes in the United Nations. Having been one of the delegates 18 months ago of our country of the General Assembly, in 1973, I know that there is a certain glamour about sitting there in this attractive hall and pushing little buttons, red for no, green for yes, amber for abstain. But button-push-

ing is not really the most appropriate function of the U.N. As a matter of fact, I suppose that the button-pushing really gets to be like this new book about Hollywood called "The Day of the Locusts"—it is an unreal fantasy world.

Basically, Mr. Chairman, the whole idea of the U.N., the purpose of the U.N., is, I think, too valuable to be left to the showboaters and to the dogmatics, and I trust we will be able, I hope we will be able in these coming few years, to enhance what this institution really is, a place where diplomacy can play its role in negotiating, in easing, in compromising, in adjusting, so that difficult as we may find life on this world in these next 5 or 10 years, we will find it tolerable through this parliament of governments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Now, Mr. Bitker, we would be very glad to hear from you.

[Mr. Bitker's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUNO V. BITKER OF MILWAUKEE, WIS.

I am delighted to be able to appear before this distinguished body during its consideration of the relationship between the United States and the United Nations. By way of identification, I am a practicing lawyer in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Although I appear in my individual capacity, I have long been active in organizations, both governmental and private, relating to the general subject matter. I have also had the honor of testifying before this Committee on previous occasions, particularly concerning ratification of human rights treaties.

Witnesses preceding me at these hearings and at other times have suggested specific steps in the form of amendments to the United Nations Charter as well as procedural changes by which the present structure could be made more effective in attaining the noble objectives of the world organization. I do not intend to discuss at length these suggestions by which the United Nations could be strengthened or the means by which the United States could make its influence felt more positively within the United Nations.

On one front this Committee has already taken a significant step toward improving the image of the United States in the world community. I refer to its action in urging the Senate to ratify the Genocide Convention which, after many years in the deep freeze, is now on the Senate calendar awaiting a vote. I believe ratification of that treaty and others, especially the Convention Against Racial Discrimination and the two International Covenants on Human Rights, would go far to convince the rest of the world that not only do we proclaim our belief in the rights covered by these treaties but that we are willing to say so by signing on the dotted line.

The matter of strengthening the United Nations through Charter review, through Charter revision, through changed procedures, has been before this Committee for many years. As long ago as 1950, a Subcommittee under Senator Elbert D. Thomas on Revision of the United Nations Charter held extensive hearings, subsequently published, which are still of great value.

One of the series of resolutions relating to strengthening the United Nations then being considered by the Subcommittee was Senate Resolution 133, 81st Congress, 1st Session. Its sponsor was Senator John Sparkman, now the Chairman of this Committee. Much of what was said then could be repeated now with equal force. That resolution contemplated the removal of the veto power under the Charter in defined matters of aggression, the avoidance of the threat of atomic catastrophe, the reduction of the armament race, and establishing "an effective but tyranny proof international police force under a 'workable' Security Council and World Court." (P. 171 of the Hearings.)

Despite excellent statements that have been made by our several Presidents since the formation of the United Nations in 1945, as well as by Secretaries of State and by United States Ambassadors to the United Nations, the official position of the State Department has changed very little since it voiced its opposition to Senator Sparkman's resolution of 1950. The Department then opposed his proposal as "a transformation of the United Nations into some form of world

government." (Testimony of John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State, Hearings, P. 458.)

As recently as December, 1974, a very mild General Assembly Resolution (3349 [XXIX]) on the creation of an ad hoc committee of 42 to consider suggestions regarding the review of the United Nations Charter, was adopted by an overwhelming vote, the United States (and the Soviet Union) voted in opposition. This is regrettable. That vote evidently prompted Congressman William L. Hungate (with the endorsement of numerous other congressmen) to introduce House Concurrent Resolution, 206 (April 8, 1975). This resolution asks the President "to direct the Department of State to formulate constructive and forward-looking United States proposals for the more effective functioning of the United Nations, through (a) changes in the Charter of the United Nations, and/or (b) procedural changes that may not require Charter amendment, in order to promote a just and lasting Peace through the development of the rule of law, including protection of individual rights and liberties as well as the field of war prevention." A report to this Committee and the House Committee is requested before June 30, 1975. It is hoped that this Committee will give its support to House Concurrent Resolution 206.

This brings me to what I deem most important for the consideration of this Committee. There is almost unanimity of opinion that the United Nations must be strengthened. The opposition to any material change, expressed by some of the nations, including our own, can be summarized by such phrases as "it would be a world government", or "it threatens our sovereignty", or "the giant states will devour the small states", or "the haves will have more and the havenots will have less." These are the same objections that were strenuously and sincerely advanced during the Era of the American Revolution by some of the 13 independent, sovereign states (the colonies). Yet out of that conflict evolved a great federation of states which we now know as the United States of America. What is here proposed is that the experience of the 13 colonies during the period from 1776 to 1789 be studied to determine whether the manner whereby the sharp conflicts that then existed between the sovereign states were resolved can serve as a possible pattern for resolving the problems now facing the international community.

It may be fortuitous that these Senate hearings should be conducted on the eve of the Bicentennial Observance. The report which could come out of these hearings and the study which might be prepared by scholars for this Committee could not only serve as a meaningful celebration of what happened 200 years ago, but also be a contribution to the whole world in seeking peace under justice for all mankind during the next 200 years.

Two hundred years ago this country consisted of 13 independent, sovereign states. At the time the notion that they could be unified into one nation, under one law, appeared to many to be pure fantasy. But it was done. The late Catherine Drinker Bowen entitled her dramatic documentary work about the Constitutional Convention of 1787, "Miracle at Philadelphia." And miracle it was! The distinguished American historian, Carl Van Doren, called it "The Great Rehearsal." Can the miracle of that time be repeated? Can the "rehearsal" become a world production?

The 13 colonies were faced with dangers from both within and from without. But no one at that time could have imagined the dangers which face mankind today. The sense of danger which impelled the 13 colonies to join together for common action is not yet deeply felt throughout the world. Yet it was this recognition of danger that enabled the Allies to win World War I and World War II. This sense of danger has produced among the Western Europeans the Common Market, which places unprecedented restrictions on national sovereignty. For the moment we may not be so fearful of World War III being started by the super powers. But we cannot be unaware of what might come out of widespread hostilities between other smaller powers, some of which may already have developed an atomic bomb. Nor can we close our eyes to the danger from famine, industrial collapse, the breakdown of international trade, pollution and other disasters resulting from world imbalances of food, of population, of energy, of money. These dangers are obviously greater than the dangers of the Era of the Revolution. They demand international solutions, as the problems of 1776 required national solutions.

It is easy to view the Revolutionary Era with the hindsight of 200 years and assert that what was accomplished then was merely the adjustment of differences between members of one family. But that simply was not true. The 13

states were not one big happy family, unified by language, by religion, by a community of interests. On the contrary, disunity prevailed throughout the war and for years afterward: harmony rarely existed.

James Madison of Virginia, a chief architect of the Constitution (and later to become the President of the United States), noted that: "Of the affairs of Georgia, I know as little as of Kamchatka." And Pierce Butler, of South Carolina, another delegate to the Constitutional Convention, concluded that "the manner and mood of thinking" of the several states, differed "nearly as much as in the different nations of Europe."

While there was no love lost between the colonies and the colonists, there were, of course, similarities between them. But it is interestering to recall that Dutch was the preferred language in parts of New York, especially in the commercial world. It is intriguing to note that many influential persons thought German should be Pennsylvania's official language. In certain of the colonies, French and Spanish were commonly used.

On the economic front, the rivalry between states was no different than what exists between some nations today. Customs laws were freely used by one state against another. New York took steps that produced a serious drain on Connecticut and New Jersey. Despite the provisions of the Articles of Confederation, New York entered into a separate treaty with the Indians. New Jersey viewed New York as a foreign state against which barriers must be erected to prevent its encroaching upon the Sovereign State of New Jersey.

It is said that because the colonies were physically adjacent to one another, eventual unity was easy to attain. This was a factor, of course. But it is necessary, when comparing now with then, to measure distances not only in miles but in time. The fact is that it took many more hours, in some instances even more days, to travel from one city to another, than the hours required today to move from one side of the world to the other. Indeed it takes far less time today to circle the globe than it took most delegates to reach Philadelphia from various points of departure.

It is a matter of wonder that the colonies won the War of Revolution. Certainly it was not due to any unity between the colonies. Although designated Commander-in-Chief, George Washington was in fact the commander of thirteen allied armies and not of a unified Continental Army. Throughout the war his correspondence consisted of constant pleas for food, for clothing, for arms. During the first part of the war, there was in fact no central government. The Continental Congress conducted the national affairs—if they could so be designated—not by virtue of any charter but under a kind of gentlemen's agreement.

Examples of the insistence upon the separate sovereignty and independence of the colonies appear not only during the post Revolutionary period, but even during the war itself. For instance when Washington urged New Jersey troops to swear allegiance to the United States, they refused, proclaiming that "New Jersey is our country." One New Jersey delegate to the Continental Congress found the idea of swearing allegiance to a central government so unacceptable that he publicly criticized Washington for requesting the oath. Even John Adams later referred to Massachusetts as "our country" and to the Massachusetts representatives as "our embassy."

As time went on it became clear that achieving independence was difficult enough, but establishing a strong, central national government was even more difficult. Before the Constitutional Convention convened in 1787, Washington concluded that: "We are either a united people under one head, and for federal purposes; or we are thirteen independent sovereignties, eternally counteracting each other." Washington was deeply disturbed by the constant bickering and confrontations between the states. Various states violated the peace treaty, particularly in respect to the honoring of prewar debts to British merchants, which the British used to justify their own refusal to evacuate frontier forts that had been surrendered to the United States. Washington was, therefore, especially fearful of the military insecurity of the United States against the British on the north, the Indians on the west and the Spanish on the south and west.

Between 1783, the end of the war, and 1789, when the Constitution came into force, citizens of all political beliefs and of no political beliefs, recognized the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation. The lack of a central national authority caused Washington to comment: "I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation without having lodged somewhere a power which will pervade the whole Union in an energetic manner as the authority of the state governments extends over the several states."

Problems confronting the 13 sovereign states of the Era of the Revolution loomed as large then as those which in 1976 confront sovereign nations of the world. The eminent Henry Steele Commager in his recent historical study, "Jefferson, Nationalism and the Enlightenment", thus summarizes the comparable situations: "The problems which confronted the Revolutionary Generation were quite as complex, as importunate, and as frightening as those which confront us now." There then existed a nation of some three millions, "divided into thirteen independent states, scattered over an immense territory without any system of roads or of communications, with no common organs of government, no common centers of economy, no common church, no common ruling class, and as yet no common loyalties. . . ."

After the end of the Revolutionary War, it did not take long for the ardor for independence, which had held the colonies together even though so loosely, to diminish. But the need to bring the states together into a single nation became increasingly obvious. Accordingly, in February, 1787, the Continental Congress, called a convention of the States "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation . . . to render the federal constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the preservation of the Union."

That convention, meeting in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, came to be known as the Constitutional Convention. The result of that convention was not the revision of the Articles of Confederation but the adoption of the United States Constitution. This was not the stated purpose of that convention and the objections to so drastic a step were vigorously advanced. A principle objection to any change then was expressed in the same phrase now used against considering United Nations Charter review: "Let well enough alone."

A key and decisive issue before the Convention was on voting. The same problem existed then as now: should the vote of every state be equal? The one state-one vote rule had been followed during the Revolutionary War and continued under the Articles of Confederation. The large states favored representation on the basis of population (and possibly other factors). If voting was proportional, the small states feared being engulfed by the large states. The small states demanded equal voting power regardless of size, of wealth, or of population.

The Great Compromise, one state-one vote in the Senate, proportional representation in the House, now appears so simple a way out, that it is not easy to realize that the Constitutional Convention might have fallen apart over this one state-one vote problem. In a sense, it is the same problem that faces the world organization today. Without attempting to resolve that question here, it is suggested, however, that a system of voting, certainly in the General Assembly, might retain the one nation-one vote formula in certain types of decisions, while following a form of weighted or proportional voting, based on population, wealth or other relevant factors, in other types of decisions.

On September 17, 1787, the 12 states represented at the Constitutional Convention unanimously approved the final draft of the Constitution (Rhode Island, the 13th state, had boycotted the Convention). It was thereafter submitted to separate constitutional conventions in each State for ratification by a minimum of nine states to bring it into force. It is significant that the Constitution begins, "We, the people of the United States," instead of, "We, the States." That phrase, "We, the people" is also the opening phrase of the United Nations Charter.

While the state conventions were debating ratification, there appeared a flood of pamphlets, pro and con. The opponents identified a central government with tyranny, feared that the voting compromise was not sufficient to protect the small states against the large states, urged that the country be divided into geographical regions (the usual proposal was for separate political entities for the Southern Colonies, the Middle Colonies and the New England Colonies).

The final ratification of the Constitution was not speedily nor easily attained. It was not until June 21, 1788, that the ninth state, New Hampshire, ratified. But as of that date, two key states, New York and Virginia, had not acted. Although the Constitution could have been considered in being without these two states, obviously the new nation would only limp into existence without them. It would be like having a world organization without the United States and the Soviet Union.

Fortunately, New York and Virginia ratified shortly after New Hampshire acted. It is interesting to note that ratification carried by only 3 votes in New York, by mere 10 vote margins in Virginia and New Hampshire. Rhode Island, which did not ratify until one year after the new government was established, did so by a slim 2 vote majority. The significance of these votes lies in the fact

that opposition to a meaningful, central government was as strong then, as opposition to strengthening the United Nations might be today. But our own history has demonstrated the worth of a central government joining together separate and even antagonistic states. From that experience should we not be convinced of the value of considering the pattern for the world? Is it possible that by using this model, the international community can reorganize itself so as to be better able to solve global problems?

In conclusion, I want again to express the hope that this Committee may produce a study in depth that would serve as a meaningful observance of the Bicentennial of the American Revolution and also as a contribution toward world peace with justice. If attempts to halt the killing conflicts in the world today through a strengthened United Nations appear visionary, it must be remembered that to many thoughtful and knowledgeable citizens of the 13 sovereign colonies, the idea of a strong, central government under a Constitution appeared wholly unrealistic. Can the United States make any greater contribution in its observance of its own Bicentennial than to help the world to abolish war, mankind's most fearful illness? It is true that America was blessed with an extraordinary galaxy of statesmen in the Era of the American Revolution. But the dangers of war, of famine, of general disaster are greater today and statesmen of equal capability and courage are here today. May America lead the way now as it did 200 years ago.

STATEMENT OF BRUNO V. BITKER, CHAIRMAN, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW

Mr. BITKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I am honored to appear before this distinguished body. By way of identification, I am a practicing lawyer in Milwaukee, Wis., and I have come out from Senator Percy's country. I am not, in the sense in which you have referred to it, officially connected with any United Nations organization, but I am affiliated with quite a number of organizations that have a direct and related interest in the United Nations and world affairs. But my appearance here is wholly in my individual capacity.

Incidentally, I have had the honor of appearing before this committee before, particularly in connection with the ratification of the Human Rights Commission.

COMMENTS ON PREVIOUS TESTIMONY

Now, the witnesses who have appeared previously, not so much this morning, but those whose testimony I was able to secure and read, and on other occasions persons have appeared before this committee to suggest specific ways in which the U.N. Charter might be amended, or by which the procedures within the United Nations might be changed so as to more nearly produce the result which was hoped for when the United Nations was first created. But I do not intend to take the time to discuss those specifics today, other than some general references to them.

In the first place, I want to make a special comment about at least one of the papers that I was able to read, of a witness that had appeared last week, and that is the statement by Senator Fulbright. It was an excellent statement, as I am sure this committee recognized. I also was impressed by the statement made by Professor Richard Gardner, although that dealt more specifically with fiscal matters and economic matters. And with the statement by Maxwell Stanley, which was of a broader, more encompassing nature. I need not tell anyone how impressed I was, as we all were, by the statement of Mr.

Buckminster Fuller this morning. He has just reminded us that this is the one world he is talking about, and which he sets forth in his very fascinating maps.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS BEFORE COMMITTEE

I also want to make just a passing comment to the effect that this committee has in the past taken at least one step which I think will go far, if it is brought to fruition, in improving the image of this country before other nations of the world, and that has to do with the ratification of the Genocide Treaty. As this committee will recall, it has on several occasions reported out favorably the matter of the ratification. I believe the matter is again—I am not sure procedurally whether it is back before this committee, because it did not come to a vote last year. But in any event, presumably it is on the calendar, and I assume at some point will again reach the floor of the Senate, and I hope this year there will be a favorable vote on it. I might say that——

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, let me say that when the Senate committee reported the Genocide Treaty, there was, you might say, a condition attached to it, and that was to the effect that it was not expected to call the treaty up before the Senate until certain enabling legislation was enacted into law. I think I am correct in that.

Mr. BITKER. I am not sufficiently familiar with the points to which you made reference now, Mr. Chairman, but my recollection is that there was—the State Department had prepared enabling legislation which presumably would have followed the ratification of the treaty and presumably would not go into—I am not sure of this—that it might not go into effect until the enabling legislation was adopted. That, of course, would not stop the Senate from giving its advice and consent.

I hope also that this committee will, in due time, consider and recommend and give its advice and consent through the Senate to another U.N. convention, and this is the one on race discrimination; this is the one we have signed in the United Nations, whereby we have committed ourselves morally to ratify it. But nothing has been done about it, and it has not actually been sent up by the White House.

Two other conventions of a very broad and encompassing nature, the so-called—two conventions, the International Conventions on Human Rights, the one on civil rights, and the one on economic rights, have not been sent by the White House to the Senate. And I hope that this will be done, and this committee would favorably recommend a ratification by giving its advice and consent.

PREVIOUS U.N. REVIEW HEARINGS

This committee, of course, has heard matters relating to the United Nations Charter over a period of years. The chairman may recall that, as long ago as a quarter of a century, in 1950, this committee held extensive hearings, and the chairman then introduced a resolution which was known as Senate Resolution 133. I don't know if the chairman will recall this; I'm sure he will—it was extensively discussed and was, I might say, opposed by the State Department, which was unfortunate, I believe. In any event, those hearings today are of extreme

value and are very useful to any student who is interested in the whole subject matter of U.N. Charter review and revision.

This committee also held extensive hearings in 1954, and I remember them well, because my own Senator from Wisconsin was the chairman, Alexander Wiley. And, believe it or not, he once held hearings of the committee out in Milwaukee, where I had the honor of testifying at that time.

PROPOSED U.N. CHARTER REVIEW

Also, I want to call attention to the fact that during the last week of the last General Assembly—and Senator Percy will be aware of this, I am sure—there was presented to the Assembly a resolution—it is Resolution 3349—which provided for the creation of an ad hoc committee of 42 to review the whole subject matter of charter review and the suggestions which might come in from the nation members of the United Nations. This was adopted by an overwhelming vote. But I regret to say that the United States voted no, as did the Soviet Union.

The resolution was adopted; the committee is now in formation of creation. I am told that the United States will be represented on the committee, although it voted against the creation of the committee, and again I am sorry to say that this does represent the position of the State Department, which was evidenced when it made its position known in 1950, that it is reluctant and very hesitant to consider any changes either basically in the United Nations structure, charter, or procedures of any consequence.

RELEVANCE OF BICENTENNIAL TO CHARTER REVIEW

However, this brings me, and I hope I will have enough time to discuss this, because this is really the main point of the statement and my testimony this morning, which is this. We are now on the eve of, and I guess officially in, the Bicentennial observance. Now, I know the Bicentennial observance is a phrase that has been so misused, and it has been so commercialized as to almost demean its real meaning. But I want to point out to this committee that in the era of the Revolution, between 1776 and the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, all of the objections that are now made to considering charter change, procedural changes or any new steps with respect to the world organization, were then advanced against the adoption of the Constitution of the United States.

And what I would like to propose, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, is that the manner in which most significantly and meaningfully this Bicentennial can be observed would be if this committee were to undertake a study in depth of how the Constitution was adopted and produce and publish it. It can be done through the use of the statements that have been made by witnesses, by scholars which this committee may wish to retain, or by its staff members, to show what happened in the era of the Revolution prior to 1789 and compare it to today. Maybe that study will end up by saying it can't done, but maybe it will point the way to the sort of thing that Mr. Fuller was talking about just a few minutes ago.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 13 COLONIES

It is interesting for us to recall that the 13 sovereign independent States, they were 13 sovereign independent nations, of the Revolutionary era, were in conflict with each other as many of the 130-plus nations of the world are today. Now, we have the idea that everything was so alike in those days. They had a common language, although that has some reservations about it. They had a common cultural background, that obviously has many reservations about it. The fact is that there was no harmony, real harmony, between the 13 States of the Revolutionary period, any more than—in fact, there was nothing but disharmony, disunity.

Catherine Brinker Bowen, who has written remarkable biographies over the years—her last book was called "Miracle at Philadelphia" and gentlemen, it was a miracle that the Constitution finally came out because there were these sharp differences between the big States and the small States, the rich States and the poor States. We now use different phrases with respect to the differences among the states in the world, but the sharp differences, the conflict, were there.

Another book of the period—anybody who wants to start on these studies can use these two books as almost basic reading on the subject—and the other one was a book by the late historian, Carl Van Doren called "The Great Rehearsal". Unfortunately, "The Great Rehearsal" is now out of print. But I did send to the committee a copy, a reprint, a photocopy of the preface to "The Great Rehearsal." It is only four pages, and I wish it were possible for every member of this committee to glance through it. It is not long, because while the book itself, "The Great Rehearsal" is a historical document, going through point by point the conflicts between the States, and how each of the provisions of the Constitution finally came into being.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE GREAT REHEARSAL—THE STORY OF THE MAKING AND RATIFYING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

(By Carl Van Doren)

PREFACE

The most momentous chapter in American history is the story of the making and ratifying of the Constitution of the United States. The Constitution has so long been rooted so deeply in American life—or American life rooted so deeply in it—that the drama of its origins is often overlooked. Even historical novelists, who hunt everywhere for memorable events to celebrate, have hardly touched the event without which there would have been a United States very different from the one that now exists; or might have been no United States at all.

The prevailing conceptions of those origins have varied with the times. In the early days of the Republic it was held, by devout friends of the Constitution, that its makers had received it somewhat as Moses received the Tablets of the Law on Sinai. During the years of conflict which led to the Civil War the Constitution was regarded, by one party or the other, as the rule of order or the misrule of tyranny. In still later generations the Federal Convention of 1787 has been accused of evolving a scheme for the support of special economic interests, or even a conspiracy for depriving the majority of the people of their liberties. Opinion has swung back and forth, while the Constitution itself has grown into a strong yet flexible organism, generally, if now and then slowly, responsive to the national circumstances and necessities.

The Constitution was made and ratified during one of the two periods of American history in which the American people have been most occupied with fundamental principles of government. In 1787 the problem was how the people could learn to think nationally, not locally, about the United States. In 1948 the problem is how the people can learn to think internationally, not nationally, about the United Nations.

The present problem has turned many minds back to 1787 in search of a historic parallel to serve as an example. In that year the former colonies of Great Britain, now independent states, were recovering from a war. During the war they had been drawn together by a common danger, but afterward they had sagged apart. The Confederation under which they lived was not so much a government as a league of states, in which the individual states retained a large part of their sovereignty. Congress was not a general legislature, but a diplomatic assembly, in which the states had equal votes. There was no general executive, no general judiciary. Congress could raise money only by asking the states to contribute their quotas for Confederation expenses. The Confederation government did not operate directly on the people of the United States, but only through the states themselves, bristling with sovereignty or absorbed in their own concerns.

The situation was, in any number of respects which can be seen at a glance, much like that of the sovereign states of the United Nations in 1948.

In 1787 the Federal Convention, called to alter and amend the Articles of Confederation, boldly created a federal government which should have authority and power to regulate federal affairs, while leaving local affairs to the states. This was no longer a league. It was a government. And many citizens of many nations are now convinced that only by some similar alteration of the Charter of the United Nations can the United Nations develop from a league of states into a government capable of securing the peace and welfare of the world.

The parallel between 1787 and 1948 is naturally not exact. Even if it were, 1787 would have no authority over 1948. Each age must make or keep its own government and determine its own future. Nor do those citizens of the world who in 1948 desire to see a federal world government created assume that the process would have to follow the example of the United States of 1787 in the details of the new government. The Federal Convention did not follow any single example. Neither should a General Conference of the United Nations be expected to.

But it is impossible to read the story of the making and ratifying of the Constitution of the United States without finding there all the arguments in favor of a general government for the United Nations, as well as all the arguments now raised in opposition to it.

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In this respect those antagonists were precisely like the enemies and the friends of world federation in 1948, now when it is obvious that no difficulty in the way of a world government can match the danger of a world without it.

The story as here told brings those older arguments and counter-arguments once more to the light. The supporters of the Constitution in 1787 knew that they were planning a government only for the United States, but they believed their experiment would instruct and benefit all mankind. Their undertaking might be, though of course no one of them ever used the term, a rehersal for the federal governments of the future.

This story shows the arguments in action, not in a philosophic vacuum. The arguments are the story. Arguments must always be seen as actions if they are to reach through the minds of men to their hearts and habits.

But to summarize it all—and I think it would be of great value to anyone who is going to work on any report to make use of the preface of Carl Van Doren's book. Incidentally, what in a sense pulled the Thirteen Colonies together was, of course, the idea they wanted freedom. They all had agreed in 1776 on the Declaration of Independence, but interestingly enough, there was no government. The country was run under so-called Conventions that were held in Philadelphia, but it was not until 1781 when, for all practical purposes, the war was over at Yorktown, that even the Articles of Confederation were adopted. It took that long to agree upon them, because of these various differences, these conflicts that existed between these 13 nations.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

And then, when they came out, when they finally did produce the Articles of Confederation, it was too weak. I won't say it was as weak as the Charter of the United Nations, because the Charter of the United Nations holds forth much more for the world than the Articles of Confederation did hold for the 13 nations or Thirteen Colonies. But no sooner, when the war was over, and the patriotic period had passed and the desire for independence had petered out, that these conflicts sharpened. And then every leader, every political leader and leaders who were not in the political world, began to recognize that something had to happen in order that they could hold this Nation together, this country together. And I want to point out that, while there were dangers—in fact, Washington, of course, was so fearful of disunity and expressed himself very positively, because during the war he was Commander-In-Chief not of one army but of 13 separate armies. And all during the war, during the Revolutionary War, his correspondence is full of pleas for clothing, for money, for help, for arms. There was no unity among the 13 nations in the era of the Revolution.

Now, of course, when we look back with the hindsight of 200 years, it seems to us as though it was nothing; everybody was a member of one family, and these differences were minor. They were not minor; they were just as great to the people then as these differences appear to nations today.

In my paper, I have cited various quotes from political leaders of the times concerning these differences, but I want to mention one item which is of interest which is the idea that this common language held everybody together. Well, you know it is interesting—there was a common language, of course—but if you wanted to do business in New York, you had to speak Dutch. You could get along without English. And you know that in Pennsylvania, there were responsible leaders who thought German ought to be the official language of Pennsylvania. And there were many parts of the colonies where Spanish and French were common languages.

Now that it is not to belittle the fact that English was the overriding language, but that did not hold these 13 colonies into any unified organization.

Incidentally, there were various acts after the war was over by these separate colonies antagonistic to each other—setting up customs against other States, refusal to recognize the money issued by some of the States. What you had, really, was a kind of—up until the adoption of the Constitution—you had a kind of Government which was run somewhat on a gentleman's agreement, and somehow or another they felt that this ought to do and it so continued in some manner. But it had to be changed and of course, it was changed.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

By 1787, the Congress, then still meeting in New York, did provide for the creation of a special meeting that we now refer to as the Constitutional Convention, which adopted the Constitution. And one of the main issues before that Convention was an issue which is here today, the one State, one vote rule.

Obviously the big States wanted representational vote; the small States wanted the one State, one vote rule. One State, one vote rule had been the rule prior to the Revolution and during the Revolution under the Articles of Confederation. They finally adopted what now, as we look back over these many decades, seems so simple, and that is, the great compromise, which saved the Constitutional Convention; it might have fallen flat except for this, which was the compromise that provided for the one State, one vote rule in the Senate and the representational vote in the House.

I do not take the time here to suggest the various ways in which voting can be weighed in the General Assembly in the United Nations, but obviously there are various ways in which this could be improved. There could be certain standards and certain things on which the one State, one vote rule applied and other ways in which there would have to be other ways weighted voting could be applied.

Finally, the Constitution was adopted in September of 1787 and then submitted to the 13 States—Incidentally, it is interesting to note too that only 12 States voted for the Constitution: Rhode Island did not even attend the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, again indicating the differences that existed between the States.

Senator PELL. If I may comment there, it is a habit of independence that we have long had. We did not ratify the Volstead amendment either.

And as long as I have interrupted—I cannot stay—but I would like to present my particular respects to Bucky Fuller; I have read this testimony, and I think it is fabulous.

Mr. BITKER. Coming from Milwaukee where you know what we make, I am glad to hear there is one State that voted against the Volstead amendment.

Senator HUMPHREY. May I say as an appendage to what has been said by the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, it is still independent, and the Senator represents a sense of idealism and purity of purpose which we commend.

Mr. BITKER. I simply indicate that you did not have 13 members of a happy family in the era of the Revolution, any more than you have 130 happy members of the world community today, although they are all members of the human family.

It is also interesting how the vote took place. When the Constitution was submitted to the State conventions for ratification, nine States were to ratify, and when nine States had ratified, the Constitution came into force. Well, many months after September 1787, the nine States had finally ratified, and New Hampshire was the ninth. But two important States had not, New York and Virginia.

Now this is particularly interesting because Virginia was almost the moving force in the Constitutional Convention, the famous Virginia Plan. And you could not have a United States, even though nine States had already ratified, you simply could not have a United States of America without New York and Virginia in it. They were just too important in the whole scheme of things in those years. Incidentally, the vote in New York—ratification carried by three votes. Just imagine how close this is. Even in Virginia and New Hampshire, the vote was carried by a majority of only 10 in the State conventions.

And I am sure Senator Pell is aware of the fact that, in Rhode

Island, which did not ratify until a year after the Constitution was in force and the new Government was going entity, and then it ratified by the slim majority of two votes.

All of this, I point out, is of historic interest, but it also points out again and emphasizes that there were sharp differences. And when you say, oh, it is nothing to think about the 13 colonies being brought together in one entity, if you try to compare it with the world today, that simply was not true. There were these conflicts and these conflicts just came right out in all these State conventions.

CONGRESSMAN HUNGATE'S RESOLUTION ON CHARTER CHANGES

The hope that I would like to conclude with and express to this group here—there are two things I would like to do, incidentally. One of the organizations with which I am affiliated is the Governor's Commission on the United Nations, which is an official agency of the State of Wisconsin and which recently adopted, on May 1, a resolution supporting the so-called House Concurrent Resolution 206, which was introduced by Congressman Hungate and a number of other Congressmen, supporting and emphasizing and directing and requesting the President to direct the State Department to submit to the Congress, both this committee and the appropriate House committee, its proposals for changes in the United Nations Charter and its procedure by June 30. Well, frankly, I have no hopes of the State Department doing that except in the most general of terms.

But I want to, if I may, Mr. Chairman, file this resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be printed in the record.

[The material referred to follows:]

THE STATE OF WISCONSIN,
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE UNITED NATIONS,
Milwaukee, Wis.

RESOLUTION UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED AT A MEETING OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE UNITED NATIONS, HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, MILWAUKEE, WIS., MAY 1, 1975

Whereas all human beings share the fragile environment of a "Spaceship Earth" where survival depends on the cooperation of all; and

Whereas the Charter of the United Nations has proven inadequate for its purpose "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war"; and

Whereas global problems such as hunger, pollution, overpopulation, resource depletion, ocean management, and arms control demand global solutions; and

Whereas the General Assembly of the U.N. on December 17, 1974 (over the opposition of the United States and the Soviet bloc) voted 82–15 to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and invited governments and the Secretary-General to submit their observations and views; and

Whereas Congressman Hungate of Missouri has proposed in House Concurrent Resolution 206 (04.08) that the State Department be asked to formulate proposals for the more effective functioning of the U.N. Charter and submit them to the appropriate House and Senate committees by June 30, 1975; and be it

Resolved, that the Governor's Commission on the United Nations of the State of Wisconsin, meeting in Milwaukee May 1, 1975: Believes that the United States should seriously consider suggestions for review of the United Nations Charter; and

Commends Congressman Hungate on his timely and forward looking resolution; and

Urges prompt action by the Congress and the executive departments to authorize and submit proposals for strengthening the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. BITKER. I take it that House Concurrent Resolution 206 is already a matter of record here. But if it is not, I would like to file it with you so that it may be part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be done.

[The material referred to follows:]

[H. Con. Res. 206, 94th Cong., 1st sess.]

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Whereas the United Nations General Assembly voted on December 17, 1974, "to establish an ad hoc committee on the Charter of the United Nations, consisting of forty-two members to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly," and therein "invites governments to submit or bring up to date their observations" on United Nations Charter review "if possible before May 31, 1975," and said committee has been directed to report its work to the thirtieth United Nations General Assembly (opening September 16, 1975): Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (*the Senate concurring*), That it is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) The United States should continue in its historic role of providing world leadership in working for modernization and reform of the United Nations, and toward the establishment and preservation of a civilized family of nations in accordance with the highest aspirations of mankind.

(2) The President is hereby requested to direct the Department of State to formulate constructive and forward-looking United States proposals for the more effective functioning of the United Nations, through (a) changes in the Charter of the United Nations, and/or (b) procedural changes that may not require charter amendment, in order to promote a just and lasting peace through the development of the rule of law, including protection of individual rights and liberties as well as the field of war prevention.

The President is further requested to report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives before June 30, 1975, on the position of the United States and the proposals submitted or to be submitted in this regard.

STUDY OF AMERICAN REVOLUTION URGED

Mr. BITKER. I would like to conclude with this statement, Mr. Chairman. I want to again express the hope that this committee will produce a study in depth that would serve as a meaningful observance of the Bicentennial of the American Revolution and also as a contribution toward world peace with justice.

If the attempts to halt the killing conflicts in the world today through a strengthened United Nations appear visionary, it must be remembered that to many thoughtful and knowledgeable citizens of the 13 sovereign Colonies, the idea of a strong central government under a constitution, appeared wholly unrealistic. Can the United States make any greater contribution in its observance of its own Bicentennial than to help the world to abolish war, mankind's most fearful illness?

May the United States be to the world what Virginia was to the 13 States in the adoption of the U.S. Constitution.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Bitker.

I want to make a correction in what I said about the Genocide Treaty. I said that it was reported out with the understanding that it would not be taken up in the Senate until implementing legislation was enacted. That provision actually says the U.S. Government declares "that it will not deposit its instrument of ratification until after the implementing legislation referred to in article 5 has been enacted."

Mr. Bitker, have you read the recent book on George Washington, I believe written by Mr. Flexner?

Mr. BITKER. I did not finish reading it until after I drew up my statement, or I would have incorporated it. It is just a fascinating story, and may I say that what I was saying here today about the conflicts between these States, it just runs right through the whole of the problems that George Washington had in those days. What a remarkable man he was.

The CHAIRMAN. I was very much impressed with the story on New York and Virginia. I thought you were also going to refer to the conflict between Massachusetts and Virginia over the proposition of Alexander Hamilton that the Federal Government would assume the States' indebtedness. That pleased Massachusetts greatly because it had a tremendous amount of bonds and securities, but Virginia did not want it, and finally they worked out a compromise. Virginia would accept it, but place the Capital of the United States where Virginia wanted it. That is how it happened to be where it is.

Senator HUMPHREY. That was a bad deal.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have Pauline Frederick with us. I think of her as being an authority on the United Nations.

We have listened to you many times. We welcome you here this morning.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, if I may—I have known Miss Frederick a long time. I am delighted to see her and I see our State singly honored to have you here. In the time I have, I hope to hear as much of your wisdom as I can. I would also like to greet the whole panel.

Like Claiborne Pell, Bucky Fuller is a friend, and a man I admire a great deal. And Dick Scammon. What a wonderful panel, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HUMPHREY. Mr. Chairman, let me associate myself with this praise for the panel. Let me also make note of the fact that Mr. Scammon is originally a Minnesotan, and we are very proud of him. He has made many distinctive contributions to the American political scene.

And I regret, Dick, that I was not here to hear your testimony, but one of my aides came up here for a few moments and whispered in my ear some of the things that you had emphasized.

I want to say that for one who has admired Buckminster Fuller over the years, it is very good to have a chance to see him again personally.

And Mr. Bitker, we welcome you and thank you for your leadership in the Midwest. I am sure you know my good friend, York Langton from Minnesota.

Mr. BITKER. I remember when we referred to you as our Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. And Miss Frederick. We recognize you in the Midwest too. I remember when I was teaching while I was sent home to pasture for awhile by my miscalculations in 1968, that I would hear you on the radio. You have been a voice of the United Nations, both objective and inspiring. And we thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I may say in connection with Miss Frederick, some young ladies in my office who have been with me for a long long

time, do not like me to tell how long they have been there and are afraid it is an indication of their age. I hope Miss Frederick will not mind my saying that I first knew her 25 years ago at the United Nations, and we are glad to have you.

STATEMENT OF MISS PAULINE FREDERICK, FORMER U.N. CORRESPONDENT FOR NBC, WESTPORT, CONN.

Miss FREDERICK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Javits, and Senator Humphrey.

I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before you today.

When I attended the American University here in Washington quite a few years ago and subsequently covered the State Department as a journalist, I felt rather close to the processes by which our foreign policy was made and implemented.

ALIENATION BETWEEN U.N. AND WASHINGTON

In the nearly 30 years since, during which I have been reporting on the United Nations in New York, an invitation to an official Washington function connected with the U.N. has seemed like a bid to enter a foreign land. There have been only three such occasions including this one today. The first was for a so-called U.N. dinner at the Pan American Union where, according to the dictates of protocol, the members of the Washington diplomatic corps outranked the United Nations ambassadors. The second was to attend a dinner at the White House for the United Nations Secretary-General who soon thereafter became less than welcome in the mansion because of his pleas against the bombing of Asians, of which he was one.

The reverse traffic has not eased this sense of alienation. In recent years, particularly, when the President and Secretary of State have gone to the United Nations, one could have the impression the purpose was mainly ritualistic—a public relations bow to what some in this city, I fear, regard as an anachronism. These visitations have aroused little belief that the United States was reaffirming the full commitment it made in 1945 in San Francisco to the treaty known as the United Nations Charter.

U.S. OFFICIAL CALLS TO THE U.N.

When the President comes to the U.N. these days, there are the usual courtesy calls on the Secretary-General and the Presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly. There is a more or less pro forma speech about peace, sometimes including criticism of U.N. members adjudged less high-minded than the United States. This is followed by a handshake with delegates, excluding representatives of governments not recognized by Washington, and lunch hosted by the Secretary-General. Then the Chief Executive flies back to the White House.

If the official call is timed for the opening of the General Assembly, which it usually is, the Secretary of State is left behind in New York to pursue a routine inaugurated by one of his predecessors. He moves across the street to the United States Mission, and down the street to the Waldorf Towers, followed by the State Department press corps.

In these quarters, isolated from the U.N., he holds mini-summit talks with delegates who need American help, or can be persuaded that they do, in the interest of shoring up loyalty to the United States. These talks are always described as "useful." Publicity is thereby focused on American bilateral relations while the activities in the assembly hall receive scant notice, if any, unless there are harsh words for the U.N. host country. And so it can appear to the American public, and to the world, that the United States rather than the United Nations is meeting in New York.

Of course, this procedure may reduce the traveling time abroad for the Secretary of State, since he is able to take advantage of the presence of world leaders in New York to pursue bilateralism. It can also emphasize to delegates and the American people that the United Nations does not have high priority with Washington foreign policy makers. A recent President highlighted this fact when, on learning that other chiefs of state would attend U.N. anniversary ceremonies to be climaxed with an evening concert by distinguished artists (which he, too, should have attended), invited the visiting dignitaries to a state dinner at the White House the very same evening and sent an official plane to New York to bring them to Washington. At least one government leader went home rather than make the embarrassing choice between the United States and the United Nations.

REASSESSMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

In the aftermath of Indochina there is much discussion about reassessing American foreign policy. This would mean reaffirming the bilateral power-balancing used with some success in the last century to maintain the status quo of similar cultures in a limited geographical area, but applied more recently with disastrous consequences. Or reassessment could mean recognition of the interdependence today of all nations with different systems when the economic, social, and political ills of some can afflict the stability of all. Obviously the vastly interconnected human problems of the present cannot be resolved by force because war, like pestilence in a closely-knit community, can now be epidemic. Therapy can be found, however, in the institution so largely of American creation and so frequently disparaged by its principal sponsor, the United Nations.

The direction the United States takes from now on rests, as in the past, with you gentlemen here in Washington, in the executive branch and in the Congress. I say "gentlemen" with due deliberation because no women have had decisive roles in plotting a course which has relied so heavily on intervention in other countries. Nor have the American people had any determining voice, judging by the lack of official interest in a recent Gallup Poll showing that 75 percent of them do not want the United States to give up its membership in the United Nations. This expression of opinion would imply that a majority of Americans would not object to constructive participation in this organization.

One reason why the United Nations was located in New York was to make it accessible to delegates traveling by steamship. I respectfully suggest that it is long since time for the United States to get off the steamship dock and onto a changing world where time and tide wait for no Nation.

It might be well to clarify here a mistaken notion found all too frequently, even in Washington. It is that the United Nations is a kind of world government that can legislate peace, if it only wants to. Of course this is not true.. The United Nations, in effect, is machinery that can be set in motion only by its member governments. Consequently, when the United Nations is blamed for what it does, or fails to do, it is a scapegoat for the behavior of the governments which belong to it.

True to much past Washington practice, the United Nations was asked, through Secretary General Waldheim only yesterday, to do something to free the American vessel in Cambodian hands, but only after the United States had initiated military action.

IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES

I suppose it is only natural for skeptics to ask, what can the United Nations do for the United States? How many divisions does the Secretary-General have? Of course, the answer is none, that is, if what is meant are divisions to fight. But the Secretary-General does have something more valuable, peacekeeping forces that have stood between hostile armies and saved the world from even more conflict than it would otherwise have experienced.

Since October 1973 until this day, the men in blue U.N. berets have separated the fighters of Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Syria, thereby giving the parties time to try to negotiate. Twelve nations are taking part in this peacekeeping; for the first time eastern Europe is involved and the Soviet Union is helping to pay a peacekeeping bill for the first time. From 1956 to 1967, U.N. peacekeepers made possible a lull in the battles of the Middle East, and from 1949 to 1956 a U.N. truce, watched over by U.N. observers, helped to shield the area from any major confrontation.

For nearly a decade U.N. peacekeepers stood between hostile Greek and Turkish communities on the island of Cyprus. They have now resumed their positions after last year's violent outside intervention. A U.N. emergency force was in the Congo for 4 years, during which Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold gave his life in trying to bring peace to a nation which had become a battlefield for outside rival interests. And the presence of U.N. representatives has helped to prevent, tamp down and even end hostilities, at various times in such farflung areas as Kashmir, West Irian, Yemen, Lebanon, and Greece.

In view of the tendency today for overarmed nations to fight first and talk last, this U.N. record is unique. It should convince the United States that there can be security in an international peace force, even a small one. Since the United States has so much to lose by war, would it not be more realistic to help create a permanent and enlarged international peace force rather than continuing to expand national war power, already strong enough to destroy the world, to compete with the Soviet Union? It would, undoubtedly, be much cheaper for the American taxpayers.

U.N. COSTS COMPARED TO ARMS COSTS

Some Members of Congress seem to be more concerned about what the United Nations costs than what it does. Last year the American assessments for the upkeep of the organization and its specialized agencies, as well as voluntary contributions for human development and disaster relief through the U.N., all came to something less than half a billion dollars. By contrast, the Pentagon estimates that $5 billion worth of American military equipment was left behind on the withdrawal from Indochina, after a war that cost at least $160 billion, not counting the human toll. Just one item in the arms race, the projected B–1 bomber fleet, is estimated to run between $50 and $75 billion.

Of course, the arms cost figures never cover the waste of so much of the Earth's resources in nonproductive output at a time when even the American living style is threatened by shortages. Moreover, those who cavil about alloting millions to the United Nations while endorsing billions for military purposes, ignore the millions in return to the American economy from the mere presence of the United Nations in the United States.

U.N. CONCERN WITH CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY

The United Nations, through its specialized and associated agencies is going beyond peacekeeping to try to uncover the sources of war, in the hope that this scourge may someday be controlled. U.N. agencies are looking into causes of human misery, frustration and futility which can trigger violence. These include scarcities of food, energy, and raw materials, inequitable distribution of the Earth's bounty, instability of prices, dislocation of finance and trade, overpopulation, social injustice, the arms race, and the unmastered explosion of technology. Since these problems respect no boundaries, they cannot be diagnosed and treated on a bilateral basis. They are multilateral in scope and, consequently, demand multinational attention which the U.N. can provide.

These needs of the human race have come to particular focus in the United Nations because of the influx of many new members from Africa and Asia. These countries have entered the organization directly from their colonial liberation. If their demands sometimes sound impatient and angry, it is because their exploitation by white colonists is so recent. We Americans could probably have understood them better 200 years ago.

DÉTENTE WITH THIRD WORLD URGED

The challenge for the United States now is how to respond to the heretofore underprivileged who would turn around the economy which has been going so well for the rest of us. There are those who say, in effect, pay no attention to the upstarts in that worthless U.N. Let's go about our bilateral business as usual. There are those who say, in

effect, go into the U.N. and give them hell, and if they try to gang up on us, gang right back. Finally, there are those who say, the world has changed, the United States is no longer "an island entire of itself;" it is now part of a global community, whether we Americans like it or not, dependent and interdependent. Our responsibility, therefore, is to help fashion a new civilized society from new conditions.

It is to be hoped that the would-be resigners and the shouters back are in the minority. There were too many of them, to no avail, during the cold war to anticipate a repetition with equanimity. Since the United States has decided that the better part of international wisdom is détente with the Soviet Union, it could be valuable also to reach a détente with the third world. If we were to lower our voices to a dialog it ought to be possible to adjust the new economic order espoused by the developing nations so that the United States could participate in a constructive consensus, rather than developing a reputation as an isolated nay sayer to the world's poor.

UPGRADING U.S. REPRESENTATION AT THE U.N.

If you gentlemen in Washington reach the conclusion that understanding adjustment is more conducive to international harmony than rhetorical confrontation in the interest of the United States, it would seem to follow that American representatives in international parleys should be selected for their status and ability to confirm this image. Men and women—I say hopefully—who are chosen for the United Nations should be of rank at least comparable to that of their peers from other nations. For instance, the Soviet Union's U.N. permanent representative at the United Nations, Yakov Malik, is a Deputy Foreign Minister and the delegate Moscow sent to the UNESCO executive meeting to engineer the decisions that caused so much anger in this country was none other than the widely experienced Ambassador Valerian Zorin.

Furthermore, at least the head of the American delegation should be assured some tenure in the interest of self-confidence and standing among other delegates. Although the American ambassador is supposed to serve at the pleasure of the President, the sudden firing of this person, sometimes without prior notice, scarcely enhances the prestige or influence of the delegation as well as the United States. Furthermore, since there are 137 other ambassadors at the United Nations whose cultivation is essentail to good international relations, Congress should increase the American representative's entertainment allowance so that a highly qualified person does not have to weigh personal resources as a condition for taking the post.

Of course, the United Nations is not perfect. Nor is the U.S. Government, or the Members of Congress would have little to do. Both are subject to human frailties. Since there is no thought of discarding democracy for another system because it is flawed, why should a United Nations be judged by harsher standards when it is designed in a democratic pattern which may not be understood by some of its members? The best American talent and most dedicated persons should be enlisted to help improve the U.N., if our aim is really peace.

SUGGESTED CHANGES IN U.S. ATTITUDES

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, in summary, my vision of the United States and the United Nations prompts these suggestions.

That the United States accept its role as a regular member of the family of nations instead of its domineering parent.

That the United States join in building an effective international peacekeeping force to reduce the use of national war power as an instrument of national policy, inasmuch as the security of one nation now requires the security of all.

That the United States recognize that the causes of international violence are found in economic decay, social injustice, and political unrest, and offer its full cooperation to work with other nations to eradicate these conditions.

That the United States select only its most qualified and outstanding citizens to represent it in international gatherings and organizations.

That the United States spend more money and resources in the search for peace for the human race while reducing its commitment to the arms race.

An American statesman, Adlai Stevenson, once said:

> The United Nations is not and must never be a weapon for the United States. It is a genuine international organization which can only really be effective if it is not dominated by us. The danger exists that those who are afraid and lack assurance would like to avoid the free exchange of conflicting ideas, of concepts and of terminology, particularly if from time to time matters do not go just as we might wish. However, it is we who evolve best in this free forum because it is our natural habitat, and if we have the courage to go ahead and the boldness to stand the test of an open society, if we have the courage to build, even something which is not perfect from our point of view, I can foresee only a more significant dialogue, a progressive lessening of tension and, finally the predominance of a better set of ideas.

It has been said that some Americans fear the inability of their country to make peace more than its ability to make war. I dare to hope that there is no less talent in this Nation for dealing with the human problems confronting us all than there is in any other nation. I only suggest that we summon up the courage to try it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Miss Frederick. That is, I think, a very fine statement. We are delighted to have it.

Now we will open questioning to the panel, with the 10-minute rule to be observed.

I am sorry, I am going to have to leave. I have a commitment I have to keep, and for that reason I will not be able to stay here for the questioning. But I know that it will be good and helpful to all of us.

Senator Humphrey, would you take over and preside?

Senator HUMPHREY [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will.

Let me join in the commendation which has been given to Miss Frederick by Senator Sparkman. It is a powerful statement, and one that is much needed. And I hope that it is listened to and read in other places than just here.

POSITION OF U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE U.N.

The five recommendations that you made in the summation, are recommendations that I fully subscribe to as an individual, personally, and as a Senator. I think they are very sound and desperately needed part of the policy of our Government. Let me quickly say that during the time that I had the privilege of serving in the Cabinet, we had two Ambassadors to the United Nations; Adlai Stevenson and Arthur Goldberg. I thought that both of them were gifted and talented men and represented the best in American quality and talent. The real problem is that the Ambassador to the United Nations is sort of set off up there by himself, and that the State Department and, indeed, the President look upon that office as an appendage, rather than an integral part of the total foreign policy and national security policy of our country. I watched two distinguished Ambassadors trying to get the attention of the more powerful figures within the Government.

EFFECT OF VIETNAM ON U.S. VIEW OF U.N.

I did go to the United Nations as the Vice President to ask U Thant to remain on behalf of the Government of the United States at a time when he was uncertain as to whether he wanted to. There were, later on, differences that grew out of the war. I have a feeling that as our difficulties in the war increased, our onus from the United Nations became even more obvious. The unwillingness to work through the U.N. at that time was always perplexing to me. The excuse was that if you did it, you would precipitate confrontation with the Soviet Union. I never felt there was a great deal of validity to that particular proposition.

DIFFICULTY OF GETTING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF U.N. CONTRIBUTIONS

Now more specifically, let me say that I have handled the foreign assistance bill on the floor of the Senate for 3 years running, in which the authorizations for the United Nations are included. Our foreign assistance bill includes not only the bilateral assistance, but also multilateral assistance. I want to say to this panel that you have a lot of work to do out in the public. I have to work at it. My political life depends on it. To handle foreign assistance in the U.S. Senate is just about as popular as handling a Zionist organization in Saudi Arabia. I want to tell you that it is an almost impossible task. If you only knew how we have to work to get those votes.

I see my distinguished colleague, Senator Javits, here, who is a stalwart in these battles. We have to plead and beg to get these votes. We won by one vote the last time. One other time we lost it, and had to use what we call a continuing resolution.

What I am getting at is, there are those of you who come here so knowledgeable about the importance of some of these programs, such as the U.N. and its many related agencies—the United Nations Development Fund, the UNESCO, the UNICEF, the Special Fund and the U.N. Assembly and all that goes with it, and our American contributions to them. But the Members of Congress, who are supposed to represent the public and have to go home and get elected, are about as interested in supporting the money for these programs as they are

in falling off a cliff in the Grand Canyon. It is an incredible ordeal.

Now I am going to have to do this again this year because I chair the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee here. I happen to be a strong proponent of the U.N. Senator McGee has been a tower of strength here in this effort, but we have unbelievable difficulties trying to get our appropriations.

Miss Frederick, you know, $500 million was our total, sum aggregate total, of U.S. assistance to all activities of the United Nations last year. That, in terms of national security, is hardly worth mentioning now. And yet, this is not what is projected to the American public.

CRYSTALLIZING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR PERMANENT U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE

We have to get the message across. We have to get the message over of what the U.N. has done in peacekeeping, and how our country has not supported actively the creation of a truly international peace force. We have supported these ad hoc temporary arrangements, and I think it is to our credit that we have.

I remember the situation in Cyprus and the pleas of President Johnson to the Canadians to be of help; the Congo, and the Middle East, all of which have received our support.

What do you suggest that we do by way of crystalizing public support for the creation of a truly international peace force?

Should it include U.S. forces, or Soviet forces, or are you of the opinion—and I speak to you, Miss Frederick, primarily—that it should be of other nations?

Could you give us your views on that?

Miss Frederick. Senator, as you, I'm sure know, up until this most recent force now in the Middle East, it has been felt to be the better part of wisdom to use only units from the small, more or less neutral, nations, so that the cold war would not become involved by the big power rivalry.

Now I believe the United States and the Soviet Union are acting as kind of advisers, or in an advisory capacity and as observers. And there are, for the first time, representatives of Eastern Europe involved.

I would suppose that as long as the big powers are in such a state of rivalry, it might be well to keep their military forces out, utilizing policing units from the smaller nations only. But they should offer whatever logistical, financial and other support is necessary. And if the time comes when the United States and the Soviet Union are really in a brotherhood, rather than in their present power competition, then I would think they could take part also. As of now, however, they should stay out of some of these conflicts and give the U.N. peacekeepers a chance, backing the international force instead of involving their own unilateral policies in the areas involved.

Senator Humphrey. But as of the present, you feel that it is possibly wise not to have the United States and the Soviet Union directly involved?

Miss Frederick. Yes, I should think so, Senator.

Senator Humphrey. Well, I would surely concur in that.

U.N.—A PARLIAMENT OF GOVERNMENTS, NOT MAN

May I ask Mr. Scammon, whom I did not have the privilege of listening to, but who, I gather, pointed out that this was not a parliament of man—speaking of the U.N.—but rather, a parliament of governments.

Is that correct?

Mr. SCAMMON. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. That was part of the thrust of your testimony?

Mr. SCAMMON. And, as such, Senator Humphrey, it is too important for us to lose in the rhetoric of, for example, the General Assembly sessions.

I think it is a difficult problem, because the General Assembly is important, but the more importance you give it, the less, I think, you can accomplish in the very kind of negotiations that lead to the setting up of this sort of peacekeeping machinery. This kind of machinery is not really negotiated in the U.N.—in the General Assembly. It is negotiated between the powers that are in New York, using the U.N. as a useful device for securing on a bilateral or multilateral basis, the maximum areas of cooperation. And we all know there are areas where the peacekeeping machinery has not been particularly effective, where it has been suspended, where the troops have been withdrawn quickly because they have been threatened.

But, then, one of the purposes of diplomacy is to avoid, as much as possible, confrontation in vital areas in which international interests are involved. Because if you can keep the area of confrontation—conflict—in those areas which are relatively unimportant, you can get much less commitment to involve other kinds of forces that are available to you.

Miss FREDERICK. I would just say, in connection with what Mr. Scammon has said, that where the U.N. peacekeeping force has not been as effective as it might have been, or has been hastily withdrawn, are instances in which the U.N., as such, and the Secretary General specifically, have not had the support of the big powers, because the latter were too much concerned with their own rival interests.

DEVELOPMENT AID THROUGH THE U.N.

Senator HUMPHREY. Last evening I had the privilege of visiting with the Prime Minister from the Netherlands, and in his brief remarks over dinner, he said that this coming year, the Netherlands will contribute 1½ percent of their gross national product to developmental assistance; 1½ percent.

Miss FREDERICK. Did he say the United States should go and do likewise?

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes, he indicated that by indirection.

I just want to go back to the real problem that we wrestle with—those of us that are prodevelopmental assistance. I think our present rate of assistance is less than one-half of 1 percent, and yet, it is an almost impossible task to get even that much.

Many of us believe that more and more of this assistance ought to go through the multilateral and multinational organizations. I have noticed, in what testimony I have heard, and quickly read, that there

has been very little attention given to what we call the economic and social agencies of the U.N.

I have always felt that these many agencies are, in the very real sense, the body, and not so much the structure, but the lifeblood of the United Nations. For example, in the Mekong area, there has been a U.N. agency there all the time and it has been working on the development of the Mekong. And it has, despite the war and everything else, been going on and making some progress.

GETTING INFORMATION ABOUT THE U.N. OUT TO PEOPLE

We Americans know very little about this. How do we get information to our people about it? You know, we in public life find that people respond to what is on the television, what is in the newspapers; and they really do not read too much of these big journals that we like to publish—our thoughtful, constructive, intellectual articles. You just have to face it; I used to look in my office, at a thousand letters a day, and I want to tell you, out of a thousand a day, there are two a week on the U.N. And I have a pretty intelligent population; we have a high degree of literacy; we have an international center in our community; we have a strong U.N. organization. But the reason for this is, that the only time anything ever gets reported on the United Nations is when somebody calls us a dirty name in the General Assembly, or when Arafat comes up there.

Some of you are in the media business. I am laying it on the line. I mean, after all, where do people get their education? Very little is taught about the United Nations in the school systems of our country, very little is taught about the rest of the world in the schools of our country. Most people do not go to college. People that testify here go to college; but a lot of the people that vote do not go to college—at least, they did not get to Harvard, and they did not get 4 years, or 6 or 8 years of college education. The trouble is that we talk to each other. We are floating around on cloud nine up here, and the folks are down there tilling the soil. All that those who are out there tilling the soil ever hear about these matters is when they hear about the bad things the Russians do, the bad things the Chinese do, and the bad things that happen in the United Nations. And it is inevitable that they are going to have a bad opinion because they do not have the time, nor have they had the orientation that brings them into a more positive understanding of what this is all about.

I think you are people who are tremendously important in all of this. You have a bigger job than even this committee. I think the committee will more or less respond to what happens at home. I know there are Members of Congress that would love to go along with us on many of these votes, but they listen back home, and all of a sudden they hear, no more of that U.N. stuff.

These public opinion polls are very reassuring for people that get the results that they like. But when it comes right down to the nitty-gritty, if some 75 percent of the people are for the United Nations, they have forgotten about it when we had the authorization and the appropriations up here, I will tell you that. Because if we have 10

percent of the people being for something, we get much more support from that 10 percent than we get from the 75 percent.

Now, what would you do to help me?

PEACE IS DULL READING

Miss FREDERICK. Well, Senator, I do not have an answer but I think we have to go back to the basic problem about publicity which was phrased by Thomas Hardy, and that is, war makes rattling good history, but peace is dull reading.

The public has to realize that there is news that is not necessarily conflict and controversy.

Senator HUMPHREY. Wait a minute. Let me just take exception to that.

I think that is the definition of news handed me by the representatives of the media. I think that it is not dull reading to read about a U.N. organization that has moved into an area and cleaned up disease, helped fix up homes, cleaned out debris.

As a matter of fact, when we have a cyclone—and we have a lot of them and tornadoes in the United States—it is on the TV all the time. They are showing how the folks all got together and fixed up the town, and how the United Fund helped out. And they will put that on every once in a while. Of course, they have to have a tornado before they do that; I realize that.

I really think this is the problem we have today—this powerful instrument called the TV, which gets to more people in one day than all the teachers in the United States will get to in 10 years. And that only comes when there is what they call man bites dog; that is news. I do not think that is true.

I think the fact that the dog has bitten the man is still news, but somebody has decided that it is not news. And to get in the news, all you have to do is get in a fight. All I have to do right now is say some nasty, mean thing about the President, or the Secretary of State, something that is as ridiculous as a whirling dervish, and bingo, it is just like that. Any man who has been in public life 2 weeks and who does not know that is in the wrong business.

And we, once in a while, despair trying to be constructive. Let me say, you really can despair trying to be constructive, because constructive work is something that they like to remind you of in your obituary, when you cannot hear it. You know, the get together afterward, and they said, oh, I remember dear old Hubert. But I would like to pop up out of the coffin and see if they really say it.

Miss FREDERICK. Senator, without disagreeing with what you have said, I just want to make a point of clarification.

I am not here today as a spokesman for the broadcast media.

Senator HUMPHREY. I know that.

Miss FREDERICK. Primarily because of the fact that I got too old for broadcasting and had to be retired. So I am not representing broadcasting at all.

Senator HUMPHREY. The reason I asked you is because you have been at it so well for so many years and because I think you have a sense of balance about it. I shall quit. I have taken more than my time, but this has bothered me to no end. I listened to a man last

night on the "Tonight Show" who had things to say about the Congress of the United States that were outrageous and they got the applause. You know, you just want to quit. Why go through all this baloney, this guff, all that people shove on you, if it is going to be distorted. And much of it is about what we are talking about here today.

Go ahead, Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. I do want to thank our witnesses today for what I consider to be extraordinarily good testimony.

I am going to limit my initial questioning to 10 minutes so that Senator Clark can come in.

Mrs. Robbins indicated, at the outset of your testimony, that you had worked very closely with the State Department, in your capacity as a journalist.

WOMEN'S ROLE IN THE U.N. AND STATE DEPARTMENT

I would like to ask you whether in this, the year of International Women's Year, women are playing the kind of role in the State Department, and in the U.N., that they are capable and competent to play, and why more women are not in policymaking roles in both organizations?

Miss FREDERICK. Senator, I am glad you gave me an opportunity to say that I think it is disgraceful that we have approached International Women's Year with the old discriminations rampant, not only in the United Nations and through the United Nations, but in the United States. And I have tried to say, today, as well as in other statements I have made, that I believe that the world deserves an opportunity for women who bear at least half the responsibility for creating the human race, to have at least that much responsibility for trying to save it.

And I think it is high time, since, with all due respect to those of your sex present, men have made such a disgraceful history of war and destruction and unhappiness in the world, women should have a chance to try to do something about it. I fear international relations are suffering from sexism and machismo.

Senator PERCY. I thank you very much for that comment. Senator Humphrey and I were cosponsors yesterday of a congressional conference on International Women's Year, and I think your comment closely parallels our own feelings. We think it would be a better world if women had a much more important policymaking role in the foreign policies of their respective countries. And if we do anything this year, it is to emphasize the importance of that, and also to stimulate women to take the kind of initiative that you have taken over the years.

IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL INTEGRITY

Dr. Fuller, you state, and I quote, "Whether the world survives birth into an entirely new world and universe relationship depends on our individual integrity, not on that of political representatives." This is a very powerful and provocative statement, with particular interest to the political representatives right here.

Would you care to expand on that?

Mr. FULLER. You speak of phenomena of which we know little—the as yet mystifying phenomena that transpires as that unspoken communication between humans which occurs when human beings are, within themselves, highly convinced of the integrity of their decisions having been made only on behalf of the many. I am quite confident that we will have scientifically reproducible proof within the next decade that what humans experience as telepathy is ultra, ultra high frequency electromagnetic wave communication to transceive which all humans are innately equipped.

Humanity has been asking much too much of its political representatives. It has asked them to be responsible for thinking. Now, for the first time in history, all of humanity is literate, and all of humanity knows about everybody else. For the first time in the history of humanity we have the capability of safely implementing direct democratic expression. I meet very large numbers of audiences—this last year an average of 1,500 people on 150 occasions. The majority of my audiences is young. I established a self-discipline a half century ago whereby I was never to ask anybody to listen to me. I was to talk to others only when I was asked to do so—and then I must give them my best. More and more people everywhere ask me to come to talk to them. I am telling them about our "final exam" and that I feel that whether humanity can "pass" is to be answered entirely within the mind of the individual. Do we really have the integrity? Do we really understand that each of us is only here for all the others? If the answer is, "I am here for me," then I think humanity is going to fail its exam.

I think that extraordinary individual courage—which dares to listen to its own cognition of the truth—is going to have to be manifest. I feel the knowledge that this is so is now emerging into prominence in human thought everywhere around the world. I have been around the world 37 times now; not as a tourist but incidental to my work. I do not have any agency or sales staff who solicit employment of whatever my potential functioning may be. I do not compete with others. Whatever I do with other humans must be spontaneously initiated by others. In this way, I stay attuned to Nature's evolutionary wave front. I have been invited to speak or take an appointment at 421 universities and colleges around the world. From direct spontaneous talk with people around the world, I find arising a spirit of truthfulness, comprehension and tolerance as most powerfully manifest in the young world which transcends all political biases.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Scammon, we welcome you this morning as not only a leading expert on public attitudes, but also as a former delegate to the U.N. General Assembly.

NATURE OF THIRD WORLD MAJORITY AT THE U.N.

Do you observe any similarities between the third world majority in the General Assembly and the real majority of the American voting public, which you and Mr. Wattenburg studied in 1968?

Mr. SCAMMON. No, I would not think that there would be many similarities except we are all members of the human race. It stops about there.

The fact is, many of the third world countries are not democratic states. One would hope they are emerging to that status, but unless you can find a freedom to speak out, whether pro or con, up or down, sideways, you cannot really maintain that kind of close association with people which is so essential as you pointed out, Senator Humphrey. And it is so important if you are really going to translate this parliament of governments to a parliament of man—which one would hope it might eventually become.

So, I would say that the institutions of the societies that are represented in the present majority are not the kind that I would find replicated in this country; at least not in all cases, though there are some that are. But unfortunately, in many of the third world countries, the development of what Mr. Roosevelt referred to so significantly as the four freedoms, are so limited that I would think the nature of representative function does not become prostituted—it is not that, it just becomes different. And it is very difficult to judge in terms of relativities.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

CHANGING VOTING PROCEDURES AT THE U.N.

Dr. Bitker, you made a recommendation for changing the voting procedure. Certainly we should pay close attention to your views because of the long-term efforts you have made to achieve world peace through world law.

You suggested that the one-nation, one-vote formula might be retained in certain types of decisions with, weighted or proportional voting in other types of decisions. That reminds me of the old story of the husband making the major decisions and the wife making the minor decisions, but the husband retains the right to decide which is major and which is minor.

In this case, have you considered which types of decisions would be more appropriately made by weighted or proportional voting, and who would decide which way a vote is taken?

Mr. BITKER. Senator Percy, I would like to respond. I do not want to avoid answering the question, but I think it would be—I could not do it in a brief period, as I am sure you recognize by your own experience last fall. But I would like, if you do not mind, to respond to an issue that Senator Humphrey has raised—how do you get the story across to the American public.

MAKING USE OF BICENTENNIAL TO EDUCATE PUBLIC ABOUT THE U.N.

And I have said, get on the band wagon of the Bicentennial observance. Now maybe this is an excuse on my part to suggest it, but if it is an excuse, it is a good one. That the American public understand the difficulties that this Nation went through when it adopted the Constitution of the United States, that it went through all the very—when you asked about the one-vote, one-man rule, it went through all those problems, the conflict over that very issue then, and similar problems.

And what I am saying is that I would hope that this committee would produce a document which, I fear, will not get the kind of TV attention that Senator Humphrey wishes it might have. But I think

that it could get a part of the attention which is being devoted to—well, if I use the word, silly, commercialized observances that are going to be taking place in the next year and a half with respect to the Bicentennial, and the fortune that is going to be spent on this observance of no permanent nature and no relationship to the era of the Revolution, and I must urge upon this committee that it undertake that task of producing this document. It need not be a heavy one. I do not mean a tome. I can call off the documents that ought to be in it, I can tell you the discussion that I think ought to be in it; and included in it was my reference to Cary Van Doren's—the preface to his "The Great Rehearsal."

And I think, Senator Percy, and I do not want to avoid answering your question——

Senator PERCY. Well, why don't we leave it this way? Why don't you answer the question after reflection, and submit the response for inclusion in the record of the hearing?

Mr. BITKER. Very good.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, I hope our witnesses have the time to stay for another round of questions. I have some time, but I would yield to Senator Clark.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Senator Percy.

I want to join you in congratulating the witnesses, both those at the witness table now, and those that have appeared earlier. I also want to congratulate you, Senator Percy, for having arranged these hearings. Their timing could not have been better because the United Nations is in a great deal of difficulty, both in the country and in the Congress.

Many of the people who have been the strongest supporters of the United Nations in the Congress now are raising great questions about it. But now is the time for those of us who believe in the United Nations to go on the offensive to talk about its accomplishments—in peacekeeping, in the various social and economic programs, and soon. We have seen in vote after vote that congressional support for the U.N. is eroding rapidly. It is clear that the votes are going to be very close in this body and in the House of Representatives for future levels of funding and other vital questions which will determine the relationship of the United States to the United Nations.

So I congratulate you on your coming here, and on your very constructive statements. For I happen to believe—and I think Mr. Scammon could speak to this with great authority, no doubt—that the American people are stronger supporters of the United Nations than is the Congress.

I would like to pose one question, and ask each of you to respond to it.

WHAT PROPOSALS COULD THE UNITED STATES ADVANCE IN NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY?

What could our Government do in the next year that would strengthen the United Nations, that would help make it a body which would be better able to bring world peace? What do you think we ought to do in this next General Assembly by way of economic proposals, or initiatives on Southern Africa, or other pressing matters?

Pauline, would you start off?

Miss FREDERICK. Mr. Senator, I would suggest, primarily, that our Government—and by that I mean, the executive branch, particularly the State Department—demonstrate that the United Nations is important to our foreign policy. So important that we bring it in on take-offs rather than just on crash landings as was demonstrated yesterday.

I think it is very, very important for the United States to prove to the American people, as well as to other people, that we do believe in the commitment we made in San Francisco in 1945—that the United Nations was going to be a cornerstone of our foreign policy, and that the United Nations Charter was going to be the law of our land.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Mr. BITKER. I would say that one of the things that can be done—and I referred to it in my opening statement—would be—is right in the lap of this very committee.

We keep on hearing in the General Assembly about South Africa. And it is true that we take a position which, on paper, is opposed to apartheid. But when it comes to signing on the dotted line, we run. We have not signed the genocide treaty. We have not even considered the treaty against racial discrimination, both of which treaties were drafted, in great measure, by our own representatives at the United Nations. And we have come nowhere near the basic international human rights treaties on civil rights and economic rights.

I would urge upon this committee that it ask the Executive to send these treaties to it, so that it can consider these treaties and give its advice and consent for ratification. This would improve the status, the position, of the United States before the whole world, and, of course, before the General Assembly.

Senator CLARK. Would you include the repeal of the Byrd amendment in that?

Mr. BITKER. Of course. I yet do not understand how that got by.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Mr. Fuller, would you care to respond?

Mr. FULLER. I really do not have suggestions, because my whole way of thinking is apolitical. I think in the terms of artifacts—of reforming the environment and not of reforming humans by laws. I am just very proud that you wish to have me come and speak, and I know all of you and am moved by your sincerity.

I think that is all I can say.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I enjoyed your remarks about our shrinking world and our growing interdependency as a result of the scientific changes.

Mr. Scammon?

Mr. SCAMMON. I would think probably Mr. Cleveland's suggestions with respect to trying to avoid, as much as possible, the votes in the United Nations would be helpful as a part of—for lack of a better word, I will call it a return to civility.

THE U.N. WILL SELL ITSELF

And, Mr. Humphrey, in your view of television, and people taking off their shoes and banging them on the table, which I am sure would get the attention of the camera immediately—the fact is, the U.N. will sell itself—it is worth selling. There is no gimmick by which the

Mekong Delta or disease or anything else is going to sell your constituents if your constituents see the U.N. as a vehicle for the gunmen, a vehicle for anti-Semitism and anti-Israel feeling. They probably will not support it, and I agree right now that there is a good deal more support for the U.N., as an ideal. There is less support for the U.N. as a specific institution.

I do not think, really, that a public relations campaign will do this because the public relations campaign is never going to outweigh the picture of a Khrushchev banging his shoe on the table, the picture of an Arafat throwing back his coat to show that he is armed in the General Assembly, the expulsion of participating nations for whatever reason. As soon as you start expelling people from the parliament of governments, you get into trouble. Because you do it, most frequently, on an ideological basis. And the business of diplomacy is not the furtherance of ideological triumphs; it is trying to work together with other people to preserve that world long enough for Mr. Fuller's dreams about it to come around. It is trying to get along, trying to negotiate.

This is not a romantic or glamorous thing; it is much easier to stand up there and, I suppose, fire six machine gun rounds into the ceiling. This would get much more attention, as it would if any Member of the Senate here this morning would do the same thing. I am sure it would get at least 30 seconds on the evening news.

The U.N. will sell itself, and as a part of that selling, I would think, Senator Clark, that the most desirable thing we could get would be by physical acts within the U.N. to reaffirm its position as the forum from which useful negotiation can be carried on. Because the more this becomes an ideological platform, the more the people opposed to any given ideology are going to reject the U.N. as an institution, because you must accept that the ideological platform—whatever it may be at the moment—is not going to be accepted by everybody.

The people who are nonaccepting of the ideological majority are going to be the ones who then must turn against the institution to preserve their own ideology. It is only when the institution can be neutral, when the institution can be used by both sides, when the institution can be a true witness, and a place where you can do business, that this is going to work. And if anything, I would think that those steps which we might take, which would make of the institution a more useful, helpful, negotiatory place, would be helpful.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I am through.

Senator HUMPHREY. Let me just say to Mr. Scammon that I do not believe in a public relations campaign for the U.N. I believe in what I call balanced observation of the U.N.

Mr. SCAMMON. I am afraid, though, Senator Humphrey, as you know better than I from your long experience in politics, people come into your office, as the mayor of Minneapolis, with a dying child in their arms, are the people to whom the people are going to listen.

I do not think, really—I would not want to say it is irrelevant, but the fact is that news values being what news values are; the fact, the demonstrable facts as an expulsion of Israel from the General Assembly, will have far greater weight than all of the youngsters

going around in my neighborhood, for example, on Halloween collecting for UNICEF.

Senator HUMPHREY. I do not disagree with that at all. That is what bothers me, I guess.

The Arafat thing was very disturbing; the boycotting of Israel in UNESCO was very disturbing to those of us, who have been very, very pro-U.N. I served as a delegate there in 1956. I have sponsored the resolution for our 10th anniversary of participation in San Francisco. I have devoted 25 years of my life to work for the U.N., but I must be very frank about it, I became very discouraged and disgusted this past year.

And I believe the point you are making about the Assembly is so valid. The Assembly does work itself into an ideological forum, regrettably.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RHETORIC—A SOUND BARRIER TO U.N. ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Mr. SCAMMON. It is a forum of showboating and rhetoric, and almost inevitably—I will not say inevitably, that would be too strong—but in many, many instances you will find that the rhetoric is so inflammatory, and the Arafats are so disturbing, that they tend to create a sound barrier through which the true accomplishments of the U.N. find a great deal of difficulty penetrating.

Senator HUMPHREY. Exactly right.

I would hope that we would emphasize, as a government, as was said here today, the very most qualified representation at the U.N. I think that is terribly important, because I think the quality of our representation indicates our interest in the U.N., and the priority that holds in our country.

Second, that we would emphasize these excellent agencies, the instrumentalities, the work force so to speak, of the United Nations. The effort at reconstituting the voting procedure is going to be exceedingly difficult, but it is not something that we should say is impossible. And I would hope that this committee would undertake this study, Mr. Bitker, that you have noted here. And we should send immediately a request to get the treaty on antidiscrimination before this committee. It belongs here. After all, we passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964.

I think we can assure you that as a result of these hearings, which are very informative, that we can draw up a body of observations and recommendations for the committee. And I hope that we will do so.

We are indebted to Senator Percy for his initiative in this matter. I want to repeat again that Senator Gale McGee, who has taken such an interest in this committee on the United Nations activity, has been a true patriot for the organization and for our participation in it.

But again, I come back to what I started with. Until the President of the United States—whoever he is—and until the power centers of the Government decide to make our participation in the United Nations something more than just a facade, it is not going to be what it ought to be.

The U.N. needs the power of the United States as a partner, and, as was said here, not as a domineering parent. I would hope that in this

period of détente there might be some more effort made to try to reconcile some of the differences between the United States and the U.S.S.R. as it relates to their conduct in the U.N. We could do a great deal that way.

Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; you have been thoughtful in your comments.

I would certainly like to note for the record the members of our own staff: Ms. Hansen; Mr. Cohen, of my office; and the other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff.

And I would also like to mention that there is one other treaty that has been hanging around the committee for many, many years: The U.N. Convention on the Political Rights of Women.

This might be an awfully good year, Senator Humphrey, for you and I to resurrect that. How many years has it been before the committee? Sixteen years. Well, this ought to be about time; it ought to be coming into its majority soon.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, it took us 15 years to get the civil rights year; maybe it will take us 16 for this.

LONGER PRESENCE OF SECRETARY OF STATE AT THE U.N.

Senator PERCY. Ms. Robbins mentioned on the first page of her testimony the time the Secretary of State spent at the United Nations. And Senator Symington made a recommendation in his report to this committee after his tour of duty last fall that the Secretary of State spend more time there and more time in the country while the U.N. General Assembly in in session.

Did you have any specific idea as to how long you think the Secretary of State should spend in New York and what he should do differently than has been done by recent secretaries?

Miss FREDERICK. Senator, I believe the Secretary is probably spending about as much time as he can in New York. I would not presume to tell him how long he should be there. He should be there as long as necessary to make it plain that he is really heading the delegation and is working through the United Nations.

As I tried to point out, one gets the impression now that he comes there largely to have his minisummit meetings, and it makes it possible for him to talk with delegates separately. I would like to see him take a more active part in the U.N. activities as such, and even in making more than just one formal speech and sitting in the assembly hall. I know that must be awfully boring for him to have to listen to all those speeches, but at least it would demonstrate an interest. I believe it is very important for the United States to show to the rest of the world that the U.N. is important to us, and I do not think we are doing that at the present time.

MOYNIHAN APPOINTMENT

Senator PERCY. I wonder if you would care to comment on the expected appointment of Professor Moynihan. And if you have read his article in Commentary magazine, would you care to give us your observations as to the approach he would take to the United Nations if he were to follow out his own recommendations in that article.

Miss FREDERICK. Senator, first I should ask you, of the Senate committee, whether or not he is going to be the next representative.

Senator PERCY. We received no official notification.

Miss FREDERICK. In other words, all we have so far is a news leak.

Senator PERCY. That is right.

Miss FREDERICK. So, the question may be academic. I believe he was offered this job once before and eventually turned it down. So, it is difficult to say.

Now, as far as his point of view is concerned, I have not read completely the article in Commentary. I have read excerpts of it; I have heard a great deal about it. I know something of the substance of it. I also have heard him interviewed on the "Today Show." I hope you do not mind the commercial.

In that interview, he did not repeat the very strong words he had used in Commentary. As far as I can remember, he did not say anything about going into the U.N. and giving them hell. But his comments seemed to be more constructive; that the idea was to go into the United Nations and make plain what our position is.

Now, I would have no quarrel with that. I think that is terribly important. But if the idea is for him to come in and pursue—or any delegate—to pursue, presumably on instructions of the State Department, rhetoric of confrontation, then I think that we are going backward instead of forward. And the time has come, as I tried to say in my remarks, that we should lower our voices and enter into a dialog such as we are trying to do with the Soviet Union. Or can it be that we have one policy for the little nations and another policy for the big nations?

Senator PERCY. Possibly we should listen to our own American Indian adage, which says that if you want to understand the soul of a man, walk in his shoes. Maybe we should try to do that with the developing world, try to see their problems through their eyes, and show an understanding of them.

HOW TO ACHIEVE DÉTENTE WITH THE THIRD WORLD

Now, we get into a very tough problem when we get to the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. I had that responsibility for 3 months in New York. This charter has been debated for 3 years, so I was in on it for 10 percent of the time, but I was there when we had to cast the vote. There were three or four extreme sections and those sections were opposed by some in the Group of 77, but they said, "Well, we have to go along; we have to vote for it. But heaven forbid, we will never invest in a country holding to the philosophy of this charter, which would confiscate, expropriate, nationalize, and pay whatever they think it is worth, considering all the excesses of the past, and with no real recourse to international law:

We did find ways that we could conciliate in other areas, but we felt these provisions would frighten private investment away from the third world. So we voted no on it.

Would you have advised that we vote for something even though we did not believe in it? Or abstain from voting, as a number of nations did, just to have sort of a détente with the third world on this new international economic order they are trying to create.

Miss FREDERICK. Senator, I would repeat what has been suggested here today, and I believe Harlan Cleveland has also suggested, that we put more emphasis on trying to reach consensus, rather than votes. I would hope that in important situations like that, a vote would be postponed or even omitted while every effort was made to reach consensus. And after all, that does not have to be in one session, a week or a month, when we consider, as Mr. Bitker has pointed out, how long it took us to get a Constitution of the United States shaped up and we consider how long it took to write the Charter of the United Nations. It seems to me that using time to try to reach consensus rather than rushing to a vote might contribute to a constructive outcome.

And in one other connection, Senator Percy, if I may recall your speaking about what we all ought to do in listening more, to quote that late statesman once more, from your State, Adlai Stevenson, he said what the United States needs most is a good hearing aid. Perhaps that is still one of our greatest needs.

Senator PERCY. I should say that is what I need, also. My battery ran out this morning, but I am happy to say I have heard all of you quite well.

I would like to ask Mr. Scammon a question on public attitudes toward foreign economic aid. As the Senator from Minnesota knows, it is not the most popular program. And Senator Humphrey and I have long supported economic assistance to developing countries, but not without a battle back home.

SUPPORT FOR BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL AID

Do you sense any support for continuation of bilateral assistance? Or do you see public support moving more in the direction of multilateral assistance?

Mr. SCAMMON. This would be too sophisticated a question. Most people are simply against foreign aid—bilateral, multilateral, unilateral, anything. It is a fact of our political system that for 30 years you have been able, in the Congress, to maintain the program of foreign aid against the manifest opposition of the great majority.

The fact of the matter is that the apparatus of our society has been able to maintain a program here which has for many, many years been anathema to the substantial majority of the American people.

When you ask the question about multilateral or bilateral, this is irrelevant. They just do not think of it this way. People who read the editorial columns in the New York Times may be able to think about this a bit and say, well, bilateral, multilateral. But for the great mass of people, this would not really be a question on which they would have any particular judgment. It is spinach and to hell with it, would be the answer.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

IS THE SOVEREIGN STATE FUNCTIONALLY DEAD?

I would like a comment from both Dr. Bitker and Dr. Fuller on the provocative statement made by Dr. Fuller that sovereign nationalities are functionally extinct. And you say, Dr. Fuller, that their continued presence is the world's No. 1 pollutant.

Do you mean by this that nationalism is dead or should be dead?

And with specific question for both of you to comment on: Do you feel any form of world government is now in order or that we are moving toward it? Or that there is any possibility that the American people are ready to accept any concept like that?

Mr. FULLER. I have been asking myself the question you asked me for a very long time; and I am a student of large patterns and trying to see what evolution does about some of these things. And I think human beings do not often realize how powerful, knowledgeable and competent is universal evolution. X-ray cinema makes visible organization of a chicken—the gradual assembly from its embryo, all taking place inside the egg—much of which process seems chaotic and discreetly uncontrolled. Humans do not see the logical interrelatedness of big evolutionary development. All the technical happenings which were unpredicted in my youth seem only in retrospect to have been obviously sequitor to their immediate predecessor developments. Humans tend to think that Universe is waiting upon them to make the evolutionary decisions. I do not. That is why I have tried to stress the fact with you today that when considered before they occurred all the technological events in my life were thought to be absolutely impossible. Therefore they were not the consequence of society deliberately undertaking to bring them about. Individual inventors often called "crack pots" brought them into realization. It was completely unexpected. When I was 5 years of age no one realized that we would develop any of the 20th-century technology. Anyone who even suggested humans reaching safely to and returning from the moon were called lunatics and in jeopardy of being incarcerated in a lunatic aslyum.

As an infinitely small detail in designing terrestrial ecology Nature designed the honey bees with their chromosomic drive to go after honey in order to have them inadvertently cross-pollinize the vegetation so too, by a million other chromosomically programed behaviors, Nature arranged to grow and sustain humans on our planet. Also 99 percent chromosomically programed humans usually have been doing a lot of the right things for the wrong reasons. What we think of as side effects are usually evolution's main events. The time has come when we must participate directly in the main stream of universe instead of only accidentally while playing lethally biased exclusive survival games instead of the all-inclusive main show.

When our forebears evolved the system of democratic representation of the United States all the first representatives were well and favorably known to their local neighbors, everybody knew them. Their term of office was predicated on the realization that they would have to go to the central meeting place in Philadelphia by foot or by horse over foot paths, Indian trials or very small highways stopping over night at inns and talking with everybody along the way. And while in Philadelphia—or later in Washington—three or four important letters might come from Europe during the whole year you were there. Everybody at the capitol knew what the letters said. They all talked about the letters with one another. Then all of the representatives started back homeward talking to people along the way, at the inns, and homes. They would tell everybody at home about the four letters from Europe this year and what everybody in Philadelphia—or later

in Washington—thought about the situation and what the people along the way think and would then say to their home people "How do you feel about it and what do you want me to do about it?" They were told and then they walked or rode on these often many-days travel to the capital. We had what science calls a one-to-one correspondence between stimulation and response.

With the unexpected development of the telegraph 30 years later news short-circuited the representatives' direct communication system and reached people in minutes instead of in months and the people had no way to respond to the stimulation. Since that time radio and television broadcasting have added to the telegraph-fed newspapers in producing a constant barrage adding to hundreds of thousands of stimulations before any political response could be manifest by the citizenry.

DEMOCRACY IS NOT WORKING TODAY

Democracy worked well with the initial one-to-one correspondence. Today, democracy is not working. It is not the fault of the concept of democracy. Democracy is unable to express itself. That is why political viewpoints—samplings—have developed. The Congress conducts as many inquiries as possible to discover in advance of elections what their constituents are thinking. Particularly amongst the young there is a feeling of absolute futility. The system is not working.

ELECTROMAGNETIC COMMUNICATIONS

Over a great many years I have been following the technology of electromagnetic communication to find out if it did not contain its own answer to how the one-to-one correspondence might be regained. In 1940 I was science and technology consultant on the staff of Fortune magazine. After checking with the telephone system engineers and finding it technically feasible and not disruptive of all other regular services—proposed daily telephone voting on all prominent questions before Congress. That was back in 1940 and I published my proposal in my book, No More Secondhand God. Since World War II studies have been scientifically conducted disclosing electromagnetic energy output of human brains. The work has been scientifically conducted in veteran hospitals with electrodes fastened to the heads of volunteers.

Then, using recording oscillographs unique patterns were discovered to be identified with specific dreams. Most recently experiments have disclosed an electromagnetic field surrounding the whole body of humans which field discloses a positive or negative attitude or response to various stimuli very much as does the polygraph or lie detector through direct contact. With the sensors, now mounted in satellites orbiting our planet, broadcasting to us, there is present in this room right now one electromagnetic program amongst several million which if tuned in by the right radio set can tell us where every beef cattle on Earth is located. As a consequence we may soon have the capability to directly sense how each and every human feels about each and every common human problem of the moment as each such problem and its alternative solutions are separately broadcast. This might well develop within the critical 10 years of which I have been speaking. Senator Percy, you have asked me what kind of world government may develop. It may

well be akin to the city management concept, where the management has to do whatever the satellite sensor harvested and computer analysis says that the world majority thinks ought to be done. Undoubtedly the world majority would make many mistakes but as the mistake becomes evident the majority of humans will think that this alternative would work better and because they think so it will be satellite sensed and the computer will instruct management to immediately alter the course.

This is the way all mechanical steering mechanisms of airplanes or ships of the sea work. The servomechanisms responding to sensed error in first one direction and then the other successively correct the steering first this way then that way averaging an accomplished course halfway between. The variations get finer and finer trending toward but never attaining absolute "straightness." This is the essence of cybernetics. This way humans reached the moon. It is the essence of all life growth. Development of such satellite harvested electromagnetic field sensing of how world democracy feels about any proposed solution of any given problem is close at hand or has already been technically prototyped. An incorruptible, true direct planetary democracy with all of humanity franchised and always voting may well render all humanity sustainable, successful. So those are my thoughts, sir.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Do you have a comment, Dr. Bitker?

Mr. BITKER. Well, it will be a very brief one, Senator Percy.

In the first place, how can anyone add to what we have just heard? But let me just quote from a leading statesman in the era of the Revolution who asked and was disturbed by the very question you are asking now, Senator Percy. And this is the question which faces this committee today, and this is what George Washington said with respect to the same problem—and this is what he said, very briefly, "We are either a united people under one head and for Federal purposes, or we are 13 independent sovereigns, eternally counteracting each other."

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

Senator HUMPHREY. I want to express my deep appreciation to our witnesses. They have added immensely to our better understanding of the problem.

Let me express our thanks on behalf of the committee.

Our next meeting is on May 21. The witnesses will be William Sloane Coffin, chaplain of Yale University; Seyom Brown, of the Brookings Institution; Alvin Toffler, author of "Future Shock"; and Norman Cousins, editor of "The Saturday Review World."

We thank the witnesses once again.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene Wednesday, May 21, 1975.]

54-738—75——16

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room 4221, the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John Sparkman [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Symington, Clark, Case, Javits, and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee come to order please.

Several other Senators have indicated they will be here, but I think we had better get moving.

OPENING STATEMENT

Today marks the fifth day in the series of hearings by the Committee on Foreign Relations on the United States and the United Nations. We have heard from many distinguished persons so far.

Our topic today is United Nations, "other visions", which will be discussed by a panel no less eminent than those who preceded them.

As I introduce them I will ask each one of them to take a seat at the witness table. First, is the Reverend William Sloane Coffin, Jr., who has been university chaplain at Yale university since 1958, but has announced his intention to leave soon. He is equally well known for his deep involvement in various causes, such as civil rights and antiwar efforts.

Next we have a representative from the world of so-called think tanks, Mr. Seyom Brown, who was for many years with Rand Corp. and is now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Among his publications is "New Forces in World Politics," of which we expect to hear something this morning.

The following witness, Mr. Norman Cousins, hardly needs introducing. Since his biographic sketch in "Who's Who" takes some 50 lines, I will say only that he has been editor of the Saturday Review for many years and a noted writer. I understand his plane had been delayed a little but, he is here now.

Then we have Mr. Alvin Toffler, another distinguished journalist, author, and educator, whose visions of the future have kept us intrigued and thinking.

Senator CASE. I admire the chairman's eloquence in introducing these men. He has not repeated himself once and that is pretty good. [Laughter.]

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Our first witness will be Mr. Coffin. We are very glad to hear from you now.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM SLOANE COFFIN, CHAPLAIN, YALE UNIVERSITY

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you. We even outnumber you right now, first of all.

The CHAIRMAN. We will overwhelm you later.

Mr. COFFIN. First of all, may I thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee for which I have often had great admiration. I often thought this committee was trying to tell the American people that we strongly need new power and we do not know how to use it.

I took very seriously, sir, your notation of vision in your letter. Obviously, a preacher is not an expert on nuts and bolts of the level of the U.N. It is one thing to say just like muddy water, something else work out of the irrigation system. So I am going, if I may, with the vision, feeling as I do, that the world is less and less visionable because our moral is less and less coherent. I will if I may, to use the language of my trade, I do not think God is a monkey, I think the world swings on an ethical hinge and we have loosened that hinge, and that is why history and nature is feeling shocked.

If I may start, sir, with a little biblical history very rapidly.

WARNING AGAINST COUNSELS OF FEAR

As you well recall, after a long trek the children of Israel finally reached the borders of the promised land and spies went out and they returned predictably with a minority report and a majority report. The minority report said we can go ahead as long as we do not lose hope which we can translate a passion for the impossible. The minority report, far from being prophetic, was pragmatic.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe he said let us go in and take the land.

Mr. COFFIN. That is right, sir. But the majority report you may remember, said we can not go in and take the land because there are giants in the land and we seem to ourselves as grasshoppers and so we seem to them. And the prudence of counsel very thinly veiled, I think, the cowardice of those submitting the majority report. Then you certainly remember, Senator Sparkman, that the loud cry went up and there were murmurs against Moses of Israel and people said let us go back to Egypt. That line "we seem to ourselves as grasshoppers" seems to bear out the statement of a great President of some years ago, we have nothing to fear but fear itself. It is also fear, it seems to me, does us in, which is why the scripture says the opposite of love is not hatred but fear. Perfect love casts out fear.

Those seek the truth fear safety and fear distorts the truth. It seems to me not by exaggerating the problems of the world but by understanding our ability to deal with them that we seem to ourselves as grasshoppers. Fear seeks safety and safety lies in failure.

It seems to me majorities are prone to the protective strategy of the deliberate failure. If you do not place any bets you will not lose any money. If you sleep on the floor you will not fall out of bed. And if you can blame your sense of failure on giants in the land, on other people, you do not feel so badly about being a failure. And then, finally, if you can feel those who tried to wean you from your sense of failure are only trying to use you, you can resist them with good conscience and, OK, Joshua, as you recall were stoned.

A PROMISED TIME AHEAD

I recall this little bit of biblical history not because I think there is any promised land left for anyone but I do think that there is a promised time, if you will, for everyone. That is that after an even longer more arduous trek all the inhabitants of the globe now stand on the borders of a time which was always promised and it will come to pass in the latter days. It was always promised in scripture that they could, in fact, be a world that was a world without famine, a world without borders, a world one in piece. But instead of moving forward to occupy the promised time, it seems to me that we Americans are adopting the protectice strategy of deliberate failure, our failure of nerve. We are talking about giant obstacles as if they were not brilliant opportunities, brilliantly disguised. And from a religious point of view it is particularly distressing. God is ahead as much as he is within or above us. So it seems to me that our task these days—and I assume that this Senate committee has sent out spies, as they were, in to the promised land to see what it looks like—is to figure out whether we can go ahead or not. I would like to take just a few moments now to say what seems to me we should be having in our minds in the way of a vision as we try and go forward into this land, and let me stay, if I may, with my religious talk.

GLOBAL FUTURE AND UNITY

The first thing I think we have to recognize is that God cares for all as if all were but one. I am often told you have to be realistic and I am completely in agreement. What else are we to be in the world if not realistic? What is reality and for religious points of view, remember America, it is that we all belong one to another. That is the way God made us, all 3 billion odd people on this planet. We all belong one to another. The Christian point of view is Christ died to keep us that way. We are constantly trying to put assunder what God himself put together. Am I my brother's keeper? No, I am my brother's brother. We are not called on to create, only to make it manifest. And what strikes me very apparent these days is there is a confluence now between ancient religious vision, Christian, Buddhist, a confluence between an ancient religious vision and absolute pragmatic need. The global future is the only future for all of us. It used to be that looking at the globe we say that part cannot protect itself against that part but now the whole cannot protect itself against the part. I am thinking of the ozone layer, the whole cannot protect itself against the parts any more, which is to say this survival of the unit in our time is not an individual, not an

individual nation, it is obviously entirely human race plus its environment. So God cares for all if all were but one. But having that, I would say, that I think we always have to be on notice that God cares for each as if he had each to care for, which is to say the bottom 30 percent of the economic ladder of the planet around is just as important to God as any other part of the economic ladder.

I stress that because Mr. Scali is not going to stress that. I stress that because Mr. Kissinger does not seem to understand that. Mr. Kissinger seems to believe in a global village, but Mr. Kissinger, like so many other people, seems to feel that the powerful are the village elders and the global unity has to be based on law and order, and on a hierarchy of power and not on equity.

THIRD WORLD—THE MORAL PROBLEM OF OUR TIME

Now it seems to me that all men are created equal, that they are endowed with certain inalienable rights. I think justice is the moral imperative of our time, which means that the Third World is the moral problem of our time.

I am impressed, in bicentennial terms, that we are now at that stage that was called the olive branch petition years and I am sure you, Mr. Chairman, will remember the shot fired that was heard around the world took place in April 1775 but we did not declare independence for over a year because the colonies did not want independence, most of them. They were too tied by communal bond to the mother country, they pleaded with the King and Parliament for unity based on law and justice, but the King and Parliament chose law and order, perhaps proving once again, as patronage is the last refuge of the scoundrel, so law and order is the last refuge of the violent. Now I think the Third World is holding out that what we might call the olive branch; the only kind of global unity that makes sense is the global unity based on justice.

SHARING OUR WEALTH

Now, if that means, as I think it does, that the United States has to share its wealth, that by me is just fine. In fact, I think the rich are more at the mercy of the richest than the poor at the mercy of poverty. We have a spiritually devastating effect. I think it would be a fine thing if the spies in the promised time would come back and say we have a new understanding of austerity.

There are two ways to be rich, obviously. One is to have lots of money, and the other is to have few needs. The American people are really given the second option. But austerity seems to me is not a necessary evil so much as a necessary ingredient for human solidarity, because the desire for greater abundance is disruptive on human solidarity. We have been ruthlessly greedy in this country with devastating effects, spiritually speaking, which is the only significant way to speak. Therefore, if we have to go for global unity based on justice, by sharing some of our wealth, that seems to me is only going to improve the morale and certainly the moral health of this country.

Now, with that kind of a vision, it seems to me, we can do many things, whether within the United Nations or outside the United Nations. For instance, with regard to world food, territorial discrimination is now as evil as reparable discrimination. That is what

that kind of vision is saying. And I know that is a tough vision to live out. But it seems to me it is our only option, and we need desparately to have spokesmen for this kind of vision. Territorial discrimination is as evil as reparable discrimination. Every human being on this planet has the right to live, not the way the Catholics define it narrowly, but simply in terms of a basic life, which would mean that food is certainly part of the right to life, and, therefore, sharing it is not an option of charity but an obligation of justice. If we define problems in this fashion we will find solutions, and we will have perhaps instead of a private food reserve, and instead of national food reserve we will have a world food reserve and we will seek deliberately to put it under world auspices so it can reflect more accurately the type of global community in which we believe.

REDUCING ARMAMENTS TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENT

Certainly I would argue that we work very quickly to reduce the armaments in this world. I do not see how we can go on with what we are doing now. It simply proves that society like misery likes company, and maybe a 10 percent reduction of the world military budget will be the best way to finance long-term development under terms which the U.N. may be able to work out, given the news in the morning paper. My concern, as I said at the beginning, is not with the nuts and bolts. It seems to me we need to have a moral reality that is more coherent; we need to have a global vision which makes sense. I would hope that the spies in the promised time will come back and say to the American people that the promised time is better than the good old days. We now have a world; we created a world for all of us.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Now we will hear from Mr. Brown of Brookings Institution.

STATEMENT OF SEYOM BROWN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am honored to be able to share some of my views about the world crisis and the U.N. with you this morning. Let me relate to the phrase of Reverend Coffin that the whole cannot protect itself against the parts. That recognition, that realization, I think, is becoming shared by more and more people today.There is a recognition, universally, that the need for international cooperation is essential, yet the United Nations system, the main hope for protecting the whole against the parts and also for protecting the legitimate rights of the parts, the U.N. system is in its deepest trouble yet. Ironically, when its prestige is at its low mark, the U.N. system is more implicated in world politics and economics than at any time since its founding. This is what is alarming—the fact that it is more needed just at the time that there is more despair about its ability to perform these needed tasks.

And I gather that it is this problem, this paradox, that is the reason why the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is devoting special attention to this problem today; and I also assume that this is the reason why someone with the perspicacity of American Ambassador Moynihan seems to have an itch to participate in U.N. debates. The U.N. is where the action is more so than ever before.

PRESENT U.N. INVOLVEMENTS

If involvement is a measure of an institution's health, the U.N. system is alive and well.

U.N. Forces at this moment are patroling the cease-fire lines in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Today under U.N. auspices, the largest negotiation ever in human history, the negotiation over the allocation and setting new rules for the oceans, two-thirds of the surface of the planet, are underway.

The international review conference on the nonproliferation treaty is considering the expansion of the role of the IAEA to keep pace with the frightening spread of weapons-convertible nuclear technology. The IMF (International Monetary Fund) today is being given more responsibility than ever before for steering the relationships between the world's major currencies lest pure unilateralism in altering exchange rates becomes a form of destructive protectionism and international economic coercion. And we have, at the beginning of September, to look forward to the U.N. special session on the new economic order. This session is going to be tackling the most highly charged international political economy issues of the mid-1970's, including the international regulations of commodity pricing.

The special session, belatedly, is being taken very seriously by the U.S. Government and other industrialized countries. Also outside of the Government, possibly within the Government, the policy community is giving serious consideration to setting up some kind of umbrella international institution under U.N auspices that would absorb the functions of the GATT and at the same time deal with the issues of commodity pricing and export controls.

GROWTH OF NEW INTERNATIONAL POPULISM

Now a Martian looking down at all of this activity today might conclude that the U.N. and indeed humankind in general was on the brink of some kind of new burst of creative international activity at least as great as that which resulted in the establishment of a League of Nations and then the U.N. system itself. So why all of the pessimism, why the despair over the future of the U.N.? The source of the despair of many in the U.S. policy community, even among some who are usually the staunchest supporters of the U.N., can be summed up in a phrase, the new-international populism, militant demands by the majority of countries upon the privileged minority, mainly the non-Communist industrialized countries, for an international redistribution of wealth and political power are being made with greater frequency and greater intensity within the U.N. system. These kinds of demands are injected assertively in all kinds of U.N. forums and negotiations with the insistence they be made top priority agenda items, often with the threat that if the redistribution demands are no given top priority attention, there will be a disruption of the normal processes of these institutions. The would-be leaders of this populist coalition, Algeria, sometimes China, will sometimes, somewhat demagogically attempt to turn even more mundane deliberations into debates on the central populous themes of redistribution. They enjoy bringing matters to a head in the form of yes or no votes on

resolutions some of which, while they may have no means of practical implementation, can reenforce the emotional bonds among the populist coalition and spotlight the isolated position of the United States at the same time.

The Arab countries have played upon the populist coalition to good effect for their own causes. They have identified themselves with the populist coalition, and this has allowed them to swing that coalition in back of their vendetta against Israel.

China has tried to effect a similar mobilization of the populists to its side in its conflicts with the Soviet Union but with less success than the Arabs, because the Soviet Union itself usually takes every opportunity to vote with the populist coalition.

INADEQUATE U.S. RESPONSE TO NEW INTERNATIONAL POPULISM

Now I am not most concerned with the fact of international populism, which I believe is a historically inevitable reaction to the dismantling of colonial empires, to the enfranchisement of people internationally who have not had a right even to express themselves, but I am most concerned rather, with the wholly inadequate responses to it, thus far, by this country. The responses to it by this country, thus far, indicate a pessimistic attitude, a withdrawal in a sense from what is really happening in the international system.

There is an exception. Ambassador Moynihan thinks he has found an appropriate response to the third and fourth world militancy which find its most expression in U.N. forums today. Moynihan traces this militancy to the Fabian socialist ideology of former British subjects who are now leaders of some of these new states. He would do just as well to blame the militancy in the former French colonies, on the French Jacobins, and radical nationalists in Latin America on Simon Bolivar. Woodrow Wilson should also be given some of the credit for the rise of this international militancy.

Moynihan's prescription presented in the "Commentary" article of March 1975, which I am sure many of you have read, is to stop appeasing the third and fourth world ideologues, and to go into opposition.

With what? Well, with a kind of a pudding of Burkean political conservatism to counter the new Jacobins and economic liberalism, ala Adam Smith, to combat the egalitarian state socialism of the new Fabians.

If only we could overcome this U.N. crisis by debate and ideological confrontation in the General Assembly; but the U.N. crisis has its sources in the structural upheavals of world society. Perhaps we can find the guide for constructively responding to these structural upheavals which are the source of the new international populism by looking to our own domestic experience with analogous pressures. After all, instead of Jacobinism or monarchical restoration we produced Jeffersonianism. The bitter populism in the late 19th century which threatened to tear apart our civil society was supplanted by the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Again, the New Deal was the progressive response to the great world depression of the 1930's, which otherwise might have left the society polar-

ized, as so many societies were, between the Marxist than Leninists and the Fascists.

The essence of the American response, the American progressive response, to populist militism, has been, first, increased accountability of the priviliged and the powerful to wider public interest and institutionalization of such increased accountability. That was the first part of the American response. Second, allowing greater participation by the otherwise alienated in the processes of politics and government.

ADOPTING A PROGRESSIVE RESPONSE TO NEW INTERNATIONAL POPULISM

I believe that an equally progressive response to the new international populism could build on the American democratic experience. The hallmarks of such a response would be U.S. open support for strengthened norms and processes of international accountability, and support for greater participation by the developing countries in important international negotiations and institutions.

A posture of international progressivism would mean that the United States would commit itself internationally to the basic ethical principle of progressivism in our own society, to the principle that those whose action substantially effect others should accord the affected parties a role in the decision processes related to the actions. As a principle, this would obligate governments, and international institutions, to consult with those whom they effect. A fuller implementation would accord the affected parties decisionmaking weight corresponding to the degree to which they are affected. We should demand this kind of international accountability from others, too. Certainly from the OPEC nations who are not acting in a way that is accountable to those whom they affect. But we have to be willing, I suggest, to take the first steps. To demand that the OPEC countries act in accord with the principles of international accountability now that their oil pricing policies substantially effect the U.S. economy is only to invite the outraged retort of the Venezuelan President: Where were you when we were screaming about the price of your industrial exports?

Understandably, others can now accuse us of saying what is mine, what is yours is international.

Now, our present ambassador to the U.N. flails out against the tyranny of the majority; but have we, when we were in the majority, refrained from imposing our will on strongly motivated minorities?

Our top foreign policy officials worry most today about the loss of U.S. credibility. How about the credibility of the U.S. commitments to international processes of dispute resolution and peaceful change? The threats to U.S. security posed by a general deterioration of international order, by a lack of international accountability in today's world, these threats are more real and loom larger in the years ahead than any fantasy of falling dominos.

The threat to the U.N. is only a part of the general crisis in the international system. The international populists are able to exploit this crisis because of the vacuum in progressive leadership by countries like the United States.

A U.S. posture of progressive international accountability, has implications, of course, beyond the way we might conduct ourself in U.N.

debates. There are numerous practical applications in a variety of fields. A few examples:

International accountability would mean that despite the sluggish pace of the negotiations on the law of the sea, the United States would refrain from unilateral extension of its coastal zone and from unilateral authorizations of its corporations to exploit the sea bed before the establishment of an international regime. The Congress, of course, must play a crucial role in resisting the pressures of special interests.

If we were serious about international accountability, if we were really as serious about world community, as Secretary Kissinger says we are, we would enter into serious negotiations to develop a comprehensive international system for protecting commodity producers and consumers from damaging fluctuations in prices. Now on the basis of Secretary Kissinger's Kansas City speech it appears that the U.S. Government is making some moves in the direction of accepting the legitimacy at least of a comprehensive negotiation on commodities.

PUBLIC OPINION RESTRAINTS ON U.S. POLICY

Senator CASE. In respect of Law of the Sea Conference, our Government is far ahead of American opinion. I want to say this again. Our Government, this administration, is far ahead of American opinion, which would extend American unilateral domination not only for fisheries but also for exploration of the seabed, far beyond that which our Government has been trying to work out.

So I want to indicate that I think you ought to be fair about this because you are not talking about a few selfish interests, you are talking about a generality of American opinion. I believe this very deeply because I have been subject to considerable pressure. I have tried to restrain American action in exploiting these things until we could see if we could get an international agreement.

Mr. BROWN. I would like to discuss this with you further during the discussion period.

Senator CASE. The only reason I interrupted, I have to leave at 11 o'clock to go to a conference and I did want to make that point here.

Mr. BROWN. May I, however, just pose a rhetorical question to you, which maybe we can pick up in the discussion, and that is how do we know what American opinion really is?

Senator CASE. You ask a politician if you want to know what American opinion is.

Mr. BROWN. I understand. But it is an articulate organized opinion. Organized and articulate opinion is one kind of opinion. Opinion that is created by any consistent, new vision is another kind of opinion, and what I am suggesting here——

Senator CASE. I might say that is inchoate opinion.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, but who makes choate? The pressure groups, the special interests, those who represent the public?

Senator CASE. I do not disagree with you. We ought to be striving to be better. But this is not opinion now.

Mr. BROWN. Granted. What we are trying to do partially today is create an understanding of why a different approach toward the

law of the sea is so essential. It is in the self-interest of some of the very groups I think are misguided in believing that a dividing up of the sea is going to be in their interest.

I would like, if we could, I am sorry that you are leaving at 11 o'clock, because that is a favorite topic of mine.

Senator CASE. We have no argument about it, but I can tell you fishermen off the New Jersey coast have very clear ideas of what their interests are.

Mr. BROWN. I am sure they do.

Senator CASE. And Massachusetts.

Mr. BROWN. What their perceived interests are.

Senator CASE. And Connecticut.

Senator PERCY. But not Illinois.

Mr. BROWN. And in San Diego they differ from the east coast.

LEADING IN THE ECOLOGY FIELD

If we were serious also about international accountability in the ecology field, we would take the lead in supporting obligatory international consultations by any country or corporation contemplating projects that might alter natural environments used in common with other countries. These consultations ought not simply to be between corporations and the U.S. government when the corporations want to drill for oil in the Gulf of Mexico, but they ought to be obligatory international consultations. There also should be consultations about other kinds of projects which we can talk about, future projects, such as weather modification.

REGULATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

With respect to multinational corporations, if we were serious about international accountability, really serious about world opinion, I believe the United States would champion international regulation of the behavior of multinationals to assure that they do not take unfair advantage of weak national governments and weak national labor movements, to balance our insistence that there be due process and just compensation by countries who take over our multinational corporation subsidiaries.

If we were taking a progressive international stance, I suggest the United States would support broadening opportunities for developing countries to participate in the decision processes of international financial institutions, of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

AVOIDING POLARIZATION ALONG NORTH-SOUTH LINES

What we should be particularly anxious to avoid is an emotional polarization of world society along north-south lines. This polarization is inconsistent with the sense of basic community that is the precondition for the international accountability that is needed. For the United States to fall into the trap of polarization set by demagogic populists, would be against U.S. interests and against the world interest. This is my main argument against the current

sulking tone of U.S. official response to the populists, and to suggestions the United States should come out swinging against them.

Now what about the support of the American people for such a progressive internationalism? What about Senator Case's concern that you have to get domestic public opinion behind these idealistic sounding notions?

Senator CASE. Take away the demagogic populists and turn them into benign populists.

Mr. BROWN. How do we do that? I would suggest that we do not do it by debating with them or falling into the trap of regarding the U.N. as a debating society. There is more to the U.N. than that.

We have to be very careful that we do not allow them to develop the U.N. forum into polarized coalitions, with the United States leading one coalition, which will be the minority coalition, and the populists leading the other. How do we do it? I think we do it by practical measures in which we identify our concerns with theirs.

GENERATING PUBLIC OPINION IN SUPPORT OF U.N.

Now, what about public opinion?

It is always difficult and probably wrong to look at public opinion polls as a real guide, and I do agree with the Senator that an elected official is the best judge of public opinion.

Senator CASE. He had better be.

Mr. BROWN. Yes. There is this inchoate public opinion which we were talking about; and some indications of what that might be for some of the policies that I am recommending here can be gleaned from a very interesting publication of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Lou Harris Associates published just about a month ago. I summarized some of the results in my prepared statement, which you have. It does show quite high support for fostering international cooperation to solve common problems. The goal of strengthening the U.N., despite all of the despair, still has considerable support, rather surprising support. The pertinent figures are in my prepared presentation.

Now, of course, these polls are an insufficient guide to policy. They inadequately probe for the tough tradeoffs which are the essence of policymaking.

Ask Americans whether they are in favor of interdependence and international cooperation and they will answer, "Yes." Ask them whether they are for preserving U.S. independence, they will answer, "Yes." The tough question involved in a lot of these fields we are talking about, is how much independence to give up in specific fields in order to respond to the needs of an interdependent world. For surely we cannot avoid the fact that by agreeing to respect and enlarge international decision processes, we are in some fields likely to limit our freedom of action, just as a complete insistence on freedom of action will tend to limit our effectiveness in international forums. But to make such tradeoffs is precisely, I would suggest, the role of statesmanship—legislative statesmanship as well as executive.

Public opinion is inert when it comes to generating the real policy

options. It can only respond to the options generated by those who have thoroughly studied the issues.

The public responses, I suggest, would also reflect the concepts and visions suggested by the statesman for evaluating the options. This interplay is crucially important when it comes to the questions at issue here: The role of the United States in international organization and the reform of international organization in the present context of this growing international populism.

To attempt to follow public opinion simply on these questions is to attempt to take guidance from a public that has received little conceptual guidance from the congressional debates so far and heavy Spenglerian visions of the decline of the West from the seventh floor of the State Department.

The main need in U.S. foreign policy generally, not just in its U.N. policies, is for fresh concepts, fresh analysis, to illuminate these optimal tradeoffs that we have to seek between independence and interdependence, and new visions of progressive internationalism that resound with the best in our domestic and international experience, in order to counter the cynicism of both the new populists and the conservative critics.

Thank you.

[The biographical sketch and prepared statement of Mr. Brown follow:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF SEYOM BROWN

Seyom Brown is senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, where he is currently directing a project on technological change and international institutions. From 1962 to 1969 he was a social scientist with the RAND Corporation. He has been a consultant to the Office of International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense, to the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State, and to the United States Navy's "Project 2000." He received his Ph. D. in political science from the University of Chicago, and has taught courses in foreign policy and international relations at UCLA and at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His publications include *New Forces in World Politics*; and *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in U.S. Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson.*

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SEYOM BROWN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

Just when the need for international cooperation is higher than ever and universally recognized, the United Nations system, the main hope for instituting international cooperation, is in its deepest trouble yet. Ironically, with its prestige at a low mark, the UN system is more centrally implicated in world politics and economics than at any time since its founding. If the UN were simply dying a slow death from irrelevance and neglect, it might not warrant our intense concern. But it is precisely the contradiction between greater reliance on the UN simultaneously with a severe loss of faith in its ability to perform its enlarged tasks that is alarming and, I gather, is the reason why the Foreign Relations Committee is devoting special attention to the problem today. It is also, I assume, the reason why someone with the perspicacity of Ambassador Moynihan seems to have an itch to participate in the UN debates.

If involvement is a measure of health, the UN system is alive and well:

UN forces at this moment are patrolling the cease-fire lines in the Sinai and the Golan Heights, with trepidation in all capitals that their mandate may not be renewed this summer.

Under UN auspices the largest international negotiation in history is underway, with fits and starts and prophecies of collapse, in an effort to allocate the biggest hunk of the world's resources ever attempted—two thirds of the earth's surface in and under the ocean.

A parallel negotiation started in April to establish an elaborate UN-affiliated organization to run a space satellite system to handle much of the world's maritime communications.

The international conference of signatories of the Nonproliferation Treaty now meeting is considering expansion of the international inspection functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency to keep pace with frightening spread of weapons-convertible nuclear technology.

In the wake of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the International Monetary Fund has had to assume major responsibility for steering the relationships between the world's major currencies, lest pure unilateralism in altering exchange rates becomes a form of destructive protectionism and international economic coercion.

The UN special session on the "new economic order" scheduled to meet in September, will be tackling the most highly charged international political economy issues of the mid-1970s, including the international regulation of commodity pricing. The special session, an idea of the developing countries, is now, albeit belatedly, being taken very seriously by the United States and other industrialized countries; meanwhile, serious consideration is being given in the U.S. policy community to setting up some kind of umbrella international trade organization within the UN system that would absorb the functions of the GATT.

A Martian looking down at all this unprecedented activity in the UN system might conclude that humankind was on the brink of a new era of international creativity at least as great as that which resulted in the establishment of the League of Nations and then the United Nations itself. So why all the pessimism? Why the despair over the future of the UN?

The source of the despair of many in the United States policy community, even among some who are usually the staunchest supporters of the UN, can be summed up in a phrase, *the new international populism:* military demands by the majority of countries upon the privileged minority, mainly the non-communist industrialized countries, for an international redistribution of wealth and political power. Redistributive demands with no chance of being accepted by the still powerful minority are put forward in an uncompromising tone and injected assertively into all types of forums and negotiations as top priority agenda items, often with the threat of disruption of normal international processes if they are not granted top priority.

Finding themselves in a potential voting majority in many international institutions whenever gross redistributive issues are being discussed, the would-be leaders of the populist coalition, such as Algeria or China, somewhat demagogically will attempt to turn even more mundane deliberations into debates on the central populist themes; they also enjoy bringing such matters to a head in the form of votes on shrill resolutions which, while they may have no means of practical implementation, can reinforce the emotional bonds of the populist coalition, and spotlight the isolated position of the non-Communist industrialized countries, especially the United States. The fact that most Arab countries have identified themselves with the populist coalition has allowed them to swing the coalition in back of their vendetta against Israel. China has tried to effect a similar mobilization of the populists to its side in its conflicts with the Soviet Union, but with less success, for the Soviet Union itself takes every opportunity it can to vote with the populist coalition.

I am most concerned not with the fact of international populism, which is an historically inevitable reaction to the dismantling of the colonial empires, but rather with the despairing and wholly inadequate responses to it thus far by this country.

Ambassador Moynihan thinks he has found an appropriate response, which he derives from locating the cause of today's Third and Fourth World militancy in the Fabian socialist ideology of the former British subjects who are now leaders of some of the new states. He would do just as well to blame the military of the former French colonies on the French Jacobins, and of the radical Latin nationalists on Simon Bolivar. Woodrow Wilson also should be given some credit.

Moynihan's prescription (as presented in his Commentary article of March 1975): Stop appeasing the Third and Fourth World ideologues. Go into open opposition. With what? Apparently with a pudding of Burkean political conservatism to counter the new Jacobins combined with economic liberalism, a la Adam Smith, to combat the egalitarian state socialism of the new Fabians. Additionally, we should expose the hypocricies of developing country leaders who

keep political prisoners in their own countries while preaching to the West about the rights of man. "It is time," he says, "that the American spokesman came to be feared in international forums for the truths he might tell."

If only we could overcome the UN crisis by elegant and witty debate in the General Assembly. But the crisis has its sources in the structural upheavals of world society. Edmund Burke, for all his skill as essayist and orator, could not turn back the French Revolution. Nor could Winston Churchill arrest the independence movement in India by his insistence, "I have not become the King's First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire."

This is not to underestimate the practical consequences of political rhetoric. It is at its best the carrier of the noble visions of a people. And there have been times when the visions of American statesmen inspired the world; but this has usually been when the visions and the rhetoric were forward looking and reflected the basically optimistic and innovative spirit of our society.

Our domestic experience perhaps provides a guide for responding to the new international populism in a more constructive spirit than that recommended by Mr. Moynihan. The radicalization of the French Revolution was not imitated here. Instead of Jacobinism or monarchical restoration we produced Jeffersonianism. The bitter indigenous populism of the late 19th Century that threatened to break the bonds of civil society was supplanted by the progressivism of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Again, the New Deal was a progressive response to the great world depression of the 1930s, which otherwise might have left the society polarized between the Marxist-Leninists and the Fascists.

This society's most progressive responses to militant domestic populism have been in the form of institutional adjustments directed toward (1) increased accountability of the privileged and powerful to wider public interests; and (2) greater participation by the otherwise alienated in the processes of politics and government. An equally progressive response to the new international populism could build on this domestic experience. The hallmarks of such a U.S. response would be support for strengthened norms and processes of international accountability and for greater participation by the developing countries in important international negotiations and institutions.

Such a posture of international progressivism would mean that the United States had committed itself internationally to the principle that those whose actions substantially affect others should accord the affected parties a role in the decision processes related to such actions. At a minimum this principle would obligate governments, international institutions, and nongovernmental entities to consult with those whom they affect. A fuller implementation would accord the affected parties decisionmaking weight corresponding to the degree toward which they are affected.

The first and yet most basic step toward implementing the concept is provided by the Kantian categorical imperative: act in such a way in world affairs as you would have all countries act. Obviously this country has been violating that norm left and right. (Indeed we have heard the present Administration on more than a few occasions justify its coercive international policies on the grounds that other countries are doing it). To demand that the OPEC countries act in accord with principles of international accountability now that their oil pricing policies substantially affect the U.S. economy is only to invite the outraged retort of the Venezuelan President: Where were *you* when we were screaming about the price of your industrial exports? To insist on free and unimpeded passage for all ships through the Strait of Malacca, considering the care with which the United States has maintained its prerogatives in and around the Panama Canal, is to appear to be taking the stance: "What's mine is mine, what's yours is international." Our present ambassador to the United Nations flails out against the "tyranny of the majority." But have we in the past in the General Assembly (and do we now in other international institutions where we are part of the majority) refrained from imposing our will on strongly offended minorities?

Our top foreign policy officials lament the loss of U.S. credibility in honoring our "security" commitments, and apparently feel driven to shore it up by refurbishing our reputation for decisive, unsqueamish military action in response to provocations from tiny and confused countries.

Surely another worry should be the credibility of U.S. commitments to international processes for dispute resolution and peaceful change. The threats to U.S. security posed by a general deterioriation of international order, given the exponential growth in the ability of countries to do each other great damage,

are more real and loom larger in the years ahead than any fantasies of falling dominoes. The threat to the UN system is a part of this general crisis. It is being exploited by the international populists because of a vacuum in progressive leadership by countries like the United States.

The proposed reorientation of U.S. policies in the direction of greater international accountability obviously has implications beyond the way we conduct ourselves in UN debates. There are numerous practical applications in a variety of fields.

A few examples:

1. Despite the sluggishness of the international negotations to revise the Law of the Sea, the United States should refrain from unilateral extensions of its coastal zones and from unilateral authorizations of its corporations to exploit seabed resources before the establishment of an international regime. The Congress must play a crucial role here in resisting the pressures of special interests urging such unilaterialism.

2. The United States should enter into serious negotiations to develop a comprehensive international system for protecting commodity producers and consumers from damaging fluctuations in prices.

3. The United States should take the lead in supporting obligatory international consultations by any country or corporations contemplating projects that might alter natural environments used in common with other countries.

4. The United States should revise its standing policy of opposing all international limitations on the capabilities of the advanced space powers to broadcast via satellite into other countries.

5. To balance its insistence on due process and just compensation by countries who take over U.S. multinational corporation subsidiaries, the United States should champion international regulation of the behavior of multinationals to assure they do not take unfair advantage of weak national governments and weak national labor movements.

6. The United States should broaden the opportunity for developing countries to participate responsibly in the international financial system, through revising voting procedures in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and opening up the informal committee structure of the International Monetary Fund.

The basic security and welfare of the United States, its international influence, and ultimately the self-respect of its people, require its full participation in the difficult task of constructing such networks of international political accountability, and assuring that the resulting institutional structures are congruent with the emerging realities of material interdependence. Other countries have no less an interest in the full participation of the United States. If the United States withdraws from this effort out of pique at not being able to dominate the process to the extent that it dominated the founding of the UN system, the necessary evolution of world society will suffer a severe setback.

An emotional polarization of world society along North-South lines is inconsistent with the sense of basic community that is the precondition for the elaboration of the needed scope of international accountability. Thus, for the United States to fall into the trap of polarization set by demagogic populists, would be against the United States interest and against the world interest. This is my main argument against the current sulking tone of the U.S. official response to the populists as well as the suggestions that the United States should come out swinging against them.

The effectiveness of the performance of the United States in the new international politics does partly depend on our style, the concepts we employ to explain our actions, and the words we use to symbolize our empathy and connection with others, or our opposition and alienation. But the words will ring hollow unless they are accompanied by concrete policies that are consistent with them. Whom we consult with; whom we invite into the forums of decision in international institutions with important operational responsibilities; our willingness to invest wide-membership international institutions with significant allocative and dispute resolution capabilities—more than the amount of foreign aid we give, more than our charity, these issues will test the credibility of our professed commitments to world community.

What about the support of the American people for such a progressive international sharing of decision-making power? Even the best public opinion polls give us little guidance; for the most part, they are still asking the old questions—Which allies should we support with military force if attacked by the commu-

nists? Would you accept a rise in taxes to finance development assistance to the Third World? etc.—to determine the degree of internationalism or isolationism in the country.

However, some possible indications of latent popular support for the kind of internationalism I am urging can be gleaned from the recently published analysis of *American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 1975* by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and Louis Harris and Associates. Despite the journalistic reports of a wholesale turning inward by the public, the foreign policy goal of "fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation, and energy" was rated "Very Important" by 67 percent of the respondents, "Somewhat Important" by 24 percent, and "Not Importnt At All" by only 3 percent. The goal of "strengthening the United Nations" did not rate as high, but still commands general support: "Very Important" 46 percent, "Somewhat Important" 32 percent, and "Not Important At All" 14 percent. The survey also asked respondents to say which among a list of 18 goals they thought were "Most Important." The largest number of respondents selected "keeping peace in the world," and the next largest number selected "fostering international cooperation to solve common problems" as most important.

Such polls of course are an insufficient guide to policy. They inadequately probe for the tough trade-offs which are the essence of policymaking. Ask Americans whether they are in favor of interdependence and international cooperation; they will answer yes. Ask them whether they are for preserving U.S. independence; they will answer yes. The tough questions involve how much independence to give up in specific fields in order to respond to the needs of an interdependent world, for surely by agreeing to respect and enlarge international decision processes we are in some fields likely to limit our freedom of action, just as an insistence on complete freedom of action will tend to limit our effectiveness in international forums. But to make such tradeoff is precisely the role of statesmanship, is it not? Legislative statesmanship as well as executive. Public opinion is inert when it comes to generating the real policy options, it can only respond to the options generated by those who have thoroughly studied the issues. The public's responses will also reflect, however, the concepts and visions suggested by the statesman for evaluating the options. This interplay is crucially important when it comes to the questions at issue here: the role of the United States in international organizations, and the reform of international organizations in the present context of growing international populism. To attempt to follow public opinion on these questions today is to attempt to take guidance from a public that has received little conceptual clarification from the Congressional debate so far and heavy Spenglerian visions of the decline of the West from the Seventh Floor of the State Department.

The main need today in U.S. foreign policy generally, not just in our UN policies, is for fresh concepts and analysis to illuminate the optimal tradeoffs between independence and interdependence, and for a new vision of progressive internationalism, that resounds with the best in our domestic and international experience, to counter the cynicism of both the new populists and their conservative critics.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Next is Mr. Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review.

STATEMENT OF NORMAN COUSINS, EDITOR, SATURDAY REVIEW

Mr. COUSINS. Senator Sparkman, my sense of appreciation being before the committee is widened by the opportunity to learn from my colleagues.

I would like to depart from my text, I think you probably have a copy, in order to comment very briefly on a few points that have been raised.

UNWORKABLE PERIOD IN U.S. HISTORY—1776 TO 1889

Dr. Coffin made reference to the Bicentennial and it seems to me that one of the important things about the Bicentennial is that despite the

popular impression, this country was not born in 1776, this country will not become 200 years old until 1989, and the intervening years it seems to me have more to teach us about what is going on in the world today than almost anything else. I would like to call to your attention a very important book in American history by John Fisk that came in a series, I think it is a 13-volume series on history of the United States. One of the volumes was called the Critical Period in American History and discussed the years from 1783 to 1787 and refers to them as the lost years for American history precisely because most Americans have very little idea of what happened during that time.

We came out of the war for independence and promptly plunged into an unworkable period in the relations among the States. Fisk points out that one's currency would shrink 10 percent from the act of crossing a State line. New York and New Jersey shot it out in the harbor over which State had the right to tax incoming ships and Massachusetts and Connecticut had some arguments over which State had the right to acquire the western territory of Wyoming.

I suppose Connecticut was worried about its surplus population. And the inability to create a peace after the Treaty of Paris in 1783 brought about a virtual disillusionment of many of the gains of the war for independence. And, finally, the men came together in 1787 in Philadelphia to correct the mistakes that had occurred from 1783 to 1787.

It was only at the conclusion of that particular experience in Philadelphia that this country was born. So the correct date I think is 1789 and the failure I think has a great deal to teach us about what perhaps may be going wrong with world affairs today, which is that we are attempting to create a peace without the proper architecture of peace.

Here I would like to comment on another point that was made. Reference was made to a biblical sentence.

It seems to me that the more apt analogy to the present has to do with the failure of the Greek states to arrive at an overall forum, just as the American States failed to understand principles of order and organization. So I think the fall of Greece probably is attributable to the failure of the Greek states to understand laws of political science that applied to geographic units. Thucydides, I think, is a tale of horror on the failure of wise men to know the principle of organization.

UNWORKABLE POSTWAR U.S. SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS

It seems to me, if I can revert to my text, that since the end of World War II the United States has gone through a long series of unworkable assumptions in its foreign policy.

POLICEMAN FOR THE WORLD

The first assumption was that the United States would be a policeman for the world. We need look no further than Vietnam for a dramatic illustration of the fallacy of that theory. The attempt of the United States to be the world's policeman has been carried out at an unacceptable cost to the American people.

SECURITY THROUGH BALANCE OF POWER

The second assumption was that the United States could achieve security by maintaining a world balance of power. The theory has had mixed success. It worked in Western Europe but has been a costly failure in Asia. The role of the United States especially through the Marshall plan, was critically important in giving Europe a springboard for economic recovery after the Second World War. The historical and economic conditions in Europe were propitious for the attempt of most of the nations to seek not just a common security but the basis for a European community.

I might add parenthetically one of the most hopeful items in any inventory of hope for the world today is to be found in the growing interrelationship of Europe. Two World Wars in this century found France and Germany as the prime antagonists. Whatever the other threats to world peace, we can at least take some measure of comfort from the fact that the old recurrent danger of a major eruption from within Europe itself has finally been laid to rest. The clear reason is that both countries have worked out an economic partnership that gives them a far higher stake in continuing peaceful relations than in pressing for conquest.

The lesson, of course, is that sound economic relations tend to create sound political relations as well.

This is not to say that our policy in Europe has been a thoroughgoing success in every respect. But it has at least worked well enough in Europe to serve as a contrast with our policies in Asia. The attempt to fill the power vacuum of Indochina after the departure of the French in the midfifties has led in a straight line to the most serious disasters in the history of U.S. foreign policy.

By and large, the theory of security through a balance of power, whatever its prominence in history going all the way back to the ancient Greeks, has become obsolete in the modern world. The theory had its natural setting in constricted areas, but it tends to lose workability in direct ratio to the distance from the center. No nation has the capacity—and this applies as much to the Soviet Union as it does to the United States—to undertake and maintain economic, political, and military commitments on a world scale.

MILITARY SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS

The third assumption, closely related to the second, was that the United States could advance its security by building twin regional anchors of military security through NATO and SEATO. Neither arrangement gave us what we were looking for. Whatever NATO may have done for the European nations themselves, it has had little to offer the United States at times of its own critical need. NATO did not spring into action on the side of the United States during the two major Berlin crises, nor did the United States receive physical or moral support from our NATO allies during the Cuban missile crisis. SEATO was not an operational fact of any benefit to the United States during the Vietnam war. The historical record with respect to NATO and SEATO would have to be that our expectations were far higher than the prospects warranted or that the course of events endorsed.

ASSUMED NEED TO STAY AHEAD IN ARMS RACE

The fourth assumption was that we could find security by staying ahead in the arms race. The United States and the Soviet Union 10 years ago passed the point at which they could annihilate one another. The explosive power of our bombs and the versatility of the delivery system have reached their apex, but there has been no corresponding increase in security for either party. Indeed, there is less security for both parties in view of all the possibilities of accident or miscalculation that could come into play in time of crisis. Retaliatory power as a deterrent to surprise attack works only when one is dealing with enemies who can be trusted not to panic in crisis situations. The very existence of saturation supplies of atomic weapons sets a stage for irrational action at times of extreme tension.

In any event, security is no longer proportionate to power in the modern world. Stockpiling additional power is not likely to be more meaningful than filling the kitchen, the living room and all the bedrooms with cordwood after the woodshed and barn are overflowing in order to guard against running out of firewood.

The attempt to justify the nuclear arms race in terms of safety through reciprocal terror has to contend with the rapid spread of fissionable materials throughout the world. Scientific and technological means for processing these fissionable materials for explosive purposes are no longer matters of great mystery. There is now a real danger of nuclear blackmail by governments that fall into the hands of men who may confuse reckless use of power with the need to be decisive.

From the beginning of the nuclear age, it was clear that true security for the United States, or for anyone else, depends on the control of force rather than on the pursuit of force or the accumulation of force. But adequate controls have yet to be established. Most dangerous of all to the American people is the myth that atomic supremacy is somehow an assurance of security.

Meanwhile, the connection between a widening arms race and the worsening of the American economy is becoming more pronounced. It is impossible to spend almost $300 billion in a decade for military expenditures—a substantial part of it outside the United States—without creating a powerful momentum for inflation. The shortages created by spending of this size, to say nothing of the outflow of dollars for maintaining military establishments in many parts of the world, contribute mightily to the erosion of the currency. Whatever other measures may be taken to combat inflation, it is doubtful that any fundamental change in the cheapening of the dollar will come about unless a genuine basis for national security is achieved that makes it unnecessary to spend in the order of $100 billion a year for military purposes.

ASSUMED NEED FOR COVERT ACTIVITIES

The fifth assumption that figured in our foreign policy strategy since the end of the Second World War was that we needed an undercover organization to compete with Soviet secret police on the level of plot and counterplot. The general theory was that covert activities were a cheap way of fighting a war. This theory, like so many of the

others, has been demolished in Indochina. The American people have had to pay a very high price for the abortive coup against Souvanna Phouma in Laos in the winter of 1959–60. They have had to pay an even higher price for the overthrow of the Sihanouk government in Cambodia in 1970. And the highest price of all we paid was in Vietnam. The original decision to call off the nationwide elections for the purpose of unifying the country, as called for in the Geneva Treaty of 1954, gave way to other costly decisions. The assassination of President Diem and the attempt to steer successive governments without adequate respect for the need of a popular consensus are not unrelated to the eventual loss of 56,000 American lives, to say nothing of our final humiliation in the ultimate disaster.

In any event, the activities of an American agency in subversive activities against other governments is probably unconstitutional. The traditional position of the United States has been to advance the principle of self-determination in the world. We subvert our own traditions and institutions when we act against that principle in the world, even when the form of government is not to our liking.

SEEKING SECURITY THROUGH WORLD ORDER PROPOSED

Having gone through a great many unworkable assumptions on the quest for security—trying to be a policeman and a peacemaker to the world, maintaining a balance of power, building anchors of security through NATO and SEATO, staying ahead in the arms race, fighting undercover wars—perhaps the time has come for the United States to pursue the possibilities of peace through world order.

The United Nations has never been a serious factor in the foreign policy of any of the major nations, the United States and Soviet Union included. There is a tendency to regard it as a necessary evil or to use it only when everything else has failed, as in the case of the Middle East crisis of 1973. But the notion of world order as the basic requirement of world peace has yet to be defined as the central objective in the foreign policy of the great nations.

Why world order? What other approach is likely to be effective at a time when the principal problems of the world are beyond the reach of any nation to solve by or for itself? The arms race, world environmental deterioration, overcrowding, famine, depletion of resources, the struggle for control of the wealth of the seabed—all these are problems that call for a world response. Since the problems are interconnected, the world agencies that will have to deal with them will have to be part of an organic whole. This is the direction that world order will have to take.

The ability of the United Nations to carry out the principal function assigned to it in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations—namely, preventing the scourge of war—is severely limited. At some point soon it is going to be necessary to reconsider the nature of the U.N. as well as the obligations of the individual nations to it.

When that reconsideration takes place, and it appears likely that such reconsideration may be far off, two main theories about the U.N. will be debated.

One theory is that U.N. must be a reflection of the world as it is; that is, it can only represent a mirror to the existing realities. This

theory is the one that has governed the affairs of the U.N. since it was founded.

The second theory is that the U.N. has to transcend the limitations of its members; which is to say, it must have the effective means of responsible governance in those matters concerned with common dangers and common needs.

It is this second theory that needs to be explored and developed—through the United Nations if possible, apart from the United Nations if necessary.

In short, a new effort must be made in the direction of workable world order. The aim must be effective governance in the world arena.

The essential parts are peacemaking, peacekeeping, economic and social development, protection of the natural environment and of the earth's resources.

The full integration of the World Court into the development of a law capability would appear to be an essential feature of a fully functioning world order.

I have the honor to represent an organization that sees relevance and advantage in the application of federalism to world order. Such federalism recognizes the right of a nation to minister to its own institutions and to maintain its sovereignty in domestic matters. It also recognizes the need for effective authority in those respects in which nations engage in traffic with one another, especially on the level of competitive security.

In the absence of an institutionalized peace, the prospect is world anarchy. We live at a time when national governments, in their dealings with one another, have to be governed themselves in certain respects. The closer the United States, in its own foreign policy, can come to advancing this concept, the closer we ourselves will come to defining a genuine basis for our own security.

Thank you.

[Mr. Cousins' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN COUSINS, EDITOR, SATURDAY REVIEW

The United States has gone through a long series of unworkable assumptions in its foreign policy since the end of the Second World War.

The first assumption was that the United States would be a policeman for the world. We need look no further than Vietnam for a dramatic illustration of the fallacy of that theory. The attempt of the U.S. to be the world's policeman has been carried out at an unacceptable cost to the American people.

The second assumption was that the United States could achieve security by maintaining a world balance of power. The theory has had mixed success. It worked in Western Europe but has been a costly failure in Asia. The role of the United States, especially through the Marshall Plan, was critically important in giving Europe a springboard for economic recovery after the Second World War. The historical and economic conditions in Europe were propitious for the attempt of most of the nations to seek not just a common security but the basis for a European community

One of the most hopeful items, in fact, in an inventory of the factors that make for peace in the world is to be found in the growing economic inter-relationship of Europe. Two world wars in this century found France and Germany as the prime antagonists. Whatever the other threats to world peace, we can at least take some measure of comfort from the fact that the old recurrent danger of a major eruption from within Europe itself has finally been laid to rest. The clear reason is that both countries have worked out an economic partnership that gives them a far higher stake in continuing peaceful relations than in pressing for conquest.

The lesson, of course, is that sound economic relationships tend to create sound political relations as well.

This is not to say that our policy in Europe has been a thorough-going success in every respect. But it has at least worked well enough in Europe to serve as a contrast with our policies in Asia. The attempt to fill the power vacuum of Indo-China after the departure of the French in the mid-fifties has led in a straight line to the most serious disasters in the history of United States foreign policy.

By and large, the theory of security through a balance of power, whatever its prominence in history going all the way back to the ancient Greeks, has become obsolete in the modern world. The theory had its natural setting in constricted areas, but it tends to lose workability in direct ratio to the distance from the center. No nation has the capacity—and this applies as much to the Soviet Union as it does to the United States—to undertake and maintain economic, political, and military commitments on a world scale.

The third assumption, closely related to the second, was that the United States could advance its security by building twin regional anchors of military security through NATO and SEATO. Neither arrangement gave us what we were looking for. Whatever NATO may have done for the European nations themselves, it has had little to offer the United States at times of its own critical need. NATO did not spring into action on the side of the United States during the two major Berlin crises, nor did the U.S. receive physical or moral support from our NATO allies during the Cuban missile crisis. SEATO was not an operational fact of any benefit to the United States during the Vietnam War. The historical record with respect to NATO and SEATO would have to be that our expectations were far higher than the prospects warranted or that the course of events endorsed.

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The attempt to justify the nuclear arms race in terms of safety through reciprocal terror has to contend with the rapid spread of fissionable materials throughout the world. Scientific and technological means for processing these fissionable materials for explosive purposes are no longer matters of great mystery. There is now a real danger of nuclear blackmail by governments that fall into the hands of men who may confuse reckless use of power with the need to be decisive.

From the beginning of the nuclear age, it was clear that true security for the United States, or for anyone else, depends on the control of force rather than on the pursuit of force or the accumulation of force. But adequate controls have yet to be established. Most dangerous of all to the American people is the myth that atomic supremacy is somehow an assurance of security.

Meanwhile, the connection between a widening arms race and the worsening of the American economy is becoming more pronounced. It is impossible to spend almost $300 billion in a decade for military expenditures—a substantial part of it outside the United States—without creating a powerful momentum for inflation. The shortages created by spending of this size, to say nothing of the outflow of dollars for maintaining military establishments in many parts of the world, contribute mightily to the erosion of the currency. Whatever other measures may be taken to combat inflation, it is doubtful that any fundamental change in the cheapening of the dollar will come about unless a genuine basis for national security is achieved that makes it unnecessary to spend in the order of $100 billion a year for military purposes.

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American people have had to pay a very high price for the abortive coup against Souvanna Phouma in Laos in the winter of 1959–60. They have had to pay an even higher price for the overthrow of the Sihanouk government in Cambodia in 1970. And the highest price of all we paid was in Vietnam. The original decision to call off the nationwide elections for the purpose of unifying the country, as called for in the Geneva Treaty of 1954, gave way to other costly decisions. The assassination of President Diem and the attempt to steer successive governments without adequate respect for the need of a popular consensus are not unrelated to the eventual loss of 56,000 American lives, to say nothing of our final humiliation in the ultimate disaster.

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Having gone through a great many unworkable assumptions on the quest for security—trying to be a policeman and a peacemaker to the world, maintaining a balance of power, building anchors of security through NATO and SEATO, staying ahead in the arms race, fighting undercover wars—perhaps the time has come for the United States to pursue the possibilities of peace through world order.

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Why world order? What other approach is likely to be effective at a time when the principal problems of the world are beyond the reach of any nation to solve by or for itself? The arms race, world environmental deterioration, overcrowding, famine, depletion of resources, the struggle for control of the wealth of the seabed—all these are problems that call for a world response. Since the problems are interconnected, the world agencies that will have to deal with them will have to be part of an organic whole. This is the direction that world order will have to take.

The obligations of individual nations will have to be carefully defined, with strict provison for due process. In general, world order requires codification of standards, monitoring facilities, an enforcement mechanism, and balance of powers. This sequence applies equally to the common security function, the environmental function, the fertilizer-and-food function, the resources function, the seabed function.

The ability of the United Nations to carry out the principal function assigned to it in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations—namely preventing the scourge of war—is severely limited. At some point soon it is going to be necessary to reconsider the nature of the U.N. as well as the obligations of the individual nations to it.

When that reconsideration takes place, and it appears likely that such reconsideration may not be far off, two main theories about the U.N. will be debated.

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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Next we will hear Mr. Alvin Toffler, author of "Future Shock."

STATEMENT OF ALVIN TOFFLER, AUTHOR OF "FUTURE SHOCK"

Mr. TOFFLER. Mr. Chairman, I am an author and social critic and I am not an expert on international affairs. I am not a specialist on the problems of the United Nations, and I was, therefore, surprised to be invited here but I must say I am delighted, because I believe that the Government all too often ignores the views of nonexperts. The outsider or nonspecialist often sees problems quite differently than those who spend their entire careers dealing with them, and I think this difference in perception can be stimulating and fruitful.

But because I have not devoted my life to international affairs, and because I have not had very close direct connections with these problems, I say what I have to say with a degree of tentativity which is not customary for me. Even if I put them in forceful terms, take them as tentative, nevertheless.

Senator CASE. You did not ask for a comment.

[Laughter.]

Senator CASE. I think you speak for all of your colleagues at that table right there.

GOALS ARE TO END INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY

Mr. TOFFLER. I obviously share a broad spectrum of agreement with the other gentlemen at this table on the need for some alternative to international anarchy. And I think we probably would all agree on a few central goals that really ought to be at the heart of American foreign policy. I can summarize those in three items.

The planet is in need of ecological rebalancing. There is a danger that we will destroy the biosphere that supports us and, therefore, it is in the interest of all nations to do something about altering the way we deal with the environment.

The second goal needs to be economic rebalancing. The disparity between the rich and poor has reached the point at which it threatens everyone.

The third goal ought to be, it seems to me, the containment of conflict.

All of these have been stated here before in better and more detailed ways, and there is no need for me to elaborate on them now.

I also think that what Dr. Brown referred to as "progressive internationalism" is basically the right attitude with which to confront the problems around us.

QUESTIONABLE NOTIONS

But, having said that, I also have certain problems and hesitations.

First, I think the projection of American experience either from the 1780's or from the progressive era or from any other era of American history onto the world scale, on to the global screen, is a cultural mistake. Analogies based on U.S. experience in U.S. history are not readily applicable to the world, to a world as diverse and conflict-filled as our own.

We are dealing with a world filled with people whose cultures are different from our own, and who have different views of reality. Those have to be respected. The notion that our history provides a model for everyone else ought to be reexamined. The American Revolution took place 200 years ago. It should not be a model for any other society as we approach the year 2000.

Secondly, we need some form of world order. But to assume that a world order needs to take the form of "world government" or some sort of "United States of the world" or some "federal model" based on our contemporary notions of federalism, is another notion that ought to be examined more carefully. It suggests that the way you get "order" is through the creation of a centralized power. The reverse may also be true. We need to reexamine our faith in centralization.

Similarly, our historic belief in the importance of economic integration has led to the notion that "interdependence" is always, under all circumstances, a good idea. This idea is particularly popular among internationalists. Unfortunately, I think that is also a dangerous misconception.

Anybody who analyzes an adaptive system, whether it is a machine system or a biological system, will find not only interdependence of the parts, but also the capability of those parts to separate or decouple from one another when necessary—to become independent under certain conditions. I believe we have reached the stage of overintegration or overinterdependence in the world economy with the result that we have all become too vulnerable to each others mistakes.

When we build ourselves an ocean liner, we build separate airtight compartments into it, so that, if one springs a leak, the whole ship does not sink.

I think such "fail-safe" principles need to be looked at in connection with the problems of world order as well, and that we need to think in terms of the creation not of a single center, or a single world government that will some day govern the nations of the world, but rather in terms of self-regulatory network of transnational institutions, multiple institutions, a polycentric system. Such a transnational network can provide a higher degree of stability for the planet than the centralized model based on a single international governmental organization. The goal of the U.N. is not and should not be to evolve into a world government.

CRISIS IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Today it is only possible to understand the problems of the U.N. if we see them in relationship to the much larger social transformations taking place on the planet. There would be no crisis, I think, in the

U.N. today, or in the U.S. relationship to the U.N., if there were not a general crisis in industrial societies. We must understand this general crisis.

Industrial societies have not always existed. Our industrial civilization is only about 200 or 300 years old. It sprang from the Industrial Revolution at different times and in different places. But all industrial societies share certain fundamental characteristics. They are based on mass production and mass distribution. They all develop mass education systems, mass media. They are all part of an integrated money system. They all develop a materialistic value system. They all, by and large, rely on the nuclear family system. And they are all dependent upon fossil fuels.

Moreover—and, as we shall see, this is crucial to the U.N.—they are all based on the nation-state and on bureaucratic forms of organization. In short, industrial societies are made up of certain common parts and processes. They form a system.

What is happening today is the crackup of this system. When I say that the system is breaking up, I am not talking about the capitalist system or the socialist or Communist system, but the larger system that includes both—the industrial system.

This breakdown is evident not just in terms of energy and resource dislocations or in dislocations and upheavals in technology. It is also evident in the breakdown of the nuclear family system, in changes in the value system in the society, and many other upsets and malfunctions.

The wild oscillation of the global economy is also related to this overall historic breakdown of the industrial system, the general crisis of industrialism.

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me. You are reading from notes. I have no copy. I am very interested. You say it is not a breakdown in capitalism, it is a breakdown in the industrial system?

Mr. TOFFLER. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you expand on that?

Mr. TOFFLER. Yes. I think that industrial societies, whether they are capitalist or Communist or any intermediate form, all make use of certain fundamental technologies and social procedures. As a result, the guy who gets up in the morning and goes to work in the factory in Kiev is not that different from the guy who gets up and goes to work in the factory in Detroit or Pittsburgh. Their daily routines and experiences are not so different.

Certainly, there are profound political, cultural, and historic differences, and certainly we would rather live here, and they might or might not prefer to live there—but these underlying life-support systems of all industrial societies are basically the same. For example, none of them could function without mass education or mass communications. They all, regardless of whether they are capitalist or Communist, rely on a certain form of family structure. They all share the assumption that economic growth or economic development is the primary aim of the society and of the individual, by and large. They all develop similar internal procedures. They all organize huge bureaucracies—pyramidal hierarchies. That is the dominant form of human organizing in all industrial societies, whether the United States or the Soviet Union.

So that, I believe, there are fundamental similarities between industrial societies quite apart from their political differences. And it is these underlying arrangements that are now out of gear, that are now beginning to come apart. Of course, when I speak about the breakdown of industrial societies, that can be taken as a Spenglerian vision of doom. But the transition out of industrialism can also be seen as the birth of a new civilization.

What is happening, I think, is some sort of fundamental historic transformation. The system that we have grown up in—most of us are products of industrial societies—is now transforming into something new, and that new society is likely to have quite different characteristics. It may very well be based on advanced technology, but not any longer, for example, on traditional assembly-line mass production. It may no longer be based on very large scale bureaucratic forms of organization, but, rather, on decentralized self-managing forms, and so on.

CHANGES IN FAMILY SYSTEM RELATED TO INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION

Similarly, the family system in this country is rapidly changing. Something like one-fourth or 25 percent of all American kids in urban areas today are no longer raised in classical nuclear family households, they are raised in single-parent households. That's a key indication of the breakdown of industrial society and its transformation into something new.

Senator CASE. What is there that makes the family system so much a part of the industrial system? We had families before the industrial system. What is peculiar about that?

Mr. TOFFLER. The family system is very closely linked to the nature of the technology that the society uses. Before the industrial revolution, several generations lived in the same household and economic production was carried out by the family as a unit. People worked in the fields near the house.

Even at the beginning of the industrial revolution the whole family moved into the factory. The father would go to work with his kids. That broke down because industrial society required a new kind of mobility on the part of the workers. It required workers who would go where the jobs were. You couldn't do that if you were dragging grandparents, uncles, aunts, and poor relatives along with you. So social pressures arose to "streamline" the family unit down to just the father, mother and the kids—what sociologists call the "nuclear" family.

In addition, fundamental functions of the family, like education, were taken away from the family and given over to specialized institutions like the schools. The care of the aged was taken away from the family and given over to State enterprises or welfare institutions of one kind or another. The family structure underwent a fundamental change with the coming of the industrial society. Today, as industrial society breaks down, we see, in turn, the breakup of the nuclear family, too.

However, this enormous revolution in the family system is only one little detail of the canvas. The technological revolution is another detail. We are simultaneously changing our social institutions, our

logic, our philosophy, our treatment of science, our religion, and many other aspects of the culture as well. All of these are part of the decline of industrialism and the emergence of a new, quite different, super-industrial society.

This, then, is the background against which the crisis in the international system and in the United Nations needs to be understood.

EMERGENCE OF TRANSITIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONS

The most obvious new fact to grow out of this historic shift is the emergence of new technology and new institutions that are simply too big for the nation-state—institutions or technology that span the planet, institutions, or technologies that are not national but transnational.

For example, we now have what is, in effect, a new transnational currency, Eurodollars, with an estimated 180 billion of these rattling around the world last year and no transnational agency capable of regulating or controlling them.

We have developed transnational banks. We have, above all, created transnational corporations and trade unions. And the scale of some of these new transnational institutions is enormous.

The multinationals, for example, are so large that, according to the International Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee, on a given day at the end of 1971, these multinational corporations held $268 billion in short-term liquid assets. This pocket money, as it were, was "more than twice the total of all international monetary institutions in the world on the same date." How can the present regulatory institutions hope to regulate such vast new entities?

These great transnational institutions are, in turn, based on powerful technologies, some of which endanger the biosphere we all share, from the ozone layer to the ocean floor, and many of which produce problems that are beyond the control of any one nation. This is why national leaders are increasingly helpless to stem the powerful external waves that jolt national economies.

In short, the transition to superindustrialism has raised the stakes in the game of survival to the transnational level.

WHERE DOES THE U.N. FIT IN TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM

Now where does the U.N. fit into this picture and why is it so widely regarded as a failure?

To understand the U.N. we must first recognize that the U.N. is only a tiny piece of a swiftly emerging transnational mosaic or network of institutions which are part of the new superindustrial system.

This network consists of thousands of organizations and millions of individuals around the world in continually shifting relationships with one another. It consists not only of multinational corporations but also of transnational communications—satellites, computer banks, telecommunication systems. It consists of transnational transport systems, ranging from supertankers to supersonics. It even includes transnational religious and cultural movements. Thus, a wave of Eastern mysticism reaches into the United States just as a wave of

American culture, in the form of blue jeans, rock music, and transistor radios sweeps through Europe, or, for that matter, the Middle East. This transnational network which is springing up also includes swiftly proliferating political and economic institutions, more and more intergovernmental organizations, regional common markets, multinational research centers, and development projects.

This profusion of intergovernmental institutions is matched at the nongovernmental level—a critical point to which I will return in a minute. For now it is only necessary to note that there are already some 2,600 nongovernmental organizations or NGO's whose activities reach beyond national borders and who themselves form a key network within the larger network.

Only when it is observed against this very large, rapidly changing background, can the U.N. be seen for what it really is. It is only one small component in a very large, rapidly developing system. It is a microchip in a highly charged interactive network. This U.N. chip or component is important because it has certain positive functions that no other part of the system can perform and the case for the U.N. rests heavily on this fact.

Some of these functions were mentioned at the table today. It is still clearly useful to be able to plant a peacekeeping force in Sinai and on Golan Heights. It is still necessary for certain global housekeeping tasks to be routinely performed, for instance, those quietly being carried out under U.N. aegis by the international telecommunication union, or the international civil aviation organization, the postal union, the copyright organization and the like.

Even the much-criticized "talk-shop" function of the U.N.—the provision of a truly global forum—is a valuable one. The rhetoric and grandstanding in U.N. debates and the passage of resolutions, 97 percent of which, by actual count, never result in action, makes this seem like an exercise in futility. Nevertheless, much useful communication is carried on behind the scenes. So the U.N. does have important functions. If it did not exist it would have to be reinvented to perform these functions.

Furthermore, in defense of the U.N., many of its failures are not surprising since it serves, as others have pointed out, as a hospital for last-resort cases, ultimate crises. Problems are dumped into the U.N. when all other efforts already have failed. It is like a doctor 90 percent of whose patients have terminal cancer when they walk in his door. So that the U.N.'s failure rate should not be evaluated in the usual way.

Finally, the dramatic failures of the U.N. should be measured against the giant scale of the problems and the contrasting size of the U.N. resources. Roughly speaking, as I calculate it, the total annual U.N. budget is in the area of $1 billion a year, give or take a bit. This means that the total U.N. budget each year is $\frac{1}{268}$ of 0.0037 of the loose change available to multinational corporations on any given day. Our U.S. per capita contribution to that budget is, I believe, only about 16 cents per month—which is the cost of a package of chewing gum. It is as though we were trying to hold the world together with chewing gum. So we ought not be surprised if the U.N. so often seems ineffective, not to say bankrupt.

U.N. IS BASED ON ANACHRONISTIC ASSUMPTIONS

Having entered all of that into the record, however, I think we must be absolutely clear that the U.N. as it now exists, is dangerously ineffective. Arrogant, shoot-from-the-glands, get-tough attitudes won't help; but neither will liberal do-good defensiveness about this fact. The U.N. is overbureaucratized. It is badly and wastefully organized. It is based on anachronistic assumptions. It is, itself, arrogant.

The U.N. does not see itself as one chip or component, in a growing transnational network, but as an independent unit, just as nations mistakenly see themselves as independent units. It argues against national sovereignty but foolishly asserts its own organizational sovereignty. It does not seem to understand that it cannot function effectively until it is connected up with, or wired into, other parts of the transnational network. And because it isolates itself from the rest of the network, it has no roots among ordinary people, no basis or constituency, or direct contact with the everyday organizations and groups through which most of the work of the world actually gets done.

Finally, if it is bureaucratic, it is also rigid, confused and disoriented. It is, in the words of one Member of the U.S. Senate, "a basket case of future shock."

This brings us to the role of the United States in the United Nations. Within this already unstable organization, the United States faces a political crisis that is likely to intensify dramatically within the next 2 or 3 years. For this reason, it is important for us to look at some of the stages, some of the forms this crisis might take.

POSSIBLE FUTURE SCENARIOS

Here is how one well-placed observer of the U.N. situation sees the crisis developing. "The rapid U.S. retreat within the present structure of the U.N. system will be characterized by the formation of large temporary majorities from the developing countries which will be demonstrably hostile toward U.S. national interest. The United States and some of its allies will be placed in a defensive, isolated position, by virtue of almost prestaged proceedings which would constitute new emotional and collective brainwashing sessions rather than civilized, international, tolerant, rational forums.

"U.N. meetings will be transformed into revolutionary tribunals where perhaps even terrorist groups will be protected" while member states are abused. The United States may well find itself singled out for these humiliating outbursts." It is also quite likely, he believes, that a successful effort will be made to move the U.N. headquarters out of New York to Vienna or Geneva, or perhaps to Algeria or Mexico City.

If we play out this scenario, we might also very quickly find dissident groups within the United States—whether American Indians or Eskimos or blacks or other ethnic minorities or, for example, prisoners or small farmers or West Virginia miners—being invited to use the U.N. as a platform from which to influence the internal affairs of this country.

Another possibility is that the U.N. itself will be torn into competing pieces as nation after nation or group after group break away to form their own mini-U.N.'s.

Now, that is not a very pleasant picture. This scenario is certainly not inevitable. No one knows how events will develop. But it represents one dramatic set of possibilities that ought not be ignored, especially since such events, in turn, are likely to intensify dangerous pressures inside the United States for a kind of Neanderthal isolationism. They could provoke us into blind, intransigent opposition to global progress.

To head off the crisis, we need to understand that it is not just a "gangup" or a random or accidental event. It is a direct outgrowth of the decline of the nation-state in the high technology world, a process which is an inescapable part of the superindustrial revolution.

U.N.—A PRODUCT OF INDUSTRIAL AGE MENTALITY

Like all industrial societies, the U.N. is nation-based. It is not a United World Organization and never was. It is a United Nation's organization. It takes for granted, right from the start, the perpetuation of and the need for nation-states. This is an industrial-era idea.

The modern nation is a direct product of the industrial revolution. Of course, great territorial empires existed before the industrial revolution. But they lacked the one decisive component that all modern nations share: an integrated economy.

Nations in the modern sense arose because industrial technology required nonlocal resources. It was impossible to build an industrial society out of purely local resources. You needed raw materials from a larger area. Similarly, the new technologies of industrialism made it possible to produce more goods than could be sold in a local market. Therefore, you began to expand, and you developed integrated, national economic markets. The modern nation state includes, therefore, an integrated economy as one of its fundamental components.

Today we have 138 member nations of the U.N. They range from the Peoples Republic of China with 800 million people to 20 nations whose combined population scarcely adds up to 10 million. I would hazard a guess that fewer than 40 or 50 of these have the tightly integrated economic systems that characterize modern nations. This doesn't mean that they are unimportant. The familiar sneers about mininations or "Third World corn flakes" and reflect an arrogance based on ignorance.

Senator PERCY. To emphasize your point, among those smaller nations with nonintegrated economies are some of the most powerful in the world, OPEC countries.

Mr. TOFFLER. That is right.

Senator PERCY. Such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. So when you say they are important, they are not only important, they are absolutely vital.

Mr. TOFFLER. Clearly. The fact that some so-called minination doesn't sit on some crucial resource today does not mean it will not someday soon. As our technology changes, our resource needs change.

So I think we are going to have to get over our cultural arrogance about small states. But we also need to understand the role of nationhood in them because it bears directly on the structure of the U.N.

NEW CONCEPTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONHOOD

Today nationalism and nations are crucially important to the so-called developing countries. To the degree that development means traditional industrialism or industrialization, they require the nation-state as a political framework for the emerging integration of their economies. We are going to see soon a new concept of development that is not based on blind implementation of Western industrial experience. When we do, the role of nationalhood will begin to change. But until now development in many countries has meant industrialization. And to the degree that developing countries mean industrializing countries, to the degree that they become enmeshed in the world money system, to the degree that they become dependent upon trade and export, and so on, they will find it convenient, if not necessary, to create or maintain the nation-state.

The crisis in the U.N. springs in good measure from the fact that, ironically, precisely the opposite situation is now the case in the most technologically advanced parts of the world. The nation-state, far from being crucially important for solving problems, is increasingly becoming an obstacle. Too small to cope with transnational realities, it is too big to deal effectively with main subnational problems. This is why we begin to hear more demands for decentralization and devolution of political power, not only in our country, but more dramatically in places like Scotland and Wales, in Alsace Lorraine and Corsica and Quebec and British Columbia and Western Australia, to cite only a few instances.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Toffler, may I inquire how much longer your statement is? We asked that it be compressed into 20 minutes and 12 o'clock is approaching very fast and I know we will want to ask some questions.

Mr. TOFFLER. OK, I will "zoom" through it. If I may, another 5 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you will zoom?

Mr. TOFFLER. I will zoom.

Senator PERCY. Is it possible for the committee to also to have a copy of that?

Mr. TOFFLER. Well, I do not have it, but I will be able to do that, I can provide it. I have to retype it and get it in later.

To return, there is a reason for these demands for regional autonomy or secession. Just as the industrial revolution "massified" society, the superindustrial revolution now occurring "demassifies" it. As the superindustrial revolution develops, technological societies become increasingly diverse, their consensus breaks apart. They become "demassified". This means they become more diverse culturally, socially, technologically, ethnically and politically.

MOVEMENT OF POWER NECESSARY

They become so varied internally that key problems can no longer be defined, let alone solved, at the national level. In this situation more

power must return to the regions, states, provinces or cities. Power must, in short move down from the national level.

Simultaneously, because of the increasing scale and scope of our technology and the global integration referred to earlier, more and more power must move up above the national level to transnational agencies. Thus more and more problems arise that cannot be solved by a single nation. As the superindustrial revolution advances, the high technology nation-state begins to lose control at both ends. In short, power moves up to transnational and down to subnational levels at the same time.

We thus live on a planet divided into one part in which the nation-state, as a political form, is growing more important, and another part in which the nation-state is growing less important. The political crisis in the U.N. springs from precisely this split. It is this split which aggravates relationships between rich and poor nations, between the mega-states and the ministates. Indeed, this division can be expected to broaden until it threatens to crack the U.N. wide open.

All this suggests that, if there is to be a workable U.N. in the future, it will have to revolutionize its basis of membership. It will have to become not the United Nations but a United World Organization (perhaps one of several). If it is to remain an umbrella under which all peoples can join, it will have to give up the assumption that the only form of representation is representation by nation.

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF REPRESENTATION AT THE U.N.

We shall have to begin designing one or more world organizations in which the principle of representation is quite different—in which, for example, representation is extended to the major religions, or to different occupational or professional groupings, from peasants to scientists, or in which racial, or ethnic differences are recognized, or in which geographical regions are represented on a population basis. In fact, one can conceive of the U.N. itself transformed in the future into an organization based on multiple forms of representation and perhaps having several different chambers.

Not only is the present structure of the U.N. not sacred, it is obsolete for all parties concerned. From a long-range point of view, the transformation of the U.N. from the United Nations to the United World Organization is a necessary next step.

The problem of the nation is, however, only one of the fundamental factors in the U.N. crisis.

The second great problem I think facing the U.N., is its international bureaucratic structure, the fact that it is built like a pyramid, rather than in a responsible, ad-hocratic, flexible form of organization. Because of the rapid rate of change and because of the very diverse and unexpected demands produced by the high-change environment, bureaucracies can no longer operate effectively. The internal structure of the U.N. will need to undergo fundamental changes if it is to become effective. I can enlarge on that later, if the members of the committee wish.

But the final point I would like to emphasize is that, if the U.N. is to function realistically, it is going to have to face the fact that it's only one piece of a larger network. And here I think the United States has a crucial and innovative role to play.

PLUGGING THE U.N. INTO OTHER TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS

Our long-term role should be to strengthen other parts of the transnational network and to encourage the U.N. to plug its efforts into them. To understand this, we might think in terms of not one but two world organizations that coexist today. The first is the U.N., which is highly visible, controversial, and political. The second world "organization," and I put that word in quotes, is not a single organization at all, but a vast, complex collection of agencies and organizations—the 2,600 nongovernmental organizations alluded to earlier. These international organizations span every conceivable human interest. They devote themselves to everything from ocean exploration to education; they deal with every conceivable produce of raw materials. They represent every conceivable shade of political interest or lack of interest. The number of these organizations has been growing very, very rapidly, rising from 1,300 in 1963 to twice that number today, and it is expected that from 1,000 to 2,000 more such organizations will spring up around the world by 1985. They represent a great unrecognized global resource. They are, in a sense, an undeveloped part of the transnational network. We have well-developed governments and governmental organizations. We have well-developed multinational corporations. But we have yet to devote much effort—or even do much thinking about—this third layer of the emerging transnational network.

Despite this, last year these NGO's or nongovernmental organizations had an aggregate budget of about $1.4 billion, of which some $800 million was channeled into aid or development projects of one kind or another. And this is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg because all of these international organizations have national affiliates and subsidiaries whose budgets are much larger as a rule than that of the international organizations to which they belong.

Many of these organizations are highly respected, high caliber groups, filled with energetic, skilled, and talented members, many of whom are eager to be of service to the global community. Many have strong scientific or other capabilities for dealing with some of the same health, medical, cultural, or ecological problems as the U.N. itself. I don't know that anybody has even calculated yet how many individual human beings are members of this vast, seething, energy-filled system.

Senator PERCY. Do you have a system of a lot of interlocking directors, people serving on multiunits and relatively smaller groups of people that really concentrate on that?

Mr. TOFFLER. I don't think so. I am sure there is overlap, but it is such a diverse group that, in fact, if anything, it is not sufficiently integrated or connected.

STRENGTHENING NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The NGO's represent a largely ignored part of the transnational network. Very often they go their own way, as though the U.N. didn't exist—which, apparently, is precisely what the U.N. wants them to do, because, while it is true that 600 NGO's hold what is misleadingly known as consultative status with the U.N., the fact is that the U.N. is very jealous of its "sovereignty." It regards these NGO's much as it regards cholera and yaws. It sometimes undercuts them, but more often

it ignores them. So basically we find two key parts of the transnational network, with many common goals, but each operating, by and large, as though the other didn't exist.

When you look at these two parts of the network you see something remarkable. The U.N. is heavy at the top, it has a sizable bureaucracy (not compared with General Motors, of course, but within its own terms, a sizable bureaucracy). Yet it has no roots. Its wires run from the U.N. to the 138 nation-states and then stop. The U.N., in a word, is all top and no bottom.

When we look at the NGO's, we find the exact reverse. They are all bottom and no top. They have lines or wires that run down through their affiliates into lives of literally millions and millions of people around the globe. The NGO's are active, doing things everywhere. But there is no coordination, no systematic way for them to interact, no effective way to find other organizations with similar goals, and no way to really connect their energies up with the United Nations system itself.

I would suggest, therefore, that one of our goals ought to be to find a way to strengthen the NGO sector of the transnational system and to channel their energies into the development of improved food supplies, conservation measures, depollution programs, community development and so forth. Here the United States could make a major change at very little cost. If the United States did nothing but simply provide a limited amount of office space, some travel funds, and telephone WATS lines for some of these organizations—facilitative services for them—I think it would significantly upgrade a fundamental piece of this emerging transnational network. Within the U.N., the United States ought to earmark specific funds to be used for the purpose of integrating these two parts of the network, the U.N. and the NGO's. For example, a special fund contribution to the U.N. environmental program for the support of nongovernmental organizations in the environmental field could have long-range structural value to both the U.N. and the NGO's. Where the United States does provide funds to the U.N. for work with NGO's moreover, it ought to stipulate that control over the funds should be jointly shared by the NGO's and the U.N., so that NGO's do not need to come to the U.N. as supplicants. By supporting the NGO or voluntary sector, the United States would be building up an enormous transnational resource of value to all of us—the U.N. included.

There are, of course, problems with this policy, as with any other. Many Third World countries look upon NGO's as essentially Western in origin and outlook.

Nevertheless, the careful, deliberate strengthening of the NGO sector and the integration of U.N. activities with the activities of the NGO's would go a long way toward replacing the present bureaucracy with a flexible, effective ad-hocracy.

To summarize, then, long-term U.S. policy toward the U.N. must take into consideration the larger transnational network that is swiftly emerging as part of the breakdown of industrialism and its replacement with a new, super-industrial world system. The United States ought to begin thinking now about proposals for alternative forms of representation within the U.N. It should support efforts at internal reorganization of the U.N. to reduce the bureaucratization. And it should present a clear, direct program for breaking down some of the

walls that separate the U.N. from other parts of the transnational network, the NGO's in particular.

Whatever it does, it should not shoot from the hip. We cannot allow ourselves the luxury of going into blind opposition. We need a calm, unexcitable approach based on long range rather than immediate goals. We need, in short, to see our relationship with the U.N. in the context of the super-industrial revolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Toffler.

By the way, an article appeared in the New York Times of this morning entitled, "Sweeping Change in U.N. Is Urged By World Panel." I believe there were 24 different nations constituting that panel, one of which was Mr. Gardner from the United States, who was before us a few days ago. I think it might be well for us to incorporate that in the record at this point.

[The article referred to follows:]

[The New York Times, May 21, 1975]

SWEEPING CHANGE IN U.N. IS URGED BY WORLD PANEL

(By Kathleen Teltsch)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., May 20—A 25-member international panel has recommended sweeping changes in the structure of the United Nations to improve its handling of economic issues and increase cooperation between rich and poor countries.

Its recommendations marked the first such major attempt at fundamental change since the world organization was formed 30 years ago.

The panels' report, entitled "A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic Cooperation," was presented today to Secretary General Waldheim. He said that this was "a historic moment in the life of the United Nations."

A major innovation suggested by the panel, consisting of one expert from each of 25 countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union, was a revamping of the present decision-making process, which has led in the last year to confrontation and deadlocks between the rich and poor members in the General Assembly.

Instead of voting showdowns in the Assembly, where the developing third-world countries easily outnumber the industrial powers, the group recommended an intricate but still imprecise process of negotiating disputes to get agreements by consensus within the Economic and Social Council.

However they ruled out any proposal that would require a revision of the United Nations Charter, clearly because they saw no prospects for agreement at this time, especially from the big powers.

The panel's report is expected to be taken up at the special General Assembly session beginning Sept. 1. But it appears to face an uncertain fate because its recommendations are not likely to satisfy either the minority of industrialized countries or the majority of developing nations that have demonstrated here that they can rush through resolutions supporting their demands for a larger share of the world's resources.

However, the high caliber of the experts, each nominated by the government of the country represented, suggests that the recommendations will get serious study from the 138 members of the United Nations. An American official said that the United States intended to give the report its closest attention, but he declined to comment on the recommendations beyond saying, "They pose some problems."

One of the recommendations that are expected to stir controversy calls for revising the present voting system in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to provide greater decision-making power for the developing countries. The existing weighted voting arrangement now gives the United States a veto over some decisions and heavy influence on lending policies.

The panel calls for the creation of a new post of Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation that would be second in importance only to that of the Secretary General. It would go to a citizen of one of the developing countries when the Secretary General was elected from a developed country.

The panel implied that the new Director General would outrank the heads of the 15 specialized agencies in the United Nations system, such as the Food and

Agricultural Organization and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

Criticizing the fragmentation of aid programs currently funneled through 23 separate funds, the report advocated that they be merged into a single United Nations Development Authority—dubbed by some panelists as the "funnel of funnels."

The amalgamation contributions now going for population control, food assistance, environmental protection and other activities would give the proposed new authority a half-billion yearly to disperse to needy nations. The United Nations Children's Fund would remain separate.

The authority would be headed by an administrator who also would serve as one of two deputies to the new Director General and would be selected from an industrialized country.

It was expected that there would be a vigorous lobbying against the proposal for a new Director General and the Development Funds—this coming from the heads of United Nations agencies who would see their authority threatened.

ROLE OF EXISTING AGENCIES

Under the recommended changes, each agency would keep its autonomy but become less involved in running projects in the field and act rather as a standard-setter.

Some of the recommendations such as the appointment of a new Director General, were proposed for action at the Assembly this year; others were not expected to be taken up for two to five years. Among these was a recommendation that an International Trade Organization be established.

Although the 25 panel members signed their report as individuals—meaning they did not signify their governments' approval—their conclusions would be expected to carry some weight since 19 hold government positions, two at cabinet level.

The panel chairman was Al-Noor Kassum, a Tanzanian lawyer-economist. The Soviet member was Aleksond A. Molchanov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Department of International Economic Organization.

The American member, Richard N. Gardner, Professor of Law and International Organization at Columbia University, served as rapporteur of the document, drafted over an eight-week period.

Copies have not reached delegations, but one panelist predicted it could run into strong opposition from the United States on several counts, but particularly because of the idea of having a third-world representative serving in the second highest post in the United Nations hierarchy—he would be selected by the Secretary General with the approval of the Assembly.

Other saw prospects that the third-world countries would negotiating procedures, seeing a threat to curb their numerical voting strength, although the report stipulates that the Assembly could go on voting resolutions as long as it "takes account" of the private conciliation efforts being tried elsewhere.

The panel's work was authorized by a General Assembly resolution of January, 1975, requesting that it propose structural changes to make the United Nations system "fully capable of dealing with the problems of international cooperation."

The resolution called for a broad geographical representation on the panel, which was appointed by Secretary General Waldheim on the basis of nominations by governments. China was offered a seat on the panel but declined.

The panel sought through its recommendations to enhance the standing of the Economic and Social Council, which is listed in the Charter as one of the major organs of the world organization. However, it has not enjoyed high prestige. The most recent session was marked by high rates of absenteeism among the 54 members.

In its efforts to steer away from the voting contests that split the Assembly membership into seemingly that the Council establish small negotiating groups to deal in private with deadlocked key issues. One such might be the continuing dispute over compensation for nationalized foreign properties—an issue that brought on a major dispute at the late Assembly.

The small groups would include representatives of the countries most deeply involved and would be headed by a prominent individual who would devote full time to trying to bring about agreements, traveling as necessary between capitals and serving, as one official suggested, as a "Kissinger for economic, instead of political, disputes."

Each such negotiating effort would be limited to one or two years, but several could be tackled simultaneously.

The panel also advocated a major overhaul of the Economic and Social Council to abolish at least eight of its subsidiary commissions.

The commission on the status of women would be eliminated along with the commissions on population, social development and natural resources. The Human Rights Commission would remain.

The business formerly handled by the others would be dealt with directly by the Council, thereby avoiding duplicating debates.

In support of such streamlining, the panel report said that the Council, as it currently operates, "lacks the necessary degree of authority," and has become bogged down by unmanageable documentation.

As part of the proposed structural change, the panel recommended that the Council be given a new role in organizing the economic matters dealt with by the Assembly.

They proposed that the Assembly's Economic Committee be renamed the Committee on Development and International Economic Cooperation, and that it take on all items currently discussed by the Social Committee that concern development. The Social Committee would be left mainly with human rights matters and humanitarian question. Each has a membership of 138 countries.

In the field of trade, the experts proposed a gradual phasing out of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which was organized in 1964 by the poorer countries because of dissatisfaction with Western domination of the existing machinery for dealing with trade issues.

The work on trade and commodity agreements would go to the proposed international trade organization under the panel's recommendations, the organization also might take over the work of GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which has been the major forum in which negotiations to lower tariff barriers have been conducted, particularly among the developed countries. The trade organization also might assume responsibility for commodity arrangements.

In proposing the new post of director general for development, the panel recommended that the duties include direct charge of the existing Department of Economic and Social Affairs—the largest in the United Nations—and that the present post of under-secretary general be abolished.

PROPOSED UN DEVELOPMENT UNIT

The proposed United Nations development authority, it was recommeded, should be managed by a small operations board of 18 to 27 members who would be "equitably balanced" between countries which are net donors to United Nations aid programs, including oil-exporter, and the net recipients of help.

Although the contributions would be collected in a single fund, the identities of some units would be preserved, mainly because it would assist them in fund-raising—as in the case of the environment and population funds. The staff of the environment agency would remain at the agency's headquarters in Nairobi.

No additional increase in personnel would be required to carry out the panel's decisions, the report said. However, its members advocated a major effort to improve staff personnel policies.

They urged competitive examinations for United Nations job candidates and the possible creation of a staff college for training officials from different agencies, in the system. They also said that a unified system should be accepted for all employees in regard to recruitment and salaries.

They also favored employing more women in nonclerical positions and hiring younger applicants from all regions.

In an attempt to insure that action would be taken on at least some proposals without delay, the panel asked Mr. Waldheim to appoint a committee that would report regularly on the progress made in restructuring.

EXCERPTS FROM SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES IN U.N.

(Special to the New York Times)

United Nations, N.Y., May 20—Following are excerpts from an unofficial summary of recommendations to the General Assembly by an international panel calling for changes in the structure of the United Nations to improve economic relations between rich and poor nations.

In its 30th anniversary year the United Nations has reached a turning point. In one direction lies the prospect of new capacity to cope with the central issues facing mankind in the decisive last quarter of the twentieth century. In the other direction lies the danger of a decline in the effectiveness of the United Nations. Which direction the organization takes will be significantly influenced by the decisions on policy and structural questions its member states take in the months and years ahead.

The proposals of the group of experts for structural change are designed to enable the United Nations system to:

Deal with international economic and social problems in a more effective and comprehensive manner, with better coordination throughout the United Nations system as a whole.

Harmonize, as far as possible, the views and approaches of member countries toward these issues.

Contribute to the promotion of a significant improvement in the transfer of real resources and technology to developing countries.

Promote economic cooperation between states, including those with different social systems.

Increase the capacity of the United Nations system to provide essential services for all its members.

Improve the management of United Nations resources available for assistance to the developing countries so as to maximize the benefit to these countries.

Respond effectively to new opportunities, problems and challenges arising from changing requirements of world economic cooperation.

Foster better utilization of the capabilities of developing countries for economic and technical cooperation among themselves.

The Group of Experts is proposing major changes in the central structures of the United Nations. Its proposals call for new approaches to the handling of economic items in the General Assembly, a major reform in the Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies, and new consultative procedures to encourage agreed solutions leading to speedy implementation by governments. They also call for the creation of a Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation to provide leadership to the Central Secretariat and the entire United Nations system, and for the consolidation of funds for technical cooperation and pre-investment activities in a United Nation Development authority (U.N.D.A.) headed by an administrator who would serve as a Deputy to the Director General.

The Group envisages a process of institutional restructuring which could be initiated immediately by the Special Session of the General Assembly and unfold over a five-year transitional period.

Whenever issues of global significance need urgent and separate consideration, the device of convening special sessions of the General Assembly, along the pattern of the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions or special sessions of the new proposed "Development Committee," should after careful preparation, be utilized rather than resorting to ad hoc world conferences.

The Second Committee of the General Assembly should be renamed Committee on Development and International Economic Cooperation (to be known as the "Development Committee"). Consideration should be given to transferring from the Third to the Second Committee, on a case-by-case basis those items on social development that might more appropriately be dealt with in the Second Committee.

The Economic and Social Council should be consulted in the elaboration of the Committee's agenda and should be asked to prepare its discussions and submit draft recommendations for action by the Committee.

The Third Committee should be renamed Committee on Social Problems Human Rights and Humanitarian Activities.

I.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

The General Assembly at its forthcoming Special Session should reaffirm the Council's central role in respect to global policy formulation and implementation and the setting of priorities for the system as a whole.

The Economic and Social Council should organize its programs on a biennial basis, with its calendar subdivided into frequent subject-oriented sets of short sessions spread throughout the calendar year (except during the General Assembly period). These sessions would take place in New York, Geneva or in other cities, such as Nairobi, depending on the subject matter and the location of the relevant secretariat units.

The council should assume direct responsibility for the work now performed by its existing subsidiary bodies. As a result, the permanent commissions and committees would be discontinued, except for the regional economic commission, the Commission on Statistical Activities, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Committee on Development Planning, the Commission on Transnational Corporations and the Commission on Human Rights.

The council should assume direct responsibility for the work now performed by the Committee on Natural Resources, the Committee on Science and Technology for Development, the Committee on Review and Appraisal, the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, the Population Commission, the Commission for Social Development, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the Committee on Housing, Building and Planning, all of which would cease to exist.

The Committee on the Application of Science and Technology should cease to exist as a collegial body; instead, to provide the United Nations in general and the Economic and Social Council in particular with ready access to the world scientific community, small ad hoc groups of scientists should be convened on a case-by-case basis to study specific problems and formulate recommendations which would then be taken into account by the Council in the formulation of relevant policies.

A Science Adviser to the Secretary General should be appointed. His main function would be to provide timely advice to help the Secretary General anticipate the impact of advances in science and technology and identify the options that their application presents, especially for the benefit of the developing countries.

SUPPORT FACILITIES

A necessary first step to strengthen the analytical capabilities of the Secretariat and to enable it to concentrate its efforts on the task of providing support, on an interdisciplinary basis, for the policy-making function of the Economic and Social Council is to divest the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs of its sectoral technical functions in the economic and social field and, particularly, of its sectoral operational responsibilities.

Within the United Nations Secretariat, a new post of Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation should be created. This official would be directly responsible to the Secretary General, would serve as primus inter pares among the heads of United Nations organziations and agencies dealing with economic and social affairs and would be in charge of directing all activities presently being carried by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the various United Nations offices and programs with respect to research, policy-making support, interagency coordination and operational activities. The new Director General would need to be assisted by two Deputy Directors General, one for Research and Policy, and the other to serve as Administrator of the new United Nations Development Authority. Under these arrangements, the existing post of Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs would cease to exist.

The Director General should be appointed by the Secretary General and confirmed by the General Assembly.

The post of Director General should be assigned to a national of a developing country, at least during those years when the post of Secretary General is occupied by a national of a developed country. If the post of Secretary General were occupied by a national of a developing country, this arrangement would have to be reviewed. The two posts of Administrator of the new United Nations Development Authority and of Deputy for Policies and Research should be allocated, respectively, to a developed country and a developing country national.

A new interagency, to be known as the Advisory Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development, should be established, under the chairmanship of the new Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation. The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank, the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Executive Director of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the Directors General of the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, the Executive Secretaries of the regional economic commissions, the Deputy Director General in charge of Research and Policies and the Administrator of the new United Nations Development Authority would be ex officio members of this Committee. The Director General of the General Agree-

ment on tariff and Trade would also be invited to join the Committee, and the executive heads of other United Nations agencies and programs would be invited, as necessary, to attend. The main task of the Committee would be to review the world economic and social situation and to bring to the attention of high-level meetings of ECOSOC, together with their own assessment and recommendations, all issues requiring, in their view, international decisions and actions.

To insure harmony between planning and operations, it would be useful to establish a post of Administrator of U.N.D.A., who would be responsible for the functions now being carried out by the Administrator of U.N.D.P. and the executive heads of other United Nations voluntary programs and funds for technical assistance and pre-investment activities excluding, for the time being, the Executive Director of UNICEF. In addition, this official would also serve as a Deputy to the Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation. It is recognized that the eventual consolidation of United Nations funds in the new U.N.D.A. and the designation of the Administration of U.N.D.A. as Deputy to the Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation must be dependent on the negotiation of satisfactory arrangements with regard to the composition of the new Operations Board and the division of responsibility between the Board and ECOSOC and the U.N.D.A. Administrator, as well as a satisfactory definition of the status of the Administrator.

The Inter-Agency Consultative Board (I.A.C.B.) of U.N.D.P. and the Environment Coordination Board (E.C.B.) should be merged with the A.C.C. However, the Program Working Group and the Meeting of Environmental "Focal Points," the two subsidiary bodies that now back up I.A.C.B. and E.C.B., should be maintained and function as subsidiary bodies of A.C.C.

II.

PLANNING, PROGRAMING AND BUDGETING

To assist the Economic and Social Council in the performance of the expanded functions envisaged for it in the fields of programing and planning, the C.P.C. should be strengthened to make it a more effective body for reviewing programs and determining priorities and, thus, for imposing a coherent and deliberately chosen balance among the wide-ranging activities of the subordinate bodies of the United Nations.

As a long-term goal, the United Nations should work toward a single body to advise the Economic and Social Council as well as the General Assembly with respect to the review, approval and evaluation of both programs and budgets. This could be a small body representative of the different groups of member states composed of highly qualified individuals nominated by governments but serving in their personal capacity.

OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES

All funds for technical assistance and pre-investment activities should be consolidated for the purpose of more effective policy-making, administration and management, into a new United Nations Development Authority (U.N.D.A.). Certain small funds for capital investment should also be consolidated, as hereinafter specified, in the U.N.D.A. With respect to trust funds established by individual donors, their future disposition would be subject to further study and negotiation among interested parties. For the time being, UNICEF is not included in this consolidation.

There should be a single governing body responsible for reviewing the operational activities of the United Nations system as a whole and providing over-all policy guidance within the context of global development strategies. The Economic and Social Council is the appropriate body to perform this policy-making function since it is fitting that global policy-making on operational activities be part of the responsibilities of the body charged with the task of formulating global developmental policies. This arrangement would not only promote the integration of global policy and operations but would also avoid the duplication of discussions that debates in the various governing bodies and the subsequent ECOSOC review of reports of the voluntary programs and funds entail. For this purpose, the Economic and Social Council should include in its program of work an annual session devoted to a global review of operation activities.

There should be a consolidation, as early as possible and under appropriate administrative arrangements, of intergovernmental structures such as the U.N.D.P. Governing Council, the U.N.E.P. Governing Council, the Inter-Govern-

mental Committee of the World Food Program, the Board of Governors of the Special Fund, and these bodies should be replaced with a single Operations Board which would be responsible for the conduct of the general operations of U.N.D.A. and would exercise all the powers delegated to it by ECOSOC. The mandate of the Operations Board would extend to all operational funds currently administered by the United Nations.

In the consolidation of funds under the proposed United Nations Development Authority the separate identities of certain administrative units should be maintained, notably in the case of population, environment and other areas where this would facilitate fund-raising or operations.

The present Department of Economic and Social Affairs, which would become part of the secretariat under the authority of the Deputy Director General for Policies and Research, should be relieved of the responsibilities presently performed by the Office of Technical Cooperation, which would be transferred to U.N.D.A., when established. The sectoral technical functions of E.S.A. should be progressively transferred to the system as soon as satisfactory arrangements could be worked out, with the understanding that certain functions would remain at the center.

The new U.N.D.A. should establish the closest possible working relations with the World Bank. Moreover, the recommended merger of the other voluntary funds with the new U.N.D.A. will make it possible for the country programs to cover a broader range of operations, including those in the field of population, environment and so on.

III.

TRADE

GATT and the United Nations should enter into a mutually satisfactory agreement providing for a formal relationship, including exchange of information and closer administrative collaboration.

As a longer-term objective, there should be an evolution toward the creation of an International Trade Organization to deal with trade issues in a comprehensive manner.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM

The following issues should be carefully examined in appropriate forums as a matter of priority:

Recycling of petrodollars through the I.M.F. to help both developed and developing countries deal with balance of payments problems related to the higher costs of energy; foods, fertilizers and other imports.

Ways of rectifying the imbalance between countries that has characterized the process of international liquidity creation over the last four years, both between developed and developing countries on the one hand, and within these two groups or countries on the other.

Better international management of global liquidity, with the S.D.R. becoming the principal reserve asset and the role of gold and of reserve currencies being reduced.

Measures to enable developing countries, particularly those most seriously affected, to adjust to a higher level of international prices in a manner consistent with their development needs possibly through the establishment of facilities within the International Monetary Fund; in this context, the trust fund category of proposals would require consideration as the possibility.

The examination of voting power in the Fund, including the question of the power of veto on decision-making by a single member more generally, the possible increase of the share of developing countries to the range of 50–50 percent of the total, with a substantially greater access of developing countries to I.M.F. credit.

The distribution of voting rights under the weighted voting system in I.M.F. should be revised to reflect the new balance of economic power and the legitimate interest of developing countries in a greater voice in the operation of that institution.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cousins, I want to ask you one thing. You dealt with the period 1783 to 1787. I was just curious what happen from 1781 to 1783.

Mr. COUSINS. That was the period in which the American colonies moved from the struggle for independence into the Articles of Confederation. Then you had the period from 1783 to 1787, the years of breakdown because the articles were not very workable.

RELEVANCE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Might I also take advantage of the question, Senator, to comment very briefly on a point that Mr. Toffler made.

One of the significant things it seems to me, about Philadelphia constitutional convention was that the framers of the American Constitution were speaking to political principles and not just with the situation of the United States. They were thinking, they drew upon all of history and the lessons of historical experience in an attempt to construct a government. Therefore, I think it is fair to say that what they did, the principles they elucidated, at this particular time do have relevance for all time and especially for the present. This is not a matter of someone imposing American history on other countries here.

I would agree with Mr. Toffler we do not seek an American sentry but you think it would be reckless to ignore any experience in any country that has something to say to the present, including American history.

The CHAIRMAN. You read I presume, Dr. Flexner's book, "George Washington"? I think that is a very fine book treating that period.

Mr. COUSINS. There is always one I think we might recall, this was called Von Doren's "The Great Rehearsal," which dealt with that period from 1787 to 1789.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I could ask a lot of questions but our time is getting short.

Senator Symington.

EFFECT OF HARNESSING NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR PEACE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I can't stay very long but I would like to ask my old and valued friend, Norman Cousins, just one question which some of us here were already asking this morning at a meeting. Nobody really realizes yet, and they should, and it is a fault of many nations, primarily the United States I would say, that they don't understand the unbelievable change, that have been made in the future preparation for war or peace by nuclear energy in the last 25 years.

As a delegate to the U.N. in 1968 my classmate, Senator John Cooper and I got a feel of the U.N. which was very different from the one I got when I had the privilege of being a delegate to it last fall with my colleague Senator Percy. It seemed to me that there is little interest in what also seems to me to be the most important subject in the world today, illustrated by the fact that the United States has 36 bombs to drop on every Russian city of over 100,000, and the Soviets have 11 to drop on every city we have of over 100,000. They are all a lot bigger than Hiroshima, which killed 100,000.

We know the price of oil has gone up. Some countries have gotten very rich and would like to have some plutonium so they could also

be a world power, and we know there are people selling them plutonium.

I could go on. I hope to go on with this problem as it develops. I think it is more than unfortunate, I think it is a national disgrace how little information has been given out to the people on this subject.

The thrust of my question would be, if you got information out to everybody in the world as to what could happen to the world, unless we can harness this great nuclear force, what is the effect of all of this going to be on the average consideration of political and economic and military problems?

Mr. COUSINS. You flatter me, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. I flatter you because I think you are an expert in this field, as good a man as I know.

Mr. COUSINS. You speak of the need to develop some information. I agree with you. I think it was H. E. Wells who said that civilization today is a race between education and catastrophe. I think you have posed the issues involved in that particular race here. I think we come to a point Mr. Toffler made when he said the Nation is the product of the industrial revolution. I think he might also have added, however, that with the industrial revolution it became impossible for any nation to perform its historic function. The historic function of a nation is to protect lives and values and the properties of its citizens, but as a result of the industrial revolution I don't think any nation in the world can perform that historic function because the industrial revolution was to lead to a point where engines of world destruction were to be created without the more responding mechanisms of world control. There is no nation in the world that can perform that function. Consequently, it becomes necessary to think in terms of what we might do. It is at that point it seems to me we are confronted necessarily with the whole concept of world order. This does not mean that the individual nation has to cease to exist. Quite the contrary. Here I agree with Mr. Toffler, the nation has certain functions to perform but those functions can be performed only if you add to independence the fact of workable and defined interdependence, and its structure of interdependence it seems to me that would determine the degree of safety and sanity we can bring to our planet.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy.

Senator PERCY. I will be able to stay here until about 10 minutes to 1, so I would rather defer to my colleagues.

Senator JAVITS. I am due on the floor at noon. I know most of these gentlemen, except Mr. Brown. I just wish to express my deep appreciation for your being here contributing to our thinking. I shall read it all very carefully. I am engaged in other committees this morning and assure you that you are one group of intellectuals that can be taken very seriously by this committee.

WHAT CAN THE UNITED STATES DO TO STRENGTHEN THE U.N.?

Senator CLARK. I am going to pose one question, Mr. Chairman, and ask that each of the members of the panel address themselves to it.

The question is, What, in your judgment, can the United States do—what policy could we follow, perhaps what change in policy, which would make the United Nations stronger and more meaningful?

Start with Mr. Toffler and work down the table.

What would you like to see us do differently that would help strengthen the U.N.?

Mr. TOFFLER. I think that we can't strengthen the U.N. by denying its weaknesses. Therefore, I think we ought to reexamine the way we support it with money. As I have said, I am not an expert, but my impression is that we support the various specialized agencies in addition to making a contribution to the central fund. I think the very idea of specialized agencies may be obsolete, that we ought perhaps to be looking at specialized missions, specialized programs, specialized temporary projects, instead. In other words, our money ought to be earmarked more closely for specific purposes and programs rather than for the maintenance of permanent structures of that kind.

MOVE TOWARD REGIONALIZATION

I think there is going to be a move toward regionalization within the U.N. and we should not oppose that move. In fact, perhaps we might use our financial contributions to encourage the development of healthy regionalization within the structure. As I said, that we ought to do something—and small amounts could make a significant difference—to shift in a dramatic way the relationship of the U.N. to all of these nongovernmental organizations outside which are essentially frozen out by the U.N. right now. These are all ways to encourage debureaucratization. Basically, the U.N. has to become mission-oriented rather than bureaucratically organized in the pyramidal form. And we can help to some degree.

On the more general philosophical or political question relating to our stance, I would simply agree with what has been said here. We would be making, I think, a dreadful mistake if we allowed ourselves to be pushed into the corner of being the opposition party—opposed to equity in the world, opposed to ecological sanity in the world, opposed to any of these goals which are necessary for survival of everyone. If we face the position that we are going to be blindly tough, that we are going to walk out, we would very soon find ourselves an international pariah, and this would have a very profound negative impact on some of the very people in this country who favor those policies.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

Mr. COUSINS. Senator, it seems to me that your question points to a double challenge to the United States. The double challenge is related to the problem we are talking about, need for better world also, need for safer world.

REDIRECTION OF WEALTH

With respect to the need for a better world, I think there are a great many suggestions now coming forward, some of them directed to the redirection of wealth. This, of course, involves an understanding of what wealth consists of. I don't think wealth consists of capital or of loose change. I think wealth consists primarily of the production capacity of society, the ability to use resources and use intelligence in a way that will meet human needs, and in that sense I think the United States could, No. 1, contribute very substantially to the growing problem of famine in the world by putting a great deal of research on a crash basis into nitrogen fixation.

The main problem of food has to do with fertilizer, and until such time as the price of fertilizer can be brought down, it is going to be difficult to talk about growing more food all over the world, which is what has not been done. We can go through that in one year. The Kettering Foundation in Dayton, Ohio, is leading the way in nitrogen fixation.

CREATING NEW FORMS OF ENERGY

Second, on the energy front there, too, it is not a matter of redistributing oil, even bringing the price down. I think we have to think in terms of creating new forms of energy. And here I would like to see the United States undertake a crash program for the development of a fuel cell. Pratt Whitney has already I think developed a prototype of a fuel cell, but you have got problems of weight and cost. But we live in an age of miniaturization. I think it is possible through effective research to create a fuel cell which I think will do a great deal toward bringing energy within the range.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the fuel cell?

Mr. COUSINS. Conversion of chemical and electrical energy into usable energy without having to go through a combustion engine, which has problems in terms of heavy use of fossil fuels, and also the problem of pollution. But the fuel cell would seem to offer one good approach. You have got the need. I think, to move very swiftly in the direction of solar energy. Swiftly those nations which need energy the most, such as India, are the nations that have the most abundant resources, which is not as utilized as it should be. Here, too, you have got prototypes but you have to accelerate, I think, your research and development.

These, are examples, it seems to me, of the use of scientific intelligence in technology rather general redistribution of capital which I think can run out in a very short time.

CREATING A WORLD MECHANISM TO KEEP THE PEACE

With respect to the whole area of safety, I think you have to go back to the basic concept of the U.N. The purpose of the U.N. fundamentally is to keep the peace.

I try to indicate in my prepared text that you come a lot closer to creating a condition of peace if you meet the problems of disparity economics and also of social justice but basically you do have the problem to create a world mechanism. You cannot expect, it seems to me, indefinitely to have the United Nations run after history with a mop, which is to say to wait until the crisis occurs and then try to mount some response. That will work only where small nations are involved. Where large nations are involved you are not going to have enough time. You will have to start thinking in terms of preventive mechanism, which is what I am thinking. That is why I emphasized the need to integrate the world court into the total peacekeeping and peace interpreting machinery of the United Nations.

We go back to San Francisco. There were certain mistakes that were made with the knowledge of the founders of the U.N. at San Francisco. They tried to do as they said the very best they could at that time, but they recognized that you could not expect the General As-

sembly to work in the system of one nation, one vote because this would mean, as Mr. Toffler said, few nations with combined population of 1 million could outvote a nation with 300 million. So you can't expect large nations of the world it seems to me to look to the General Assembly for codifying and carry out law.

The Security Council represents imperfections and weakness on the opposite side, which is to say it gives the large nations a predominance role in keeping the peace. That is the responsibility, however, that has to be tied to definition of law, if the smaller nations are going to expect it, and also involve social justice. So both with respect to the General Assembly and Security Council it seems to me you have built-in weaknesses which at some time are going to have to be examined. Therefore, I would hope that the United States in supporting resolution 25, would also support the concept that at some time very soon we ought to have a fundamental reexamination as to how the United Nations can be given capability of the world. The need to codify laws so all nations understand what their obligations are in the world.

Second, the need to enforce it. And third, the need to refine it and interpret it so it will not be abused.

You always have need to balance powers in due process. I don't think it is too soon for the U.S. now to be considering a very serious way in which the world law can become a unifying principle of its foreign policy, so I have tried to address myself both to the problem of a better world and also the problem of a safer one.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Cousins.

IDENTIFYING OURSELVES WITH THEMES OF POPULIST MAJORITY

Mr. BROWN. You asked, Senator Clark, what we could do this year in the U.N., what would be the most important thing to do this year, and I think that is a pertinent question because this year is going to be one of the toughest years that we have faced in the U.N. It is going to try the patience of the U.S. Government more than probably any other session. It is going to start off with the U.N. special session in which the issues are being defined, at least up to now, not by the United States but the militant populist coalition I was talking about. They want to discuss a new economic order on their own terms. It is also a session in which the coalition is going to be exploited by the Arabs to make things as impossible as they can for the Israel delegation to the U.N.

The question is going to face us: How are we going to react to these kinds of moves which are going to be embarrassing, which are going to try our patience. I suggest this really compels us to reexamine our philosophy of how we are going to behave. If indeed the rumor is true the next ambassador to the U.N. is going to be coming up for confirmation next week, I imagine a probing on this point of exactly what our posture should be is very important.

Let me suggest that it is not only a negative posture, not isolating ourselves that has to be developed, but a positive strategy of identifying ourselves as much as possible with particular action and with resolutions that are presented by elements of the populist majority.

I would suggest, for example, that we will not lose too much by identifying ourselves with some of the favorite themes of the Africans

in the U.N. We don't have to identify ourselves with everything that they want but we have to look for opportunities to identify ourselves with resolutions that they put forward.

Now, of course in the legislative process this is well known. A Senator doesn't have to support every single word in a resolution in order to be a cosigner of a resolution. The United States should not feel it has to support every single nuance in every resolution in order to be a cosigner. I would suggest in some debates and some international forums we have been much too rigid about the wording of resolutions that we could have supported. This certainly characterized how we behaved at the Stockholm International Conference when countries like Japan, France and others went along with some of the more militant sounding resolutions proposed by the less developed countries because they were coalition building. This suggests to me we ought to be building coalitions and——

Senator PERCY. Do you think we should have gone along with the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties that meant so much to Mexico and quite a bit to Algeria, Iran, and Yugoslavia, even though we decided we couldn't approve it or abstain.

Do you think we should have just tagged along with the boys?

Mr. BROWN. I think that we wouldn't have lost very much by finally going along, registering our objections but indicating that the basic concerns were ones that were important.

Now, we did this for example, in the Alliance for Progress, where there were elements that were very idealistic sounding, probably nonimplementable. We gained nevertheless by identifying with those kind of slogans. It appears to me that the United States was able to at least to include itself on the side of those who have those concerns. The Charter on Economic Rights and Duties was only such a resolution.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is all the U.N. passes, they are not laws. Where do you draw the line?

Mr. BROWN. I would draw the line on certain kind of action that would destroy the U.N. system.

It appears to me that the question of Israel——

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you think if it destroys the economic system—not reform or evolutionize it, which I certainly favor—but revolutionize it and really cut off the flow of capital to the developing nations in the whole private sector?

Mr. BROWN. If they are actions. If you are talking about philosophies of redistribution, we can indicate that we are for philosophies of redistribution.

Now, in order to answer on that specific declaration, I would have to go over the charter again, and perhaps I would have to come out as a dissenter on the basis of one or two points.

TAKING THE OFFENSIVE ON UNIVERSALITY TO COUNTERACT ATTACK ON ISRAEL

Let me, however, answer my own question about the position that we should take with respect to attempt of the Arabs to mobilize the U.N. majority against the Israelis because I think this is going to come up in other agencies; it is going to come up in the World Health

Organization. The United States has been defensive on this issue. It seems to me that here is a place where we can take the offensive.

We have become a recent convert to universal membership in the U.N. We fought Chinese membership, but now it is the principle of universality that is at issue. The United States could help break the coalition which is going away from the principle of universality by taking the lead in sponsoring universal membership.

Now there is a candidate coming up for membership. The United States could indicate that it is truly for universal membership even for a country that is very hostile to us by supporting the membership in the U.N. of the Government of Vietnam. This is going to be difficult for us to do, but it seems to me that we want to indicate to the Arabs and to others that you don't expel a nation or don't deny a nation membership and participation in this very messy world body, because you fundamentally disagree with them. Even if you have recently fought a war with them, nonetheless, they ought to have an opportunity to be full participants in the kind of deliberations that take place in the U.N.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you include the Palestine Liberation Front as evidence of our position.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, I would, but with the qualification to the extent that we are admitting a government of a state that is still coming into being, which means we have to consider them for a different kind of membership. They are not yet a state, so that representation or the ability to come to the U.N. and present their case appears to me is what they should get now. They don't get the status in the U.N. of a full state, which doesn't deny them coming to speak. We don't deny them coming to make their case. With respect to Vietnam, the new governmental organization in Vietnam, whether it is South Vietnam or whether it is a unified government that emerges out of Vietnam, it appears to me the United States can indicate that we would accept their formal membership in the U.N.

Senator CLARK. Reverend Coffin.

PROPER DEFINITION OF PROBLEMS FACILITATE SOLUTIONS

Mr. COFFIN. I was turning over in my mind following Senator Percy's line, this must be a terrible dilemma for you gentlemen between problem staters and problem solvers. My sympathies are very large. On the other hand, I keep coming back to the fact until we define problems we are just not going to have any answers. On the definition of something as basic as the law of the sea, are we going to be able to define this in a monetary way? Can we be planetary or do we have to go on power really.

Now, I think it is kind of naive to think if you are born over an oil well it belongs to you. But most people seem to feel that way. But the sea is different. This could be a terrific breakthrough, couldn't it, and wouldn't it be possible in this instance to define the problem so the solution could genuinely be different and not just for this jurisdictional approach, you know. And I feel going back to our earlier conversation, when Senator Case was inquiring here about American public opinion, I think there is a yearning for spokesmanship, a craving to be satisfied by leaders like you who would really talk about

interdependence. Everybody knows that is true. And a larger vision would capture the imagination. I think law of the sea would certainly be one place where we might be able to define correctly and really have some kind of breakthrough. Food, how do you define food?

I am impressed not by everything that goes on in China, I don't know that much about it, but I surely am impressed that the most populous nation in the world and surely one of the world's poorest has no famine, and to me it is not mercenary. Food is defined as a right. It would be a great thing if we could define food in our own country that way. Actually public education I suppose is more of a right than food. It seems to me once again if we define it properly we might come out with a planetary solution to the world problem. It demands a world solution. Suppose we could get it out on a global basis. Suppose some organization, let's say the World Food Council was given authority to decide and to draw up a stiff criteria how money is going to be spent or using NGO's. There are all kinds of imaginative ways it could be done. If we define food as a right at home and in the world, I think that would be another area where we could deal with it.

Lastly, to come back to Senator Symington's point on nuclear disarmament. I am not sure that you can get peace through disarmament. Mr. Cousins knows more about this than I do. I am more impressed by the fact you get disarmament through peace. That is, if people can move from détente to entente some way, you really are working together on something, so you are not targeting each other. Then maybe it makes sense to go for some type of disarmament. This whole notion of taking 10 percent of everybody's military budget for long-term development seems to me to make sense and a way from dealing with the world problem with a world solution, and that is $27 billion if you throw the Arabs in. If you put 10 percent of everyone's military budget that is something I think most people can see make eminent sense. I can't help think people of the world around would just rise up and say we have heard some uncommonsense and we go with it.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to have to leave. I have a 12:30 appointment that I must go to.

Before I go I certainly want to extend my thanks and the thanks of the committee to the panel we have had today.

Senator SYMINGTON. I can stay until 12:30. Senator Percy said he will stay until 10 of 1.

Mr. COUSINS. Just a brief comment.

PERSPECTIVE ON ARMS CONTROL PROBLEMS

Dr. Coffin raises the question: Is peace the product of the disarmament or disarmament the result of peace? Obviously no nation is going to disarm until it finds a place for its security; therefore, the need is to create a basis that will enable the nation to disarm. At the same time we have to recognize that the very existence of arms of certain types and certain quantities especially in certain situations, tend to be attacks on the peace and so you have got both.

No nation is going to disarm until it creates the equivalent or creates a basis for peace.

Mr. COFFIN. What about the proposal made by some very establishment types? After all——

Senator SYMINGTON. Before I yield to Senator Percy I want to make this point. You have been using two words interchangeably, disarmament and arms control. I have found through my experience in Government of 30 years or so the word "disarmament" automatically creates a lot of unnecessary friction. I think what Mr. Cousins is talking about, for example, today you look at the number of people who are using nuclear energy in hospitals against what they did 15 years ago. It's almost unbelievable, in the way of radioisotopes for instance. You have got problems of distribution of plutonium which should be eliminated immediately and completely. We could develop either the plasma or laser. The question was not one that just had to do with armament because of the danger of being destroyed by the millions instead of by the thousands. It had to do with the way we could perhaps save the world from other problems such as overpopulation, and so forth. That was my point.

Senator PERCY. I would like to comment.

I was at a meeting this morning with Senator Symington and the Acting Secretary of State, which prevented our being here on time. I couldn't give my opening statement which was very short. The opening statement simply wanted to indicate that we had invited particularly for this session, on the fifth morning of these hearings, four opinion leaders who are known for their creative thinking, known for their nonconventional thinking, but whose thinking could stimulate us to have other visions about where we are going. And I think it is not only the most frustrating morning that I have had but also the most stimulating and rewarding frustration from the standpoint that I think we could have spent a whole day or a week with anyone of you, and it's not doing justice to you to have you on a panel of four.

But certainly it has been rewarding from the standpoint that you stimulate our thinking. We would like to keep the record open long enough so any thoughts you may want to send back to us could be incorporated, and I ask unanimous consent this be done.

Senator SYMINGTON. Without objection.

UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Senator PERCY. The subject matter that Senator Symington and I were dealing with this morning was the nuclear nonproliferation treaty review now going on in Geneva and the people who met with us had just flown back last night to report to us. I think we share a deep concern which has been expressed in one way or another by all four of you. We share that concern as we see the price of oil possibly going up, and the balance-of-payments problem becoming tremendous not just for developing countries but for the developed countries as well to find the money to pay for imports and oil needs. And what we have to sell that is high ticketed is nuclear power. But there is danger that these sales will encourage nuclear proliferation, increasing the level of terror.

I would like to ask each of you to comment just very briefly on what you think the United Nations' role should be in this. What can we do now on this very, very dangerous problem?

Mr. Brown. It is very difficult because of France's nonmembership to control France and also to control what China does. We would like to be able to strengthen the safeguarding provisions of the international atomic energy agencies as much as possible for managing the use of nuclear materials but again this is very difficult to do with some of the nations.

It seems to me that here is a policy area in which if we wait for the United Nations to act, we are not going to get the control that we want. We need international coordination with our allies, with the Soviet Union, with others, and this is not simply a United Nations question. It appears to me the President and Secretary of State have to raise this to such a high level of American concern that in bargaining on other issues with France, Soviet Union, and China, this has to be made something that we insist upon. I don't believe that we have done it. I don't believe this has really been a Presidential and Secretary of State issue at this level of concern, partially because I think possibly we have been a little bit lax ourselves in wanting to market these materials.

Senator Percy. Very good.

I think you are right.

Mr. Cousins. Senator Percy, I think we may be 30 years too late. The time for this question to have been asked was in 1945 when it was clear that there would be a spread of nuclear materials in the world and at the time these questions were raised. I am not saying that we have got to give up now but I am trying to suggest we have lost a great deal of time. I think that we have here a dramatic illustration of the fact that the national interest and human interest are in conflict in the world today. Any nation which develops new fissionable materials in the pursuit of its own interest is less concerned about the impact of others on the rest of the world than it is about its own need. This is certainly true of the United States as much as any of the others. So I am not sure the U.N. now can, given its present framework, attempt to act as effectively, but I would hope that this would serve to highlight for the United States the need to have a fundamental reexamination of what it is we want the U.N. to do. The U.N. has to regulate in most matters of common interest. It lacks the responsible authority for doing so. Perhaps the time has come to move as swiftly as we can, taking whatever losses we may have to take doing the best we can in the terms of appeal to the conscience of mankind, whatever use that euphemism may have.

Mr. Toffler. I would just emphasize the idea behind what Mr. Cousins just said—that we are 30 years too late. Perhaps one of the things we ought to do is sit down right now and make up a list of other problems that are going to hit us 5, 10, 20, or 30 years down the line. The spread of nuclear weaponry is clearly a nightmare, but it is only one of a whole Pandora's box of nightmares, including biological nightmares, that are potentially at our door, and that we may still have some opportunity to control.

Mr. Coffin. I think it has dealt with ecology, it has dealt with the population problem. As a U.N. it hasn't dealt with the nuclear problem, has it, as a U.N., so that certainly would highlight it there, too, and if we appeal to the U.N. to deal with it, you have to control it.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Cousins, you have just returned from the Middle East. You talked with Arafat. Would you care to comment on how the United Nations handled his appearance? The United States voted against his appearance in plenary and did everything it could in the delegation to show its displeasure but we were very much isolated in world opinion. And could you comment on the role of the United Nations now in the Middle East? What role should it be playing, what role can it not play? How do you foresee the outcome of Geneva, and what should be done pre-Geneva to make that a success?

Mr. COUSINS. I will try to restate the question.

Senator PERCY. And supplement it.

Mr. COUSINS. That to begin with, the last point, I think that Secretary Kissinger's initial reluctance to go to Geneva was probably sound and it is difficult for me to imagine that you could expect Geneva—where the difference of opinions will be fairly substantial within the Arab communities—to arrive at a meaningful agreement. I think the usefulness of Geneva would be to ratify rather than to negotiate.

Therefore, I think to the fullest possible extent questions ought to be resolved or at least carefully defined before Geneva. That would facilitate discussion as well as to minimize the attempt of each nation to prove to the other how adamant and militant it can be. So Geneva could be a staged breakdown.

I would hope the Secretary would persist in the attempt to continue with Israel and Egypt. I think, you have got a far better chance of agreement between those two countries than you have with the others. My apprehension is when all Arab countries will come together there will be an attempt by each one to show how adamant it can be or how hardlined it can be.

Concerning the early question, about the role of the United Nations, I would hope that at the very least we could keep the United Nations informed. I do not think the Secretary General of the United Nations, has had the courtesy of being informed on all the moves the United States has made with respect to the Middle East, nor do I think that the Office of the Secretary General has been used to whatever extent might be possible during this period. I think this has made some awkwardness between the United States and the United Nations, and I do not think that has been necessary.

I see an enlarged and useful role for the United Nations, certainly for the Office of the Secretary General, who is a very patient man and a good negotiator in that, and I hope that he would be used much more than he is.

With respect to the question about Arafat and his position, I suppose by inference the question is what should our policy be toward Mr. Arafat? I think you indicated correctly, Senator Percy, sometime ago that you are dealing with a plural enterprise when you talk about PLO. It becomes necessary to understand how the PLO itself is fashioned, and I think you are right when you suggest that Arafat may actually be the most moderate of any of the elements in the PLO and since he has——

Senator PERCY. Be sure you add "relatively speaking."

Mr. COUSINS. Yes.

Senator PERCY. I want to also emphasize, relative to who might replace him if he fails.

Mr. COUSINS. That is the point you made, I think when you came back, and a point I would support. Yesterday, Secretary Kissinger made the statement he did not feel that the United States would support a place for the PLO until such time as PLO recognized Israel. I think the Secretary correctly identified the crux of the problem in the Middle East which is to say, and the number of prominent people in the Arab world agree with this, certainly Mr. Malik, former President of the United Nations General Assembly, takes the position that the heart of the matter is the willingness of the Arab States to accept the existence of Israel. Once that step is taken, then I think all other problems can be resolved. I certainly do not think that the Israelis will hold onto any territory they have taken in 1967 if they can get that recognition. And I think that here is where all your questions come together. I think it is possible that the United Nations or the Office of Secretary General might be useful in making probes toward that end.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

SPEAKING OUT ON SOCIAL JUSTICE

Reverend Coffin, you have been an outspoken advocate of, and have expressed deep concern for, social justice in the world through the years. We find ourselves at the United Nations allied with some totalitarian governments, military dictatorships, where social justice does not exist. We are creating or attempting to create détente with Communist countries where social justice is defined differently, to say the least.

Bill Buckley, as a delegate to the United Nations, has criticized our policy for being very mute in world forums on the issue of social justice.

Taking everything into account, what would be your advice to the U.S. delegation, with respect to speaking out for the right of social justice, whether it rubs the fur the wrong way of people who are allies or with whom we are attempting to establish better relations?

Mr. COFFIN. I guess when my buddy, Buckley, talked of social justice he was not thinking in economic terms.

Senator PERCY. He was thinking of human rights.

Mr. COFFIN. Right.

Well, he does not think that much about the plight of the poor economy. He is very good on things like amnesty international, and that sort of thing. I do not think he is terribly troubled by the plight of the poor. I recognize we all have a dilemma here and we have to live with the dilemma and you have to balance up peace and freedom and justice, but I do think generally speaking, it is fair to say that world order will only work if it is based on justice, some degree of justice, a greater degree than what we have now. My fear is that it is presently being organized by a powerful people, powerful organization, powerful nations with wrong values. If we say the third world is the moral problem in a generalized way like this, and then try to deal with the redistribution of power and the redistribution of wealth, I think we have got a chance for some type of global unity, and I guess it was Norman said earlier, if you get dissent in

economic relations, you get dissent in political relations. But I think in a basic way we should understand the need for redistribution of power and the need for redistribution of wealth, and as a minister I can only say spiritually it would do us no end of good to have both our power and our wealth taken from us if we are not free enough to share it.

I do not think most nations would be free enough to share it, so I do not think we are any more sinful than anybody else. Human nature is prevalent; we do not have to see the loss of power as a negative thing, particularly when we misuse our freedom. I think the redistribution of wealth makes for much greater well-being, spiritually and physically, so it should not be approached as a negative thing.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN VOTING PROCEDURES OF IBRD AND IMF

Dr. Brown, in your statement, you suggested that we revise the voting procedures in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Your paper was written before publication of the report of the United Nations Panel, which yesterday suggested revision in the voting systems of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to give developing countries a greater part in the decisionmaking.

Bankers might say this is like taking a bank and turning it over to decisions made by the borrowers, rather than those who provide the capital. Obviously, the borrower is interested in the longest possible terms, the lowest possible rate of interest, and the least enforcement of repayment.

How would you revise our voting pattern so as to prevent and make needless the fears of those who would say this would lead to the destruction of the banks themselves?

Mr. BROWN. I do not want to present a detailed design without looking very carefully at other studies of colleagues, who are better able to discuss that than I could, and if you like, I could insert some of my favorite schemes in the record later.

Let me suggest, however, that a revision of voting procedures to give less developed countries more weight does not mean that we have to completely revise voting procedures so that stupid and basically unproductive things are done. We need not go completely away from a weighted voting procedure in the World Bank, in order to revise it in the direction of giving some of the participants, recipients, greater weight. So I think we do not have to go all the way just now. For the very reasons that you suggest, I doubt that would be the way that some of the less developed countries would really want to go, because I think the recipients themselves, who have received World Bank money, are sophisticated at least to that level, and they understand the contributions do come in part from private sources who require some reliable indication that they will have repayment. The funds will only go to projects which are thought to be worthy projects.

Otherwise, these funds will dry up. This is not an insight which is only an insight of the contributors; it is also insight of the recipients. So I do not think they will be completely stupid. Even though this is a fear, the principle of revision of voting procedures is now supported by a wide group of nations.

Senator PERCY. Should you want to expand on that with any greater specificity, we would be very happy to have your afterthoughts for the record.

[The following additional comments were subsequently submitted for the record:]

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION,
Washington, D.C., May 28, 1975.

Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN,
U.S. Senator,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: I would like to submit for the record a more considered response to two questions posed to me by Senator Percy during the hearings on May 21. The inserts are as follows:

First, possibilities for revising the weighted voting in the World Bank. I do not think all weighted voting should be eliminated; but I do not believe it is essential for the United States to maintain a weighted vote amounting to a veto—either for soft or hard loans. For the hard loan window, a formula will have to be negotiated that does not discourage the private sector from purchasing the bonds; I doubt, however, that this means we have to stick to our existing percentage. For the soft loan window, where contributions are provided by governments, the Congress itself will have to make up its mind about how much decision power it wants to share with potential recipients. In neither case are we talking of the U.S. giving up its influence. We are talking of putting the loans on a more truly multinational basis. The precise formulas can be negotiated with other members of the IBRD, including the potential loan recipients, who surely understand their own self-interest in keeping the donors assured that the institution will continue to function responsibly.

Second, on the United States position on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, voted on in the U.N. last December, I have now had the opportunity to read Senator Percy's report to this Committee on his attempts to get more qualified language in the Charter, and on his strategy for having separate votes to proposed amendments to the Charter in order that the United States and other governments might clearly pinpoint their areas of agreement and disagreement. Senator Percy is to be commended, I believe, for acting in a patient and understanding spirit, and on his tireless efforts at compromise, in response to the populist demands in this Charter. I can see why our U.N. delegation could not finally vote in favor of the Charter. But I do wish we could have seen fit to abstain along with Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, instead of voting against the resolution.

Again my thanks to you, Senator Percy, and other members of the Committee for the opportunity to participate in these important hearings.

Sincerely yours,

SEYOM BROWN.

WORLD ORDER AND JUSTICE DEPEND ON LAW

Mr. COUSINS. Just a very brief comment on Coffin's observation. You are quite right, you cannot have world order without justice, but neither can you have justice without law.

Therefore, it would seem clear that the basis of both justice and order has to be the codification of responsibility, which is what we mean by law, and this is the next big job it seems to me for the United Nations.

What does law consist of? How do you make it? What do we mean by defined responsibility? What do we mean by due process in the world scales? You do not expect to enforce the peace unless you know what is being enforced. So both justice and order in the end, it seems to me, requires law.

Mr. TOFFLER. Law without some power to back it up is paper.

Mr. COUSIN. That is what we are talking about. Lawmaking, law enforcement, and law interpretation.

"ADHOCRACY"

Senator PERCY. Dr. Toffler, in "Future Shock," you express the view that "adhocracy" will be the organizational system of the future. Would you expand on that? What do you mean by adhocracy, and how does the concept apply to international organization matters?

Mr. TOFFLER. That is what I alluded to in a very, very sketchy fashion.

During the period of industrial society, we have learned to create very large, very powerful, and very seemingly efficient organizational structures that are essentially designed in the shape of pyramids, with a hierarchy of command, with the orders flowing from the top down, with the people down below taking orders, with functional divisions, so that you have, in a company, for example a marketing department, a manufacturing department, a research development department, and some other departments. These are permanent structures with people frozen into positions that are also regarded as more or less permanent. Any large civil service bureaucracy including the U.N. civil service bureaucracy, reflects that kind of organizational structure.

Now, that type of organization is highly efficient in an environment which is predictable, because, in effect, the bureaucracy is a kind of machine. It is a factory for producing repetitive decisions. That is what a bureaucracy really is. It is designed to produce a relatively narrow range of decisions and to produce those in as routine and repetitive and standardized a fashion as possible.

Senator PERCY. Could it also be looked on as a machine for grinding up and disintegrating new ideas?

Mr. TOFFLER. Clearly. At this point I would like to throw in a four-line poem that Kenneth Boulding once wrote while attending a boring conference. He said:

> In every corporation
> Are lines of communication,
> Along which, from root to crown,
> Ideas flow up and vetoes down.

So yes, of course. But the reason we have built bureaucracies is that they make a certain kind of sense where the organization has to deal with a predictable environment. If it knows that very week it is going to get a fixed number of orders for a certain product, and it will receive a fixed amount of supplies, that is fine. But as organizations move into less predictable environments, as the rate of change becomes more rapid, the "efficiency" of bureaucracy breaks down. What is required are organizational forms that permit ideas, permit inventive responses, permit resourceful responses to totally new situations. Bureaucracies are no good at that. The U.N., it seems to me, is still organized in this anachronistic pyramidal fashion. One alternative to that is the structure which is now beginning to emerge in many advanced industries, but which also has analogs outside the corporate world.

For example, both ITT and the Vietcong share certain organizational characteristics. Thus neither of them is really a classical bureaucracy. Both of them rely on temporary units that are mission-oriented, that are created and then folded down after their mission is accomplished. And both of them undobutedly require a great deal

of movement of the people back and forth. Neither of them is a civil service kind of organization. The U.N. is. That's why I think it is going to be forced to restructure itself along more ad-hocratic lines—which also implies a downward movement of the decisionmaking within the structure. And this is what I was trying to suggest, that our policy could encourage that kind of internal renovation.

HOW TO CREATE A COHERENT INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF NONGOVERNMENTAL GROUPS

Senator PERCY. You are a sharp critic of the concept of world government, feeling that you really distrust the centralization of power, as I understand it, and you would much prefer to see created an international network of institutions and arrangements.

I am troubled by how you would organize that and yet I saw in Bucharest where we had the bureaucracy represented by all of the governments there, and all of the private agencies that dealt with population planning formed an organization that they called a tribune. You could actually meet with all of them, address them all. They had a newspaper, they put out daily bulletins, they really proved an effective force and found a way to work with the governments of the bureaucracy. The effort is really rather remarkable.

Would you care to expand on how you would envision groups of people representing across-the-board industry, labor, women, ethnic and religious groups, organized students and so forth, coming from various geographic units? How would you organize them into some sort of a coherent network and what issues would such assemblies take up?

Mr. TOFFLER. The question raises extreme difficulties. When you say I mistrust world government, what I mistrust is centralization of power, and I think we should not find ourselves in a position of opposing the notion of world order based on decentralized power or pluralistic power. We have got to find an alternative structure which deals with both these questions. The ready assumption that if we can centralize power we will be able to solve our problems, is a traditional assumption that grows out of our industrial-era experience. I think it applies less and less.

One of the reasons I argue the case for much more attention to the NGO's is that the NGO's form the potential for any number of temporary, mission-oriented consortia that could be brought together, whether they are environmental organizations or scientific organizations or organizations concerned with community development of food or whatever the issues are. It is possible to put together temporary consortia to deal with specific problems.

Now, in order for that to work you have to have some coordination or management. But what I am describing need not be a pyramid.

Now, here is one way to verbalize the alternative organizational structure. Think of the pyramid. Then think of a thin frame, a very thin frame which is essentially coordinative, which is a thin layer of management and direction, with a whole series of essentially temporary organizational clusters of modules that have relatively short life spans, and among which people float quite freely. They move from one module to another rather than being frozen in a single bureaucratic niche.

If we pump some funds into the nongovernmental sector, we might help to create precisely this thin coordinative system at the top. We would then have a basis for a very large, very diverse, very flexible, ad-hocratic organization that could operate in the international field. If we simultaneously help the U.N. destructure itself and then restructure itself along these lines, we would be ahead of the game that much further. Then if we connected these two networks, we would be light years ahead of where we are now.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Dr. Brown, can developing countries contribute to international decisionmaking? I understand from your testimony that you believe that the reaction of the United States will be extremely important to determine whether or not a transition from a world dominated by the industrialized countries to a more interdependent world can come about or whether we go into a series of confrontations and conflict.

Is that a correct assumption?

Mr. BROWN. That is a correct assumption on two counts. One, it is a correct assumption that is the message of the paper; and I think it is also a correct assumption about what the U.S. policy should be.

Senator PERCY. Do you have any hope, considering the political climate which creates a climate of hostility toward the developed world, that the developing nations are in a position to make a constructive contribution to international decisionmaking and play the role that you would advocate for them?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, I feel that they are; and I feel that they are very sad that the United States is not playing these days the innovative role that they have come to expect from the United States. At the time of the creation of the U.N., the United States put itself on the side of the newly emerging countries. We have not played that role. Most of the diplomats representing these countries, even the countries that are very small, tend to be very sophisticated men and are looking for the opportunities to cooperate with the United States, if only they could do so in a way that would not force these people to go back home embarrassed by their cooperation. This means that on matters such as resolutions, possibly we have to identify with symbols of change rather than symbols of conservatism and the status quo more than we have; whereas on precise organizational arrangements it appears to me that we can work with most of these diplomats to work out very practical institutions.

The Law of the Sea Conference, it appears to me, is a main laboratory for that kind of constructive working together and I do believe that there is a good prospect of some arrangements being made that will not alienate the less-developed countries as long as we do not force them by our rhetoric, by our public posturing, into opposition to us. There are many, many instances of very constructive collaboration. The Outer Space Committee of the U.N. has a great deal of constructive cooperation between the United States and the developing countries although not at the level of rhetoric; there is a grand confrontation in words but not when it comes to working out very practical designs.

Senator PERCY. On behalf of the Senate and the committee I would like to thank you, each of you, for your contribution this morning. The hearing record will be kept open until June 10 in the event that

any of you would like to supplement your comments here. I think we all realize what we are leaving just as we are really getting started.

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock when we have the final hearing on the U.N.

Mr. COUSINS. I thank you not for the privilege of coming here but the general principle of these open hearings and your leadership throughout.

Senator PERCY. I thank you and I would be happy to have any last comments any of you would like to make.

SELF-FINANCING PROPOSALS

Mr. TOFFLER. I have one last thought, just an idea for a way perhaps we might show some initiative and begin to shift our relationship advisory to the U.N. I am sure there have been many proposals before. I do not know what the history of this has been; I do not know what the U.S. position has been on this. But I wonder whether we might not take one step toward regaining our balance in the United Nations, so to speak, if we were to come forward with a set of concrete proposals for ways in which the U.N. system itself might become self-financing. There are many proposals available, many imaginative ideas. The proposals for a slight tax on international postal.

Mr. BROWN. Or shipping.

Mr. TOFFLER. If we took that position, I think that might give proof of the fact that we are not going into a blind isolationism, and that we, indeed, are serious about the problems of the planet.

Mr. COUSINS. The point Dr. Coffin makes about the seabed fits beautifully; you are talking about hundreds of millions of dollars; this is why you have to stake the claim immediately. But on the point Mr. Toffler made, government is the basis of justice and you cannot have justice without it. The question is how do you make government responsible. I sense virtual anarchy in the present world situation between anarchy and government. You have no bridge. You have got, it seems to me, to create government and make it work. The problem of abuse of power in government has always been with us and will always be with us. The answer to that is not eliminate government but the answer is to apply history as much to consensus as you can to make government responsible.

Senator PERCY. Right of reply.

Mr. BROWN. Endorsement.

Mr. COFFIN. Thank you very much.

Senator PERCY. These hearings are now recessed.

[Whereupon at 1:03 p.m. the committee recessed to reconvene at 10 a.m., May 22, 1975, the following day.]

THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS

THURSDAY, MAY 22, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 4221, the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Charles Percy presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Pell, Clark, and Javits.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator PERCY. Today's session will complete the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the United States and the United Nations.

This morning we are very honored to have with us Ambassador Scali, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The word "permanent" is an obvious exaggeration. In fact, Ambassador Scali is our sixth "permanent" representative since 1968—a span of 7 years, which hardly seems to me to be a permanent status. It is clear that a seventh permanent representative is about to make his debut.

Ambassador Scali is here to give the committee the official U.S. Government position on the United Nations. I hope he will give us more than that, however. The law entitles him to give his personal views upon our request, and the request is now being made of him by the Chair.

As you know, Mr. Ambassador, we have heard from a number of your distinguished predecessors and other prominent Americans, and I hope you will feel free to comment on their testimony.

We welcome you and I would like to say, as I have on many occasions before, since returning from the United Nations, that it was a great honor to serve with Ambassador Scali as a member of the U.S. Delegation. In our staff meetings, he made all of us feel that we were a part of the operation.

Ambassador Scali is also a man who forthrightly expressed his views to the State Department with candor and honesty and tremendous integrity, although he faithfully adhered to the U.S. position once it was decided. Moreover, I was deeply impressed by the high regard in which he was held by the representatives of other nations—some of whom, such as Ambassador Baroodi of Saudi Arabia are much more permanent than the American representative. So many of his colleagues up there from all over the world have the highest regard for him. They enjoyed working with him.

I think the people of the United States can be very proud to have had Ambassador Scali as their representative at the United Nations during this period.

Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a brief opening statement.

I first want to join with you in adding a brief personal note about our witness this morning, John Scali, who as you rightly pointed out, has served in a most difficult period, one of the most difficult periods of American diplomacy. I think it is clear that he has served with great distinction. In the process, he has gained the highest respect not only of the members of this Government, but also of those at the United States Mission, and of his colleagues from around the world—especially the delegates from many of the third world nations. I think that is a great measurement given the problems that we have had, and I want to join with you in complimenting John Scali on serving this Nation so well in such a difficult period.

Mr. Chairman, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has done the Congress and the country a service in holding hearings to discuss the United States and the United Nations.

CONCERNS OVER THE UNITED NATIONS

On this last day of hearings, I especially want to commend Senator Percy, who first urged that they be held. Their timing couldn't have been better. Never has the United Nations come under more sustained or more significant attack in the Congress than in recent months. But, at the same time, never has there been a greater need for a vital and active United Nations than there is today.

Earlier this month, a number of the bicameral, bipartisan Members of Congress for Peace Through Law went to New York for a series of briefings by U.N. officials and U.S. diplomats, including our distinguished Ambassador, John Scali, who, by even the standards of his harshest critics, has done an outstanding job.

I came away from those meetings, as I come away from these hearings, with a very deep concern that, in its 30th year, the United Nations will be confronted with issues so potentially divisive that they could put the United Nations in danger of extinction. And if that happens—if the United Nations is allowed to disintegrate—it may well be due in part to American indecision and indifference.

Everyone has heard the political adage "when you've got the votes, call the roll." For more than 20 years since the creation of the U.N. this country had the votes. The United States emerged from World War II in a class by itself—a nuclear power. While industrial Europe lay in ruin, the United States alone accounted for more than half of the world's gross production. The U.N. quite naturally reflected that U.S. dominance; most of the original 51 members were U.S. allies and dependents. The United States had the votes, and we called the roll.

CHANGES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Since then, the world has changed dramatically and the U.N. has changed with it. New economic powers, indeed, new economic systems, have risen to challenge American preeminence. Instead of one nuclear power, there are six with the immediate potential for many more.

Scores of new nations have entered the world community. Membership in the General Assembly has nearly tripled in just 30 years.

As a result, when the U.N. role is called today, the United States may find itself on the short end—sometimes it may even find itself alone. As Senator McGee said last year. "We have found that the world is not going to dance to a tune just because we snap our fingers."

It is no longer the United States and its allies, but the world's "nonalined" countries, that have the majority in the General Assembly. And this new minority position for the United States in the U.N. has led an increasing number of Congressmen and Senators to begin turning away from the United Nations. It is becoming fashionable to be against the U.N.

But it is not wise.

In some respects, this country and its policies have been taking a beating at the U.N. lately—at times with jurisdiction, at times because of the pique or parochialism of other nations. The question now is: What will our reaction be?

Are we to respond to these setbacks with a policy of increased confrontation with the nonalined bloc, as some have advocated? Will we continue to turn to the U.N. only in times of crisis and only then as a matter of form, after we already have taken unilateral action as was the case with the *Mayaguez* incident last week? Should U.S. reverses in the General Assembly lead us to curtail further our financial and diplomatic support for the U.N. and its many worthwhile programs?

In my judgment, to follow such a course would amount to nothing less than the wholesale abandonment of everything this Nation can and should stand for in world affairs. If this country has suffered a decline in international prestige from the withdrawal from Indochina—and I doubt that we have—the blow to our world standing from a substantial withdrawal of support from the United Nations would be immeasurably greater and more harmful to the prospects for world peace.

TIME TO TALK OF U.N. ACHIEVEMENTS

That is why it is time for those who believe in the U.N. to talk about its accomplishments, about its promise—and yes, its problems. Numerous witnesses of vast experience have come before this committee over the past several weeks to outline the U.N.'s many achievements. Right now, U.N. forces are helping keep the peace on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai. In Cyprus, despite Secretary Kissinger's efforts, and those of the British, the only significant progress that has been made in the difficult negotiations there has come through the good offices of the U.N. Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim.

These are but the most dramatic examples. It would take hours to touch on the many contributions of the U.N. in the areas of disaster relief, world health, economic development, international monetary cooperation, communications, aviation, international law, the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the exchange of educational, scientific, and cultural ideas. The list is almost endless. It is not by accident that the United Nations has become the focal point for action to combat hunger and malnutrition, overpopulation, environmental pollution, and income maldistribution. These are truly global problems, requiring global solutions. In seeking such solutions, as in the search for world

peace, the U.N. remains, as President Kennedy put it, "Our last, best hope."

But the longer the United States remains isolated and ineffective at the United Nations, the greater the danger of allowing this "last, best hope" to slip away. At the U.N., this country should be firm, decisive, and innovative—playing a role that emphasizes leadership and cooperation. This country's standing at the United Nations will not be enhanced by a U.S. Ambassador with a policy of storming into the General Assembly to "give 'em hell." There are a number of steps Congress and the administration can take that would have far more positive impact.

STEPS CONGRESS COULD TAKE

As a beginning, everyone must realize that the United States cannot speak with any real authority or persuasiveness about violations of the U.N. Charter until we ourselves are in compliance with the Charter. That requires repeal of the Byrd amendment. The U.N. economic sanctions against Rhodesia were adopted with U.S. support. It is time that we joined in their implementation. The House International Relations Committee will soon be taking up repeal legislation. The Senate passed it overwhelmingly last year, and we must do so again.

Further, Congress should appropriate, at the very least, the full $169 million requested by the administration for U.S. voluntary contributions to the United Nations for the next fiscal year. This year, Congress cut more than $25 million from the administration's request—our contribution was actually less than it had been the year before. U.S. support for the U.N. development program alone slipped more than $12 million in 1 year.

Our contributions to the multilateral activities of the development program, the Children's Fund, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the relief and works agency are of far more value to the recipient nations—and to U.S. foreign policy objectives—than bilateral aid. Increased financial support for these vital U.N. programs would be a modest price to pay for increased U.S. stature and effectiveness in the world community.

In addition to financial support, the administration needs the active backing of the Congress in dealing with three major issues coming before the United Nations this fall, each of which threatens to further damage the already weakened position of the United States at the United Nations.

One is the threatened expulsion of Israel from the U.N. General Assembly, a proposal which clearly is gaining momentum within the Third World bloc. The U.N. must be open to every nation under the terms of its Charter. If one country is excluded, the U.N. loses both its character as an international forum and its integrity. We are late converts to the concept of universality in the U.N., but we must assert that concept now before it is too late, for the benefit of every nation.

POSITIVE ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES

In confronting the problems of southern Africa, the United States can play a more positive role. U.S. efforts must continue to be directed at convincing South Africa to grant independence and self-determination to the people of Namibia. Failing that, the United States must not hesitate to support and participate in vigorous sanctions against South Africa's continued violations of the U.N. Charter. If the U.S. fails to be active in the effort to change South Africa's policies, we will certainly lose what little influence we have left in Black Africa. Our position at the United Nations will have suffered still another irreparable blow.

Finally, it is time to ask for the administration to develop constructive, imaginative economic proposals to contribute at the upcoming seventh special session. In this regard, Senator McGee and I, and a number of other Senators have written Secretary Kissinger expressing our concern over the status of U.S. preparations for this session. We ought to be capable of presenting reasonable alternatives on such key issues as commodity price indexing and compensation for nationalized foreign investments, alternatives that would prevent us from having to play the essentially negative role that characterized the U.S. position during the drafting of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. Right now, the prospects for that kind of positive role are not very encouraging. One thing is certain: If we demonstrate to the Third World nations at the U.N. a disinterest in their most serious difficulties—falling world prices for their products while the goods and services of the industrialized nations and the oil of OPEC continue to rise, crushing burdens of debt repayment and servicing, shortfalls in food and fertilizer production—then we can expect little cooperation from same Third World nations on the pressing international, economic, political, and legal issues we confront. I think we can do a far better job of building a new consensus with the Third World than we have done in the past.

Mr. Chairman, the answers to these questions about the U.N. which have been raised at these hearings strike at the very heart of our future role in world affairs. Are we so far from our own beginning—from our own revolution—are we such a "have" country, that we can no longer identify with the hopes and aspirations of the "have nots"? I believe this Nation can still lead the effort for such causes in the world.

And I believe the best forum for such action is the United Nations. There always has been criticism of the U.N.—perhaps that is an indication of its strength and potential—and I remember that Adlai Stevenson used to reply to U.N. critics with a story. He always cited Adam's proposal of marriage to Eve in the Garden of Eden. "She hesitated for a moment," Stevenson would say, "whereupon Adam asked, 'Is there somebody else?'"

There was no one else then. There is no one else now.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PERCY. Senator Clark, I would like to tell you how much I appreciate your attendance at these hearings and the contributions you

have made to them. I do not know of a single Member of the Senate who has had greater impact than you on the work of this Committee, during the brief period that you have served on it. I think your participation in these hearings has been exceptionally good, and I am pleased to join you in the letter to Secretary Kissinger about preparations for the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly.

I would also like to express appreciation to our Chairman, Senator Sparkman, and our ranking minority member, Senator Case, for their diligence in being here. They both deeply regret their inability to be here today. Senator Javits has also participated very actively, as has Stuart Symington, who served at the United Nations with me. Claiborne Pell, Gale McGee, Hubert Humphrey, and our other Members have not been able to be here as much but they have all been deeply interested.

LETTER FROM SENATOR M'GEE

I know, Ambassador Scali, that you have had a telephone call from Gale McGee from Wyoming, expressing his regret. I have a letter from him in which he asked that I read his statement on the closing of these hearings. I know that he wrote it because of his high regard for you personally, and wanted me to read it at this hearing. So I am sure you will not mind a short delay. It will just take a few minutes to read it.

Senator McGee says: "First, I would just like to say that prior commitments, including hearings my Post Office and Civil Service Committee held on voter registration legislation, have prevented my attending this series of hearings on the United Nations. My absence should in no way be interpreted to mean my interest in, and zeal for, the United Nations has diminished in any way. It has not.

"I also want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to our distinguished colleague, Senator Charles Percy, for being the catalyst in this series of hearings. In my estimation, this has been one of the most important undertakings of this committee in recent years.

"In addition, I commend two of our colleagues not only for their participation in the hearings, but for their continued substantive contributions to our efforts to strengthen the role of our Nation in the United Nations—Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Dick Clark.

"Finally, I particularly regret being unable to attend today's hearings, not only because the committee will be discussing relevant United Nations issues with our Ambassador, John Scali, but also because of the friendship which has developed between John and me as we have worked together on so many issues important to our effective participation in that organization. I, personally, appreciate the many contributions he has made in this regard.

"Three years ago, I had the distinct honor of serving as a delegate to the 27th General Assembly of the United Nations. In the report I compiled on my experiences at the United Nations, I made the following observation which I believe is even more relevant than 3 years ago. At that time, I noted: 'The United Nations is presently at the crossroads of its development as an international institution. What it will come to be in the future is contingent upon our ability to exercise foresight and wisdom to insure its viability and its increased efficiency and effectiveness.

" 'Yet, this will require a much greater commitment and involvement on the part of the United States than we have recently been willing to devote to the United Nations.

" 'Thus, even as the United Nations faces an uncertain future of almost crisis proportions, its chances for viability are threatened by a declining interest and support on the part of the United States. Indeed, there is a great danger that the United States could be responsible for the unraveling of the United Nations unless we recommit ourselves to strengthening the institution.

" 'In Congress, we are witnessing an erosion of support for the United Nations. The executive branch of Government is no less culpable in this regard, for it has not provided the leadership to stem the increasing congressional hostility to the United Nations, let alone promote a greater spirit of support for, and understanding of, the institution.

" 'In sum, both Congress and the administration are guilty of placing the United Nations far down the list of their respective priorities.'

"Three years ago, this was the state of affairs as I perceived them. Today, the situation has deteriorated even further.

"The United Nations has become a convenient tool only when we want to make it that instrument. Despite the efforts of a handful of people within the Congress and the executive branch, the institution suffers from a lack of attention or even a lack of regard on the part of our Government.

"The many positive contributions—contributions which are essential to our own well-being—are continually overlooked as the assaults upon the institution have increased in frequency in recent years. The potential of the United Nations as a viable institution is undermined by our own shortsighted disregard for the organization.

"I would like to make an additional observation. Once again, I quote from my report: 'I am very disturbed with the attitude expressed from time to time in the U.S. Congress that, somehow, 80 nations of the world are not qualified to have their views aired in an international forum. I am particularly referring to a dialogue this session of Congress on the floor of the Senate, where the view was expressed that the United Nations was much better off when only 50 nations comprised its membership. This view concluded that admission of some 82 additional members has somehow had a deleterious effect on the organization. I am disturbed, since we are extremely proud of our own national sovereignty, that we should not have the decency to respect the sovereignty of all nations of the world, no matter how small, no matter how underdeveloped, or no matter how much we may disagree with their positions. I believe in the integrity of all nations, I respect the sovereignty of all nations.

" 'In many ways, the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, is reflective of our own bilateral relationships around the world. We have given the developing nations of the world short shrift in our foreign policy considerations. The United Nations is the one forum where our insensitivities to these nations is manifested, oftentimes much to our dislike.'

"In concluding my remarks, I want to make one final observation.

"At a time when there has never been a greater need to strengthen and expand multilateral institutional approaches to global problems which are increasing in severity—problems which threaten our own viability as a nation—the United States is slowly turning its back on the United Nations.

"I have never felt more strongly than I do now that the United Nations offers mankind its best hope for achieving peace and stability in the world. Yet, we are allowing this hope to slip through our fingers."

Senator PERCY. Now, I would like to introduce Ambassador Scali.

Seventy-five percent of the American people still affirm their faith in the United Nations, despite the United States having been told to get out of the U.N., and the U.N. having been told by some Americans to get out of the United States. I cannot imagine the reaction of young people, who have never lived in a world without a United Nations if we were to leave the U.N. I think if we did not have the U.N., we would have to invent something like it. Maybe we can strengthen and perfect what we actually do have. Ambassador Scali, you have spent a lifetime observing the problems of the world in the field of journalism. During the Cuban missile crisis, you participated in the top councils of decision in the White House. Most recently, you have been our Permanent Representative at the United Nations. There could be no more appropriate witness to close our hearings and provide us with some concluding thoughts.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR JOHN SCALI, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador SCALI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Percy, Senator Clark, as I begin what I expect will be my last appearance before this committee in my role as Ambassador to the United Nations, I want to thank you for your generous comments as well as those of Senator McGee.

I deeply appreciate the kind word at this particular time, and I will do my best to answer your questions honestly. In that context, I think, I will accept Senator Percy's suggestion that I give my personal views. I will seek to be responsive, but I think that speaking personally, perhaps I could have a little more flexibility in giving you my innermost thoughts on some of the issues which face us.

TRIBUTES TO SENATORS

I want to, before I begin, pay particular tribute to Senator Percy for suggesting and organizing these hearings. They could not have come at a better time. As the United Nations nears its 30th anniversary, as it begins the process of looking inward, as well as outward to decide how better to cope with the world. I think that some of the suggestions and ideas that have been laid forward by the witnesses that you have had here are well worthy of thought by two committees which are already at work within the United Nations to decide whether there can be improvement, and I have in mind the Committee of 42, which is trying to decide whether there should be charter reform and the Committee of 25 experts which only a few days ago

put forward a 160-page report on how to reform the international economic arena in which the United Nations operates. And as we have a changing of the guard at the U.S. Mission, I suspect, too, that the thoughts that are being expressed within this room could be a useful guide, not only for the administration, but for us all.

I wish to note, and I am not exaggerating, that it has been a rare privilege for me to work closely with Senator Percy during the last special session. I have known many Members of Congress who have been public members of the U.S. Delegation at the United Nations and am familiar with the amount of work that some of them have devoted to this project, while continuing to serve as active Members of Congress. I can say honestly and without the slightest exaggeration that I do not think I have ever been as impressed as I have been by the amount of time and careful attention that Senator Percy devoted to his work at the United Nations. I marveled at the number of times that he flew back and forth, even in the course of one day, in order to be on hand, and particularly to carry out the work which he took on in terms of the American role on whether there was to be a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties.

Senator Percy, I think that was in the highest tradition of statesmanship and I just wish to make this point for the record.

Senator McGee, of course, is a tried and true and tested friend of us all and of the United Nations in particular, and he has been a man who has led the way in many areas in mobilizing American support. He has done so in the spirit of realism, and one which takes full account of the national security and other objectives which are important to the U.S. Government.

I remember meeting Senator Clark for the first time at the U.S. Mission just for a few days prior to the beginning of the Rome Food Conference. If you remember, Senator, we shared a deep and I think common interest in seeing to it that the U.S. Government contributed more than appeared to be the likely result of whatever pledges we were to make.

And, if you remember, I encouraged you in your thought that perhaps you would fly to Rome to be on hand to exert whatever positive influence that you could. You not only did fly there but you exerted a powerful positive influence along with Senator Humphrey, Senator Percy, and others, and as a result, we as a government wound up surpassing all previous pledges that we had made to help feed the hungry, and I wish to pay a suitable tribute to you for that.

I will begin this brief prepared text that I have before me with the emphasis that I am speaking personally now, because of my unique status.

THE U.N.—DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY

The Chinese word for crisis combines the characters for danger and opportunity. This is a good description of the current state of the United Nations, an organization in crisis, poised between imminent opportunity and eventual disaster.

Over the past 2 years the United Nations has in assorted forums approved a series of thoroughly one-sided economic declarations. It has taken discriminatory action against Israel in UNESCO, invited Yasir Arafat to speak in New York and illegally suspended South Africa.

Yet, during this same period the United Nations played an indispensable role in limiting and eventually halting dangerous wars in the Middle East and on Cyprus. It convened successful world conferences on two of the most critical issues of our time, those of food and population. In just the past few weeks it has moved swiftly to seek to bring relief to the war victims in Indochina.

Unpalatable and arbitrary as some recent United Nations decisions are, we must face the possibility that there may be worse in store. Unless we move with care and understanding, our confrontation with the Third World will worsen. If we, as a government, stand immovable in a rapidly changing world, we may wind up standing alone. If, on the other hand, we choose to lead the way, we can still lead the United Nations into an era of historic achievement.

No one can predict with any certainty which of these paths the United Nations will take. I do believe, however, that the decisive turning point will be reached sooner rather than later.

SOURCES OF TENSIONS AT THE U.N.

It is not hard to pinpoint the present sources of tension at the United Nations. There are three—the Arab-Israeli dispute, the battle for racial justice in Southern Africa and the growing gap in living standards between developed and developing nations. These three issues dominate all United Nations deliberations for a good reason: These are the problems that most of the world's people feel most keenly. For most member nations a United Nations which cannot promote progress on these issues is not worth having.

On December 6, I spoke to the General Assembly about the unfair, unrealistic, one-sided and even illegal actions which the Third World majority was forcing on the United Nations in pursuing these goals. I warned of the damage these decisions were doing to the United Nations and to the real interests of all its members.

These remarks set off one of the most comprehensive and, in my opinion, most constructive debates in the Assembly's recent history. Representative after representative frankly laid out his country's policies, fears, and hopes about the fundamental problems now faced by us all. This debate was helpful, but it did not resolve our differences. It did, however, create a more hopeful atmosphere and gave us a better idea of the deep-seated emotions that exist on both sides.

We and the nations of the Third World are divided on issues of major importance. We differ on how to achieve peace in the Middle East, how to bring social justice to Southern Africa and how to insure a more equitable sharing of the world's wealth. We are not divided on goals, however, and we are not fundamentally divided on the role which the United Nations can play.

There is no single surefire formula which can reform the United Nations and reverse the trend toward confrontation there. The tone in which we conduct our dialog can soothe, or it can inflame our current differences. Our language, our posture, can enhance or set back the prospects of compromise. But only sincere negotiation on the problems of critical importance to the Third World can halt the continued deterioration in our relations with these nations.

If, because of choice or neglect, the world community fails to make the United Nations work, the alternative is not cooperation elsewhere

in some other more promising forum, but inevitably a fundamental breakdown of the main path to international cooperation. The dream of an open and cooperative world order to which mankind committed itself 30 years ago will wither and die. In its place there certainly will arise a world divided into exclusive, selfish, and rival camps, where each nation's gain is another's loss.

FULFILLING U.N.'S POTENTIAL

I see a different future, however. I see a United Nations capable at last of fulfilling the mandate of its founders. I see a United Nations serving as the international community's principal forum for peacemaking and peacekeeping. I see the United Nations being used by its members as the court of first resort to settle differences, rather than as the court of last resort for their conflicts. I see a world in which 150 nations live at harmony and in peace—their security preserved collectively and their prosperity pursued cooperatively. I see a world in which nations will frankly recognize that there may be deep differences on fundamental issues but continue to work at narrowing these differences and at the same time move ahead in areas where they are able to agree. And there are such areas where patient diplomacy can make the difference.

This is no dream. It is a realistic alternative. It requires only that we and other nations begin to use the United Nations to its capacity to help it fulfill its potential. In the Middle East and in Cyprus, the United Nations is showing that it can keep the peace. In crisis after crisis the United Nations is demonstrating that when called upon in time, it can respond effectively to the task at hand. At conference after conference, the United Nations is proving that 100 and more countries can be brought to meaningful agreement even on the most complex and controversial issues when they have the will to do so. The United Nations need not be the sole institution for negotiating and managing the complex problems of interdependence. But it should have a central role in that process as the single universal organization that expresses in broadest terms the collective hopes and needs of all who inhabit this planet.

U.S. ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

The fate of the United Nations rests with all of its members, but it rests most heavily with those in a position to help resolve the issues confronting it. The United States cannot singlehandedly bring peace to the Middle East, majority rule to Southern Africa, or economic justice to the world.

We can, however, continue to support these goals and we can seek to lead—not as the sole headquarters of justice and wisdom, but as one who recognizes that new and exciting doors can be opened by many countries in an increasingly interdependent world.

The record of our country as a champion of freedom, social justice, and economic opportunity is one in which every American can take pride. No nation, however, can expect to be judged on its past. To the peoples of the Third World, we can show that we are still the same Nation which issued the Declaration of Independence, promulgated the Emancipation Proclamation, advanced the principle of self-

determination of peoples, created the concept of international development and pressured its closest allies to free their vast colonial empires.

In Southern Africa we can do more than decry racism—we can disassociate ourselves from it entirely. In the Middle East, we can commit ourselves unequivocably to the pursuit of a just settlement which recognizes the rights and national aspiration of all the people of that area. In our relations with the developing nations, we can move once more into the forefront of those seeking to close the gap between rich and poor.

If the United States follows this course steadfastly, I believe we can realistically require that others meet their responsibilities to move with us on the course of cooperation.

If we listen as well as lead, I am convinced that the current trend toward confrontation will be reversed, and that this will open a new era of achievement at the United Nations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much, Ambassador Scali. I think that is a wonderful beginning for our conversation this morning. Now, I am going to limit my questioning to 5 minutes and then turn to Senator Clark and yield to him whatever time he needs to finish his questions and then I will come back and complete my own.

REACTIONS TO AMBASSADOR SCALI'S DECEMBER SPEECH

Probably one of the most memorable things you have done at the U.N. was the speech you gave last December, which received both accolades and brickbats from different sides.

I wonder if you could just give us the background for that speech, how it came about, how much of it was John Scali's feeling that something had to be said, and how reflective it was of the official position of the U.S. Government. Could you also give us a capsule of the reactions that you received from American citizens, from journalists across the country, and the editorial positions of newspapers and other news media. Certainly it was the most discussed speech, probably, of the 29th General Assembly. It almost rivaled in public attention the attention that Arafat received when he arrived, although the attention was somewhat different.

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Percy, I will seek to be as responsive as I can to your question. Let us begin with the reaction to it. Of all speeches that I gave during my time at the United Nations, this received by far the most acclaim. I think that the count at last look was something like 99 to 1 in favor of what I said. If you recall, on December 6, I warned that American support for the United Nations was eroding because of a series of one-sided unrealistic and unenforceable resolutions which the Assembly had overwhelmingly passed despite the vigorous opposition of the United States and many of the developed countries. I spoke then as I do now as a friend of the United Nations who was speaking more in sadness than with indignation. I was seeking to warn those who were beginning to use the U.N. as a political weapon that to continue to pervert the charter, to continue to take illegal actions for short-term political gain,

would destroy the very structure that was put in place so many years ago as a principal device for keeping the peace.

As a result of my talk, some 50 representatives engaged in what then turned out to be a great debate. The rejoinders started out fairly indignantly blaming the United States for its share of confrontation and recalling that perhaps we were guilty of a short memory in that the majority now was doing what the United States and its allies did early in the history of the U.N. As these answers continued, however, they took on a less heated and more constructive tone, and the last 25 or so, which included the representatives of some of the most influential countries, agreed that something more had to be done to prevent the very problem which I had sought to warn against. They acknowledged there had to be a greater emphasis on a conciliation and accommodation rather than seeking one-sided votes which approved resolutions that could not be carried out and which represented paper triumphs for the third world and nothing more.

In the months that have followed this increased desire to avoid confrontation has, I think, become evident in private discussions even though on many public occasions the rhetoric is still hard and still sounds uncompromising.

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS EVINCE DESIRE TO CONCILIATION

In the preliminary discussions which are underway in assorted forums, prior to the special session which begins September 1, we have found that even the most militant of the third world leaders are saying that they want to compromise, they want conciliation and they do not want a repeat of the situation that occurred last fall. We are seeking to meet them and seeking to concentrate on what we hope will be a positive U.S. position which, as I said in my text, listens as well as leads and which seeks to compromise the differences.

I am not sure at this stage Senator Percy, whether all of these preliminary discussions will lead us to softer rhetoric and more accomplishment this fall. I am hopeful that this is so.

I am encouraged by the more moderate tone and indeed even the more moderate proposals that are being discussed as a possible agenda but the final outcome of this will depend on a series of developments including political developments.

If, for example, there is progress toward peace in the Middle East, if there is additional acceptable progress on the problem of South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia, many of the third world countries will moderate other demands. So all of these are inextricably linked and my only hope is that we recognize that the problems that the third world is bringing up are not just idealistic and retaliatory visions which they wish to force the industrialized world to accept, but that they reflect genuine fears, deep worry, for example, that the gap between rich and the poor countries is increasing at a time of recession, at a time of energy crisis, and at a time when food remains one of the great uncertainties of our time. And I think that we in the West who possess so much wealth and a good deal of wisdom, too, should recognize that some of the economic reforms that are being asked are not

that radical if we just recognize what the international facts of life today really are.

SUFFICIENT EFFORT BEHIND INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR

Senator PERCY. Another question relates to International Women's Year.

We had a tremendous U.N. effort for the population conference and also for the food conference. Do you think a comparable effort is being made for International Women's Year? Are we in the United States making enough of a contribution to it? And what do you think is the principal purpose of it? Also, do you think enough effort is being put into the special session? You are aware that Gale McGee and Senator Clark have written a letter to the Secretary asking for heavy emphasis to go into the planning for the special session so we can take the leadership and initiative and not just find ourselves in a confrontation. Do you think enough effort is going into that? After your response I will yield to Senator Clark.

Ambassador SCALI. On your first question, I suspect very strongly that the United States will be represented at a very high level in Mexico City at the International Women's Year Conference. I have urged it and I also believe that the suggestion perhaps will be adopted.

I am more encouraged in the past few weeks about the kind of preparations that we are making for this Conference because I think it is one of the most important that the United Nations has undertaken recently. I suspect that 5,000 American women who will show up there will remind us very clearly if we have not prepared properly and if the results do not meet with their expectations.

So I would hope that those of the administration who have the task of making sure that there are adequate preparations, adequate programs and adequate followthrough, would keep in mind that many of the American women leaders in this area are expecting that Mexico City is going to be more than just a carnival of women getting together to discuss some of the overdue achievements and goals which are rightfully theirs.

PREPARATIONS FOR SPECIAL SESSION

On the preparation for the special session, I have been somewhat disturbed that we have not moved as quickly as we might have within the Government in creating an all-Government position. The State Department has created a special task force to formulate assorted proposals. The U.S. mission has come up with what I believe are some very important suggestions which have been cranked into this, but there continues to be some evidence, I must say frankly, that all segments of our Government are not in agreement at this stage.

Now we still have time and we are dealing and discussing highly complex problems such as whether there should be commodity agreements, for example, whether there should be even consideration of an indexing price system, and whether or not there should be a reform, for example, of the voting rights of the International Bank and Monetary Fund.

You are talking about some very important and very fundamental changes of a kind that have an impact in the field of international eco-

nomics and finance for decades to come, so there deserves to be the most careful consideration.

I would hope that once this consideration and interagency and interdepartmental discussion ends that we wind up with a positive constructive policy and one which recognizes that some change inevitably not only should be made but are overdue.

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much.

Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have only four or five questions. I would like to start out with a general question.

USING U.N. MORE AS A CENTRAL FORUM FOR CONDUCT OF U.S. POLICY

Do you think that the United Nations can become a more central forum for the conduct of American foreign policy and, if so, what can we do as a government to better utilize the United Nations?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Clark, I do believe that it should become a more important vehicle for foreign policy. It requires a determination in advance that it be used more often and that its presence be a constant reminder that there is an international forum which can be of positive assistance to the United States in achieving its own foreign policy goals.

I do not believe that the U.N. can or should be the sole forum. I think that there are many, many international groups of a kind that provide more specific expertise than you can in a broad sweep forum of 138 members. But I would suggest that if we follow through with some of the economic streamlining and reforms which I think are fundamental to a more effective U.N., that the United States will of its own will decide that more of its aid, for example, could be channeled through multilateral sources.

I would also hope that as the Middle East crisis eases, and I believe it will ease one day, I think that there will be permanent peace in the Middle East and that the United Nations and United States will join in playing the central roles. But as this eases, the United States can then expect more objective judgments of third world countries to line themselves up with the United States in seeing the same way to the solution of economic and other problems.

I would suggest that the Middle East crisis right now is completely distorting the possibility of the kind of cooperation which we should have within the United Nations, but once that is substantially eased I can see the nations of Africa, for example, who then would no longer have to march in step automatically with all of the Arab countries and the developing countries of Asia, moving in parallel with us to achieve many of the same objectives that we both want. Most of the African countries, despite their current preoccupation about what is happening in South Africa and Namibia and Rhodesia, very well remember that the United States took the lead in promoting independence for the black African nations and they know that while some countries talk about aid, the United States is usually the one that produces it and provides more than words, it provides food for them. So there is a tremendous reservoir of good will and believe that we can work together.

And so I think maybe the longhand answer to our question, Senator, is that we must make considerably more progress in settling the Middle East crisis and in moving substantially further in the problem of what to do about Rhodesia, and Namibia and South Africa before we can expect the kind of cooperation which will come someday. But I think that we are also prisoners right now of international developments of long standing of tremendous complication and which U.N. itself cannot solve. Those are good recommendations. I am in particular agreement with the idea that each President or administration and Congress has to keep in mind that it is largely a question of attitude. Our willingness to go to that forum whenever possible to use it should be a priority rather than going to it as an afterthought.

TOUGHER ATTITUDE TOWARD THIRD WORLD

Senator CLARK. The other questions I have are somewhat more specific. First, some have now advocated that we should be taking a tougher attitude toward the third world in the U.N. What effect do you think that would have? Do you think that is good advice? What effect do you think it will have if we do that?

Ambassador SCALI. I thought that is what I did last December 6, at least that is what one or two people thought I had done. I made my criticism and warned the third world countries that they were rushing pellmell toward a result which would hurt all of us.

I think that many of the third world countries stopped and took a very serious look at whether this was true and concluded that perhaps it was. As a result there has been the first sign of a new and improving attitude, and additional readiness to conciliate and accommodate. And I think that to fail to take advantage of what appears to be a new third world mood, and to complicate this by additional criticism, would set back the prospects for the kind of accommodations and compromises which appear to be possible and on the horizon. I say this because there are also signs within our own Government, for example, that we are facing up to some very important decisions economically on, for example, whether to begin discussions toward possible commodity agreements for key raw materials. This represents a very important departure and if we do not have an opportunity to test the readiness of the third world in this present situation, in a calm and rational atmosphere, without grandstand debates, I think that we will miss a tremendous opportunity.

Senator CLARK. As I understand it, you would not feel that ongoing criticism of the third world at this time would be useful?

Ambassador SCALI. I think it would set back the prospects for cooperation with the third world.

POSITIVE ALTERNATIVES TO CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Senator CLARK. This question is a bit more complex in that it has two or three parts. I ask it, of you in your capacity as a private citizen, Many observers of the United Nations argue that, in recent times, we have taken an essentially defensive, inflexible position, particularly at the sixth special session when the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties was drafted, and some of these people contend that the United States failed to come forth with any positive alternatives on the very

touchy issues, such as nationalization, commodity agreements, and so forth.

Do you think that assessment has any accuracy? How would you respond to that criticism?

Ambassador SCALI. Well, I do not accept that criticism. I think that we could have been forthcoming, more forthcoming in one or two areas but, for example, on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, which Senator Percy had a major task in seeking to resolve, the fundamental hang up there was whether or not under this proposed rules of the game governments should provide for adequate compensation in the event that a country took over some private industry. Our position I thought was a completely reasonable one. If you confiscated why not compensate? And if we cannot agree directly on what the sum should be, let us turn it over to some third party for an impartial decision.

Basically, the possibility of agreement, and Senator Percy knows this better than I, broke down on the insistence of the developing countries that national law, not international law, should be the decisive factor in determining what compensation there was to be, if any.

Well, our experience has demonstrated that some American companies, for example, have been nationalized and have then been presented with a bill for alleged past injustices, and that instead of gaining any compensation they wind up owing the country where their properties have been nationalized. This is really confiscation in our view and such treatment is very fundamental to whether or not we can encourage private companies to move in and provide the economic know-how which I think is indispensable. As important as Government assistance is, I think that the amount of help that private companies can provide is not only greater, it is more affective, more efficient, and in the final analysis I think is going to be the dominant method of assistance for the next several generations.

ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES ON ECONOMIC CHARTER

Senator PERCY. I would like to say that I never in my life worked harder trying to resolve a difference. I really began with the objective, as Ambassador Scali knows, of finding a way to come together with the third world countries in this charter. But I finally decided that this charter would do more harm to the third world because it would discourage the flow of private capital. Latin America needs a tremendous amount of capital. All the commissions and studies indicate that, no matter how much public investment you have, about 70 percent of Latin America's development has come from the private sector.

A private investor can bring technology, know-how, scientific experience, and everything else into a situation. How would we agree that he not only would be subject to expropriation, nationalization and seizure—no one contests the right of any sovereign nation to do that—but to also present him with the fact it would not even have to be an action of his company that led to its being taken over? Under this charter if the country from which he came engaged in racial discrimination, neocolonialism, colonialism, apartheid, or whatever it is—all of which we condemn—then those factors would be taken into account in determining what would be paid to the owners of the expropriated firms.

Well, I can just see a company board of directors asking, "Are we to be held responsible for actions of our country a hundred years ago?" Because there is no time limit at all. I really felt a majority of the developing world felt that that was too onerous. There were just three or four representatives who were really adamant and who in my judgment had no desire to see private capital ever flow into the third world. They consider private capital from the World Bank just as bad; it is tainted; it comes from the developed world. This small minority just did not want foreign capital, and they do not want any influence of democratic societies in the developing countries. So the crucial point was that radical position they adopted on the right of expropriation. And it was plain that American businessmen would never invest in accordance with that philosophy. I finally realized that, in good conscience, we simply could not vote for it. But we hoped to the end to bring about certain modifications and changes. We had 73 rollcalls, I think, on the charter to demonstrate and prove that we actually subscribed to 95 percent of that charter. It was only the last few remaining issues on which we found there would be no yielding whatsoever. Three or four countries, I would say the radical fringe, simply said in effect they did not want a viable charter, and that is what caused the breakdown. We deeply regretted it.

Ambassador SCALI. I might add, Senator Percy, we have not yet given up hope that in improving atmosphere and easing of the confrontation will make it possible to write a charter that all can agree on so that there will be ground rules, that all corporations will know in advance they must follow, and which they can then rely on to protect their investment, and which the receiving countries will then know will protect them.

TIMELIER PROPOSALS AT SPECIAL SESSION

Senator CLARK. The other criticism of which you are aware with regard to the 6th Special Session dealt with the fact that the U.S. proposals were presented only 2 days before the close of the session, and that they really came awfully late in the session to be helpful. Would you assess that?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Clark, this is a very big government and sometimes it takes us a little longer than is desirable to bring together diverging viewpoints and to wrap it all up into a single package. Despite the tardiness of the American proposal, it was made in good faith and I only regret that we could not have made it earlier, but I know something about the depth of the disagreements that had to be overcome and some of the traditional positions which had to be bent in order to have a proposal at all.

I would hope that in presenting proposals and initiative for the next special session that we put them on the table far sooner.

Senator CLARK. In other words, as we go into the 7th Special Session it is imperative that our Government be prepared in advance to make the proposals that it has in mind and to make them in a meaningful way—soon enough to have some effect?

Ambassador SCALI. I think it would be important and highly desirable and I have reason to believe that the administration recognizes that it had better move sooner rather than later.

PROPOSALS ON SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA

Senator CLARK. The last two questions, Mr. Ambassador, deal with the United States assuming the leadership position on the question of majority rule for Southern Africa. What could the United States propose, particularly on the pressing problem of Namibia, that would strengthen our position with black Africa?

Can you talk about any alternatives we might have? I am not asking you to recommend a specific policy, necessarily, but what are our alternatives of action that would be useful?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Clark, I am afraid I cannot be as forthcoming in discussing this as I would like to be in public. Within a matter of a few days we are going to have a Security Council meeting on Namibia. I just think I can say generally, however, that the United States has made it known that it favors independence for Namibia, that it favors a principle of self-determination and that it believes that Namibia should be one country and not split up into a series of countries.

Having said that, I think that how this is to be achieved or in what period of time, and what the response of South Africa has been and will be as it is laid out in the Security Council is something I had better not go into less something I say complicates achievement of the objective. But I think, as you know, I am very strongly dedicated to the principle of self-determination and I look forward to being of whatever assistance I can to help those who favor independence for Namibia. After all, it is a trusteeship South Africa had in hand for a specific purpose and I look forward to the day when there will be self-determination and a representative of a Namibia delegation.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I think our position on South Africa very often has been a positive one, and particularly our position with regard to Namibia, and we, as I recall, exercised the sanction on military sales to South Africa. Am I wrong about that?

Ambassador SCALI. No, there are no existing military sanctions against shipment to South Africa. There is a possibility that such a resolution might be introduced in this forthcoming debate. We would not be affected by any such ban because we ship no military weapons of any kind to South Africa. But there is a principle involved here which we would have to take a very close look at, namely, should the United Nations get into the business of imposing military bans, in effect taking what is called chapter 7 action for a political purpose?

Senator CLARK. The last question. The purpose of these questions is not to give you the most embarrassing questions to deal with but to bring out some facts.

"MAYAGUEZ" INCIDENT AND THE U.N.

Could you characterize the U.S. initiative at the U.N. during the *Mayaguez* incident? It seems to me that we may have approached the Secretary-General as an afterthought. Could a more serious effort in the U.N. have brought about a different solution, in your judgment?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Clark, I strongly doubt that because in my discussions with the Secretary-General when I did go to see him and when I had talked with him privately before, he acknowledged that he did not know where and/or how to contact the Cambodian

authorities. It seemed pretty clear at that stage that Prince Sihanouk was not the dominant decisive factor in any decisions that the new authorities in Phnom Penh were making. When the Secretary-General last contacted the new authorities in Phnom Penh, he did so from Vienna via the device of sending an open telegram to quote, the government, unquote; Phnom Penh, and someone eventually acknowledged that they had received it, but whether this telegram from the Secretary-General was instrumental in this particular case, which was to allow the refugees then located in the French Embassy to go to Thailand, no one knows. So the Secretary-General was not necessarily the fastest route for relaying the message and/or making any moral influence felt in that situation.

Senator CLARK. It is unlikely that any positive solution could have come through that route if it had come earlier?

Ambassador SCALI. I do not think the new government in Cambodia has shown that it is particularly receptive to U.N. assistance and/or pressure because, if you recall, among those who were forced to leave were representatives of the United Nations.

Senator CLARK. I am curious why our Government decided finally, to go through the U.N.?

Ambassador SCALI. I think it was seeking to make sure it exhausted every conceivable means of persuading the Cambodian Government to release the ship and crew.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much. I appreciate your forthright answers.

Senator PERCY. I would like to follow upon that question of yours, the last one.

A Washington Post article of May 15 indicated that you, Ambassador Scali, had delivered a letter to Secretary-General Waldheim asking for assistance in obtaining the release of the crew 1 hour after the first military steps had already been taken by the United States, namely, the sinking of three Cambodian patrol boats. This timing raises, really, two specific questions.

Did you know, at the time you delivered that letter, that the United States had already taken military action? If so, why did we bring the issue to the U.N. at all when we had begun the military action?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Percy, I cannot recall specifically whether I knew at the time. I do know that I delivered a note to the Secretary-General at 1 o'clock in the afternoon and that it was at a time when some kind of action had taken place or was about to take place.

Senator PERCY. Would it have been, in your judgment, possible to have allowed the Secretary-General time to institute a diplomatic initiative before resorting to military action?

You are a member of the National Security Council and to the extent that you can tell us, what were the considerations that led us to believe that we could not wait for such diplomatic initiatives?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, just for the record, I am not a member of the National Security Council and I did not sit in.

Senator PERCY. You attend Cabinet meetings though?

Ambassador SCALI. Yes.

Senator PERCY. Did you happen to attend any meetings where the deliberations were carried on?

Ambassador SCALI. I think that there was no desire to bypass the U.N. if we had thought that the U.N. offered a quick avenue to the new Cambodian Government. I am sure that this route would have been chosen because it would amount to basically choosing the right post office to deliver the message. But we did have a mission in Peking where we thought, and we did have good reason for knowing, that the Chinese were not only in touch with but very friendly to the new Cambodian Government, so I think it was logical for us to believe that perhaps this avenue could produce results faster than going through the U.N. when we knew the Secretary-General was not sure how to get in touch with the Cambodian authorities.

Senator PERCY. Would you care to comment on the initiative that we took with the Chinese and how you evaluate what happened there and why?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, I am afraid I do not know enough about that to respond with any real meaning.

MORE DELEGATION OF POWERS TO THE U.S. MISSION AND DELEGATION

Senator PERCY. When I left the U.S. delegation at the end of last year, I wrote a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and made a number of suggestions as to how I felt the delegation could improve its relationship with the State Department and vice versa. Among these were suggestions for the State Department delegating more responsibility to the U.S. Delegation and Mission at the U.N.—not nitpicking so much on words and phrases, allowing more initiative to be taken and having some confidence in giving the delegation the sense that they did not have to get the directions from Washington on every last little thing, that they could take initiatives.

Would you care to make any comments from a personal standpoint? I think the State Department would be interested in how the delegation can be strengthened, how it can be improved, how the relationship between Washington and New York, which are connected by many, many cables, could be improved?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, most of the time I had no difficulty with the basic instructions under which I operated in the U.N. As the U.S. permanent representative you are an instructed Ambassador and it is very carefully spelled out that you operate under the instructions of the Secretary of State and the Department of State.

However, there were occasions, as I think you know first hand, when we felt that there was excessive quarterbacking from the distance that did not sufficiently take into account what we thought was our special knowledge about the intimate conditions. I would hope that the Department would give greater latitude and greater flexibility to the U.S. mission, specifically to the Ambassadors and the public delegates during the assembly time, with the understanding that if they are worthy of being appointed they are worthy of being allowed to make decisions, and if the decisions do not work out I suspect there is some way to get rid of them.

GREATER INVOLVEMENT OF SECRETARY IN U.N. MATTERS

Senator PERCY. A number of suggestions have been made that the Secretary of State should take a much more active interest in the

United Nations and should be physically present in New York, not just to hold bilateral talks on the business between the United States and a particular country, but to actually engage in the dialog and the United Nations problems on the agenda. Would you care to offer any advice or counsel in this respect?

Ambassador SCALI. As you know, Secretary of State Kissinger has been very heavily engaged with international shuttle diplomacy and this has necessarily limited the amount of time that he can spend in New York let alone Washington.

I would hope that as the need for the Middle East phase of this diplomacy abates he could spend more time at the U.N. I think that among other things that it would be a handy locale to meet assorted foreign ministers and perhaps even cut down on the need for some of this travel.

But I would also like to see the Secretary, and I have reason to believe that this may happen, look at the U.N. as a more promising avenue of initiatives of the kind that can fit in with American foreign policy objectives.

RECOMMENDATION OF PANEL OF EXPERTS

Senator PERCY. One of our earlier witnesses observed that serious consideration was being given in the U.S. policy community to setting up some kind of umbrella economic organization within the U.N. system that would absorb the functions of existing organs. This was also a recommendation of the group of experts which reported this week. How far has thinking moved in this direction within the State Department, what kind of organization is being projected, what would its functions be?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, I cannot answer that question because I am not sufficiently familiar with all of the details. The report of the committee of experts, is 160 pages long, and it is a highly complicated document. I received my copy just 2 days ago and until I have had a far better chance to study it I am going to have to ask to be excused from answering that.

GREATER STATUS FOR NGO'S

Senator PERCY. Yesterday, Alvin Toffler, author of "Future Shock," suggested that the 2,600 or so nongovernmental organizations—NGO's—now in existence are unrecognized global resources and that they should be given special status within the U.N. system. Do you view this as a feasible and desirable proposal?

Ambassador SCALI. I think it is a proposal well worth considering but I see problems in it. To begin with, we would then face the problem of deciding which nongovernmental organizations should be given this special status. To give them status wholesale might lead to some rather unwieldy conferences or moments, but I think it is a proposal well worth studying.

Senator PERCY. Do you feel that any steps should be taken to see whether or not such NGO's should be institutionalized within the U.N. framework?

Ambassador SCALI. I have not given that any serious thought, Senator, but I think along with other proposals it is well worth looking into it.

SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO MEMBERSHIP OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND ISRAEL

Senator PERCY. It has been suggested that one method of countering a possible move by the next U.N. General Assembly to suspend Israel would be to argue the principle of universality of membership. In support of this principle the United States might take the lead in sponsoring U.N. membership for the new Government of South Vietnam. What is your own reaction to this suggestion?

Ambassador SCALI. I see no immediate prospects that the United States is going to sponsor the new Government of South Vietnam. I think their arguing the principle of universality would have hardly any impact at all upon the nations that might decide that it was time for Israel either to be expelled from the U.N. or to be suspended from participation in the Assembly.

Senator PERCY. Would you relate more exactly whether you feel there is any possibility of such an effort being made at the next General Assembly and what its success may be? And then would you indicate the reasons why you feel—I am sure, and I would share them with you—that this would be a very, very wrong move for the U.N. to make? Why it would be ill advised and could be quite disastrous in this country's attitude toward the U.N.?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, I will have to speak, I must emphasize, personally.

A subcommittee of the nonalined group which met in Havana last month decided that it would recommend to a meeting of the nonalined foreign ministers a proposal whereby Israel's expulsion or suspension from the U.N. be considered as an overall position by the nonalined.

To begin with, if there was any move made within the Security Council to expel Israel, I confidently believe the United States would veto this move. I also expect that perhaps Britain and——

Senator PERCY. I think their veto would have broad support.

Ambassador SCALI. I think Britain and France would join in this.

If, on the other hand, the Arab countries took the lead in seeking to do to Israel what they did to South Africa; namely, to suspend it for the session from the assembly, then we would be faced with a different problem. I would hope that the nonalined countries recognize that this would be an exceedingly reckless move at this time, that it could ruin the more promising atmosphere for conciliation and accommodation.

In the event they decided that as a political tactic they wanted to go through with this, regardless of the consequences, which I have described, I would recommend that our Government take concrete action to demonstrate that it would not accept illegal action of the kind that threatens the continued existence of the U.N.

I cannot spell out right now what this concrete action might be. I know that you have had a variety of suggestions put before you, which

include freezing American contributions, perhaps suspending ourselves voluntarily from the Assembly during the time that Israel is suspended, but I would think that it might be improper for me and perhaps unwise to single out any step that we should adopt because it would depend on the nature of the resolution, it would depend, for example, on the status of peace negotiations, and indeed the energy discussions and the overall prospects for a more harmonious relationship in the whole economic area.

But I do think that American public opinion and Congress would virtually demand that we adopt some kind of retaliatory action, and as one who recognizes what a disastrous impact this could have on American public support for the U.N., I would be very much inclined to recommend some concrete response.

SELF-FINANCING FOR THE U.N.

Senator PERCY. The U.N. also seems to have a financial problem, and I do not think this is just because the U.N. is located in New York City and the city's problems are contagious. I can think of one trust fund in this country that does not have any trouble, the highway trust fund, because it is self-funding, it even has a surplus. I was interested that Australia's opera house which is funded by a lottery, is perhaps the only institution of art in the world that has a surplus, and steady source of income, and is assured of its continuation. From time to time, proposals have been made for self-funding the U.N. system through a postal tax or by taxing profits derived from the seabeds.

What is the U.S. position toward self-financing in general? Has the State Department developed any specific proposals? What is your own personal thinking about this?

Ambassador SCALI. I do not know that the Department has yet focused on this. I do not believe it has a position. If you could persuade enough Congressmen to weigh this seriously, I would be happy to join you in recommending it.

Senator PERCY. I am moving to abolish the highway trust fund. I am not exactly in favor of self-financing. But I felt on behalf of those who have made such proposals I ought to get your judgment.

PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE U.S. APPROACH

Richard Gardner, appearing before us, suggested a coordinated U.S. approach to multilateral issues that would cut across many departments in the U.S. Government. It might best be handled in the process used in the Law of Sea negotiations; that is, establishment of an interagency task force as a subgroup of the National Security Council, to elicit regular congressional consultation and private sector involvement through a working, not ceremonial, public advisory committee.

Would this be feasible, in your opinion?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, that is the first I have heard of that suggestion. It sounds like a very comprehensive one. I think I would have to take time to look at it very carefully.

Senator PERCY. Suppose I provide that to you in writing and should you wish to comment we will hold this record open for a week or so to give you adequate time to reply to it if you would like to study it and reply.

IS THE U.N. AN ARENA FOR COMBAT?

The fundamental approach of Abraham Yeselson, who testified before us on May 8, was that the U.N. is an arena for combat and that member states, including the United States, use the organization to advance what he called national conflict positions. In his view, the U.N. is not necessarily functioning in the interest of international peace.

What is your response to his particular thesis?

Ambassador SCALI. I think that is an exaggeration. Of course, there are debates of the kind that involve diplomats speaking for the home folk back home to advertise the purity and sanctity and the rightness of positions, but I think there are ample interests of cooperation of the kind which helps the international community as, for example, the success of the Security Council in agreeing on a 12-nation peace force in the Middle East, which even today is patrolling both the Golan Heights and the Egyptian front and giving us the time we need hopefully to see whether there is to be a next step in this disengagement or indeed important movement toward permanent peace.

ANNUAL U.N. SESSIONS—OPPORTUNITY AND HEADACHE

Senator PERCY. Now, I would like to ask you to try to give us a feeling of the mood of the State Department toward the annual U.N. sessions. There have been inferences by some of our witnesses, and a great many other people, that the State Department really reacts quite negatively to these annual sessions. How does it, in your judgment, react? I recognize that it is a composite, and it is very difficult to get a response from such a large number of people as that. But for those who have responsibility, at top levels or medium or lower levels, are the sessions viewed as just another chore which they must endure, or are they recognized as a real opportunity for U.S. representatives to examine the pulse of the world? Do we just drag out last year's positions on each agenda item, or does the Department review and examine the issues before the Assembly for changing circumstances—and look for opportunities for U.S. leadership in actually resolving some of those problems? Does it look forward to the chance to use this forum to see what can be done?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, I think the Department looks on the annual United Nations as part opportunity and part headache. Sometimes it is more headache than opportunity, particularly in the past few years when the Third World has used the U.N. more as a platform for advancing special ideas, including some radical positions rather than a central arena for accommodation.

I do think, for example, that we have used the United Nations positively to advance proposals such as the World Food Council, as you know, and to call for meetings of the Law of the Sea, to talk about the problem of population growth and other issues.

I am also very pleased to say that after many, many years of discussion we have finally agreed on the definition of the word "aggression." This may not sound like much but when you have 138 different people stirring the pot and you finally come up with the definition of the word "aggression," it has to be noted in history.

I do not want to indicate that that is a maximum contribution at the U.N. I mentioned this only to indicate the degree of difficulty that is involved in coming up with agreement in a forum where you have 138 separate votes. But if you recall correctly, we voted yes on almost 80 resolutions last year. We abstained on 17 and opposed only about 10 or 12. So the opportunity to agree even in that overabundant forum sometimes is present, too.

COST OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator PERCY. I have heard some comment across the country about the cost of the U.N., that it is too expensive. I cannot precisely bring to mind the figure of our present contribution, or all the agencies to which we contribute. But it probably is close to half a billion dollars. And yet, years ago I can recall the comparison being made that it was less than collecting the garbage in New York. At that time, it was substantially lower in dollars but our proportionate share of the U.N.'s total cost was higher.

As the OPEC countries increase their national wealth a great deal, does that automatically mean they will be increasing their proportionate share of the cost of the U.N.? I believe the U.S. share of the U.N.'s cost is down now to about 25 percent; isn't it?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, I wish the answer to your question was automatic. As the Arab countries increase their wealth do they also automatically increase their contributions to the United Nations and its family of assorted agencies? I would be very happy to see this happen. I think that the U.S. Government would not be reluctant to suggest that this is perhaps a good use of the increasing funds that they have. I do not believe that the United States is contributing too much to the upkeep of the United Nations system. As you said, we are contributing about $485 million a year, which includes not only the assessed dues but all of the voluntary contributions to the more than two dozen voluntary agencies.

When you consider the unbelievably important role that the Security Council played in creating an emergency peace force in the Middle East and positioning it between the combatants in 1973, I believe that you can see evidence of how the United Nations can respond in a peacekeeping role. I think that this single action which brought the United States and Soviet Union together for the first time to create an emergency peace force and to agree on the ground rules and also to agree on finance is one of the more important achievements of the U.N. history. The success of this peace force even today, I think, is worth all of the money that the United States has spent in the 30 years that the U.N. has been in existence.

IMPORTANCE OF PEACEKEEPING FORCES

Senator PERCY. What do you think would have been the potential for peace in the Middle East if Syria had refused the U.N. presence and the extension of its presence as against the decision that had apparently been made to extend that mandate for 6 more months now?

Ambassador SCALI. I think had Syria declined to permit the U.N. peace force to remain on the Golan Heights would have created an

instant world crisis of the kind whose consequences could not have been foreseen. I was most pleased when the Syrian Ambassador came to see me at the U.N. yesterday and informed me that his government was willing to extend it for 6 months more. This gives us an additional breathing space and allows us more time to see whether diplomacy cannot be brought to bear.

Senator PERCY. I would challenge anybody who says that the U.N. is just a temple of hot air and endless debate. I would say, go to the Golan Heights and visit with those international forces under the jurisdiction of the U.N., and see what is being done right there on the ground to preserve peace in one of the most dangerous areas of the world. The cost is just miminal, a fraction of 1 percent of the total armament cost of the world for this and all other peacekeeping efforts. Certainly, I think, it should be pointed out that this is one of the great contributions the U.N. has made.

RECENT UNIDO CONFERENCE ACTIONS

The second general conference of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, (UNIDO) which met in March and adopted a declaration of action on industrial development and cooperation. The United States was the only country to vote against this resolution which was adopted by a vote of 82 in favor, one against, with seven abstentions.

What were the major elements in the program the United States was in favor of, and which elements caused us to vote negatively on this matter?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Percy, the vote at Lima at the UNIDO Conference represents one of those movements which I alluded to earlier. The issue here was whether sitting in Lima, Peru, a group of foreign representatives with varying degrees of economic expertise could decide on behalf of their governments that all nations of the world should be assigned a specific industrialization goal and that it should be set via this forum. We thought that deciding how much industrialization should be the goal was a matter worthy of very great detailed study and that it could not be proclaimed in a meeting of very few weeks and indeed we questioned the very concept of whether any international organization can decide that county "x" should have an industrial growth rate of 10 percent, country "y" 2½, and country "z" a different figure.

We think that basically what should govern is the ability of the country to utilize any industrial project at all, and that industralization as an objective per se has to be related to what is happening in agriculture, what is happening in the region, and indeed even the play of economic factors. So this is one of those examples where we thought that the goal while commendable in practice did not mean much, and so rather than create the illusion that somehow all of this was going to happen when it would not, we decided as a matter of principle to vote no.

Senator PERCY. Did the United States take an active leadership role in attempting to bring about the consensus?

Ambassador SCALI. Ambassador Bennett was our representative at that meeting and I can assure you, Senator Percy, he sought until the last three sessions, I think lasted, went on until 5 o'clock in the

morning, seeking an acceptable consensus. If I recall correctly, one of the sessions lasted so long that the rapporteur collapsed and was carried out of the room. The answer to your question in shorthand, Senator, is yes.

PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS AND FRUSTRATIONS OF U.S. REPRESENTATIVE

Senator PERCY. On the basis of your experience as the U.S. Representative to the U.N., what have you found to be the main problems you have had in carrying out your responsibilities? What are your principal frustrations? What kept you awake nights, if anything did?

Ambassador SCALI. I think that they perhaps were two. One making sure that I knew enough about what was happening within my own government and our own policy. Two, trying to decide on the basis of whatever knowledge I did have how to deal with the north-south confrontation, third world problem, in a constructive way.

I do not necessarily believe in scolding or shouting at people because they have a different position even on the matter of deep principle, but I do think that there are moments when you have to make your views known firmly, provided that you also have enough compassion and understanding of what motivates them. I think that the whole problem of better distributing the resources of the world or making them better available to the poorer nations is going to be the problem which will occupy us for at least the next generation, and until we find a better way of doing it than we now have before us we are going to continue to have this as a crisis area which is going to dominate much of our foreign policy.

Senator PERCY. I have previously expressed appreciation to Senator Pell for his interest in these hearings, and he is, I think, the only member of the Foreign Relations Committee who served in the State Department. He is one of the leading experts on the law of the sea. I am very happy to have him join us, and yield to him now.

MORE SUCCESSES THAN FAILURES

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Senator Percy. May I congratulate you and Senator Sparkman for taking the initiative in holding these hearings. As one who was at the San Francisco Conference, I think of all of the brave ideas that we had there. I remember we spent 3 weeks working on the charter. Then through the years our hopes have declined; the countries that were our allies have become our adversaries. Yet the organization has managed to move along. I think when you add up the successes you find they more than outweigh its failures.

I think this positive view is one that should be expressed to the American people. Perhaps it would be a good exercise sometime if our delegate to the Security Council in his own way made an inventory of the successes and failures in terms of lives have been saved from malnutrition or from warfare.

I look forward going through the transcripts of these hearings because I have not been as conscientious as I should like to have been. I will not ask any specific questions at this time, because I do not

want to ask one that has been asked. I do want to wish Mr. Scali the best of luck. I understand he is moving on to other fields.

What do you think we should do in the future at the U.N.? I remembered Pat Moynihan's article in Commentary magazine and I also remembered your own statement about the tyranny of the majority. I am wondering what we should do to avoid this tyranny? Do you have any positive steps to recommend?

Ambassador SCALI. Thank you Senator Pell. I appreciate your generous word and I want to join with Senator Percy in noting publicly that you have played a unique and important role particularly in the problems of, enormously important problem of how to deal with the Law of the Sea. I know this continues to be an area where you have great and continuing interest and I wish to say you have made a very positive contribution to the problem that still is before us.

I also recognize that your longstanding diplomatic background gives you insight into the U.N. few of us have had and I value your support and your counsel as I leave the U.N. I think, I leave with more hope than when I arrived. I think the U.N. is alive and well and that not only is working, it can be made to work better.

I believe that the degree of confrontation that reached a climax last December is now beginning to subside and if we allow quiet, patient, and understanding negotiations to take place, in an atmosphere devoid of recrimination and fiery exchange, we can, I think, inch forward further on the road to peace. It is not going to be easy, progress will be uneven, and there will be moments of frustration, but I think that there is evidence now of a spirit of increasing readiness to conciliate, a recognition that all of these problems are not only interdependent, they are interconnected in a way that makes it mandatory for us to work closely together.

I might note in this regard that one of the pleasant surprises has been during the past year that the United States and the Soviet Union have worked together not only for the cause of peace in the Middle East, as evidenced by the creation of the United Nations Peace Force, but that on a surprising number of issues, perhaps reflecting détente, U.S. and the Soviet Union did vote the same way and that the moments of acrimony and bitter debate were far less frequent than they were. We still have important differences between us but I think that this should be a matter of record and I think also is for perhaps even better cooperation in the days ahead.

I wish to note that we have fundamental differences on such issues where we do speak very directly to one another, but the number of moments when it has been necessary to engage in the kind of debate that used to characterize the U.N., are now fewer.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you. I have noted in some of the conferences I have attended that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States seem closer than between the United States and any other nation. Either we agree to agree or agree to disagree. It is odd our great adversary and we are very, very close together indeed, very often behind the scenes, I think. You are right, too, that the problems of energy and population go beyond any national borders and require global solutions. I am a member of the Club of Rome. We work

very hard on these global problems. When it comes to solutions a small nation in population and riches is still a sovereign nation, and its cooperation is just as necessary as that of a larger one.

U.S. VOTE ON SOVIET ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION RESOLUTION

Finally, there is one specific question that bothered me a good deal at the last General Assembly, and that is the environmental warfare resolution, which I took an interest in, now that the Law of the Sea movement is launched. We passed a resolution in the Senate by 82 to 10, calling for the Department and Government to move ahead with the idea of a treaty outlawing environmental warfare. Then, when such a treaty was tabled by the Soviet Union, at the General Assembly, we joined with four other nations in abstaining simply because our nose was out of joint. We two big boys were supposed to continue our consideration a little bit further before it was actually tabled. I think that was very small potatoes on our part. I was curious if you had any view why the advice of the Senate, which passed the resolution 82 to 10, was so fantastically ignored in the position that was adopted at the General Assembly.

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Pell, this is one of those embarrassing moments when speaking personally, I must say that I agree with you that it perhaps would have been better on reflection on our overall view had we joined in voting yes. That was the recommendation of our mission. Now there were other factors that were cranked into this equation, as I understand it, so I am not criticizing the instructions but I just thought perhaps you should be aware that there were those within the U.S. mission, including, I think, Senator Percy and Senator Symington, who felt pretty strongly about that.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much for your personal opinion. I hope that this 82 to 10 vote of the Senate will be borne in mind by the executive branch as it moves ahead. I know Dr. Ikle would like to see us move in this direction and this needs support from the other Government departments as well as the State Department and ACDA. Thank you very much.

Senator PERCY. Senator Javits, I commented in opening the hearings today on my appreciation to you for your interest in them. We are very happy to have you with us this morning. It is my first opportunity to congratulate you on the initiative that you and some of our colleagues took in connection with the letter to the President on Israel. I think, as you know, I was with you in spirit and heart. I simply chose to express it in my own words.

We have a common, deep desire for peace in the Middle East. We had previously commented in the hearings and again this morning on the very important role that the peacekeeping forces the U.N. can have in the Middle East. Certainly we want to use every resource that the U.N. has to help us resolve this dilemma. The peace of the world really depends upon our finding stability there, an objective that we very deeply both share.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NEED TO SPEAK OUT

Mr. Ambassador, I came today notwithstanding other problems, which Senator Percy has referred to, because I was very interested in your speech of December 6. We had quite a discussion with a professor from Princeton on that subject. The question was, do we refrain from voicing the strong view which you voiced about the Third World's action and its sense of responsibility, as reflected by these votes, some of which you even called illegal at the U.N., while not in any way threatening to quit and go home, resign, or withdraw? Or do we stand up and speak strongly and decidedly for what we think is very unfair language? It was suggested by the professor and supported by other witnesses, that a strong debate like that, strong protest, indignation, is what I call it, was counterproductive, that it chased the Third World away, and that it tended to isolate us more. One witness even testified that it tended to confirm in the mind of the Third World the determination of the United States to remain on the side of the status quo and the reactionary forces, the colonial forces of the world.

You are the man who did speak out and you saw the result. I think it would be very interesting to hear from you what you think about this question.

Ambassador SCALI. Thank you, Senator Javits. I think that it is necessary and desirable for the representative of the United States to speak for the right and if necessary to vote alone on matters of principle. I think, however, that these opportunities must be chosen very carefully and that we speak from conviction and on matters of principle only when we believe that we are reaching a crossroads point. If we instead do this too often, I think we not only dilute the importance of our stand, but we become tiresome. I think that we reached just such an occasion last December when South Africa was illegally expelled from the Assembly, when Yasir Arafat was invited to speak before the full General Assembly and accorded almost the reception given a head of state at a time, too, when the militants of the Third World had succeeded in pushing through a one-sided charter of Economic Rights and Duties. I thought at that time the moment had come to warn, on behalf of the United States, the Third World majority exactly where such illegal and arbitrary conduct was leading the U.N. per se, and I sought to couch it in terms of whether the actions were, (A) unprecedented, and (B) illegal, and (C) what it was doing to support within the United States both within our Congress and among our people for the institution itself.

I do not think this speech scared the Third World away, despite the large number of speeches which erupted after that. We had some 50 speakers representing 50 viewpoints but most of them, I think, agreed that the time had come for more conciliation and accommodation, and less confrontation.

In other words, I think that that single speech allowed the air to clear and that it allowed time for many governments which had not really been thinking too far ahead to take a look at what was happening to the use of the United Nations as a political weapon.

I was also very much interested in making sure that the expulsion of South Africa on the flimsy excuse that it did not have correct credentials would not be a precedent to the expulsion of any other country.

For these reasons I thought that, along with the Department of State, that the time had come to speak as we did. I think that the events since then, particularly the events behind the scenes, have indicated that there is now an increased desire on the part of the Third World countries to conciliate and to accommodate and reach compromises rather than to have continuing angry confrontations.

I am not yet sure that we have traveled far enough down the road so that I can say that this special session and the regular session which follows on September 21, will reflect this increased desire to reach a common solution, but I do know that there is increasing thought being given to it and that depending on the state of the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, the price of oil, the opportunity for discussions outside the forums of the U.N. on the problem of food and raw materials, that we can have a better attitude and more cooperation. And just to wind up, I know that the very leaders though of the Third World who lead the offensive against the United States and Western countries themselves are now the ones who are most active behind the scenes in seeking to quiet the rhetoric and to lower the voices.

Senator JAVITS. Good. Did you give them a bill of particulars in that speech?

Ambassador SCALI. I did. I mentioned——

Senator JAVITS. The three points?

Ambassador SCALI. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. But do you think it would be desirable—and I will not ask you unless you think it would be desirable—to make as part of this record a catalog of what we consider to be actions coming within the purview of that speech? Think it over. If you think it is desirable, then go on the record; if you do not, don't.

Ambassador SCALI. I would like to take that under advisement.

Senator JAVITS. I think when you make a charge it is always useful to give a bill of particulars. But this is diplomacy and I do not wish to force your hand.

A number of us here felt very strongly like you did. On the other hand very strong exception was taken to the speech. This is great; that is the way life ought to be. I was one of those who voiced support for what you had done. It struck me that if you want to treat people as equals, you do not patronize them by giving them soft talk when you do not mean it. If they are going to be equals, then they have to be equals and take the rap just like we do.

Thank you.

EFFECT OF DÉTENTE ON U.S.-U.S.S.R. RELATIONS AT THE U.N.

Senator PERCY. I would like to follow that question up with an issue that has arisen during the course of these hearings. Bill Buckley commented on it—the artificiality of our dialog with the Soviet Union at the United Nations where we have obvious differences of opinion on matters of human rights. We see these issues somewhat differently and yet in the spirit of détente there seems to be an artificial restraint of

criticism at the U.N. where certainly China and the Soviet Union have no restraint whatsoever pointing out the obvious differences that they have.

Would you care to comment on whether you feel that this policy of restraint is desirable even though it might appear to be an artificial relationship on occasion?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator Percy, I think I will take a back seat to no one when it comes time to defend the United States and to answer unfair accusations and/or charges. I do, however, think it is self-defeating to stand up and seek opportunities to answer either current charges, the kind which are basically insignificant and which really fool no one and which represent little pin pricks. We have a duty to demonstrate that we are a mature country that does not need to prove its manhood by answering every tiny little charge that is made. One of the problems involved in having newcomers, with the best intentions, come into an international arena, is an understandable desire to make known their disagreement and their anger with past actions. This falls into the category of what I sometimes call selective outrage. Now, I, too, well remember what the Soviet Union did to Hungary and what it did in Czechoslovakia and I am not among those who believe that the Soviet Union is an example of democracy. I am aware of the slave labor camps and many other conditions of the kind which we in the United States do not necessarily approve of. I do not know that it advances us anywhere if even in a discussion on human rights now we have to remind the Soviet Union that it has a slave labor camp. I think that we might derive a momentary satisfaction out of this but I am not sure that it is going to move us any further on the road toward peace now, which happens to be at least an important goal. So rather than seeing these opportunities, tempting as they may be sometimes, I would recommend that we pass them up and concentrate on the important issues.

HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS

Senator PERCY. On March 5, this year, you addressed the issue of a new approach to human rights in the United Nations. You urged Senate action on the Genocide Convention and suggested that the United States might examine other human rights treaties. We have the Convention on the Political Rights of Women which has also been around a long time. Do you feel these conventions should be acted upon by the Senate? Are there many human rights treaties not yet submitted to the Senate which are in the process of preparation for submission?

Ambassador SCALI. I would most strongly advocate that the treaty on human rights for women be revived and brought before the full Senate and I am very pleased to see that the Genocide Treaty has now been cleared by this committee and is now before the Senate for possible action. I would urge this be done. I think there are several other treaties, Senator, but I cannot recall them offhand.

Senator PERCY. What additional action might be taken within the U.S. Government to strengthen our position in the United Nations with respect to human rights violations throughout the world?

Ambassador SCALI. I think that the position that we outlined at the recent Geneva meeting is one that I could feel fairly proud of. It puts

the U.S. Government on record as willing to vote yes to examine evidences of instance of human rights violations anywhere in the confines and within the borders of adversaries as well as friends when there is evidence of (A) ongoing abuse of human rights, (B) that there has been no credible effort made to relieve this condition, and (C) when there has been an appeal for corrective action on the part of some organization within the country itself. Now I think this is a very forthcoming position and I think it represents an advance over our past policies and I am very pleased that Leonard Garment has now been named by the White House to be our new representative on the Human Rights Commission because I know how strongly Leonard Garment feels about this entire field and I think he will carry out his duties with distinction and with dedication.

REAFFIRMATION OF AMERICAN COMMITMENTS

Senator PERCY. I would like to ask your judgment on the problem that we face with American commitments around the world. We are being called upon as a Nation to reaffirm our commitments, and they have been challenged. Certainly Senator Javits believes that reaffirmation of our commitment to NATO might well be in order, and I would be happy to join him in that initiative which I think is important.

But we are faced with this dilemma. We have a lot of treaties. Do we reaffirm all of those, and in so doing, do we mislead the governments of those countries, as we may have mislead President Thieu—into thinking that no matter what they do we are behind them 100 percent. We may have misled Thieu into thinking that we backed him in spite of repressive measures, suppression of the press, unresponsiveness of government, corruption, all of those things. We allowed him to believe we support those things and we removed the need for evolutionary change to make his government more responsive.

What would your advice be with respect to South Korea at this particular time? Do you think reaffirmation of our treaty is necessary? What role should the Congress play in this regard?

Ambassador SCALI. Senator, I think we have to approach this on a country-by-country and case-by-case basis. In South Korea, for example, I think that it would have a beneficial effect to reaffirm our readiness to defend South Korea, in keeping with our long-standing defense commitment. I think this would reassure the South Korean Government at a time when inevitably because at one time it had troops in Vietnam, it has been shaken by the fact that they have now been forced to withdraw. I would be inclined to subscribe to Senator Javit's desire to have a reaffirmation of our commitment to our Atlantic pact allies because that is the central alliance and I think as long as we can do this in one fell swoop so that there need be no doubt whatever in the heart of Europe it would also be a help in our overall foreign policy.

However, I am not among those who believed that what has happened in Vietnam in any way diminishes the credibility of existing American commitments and I think the sooner we stop talking about whether and how it has, the better off we are going to be. The diplomats that I have talked to in New York have no doubt whatever that the United States will be not weaker but stronger as a result of the fact

that we do not have to allocate time, energy and manpower to Southeast Asia in this particular arena at least. Indeed, I might even note that one of the distinguished leaders of the People's Republic seems to share the view that the United States now can concentrate more on what it believes are its important interests.

ACTION BY CONSENSUS RATHER THAN VOTES

Senator PERCY. Harlan Cleveland recently suggested that consensus and conciliation be adopted as a means of developing resolutions at the U.N. rather than voting on every issue there. Do you see any trend at all toward that procedure, rather than the rollcall votes which are usually resorted to?

Ambassador SCALI. I have read Harlan Cleveland's very excellent article in the New York Times Sunday Magazine section on this. I think that the course which he proposes is one which is very well worth studying and pursuing further. I am constantly impressed by the number of times that we manage to reach a consensus in the Security Council. Granted there is the threat of the veto hanging overhead, if there is no consensus, but I see an increasing need to forget about numerical votes and to seek to arrive at a just compromise. I think that even within a forum of 138 countries it is possible. And one device might be to adopt the very technique that is being used at the law of sea conference, namely, to set up small committees of countries most directly concerned to go off into back rooms and talk quietly so that they are not making speeches for the home folks and see what they can do about accommodating about major interests of all the important countries involved in the problem.

Senator PERCY. Harold Stassen was our first witness, and he recommended the creation of a U.N. council of ministers with weighted voting. This council of ministers would serve as a cabinet to the Secretary-General; it would stand between the veto power of the Security Council and the one-nation one-vote principle in the General Assembly.

Do you want to respond to that recommendation? I think this is an idea worth considering.

Should you have any observations or thoughts on it subsequently, after you leave the meeting sometime within the next week, we would be happy to have it for the record.

ISSUES ON WHICH UNITED STATES VOTED WITH THE U.N. MAJORITY

Finally, our mutual friend, Joe Segel, noted that the United States actually joined with U.N. members in adopting 125 resolutions during the past General Assembly session while voting against only 17 resolutions and abstaining on 32 others. In other words, the United States voted with the majority 72 percent of the time. If a Senator from either party votes with the administration 72 percent of the time, he would be at the absolute top of the list of those who were supportive. Yet, U.S. actions opposing these 17 resolutions received most of the public attention. In order to give equal time to the positive side, can you identify some of the instances where we joined with the majority of the U.N. membership, particularly with the Third World nations, in voting for resolutions passed by the Assembly in 1974?

Possibly you would like to answer for the record, but I might parenthetically add that it all reminded me of headlines in the Chicago newspapers. When I first got down here, Everett Dirksen and I might vote the same way on a number of issues and then we would split; and it was always that one where we split, that received the most attention in the press. Well it was news, I suppose, and it is news when we vote against a resolution of the U.N.

Can you identify some fairly major issues on which we voted with the majority of the U.N. members?

Ambassador SCALI. Well I can recall a resolution that you were deeply interested in which was the resolution on the need to provide more information wherever it might exist on prisoners, missing in action. I recall also another one that you were interested in; namely, the resolution calling for the U.N. to cease all discrimination in the hiring of women. Senator, on the substantive ones you are going to have to give me a little time because I am not focusing on that right now.

CLOSING STATEMENT

Senator PERCY. I think it might be well to have that as Ambassador Scali's final statement in the record after these hearings. This will indicate that we may differ strongly on principle with the majority of the U.N. members on some issues, but we voted with the majority 72 percent of the time. This indicates that our position is closer to that of most other members than might be generally appreciated.

I want to add that I estimated you would be here for an hour and a half. You have been at the witness table 2½ hours, and on every other occasion we have generally had a panel of four or five members. I think this has been rather frustrating on occasion; yesterday one question took 22 minutes for all four members of the panel to answer, although it took Senator Clark only 30 seconds to ask it. I said then that I hoped we would have an opportunity to question a witness in greater depth. Thus, I have found this a most satisfactory hearing. We are very grateful for your contribution, Ambassador Scali. I would like to express our deep appreciation to you on behalf of myself personally and on behalf of this committee for the extraordinary service you have rendered to the American people, to the U.S. Government, and to the cause of peace in the world during your term as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations.

I would also like to express our appreciation to the entire staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who helped with these hearings: Pat Holt, the chief of staff, and particularly to Morella Hansen, of the committee staff, who was with us at the U.N., serving both Senator Symington and myself; and to my own colleague, Scott Cohen, who for so many years has been my adviser in matters of foreign policy and military affairs. Mr. Cohen's work on these hearings has contributed so much to their success.

With that, these hearings are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

NOMINATION OF DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, OF NEW YORK, TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m. in room 4221, the Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Jacob Javits presiding.

Present: Senators Javits, Clark, Biden, Case, Pearson, Percy, and Baker.

Senator JAVITS. The committee will come to order.

At the request of the chairman, I will preside.

Senator Case is our ranking member but he has kindly yielded to me momentarily.

The Chair wishes to announce to the nominees who will be heard this morning that, at the request of a member of the committee, Senator Percy, of Illinois, we would appreciate it if Mr. Moynihan and Mr. Toon, nominees respectively for the U.N. and Israel, would return at 2:30 this afternoon. Senator Percy has some questions.

The Chair wishes also to express great satisfaction in commending to the committee the first witness, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, nominated by the President to be U.S. representative to the U.N. with rank and status of Ambassador and U.S. representative to the Security Council.

Mr. Moynihan is a constituent of mine. He has a small farm in West Davenport, N.Y. I commend him to the committee as qualified for the position for which the President has nominated him. He is, as everybody knows, a distinguished member of the academic community at Harvard University and without objection his biography will be made a part of the record at this point.

Is there anything in it you wish to change as printed by the committee? Have you seen it?

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, OF NEW YORK, NOMINEE TO BE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, WITH THE RANK OF AMBASSADOR

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have not seen it.

Senator JAVITS. If you will examine it, please, and if there are any changes, please testify to them in the course of your testimony.

[The biography of Daniel P. Moynihan follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN

Position for which considered: United States Representative to the United Nations with the rank and status of Ambassador and the United States Representative in the Security Council.

Present Position: Professor and Member of the Faculty, Harvard University.

Office Address: Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Born: March 16, 1927, Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Legal Residence: West Davenport, New York.

Marital Status: Married.

Family: Wife: former Elizabeth Therese Brennan, Children: Timothy Patrick, Maura Russell, John McCloskey.

Home Address: Care of Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Education: B. Naval Science, Tufts University, 1946; B.A. (cum laude), Tufts University, 1948; M.A. 1949, Ph. D. 1961, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Fulbright fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1950.

Honorary Degrees: Harvard University, 1966, A.M.; LaSalle College, 1966, LL.D.; Seton Hall University, 1966, LL.D.; Providence College, 1967, Dr. Public Administration; University of Akron, 1967, Dr. of Humane Letters; Catholic University, 1968, LL.D.; Illinois Institute of Technology, 1968, LL.D.; Villanova University, 1968, Dr. of Social Science; St. Louis University, 1968, LL.D.; Hamilton College, 1968, Dr. of Humane Letters; New School for Social Research, 1968, LL.D.; Tufts University, 1968, LL.D.; Duquesne University, 1968, LL.D.; University of California, 1969, LL.D.; University of Notre Dame, 1969, LL.D.; Fordham University, 1970, LL.D.; St. Bonaventure, 1972, LL.D.; Bridgewater State College, 1972, Dr. of Humanities; Michigan Technological University, 1972, D.Sc.; Honorary Fellow, London School of Economics and Political Science; Syracuse University, 1969, Centennial Medal; University of Indiana, 1975, LL.D.

Language Ability: Some knowledge of French and Spanish.

Experience:

1944–47—United States Navy.

1954—International Rescue Committee.

1955–58—Successively Assistant to Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Acting Secretary to the Governor of New York State.

1959–60—Member, New York State Tenure Commission.

1959–61—Director, New York State Government Research Project, Syracuse University.

1961–62—Special Assistant to the Secretary of Labor.

1962—Member, UN Delegation for Negotiating the Long Term Cotton Textile Agreement, Geneva.

1962–63—Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Labor.

1963—Member of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference of Labor Ministers of the Alliance for Progress, Bogota.

1963—Member of the U.S. Delegation to the Second General Ministerial Meeting of the Alliance for Progress, Sao Paulo.

1963–65—Assistant Secretary of Labor.

1965—U.S. Representative at the UN Seminar on Minorities, Ljubljana.

1965–66—Fellow, Center for Advanced Studies, Wesleyan University.

1966–69—Director, Joint Center of Urban Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University.

1969—Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs. Executive Director, Council for Urban Affairs.

1969–70—U.S. Representative on the NATO Committee on the Challenge of Modern Society, Brussels.

1969–71—Counselor to the President, Member of the Cabinet, Member of the Domestic Council, Member of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy.

1971–73—Consultant to the President.

1971—U.S. Representative to the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

1973–75—Ambassador to India.

1975 to present—Professor and Member of the Faculty, Harvard University.

Positions:

1959–60—Secretary, Public Affairs Committee, New York State Democratic Committee.

1966–72—Vice Chairman, President's Temporary Commission on Pennsylvania Avenue.
1967–68—Chairman, Advisory Committee on Traffic Safety, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
1969– —Vice Chairman, Board of Trustees, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution.
1971– —Member, President's Science Advisory Committee.
1971– —Chairman, Board of Trustees of the Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden.

Member: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, American Philosophical Society, Board of Directors, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Editorial Board, *The American Scholar, The Public Interest.*

Awards: Anisfield-Wolf Award in Race Relations, 1964 (*Beyond the Melting Pot*); National Book Award Nomination, 1965 (*Beyond the Melting Pot*); Meritorious Service Award of the Department of Labor, 1964.

Author: *Beyond the Melting Pot*, co-author with Nathan Glazer, 1963. *Defenses of Freedom; The Public Papers of Arthur J. Goldberg*, Editor, 1966. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, 1969. *On Understanding Poverty: Perspective From the Social Sciences*, Editor, 1969. *Toward a National Urban Policy*, Editor, 1970. *On Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Co-Editor with Frederick Mosteller, 1972. *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income*, 1973. *Coping: Essays In the Practice of Government.*

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Moynihan's experience is an unusual blend of academic experiences and very practical experience in government. At the State level it so happens he was Secretary to the Governor of the State of New York when I was Attorney General of the State of New York; Governor Harriman and I know him very well for that reason and for a very long time personally. And in addition, of course, he has participated in many international conferences with great responsibility, including a session at the U.N. in 1971, the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly, where he was a U.S. delegate. He has been our Ambassador to India and is now back on the faculty of Harvard University, and is an extraordinarily well-known American.

As to his unique qualification for this position, I ask unanimous consent, without objection, there be introduced into the record in support of my commendation of Mr. Moynihan to the Committee, a piece of Commentary of March, 1975, entitled "U.S. In Opposition," which in a most prescient way develops Mr. Moynihan's views respecting the United Nations, the very post to which he is being named. (For text, see p. 338.)

Senator CASE. I think I wish to say on behalf of your colleagues we object for the record. [Laughter.]

Senator JAVITS. One further thing, gentlemen, and that is that I think the United States is facing a very difficult problem with the U.N., especially in the relations with the Third World. In colloquy here a few days ago with a professor of Princeton, Senator Case and I developed our thoughts on how best to handle that particular problem with the most ardent desire for the best relations possible with the Third World and the desire to discharge that responsibility toward the Third World. I find Mr. Moynihan's views very consistent on the whole with the general attitude which was expressed.

Mr. Moynihan would you like to make a statement to the committee and then you will be open to questions by the membership.

GENUINE POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have not any prepared statement, Senator. I would like to thank you, sir, for your generous remarks. I would like to say I have had occasion to read a summary of the exchange you and Senator Case had, I believe, with Professor Falk and I have heard or read others of the things that you have said in these hearings, the hearings on the U.N. I would like wholly to agree with what you said. I think the first fact of our relations with the new nations should be our perception, that these are and ought to be our allies in the world, allies in terms of the beliefs we share and objectives we share; that there ought to be a genuine political community with these nations of a kind which we do not have with the totalitarian powers and are not going to have in our time.

A certain principle statement of views on both sides can be useful; it requires that we respect what others think and try to understand what they think and ask that they do the same in return. It is no more than you would hope to have in the way of a relationship with people that you agree with about everything. Things where we disagree are marginal compared with where we do agree. And yet it is so easy to grow estranged that the first problem, the first question is how to get away from the confrontation system back toward the quest for understanding an agreement in a situation where this is wholly possible and entirely necessary.

That is about as much as I would wish to say at the outset, Mr. Chairman.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Mr. Moynihan.

Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moynihan, Senator Javits has very well expressed our general attitude. I wish to say it is a very great pleasure for us to recognize a man of such wit and perspicacity in agreement with the views that we hold.

HONORARY DEGREES

What did you ever do in 1968 besides travel the country to get honorary degrees? Did you know how many you got in that year?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I made a speech for Martin Luther King, Jr., in Florida. I made about 15 for Robert F. Kennedy in California.

Senator CASE. Eight degrees in 1 year, a total of 20. I think it was Robert Frost who said that he had his wife cut up these things and make quilts out of them because there was no place to store them any more. What do you do with yours? As everybody knows, they are the most intractable things as far as folding goes.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. You hang them upright.

Senator CASE. You must have a bag to carry them around with you.

Seriously, the only reason we divert at all is the fact we do seriously agree. What is the reason? Is it largely a matter of personality or is it jealousy or what is it that makes you such a target among certain academic people?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, sir, I think that someone such as the Princeton professor, he and I would disagree about things and not have the same views.

Senator CASE. Is that because you achieved such success as witnessed by the election of honorary degrees?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Oh, I would never want to say that about a Princeton professor.

Senator CASE. Did you have any trouble in India on account of this outspoken quality?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, no, sir, I think not. I did not speak up very much in India. I thought it was my business to—I think sometimes in those countries we may have been a little more conspicuous than was good for them or us. I was there 2 years and the only press conference I had was to say goodbye. I found that there was a role for speaking privately and getting to know people well but not on public matters, and I think that that was to me an enormous, a great reward of being in India and I had no problem of any kind.

Senator CASE. Your academic discipline is economics?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. No, sir, I am a political scientist, whatever that is.

Senator CASE. You could say the same thing about economics.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Lately they do.

Senator CASE. This thing called political economy would marry the two.

ECONOMIC ORDER—NEW AND OLD

It is not fair to ask you about the policies of the administration which you are now going to represent, so I would not go into that. If you had anything to say about the "new economic order," I would be glad to have you comment.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. What I would have to say, Senator, would be about what the Secretary of State said in Paris. It will soon be precisely what the Secretary of State says, but today it is "about."

Senator CASE. Even if you were saying it on your own?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. When he said——

Senator CASE. What does it mean then?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, I think that what he asked in his speech to the OECD in Paris, is what is the use of trying to define something as undefinable as an old economic order, a new economic order, the intermediates.

Senator CASE. You mean it is only good to make speeches about?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Precisely. Forums in which you reach general disagreement quickly and irrevocably. Meaningful agreements are reached in minute detail on specifics. I think the Secretary went to Paris and made a first rate speech and he went down a list of such specifics. We will talk commodities, we will talk about agricultural development fund, we will talk about trust fund for the most severely affected by the oil price increase. That kind of specific, as you know from your work as a legislator, is where you can get agreement. To stand up and make pronouncements about whether you are for a new economic order means little. Who wants to be for an old economic order? And yet who knows what a new one means. It seems to me at that level of generalization people almost seek disagreements, and the less of that there is the more you can get on with real issues at which, clearly, the world does not do badly, which is agreement on specifics.

Senator CASE. You are reassuring to me. I did not think it meant a

rigidly structured order in which somebody would fix prices, fix wages, fix quotas of various countries for imports and exports. This is not your understanding of the new economic order?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Not my understanding of an international economic order I would want to have anything to do with, Senator. I do not think we should delude ourselves, however. There are persons of good will and perhaps even good understanding who would see that kind of wholly planned, wholly regulated arrangement. But I think the experience of the world suggests otherwise. And in fact as long as we are prepared to deal with some specifics, I think the threat of these large propositions recedes.

Senator CASE. I have taken more time than I should, Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to welcome you, as Senator Javits did, and express very best wishes to you on this job.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thank you.

Senator CLARK [presiding]. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Mr. Moynihan, I have been a delegate to the U.N. too. The dynamics are very, very interesting and I am glad that you are acquainted with them because it means an enormous job of dealing with one's staff, the members of the delegation often unknown to the head of the delegation, as well as the widest range of officials of the U.N. and the officials of other countries.

SUMMARY OF COMMENTARY ARTICLE

I would like to ask you if you could summarize your commentary article, and I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that it be printed at this point in the record, together with the condensation from the Reader's Digest.

Senator CLARK. Without objection.

[The document referred to above follows:]

[Commentary, March 1975]

THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

(By Daniel P. Moynihan)

"We are far from living in a single world community," writes Edward Shils, "but the rudiments of a world society do exist." Among those rudiments perhaps the most conspicuous, if least remarked, are the emerging views as to what kind of society it is. A measure of self-awareness has appeared, much as it did for smaller politics in earlier times. These assessments tend at the international level to be as diverse as those commonly encountered concerning national societies, or local ones. Some will think the society is good and getting better; others will see it as bad and getting worse. Some want change; some fear it. Where one sees justice, another sees wrong.

The notion of a world society is nothing new to Americans. It dominated the rhetoric of World War II, of the founding of the United Nations, of much of the cold war. It is now a received idea, and its impress may be measured by the success with which advocates have found audiences for issues defined in international terms, the world environmental problem: the world population problem: the world food problem. Not a generation ago, these were national issues at most.

Much of this internationalist rhetoric is based on things real enough. There is a world ecology; there is a world economy; and some measures important to individual countries can only be obtained through international accord. Thus the concept of interdependence has become perhaps the main element of the new consciousness of a world society. This is a valid basis on which to posit the existence of a society, it is almost a precondition of a society's coming into being.

Yet societies rarely stop at the acknowledgment of the need for cooperation which is implied by the term interdependence. The image of a society as a family is a common one, and with reason, for in both cases the idea of cooperation is frequently supplemented or even supplanted by the idea of obligation. What does one member *owe* another? This is something new in international pronouncements. If one were to characterize the discomfiture and distress with which Americans responded to the events of the 29th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, some measure would have to be attributed to the discovery that a vast majority of the nations of the world feel there are claims which can be made on the wealth of individual nation that are both considerable and threatening—in any event threatening to countries such as the United States which regularly finds itself in a minority (often a minority of one or two or at most a half-dozen) in an assembly of 138 members.

The tyranny of the UN's "new majority" has accordingly been deplored, and there has been much comment that whereas opposition to the United Nations was once a position of "conservatives" in the United States, it is increasingly one of "liberals" also. Yet while there have been some calls to boycott the General Assembly, or not to vote in it, there have been but few calls for withdrawal from the United Nations. It is almost as if American opinion now acknowledged that there was no escaping involvement in the emergent world society. All the more reason, then, for seeking to understand what has been going on.

I

Now, of course, a lot is going on, and no single element dominates. Yet it may be argued that what happened in the early 1970's is that for the first time the world felt the impact of what for lack of a better term I shall call the British revolution. That is the revolution which began in 1947 with the granting by socialist Britain of independence to Socialist India. In slow, then rapid, order the great empires of the world—with the single major exception of the Czarist empire—broke up into independent states; the original membership of the United Nations of 51 grew to 138. These new nations naturally varied in terms of size, population, and resources. But in one respect they hardly varied at all. To a quite astonishing degree they were ideologically uniform, having fashioned their politics in terms derived from the general corpus of British socialist opinion as it developed in the period roughly 1890–1950. The Englishmen and Irishmen, Scotsmen and Welsh, who created this body of doctrine and espoused it with such enterprise—nay, genius—thought they were making a social revolution in Britain. And they were. But the spread of their ideology to the furthest reaches of the globe, with its ascent to dominance in the highest national councils everywhere, gives to the British revolution the kind of worldwide significance which the American and French, and then the Russian, revolutions possessed in earlier times.*

From the perspective of their impact on others, the American and French revolutions can be treated as a single event. They were not of course identical in themselves, and profoundly important distinctions can be made between them. But these distinctions were little noted in the political rhetoric of the century that followed, or in the forms of government fashioned in the likeness of this rhetoric, or in the goals of governments so fashioned. Men sought a constitutional regime which disestablished ancient privilege, guaranteed liberties, and promoted the general welfare through what came to be known as liberal social policies. Liberalism was at first characterized by the opposition to state intervention in economic affairs, and later by the advocacy of such intervention, but the

*The term British revolution is open to objection as seeming to exclude the influence of continental socialism on the new nations, and indeed a good case should be made for calling the phenomenon I am trying to describe the revolution of the Second International. But the term British can be justified by the fact that of the 87 states to have joined the UN since its founding, more than half—47—had been part of the British empire. Even apart from the empire, British culture was in the first half of this century incomparably the most influential in the world, and that culture was increasingly suffused with socialist ideas and attitudes. I anticipate and hope for a rigorous critique of the arguments of this paper, but I also hope it will not be too much distracted by the difficulties of finding a concise term to describe what was on the whole a concise phenomenon; the development of socialist doctrine and the formation of socialist parties in Western Europe at this time. I should also note that the political ideology in the new states of the Third World of which I will be speaking was best described by the late George Lichtheim as "national socialism." This term has, of course, acquired an altogether unacceptable connotation.

intervention in question was a fairly mild business, it being no liberal's view that the state was an especially trustworthy servant of the citizen. The citizen, as liberals viewed the world, was a very important person, especially perhaps if he tended to clean linen.

The Russian revolution of 1917 brought into existence a regime even more dramatically different from its predecessors than had the liberal regimes of a century earlier been from theirs. Everything, it was understood, had changed. Those who would change everything, or who believed that, like it or not, everything was going to change, rallied to this rhetoric. As for the rest of the world, it came soon enough to know that a wholly extraordinary event had occurred, even that the future had occurred. For three decades, culminating in the triumph of Communist arms in China in 1948, this was quite the most vivid, and the most attended to, movement in the world.

The British revolution of the second quarter of the 20th century attracted no such attention. Everyone certainly recognized that new states were coming into existence out of former European, and indeed mostly British colonies, but the tendency was to see them as candidates for incorporation into one or the other of the older revolutionary traditions then dominant elsewhere in the world. It was not generally perceived that they were in a sense already spoken for—that they came to independence with a preexisting, coherent, and surprisingly stable ideological base which, while related to both the earlier traditions, was distinct from both. This most likely accounts for the almost incurious initial reaction in what would soon be known as the First and Second Worlds. In the Republic of India the United States could see democracy; the Soviets could see socalism. In truth, a certain Hegelian synthesis had occurred. On the one hand, the Minimal State of the American revolution; in response, the Total State of the Russian revolution; in synthesis, the Welfare State of the British revolution.

Samuel H. Beer describes the doctrine of British socialism as follows: . . . it is especially the socialist's commitment to "fellowship" that fundamentally distinguishes his approach. . . . For private ownership he would substitute public ownership; for production for profit, production for use; for competition, cooperation. A cultural and ethical revolution would also take place, and motives that had aimed at individual benefit would now be aimed at common benefits. Industry, which had been governed by individual decisions within the competitive system, would be subject to collective and democratic control. . . . Government would consist in comprehensive and continuous planning and administration.

Two general points may be made about this British doctrine. First, it contained a suspicion of, almost a bias against, economic development which carried over into those parts of the world where British culture held sway. The fundamental assertion of the age of the Diamond Jubilee was that there was plenty of wealth to go 'round if only it were fairly distributed. No matter what more thoughtful socialist analysts might urge, redistribution, not production, remained central to the ethos of British socialism. Profit became synonymous with exploitation. That profit might be something conceptually elegant—least-cost production—made scarcely any impress. "Production for profit" became a formulation for all that was wrong in the old ways, and Tories half-agreed. (For it was the Liberals and the Radicals who were being repudiated by such doctrine, and it was the Liberal party that went under.) This, too, was passed on. When Sir Arthur Lewis in 1974 gave the Tata lectures in India and found himself pleading, as a socialist and as a man of the Third World, but also as an economist, that profit was not a concept public-sector enterprise could afford to ignore, no less a personage than the head of the Indian Planning Commission felt called upon to rebut him.

To be sure, much of the redistributionist bias was simply innocent. British socialists, for example, proved in office to know almost nothing about how actually to redistribute income, and British income has not been significantly redistributed. Coming to power just after World War II, the socialists appeared to think they had abolished wealth by imposing a top income-tax rate of nineteen shillings six pence in the twenty-shilling pound, which is to say confiscating the rich man's pay envelope. Few seemed to note that capital gains remained exempt from income tax altogether, so that in large measure thereafter only those with property could acquire property: the very antithesis of the social condition socialism sought. (This detail perhaps did not escape the well-to-do of the developing nations when the prospect of socialism on the British model first appeared there.)

The second general point about socialist doctrine as it developed in Britain was that it was anti-American. More anti-American, surely, than it was ever anti-Soviet. The reasons for this are not that obscure. The British were not over-

much admiring of Americans in that era, nor we of them. In part their attitude began as aristocratical disdain. (An intimate of Pandit Nehru's describes once asking India's first Prime Minister why he was so anti-American. This was in 1961. Nehru's first reaction was a rather huffy denial of any such predisposition, but he then became reflective and after a moment admitted that, yes, it was true, and that probably it all dated back to his days at Harrow. There was one American boy there at the time: filthy rich, and much too pushy.) But more importantly, of course, America was seen as quintessentially capitalist.

With the Russian revolution, and then especially with the world depression of the 1930's and the onset of popular-front movements in Europe, a considerable number of British socialists, despite their party's fundamental and central attachment to democratic processes, became supporters of the Soviet regime. Russia was the future. America was the past. With the coming of the cold war this attitude became institutionalized and almost compulsory on the British Left. The *New Statesman*, a journal which tended to follow Asian and African graduates after they had left Britain and returned home, became near Stalinist in its attachment to Soviet ways with the world and its pervasive antagonism to things American.

And yet the *New Statesman* was never Communist, and neither, save in small proportion, were its readers. They were British socialists, part of a movement of opinion which spread in the course of the first half of the 20th century to the whole of the British empire, a domain which covered one-quarter of the earth's surface, and which an inspired cartographic convention had long ago decreed be colored pink. It was British civil servants who took the doctrine to the colonies. (How curious in retrospect, are the agonizings of Harold Laski and others as to whether the civil service would carry out the policies of a socialist government. What more congenial task for persons whose status comes from the power and prestige of government? But in the Britain of that era it could be thought that class origin would somehow overcome occupational interest.)

What the civil service began, British education completed. Has there ever been a conversion as complete as that of the Malay, the Ibo, the Gujarati, the Jamaican, the Australian, the Cypriot, the Guyanan, the Yemenite, the Yoruban, the sabra, the felaheen to this distant creed? The London School of Economics, Shils, notes, was often said to be the most important institution of higher education in Asia and Africa. In her autobiography, Beatrice Webb wrote that she and her husband felt "assured that with the School [LSE] as the teaching body, the Fabian Society as a propagandist organization, the LCC [London County Council] as object lesson in electoral success, our books as the only elaborate original work in economic fact and theory, no young man or woman who is anxious to study or to work in public affairs can fail to come under our influence." For reasons that are understandable, this was true most particularly for young men and women coming from abroad in that long and incongruously optimistic intellectual age that began amid late Victorian plumpness and ended with the austerity of postwar Britain. In 1950 the conservative Michael Oakeshott succeeded to the Fabian Harold Laski's chair in political theory at LSE and in a sense *that* party was over. But by then not Communists but Fabians could claim that the largest portion of the world's population lived in regimes of their fashioning. Before very long, the arithmetical majority and the ideological coherence of those new nations brought them to dominance in the United Nations and, indeed, in any world forum characterized by universal membership.

But if the new nations absorbed ideas about others from the doctrines of British socialism, they also absorbed ideas about themselves. The master concept, of course, is that they had the right to independence. This idea goes back to the American revolution, and even beyond to the Glorious Revolution in 17th-century Britain, but British socialism readily incorporated and even appropriated it. As the 20th century wore on and the issue of independence arose with respect to these specific peoples and places, it was most often the socialists who became the principal *political* sponsors of independence. It was a Labour government which in 1947 granted independence to India and formally commenced the vast, peaceful revolution that followed. The Indian Congress party had been founded in 1883 by a British civil servant, Alan Octavian Hume, whose politics were essentially Liberal. But by the time of independence, it was a matter to be taken for granted that the Congress was socialist and that its leaders, Gandhi and then Nehru, were socialists too.

Two further concepts triangulate and fix the imported political culture of these new nations. The first is the belief—often, of course, justified—that they have been subject to economic exploitation, exactly as the working class is said in socialist theory to have been exploited under capitalism. The second is the belief—also, of course, often justified—that they have been subject to ethnic discrimination corresponding to class distinctions in industrial society. As with the belief in the right to independence, these concepts, which now seem wholly natural, rarely occur in nature. They are learned ideas, and they were learned by the new nations mostly where they mostly originated, in the intellectual and political circles of Britain of the late 19th and early 20th century. Gandhi greatly elucidated the moral dimensions of exploitation and discrimination, but he did so in the context of a worldwide political movement that was more than receptive to his ideas, a political movement of which he was a part. At root, the ideas of exploitation and discrimination represent a transfer to colonial populations of the fundamental socialist assertions with respect to the condition of the European working class, just as the idea of independence parallels the demand that the working class break out of bondage and rise to power.

Now it is possible to imagine a country, or collection of countries, with a background similar to that of the British colonies, attaining independence and then letting bygones be bygones. The Americans did that: our political culture did not suggest any alternative. International life was thought to operate in Wordsworth's terms:

The good old rule
. . . The simple plan
That they should take, who have the power,
And they should keep who can.

So in their own terms might Marxists judge the aftermath of Marxist triumph: history was working its ineluctable way: there would be no point, no logic, in holding the past to account. Not so the heirs of the British revolution. British socialism is, was, and remains a highly moral creed. It is not a politics of revenge; it is too civil for that. But reparations? Yes: reparations. This idea was fundamental to the social hope of a movement which, it must ever be recalled, rested on the assumption that there existed vast stores of unethically accumulated wealth. On the edges of the movement there were those who saw the future not just in terms of redistribution, but of something ominously close to looting. In any event, the past was by no means to be judged over and done with. There were scores to be settled. Internally and internationally.

A final distinctive character of the British revolution concerns procedure. Wrongs are to be righted by legislation. The movement was fundamentally parliamentarian. The Labour party came to power through the ballot, and proceeded to change society by statute. This was dramatically so with respect to the empire. For the first time in the history of mankind a vast empire dismantled itself, piece by piece, of its own systematic accord. A third of the nations of the world today owe their existence to a statute of Westminister. What more profound experience could there be of the potency of parliamentary majorities in distant places, and of their enactments?

Plainly, not all the new nations of the postwar world were formerly British. There were French colonies, Belgian Dutch, Portuguese. Political traditions in each case were different the British. But only *slightly* different: viewed from Mars, London, Paris, and The Hague are not widely separated or disparate places. By the time of the granting of independence, all were democratic with a socialist intelligentsia and often as not a socialist government. With the exception of Algeria—which is marked by the exception—the former French and Dutch colonies came into being in very much the manner the British had laid down. For a prolonged initial period the former British possessions had pride of place in the ex-colonial world—they speak English at the UN, not American—and pretty much set the style of politics which has become steadily more conspicuous in international affairs.

Not everyone has noticed this. Indeed, there is scarcely yet a vocabulary in which to describe it. In part, this is because the event is recent; but also because it was incomplete. As with the liberal revolution which came out of America, and the Communist revolution which came out of Russia, this socialist revolution coming mainly out of Britain carried only so much of the world in its initial period of expansion. The liberal revolution of America was not exactly a spent force by the mid-20th century, but (*pace* the Mekong Delta Development Plan) there was never any great prospect of its expanding to new territories. On the other hand, the heirs

of the Russian revolution did capture China, the greatest of all prizes, in 1948, and at least part of Indochina a bit later. But in the main the Communist revolution stopped right there, and the two older revolutions now hold sway within fairly well-defined boundaries. Since 1950 it has been not they but the heirs of the British revolution who have been expanding.

Almost the first international political act of the new states was to form the nonaligned bloc, distinguishing themselves—partially—from the two blocs into which the immediate postwar world had formed. From politics the emphasis shifted to economic affairs. In 1968 these countries, meeting at Algiers, formed the Group of 77 as a formal economic bloc. Their Joint Statement described the group as "comprising the vast majority of the human race"—and indeed it did. The B's in the list of members gave a sense of the range of nations and peoples involved: Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi. And yet there was—now somewhat hidden—unity to the list. Of these eight countries, five were formerly British-governed or British-directed. At its second Ministerial Meeting in Lima in 1971, the group (now numbering 96) drew up an Action Program which stated, *inter alia*, that developing countries should encourage and promote appropriate commodity action and, particularly, the protection of the interests of primary producers of the region through intensive consultations among producer countries in order to encourage appropriate policies, leading to the establishment of producers' associations and understandings. . . .

This was represented in the press as a major gain for the black African states who carried the point over objections from Latin Americans accustomed to working out raw-material and commodity arrangements with the United States. But the idea was fundamentally a heritage of the British revolution, and if the black Africans took the lead in proclaiming it, there is no reason to think it was any less familiar to Arabs. They had all gone to the same school. Was it not right for those who have only their labor to sell, or only the products of their soil, to organize to confront capital? Had they not been exploited?

II

How has the United States dealt with these new nations and their distinctive ideology? Clearly we have not dealt very successfully. This past year, in the 29th General Assembly, we were frequently reduced to a voting bloc which, with variations, consisted of ourselves, Chile, and the Dominican Republic. As this "historic session" closed, the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations declared: "The activities of the Soviet delegation at the session showed once again that the Soviet Union deeply understands and shares the aspirations of the Third World." This was not Krishna Menon, but a balanced and considerate Asian diplomat. If no equivalent pronouncement on China comes immediately to hand, this may be because the Chinese feel free to identify themselves as members of the Third World. As such, at the end of 1974 they declared that the new majority had written a "brilliant chapter" during the twelve months previous, that it was "sweeping ahead full sail as the boat of imperialism [the United States] and hegemonism [the Soviet Union] founders." "These days," the Chinese statement continued, "the United Nations often takes on the appearance of an international court with the Third World pressing the charges and conducting the trial." A statement to which many could subscribe. But no such statement could come from an American statesman, no such praise would be accorded American policy. Clearly at some level—we all but *started* the United Nations—there has been a massive failure of American diplomacy.

But why? Why has the United States dealt so unsuccessfully with these nations and their distinct ideology? A first thought is that we have not seen the ideology as distinctive. Not recognizing it, we have made no substantial effort to relate ourselves to it. The totalitarian states, from their point of view, did. They recognize ideologies. By 1971 it was clear enough that the Third World—a few exceptions here and there—was not going Communist. But it was nevertheless possible to encourage it in directions that veered very considerably from any tendency the bloc might have to establish fruitful relations with the West; and this was done. It was done, moreover, with the blind acquiescence and even agreement of the United States which kept endorsing principles for whose logical outcome it was wholly unprepared and with which it could never actually go along.

A relatively small but revealing example of this process may be seen in the development of the World Social Report, a document of the Economic and Social

Council. The first volume, covering the year 1963, was directed almost exclusively to problems of the developing countries, and the United States took its advent as a promising event. The 1965 report, concentrating on "practical methods of promoting social change," might have caused some to take note, but American officials were entirely unwary: this was, after all, a report designed to help the developing world. In actual fact, it was becoming a document based on the veritably totalitarian idea that social justice means social stability and that social stability means the absence of social protest. Thus by 1970, the Soviet Union—not much social protest there!—emerges as the very embodiment of the just state, while the United States is a nation in near turmoil from the injustices it wreaks upon the poor and the protests these injustices have provoked. And Western Europe hardly comes off any better.

What happened here was that a "Finlandized" Secretariat (the official in charge of preparing the document was indeed a Finn) found that the developing countries and the Communist countries had an easy common interest in portraying their own progress, justifying the effective suppression of dissent, and in the process deprecating and indicting the seeming progress of Western societies. It is easy enough to see that this would be in the interest of the Soviet bloc. (The Chinese did not participate in the debate.) But why the developing world? First, the developing nations could ally with the totalitarians in depicting social reality in this way, in part because so many, having edged toward authoritarian regimes, faced the same problems the Communists would have encountered with a liberal analysis of civil liberties. Secondly, the developing nations had an interest in deprecating the economic achievements of capitalism, since almost none of their own managed economies was doing well. To deplore, to deride, the social effects of affluence in the United States is scarcely a recent invention. For a generation the British Left has held the patent. Further, there is an almost automatic interest on the Left in delegitimating wealth—prior to redistributing it—much as the opposite interest exists on the Right.

Small wonder that officials could describe the Social Report as the most popular document in the UN series, a statement intended as more than faint praise. Yet it has been more representative than otherwise. There are hundreds like it, suffused with a neo-totalitarian, anti-American bias.

American protests at the 26th General Assembly have evidently influenced the most recent Social Report, submitted to the 29th, but here the significant fact is that this protest—entered at the very last moment, when the document was being presented for pro-forma approval—was the first of its kind, or one of the first. In fact the United States until then did not protest. To the contrary, the United States actively participated in preparing this sustained assault on American institutions. The 1970 Social Report had been three years in the making. During those three years it made its way through layers of bureaucracies, all manner of meetings. Americans were always present, and Americans always approved. This was, after all, a Third World document; it was to be treated with tolerance and understanding. Complacency of this order could only arise from the failure to perceive that a distinctive ideology was at work, and that skill and intelligence were required to deal with it successfully.

The blindness of American diplomacy to the process persists. Two large events occurred in 1971, and a series of smaller ones were set in motion. China entered the United Nations, an event the Third Word representatives saw as a decisive shift of power to their camp. In that same year the Lima conference established the nonaligned as an economic bloc intent on producer cartels. Less noticed, but perhaps no less important in its implications, a distinctive radicalization began in what might as well be termed world social policy.

This radicalization was first clearly evidenced at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in 1972, or more precisely at the 26th General Assembly, which was finally to authorize the conference. The conference was in considerable measure an American initiative, and while American negotiators were primarily concerned with ways to get the Russians to join (which in the end they did not), the Brazilians suddenly stormed onto the scene to denounce the whole enterprise as a conspiracy of the haves to keep the have-nots down and out. The argument was that the rich had got rich by polluting their environments and now proposed to stay that way by preventing anyone else from polluting theirs. This, among other things, would insure that the rich would continue their monopoly on the use of the raw materials of the poor. Thus was it asserted that matters originally put forward as soluble in the context of existing economic and political relations were nothing of the sort. To the contrary,

they were symptomatic of economic and political exploitation and injustice which could only be resolved by the most profound transformation: to expropriate the expropriators.

At Stockholm itself, this quickly became the dominant theme—espoused by a dominant majority. "Are not poverty and need the greatest pollutors?" Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India asked. "There are grave misgivings," she continued, "that the discussion of ecology may be designed to distract attention from the problems of war and poverty." She was wrong in this. They were not so designed. But at Stockholm the nations who feared they might be took control of the agenda. The conference declared as its first principle:

Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality which permits a life of dignity and well being, and bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.

The American delegates routinely voted for this resolution. It was, after all, language the new countries wanted. What wholly unwelcome meanings might be attached to "other forms of oppression and foreign domination" which stood "condemned" and had to be "eliminated" was a thought scarcely in keeping with the spirit of the occasion.

The Stockholm Conference had been turbulent. The United Nations World Population Conference, held nearly two years later, in August 1974, had an air of insurrection. This conference too was largely an American initiative, the culmination of years of State Department effort to put population on the agenda of world social policy. The Secretary General of the United Nations proclaimed the gathering would be "a turning point in the history of mankind." The centerpiece was a Draft World Population Plan of Action, which in essence set 1985 as the year crude birth rates in developing countries would be reduced to 30 per thousand (as against an anticipated 34) and when "the necessary information and education about family planning and means to practice family planning" would be available "to all persons who so desire. . . ." There can be no doubt of the social change implicit in such a conference's even meeting: in most industrialized countries, family planning has only just achieved the status of an accepted social value deserving of public support. Yet neither should there be any doubt that a disaster overtook the American position in the course of the conference, and that this disaster was wholly predictable.

To begin with, the conference was thought up by Americans to deal with a problem we consider that other people have. (In fairness, not long ago the United States itself was thought to have a problem of population size, while the provision of family-planning services is an issue of social equity as well as of population growth.) Specifically, it was considered a problem of the developing countries: countries, that is, of the British revolution who are animated by the liveliest sense that their troubles originate in capitalist and imperialist systems of which the United States all but offered itself as an exemplar. Further, the conference met in Bucharest, capital of a Communist country. At one level no great imagination would have been required to anticipate the outcome. President Nicolae Ceausescu opened the conference by declaring that "The division of the world into developed and underdeveloped countries is a result of historical evalution, and is a direct consequence of the imperialist, colonialist, and neocolonialist policies of exploitation of many peoples." He called for "a new international economic order" and condemned "a pessimistic outlook" on population growth.

But if this was to be expected, few could have anticipated the wild energy of the Chinese assault on the Western position. China has the strictest of all population-control programs. Yet the Chinese arrived in Rumania to assail with unprecendented fury and devastating zeal the very idea of population control as fundamentally subversive of the future of the Third World. The future, the Chinese proclaimed, is infinitely bright. Only the imperialists and the hegemonists could spoil it, and population control was to be their wrecking device. A theory of "consumerism" emerged: it was excessive consumption in the developed economies which was the true source of the problems of the underdeveloped nations and not the size of the latter's population. None dared oppose the thesis. The Indians, who are thought to have a population problem, went to the conference rather disposed to endorse a Plan of Action. But they did nothing of the sort. Instead, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, who headed the Indian delegation, found himself denouncing "colonial denudation" of the East, and the "vulgar affluence" of the West. The scene grew orgiastic.

In the end, a doctrine emerged which is almost certainly more true than otherwise, namely that social and economic change is the fundamental determinant of fertility change, compared with which family planning as such has at most a residual role. There need be no difficulty with this assertion. The difficulty comes with the conclusion said to follow: that economic growth in the West should cease and the wealth of the world be redistributed. We are back to Keir Hardie, expropriating the expropriators. Not to produce wealth, but to redistribute it. As with the environment conference, the population conference turned into another occasion for reminding the West of its alleged crimes and unresolved obligations.

This tone attained to manic proportions in Population Tribune, an unofficial, American-financed parallel conference of a form that first appeared in Stockholm. Ritual recantation became the order of the day as one notable after another confessed to a class-bound past which had blinded him to the infinitely bright future. Most of the recanters were American, but it was Professor Rene Dumont of France who epitomized the argument in a statement, "Population and Cannibals," which was subsequently given the full front page of *Development Forum*, an official, five-language, UN publication. Professor Dumont—blaming the "Plunderers of the Third World" for world conditions—"They . . . 'under-pay' for the rare raw materials of the Third World and then squander them"—put the case with some vivacity:

Eating little children. I have already had occasion to show that the rich white man, with his overconsumption of meat and his lack of generosity toward poor populations, acts like a true cannibal, albeit indirect. Last year, in over-consuming meat which wasted the cereals which could have saved them, we ate the little children of the Sahel, of Ethiopia, and of Bangladesh. And this year, we are continuing to do the same thing, with the same appetite.

Dr. Han Suyin, a sympathetic commentator on Chinese Communist affairs, summed up for others:

You cannot cut off any talk about population, about people, from economics and politics. You cannot put in a vacuum any talk about population and world resources without relation to the present as it exists. I admire people who can talk about a noble future where there will be an equal society and where resources will be controlled by all. But, forgive me for saying so, if this is to be done, then we have to begin by sharing now everything and that would mean that a lot of people who have a lot of private property, for instance, should divest themselves immediately of it in favor of the poor. It means that at this very moment we should start to implement a very simple thing—something which we heard . . . at the United Nations at the sixth special session of the United Nations where the voice of the Third World—the majority of the world—at last formulated their demand for more equitable terms of trade, and for an end to exploitation, for an end to the real cause of poverty and backwardness, which is not population, but which is injustice and exploitation. The Third World has a word for it, it calls it imperialism and hegemony.

And the American delegation? The official view, flashed to diplomatic posts around the world, was as uncomplicated at the end as it had been at the outset: "ALL BASIC U.S. OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED AND U.S. ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE MANY. . . . U.S. DELEGATION UNANIMOUSLY PLEASED WITH FINAL RESULT."

The World Food Conference which followed in Rome in November was even more explicitly an American initiative. Yet as the American delegation somewhat sadly noted, the plenary forum was used to the fullest by LDC's (Less Developed Countries) to excoriate the United States and other developed nations as responsible for the current food crisis and the generally depressed state of their part of the world, calling for "radical adjustment in the current economic order and, in effect, reparations from developed countries" to the less developed. Such negotiations as took place were somewhat more sober since something immediately of value—wheat—was at stake and obviously only the United States and a few such countries were prepared to part with any. Even so, by the time the conference was concluded, one of the great, and truly liberal, innovations of world social policy— the American-led assertion that the hungry of the world should be fed by transfers of resources—had been utterly deprecated. Thus the Indian Food Minister's statement with respect to the needs of the developing countries:

It is obvious that the developed nations can be held responsible for their (the developing nations) present plight. Developed nations, therefore, have a duty to help them. Whatever help is rendered to them now should not be re-

garded as charity but deferred compensation for what has been done to them in the past by the developed countries.

The UN General Assembly pursued this theme with notable persistence throughout 1974, commencing with a special session in the spring which dealt with the economic crises of the underdeveloped in just such terms. Occasioned as much as anything by the devastating impact of oil price increases, the special session dwelt on every conceivable abuse of economic power save that one. At the end of the regular autumn session, the General Assembly solemnly adopted a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which accords to each state the right freely to exercise full permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments, and to nationalize, expropriate, or transfer ownership of foreign property pretty much at will. The vote was 120 to 6—the United States, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. What was being asserted was a radical discontinuity with the original, essentially liberal vision of the United States as a regime of international law and practice which acknowledges all manner of claims, but claims that move in all directions. Now they moved in one direction only.

In general a rhetoric of expropriation became routine. At year's end, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, opening the 56th Conference of the International Law Association meeting in New Delhi, declared:

Laws designed to protect the political or economic power of a few against the rights of the many, must . . . yield place to laws which enlarge the area of equality, and . . . law itself should be an ally and instrument of change.

She spoke a now-common language of resentment over population issues:

Is it not a new form of arrogance for affluent nations to regard the poorer nations as an improvident species whose numbers are a threat to their own standard of living.

She suggested a reversal of roles had taken place as between the new nations and the old:

An obligation rests on the haves to generate confidence among the have-nots . . . A new approach to foreign investments is indicated, in which investments abroad are regarded more as a service to the recipient community than as an enterprise where profits and their repatriation must be secured at all cost.

Now there is nothing unfamiliar in this language: only the setting is new. It is the language of British socialism applied to the international scene. American diplomacy has yet to recognize this fact and, failing to recognize it, has failed even to begin dealing intelligently with it.

But if the beginning of wisdom in dealing with the nations of the Third World is to recognize their essential ideological coherence, the next step is to recognize that there is every reason to welcome this ideology, and to welcome the coherence also. Because of the British revolution and its heritage, the prospect now is that the world will not go totalitarian. In the Christian sense, has there been such political "good news" in our time? But there is bad news also. The great darkness could yet consume us. The potential for absorption of these states into the totalitarian camp is there and will continue to be there. This is perhaps especially true where one-party states have been established, but even where multi-party democracy flourishes the tug of the "socialist countries," to use the UN term, persists.

The outcome will almost certainly turn on whether or not these nations, individually and in groups, succeed in establishing sufficiently productive economies. If they do not, if instead they become permanently dependent on outside assistance, that assistance is likely more and more to come from the totalitarian nations, and with it the price of internal political influence from the totalitarian camp through the local pro-Moscow, or pro-Peking, Communist party. For everywhere there are such parties. They appear able to go on indefinitely in a dormant state, and can be awakened pretty much at will. India, with a population equal to that of the whole of Africa and South America combined, is the best current example. Parliamentary democracy is vigorous enough there, but economic incompetence on its part and diplomatic blunders on ours have to an increasing dependence on Soviet support, which in the space of three years has brought about an open electoral alliance between the Congress party and the Moscow-oriented Communists, an alliance we would have thought worth fighting a war to prevent two decades ago, but which we scarcely notice today.

This alliance would not have come about save for the failure of the Indian economy to prosper and the success—typical—of the argument that the cure for the damage done by leftist policies is even more leftist policies, which in practice translates into dependence on the Soviets and alliances with their internal allies. And here is the nub of the bad news: for all the attractions of this variety of socialist politics, it has proved, in almost all its versions, almost the world over, to be a distinctly poor means of producing wealth. Sharing wealth—perhaps. But not producing wealth. Who, having read British political journals over the past quarter-century, would be surprised to find that during this period (1950–73) the United Kingdom's share of the "Planetary Product" has been reduced from 5.8 to 3.1 per cent? Why then be surprised that those who have made British socialism their model have trouble taking off in the opposite direction? Yet even so, one must be surprised at the decline of economies such as those of Burma and Sri Lanka: immensely productive places not a generation ago. Sri Lanka, for example, having first got to the point where it was importing potatoes from Poland, has now got to the further point where it can no longer afford to do so. A recent survey of the Ceylonese economy in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* was entitled: "Conspiracy or Catastrophe?" For what else could explain such failure?

What else, that is, to those experiencing it (with all that implies for political instability)? The outsider can indulge a more relaxed view. The fault lies in ideas, not persons. Americans—Westerners—do not have any claim to superior wisdom on the subject of these economies. Starting in the 1950's a large number of first-rate economists began working on theories of economic growth designed to get the LDG's on a path of self-sustained growth. "To be perfectly brutal about it," Jesse Burkhead recently stated, "it hasn't worked." And yet there is no need to stand mute. Two assertions may be reasonably put forth, of which the first is that to say these economies haven't worked as well as hoped is not to say that none has worked at all. There *has* been growth. In the main, things are better than they were. For every Argentina—that "miracle" of economic non-growth—there is a Brazil. For Ghana, Nigeria. For Calcutta, Singapore. The second assertion is that relative failure is particularly to be encountered in economies most heavily influenced by that version of late Fabian economics which compounded the Edwardian view that there was plenty to go around if justly distributed with the 1930's view that capitalism could never produce enough to go around regardless of distributive principles.*

Still, there are gains in the relative loss of income associated with the managed economies of the Third World which need to be appreciated. An Asian economist has said of his own country, plaintively yet not without a certain defiance: "We are socialists, so we do not believe in capitalism. We are democrats, so we do not believe in terror. What, then, is our alternative save one per cent a year?" There is a welfare state of sorts; there is protection of industrial labor; and in some countries, at least, there is freedom to protest.

But the most distinctive gain and the least noted is that in the course of its outward journey, the managed economy was transmuted from an instrument of economic rationality to an instrument of political rationality. It is sometimes difficult to recall, but early socialist theory expounded the greater *efficiency* of production for use rather than for capital, and put much stress on capitalist wastefulness. In practice, however, the real attraction of the managed economy has been the means it provides to collect enough political power at the center to maintain national unity—almost everywhere a chancy thing in these generally multi-ethnic states.

One must still conclude, however, that these political gains are purchased at the expense of even more conspicuous economic losses. India will serve for a final example. In the year of its independence, 1947, India produced 1.2 million tons of steel and Japan only 900,000 tons. A quarter-century later, in 1972, India produced 6.8 million tons and Japan 106.8. These outcomes are the result of decisions made by the ruling party of each nation, and only an innocent could continue to accept Indian protestations that the results were unexpected. The break in Indian growth came precisely in 1962 when the United States, which

*This latter idea is very much alive. On leaving my post as United States Ambassador to India, I gave a press conference in which *inter alia*, I touched upon the failure of India to achieve a productive economy. The *National Herald*, the Nehru family newspaper, commented in an editorial: "Mr. Moynihan may be justified in some of his criticism of the state of the Indian economy, but what he is trying to sell is the capitalist system which can only impoverish India's millions further."

had been about to finance its largest aid project ever, a steel complex at Bokharo in Eastern India, insisted that it be managed privately. India insisted on a public-sector plant, for which read a plant that would do what the Prime Minister of India wanted done. In the manner of the Aswan Dam (and with as much political impact), the Russians stepped in to finance the public-sector plant. By 1974 this plant had yet to produce sheet steel. For the period 1962–72 Indian steel production grew by a bare 1.8 per cent, while Japanese grew 13.1 per cent.

There is no way to deny that India has in a very real sense desired this outcome, just as there is no way to deny that high living standards in the modern world are associated with relatively free market economics and with liberalist international trade policies. Granted that much economic policy does not have high living standards as its true objective, but is rather concerned with political stability, and granted that such a concern may be wholly legitimate in a new nation—in any event it is not anyone else's business—it nevertheless remains the case that the relative economic failure accompanying political success in regimes such as that of India sooner or later begins to undermine that very success. Promises are made and political stability, especially in the more democratic regimes, requires some measure of performance. When it is not forthcoming, regimes change. They become less democratic. They become less independent.

Neither of these developments can be welcomed by the United States. The United States in the past may have cared about the course of political events in these nations, but only in the most abstract terms. (Consider the casualness with which we armed Pakistan and incurred the bitter and enduring hostility of India, the second most populous nation in the world.) But India has now exploded a nuclear device. *That* may well prove the most important event of the turbulent year 1974. Other Third World nations are likely to follow. Hence political stability in the Third World acquires a meaning it simply has never in the past had for American strategic thinking, as well as our general view of world politics.

IV

What then is to be done? We are witnessing the emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the countries of the Third World. This order is already much too developed for the United States or any other nation to think of opting out. It can't be done. One may become a delinquent in this nascent world society. An outcast in it. But one remains "in" it. There is no escape from a definition of nationhood which derives primarily from the new international reality. Nor does this reality respond much to the kind of painfully important threats which are sometimes heard of America's "pulling out." Anyone who doubts that Dubai can pay for UNESCO, knows little of UNESCO, less of what the United States pays, and nothing whatever of Dubai.

In any event, matters of this sort aside, world society and world organization have evolved to the point where palpable interests are disposed in international forums to a degree without precedent. Witness, as an instance, the decisions of the World Court allocating the oil fields of the North Sea among the various littoral states in distinctly weighted (but no doubt proper) manner. Witness the current negotiations at the law of the Sea Conference. Two-thirds of the world is covered by the sea, and the United Nations claims the seabed. That seabed, especially in the region around Hawaii, is rich in so-called "manganese nodules"—concentrations of ore which American technology is now able to exploit, or will be sooner than anyone else. At this moment we have, arguably, complete and perfect freedom to commence industrial use of the high seas. This freedom is being challenged, however, and almost certainly some form of international regime is about to be established. It can be a regime that permits American technology to go forward on some kind of license-and-royalties basis. Or it can assert exclusive "internationalized" rights to exploitation in an international public corporation. The stakes are considerable. They are enormous.

And then, of course, there remains the overriding interest, a true international interest, in arms control, and here true international government has emerged in a most impressive manner. If we were to ask who is the most important international official, a persuasive case could be made for choosing the Inspector General of the International Atomic Energy Authority, the man who supervises the sfaeguard agreements of the world's atomic reactors. Few would know the name of this unobtrusive Swiss chemist; few, perhaps, need to. But more than a few do need to know that the post is there and that its viability derives ultimately from the international system of which it is a part. For the moment,

American security derives primarily from our own armaments, and our strategic agreements with the Soviet Union and a few other powers. But the international regime of arms control is already important and certain to become more so.

If, that is, it does not go down in the general wreckage of the world system embodied now in the United Nations. But assuming that the new majority will not destroy the regime through actions that drive nations like the United States away, is it not reasonable to anticipate a quasi-parliamentary situation at the international level—the General Assembly and a dozen such forums—in which a nominally radical majority sets about legislating its presumed advantage in a world which has just come into its hands? The qualification "quasi-parliamentary" is necessary, for in fact the pronouncements of these assemblies have but limited force. So did the pronouncements of the Continental Congress. They are not on that ground to be ignored. What then does the United States do?

The United States goes into opposition. This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are out-voted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation. The question is what do we make of it. So far we have made little—nothing—of what is in fact an opportunity. We go about dazed that the world has changed. We toy with the idea of stopping it and getting off. We rebound with the thought that if only we are more reasonable perhaps "they" will be. (Almost to the end, dominant opinion in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations was that the United States could not vote against the "have-nots" by opposing the Charter on the Rights and Duties of States—all rights for the Group of 77 and no duties.) But "they" do not grow reasonable. Instead, we grow unreasonable. A sterile enterprise which awaits total redefinition.

Going into opposition requires first of all that we recognize that there is a distinctive ideology at work in the Third World, and that it has a distinctive history and logic. To repeat the point once again, we have not done this, tending to see these new political cultures in our own image, or in that of the totalitarians, with a steady shift in the general perception from the former to the latter. But once we perceive the coherence in the majority, we will be in a position to reach for a certain coherence of opposition.

Three central issues commend themselves as points of systematic attack: first, the condition of international liberalism; second, the world economy; third, the state of political and civil liberties and of the general welfare. The rudiments of these arguments need only be sketched.

It is the peculiar function of "radical" political demands, such as those most recently heard in the international forums, that they bring about an exceptional deprecation of the achievements of liberal processes. Even when the radicalism is ultimately rejected, this is rarely from a sense that established processes do better and promise more. American liberalism experienced this deprecation in the 1960's; international liberalism is undergoing it in the 1970's. But the truth is that international liberalism and its processes have enormous recent achievements to their credit. It is time for the United States to start saying so.

One example is the multinational corporation which, combining modern management with liberal trade policies, is arguably the most creative international institution of the 20th century. A less controversial example is the World Health Organization. In 1966 it set out to abolish smallpox, and by the time this article is read, the job will more than likely have been successfully completed—in very significant measure with the techniques and participation of American epidemiologists. While not many Americans have been getting smallpox of late, the United States has been spending $140 million a year to keep it that way. Savings in that proportion and more will immediately follow. Here, as in a very long list, a liberal world policy has made national sense.

We should resist the temptation to designate agreeable policies as liberal merely on grounds of agreeableness. There are harder criteria. Liberal policies are limited in their undertakings, concrete in their means, representative in their mode of adoption, and definable in terms of results. These are surely the techniques appropriate to a still tentative, still emergent world society. It is time for the United States, as the new society's loyal opposition, to say this directly, loudly, forcefully.

The economic argument—which will appear inconsistent only to those who have never been much in politics—is that the world economy is not nearly bad enough to justify the measures proposed by the majority, and yet is much worse than it would otherwise be in consequence of measures the majority has already taken. The first half of this formulation will require a considerable shift in the government mind, and possibly even some movement in American elite opinion

also, for we have become great producers and distributors of crisis. The world environment crisis, the world population crisis, the world food crisis are in the main American discoveries—or inventions, opinions differ. Yet the simple and direct fact is that any crisis the United States takes to an international forum in the foreseeable future will be decided to the disadvantage of the United States. (Let us hope arms control is an exception.) Ergo: skepticism, challenge.

The world economy is the most inviting case for skepticism, although it will be difficult to persuade many Americans of this during an American recession, and although the rise in oil prices is now creating a crisis in the Third World which is neither of American contrivance nor of American discovery nor of American invention. But until the dislocations caused by OPEC, things were simply not as bad as they were typically portrayed. *Things were better than they had been.* Almost everywhere. In many places things were very good indeed. Sir Arthur Lewis summed up the evidence admirably:

We have now had nearly three decades of rapid economic growth. ... Output per head has been growing in the developed world twice as fast as at any time within the preceding century. In the LDC world, output per head is not growing as fast as in the developed world, but is growing faster than the developed world used to grow.

The data can be quite startling. In 1973, as Sir Arthur was speaking, the "Planetary Product," as estimated by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, grew at a real rate of 6.8 per cent, an astonishing figure. The Third World product expanded by 5.75 per cent, no less astonishing.

Simultaneously it is to be asserted that these economies do less well than they ought: that the difference is of their own making and no one else's, and no claim on anyone else arises in consequence. This will be hard for us to do, but it is time we did it. It is time we commenced citing men such as Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Professor of Economics at MIT, an Indian by birth, who stated in the Lal Bahadur Shastri lectures in India in 1973:

In the 1950's our economic programs were considered by the progressive and democratic opinion abroad to be a model of what other developing countries might aspire to and emulate. Today, many of us spend our time trying desperately to convince others that *somehow* all the success stories elsewhere are special cases and that our performance is not as unsatisfactory as it appears. And yet, we must confront the fact that, in the ultimate analysis, despite our socialist patter and our planning efforts, we have managed to show neither rapid growth nor significant reduction of income inequality and poverty.

It is time we asserted, with Sir Arthur—a socialist, a man of the Third World—that economic growth is governed not by Western or American conspiracies, but by its own laws and that it "is not an egalitarian process. It is bound to be more vigorous in some professions, or sectors, or geographical regions than in others, and even to cause some impoverishment."

A commentator in *The Statesman*, Calcutta's century-old and most prestigious journal, recently warned:

It would be unwise for policy planners in the developing world to dismiss too easily ... the basic premise of a society that worships success: if you are poor, you have only yourself to blame. Development is a matter of hard work and discipline. So if you are not developing fast, it is not because the rules of the game are stacked against you or that structural changes are never easy to bring about, but because you are lazy and indisciplined. The general disenchantment with economic aid flows from this. It is difficult for Americans to understand why such substantial flows of food and money have made so little impact.

Well, the time may have come when it is necessary for Americans to say, "Yes, it *is* difficult to understand that." Not least because some Third World economies have done so very well. For if Calcutta has the lowest urban standard of living in the world, Singapore has in some ways the highest. It is time we asserted that inequalities in the world may be not so much a matter of condition as of performance. The Brazilians do well. The Israelis, The Nigerians, The Taiwanese. It is a good argument. Far better, surely, than the repeated plea of *nolo contendere* which we have entered, standing accused and abased before the Tribune of the People.

Cataloguing the economic failings of other countries is something to be done out of necessity, not choice. But speaking for political and civil liberty, and doing so in detail and in concrete particulars, is something that can surely be undertaken by Americans with enthusiasm and zeal. Surely it is not beyond us, when the next Social Report comes along, to ask about conditions and events

in many countries of the Third World of which almost everyone knows, but few have thought it politic to speak. The AFL-CIO does it. Freedom House does it. Amnesty International does it. *American* socialists do it. The time has come for the spokesmen of the United States to do it too.

It is time, that is, that the American spokesman came to be feared in international forums for the truths he might tell. Mexico, which has grown increasingly competitive in Third World affairs, which took the lead in the Declaration of the Economic Rights and Duties, preaches international equity. Yet is preaches domestic equity also. It could not without some cost expose itself to a repeated inquiry as to the extent of equity within its own borders. Nor would a good many other Third World countries welcome a sustained comparison between the liberties they provide their own peoples with those which are common and taken for granted in the United States.

For the United States to go into opposition in this manner not only requires a recognition of the ideology of the Third World, but a reversal of roles for American spokesmen as well. As if to compensate for its aggressiveness about what might be termed Security Council affairs, the United States has chosen at the UN to be extraordinarily passive, even compliant, about the endless goings-on in the Commissions and Divisions and Centers and suchlike elusive enterprises associated with the Economic and Social Council. Men and women were assigned to these missions, but have rarely been given much support, or even much scrutiny. Rather, the scrutiny has been of just the wrong kind, ever alert to deviation from the formula platitudes of UN debate, and hopelessly insensitive to the history of political struggles of the 20th century.

In Washington, three decades of habit and incentive have created patterns of appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal. Delegations to international conferences return from devastating defeats proclaiming victory. In truth, these have never been thought especially important. Taking seriously a Third World speech about, say, the right of commodity producers to market their products in concert and to raise their prices in the process, would have been the mark of the the quixotic or the failed. To consider the intellectual antecedents of such propositions would not have occurred to anyone, for they were not thought to have any.

And yet how interesting the results might be. The results, say, of observing the occasion of an Algerian's assuming the Presidency of the General Assembly with an informed tribute to the career of the liberator Ben Bella, still presumedly rotting in an Algerian prison cell. The results of a discourse on the disparities between the (1973) per-capita GNP in Abu Dhabi of $43,000 and that of its neighbor, the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, with one-thousandth that. Again, this need not be a uniformly scornful exercise; anything but. The Third World has more than its share of attractive regimes, and some attractive indeed—Costa Rica, Gambia, Malaysia, to name but three. Half the people in the world who live under a regime of civil liberties live in India. The point is to differentiate, and to turn their own standards against regimes for the moment too much preoccupied with causing difficulties for others, mainly the United States. If this has been in order for some time, the oil price increase—devastating to the development hopes of half-a-hundred Asian and African and Latin American countries—makes it urgent and opportune in a way it has never been.

Such a reversal of roles would be painful to American spokesmen, but it could be liberating also. It is past time we ceased to apologize for an imperfect democracy. Find its equal. It is time we grew out of our initial—not a little condescending—supersensitivity about the feelings of new nations. It is time we commenced to treat them as equals, a respect to which they are entitled.

The case is formidable that there is nothing the Third World needs less—especially now that the United States has so much withdrawn—than to lapse into a kind of cargo cult designed to bring about our return through imprecation and threat rather than the usual invocations. The Third World has achieved independence, and it needs to assert it in a genuine manner. The condition of the developing countries is in significant measure an imported condition. In the main a distinctive body of European ideas has taken hold, not everywhere in the same measure. Sri Lanka will be more cerebrate in its socialism than will, say, Iraq, Brazil more given to actual economic expansion than Syria or Egypt, Algeria considerably less libertarian than Nigeria. Still, there is a recognizable pattern to the economic and political postures of these countries, of which the central reality is that their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist ideologies are in fact themselves the last stage of colonialism. These are imported ideas every bit as much as the capitalist and imperialist ideas to which they are opposed. The sooner they

are succeeded by truly indigenous ideas, the better off all the former colonies will be, the United States included.

The Third World must feed itself, for example, and this will not be done by suggesting that Americans eat too much. It is one thing to stress what is consumed in the West, another to note what is produced there. In 1973, 17.8 per cent of the world's population produced 64.3 per cent of its product—and not just from taking advantage of cheap raw materials.

In the same way, the Third World has almost everywhere a constitutional heritage of individual liberty, and it needs to be as jealous of that heritage as of the heritage of national independence. It should be a source of renown that India, for one, has done that, and of infamy that so many others have not.

Not long ago, Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, speaking of the case of a Soviet dissident who had been detained in a mental hospital, asked whether world opinion would ever permit South Africa to detain a black African leader in this fashion. Answering his own question, he said, "The storm of worldwide rage would have long ago swept the roof from that prison!" His point is very like the one Stephen Spender came to in the course of the Spanish Civil War. Visiting Spain, he encountered atrocities of the Right, and atrocities of the Left. But only those of the Right were being written about, and it came to him, as he later put it, that if one did not care about every murdered child indiscriminately, one did not really care about children being murdered at all. Very well. But nothing we finally know about the countries of the Third World (only in part the object of the Solzhenitsyn charge) warrants the conclusion that they will be concerned only for wrongdoing that directly affects them. Ethnic solidarity is not the automatic enemy of civil liberties. It has been the foundation of many. If there are any who can blow off the roof of any such prison—then all credit to them. If you can be against the wrongful imprisonment of a person anywhere, then you can be against wrongful imprisonment everywhere.

It is in precisely such terms that we can seek common cause with the new nations: granted that they, no more than we, are likely ever wholly to live up to either of our protestations. Yet there exists the strongest possibility of an accommodating relationship at the level of principle—a possibility that does not exist at all with the totalitarian powers as they are now constituted. To contemplate an oppositional role to the Soviet bloc, or the Chinese, in, say, the General Assembly would be self-deceptive. One may negotiate there as between separate political communities, but to participate as in a single community—even in opposition—would simply not be possible. We can, however, have such a relation with most Third World nations. And we can do so while speaking for and in the name of political and civil liberty.

And equality, what of it? Here an act of historical faith is required: what is the record? The record was stated most succinctly by an Israeli socialist who told William F. Buckley, Jr. that those nations which have put liberty ahead of equality have ended up doing better by equality than those with the reverse priority. This is so, and being so, it is something to be shouted to the heavens in the years now upon us. *This is our case.* We *are* of the liberty party, and it might surprise us what energies might be released were we to unfurl those banners.

In the spring of 1973, in his first address as director-designate of the London School of Economics—where Harold Laski once molded the minds of so many future leaders of the "new majority"—Ralf Dahrendorf sounded this theme. The equality party, he said, has had its day. The liberty party's time has come once more. It is a time to be shared with the new nations, and those not so new, shaped from the old European empires, and especially the British—and is the United States not one such?—whose heritage this is also. To have halted the great totalitarian advance only to be undone by the politics of resentment and the economies of envy would be a poor outcome to the promise of a world society. At the level of world affairs we have learned to deal with Communism. Our task is now to learn to deal with socialism. It will not be less difficult a task. It ought to be a profundly more pleasant one.

[Reader's Digest, June 1975]

THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW WORLD SOCIETY

(By Daniel P. Moynihan)

"We are now witnessing the emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the countries of the Third World," writes Daniel P. Moynihan, former U.S. Ambassador to India and currently professor of government at

Harvard University. Increasingly, the United States stands "accused and abased" before these nations, charged with the crimes of economic imperialism, exploitation, pollution and waste, its policies often characterized as the real cause of poverty among underdeveloped states.

While often hostile, these nations are not communist; generally they are socialist. To date, their ideology has had limited force but, the author warns, it is not to be ignored. We must assume that, in the General Assembly of the United Nations and a dozen other such international forums, this new majority will set about to legislate "its presumed advantage in a world that has just come into its hands."

In this penetrating essay, Mr. Moynihan examines the unrecognized causes behind this transformation in world society. He argues that American spokesmen must abandon the compliance and appeasement that so frequently serve as our response to the indictments of the Third World. And he explains just how the United States can go on the offensive and seek common cause with new nations that today stand more in the shadow of totalitarian powers than in the light of our beliefs.

The notion of a world society is nothing new to Americans. Issues are commonly defined in international terms: the world environmental problem; the world population problem; the world food problem. But there is something new in international pronouncements. A vast majority of the nations of the world now feel that claims can be made on the wealth of individual nations. These claims are threatening—in any event threatening to countries such as the United States, which regularly finds itself in a minority (often a minority of one or two or at most a half-dozen) in the 138-member General Assembly.

The tyranny of this "new majority" has been deplored. Yet there have been but few calls for withdrawal from the United Nations. It is almost as if American opinion now acknowledged that there was no escaping involvement in the emergent world society. All the more reason, then, for seeking to understand what has been going on.

INVISIBLE REVOLUTION

What happened in the early 1970s is that for the first time the world felt the impact of what I shall call the British revolution. That is the revolution which began in 1947 with the granting by socialist Britain of independence to socialist India. In slow, then rapid order, the great empires of the world—with the major exception of the former Czarist empire—broke up into independent states; the original U.N. membership of 51 grew to 138.

These new nations naturally varied in terms of size, population and resources. But to a quite astonishing degree they were ideologically uniform, having fashioned their politics from British socialist opinion as it developed in the period roughly 1890–1950.

The men who created this body of doctrine thought they were making a social revolution in Britain. And they were. But the spread of their ideology to the furthest reaches of the globe, with its dominance in the highest national councils everywhere, gives to the British revolution the kind of worldwide significance which the American and French, and then the Russian, revolutions possessed in earlier times.

Yet this revolution has attracted little attention. Everyone certainly recognized that new states were coming into existence out of former European, and indeed mostly British, colonies.* But it was not generally perceived that they came to independence with a coherent, and surprisingly stable, ideological base which, while related to both the earlier revolutionary traditions, was distinct from both.

SCORES TO SETTLE

Two general points may be made about the doctrine of British socialism. First, it contained a suspicion of, almost a bias against, economic development. The fundamental assertion was that there was plenty of wealth to go around if only it were fairly distributed. Redistribution, not production, remained central to the ethos of British socialism. Profit became synonymous with exploitation.

The second point about socialist doctrine as it developed in Britain was that it was anti-American. More anti-American, surely, than it was ever anti-Soviet.

*Of the 87 states to have joined the U.N. since its founding, more than half—47—had been part of the British empire.

The reasons for this are not obscure. The British were not overmuch admiring of Americans in that era, nor we of them. In part their attitude began as aristocratical disdain. But more importantly, America was seen as quintessentially capitalist.

In the first half of the 20th century, British civil servants took the doctrine of British socialism to the colonies, a domain which covered one quarter of the earth's surface. By 1950 not communists but Fabian socialists could claim the largest portion of the world's population lived in regimes of their fashioning. Before very long the arithmetical majority and the ideological coherence of those new nations brought them to dominance in the United Nations and, indeed, in any world forum characterized by universal membership.

British socialism was, and remains, a highly moral creed. It is not a politics of revenge; it is too civil for that. But reparations? Yes: reparations. The movement, in part, rested on the assumption that there existed vast stores of unethically accumulated wealth. There were scores to be settled.

Almost the first international political act of the new states was to form the nonaligned bloc, distinguishing themselves—partially—from the two blocs into which the immediate postwar world had formed. From politics the emphasis shifted to economic affairs. In 1967 these countries, meeting at Algiers, formed the Group of 77 as a formal economic bloc. Their Joint Declaration had described the group as "comprising the vast majority of the human race"—and indeed it did.

ASSAULTING OURSELVES

How has the United States dealt with these new nations? Clearly, not very successfully. This past year, in the 29th General Assembly, we were frequently reduced to a voting bloc which, with variations, consisted of ourselves, Chile and the Dominican Republic. As this "historic session" closed, the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations declared: "The activities of the Soviet delegation at the session showed once again that the Soviet Union deeply understands and shares the aspirations of the Third World." Clearly at some level—we all but *started* the United Nations—there has been a massive failure of American diplomacy.

But why? Why has the United States dealt so unsuccessfully with these nations and their distinct ideology? A first thought is that we have not seen the ideology as distinctive. Not recognizing it, we have made no sustained effort to relate ourselves to it. The totalitarian states, from their point of view, did. They recognize ideologies. By 1971 it was clear enough that the Third World—a few exceptions here and there—was not going communist. But it was nevertheless possible to encourage it in directions that veered very considerably from any tendency the bloc might have to establish fruitful relations with the West; and this was done. It was done, moreover, with the blind acquiescence and even agreement of the United States.

A revealing example of this process may be seen in the development of the World Social Report, a document of the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council. The first volume, covering the year 1963, was directed almost exclusively to problems of the developing countries, and the United States took its advent as a promising event. The 1965 report, concentrating on "practical methods of promoting social change," might have caused some to take note, but American officials were entirely unwary; this was, after all, a report designed to help the developing world. In actual fact, it became a document based on the totalitarian idea that social justice means social stability and that social stability means the absence of social protest.

Thus by 1970, the Soviet Union—not much social protest there!—emerges as the very embodiment of the just state in the World Social Report, while the United States is a nation in near turmoil from the injustices it wreaks upon the poor and the protests these injustices have provoked. Western Europe hardly comes off any better.

It is easy enough to see that this would be in the interest of the Soviet bloc. But why the developing world? First, the developing nations could ally with the totalitarians because so many, having edged toward authoritarian regimes, faced the same problems the communists would have encountered with a liberal analysis of civil liberties. Secondly, the developing nations had an interest in deprecating the economic achievements of capitalism, since almost none of their own managed economies was doing well.

The United States actively participated in preparing this sustained assault on American institutions. The 1970 Report had been three years in the making, during which it made its way through layers of bureaucracies, all manner of meetings. Americans were always present, and Americans always approved. This was, after all, a Third World document; it was to be treated with tolerance and understanding.

"EATING LITTLE CHILDREN"

The blindness of American diplomacy to the process persists. Two large events occurred in 1971. China entered the United Nations, an event the Third World representatives saw as a decisive shift of power to their camp. Less noticed, but perhaps no less important, a distinctive radicalization began in world social policy.

This redicalization was first clearly evidenced at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in 1972. The conference was in considerable measure an American initiative. The Brazilians suddenly stormed onto the scene to denounce the whole enterprise as a conspiracy of the haves to keep the have-nots down and out. The argument was that the rich had got rich by polluting their environments and now proposed to stay that way by preventing others from polluting theirs. Thus, the rich would continue their monopoly on the use of the raw materials of the poor.

While the Stockholm Conference was turbulent, the United Nations World Population Conference held in 1974 had an air of insurrection. It, too, was largely an American initiative. Yet a disaster overtook the American position.

To begin with, we thought up the conference to deal with a problem we consider other countries to have; countries, that is, of the British revolution who are animated by the liveliest sense that their troubles originate in capitalist and imperialist systems. The conference met in Bucharest, capital of a communist country, and President Nicolae Ceausescu declared in his speech that "The division of the world into developed and underdeveloped countries is a result of historical evolution, and is a direct consequence of the imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist policies of exploitation."

If this was to be expected, few could have anticipated the wild energy of the Chinese assault on the Western position. China, which has the strictest of all population-control programs, arrived to assail with unprecedented fury the very idea of population control as subversive of the future of the Third World. The future, the Chinese proclaimed, is infinitely bright. Only the imperialists and the hegemonists could spoil it, and population control was to be their wrecking device.

A theory of "consumerism" emerged: it was excessive consumption in the developed economies which was the true source of the problems of the underdeveloped nations and not the size of the latter's population. None dared oppose the thesis. The conference turned into another occasion for reminding the West of its alleged crimes and unresolved obligations.

This tone reached manic proportions in Population Tribune, an unofficial, privately financed conference. Ritual recantation became the order of the day. Prof. René Dumont of France—blaming the "Plunderers of the Third World" for world conditions—epitomized the argument in a statement "Population and Cannibals' which was subsequently given front-page coverage in *Development Forum*, an official, five-language U.N. publication:

Eating little children. I have already had the occasion to show that the rich white man with his overconsumption of meat and his lack of generosity toward poor populations, acts like a true cannibal. . . . Last year, in overconsuming meat which wasted the cereals which could have saved them, we ate the little children of the Sahel, of Ethiopia and of Bangladesh.

And the American delegation? The official view, flashed to diplomatic posts around the world, was uncomplicated: "ALL BASIC U.S. OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED. . . . U.S. DELEGATION UNANIMOUSLY PLEASED WITH FINAL RESULT."

GOOD NEWS AND BAD

If the beginning of wisdom in dealing with the nations of the Third World is to recognize their essential ideological coherence, the next step is to recognize that there is every reason to welcome this ideology, and to welcome the coherence also. Because of the British revolution and its heritage, the prospect now is that the world will not go totalitarian. In the Christian sense, has there

been such political "good news" in our time? But there is bad news also. The great darkness could yet consume us. The potential for absorption of these states into the totalitarian camp is there.

The outcome will almost certainly turn on whether or not these nations succeed in establishing sufficiently productive economies. If they become permanently dependent on outside assistance, that assistance is likely more and more to come from the totalitarian nations, and with it the price of internal political influence from the totalitarian camp through the local pro-Moscow, or pro-Peking, communist party.

India is the best current example. Parliamentary democracy is vigorous enough there, but economic incompetence on its part and diplomatic blunders on ours have led to an increasing dependence on Soviet support, which has brought about an open electoral alliance between the Congress Party and the Moscow-oriented communists, an alliance we would have thought worth fighting a war to prevent two decades ago, but which we scarcely notice today.

This alliance would not have come about save for the failure of the Indian economy to prosper and the success of the argument that the cure for the damage done by leftist policies is even more leftist policies. And here is the rub of the bad news: for all the attractions of this variety of socialist politics, it has proved, in almost all its versions, almost the world over, to be a distinctly poor means of producing wealth.

ENORMOUS STAKES

India will serve as an example. In the year of its independence, 1947, it produced 1.2 million tons of steel and Japan only 900,000 tons. A quarter-century later, in 1972, India produced 6.8 million tons and Japan 106.8. These outcomes are the results of decisions made by the ruling party of each nation.

The break in Indian growth came precisely in 1962 when the United States, which had been about to finance its largest aid project ever, a steel complex at Bokharo in Eastern India, insisted that it be managed privately. India insisted on a public-sector plant—a plant that would do what the Prime Minister of India wanted done. In the manner of the Aswan Dam (and with as much political impact), the Russians stepped in to finance the public-sector plant. By 1974 this plant had yet to produce sheet steel. For the period 1962–72 Indian steel production grew a bare 1.8 percent per year, while Japanese grew more than 13.4 percent per year.

Granted that much economic policy is concerned with political stability, it remains the case that the relative economic failure accompanying political success in regimes such as that of India sooner or later begins to undermine the very success. Promises are made, and political stability requires some measure of performance. When it is not forthcoming, regimes change. They become less democratic. They become less independent.

Neither development can be welcomed by the United States. India has now exploded a nuclear device. *That* may well prove the most important event of 1974. Other Third World nations are likely to follow. Hence, political stability in the Third World acquires a meaning it has never in the past had for American strategic thinking, as well as for our general view of world politics.

World society and world organization have evolved to the point where interests are disposed of in international forums to a degree without precedent. Witness the current negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference. Two thirds of the world is covered by the sea and the United Nations claims the seabed. That seabed, especially around Hawaii, is rich in "manganese nodules"—concentrations of ore which American technology is now able to exploit. At this moment we have complete freedom to commence industrial use of the high seas. This freedom is being challenged, however, and almost certainly some form of international regime is about to be established. It can be a regime that permits American technology to go forward. Or it can assert "internationalized" rights to exploitation. The stakes are enormous.

TO TELL THE TRUTH

What then does the United States do? *The United States goes into opposition. A loyal* opposition. We are a minority. We are outvoted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation. The question is what do we make of it.

In going into opposition, three central issues commend themselves as points of systematic attack: first, the condition of international liberalism; second, the world economy; third, the state of political and civil liberties and of the general welfare. The rudiments of these arguments need only be sketched.

It is the peculiar function of "radical" political demands that they bring about an exceptional depreciation of the achievements of liberal process. But the truth is that international liberalism and its processes have enormous recent achievements to their credit. It is time for the United States to start saying so.

One example is the multinational corporation which, combining modern management with liberal trade policies, is arguably the most creative international institution of the 20th century. A less controversial example is the World Health Organization. In 1966 it set out to abolish smallpox, and by the time this article is read, the job will more than likely have been completed—in very significant measure with the techniques of American epidemiologists. Here, as in a very long list of examples that could be cited, a liberal world policy has made national sense.

In 1973 the "planetary product, as estimated by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, grew at a real rate of 6.8 percent, an astonishing figure. The Third World product expanded by 7.6 percent, no less astonishing.

Simultaneously it is to be asserted that these economies do less well than they ought: that the difference is of their own making and no one else's. It is time we asserted that economic growth is governed not by Western or American conspiracies, but by its own laws.

A commentator in *The Statesman*, Calcutta's most prestigious journal, recently warned:

It would be unwise for policy planners in the developing world to dismiss too easily . . . the premise of a society that worships success: if you are poor you have only yourself to blame. Development is a matter of hard work and discipline. So if you are not developing fast, it is not because the rules of the game are stacked against you or that structural changes are never easy to bring about, but because you are lazy and undisciplined. The general disenchantment with economic aid flows from this. It is difficult for Americans to understand why such substantial flows of food and money have made so little impact.

Well, the time may have come when it is necessary for Americans to say, "Yes, it *is* difficult to understand." And it is time we stated that inequalities in the world may not be so much a matter of condition as of performance. The Israelis, the Nigerians, the Taiwanese do well. It is a good argument.

THE CASE FOR LIBERTY

Speaking for political and civil liberty is something that can surely be undertaken by Americans with enthusiasm and zeal. Surely it is not beyond us, when the next Social Report comes along, to ask about conditions in many countries of the Third World of which almost everyone knows, but few have thought it politic to speak of.

It is time that the American spokesman came to be feared in international forums for the truths he might tell. A good many Third World countries would not welcome a sustained comparison between the liberties they provide their own peoples and those which are common in the United States.

For the United States to go into opposition in this manner requires reversal of roles for American spokesmen. In Washington, three decades of habit have created patterns of appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal. And yet how interesting the results might be. The results, say, of observing the occasion of an Algerian's assuming the presidency of the General Assembly with an informed tribute to the career of the liberator Ahmed Ben Bella, still presumably rotting in an Algerian prison cell. The results of a discourse on the disparities between the (1973) per-capita GNP in Abu Dhabi of $43,000 and that of its neighbor, the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, with one-thousandth that.

This need not be a uniformly scornful exercise; anything but. The Third World has more than its share of attractive regimes—Costa Rica, Gambia, Malaysia, to name but three. Half the people in the world who live under a regime of civil liberties live in India. The point is to differentiate, and to turn their own standards against regimes for the moment too much preoccupied with causing difficulties for others, mainly the United States.

It is past time we ceased to apologize for an imperfect democracy. Find its equal. It is time we grew out of our supersensivity about the feelings of new nations. It is time we commenced to treat them as equals, a respect to which they are entitled.

The Third World must feed itself, for example, and this will not be done by suggesting that Americans eat too much. It is one thing to stress what is consumed in the West, another to note what is produced there. In 1973, 17.8 percent

of the world's population produced 64.3 percent of its product—and not just from taking advantage of cheap raw materials.

In the same way, the Third World has almost everywhere a constitutional heritage of individual liberty, and it needs to be as jealous of that heritage as of the heritage of national independence. It should be a source of renown that India, for one, has done that, and of infamy that so many others have not.

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To have halted the great totalitarian advance only to be undone by the politics of resentment and the economics of envy would be a poor outcome to the promise of a world society. At the level of world affairs we have learned to deal with communism. Our task is now to learn to deal with socialism. It will not be a less difficult task. It ought to be a profoundly more pleasant one.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator JAVITS. I was going to ask Mr. Moynihan, because of the tendency of people to run rather than read, if he could summarize of how he feels the U.S. policy toward the United Nations ought to be adapted to the present situation which is characterized, without in any way being invidious on the particular item, by the vote on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as proposed by President Echeverria of Mexico, whom I have just conferred about that very matter. They voted 120 to 6, the United States being 1 of the 6, and the question would be, should it be our policy to avoid such one-sided votes by abstaining or some other way avoiding such a crushing defeat. I hope very much that we would not avoid it. You are going to be the representative. It is very important that you deal with it. Also what should be the policy of the United States respecting the advocacy of its position in the face of that kind of a situation, which is not uncharacteristic of the United Nations today.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Exactly, Senator, let me first say that in a world organization such as the U.N., you bring different styles of political and legislative behavior. I mean here to be only descriptive. I think it ought to be understood that there are legislatures around the world in which perfectly competent men, of integrity, men of sincere purpose enact legislation which is seen as stating an ideal goal. That legislation is far from being a statutory requirement which must thereafter most rigorously be adhered to such that it first has to be most meticulously examined. It is rather a version of what things ought to be like. Such legislation says: Let us establish the ideal and hope in time we might attain it. In those situations, in all truth, pronouncements can be more readily accepted by people who do not perhaps intend immediately to adhere to and abide by them.

If you look at the international labor treaties of the ILO, which we have had now for 55 years, I am sorry to say there is almost an inverse relationship between the number of labor treaties that have been ratified in given countries and the standards of labor in the societies involved.

And I think that it probably behooves us to understand this is the style of some countries and it is not ours and maybe there are situations where you have to accept it.

It also behooves other nations, however, to understand our position in these matters and in particular to be interested enough in us to

know that when we take exceptions, and we are sticky and we are hard to convince on things like this, it comes out of what to us is honorable, political, legislative tradition. You do it; you do not say, well, somebody is going to do it some day. You understand that you should do it right here and now. It is perfectly clear that actions of the last General Assembly produced the impression of the nontotalitarian nations of the world divided with respect to economic cooperation, when in fact that division does not exist in practice. Our relations with Mexico are close; regarded as indispensable by both of us. It seems to me that nobody was the better off for having brought it down to who said yes and who said no. As much as possible the avoidance of that kind of situation where the things that the United States must take exception to were the lesser part of the charter and certainly not essential to it; the things with which we agreed were certainly important and the largest part of the subject.

Consider some of the things we took issue with, as for example, this question of the right to nationalize foreign properties. I was in India when this issue was being argued and you learn a little bit about the problems here.

Now, the Government of India has a meticulous record of compensating anybody who for whatever reason has their government taken over, their property taken over by the government. India is a country which operates under a legal system very similar to our own. The decisions of the Supreme Court two blocks away from here are cited every day in the Supreme Court of India. They are just as careful in this matter as we would be ourselves. Yet, as a matter of principle, they did not want to have to say in writing that they would in fact do what in fact they did do; such is sensitivity.

Now, I think I can understand how they might not wish to feel obliged to behave the way in fact they intend to behave. But now that the poorest nations of the world have gone on record as not being responsible for compensation of foreign investments that are expropriated, or nationalized, they must now face the fact that the new, the oil-rich nations with enormous resources to invest and looking for investment, know this. Where are those investments going? Are they going to the poorest countries that need them? Or are they coming to the industrial nations which certainly can use investments but are not at the same level of necessity. They are coming to the latter, and why are they? Because the investments elsewhere are risky. And why are they risky? Did not the U.N. design a big charter saying you have no international obligations for recompense? Whose interest was that? Was it in the interest of the poorest countires to go on record in such a way that investment will avoid them? I do not think it was. And whose investment? The investment of that same Third World.

I think a little more time to argue that case may have persuaded a lot of people that maybe last year was not the best year to enact something like that and maybe a vote is not the best way to decide it. Yet it is behind us. All I would say, having gotten it out of their system, let us hope we can proceed on issues Secretary Kissinger talked about, which involve specific and real problems with real countries and real solutions. Not consensus voting.

Senator JAVITS. I am sure it will interest all of us to know that is exactly the line I took with the President of Mexico.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Did you?

Senator JAVITS. And I did not find it a bit unreceptive; everybody had their say, made their declaration. Interestingly enough it seems generally agreed that no company and no investor is going to go in or stay out of a country because of its expropriation prospects, because if they think they are going to be expropriated, as you have said, they are not going to go in at all. So, it is strictly academic.

DEALING POSITIVELY WITH ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

One last thing, and that is the negative side. We need a positive side, too, do you not agree, in terms of what we are prepared to do in the world to close the gap, which is widening instead of closing, between the developing and developed, and how to deal with the fourth world problems of those who have no resources, no bauxite, no copper, no manganese, no oil—about 40 nations, with a billion people—and also to deal with the threat to world commerce of an engrossment of particular commodities on the OPEC model, a threat thereafter, of shattering the world's economy, enormously increased over what it already is because of the OPEC trust operation.

Would you not, one, agree that that is your major problem of the affirmative side, and two, any other thought you wish to express realizing, as Senator Case has so properly said, that you are the servant essentially of the President and that you should not in any way prejudice your opportunity to serve him faithfully.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thank you for saying that, Senator. If I were to ask what the most pressing problems the U.N. faces I would always end up with nuclear proliferation. I start out with nuclear proliferation. I think it is such a great problem we perhaps do not want to think about. Yet it is there and the International Atomic Energy Agency is important to the Security Council as far as I am concerned. But on this other matter, which is certainly the matter we will be talking about most, could I cite a comment which Ambassador Scali made to the committee in the hearings on the U.N. when he said that it is possible to mistake what is said at the United Nations for what is caused by the United Nations. United Nations did not cause those things to be said. It is a forum in which they are said. So why get mad at the U.N.? People go there and say things they think and come to conclusions they have reached elsewhere. We easily overlook things the U.N. has done.

NO COMPROMISE ON FACTS

One of the great problems we have in reaching international agreement is that while people can compromise on principles, it is very hard to compromise on facts. I mean you can give a little on what you think is right and I can give a little on what I think is right. But the question is whether it is the 10:30 in the morning or 4 o'clock in the afternoon; if we do not agree on that, we have nowhere to go.

Now, a year ago the head of UNCTAD appointed a committee of economists headed by a colleague of mine, Henry Houthakker of the Department of Economics at Harvard. It had representatives from Britain, from Nigeria, from Jamaica, from Algeria, from many such countries. Such list of people, economists, sat down to take on this issue of the deterioration of the terms of trade as between manu-

factured and primary products in the world, a fundamental issue on which so much of the argument such as this charter of rights and duties is based, the argument that the terms of trade are working against the primary producers, that there has been a long run deterioration, that as a consequence the poor get poorer and so forth and so on.

That report is not yet made official and whether in that present form it will be made official I do not know. But the findings have been published in England, and published in the United States. What did these economists find? There was no such deterioration—and they exclude oil from their consideration as a special case. That is where there is obviously not a market system. With the other commodities they went down the list. Do the prices of primary products deteriorate in the postwar era? Has there been such a trend? And the answer was a unanimous no. The facts do not suggest it. If you put oil into it there has indeed been a trend but it has been the opposite direction.

Well, sir, I would say that that is a very important finding and in that context it seems to me that the case for extending commodity agreements and rigidifying endlessly is not so strong as it may have been thought to be. Which is not to say we should not talk about it. It certainly is not to say that the short-term fluctuations in commodities are not great. I am not an economist. I do not understand the fluctuations. How can copper be at 100 in July and 50 in August and 140 in September. I mean there are problems here and clearly they cannot help the longrun increase of production. And I think we should talk about that kind of thing.

In some of these commodities I think probably there is too much speculation because there is not a big enough market. Prices do fluctuate, erratically. In the main my point would be that now that we have learned some facts that we did not necessarily know, we can now agree on, I think this will change the climate in which this issue is discussed. You would agree; where do we learn those facts? We learned them in the U.N. setting.

RESIGNATION IN CASE OF BASIC DISAGREEMENT

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Moynihan, just one other question, if I may, which is almost like asking you to swear allegiance to the Constitution, which you would do in due course, and that is the question I always like to ask of a high official.

Do you feel morally secure in your own heart that if you find yourself in basic disagreement with the President on a major question, you would feel you would rather resign rather than carry out an order which you did not believe?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have no problem with that, sir, in the terms that you have stated. I agree. I have served three Presidents, four really, because I served President Ford. But I do not have to say to you that I wish those questions came in as clear cut a form. But they did not.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much.

Senator CLARK. Senator Baker.

Senator BAKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have great admiration for this nominee. I fully intend to support his nomination, and I will not prolong the hearings with questions at this time.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Thank you very much.

DESIRE FOR THE POSITION

Mr. Moynihan, I have a few questions. The first question, the most basic one is, Why do you want the job?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am not sure I want the job, Senator. I will be very proud to accept the job, the President having nominated me, if the Senate confirms me.

Senator CLARK. You are not sure whether you want the job?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Did you have to ask that question?

POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE

Senator CLARK. Well, let me try to be more specific. Many of the witnesses that came before this committee in recent weeks, when we had a series of hearings on the United Nations, talked about why the United States had to play a more positive role in the United Nations—that we should have a positive program that we put forward in the United Nations, kind of innovative proposals on commodity pricing, South Africa, and other key issues.

Do you agree that the United States should come forward with such positive proposals in the next General Assembly session?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I absolutely agree. I mean this is a place to be used, this is a place where things of the utmost importance take place.

I do not want to make a speech about the International Atomic Energy Agency but that is a very important place. The Inspector General of the IAEA is probably the most important international civil servant the world has known. That is the man you depend on and I depend on and our grandchildren depend on, that man is seeing that plutonium is not slipped away from the atomic energy plants the world over. In the far reaches of the world that man's job is to see that inspection works, I absolutely agree. I think that is a question reasonably men can disagree on, about what is positive, what is helpful, and what is not helpful. But in terms of, ought this country stay in there and make our case and propose our alternatives when we have not got a majority, we think the majority is not right, my view is yes. We do. We do not walk away from the place. We do not settle for damage limitation, which is what you can do if you get sort of depressed about it. My view is just the opposite, that you make use of this institution. It is indispensable.

A colleague of mine once described the United Nations as the only institution that became indispensable before it became possible. But all right, we will find out. Certainly you do not want to walk away and do not hunker down. You play a part.

POSITIVE POSITION ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

Senator CLARK. I do not expect you to say things about the President's position, our Government's position in the next session. But, as I recall, the three issues that the U.N. is going to have to face most directly are the whole question of the new economic order, the question of South Africa, particularly mandatory sanctions, and the question of Israel.

Now, as you look at those three problem areas, what kind of positive proposals, what possible proposals might we put forth at the U.N.? What do you see as some of our alternatives?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, in the first area I think the Secretary's speech at the OECD was a first rate speech. It was full of specifics and that is an agenda right there. As I am sure you know we have a special session of the Assembly coming up the first of September that is very much going to be involved with this. Just what setting, what is to be the setting in which you proceed on commodity suggestions and so forth is optional. It does not have to be the U.N. But the U.N. is as good a place as any.

You do know, sir, that there is now a report to the Secretary General of a committee established by him—the rapporteur was Richard Gardner of Columbia Law School—on a complete restructuring of the United Nations in its economic activities. My personal impression is it is a good report. A very responsible middle ranking sort of a person in the State Department, where I called him, to ask what do you think about this report said: "We think it is a pretty good report." But he said, "We do not want to say so because if people got the idea we thought it was a good report they might be against it." That is silly when you get to where people, knowing where is the United States, will be on the other side. That is no way to help out. But I fear there is a lot of truth in his remarks.

Can I say to you that there has been too much of a tendency to take interesting subjects out of the General Assembly, if it is interesting, if it is attractive, take it to another place, get a whole new set of political actors, who are not going to meet each other to talk about something else the next day. You almost ask for extreme positions when you take environment to Stockholm and population to Bucharest and food to Rome and the delegates are not the same people who the next day are going to be talking about something else together, and the way you gentlemen do in the Senate. You know you are going to have to see each other the next day so you act today with some in that moderation.

I think that this general idea is a good one.

On the second point you raised, I think beside saying I thought Ambassador Scali's statement yesterday was a wise one, I think I had better stay and wait to be instructed.

SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

I hope I may be permitted to say that I have been reading a report that Mr. Barton of the staff has made on a trip to the southern part of Africa. I am only about a third of the way through it, but I was very impressed with the things he had to say, and it seems to me that as we think of some of the horrors of that part of the world, we ought

not to exclude some of the progress. I mean some of the things that Barton is being told by people down there about, as for example will we have majority rule this year, or must we wait 3 years?

Well, I can only read that as progress in terms of 10-years ago, when it was majority rule never. As a matter of fact, one can compromise between today and 3 years from today. That is not impossible for people. That is within the human capacity.

It may be things there are moving in a better direction than we think.

Senator CLARK. But it seems to me that you are saying that our positive proposal on South Africa ought to be to look at how much progress we have made in the past rather than talking about sanctions for the future.

What are the positive proposals we can make to the United Nations in regard to South Africa?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. May I say I should like not to speak to what we should do because I will be instructed. But it seems to me you can propose measures in a much more hopeful and much more positive posture if you accept, you know, that things are happening, that that deadlock, that intransigent absolute total unyielding position of 10 years ago is no more. That is the kind of progress you look for in the world. You welcome it, and I think you welcome it as a measure of the influence the United Nations has had. There is scarcely a more abominable social condition than apartheid. It is horrible, it is shameful, it is wrong. And yet, obviously, the people who impose it do not necessarily think that, and if they do not know that other people do, they are not much likely to change. Obviously exposure to the world view on this has had an effect.

Senator CLARK. I think you are quite right about that. To frame the question in a broader perspective, I am thinking of a way in which the United States could take a positive position on these issues that would find some acceptance by the majority. It seems to me that the issue before us right now is Namibia—whether or not the U.N. is going to take a stronger position and what the United States is going to do in relationship to that.

If we rule out mandatory sanctions—which may be wise, I am not sure—if all we are prepared to do is talk about how much we have done in the past, then it seems to me we will again be on the tail end.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. It seems to me that is not enough and I agree, sir.

Senator CLARK. Good.

EFFECT OF POSITION ADVOCATED IN COMMENTARY ARTICLE

Let us talk about the Commentary article which several Members have mentioned. If we are going to make constructive proposals on commodity issues, if we are going to take a positive position with regard to South Africa, if we are going to try to take a leadership role in the General Assembly, wouldn't taking a position similar to what you have outlined in the Commentary article really make such efforts more difficult?

Let me state it another way, Mr. Moynihan.

Doesn't a position of confrontation, which it seems to me you have outlined in that article, in effect make it more difficult for us to take a leadership role with the nonalined majority?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Senator, obviously I do not think so, and I could be wrong. I have been wrong about a lot of things in my life. But I would like to be very explicit on this. Which is that it seems to me that one of our problems in dealing with the new nations has been that we have never been able to distinguish between a principled statement of our views and a confrontation with them, a rejection of them. It suggests that we feel they are not somehow as politically mature as we, as politically equal as we think they are. They do not expect us always to agree with them. They assume we do not agree with them about some things. The posture of avoiding the statement, avoiding the justification of areas where we do not agree has not led to any general assumption by those nations that, well, there is in fact a larger area of agreement. It has tended to leave the impression there is no area of agreement. I have lived out in those parts of the world, I am an honorary fellow of the London School of Economics, I know that part of the world—not as well as 50 men you could name, but I am not unfamiliar with it—and I am saying to you that we should not be so polite as to be misunderstood. We should assume that other nations are serious in what they say, be serious in response and assume they will be serious about what we say and think. Far from confrontation, this is engagement, this is when you are seriously working together on issues, when you hope you will come up with some resolution, and you mean as much as possible to abide by what comes out. I use the parliamentary term opposition, and I spoke of a loyal opposition. I do not want to suggest that the General Assembly is a legislature. It is not. But I talk of finding ones self in the minority with respect to certain matters and vis-a-vis a majority, with which one shares an essentially political community.

I mean what do the gentlemen on your right do in the U.S. Senate? They are a minority. Do they give up? do they not come to hearings? do they go away? or do they not come in year after year, perhaps, state their position, offer alternatives, and in the end do they not end up sharing in the outcome? They do. They influence the outcome. That is what I meant by that, that is not confrontation.

Senator CLARK. I think others have questions and I have others that I will postpone until we go around again. But it seems to me the article goes somewhat beyond a statement of principle, as you have outlined it. I think the position that you have just stated is very defensible. But when you talk about "systematic attack," to take one of the terms you used in the Commentary piece, when you talk about paying tribute to Mr. Ben Bella, presumably still imprisoned in Algeria, as the Algerian President of the General Assembly takes office, it seems to me you go beyond a statement of principle and you would be received in an antagonistic way. That would make it more difficult for us to take a leadership role. It seems to me that is confrontation—not a statement of principle.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. It seems to me you are right. I wrote that article in India. I have not read it since I wrote it, so you have me at a little bit of a disadvantage.

I want to be very clear on this, sir. You may not agree, most people probably would not agree, but I believe the totalitarian powers are expansive. I think they are expansionist even if not in the territorial sense. Ideologically they still mean to rule in the world and ideologi-

cally they may yet. The world is divided between the totalitarian powers—with internal divisions there too, of course—the West, and this large new majority of nations who inherit a political doctrine which in the main, in its ideal form is that of democratic socialism. Now this is an honorable and decent political tradition, one with which we can engage in a thoroughly satisfactorily political community. Our job is to see that the social democracies of Asia and Africa and Latin America succeed. The totalitarian job is to see that they fail. And part of the posture of bringing about that failure is the systematic assassination of the reputation of the American democracy.

You go to any of those countries and what do you find? Beyond anything that is just idiosyncratic or happenstance, there is a systematic effort to declare that ours is the worst society the world has known. It is drummed in and beaten into the minds of people all over the world by persons who know what they are doing. I say to you that the reputation of this democracy is not just important to us; it is important to these other countries also and we have got to recognize the systematic and sustained—it has been going on 50 years, it will be going on 50 years from now—effort to discredit us in the world. And we have to understand the ideological context in which it takes place.

I sometimes think we have been more innocent about ideology than we are tought to be. We have to recognize what is credible and what is not credible and to know that we are on the defensive in the world and to care about that. To an extraordinary degree I think the world does not perceive us as being particularly sensitive on these issues. I think the reputation of our democracy is the most important interest we have in the world.

Senator CLARK. Well, I certainly could not disagree with anything you say, other than that it seems to me that for us to systematically attack them in the same way would not necessarily restore our reputation, that we would not necessarily gain a greater position of leadership.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. How could I disagree?

Senator CLARK. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. No questions.

Senator CLARK. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. I think, Mr. Chairman, you have put your finger on the precise thing that is the most interesting about Mr. Moynihan's appearance this morning and the job he is going to take on and his general thoughts.

I do not see why we ought to let up attacking the kind of conduct in foreign countries which is contrary to our view of the dignity and sanctity of the individual. In the specific instances you referred to, Mr. Chairman, I think I would rather disagree that it is wrong to bring this out constantly; the man languishing in prison and being tortured by a foreign dictator: this is an appropriate place in which to attack the dictator, to bring it out because I think this is the essence of the difference between the East and the West using those terms very loosely. This is something we ought not to gloss over.

That is all.

Senator CLARK. Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. I think I have had my turn.

Senator BAKER. I had no questions previously and I still have no questions. As I listened to the dialog between the chairman and this

witness I came to have even greater admiration for his clarity of thought and perception of issues of extraordinary scope and importance. I underscore my previous accolade. I have one question, however, I would like to pursue a little.

IMPORTANCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARD PROGRAM

You mentioned the IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency. I quite agree with you that nonproliferation and possession in irresponsible hands of the world's growing supply of plutonium may be the millennium size question that confronts civilization.

It also occurs to me that the IAEA is unique and unused as an international asset. IAEA is the only forum I know of in which the United States, Soviet Union, and most of the superpowers of the world are members, but there is no veto. It seems to me that considerable effort ought to be made in trying to expand and extend the authority of IAEA and bring it greater public visibility to make clear that there are nations which, while they are members of the IAEA, do not subscribe to the inspection requirement of IAEA—our good friend from Israel, for instance.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. That is correct.

Senator BAKER. As a case in point, they operate two reactors, neither of which are subject to inspection by the IAEA. I think they should be. As we see the prospect of other reactors developing in Brazil, throughout Europe and Asia, there is not only a growing concern on my part for the national security arrangements over plutonium but for the non-national security arrangements—that is, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that our greatest concern may be from non-national threats, from terrorists, for instance.

We ought to consider very carefully in the United Nations, that not only do 14 nations or 13 nations profess the ability to produce plutonium or enriched uranium out of which an explosive device could be built, but there are also probably 50 corporations, or aggregations of industrial complexes, that could do it, too.

There is no doubt that the gaseous fission technique, gaseous centrifuge, are fully within the competence of the talent and capital resources of non-national entities to go forward.

I urge you to consider the possibility of using the IAEA in facing up to this millennium type problem.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank you, Senator. You have said something profoundly serious.

Senator BAKER. It may be there is no way to deal with it. I very much hope there is a way and I believe there is a way. There is pitiful little thought being given to the question that it is very late in the game to start and we have to start.

Senator JAVITS. I would like to join with the Senator in the idea he has expressed. I hope he will not confine it to Israel alone. I agree with him. But to many others where the same danger is, and danger which originates not only with the U.S. supply of atomic materials, but Canada and the Soviet Union and many other suppliers, and the fact that they are not reachable by the United Nations should not make any difference in this world forum.

Senator BAKER. Obviously there are other countries, for instance, India, from which the Ambassador just returned. The reactor there is not subject to inspection either. The plutonium yield is easily calculated from the Indian reactor and the Demona reactor in Israel. We know with great precision how much fissionable material of weapon grade they have.

Senator JAVITS. One other thing I would like to call to the witness' attention. While we are dealing with this problem of what is available as capability for the United Nations, there is a treaty on Antartica, which is an extraordinary grant of supernational authority, including world authority, again in which the Soviet Union has joined, in short, to call attention to the great opportunities which already exist, which are pressing and which can be applied to many other problems.

Senator BAKER. I apologize for making statements instead of asking questions.

You will be our representative and this may be the last effective opportunity we have to speak to you in this way, because of our respective demand for time and scheduling. I do not think it is an oversimplification to say that the greatest challenge that confronts the super powers—namely, the United States, Soviet Union, Peoples Republic of China and the others, the nuclear powers—may be in the next year or so, to derive a way to monitor, control, and secure against the proliferation of fissionable material. I think that we have the structure at the United Nations and IAEA but we have not yet marshalled the will to harness it. I would hope a major multinational initiative, by the United States and the Soviet Union, for instance, may be mounted soon to see if we can find a way to attend to the problems you and I have just discussed. If we do, the existence of the United Nations would be fully justified for that alone.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes. In my last unofficial statement, if it turns out that way, I would like to agree with you. And if I may I would add one thing.

Senator Javits mentioned Canada. I think that there are few nations which we could better emulate than Canada. They take these matters very seriously, they are thoroughly responsible about them, and admirably so, and they could teach us a lot.

Senator BAKER. I might add, in response to Senator Javits' remark, in using the Demona reactor I did not mean to single out the Israeli situation as a particular threat, but only as an example of the problem. There are many others.

ROLE OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Senator CLARK. Mr. Moynihan, I have only three or four additional questions. One more on the Commentary article and then I promise to leave it. It is a little unfair, it seems to me, to keep quoting you on an article that you wrote two or three months ago but I cannot resist it. Since you have not looked at it since, let me quote from page 41. You say, "the truth is that international liberalism and its processes have enormous recent achievements to their credit. It is time for the United States to start saying so. One example is the multinational corporation which, combining modern management with liberal trade policies, is arguably the most creative international institution of the 20th century."

This committee has had a number of witnesses at hearings in the last several weeks that seem to me to call that statement into question. One of them was the Gulf Oil Co. president, who sat in the same seat you are sitting in and told us of the millions of dollars that that particular corporation turned over to the Korean Government, in the form of illegal campaign contributions. I specifically asked whether he thought these activities were unique among multinational corporations, and he said he certainly hoped they were but he seriously doubted it. Yesterday, in a closed meeting in preparation for a hearing to be held next Monday, a good deal of information was revealed about another major multinational corporation, its very questionable activities in many other parts of the world. I am inclined to believe a pattern is developing that is not exactly consonant with your position on multinational corporations.

Do you have any comments on that?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes, which is to say that I was speaking of the peculiar success with which these institutions—they go back to the turn of the century, the Dutch and British helped commence them—have been able to organize capital and management and materials for productive purposes and they are very productive. They make a lot of things people use, and they get around the rigidities which earlier companies faced and they are very adaptable.

I gather from what you say that they are also adaptable to the political mores of lots of places where they happen to be doing business. Well, I suppose they are and if any of them are let them face the consequences. Did I say they were without sin?

Senator CLARK. I have not read the whole article either.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am an Irish-Catholic, Senator. I believe none of us is without sin. If there are such people I have not met them yet.

Senator CLARK. I think we reap the harvest of the multinational corporations activities.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. We still must be appalled by some of those practices although we have seen some of them take place elsewhere—not in Iowa, I am sure, but in New York, I think they take place in New York.

Senator CASE. Even in the United States.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Even in the United States.

ATTEMPT TO KEEP AMERICAN BUSINESS OUT OF THIRD WORLD

May I make a point on the multinational corporation here. I hope I do not expand beyond my knowledge.

For two years in India I found myself going into seeing ministers of one kind or another and saying, "Minister, do you remember the XYZ company that come out to India and worked 4 years with you negotiating an agreement to build a fertilizer plant or to look for oil or to dig some coal. Finally they broke their pick and they left and nothing happened?" Yes, he remembers it very well. Next I would say: "Do you know where they have opened up business? Not far away from you. They are in Siberia now. And did you ever stop to think that maybe the people who were touting you off them in 1960 were waiting to get them themselves in 1970?" If you go around the world you will see, I do not want to use the word systematic, that

suggests more planning than I think is the case—a sustained effort to discredit American business enterprise, and by people who speak for the interests of the very same nations who will do almost anything to get themselves.

They keep American business out of the democratic socialist societies in the world. What kind of bargain is that for us and what is happening there? Why do they not want India, and Sri Lanka and Tanzania and so forth to do what they themselves want to do? I will tell you the Communist Party of India felt the contrast between the Soviet Union behavior with these companies in its own country and its posture about them elsewhere. It became so conspicuous they felt called upon in India to make a statement. They explained Soviet socialism is more mature and able to deal with the encounters with these virus-bearing institutions. Indian socialism was not mature enough. I swear to you it is the only statement that the Indian intellectuals have found patronizing in the whole time I was there. What kind of talk is that? You are not mature enough to deal with General Motors. But observe that and if you want testimony as to the creative powers of these institutions, Russia will tell you. I am saying it is one thing to let bureaucrats and Western educated ideologists in those countries deny their people things they need such as saying that the Dupont Co. cannot work within democratic India which is an opportunity which never came to anything. It is not a question of American profits. It is a question of economic development of those countries. It does not have to involve American firms. The Japanese are increasingly kept out for the same way, and I ask you why do the totalitarian powers try to prevent international business operating in the democratic socialists part of the world while they do a lot to get it operating in their own part. That is not consistent.

EXPULSION OF SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL

Senator CLARK. In your judgment was the expulsion of South Africa from the 29th, this session of the General Assembly, a violation of the U.N. Charter?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. As far as I have heard it stated, I believe that is the position of our Government. The argument on the other side is that the representatives were not in fact representatives, as they represented 20 percent of the population and not the other 80. I guess it is my view that this is exactly the time to keep countries like that in the General Assembly under the spotlight of world opinion, forced to recognize what other people think about abominable practices such as apartheid.

Sir, Ambassador Scali said this, I do not need to repeat, there is an effort afoot to expel Israel. The nonalined meeting in Havana, which is a great nonalined capital, as you may know, in March, signed a declaration of Havana in which they wrote that the expulsion of Israel from the U.N. is a measure they must consider, denouncing the United States in the same process.

Now, they cannot do that. They must not do it. First, they cannot do it. It is a Security Council measure. But even an effort to expel Israel from the General Assembly will bring a disastrous reaction from public opinion in this country. It is exactly what we should not do at just that moment the U.N. is playing a constructive role in the Middle East.

We have UNDOF agreements that have just been renewed with Syria and Israel. I think the others, will be extended too. To try to expel Israel is madness and it is contrary to the spirit of the Charter, it is contrary to the letter of the Charter. Whatever you may think of Israel its U.N. representatives are representatives of the government and the people there. It is just this kind of mindless giving in to totalitarian, authoritarian streaks in those other countries which we should not encourage. If they do it with themselves they do it with the U.N.; pretty soon what could have started out to be a pretty attractive political tradition has deteriorated. They must not do that. The U.N. forces people you want to influence to come before it to be have them there.

Senator CLARK. I certainly agree with you and I would like to pursue that a little further. The principle you are laying down—which I certainly agree with—is that the U.N. ought to be a universal body.

Would you be willing to extend that same universality to the new governments of Cambodia and South Vietnam?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I know that I would. I would today. Whether I will tomorrow if I am confirmed, I will have to find out. But Cambodia is a member of the U.N., sir, and there would not be any question.

Senator CLARK. Just a question of recognizing the new government, apparently.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I mean surely there is no question that there is a new government and if there is, it has the right to be represented in the General Assembly.

VOLUNTARY U.S. SUSPENSION IF ISRAEL IS EXPELLED

Senator CLARK. What do you think of Ambassador Goldberg's suggestion made here that if—in spite of our strong feelings and position to the contrary—Israel actually is expelled from the next General Assembly of the United Nations, we should take the position now that we will ourselves walk out of the General Assembly and freeze our contributions; and that we ought to make that position clear so that the nonalined members of the General Assembly would be well aware of the consequences.

Do you subscribe to the Goldberg idea?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. May I be just marginally indirect? Let me first say I am not familiar with any views of Justice Goldberg that I do not share. I worked for him, sir, and I edited his papers, and I have the deepest respect for that man. Second, I spoke to the Women's National Democratic Club in March, late March, just after this thing came out. I was asked what would happen if—what I would think we should do if in fact this expulsion took place, and I said that we should do what Justice Goldberg said we should do.

Senator CLARK. Do you take an advanced position we should not participate in the next General Assembly?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have a personal tactical view on that. It is personal. Spend some time, as Senator Javits has done, at the U.N. Try to turn your own Government around on an issue. If you succeed it is a 7-month affair. Did you ever see the number of people who have to sign a State Department cable before it can go out? It takes a week if they line up to sign it. Most of these countries, since they began the bloc process with the nonalined and now the UNCTAD group, start

forming their positions in March, they get a fully written out document in March, the Bureau of nonalined does, they circulate it. They will be meeting in Lima, Peru, in August, where they will put the final agreement on it. All the foreign ministers will sign and so forth. Then in September their ambassadors will show up in New York with these instructions. If at that point we start trying to chase 120 fellows around the east side of New York saying would you mind changing your government's view, they cannot change the government's view. Most of them are career officers. They are not in the business of calling back to their government asking to have their instructions changed.

It is hard to turn a government around. We should be telling them now before they have frozen their ideas, before they reached an agreement, as to what they were all going to do. This is when we should be acting.

Could I say this is a little bit of a problem of adaptation. These blocs really have not existed that long in this forum. They are recent. We are beginning to learn if you want to influence opinion in October in New York you first of all notice what they do in Havana in March and get out to the capitals and try to turn them around.

CURRENT LEVEL OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE U.N.

Senator CLARK. What do you feel about the current level of the U.S. financial support for the U.N.? Do you think it is sufficient, particularly the voluntary contributions? Have you had a chance to look at that yet?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have read Ambassador Buffum's testimony in the other places. We put up about $277 million, it is not, sir. I am sorry, I do not want to be vague.

Senator CLARK. We actually appropriated somewhat less than the administration asked for in most of the areas.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I guess we are asking for 245. Excuse me.

Well, I think I had better not speak to that, Senator.

Senator CLARK. My last question—really, in some ways, I think it is the most central question. Do you believe that our Government in the past has used the United Nations as an international forum to the degree that it should have, and, if not, what can our Government do to better utilize this facility or international organization, to make it more effective. Or do you think we are doing the best we can do in that regard?

How can we make the U.N. a more central forum for the conduct of American foreign policy?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. May I simply say that there is a history, although it is a brief one, it has got lots in it. There was a time when we proposed to turn over to the United Nations our atomic monopoly in the world. It is not as if we have not given the outfit a chance. When we were the only atomic power in the world we proposed to turn that power over to the U.N. There was a long period when I do not think there was any question we abused our majority, got saying the General Assembly could do things which the Charter does not say it can do. Then we were a little bit shaken by the onset of a majority clearly that was not with us.

I have been a student of the League of Nations. I wrote my doctoral dissertation about the "United States and International Labor Organization," which was only one of the three branches of the League we joined. I think I have some feel for what do you get, what comes of trying to make large formulations about what the relationship of this international organization will be. Not much, sir. You shape, you evolve a relationship in terms of specifics, you do this and then you do that. I think in all truth that relationship tends to be denser and to go further faster to the degree that you speak in more specific and confined terms.

Senator Baker was speaking about the International Atomic Energy Agency. That is an important organization. You do not have to know five things about it before you want to know five more. You do not have to know anything it does to believe probably it ought to be doing more. That leads you into a relationship which is a large question of how much sovereignty you want to turn over. That happens to be what I think I learned from what I have studied. If I have changed my mind in time I will tell you.

Senator CLARK. Thank you. Are there further questions?

Senator BIDEN. I have a couple of questions.

CREATIVITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

As an Irish-Catholic, like yourself, and as a Senator from Delaware where the DuPont Corp. is located, I am compelled to speak.

No. 1, I happen to have read your article, which you are having trouble recalling parts of, in which you describe the multinational corporation, combining modern management with liberal trade policy, et cetera, as "the most creative international institution of the 20th century." Maybe you could expand on that concept a little bit for me.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, the first thing to say, Senator, is that in 1945, after that war and the long recession and trade wars that preceded the recession, international trade was depressed. More certainly than it should have been. The United States made one of its principal commitments from the time of Cordell Hull, the expansion of international trade. Mind you, for a long time after the war we probably had an over valued dollar and it was in our advantage to do so. But still Presidents made this a major issue. As I remember, in 1962, President Kennedy's principle legislative measure was the Trade Expansion Act. I was involved in negotiating a cotton-textile agreement that we needed to get some Southern votes in this building here. This was not marginal, it was central to our foreign policy. And why? Because it had the potential to create an international community of reality, rather than simply of principle, which things like the League Charter and the U.N. Charter do. In the 25 years since, 27 since World War II, international trade has consistently expanded twice as fast as national economies.

It has been the dynamic and it is clearly responded to opportunities and these particular institutions have been very good at putting together the components. Some of them made too much money, I do not doubt. Some misbehaved in other ways. That is part of the record, I believe. But did they expand welfare or did they not? By God they did. Go to a country like Singapore and see what they can do for an

Asian economy. I wish the standard of living in Washington, D.C. were as high for our residents as it is in Singapore. And look up and see what you see working there. You see American, British, German, Japanese companies. What free trade meant basically was that you created a world market which had all the enormous advantages of scale, just as American firms grew in the 19th century to enormous size because suddenly had the whole continent to work with. The same phenomena occurred in the 20th century. If you are talking about the production of goods and services these are very productive organizations.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. One last question, if I may, let's go back to Justice Goldberg's statement to the effect that if Israel is unlawfully denied a seat in the General Assembly the United States not only should vote against such a proposal in the Assembly, and that the United States should not participate in the Assembly's deliberations.

You concur with that, I understand.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Yes. Just before I answer may I say something about the other matter I have talked about, the multinational corporation. The fact that these have been economically creative does not mean they should not be subject to social control of the kind that this Congress has legislated with respect to American corporations for three generations. But the question is do you desire productivity? Where do American trade unions have their closest relationship? Really, with the great corporations. They are the ones who are organized and they are the ones who pay the best, and so forth.

To your question just now, I do not think it is for me to expand on much of what Justice Goldberg said.

Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting you do. I am asking if you agree.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I agree as an individual.

EFFECT OF VOLUNTARY U.S. SUSPENSION

Senator BIDEN. Now, as an individual, do you find that at all inconsistent with your earlier statement saying that one of the primary purposes of the U.N. as stated by the chairman, is to have a world forum where people with whom you agree or disagree on matters have a chance to exchange and focus ideas? Do you see anything inconsistent by this?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. It certainly could end up coming out all wrong. But that is a risk you take to maintain the first principle, which is we should all be in, and I think that the risk is great, I have not counted the votes at all, but I think that any message now from us as to how serious we would take this is the best approach to assuring that it does not happen. I think that, Senator. I could be wrong counting votes, but I cannot imagine, for example, that any of the parties directly involved in the Middle East conflict, Egypt, for example, would want this to happen. Consider Security Council Resolutions 242 and 336. Think of the obligations which they impose on Israel. How possibly could the Egyptians wish to see Israel leave the U.N. and I suppose leave behind any commitments that that membership entailed? How could they? And why would they want other countries around the world deciding Egypt's future.

Senator BIDEN. One last question, and I am not trying to be facetious, I do not know why Egypt would want that, and I do not know why you would want the job. Would you tell me why you want the job, seriously? I am really curious.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Senator, that is the way we started out this hearing, before you came in.

Senator BIDEN. Then I will read the record, no need to repeat it.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. That is very kind of you.

Senator CLARK. He avoided my question, too.

You have done a good job and we are very appreciative of your coming before this committee this morning.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon the committee proceeded to the consideration of other business.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senator Percy (presiding).

Senator PERCY. The hearing will come to order.

Ambassador Moynihan, I would like to express to both you and Ambassador Toon my regret for this scheduling today. There was no way I could reschedule the speech I was giving this morning to the Council of the Americas at the State Department.

I appreciate very much your coming back this afternoon and I would like to make it clear that my purpose is not to question your qualifications or Ambassador Toon's. But these hearings on confirmation provide an excellent opportunity to exchange ideas, and I will ask you to express your own personal views. I know that you have never hesitated to do that in the past and it is always refreshing and helpful.

Because I was not here I did have a staff member here this morning. I would like to mention a few of the notes that staff member made.

I believe you did discuss nuclear proliferation as a top priority concern, with which I thoroughly agree. We have been holding hearings on the meetings that are going on in Geneva right now. I have sent staff members there to observe those meetings. We have had private consultation and public hearings with Dr. Ikle, and a number of meetings, because of our great concern about countries competing against each other to provide nuclear knowhow and technology.

EFFECT OF THREATENING TO SUSPEND OURSELVES VOLUNTARILY

On another matter, you commented, I believe, on Dr. Goldberg's proposal that the United States announce now that if Israel were suspended from the General Assembly we would take certain actions.

I wonder if you could expand on whether you feel that such a clearcut policy by us, enunciated ahead of time, would possibly cause a reevaluation of such a movement, or would just challenge the majority to take us on on this particular issue, and then what kind of a position would it put us in?

I would consider such a movement abhorrent and I would do everything I could to see that we used our influence, to deter such an action, which I think would be catastrophic for the U.N.

Could you comment on whether you believe the suggested position would precipitate some action or whether it would deter it?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Senator, first, I think you would agree this comes down to a matter of judgment and of how you go about, you take a risk either way, and in either direction. There is some room for style in this.

I was asked about Justice Goldberg's statement and I said that I could not imagine, as I said, I have to give a direct answer, I could not imagine a view of Justice Goldberg that I didn't share. I was his assistant and I have edited his papers and I am devoted to him. I said I had been a speaker to the Women's Nationl Democratic Club in March where I had in effect in response to a question, said, entirely as a private person, much the same thing.

There are two things here, Senator, of which I think the United States is in the process of adapting to a new situation in the General Assembly. The basic thing is that we have commenced to see the formation of blocs in the U.N. which serve purposes. They are caucuses in a sense, much as you have in Congress. The two principal ones are the nonalined group and then the UNCTAD group, and of course, there is great overlap.

In March, as you, of course, know, they, as is beginning to be their practice, met a long way ahead of the General Assembly and begun forming positions. They debate them. They go through the process of collective judgment. They tend to arrive in New York with their opinions made up, their instructions written out, with group solidarity about these positions.

At Havana, in March, the Bureau of Nonalined met and there were other countries present as observers. I would like to note for the record that in this document that I had seen they list other countries, quote, unquote, present as observers, including the Socialist Party of Puerto Rico, which I do not think is a nation. It is not a government, not a country. But put that aside. But that is also a cloud no bigger than a man's hand, a small group like that. Or in fact a government in exile. Well, in that document, the declaration of Havana, there is a paragraph calling for sharp measures against Israel and its allies, the United States, including a consideration of expulsion of Israel from the U.N.

Now, of course, they cannot expel from the U.N. as you know, but they can in one General Assembly. It could take place.

This document begins to circulate. It goes back to governments and then there is, I think, a second meeting. I don't know that for sure, but at least there is a final ministerial meeting in Lima in August where they will get together and agree on a final position.

At that point people will be leaving Lima and coming to New York. On September 1, we meet in special session. At that time, particularly with many governments which don't have the communications we have—I said this morning trying to turn the U.S. Government around on an issue it takes you months—to start asking people to go back to their capital, finding people on the East Side of Manhattan, saying "Listen, would you go back to your government and reverse your instructions." It doesn't work. It is too late. The politics of the General Assembly begin in January, and February, when these blocs begin taking their positions. I think to send them a message, not aggressively, but to any "Don't do that," the reaction might surprise you.

One other thing, obviously it need not be action directly by us. I cannot imagine national parties directly involved in the Middle East where you have just been, Senator, where the U.N. Resolutions 242, 338, are so important and I think are seen by Arab countries as being to their advantage wanting this. They want what those provisions, those resolutions carried out.

What possible advantage to those nations could there be to expel Israel? I do not know what would follow legally from expulsion, but would Irsael feel bound by a U.N. security resolution if it be thrown out of the United Nations? Probably not.

It is not in the interest of anybody who wants peace in the Middle East, and I think that if these nations would start saying so to some other nations, it would help. I think it is time for them to say, "Don't do that," "Don't do it, leave us here where we are working in the U.N. context, leave it be," and not have other peoples be more Arab than the Arabs.

That is my view, Senator, it is no more than that, and it is, of course, a personal view.

CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Senator PERCY. Throughout the morning session I understand you stressed the need to relate to nonalined nations in terms of specific projects and proposals. You felt that on specifics we could reach mutually satisfactory agreements, whereas we can only expect disagreement on statement of principle.

The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties was the other way around. We agreed completely on principle, but when we got to the specifics we found that we differed strikingly.

Is is possible that the view you expressed this morning does not really mesh too well with the much discussed view in Commentary magazine that we should be more open about our disagreement in principle. I wonder if that might not possibly jeopardize our chances for achieving accommodation on specifics then?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I would agree with what you have just said. I read with great interest your report on your meeting at the 29th Assembly, which was a beautiful document. I wish we could get them in town to write that much that shortly, and your description of how you went through the articles one by one and it was the case that in the largest degree we shared that charter's principles.

There were those specific principles, if you will, which we couldn't go along with. And so in the end, where there was 80- to 90-percent agreement the industrial world and the new nations on matters of general importance, you end up with the vote of 132 to 6, something like that, as if there were no agreement at all.

Well, the charter is behind us. Secretary Kissinger said in Paris; new economic order, old economic order, what does it matter, let's talk commodity prices. I think that is now the wisdom of the case, sir. It is the question of commodity prices, and what to do about the nations devastated by the oil price increase, what to do with the billion dollar fund which oil producers said they would contribute for agricultural development, how do you get on with what was agreed to at the Rome Food Conference. That is the agenda ahead of us, not charters.

POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF ISRAEL

Could I just go back to another point on this one thing?

Senator PERCY. Yes.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I really meant to say, and I didn't say this morning, I have talked to a number of U.N. Ambassadors from major countries who are on the Bureau of Nonalined. It just happened, I was not seeking them out. One came to Harvard, for example, and talked to us at lunch. I asked, they were asked about this Israeli situation. It would surprise you and not entirely encourage you to know the degree to which they say nothing like that is going to happen, don't worry about it, you know. It is coming right down the line at them and because they would not want to be disagreeable and say something unpleasant and give you bad news, they say "Don't worry."

Well, of course, they are not going to worry because they have their jobs anyway, but obviously it would be a terrible thing and it might indeed happen, and this, of course, is the whole question, I think, with respect to things like the charter as well. The U.N. is the place at which decisions can be made, of certain kinds, but they are always actually made in capitals and we should not, cannot do an effective job at the U.N. if we think about it 3 months a year, it is a year-around job.

LESSONS OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS

Senator PERCY. I understand that this morning you did talk about the multinationals. I serve on the Multinational Subcommittee and obviously we don't spend our time in the subcommittee looking at the good things. The subcommittee points out the ills, the problems of ITT and Chile, the problems of Gulf Oil, now the problems of Northrup in the Gulf States, and so we go.

The process that we have here is one that tries to look always at what is wrong and correct it.

Do you feel as a future Ambassador to the U.N. that you can somehow get across the story that multinationals are a means of carrying technology and scientific knowhow into developing countries? When they get public funds from the development banks, very seldom do they get the kind of technology and knowhow that flows from the MNC's. How do we get the story across that without our multinationals, which are perhaps the most efficiently organized way of doing business that has ever been developed, that we would not have the balance-of-payments surplus which finances our defense, our foreign aid program and our raw material purchases.

Is the U.N. a forum where this story can be put across? For centuries from the days of the old charter trading corporations in the 18th century, there has always been some one criticizing business organizations. There are excesses that must be dealt with, but somehow we have to get across also that we have to live with the best business organization we can develop and try to stamp out the abuses. Business has evolved over a period of centuries to its present stage and has helped to bring about a new set of forces we have favored: decolonialization, stabilization of international currencies and freer trade.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, sir, if there is any subject that interests me, is how do you create, how do you get a dictionary whereby you can translate the language of economic liberalism in such ways that

democratic socialists understand and don't just recoil from certain symbols.

I have told you, sir, when you were last in India, about the occasion I would go and call on Indian Ministers and say to them, you remember company X or Y that was here in the 1960's, they spent 3 years talking about developing a fertilizer complex, and so forth, and they would say yes. You remember it didn't work out? They broke their pick and they left.

Well, you know where they are now? I would say they are now opening up in Siberia. And if ever there was a people who could testify to the economic efficiency of these companies as producers of goods, it will be the totalitarian powers. If you remember, sir, this got to be such a seeming problem for the Communist Party of India they issued a statement, and it was an insufferable statement. They said, "Well, you see, Soviet socialism is mature and can take these encounters. Indian socialism is not mature enough." But they recognize how come we do. We say it is all right for us but not for you.

I am not a conspiratorial sort, but I say to you there is a pattern whereby the totalitarian parties in these countries, speaking also often at directions from totalitarian capitals, systematically try to keep American and European and Japanese business enterprises out of the democratic socialist countries while bringing them into their own.

Why do they? Everywhere those countries exist, those parties exist, they have one basic doctrine, the only way they know how to think, Senator, and that is the worse the better. They really do believe if the thing gets worse they end up in power. And so why do they keep these companies out?

Now these companies make mistakes; there are abuses. They are just as much subject to things you know about as anything else. But they are great producers. In particular for these new nations, in short supply of managerial talent, and for good or ill a planned economy requires managerial talent. Now if they could be just inventive enough to learn how to use enterprises of this kind, keeping their socialist goals, keeping their collective beliefs, but using the productive capacity of these firms, I think we would all be a lot better off.

For the moment I say to you it is funny the communists think they are great but they don't want anybody to seemingly know this.

STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC EXPERTISE AT U.S. MISSION

Senator PERCY. Several years ago I had a feeling we ought to strengthen the economic end of the State Department and I worked with the administration introducing legislation to create a full-time Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

My own experience at the U.N. indicated the great importance of economic issues on everyone's mind up there.

Do you feel that the U.S. Mission at the U.N. should be beefed up or strengthened in the economic area, or would you want to take a good careful analysis and look at it to see whether or not you feel it should be? If you decide it ought to be strengthened. I certainly would give every bit of support I could to you.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Let me, if I may, get a little experience in the job, but that is my disposition. The Economic and Social Council, for

example, we have always assumed is really social. But we are moving from the era, happily, of security politics to economic politics.

I would rather talk trade war than nuclear war. But the question of competence comes in and I think you have been right all along. You certainly have been one of the few people who have been saying it on either end of town and keep saying it—even though I am not an economist.

STRENGTHENING U.N. SECRETARIAT

Senator PERCY. Do you feel that the U.N. Secretariat should be strengthened in any way? Do you have any feelings as to whether the role of the Secretary General could or should be strengthened?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I think, sir, that there is a problem of the career international service. They follow, the U.N. practice picked up from the League, which took its civil servants almost wholly from the British and French civil service. At the time, it was assumed these were lifetime jobs. They gave everybody 20-year contracts, every one spoke English and French and pretty high quality people came in.

I don't know that this is the case any longer at the U.N. Certainly there are people who are depressed by it. Maybe life tenure is not the logical arrangement for a new situation. I don't know why some of these new countries would want to have a first-rate man go there for the rest of his life.

I would like to note with pleasure that my colleague at Harvard, Wassily Leontief, is leaving the university and coming to New York and is going to be working on U.N. matters, doing a world input-output economic model. It may be the U.N. is going to find it can contract out a lot of its high quality work and get it done that way. But it is a problem.

UNIVERSALITY OF MEMBERSHIP

Senator PERCY. On membership in the U.N., we have had a great deal of testimony on the hearings that we had in the United Nations on the concept of universality of membership.

Do you support that principle in general?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I support it absolutely. There is obviously a point of de minimis, I mean——

Senator PERCY. But in principle?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. But in principle.

Senator PERCY. Do you support the admission of North Vietnam and South Vietnam?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I would assume following my principles I would, but I will wait and see what my instructions are.

CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Senator PERCY. On the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties you indicate you have seen my comments. Our position as a country has been that we stand ready to, in accordance with article 34 of the charter, to consider revisions, modifications, and improvements, that would possibly lead toward our being able to support it rather than oppose it.

Our position has pretty much been that the initiative should come from the originator of it, Mexico, and there should be an indication

from the others, from those who have advocated and supported the charter that they want to have this accord. I look upon it as opportunity to try to bring our thinking together.

What would be your own particular feeling about what we ought to do, if anything, about the charter in the 30th General Assembly?

REVISION OF U.N. CHARTER

Mr. MOYNIHAN. My feeling is no matter what we want to do, the Russians don't. But obviously we shouldn't be adamant on this.

There are a lot of changes that need to be made in the arrangements of a world which was organized around 50 countries, which now has 138. I think the Secretary General's committee on restructing the economic activities of the U.N. was a sensible proposition on questions of voting in the bank and in the monetary fund.

I guess for the moment, sir, I would like to see this patient quieted down before we decide to operate. The U.N. Charter is there, everyone needs to feel a lot happier about the way things are going before we think of any fundamental changes. That would be my judgment. I think the American people would be scared about what might come out of opening up all possibilities.

I think I would be scared myself just now.

CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Senator PERCY. Right now I don't anticipate personally much will come out because the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties is like a contract which is available for two parties to sign but only one has signed it, so it is really almost an inoperative document right now and lays down principles and so forth which are not adopted by the developed part of the world and it is not binding, of course, on anyone.

U.N. ROLE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS FIELD

Ambassador Yost testified that the United States should assume leadership in urging a larger role for the United Nations in the field of conventional arms, including arms sales.

Do you believe that this is practical and feasible?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. It is practical and it is feasible. If the United Nations has done as much as it has done on nuclear matters we have a fundamental important organization, IAEA, that is fraught with more peril than conventional arms.

How successful, how do you know until you try some of those things.

SELF-FINANCING PROPOSALS FOR U.N.

Senator PERCY. The United Nations has always had a financial crisis. It has been suggested that means be devised to assure the United Nations of self-financing by a postal tax or tax on profits from exploration of the seabed, for example.

Do you favor development of a self-financing procedure or the present procedure that we are using?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I would think that it would be appropriate. One of the great things that happened in the 20th century was the agreement

by the nations of the world the seabed belongs to the world. It is almost equivalent to the Louisiana purchase and what happened to American society in the aftermath. Once we start industrial use of the seabed I don't know why a portion of those revenues ought not to go to the United Nations, especially as the United Nations is the channel through which the overall resources are going to flow to the developing countries.

The answer in my view is "Yes," it might encourage them to get on with that.

COMMENTS ON COMMENTARY ARTICLE

Senator PERCY. Finally, I would like to ask you about the Commentary article because we did question a number of our witnesses about that, and their reactions to it. It was a highly provocative, thought-provoking piece.

Justice Goldberg indicated he feels every American representative to the United Nations from its beginning has attempted to do precisely what you recommended in the article. I add, parenthetically, he also said you are an able and gifted man.

I think what you are disagreeing with is that we had not spoken up enough in the past; he felt that we had.

Senator Lodge said "To my knowledge the U.S. representative has always done that and done quite a good job."

So here you have two previous permanent representatives in a sense defending what has been done and feeling that they had done that job adequately and the government and State Department had done an adequate job of defending our position.

Could you be a little more specific, how you would feel new policy should differ from what we have done in the past?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. First, if Arthur Goldberg says I am wrong I am wrong.

Senator PERCY. He is no longer a Justice.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Second, I think it is fair to say that Commentary article was not written to describe how we should behave in the U.N. it was talking about what kind of relationship we can have with the Democratic Socialist countries in the world, and it arises out of a particular concern of mine that there is a streak of anti-Americanism in that doctrine and that we have to be aware of that and work at countering it because there is nothing more essential than the good reputation of American Democracy to the success of those democracies.

We are not like them in some respects, but we would hope to be like them on the fundamental issues. To let ourselves be systematically degraded and disgraced in public opinion in those countries is to let the totalitarians slowly win the advantage, and I would say respectfully to Ambassadors Yost and Lodge and Justice Goldberg, that I think the fury of these sentiments, the temper has heated up very much in recent years.

As recently as 10 years ago this was not the style of New York on these matters or these international conferences. It is something new, there is something going on in the world and my feeling is that it is no longer a peripheral undertone but rather increasingly asserted, aggressively stated, and reputed propaganda.

We are in a propaganda war. We have to respond with a comparable level of effort to that which is directed against us. I think the effort is much greater than it was.

NOMINEE'S INTENDED POSTURE AT THE U.N.

Senator PERCY. Maybe I could paraphrase the concern that I have heard from people associated with the U.N., columnists that follow the U.N., that they are concerned that in your role as the permanent representative that suddenly we are going to be almost in the position that the Soviet Union and China find themselves, constantly attacking each other.

This has not just come from observers. I would like to read to you Ambassador Yost's exact words. He said:

> I, like Justice Goldberg, have responded very frequently myself. I don't know how Moynihan got under this misapprehension. I would differ from him only in the suggestion that crops up in one or two places in that article, and that is that we would engage in rather abrasive personalities vis-a-vis in responding. I see little advantage in that and there is too much of that in the U.N. already. I think one should respond very firmly and clearly and in defense of our positions but not in a strident or vicious tone.

Would you want to clarify how you would verbalize, because I think it is going to be a refreshing change from sometimes in the past to have a permanent representative who will really fight to say what he believes.

I think people will probably look to you to express yourself up there, but would you intend to take a strident tone? I am not exactly sure Ambassador Yost interpreted your article to mean that. He has very high regard for you, obviously.

Would you want to clarify the kind of tone that you would intend taking in order to put across a clear firm position for the United States, but not to suddenly change the total posture we have developed over a period of many years?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I agree with Ambassador Yost. You had occasion to visit out in India where we have a lot of these problems. You didn't see me going around lecturing Indians. But we would make it our business in India that when someone said something quite out of the order with respect to the United States where there was a Government connection, let the Government know we had heard it and we did not think it was helpful to India, and it wasn't helpful to us.

It seems to me that the first object of American policy with respect to this kind of statement and accusation is to see that it is not made, and when it is made, the second object should be to see that it is stopped, and if that can't be, then the third necessity of responding comes into play.

Senator, it is a very simple fact that for too many years intolerable things have been said about the American Democracy in the U.N., and when the effort would be made to go back to the Nation's capital and make some refutation of it, it would get lost on the fourth or fifth floors of the Department of State. Country officers would say, "Well, we have an aid program just beginning to start up there so let's not get that into a mess."

It is exactly if you have an aid program starting up that it ought to be known, and how we ought to ask could you want to take help from

a country of which you have such a low opinion as evidenced by what your Ambassador in New York said.

Those countries can't have it both ways and many times they want to. Nor can our Government separate the affairs of the U.N. from the other practices of diplomacy.

Our Government, I think the Secretary believes this, I think the President believes this, feels that we can say, it is only words and surely you don't take them seriously. Yes, we do take them seriously, we take the reputation of our democracy seriously.

Among other things we know that there is more sustained activities and interest of the totalitarians than to undermine that reputation.

DEGREE OF ACHIEVEMENT OF SPECIAL WORLD CONFERENCES

Senator PERCY. Richard Gardner commented specifically on certain parts of your article, and he said, for instance, that he disagreed with your statement that the great global conferences on population, food, and environment were disasters.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, he disagreed in the report of which he was rapporteur very specifically, said let's stop having these great global conferences out in nowhere and bring them, these issues, back to the General Assembly.

The specific here, Senator, which is that if you get an interesting subject and it is interesting enough and glamorous enough—environment, population, food, that somebody wants to pay attention to it—that is exactly the time not to pull it out of the General Assembly and have a meeting in Stockholm or Bucharest or Rome. Get a whole new set of delegates, delegates who never have to see each other for any other purposes, so they can come with the most strident views of their own, and if they make enemies, say, of us, then they aren't going to be the same people who have to come around in a week's time.

The way you gentlemen in the Senate have debates on Tuesday about this and on a Wednesday you are going to have to debate about something else, and so you don't end your relationship at the end of the day.

I don't want to hold to any one characterization of those two conferences but I think the proposition of keeping those important subjects close to the General Assembly is a good idea.

Senator PERCY. Did you use the word "disaster"?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. I don't remember using it but I haven't read the thing.

Senator PERCY. This is not in quotes of yours, it was a quote from Richard Gardner, and I am not sure that you did say "disaster." I don't remember that. But the implication was that they didn't work out. Let's put it that way.

WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE

As you recall, I went to India via Bucharest and the Population Conference. I was rather impressed with the fact that it was taken out of New York. It was the best attended international conference the world has ever seen, more nations were there; and they did come up with a plan of action. It was a spirited debate.

As I went through the subcontinent, India particularly, the subject of population was moving to the front pages. It was given very, very prominent space, just at a time when I was so concerned about the budget being cut in India for population planning, so I really felt the couple of million dollars spent on that conference was more than repaid by just the fact that it was given great attention. We had a chance to debate the great issues among the major powers and ultimately the conference developed a plan of action which has now been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

I would like your evaluation of what you think of a conference like that. I was rather impressed. I went skeptical. I came back thinking it was well worth it for the tremendous impact that it had.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Well, sir, I could be wrong on this. It won't be the first time. I have a fairly clear view of the reason I was not happy with the outcome, was that it seemed to me to have dealt a very serious blow to the sort of straight out population control program which countries such as India had begun—the first to do so was India—for better or worse. They were plugging away, cutting appropriations here and there, but committed to the idea that that contraception is the way, is one way to lower birth rates.

The fundamental assertion of Bucharest—which was probably in the large an accurate assertion, although in the ways it was put forward I am not so sure—was that population control comes in the wake of economic development. Well, I am not so sure that is true. I am not so sure that is true.

I can argue otherwise in five or six cultures that the reverse is true. And in any event it is a curiously debilitating argument. It says don't worry about your IUD programs and don't worry about your condom program and don't worry about this other business, because as soon as we get some steel mills here we are going to be all right.

Now look, you know the rates at which steel mills get built and the rates at which babies get born. I don't want to be invidious, but I visited Peking on my way back to the United States, and in Peking they couldn't have been more concrete to the effect that you have to be 28 years old if you are a male and 25 if you are female in order to marry, and that 1 child is thought not too few, 2 is quite enough, and 3 is not permitted.

Now, that seems to me population control and yet was that the tone of speech you heard from those delegates?

Senator PERCY. What was the question?

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Did the delegates at Bucharest from that part of the world come to you and say, come to that meeting and say population control is good for you?

I thought they said population control was an imperialist, capitalist scheme.

Senator PERCY. Well, actually I met with the Indian Minister of Health and Family Planning at that conference.

He seemed really quite pleased and he was the one who encouraged Prime Minister Gandhi to write the special letter to the heads of all villages in India, but he felt this provided leverage to him.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Senator, we ought to talk about this in a year's time. I could be dead wrong, my impression was that the Indians felt that the result of the conference was to absolve them of working much harder on the programs as they had originally conceived them.

The proposition that economic development takes care of those things is curiously counterproductive. I mean I didn't see anybody come back to India saying I have got the idea, I talked to the delegate from China. No male should marry until he is 28 and no female until they are 25. They didn't come back and say that.

Senator PERCY. I didn't want to leave any misimpression with you because in my own report on the U.N. to this committee I pointed out the artificiality of our dialog in New York with, say, the Soviet Union when we do have some basic differences of opinion on issues which we don't hesitate to express on Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.

They object to it but it doesn't spoil détente. They understand that we have a right to speak and they have a right to speak. And I have suggested that it could be fairly forthright.

I presume the concern is the way in which it would be done. And opinions vary.

FURTHER COMMENTS ON COMMENTARY ARTICLE

William Buckley said in testimony before this committee:

I should think what Senator Percy and I probably would agree to call—I am not sure we have always agreed on things but I am glad to see we might—we agree to call the Moynihan approach very definitely in order. It is an approach best described as saying that the U.S. has not only the right but duty to argue its own ideals in its own self interest.

But Richard Falk said:

It would not help (as he conceded what the Moynihan approach was) it will give us a warm feeling domestically. It is for that reason that Ambassador Moynihan's way of thinking about these issues has attracted, in my view, a very large following, but it is a very short-sighted attitude on how to participate constructively and effectively in international institutions.

Pauline Fredericks said:

If the idea is for him to pursue, presumably on instructions of the State Department, rhetoric of confrontation, then I think we are going backwards instead of forwards. The time has come we should lower our voices and enter into a dialogue such as we are trying to do with the Soviet Union. I wonder whether we should have one policy for the little nations and one policy for the big nations.

You have got all kinds of advice from all quarters. I must say it is one of the most provocative arguments. If it was put out for the purpose of orbiting thought and creating debate and draw attention to the U.N., it certainly has accomplished that purpose. But I think it will mean that your performance in New York will be watched with unusual interest, your words watched with unusual interest, and that I think you will draw from all of this advice.

The last comments I have is the comment that was the undertone of some of the testimony here, that the word and phrase "benign neglect" might refer to the United Nations, and that maybe that is

why you were selected by the President for this job, that really we wanted to deemphasize the U.N., not to withdraw but to not pay much attention to it, and maybe you would be the best one to do it.

IMPORTANCE ATTACHED TO THE U.N.

Alexander Dallin said, "I do no mean to imply that he necessarily would himself apply it, that is, benign neglect toward the United Nations," but the implication was running through there that maybe you would, and my final question to you is, would you care to summarize what you consider the importance of the U.N. today is in the world, what the importance of the U.N. is to the United States in its relationship to our foreign policy, and what you as a permanent representative would want to carry out as your own personal conviction about the U.N., because you are obviously accepting the nomination of the President because you attach some degree of importance to being there and saying what you want to say.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Sir, I made that fairly clear in that commentary piece and a dozen other things I have written. I have spent my life more involved in this subject than any other.

My doctoral history concerned our involvement in the International Labor Organization, I have been involved in these things for years. At different times in our post-war period the United Nations has been of greater or lesser importance to us. The huge decision was made in 1919 in the U.S. Senate. The world has never quite recovered from our failing to pursue the Wilsonian League idea, just as the world has never really recovered from the first World War.

Most of the things that have happened to us in our lives happened before we were born and there is not much we can do about it. The world is in very bad shape and the critical year was 1919, 1920, and we made critical mistakes and I don't know, I don't expect we are going to get that back.

With the U.N., I think President Roosevelt was wise in preparing the ground for the way President Wilson didn't do. He had Wilson's example. For the early U.N., remember, we put propositions into the United Nations that would have yielded our atomic monopoly. We proposed to turn it over to the U.N. Think about that. We are a long way from there.

The question of the world order is not really any longer whether you want one, but in what arena do you want one. One of the great services the U.N. has done in the world is to persuade people who want to avoid the United Nations to set up special purposes agencies to do so, some of which have been very effective.

To answer as a general proposition what our role in the U.N. should be, it is clear that there are absolutely indispensable functions which the United Nations carries out. If you forgive me, the International Atomic Energy Agency is one. If you start out with that conviction and you see what it does and can do in the Middle East, in places like Cyprus and the Congo and so forth, if you start out with that conviction, then it seems to me it takes one of two courses.

You can say because this is so important we must be excessively concerned with how we behave so as to not to annoy people and not to be offensive, and that is the way we want to work. Look at an

American opinion, which is still pretty pro U.N., but something could happen in October in New York, sir, which would result in a 95 to 5 vote in the U.S. Senate to freeze all funds and withdraw from the General Assembly. That is your opinion in this building and over in the House side the same thing, and you wouldn't have any problems with your constituents. That is how close events have brought us to where, with near unanimity, the United States could get out of the U.N. altogether.

How did that happen? Does this not somehow suggest that things have not been managed perfectly. What ought to be unthinkable, could happen just like that. And how do we get to this point? I think a certain pattern of avoidance by people who care too much to have thought clearly has contributed to this situation.

It is not people like me who are saying downgrade the U.N., on people in this building who say if they don't do this and don't do that, out we go. It seems to me that the responsibility—it is not going to be an easy job—the responsibility of the U.S. Government, its representatives is to seek to get the United Nations to behave collectively in a manner that continues to command the respect of the American people.

We don't expect it to be perfect and don't expect it to be an instrument of the United States. But opinion recognizes that respect for it is eroding, it is eroded right in this building, and you know it. How to reverse this? It will not be achieved by a process of saying, well, after all, words don't hurt us. Say what you will. Words do hurt us. Words hurt. I know something about that and you, too, I am sure. What we must say to the rest of the world is that if you wish us to be involved in these affairs, in this affair and we ought to be, you have got to have some concern for things that are important to us. Our reputation as a free country is fundamental to us. We should not to be so polite as to be misunderstood on that point, sir.

We still have a world of expansive totalitarianism, we have a world filled with people who wish to see a free system fail, and they are our enemies and we have got to see them as such, and that is what I think. I didn't write that article with respect to the U.N., I was thinking about the general posture, the ideological history of these new nations, and how we can find community with them, which I think we can and should do.

I don't know all there is to know about the subject but I am not the least informed. Senator.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Senator PERCY. Well, I think I can soon present you with a document that will embody all of the hearings that we held for 5 or 6 days, the first hearings in this committee since the 1950's on the U.N. So we will present it to you for your bedside reading in New York.

Many of us will be interested in following your work there, and your accomplishments, and we offer you every bit of help and advice and counsel, free or otherwise, that we can offer.

I think you have contributed a great deal to our understanding of how you look on your future responsibility.

Thank you very much.

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Senator.

[Whereupon the committee proceeded to the consideration of other business.]

[The following communication was received for inclusion in the record:]

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH,
HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
Cambridge, Mass., June 2, 1975.

Senator JOHN J. SPARKMAN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: This is with reference to the nomination of Daniel Patrick Moynihan to be Ambassador to the United Nations. In some superficial sense I am qualified to pass on the Moynihan appointment on more grounds than any man alive—including, if I may so presume, even the members of this distinguished Committee. He has been my fellow Ambassador to India; my fellow faculty member; my next-door neighbor; and though I have no wish to damage him in the eyes of any of the Republican members of the Committee, my fellow Democrat. In all of these roles as diplomat, teacher, politician and friend he has invited both admiration and affection. Were I not so certain that the Committee would agree, I would write at length on his qualifications. May I confine myself to congratulating the Committee members in having such a distinguished and interesting appointment on which to pass.

My warmest regards.

Yours faithfully,

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.

P.S.—Should it be your pleasure to have this letter made part of the record on this important appointment, I would, of course, agree.

J. K. G.

APPENDICES

Appendix I

Official Documents Referred to During Hearings

Fulbright Resolution

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 25—SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS, SEPTEMBER 21, 1943

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, and as favoring participation by the United States therein through its constitutional processes.

Passed the House of Representatives September 21, 1943.

Office of Public Information

CHARTER
of the
UNITED NATIONS
and
STATUTE
of the
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE



United Nations, New York

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter.

Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter were adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1963 and came into force on 31 August 1965. A further amendment to Article 61 was adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1971, and came into force on 24 September 1973. An amendment to Article 109, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1965, came into force on 12 June 1968.

The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The amendment to Article 61, which entered into force on 31 August 1965, enlarged the membership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven. The subsequent amendment to that Article, which entered into force on 24 September 1973, further increased the membership of the Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four.

The amendment to Article 109, which relates to the first paragraph of that Article, provides that a General Conference of Member States for the purpose of reviewing the Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote

of any nine members (formerly seven) of the Security Council. Paragraph 3 of Article 109, which deals with the consideration of a possible review conference during the tenth regular session of the General Assembly, has been retained in its original form in its reference to a "vote, of any seven members of the Security Council", the paragraph having been acted upon in 1955 by the General Assembly, at its tenth regular session, and by the Security Council.

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
determined

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

and for these ends

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

have resolved to combine our efforts

to accomplish these aims

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I

PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

ARTICLE 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

ARTICLE 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

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3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II
MEMBERSHIP

ARTICLE 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

ARTICLE 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

ARTICLE 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

ARTICLE 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III
ORGANS

ARTICLE 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

ARTICLE 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity

and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Composition

ARTICLE 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

ARTICLE 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

ARTICLE 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

ARTICLE 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

ARTICLE 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

a. promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;

b. promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting

in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

ARTICLE 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

ARTICLE 17

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.

2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

Voting

ARTICLE 18

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

ARTICLE 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

Procedure

ARTICLE 20

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 21

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

ARTICLE 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER V
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Composition

ARTICLE 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate reelection.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

ARTICLE 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

ARTICLE 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

ARTICLE 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article

47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

ARTICLE 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure

ARTICLE 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

ARTICLE 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

ARTICLE 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

ARTICLE 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

ARTICLE 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

ARTICLE 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

ARTICLE 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

ARTICLE 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

ARTICLE 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

ARTICLE 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

ARTICLE 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

ARTICLE 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete

or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

ARTICLE 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

ARTICLE 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

ARTICLE 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

ARTICLE 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

ARTICLE 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed

forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

ARTICLE 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

ARTICLE 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

ARTICLE 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

ARTICLE 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

ARTICLE 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

ARTICLE 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of

measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

ARTICLE 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION

ARTICLE 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;

b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and

c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

ARTICLE 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

ARTICLE 57

1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

ARTICLE 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

ARTICLE 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

ARTICLE 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Composition

ARTICLE 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place of the nine members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, twenty-seven additional members shall be elected. Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of office of nine members so elected shall expire at the end of one year, and of nine other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

ARTICLE 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.

2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

ARTICLE 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

ARTICLE 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

ARTICLE 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connexion with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Voting

ARTICLE 67

1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

ARTICLE 68

The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

ARTICLE 69

The Economic and Social Council shall invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that Member.

ARTICLE 70

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies.

ARTICLE 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

ARTICLE 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

CHAPTER XI
DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

ARTICLE 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and

educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

ARTICLE 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XII

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

ARTICLE 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

ARTICLE 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

a. to further international peace and security;

b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;

c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and

d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

ARTICLE 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in

the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:

a. territories now held under mandate;

b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and

c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

ARTICLE 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

ARTICLE 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

ARTICLE 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

ARTICLE 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

ARTICLE 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

ARTICLE 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

ARTICLE 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and

assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

ARTICLE 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Composition

ARTICLE 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:

a. those Members administering trust territories;

b. such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and

c. as many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Functions and Powers

ARTICLE 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

a. consider reports submitted by the administering authority;

b. accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;

c. provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and

d. take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

ARTICLE 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Voting

ARTICLE 89

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

ARTICLE 90

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the

convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

ARTICLE 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

CHAPTER XIV
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

ARTICLE 92

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

ARTICLE 93

1. All Members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

ARTICLE 94

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

ARTICLE 95

Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

ARTICLE 96

1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV
THE SECRETARIAT

ARTICLE 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

ARTICLE 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

ARTICLE 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

ARTICLE 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

ARTICLE 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

ARTICLE 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization.

3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.

CHAPTER XVII

TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

ARTICLE 106

Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in

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accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

ARTICLE 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

CHAPTER XVIII
AMENDMENTS

ARTICLE 108

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

ARTICLE 109

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER XIX
RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE

ARTICLE 110

1. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization when he has been appointed.

3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the ratifications deposited shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signatory states.

4. The states signatory to the present Charter which ratify it after it has come into force will become original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications.

ARTICLE 111

The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatory states.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Governments of the United Nations have signed the present Charter.

DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

"Uniting for Peace"; Resolution of the General Assembly, November 3, 1950

RESOLUTION A

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the United Nations are:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justices and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

"To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;"

Reaffirming that it remains to the primary duty of all Members of the United Nations, when involved in an international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dispute by peaceful means through the procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the successful achievements of the United Nations in this regard on a number of previous occasions,

Finding that international tension exists on a dangerous scale.

Recalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled "Essentials of peace," which states that disregard of the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the continuance of international tension, and desiring to contribute further to the objectives of that resolution.

Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the Security Council of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,

Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the agreements for armed forces provided for in Article 43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such agreements, the United Nations has at its disposal means for maintaining international peace and security,

Conscious that failure of the Security Council to discharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member States of their obligations or the United Nations of its responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.

Recognizing in particular that such failure does not deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recognizing that discharge by the General Assembly of the responsibilities in these respects calls for possibilities of observation which would ascertain the facts and expose aggressors; the existence of armed forces which could be used collectively, and for the possibility of timely recommendation by the General Assemble to Members of the United Nations for collective action which, to be effective, should be prompt,

A.

1. *Resolves* that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emergency special session shall be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;

2. *Adopts* for this purpose the amendments to its rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present resolution;

B.

3. *Establishes* a Peace Observation Commission for which the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on the situation in any area where there exists international tension the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Upon the invitation or with the consent of the State into whose territory the Commission would go, the General Assembly, or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session, may utilize the Commission if the Security Council is not exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter with respect to the matter in question. Decisions to utilize the Commission shall be made on the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members present and voting. The Security Council may also utilize the Commission in accordance with its authority under the Charter;

4. *The Commission shall have* authority in its discretion to appoint subcommissions and to utilize the services of observers to assist it in the performance of its functions;

5. *Recommends* to all governments and authorities that they cooperate with the Commission and assist it in the performance of its functions;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities, utilizing, where directed by the Commission, the United Nations Panel of Field Observers envisaged in General Assembly resolution 297 B (IV);

C.

7. *Invites* each Member of the United Nations to survey its resources in order to determine the nature and scope of the assistance it may be in a position to render in support of any recommendations of the Security Council or of the General Assembly for the restoration of international peace and security;

8. *Recommends* to the States Members of the United Nations that each Member maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes, for service as a United Nations unit or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council or General Assembly, without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter;

9. *Invites* the Members of the United Nations to inform the Collective Measures Committee provided for in paragraph 11 as soon as possible of the measures taken in implementation of the preceding paragraph;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to appoint, with the approval of the Committee provided for in paragraph 11, a panel of military experts who could be made available, on request, to Member States wishing to obtain technical advice regarding the organization, training, and equipment for prompt service as United Nations units of the elements referred to in paragraph 8;

D.

11. *Establishes* a Collective Measures Committee consisting of fourteen Members, namely: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Egypt, France, Mexico, Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, and directs the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General and with such Member States as the Committee finds appropriate, to study and make a report to the Security Council and the General Assembly, not later than 1 September 1951, on methods, including those in Section C of the present resolution, which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, taking account of collective self-defence and regional arrangements (Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter);

12. *Recommends* to all Member States that they co-operate with the Committee and assist it in the performance of its functions;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the staff and facilities necessary for the effective accomplishment of the purposes set forth in sections C and D of the present resolution;

E.

14. The General Assembly, in adopting the proposals set forth above, is fully conscious that enduring peace will not be secured solely by collective security arrangements against breaches of international peace and acts of aggression, but that a genuine and lasting peace depends also upon the observance of all the Principles and Purposes established in the Charter of the United Nations, upon the implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other principal organs of the United Nations intended to achieve the maintenance of international peace and security, and especially upon respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all and on the establishment and maintenance of conditions of economic and social well-being in all countries; and accordingly

15. *Urges* Member States to respect fully, and to intensify, joint action, in co-operation with the United Nations, to develop and stimulate universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to intensify individual and collective efforts to achieve conditions of economic stability and social progress, particularly through the development of underdeveloped countries and areas.

ANNEX

The rules of procedure of the General Assembly are amended in the following respects:

1. The present text of rule 8 shall become paragraph (*a*) of the rule, and a new paragraph (*b*) shall be added to read as follows:

"Emergency special sessions pursuant to resolution—(V) shall be convened within twenty-four hours of the receipt by the Secretary-General of a request for such a session from the Security Council, or the vote of any seven members thereof, or of a request from a majority of the Members of the United Nations expressed by vote in the Interim Committee or otherwise, or of the concurrence of a majority of Members as provided in rule 9."

2. The present text of rule 9 shall become paragraph (a) of that rule and a new paragraph (b) shall be added to read as follows:

"This rule shall apply also to a request by any Member for an emergency special session pursuant to resolution—(V). In such a case the Secretary-General shall communicate with other Members by the most expeditious means of communication available."

3. Rule 10 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"In the case of an emergency special session convened pursuant to rule 8 (b), the Secretary-General shall notify the Members of the United Nations at least twelve hours in advance of the opening of the session."

4. Rule 16 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"The provisional agenda of an emergency special session shall be communicated to the Members of the United Nations simultaneously with the communication summoning the session."

5. Rule 19 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"During an emergency special session additional items concerning the matters dealt with in resolution—(V) may be added to the agenda by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting."

6. There is added a new rule to precede rule 65 to read as follows:

"Notwithstanding the provisions of any other rule and unless the General Assembly decides otherwise, the Assembly in case of an emergency special session, shall convene in plenary session only and proceed directly to consider the item proposed for consideration in the request for the holding of the session, without previous reference to the General Committee or to any other Committee; the President and Vice Presidents for such emergency special sessions shall be, respectively, the Chairman of those delegations from which were elected the President and Vice-Presidents of the previous session."

RESOLUTION B

For the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and, in particular, with Chapters V, VI and VII of the Charter,

The General Assembly

Recommends to the Security Council:

That it should take the necessary steps to ensure that the action provided for under the Charter is taken with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression and with respect to the peaceful settlement of disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security;

That it should devise measures for the earliest application of Articles 43, 45, 46 and 47 of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the States Members of the United Nations and the effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee.

The above dispositions should in no manner prevent the General Assembly from fulfilling its functions under resolution—(V).

RESOLUTION C

The General Assembly,

Recognizing that the primary function of the United Nations Organization is to maintain and promote peace, security and justice among all nations.

Recognizing the responsibility of all Member States to promote the cause of international peace in accordance with their obligations as provided in the Charter,

Recognizing that the Charter charges the Security Council with the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

Reaffirming the importance of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council on all problems which are likely to threaten world peace,

Recalling General Assembly resolution 190 (III) entitled "Appeal to the Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace,"

Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that:

(*a*) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter;

(*b*) They advise the General Assembly and, when it is not in session, the Members of the United Nations, as soon as appropriate, of the results of their consultations.

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

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United Nations

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

On 12 December 1974, the General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, contained in resolution 3281 (XXIX). It was adopted by a roll-call vote of 120 in favour to 6 against, with 10 abstentions. In the preamble of the resolution, the Assembly stressed the fact that "the Charter shall constitute an effective instrument towards the establishment of a new system of international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and interdependence of the interests of developed and developing countries".

PREAMBLE

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

Reaffirming the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, in particular, the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations and the achievement of international co-operation in solving international problems in the economic and social fields,

Affirming the need for strengthening international co-operation in these fields,

Reaffirming further the need for strengthening international co-operation for development,

Declaring that it is a fundamental purpose of this Charter to promote the establishment of the new international economic order, based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems,

Desirous of contributing to the creation of conditions for:

(a) The attainment of wider prosperity among all countries and of higher standards of living for all peoples,

(b) The promotion by the entire international community of economic and social progress of all countries, especially developing countries,

(c) The encouragement of co-operation, on the basis of mutual advantage and equitable benefits for all peace-loving States which are willing to carry out the provisions of this Charter, in the economic, trade, scientific and technical fields, regardless of political, economic or social systems,

(d) The overcoming of main obstacles in the way of the economic development of the developing countries,

(e) The acceleration of the economic growth of developing countries with a view to bridging the economic gap between developing and developed countries,

(f) The protection, preservation and enhancement of the environment,

Mindful of the need to establish and maintain a just and equitable economic and social order through:

(a) The achievement of more rational and equitable international economic relations and the encouragement of structural changes in the world economy,

(b) The creation of conditions which permit the further expansion of trade and intensification of economic co-operation among all nations,

(c) The strengthening of the economic independence of developing countries,

(d) The establishment and promotion of international economic relations, taking into account the agreed differences in development of the developing countries and their specific needs,

Determined to promote collective economic security for development, in particular of the developing countries, with strict respect for the sovereign equality of each State and through the co-operation of the entire international community,

Considering that genuine co-operation among States, based on joint consideration of and concerted action regarding international economic problems, is essential for fulfilling the international community's common desire to achieve a just and rational development of all parts of the world,

Stressing the importance of ensuring appropriate conditions for the conduct of normal economic relations among all States, irrespective of differences in social and economic systems, and for the full respect for the rights of all peoples, as well as the strengthening of instruments of international economic co-operation as means for the consolidation of peace for the benefit of all,

Convinced of the need to develop a system of international economic relations on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual and equitable benefit and the close interrelationship of the interests of all States,

Reiterating that the responsibility for the development of every country rests primarily upon itself but that concomitant and effective international co-operation is an essential factor for the full achievement of its own development goals,

Firmly convinced of the urgent need to evolve a substantially improved system of international economic relations,

Solemnly adopts the present Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

CHAPTER I

Fundamentals of international economic relations

Economic as well as political and other relations among States shall be governed, *inter alia*, by the following principles:

(a) Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States;

(b) Sovereign equality of all States;

(c) Non-aggression;

(d) Non-intervention;

(e) Mutual and equitable benefit;

(f) Peaceful coexistence;

(g) Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

(h) Peaceful settlement of disputes;

(i) Remedying of injustices which have been brought about by force and which deprive a nation of the natural means necessary for its normal development;

(j) Fulfilment in good faith of international obligations;

(k) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(l) No attempt to seek hegemony and spheres of influence;

(m) Promotion of international social justice;

(n) International co-operation for development;

(o) Free access to and from the sea by land-locked countries within the framework of the above principles.

CHAPTER II

Economic rights and duties of States

Article 1

Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.

Article 2

1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.

2. Each State has the right:

(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and priorities. No State shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment;

(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its economic and social policies. Transnational corporations shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a host State. Every State should, with full regard for its sovereign rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise of the right set forth in this subparagraph;

(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.

Article 3

In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, each State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate interest of others.

Article 4

Every State has the right to engage in international trade and other forms of economic co-operation irrespective of any differences in political, economic and social systems. No State shall be subjected to discrimination of any kind based solely on such differences. In the pursuit of international trade and other forms of economic co-operation, every State is free to choose the forms of organization of its foreign economic relations and to enter into bilateral and multilateral arrangements consistent with its international obligations and with the needs of international economic co-operation.

Article 5

All States have the right to associate in organizations of primary commodity producers in order to develop their national economies to achieve stable financing for their development, and in pursuance of their aims, to assist in the promotion of sustained growth of the world economy, in particular accelerating the development of developing countries. Correspondingly all States have the duty to respect that right by refraining from applying economic and political measures that would limit it.

Article 6

It is the duty of States to contribute to the development of international trade of goods, particularly by means of arrangements and by the conclusion of long-term multilateral commodity agreements, where appropriate, and taking into account the interests of producers and consumers. All States share the responsibility to promote the regular flow and access of all commercial goods traded at stable, remunerative and equitable prices, thus contributing to the equitable development of the world economy, taking into account, in particular, the interests of developing countries.

Article 7

Every State has the primary responsibility to promote the economic, social and cultural development of its people. To this end, each State has the right and the responsibility to choose its means and goals of development, fully to mobilize and use its resources, to implement progressive economic and social reforms and to ensure the full participation of its people in the process and benefits of development. All States have the duty, individually and collectively, to co-operate in order to eliminate obstacles that hinder such mobilization and use.

Article 8

States should co-operate in facilitating more rational and equitable international economic relations and in encouraging structural changes in the context of a balanced world economy in harmony with the needs and interests of all countries, especially developing countries, and should take appropriate measures to this end.

Article 9

All States have the responsibility to co-operate in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and technological fields for the promotion of economic and social progress throughout the world, especially that of the developing countries.

Article 10

All States are juridically equal and, as equal members of the international community, have the right to participate fully and effectively in the international decision-making process in the solution of world economic, financial and monetary problems, *inter alia,* through the appropriate international organizations in accordance with their existing and evolving rules, and to share equitably in the benefits resulting therefrom.

Article 11

All States should co-operate to strengthen and continuously improve the efficiency of international organizations in implementing measures to stimulate the general economic progress of all countries, particularly of developing countries, and therefore should co-operate to adapt them, when appropriate, to the changing needs of international economic co-operation.

Article 12

1. States have the right, in agreement with the parties concerned, to participate in subregional, regional and interregional co-operation in the pursuit of their economic and social development. All States engaged in such co-operation have the duty to ensure that the policies of those groupings to which they belong correspond to the provisions of the Charter and are outward-looking, consistent with their international obligations and with the needs of international economic co-operation and have full regard for the legitimate interests of third countries, especially developing countries.

2. In the case of groupings to which the States concerned have transferred or may transfer certain competences as regards matters that come within the scope of the present Charter, its provisions shall also apply to those groupings, in regard to such matters, consistent with the responsibilities of such States as members of such groupings. Those States shall co-operate in the observance by the groupings of the provisions of this Charter.

Article 13

1. Every State has the right to benefit from the advances and developments in science and technology for the acceleration of its economic and social development.

2. All States should promote international scientific and technological co-operation and the transfer of technology, with proper regard for all legitimate interests including, *inter alia*, the rights and duties of holders, suppliers and recipients of technology. In particular, all States should facilitate the access of developing countries to the achievements of modern science and technology, the transfer of technology and the creation of indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing countries in forms and in accordance with procedures which are suited to their economies and their needs.

3. Accordingly, developed countries should co-operate with the developing countries in the establishment, strengthening and development of their scientific and technological infrastructures and their scientific research and technological activities so as to help to expand and transform the economies of developing countries.

4. All States should co-operate in exploring with a view to evolving further internationally accepted guidelines or regulations for the transfer of technology, taking fully into account the interests of developing countries.

Article 14

Every State has the duty to co-operate in promoting a steady and increasing expansion and liberalization of world trade and an improvement in the welfare and living standards of all peoples, in particular those of developing countries. Accordingly, all States should co-operate, *inter alia*, towards the progressive dismantling of obstacles to trade and the improvement of the international framework for the conduct of world trade and, to these ends, co-ordinated efforts shall be made to solve in an equitable way the trade problems of all

countries, taking into account the specific trade problems of the developing countries. In this connexion, States shall take measures aimed at securing additional benefits for the international trade of developing countries so as to achieve a substantial increase in their foreign exchange earnings, the diversification of their exports, the acceleration of the rate of growth of their trade, taking into account their development needs, an improvement in the possibilities for these countries to participate in the expansion of world trade and a balance more favourable to developing countries in the sharing of the advantages resulting from this expansion, through, in the largest possible measure, a substantial improvement in the conditions of access for the products of interest to the developing countries and, wherever appropriate, measures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices for primary products.

Article 15

All States have the duty to promote the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and to utilize the resources freed by effective disarmanent measures for the economic and social development of countries, allocating a substantial portion of such resources as additional means for the development needs of developing countries.

Article 16

1. It is the right and duty of all States, individually and collectively, to eliminate colonialism, *apartheid*, racial discrimination, neo-colonialism and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination, and the economic and social consequences thereof, as a prerequisite for development. States which practise such coercive policies are economically responsible to the countries, territories and peoples affected for the restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the natural and all other resources of those countries, territories and peoples. It is the duty of all States to extend assistance to them.

2. No State has the right to promote or encourage investments that may constitute an obstacle to the liberation of a territory occupied by force.

Article 17

International co-operation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all States. Every State should co-operate with the efforts of developing countries to accelerate their economic and social development by providing favourable external conditions and by extending active assistance to them, consistent with their development needs and objectives, with strict respect for the sovereign equality of States and free of any conditions derogating from their sovereignty.

Article 18

Developed countries should extend, improve and enlarge the system of generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariff preferences to the devel-

oping countries consistent with the relevant agreed conclusions and relevant decisions as adopted on this subject, in the framework of the competent international organizations. Developed countries should also give serious consideration to the adoption of other differential measures, in areas where this is feasible and appropriate and in ways which will provide special and more favourable treatment, in order to meet the trade and development needs of the developing countries. In the conduct of international economic relations the developed countries should endeavour to avoid measures having a negative effect on the development of the national economies of the developing countries, as promoted by generalized tariff preferences and other generally agreed differential measures in their favour.

Article 19

With a view to accelerating the economic growth of developing countries and bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries, developed countries should grant generalized preferential, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment to developing countries in those fields of international economic co-operation where it may be feasible.

Article 20

Developing countries should, in their efforts to increase their over-all trade, give due attention to the possibility of expanding their trade with socialist countries, by granting to these countries conditions for trade not inferior to those granted normally to the developed market economy countries.

Article 21

Developing countries should endeavour to promote the expansion of their mutual trade and to this end may, in accordance with the existing and evolving provisions and procedures of international agreements where applicable, grant trade preferences to other developing countries without being obliged to extend such preferences to developed countries, provided these arrangements do not constitute an impediment to general trade liberalization and expansion.

Article 22

1. All States should respond to the generally recognized or mutually agreed development needs and objectives of developing countries by promoting increased net flows of real resources to the developing countries from all sources, taking into account any obligations and commitments undertaken by the States concerned, in order to reinforce the efforts of developing countries to accelerate their economic and social development.

2. In this context, consistent with the aims and objectives mentioned above and taking into account any obligations and commitments undertaken in this regard, it should be their endeavour to increase the net amount of financial flows from official sources to developing countries and to improve the terms and conditions thereof.

3. The flow of development assistance resources should include economic and technical assistance.

Article 23

To enhance the effective mobilization of their own resources, the developing countries should strengthen their economic co-operation and expand their mutual trade so as to accelerate their economic and social development. All countries, especially developed countries, individually as well as through the competent international organizations of which they are members, should provide appropriate and effective support and co-operation.

Article 24

All States have the duty to conduct their mutual economic relations in a manner which takes into account the interests of other countries. In particular, all States should avoid prejudicing the interests of developing countries.

Article 25

In furtherance of world economic development, the international community, especially its developed members, shall pay special attention to the particular needs and problems of the least developed among the developing countries, of land-locked developing countries and also island developing countries, with a view to helping them to overcome their particular difficulties and thus contribute to their economic and social development.

Article 26

All States have the duty to coexist in tolerance and live together in peace, irrespective of differences in political, economic, social and cultural systems, and to facilitate trade between States having different economic and social systems. International trade should be conducted without prejudice to generalized non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal preferences in favour of developing countries, on the basis of mutual advantage, equitable benefits and the exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment.

Article 27

1. Every State has the right to enjoy fully the benefits of world invisible trade and to engage in the expansion of such trade.

2. World invisible trade, based on efficiency and mutual and equitable benefit, furthering the expansion of the world economy, is the common goal of all States. The role of developing countries in world invisible trade should be enhanced and strengthened consistent with the above objectives, particular attention being paid to the special needs of developing countries.

3. All States should co-operate with developing countries in their endeavours to increase their capacity to earn foreign exchange from invisible transactions, in accordance with the potential and needs of each developing country and consistent with the objectives mentioned above.

Article 28

All States have the duty to co-operate in achieving adjustments in the prices of exports of developing countries in relation to prices of their imports so as to promote just and equitable terms of trade for them, in a manner which is remunerative for producers and equitable for producers and consumers.

CHAPTER III

Common responsibilities towards the international community

Article 29

The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind. On the basis of the principles adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, all States shall ensure that the exploration of the area and exploitation of its resources are carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the benefits derived therefrom are shared equitably by all States, taking into account the particular interests and needs of developing countries; an international régime applying to the area and its resources and including appropriate international machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be established by an international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon.

Article 30

The protection, preservation and the enhancement of the environment for the present and future generations is the responsibility of all States. All States shall endeavour to establish their own environmental and developmental policies in conformity with such responsibility. The environmental policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present and future development potential of developing countries. All States have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. All States should co-operate in evolving international norms and regulations in the field of the environment.

CHAPTER IV

Final provisions

Article 31

All States have the duty to contribute to the balanced expansion of the world economy, taking duly into account the close interrelationship between the well-being of the developed countries and the growth and development of the devel-

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oping countries, and the fact that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent parts.

Article 32

No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.

Article 33

1. Nothing in the present Charter shall be construed as impairing or derogating from the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or actions taken in pursuance thereof.

2. In their interpretation and application, the provisions of the present Charter are interrelated and each provision should be construed in the context of the other provisions.

Article 34

An item on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States shall be inscribed in the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, and thereafter on the agenda of every fifth session. In this way a systematic and comprehensive consideration of the implementation of the Charter, covering both progress achieved and any improvements and additions which might become necessary, would be carried out and appropriate measures recommended. Such consideration should take into account the evolution of all the economic, social, legal and other factors related to the principles upon which the present Charter is based and on its purpose.

United Nations Office of Public Information
OPI/542—75-38308—February 1975—10M

ADDRESS[1] BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE, BEFORE THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, MARC PLAZA HOTEL, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, JULY 14, 1975

GLOBAL CHALLENGE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Ten days ago our nation entered its two hundredth year. We begin our Bicentennial with justifiable pride in our past, a recognition of the challenges of the present, and great hope for the future.

The world in which we live is poised uneasily between an era of great enterprise and creativity or an age of chaos and despair. We have, on the one hand, developed weapons that could destroy us and our civilization; we have, on the other, created a world economy that could—for the first time in history—eradicate poverty, hunger and human suffering.

This complex of unprecedented opportunity and unparalleled danger is at the heart of the great challenge that has faced the United States with increasing urgency since the close of World War II. And it is our generation that must make the choices which will determine succes or failure. It is a burden that we can shoulder with fortitude or ignore with peril—but it is a burden we cannot shed.

Our nation has come to symbolize man's capacity to master his destiny. It is a proud legacy that has given hope and inspiration to the millions who have looked to us over the past two centuries as a beacon of liberty and justice.

Today's generation of Americans must be as true to its duty as earlier generations were to theirs. When weapons span continents in minutes, our security is bound up with world peace. When our factories, farms and financial strength are deeply affected by decisions taken in foreign lands our prosperity is linked to world prosperity. The peace of the world and our own security, the world's progress and our own prosperity are indivisible.

The Structure of Peace

We have a proud foundation on which to build. We have maintained stability in the world, ensured the security and independence of scores of nations and expended blood and treasure in the defense of freedom. Our economic support helped our major allies regain their strength; we contributed to a global trading and monetary system which has sustained and spread prosperity throughout the world. With our encouragement, the new nations took their place in the international community and set out on the path of economic development. At our initiative many long-standing disputes were settled by peaceful means. Conflicts were contained and global war was avoided.

We have provided more economic assistance than any other nation in history. We have contributed more food, educated more people from other lands, and welcomed more immigrants and refugees. We have done so because we are a generous people—for which we need not apologize—and because we have understood that our self-interest is bound up with the fate of all of mankind.

These successes have brought great change. The rigidities of the Cold War period have fragmented. Power and wealth, ideology and purpose have become diffused and have transformed the international scene. The reemergence of Europe and Japan, the rivalry among the Communist powers, the growth of military technologies, the rise and increasing diversity of the developing nations have produced a new global environment—a world of many centers of power, of persistent ideological differences clouded by nuclear peril and struggling for economic security and advance. The central focus of United States foreign policy is to help shape from this environment a new international structure, based on equilibrium rather than confrontation, linking nations to each other by practices of cooperation that reflect the reality of global interdependence.

Our task begins at home. To be strong and effective abroad, we must be strong and purposeful at home.

To preserve peace, our military strength must be beyond challenge.

To promote global prosperity our domestic economy must prosper.

To carry forward our international efforts we must be a united people, sure in our purposes and determined to build on the great achievements of our national heritage.

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[1] Secretary Kissinger declined the Committee's invitation to testify. This address is being printed in lieu of his personal testimony.

Our first responsibility abroad is to the great industrial democracies with whom we share our history, our prosperity and our political ideals. Our alliances across the Atlantic and with Japan are the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Today they are more than responses to military threat, they are instrumentalities of social and economic cooperation as well.

The ultimate objective of our alliances has always been to ease, not to freeze, the divisions of the world. In the past few years the United States has taken a number of steps to resolve concrete problems with the Soviet Union and lay the basis for more positive endeavors. We have also forged a new relationship with the People's Republic of China. There can be no lasting international stability unless the major powers learn habits of restraint and feel a stake in international peace; all our hopes for a better world require that they use their power for the benefit of mankind.

The scores of new nations that have become independent since the Second World War are now major actors on the world scene. In their quest for their own progress, they present a challenge to the rest of the world—to demonstrate that the international structure can give them a role, a fair share, dignity and responsibility.

All of us—allies and adversaries, new nations and old, rich and poor—are part of a world community. Our interdependence on this planet is becoming the centeral fact of our diplomacy. Energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas—these are problems whose benefits and burdens transcend national boundaries. They carry the seeds of political conflict over the coming generation; they challenge the capacities of the international community with new requirements for vision and statesmanship.

Much of our current agenda is therefore global in nature and must be dealt with on a global basis. Within a few weeks there will be two major meetings of the most prominent international organization, the United Nations. A Special Session of the General Assembly will be devoted to economic issues and the 30th regular session of the General Assembly will address the broad range of international problems.

Therefore, I would like to use this occasion to place before you and our fellow members of the United Nations a candid assessment of how the United States Government views the contemporary UN—its capacities and its limitations, its promise and the trends which threaten future progress.

The record of the United Nations

Thirty years after the founding of the United Nations, is achievements have been substantial and its promise is great. Most of the world is at peace. Beyond the absence of armed conflict, there has been a transition from a preoccupation with security to a new concern for the economic and social progress of all mankind. Yet, at the very time when interdependence impels international cooperation and when the membership of the UN is most universal, the international organization is being tested by a new clash of ideologies and interests, and by insistent tactics of confrontation. Such tendencies diminish the prospect for further achievement and threaten the very institution itself.

Let me place these tendencies in historical perspective.

The end of the Second World War brought on a period of idealism and hope. Victory in war against tyrannical regimes—by nations united for that purpose—seemed as much a triumph for liberty as for peace. The end of the colonial era was shortly to begin, and was clearly in prospect. The awesome power of nuclear weapons ironically gave hope that the imperatives of collective security and peaceful settlement of disputes would at least impress themselves on mankind. The League of Nations had failed, but the cost of another failure now seemed so overwhelming that it was possible to hope that the nations of the world would be obliged to make the United Nations succeed.

No nation embraced this hope more genuinely than the United States. No country more seriously looked for the United Nations to replace force and domination with cooperation. No government more earnestly sought to create a world organization with a capacity to act. It is worth recalling that a year after the San Francisco Conference, when the United States was the sole possessor of nuclear weapons, we offered to turn this entire technology over to the United Nations.

Even then American spokesmen were careful to insist that there were realistic limits to the scope of the new organization. Of these limits the most important, even if perhaps the easiest to overlook, is that the UN is not a world govern-

ment; it is an organization of sovereign states. It is not an entity apart from its membership. It reflects the world context in which it operates: its diversity, its imperfections, its many centers of power and initiative, its competing values, its worldly compound of nobility and tragedy.

The founders' hope for peace rested not on a naive belief in the perfectibility of man but on the hope that the major powers, given a dominant role in the Security Council, would be able to concert together to keep the peace. This hope, of course, proved stillborn when the UN became an arena for the confrontations of the Cold War.

A generation later, its record in maintaining the peace shows both success and failure. There have been local wars, yet there has been no general war. More than once, small conflicts which had led in the past to great ones have been contained through the efforts of the United Nations.

Time and again—in the Eastern Mediterranean, in the Middle East, in the Congo, in Kashmir—the peacekeeping role of the UN has proved indispensable for settlement, guarantees and prevention of major power intervention. While a far cry from the concept of collective security orginially envisioned, these operations have proven valuable and increasingly indispensable. They represent the most advanced manifestations of international cooperation for security yet achieved.

The United Nations has understood the principle that peace is not the same as the *status quo*, but must embrace procedures for peaceful change. Whether by special commissions or mediators or through the expanded role of the Secretary General within his broad responsibilities under Article 99 of the Charter, the UN has offered a flexible instrument of pacific settlement on a score of occasions since its founding.

The UN has provided a forum for debate and negotiation on regional or global problems and for multilateral efforts for arms control and disarmament. The talks provide a safety valve and a sounding board; in the corridors quiet progress is often being made.

We found early on that there were limits to United Nations action on behalf of peace and security. Its writ can run no further than the agreement of its members. And on the sweeping issues of war and peace, it is the great powers, by virtue of their size, military strength, economic power and political influence, who bear the principal responsibility for world stability and security. Of late, as the great powers are learning the practices of coexistence there is hope that the UN can find renewed possibilities for effective action in accordance with the vision of its founders.

The United Nations, originally concerned primarily with issues of peace and security, has been the focus of increasing attention to economic and social issues. The UN Charter contains a commitment "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." Today, roughly nine-tenths of expenditures within the UN system relate to economic and social cooperation. We welcome this evolution and have contributed generously to it.

Indeed it is in these fields, that the work of the UN has been most successful and yet the most unheralded. Its specialized agencies have been effectively involved with countless areas of human and international concern: speeding decolonization; spreading education, science, and technology; organizing global cooperation to combat hunger and disease, to protect the environment, and to limit population growth; regulating international transport and communication and peaceful nuclear power; advancing human rights and expanding international law among nations and in outer space and on the seas; preserving the priceless cultural heritage of mankind. It is striking, and of great importance for the future, that the United Nations has been able to respond creatively to so many of the challenges of the modern age.

Thus the UN is of considerable importance for the world's future. It has accommodated our traditional security and political concerns to the new conditions of international diplomacy; it has extended its reach—even before most nations did—toward the new agenda that now confronts the world community. The UN is both a symbol of our interdependence, and our most universal instrument for common progress.

In this connection, I want to pay tribute to the outstanding leadership given to the UN by its Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. He is tireless and totally dedicated to peace, fairness and the future of the United Nations. The rapidity and efficiency with which he organized and dispatched peacekeeping forces to

the Middle East in late 1973 was but one example of the many services he has rendered the organization and the international community.

The United States and the United Nations

Yet with all these achievements, the future of the United Nations is clouded. Much that has transpired at the United Nations in recent years gives us pause. At the very moment when great power confrontations are waning, troubling trends have appeared in the General Assembly and some of its specialized agencies. Ideological confrontation, bloc voting, and new attempts to manipulate the Charter to achieve unilateral ends threaten to turn the UN into a weapon of political warfare rather than a healer of political conflict and a promoter of human welfare.

The UN naturally mirrors the evolution of its composition. In its first phase it reflected the ideological struggle between the West and East; during that period the UN generally followed the American lead. Time and again in those days there were some 50 votes in support of our position and only a handful of communist bloc members against.

Ten years later when membership had grown to more than 80, our dominance in the General Assembly no longer was assured. Neither East nor West was able to prevail. In the Security Council the American position was still sustained, while the Soviet Union was required to cast veto after veto in order to protect what it considered to be its vital interests.

But with the quantum leap to the present membership of 138, the past tendencies of bloc politics have become more pronounced and more serious. The new nations, for understandable reasons, turned to the General Assembly in which they predominated in a quest for power that simply does not reside there. The Assembly cannot take compulsory legal decisions. Yet numerical majorities have insisted on their will and objectives even when in population and financial contributions they were a small proportion of the membership. In the process, a forum for accommodation has been transformed into a setting for confrontation. The moral influence which the General Assembly should exercise has been jeopardized and could be destroyed if governments—particularly those who are its main financial supporters—should lose confidence in the Organization because of the imposition of a mechanical and increasingly arbitrary will.

It is an irony that at the moment the U.S. has accepted non-alignment, and the value of diversity, those nations which originally chose this stance to preserve their sovereign independence from powerful military alliances are forming a rigid grouping of their own. The most solid bloc in the world today is, paradoxically, the alignment of the non-aligned. This divides the world into categories of North and South, developing and developed, imperial and colonial, at the very moment in history when such categories have become irrelevant and misleading.

Never before has the world been more in need of cooperative solutions. Never before have the industralized nations been more ready to deal with the problems of development in a constructive spirit. Yet lopsided, loaded voting, biased results and arbitrary tactics threatened to destroy these possibilities. The utility of the General Assembly both as a safety valve and as an instrument of international cooperation is being undermined. Tragically, the principal victims will be the countries who seek to extort what substantially could be theirs if they proceeded cooperatively.

An equally deplorable development is the trend in the Specialized Agencies to focus on political issues and thereby deflects the significant work of these agencies. UNESCO, designed for cultural matters, and the International Labor Organization have been heavily politicized. An egregious recent case came in the World Food Council in Rome where the very nations who desperately need, and would most benefit from food assistance, threatened to abort its work by disruptive tactics unworthy of an international organization. This Council grew out of the American initiatives at the World Food Conference last year.

It reflects our deepest humanitarian concerns; it represents a serious effort on our part to eliminate hunger and malnutrition. Abuse by those whom we are trying to help, attacks on our motives by the beneficiaries of our efforts threaten to undermine the very fabric of cooperation in a field of crucial long-range importance to mankind.

We realize that those of us who wish to surmount the current crisis must show some understanding of its origins. The major powers have hardly always set a consistent example of altruistic or benevolent behavior. The nations which

would seek to coerce the industrialized countries have themselves been coerced in the past. History haunts us all. But it is precisely to transcend that history that the United Nations was founded. And it is precisely to arrest such trends that the United States is calling attention to them today.

The process is surely self-defeating. According to the rules of the General Assembly, the coerced are under no compulsion to submit. To the contrary, they are given all too many incentives simply to depart the scene, to have done with the pretense. Such incentives are ominously enhanced when the General Assembly and Specialized Agencies expel member nations which for one reason or another do not meet with their approval.

Our concern has nothing to do with our attitude towards the practices or policies of the particular governments against which action is being taken. Our position is constitutional. If the UN begins to depart from its Charter, where suspension and expulsion are clearly specified prerogatives of the Security Council, we fear for the integrity and the survival of the General Assembly itself, and no less for that of the Specialized Agencies. Those who seek to manipulate UN membership by procedural abuse may well inherit an empty shell.

We are determined to oppose tendencies which in our view will undermine irreparably the effectiveness of the United Nations. It is the smaller members of the Organization who would lose the most. They are more in need of the UN than the larger powers such as the United States which can prosper within or outside the institution.

Ways must be found for power and responsibility in the Assembly and in the Specialized Agencies to be more accurately reflective of the realities of the world. The United States has been by far the largest financial supporter of the United Nations; but the support of the American people, which has been the lifeblood of the organization, will be profoundly alienated unless fair play predominates and the numerical majority respects the views of the minority. The American people are understandably tired of the inflammatory rhetoric against us, the all-or-nothing stance accompanied by demands for *our* sacrifice which too frequently dominate the meeting halls of the UN.

The United States despite these trends intends to do everything in our power to support and strengthen the United Nations in its positive endeavors. With all its limitations and imperfections the world body remains an urgent necessity. We are eager to cooperate, but we are also determined to insist on orderly procedures and adherence to the Charter. The UN was never intended as an organization of like-minded states, but rather an arena to accommodate and respect different policies and different interests. The world needs cooperative, not arbitrary action; joint efforts, not imposed solutions. In this spirit the United States will do what it can to make the United Nations a vital hope for a better future.

The agenda before us

This then is the promise and the problem of the United Nations. We must ensure that the promise prevails because the agenda we face makes the institution more necessary than ever before.

The United Nations, first, faces continuing and increasing responsibilities in its mission, in the famous words of the UN Charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

One of the central issues of our time is the Middle East conflict, and the UN Security Council continues to play a vital role in the quest for a solution. Resolution 338 of 1973 launched a negotiating process which has borne fruit and proved durable. Security-General Waldheim convened and addressed the first session of the Geneva Conference. Resolution 242 of 1967 stated general principles for a comprehensive peace. The stationing of United Nations forces was an indispensable element of the recent disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria in 1974.

But despite these and other real achievements, the global perils of local conflict continue to loom large. The world has dealt with them as if it were possible to contain conflict perpetually. But such tolerance tempts conflagration. That is how the first two world wars began. We must not have a third, with modern weapons there would not be a fourth. It is not enough to contain the crises that occur; we must eradicate their causes. President Ford is therefore determined to help bring about a negotiated solution in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and in other areas of dispute. And peacekeeping and peacemaking must be a top priority on the United Nations agenda.

Another problem of peace which the world community must urgently address is the spread of nuclear weapons.

Their awesomeness has chained these weapons for almost three decades; their sophistication and expense have long helped limit the number of nations which could possess them. But now political inhibitions are crumbling. Nuclear catastrophe—whether by plan or mistake, accident, theft or blackmail—is no longer implausible.

It is imperative to contain—and reverse—the nuclear arms race among the major powers. We are now engaged in translating the principles agreed to in Vladivostok between President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev into a new accord between the United States and the Soviet Union that will for the first time place a long-term ceiling on the strategic weapons of both sides.

As we strive to slow the spiral of nuclear arms, we must work as well to halt their spread. This requires both political and technical measures. In these areas the work of the United Nations has been important and could be crucial.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 was an important beginning. The recent Conference held under UN auspices to review the treaty and the adherence of additional countries to its provisions, have been valuable further steps.

The priority now is to strengthen the safeguards on the export of nuclear materials for peaceful uses. The oil crisis adds fresh urgency to this task, because it has made the development of nuclear energy essential for an increasing number of nations. This means wider availability of materials, such as plutonium, and of equipment which might be used to develop nuclear explosives.

Future generations have a right to expect of us that commercial competition among the industrial exporting countries will not be so reckless and irresponsible that it accelerates the spread of nuclear weapons and thereby increases the risks of a nuclear holocaust

Therefore the United States has begun confidential discussions with other nuclear exporting countries to develop stronger and generally accepted safeguards. In this task, the role and work of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency is vital. As peaceful nuclear programs grow in size and complexity it is crucial that supplier and user nations agree on firm and clear export standards and strengthened IAEA safeguards. An effective world safeguards system will minimize nuclear risks while fostering the development of peaceful energy. The control of the nuclear weapons is one of the most critical tests of this generation. The United Nations can crucially help decide whether we will meet this test.

The new agenda: The problem of interdependence

In the last few years the world economy has undergone a series of shocks and strains.

—Nations have suffered both severe inflation and deep recession on a worldwide scale.

—The price of the world's most essential commodity, petroleum, has been precipitously and arbitrarily increased, burdening the economies of all consuming nations and imposing the most serious hardships on the poorest countries.

—The world's food reserves have dwindled alarmingly in only a few short years. Unless massive efforts are mounted, the gap between population growth and food production could reach disastrous proportions.

—The pursuit of economic growth is complicated by the fact of interdependence; it can no longer be pursued by national efforts but requires coordinated, global actions.

This September's Special Session of the General Assembly will focus on the new global economic concerns. It will be an early and important test: will the rich nations and poor nations identify common goals and solve problems together, or will they exacerbate their differences? Can we turn our energies from rhetorical battles to practical cooperation? Will nations strive for empty parliamentary victories or concrete progress?

The United States has made its choice. We believe strongly in a cooperative approach. We believe that the time has come to put the technological and economic genius of mankind into the service of progress for all. We will approach the Special Session with determination to make progress; we intend to make concrete and constructive proposals for action across a broad spectrum of international economic activities such as trade and commodities, world food production and international financial measures.

The session will also consider structural changes to improve the UN's

capabilities in the field of economic development. A group of experts appointed by Secretary General Waldheim has just completed a study of this subject. We will offer specific comments on these recommendations during the Assembly debate.

In this spirit let me speak directly to the new nations who have pressed their claims with increasing fervor. We have heard and have begun to understand your concerns. We want to be responsive. We are prepared to undertake joint efforts to alleviate your economic problems. Clearly this requires a posture of cooperation. If nations deal with each other with respect and understanding, the two sessions this fall could mark the beginning of a new era in which the realities of an interdependent world economy generate a global effort to bring about peaceful and substantial change.

At the same time we are obliged to speak plainly, to the question of what works and what does not. We believe that economic development is in the first instance an internal process. Either societies create the conditions for saving and investment, for innovation and ingenuity, for enterprise and industry which ultimately lead to self-sustaining economic growth or they do not. There is no magical short-cut and no rhetorical substitute. And to claim otherwise suggests a need for permanent dependence on others.

In this quest for development, experience must count for something and ideology is an unreliable guide. At a minimum, we know which economies have worked and which have failed; we have a record of what societies have progressed economically and which have stagnated. We know—from our own experience—that investment from abroad can be an important spur to development. We know also that it is now in short supply. In the future, as in the past, there will be competition to attract capital; therefore those who do not wish investment from abroad can be confident that they will not receive it. By the same token those countries which are eager to industrialize must also be ready to create the conditions that will attract large-scale investment.

The voting records of the blocs in the General Assembly simply do not reflect economic reality. The family of less developed countries includes both producers and consumers of energy, importers and exporters of raw materials, and nations which can feed their populations as well as those which face the specter of famine. These divergent interests must be accommodated and reflected in practical measures; they cannot be resolved from the unreality of bloc positions.

At the same time the industrial world must adapt its own attitudes to the new reality of scores of new nations. At bottom the challenge is political, not economic—whether the interests and weight of the less developed nations can be accommodated in the international order. Their political objectives often represent legitimate claims. Yet at the same time the new nations must not expect us to make *only* political decisions, with *no* thought for economic consequences. If they want truly to serve their peoples, there must be practical concern for effective results.

If the industrial world wants to overcome the attitude of confrontation between nations, it must offer equitable solutions for the problems of the less fortunate parts of the world. Just as we are righly concerned about the economic impact of exorbitant oil prices, so we should show understanding for the concerns of producers of other raw materials whose incomes fluctuate radically. As for the operation of our companies abroad, we consider it in our interest, as well as in the common interest, to promote an environment of mutual benefit, in which our international businesses can continue to be both profitable and beneficial to the countries in which they operate. We will address this issue more fully at the Special Session.

Above all the industrialized countries must recognize that many developing countries have had frustratingly slow rates of growth. Rather than a comfortable margin of progress, they face an abundance of obstacles and a surplus of despair. The future of international politics over the next generation—the kind of world our children will inherit—will be determined by what actions governments take now on this spectrum of economic issues.

CONCLUSION

Dag Hammerskjold once predicted that the day would come when people would see the United Nations for what it really is—not the abstract painting of some artist, but a drawing done by the peoples of the world. And so it is—not

the perfect institution of the dreamers who saw it as the only true road to world harmony; and not the evil instrument of world domination that the isolationists once made it out to be.

Rather it is, like so many human institutions before it, an imperfect instrument—but one of great hope nonetheless. The United States remains dedicated to the principles upon which the United Nations was founded. We continue to believe it can be a mighty and effective vehicle for preserving the peace and bridging the gap between the world's rich and poor. We will do all we can to make it so.

The past decade—and particularly the past several years—have been a difficult time for America. We have known the agony of internal dissension and political turmoil, and the bitter costs of a lengthy war. But our nation has come through all this, and its most difficult constitutional crisis since the Civil War, with our institutions intact and our people resilient. And we have seen that the world still looks to us for leadership in preserving the peace and promoting economic advance for all mankind.

But the past decade has also surely shown that—strong and prosperous as we are—we cannot remake the world alone. Others must do their part and bear their responsibility for building the better world we all seek for the generations that will come after us.

In this endeavor, the United Nations plays a central role. It is there that each nation, large or small, rich or poor, can—if it will—make its contribution to the betterment of all. It is there that nations must realize that restraint is the only principle that can save the world from chaos, and that our destinies are truly intertwined on this small planet. It is there that we will see whether men and nations have the wisdom and courage to make a reality of the ideals of the Charter, and in the end, to turn the parliament of man into a true expression of the conscience of humanity.

Appendix II

Statements Submitted for the Record

Statement on Substantive Issues Adopted by Delegates Present and Voting at the Biennial Convention of the United Nations Association of the United States of America, April 17, 1975

Issues in the United Nations: Policy Recommendations for the United States

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2. *The UN and Indochina*: Need for constructive US relations with all governments in the area; UN guarantees; support for impartial UN and private humanitarian programs
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9. *Law of the Sea:* Threat to the global interest: need for strong US leadership for an international legal order for the oceans
10. *Outer Space:* More help needed for UN space applications program; keep remote sensing available to all; a moderate stand on rules for future internatinoal TV broadcasts via satellite; support for a future UN world TV broadcasting network
11. *Human Rights:* Despite some successes, a bleak outlook for many human rights priorities; need for greater US attention for majority concerns, e.g., by ratifying Genocide and Racial Discrimination Conventions; a stronger State Department human rights staff; opposition to UN double standard and to Arab blackiist of Jews
12. *UNESCO:* The General Conference's actions against Israel condemned; politicizing of UNESCO deplored; appeal to US to make every possible effort for reversal of these actions
13. *UNICEF:* Commendation of its work; appeal for increased US official and private support for its expanded work, particularly in Indochina
14. *International Women's Year and the Status of Women:* Need for more women on US delegations to UN conferences; ratification of UN conventions related to women; enforcement of Percy amendment stressing status of women as priority for US aid; need for equality in hiring at all levels in UN Secretariat; vigorous participation in and follow-up to Mexico City Conference in June
15. *Finance and Personnel:* Need to raise US contributions to UN voluntary programs in line with 1972 pledge by US; need for new US initiative to end perennial $90 million UN deficit; US must set example to support competence and impartiality of UN Secretariat.

I. Introduction

Two years ago, the Delegates to the 1973 Biennial Convention of the United Nations Association of the USA stated "the central issue" facing our country in the United Nations in these words:

"Will the United States return to a course of meaningful support for and serious attention to multilateral diplomacy, as represented by the United Nations, or will we contribute to its neglect?"

Today, as the UN approaches its 30th anniversary, that central issue remains the same. Indeed, recent events have posed it more sharply and more insistently than ever.

In these two years the United Nations has achieved important successes and, at the same time, has entered a period of dangerous crisis. Its achievements are a reminder of what the Organization can do at its best. The crisis should be taken as a clear warning that the long deterioration in relations between the US and the majority of UN members must be reversed. Otherwise the UN's capacity to act in the common interest will be further diminished, the framework of world order undermined, and the future of all nations, our own included, made still more insecure.

We believe, therefore, that the US should support the purposes of the UN as central to its foreign policy. In particular, we are convinced of three broad propositions which must shape future American policy in the United Nations:

1. Reinvigoration of the United Nations, the world's only near-universal, all-purpose organization of nations, is essential to the management of major world problems, and to a peaceful and decent human existence.

2. A vigorous United Nations must be founded on a new and durable community of effort involving the industrialized as well as the developing

nations on key economic, political and technological questions whose solution is beyond the separate reach of either. In this partnership, each should search for areas of compromise on issues of key importance.

3. No time should be lost, or effort spared, in developing the "north-south" dialogue that must precede and shape this new community.

ACHIEVEMENTS

Most conspicuous among the UN's recent achievements are its actions in the Middle East crisis of October 1973. The Security Council, with unprecedented Soviet support, established two new UN peacekeeping forces to police a cease-fire and disengagement in the Suez and Golan areas. Equally important, for the first time the Council placed its unanimous weight behind the search for a settlement by direct negotiation "between the parties concerned." These creative steps toward peacemaking could scarcely have been performed outside the UN. They are key elements in today's delicately poised hopes for peace in the area.

Ranking with these achievements is the series of four major UN conferences of 1972–75, each dealing with a major world problem of our technological age: environment, law of the sea, population, and food. By these conferences—and by common efforts in other fields such as disaster relief, care of refugees, control of the drug traffic, etc.—the community of nations is, however haltingly, framing common rules and instruments of global management in those spheres where human need now far transcends political boundaries.

These recent achievements are steps—but no more than steps—toward the solution of great international problems, and toward the "comprehensive institutionalized peace" which Secretary Kissinger envisioned in his first address to the General Assembly in 1973. The outlook for continued progress is now threatened by the crisis of the United Nations itself.

THE CRISIS

The crisis of the UN today has come as the climax of a long-building tension between the US and other leaders of the non-communist "north," now in the minority, and the new majority of the "south," generally non-aligned, in most cases recently independent, either very poor or newly rich, and increasingly restive concerning the relationships existing between the two groups. This crisis is most visible in the veto-free, 138-member General Assembly. There, the new majority can now muster overwhelming voting support for its demands on a wide range of political and economic issues—especially resources and development, racial and colonial grievances in southern Africa and Arab grievances against Israel. Some of these have led to intemperate UN actions of doubtful legality. By the same token, the majority sometimes tends to avoid UN action on issues to which the West assigns high priority, such as terrorism and violation of individual rights, and even to undermine such rights in pursuit of political objectives. On occasion militant leaders in the majority camp have mustered majority votes to curb free debate, and even to exclude unpopular members in disregard of procedural safeguards laid down in the Charter.

Such tendencies have long been apparent but were especially strong at the 29th session in 1974. It was against them that US Ambassador John Scali warned last December in his UN speech deploring the "tyranny of the majority."

THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM

We deplore such excesses. But we believe that to respond to them by turning away from the United Nations, or reducing US contributions and participation in it, would miss the meaning of what has happened. It would neither remedy the actions complained of nor prevent their repetition; instead, it would deal a heavy blow to the interests of this country and of world peace.

The confrontation of 1974 did not originate overnight. Most of the trouble in the United Nations in recent years occurred because some Western nations, including the United States, tended to underrate the importance of the Third World in international affairs and to shrug off the perennial majority votes expressing their views. Now, however, the nations of the Third World—not just in the UN but in the world which it mirrors—have begun organizing to secure

far better terms for the resources they export to the industrial West. They have thus acquired important economic and political weight. Their increasingly assertive and coordinated policies can be modified by negotiation, but they cannot be ignored. New relationships must be found in which, as they and the industrial world discover their mutual interdependence, bargains will be struck which all can accept as equitable.

We recognize the importance of building peaceful and constructive relations among the major power centers of the Northern Hemisphere, including large adversary states, and we applaud the creative labors of Secretary Kissinger to this end. But such relations, vital though they are to world peace, are not sufficient. The oil crisis is a glaring reminder of how global interests are intertwined—and how impermanent are equations of national power. The resources also highlights the plight of the "Fourth World," now more than ever in need of a new humanitarianism on the part of both the old and newly rich nations. We support the United Nation's policy of humanitarian criteria for aid, technical assistance and services, and oppose political, racial or religious motivation for excluding peoples or nations from UN assistance programs.

The structure of peace remain dangerously incomplete if great power relations are cemented at the expense of, or in indifference to, the underprivileged majority of mankind. Only an inclusive world order can be secure. Seen in this light, the General Assembly's repeated demands upon the West appear not as irritating trifles but as ominous symptoms of the breakdown of the old international economic and social order and the absence of a new and more equitable order to replace it.

TOWARD A NEW PARTNERSHIP

The more lasting—though too little noticed—moral of Ambassador Scali's famous December speech lies not in its complaints against the majority, justified though these were in many ways, but in its eloquent appeal for a common rededication to making the United Nations work:

"The reasons for which the World Organization was founded remain as valid and as compelling today as they were in 1945. If anything, there is added reason: the specters of nuclear holocaust, world depression, mass famine, overpopulation and a permanently ravaged environment.

"If we are to succeed, we (the members of the UN) must now renew our commitment to the central principles of tolerance and harmony upon which the United Nations was built. We must redouble our efforts to use this Organization as the world's ultimate instrument for compromise and negotiation."

Significantly, in the debate that followed a number of speakers of the Third World responded in a similar vein, appealing for consultation and compromise on both sides. If these appeals are sufficiently heeded, the debate of December 1974 may prove to have been the prologue to a new entente between the founders of the United Nations and its new majority.

The dialogue within such an entente will have many issues to resolve, some of them already prominent in the UN's agenda. Most of the key issues in the dialogue—such as trading rules, access to and prices of oil and other resources, national control over foreign private investment, the conflicts of the Middle East and Southern Africa—are inherently difficult. But given sufficient priority, they can be made manageable. Further neglected, on the other hand, these issues could soon become tangled in a Gordian knot of confrontation politics beyond the capacity of diplomacy to untie. To avert an impasse profoundly dangerous to peace, and to construct a more inclusive world order which all UN members will have a stake in upholding, the dialogue now begun must be pursued—with increased energy, patience, insight, and a determination not to fail.

II. Specific Issues

1. THE MIDDLE EAST

Today as throughout its existence, the United Nations remains deeply involved in efforts to mitigate and resolve the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The UN played an indispensable role in halting the war of October 1973, policing the cease-fire and disengagement of forces in the Suez and Golan areas, and initiating the first direct negotiating contact ever achieved between the major parties to the conflict. The periodic renewal of the two peacekeeping

forces by the Security Council is a hopeful sign of the solidity of these steps. Pending a definitive settlement, the UN's humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees also remains of special importance, as it has been for many years.

There is widespread agreement that peace in the Middle East is essential to peace in the world. We therefore support all efforts for a negotiated settlement consistent with the following principles:

Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries, matched by termination of all Arab claims or states of belligerency, along with respect for, and acknowledgement of, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state in the area.

Recognition of Palestinian national aspirations and termination of their protracted refugee status, matched by firm acknowledgement of the right of all states in the area to live in peace, free from guerrilla or terrorist action or any other threats or acts of force.

Feedom of navigation for all countries through international waterways of the region without discrimination.

The final borders between Israel and its neighbors to be guaranteed by international agreement and if necessary by the US and other great powers.

We deplore the failure of the General Assembly—and parties to the dispute—to implement these principles.

We commend our government for its continuing efforts to promote a peace settlement consistent with these principles and we deeply regret that the bilateral negotiations involving Israel and Egypt, aimed at further partial steps toward peace, failed during March despite the intensive mediation of Secretary Kissinger. It is now critically important that the Security Council, as an interim measure, extend the life of the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights, whose current mandate expires May 30. However, the temporary character of UN buffer forces only points up the urgency of regaining the lost momentum of peace negotiations. We appeal to all the parties and all concerned governments, our own included, to strive unremittingly, through every available channel including the Geneva Conference soon to be resumed under UN auspices, to reconcile the wide differences that still remain.

Americans deeply desire and need friendship with all countries of the Middle East. We again appeal to the parties, and to all states concerned, to hasten the conclusion of a negotiated peace that will be fair and honorable for all. That this will involve painful concessions on all sides is obvious. It should be even more obvious that such concessions will be far less painful than the alternative of continued and mounting violence in that explosive area, whose conflicts have for far too long threatened the peace of the entire world.

2. THE U.N. AND INDOCHINA

The searing experience of past US intervention in Indochina must warn against any attempt to reverse present tragedies by still further interventions. We urge that the U.S. as a long-range policy seek to develop constructive relations with all governments in the area, and work within the prudent limits of its influence and resources to improve the lot of the peoples of Indochina. We further propose that the U.S. join with other nations in seeking an international guarantee, if possible through the Security Council, for the independence, neutrality, and security of all states of Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile the immediate need is to relieve the desperate plight of refugees and other suffering civilians, men, women, and children, in the stricken areas. We commend the private voluntary agencies and U.N. agencies now engaged in this humanitarian work, and the U.S. Government for its support of their efforts. We note especially that UNICEF and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees are providing humanitarian services throughout Indochina. We urge that all U.N. humanitarian programs in the area be kept under strict international control and not become subservient to the political purposes of any of the parties to the conflict. We also urge our government, and all Americans of good will, to increase their support for these U.N. efforts so that they may meet the greatly increased demands upon them.

3. CYPRUS

For over 20 years the U.N. has been involved in attempts to settle the strife between Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Since 1964 a U.N.

peacekeeping force has stood guard in the island republic to discourage further incidents. Last July the fragile truce collapsed when the then Greek government launched a coup in Nicosia. Turkey quickly reacted by invading and occupying 40 percent of the island, precipitating severe fighting and suffering for many thousands of refugees on both sides.

Despite renewed attempts at a negotiatied solution, the outlook for a settlement again darkened this year when the Turkish Cypriot community announced in February a "separated federated state" in the part of the island they occupy. In March the Security Council adopted a resolution reaffirming the independence and integrity of Cyprus and urging a resumption of talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General, the return of refugees and the withdrawl of Turkish troops. We strongly support this U.N. diplomatic effort now in progress. The need for creative diplomacy on the Cyprus issue is highlighted by mounting dangers of a new war in the sensitive region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

U.S. policy in this tragic episode is open to severe criticism. After the July coup in Nicosia, the U.S. is reported to have actively discouraged any countermove including use of the Security Council. No such move was made and Turkish apprehensions deepened, setting the stage for the invasion. When the initial Turkish invasion was expanded, after the events which gave rise to it had been reversed, the U.S. did not effectively oppose Turkey's use of U.S. weapons, acquired under NATO programs, to pursue its aims in Cyprus. In the circumstances, we believe the action of Congress in cutting off military aid to Turkey was justified. Any modification of this action should be designed solely to strengthen the President's hand in promoting negotiations for a permanent settlement.

We pay tribute to the courage and effectiveness of the U.N. peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, in mitigating civilian suffering during and since the 1974 fighting, in some cases at great risk and cost in casualties. We also pay tribute to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees for his program of humanitarian aid in Cyprus, and commend our government for its contribution of $10.9 million to this cause.

4. PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING

The United Nations scored major achievements for peace in halting the Middle East war of October 1973 and in creating the two new international peacekeeping forces—UNEF–II and UNDOF—to stand guard between opposing forces in the Suez and Golan areas. The vote of the Soviet Union to create these forces, its participation in their financing, and the inclusion in UNEF of a battalion from a member of the Warsaw Pact, are all without precedent in the history of UN peacekeeping. They demonstrate—contrary to some predictions—that the UN's capacity to improvise peacekeeping forces in an emergency was not destroyed by the bitter controversy of the 1960s. On the contrary, time, circumstances, and years of patient dialogue evidently convinced the Soviet Union and others that such impartial forces have a part to play on the world scene.

We commend all governments involved, including our own, for these creative steps. And we salute the valor of soldiers from 11 countries serving under UN colors—both in the Middle East and in UNFICYP, the invaluable UN force in Cyprus—over 400 of whom have become casualties in the service of peace since October 1973. We urge our government to give vigorous support to existing UN peacekeeping forces.

It cannot be assumed, however, that these steps guarantee the UN's peacekeeping capacity in future emergencies. It is important that the recent progress toward agreed peacekeeping principles, reported by the General Assembly's Committee of 33 on Peacekeeping Operations, be followed up vigorously, supported by continued close consultation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Wisely, these efforts are now aimed at a set of general principles rather than at detailed guidelines. Such principles must provide adequate operating flexibility for the Secretary-General's command of a peacekeeping force under the general oversight of the Security Council; strong safeguards against premature dismissal by a host government; and equitable sharing of costs. We believe an agreement on such principles might be reached if the US and Soviet governments placed peacekeeping on the agenda for the next summit meeting, and we urge that this be done.

A still more basic need is for more ready and consistent application of the Charter obligation (article 33) to settle international disputes by peaceful means. Such means can often be, but need not be, provided within the UN framework.

The essential point is the willingness of the parties to reach a settlement, and the proper contribution of the UN is to promote that willingness in every way possible. The good offices of the Secretary-General and his representatives have been of great value in this way more often than is generally known.

We point out once again the deplorable neglect of the International Court of Justice. Judicial settlement is one major means, specified in the UN Charter, for peaceful resolution of disputes among nations. But the intended role of the World Court as judge among nations has been frustrated from the start by the refusal of member states to accept its jurisdiction where their interests were involved. Unfortunately, one of the worst examples in this respect was set long ago by the United States when the Senate enacted the Connally Reservation. We appeal once again to the US Senate to show world leadership by repealing that unfortunate clause, so enfeebling to the world order of which our country has been a leading advocate.

A particularly grievous challenge to the peacemakers is the new upsurge of international terrorism against innocent third parties. It is an evil which responsible authorities in conflict situations are often either unable or unwilling to control. We are deeply disappointed at the unreadiness of many member states to deal firmly with such outrages against human beings. We urge our government to persist in pressing this essentially humanitarian issue in season and out, until a solution is achieved.

5. SOUTHERN AFRICA

The transformation of Portugal's African empire in 1974 dramatically heightened international pressure on the remaining areas of the "white redoubt" in Southern Africa. In the United Nations, a long-expected move to expel South Africa from the United Nations was stopped only by a triple Western veto in the Security Council. Thereupon the General Assembly voted over Western objection to exclude the South African delegation from the rest of the 29th session—an unprecedented step which raises questions of the utmost gravity for the future of the organization.

These steps put a new and sudden strain on the already fragile relations between the United States and the Third World majority in the UN. Discord over Southern Africa is now a main factor in the crisis of conference that threatens the organization, even while some signs begin to emerge of a more moderate South African position on both Rhodesia and Namibia.

The damage was not done overnight. The US delegation, explaining its votes on these issues, stressed the principles of universality, due process and fair play—and once more reiterated its much-reiterated detestation of apartheid. But such verbal expressions had long since been drained of their credibility in Third World eyes by Washington's failure to exert effective economic or diplomatic persuasion on South Africa or the leaders in Rhodesia to mend their policies. For over three years the best-advertised American policy toward Southern Africa has been the lamentable Byrd Amendment, by which Congress opened US commercial market to imports of Rhodesian chrome—the alleged strategic need for which proved non-existent. Thus we placed ourselves and still remain, in contempt of our Charter obligation to comply with Security Council orders against trade with that outlaw country.

No single aspect of United States foreign policy has been more needlessly damaging to our country's posture in the United Nations than the long-standing habit of condemning apartheid in our statements while condoning it in our actions. If we seriously wish to build a partnership with the Third World majority in the UN, we must lose no time in bringing our policies on this issue into line with our pronouncements. To that end:

1. Congress and the Administration should give top legislative priority to repeal of the Byrd Amendment permitting chrome imports from Rhodesia—thereby restoring full US compliance with the Security Council's mandatory economic sanctions against the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

2. We should lend vigorous diplomatic support to the Security Council's unanimous resolution of December 17 calling on South Africa to prepare promptly to withdraw from Namibia, to recognize that country's unity and territorial integrity, and to cooperate with the UN in transferring political power to the Namibian people.

3. As a corollary to these steps, we should consult actively with leading statesmen of Africa on steps to assure that majority rule in Southern Africa will be achieved as much as humanly possible in conditions of interracial harmony and peaceful progress.

In advocating these steps we do not ignore the tragic prevalence of racial, tribal or ethnic discrimination as well as interferences with the expression of popular will, practiced by governments of many nations in every quarter of the globe, with little or no protest from the UN. We believe the US should be impartial in condemning and opposing actively these evils wherever they exist.

6. ARMS CONTROL, ZONES OF PEACE, AND DISBARMENT

In the past year the world has drifted into a period of accelerating danger from the increase of nuclear weapons. "Vertical" proliferation, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, continues at a very high level due to the meager results of the SALT negotiations to date. "Horizontal" proliferation may become more tempting to a score or more countries with the necessary technical and financial base—and even to terrorist groups. India's nuclear explosion in May 1974 was an alarming signal that this long-foreseen danger has now materialized. Man's remaining chance to limit the universal spread of nuclear weaponry may soon be irrevocably lost.

Key negotiations this year bearing on this immense problem include the review conference on the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, meeting during May in Geneva, and the next round of SALT negotiations for lower limits on strategic delivery systems. We urge our government to pursue both these avenues with determination—and to bear in mind that non-nuclear nations cannot be expected to forgo nuclear weapons permanently unless the superpowers reduce their own nuclear arsenals. For the same reasons we urge strong international controls against clandestine diversion of nuclear material for weapons purposes.

We urge the highest priority for the conclusion of the long-sought comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests. No step could do more to dampen the threat of further proliferation, both vertical and horizonal. Twelve years ago, in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the United States joined in pledging to pursue "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." Ever since, a principal obstacle to a ban on underground tests has been US insistence on a system of on-site inspection which advances in seismic detection have now rendered unnecessary. The bilaterial ban on weapons tests above 150 kilotons—even if this threshold were substantially lowered—cannot be a full substitute for a comprehensive multilateral test ban.

US inflexibility on this technical issue has caused many to question the reality of this country's commitment to a complete test ban. A new affirmative US policy on this subject is now more than ever essential if the nuclear arms race is to be brought under control while there is still time.

Exceeding even the nuclear weapons issue in sheer magnitude is the still-escalating expenditure of the world's governments on "conventional"—i.e., non-nuclear—armaments. An aspect of this problem that may lend itself to international management is the unconscionable export of weapons, chiefly by the major powers, to less-developed countries. In recent years international arms sales to such countries have grown alarmingly in both quantity and quality, with the US sometimes even arming both sides in the same conflict.

Many customers in this arms trade can ill afford such a diversion of national treasure from economic development. Even where financing is easy—as it is now for the oil-exporting counties—there is a danger of new tensions if competitive arms imports were to destabilize political relations in sensitive regions like the Persian Gulf. We believe this issue is overdue for international debate in the UN. We urge our government to consider in all seriousness whether its policy of arms exports contributes to international security or the reverse.

We support further exploration of a fully audited and verified reduction of military budgets, pursuant to the recommendations of the General Assembly. We also urge that the US take the lead in obtaining a negotiated international reduction of armaments, so that the resources thus saved can be dedicated to the elimination of the world food crisis and the solution of other grave economic and social problems, including those of the US.

We further suggest the major powers should take far more seriously the spreading interest of smaller powers in region "zones of peace." The oldest of these, the Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, is well advanced (although the Soviet Union still refuses its cooperation and that of the US and France is incomplete). We see much to be gained by a similar evolution in the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace recently proclaimed by the General Assembly. All the nuclear powers except China have—unwisely in our view—hung back from

this imaginative project. We see no possible net strategic benefit, but only new burdens and dangers, in the superpower naval arms race that now looms in the Indian Ocean. We urge our government to take a more positive attitude toward the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace in concert with the other nuclear powers, and as part of this process to reconsider development of a major US base on the island of Diego Garcia.

We urge our government to participate in the preparatory discussions for a World Disarmament Conference which may prove valuable at the proper time as a way to include China in disarmament negotiations. We believe the US should be present this year at the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on a World Disarmament Conference.

Finally, we urge the US government to keep in mind that it has joined with other governments in the United Nations in designating the 1970s as the Decade of Disarmament.

7. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Never have international economic problems been more central to United Nations debate, or a greater source of tension among the members. This tension is not in itself a sign of weakness or wrong headedness; it is rather a sign that the world community, with the inadequate institutions available to it, is wrestling with social and economic changes of extraordinary scope and complexity. Among those changes are:

Uncontrolled inflation, with consequent trade and currency dislocations, resulting from a generation of rapid (and often prodigally wasteful) economic growth in industrial and industrializing areas.

Unprecedented world population growth, most rapid in poor countries, reaching doubling periods as short as 21 years in some cases.

Rising pressure on a finite world resource base of fuels, minerals, arable land and fisheries—increasing human vulnerability to famine and economic or environmental disasters.

Finally, a growing capability of resource-rich developing countries to control the production, volume and export prices of their resources, especially oil—and to use the resulting international leverage for their own advantage.

From these changes have flowed sudden—and, without a doubt, lasting—changes in the world economic and political landscape. The spectacular flow of money to the oil-exporting countries since 1973 has multiplied overnight their influence on world events. It has correspondingly multiplied their responsibility. They will increasingly feel pressure not only to accommodate their interests with those of the major oil-consuming countries, but also to respond to appeals from resource-poor developing countries for relief from skyrocketing oil prices, hunger and economic stagnation. We of the United States and other industrial powers, ourselves now hard-pressed to fulfill past commitments to international development, should urge these newly affluent states to accept their full responsibility in the emerging global partnership. They should be encouraged to accept their due share of both the privileges and the burdens of international economic leadership, including support for the development and humanitarian programs of the United Nations system. These programs should become an important channel for recycling petrodollars to developing countries most in need.

For our part, we of the United States, despite our current domestic troubles, must continue to carry major global economic responsibilities. This means, among other things, continuing support for the tested institutions of the UN system that serve the needs of developing countries: the World Bank and Fund, the regional development banks, the UN Development Program, and the family of UN Specialized Agencies which collaborate in development projects. It also means supporting new institutional arrangements, such as the special $6 billion lending facility set up by the International Monetary Fund to channel assistance from both the developed and the newly-rich states to the developing countries hardest hit by the economic crisis.

US development assistance in 1974 was at its lowest level since World War II—approximately one quarter of one percent of our gross national product, including bilateral programs most of which support specific US political or strategic objectives. We urge that these trends be reversed, and that a greater share of US development aid be channeled through the multilateral agencies of the UN system. We deplore the action of Congress in rejecting the President's request for a $29 million increase in appropriations to international organizations in 1975. We also deplore the severe cuts made by Congress in appropriations

for specific UN programs, including the UN Development Program. Where UN delivery systems are felt to be insufficiently effective, US policy should be to increase their effectiveness—not to point to their defects as an excuse for diminished support.

In addition, this country has an important stake in resolving a wide range of new and old economic issues affecting the developing nations. Some slow but solid progress has been achieved, especially toward monetary and trade accords with developing countries. But much more remains to be decided: on emergency food aid and aid to developing countries hit by the oil crisis; and, in the longer-term development context, on capital flows, prices of commodities and manufacturers in world trade, nonreciprocal tariff preferences for developing countries without crippling exceptions, technology transfer, and the role of private capital.

The United Nations has yet to produce a viable consensus among nations on this huge problem area. Neither in the International Development Strategy of 1970 nor in the New Economic Order resolutions of May 1, 1974—despite the formal consensus on both—did the General Assembly really bridge the gulf of divergent interests and priorities between the industrial nations and the aspiring Third World.

A new attempt to narrow that gulf will be made at the Assembly's brief special session on economic questions scheduled to convene next September 1. The United States cannot afford to hang back again from serious negotiation, as we did before and during the special session last spring. The longer we do so, the more likely it is that anti-Western influences will predominate in the resource, trade, and investment policies of Third World countries. We urge our Government to carry its proper share of leadership in preparing for the coming special session—a major opportunity to begin serious negotiation for a new economic system acceptable to all concerned, and adequate for the world we live in.

As part of this process, we endorse current UN efforts to deal constructively with relations between multinational enterprises and developing countries, and urge that a code of conduct be written applicable to both.

The new partnership which we envisage at the UN will not be built in a day or a year. It may involve the creation of new UN institutions strong enough to achieve more rational and less contentious management of scarce world resources. Until it begins to take shape, economic discord will continue to hamper and distract all attempts to frame solutions for the fundamental long-term world problems of international order, arms control, and human environment, overpopulation, resources, and the future quality of human life.

8. FOOD, POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT

Among recent United Nations actions which are likely to live in history are three pioneering world conferences of governments on the emergent human problems of the environment (1972), population, and food (1974). Global cooperation in these three overlapping areas is troubled by much the same north-south tensions and frustrations that afflict the entire movement for international economic development. Yet despite these troubles some important steps have been taken, and new steps are urgently necessary.

Food

Hunger is among the most pressing problems in the world today. The U.S., as a principal food producer and world leader, must accept a major responsibility for its solution. We applaud our government's initiative in proposing the World Food Conference, held last November in Rome. The World Food Council, whose creation the conference recommended, has now been established as a new organ of the United Nations. It is a first step toward systematic global cooperation on long-term food problems which, if further neglected or mishandled, will threaten development and even survival in large parts of the world.

Since the hundreds of millions of people now threatened with starvation and crippling nutritional diseases cannot wait for a coordinated long-term solution, we are pleased to note also that the U.S. has announced a food aid program for this fiscal year of $1.6 billion, at least 70 percent of which must go to nations designated by the UN as most in need.

It is vitally important that our government continue to contribute its share of resources and leadership in this cause. The next steps to which Washington should urgently address itself are these:

US development assistance policies and programs, both bilateral and multilateral, and especially through UN self-help technical assistance programs, should give major new emphasis, in line with the recommendations of the Rome Conference, to building up the capacity of developing countries to produce their own food.

The US should play its full part in the effort, also emphasized by the Rome Conference, to achieve world food security, especially by the creation of adequate national and international food reserves.

Since vast quantities of agricultural acreage and basic protein crops are used for the production of meat, alcohol and tobacco, we urge that the US Government provide economic incentives to farmers to reduce such usage and increase poultry and basic protein production.

Population

The World Population Conference in Bucharest in August 1974 gave important new impetus to efforts for more rational population policies and programs throughout the world. The "World Population Plan of Action," despite inevitable compromises, is a major advance toward a world consensus on key points: the interdependence between family planning and development; the right of parents to decide the number of their children; the active role of women in development; the value of numerical targets for reduction of population growth rates; and the need for increased international aid to countries seeking to improve their population programs. The General Assembly last fall substantially endorsed the Bucharest recommendations and called for their implementation, including further expansion of the UN Fund for Population Activities. In addition, the World Food Conference stressed the need for a balance between food resources and population.

We commend our government for its constructive role in this work and urge that it give continued high priority to implementing steps.

Environment

The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment, and the subsequent creation of the UN Environment Program and Fund, were landmark achievements of the world community in enabling technological man to collaborate more wisely with his natural environment. Particularly important were the launching of the "Earthwatch" program of global research and monitoring of pollutants, and the increased commitment by developing countries to development policies that give adequate weight to environmental protection.

From the outset, these achievements were flawed by a suspicion among developing countries that the environment movement, originating in the industrial West, was "anti-development." To help allay this suspicion, the mandate given to UNEP struck a careful balance between global environmental concerns and those of special concern to developing countries. Ever since, pressure from the developing country majority has tended to upset this balance and to focus the great bulk of UNEP's still very limited program on development-related projects.

Such an unbalanced program, though by no means valueless, carries an inherent risk that the US and other developed countries may lose interest in UNEP and seek auspices outside the UN for global environmental management programs such as Earthwatch. We urge our government to resist this temptation and persist in seeking common ground with the majority.

That this uniquely important venture in world cooperation should be thus endangered in its infancy is a measure of how far the West and the Third World still are from reconciling their widely differing priorities. This situation again illustrates the fundamental need, discussed early in these pages, for a new dialogue in the UN leading to a better working relationship between the West and the Third World. We further note that global efforts to slow the degradation of the earth's life support resources—air, water and land—cannot be fully effective until major industrial powers, including the U.S., act to diminish pollution within their own borders. We urge that the U.S. reduce pollution from fossil fuel and nuclear energy sources and speed conversion to non-polluting energy sources, such as solar, geothermal, wind and tidal.

9. LAW OF THE SEA

Eight years ago the General Assembly addressed itself to the need for modernizing international law governing man's activity on and beneath the oceans—more than two-thirds of the earth's surface whose fish, petroleum and mineral

resources are increasingly accessible to advancing technology. From this concern came plans for a new UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. Through years of preparations its agenda steadily widened to include issues of territorial limits; rights of passage through straits; use and conservation of fisheries; rights of landlocked countries; international rules, machinery and fees governing economic exploitation of the seabed; control of marine pollution; scientific research; procedures for settling disputes; etc.

For two months in 1974, the 148-nation conference held its first negotiating session in Caracas. A further (though probably not final) negotiating session is now under way in Geneva.

The conference's broad agenda and near-universal participation made for an extremely complex pattern of alignments and negotiating pressures. The Caracas session succeeded in identifying the key issues and sorting out the major proposals. The crucial bargaining stage has now arrived. At this point two main dangers threaten the conference's ultimate success.

One danger arises from conflicting national pressures. Most developing countries press for the widest and most exclusive national coastal zone, and for strict international control in the common realm. The major powers press for unrestricted military and commercial transit through straits, narrower and less exclusive coastal jurisdiction, and (in the case of the U.S. especially) the least burdensome international regulation over seabed exploitation in the common realm. On fisheries, most nations are most interested in shares of the catch than in conservation of threatened species.

The danger is that the conference, in reconciling these conflicts, will neglect the global interest and set the stage for an unregulated international free-for-all to exploit marine species and seabed wealth while they last. Such an outcome entails unacceptable threats to the marine environment and to international order.

The second danger reinforces the first. It arises from commercial and industrial pressures on Congress, some of them already embodied in pending legislation. These, if allowed to prevail, would pre-empt for U.S. fishing and mining interests various unrestricted rights of exploitation which the conference still has a chance to subject—and ought to subject—to international regulation as regards pollution, overfishing, international royalties, and the equitable distribution of benefits.

The central task for the Law of the Sea Conference is to build an international regime, sturdy and durable enough to protect mankind's common heritage of the sea and assure that the uses of this vast realm are fairly shared. This effort is an unprecedented test of how well our world of nations can function as a community. Only strong leadership can prevent the long-term interest of all from being pulled apart in an unseemly scramble to maximize the special advantage of each.

We urge our government to provide its share of that leadership at this critical point; to resist short-sighted pressures at home; and to insist upon a strong world legal order for the oceans—one that will be equitable to diverse national interests without slighting the enduring interests of all people.

10. OUTER SPACE

For nearly 15 years the UN, through the General Assembly's Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, has sought to assure that pioneering exploits of the space age would visibly benefit not only the few advanced space powers but all nations. Potential or actual benefits have appeared in such fields as communications, mapping, navigation, weather forecasting, and most recently in the development by the US of a powerful new tool, remote sensing by satellite, to gain information on natural resources and the environment.

Two broad issues have arisen over the years in this field.

First is an organizational issue: Shall the US and other space powers use multilateral channels such as the UN for their technical aid to developing countries in the field of outer space, or shall these benefits be channeled bilaterally?

We believe the US, presumably for the sake of political or strategic influence, has thus far given undue stress to its own bilateral space cooperation programs at the expense of the UN. This has been especially evident in the US attitude toward the work carried on under the Outer Space Committee. The US, in concert with other states, should call on the UN to stop starving the diminutive "space applications program" in the UN Secretariat and should move to enhance both its budget and its staff capabilities as a source of guidance and training for developing countries. In the same spirit we support the declared willingness of the US to provide remote sensing data to global or regional data distribution

centers that may be established under UN auspices; and we urge that the US work energetically for the establishment of such centers. These steps could be a valuable signal that the US is moving—as recommended at the outset of this statement—to give a higher priority to its relations with the UN and to the needs of the Third World.

Second is a legal issue: Shall space technology be used to promote the free flow of information and knowledge among nations, or shall its use be restricted by traditional concepts of national sovereignty? This issue has been raised with regard both to remote sensing and to the anticipated technology of direct international TV broadcasting to home receivers.

The two situations are not the same. In the case of remote sensing, some countries such as Argentina and Brazil want to make the dissemination of such data subject to the consent of the "sensed" country. The US holds, and we agree, that such a doctrine could severely hamper the practical use of this highly important technology. The best way to assure that remote sensing information is used effectively and fairly is to make it available to all—including, of course, the "sensed" countries. Such a policy has been wisely applied by the US from the outset to the data from its first two satellites of this type, Landsat 1 and 2. The international data distribution centers mentioned above should be established on the same principle.

A quite different issue arises in connection with the international broadcasting of TV programs to home receivers, a technology which is likely to become practical within the next decade. The Soviet Union has urged in the General Assembly a highly restrictive doctrine—even more restrictive than that adopted earlier by UNESCO—under which states could act unilaterally to exclude such broadcasts. The US initially replied with a "freedom of information" position which seemed to some observers even more absolute than the very liberal broadcast licensing laws of our country. Recently, however, US spokesmen have indicated willingness to assure respect for each country's cultural integrity. We agree with this modification of the concept. We do not believe that the cause of freedom of information would be served by insisting on the right to broadcast any TV program to any receiver in the world. The great principle can be better served in the international sphere by harmonizing it with the views and felt needs of other nations.

In this quest serious consideration should be given to the longer-range possibility of the UN itself operating a world television satellite broadcasting system for the dissemination of UN information and for non-political broadcasts by member states.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS

The argument that action on human rights falls within the domestic jurisdiction of member states has limited the potential of the UN for advancing the ideals of the Charter in this field. A growing majority of members do not assign a high priority to the civil and political rights of individuals so highly valued in the West; many, indeed, see in the spread of these rights a threat to their own power. Instead, the majority in the Human Rights Commission and the General Assembly have increasingly laid primary emphasis on the collective rights and grievances of whole nations, or of particular racial, ethnic or political categories. This tendency, first embodied in the Genocide Convention of 1948, has found more recent expression in the Convention on Racial Discrimination (1965), the Convention Against Apartheid (1973), and a steady stream of UN resolutions demanding the right of self-determination for peoples still in colonial or racial subjection.

By contrast, Western efforts to revive interest in conventions or declarations on traditional civil and political rights, notably freedom of information and freedom of religion, have encountered indifference from most members. Moreover, the majority has found it politically convenient to be highly selective in its attention to human rights violations—and in its interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction clause.

In this situation the United States and other Western members have persisted in advocating human rights projects or institutional reforms in keeping with Western concepts. One of these, the proposal to establish a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as an international ombudsman in the field, has failed to be endorsed by the Assembly. Another, an effort to have the Human Rights Commission deal with non-governmental complaints has had some modest procedural success but may require years to yield practical results.

Other initiatives have been more successful. Notable among these is the designation of 1975 as International Women's Year and the scheduling of a UN conference on the subject in Mexico City in June. At the last General Assembly the United States and other Western members successfully sponsored resolutions for international rules against torture, for UN study of threats to human rights from modern technology, for action on behalf of families of soldiers missing in action, and for renewed attempts to frame a declaration against religious discrimination. We commend our government for its persistence in supporting these valuable initiatives.

Despite these modest gains, the outlook for effective international action on many major human rights problems remains bleak. Viewing the UN's slow progress in this field, Americans may be tempted to react with self-righteousness and cynicism. Such a reaction would be unwarranted. Here as in so many other fields of UN endeavor, our country's chances of enlisting majority support for its views could be enhanced by greater US attention across the board to the genuine grievances of the majority. In the human rights field, nothing could more effectively demonstrate such increased attention that ratification by the United States of basic human rights conventions such as those on Genocide and on Racial Discrimination.

We particularly commend to our government the ratification of these two conventions, delayed for so many years in Washington but so full of meaning to the community of nations. They deserve a much higher priority in US policy on human rights, and could, if implemented throughout the world, encourage the principles on which our own government is based. We further urge that the US State Department upgrade and adequately staff a separate office of Human Rights, within the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.

We are seriously concerned with the UN's double standard for human rights, as well as the erosion by recent majority votes of widely agreed international standards incorporated in the historic Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We believe that violations of religious freedom and freedom of emigration in many countries should be a matter of particular concern. And, as noted in our statement on Southern Africa, we unreservedly deplore violations of human rights wherever they take place.

We also oppose in the strongest terms the illegal and clearly anti-Jewish Arab blacklist and support President Ford's unequivocal position that such discrimination "is totally contrary to the American tradition and repugnant to American principles."

12. UNESCO

An especially disturbing action took place last November in the Paris meeting of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). A majority voted, over Western objections, to impose sanctions in the form of the cut off of all financial support to Israel and refused Israel's application for admission to the European regional group, thereby making Israel the only member of UNESCO to be refused admission to one of the regional working groups.

These actions were quickly condemned by scientists, artists and scholars in many countries. Many decided to boycott UNESCO activities. An even stronger reaction took place in the US Congress, which quickly passed the Case amendment to suspend payment of US assessed contributions to the UNESCO budget until the organization takes "concrete steps to correct its recent actions."

We unreservedly condemn the UNESCO General Conference's blatantly discriminatory actions against Israel. We also deplore the politicization of UNESCO (or any other UN specialized agency). We call on our government to exert every possible effort to obtain a reversal of these actions.

13. UNICEF

We call special attention to the work of UNICEF, one of the UN's family of agencies. Its programs, devoted to improving the health and welfare of mothers and children throughout the world, are among the most effective carried on in the UN system. We commend UNICEF for its continued excellent work and urge Americans to increase their traditional support with governmental and private contributions because of the critical needs facing the billion children in developing countries. We are particularly concerned that UNICEF aid be provided for child victims of the war in the Indochina peninsula.

14. INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN

The UN's designation of 1975 as International Women's Year has served to focus attention on a long-neglected issue. For years the question of women's rights was relegated to the Commission on the Status of Women and its small staff and virtually ignored by other branches of the Organization. One result is rank discrimination against women in the hiring and promotion practices of the Secretariats of the UN and the Specialized Agencies. There is need to equalize work and pay benefits, and to integrate more women into administrative and executive positions in the United Nations, and for study of employment practices to avoid discrimination in hiring. Another problem is a sexual imbalance in the targeting of UN development aid. Industrialization and vocational training programs are often designed for men only, with the unfortunate, if unplanned side effect of leaving women further behind their male counterparts than they were before the UN entered the picture. In the past few years, due partly to consciousness-raising with the approach of International Women's Year, some progress has been made toward sensitizing UN delegates to the interests of women. For example, statements about women and their status were included in the World Population Plan of Action and in the resolutions of the World Food Conference.

While the US government has as good a record as most in the field of women's rights, it, too, can do more in this area. We urge our government to increase the representation of women on US delegations to UN-sponsored conferences of all kinds, not just those that deal with "women's issues." It should work for Senate ratification of the UN human rights conventions that focus on women and should support a strengthening of the UN Secretariat's Branch for the Promotion of Equality of Men and Women. Vigorous enforcement of the Percy amendment to the US foreign aid program, calling for support by the US of programs that advance the status of women in developing countries, is essential. And on International Women's Year specifically, the US should support a positive World Plan of Action for the advancement of women at the Mexico City conference in June, and a concrete program for its implementation.

15. FINANCE AND PERSONNEL

For many years the member nations of the United Nations have permitted its financial and administrative affairs to undergo a gradual deterioration which bodes ill for the future of the organization. All too often the UN's administrative defects have been pointed to in Washington not as a condition to be remedied, but as an argument for reducing US contributions and for a general downgrading of the organization in US policy.

Issues of finance and administration are, of course, properly subordinate to questions of basic policy. If the United Nations were really marginal to our national interests, as is too often supposed, then its financial and administrative weaknesses would be small cause for concern. But if, as we believe, world problems of the present and future absolutely demand an effective world organization, then these weaknesses become a serious matter.

Accordingly, in line with our belief that the United Nations must be generally upgraded in US foreign policy, we urge our government to take these steps:

1. The total of US contributions to UN voluntary programs such as the UN Development Program, UNICEF, the World Food Program, the refugee programs, the environment and population funds, etc. should be raised substantially so as to restore them to a level consistent with the public pledge given by our government in 1972. At that time, in successfully arguing for the reduction of our share of the budget to 25 percent, the US pledged that this would not result in any "diminution in the overall commitment of US resources to the UN system." Our subsequent retreat from that pledge may cause damage to international cooperation out of all proportion to the potential budgetary savings of, at best, a few dimes per capita.

2. We should take a strong new initiative to clear up the UN's perennial deficit, now some $90 million, inherited from the bitter controversy more than a decade ago over the financing of peacekeeping operations. By US budgetary standards this deficit is a small matter, but to the UN it is large and debilitating. The constant hand-to-mouth financial practices it has imposed on the UN are utterly out of keeping with the great purpose and responsibilities of the organization. Some voluntary contributions to reduce

the deficit have been made by, among others, France, the United Kingdom and certain Persian Gulf states. The major sticking point has been the relative size of such contributions by the Soviet Union and the United States. We urge that in resolving this matter the US should be less preoccupied with the question of who is to blame for the creation of the deficit, and more with our country's fundamental interest in a more effective United Nations.

3. It should be our settled policy to uphold in every way we can the professional competence and impartiality of the United Nations Secretariat, and to set an example by the high quality of the persons we nominate to fill key UN posts. At its best the Secretariat is beyond praise; but too often is not at its best. Preoccupation of member states—including the US—with the number and rank of "their" nationals in the Secretariat, often on short-term rotation from national service, undermines the impartiality and coherence of the Secretariat and saps its morale. An effective system of recruitment and training of able junior career officials is badly needed. Our goal should be a Secretariat equal to that contemplated by the Charter; chosen in accordance with "the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity;" free of discrimination based on sex; insulated from influence by governments; and "responsible only to the Organization."

STATEMENT OF EDITH WYNNER OF NEW YORK

I am glad the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is holding hearings on the United Nations and I hope it will come to forthright decisions on the importance of American leadership in the coming first-stage consideration by the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Charter Review this summer.

I find it deplorable that the United States was one of the 15 nations voting against review. What a line-up was there with us! (Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States.) And what a betrayal of our own traditions of federalization to attain effective inter-state organization.

Since the end of World War II we have been increasingly addicted to the eighteenth and early nineteenth century practices of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Prince Metternich, with his holy and unholy alliances and our seemingly never-ending regional wars in Indochina which have not only ravaged those people but also damaged our economy and our standing in the world. And yet our Metternichian Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and our President, Gerald Ford, continue to equate trigger-happy readiness to make war with internationalism and a negative attitude to raining instant devastation here, there and everywhere to isolationism. They still haven't had enough of this diet despite the 150 billion dollars worth of military clutter with which North Vietnam has now been so generously endowed by our lavish stupidity and the greed and corruption of our military, our militarized industry and of the South Vietnamese leaders.

Our panicky over-reaction and sledge-hammer reflex action to free the ship, Mayaguez, and our determination to demonstrate our virility by once again slapping an impertinent little "punk" of a nation down, terrified me. It reminded me that we were acting like the Austro-Hungarian Empire toward Serbia, with its 48 hour ultimatum in July 1914, after the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. That Empire was a declining power and was determined to prove its virility so as to convince Germany that it was still worth having as an ally. Need I remind this Committee how that demonstration of great power virility ended? Serbia is one of three small European peoples with whom it is fatal for great powers to tangle. It helped destroy the Turkish Empire and the Austor-Hungarian Empire. Even the Soviet Empire under Stalin and his successors decided it was the better part of valor to call it a draw. With Mayaguez we too acted like a declining great power, hystericaliy determined to prove to our allies that we were still worth having as an ally. And most of our Congress cheered this act of hysteria. And that terrifies me even more. As if the Tonkin Gulf fabrication had never been.

In both individuals and nations, the process of maturation requires the experience of losing once in a while. The only profit we can reap from our harrowing experience in Indochina is an increase in national maturity. We have been act-

ing as world policeman since the end of World War II and shared government of the world with the Soviet Union since that time. Our Presidents have acted as part-time presidents of the world and our Congress has been acting as a part-time world legislature. Let us now abandon this make-shift role. At age 200 we ought to begin to show some maturity. And the most appropriate way to do that is to drop our Metternichean bully-boy role and revive our own eighteenth century tradition, which we pioneered and under which we still live but on which we turned our backs when we assumed leadership in the construction of international organization in 1919 and 1945. Both times we joined in establishing a confederate organization. Our thirteen states also began on this level but had a bellyful of its defects within thirteen years and meeting in constitutional convention they created a constitution for a federal republic of states.

In contrast to our American experience, we have on the world level over half a century of trial and tribulation with confederate organization. The present model—the United Nations—has in theory immense responsibilities over economic, social, political, peace-keeping and human rights problems. But in practice it is an over-grown paper-work factory, restricted to taken gestures and carefully confined to the more trivial episodes of man's inhumanity to himself. With the simultaneous pressure of converging global problems, unprecedented in character and immensity, our political time-lag is catastrophic. We are in acute need *now* of an already existing powerful world federal government capable of taking emergency action over a broad field of issues that should include coping with both the population and living-standard explosions; with the development, use, conservation and recycling of natural resources and protection of the environment for the benefit of present and future generations; with the ownership, administration, protection and supervision of sea-bed development; with control of nuclear research, testing and power production; with the supervision of simultaneous universal disarmament and the demobilization of standing armies; with the preservation of the democratic process and the stemming of world-wide erosion of civil government and provision for the protection of human rights. This is but a partial list of the overwhelming problems that require world action.

Now that we are no longer able to marshal automatic majorities in the United Nations General Assembly, we are increasingly displeased with the United Nations. As the New York Times editorial puts it today (May 27, 1975):

The reason the General Assembly does not work now is that countries with 10 percent of the world's population and 5 percent of its output can muster a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. Half that number can block a Soviet-American proposal—and have done so.

The disparity between nations with voting strength in the General Assembly and those with effective power in the real world has led to frustration on both sides.

This is one way of stating the problem but it is a superficial analysis of what is wrong with the United Nations. On December 17, 1974, 82 nations in the General Assembly voted for an Ad Hoc Committee of 42 to Review the Charter. Most of those voting were "the wretched of the earth" but no line-up containing as this one did, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Venezuela, Yugoslavia can be described as having only 10 percent of the world's population, nor are they all that insignificant in world output.

There are statistics and statistics. We choose the ones that suit our purpose. But let us take a look at the statistics that weigh on the developing world which contains the majority of earth's people. These figures are supplied by that former Pentagon whiz-kid, Robert S. McNamara, who used to give us those splendidly fictive, computerized body-counts of the Vietnam War. As President of the World Bank he now has a better grasp of the grim realities. He tells us:

"During the First Development Decade, the total Gross National Product of the world increased by 1100 billion dollars. But how was this growth in income distributed throughout the world? Eighty percent of the increase went to countries where per capita incomes already average over $1,000—and they contain only one-quarter of the world's population. Only 6 percent of the increase went to countries where per capita incomes average $200 or less—but they contain 60 percent of the world's people."

Professor Gunnar Adler-Karlsson of Roskilde University, Denmark, interprets this to mean that:

"People belonging to the world's 25 percent richest, consumed 32 times more per capita of the increase in total world income than every person belonging to the poorest three-fifths of the world population.

"During the sixties every rich individual increased his ecological pressure about thirty times more than every poor individual.

"60 percent constituting the poorest in the world get 11 percent of incomes, whereas the 20 percent richest get 66 percent of incomes."

He concludes that:

"The living standard explosion of the rich countries exerts a very much greater pressure on the limited resources of the earth . . . than does the growth of population in the developing countries."

Then there is still another way of looking unpleasant statistics in the face by taking note of the protein empire of which we surely constitute the top hog. This is how George Borgstrom, Professor of Agricultural Economics and Geography of Michigan State University, puts it:

"We continue to mobilize world resources almost to the exclusive benefit of the well-to-do. What amounts to a protein empire was built on the prevailing trade patterns, with Europe and Japan as dominant recipients. In the shape of grain, oilseeds, and oilseed meal, Europe is purchasing per year more feed protein in plant products than either Africa or India is over a whole year consuming as human food. The USSR was let in as a member of the luxury enclave last year, initiating the biggest transfer of food and feed ever taking place in history . . . thereby placing these indispensable reserves beyond reach of the hungry less rich world . . ."

World fertilizer production and consumption is another painful subject dividing the minority of the rich from the majority of the poor of the world. Kenneth Laidlow, Research Officer for the World Development Movement, had this to tell us on that:

"Over 90 percent of the world fertilizer production is in developed countries. The developing countries produce only 7 percent and consume 15 percent of world production. What this amounts to is that 30 percent of the world's population consumes 85 percent of the fertilizer supply.

"Whereas every developed country possesses its own domestic fertilizer industry, more than 70 countries in the developing world have no domestic production and are completely dependent on the developed world for their supplies. . . ." [1]

Enough in the developing world have learned to read to have learned not only that they are hurting, but also where they are hurting and why they are hurting. No wonder they're mad. This is why the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has begun to use clout to force fair prices and development out of us, over-consumers, during the relatively brief period before their highly depletable resource—oil—is exhausted They are trying plan ahead for that time.

Are we? Or do we first guzzle it up to the very last drop even though we no longer hold all the chips? Other developing countries are also beginning to insist on fair prices for the commodities and raw materials on which their livelihoods depend. Do we go through motions pretending to meet them halfway while we diddle them out of it? Do we imitate multinational corporations, such as United Brands and Gulf in bribing their governments so as to deprive their people of a living wage? Our Congress, President, Secretary of State and we, the people, have to face some really unpleasant facts very fast. We can no longer afford our high and wasteful standard of living and the rest of the world is coming to realize that they cannot afford us either.

Recently there has been a tremendous outpouring of indigantion over relatively trivial episodes within the United Nations, such as allowing the Palestine Liberation Organization leader, Yasir Arafat, to address the General Assembly, the suspension of South Africa and a UNESCO vote against Israel. Since the General Assembly it basically a talk-shop, even Arafat, ought to be allowed his say. He just might rely less on his machinegun if we let him use his mouth more. But surely these are trifles compared with United Nations inability to liberate the United States from its ten-year war in Indochina. Or its powerlessness to stop the massive world-wide proliferation of both so-called

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[1] The foregoing quotations are from the Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Oslo, 1975, Vol. I, pp. 8–9, 19, 25.

conventional and nuclear armaments involving the criminal waste of precious non-renewable resources in the production of this lethal junk.

American denunciation of United Nations misbehaviour, weakness and ineffectiveness comes with special ill grace from us. That's how Franklin D. Roosevelt designed it in May 1944 in order to get our Senate to accept it. One vote, one nation is part of the original sketch of what is essentially a permanent diplomatic conference with elaborate trimmings. Thirty years later, is the Senate of the United States ready for something more effective? Because as far as I can tell our State Department is basically content with things as they are since we voted against even the most superficial consideration of Charter Review.

Carlos Romulo of the Philippines has been the leader these many years in efforts to get the Charter reviewed. The Philippine Proposals presented by him in December are beautifully phrased, eminently sensible and moderate within a minimalist range that, if adopted, would make for more effective operation without earth-shaking changes in basic United Nations structure. Will the United States, which is on that Ad Hoc Committee of 42, support even these modest proposals or will we maintain our negative stance all the way? Then, on May 21, we learned of the recommendations of an International Panel appointed by the Secretary General, to contain the unmanageable, duplicating and inefficient Specialized Agency sprawl and to provide for behind-the-scenes consensual agreements on economic issues between developed and developing nations. Do we remain negative also on this?

I hope this Committee will put the heat on the Ford Administration to propose some serious, up-dated bicentennial, revolutionary American thinking on Charter Review. I also hope you will establish your own sub-committee to act as a stimulus and pacemaker. It is very important that the developing nations who are in favor of review, realize that American opinion on this issue is not a united monolith, that both in our Congress and among our people there is support for review and for fundamental changes to make for an effective United Nations.

However, we must also recognize that because of built-in barriers to major changes in the Charter, nothing significant may be achieved. Nevertheless, we cannot afford to sweep the question under the rug for another thirty years. I suggest we bear in mind that we too may have to do what our thirteen states did, letting the United Nations manage as best it can, while a World Constitutional Convention outside the United Nations system tries to hammer out an effective Constitution for World Federal Government, endowed with maximum powers to cope with the catastrophic problems we face.

Personally I do not believe that minor tinkering with the Charter can have any relevance to the agonies which engulf us. Therefore, as an example of a structured global plan containing the necessary far-reaching provisions that a World Constitution ought to encompass, I submit for inclusion with this statement in the Hearing Report, the enclosed Constitution for the Federation of Earth.[2] As far as I know this is the most recent draft proposal conceived in comprehensive maximalist terms and deserves the most serious attention.

THE WORLD ASSOCIATION OF WORLD FEDERALISTS PROPOSALS FOR UNITED NATIONS REFORM

The United Nations, as a political structure, is evolving with the passage of time and by the light of its experience in dealing with the problems of human society. Some substantial possibilities for further evolution, moreover, exist in the present Charter. History and experience show the need for continuing reform of the United Nations to meet the needs of a shrinking, dangerous and rapidly changing world.

Since 1945 the advent of nuclear power, the spreading of armaments, numerous wars, the wasting of resources, a deteriorating environment, rising human expectations in collision with poverty and over-population, a sharp increase in United Nations membership and major shifts in international relationships, and the demonstrated shortcomings of the United Nations in meeting these and other global problems and in the creation of world law, combine to show the urgency of reform and strengthening of the United Nations.

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[2] I have the permission of the World Constitution and Parliament Association to include this Constitution with my statement. (The Constitution for the Federation of Earth is on file with the committee.)

Proposals for the development of the United Nations must have the guiding purpose of promoting the well-being and dignity of the human person.

The longer term aims of the suggestions we offer are:

1. To strengthen the capacity of the United Nations as a means of international decision-making, as a system of justice and as a source of enforceable law, so that it may replace a system based on the threat and destructive use of national power;

2. To re-enforce human rights and to enable the United Nations to meet needs which nation-states or lower levels of government cannot effectively serve, and

3. To redirect the use of human and natural resources from war and arms into an improvement of the quality of life.

The World Association of World Federalists suggests to the Member Nations of the United Nations some important areas for reform of its structure and operation. We recommend such proposals as these to the Member Nations as a response to the request of the Secretary-General, acting for the General Assembly, that Member Nations present their views on review of the United Nations Charter at the 27th and 29th General Assemblies.

We believe that the challenges of our present world environment demand a quantum jump toward world order and that world leadership must move quickly to prepare an adequate response. We urge the 29th General Assembly to establish a United Nations committee for the orderly consideration of suggestions and proposals which have been made and will be made by Member Nations and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, with a view to the adoption at the earliest practicable date of those measures to strengthen the United Nations which gain general support.

Some of the recommended proposals would require, at least in part, changes in the present wording of the United Nations Charter. For other proposals, Charter changes would be preferred, but are not absolutely essential. Finally, we offer several suggestions concerning the development of the United Nations system which do not involve the Charter.

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I. PROPOSALS REQUIRING CHARTER CHANGE

1. Membership.—The function of the United Nations is to represent the peoples of humanity. Full implementation of the principle of universal membership will greatly strengthen the United Nations. The seating of the Peoples' Republic of China is a major advance toward the principle of universality. This development provides a basis from which to press forward for the admission of the other States not now Members of the United Nations. Amendment of the Charter is long overdue to remove from its language all reference to the "enemy states" of World War II.

2. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.—The provisions of the Charter for dealing with peaceful settlement of disputes need improvement. Experience indicates that the existing wording is too imprecise and too permissive, often leading to delay and the failure to deal with disputes at the optimum time for their settlement. There has been a tendency, moreover, for the United Nations to immobilize disputes, rather than to settle them.

The redrafting of Article 33 is therefore advisable in order to provide a specific mode of progression, when necessary, from two-party negotiations to increasingly higher levels of third-party involvement in stubborn diputes. Such provisions would commit the parties to a dispute, in advance, to accept arbitration or judicial settlement, in the event that negotiation, inquiry, mediation or conciliation may prove insufficient.

While, under Article 29, the Security Council may establish subsidiary organs as it deems them necessary for the performance of its functions, there is in fact no permanent standing machinery to function in pacific settlement of political disputes. Therefore the wording of Article 37 should be amended to include provisions for a standing Conciliation and Arbitration Commission. Such a Commission should consist of a small group of persons universally respected, such as past Presidents of the General Assembly; the Commission should determine its own procedures and methods, and its work should normally be confidential.

3. The International Court of Justice.—It is desirable to relate the Court much more closely and effectively to the maintenance of international peace and security. No single act would be of greater aid to this aim than for states

to declare that they recognize as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes.

In addition, the following amendments, among others, are worth consideration in reviewing the Charter and the Statutes of the International Court of Justice:

(*a*) There should be a provision for referring automatically to the International Court of Justice for judicial settlement the justiciable legal elements of any dispute which has proved intractable under a revised Article 33 on Peaceful Settlement.

(*b*) Broader provisions for the use of the Court for advisory opinions are necessary. At present the Security Council, the General Assembly, and any United Nations organ or agency so authorized by the Assembly may request an opinion. In addition, regional organizations, individual States, and the Secretary-General should have such rights before the Court.

(*c*) The United Nations as a legal entity should also have authorization to bring cases before the Court.

(*d*) There should be provisions to establish international regional Courts under the supervision of the International Court of Justice, and for the right of litigants to appeal from a regional court to the International Court of Justice.

4. Human Rights.—At the present time the United Nations deals with most human rights matters at as many as five different stages: in a sub-committee or ad hoc committee or by a special rapporteur, then in the Commission on Human Rights, in ECOSOC, next in the Third Committee, and finally in the Plenary of the General Assembly. The United Nations should create a new Human Rights Council to integrate these steps and to report directly to the General Assembly. Such a Council would be on the level of the Economic and Social Council, and would relieve ECOSOC of its human rights responsibilities, thus freeing it to concentrate on economic and social developments.

It is desirable that the United Nations should implement the proposal for creating a new post of High Commissioner for Human Rights. The establishment of a World Court of Human Rights to supplement existing and planned regional Courts of Human Rights deserves study. Such a World Court of Human Rights would have responsibilities analogous to the European Court of Human Rights.

5. Strengthening the ECOSOC.—The United Nations Economic and Social Council needs the means to fulfill the functions for which it is responsible. Moreover, the authorization in the Charter for ECOSOC to "co-ordinate the activities of the Specialized Agencies through consultation" is inadequate. We may well expect that the present enlarged membership of ECOSOC will strengthen its ability to make broadly based decisions of policy. It is important that ECOSOC reflect the kind of concerns about the terms of trade, commodity price levels and related matters which are central interests of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

For truly effective co-ordination of the economic and social work of the United Nations system, ECOSOC should have the authority to review all questions relating to economic and social matters before their submission to the General Assembly and to pass on the policies, plans and budgets of the concerned Specialized Agencies before their adoption by those bodies. Authority well beyond that specified in the Charter is necessary to enable the Economic and Social Council to carry out its job effectively.

II. PROPOSALS FOR WHICH CHARTER CHANGE IS DESIRABLE

6. Peacekeeping.—The Charter has spelled out the procedure for taking enforcement action against aggressors in Chapter VII. These provisions should, of course, be implemented. In addition, however, the framers of the Charter did not adequately foresee the evolution of international peacekeeping by interposition in order to arrest conflict and prevent violence without prejudice to the matter at issue. Consequently a new paragraph under Article 40 is desirable to spell out the generally agreed principles of observation and of peacekeeping by interposition. A draft of this new section should include points such as the following:

(*a*) The Security Council may, whenver it deems it necessary to prevent aggravation of a situation, establish United Nations Peace Observation Teams, and a United Nations Interposition Force to arrest or prevent violence, and to permit peaceful settlement as delineated in Chapter VI.

(*b*) The establishment, deployment and maintenance of such teams and forces would be in accordance with agreed guidelines to be annexed when developed.

(*c*) All Member Nations able and desiring to participate shall designate especially trained and instantly-ready observer personnel and armed contingents or equivalent support for the United Nations Observer Teams and Interposition Forces.

(*d*) The Security Council may at any time decide to authorize direct United Nations recruitment and training of such personnel, initially for a United Nations "fire brigade" force of not more than two thousand in number.

(*e*) All States shall accept United Nations Peace Observation Teams at any trouble spot and on both sides of contested areas or borders when required by the Security Council, the General Assembly or the Secretary General.

(*f*) United Nations peacekeeping operations by interposition need not, if international security requires, be confined to "consent type" missions in which states in potential or actual armed conflict assent to their use.

(*g*) Removal or recall of UNIForce contingents shall require a decision of the Security Council.

(*h*) The regular budget of the United Nations shall provide for financing of United Nations observer teams and UNIForce contingents together with a special Peacekeeping Fund held in reserve to assure rapid response in the event of threats to the peace.

(*i*) If the Security Council, which under the Charter has primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security, fails to act in establishing an observer team or an Interposition Force in any crisis situation, the General Assembly shall have the authority to act.

In order to assure a nucleus of individuals trained in control of violence, in arbitration and mediation, and to provide personnel specializing in the solution of problems of conflict the United Nations should establish, as one division of the United Nations University, an Academy for peacekeeping and related matters.

7. *Security Council Membership.*—The composition of the Security Council should reflect the realities of power and responsibility in the United Nations balancing the representation of all Member Nations in the General Assembly. Regarding the election of non-Permanent Members, the Charter says, "due regard is to be given to the contribution of Members to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization." This principle could be applied informally by the more frequent election of those States most able to contribute to the purposes of the Organization. To facilitate this, the prohibition of the Charter against immediate re-election should be removed. However, such informal arrangements as these might well prove insufficient.

Among possible means for such purposes would be the creation, formally or informally, of a new class of semi-permanent Members by adding a seat for each world region which the nations of such a region most able to contribute to the purposes of the United Nations would occupy in rotation or according to the wishes of the regional group. In order that Council membership may better reflect world realities, a provision of this nature might explicitly change one-half of the existing non-Permanent seats to semi-permanent seats, or might add new semi-permanent seats and thus modestly enlarge the membership of the Council to 21. Either of these means would enable the creation of semi-permanent seats for each world region. Such a step would require amendment of Article 23 of the Charter.

8. *Security Council Voting.*—The Charter Provision that action in substantive matters shall require the affirmative votes of all the Permanent Members should be changed or modified, while still recognizing that primary responsibility for peace and security rests with the Permanent Members. The unanimity rule has, in fact, already undergone modification in that the Security Council no longer regards the abstention or "non-participation" of a Permanent Member as a "veto". Simply to bring the Charter into line with this practice requires a change of the language prescribing that decisions on substantive matters shall require the affirmative votes of nine Members provided that no Permanent Member costs a negative vote.

A further step forward would be to limit the use of the veto, for instance by provision for special majorities in certain situations, except in matters involving enforcement action by the United Nations. This could take place initially by a voluntary agreement for a specified number of years, after which the principle could become a part of the Charter. Experience indicates the desirability of retaining the unanimity requirement for enforcement action as envisaged under Articles 42–54. However, unanimity of the Permanent Members should not be a

requirement for peacekeeping by interposition, nor for any Security Council resolution other than on enforcement. The "veto" should not be extended to any new Members, permanent or otherwise; or, in any case, there should be no increase in the present number of vetoes.

Recent reforms of the procedures of the General Assembly offer an example for possible improvements of the practices of the Security Council. Among such possibilities are meetings of the Council to review implementation of its resolutions, including periodic meetings at the ministerial level implementing the provision of Article 28, Paragraph 2 of the present Charter for this purpose; the creation of an Executive Committee for day-to-day observation of world events; and the establishment of subsidiary organs for investigation, for fact-finding in disputes, and for purposes of inquiry, good offices, conciliation and mediation.

9. General Assembly Voting and Representation.—The one-nation-one-vote principle in the General Assembly needs re-examination in the course of any major review of the structure of the United Nations. Several proposals are available which could bring General Assembly representation and voting more into line with world political reality and with the principles of democracy and justice.

10. United Nations Finance.—United Nations revenue is grossly inadequate for the tasks at hand, and is a tragically small sum compared to the more than 200 billion dollars which the world's nations spend annually on arms.

To supplement contributions from Member States it will be useful to investigate other sources of revenue. Such sources might include revenues from the exploitation of the sea-bed and a limited tax or license fee in relation to space communications and other commercial uses of outer space.

The idea is worth consideration that the United Nations should have the power to offer certain types of services to international corporations, and to grant them charters, and to impose limited taxes.

A special United Nations fund should exist in each country to enable individuals, corporations and foundations to contribute to humanitarian and educational activities of the United Nations.

11. An International Disarmament Agency.—The United Nations has long recognized that the thorough implementation of General and Complete Disarmament will require the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization. Both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics draft treaties for General and Complete Disarmament make provision for an International Disarmament Organization. Any review of the United Nations structure should examine the character of such an International Disarmament Organization and its relationship with the other organs of the United Nations. Since disarmament is a Charter obligation, we believe that all disarmament negotiations should take place under the auspices of the United Nations.

III. PROPOSALS NOT REQUIRING CHARTER CHANGE

12. The United Nations Development Program.—The strengthening and expansion of the United Nations Development Program as a result of recent studies is welcome. The enhanced potentiaal of UNDP an as agent for economic and social development programs should be an encouragement for industrially developed States to channel larger contributions and a greater proportion of their economic assistance through UNDP. The important advantages of multilateral as opposed to bilateral aid have become more apparent both to donors and to recipients. In connection with achievement of the goals of the Second Development Decade, States should substantially increase their contributions to the UNDP.

13. A World Environmental Agency.—The United Nations Environment Program should eventually become a global authority with the responsibility for dealing effectively with the problems of the environment, and in particular should become the co-ordinating and expediting body for international standards and guidelines for control of the contamination of the environment.

14. An Ocean Space Regime.—For the protection of the environment, the marine food chain, rights of navigation, the rational exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed, and peaceful relations between all users of the world's waters, the United Nations should establish a Regime to control the use of the sea-bed and the waters beyond the limits of national jurisdiction both as regards their

mineral and living resources. The maximum possible area of the sea-bed should be reserved to international jurisdiction.

The United Nations should ensure the development and protection of the oceans as the common heritage of mankind. A substantial portion of the revenues from the exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed should accrue to budgetary and economic development needs of the United Nations. For these purposes it is necessary to specify a form of organization with effective jurisdiction, and to specify its relationship to the other organs of the United Nations system.

15. Relief in International Disasters.—In order to supplement and strengthen the action of the United Nations establishing the post of Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, and in order to provide a prompt international response in situations arising from catastrophes both natural and man-caused, we proposed setting up under the auspices of the United Nations a Disaster Relief Agency, equipped with materiel and personnel means necessary for rapid and efficient intervention in disaster situations, and for the purpose of co-ordinating the efforts of relevant United Nations agencies, national governments and voluntary groups.

STATEMENT OF WOMEN'S LEAGUE OF CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM

The United Nations has now grown to 138 countries. Lacking sovereign power, it can only accomplish what these member nations are willing to support. Women's League for Conservative Judaism realizes that the survival of this international organization for thirty years is no mean achievement. We believe that, as an essential element in the structure of a peaceful world, the United Nations is greatly in need of improvement. We believe that the active participation of the United States in the U.N. can help achieve this. We believe that the United States can improve its image and its influence in the U.N. if our government, the prime mover of the original resolution, would endorse the Genocide Convention—a convention based on principles of human dignity.

There is a constituency for the United Nations in the United States, to support the following U.N. programs, all of which our organization of 200,000 women endorses.

HUMAN ENVIRONMENT

Women's League for Conservative Judaism urges our government to work together with the United Nations to control those aspects of the environment which cannot be regulated by private or national action. It is only through international cooperation that the objectives of the Stockholm Conference can become a reality.

RESOURCES OF THE SEA AND USE OF SEA BEDS

Women's League for Conservative Judaism urges our government to cooperate with the U.N. measures seeking to:

1. Prevent any state from further extending its territorial jurisdiction in the sea, or laying claim to mineral resources on the bed of the sea beyond such jurisdiction.
2. Forbid the use of the floor of the seas for nuclear armaments.
3. Provide for the exploitation of the sea as a common heritage of mankind.

DRUGS

Women's League for Conservative Judaism urges our government to utilize the influence of the United Nations over its member nations to cooperate in stopping the production of heroin and other drugs at their source. We also urge our government to give added support to the U.N. Commission for Narcotic Drugs, which has been charged with the control of narcotic drugs and the elimination of narcotic-yielding crops at the source.

APARTHEID

Women's League for Conservative Judaism condemns the policy of Apartheid and urges our government to observe the sanctions of the United Nations designed to end Apartheid in South Africa, and to observe the United Nations Security sanctions against Rhodesia.

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UNICEF

Women's League for Conservative Judaism urges the continued support, wholeheartedly, of UNICEF's life-giving and essential programs and projects to care for the homeless, to combat disease, to banish illiteracy and to furnish the means whereby the world's children may be aided to grow up in a happier and peaceful world.

FOOD AND POPULATION

Women's League for Conservative Judaism calls upon and urges all governments in the United Nations to work together on realistic measures to expand production and distribution of food, and to support sound population policies.

ALEXANDRIA, VA., *May 9, 1975.*

Senator JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: Would you be kind enough to include the enclosed article, "What's Wrong With the United Nations", in the published record of the hearings that the Committee is currently conducting on the United Nations? Thank you very much.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL BURCH.

Reed Benson & Robert Lee

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE UNITED NATIONS

■ DURING a lengthy foreign policy report to Congress on February 18, 1970, President Nixon asserted: "As the United Nations begins its second quarter century, America reaffirms its strong support for the principles and promise begun at San Francisco in 1945. Our task now – as for all U.N. members – is to help the organization in steady progress toward fulfillment of that promise."

Thus, Mr. Nixon affirmed that the United States would continue one of the major tragedies of its contemporary foreign policy by relying on, and supporting, an organization which was conceived by Communists, created by Communists, is controlled by Communists, and operates consistently to further the objectives of Communism.

We realize that many Americans may find it difficult to accept this evaluation of the United Nations. The image of the U.N. which has been created by our "Liberal" politicians and communications media over the years has been so blatantly one-sided in favor of the world body that the American people as a whole simply have not been allowed to evaluate properly the U.N. record. Some United Nations propagandists have even been so bold as *publicly* to encourage newsmen to project a false U.N. image to the world. In a February 14, 1961, speech to the United Nations Correspondents Association, for example, United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson urged the news media:

> *Help us to create the sense of our overriding human concern. Interpret us to each other not as plotters or as war mongers or as demons or demigods, but as puzzled yet aspiring men and women struggling on the possible brink of Armageddon to achieve a common understanding and a common approach.* We are not at all like that, I have no doubt. *But I believe the majority of our delegates would accept such a description of their own attitudes. The whole press corps*

working at the United Nations has a unique part to play in projecting this picture . . . . (Emphasis ours. *United Nations Guardian Of Peace,* Department of State Publication 7225, September, 1961, Page 36.)

One of the tactics used by the United Nations propaganda network to attract the support of the American people is the claim that the Communists are trying to destroy the U.N., and it is therefore in America's interest to support it. An attempt is usually then made to discredit Americans who oppose the United Nations by claiming they are working for the same end as the Communists. It's a clever pitch, but what is the truth about the Communist attitude towards the U.N.?




Hiss, Truman, Stettinius at U.N. founding.

Let's look at a sampling of the record.

Political Affairs is the monthly theoretical journal of the Communist Party, U.S.A. In April of 1945 – two months before the San Francisco Conference at which the U.N. was founded – that journal told its readers: "Great popular support and enthusiasm for the United Nations policies should be built up, well organized and fully articulate . . . . The opposition must be rendered so impotent that it will be unable to gather any significant support in the Senate against the United Nations Charter and the treaties which will follow."

In June of 1945, Alger Hiss (who had been described by *Time* magazine in its issue for April 16, 1945, as "one of the State Department's brighter young men," and who was later convicted of perjury for lying about his activities on behalf of the Soviet Union) presided as Secretary General of the San Francisco Conference. And shortly thereafter, under a barrage of Leftist propaganda, the U.S. Senate ratified the Charter with only two dissenting votes. The opposition had indeed been rendered "impotent."

On March 23, 1946, Josef Stalin was quoted by *Pravda* as having declared: "I attribute great importance to U.N.O. since it is a serious instrument for preservation of peace and international security." And in November of 1946 the Soviet publication *Bolshevik* (No. 22, Page 51) asserted that "The masses know that peace is possible only on the basis of cooperation among the existing



THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
SAN FRANCISCO 1945

THE BEARER LIEUT. STANHOPE LINEBERRY
is a visitor and may be admitted to the Conference premises subject to regulations concerning attendance at meetings

VALID ONLY ON DATE STAMPED
APR 25 1945 — JUN 26 1945

NINTH PLENARY SESSION

Alger Hiss
SECRETARY GENERAL

Pass to U.N. founding conference, signed by Communist Alger Hiss as U.N. Secretary General.

states . . . . The Soviet Union is fighting to have the United Nations as effective as possible."

By December 21, 1954, we find the Communist *Daily Worker* pointing out to its readers that " . . . it's not the U.N. that merits your scorn and active opposition, but the policies that have undermined the U.N. . . . " That is, the U.N. must be consistently supported by Communists unless specific notice is given to the contrary. This attitude on the part of the Comrades began to be even more forcefully presented in 1961. For by that time opposition to the United Nations in the United States was beginning to grow and – more important – to become effective. Instead of remaining diffused, opposition to the U.N. was being mounted in a manner that was causing real concern to those running the United Nations Organization. And so, on October 7, 1961, the West Coast newspaper of the Communist Party, *People's World,* carried an editorial entitled, "Save the U.N." It declared, in part:

> *The U.N. commands a great reservoir of support in our country.*
>
> *This support should now be made vocal.*
>
> *People should write President Kennedy, telling him –*
>
> *Do not withdraw from U.N.*
>
> *Restore U.N. to the Grand Design of Franklin Roosevelt – the design for peaceful coexistence.*

And on January 21, 1962, *The Worker* (no longer a daily) carried an article headlined, "Birchers Take Warpath Against UN Peace Hopes," to tell the Comrades:

> *The John Birch Society has instructed its members to prepare a hate campaign against the United Nations. In his secret "bulletin" for members, Robert Welch . . . orders his followers to place this anti-United Nations drive at the top of their 1962 political agenda . . . . It was in the spring of last year that the ultra hate campaign to destroy the United Nations actually began. The origins of this insidious business can be traced to . . . a so-called "United States Day Committee," the purpose of which was to replace United Nations Day with "United States Day."*

In late 1964 and early 1965 the Xerox Corporation sponsored a television series to present the most blatant sort of U.N. propaganda. In commenting on one of these programs the Communist *People's World* for January 23, 1965, noted: "It's not a little horrifying that in our country at this time a pitch is needed for the UN and for peace, but that is the case, and we're all for figuratively hitting people over the head with the message. The [*Xerox*] program did that."

And on June 27, 1965, Mikhail Sergeyevich Lvov, an official Soviet spokesman on U.N. affairs, told a *Moscow Radio* audience: "There can be no doubt that with the United Nations constituted as it is at present, the consistent line of the Soviet Union in pressing for the United Nations to face fully up to the problems of strengthening peace and ensuring freedom is producing more and more positive results." (*Congressional Record*, August 4, 1965, Page A4317.)

In the Aesopian language of Communism the word *peace* means "an absence of resistance to Communism." If it were possible to find an island somewhere on which there had not been even a fist fight for fifty years, that island would still not be "peaceful" to the Communists until it had become completely subjected to their rule. And in light of this Communist use of the word, the following Associated Press dispatch from the *Los Angeles Times* of April 7, 1970, takes on special meaning:

> *Secretary General U Thant praised Vladimir I. Lenin, founder of the Soviet Union, as a political leader whose ideals were reflected in the U.N. charter.*
>
> *Thant released Monday the text of a statement sent to a symposium on Lenin at Tempere, Finland, sponsored by the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* [U.N.E.S.C.O.].*

*It should not surprise anyone that U.N.E.S.C.O. would sponsor a symposium honoring Lenin. As far back as 1956, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee noted in its Annual Report for the year: "What appears . . . to be by far the worst

"Lenin was a man with a mind of great clarity and incisiveness, and his ideas have had a profound influence on the course of contemporary history," Thant's statement said.

"(Lenin's) ideals of peace and peaceful coexistence among states have won widespread international acceptance and they are in line with the aims of the U.N. charter . . . . "

Earl Browder, former General Secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and twice its candidate for President of the United States, wrote in his book *Victory And After*: "The American Communists worked energetically and tirelessly to lay the foundations for the United Nations, which we were sure would come into existence." And a Preamble to the Constitution of the Communist Party, U.S.A., states that the Party believes "the true national interest of our country and the cause of peace and progress require . . . the strengthening of the United Nations as a universal instrument of peace." Clearly, the belief that the Communists actually *oppose* the U.N. cannot withstand the massive evidence to the contrary.

In its issue for December 12, 1952, *U.S. News & World Report* noted: "An informed estimate suggests that as many as one-half of the 1,350 administrative executives in the UN are either Communists or people who are willing to do what they want." A few years later, on March 22, 1954, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee reported:

In our investigation of United States citizens employed by the United Nations, we found considerable evidence to indicate that Communists used the same techniques in infiltrating the U.N. Secretariat, as had previously been used in infiltrating the United States Government.

Some of these persons exposed in our Government investigation played key roles in the actual establishment of the U.N. itself as well as the establishment of U.N.'s specialized agencies. (Activities of United States Citizens Employed By The United Nations, *Page 9.*)

Four years earlier, in 1950, the State Department had issued a volume

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danger spot, from the standpoint of disloyalty and subversive activity among Americans employed by international organizations, is UNESCO . . . . Mr. Pierce Gerety, former Chairman of the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board . . . expressed the opinion that there existed in UNESCO a clique of people who placed the interests of the Communists and Communist ideology above any service to UNESCO, and above their own country."

In 1962, U.N.E.S.C.O. published a blatantly pro-Communist tract entitled, *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*, the slant of which is well-illustrated by this quotation from Page thirteen: "The Soviet Union is a brotherhood of free and equal peoples comprising 15 sovereign Soviet republics in voluntary association on a footing of complete equality. Under the Constitution of the USSR, each of these republics retains the right to secede from the Union. Each of them embodies the collective will of its people and can decide its own future in entire freedom."

entitled *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945,* which listed the following men, among others, as being key U.S. Government figures in U.N. planning: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, Virginius Frank Coe, Noel Field, Laurence Duggan, Henry Julian Wadleigh, John Carter Vincent, David Weintraub, Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, Harold Glasser, Victor Perlo, Irving Kaplan, Solomon Adler, Abraham George Silverman, William L. Ullman and William H. Taylor. *All sixteen* were later identified in sworn testimony as secret Communist agents!

This does not mean, of course, that the Communists do not now and then *pretend* to oppose the United Nations. To the contrary, the Communists realize better than anyone else just how repulsive their system is to the vast majority of mankind, and they are perfectly willing to attack the U.N. and its policies from time to time if their mere vituperation will help to rally public opinion in non-Communist countries behind policies they really want. Former Ambassador Adlai Stevenson helped to confirm this thesis a few years ago when he declared:

> *. . . the Soviet Union has attacked the United Nations, has refused to pay its share of the Congo expenses, and has laid siege to the institution of the Secretary-General. Thus,* as often before, the Soviets have pressed their attack at a moment when the [*U.N.*] community seems most divided against itself. *But, once again, that very attack makes the members realize more keenly that they are members of a community* and causes them to draw together. (*Emphasis ours.* United Nations Guardian Of Peace, *Page 24.*)

Stevenson's reference to Soviet attacks on the post of Secretary General is especially noteworthy. He was referring, of course, to the Soviet demands for replacement of that office with a "Troika" system. You will recall that prior to September of 1961 the Soviet demands for the "Troika" were very firm – so much so, in fact, that Adlai Stevenson and then-Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld and others told us that the very existence of the U.N. was thereby threatened. In mid-September of 1961, however, Hammarskjöld was killed in a plane crash in the Congo and the position of Secretary General became vacant. Here was an unparalleled opportunity for the Soviets to wreak havoc in the U.N. by pressing their "Troika" demands and refusing to accept a new Secretary General. But what actually happened? The Soviets turned off their "Troika" talk like a water faucet, backed Burmese Marxist U Thant as Hammarskjöld's successor, and "permitted" the U.N. to go right on supporting Soviet interests.

Another unintended confirmation of this Communist duplicity was given on March 3, 1966, when Leftist (and pro-U.N.) news commentator Howard K. Smith spoke at Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah. During his

talk, Mr. Smith made this point: "The Russians attacked us bitterly over the Congo, but the key fact is they voted for U.N. intervention in the Congo. The Russians attacked us bitterly over the Cyprus crisis, but the main thing is they did not veto U.N. action; they let it go in."

And in 1964, when the Afro-Asian bloc at the U.N. was pressing for an increase in membership on various councils of the world body, the Communists pretended to oppose this move in public debate, but then quietly reversed themselves when it counted. A dispatch of June 13, 1964, from the News Service of the *New York Herald Tribune* described the situation this way: "The Soviet Union quietly backed down in its opposition to Afro-Asian demands for an expansion of the United Nations Security Council and economic and social council . . . . During the assembly's debates on these resolutions, the Soviet Union and the entire Communist block . . . opposed the proposal." Later in the same year, Associated Press writer Max Harrelson commented on this Communist tactic. In a report carried in the *Salt Lake Tribune* for November 8, 1964, Harrelson noted:

> *Those who have observed Soviet actions at the United Nations over the past 18 years are sure only that the Russians can – and do – change their minds.*
>
> *They may walk out of a U.N. body today and return without so much as a word to explain their reversal.*
>
> *Over the years they have made many threats they have never carried out, and they have suddenly abandoned policies which they previously held to be absolutely unchangeable.*

One of the instances then discussed by Mr. Harrelson was that of the Korean situation in 1950. The Soviets, using the non-membership of Red China in the U.N. as an excuse, walked out of the Security Council. The Council, with Russia absent, then voted U.N. intervention in Korea – "a decision," wrote Harrelson, "which the Soviet Union could have blocked with its veto if it had been present." After the vote, and with Red China still not seated in the United Nations, the Soviets returned to the Security Council. And they must have given a Br'er Rabbit-like chuckle at having been thrown into the very Korean brier patch which history has shown they had sought from the beginning – especially as they watched U.S. and U.N. officials chortle about how the Soviet walkout "backfired" on the Communists.

The placing of American forces under U.N. command in Korea was most obviously in the interest of the Communists, since the U.N. post of Undersecretary General for Political and Security Council Affairs, which has the responsibility of controlling the military and police functions of U.N. "peace-keeping" forces, was then (and always has been) held by a Communist.

This last point brings us to a ques-



U.N. troops in Congo fire on civilians.

tion of some importance: If the ideals of "peace" held by Lenin are in line with the aims of the U.N. Charter (as U Thant claims they are), and if the U.N. post responsible for control of U.N. "peace-keeping" operations is supervised by a Communist, then is the United Nations really a peace organization? The answer, in one sense, is "yes." As we mentioned earlier, the Communists define *peace* as an absence of resistance to Communism. And the record clearly shows that this is what the U.N. means when *it* talks of "peace." For instance, when the United Nations waged war against black-ruled, anti-Communist Katanga in the early Sixties, it described its atrocities there as a "peace-keeping" operation. Katanga was firm in its opposition to the desires of the Communists in Africa, and the U.N. mercenaries were sent in to bomb hospitals and bazooka ambulances until this "resistance to Communism" was removed. The operation, in Communist and United Nations terms, was therefore "peaceful."

The principle holds true in 1970 in the case of white-ruled, anti-Communist Rhodesia. Rhodesia refused to go along with plans for a Communist-style drive for a phony "independence," and instead declared her own *real* independence contrary to the Communist timetable. This resistance to Communist plans was met with vicious propaganda, economic sanctions, and threats of physical violence



U.N. soldier views the wounded and dead.

from the United Nations – again, in the name of "peace."

However, if we set aside the United Nations' Communist definition of *peace,* and simply use the word as most Americans think it should be used and expect it to be used, it becomes obvious that the United Nations is actually a *war* organization.

One of the most astute international lawyers of our time, Ambassador J. Reuben Clark Jr., drafted an important cursory analysis of the United Nations Charter in August of 1945, at about the time the ink on the new Charter was drying. Ambassador Clark, who served as both Undersecretary of State and Ambassador to Mexico, and authored the authoritative *Memorandum On The Monroe Doctrine,* charged in his analysis of the Charter:

> *There seems no reason to doubt that such real approval as the Charter has among the people is based upon the belief that if the Charter is put into effect, wars will end . . . . The Charter will not certainly end war. Some will ask – why not? In the first place, there is no provision in the Charter itself that contemplates ending war. It is true the Charter provides for force to bring peace, but such use of force is itself war . . . . The Charter is built to prepare for war, not to promote peace . . . . The Charter is a war document not a peace document . . . .*
>
> *Not only does the Charter Organization not prevent future wars, but it makes it practically certain that we shall have future wars, and as to such wars it takes from us the power to declare them, to choose the side on which we shall fight, to determine what forces and military equipment we shall use in the war, and to control and command our sons who do the fighting.*

Remember, this was August of 1945. In the light of the U.N. record since that time, can there be any doubt as to the accuracy of Ambassador Clark's analysis?

President Herbert Hoover was another who came to recognize the truth about the U.N.'s alleged role as a promoter of "peace." In a speech delivered on August 10, 1962, President Hoover admitted: "I urged the ratification of the United Nations Charter by the Senate. But I stated at that time, 'The American people should be under no illusions that the Charter assures lasting peace.' But now we must realize that the United Nations has failed to give us even a remote hope of lasting peace. Instead, it adds to the dangers of wars which now surround us."

This same general conclusion has been affirmed editorially by a number of the nation's newspapers which have stood firm against the barrage of pro-U.N. propaganda and pressure. One such paper, the highly respected *Santa Ana Register,* commented on March 2, 1964: "Most of those folks who say they like the United Nations proffer

their affections on the grounds that the U.N. is a 'peace-making' organization. Now, that simply isn't so. The whole purpose and, indeed, the method of the U.N. is to use armed might against any nation presumed to be an aggressor. Its function is to make war . . . . We object to it [*the U.N.*] because, though it professes peace, it is obviously a war-making agency. Even the U.N. has not been able to disguise this fact altogether, though, in its early days, it deceived a great many."

And a practical illustration of how well the United Nations has "preserved peace" appeared in the *Indianapolis News* on April 29, 1963, where a report headlined, "There Is No Peace – 18 Years, 57 Wars," catalogued the escalation of wars since the year the U.N. was founded. Yes, even seven years ago there had already been *fifty-seven* of them. The United Nations was allegedly founded as a fire commission to extinguish the flames of war. Yet, from the very beginning, the world's most notorious pyromaniacs – the Communists – have had controlling influence over the commission.

On July 9, 1970, President Nixon appointed a special forty-five member Commission for the observance of the U.N.'s twenty-fifth anniversary. According to Executive Order 11546, which established the Commission, one of its tasks will be "to convey to the American people a balanced and realistic understanding of the United Nations family of agencies . . . . " This will not be accomplished, of course, because the Commission is heavily stacked with U.N. advocates, and its Chairman is former U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. (The Vice-Chairman is Frederick Ehrman, chairman of Lehman Brothers, the enormously wealthy banking partnership famous for its support of Leftist activities.) Americans who would like to gain a "balanced and realistic understanding" of the U.N. will have to look elsewhere.*

The United Nations was purportedly formed to ensure peace and extend freedom in the world. Yet, since its inception, there has been continual warfare and over a billion people have been enslaved by the Communists. Obviously, from the standpoint of *real* peace and freedom, the United Nations has been a catastrophe. Yet, from the standpoint of the Communists, it has been a smashing success. It is tragic, but nevertheless true, that United States participation in the United Nations makes every American taxpayer, in effect, a supporter of the largest Communist Front organization in the world. It is the task of informed Americans to tell the *truth* about the United Nations as widely as possible, in the hope that the day may soon come when the anti-U.N. slogan "Get US out!" can be changed to "Keep US out!" ■ ■

*As one source of excellent information, we suggest the *United Nations Packet* available (at one dollar) from American Opinion, Belmont, Massachusetts 02178.

Reprints of this copyrighted article are available at the following prices: One to 99 copies, ten for one dollar; 100-999 copies, eight cents each; 1,000 or more copies, seven cents each. Order from *The Review Of The News*, Belmont, Massachusetts 02178.

ELSMAN, YOUNG & O'ROURKE,
Detroit, Mich., April 30, 1975.

Re U.N. Charter review hearings.

Senator JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: I would like to be considered to give testimony at the above hearings. I'm a private lawyer with a rather "establishment" background who is concerned that the U. S. is not exerting enough leadership in promoting a regulated world under law. Such void allows many of the observable world conflicts and tragedies we read about to go on-and-on, when, I believe, creative men can build a better structure. U. N. Charter Reform is the best means, it seems to me.

In the course of my concern, I tried my hand at a proposed World Constitution which I enclose herein. It has had considerable circulation amongst lawyers around the world.

My Martindale-Hubbell biographical sketch is enclosed for your information.

Please let me know if and when you desire my testimony. Please respond to the Birmingham address underlined above.

Best wishes in your important work,

Very truly yours,

JAMES L. ELSMAN.

[Enclosure is on file with the Committee.]

STATEMENT OF ROBERT Y. GROMET, M.D., CHAIRMAN, NORTH AMERICAN GROUP, WORLD FEDERAL AUTHORTY COMMITTEE

We humans have less than 9 years left to us to create a new government to be placed over the governments of the individual nations. If we fail to do this, George Orwell's "1984" will arrive, and we will all become like ants or robots under the several "Big Brothers" who will be the totalitarian rulers of the few super-powers which will rule the whole earth. Everybody will be equal, but of course some will be more equal than others. Human liberty will be dead, private thoughts will be manipulated by drugs in the water supply, and intimate actions of individuals will be under covert surveillance.

In today's world, traditional foreign policy, which is based on "power politics," can no longer be effective, because of many developments which have made such policy, strategy, and tactics, as dead as the extinct dodo. Some of these existing and expanding phenomena and situations are:

1. Intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying hydrogen bomb warheads, which can traverse 3 or 4 thousand miles in 15 minutes, and can wreak instantaneous destruction of people by the tens of millions, annihilate whole cities with their thousand-square-miles of suburban areas, and even of all plant and animal life on earth, through their delayed radiological effects.

2. Pollution of air, land and sea, not only as a result of the possible Armageddon just mentioned, but through cumulation of radioactive poisons consequent to testing of atomic and thermonuclear weapons by ever-increasing numbers of nations, ever third-rate in size. Also, ordinary types of pollution due to industrial waste-products are of course large dangers, with alarming growth-rates.

3. Overpopulation of the world in relation to supplies of available foods. Huge birth-rates contribute seriously to this peril.

4. Guerrilla, anarchist, and terrorist attacks arising in one country and invading another, as well as hi-jacking of airplanes, sending explosives to other countries through the postal services, fomenting revolutions and civil wars for ulterior purposes, and similar lawless activities.

5. Monopolistic control of natural resources such as oil, accompanied by financial and commercial pressures of such proportions on other nations, as in effect to be practically equivalent to "blackmail".

6. Hazards attendant on competitive exploitation of undersea oil and mineral wealth.

7. Numerous other international situations and problems, each laden with its own kind of threat to world peace, economic justice, financial stability, industrial

development, health, liberty, individual human rights, and cultural protection and growth.

Modern airplane transportation, and instantaneous world-wide distribution of news by television and radio, utilizing extra-terrestrial earth-satellites, have made people in even the remotest sections and countries of the "Third World," ambitious to share in the wealth and conveniences of the industrialized countries, which seem fantastic in amount and character, when these peoples compare them with their own "have-not" status. There is a revolution of rising expectations growing throughout much of the world. The Chinese have an ancient saying, which goes something like this: "When the rich are too rich, there is a way; and when the poor are too poor, there is a way."

Unless the "have" nations learn to assist these expectations, with more than token efforts, and at the same time cope with the hindrances standing in the way of appropriate development of the under-privileged nations, while continuing to guide the latter into equitable, peaceful and lawfully regulated channels, for which supra-national government of the world is necessary, calamities of horrible dimensions to all humanity will follow one upon the other, as recently predicted in Orwell's "1984." On the other hand, over a hundred years ago the poet Alfred, Lord Tennsyon, predicted in his poem, "Locksley Hall,"

> "Till the war-drum throbb'd no longer,
> And the battle-flags were furled
> In the Parliament of man, the Federation
> of the world."

In the Bible over two thousand years ago the prophet Isaiah predicted in Chapter 2, verse 4,

> "And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares,
> And their spears into pruning hooks;
> Nation shall not lift up sword against nation,
> Neither shall they learn war any more."

These are concepts of a religious nature, as well as of practical necessity, if humankind is to survive. Practically all the religions of the world preach this same basic message. If we, the human community or extended family, fail to comply, we shall be doomed, if not to actual extinction, then to a life no better than that of the insects.

The essential elements of a government placed above national governments, according to numerous qualified investigators, embrace the following:

A Constitution or Charter, creating a government, not a Confederation, league, treaty organization, or falsely named "Union," but a dynamic authority or organism in being, functioning with adequate powers, duties, financing, taxing power, and support, to achieve the following purposes:

Prevention of war, termination of military actions or naval blockades, disarmament, protecting victims of aggression, settling of international quarrels and disputes, fostering of human rights, economic and social justice, relieving disasters; cultural security industrialization, equitably regulating world trade and currency exchange, protecting the ecology, and doing things individual national governments cannot effectively achieve unilaterally.

A Legislature, empowered by the Constitution or Charter to pass laws in specified domains which are binding on national governments, all corporations, and all individuals (who will be citizens of the new world super-nation created by this process).

The members of the Legislature must represent constituencies or districts based on size of population, with variations accounting for levels of literacy and Civilization. The Legislature probably should consist of more than one chamber, with representation of national governments in one Chamber or House. The Legislature shall have power to override an Executive Dept. veto, if such be existing or created.

Courts with compulsory jurisdiction.

An Executive Dept. which shall enforce the laws, act to prevent or terminate aggressions, blockades, invasions or wars; and administer the Specialized Agencies such as those now present in the United Nations.

To those who say such a democratically controlled federal type of world government has never existed, and never will exist, let us echo the words of the late Senator Robert Kennedy, "Why not?" In fact, our own country's history

shows that federalism was put into practice here when the original weak Articles of Confederation were replaced by our present Constitution, in 1787. Carl Van Doren's book on this subject is entitled "The Great Rehearsal," indicating that the American Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 was a rehearsal for a future World Constitutional Convention. In this United States bicentennial year of 1975, it would be specially appropriate for the U.S. to initiate some type of action toward the world goal indicated by Van Doren's book and title.

In all likelihood, it would not be necessary to have a completely new Constitution created, as comprehensive revision and amendment of the existing Charter of the United Nations can serve the same purpose. Several authoritative books on this subject, giving word-by-word complete texts of the Charter as now existing, and also as revised according to the authors' concepts, are in existence, as well as numerous texts of completely new Constitutions or Charters. The literature on this subject is voluminous, and documentations and bibliographies are in existence, going back to the 13th century and earlier.

Although the UN Charter calls for a charter review conference every 10 years, this has never been done to date. However, recently for the first time the UN created an Ad Hoc Committee to meet in late July and August 1975, to consider suggestions for Charter Review. The U.S. Mission unfortunately voted against the motion, but it was carried by affirmative vote of 82 nations, mostly from the "Third World." There will also be held an unofficial Parallel United Nations Charter Hearing ("P.U.N.C.H.") as a result of a decision of the Seminar on World Government held in N.Y. City on April 12, under sponsorship of the monthly newspaper, World Peace News. This "Punch" will have sponsorship of many organizations concerned with these problems, and will convene directly following the World Citizens Assembly, which meets in San Francisco July 20 to 25. At that Assembly, our organization, North American Group of W.F.A.C. (World Federal Authority Committee) will conduct workshops on composition of proposed World Constitutions.

WRAC is an international body whose chairman is Dr. Max Habicht of Switzerland, and whose Secretary-General is Attorney Aake Anker-Ording, with an office in Oslo, Norway. These gentlemen, as well as the members of the Executive Committee, from nations on various continents on the earth, have been engaged in these endeavors for many decades. The purpose is to create an International Institute for Documentation and Research on a Democratically-Controlled World Federal Authority, in cooperation with national governments and with the support of individuals and foundations in all countries. WFAC has already received grants of money from the governments of Norway, Denmark and West Germany. Because of the length of the official name of the proposed Institute, the undersigned has created an acronym for it, namely, "Indarwa" (Institute Documentation and Research World Authority).

In conclusion, we respectfully request that the Committee on Foreign Relations consider the following suggestions for appropriate recommendations to the Senate:

1. That the U.S. Mission to the UN be instructed through appropriate channels to participate fully in the forthcoming deliberations of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Charter Review, to be held this summer.

2. That a U.S. government agency or official be designated to assist in the organization and convening of "Punch," the unofficial Parallel U.N. Charter Hearing.

3. That the U.S. grant some form of recognition, and modest financial support, to WFAC, as several other nations have done.

BOARD OF CHURCH AND SOCIETY
OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
Washington, D.C., May 15, 1975.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
U.S. Senate, Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MS. HANSEN: Enclosed are several items showing the support of the United Methodist Church for the United Nations:

1. *Official statements* of the United Methodist Church concerning the United Nations. These are the operative paragraphs from policy statements approved by the General Conference, the governing body of the United Methodist Church.

2. *Two articles* concerning the recent debate following Ambassador Scali's speech to the General Assembly in December 1974, written by representatives of United Methodist agencies at the U.N.

3. *Booklet*, "The Church Center for the United Nations on Its Tenth Anniversary," outlining the historic commitment of the United Methodist Church to the United Nations concept.

If possible, we would like to have at least the official statements of the United Methodist Church placed in the printed record of the hearings currently being held on the role of the United Nations by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Sincerely yours,

HERMAN WILL,
Associate General Secretary.

OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH CONCERNING THE UNITED NATIONS

(From the Social Principles, 1972)

Believing that international justice requires the participation of all peoples, we endorse the United Nations and its related bodies as the best instrument now in existence to achieve a world of justice and law. We commend the efforts of all people in all countries who pursue world peace through law. We endorse international aid and cooperation on all matters of need and conflict. We urge acceptance for membership in the United Nations of all nations who wish such membership and who accept United Nations responsibility. We urge the United Nations to take a more aggressive role in the development of international arbitration of disputes and actual conflicts among nations by developing binding third-party arbitration. We reaffirm our historic concern for the world as our parish and seek for all persons and peoples full and equal membership in a truly world community.

(From the Bishops' Call for Peace and the Self Development of Peoples)

This movement from narrow nationalism to global loyalties requires both international law and international organization. The development of international law has included landmark treaties resulting from conferences at The Hague, Dumbarton Oaks, and the Geneva Conventions. Structures of international order have been anticipated by the ill-fated League of Nations and the United Nations. If peace with justice is to come, nation-states should utilize the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, as well as international trade, relief and scientific institutions, while seeking to perfect the instruments of international organization.

(From the United Methodist Church and Peace, 1968)

5. The United Nations

We commend the United Nations for its success in reconciling differences, promoting human rights, lifting the levels of health, education, and welfare, and advancing self-government among the nations. These accomplishments are in spite of a total U.N. budget that is currently less than 1 per cent of the United States military expenditures. It should become an increasingly useful instrument in the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

We believe the United Nations and its agencies should be supported, strengthened and improved. Moreover, if these facilities are to become most effective, the United Nations, with membership open to all nations which seek to join and which subscribe to its Charter, must be given sufficient authority to enact, interpret and enforce world law against aggression and war.

Meanwhile, the governments of all nations, and especially the great powers, should utilize to the fullest possible extent the avenues of the United Nations for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

All nations should give adequate financial support to the U.N. and its peacekeeping operations and its specialized agencies.

We urge the early ratification by all nations of the fourteen conventions on human rights developed and approved by the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

We believe in the principle expressed in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of a Child. "Mankind owes to the child the best that it has to give." We, therefore, commend the work of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) which has since 1947 served more than 200 million children in more than one hundred countries through material aid to programs of supplemental food, disease control, nutrition and maternal and child health.

We support the greater use of the International Court of Justice and urge the nations to remove any restrictions they have adopted which impair the court's effective functioning.

The economic and political turmoil within many developing nations provides a grave temptation to the great powers to intervene through subversive activity or military force. We condemn this new version of imperialism which often parades as responsibility and we urge the great powers to use their strength to support the United Nations and enable it to render multilateral judgments as to those internal disturbances which endanger the peace and require collective measures.

[From the Engage/Social Action magazine, February 1975]

Attacks on the UN

(By Robert McClean)

I am concerned about current reactions to the UN. I am concerned that US Ambassador Scali, speaking before the General Assembly on December 6, said a "tyranny of the majority" is passing outrageous, unenforceable, and irresponsible resolutions that weaken the UN. I am concerned that so many US newspapers editorially seconded that speech without checking the accuracy of its allegations. I am concerned that Scali may have been right when he suggested that many Americans are "deeply distressed at the trend of recent events." I am concerned because many of those "recent events" that he depreciates are the very acts that affirm the UN's success in areas of justice and equitable relations between peoples and states.

The now famous Scali speech was undoubtedly directed at easing Israel's feelings of US compromise in Middle East negotiations. However, behind this public relations facade is the real issue of recent General Assembly resolutions concerning trade and tariffs, sovereignty over natural resources, producer's associations, prices of raw materials, and transnational corporations.

These trade issues form the basis of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) discussions and precipitated the most controversial negotiations at the Rome Food Conference. The US, joined by other western industrialized nations, won those battles. However, losses on two significant related General Assembly resolutions are the heart of Scali's real concern.

In the spring of 1974 the Sixth Special General Assembly approved by concensus a resolution concerning a "New Economic Order." It contained paragraphs on each of the issues mentioned above. Immediately after its approval Scali strongly removed US support from it saying, "Concensus is not a steamroller." However, because of the importance of this document the Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church has now established a committee to study this "new economic order" to determine its relationship to United Methodist position statements.

At the recently conducted 29th General Assembly a "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" was approved, not by concensus, but by vote: 120 for, 6 against, 10 abstentions. The US voted with the minority. It was this issue that was foremost in Scali's concern when he spoke six days earlier.

These two resolutions boldly state the aspirations of those notions that are not members of the world's economic or industrial clubs.

The new Charter of Economic Rights and Duties is a resolution of the General Assembly and as such will only have power (other than moral persuasion) as industrialized states observe its rules. Without that, support—in Scali's words—"cannot be implemented." However, each should judge if it is "one-sided" or "unrealistic."

The text covers thirty-four articles plus an introduction. Most articles were acceptable to all. Rather than evaluate acceptable points, here is a summation of three the US found most unacceptable and attempted in committee to have deleted, but failed.

Many states feel former colonial rulers and today's transnational corporations have removed raw materials from their territory without adequate repayment.

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One of the charter's "principles" governing relations between states calls for "remedying of injustices which have been brought about by force and which deprive a nation of the natural means necessary for its normal development." This principle parallels that of reparations heard in the US Civil Rights movement.

Article 5 deals with "producer's associations." "All states have the right to associate in organizations of primary commodity producers in order to develop their national economies to achieve stable financing for their development. . . ." The association of oil exporting countries (OPEC) is such a group. Banana growers or Bauxite miners might use this principle. Fear of industrialized states is based in the understanding that is most profitable to form such associations if their primary product is consumed by financially able states that do not themselves have the capability of such production. States supporting this concept feel these raw materials have in the past been controlled, to their detriment, by outside states or corporations, e.g., iron ore in Swaziland, petroleum and coffee wherever it is found.

Article 28 concerns "indexing" prices of raw materials to make them equitable with finished products. "All states have the duty to cooperate in achieving adjustments in the prices of exports of developing countries in relation to prices of their imports so as to promote just and equitable terms of trade for them, in a manner which is remunerative for producers and equitable for producers and consumers." Because manufacturing takes place in industrialized countries, those countries that produce raw materials for export develop trade deficits when buying back finished products. They feel this situation is unfair and feel "indexing" would help remedy inequities.

Scali said, "Many Americans are questioning their belief in the United Nations. They are deeply disturbed." I would like for many Americans to let their government know they are deeply disturbed—disturbed because they do understand and affirm the aspirations of the developing nations; because they want the future to be different from the past; and because they want the UN to grow in strength as it attempts to bring the desires of all states into equity.

If you would like to register your feelings, we would be glad to forward your response to Ambassador John Scali at the United States Mission to the UN. If you write directly, we would appreciate a copy.

[Remaining enclosures are on file with the committee.]

STATEMENT OF ELEANORE SCHNURR, UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE, AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES USA, NATIONAL MINISTRIES

As the United Nations Representative for the American Baptist Churches, USA, National Ministries, I would like to request that the following statement be included in the records of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on the United Nations:

For over a period of more than 30 years American Baptists have stated, through Resolutions made at their annual National Conventions, their conviction that in today's rapidly shrinking world of nuclear and electronic war power, the only sane philosophy of international relations, the only sensible theory of national security is one which recognizes the necessity of increasing multilateral cooperation. This applies to trade, to technical assistance and economic aid, to ecological matters as well as to disarmament, and to continuous support of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

While we, as American Baptists, support those efforts in which United States foreign policy makers have endeavored to seek peaceful solutions to crisis situations, we feel that there should have been more use made of the various multilateral channels which are available through the United Nations system.

A foreign policy approach which only involves big power diplomacy and which fails to take into consideration issues of concern to the members of the global family is too narrow, creates gulfs, and widens the gap between divergent interests of nations. The longer we allow such a state of affairs to continue, the more dangerous becomes the illusion that we can safely ignore the needs and interests of the majority of the members of the global community.

Recognizing that we are now truly living in an interdependent world, we feel that the negative votes cast by our Government, concerning issues related to the new economic order, were votes cast in haste and not in contemplation of the long-range interests of the people of the United States or of the world at large.

We feel that the United States Government would much rather be placed in a position where there is knowledge and understanding on its part of the fact that the Third World definitely exists and that new relationships will develop.

As a nation it is not in our best interest to be singled out by other nations as a reactionary country supporting only the status-quo when there is opportunity to make allowance for the aspirations of the underprivileged majority of humanity.

In this respect, it was the United States unwillingness to recognize the repeated demands of the majority of the United Nations membership, during the last session of the General Assembly (29th), calling for an ending of the old economic order, which led to the passage of many United Nations Resolutions which could be interpreted as "anti-U.S.". In reality, these Resolutions were calling for a new and more equitable economic order on which to begin to build a more stable global partnership.

We commend the United States initiative, during the 25th session of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (1974), in calling for the convening of an international conference in 1975 to celebrate International Women's Year. The United States has much to contribute to this Conference and we urge our Delegation to assume a leadership role, focusing its energies on issues pertinent to the Conference's subject matter.

We, as American Baptists, still believe and affirm that the United Nations represents, to date, the best international organization through which nations can work for a lessening of world tensions and a strengthening of mutual understanding and cooperation for world peace with justice.

STATEMENT BY CAMPAIGN FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT, INC.

Consent of the governed, yes. Rightly a fundamental principle in human relations. Why, then, do we keep it confined within the boundaries of nations? Hunger, security, population, pollution, freedom of the seas and canals, equitable access to goods and natural resources: these urgent problems are global, but is the machinery for solving them global?

Unfortunately, in spite of my best organized and personal efforts as an accredited observer to the funding conference of the United Nations in 1945, the United Nations is an association of sovereign States. This is anarchy, not a practical way to peace.

What is most flagrantly missing in the United Nations is the two-way street familiar in the U.S.A. and other federations leading through elected representatives, to a legislative body capable of resolving problems of general concern because powers to deal with them have been delegated to it. In the other direction, the governing body can enforce its laws directly on individual citizens without the interference of member states.

The building of such a two-way street, from the people to the world organization, and from the world organization to the people directly is the challenge presently before humanity. To accomplish this the United Nations needs:

1. Powers granted to it to deal with world-wide problems, provided.
2. Popular control is maintained through a fair system of elected representatives to one or more legislative branches.
3. Independent enforcement agencies (the smaller the unit needing coercion—that is, the individual citizen, the easier and more peaceful and civilian the enforcement).
4. Independent sources of revenue.

Someone will surely raise the cry; what about national sovereignty? That is a bugaboo standing in the way of a peaceful world order. Where does sovereignty reside? According to the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, "The powers not delegated to the U.S. by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The people have every right to re-allocate their reserved powers the better to serve their needs, the purpose of government.

The granting of such powers and responsibilities to the United Nations would be a reallocation of sovereignty. This would restrain nations, but wouldn't that be a blessing? It would not diminish the rights of individuals. Quite the contrary. Popular sovereignty would be augmented because the individual gains a say in what happens to him/her, and within this area of citizenship, gains security from wars and threats of wars. How does the individual benefit from the retention of a national sovereignty which denies citizens any franchise in world affairs and leaves these decisions in the hands of a nation's executive, and the use of military force virtually unrestrained? What kind of protection is this?

Food, peace and security, with justice in close company, these are the primary needs of people all over the world. The kind of political machinery to secure these needs has succeeded in this country for almost two hundred years. Who can say it is impossible to create such machinery at the world level? We have put men on the moon! Of course, it is possible.

Let us proceed now to create the world political machinery necessary to guarantee in all human beings everywhere the unalienable Rights to Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness! That is the goal worthy of our great heritage.

Respectfully submitted by,

GEORGIA LLOYD,
Executive Secretary.

MR. AND MRS. FRANCIS M. RANDALL,
Alabaster, Ala., May 14, 1975.

Senator JOHN SPARKMAN,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: Enclosed is an article from today's front page of The B'ham News entitled, "Sparkman leading deep probe of U.N.," which I have read and which probe I hope you will pursue with vigor.

Also enclosed is a letter that I sent to you 10 years ago urging you to, among other things, get us out of the UN and the UN out of the U.S. I apologize for the two garbled lines, they were garbled on 4–15–1965, and at that time I had no idea that I would ever be remailing that letter. I am not sending copies of that letter to Senator Allen and all Alabama U.S. Representatives because I have sent them similar letters over the past 10 years. I here ask all of these gentlemen to help you and support that probe into the U.N.

I believe that the testimony of former U.N. Ambassadors such as Mr. Lodge and Mr. Goldberg is biased—their job was to promote the U.N. and they still are. They have a vested interest in the error of our participating in the U.N. and neither has the courage to say I made a mistake. Reform won't work—the structure was built on sand—the U.N. was conceived, created and is now OBVIOUSLY controlled by the communists.

Enclosed is Mr. Brooks cartoon of 11–4–74 Re: U.N.—and we've had worse abuses by that so called, "peace," organization. The communist nations of the U.N. are saying nothing about the sickening blood baths and atrocities that are going on in Vietnam and Cambodia. Our President probably hasn't even told Congress about them, Senator Sparkman, but they ARE going on! (See Scott Report of 4–23–75.)

I request that this letter be submitted to the probe on my behalf as I cannot afford to go to Washington to testify, but if your committee wants irrefutable evidence that we need to be Out of the U.N., Mr. Reid Benson of The John Birch Society in Washington can probably convince you all of this need and in short order. Having Mr. Lodge and Mr. Goldberg give evidence on the effectiveness of the U.N. is like asking the crows to guard the cornfield or the fox to guard the chickenhouse.

Congratulations to President Ford (5–15–75) on getting our ship and crew back. That action and the freedom to own gold and the rescue of some of the South Vietnamese civilians and soldiers are the only significant 3 actions of President Ford that I approve of. Today I am very proud of President Ford—hope he will continue to just do what is right and expletive deleted with what the rest of the world thinks of U.S.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS M. RANDALL,
HARRIET RANDALL.

[Enclosures are on file with the committee.]

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, D.C., *May 8, 1975.*

Senator JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

The 1975 National Council of the League of Women Voters of the U.S., composed of delegates from all 50 States, the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, wishes to commend the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for holding hearings on the United Nations at this crucial point in the UN's history. We deplore recent UN General Assembly and UNESCO General Conference actions which violates the spirit of the UN charter. We do not feel, however, that withdrawal of U.S. participations from these organizations is an appropriate response. We strongly urge that the U.S. provide firm constructive leadership to support UN policies and programs which promote the spirit of the charter.

RUTH C. CLUSEN,
President, League of Women Voters of the United States.

UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.,
IOWA DIVISION,
May 24, 1975.

Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN, M.C.,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: It's a pleasure to send you this copy of a Resolution unanimously adopted by the Annual Assembly of Iowa members of the United Nations Association.

It is a further, personal gratification to have followed during the past few days, testimony before your Committee's hearing on the United Nations.

It was a most useful congressional activity.

Sincerely,

C. G. DOUGLASS,
Executive Director.

RESOLUTION

Whereas, the Iowa Division, United Nations Association of U.S.A., Inc., is seeking creativity to develop programs designed to strengthen citizen support for and understanding of the United Nations, and

Whereas, we believe it incumbent upon us to emphasize educational programs for this purpose among youth and adults through out the state and,

Whereas, recent U.N. World Conferences on Population, Laws of the Seas, and World Food Problems demonstrate the validity of a global approach to global problems, and

Whereas, we count it a privilege to commend Congressional committee Chairmen and members who are committed to the more active utilization of the U.N. as a means of facilitating international cooperation, therefore be it

Resolved, That the Iowa Division, U.N.A., meeting in Annual Assembly on May 10, 1975, in Iowa City, commend you for your recent call for a "Strengthened and rejuvenated United Nations" since our "village world" is sorely in need of "international institutions for the solution of global problems."

STATEMENT BY THE CITIZENS FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (CNIEO), JUNE 11, 1975

The immediate goal of CNIEO is to stimulate the Congress and to assure that the Administration begins an active and constructive role in NIEO discussions—beginning this September 1, 1975 at the United Nations, special session on a New International Economic Order (NIEO). No area of policy discussions is more critical than a NIEO—the issues are War or Peace.

The paths to Global Peace and cooperation must be embraced with the mobility and excitement with which men have marched to war.

Congress is asked to submit letters and/or legislation to the President urging full U.S. participation in NIEO discussions.

* * * * * * *

"There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union—the two nations with the power to destroy mankind . . . yet the interdependence that earlier fostered our prosperity and now threatens our decline can usher in a new period of progress if we perceive our common interest and *act boldly to serve it.* It requires a new level of political wisdom, a new standard of responsibility, and a new vigor of diplomacy." (Kissinger, 1/24/75)

"The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations. No one nation, no one part of the world, can prosper or be secure in isolation. " . . . "The world stands uneasily poised between unprecedented chaos and the opportunity for unparalleled creativity. The next few years will determine whether interdependence will foster common progress or common disaster. Our generation has the opportunity to shape a new cooperative international system; if we fail to act with Vision we will condemn ourselves to mounting domestic and international crises." (Kissinger, 1/24/75)

. . . "You cannot have a peaceful world without most of the countries and preferably all of the countries feeling that they have a share in it." (Kissinger, 1/16/75)

"The achievement of peace requires a vision of peace." (Kissinger, 5/12/75)

The philosophies herein reflect:

1. The Kelso, Adler, Hetter thinking of: *The Capitalist Manifesto, The New Capitalists, Two Factor Theory—The Economics of Reality*:
2. The critical realities outlined by the Club of Rome, Meadows report "Limits to Growth;"
3. The "more with less" Bucky Fuller perceptions of our new technologies; and
4. The experience of the founder of CNIEO in the systems, management and economic sciences—from technical and economic feasibility studies of industry-wide automation and organizational designs; urban and international development projects.

The essence of Kelso or Universal Capitalism is ownership by all instead of by the few or by the state.

The CNIEO has been formed in dedication to the following principles; namely, that:

1. Only free and equal discussion will bring liberty from conflict; and
2. Only acceptance of common goals will bring cooperation.

This is an attempt to define those goals, and the principal economic tools required to achieve them.

The purpose of the CNIEO is to promote a full discussion of a NIEO in America, in the Congress, at the UN; and to bring forth cooperation and unity by the establishment of a NIEO among nations and peoples in pursuit of common global goals.

The ideologies expressed by CNIEO should in no way distract from the principal goals of bringing capitalist and Communist nations, and all of divided societies—together. Many of the ideas expressed by CNIEO, although capitalist-derived—are offered to stimulate dialogue and need not reflect the thinking of members and advocates who are joined together by common agreements to the above principles, purposes and goals. Hopefully, the ideas expressed will focus the best that capitalism, Marxism and democracy have to offer in order to equal and exceed the accomplishments of socialism and Marxism.

The economic philosophy herein described involves the use of strong personal incentives in addition to necessary socialist tools, in order to improve the general welfare and environment.

A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (NIEO)

A NIEO means global cooperation to achieve Global goals. Global goals may be expressed as—SURVIVAL—from the threats of conflict, overpopulation, overconsumption and inflation.

Global goals include:

1. A single Global Cooperative Economy and an end to conflict.

2. Cooperation between the U.S., Russia and China—moving detente closer to disarmament—by building interdependent trade, mutual trust and by cooperative development of the globe.

3. An end to conflict—an end to the Anti-Communism and Anti-Capitalism of the Cold War period. Cooperative development of Third World nations and the transfer of resources and economic development sufficient to overtake the threats of overpopulation; an end to confrontations over the price of oil or bauxite or other raw materials and commodities.

4. The harnessing of maximum economic expansion—to respond to overpopulation; to allow for the reconstruction of cities, to survive the threats of overconsumption, and to alleviate inflation.

5. The establishment of standards for both democratic government, and for economic development and justice.

The transfer of resources and the building of a conserving economy in the Third World can not occur without immediate planning and reconstruction of the U.S. economy in order to end wasteful consumption which exacerbates internal and external conflict.

A NEW GLOBAL MONETARY SYSTEM

Financial and monetary policies must provide the tools necessary to harness the full productive expansiveness of the economy. See Chapter II of TWO FACTORY THEORY, Kelso and Hetter.

Savings as a determinant for economic expansion is a social system as opposed to an economic necessity; see "Economic Expansion."

SDR's can be allocated by priority and in exact accord with expansion capacity—estimated to be 30% to 50% per year, or $750 billion to $1,450 billion—which is a vast capacity when compared to current 3% to 6%/year economic growth.

The amount of savings in the system is totally inadequate for the modest or low expansion rate currently projected for the needs of the U.S. economy—let alone to serve the vast needs of the Global Economy.

Use of the SDR's will include into the economy, the vast majority of society—the poor—who have vast needs, no savings, and who are trainable. Financing expansion with pure credit or SDR's together with a discipline ensuring the creation of productive enterprise—the earnings of which can be used to repay the loans.

SDR's for the expansion of investments can be made available at an interest rate of 3% per year.

ECONOMIC EXPANSION

The physical capacity for economic expansion can be measured by: idle plant capacity; vast unemployment; underemployment; nonproductive employment (about 40% for the economy as a whole); the conservation inherent in new technologies; and wasteful consumption. These factors all relate to capacity capable of use to achieve global goals—30% to 50% growth in the GWP/year appears to be the necessity and capacity for building a new Global economy.

Expansion must be maximum in order to allow for simultaneous:

(*a*) Transfer of resources for the Third World;

(*b*) Reconstruction of cities in order to conserve resources and provide alternative life styles in an inflated economy.

MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (MNC'S)

MNC's offer a means of separating economic power from political power. MNC's can more easily establish a global interdependent healthy economy than 138 governments, all of whom have nationalized their industries and who would have varying degrees of dedication to the achievement of global goals.

MNC's must be encouraged to monopolize and totally control markets. Higher and lower prices can be used as disincentives and incentives to reduce consumption of critical resources and to increase consumption of abundant substitute materials. See the energy plan below.

MNC's have the maximum flexibility in exploiting labor resources and technology. Of course, fair labor standards and capital ownership standards must be applied. The only thing wrong with the MNC's or with capitalism itself—is

simply that there just aren't enough capitalists. Less than 1% of Western society owns virtually all capital.

As the technology makes the machine or capital more productive than labor, making a person productive means to make him or her an owner of capital. Ownership of the MNC's, the distribution of dividends, or of rebates must be made available to those citizens and communities who step out of the disintegrating economy and into the surviving or ecologically sound "*New Global Economy.*"

The alternative to larger government and government redistribution of income is private sector distribution of non-inflation income—based on capital as well as wage income. In this way, the private sector supplies the purchasing power—based upon productivity and profit.

Consistent with environmental interests, ensured by planning, the private sector can expand its own marketplace and not be dependent upon government financing.

The MNC's and other large corporations must form the large conglomerates required to bring forth new cities and towns—allowing the development of large ecologically sound "systems economy"—instead of products and services economy.

OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE EARNINGS

Corporate ownership should be broadly distributed allowing all citizens to be productive by virtue of owning capital—the machienry of automation, especially in the absence of productive job availabilities.

The wages of capital (i.e., corporate earnings) like the wages of labor should be paid in full—in order to allow full distribution of purchasing power. Those who are super productive, i.e., the 5% in America who own virtually all the wealth will pay taxes on their dividends and allow non-deficit government redistribution. The practice of allowing the super productive to plow virtually all their corporate earnings into tomorrow's plants perpetuates the super productivity of the few and ensures the continuing inflation and ultimate depression of the economy by expanding non-productive payments by governments in the form of various make work—welfare to warfare expenditures—fueled by higher taxes and deficit spending.

Tax policy can moderate their purchasing power at either the corporate tax level or at the individual tax level. Investments in new plant will be made by a public planning process, the use of SDR's or pure credit or currency, with a discipline to ensure productive and profitable enterprise.

Corporate earnings should be used for R & D, as incentives for citizens, communities, for metropolitan areas, and for nations who contribute to production or conservation or otherwise to the achievement of global goals.

Workers must accumulate stock to provide for retirement. In capital—intensive industries ownership must be "given to," or "earned by" consumers in the same way that ownership is paid for by the rich—i.e., by the earnings of new investments.

The concepts above concerning broad distribution of capital ownership allowing the gradual elimination of work, and the establishment of an automated "self serving" society—must be controlled or moderated by the need and responsibility of advanced societies to assign labor to the tasks of promoting interdependent trade among adversaries and to hasten global developments of over populating and under nourished societies.

NEW TECHNOLOGY

New Technologies emphasizing increased production, better working conditions and resource conservation are to be encouraged. Satellite Communications where a 200 pound satellite replaces 100,000 tons of under sea cable—advanced communications and computer techniques extending information to the home and to the local community center—bringing work to the workers—can reduce commuting and conserve resources; the elimination of unnecessary work or make-work conserves resources—and allows the worker to be assigned to productive ownership and/or work—or to leisure; democracy and cultural enrichment—the business of humanity.

AT&T, Cable and Wireless, and the International Radio Carriers must be compensated for their current obsolete systems in order to allow or apply the benefits of satellite, CATV and laser communications.

The various vested interests in transportation and land use must be consolidated into giant conglomerates to provide the institutions and policies necessary to build better cities and towns. See "Human Settlements Growth Policy."

Agri-business high technology farming is feasible for Third World nations where resources allow, by the organization of labor populations, to benefit as owners and part-time workers.

ENERGY

Oil prices should be administered by MNC's at high rates in order to: (a) persuade lower consumption; (b) accumulate funds for R&D—for both substitute energy sources—such as solar and fusion, as well as for New Cities which will conserve fuel; (e) accumulate incentives to reward those citizens who step into the NIEO, i.e., step out of the overpopulating, overconsuming, and conflict way of life. This energy model is typical of what can be done with MNC's in all industries.

FOOD, RAW MATERIALS AND PRODUCTIVE CONTROLS

World food policy funded by SDR's should include maximum production for existing markets, buffer or storage stocks, and export sales to Third World nations for local currencies. The use of these local currencies, together with capital and land reform policies, as loans to various enterprises, will provide expansion of local agricultural and industrial production.

Firm price support programs—for all commodities and raw materials are absolutely required.

As Third World production provides increasing self-sufficiency in food, developed nations can ease production.

Provisions should be made to export technical assistance to increase world production while maintaining advanced technological capacity intact in developed nations.

Where energy resources and other factors allow—capital intensive agriculture can be exported.

Production controls must be implemented with full price support to a given desired maximum production level for each commodity or raw material, together with lesser prices varying to a bare subsistence level for excess production over the maximum desired levels.

HUMAN SETTLEMENTS GROWTH POLICY

The conservation of resources, which will—improve the environment, allow transfer of resources to Third World Markets—ensure survival from the threat of economic collapse due to resource depletion demand the development of New Cities and Towns.

Citizens must organize into larger political units in order to apply specific land use and infrastructure designs. Community, metropolitan and regional development corporations—public in terms of their unity and size—but yet private, in that they will represent only those citizens in that geographic area—are required to greatly improve the environment. These institutions are giant cooperative corporations—owning all land and infrastructure and providing income to upgrade the general welfare of the community.

Existing corporations can be encouraged to form the development and promotion institutions which will bring about the markets for large scale systems as opposed to the disparate products which are now very much part of the problem.

ARAB-ISRAELI STRUGGLE

Current American policy in placing the exclusion of Russian influence, before the safety of Israel and before the prevention of war; "Step by Step" diplomacy without direct Russian and Palestinian involvement; forcing a useless dangerous Egyptian treaty upon Israel; dangling Israel in a vacuum, by delaying $2.6 billion aid, thereby forcing Israel and Arabs to consider war; are unwise as well as dangerous. Fortunately, Russia moved in and prevented war by guaranteeing Israeli security at pullback to 1967 borders while pulling together Arab unity.

Imagine the lunacy or brilliance of American policy currently considering financial aid to Egypt—by paying off Egyptian debts to Russia, for aid and in-

fluence which Russia will continue to use to deny peaceful settlement until Russia is included as an equal partner in the peace finding process.

Nothing short of direct and absolute American and Russian cooperation is required for MIDEAST and world peace.

KOREA AND OTHER NON-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS

South Korea must be given free speech and free political process, with the wise understanding that several policy alternatives offering peace and mutual disarmament with North Korea will result. The Koreans do not want to be slaughtered by another Anti-Communist machine, which denies their rights to self-determination—as we denied the Vietnamese by refusal to honor the 1954 Geneva requirement for free elections.

The U.S. treaty commitments to South Korea, Chile, the Phillipines, and to other non-democratic governments mean nothing when compared to the urgency, self-interest and global interests of cooperative policy with Russia and China.

Self-determination of the nations must take precedence over the monetary and self-destructive habits of the cold war.

Either the Third World nations are to be used as fodder for the U.S. Military Industrial machine which is served by the "Limited War strategy," or the third world is to be used as the proving ground for cooperative economic development.

The dependency of the world upon American freedoms, democracy and economic power will ensure peace unto all the generations.

Détente and cooperative policy with Russia and China demands an end to conflict with satellite or Third World nations.

PLANNING

Development strategies required to achieve global goals—to include plans and designs, incentives and disincentives—must be provided by global and national organizations.

Planning must become an open public process. Consumption for the purpose of achieving global goals and improving the social, economic, and cultural environment—must replace consumption for the sake of consumption. New Institutions must be structured to achieve profits in the course of serving the public and environmental interests.

For environmental and conservation purposes, high prices and fixed production limits must be set for automobile and for oil consumption, for example. Price controls and tax policy must be used to control consumption. Investments will be planned and implemented by SDR's allocations.

Price controls, tax policy and production controls will be used to curtail or expand consumer consumption. Absolute control is required to orient the world toward achievement of global goals. Personal, community, metropolitan, and national incentives must be structured to spur progress toward those goals.

The multinationals must be internationalized and given global control of markets and resources; and the global criteria for regulations must be structured through the UN. The MNC's must become the common apparatus of global economic management. The alternative is complete anarchy muscled by the constant growth in military power and absolute destruction.

The only way the super powers can translate their military, political and economic power into a surviving power and influence for furthering world progress and unity is by the conversion of their influence via the MNC's, by democratizing the UN machinery and by expanding the economic planning and regulatory functions of the UN.

The cooperation among the Super and Major powers must be complete enough to stop the global destructiveness of increasing militarization.

Free and equal discussion among all nations will and must bring liberty and survival.

THE CITIES OF AMERICA

The critical problems of ghetto destitution and crime, the hopelessness of 40% unemployment for black teenagers—must be a central concern for an NIEO. The divisiveness of American society must be healed by the establishment of bold, challenging and inspiring global goals to uplift the spirit of people everywhere. Global peace is not a dream, but rather the necessity of survival.

INFLATION

Inflation must be allowed to suffer those who do not take positive steps to avoid the dying unecenomic, overpopulating, overconsuming and conflict-oriented society. Inflation may be considered the incentive or stimulant to establish a *New Global Economy* or an NIEO. Rebates from administered prices must be offered to only those who step into the New Global Economy.

All citizens are invited to join or support the CNIEO, and to make the discussions and plans for an NIEO—as their demands of politicians to build a world—without inflation, depression and conflict. The political will and planning for peace must precede the achievement of peace.

WORLD FEDERALISTS, USA,
CHICAGO REGION INC.,
Chicago, Ill., June 3, 1975.

Senator CHARLES H. PERCY,
New Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR . . . [SENATOR] : The hearings which your Subcommittee has been holding on "The United States and the United Nations" offer an exciting possibility of re-orienting our foreign policy toward the future world rather than seeking vainly to preserve the past. I ask you to include this letter, if possible, in the record of your hearings and among the views you have invited others of us to submit in writing.

. . . During the past ten years or so, because of my concern for the future of the human race, I have borne the responsibility of President of the Chicago Regional Council of World Federalists, USA. I am writing on behalf of world federalists in our area who share with me the goal of a self-government of humanity.

Since the beginning of our time on earth mankind has fought wars, between tribes, between cities and nation-states, and more recently on a global scale. As long as there has been an exterior enemy, our armies and fleets have sought each other's destruction. This is no longer a possible way to live. There is no longer an exterior enemy. Humanity is one, the world is one, and the enemy is ourselves. We can continue to live on earth only if we become a civilized race able to control our suicidal urges. This is a tough thing to ask of the savages we still are. But if the history of our own nation proves anything, it is that larger communities of human beings are, in fact, becoming capable of government.

The role of the United Nations is central to human survival. If it didn't exist, we would have to invent it. If it has obvious shortcomings, it is up to us, not to someone else, to improve the structure and powers under which the United Nations now operates. Many Americans do not yet see this. They think the old way of war, armaments, intrigue and forces is the "normal" process of foreign politics. A hallowed place in our history awaits the leader who grasps that strengthening the United Nations should be a main aim of United States foreign policy.

Smaller nations have already discovered in the United Nations a source of unity and power. It takes vision for a larger nation to foresee that the supreme opportunity which the United Nations offers is imperative to the nations of the earth which are already great and powerful. Such great nations as the United States have the most to gain, or to lose, by the success or failure of world political institutions. The United States, at the celebration of our second century of nationhood, is uniquely fitted for leadership in the development of a self-government of mankind. Our history points in a straight line to this destiny. The newer and smaller nations need and want what is best in this kind of Americanism.

The United States should support a conference to review the Charter of the United Nations. Our enlightened self-interest will ask that we support a strengthening of the functions of the United Nations, and will urge, for instance, that among measures to this end we seek a more realistic system of representation of great and small nations in the General Assembly—a necessary step, from our point of view, in order to make the United Nations a more workable world

forum. This will have, to you, a familiar ring of political bargaining. This it will be, and to the common good.

It is a matter of pride to us that Chicago world federalists have taken a leading role in producing proposals for strengthening the United Nations. Our members have conducted studies summarized in the report *Freedom in a Federal World* which includes a practical formula for fairer representation in the General Assembly. We have led an international committee in developing a set of 15 *Proposals for United Nations Reform*, worthy of immediate consideration by a review conference, available in English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, German and Dutch texts. Under separate cover I am sending you copies of these two documents, which you may find useful as resources in your present study.

My plea for American leadership toward a self-government of the human community is not just the idealism of a liberal. It is a demand of modern circumstances which does not depend on utopianism. It is a case of grinding necessity. An age of terrorism and military insecurity, a period in which we are poisoning the seas and the soil and the atmosphere, an era in which the depletion of our resources is leading to an international energy crisis, cries for the creation of institutions to govern the global problems which nations cannot govern for themselves.

The life of influential segments of our population in this country has become so comfortable, and our influence so overriding, that our sin is complacency and our temptation is to hope if we do nothing our problems will go away. One thing is certain. If we do nothing our problems will get worse. The difficulty which Congress is experiencing in the construction of an effective energy program for the United States indicates something of issues which an international parliament will encounter. It will no doubt prove necessary to establish international regulatory agencies with a considerable degree of autonomy. But it is even more imperative that international agencies be responsible to the world's people.

Issues which affect human life and death are today joined in your Subcommittee. We hope you and your colleagues will find the statesmanship necessary for this task.

With warm personal regards.

Cordially,

EDWARD J. SPARLING,
President.

WORLD FEDERALISTS, USA,
NEW JERSEY BRANCH, INC.,
Wayne, N.J., June 11, 1975.

Senator SPARKMAN,
Chairman,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: Please find enclosed the testimony prepared for the record of your United Nations hearings.

I commend you and Senator Percy for focusing attention on the United Nations and the role the United States should play in the UN.

We look forward to continued contact with you and the committee regarding ways to reform the UN.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

WALTER HOFFMANN,
Chairman, Ex. Council.

Enclosure.

THE CASE FOR UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP FOR U.N. REFORM

(By Water F. Hoffmann)

The United States and the world are again entering a rare cusp—a special time for advancing world peace, prosperity and justice. On December 17, 1974, the United Nations General Assembly decided to invite suggestions for ways to strengthen the U.N., including charter changes. The World Federalists of New Jersey are providing the national leadership for U.N. Reform among the U.S.

Federalist organizations. We urge the Congress and the Executive to propose strong reforms for the U.N. and undertake imaginative leadership. The old turtle's responses of pulling back into its shell and letting the shell of military force and bilateral alliances protect the U.S. will only serve to increase the danger for the American people and other people throughout the world.

The recent United Nations actions are not the first attempt to provide a forum for positive suggestions on reforming the United Nations. There have been other, more modest attempts. On December 11, 1970, the small nations in the United Nations—led by the dynamic Carlos Romulo of the Philippines—succeeded in passing a motion (by a vote of 82–11) which placed on the agenda of the General Assembly for the Fall of 1972 the question of the need to consider the revision of the Charter of the United Nations.

As a part of that motion, the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to invite Member Nations to communicate to him their views and suggestions on Charter Review. In response to that invitation, in April of 1971, Congressman William Hungate of Missouri introduced House Concurrent Resolution 258 which called for the United States to support a United Nations Charter Review Conference. An identical resolution was introduced in the Senate by Senator Alan Cranston of California. There were 132 co-sponsors in the House of Representatives of the Hungate-Cranston resolution and no less than 69 co-sponsors in the Senate. They include the Democratic presidential nominee and most of the Democratic presidential hopefuls of that year—Senators McGovern, Humphrey, and Muskie and Congresswoman Chisholm. They included such conservative stalwarts as Senator Buckley of New York.

Although the resolutions were not reported out of Committee in time for a vote on the floor of Congress in that session, Charter Revision and Reform of the U.N. nevertheless remained an agenda item for discussion by the United Nations General Assembly in the Fall of 1974. On December 17, 1974, the General Assembly by a vote of 82–15 created a special Ad Hoc Commitee to study suggestions for strengthening the U.N. including changing the U.N. Charter. That Committee will meet later this summer and will report to the General Assembly in the Fall. The U.S. was one of the 15 countries voting against this review. Whether the U.S. continues to avoid playing a leading role in suggesting both necessary and constructive changes for the United Nations will primarily determine not only the future effectiveness of the U.N. but also U.S. foreign policy.

The U.N., not unlike the Articles of Confederation of the 13 colonies, has proven to be too weak and poor to manage the serious problems it was designed to manage. Indeed the most destructive short run problem, nuclear weaponry, was not even envisioned when the U.N. Charter was drafted. One year ago in May, India set off a nuclear device. Scientists tell us that 15 to 30 additional countries are likely to possess nuclear weapons by the late 1980's.

At a recent meeting in New York, a person from India now practising medicine in the U.S. participated in discussion on what types of positive proposals the U.S. should advocate at the U.N. for U.N. Reform. During discussion of nuclear weapon proliferation he emphasized that the nuclearization of India and other Third World countries was different, very different than Western First World countries obtaining nuclear weapons. The difference he saw was that India and others would use them! He was not talking about accident or terrorist political coup. He was talking about the deep problems of poverty, starvation, political instability and historical animosity which so many Third World countries face. "We are not like you. . . ." "You can not assume. . . ." he indicated. Americans have painfully been learning that "We are not like you. . . ." If this man is correct, the most painful and tragic lessons might be ahead.

How the U.S. responds to the current review of ways to strengthen the UN might decide not only the future role of the U.S. in the UN but the more important question of whether present and future global problems can be resolved through global machinery set up to deal with them, or whether they will determine their own costly solutions.

The present U.S. response to UN Reform is a turtle response—pulling in its head and immobily hoping its shell will protect it. The State Department response to the UN request for suggestions on strengthening the UN indicates that the U.S. would consider specific suggestions made by others, but does not want a broad review of the UN or a UN Charter Conference. But the U.S. does not spell out its specific ideas for strengthening the UN. If we have suggestions, even if we have made them in the past, now is the time to bring them forward as a demonstration of our good faith in the need for reforming the UN. One wonders

what would have happened to the 13 colonies if Va. had said that she thought there were troubles with the Articles of Confederation, but a Constitutional Convention was much broader than the needed approach—instead States should suggest specific remedies of both a procedural and substantive nature. What would have happened if Va. had then said that Virginians were always interested in specific ideas for improving the Articles—and/or government, but offer no specific suggestions for reform other than to refer those interested to suggestions they had made in the past?

Some varieties of turtles were once very plentiful. The terrapin was the object of colonial protection with an early ordinance proscribing the feeding of terrapins to slaves more than three times a week. A number of these plentiful turtles now face extinction because the shell of the turtle could not protect it from newer, different threats. The world has undergone light years of change since the UN was first formed. Whether we take population, numbers of nations, gross world product, communications changes, weapon changes, etc. we see the types of changes which, when compared to the changes between the formation of the Articles of Confederation and the awareness that they had to be reformed, make the American Founding Fathers look like sages or radicals or both.

The United Nations Charter was written thirty years ago. The basic assumption underlying the Charter—big power unity to keep the peace—was quickly shattered. The advent of nuclear power with its potential proliferation placed the world on a powder keg from which it has never recovered. The illustrious draftsmen and draftswomen of the Charter recognized that changes would and should be made in the Charter to reflect changing world conditions. They specifically provided in Article 109 for the calling of a general Charter Review Conference after ten years. They also provided that the calling of such a conference would not be subject to the Big Power Veto—requiring instead a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and the vote of any nine members of the fifteen member Security Council.

To understand the importance of UN Reform and the need to strengthen the UN it is helpful to remember some of the initial hopes and aspirations for the United Nations. In April of 1945, President Harry Truman said in an address in Kansas City:

> When Kansas and Colorado have a quarrel over the water in the Arkansas River, they don't call out the National Guard in each State and go to war over it. They bring suit in the Supreme Court of the United States and abide by the decision. There isn't a reason in the world why we cannot do that internationally.

Thirty years later, it is obvious that that dream has not come true. No one brought the Viet Nam War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the civil war in Northern Ireland, or the India-Pakistan dispute to the World Court. The United Nations has stood by helpless in the face of such armed conflicts.

The Indian-Pakistani dispute of a few years ago is a classic case in point. After the war broke out on December 3rd, 1971, the Security Council met. Two resolutions received a majority vote but were vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Security Council, unable to act because of the veto, referred the matter to the General Assembly.

The General Assembly did adopt a resolution calling upon both sides to agree to a cease-fire and to withdraw their troops behind their respective borders. Pakistan, which by then was losing the war agreed. India, which by then was winning the war, stalled for time. "Time" magazine summed up the whole situation by writing: "There wasn't a thing the United Nations could do to enforce its resolution."

The essential fact about world politics today is that the United Nations, as presently constituted, is too weak to accomplish one of the tasks it was given at San Francisco, namely "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." The U.N. is too weak to preserve world peace because it is bogged down by the veto in the Security Council; too weak because it has no permanent peacekeeping force; too weak because it has no independent revenue-raising authority to support such a peace force if it had one; too weak because it has no authority to compel quarreling parties to submit their legal disputes to the International Court of Justice; too weak because it has no specific procedure for binding arbitration; and too weak because it cannot legislate step-by-step universal—not unilateral—disarmament.

As long as the United Nations remains so weak that it cannot preserve world peace, we will continue to spend billions and billions and billions of our tax dollars to try to obtain some kind of security through armaments. But there is no real security in the arms race, Whatever we build, other countries build; whatever they build, we build; and sooner or later someone will light the match that will send the world up to the fires of nuclear devastation. This will happen either by madman design, by accident, or by eyeball to eyeball confrontation when neither side backs down.

Bertrand Russell once wrote an epitaph for mankind. It went like this: "Ever since Adam and Eve ate the apple, man has never refrained from any folly of which he was capable. The end." The question of whether the human race will commit the ultimate folly of nuclear self-destruction is an issue, I believe, which our generation will decide.

In a law day message in 1958, President Dwight Eisenhower said almost the same thing: "The world no longer has a choice between force and law; if civilization is to survive, it must choose the rule of law." The function of law throughout history has been to try to bring human conduct up closer to the ideal of the natural law. In the days of the old west, when people had an argument, they drew pistols and shot it out. But at a certain point in history, people recognized that it made sense to turn their guns over to the sheriff and live under the rule of law.

Today we have at least the structure of law and order within our towns and our states and our nation. But on an international level, we really have anarchy; for any nation can do whatever it pleases so long as it has the force to do so. There is no enforceable world law to apprehend the international criminals who would make war.

The threat of nuclear self-destruction and the costly armaments race are but two reasons for imaginative U.S. initiatives to strengthen the authority of the United Nations. Other global problems cry out for global solutions.

The United Nations conferences in Stockholm, Bucharest, Caracas, and Rome evidence a growing concern for the world's environment and the support systems capable of sustaining mankind's environmental needs. Pollution of the oceans and of the airways of the world knows no national boundaries. Pollution originating in one country comes down on another. International guidelines are but a step toward the eventual enforcement of anti-pollution standards by a United Nations Agency. The fundamental right of every human being to a decent environment will be recognized sooner or later and will be protected.

The world-wide strike by airline pilots demanding action by the United Nations against skyjacking is still another indication that people recognize the necessity for some kind of world law. Only a Reformed United Nations can give the world the legal authority to act against the international air pirates who endanger so many lives.

The continuing world monetary crisis with the fluctuations in the exchange rates is another example of a global program which demands global management. The growing economic interdependence of the world is obvious to all. So are the problems raised by increasing polorization of wealth and poverty.

The Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs testified several years ago before the Fraser Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House of Representatives. He testified that "a full-scale Charter Review conference at this time would not prove useful." He also testified: "In our judgment, an attempt to make a general review of the Charter, in the face of diversified membership and divergent outlooks of the present organization and without any indication of substantial agreement on specific proposals, or even on the general direction review should take, is not likely to prove constructive."

If the founding fathers of our country were to have embraced the same view, we would never have established the United States of America. One holds a conference in order to explore areas of agreement and to reach compromises that result in a consensus. One does not wait for agreement first before calling a conference.

During the present UN Reform discussions, the United States could initiate any number of positive proposals. Since the World Association of World Federalists Proposals for United Nations Reform (Revised Text, July 1, 1974) are already included in the record of these hearings, I only refer to them as a set of specific suggestions which include both procedural and substantive changes both

"useful" and "productive". These proposals cover such areas as: Membership, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, The International Court of Justice, Human Rights, Strengthening of ECOSOC, Peacekeeping, Security Council Membership and Voting, United Nations Finance, A World Environment Agency, and An International Disarmament Agency. To clarify my assertion that the United States has not been fulfilling the positive leadership role that it should, I submit the World Association of World Federalists World Voting Survey to show that from a "World Interest" point of view, the U.S. has a dismal record in the United Nations. The way to change this is for the U.S. to begin filling the leadership gap now so apparent in the UN. In spite of the poison created by Viet Nam and the CIA, I think countries around the world would welcome a positive and strong role by the U.S. Offering and supporting the types of reforms which the World Association of World Federalists Proposals outline should be the beginning of a new U.S. leadership role.

If two thirds of the General Assembly and the Security Council agree to these proposals, we may well be embarking upon a period of world history similar to the year 1787 in American history when a call went out from Philadelphia to thirteen separate quarrelling states to send delegates to a conference to amend the Articles of Confederation. And they came to Philadelphia and hammered out a document which became the constitution of the United States of America.

If we are to achieve the rule of law in world affairs, we must build the institutions necessary to make, interpret and enforce law with justice on a world level. This means the substantial strengthening and reform of the structure of the United Nations.

Our own great American Federalist, Alexander Hamilton, once said: "He who wills not the means, wills not the end." If we do not give the United Nations the means to preserve world peace and to solve global problems, we will never attain the goals of world peace and a healthy environment.

In a speech at American University in June of 1963, President John F. Kennedy said: "We seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished. This will require a new effort to achieve world law."

According to a number of polls, the American people continue to want to see the United Nations strengthened. In order to strengthen the United Nations, however, we have to convince ourselves and the rest of the world that there are global problems which demand global solutions, that there is no real security in the arms race, and that the only real security lies in some form of a substantially strengthened United Nations. If we are to prevent the United Nations from going the way of the old League of Nations, the effort must be made now to strengthen the U.N. There is no rational alternative solution on the horizon.

Everett Dirksen, the late Senator from Illinois, once said with regard to the Civil Rights Bill of 1964: "Every great idea has its time in history." I firmly believe that the time for the great idea of world federation is coming.

In 1965, Carlos Romulo, one of the leaders in the struggle for U.N. reform, said: "Charter revision is not a utopia for the future. We cannot wait for the next generation to achieve it—there may never be a next generation. The need is essential. The time is now. Do not tell me it is a great idea, but it cannot be done. I have heard all of the reasons and I am not impressed. It must be done. This is the only way I know for enforceable world law to replace international anarchy. Without such law, there can be not peace. It must be done; it shall be done. We will do it."

Walter Hoffmann, a practicing lawyer in Wayne, New Jersey, is a member of the UN Charter Review Subcommittee of the World Peace Through Law Center vice-president of the World Federalists–USA and Council Chairman of the New Jersey World Federalists. He attended the World Peace Through Law Conference in Geneva, Belgrade and Abidjian and the World Federalist Congresses in Ottawa, Brussels and New Delhi. He has testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Democratic National Platform Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (on the International Court of Justice).

The 29th General Assembly of the United Nations

(Report by Donald F. Keys and George Mannello, World Federalist Education Fund)

UNITED NATIONS VOTING BOX SCORE—20 VITAL ISSUES

Summary

Top Score: 98%. New Zealand (Also top last year).
Bottom of the List: 38%—Bahamas (absences hurt).
High Scores:
95%—Australia, Japan, Mexico.
90%—Colombia, Costa Rica, Equador, Finland, Peru.
88%—Iran, Nigeria, Philippines, Spain.
85%—Ireland, Ivory Coast, Niger, Singapore, Sweden, Trinidad, and Tobago.

Low Scores:
40%—Gabon.
43%—Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Equatorial Guinea, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Ukraine, USSR.
45%—U.S. (up from the cellar last year—15% 1973).
49%—Cuba, Saudi Arabia, France.
No Shows: Maldives.

Notes:
China: 58% this year, 57% last year, continuing a decline.
USSR and colleagues voted uniformly as usual (at 43% compared with 55% last year).
Portugal: under new regime. 73%, up from 25% last year.
Greece: also under new regime. 83% up from 45% last year.
Romania: again broke with the herd for a far better score: 68%.
West Germany only turned up 65%, but far better than East Germany at 43%.

Procedure in Scoring: Resolutions are evaluated on their contributions to world problems. The voting record on these resolutions is then tabulated.
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U.S. VOTING RECORD

Percentage score: 45 percent—[Percentage score 1973: 20 percent; 1972: 15 percent]

How U.S. voted—Issue	U.S. vote	Scored
1. Situation in Cyprus	Yes	Right.
2. Cambodian Representation	do	No score.
3. Invitation to Palestine Liberation Organization	No	Wrong.
4. Palestine Settlement	do	No score.
5. Palestine—Observer status	do	Right.
6. Suspension of South Africa	do	Do.
7. Prohibition of napalm	Abstain	Wrong.
8. End to all nuclear tests	do	Do.
9. Indian Ocean a zone of peace	do	Do.
10. SALT Talks: nuclear halt, cutbacks	do	Do.
11. Nuclear free zone in Asia	do	Do.
12. Military budget study by U.N.	Yes	Right.
13. Future of Korea	Yes	Right.
14. U.N. charter improvement	No	Wrong.
15. Individual human rights petition to U.N. (motion to strike from resolution)	do	Right.
16. Rhodesia	Abstain	Wrong.
17. Namibia	do	No score.
18. Charter of economic rights and duties	No	Wrong.
19. Use of U.N. in peaceful settlements	Yes	Right.
20. Human rights in Chile	Abstain	No score.

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National scores—Cumulative results

Afghanistan	83	Iraq	70
Albania	53	Ireland	85
Algeria	75	Israel	55
Argentina	78	Italy	73
Australia	95	Ivory Coast	85
Austria	80	Jamaica	70
Bahamas	38	Japan	95
Bahrain	80	Jordan	80
Bangladesh	73	Kenya	83
Barbados	53	Khmer Republic	75
Belgium	63	Kuwait	78
Bhutan	55	Laos	70
Bolivia	65	Lebanon	83
Botswana	78	Lesotho	60
Brazil	80	Liberia	80
Bulgaria	43	Libyan Arab Republic	78
Burma	80	Luxembourg	58
Burundi	68	Madagascar	78
Byelorussian S.S.R.	43	Malawi	55
Canada	78	Malaysia	78
Central African Republic	68	Maldives (absent)	0
Chad	53	Mali	65
Chile	80	Malta	63
China	58	Mauritania	75
Colombia	90	Mauritius	58
Congo	70	Mexico	95
Costa Rica	90	Mongolia	43
Cuba	49	Morocco	60
Cyprus	78	Nepal	78
Czechoslovakia	43	Netherlands	83
Dahomey	73	New Zealand	98
Democratic Yemen	65	Nicaragua	68
Denmark	70	Niger	85
Dominican Republic	58	Nigeria	88
Ecuador	90	Norway	78
Egypt	75	Oman	75
El Salvador	70	Pakistan	55
Equatorial Guinea	43	Panama	55
Ethiopia	78	Paraguay	65
Fiji	78	Peru	90
Finland	90	Philippines	88
France	49	Poland	43
Gabon	40	Portugal	73
Gambia	65	Qatar	70
German Democratic Republic	43	Romania	68
Germany, Federal Republic of	65	Rwanda	83
Ghana	78	Saudi Arabia	49
Greece	83	Senegal	80
Grenada	60	Sierra Leone	80
Guatemala	80	Singapore	85
Guinea	63	Somalia	70
Guinea-Bissau	53	South Africa (suspended)	0
Guyana	78	Spain	88
Haiti	80	Sri Lanka	73
Honduras	70	Sudan	80
Hungary	43	Swaziland	53
Iceland	78	Sweden	85
India	70	Syrian Arab Republic	78
Indonesia	83	Thailand	80
Iran	88	Togo	65

National scores—Cumulative results—Continued

Trinidad and Tobago	85	United Republic of Tanzania	70
Tunisia	83	United States	45
Turkey	80	Upper Volta	75
Uganda	78	Uruguay	75
Ukrainian S.S.R.	43	Venezuela	83
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	43	Yemen	78
United Arab Emirates	75	Yugoslavia	75
United Kingdom	53	Zaire	65
United Republic of Cameroon	80	Zambia	65

How Issues Were Scored

DESCRIPTIONS OF RESOLUTIONS

1. *Cyprus:* Yes—right; Against—wrong; Abstain—wrong. Unanimously adopted.

Urges speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs. Calls for the return of all refugees to their homes in safety, provides for negotiations, and for strengthening of UN peacekeeping force. Unusually strong resolution and vote on an issue many had been avoiding.

2. *Cambodia:* Yes—no score; No—no score; Abstain—right.

Vote is on priority for the Western resolution on who represents Cambodia at the UN: the incumbent Lon Nol government or Prince Sihanouk. On the one hand the UN cannot afford to get into the business of deciding between incumbent and exile governments. On the other hand, anger and frustration at the US for involving Cambodia in war, and at the long effort of the US to upset Sihanouk were surely justified. Therefore, no score either way.

Vote: 58 in favor, 56 against, 20 abstentions.

3. *Palestine:* Invitation to the Palestine Liberation Front to address UN Assembly. Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—no score.

Customarily groups of individuals who are necessary to the discussion of an issue are invited to appear. Representatives of Palestine have appeared in the past. Their presence cannot be considered a judgment on the substance. Therefore, the invitation in itself was appropriate.

Vote: 105 in favor, 4 against (Bolivia, Dominican Republic, US, Israel) 20 abstentions.

4. *Palestine:* Resolution on the future of the Palestinians. Yes—no score; No—no score; Abstain—right. While the rights of the Palestinians is a proper matter and a badly neglected one, the resolution was out of the context of previous resolutions on the Middle East, contained some dangerously ambiguous elements.

Vote: 89 in favor, 8 against, 37 abstentions.

5. *Palestine:* Observer status for the PLO. Yes—no score; No—right; Abstain—right.

Elevating the PLO to the status of an observer nation such as Switzerland was inappropriate.

Vote: 95 in favor, 17 against, 19 abstentions.

6. *Suspension of South Africa:* Yes—no score; No—right; Abstain—right.

Vote was in support of a ruling of the Assembly President, calling for the suspension of South Africa from the proceedings of the Assembly. While frustration has run high for years because of the unwillingness of the big powers to in any way exert themselves on behalf of the end of Apartheid, the ruling was essentially illegal under the Charter. The impact on South Africa was probably useful; the impact on the UN was damaging.

Vote: 91 in favor, 22 against, and 19 abstentions.

7. *Napalm and Weapons Causing Unnecessary Suffering:* Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—wrong.

Urges further progress by the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on International Law in Armed Conflicts updating the laws of war, toward banning napalm and other cruel and indiscriminate weapons.

Vote: 108 in favor, none against, 13 abstentions (potential or actual napalm users).

8. *Nuclear Tests*: Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—wrong.

A straightforward resolution condemning all nuclear weapons tests in whatever environment they are conducted. Calls for a comprehensive test ban, and for a moratorium until it is worked out.

Vote: 95 in favor, 3 against (current atmospheric testers China and France plus tagalong Albania), and 33 abstentions (US, UK, USSR and close friends).

9. *Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace*: Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—wrong.

Asks the US and USSR to cool it on their arms build up in the Indian Ocean, until the states in the area can meet and establish the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Vote: 103 in favor, none against, but 26 abstentions (the US, USSR and their closest friends gave their usual whole-hearted support).

10. *Salt Talks*: Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—wrong.

"Shares the concern" of the US and USSR about the nuclear arms race; urges them to "broaden" the scope and accelerate the pace of their talks; stresses the necessity of qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of strategic and nuclear arms. Asks them to inform the Assembly.

Vote: 105 in favor, 1 against (Albania. China "not participating") 23 abstentions (US, USSR and small group of friends).

11. *Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia*: Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—wrong.

Although the Pakistan initiative was triggered by India's entry into the nuclear explosions club, it was still a good initiative. Invites states to consult on setting up such a zone; asks the UN to convene a meeting for that purpose and to provide assistance.

Vote: 96 in favor; 2 against (Bhutan, India), 36 abstentions. China voted for; US, UK, USSR and France against.

12. *Military Budgets:* Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—wrong. Very interesting resolution building on work of previous year. Asks states to provide views on definition, procedures for establishing a system of comparing military budgets to facilitate their reduction by the proposed 10% and the allotment of part of the savings to development through the UN.

Vote: 99 in favor; 2 against (China and Albania in their usual constructive role); 12 abstentions (USSR group plus France and Paraguay!).

13. *UN Command in Korea*: Yes—right; No—no score; Abstain—right.

A moderate and constructive resolution offered by the US and friends under pressure. Foresees the end of the "UN Command" in Korea which is a ridiculous anachronism; urges continued dialogue toward conciliation and unification between North and South. Abstention is also regarded as right, inasmuch as the resolution did not remove UN imprimateur from US presence.

Vote: 61 in favor, 42 against, 32 abstentions. (Vote in Committee I.)

14. *Improvements to UN and to Charter*: Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—no score.

Resolution sets up a committee of 32 members to consider this year proposals and recommendations of the members for improving the UN and its Charter; asks the Secretary-General for his views.

Vote: 77 in favor, 29 against, 32 abstentions in the 6th Committee.

15. *Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Optional Protocol:* Yes—wrong; No—right; Abstain—wrong.

Vote was on a Soviet move to take reference to the Protocol out of a resolution calling for ratification of the Covenants on Human Rights. The Protocol provides for the right of individual petition over the heads of governments on rights grievances, if governments have agreed in advance. A rare vote showing the line-up on individual human rights.

Vote: 26 in favor, 33 against, 52 abstentions. China did not even wish to participate. The large number of abstentions show nations not knowing, not caring, or caught between two fires of the proponents and opponents of human rights.

16. *Rhodesia*: Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—wrong.

Annual omnibus resolution on Rhodesia. Calls for enforcement of sanctions taken against Rhodesia, names the US in this matter.

Vote: 99 in favor, none against, 17 abstentions, in 4th Committee.

17. *Namibia:* Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—no score.

Annual omnibus resolution on exertion of UN mandate over Namibia. Each year the African states hunt around for something new to do to try to prod action

on this question, with absence of help from the big powers. This year the resolution provides funding for one of the liberation groups' offices, and for a transmitter to broadcast into Namibia—questionable items, therefore abstention is not marked wrong, but only no score.

Vote: 96 in favor, none against, 14 abstentions, in Fourth Committee.

18. *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties*: Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—no score.

A Magna Carta or a hoax, depending on whom you talk to. Probably neither one, but a painful first step toward a statement of international responsibility in the area. The industrialized western countries wanted amendments easier on their multinational corporations concerning compensation for nationalization, etc., main reason for their votes.

Votes: 120 in favor; 6 against (Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Luxberg, UK, US); 10 abstentions.

19. *Peaceful Settlement of Disputes:* Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—no score.

A fine resolution stressing the importance and value of using the UN Charter provisions for settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation, arbitration, with the UN as third party when helpful. Although an endorsement of motherhood, some states were hoodwinked by a USSR campaign against it, a country which wants everything settled only by bilateral negotiations.

Votes: 69 in favor; 10 against, 35 abstentions.

20. *Human Rights in Chile:* Yes—right; No—wrong; Abstain—no score.

Although the UN is political in its choice of human rights issues (Chile is a USSR favorite), the resolution was good one and well-sponsored, and unfortunately, there is no doubt about the severity of the repression of rights in Chile.

Vote: 90 in favor, 8 against (all Latin), and 26 abstentions.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY • ROLL-CALL •

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	%
AFGHANISTAN	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	AO	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	83
ALBANIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	-W	+R	-W		-W	-O	+R		+R	+R	+R			53
ALGERIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	75
ARGENTINA	+R	+O	+R	+O		NP	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R	+R	-W	78
AUSTRALIA	+R	+O	AO	AR	AR	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	95
AUSTRIA	+R	+O	+R	AR	AR	-R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	-R	AW	AO	AO	+R	+R	80
BAHAMAS		+O		AR	AR			+R	+R	+R	AW		+R					+R			38
BAHRAIN	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	-W	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	80
BANGLADESH	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	AO		+R		+R	AO	+R	73
BARBADOS		+O	AO	AR	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R					+R		AO	53
BELGIUM	+R	+O	AO	AR	-R	-R	+R	AW	AW	AW	+R	+R	AR	-W	-R	AW	AO	-W	+R	+R	63
BHUTAN	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O				AW	-W		AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	55
BOLIVIA	+R	+O	-W	-O	-R	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R				+R		-W	65
BOTSWANA	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	AO		+R		+R	+R	+R	78
BRAZIL	+R	+O	+R		+O	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	-W	80
BULGARIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	+R	43
BURMA	+R	AR	AO	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	80
BURUNDI	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	AW	+R	+R	-O	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R		+R	68
BYELORUSSIAN SSR	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	+R	43
CANADA	+R	+O	AO	AR	-R	-R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	-R	AW	AO	AO	+R	+R	78
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R		+R		+R	+R		+R		+R	AO	68
CHAD	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R				AW		+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	53
CHILE	+R	+O		-O	-R	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R		+R	+R	+R	-W	80
CHINA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	-W	+R		+R	-W	-O	+R	XX	+R	+R	+R			58
COLOMBIA	+R	+O	AO	AR	AR	AR	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	90
CONGO	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R		+R	+R	+R	AO		70
COSTA RICA	+R	+O	AO	-O	-R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	90
CUBA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	+R	49
CYPRUS	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	AR	+R	+W	+R		+R	+R	+R	78
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	+R	43
DAHOMEY		-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	AW	+R		+R	+R	+R	73
DEMOCRATIC YEMEN	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	-W	+W	+R		+R	AO	+R	65
DENMARK	+R	+O	AO	AR	-R	-R	+R	+R	AW	+R	AW	+R	+R	AO	-R	AW	AO	-W	+R	+R	70
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		+O	-W			AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R			+R			58
ECUADOR	+R	AR	AO	AR		AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	90
EGYPT	+R		+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	AO	+W	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	75
EL SALVADOR		+O	+R	AR		-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R				+R	+R	AO	70
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O		AW	+R	+R			-O					+R		+R	43
ETHIOPIA	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	+W		+R	+R	AO	AO	78
FIJI	+R	+O	+R	AR	+O	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	AR	+R	+W	+R		+R	+R	AO	78

HOW SCORED: Y--"Yes" vote; N--"No" vote; A--"Abstain" vote. R--right. W--wrong. O--no score Slant line--absent. NP (a Chinese invention)--not participating. The scores are computed on the basis of Right minus Wrong, and minus the number of absences.

Rationale: There is difficulty selecting votes for comparison because roll calls or recorded votes are not always available on important issues and because the resolutions do not always reflect the issues accurately. The votes were selected with these points in mind.

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	%
FINLAND	+R	AR	+R	AR	+O	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	AO	-R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	90
FRANCE	+R	AR	+R	AR	AR	-R	AW	-W	AW	AW	AW	AW	+R	-W	AW	AW	AO	AO	AO	+R	49
GABON		-O	+R	+O	+O	+O					+R		+R			+R	+R	+R			40
GAMBIA		-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AW		+R	+R		+R	65
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+W	+R	+R	-W	+R	43
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC of	+R	+O	AO	AR	-R	-R	+R	AW	AW	AW	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	-R	AW	AO	-W	+R	65
GHANA			+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	78
GREECE	+R	AR	+R	AR	AR	AR	+R	+R	AW	+R	AW	+R	+R	AO	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	83
GRENADA	+R	+O		AR	+O	+O		+R	+R	+R	AW		+R	+R		+R	+R	+R	AO		60
GUATEMALA	+R	+O	AO	AR		AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R		-W	80
GUINEA		-O	+R	+O	+O	+O		AW	+R	+R	+R		-O	+R		+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	63
GUINEA-BISSAU		-O	+R	+O	+O	+O		AW		+R	+R		-O			+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	53
GUYANA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	AR	+R		+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	78
HAITI	+R	+O	AO	AR	AR	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R		-R		+R	+R	+R	AO	80
HONDURAS		+O		AR	AR		+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R		+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	AO	70
HUNGARY	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	43
ICELAND	+R	+O	AO	-O	-R	-R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R		+R	AO	-R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	78
INDIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	AW	-W	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	80
INDONESIA	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	70
IRAN	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	83
IRAQ	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R		-O	AO	+W	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	88
IRELAND	+R	+O	+R	AR	-R	-R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	-R	+R	AO	AO	+R	+R	70
ISRAEL	+R	+O	-W	-O	-R	-R	AW	+R	AW	+R	AW		+R	AO	-R	AW	AO	AO	+R	AO	85
ITALY	+R	+O	+R	AR	-R	-R	+R	AW	AW	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	AW	AO	AO	+R	+R	55
IVORY COAST	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	73
JAMAICA	+R	-O	+R	+O	AR	+O		+R	+R	+R	+R		AR	+R	AW	+R		+R	AO	+R	85
JAPAN	+R	+O	+R	AR	AR	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	AO	+R	+R	70
JORDAN	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	95
KENYA	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R		AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	80
KHMER REPUBLIC	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R		+R	+R		83
KUWAIT	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	AO	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	75
LAOS	+R	AR	AO	AR	AR	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R		AO	AW			+R	+R	AO	78
LEBANON	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	AO		+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	70
LESOTHO		+O		+O	+O	AR		+R	+R	+R	+R		+R	AO	AW	+R	+R	+R		+R	83
LIBERIA	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R		60
LIBYAN ARAB REPUBLIC	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	AO	+W	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	80
LUXEMBOURG	+R	+O	AO	AR	-R	-R	+R	AW	AW	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO				-W	+R	+R	78
MADAGASCAR	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R		+R	58
MALAWI		+O		AR	AR	AR	+R	AW	+R		AW	+R	AR	AO		AW	AO	+R	+R	+R	78
MALAYSIA	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	55
MALDIVES																					78
MALI	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O				+R	+R		-O	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	0
MALTA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O					+R		+R	65
MAURITANIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	63
MAURITIUS	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O		+R	+R	+R	AW		+R	+R				+R	AO	+R	75
MEXICO	+R	+O	+R	AR	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	58
MONGOLIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	+R	95
MOROCCO	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	43
NEPAL	+R	-O	+R	AR	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	AW			+R	+R	+R	60
NETHERLANDS	+R	+O	AO	AR	-R	-R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	-R	+R	AO	AO	+R	+R	78
NEW ZEALAND	+R	+O	+R	AR	AR	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	83
NICARAGUA		+O	AO	-O	-R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R			+R		-W	98
																					68

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	%
NIGER	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	85
NIGERIA	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	88
NORWAY	+R	AR	+R	-O	-R	-R	+R	+R	AW	+R	AW	+R	+R	AO	-R	AW	+R	AO	+R	+R	78
OMAN	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	AO	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO		75
PAKISTAN	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	55
PANAMA	+R	+O	+R	AR	AR	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R		+R		+R	+R		55
PARAGUAY	+R	+O	AO	AR	AR	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R				+R		-W	65
PERU	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R	+R		90
PHILIPPINES	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	88
POLAND	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	+R	43
PORTUGAL	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	AO	AW	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	73
QATAR	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R		+R	-W	AW	+R	+R	+R		+R		70
ROMANIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	AW	+R	+R	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	68
RWANDA	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	83
SAUDI ARABIA		+O	+R	+O	+O		+R	+R			+R		+R	-W	+W	+R		+R		+R	49
SENEGAL	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	80
SIERRA LEONE	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R		+R	80
SINGAPORE	+R	+O	+R	AR	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	85
SOMALIA		-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	+W		+R	+R	AO	+R	70
SOUTH AFRICA																					
SPAIN	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	+R	+R	AO	+R	AO	88
SRI LANKA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+O	+W			+R	+R	+R	73
SUDAN	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	80
SWAZILAND	+R	+O		AR	AR	+O					+R		+R	AO	AW	+R	+R	+R		+R	53
SWEDEN	+R	AR	+R	AR	AR	-R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	AO	-R	AW	AO	+R	+R	+R	85
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	AO	+W	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	78
THAILAND	+R	+O	+R	+O	AR	+O	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AW	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	80
TOGO	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O		+R	+R	+R	+R		-O	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R		AO	65
TRINIDAD and TOBAGO	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R		+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	85
TUNISIA	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	83
TURKEY	+R	+O	+R	+O	+O	AR	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	+W	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	80
UGANDA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	AO	78
UKRAINIAN SSR	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	+R	43
UNION of SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	-O	-W	+W	+R	+R	+R	-W	+R	43
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	+R	AR	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	-W	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	75
UNITED KINGDOM	+R	+O	AO	AR	-R	-R	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	+R	+R	-W	-R	AW	AO	-W	+R	+R	53
UNITED REPUBLIC of CAMEROON	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	AW		+R	+R	+R	+R	80
UNITED REPUBLIC of TANZANIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R		AW	+R	-O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	70
UNITED STATES	+R	+O	-W	-O	-R	-R	AW	AW	AW	AW	AW	+R	+R	-W	-R	AW	AO	-W	+R	AO	45
UPPER VOLTA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R		-O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	75
URUGUAY	+R	+O	AO	AR	AR		+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-R	AW	+R	+R		-W	75
VENEZUELA		+O	+R	AR	+O	AR	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AO	83
YEMEN	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	+R	-O	AO		+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	78
YUGOSLAVIA	+R	-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	+R	+R	+R	AW	+R	-O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	75
ZAIRE		-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	+R	AW	+R	+R	+R	+R	AR	+R	+W	+R		+R	AO	AO	65
ZAMBIA		-O	+R	+O	+O	+O	-R	+R	+R	AW	AW	+R	-O	+R	+W	+R	+R	+R	AO	+R	65

ISSUES

1-Cyprus
2-Cambodia representation
3-Invitation to PLO
4-Palestine settlement
5-Palestine--Observer
6- Suspension of South Africa
7- Napalm
8- Nuclear Tests
9- Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
10-SALT talks
11-Nuclear Free Zone-Asia
12-Military Budget
13-Future of Korea
14-UN Charter
15-Optional Protocol
16-Rodesia; 17-Namibia
18-Charter of Economic Rights, Duties
19-Peaceful Settlements
20-Chile

[From the New York Times Magazine, May 4, 1975]

THE UNITED STATES VERSUS THE U.N.?

WE MAY BE OUTVOTED NOW, BUT VOTING IS ONLY ONE WAY TO MAKE DECISIONS—WE SHOULD TRY OTHERS, FOR THERE IS STILL MUCH IMPORTANT WORK TO BE DONE

(By Harlan Cleveland)[1]

On Nov. 11, 1974, the adult leaders of the Little League, a baseball organization for children 8 to 12, announced that henceforth their World Series would be limited to American teams. They did not say why. But the news item reported, deadpan, that teams from Taiwan and Japan have captured seven of the past eight championships. The incident reflects a mood and raises a question about the capacity of Americans to adjust to a world in which power is diffused, centers of decision are plural—and, even when our national game is played, Americans do not always win.

Americans certainly haven't been winning lately. We and our Western European partners have been on the receiving end of more international flak than at any other moment in our history—some of it from people who have been beneficiaries of our bounty, protected by our power and educated in our universities. At a U.N. Special Assembly called last year to consider a "new international economic order," we were accused of wasting energy and minerals, building weapons we don't need, polluting the air and the oceans, eating too much and contributing to the poverty and starvation of others. The U.N.'s "automatic majority"—nearly all the Latins, all the black Africans, the Arabs, the Iranians, the South Asians, most of the Southeast Asians and all the different kinds of Communists—had no difficulty, in a one-country-one-vote assembly, passing resolutions advocating more economic help from those who vote no to those who vote yes. And subsequently, at the General Assembly, the same globe-girdling majority excluded South Africa from its debate, royally received a Palestinian guerrilla leader, and, in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in Paris, excluded Israel from a regional caucus—all actions opposed by the United States.

On Dec. 6, the United States Ambassador to the U.N., John Scali, cleared his Government's throat and warned that the U.N. was fading into "the shadow world of rhetoric, abandoning its important role in the real world of negotiation and compromise . . . Support is eroding—in our Congress and among our people. Some of the foremost American champions of this organization are deeply distressed at the trend of recent events." Ten Western Ambassadors spoke in similar vein. "We cannot overlook," said the French delegate, Louis de Guiringaud, "the drawbacks of adopting so many short-lived resolutions—each longer than the last, one a repetition of the other—virtually unreadable and sometimes not read, even by their sponsors. No newspaper in the world reproduces them. The United Nations thus runs the risk of living in a closed world."

The replies from the non-Western delegations were sharp. Their common theme was that the West had had the votes and had victimized the rest of the world for a generation, and now it was the rest of the world's turn to victimize the West. The West hadn't seen anything wrong with the "tyranny of the majority" when it was used to partition Palestine, to keep Peking out, to bar North Korea from U.N. debates. Huang Hua of China gloated from the sidelines: "The world is progressing amid turbulence . . . peoples want revolution. . . . The present world situation is excellent."

Yet many of the replies were also tinged with conciliation: The educated leaders of developing nations do not really believe that resolutions feed people or hasten economic growth. "We here are not a parliament," said Fereydoun Hoveyda, Iran's representative and brother of the Shah's Prime Minister. "Here we have to try to find in common—I stress the words 'in common'—solutions to the world's problems. To form a majority or act as a minority can lead to nothing constructive. A dialogue between the various schools of thought in our assembly must begin. . . . The time for monologues is past."

We made this lumpy diplomatic bed ourselves, of course. The Americans and other Westerners who wrote the United Nations Charter were programed by Magna Charta, Montesquieu, Jefferson, the United States Constitution and General Robert's "Rules of Order." Majority rule and parliamentary procedure were

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their narrow, procedure-oriented definition of democracy; the carry-over from one-man-one-vote to one-nation-one-vote was a natural. In setting up the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as affiliated United Nations agencies, the affluent voters weighed the voting according to affluence; even Jefferson limited the application of his philosophy when it came to money matters. In the Security Council they reserved the right of veto, blaming it on the Russians. But in the General Assembly and the specialized and functional agencies that radiate from it, they nailed down the principle of the juridical equality of nations. The number of juridically equal units in the world has tripled since then.

We didn't notice at first what a silly system this always was, because the automatic majority of the first 51 members were our friends or clients (sometimes both). Warren Austin, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and Adlai Stevenson, all of whom went directly from American politics to become American Ambassadors to the U.N., won many a domestic plaudit by mobilizing a coalition of the righteous to flay with rhetorical scorn and then vote down the Kremlin's pitiful band of 5 to 11 votes; the subject of the resolutions was Communist behavior. (During the Kennedy Administration, when I was working on U.N. affairs in Washington, I once asked Senator Hubert Humphrey why Stevenson had so much less clout in Congress than he did in the country and around the world. "We're jealous," said Humphrey with his disarming frankness. "We work for a week on a major Senate speech, and it gets two paragraphs on page 36. All Adlai has to do is walk across the street and come out against the Communists, and he's on page 1 with a photo.")

Showboating tactics are still in vogue—and about as ineffective in getting things done. The earlier resolutions had little discernible effect on the minority's behavior, and the same is true of the latterday resolutions. Only now the automatic minority has a new set of targets: Afrikaners, Israelis and the industrial rich.

To be in the minority is uncomfortable, of course. We may in consequence become less obsequious in our public rhetoric; candor is as refreshing in international politics as in the domestic variety. Daniel P. Moynihan has implied (during his brief period of free speech as a Harvard professor) that we should not be so polite at the United Nations, that we have failed to make ourselves understood. But that is a comment on style. The unanswered question is whether the Government thinks that a change in style is a substitute for American leadership in building the institutions of interdependence.

The U.N.'s main problem is not that Americans are sore. Its main problem is that the system is not coping with interdependence—because its members, including ourselves, haven't decided that they want it to. The instruments intended to "harmonize the actions of nations" are so clearly no match for conflict, poverty and runaway technology that most people in every nation display toward them a mixture of uninterest and dismay.

In the decade of the nineteen-forties, a war-generated spasm of creativity brought into being a cumulation of functional global andl regional international agencies for relief, collective security, technological cooperation, technical assistance, development lending and the regulation of trade and money. The dominant mood in 1975, about this legacy of the forties, is disenchantment. Americans are not only impatient with the General Assembly; they are annoyed with their allies and tired of foreign aid. Instruments of collective security and allied consultation are eroded by big-power strategies of coexistence and détente. A semiunited Western Europe and a suddenly powerful Japan still are embarrassingly dependent on the United States for their security and on Middle Eastern monarchs and colonels for their energy. And the developing nations of three continents find that bloc voting in global assemblies fails to redistribute the world's wealth, or even give promise of avoiding a crisis of survival, beginning almost immediately, for milliions of human beings.

The U.N. Charter and compacts of 30 years ago simply did not predict or provide for the now foreseeable vital issues in "harmonizing the actions on nations." Many important trends of the present era are, taken together, clearly adverse to the self-fulfillment of nearly every human being, and to the survival of a large minority of the human race. Most of the thoughtful American statesmen who helped write the Charter were apprehensive that the U.N. might do something damaging to our independence. But now the danger is that the U.N. which is all of us, will fail to do something decisive about our interdependence.

Although it is clear enough that the U.N. isn't coping, the knee-jerk debate between let's-stay-in and let's-get-out schools is an exercise in irrelevance. The

real questions are more difficult—indeed, more interesting: What functions are simply going to have to be handled internationally, because they require decisions too big or too sensitive to be left to individual nation-states? To what extent can those functions be handled by reforming the U.N.? And what functions will require new social invention?

INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING

The early United Nations doctrine was that an "aggressor" would be deterred or defeated by the overwhelming might of the rest of mankind. The hidden premise was that the World War II Allies (who had called themselves the United Nations in wartime, too) would stick together. The cold war, of course, changed the game, though the rules were never rewritten. One nation's aggression became another's "war of liberation" or "aid to beleaguered allies." The U.N. could not do what its members did not want it to do.

In the nuclear confrontation, the peace has been kept by a credible and mutual fear, nobody who studies the potential of nuclear weapons thinks they are very usable. In day-to-day world politics, they are not even very useful for brandishing.

But in less-than-global warfare, there turned out to be a U.N. peace-keeping function not really envisaged in the charter. Several times in the Middle East, and in a dozen other places, mediation and physical separation of combatants by an operational third party, acting on a mandate from the "general opinion of mankind," has proved to be both practical and indispensable. The ethnic and economic rivalries of the future will certainly require an enhanced capacity of the U.N.—or, in a pinch, less-than-global "consortia of the concerned"—to send peace teams, ranging from a single mediator to a division or two of "soldiers without enemies," into the no-man's land between combatants.

Similarly, in arms control, an international capacity to monitor, inhibit and collectively frustrate the actions of individual nations will surely be needed. The traffic in "conventional arms"—no longer obsolete leftovers from the big-power military arsenals but the most up-to-date weaponry that money can buy—is now enormous; each supplier says he's doing it only because if he doesn't others will get the business. The situation is ripe for agreements in restraint of a dangerous trade. Moreover, a dozen nations now have, and two or more dozen will have before long, the stuff and the know-how to convert their nuclear fuel into nuclear warheads.

An international system is also necessary to coordinate the international policing of terrorism as the miniaturization of high explosives puts more power in the hands of guerrilla groups and individual desperadoes.

PLANETARY BARGAINING

An extraordinary political bazaar will very likely be at the center of things in the coming decade. In its varied boutiques, groups of nations will try to arrive at practical agreements about the price and supply of energy, management of food reserves, access to scarce raw materials, the stabilization of commodity markets, the limitation of population growth rates, the transfer of technology, the meeting of minimum human needs—in sum, the distribution of wealth and opportunity among the equal and the unequal.

The nature of this new peace game and the initial distribution of the chips are easier to predict than the international auspices under which the planetary bargains will be struck, monitored, enforced and renegotiated. Rhetoric in United Nations assemblies has doubtless helped make necessary a planetwide negotiation about who gets what, and when and how and why. The question is: Can the United Nations system develop (will its members permit it to develop?) the operational capacity to manage this deadly serious game—to administer the rulemaking, to monitor the keeping of agreements, to mobilize sanctions against those who break their agreements?

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The United States and other industrial nations have gradually learned that bilateral giving does not buy durable political friendships for the grantor or political freedoms for the grantee. In consequence, the U.N. system, including the World Bank, is now the world's largest purveyor of development aid. In this aspect of the United Nations, there is much to build on, but the bargaining about who gets to decide what will be intense.

The changing pattern of world wealth, the rising demands for social justice and the growing capacity of the less powerful countries to get together for "collective self-reliance" have combined to mount an unprecedented challenge to the global "seniority system." The new-rich oil nations, for example, have only tiny influence in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. If they don't get more votes in the weighted-voting system, it is illusory to expect them to endow these institutions for long with their petrodollars.

And in our dealings with the developing areas that haven't yet discovered riches under their national domains, aid as charity will have to give way to mutuality of decisions about what they are going to do for themselves and what we are going to do for them, just as, at home, we have created devices for involving the poor in decisions about antipoverty programs.

MONEY AND BUSINESS REGULATION

For most of modern history, agreements about trade, investment and money have been dominated by a dozen countries; they did most of the trade, made most of the investments and issued most of the money. World monetary arrangements were left in disarray when, in 1971, the United States decided that the dollar was no longer strong enough to serve as the world's "key currency"; up to then, the Federal Reserve System had acted in effect as the world's central banker. The leadership vacuum has been compensated for, in part, by floating exchange rates, which force each nation to take more responsibility for its own monetary policies. But there will have to be a system of intensive consultation among the nations to coordinate their varying rates of money growth.

Another part of the broad challenge to the "seniority system" is the growing demand for international regulation of multinational business. The outcome here depends on the multinational enterprises as a group. If they develop and live by a reasonable code of international behavior that takes account of small-country sensitivities, the drive in the United Nations to establish an international regulatory agency will lose some steam. But one or two more I.T.T.-Chile episodes will bring on international regulation as surely as, in American history, the excesses of a few utilities brought on the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and cheating by a minority of brokers brought on public regulation of the securities exchanges.

The Environment

It is increasingly evident that air and water and outer space are a global "commons," in which littering by one is pollution for all. It is no accident that the most vigorous and potentially most important United Nations agency created since the nineteen-forties is the U.N. environmental program, headed by one of the world's truly international men, Maurice Strong of Canada.

Whether we consider ourselves Americans or citizens of the world (or both), we need global monitoring and agreed international rules about (for example) oil spills, air pollution, the handling of radioactive waste and the changing of climate at human command. International control is also necessary for the regulation of new kinds of world traffic—not just aircraft movements, which are troublesome enough, but sonic interference, broadcasting from satellites, remote sensing technologies, orbital arcs in space and the competitive use of the frequency spectrum.

Ocean Resources

As nearly everyone is vaguely aware by now the oceans are man's last and greatest frontier on earth. They cover two-thirds of its surface; there are vast uncharted areas of seabed, with ocean trenches deeper than Mt. Everest is high; there may be as much oil, gas, copper, nickel, cobalt, manganese under them as there is on land; the table varieties of fish we now enjoy and require could vanish in a decade without new conservation measures; the oceans offer a vast potential for floating cities, man-made islands and new transportation systems; they could also become a giant irreversible cesspool.

What is lacking is a common international perspective. The oceans do not, by any stretch of nationalist imagination, "belong" to any nation.

Global Planning

There is an acute need for long-range professional analysis of global futures, from an international point of view, to catch problems before they become insoluble by peaceful means, to identify new technologies that will need to be

controlled and channeled by new institutions to human rather than antihuman purposes. Some of these will be the consequence of developments in the biological sciences, which look to be every bit as revolutionary as the industrial/nuclear/electronic upheaval.

The management of interdependence is a collection of Herculean labors too big or too sensitive to be tackled by single nations, or even in two's and three's. The imperatives to multilateral action are so strong that despite all the international obstacles and national reluctances, the U.N. system has already developed a limited capacity to act.

Apart from the World Bank and Fund, the U.N. system spent about $1.3 billion last year, more than 90 per cent of it for development work in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. (That seems a sizable sum until you calculate that it is one-half of 1 per cent of the world's military spending for the same period). The World Bank and its "soft-loan window"—the International Development Association—lent $4.3 billion to 75 developing countries last year, the International Monetary Fund lent about $4 billion more to its members, mostly for stability rather than development.

So, much real work gets done in the U.N. family, and its more operational agencies are managed about as effectively as the comparable national bureaucracies are. From a generation's experience with international agencies, those that are effective and those that are not, two useful lessons stand out. One is that *the more voting there is, the less action there is.* The other is that *the more initiative is placed in the hands of international executives, the more international action results.*

On the voting issue, we know from experience what *doesn't* lead to action: a pseudo-parliamentary process that (1) pretends that every nation is equally relevant to every subject, (2) takes many-sided complexities and squeezes them into a Pro-crustean yes-or-no two-sidedness, and (3) moves each issue toward quick disagreement about words rather than careful agreement about action. The way the General Assembly now operates makes it clearly the wrong system for the needed actions.

But of course it doesn't have to operate that way. There is a remarkably simple solution to the "voting problem" in the General Assembly: Don't take any votes. The alternative mode—the action mode—is to decide by *consensus* among those whose action together is necessary to carry out any given international program. Voting seems to focus attention on disagreed issues of high principle; consensus focuses on cooperation about what to do. And if there is a central truth about man the social animal, it is this: that people from societies at differing stages of development, professing competitive philosophies, growing up in varied cultures, speaking many languages, do seem to be able to come together on what to do next, if they carefully avoid trying to agree on *why* they are acting together.

Once there is a consensus about action, a vote is unnecessary. When there is not yet a consensus about action, a vote dramatizes the differences and makes eventual reconciliation that much more difficult.

Suppose, for example, that war breaks out again tomorrow in the Middle East. In a voting system, the problem is tackled by formulating a two-sided proposition to decide who's right and who's wrong. There are, however, not two sides but many—Egyptian, Israeli, Syrian, Iraqi, Libyan, Jordanian and Palestinian sides that are very different from each other; interests of arms suppliers like France, interests of the two nuclear superpowers and the separable interests of the rest of the world in not having local rivalries lead to wider war.

In this complexity a system that requires a yes-or-no vote on a two-sided proposition would be ridiculously dysfunctional. A vote that guarantees Israel's existence is no use if the Arabs vote "no"; a vote that tells Israel to withdraw and disarm will be ineffective if Israel and its friends (including the United States) vote "no." The problem is rather to stop the fighting, maintain a cease-fire, mediate the disputes and enforce an agreed settlement. This requires a legislative framework that takes the multiple interest into account: perhaps an armistice, a peace-keeping force to discourage creating and a mandate to a shuttling peacemaker to seek the more permanent settlement. Such a legislative mandate must represent a true consensus of the interests engaged in the dispute—and not a one-sided judgment about rights and wrongs.

The U.N. Security Council, now 15 nations including five with vetoes, has in fact sponsored a number of useful peace-keeping operations, notably in Lebanon, Palestine, Suez, Yemen, Sinai, the Golan Heights, Greece, Kashmir and West Irian. Many U.N. enthusiasts used to decry the veto. But it turned out that

because of the veto, negotiations about Security Council actions had to be serious. The Russians, for example, have to be persuaded to join the consensus or there is no consensus. That sometimes takes days, or months or years; sometimes it never comes; but if agreement is reached, something then happens: Money is spent; people are put to work; peace-keeping forces are dispatched; pressure is put on combatants to stop fighting and start talking.

In both the bank and the fund, weighted voting has somewhat the same effect as consensus. Those nations that put up most of the money have to be in agreement, or no action results. But consensus, of which they are a part, unlocks their treasuries.

Some international agencies have always acted without voting—by a "no objection" procedure, or "consensus." During the four years I served as U.S. representative on the North Atlantic Council, the political board of directors of the NATO alliance, I do not recall a single vote on a matter of substance. Not that we lacked for controversial issues and divided Atlantic counsels during 1965–69. But it just did not occur to any of us around the table, for example, to call for a 14-to-1 vote on General de Gaulle's antipathy to NATO. Instead, we negotiated at tedious length to limit the damage in France's military withdrawal. When we had carried the consensus as far as it would stretch, we saw no good purpose in making a public scene about the remaining fraction of dissent. An adversary vote might have persuaded de Gaulle to cut off permission for NATO over-flights, which (unlike the absence of French units in NATO military exercises) could have done real damage to Western defense.

It is interesting to see how many of the recent U.N. processes have been coming around to consensus procedure, whenever international action seems more desirable than words for domestic consumption. The U.N.'s Outer Space Committee worked this way, and as a result produced the Outer Space Treaty and conventions on the return of astronauts and space objects, and on damage claims resulting from space activity. The Geneva Disarmament Committee and the Seabed Committee also formally decided to work by consensus. The big sensitivity training sessions—on environment at Stockholm, on population at Bucharest, on food at Rome—used straw votes in committee sessions, but adopted far-reaching "action programs" by consensus, even in their plenary meetings. (In the General Assembly last winter the complex proposal for a new World Food Council, to monitor production and consumption and work out an international food-reserve system, was agreed to by more than 100 sovereign countries, including even the selection of the founding members, in a two-week period, showing a sense of urgency any national legislature would find it hard to match.)

"Consensus" does not mean unanimous consent. In a Pacific island village, important decisions will draw all the villagers to a community circle, but only those who care about a particular decision will edge toward the circle's center to make their views known and their weight felt. The others will sit around the outside, often talking among themselves about something else. When the village elder is able to divine and announce a common view, that doesn't mean that everybody is an uncritical endorser of what will be done. It *does* mean that among those whose water-buffaloes might be gored, there is at least passive acquiescence, and those who don't much care are willing to leave the outcome to those who do. To insist at this juncture, under Western procedures, that everyone's pulse be taken, and then to divide the converging company into clear ayes and nays, would endanger the agreement already reached.

To convert the U.N. system to consensus decision-making will seem visionary only to Americans and Europeans who have grown up in the belief that parliamentary procedure and Robert's "Rules" are the very stuff of democracy. But that is a minority view in the modern world, and even in the West is a rather recent notion, not deeply rooted in classical or Christian thought. "Consensus" will not seem extraordinary to any one who has participated in a Quaker meeting, grown up in a modern family, or sat on a British or American jury. It will not seem strange to a Japanese businessman, a Chinese scholar, an African villager. Chaidir Anwar Sani, the Indonesian delegate to the U.N., commenting on the Scali speech, actually charted a way out: "Indonesia," he said, "has a tradition of decision making through *musyawarah* and *mufakat*, consultations and consensus. Most of our countries have at one stage or another known that method. The process may be lengthy, cumbersome, sometimes exasperating, but we are much better off than immediately after our independence when we experimented with the 'half-plus-one-is-right' method. . . . My delegation would not like to see the United Nations turn into an arena for confrontation between

majority and minority, or a factory to turn out resolutions, but a forum for the combined and concerted efforts of all the countries in the world to find concrete solutions." Let's elect *him* President of the General Assembly. Voting has formed a habit, and like any addiction, it will be hard to shake—both for Westerners who have been missionaries of the gospel that voting equals democracy, and for the more recent converts who have found out what fun majority rule can be—for the majority. I have a constructive suggestion: To hasten the day when "the time for monologue is past," let's negotiate a one-year moratorium on voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

But legislation by consensus is only a beginning. The key to international action—and often the agent of consensus-building—is the international executive. The great work of gluing the international community together requires a rare quality of executive leadership.

Some national leaders consider it disloyal if one of their citizens acts in the interest of mankind. Nikita Khrushchev was one of these, and during a visit to the Black Sea port of Sochi shortly after the launching of Sputnik I, a Secretary General of the United Nations argued the point with him. "As long as I remained on my Swedish launching pad," Dag Hammarskjold told the Russian leader, "I found it hard to think and act as an international person. But once in orbit as an international official, I am like your sputnik, free from the divided jurisdictions on earth."

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the U.N. Development Program, the Children's Fund (UNICEF), the new U.N. Environmental Program, and some other parts of the system work comparatively well because their centers of initiative are competent and self-confident executive leaders not afraid to act in the long-run international interest as they see it, even if that sometimes isn't the perceived short-term interest of their own national governments.

The negative cases in point are equally instructive. UNESCO's director general pandered for years to the emotional majority in his governing body. He was consequently reelected to office several times, but UNESCO failed then to attract to its activities the outstanding leaders in education, science and culture from around the world. It is no accident that UNESCO so often, as recently in the case of Israel, lets politics get in the way of its *raison d'etre*. The world needs a first-rate international public agency devoted to education, science and culture; but, because of one executive's maneuverings, important elements of the international intellectual community are wondering if they couldn't do better than UNESCO if they started all over again.

Another instructive contrast was the way two different Secretaries General reacted when the U.N.'s peacekeeping role was challenged. In 1960, a short-lived Soviet-dominated Government in the former Belgian Congo (now Zaire) demanded that the U.N. peace-keeping force withdraw from its territory. Dag Hammarskjold refused to comply and insisted that the U.N. Security Council's mandate took precedence over the national Government's desires. In 1967, U Thant was faced with an Egyptian demand for withdrawal of the U.N. Emergency Force from its mission of observing the truce on the Sinai frontier with Israel. Without consulting the Security Council or the General Assembly, Thant ordered the blue helmets to withdraw; later reports indicated that even the Egyptians were astonished that the Secretary General had pushed the panic button so fast. The Six Day War followed soon after.

The command of peace-keepers, the management of planetary bargaining, the promotion of just and rapid development, the regulation of money and business, the creation of an environmental alert system, the establishment of an international oceans authority, the conception of a global planning staff—each of these tasks will require the world's best talent. In the United Nations system, national logrolling on appointments and long tenure in most of the senior posts has made it impossible to bring together a critical mass of first-rate public executives. That is why, when a major new international operation is planned, talk of bypassing the United Nations is normal; the proposed seabed authority is a current case in point.

But—again—things don't have to work that way. The administration of international responsibilities is not necessarily characterized by timidity or time-serving. Governments, if they want to, can lend the international community their very best people. And international agencies—though they are subject to the same Parkinson's Law as other institutions—can also respond to the

personal leadership of men and women, of whatever race or political creed, with vision in their minds and fire in their bellies.

Charlie Brown is right, of course, in most cases, when he says, "No problem is so big and complicated that it can't be run away from." But the management of interdependence is the exception; multilateral systems for interdependent functions are, quite simply, a must. To the extent that the United Nations system we helped create doesn't roll, we will have to turn to and help install new and better wheels. And since both the United States and the United Nations will be around for quite a while, let's teach our Little Leaguers not to cop out, but to hang in there.

STATEMENT OF JOHN NELSON WASHBURN, A WASHINGTON-BASED INTERNATIONAL LAWYER AND SOVIET AFFAIRS SPECIALIST, ON THE SUBJECT OF FUTURE U.S. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION

In my capacity as attorney-adviser (international) in the Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State U.S.A. during the period March 1958–October 1966, it was my good fortune to serve as an adviser on the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly four times, in the autumn of 1958, 1960, 1961 and 1962, twice under a Republican Administration and twice under a Democratic Administration.

I have two major suggestions to make on the basis of such service on the United States Delegation at United Nations Headquarters and the United States Mission in New York City.

First, without deprecating in any way the qualifications of the United States Representatives and Alternate Representatives at the United Nations General Assembly who have served since the Seventeenth Regular Session in 1962, let me urge that the White House consider naming as Representatives and Alternate Representatives during the American Revolutionary Bicentennial Years 1975–1976 really eminent Americans representing as many ethnic groups as possible and most regions of our vast land. Where, oh where, is the current equivalent of Miss Marian Anderson, who graced the United States Delegation at the Thir- and most regions of our vast land. Where, oh where, is the current equivalent torney from Billings, Montana—the late Arthur F. Lamey, who proved so effective working in and about the Third Committee of the General Assembly at the Fifteenth Regular Session in 1960? These were the individual United States Representatives and Alternate Representatives who made so many friends for the United States, particularly among countries which would today be considered to belong to The Third World, the developing world. To produce amicable activities along the same lines in 1975–1976, why not designate as Alternate Representatives or United States Delegation Advisors such able and charming American Indian representatives as Gail, Charlotte or Grace Thorpe—the three daughters of that greatest of American athletes of the first half of the twentieth century—James Francis "Jim" Thorpe of Oklahoma?

My second suggestion also bears on the problem raised by Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan prior to and upon becoming United States Representative to the United Nations, namely, how best to deal with countries defending the interests of The Third World, the developing world, within the United Nations system? I respectfully submit that there be no slippage, no dilution of the words of President Ford's pledge made in the White House Rose Garden on the occasion of the swearing-in ceremony for Ambassador Moynihan June 30, 1975:

"We must deal with new political problems as developing nations press forward vigorously to correct what they see as injustices. . . . We will work with firmness and with patience in a determined effort to foster mutually beneficial relations with the developing world."


In this connection let me take the liberty of urging President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger and Ambassador Moynihan to do justice to the People's Republic of Albania (a Third World leader still unknown even geographically to the State Department, judging by the map enclosed on which Yugoslavia's town Dibrë is found inside Albania!) as my enclosed article urges.

background notes

Albania

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The People's Republic of Albania: Shall We Now Enter An Era Of Negotiation With It After Twenty-five Years Of Confrontation?†

JOHN NELSON WASHBURN

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The People's Republic of Albania: Shall We Now Enter An Era Of Negotiation With It After Twenty-five Years Of Confrontation?†

Introduction—How Present Sino-Albanian Ties Relate to the United States

The People's Republic of Albania is strategically located, and rugged yet vulnerable. Its great importance to world peace despite its small size is best reflected in the graphic sentence contained in a telegram dated September 17, 1968 from Communist Party Chairman Mao, Communist Party Vice-Chairman Lin Piao and Premier Chou En-lai, addressed to Albanian Labor Party First Secretary Enver Hoxha and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mehmet Shehu, which appeared high on the front page of Peking's official Chinese-language daily, *Renmin Ribao:*

> If the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet modern revisionists and their running dogs dare touch a hair on the head of Albania, nothing but complete, ignominious and irrevocable defeat awaits them.

Those prone to discount such a lopsided Asian-European military link, as at the most merely symbolic, should ponder the message published in the official English-language weekly *Peking Review*, No. 29, July 16, 1971, alongside the Hsinhua News Agency dispatch, announcing that Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. That message, dated July 9, was from the Minister of National Defense of the People's Republic of China to the Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of Albania, on the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Albanian People's Army, and concluded:

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†In view of the very detailed references given in the text of this lengthy article, the author believes footnotes are neither necessary nor desirable. Research for the article was made possible by a grant from the Earhart Foundation, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

> Let us, the Chinese and Albanian peoples, unite with the people throughout the world and strive jointly to defeat the U.S. aggressors and their running dogs completely!

A Review of United States Recognition Policies Toward Albanian Governments: 1921–1971

Since December 1921, the United States Government has continually been faced with appraisals and reappraisals of various Albanian governments, in order to determine the feasibility as well as the timing of according *de jure* recognition after considering conditions in that country, the stability of those in authority, existing or prospective American interests there, and whether or not other nations had arranged to accord *de jure* recognition.

United States conduct towards Albanian Governments, in according and in withholding *de jure* recognition between World War I and II, as well as during and after World War II, can with the benefit of hindsight provide us with useful clues as to what approach to try in 1972 with respect to the People's Republic of Albania. The instances investigated and reviewed below in considerable detail, are believed to hold the key in charting our future policy in the direction of recognition.

Prewar (1922) Recognition

In July 1922, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes completed swift action to recognize an Albanian government, in the light of warnings received in April 1922 from Ambassador Richard W. Child at the American Embassy in Rome. He had expressed fear that American interests in Albania would be harmed, should other countries gain early ascendancy there. Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover in Washington, had reached the same conclusion after talking with a representative of the Sinclair Oil Company negotiating for an Albanian oil concession. Ambassador Child had concluded:

> It is quite possible that if skillfully handled some definite benefit could accrue to American interests through the promise of recognition and the timely culmination of the event.

Secretary Hoover, in his letter dated April 26, 1922 to Secretary Hughes, had pointed to recognition of the Albanian Government by England and Italy, and then asked him "to give serious consideration to the recognition of Albania." By the time (May 22, 1922) Hughes had answered Hoover's letter, help for American interests was on its way in the person of Consul General Blake, formerly Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Tangier. On Blake's recommendation of the "propriety and expediency of immediately according American recognition of Albania," based on the

commitments in writing favoring American commercial interests made by Albanian Prime Minister Djafer Ypi under date of June 25, 1922, Hughes telegraphed Blake on July 25 that he could extend United States *de jure* recognition on July 28, 1922.

Prewar (1924) Non-Recognition

A new Albanian government seeking United States *de jure* recognition between June and December 1924, met with American inaction and was overthrown. Within a week of the public announcement in mid-June of the composition of the Albanian Government headed by Prime Minister Fan Noli, American Minister in Albania, Grant-Smith, had received the Prime Minister, who pleaded for recognition by the United States. The American Minister informed his visitor that American policy in Europe regarding recognition was one of "avoiding the impression of hasty actions." He then reminded Noli that the prior Albanian régime "had failed to fulfill its promises as to equality of opportunity" and had not yet brought to justice those responsible for the murder of two Americans in Albania on April 6, 1924.

Secretary of State Hughes did no more than authorize Minister Grant-Smith to continue at his discretion to carry on relations with the then present Albanian Government; action constituting *de jure* recognition on the part of the United States Government was not taken. On October 10, 1924 the American Chargé d'affairs in Tirana reported that the Noli Government was as weak as ever and the Prime Minister remained abroad. He concluded:

> I do not believe that it will serve American interests to take up formal relations at present with the Nationalist regime, in view of all the facts and considering that Greece is the only nation represented here which is not reserving recognition for a more favorable time.

On December 25, 1924 Minister Grant-Smith telegraphed the Secretary of State that the Albanian revolution had succeeded, Ahmet Zogu having entered Tirana that morning.

Prewar (1925) Recognition

Following the reconvening of the Constituent Assembly on January 15, 1925 for the purpose of regularizing the new regime, which appeared to American Minister Grant-Smith to be "relatively stable," a Republic was proclaimed on January 21. Ahmet Zogu became its President. In a telegram dated January 22, 1925, Secretary of State Hughes said: "There is nothing to be gained by indefinitely withholding recognition." Nevertheless, he requested certain assurances from President Ahmet Zogu, that more vigorous action would be taken with respect to those Albanians

responsible for killing American citizens Coleman and De Long on April 6, 1924. American Minister Grant-Smith obtained such assurances. Informed of this January 30, Secretary of State Hughes on January 31 cabled Minister Grant-Smith authorization "to extend recognition to the new régime in Albania and to acknowledge the receipt of official notification of establishment of the republic." This was done under date of February 2, 1925.

Within a year the new American Minister in Albania, Charles C. Hart, could report that, by virtue of a unanimous vote of both houses of the Albanian Parliament:

> Engagements made by the Albanian state as the conditions upon which recognition was granted by the American Government on July 28, 1922, have at last been removed from the field of controversy. . . .

After the measure passed unanimously by parliament on December 14 was signed December 21 by President of the Republic Ahmet Zogu, equal commercial opportunity for the United States became part of the law of Albania on December 28, 1925, the statute taking effect on that day with its publication in the *Official Gazette*.

Events Preceding Wartime (1944) Non-Recognition of the Hoxha Government Formed at Berat

The Albanian Government of former President Ahmet Zogu, on September 1, 1928 proclaimed His Majesty Zogu I, King of the Albanians. He was of the illustrious Albanian family of Zogu, and thereafter ruled in accordance with the Fundamental Statute of the Kingdom of Albania, but his government disintegrated following the occupation of Albania by Italian troops in April 1939. King Zogu eventually received admission to England. The United States Government never formally terminated its relations with King Zogu, but instructions were given to American Minister Hugh G. Grant to leave Albania, and the Albanian Legation in Washington was closed late in the spring of 1939. The United States Government never recognized the subsequent annexation of Albania by the Italian crown, and it refused to recognize the puppet government established in Albania by Italy; moreover, from 1942 to 1944 it publicly sought to encourage Albanian resistance and unity.

In a widely disseminated "Statement by the Secretary of State," released to the press on December 10, 1942 (and published in the *Department of State Bulletin* December 12, 1942) a call for self-government was issued within the context of the restoration of a free Albania, as envisaged in the joint declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, made on August 14, 1941 and known as the "Atlantic Charter." A sequel termed "Statement by the Department of State" was released to the

press April 6, 1944 (and published in the *Department of State Bulletin* April 8, 1944). It expressed pleasure that the Albanian struggle for freedom had not been abandoned after the fall of Prime Minister Benito Mussolini in 1943, and the commencement of the Nazi German occupation of Albania.

The first formal step toward Albanian unification within Albania took place in Permet, a small town in southern Albania not far from the Greek frontier, even before Allied Forces had entered Rome. The First Anti-Fascist National Liberation Congress, adopted in Permet on May 24, 1944, a lengthy "Declaration" in which Secretary of State Cordell Hull's Statement, and similar ones also released in December 1942, by British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden and by Vyacheslav Molotov's People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, were referred to in a preambular paragraph as constituting solemn recognition of Albania's right to independence. There followed a paragraph ascribing exceptional importance to this First Anti-Fascist National Liberation Congress, because it would create an Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council as the Albanian people's "supreme legislative and executive organ," which would in turn create an Anti-Fascist National Liberation Committee as the "chief executive organ, with the attributes of a provisional government."

The formal decision of the Permet Congress to elect such a Council, and to empower it to form such a Committee, came on May 27. Thereupon this Council, on May 27, issued a six-point decree, providing for this Committee "having all the attributes of a provisional people's government." Later that day this Council issued three more decrees. One of the three named Enver Hoxha Commander in Chief of the Partisan Volunteer National Liberation Army and bestowed upon him the rank of Colonel General. This decree took on added significance due to the fact that the Permet Congress had indicated, as the eighth point of its formal decision of May 27, the desire of the Congress that both the Soviet Union and the United States of America send military missions to be attached to the PVNLA's General Staff. Of possible interest, but little importance, was the fact that all these Permet decrees dated May 27 or 28, 1944 bore the signature of the Secretary of the Anit-Fascist National Liberation Council, Koço Tashko, who had attended Harvard University in 1921.

The Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council of Albania, by virtue of its decree dated October 22, 1944, issued in the city of Berat, was transformed into a "Democratic Government of Albania." The adjective "provisional" rendered both as "përkohëshme" and "provizore" in the Permet Congress declaration of May 24, and the AFNL Council decrees

of Permet dated May 27–28, did not appear once in the AFNL Council decree of October 22. Colonel General Enver Hoxha gained additional stature under this Berat decree, being designated Prime Minister as well as Minister for War and for National Defense.

The ostensible domination of this new "Democratic Government of Albania" by a man reputed to be one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Albania founded in Tirana on November 8, 1941, could not help but worry Prime Minister Churchill. His British Government already faced "confusion and disaster" in Greece, England's old ally, due in large part to lack of firmness exhibited under what Churchill so expressively described as "the general principle of slithering to the left." By November 3, 1944 it had been decided, not surprisingly, that "In the present confused situation in Albania, His Majesty's Government do not propose to recognize the Provisional Government," *i.e.*, the Hoxha Government. On November 21, 1944, the Department of State concurred in this decision, explaining:

> The Department of State concurs in the view of the British Government that any request for recognition of the provisional government formed at Berat which may be received at this time should not be granted. The Department feels, however, that there may be a stage in the not distant future in which it may be found expedient to consider the desirability on practical grounds of establishing with such governing authority as may be in *de facto* control of the country such relations as would enable this Government to open an office in Tirana for the purpose of protecting American interests there and coordinating the activities of the representatives of other American agencies who may be sent to Albania. The Department will be disposed to give sympathetic consideration to a request for *de jure* recognition by an Albanian Government only at such time as it may be able to demonstrate that it is non-Fascist in character, that it has established its authority over the country, that it represents the will of the people and is prepared to fulfil its international obligations.

Preliminary (1945) Concerted Allied Steps toward Recognition of the Hoxha Government

By the time (January 12, 1945) the British Government had expressed complete agreement with the American position taken in the Department of State Memorandum of November 21, 1944, both British and American *de jure* recognition of Hoxha's Albanian Government had been rendered more complicated. Colonel General Enver Hoxha, as "Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Government of Albania," had on December 21, 1944, sent a personal letter appealing for recognition of his Government to President Roosevelt.

Letters with an identical text were addressed to Prime Minister Churchill and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Marshal Stalin.

This tripartite appeal was repeated by publication of the text on the front page of the January 4, 1945 issue of Tirana's leading newspaper *Bashkimi* (The Union), Organ of the General Committee of the National Liberation Front. In his letter to President Roosevelt, written in French, Enver Hoxha termed the events at Permet and Berat the crowning achievements in Albania's five-year struggle for national liberation and then declared:

> Aujourd'hui notre pays étant liberé, le Gouvernement Démocratique est le seul Gouvernement qui représente l'Albanie chez nous comme à l'étranger. En Albanie comme à l'étranger personne ne peut contester le fait de l'existence de notre gouvernement. L'autorité de notre gouvernement s'étend sur toutes les regions du pays, sur tout le peuple albanais.

In conclusion, Enver Hoxha sought recognition by Albania's three Great Allies:

> Pour garder et consolider les rapports d'amitié contractés dans la lutte commune contre le fascisme, pour consolider la collaboration entre l'Albanie et les Grands Allies, j'ai l'honneur de Vous présenter l'expression de la volonté du peuple Albanais à ce que son gouvernement soit reconnu en premier lieu de la part de nos Grands Alliés Anglo-Sovieto-Americains et d'établir des relations diplomatiques entre Votre gouvernement et le notre.

The official seal of the Council of Ministers appeared over the edge of the signature of Enver Hoxha.

As we discover from a Memorandum dated March 17, 1945 in the Department of State's Division of European Affairs, of which Cavendish W. Cannon was the drafter, Enver Hoxha's letter "came to the attention of the President only after his return from the Crimea Conference," which took place February 4–11, 1945. Meanwhile, the Department of State had under active consideration, a plan to send to Albania an informal and unofficial survey mission to determine when and under what conditions American representatives might be officially established in Tirana. Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew had this plan outlined in a memorandum dated January 26, 1945 in mind when cabling instructions on January 31 to the United States Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, Caserta, Italy.

The Colonel General was to be told: (1) his request for recognition addressed to Roosevelt had been received in Washington, but the Department of State planned no formal reply; (2) the United States Government, before according recognition to any Albanian Government, would have to be more fully informed than at present regarding the situation in Albania. According to the aforementioned Cannon Memorandum dated March 17, President Roosevelt had indicated he would like to speak to the Secretary of State about the question of recognition of the present Albanian Government, but on the recommendation of the Division of European Affairs, the

discussion had been postponed until a report could be received on the progress made to conduct a preliminary survey of conditions in Albania.

Shortly thereafter, on March 19, a telegram was sent to Caserta over the signature of Acting Secretary Dean Acheson, providing the text of a memorandum to be prepared for delivery to Colonel General Hoxha with respect to his request for recognition. In essence it stated that the United States Government wished to become more fully informed regarding conditions and developments in Albania, and proposed to send into Albania a small group on an informal basis to obtain the necessary information upon which to base any official recognition. Any delay in working out some such arrangement would only delay the decision on official recognition by the United States Government sought by Colonel General Hoxha. The memorandum prepared in Caserta long these lines was delivered to Colonel General Hoxha on March 23, and, although he commented adversely on the fact that it was unsigned, the next day he sent a note in reply accepting the proposed mission for the purpose of "facilitating the recognition of our Democratic Government."

By April 7, 1945 detailed instructions from Secretary of State Stettinius had been prepared for Foreign Service Officer Joseph E. Jacobs, who had been chosen to head the mission. A major policy consideration was outlined:

> It is our view that no one of the three principal Allied Governments should take any decisive action with regard to Albania on matters of international importance, such as recognition, boundaries, federation, alliances, et cetera, except in consultation with the other two Allied Governments.

Jacobs was instructed as to when he should make an informal call on Colonel General Enver Hoxha, and how he should conduct himself during that call:

> You should leave no doubt in his mind that your presence is not to be in any way construed as representing any degree of recognition whatever and that the carrying out of your mission is a prerequisite to this Government's consideration of the question of establishing official relations, whether *de facto* or *de jure* with the existing Albanian authorities.

In accordance with these instructions, after his arrival in Tirana on May 8, 1945 with a party of eight comprising the unofficial American survey mission, Jacobs called on Colonel General Hoxha, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Government of Albania. In a telegram reporting on this call of May 9, he commented:

> Hoxha strikes me as a forceful character with ambitions but suffering from effects of an inferiority complex because of his failure to win recognition.

Six days later, after acquainting himself with the findings of Brigadier D. E.

P. Hodgson, Commander of the British Military Mission to Albania, Jacobs reported:

> Finally I feel that unless present regime falls before my report is submitted which seems highly unlikely continued failure of the United States and Great Britian to recognize will drive it completely into Yugo-Slavia-Soviet fold.

Jacobs filed a preliminary summary of the findings of his survey mission on July 1, 1945, and sent a summary report incorporating final recommendations on August 15, 1945. His principal recommendation in each instance was to the effect that recognition should be accorded the present authorities on condition that they undertake to hold elections of a free and democratic nature subject to international supervision in accordance with a joint British-Soviet-American formula; simultaneous recognition by the three Allied Governments would follow as soon as possible. At sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in October 1945, with Jacobs present to assist, arrangements were made for concerted tripartite notification of expeditious recognition of the Hoxha Government. In this connection, the French Government was requested to postpone its recognition of the Hoxha Government until the British-Soviet-American notification had taken place.

The Tripartite Notification of Recognition, Tirana, November 10–12, 1945

Concerted Allied action on recognition of the Hoxha Government appeared probable and imminent from Washington's viewpoint by the close of business November 8, 1945. That afternoon two telegrams were sent to Tirana to Acting Representative in Albania Harry T. Fultz. The first provided him with the text of the United States note on recognition for Colonel General Enver Hoxha; the second informed him that British and Soviet representatives in Tirana had been instructed by their respective Governments to communicate notes on recognition to Hoxha on November 10, and instructed him to deliver the note of the United States Government on that day.

On the morning of November 10, Fultz, who had received the second telegram but not the first, was compelled to improvise. Brigadier Hodgson, Fultz's British counterpart in the proposed tripartite notification procedure, informed him that Soviet representative Colonel Sokolov had already called on Hoxha at 8:00 a.m.; it was not known whether he had done so by instruction or on his own initiative. Fultz then arranged to accompany Hodgson to his meeting with Hoxha, which took place at 11:00 a.m. At that meeting Fultz handed Hoxha an informal note mentioning the con-

certed tripartite notification procedure and then explaining that the United States note on recognition had been delayed in transmission but would be delivered to Hoxha immediately upon receipt; the note would be released to the press in Washington on November 10 as scheduled, however.

Colonel General Hoxha finally received the text of the United States note, delivered by Fultz, on November 12 at 11:30 a.m. By then the Anglo-American team had been placed in an awkward position in the Albanian press. A special one-page edition of *Bashkimi* on November 10 contained only the unconditional Soviet note signed by Colonel Sokolov, Head of the Soviet Military Mission, and Anglo-American notes of recognition were reported to have been delayed in transit. When *Bashkimi's* regular four-page edition appeared November 11, separate treatment was given to the British and American notes on recognition, bringing more loss of face to the United States. The process was culminated November 17 when *Bashkimi* printed side by side the British note on recognition containing one condition and the American note setting forth two.

The Belated United States Note on Recognition

The pertinent paragraphs of the United States note released to the press November 10 (and published in the *Department of State Bulletin* November 11, 1945), were candid and unambiguous:

> The Government of the United States, having considered the request of the Albanian authorities for recognition, has instructed me to inform you of its readiness to enter into diplomatic relations with the existing regime in Albania as the provisional Government of Albania.
>
> In establishing official relations with an Albanian Government, the United States Government desires to act in conformity with the obligations and principles to which it subscribed in the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe and accordingly requests assurances that the forthcoming elections for a Constituent Assembly shall be held on a genuinely free basis, with secret ballot and without threats or intimidation; that all democratic individuals and groups in Albania shall enjoy freedom of speech and the right lawfully to present and support their candidates; and that foreign press correspondents shall be permitted to enter Albania to observe and report freely on the elections and the work of the Constituent Assembly.
>
> The Government of the United States also desires that the Albanian authorities shall confirm that the treaties and agreements which were in force between the United States and Albania on April 7, 1939, remain valid. The United States Government, on its part, confirms the continuing validity of these instruments.
>
> Upon receipt of the assurances requested, the Government of the United States will be prepared to proceed with the exchange of diplomatic representatives.
>
> I have also been directed to advise you that the present proposal of the

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> United States Government with regard to the establishment of diplomatic relations should not be construed as prejudicing consideration, at a later date, of other questions of an international character involving Albania.
>
> I shall be most happy to transmit to my Government your reply to the proposals set forth above.

Mutual Accommodation (November 15, 1945) on the Legal Issue Involved in Recognition

The official Albanian reply of November 15 to Mr. Fultz for transmission to the United States Government, contained one paragraph devoted to the subject of the continuing validity of Albanian-American treaties and agreements, which read in this writer's translation from the original Albanian text:

> As for any treaties or agreements which have been entered into between Albania and the United States previous to April 7, 1939, we refer to our letter of November 13, 1945, in which we have requested that we be sent copies of these treaty instruments in order that we may look into them because the majority of the archives of the Foreign Ministry of Albania were burned or stolen by the invaders. However, we hope that this will not cause any delay in the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries, so that our Government can quickly take into consideration all the agreements that may exist between the two states.

The last part of the original Albanian text is very misleading, for it meanders like a stream from "treaties" (traktateve) to "agreements" (marevеshjet), and from "countries" (vendeve) to "states" (shteteve). Faced with perhaps a deliberately misleading text, the mission staff translated it in a manner which tended to raise false hopes of Albanian accomodation. This translation, which had the approval of Albanian-speaking Harry T. Fultz, the Action American Representative in Albania, was sent to Washington in dispatch No. 120 dated November 22, 1945. The final Albanian sentence had been split in half, the final Albanian clause rendered in English as:

> In this way our government will take over all the agreements which may exist between the two states.

The key verb to be translated here is a compound one appearing in the original Albanian test as "marë shpejt në shqyrtim," which means literally "take quickly into consideration." Having rendered these four words as "will take over," Acting Representative Fultz was committed to an overly optimistic interpretation of the note dated November 15, 1945, signed by Colonel General Enver Hoxha as Prime Minister of Albania:

> In paragraph five, the final sentence of which reads, 'in this way our government will take over all the agreements which may exist between the two states', General Hoxha is apparently stating that his government in general will respect treaties previously entered into by the two countries but

> seeks the privilege first of knowing specifically to what past governments have committed the country. This position does not seem to diverge greatly from the proposal made by the Department in its telegram no. 109, referred to above.

As a matter of fact, the Department's telegram No. 109 sent to Tirana November 15 may well have evoked the optimistic interpretation from Fultz, because it reflect genuine anxiety about facilitating recognition of Hoxha's Government:

> Please inform Gen Hoxha that in view of destruction of Albania State archives and time required for copies of treaties to reach Tirana US Govt is willing, provided Albanian authorities will affirm established principle of international law respecting continuing validity of treaties entered into by former Govts and not legally terminated, to proceed with establishment of diplomatic relations upon receipt of assurances concerning free elections. You should add, however, that in accepting temporary postponement of reply by Albanian authorities confirming validity of specific treaties which were in force between US and Albania on April 7, 1939, this Govt will expect to receive assurances regarding status of these instruments as soon as possible after copies of them are made available in Tirana.

Enver Hoxha Cites a Legal Bar to Assurances Sought by the United States

This United States Government offer to accept from Albania authorities in lieu of confirmation mere affirmation, pending subsequent examination of specific treaty texts, of the established principles of international law concerning the continuing validity of treaties entered into by previous Governments and not legally terminated, was transmitted November 17 to Colonel General Enver Hoxha. In his reply dated November 23, Hoxha cited a provision of Albanian law which, he contended, barred assurances by Albanian authorities of the continuing validity of such Albanian-American legal instruments.

The provision cited can be found on pages 4 and 5 of the *Official Gazette* (Gazeta Zyrtare), No. 1, December 21, 1944, published by the Democratic Government of Albania's Ministry of Press, Propaganda and People's Culture. The provision is actually the second of three operative sections of a decree issued May 27, 1944 in Permet, by the First Session of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council, which this issue of the *Official Gazette* identified in its Table of Contents as: "Decree of the AFNL Council on Forbidding the Return of Zogu to Albania—No. 3." Major excerpts from this official text are set forth below in this author's translation:

The Anti-Fascist National Liberation
Council of Albania

No. 3

Decree

of the First Session of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council on Forbidding the Return of Zogu to Ablania before Total Liberation of Our Country

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. . . Considering the destruction of the country's economy and the placement of Albania in a completely vassal-like position economically by concluding economic treaties with Fascist Italy,

. . . Considering the betrayal of the Fatherland through contriving Italian Fascism's domination of Albania by importation of military organizers and organizers of youth and via concessions granted to various Italian corporations,

. . . The Anti-Fascist National Liberation Council, expressing the will of the Albanian people, has decreed:

I.

That the entry of Zogu into Albania is forbidden until the regime it will have has been decided by the people after total liberation of our country.

II.

That all agreements, economic and political, concluded with foreign states be reviewed and those made by the Zogu government which are damaging to the Albanian people be breached and replaced by new ones.

III.

That not one agreement and not one international commitment be accepted which was made outside or within Albania by reactionary cliques, whether acting as a political group or as a government.

CHAIRMAN
Dr. Omer Nishani [signature]

SECRETARY
Koço Tashko [signature]

An Analysis and Critique of Colonel General Hoxha's Legal Citation of November 23, 1945

Before undertaking an analysis and critique of Hoxha's legal citation, it is appropriate to quote a paragraph providing general coverage of this decree which appeared in an official, authoritative publication issued in

Tirana in 1969, and widely circulated in the English-speaking countries—*Answers to Questions about Albania:*

> The Congress of Permet decided that the question of Albania's régime be settled immediately after the country's liberation, but it prohibited the return of King Zogu to Albania and it did not recognize any other government formed, inside the country or abroad, against the will of the Albanian people. The Congress voted to reconsider all political and economic agreements entered into by previous governments, especially by that of Zogu, and to annul all those that jeopardized the sovereignty of the people or the economic interests of the country.

In view of the wording of my translation above and the general statement of an authoritative character made twenty-five years after the action taken in Permet in May 1944, it is submitted that in explaining to Jacobs in mid-December 1945 "that all treaties and agreements of former régimes must be abrogated and new treaties negotiated" Hoxha tended to exaggerate the scope and effect of this May 27 decree, at least of section II, which was the sole legal provision cited by Hoxha, and probably did so to give the United States Government the impression that his hands were tied by it.

It is also submitted that Hoxha may have given on November 23, 1945 an imprecise citation of a legal provision and an unjustifiably harsh interpretation thereof deliberately, because he was then ignorant of the particular treaties and agreements the United States had in mind. According to Jacobs, who had returned to Tirana on November 29 after a long absence, Hoxha did not know what instruments were actually involved until November 30, 1945:

> He expressed keen disappointment that US had made affirmation of former treaties condition precedent to recognition, especially as British Government had not done so. He said that members regime were extremely suspicious of all treaties negotiated by former Albanian Government; so much so that mere word treaty had become in minds of Albanians a symbol of the sale or gift of Albania's birthright to foreign powers. Until I handed him yesterday (informally pending receipt of certified copies from Department) copies of the four treaties (arbitration, conciliation, extradition and naturalization) he and his régime did not even know what treaties existed between US and Albania.

It is further submitted that Hoxha needed a legal bar to assurances sought by the United States because his Government was then concerned about whether France would accord it unconditional recognition regardless of the outcome of the dispute over the continuing validity of the prewar treaties and agreements. According to a telegram from Jacobs dated December 18, 1945:

> Hoxha makes much of fact that British and Soviet recognition without

> commitments regarding treaties (knowing that Soviet has none) and that acceptance either our alternatives may lead to complications with France which on basis commitment with US might seek to revive concessionaire treaties.

Shortly thereafter, on December 21, 1945, the French Government's decision to recognize unconditionally the Albanian Government of Colonel General Hoxha was communicated to Minister of Foreign Affairs Omer Nishani through the Chief of the French Military Mission, who received a greatful note dated December 22, 1945 in reply.

Finally, it is submitted that not only Colonel General Hoxha but also Mr. Harry T. Fultz, the Acting Representative of Albania in the absence of Mr. Jacobs, had a mistaken idea of what precisely was done at Permet in May 1944. In a despatch to Washington dated November 24, 1945 Fultz explained:

> The laws referred to as enacted in Permeti May 25, 1944, I believe, are in fact resolutions adopted at the time. We do not have available a copy of the decision taken at Permeti but suggest that a translated version of this should be available in OSS files, should you find it desirable to check this.

From the explanation provided one may conclude that with respect to vital decisions taken at Permet the American mission was unable to distinuish between actions taken there (on May 24 a Declaration and on May 27–28 eight decrees), and had not thought of checking those actions in the only authoritative Albanian source – the *Official Gazette*.

Albanian-American Relations Start to Deteriorate (January-March 1946)

Eventually, on January 16, 1946, certified copies of all treaties and agreements in effect between the United States and Albania on April 7, 1939 were delivered to Colonel General Hoxha. By then the status of the unofficial survey mission headed by Foreign Service Officer Jacobs had markedly deteriorated from the previous year. Its activities were being effectively circumscribed, and it was subjected to such discourtesy on the part of the controlling authorities that closing the mission had become a possibility.

The change in the relationship of the American survey mission to the Hoxha Government was reflected in developments in January 1946 with respect to that Government. After elections to the Constituent Assembly had been successfully held on December 2, 1945, the newly elected Constituent Assembly convened on January 10. The following day it proclaimed Albania a "People's Republic," officially dissolved the Zogu monarchy, and acted "to approve all laws and decisions of the Anti-Fascist

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National Liberation Council, and its executive organ, from the Congress of Permet to the day when the Constituent Assembly was convened."

Meanwhile, the question of assurances requested by the United States Government concerning the status of treaties and agreements in effect between the two countries on April 7, 1939, became linked more closely with frantic efforts by the new People's Republic of Albania to obtain membership in the United Nations. Despite its efforts, assumption of a responsible place for the People's Republic of Albania within the postwar family of nations seemed to depend upon affirmation of the continuing validity of such prewar treaties and agreements. Rebuffed in its efforts to gain sufficient support to overcome direct and indirect Anglo-American resistance to membership for the People's Republic of Albania in the United Nations, the Albanian Government in general, and Colonel General Hoxha in particular, simply ignored the suggestion of long standing made to Hoxha in a note from the United States Government delivered December 1, 1945.

This was unfortunate, because the suggestion was the most sensible one made by the United States in the entire controversy and should have been advanced earlier. The suggestion was that should American-Albanian agreements or provisions thereof require, according to the Albanian authorities, modification, suspension pending conclusion of new agreements, or termination due to changed circumstances or other legitimate reasons, then the United States Government was convinced that such steps should be taken by common accord, resulting from negotiation following appropriate prior notification rather than by unilateral repudiation.

On February 27, 1946 Jacobs was told by Hoxha that the Albanian Government's position remained unchanged—any reexamination of existing prewar treaties and agreements must follow United States recognition and the arrival in Tirana of an American Minister.

American Support (April–August 1946) for Greece's Territorial Claims Angers Hoxha

During the spring and summer of 1946, one major issue plaguing American relations with the People's Republic of Albania, was the manner in which the United States Government supported Greek Government Claims to "Northern Epirus" (Southern Albania). These claims were raised primarily at the Paris Peace Conference, where provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy were being hammered out.

On April 12, 1946, Colonel General Hoxha sought an official explanation from the United States Government for a resolution (S. Res. 82)

introduced by Senator Claude Pepper which, on March 27, 1946, had been reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably and without amendment:

> *Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that Northern Epirus (including Corytsa) and the twelve islands of the Aegean Sea, known as the Dodecanese Islands, where a strong Greek population predominates, should be awarded by the peace conference to Greece and become incorporated in the territory of Greece.

The reply to Hoxha was in the form of a Memorandum sent out on May 11, 1946 over the signature of Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The Memorandum concluded that Senate action on S. Res. 82 should not be construed as indicating the attitude of the United States Government's Executive Branch as to its merits, pro or con.

In the Senate passage of S. Res. 82 came on July 29, 1946 after a short debate in which misconceptions about geography on the part of a number of Senators were on exhibition. However, it was the follow-up action on August 30 at the Paris Peace Conference which angered Hoxha. The United States vote then in favor of placing the issue of Greek territorial claims to Northern Epirus on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference, was denounced by Hoxha in the presence of Jacobs on more than one occasion, although it was a vote not on the substance of the matter but one of procedure. Both Prime Minister Hoxha and Greek Prime Minister Tsaldaris had made statements at the Paris Peace Conference in late August, concerning draft provisions of the Treaty of Peace with Italy in the context of relations between Albania and Greece.

Hoxha's Compromise Offer (August 13, 1946) on Existing Albanian-American Instruments

On August 13, 1946, five days before departing for Paris to become Head of the Albanian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, Prime Minister Hoxha submitted what was to be his Government's final offer on the subject of the continuing validity of treaties and agreements in effect between Albania and the United States on April 7, 1939. As reported by Jacobs (articles being omitted for brevity's sake) Hoxha had presented the compromise offer in these terms:

> Government of the Republic of Albania having always in mind friendship based on mutual respect for international and national rights as link between our two countries, as well as similar relationships with all other democratic and progressive countries, most sincerely and patiently accepts validity of treaties of international character which existed between our two countries as listed below: (here Department should insert titles of eleven multilateral treaties copies of which Department submitted to Albania authorities through this Mission in January).

> With respect to other treaties of bilateral character as listed below: treaties of arbitration, conciliation, naturalization and extradition the Albanian Government is ready to take them under consideration immediately with American Minister who will come to Tirana after our government is recognized. After necessary corrections have been made by two parties these treaties will enter into force at once.

Then, comparing this cable text of Hoxha's letter dated August 13 with Hoxha's oral comments on that day on this subject, Jacobs noted astutely:

> Letter reiterates substance what Hoxha said, mentioning eleven multilateral and four bilateral treaties, but contained no reference to nature desired corrections and does not mention passport fees agreement, money order convention and, what is far more important, most-favored-nation treatment, exchange of notes beginning 1922 and completed 1925 which Hoxha did not mention orally.

Hoxha's letter, equivocal as usual and with the emphasis upon treaties rather than agreements, and upon multilateral treaties rather than bilateral ones, went unanswered. Hoxha, obviously impatient, took the opportunity of discussing his compromise offer in public among his supporters on October 7, 1946, when he addressed the General Council of the Democratic Front. According to the text provided by the newspaper *Bashkimi* the following day, Hoxha began the presentation of his case by railing against the series of nefarious treaties concluded by the Zogu Government, and by praising the Albanian people's delegates gathered at Permet in May 1944 for rejecting those treaties.

Besides impatience, another reason for this show of displeasure with the United States on the part of Hoxha, may have been his anger over the forthcoming departure of Jacobs, whose farewell call on the Prime Minister took place on October 9. Whether or not Hoxha knew that Jacobs had become head of the American survey mission with the understanding that if *de jure* recognition was ever accorded to the Hoxha Government, he would be the new American Minister, Hoxha must have surmised that, with the departure of Jacobs, such recognition was no longer envisaged.

Withdrawal of the American Survey Mission in November 1946

Almost a month before Prime Minister Hoxha delivered his major political address, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes had reached the conclusion that United States *de jure* recognition of the People's Republic of Albania had become completely undesirable. He embodied his conclusion in a telegram dated September 20, 1946:

> I wish that no steps be taken toward recognition of the régime in Albania at this time. Regardless of what Albania may do to accept the validity of our treaties, any recognition extended at this time would be widely misinterpreted.

On November 2 the decision to withdraw the entire mission was communicated to Tirana and, on November 5, an informal note was delivered to Hoxha acknowledging that "the Mission has been unable to achieve the purposes for which it was originally sent to Albania." Prime Minister Hoxha quickly placed his interpretation on this new development, incorporating it in a lengthy note delivered to the American mission on November 7 and published in *Bashkimi* on November 12, in which he lauded the compromise offer made August 13 and criticized the impolite Americans for their failure to respond. Meanwhile, the United States Government presented its side of the matter in dispute, setting forth the history of the mission and the rationale for its withdrawal in a State Department press release of November 8 (published under the title "American Mission to Albania Withdrawn" in the *Department of State Bulletin* November 17, 1946), which read in part:

> The proposal made by the United States Government on November 10, 1945, to recognize the Albanian regime headed by Col. Gen. Enver Hoxha specified as a condition that the Albanian authorities affirm the continuing validity of all treaties and agreements in force between the United States and Albania as of April 7, 1939, the date of the Italian invasion of Albania. The requirement of such an assurance from the Albanian regime as a prerequisite to United States recognition is in accord with the established practice of this Government to extend recognition only to those Governments which have expressed willingness to fulfil their international obligations. The Albanian regime on August 13, 1946, after a delay of nine months, indicated its acceptance of the multilateral treaties and agreements to which both the United States and Albania are parties, but it has failed to affirm its recognition of the validity of bilateral instruments between the United States and Albania.
>
> In view of the continued unwillingness of the present Albanian regime to assume these bilateral commitments and obligations, which are in no instance of an onerous character and concern such customary subjects as arbitration and conciliation, naturalization, extradition, and most-favored-nation treatment (see the appended list), the United States Government can no longer serve any useful purpose by remaining in Albania. . . .
>
> Bilateral Treaties and Agreements between the United States and Albania
>
> Arbitration treaty
>
> Signed at Washington, Oct. 22, 1928. Ratifications exchanged Feb. 12, 1929; proclaimed Feb. 12, 1929. Effective Feb. 12, 1929.
>
> Conciliation treaty
>
> Signed at Washington, Oct. 22, 1928. Ratifications exchanged Feb. 12, 1929; proclaimed Feb. 12, 1929. Effective Feb. 12, 1929.
>
> Naturalization treaty
>
> Signed at Tirana, Apr. 5, 1932. Ratifications exchanged July 22, 1935; proclaimed July 29, 1935. Effective July 22, 1935.
>
> Extradition treaty
>
> Signed at Tirana, Mar. 1, 1933. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 14, 1935; proclaimed Nov. 19, 1935. Effective Nov. 14, 1935.

Agreement relating to most-favored-nation treatment and other matters.
Signed at Tirana, June 23 and 25, 1922. Effective July 28, 1922.

Agreement effected by exchange of notes for the waiver of passport visa fees for non-immigrants.
Signed at Tirana, May 7, 1926. Effective June 1, 1926.

Money order convention.
Signed Apr. 13 and June 18, 1932. Effective July 1, 1933.

On November 14, 1946 a three-minute flag lowering ceremony took place at the Department of State's survey mission in Tirana, and its American staff drove off for Durres and, on November 15, ships carrying the mission's American staff weighed anchor in heavy seas off this Albanian port en route for Naples, arriving the next afternoon. Ironic sidelights in connection with the hazardous boarding operation completed nearly ten miles off Durres, despite ten-foot waves and minimal cooperation of Albanian authorities, were a prior protest by the Albanian Government to the United Nations charging the American mission with an improper request for "two military craft," apparently UNRRA-owned but Albanian-operated cargo lighters, for transferring freight from the docks to ships at anchor, and subsequent claim of nearly $1,000 for the "loan" of the UNRRA owned tug and lighter actually used in quitting Durres.

Noteworthy Developments (1955–1967) Following Departure of American Survey Mission

A number of noteworthy developments have occurred since Prime Minister Enver Hoxha in his New Year's Message of December 31, 1946 castigated the United States Government, and referred to the departure of the American survey mission as good riddance.

On December 14, 1955, the People's Republic of Albania was admitted to the United Nations, and, at the United Nations General Assembly's 601st Plenary Meeting of November 29, 1956, participated in the Assembly's general debate for the first time. On that occasion Minister of Foreign Affairs Behar Shtylla announced that on the basis of the five well-known principles of peaceful coexistence, the People's Republic of Albania had established diplomatic relations with twenty countries and was "ready and willing to establish normal relations with every country desiring this."

At the 872nd Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, on September 28, 1960, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mehmet Shehu, made the invitation more specific:

> We again confirm our readiness to establish normal relations with all States which wish to have such relations with us, including the United States and the United Kingdon.

Three years before addressing those conciliatory words to the United

States and British Governments, Mehmet Shehu had received in Tirana the enterprising foreign correspondent of *The New York Times*, Harrison E. Salisbury. As the first American newspaperman to enter Albania in ten years, Salisbury owed that honor to Mehmet Shehu himself. Despite this small token of goodwill toward one individual, amplified obliquely to include the United States itself in comments made by Mehmet Shehu, reported by Mr. Salisbury in the series of articles he wrote to describe a week's visit in Albania, officials of the Department of State were quoted in *The New York Times* of September 13, 1957, as saying that there was "no present prospect of any change in United States relations with Albania."

On March 16, 1967 it became less inappropriate for Americans to seek to enter the People's Republic of Albania as far as the United States Government was concerned. On that date the Department of State published in the *Federal Register* a revision of Section 51.72 Passports invalid for travel to restricted areas, of the Code of Federal Regulations. On the same date, in the *Federal Register*, four public notices, Nos. 256-259, emanating from the Office of the Secretary of State, pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72, were published. These public notices for United States citizens set forth a restriction on travel to, in, or through Mainland China, Cuba, North Korea and North Viet-Nam.

The restriction on travel to Albania was not published, indicating that the Secretary of State had not determined, as he could have, that in addition to the aforementioned restricted areas or countries, Albania was now a "country or area to which travel must be restricted in the national interest because such travel would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs." Therefore, the restriction on travel to Albania is no longer in effect as of March 16, 1967. However, this does not mean that the United States Government is in a position to afford normal protection to its citizens traveling there; it only means that United States passports no longer need to be specially validated for travel to Albania.

"Study the Past" and "What is Past is Prologue"

On the Pennsylvania Avenue side of the National Archives Building in Washington there are impressive statues, each bearing one of these inscriptions. It is evident from the within detailed account of diplomatic and legal ramifications with respect to the policies of *de jure* recognition and non-recognition, as applied by the United States Government to Albanian Governments over the past fifty years, that the facts are now available upon which to develop in 1972, a new and far more constructive policy

toward the present Maoist-oriented Albanian Government still controlled by those two comrades in arms of World War II—Colonel General Enver Hoxha and Major General Mehmet Shehu.

One of the facts which can be documented in the files reposing in the National Archives is the very close relationship between Albanians in the United States of America, and their kinfolk in the southern part of Albania, mainly in the prefectures along the Greek frontier. Although cut off from their American kinfolk from 1939 to 1945, and again from 1946 to 1971, they undoubtedly remain, as in June 1945, "highly pro-American" and unaffected by anti-American propaganda.

A report on southern Albania based on personal observation, May 31–June 3, 1945, contained the sentence: "There are still hundreds of people in the South who depend wholly on their husbands, parents, or close friends in America." The truth of this statement can be seen in such newspaper reports as the recent one entitled "Four Weeks in Albania," by an Albanian American, Bill Gounaris. His personal account was serialized throughout most of 1971 in *Liria*, one of the two Albanian-language weekly newspapers published in Boston, the undisputed center of Albanian American activities in the United States.

The Gounaris account of his travels in southern Albania during his stay in Albania from November 3 to December 1, 1970, provides current support for the recommendation of July 1, 1945 made by Foreign Service Officer Joseph Jacobs to the Secretary of State. Jacobs urged that, irrespective of recognition, communications between the United States and Albania should be reopened for, according to his best estimates from the vantage point of Tirana, "about 25% of Albania's population have either been in US or have friends and relatives who have been there."

The Peking Precedent: From Confrontation to Negotiation—An Historic First Step

Now that President Richard Nixon has made his historic journey to Peking, the saying attributed to the Chinese that a long journey begins with a single, first step should enjoy even more currency. From the day (October 26, 1970) when President Nixon in a toast to visiting President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania at the White House, deliberately used Peking's official title—the People's Republic of China, the first time an American President had ever done so, to the day of his arrival in Peking (February 20, 1972) is a long time, almost sixteen months.

Inasmuch as the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Albania, through public expressions of mutual respect and joint assis-

tance by their respective Party leaders, Chairman Mao and First Secretary Enver Hoxha, *e.g.*, in the exchange of telegrams between Peking and Tirana dated September 9 and 17, 1968, within the context of an everlasting and a "great and unbreakable militant friendship between the peoples of China and Albania," do indeed form a sort of big and baby brother combination, little (2 million population) Albania should not be overlooked as a result of the awesome size of China (over 700 million population) and the long distance from Peking to Tirana.

Moreover, President Nixon, in moving beyond the watershed year of 1971, has reasserted in his Third Annual Report on the State of United States Foreign Policy dated February 1972, the continuing validity of the American approach toward all potential adversaries as set forth in his Inaugural Address of January 20, 1969, which contained these statements:

> Let all nations know that during this Administration our lines of communication will be open.
>
> We seek an open world—open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people—a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.

If, when he spoke those lines, President Nixon did not have in mind, besides the great People's Republic of China the small People's Republic of Albania, he should be reminded of the statement he made July 15, 1971 to explain his Journey for Peace to Peking, in which he expressed the conviction "that all nations will gain" from an improved relationship between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China.

Recommendations in Conclusion

It is respectfully submitted that the approach promised by President Nixon in his Inaugural Address contemplating entry now into an era of negotiation has proved to be valid with respect to the People's Republic of China. Accordingly, the approach should be pursued without delay with respect to the People's Republic of Albania which, under the leadership and control of Enver Hoxha, has engaged in continuous confrontation with the United States of America for almost five years longer than the People's Republic of China and as recently as the autumn of 1971—when it sponsored the resolution for "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations."

Moreover, in view of the statesmanship he has exhibited by visiting two crucially pivotal Balkan nations, one would hope that President Nixon will seek and find an appropriate occasion, as with Ceausescu at the White House, for deliberately using as President of the United States, Tirana's official title—the People's Republic of Albania. From this new start we

may find it possible to discard the sterile formula invariably utilized in connection with the existing Albanian authorities, for almost three decades and as recently as March 1971 in Secretary of State Rogers' detailed report *United States Foreign Policy 1969–1970*, to the effect that because the United States does not recognize the Government of Albania it has no diplomatic relations with it.

Postponement of the opening of official bilateral channels of communication between the two countries only serves to perpetuate errors and shortcomings exhibited on both sides, in such matters as the diplomatic and legal issues connected with the existing pre-war bilateral treaties and especially the bilateral agreements. Having written personal letters requesting recognition to President Roosevelt (December 21, 1944) and President Truman (July 25, 1945), which went unanswered, Enver Hoxha can with some justification expect President Nixon to take the initiative in resuming the dialogue.

ANTONOW & FINK,
August 6, 1975.

Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN,
U.S. Senate, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
Capital Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN:

* * * * * * *

I thought you might be interested in the enclosed prepublication entitled "*The United Nations Revisited! Should the United States Quit the Organization?*" which will appear in the fall issue of the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientist*. Perhaps this can be made part of the proceedings of the Committee recently held.

Very truly yours,

BENJAMIN M. BECKER.

Enclosure.

"THE UNITED NATIONS REVISITED! SHOULD THE UNITED STATES QUIT THE ORGANIZATION?"

(By Benjamin M. Becker[1])

During the last days of the 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Scali warned the General Assembly that Americans are deeply disturbed by actions of the world body and that U.S. support is eroding; that the unrealistic resolutions passed by the U.N. had become a "clear and present danger" to its usefulness; that "if the U.N. ceases to work for the benefit of all its members, it will become increasingly irrelevant. It will fade into the shadow world of rhetoric, abandoning its important role in the real world of negotiation and compromise"; that "they (Americans) are concerned by moves to convert humanitarian and cultural programs into tools of political reprisal", and that neither the American people nor the American Congress believe that such actions can be reconciled with the spirit or letter of the U.N. charter.

It is appropriate for Americans and the United States Congress to take another look at the U.N.

In 1969 this writer authored a book entitled "Is the United Nations Dead?" and therein considered whether or not despite its failures and general disenchantment with the U.N. whether in fact the continued American support was warranted. The conclusion was reached that despite the ineptness of the United Nations, it was the only nearly-universal international organization which possibly someday could provide the framework for international cooperation to tackle many of the pressing global problems which faced all of humanity. It was concluded that the U.N. participation in ceasefire and peacekeeping operations in the Mideast and elsewhere and its extensive work in the social and economic field were sufficient justification for continued U.S. support.

Much has happened since that book was published. China was substituted for Taiwan as a member. Many more nations have been admitted. The membership grew from 111 to 138 at the last count. The United Nations has involved itself in many more areas of economic concern to member nations. The U.S. has lost influence among member states and begun to use its veto in the Security Counsel. The Afro-Asian-Arab-communist bloc have developed an over-whelming majority in the General Assembly. On the positive side, thrice in the past two years the U.N. has been called upon to supervise ceasefires and keep the peace, twice in the Mideast and once in Cyprus. It appeared as if the United Nations had come alive.

But nothing in recent years has so greatly diminished the U.N. in the view of many people as some totally irresponsible actions taken in the last two months of the 1974 session.

1. There was the General Assembly's invitation to terrorist Palestinian Liberation Organization leader Yasar Arafat to present his appeal to the General Assembly. Arafat, with gun in holster, pleaded for the creation of a Palestinian state and to eliminate the State of Israel to which the U.N. had given birth some 26 years before. Arafat was the man who was and is the commander of

[1] Chicago lawyer; author "Is the United Nations Dead?" Whitmore Press, Phila., Pa. (1969), 163 pp.; "The Myth of Arms Control and Disarmament, "Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April, 1971. Vol. XXVII, No. 4, p. 5, and books and numerous articles in the legal field.

Fatah-Black September group, personally received $5 million from President Qaddafi of Libya as a price for the slaughter of Israeli sportsmen at the Olympic games, who personally directed the murder of diplomats in Khartum, and told the Italian weekly L'Europeo. "Our goal is the destruction of Israel. Peace for us means Israel's destruction, nothing else." Three of Arafat's guards while in New York at the U.N. had been involved in the killing of three diplomats at Khartum, including one American. Arafat was received with resounding applause by the large majority of U.N. members. This was the U.N. which for more than four years has failed to act to stop international terrorism. The invitation to Arafat was a craven surrender to political expediency of the worse kind, an acknowledgment that terrorism and violence was the road to international recognition. It is a surrender to barbarism. As the new York Times editorialized, "It is grim irony that virtually the same Assembly majority that suspended a founding member of the U.N. one day could on the next enthusiastically welcome the leader of a terrorist organization whose goal is the destruction of another state."

2. For the first time in its history, the U.N. General Assembly voted to gag a member nation (Israel), denying it the right to speak more than once during the heated debate on the Palestinian question, and that notwithstanding that there were some 75 to 90 Arab, Third World and communist bloc nations ready to take the rostrum in opposition to Israel.

3. There was the arbitrary, capricious suspension of South Africa from the current United Nations General Assembly. This was clearly illegal and a violation of the U.N. charter.

4. There was the attempt to oust the Cambodian government headed by Marshall Lon Nol and to replace it with the exile regime of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. It failed by the narrowest of margins.

5. The overwhelming General Assembly action against Israel after the debate on the Palestinian question was quickly followed by the irresponsible action of UNESCO in measures taken against Israel. These measures included resolutions expressing hostility to Israel and weakening her status in the agency, barring Israel from UNESCO's European region without admitting her to any other regional grouping, cutting off Israel's modest UNESCO aid from $24,000 in 1973–1974 for cultural institutions, (notwithstanding Israel's past contributions to UNESCO in financial terms far exceed what Israel had received from UNESCO), and inviting UNESCO's new director general to supervise educational and cultural institutions in territories under Israel occupation, in cooperation with the Arab states concerned and with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In contrast, no action was taken against member nations who harbored hijackers, kidnappers, murderers and the like.

6. Once again the U.S. General Assembly voted without opposition to postpone debate on the problem of international terrorism until the following year. Israel was the only nation voting against the postponement.

7. On December 12, 1974, the General Assembly approved a highly controversial economic declaration called the "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" by a vote of 120 to 6, with the United States, Britain, West Germany, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg voting against the charter. Under the declaration every nation would have full sovereignty over all its wealth, resources and economic activities, the right to regulate foreign investments in accordance with its laws and to supervise transnational corporations within its jurisdiction. The basic objections to the new declaration involved the provisions permitting expropriation of foreign properties without guarantee of equitable compensation under international law. With the sanction of the seizure of property without any guarantee of compensation, as the Chicago Daily News editorialized, "This could be construed as an open license to steal" and illustrated "the paucity of principle in the UN General Assembly."

The Chicago Daily News editorialized, "Under the domination of the Afro-Asian-Arab blocs, it (U.N.) is tossing aside the rules of reasoned debate and substituting raw emotion and numerical power."

The Chicago Tribune observed, "The spreading miasma of bias and hatred permeating the U.N. can produce only revulsion and mistrust on the part of the more developed democracies upon which the U.N. depends primarily for its support."

Small nations clearly now dominate the U.N.. How did this come about? When the United Nations was founded in 1945 there were 51 members, and now there are 138. Now most debate concerns the new members who emerged from

colonial status since the end of World War II. They command the majority of votes and steer debate in areas of their interests. With the close of the 1974 session of the U.N. General Assembly it was clear that the U.S. had lost whatever influence it had. Appeal to reason fell on deaf ears.

Somewhat petulantly, on December 17th the United States decided to boycott a special fund set up by the United Nations to provide emergency relief and development aid to the countries hardest hit economically. The U.S. action was interpreted as a retaliation for the controversial action taken by the General Assembly by the Arab, African, Asian and communist bloc nations.

The American people and the U.S. Congress now are faced squarely with the question of whether to continue U.S. support for the U.N. The problem is not easily resolved. The U.S. contributes approximately one-third of the entire cost of the U.N. and its varied operations. Is it in the U.S. national interests to continue to support the United Nations?

It will take a largeness of perspective to recognize that the U.N. should continue to be supported and that the task of getting it to work effectively in accordance with charter principles is something that involves a long-term undertaking, continuing commitment and the utmost patience and fortitude.

Impartial critics of the U.N. recognize that it is not the structure of the U.N. as much as the conduct of U.N. members which is largely responsible for U.N. failures in many areas. That aside, the U.N. has served well, considering the limitations imposed upon it by its members.

Without unduly burdening this presentation and to state the case for the U.N. very briefly there is much which has been accomplished by the U.N. There are the many U.N. supervised ceasefires and peacekeeping undertakings—in Korea, in the Mideast on numerous occasions, in Africa, and in Cyprus. There are the continuing day-to-day economic and social welfare programs and operations in underdeveloped nations. There is continuing identification and study of potentially disastrous global problems, such as the population explosion, pollution of the environment, hunger and nuclear proliferation. There is the sponsorship of and planning for world conferences on population (Stockholm), food (New York), hunger (Rome), sea law (Caracas), disarmament (Geneva). And, lastly, there is the continuing availability of the U.N. as a central place for international multipolar diplomacy and off-the-record discussions involving critical world problems.

To be sure, the U.N. may be short of definitive accomplishments in many areas. But it does serve important purposes.

THE CRUCIAL INQUIRY

Has the United Nations fallen so far short of the high and noble aspirations and hopes of itse founders and supporters that it is time to call it quits and let it go the way of the League of Nations? New York Times columnist William Safire notes, "But this has not been (the recent actions on South Africa and the Mideast) a victory of the U.N.—rather, a victory over the U.N.—and the organization that could still be helpful in averting World War II has made the breeding ground for the third world's war." Before we bury the United Nations, let us ask: What would the world do without the U.N.?

WITHOUT THE UNITED NATIONS' THEN WHAT?

What would have happened on the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950 without the U.N. participation? True, it involved minimal participation by nations other than the U.S. But it would have meant U.S. entry into hostilities independently, perhaps another Vietnam?

What would have happened without the U.N. on the outbreak of hostilities in the Mideast in 1957, 1961, 1963, 1967, 1971 and 1973? Each of the principals had their patrons, the Soviet Union and the United States. What would have followed had hostilities continued to the end without the intervenion of he U.N. ceasefire and peacekeeping assistance? Certainly the ceasefires and peacekeeping were encouraged by the U.S. and the Russians, but the U.N. provided the format for easing the difficult step from active hostilities to ceaasefire and peacekeeping.

The same questions may be posted in connection with Cyprus, Africa, India-Pakistan hostilities. What would we have done without the U.N.?

But there was a United Nations.—There was a hastening to the U.N. to bring each crisis before the Security Council. Here was a ready-made international forum for the statement of positions by the combatants and their supporters, a

place for giving vent to their feelings, and yet a central point for quick, but quiet, diplomacy and negotiations to move toward a ceasefire, and then to some reasonable posture of peace.

Here was the U.N. with experience in organizing and maintaining a ceasefire, as it had on other occasions in the Middle East and elsewhere. To be sure, the U.N. could act only when the superpowers agreed, persuaded and pressured the combatants to agree. But the U.N. was there to follow through and implement such agreements. As at this writing U.N. peacekeeping force is in place in the Mideast and in Cyprus.

GLOBAL PROBLEMS

But there are more compelling reasons for the existence the U.N. and strengthening the U.N. so that it can act more effectively. Apart from the danger of nuclear war and devastation, there are the rapidly worsening global problems which threaten all people and nations.[2] These problems cannot and will not be solved by summitry, balance of power approach or tenuous detentes, but only by a global approach in the form of a strong international body which can act effectively. Appropriately strengthened and utilized the U.N. *can* be such an organization.[3]

Most of the critical problems of our time are universal in character. No nation is immune from the disastrous effects of the failure to grapple with these world problems.

Radiation fallout from nuclear testing in any part of the world is of concern to all peoples and nations.

Hunger and impoverishment of more than half of the world's population is a matter of international concern. Revolution is born of the desperation of the human condition.

Disease has no national boundaries.

Pollution and despoilation of the environment is world-wide.

The economic interdependence of nations has been demonstrated time and time again. The weakness of the American dollar has its reverberations throughout the world. Monetary imbalances seriously affect the economies of all trading nations. The current oil crisis has world-wide repercussions and dramatically demonstrates the interdependence of nations.

Only with a common vision and purpose can nations even begin to attack problems with world-wide consequences. As the massive problems of environment and atmospheric pollution, exhaustion of natural resources, poverty and health are exacerbated and we come closer to the days of reckoning, there will be, and there is now a growing realization of the need of a global and universal approach to the easing of these problems. Here is where the U.N. some day may be found to be indispensable as the only truly available universal organization, not perfect to be sure in its organization and operations, but yet the only truly global organization standing ready to tackle the monumental tasks facing humanity. Imperfections in U.N. organization will become less important when world problems involving survival transcend national boundaries and nations are impelled to work together with a common purpose.

Weak as it is, the U.N. is doing what it can about these global problems. To cite a few examples:

In the April, 1974, there was the special session of the U.N. General Assembly on the subject of raw materials involving a global emergency which faces both poor and rich nations. This includes the existing and anticipated mass poverty in the underdeveloped and developing nations, the tragic consequences of the population explosion, the frighteningly low supply of food to feed the world population, the energy crisis, the massive military expenditures, and the world wide inflation. U.N. Secretary General Waldheim called it a "global emergency" of massive proportions. Of the then U.N. 135 members, 96 nations are classified as developing countries, which in turn encompass 70 percent of the world's population. As stated at that time by U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim the problems "affect the lives of virtually every man, woman and child on earth. It holds vast significance for future generations. It raises the fundamental ques-

[2] For example, three significant books on this subject include Robert L. Heilbroner's significant "An Inquiry Into The Human Prospect", Norton, 1974, 150 pp.; "America and The Future of Man", CRM Books, 1973; Richard A. Falk's "This Endangered Plant", Random House, 1971, 495 pp., and Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos, Only One Earth, W. W. Norton & Co., 1972, 225 pp.

[3] Lester R. Brown's World Without Borders, 1972 Random House 305 pp.

tion of the kind of world economic system and social order we wish to establish and live under. It challenges us to make a series of rational and agreed choices which may be decisive in determining the quality and condition of mankind's future life on the planet."

There was the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment to tackle the problems of world pollution, the International Narcotics Conference and Control Board to control the illicit international narcotics trade, the SALT talks to arrest the nuclear arms race, the frantic monetary conferences to stabilize the international economy, the efforts toward control of international terrorism, the world conferences on population and hunger.

There is the critical problem of a global approach to the task of eliminating the pollution of the world waterways and utilizing the seas as a course of food and raw materials. This involves 70 percent of the earth's surface and its utilization of the oceans as a source of food supply to the world population. The Caracas Law of the Sea Conference in 1974 initiated through the U.N. made a start in tackling this difficult problem.

The universal urgency of solving, or at least easing, the pressing global problems may well transcend disagreements on nuclear arms control for at that point our very survival will be at stake. Sovereignty will need to bow to the primacy of survival. The past failures and ineptness of the U.N. may be viewed as part of the growing-up process by which nations learn to work together in pecaceful co-existence, striving cooperatively to survive. In the meantime, it behooves nations and leaders to strengthen the U.N. step by step for that day when its availability will be crucial, and that day is now.

It is reasonable to assume that at least in the foreseeable future there will be no definitive resolution of the basic ideological conflict and differences which now divide the world. Yet, it is equally reasonable to assume that the economic inter-dependence and the mutual interests of nations in solving and easing the crucial world problems will necessitate expanding areas of cooperation despite basic differences. There is evidence of this all around us.

It is a much different world in which we live. Global problems require a global approach and a global approach involves effective international organization. And there is in existence today only one truly universal organization—the U.N. As Richard J. Walton has noted, "It is easy to scorn the United Nations but can anyone suggest an alternative? Or imagine the world without it?"

Contrasting the global approach to the current scurrying for new international relationships and balances of power, is it to be expected that the latter policy can more readily solve or ease world problems and that the superpowers and their separate allies or satellites can manage the world problems affecting all nations? The experience of the past twenty-nine years clearly impels a negative answer. Neither the U.S. with its friendship and mutual defense treaties such as NATO and SEATO nor the Soviet Union with the Warsaw Pact and its many friendship and mutual defense treaties has brought peace to the world or cleared the road for relative peaceful co-existence.

The balance of power approach is no more valid today than the nuclear "balance of terror" during the past three decades, nor will the balance of power approach to peace be more effective than it was prior to World War II, prior to World War I, and prior to other European wars during the 19th Century.

As Harry S. Ashmore has written, "The nations face common problems of great urgency as technology steadily increases the possibility of exploiting traditionally extraterritorial areas in the seas and atmosphere . . . Control in these areas is clearly beyond the reach of any national sovereignty; so is the spread of pollution of air and water across national boundaries . . . So far, tentative developments to come with these new technological realities have been outside, or only peripheral to, the U.N. That trend, however, could be reversed if a fundamental reorganization of the U.N. is made possible by the end of the paralyzing bipolar power balance. It should follow that if the U.N. and its agencies are able to take a dominant role in these undertakings the process at the same time would generate support from the member states sufficient for the world organization to assume its unrealized role as focus and guarantor of collective security."

Therein lies the rationale of strengthening the U.N. to prepare it to take a more crucial and effective role in world affairs. The need for the U.N. will increase as world problems become less manageable on an ad hoc or less than universal basis.

WHAT IS NEEDED

What indeed will it take for the nations of the world to realize the potential of the U.N.? After ten years as the late U.N. Secretary-General, U Thant said, "What is required, of course, is a common global ethic, (which, of course, We do not have, except in time of catastrophe), which the human society as a whole wishes implemented . . . When I am asked what I see as the key to a world order that is adequate to assure peace, justice, and progress . . . the need for such a global ethic is always the first of three major considerations that come to my mind. The others are modifications of the nation of national sovereignty, (hardly conceivable with the revival of nationalism among nations) and structural adjustments in the world organization (which none of the major powers would support)." (World, July 4, 1972, p. 38.) (Bracketed portion supplies).

But the situation is not without hope.

There *is* a growing "planetary awareness," with the increasing concern about the common global problems of environment, poverty, health and nuclear war.

As the global approach to international problems is expanded the U.N. conceivably can come into its own. With or without major structural changes, again as U Thant has noted. "There is no alternative to the U.N. as the major focus for the building of a world order guaranteeing peace, justice and progress for all peoples." Going and looking to the U.N. yet may become a pattern of international life.

No, the U.N. is not dead. It is reborn with each major crisis. It deserves continued U.S. support.

What will be needed to procure the enthusiastic and important support of the UN by the major powers? Perhaps, as former U.S. Senator J. William Fulbright recently noted, "A long period of trouble and education combined—getting into crises one after another."

But then it may be too late!

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