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
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
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Emergency Military Assistance and Economic and Humanitarian Aid to South Vietnam

Fiscal Year 1975



94th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION



**EMERGENCY MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND
ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN AID
TO SOUTH VIETNAM, 1975**

**HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION**

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1975

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(II)

CONTENTS

	Page
Statements by:	
Hon. Birch Bayh, U.S. Senator from Indiana.....	54
Hon. Henry Bellmon, U.S. Senator from Oklahoma.....	62
Hon. Edward W. Brooke, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts.....	24
Hon. Robert C. Byrd, U.S. Senator from West Virginia.....	32
Hon. Lawton Chiles, U.S. Senator from Florida.....	68
Hon. Thomas F. Eagleton, U.S. Senator from Missouri.....	59
Hon. Mark O. Hatfield, U.S. Senator from Oregon.....	29
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, U.S. Senator from South Carolina.....	49
Hon. Roman L. Hruska, U.S. Senator from Nebraska.....	34
Hon. Walter D. Huddleston, U.S. Senator from Kentucky.....	66
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii.....	40
Hon. J. Bennett Johnston, U.S. Senator from Louisiana.....	64
Hon. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State.....	8
Chairman John L. McClellan, U.S. Senator from Arkansas.....	1
Hon. Charles McC. Mathias, U.S. Senator from Maryland.....	52
Hon. Joseph M. Montoya, U.S. Senator from New Mexico.....	36
Hon. John O. Pastore, U.S. Senator from Rhode Island.....	27
Hon. Richard S. Schweiker, U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania.....	57
Hon. John C. Stennis, U.S. Senator from Mississippi.....	17
Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska.....	46
Hon. Strom Thurmond, U.S. Senator from South Carolina.....	70
Hon. Milton R. Young, U.S. Senator from North Dakota.....	15

INDEX

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
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81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

EMERGENCY MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM, 1975

TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:35 a.m., in room 1202, Everett McKinley Dirksen Office Building, Hon. John L. McClellan (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Stennis, Pastore, Byrd, Mansfield, Montoya, Inouye, Hollings, Bayh, Eagleton, Chiles, Johnston, Huddleston, Young, Hruska, Brooke, Hatfield, Stevens, Mathias, Schweiker, and Bellmon.

Also present: Senator Thurmond.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE

ACCOMPANIED BY:

PHILIP C. HABIB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIA AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS

DANIEL PARKER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE AGENCY FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SPECIAL COORDINATOR
FOR DISASTER RELIEF

ROBERT S. McCLUSKY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE ON VOLUNTARY FOREIGN AID

OPENING REMARKS OF THE CHAIRMAN

Chairman McCLELLAN. The committee will come to order.

We are meeting today in response to an urgent request from the President to provide \$722 million for emergency military assistance to South Vietnam as well as an initial sum of \$250 million for economic and humanitarian aid.

In his message to the joint session of Congress last Thursday, the President stated, "Because of the gravity of the situation, I ask the Congress to complete action on all of these measures not later than April 19."

In an effort to accommodate the President and to give to the Senate an opportunity to expeditiously work on the President's request, I have

scheduled hearings today and tomorrow to receive testimony from administration officials in support of these proposals.

Today's witness will be the Secretary of State, the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger.

Tomorrow, we expect to have as our witness the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Gen. Fred Weyand.

We are all painfully aware of the high cost we have already paid in Vietnam in men, money and materiel. I am sure that not only each member of this committee, but every Member of Congress and of the American public will want to know what we can hope to achieve by spending still more money to support South Vietnamese military forces.

Now, in order to give each member of the committee an opportunity to question the Secretary after he is finished with his prepared statement, without objection I will yield 10 minutes to each member in turn by seniority, alternating between the Democrats and Republican members of the committee.

Senator Young, do you have any comments before we proceed?

Senator YOUNG. I find myself in a very agonizing situation. I was opposed to getting into this war in the first place and I said so on many occasions. I made this position known to President Johnson before he sent troops over there. After we became committed I supported our troops over there and I supported the appropriation to support them. We talked these people into fighting this war. Do we leave them high and dry now without help? It is a tough question.

I think that we are obligated to do something for them.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Is there any other member of the committee who wishes to make any brief comment before we proceed?

Senator PASTORE. I think we ought to hear from the Secretary.

CORRESPONDENCE AND OUTLINE OF REQUEST

Chairman McCLELLAN. All right. Before he begins though, I think certain information should be placed in the record.

Without objection, the White House request from President Ford to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the letter to the President from the Director of the Budget, and an outline of the request we are considering, will all appear in the record at this point.

House Document No. 94-104

[A copy of the request follows:]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, April 11, 1975.

THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SIR: I ask the Congress to consider for fiscal year 1975 a proposed supplemental appropriation in the amount of \$250,000,000 for Indochina Postwar Reconstruction assistance and an amendment to the request for supplemental appropriations transmitted to the Congress on January 28, 1975, in the amount of \$422,000,000 for Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces.

The details of these proposals are set forth in the enclosed letter from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. I concur in his comments and observations.

Respectfully,

GERALD R. FORD.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
Washington, D.C.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House.

Sir: I have the honor to submit for your consideration for fiscal year 1975 a proposed supplemental appropriation in the amount of \$250,000,000 for Indochina Postwar Reconstruction assistance and a proposed amendment to the request for supplemental appropriations transmitted to the Congress on January 28, 1975, in the amount of \$422,000,000 for Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces. The details of these proposals are contained in the enclosure of this letter.

I have carefully reviewed these proposals for appropriations contained in this document and am satisfied that this request is necessary at this time. I recommend, therefore, that they be transmitted to the Congress.

Respectfully,

JAMES T. LYNN.

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

INDOCHINA POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

For an additional amount for "Indochina postwar reconstruction assistance", \$250,000,000 to remain available until expended.

The proposed supplemental appropriation is urgently needed to provide refugee assistance and relief for those people displaced by hostilities in South Vietnam. It has been made necessary by recent intense fighting in the area. Without this appropriation, humanitarian assistance to refugees in the area will be severely limited. Additional authorizing legislation of \$73,000,000 is being submitted.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Military assistance, South Vietnamese forces (authorizing legislation is being requested)

1975 supplemental request pending House Doc. 94-38.....	\$300,000,000
1975 proposed amendment.....	422,000,000
1975 revised request.....	722,000,000

The amendment is necessary in order to provide urgently needed ammunition and other military equipment to South Vietnam. Provision of additional military equipment and supplies provides the best chance of success for South Vietnam's defense plan and stabilization of the military situation offers the best opportunity for a political solution.

JUSTIFICATION MATERIAL

Chairman McCLELLAN. Also at this point in the record, there will appear certain information from the justifications.

[The information follows:]

MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

APPROPRIATION LANGUAGE

For necessary expenses to support South Vietnamese military forces, to be obligated only by the issuance of orders by the Secretary of Defense, for such support, \$700,000,000, \$1,422,000,000: Provided, That this appropriation shall be deemed obligated at the time the Secretary of Defense issues orders authorizing support of any kind for South Vietnamese military forces, which obligations shall in the case of non-excess materials and supplies to be furnished from

the inventory of the Department of Defense be equal to the replacement costs thereof at the time such obligation is incurred and in the case of excess materials and supplies be equal to the actual value thereof at the time such obligation is incurred: Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated in this title shall be used for compensation or allowances of more than \$2,850 citizens of the United States in South Viet Nam who are members of the Armed Forces or employees of or under contract to the Armed Services or the Department of Defense or any department or agencies thereof. (Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1975.)

MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES PROGRAM AND FINANCING

[In thousands of dollars]

Identification Code 07-38-1087-0-1-052	Fiscal year—		
	1975 presently available	1975 revised estimate	1975 proposed supplemental
Program by activities:			
Aircraft.....	37,300	82,200	44,900
Ships.....	1,350	1,350	-----
Tanks, other vehicles and weapons.....	4,410	268,732	264,322
Ammunition.....	265,930	517,744	251,814
Missiles.....	510	7,555	7,045
Electronic equipment.....	14,630	35,063	21,433
Military public works.....	1,160	1,160	-----
Offshore procurement.....	16,100	16,100	-----
Supply operations.....	74,000	167,700	93,700
Training.....	6,680	6,680	-----
Administration.....	39,220	39,220	-----
Other activities.....	238,710	277,496	38,786
10 Total obligations.....	700,000	1,422,000	722,000
Financing: Budget authority.....	700,000	1,422,000	722,000
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71 Obligations incurred, net.....	700,000	1,422,000	722,000
72 Obligated balance, start of year.....	-----	-----	-----
74 Obligated balance, end of year.....	-160,000	-332,000	-162,000
90 Outlays.....	540,000	1,100,000	560,000
11.8 Special personal services payments.....	26,550	26,550	-----
13.0 Benefits for former personnel.....	240	240	-----
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	2,700	2,700	-----
22.0 Transportation of things.....	1,240	1,240	-----
23.0 Rent, communications, and utilities.....	1,790	1,790	-----
24.0 Printing and reproduction.....	50	50	-----
25.0 Other services.....	121,840	215,540	93,700
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	383,680	674,280	290,600
31.0 Equipment.....	161,910	499,610	337,700
99.0 Total obligations.....	700,000	1,422,000	722,000

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Fiscal Year 1975:

	<i>Thousands</i>
Presently available.....	\$37,300
Revised estimate.....	82,200
Proposed supplemental.....	44,900

Budget Activity: Aircraft.

JUSTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS

This request for \$44,900,000 provides for two C-130A replacement aircraft, aircraft support equipment, ground equipment, engines and spare parts for VNAF aircraft in the RVN area of control. \$10,295,000 is for two aircraft, from current

production, to replace the two C-130 aircraft provided by USAF. \$16,016,000 provides spares, ground equipment, and engines for reconstitution of four UH-1H helicopter squadrons relocated to southern South Vietnam. \$9.8 million provides for similar reconstitution of one F5E fighter-bomber squadron. \$5,222 million permits reconstitution of single squadrons of CH-47 helicopters, O-1 and U-17 aircraft. \$3,567 million is for spares and equipment to support A-37 attack aircraft operating at increased tempo.

Nomenclature	C-130A Aircraft
Unit cost	¹ \$5,147,500
Quantity	2
Cost	\$10,295,000

¹As required by law, represents current replacement cost to USAF. Actual acquisition costs of C-130A aircraft was approximately \$2,750,000.

Fiscal Year 1975:	<i>Thousands</i>
Presently available	\$4,410
Revised estimate	268,732
Proposed supplemental	264,322

Budget Activity : Tanks, Other Vehicles and Weapons.

JUSTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS

This budget activity request of \$264,322 million is urgently required to reconstitute four Infantry Divisions, convert 12 Ranger Groups to four Ranger Divisions and upgrade 27 Regional Force Groups into 27 Separate ARVN Infantry Regiments. The equipment is required to halt the present NVA invasion.

Principal elements of the request include \$42.7 million for tanks and track vehicles for the four Infantry divisions; \$33.9 million for tanks and track vehicles for the four Ranger Divisions; \$48.8 million for wheel vehicles for the four Infantry Divisions; \$45.0 million for wheel vehicles for the four Ranger Divisions; \$44.0 million for wheel vehicles for the 27 ARVN Infantry Regiments; \$19.2 million for weapons for the four Infantry Divisions; \$11.5 million for weapons for the four Ranger Divisions; \$15.9 million for weapons for the 27 ARVN Infantry Regiments; and \$3.4 million required for engineer equipment.

The above equipment is urgently required to reconstitute and upgrade ground combat units if South Vietnam is going to be given a chance to stabilize the military situation.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

[In thousands of dollars]

Item and nomenclature	Unit cost	Quantity	Cost
Weapons, major:			
1. Rifle recoil 106MM	(13,522)	56	757,232
2. Mortar 4.2 in M30	(14,310)	20	286,200
3. Howitzer 105MM M101	(21,254)	600	12,752,400
4. Howitzer 155MM M114	(30,618)	144	4,408,992
Subtotal			18,204,824
Weapons, minor:			
1. Rifle M16	(142)	101,849	14,462,558
2. Pistol cal. 45	(46)	22,994	1,057,724
3. Machine gun 7.62 M60C	(1,081)	5,122	5,536,882
4. Launcher grenade, M79	(222)	11,664	2,589,408
5. Launcher rocket, XM202	(1,100)	822	904,200
6. Rifle recoil 57MM	(2,586)	483	1,249,038
7. Mortar 60MM	(533)	412	219,596
8. Mortar 81MM, M29A1	(4,500)	453	2,038,500
9. Circle aiming, M1	(534)	652	348,168
Subtotal			28,406,074
Total			46,610,898
Tanks: 1. Tank, M48A3	(280,043)	114	31,924,902

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

Item and nomenclature	Unit cost	Quantity	Cost
Other tracked vehicles:			
1. Carrier mortar, M125	(92, 927)	48	4, 460, 496
2. APC M113	(76, 887)	332	25, 526, 484
3. Carrier mortar, M106	(84, 194)	32	2, 694, 208
4. Carrier comd post, M577	(89, 481)	24	2, 147, 544
5. Carrier cargo, M548	(93, 848)	24	2, 252, 352
6. Recovery vehicle, M578	(185, 074)	16	2, 961, 184
7. Recovery Vehicle, M88	(169, 410)	4	677, 640
8. Recovery vehicle, XM806	(51, 220)	16	819, 520
9. Car commando, XM706	(52, 875)	48	2, 538, 000
10. Carrier flame Thr, M132	(22, 687)	24	544, 488
Total			4, 621, 916
Other vehicles:			
1. Truck utility, 1/4 ton, M151	(7, 320)	5, 438	39, 806, 160
2. Truck cargo, 3/4 ton, M37WOW	(4, 498)	2, 189	9, 846, 122
3. Truck cargo, 2 1/2 ton M35	(17, 731)	4, 128	73, 193, 568
4. Truck cargo, 5 ton, M543	(8, 753)	336	2, 941, 008
5. Truck tanker, 2 1/2 ton, M49A1C	(11, 362)	24	272, 688
6. Truck tractor, 5 ton, M52	(8, 454)	12	101, 448
7. Truck dump, 5 ton, M51	(8, 764)	96	841, 344
8. Truck wrecker, 5 ton, M816WW	(68, 165)	143	9, 747, 595
9. Trailer tank Wtr, 1 1/2 ton, M149	(2, 318)	336	778, 848
10. Trailer cargo, 1 1/2 ton, M105	(1, 049)	348	356, 052
11. Trailer ammo, 1 1/2 ton, M332	(1, 254)	240	300, 960
12. Semi trailer stake, 12 ton, M127	(8, 635)	16	138, 160
13. Semi trailer low bed, 25 ton, M172	(9, 375)	12	112, 500
14. Tractor, full tracked	(37, 275)	28	1, 043, 700
15. Grader RD, MTZD 12 ft	(12, 613)	16	201, 808
16. Loader, scoop	(5, 047)	16	80, 752
17. Crane, 20 ton	(62, 706)	16	1, 003, 296
18. Crane, 10 ton	(34, 137)	4	136, 548
19. Roller, 10 ton	(18, 932)	8	151, 456
20. Tractor, 5 ton	(8, 454)	12	101, 448
Total			141, 164, 461

Fiscal Year 1975:	Thousands
Presently available	\$265, 930
Revised estimate	517, 744
Proposed supplemental	251, 814
Budget Activity: Ammunition.	

JUSTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS

This request for \$251,814,000 is for essential ground and air munitions. It is designed to support intense combat for the remainder of FY 75. \$198 million is for 60 days of ground ammunition. This provides for approximately 50,000 short tons (ST) of ground ammunition consumption per month. \$21 million is requested for Air Force munitions to support consumption at 10,000 ST per month. \$33 million is for initial issue of basic load ground ammunition for reconstituted and converted ARVN combat forces.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Item—Ammunition category	Cost
1—Small arms	\$26, 040, 748
2—Mortar	39, 700, 042
3—Artillery	136, 872, 820
4—Rockets	4, 616, 284
5—Grenades/signal	20, 773, 278
6—Mines	3, 462, 213
7—Explosives	230, 814
8—GP bombs	19, 240, 389
9—Miscellaneous air	877, 611
Total	251, 814, 199

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Fiscal year 1975:	<i>Thousands</i>
Presently available-----	\$510
Revised estimate-----	7, 555
Proposed supplemental-----	7, 045

Budget Activity : Missiles.

JUSTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS

This request for \$7,045,200 is for 114 TOW missile launchers. Thirty-six (36) of these are required to reconstitute four ARVN Infantry divisions; thirty-six (36) are necessary for equipping 12 Ranger groups as four Infantry divisions, and 42 are required to convert regional force to regular force ARVN regiments. With the large NVA tank force threatening the SVN defensive perimeter, TOW missiles are essential to effective defense.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Item—Nomenclature	Unit cost	Quantity	Cost
1—TOW missile launcher-----	\$61, 800	114	\$7, 045, 200

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Fiscal year 1975:	<i>Thousands</i>
Presently available-----	\$14, 630
Revised estimate-----	36, 063
Proposed supplemental-----	21, 433

Budget Activity : Electronic Equipment.

JUSTIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS

This request for \$21,432,514 is for radio and telephone communications equipment to be used in stabilizing the combat situation in South Vietnam. \$9,275,244 is requested for quantities of twenty-two various signal equipments to be used for reconstitution, in the defensive perimeter, of four South Vietnamese Army divisions. \$7,481,716 is requested for upgrade of 12 existing ranger groups to four full strength regular divisions. \$4,675,554 is requested for quantities of twelve various signal equipments for upgrade of 27 Regional Force groups to full strength regiments.

Equipments which are required include manpack and transportable radio equipment, which represent the largest money value, and field telephone sets which are the largest quantity items requested.

Fiscal year 1975:	<i>Thousands</i>
Presently available-----	\$74, 000
Revised estimate-----	167, 700
Proposed supplemental-----	93, 700

Budget Activity : Supply Operations.

JUSTIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

This request for \$93.7 million would fund packing, crating, handling and transportation costs for materiel provided South Vietnam under the supplemental request. The request is based on recent cost experience and assumes that virtually all supplementally funded items would be received in Vietnam during FY 75. This

is consistent with the nature of items requested and their urgency of need. The request considers that a higher ratio of air shipment than previously used will be required for these urgent needs.

Fiscal year 1975:	<i>Thousands</i>
Presently available-----	\$238, 710
Revised estimate-----	277, 496
Proposed supplemental-----	38, 786

Budget Activity : Other Activities.

JUSTIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

This request for \$38.8 million reflects urgent requirements for stabilization and reconstitution of South Vietnamese Forces. This request is for petroleum, lubricants, general supplies, repair parts, medical supplies and mine detection equipment. \$21.0 million is requested for general supplies and repair parts. These include critical replacement parts for artillery, vehicles, tanks, communications equipment and naval craft. Also included are vitally needed batteries for communications equipment and vehicles, individual field equipment, and defensive supplies for building bunkers and revetments. \$10.4 million is a minimum request for POL products, including diesel fuel, gasoline, jet fuel and lubricants, to sustain combat operations at intense rates for the remaining months of the fiscal year.

\$7.0 million is requested for medical supplies needed for the current combat situation. \$4 million is requested for mine detectors for engineer companies of the reconstituted and upgraded infantry units.

In compliance with Section 844 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, FY 1975 (Public Law 93-437), no petroleum fuels furnished under the above request will be produced in the Continental United States.

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER

Chairman McCLELLAN. Mr. Secretary, we welcome you, and we want to express our appreciation to you for coming today to present your views in support of the President's request. You may now proceed.

Secretary KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity of appearing before you and for arranging this meeting so promptly after the President's request.

TRAGIC STAGE OF VIETNAM CONFLICT

The long and agonizing conflict in Indochina has reached a tragic stage. The events of the past month have been discussed at great length before the Congress, and require little additional elaboration.

In Vietnam, President Thieu ordered a strategic withdrawal from a number of areas he regarded as militarily untenable. However, the withdrawal took place in great haste, without adequate planning, and with insufficient coordination. It was further complicated by a massive flow of civilian refugees seeking to escape the advancing North Vietnamese Army.

Disorganization engendered confusion; fear led to panic. The results, as we all know, were tragic losses—of territory, of population, of materiel, and of morale.

But to fully understand what has happened, it is necessary to have an appreciation of all that went before.

The North Vietnamese offensive, and the South Vietnamese response, did not come about by chance—although chance is always an element in warfare. The origins of these events are complex, and I believe it would be useful to review them briefly.

HANOI VIOLATION OF PARIS AGREEMENT

Since January 1973, Hanoi has violated—continuously, systematically, and energetically—the most fundamental provisions of the Paris agreement. It steadily increased the numbers of its troops in the south. It improved and expanded its logistics system in the south. It increased the armaments and ammunition of its forces in the south. And, as you know, it blocked all efforts to account for personnel missing in action.

These are facts, and they are indisputable.

All of these actions were, of course, in total violation of the agreement.

Parallel to these efforts, Hanoi attempted—with considerable success—to immobilize the various mechanisms established by the agreement to monitor and curtail violations of the cease-fire. Thus, it assiduously prepared the way for further military actions.

South Vietnam's record of adherence to the agreement has not been perfect. It is, however, qualitatively and quantitatively far better than Hanoi's.

South Vietnam did not build up its armed forces. It undertook no major offensive actions—although it traded thrusts and probes with the Communists. It cooperated fully in establishing and supporting the cease-fire control mechanisms provided for in the agreement. And it sought, as did the United States, full implementation of those provisions of the agreement calling for an accounting of soldiers missing in action.

But perhaps more relevant to an understanding of recent events are the following factors.

While North Vietnam had available several reserve divisions which it could commit to battle at times and places of its choosing, the South had no strategic reserves. Its forces were stretched thin, defending lines of communication and population centers throughout the country.

While North Vietnam, by early this year, had accumulated in South Vietnam enough ammunition for 2 years of intensive combat, South Vietnamese commanders had to ration ammunition as their stocks declined and were not replenished.

While North Vietnam had enough fuel in the south to operate its tanks and armored vehicles for at least 18 months, South Vietnam faced stringent shortages.

In sum, while Hanoi was strengthening its army in the south, the combat effectiveness of South Vietnam's Army gradually grew weaker.

While Hanoi built up its reserve divisions, and accumulated ammunition, fuel and other military supplies, United States aid levels to Vietnam were reduced—first by half in 1973 and then by another third in 1974. This coincided with a worldwide inflation and a fourfold increase in fuel prices. As a result, almost all of our military aid had to be devoted to ammunition and to fuel. Very little was available for spare parts and none for new equipment.

These imbalances became painfully evident when the offensive broke full-force, and they contributed to the tragedy which has unfolded.

LOSS OF RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Moreover, the steady diminution in the resources available to the Army of South Vietnam unquestionably affected the morale of its officers and men. South Vietnamese units in the northern and central provinces knew full well that they faced an enemy superior both in numbers and in firepower. They knew that reinforcements and resupply would not be forthcoming. When the fighting began, they also knew, as they had begun to suspect, that the United States would not respond.

I would suggest that all of these factors added significantly to the sense of helplessness, despair, and eventually panic which we witnessed in late March and early April.

I would add that it is both inaccurate and unfair to hold South Vietnam responsible for blocking progress toward a political solution to the conflict. Saigon's proposals in its conversations with PRG representatives in Paris were in general constructive and conciliatory. There was no progress toward a compromise political settlement because Hanoi intended that there should not be. Instead, North Vietnam's strategy was to lay the groundwork for an eventual military offensive—one which would either bring outright victory, or at least allow Hanoi to dictate the terms of a political solution.

Neither the United States nor South Vietnam entered into the Paris agreement with the expectation that Hanoi would abide by it in every respect. We did believe, however, that the agreement was sufficiently equitable to both sides that its major provisions could be accepted and acted upon by Hanoi and that the contest could be shifted thereby from a military to a political track.

However, our two governments also recognized that, since the agreement manifestly was not self-enforcing, Hanoi's adherence depended heavily on maintaining a military parity in South Vietnam.

So long as North Vietnam confronted a strong South Vietnamese Army, and so long as the possibility existed of United States intervention to offset the strategic advantages of the North, Hanoi could be expected to forgo major military action. Both of those essential conditions were dissipated over the past 2 years.

Hanoi attained a clear military superiority, and it became increasingly convinced that U.S. intervention could be ruled out. It therefore returned to a military course, with the results we have seen.

COMPARISON OF NORTH VIETNAM/SOUTH VIETNAM
MILITARY POSITION

The present situation in Vietnam is ominous. North Vietnam's combat forces far outnumber those of the South, and they are better armed. Perhaps more important, they enjoy a psychological momentum which can be as decisive as armaments in battle.

South Vietnam must reorganize and reequip its forces, and it must restore the morale of its Army and its people. These tasks will be difficult, and they can be performed only by the South Vietnamese. However, a successful defense will also require resources—arms, fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies—and these can come only from the United States.

Large quantities of equipment and supplies, totaling perhaps \$800 million, were lost in South Vietnam's precipitous retreat from the northern and central areas. Much of this should not have been lost, and we regret that it happened.

But South Vietnam is now faced with a different strategic and tactical situation, and different military requirements.

Although the amount of military assistance the President has requested is of the same general magnitude as the value of the equipment lost, we are not attempting simply to replace those losses. The President's request, based on General Weyand's assessment, represents our best judgment as to what is needed now, in this new situation, to defend what is left of South Vietnam.

Weapons, ammunition, and supplies to reequip four divisions, to form a number of ranger groups into divisional units, and to upgrade some territorial forces into infantry regiments will require some \$326 million. The balance of our request is for ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and medical supplies to sustain up to 60 days of intensive combat, and to pay for the cost of transporting those items. These are minimum requirements, and they are needed urgently.

REFUGEE SITUATION

The human tragedy of Vietnam has never been more acute than it now is. Hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese have sought to flee Communist control and are homeless refugees. They have our compassion, and they must also have our help.

Despite commendable efforts by the South Vietnamese Government, the burden of caring for these innocent victims is beyond its capacity. The United States has already done much to assist these people, but many remain without adequate food, shelter, or medical care. The President has asked that additional efforts and additional resources be devoted to this humanitarian effort. I ask that the Congress respond generously and quickly.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN CONFLICT

The objectives of the United States in this immensely difficult situation remain as they were when the Paris Agreement was signed—to end the military conflict and establish conditions which will allow a fair political solution to be achieved. We believe that despite the tragic experience to date, the Paris agreement remains a valid framework within which to proceed toward such a solution. However, today, as in 1973, battlefield conditions will affect political perceptions and the outcome of negotiations. We therefore believe that in order for a political settlement to be reached which preserves any degree of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam, the present military situation must be stabilized.

It is for these reasons that the President has asked Congress to appropriate urgently additional funds for military assistance for Vietnam.

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD VIETNAM INVOLVEMENT

I am acutely aware of the emotions aroused in this country by our long and difficult involvement in Vietnam. I understand what the

cost has been for this Nation, and why frustration and anger continue to dominate our national debate.

Many will argue that we have done more than enough for the Government and the people of South Vietnam. I do not agree with that proposition, however, nor do I believe that to review endlessly the wisdom of our original involvement serves a useful purpose now. For despite the agony of this Nation's experience in Indochina, and the substantial reappraisal which has taken place concerning our proper role there, few would deny that we are still involved, or that what we do—or fail to do—will still weigh heavily in the outcome.

We cannot by our actions alone insure the survival of South Vietnam. But we can, alone, by our inaction assure its demise.

The United States has no legal obligation to the Government and the people of South Vietnam of which the Congress is not aware. But we do have a deep moral obligation—rooted in the history of our involvement and sustained by the continuing efforts of our friends. We cannot easily set it aside.

In addition to the obvious consequences for the people of Vietnam, our failure to act in accordance with that obligation would inevitably influence other nation's perceptions of our constancy and our determination. American credibility would not collapse, and American honor would not be destroyed. But both would be weakened, to the detriment of this Nation and of the peaceful world order we have sought to build.

COMMUNICATION

Mr. Chairman, as our Ambassador in Phnom Penh was about to be evacuated last week, he received a letter from a long-time friend of the United States, who has been publicly marked for execution. Let me share that letter with you:

DEAR EXCELLENCY AND FRIEND: I thank you very sincerely for your letter and for your offer to transport me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it.

You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under this sky. But mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is too bad, because we are all born and must die one day.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I suspect that neither Ambassador Dean nor I will ever be able to forget that letter, or the brave man who wrote it.

Let us now, as Americans, act together to assure that we receive no more letters of this kind.

MAXIMUM OPERATING TIME OF \$722 MILLION REQUEST

Chairman McCLELLAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I have just two or three questions by the Chair, and then I will yield to my colleagues.

If this request should be granted and the \$722 million made available for military assistance, how long, in your judgment, would it last?

Would it serve for the 60 days of intensive fighting to which you referred in your prepared statement?

Secretary KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I think that General Weyand, who I understand will testify before this committee tomorrow, can give you a more conclusive answer.

My understanding is that it would take care of the necessities for the remainder of this fiscal year and somewhat beyond.

Chairman McCLELLAN. The remainder of the fiscal year, until June 30?

Secretary KISSINGER. And somewhat beyond. I think that General Weyand can give you the exact figures. The estimate would be for 60 to 90 days.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Do you regard this requested military assistance as just another installment on the continuing indefinite obligation for us to provide military assistance to South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Mr. Chairman, we face in Vietnam an extraordinarily complicated situation and the President made the request he did because it seemed to him that whatever contingencies are perceived and whatever outcome is predicted, this amount will enable us best to meet our national interests.

It is clear that, if military operations continue, that the Congress will have to act on the request which is before the Congress for the appropriations for fiscal year 1976. It is also true that to the degree that the military situation is stabilized the possibilities for a negotiated settlement will improve; that is, for a negotiated settlement that will preserve a minimum of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam and as the President pointed out, if the worst should come to pass and if it should turn out that this sum is no longer sufficient, then it will permit the most orderly transformation of the situation.

So whatever contingency we have considered, we concluded that this request best served the national interest.

STOCKPILED MUNITIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Chairman McCLELLAN. Mr. Secretary, you stated that North Vietnam has long been preparing for a continuation of the struggle in South Vietnam. I believe you stated that they now have armaments and ammunition in the South that would permit them to engage in intensive warfare for a period of 2 years. Is that correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. More or less, yes. I mean they have stocks, that is correct. I won't quibble over that.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Does that mean we will be expected to continue supplying arms and munitions to South Vietnam for another 2 years of conflict, assuming the conflict would last that long?

Secretary KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, there is one elemental fact that we might reflect upon. Obviously, the question you have put to me has not been answered in the negative by the friends of North Vietnam because they have managed to continue to supply arms without apparently asking this particular question.

It is, of course, substantially up to North Vietnam how long it wishes to continue military operations, but it is also clear that recent events will have produced an impetus towards negotiations, probably on both sides, that may not have existed previously, and therefore we

believe that the sum that we have requested would enable the government of South Vietnam that after all knows the balance of forces as well as we do, to negotiate under conditions that are more consistent with self-determination.

VALUE OF STABILIZED MILITARY SITUATION TOWARD POLITICAL SOLUTION

Chairman McCLELLAN. I have just one other question, Mr. Secretary. The President said in his April 10 message to the Congress, and I quote:

In my judgment, a stabilization of the military situation offers the best opportunity for a political solution.

I don't know exactly what he means by stabilization, but I assume he means the South Vietnamese will reach a point where they are able to defend themselves. But let me ask you this: Did not the accords in Paris give us a stabilization that was expected to enable the parties to reach a political solution?

Secretary KISSINGER. It is quite true that the Paris accords were expected to provide the framework for a political solution and for the first 15 months of their operation the level of violence in South Vietnam declined. There occurred, however, last year, a series of events—a decline in military assistance, part of which was ascribable to inflation and the rise in fuel prices, domestic convulsions in the United States which altered Hanoi's perception of the ability of the United States to perform an international role, and apparently caused Hanoi to alter its tactics. And from the middle of last year onward the military balance changed in favor of the North Vietnamese.

Once the military balance changed in favor of the North Vietnamese, their incentive to conduct political negotiations disintegrated. They walked out of the political talks that were going on near Paris and they stonewalled every proposal that was made by the South Vietnamese Government.

So our argument is that a degree of military stability is essential for the kind of negotiations that are possible now under clearly altered circumstances.

HANOI RESPONSE TO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

Chairman McCLELLAN. The question then follows that, in view of the conduct of Hanoi since the Paris accords—the buildup she has made in South Vietnam, the events that have taken place, the number of violations of the agreement—how do you hold any hope that North Vietnam will be more interested in keeping an agreement now than she has in the past. Even with a temporary stabilization of the military situation, do you really expect that she will honor a treaty that, according to your statement, she has violated in the past?

I am trying to determine what we can realistically expect to occur. Suppose we appropriate enough money to do what the President asks, to stabilize the military situation for the moment. What is the hope or expectation that Hanoi will respond to political effort for settlement?

Secretary KISSINGER. There is no substitute for American assistance, and that is the basic fact in the situation. However, whatever assistance you give to produce it, a degree of military stabilization will permit the most humane evolution that is attainable under present circumstances and therefore even if one were to accept—which we do not necessarily—the assessments that your questions imply, even then some American military assistance would now be necessary.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR YOUNG

SOUTH VIETNAM ABILITY TO RESIST IF ADEQUATELY SUPPLIED

Chairman McCLELLAN. Very well. I am going to now recognize Senator Young for 10 minutes.

Senator YOUNG. Mr. Secretary, in view of the situation in South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese army losses, although in the last few days they seem to be doing better, is there any hope that they can win a war or even hold Saigon if we give them plenty of equipment and money?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, as I understand the military situation, the judgment that was made by President Thieu, which really turned out to be disastrous, was that his forces in the Central Highland and in the North were overextended, and he felt that they were overextended partly because he was running out of spare parts, and he was short of ammunition, and he had not received any new equipment.

For example, I believe that of the 20 C-130's in the South Vietnamese Air Force only six could fly because of lack of spare parts and adequate maintenance. As a result, strategic mobility was lost and the South Vietnamese units were caught in fixed positions where the North Vietnamese could concentrate at any one point while the South Vietnamese had to defend every point.

Moreover, President Thieu, as we know this from our later information, concluded that his prospects for achieving adequate military aid this year from the Congress were not very bright. He therefore decided to withdraw his forces to more defensible positions, and to save 1 year's campaign supplies in order to build up stocks and to be in a position to conduct the campaign next year.

He made the decision so precipitously, however, that the problem of withdrawal, which is one of the most difficult military maneuvers, was carried out with extraordinary lack of skill.

Moreover, the South Vietnamese forces are accompanied in the field by their families. Therefore, as the South Vietnamese divisions began to move, their families moved with them so a huge column began to form in every area of retreat.

As these troops abandoned fixed positions, accompanied by their families, as tremendous jams developed on roads that were never intended to move such large units, the soldiers and officers began to think of saving their own families, and as that stream was swelled by refugees seeking to flee, a panic developed.

So it is true in retrospect that had these units stayed and fought, it would have been a better decision. The strategic concept was not

wrong. The execution turned into a disaster, but we have to recognize that under the conditions that obtained, whatever decision that was made by the South Vietnamese Government would have had grave consequences for it in the light of the overall situation as I have described it.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

Senator YOUNG. It seems to me that the South Vietnamese soldiers take their families with them and are at a disadvantage against the North Vietnamese, who had just their fighting men down there.

Secretary KISSINGER. General Weyand, of course, who served in Vietnam for, I believe, 5 years, can give you a better professional assessment of the situation, but it has been the case that the South Vietnamese Army was organized on a regional basis, that is to say, the troops were recruited in the region they were supposed to defend and their families lived some short distance behind them.

Under these conditions it turned out to be a disaster. Under conditions of static defense it might have turned out to be an advantage. At any rate, this was a decision that was made a decade ago and it is clear that the North Vietnamese are not encumbered by these restraints.

Senator YOUNG. The South Vietnamese hold the area around Saigon and the Delta area. I feel a bit more encouraged but the North Vietnamese seemed to be making advances and only yesterday a big ammunition dump, close to Saigon was blown up—that was very discouraging.

Secretary KISSINGER. The outlook is very difficult and throughout the Vietnamese war there have been two wars going on—those between the regular units and those involving the guerrillas. So that particular event could have happened at any time.

But we should not delude ourselves. Neither the President nor I have any desire to underrate the gravity of the situation. It is a very grave situation. It is our judgment, however, that in any assessment of military prospects and the American obligation, the wisest course is the one that we have proposed.

EQUIPMENT MOST NEEDED

Senator YOUNG. I have just one or two more questions. What kind of equipment do they need most, tanks or planes, and where would they come from?

Secretary KISSINGER. I have a breakdown of the equipment which was given to me by General Weyand. I believe that it is classified, but most of it is equipment to reequip some of the men that have come down from the North, that is, the \$326 million, and the larger part is for ammunition and fuel to sustain military operations.

Senator YOUNG. What happened to the equipment we sent to South Vietnam? We have given them billions of dollars worth of equipment, put in over a billion dollars worth and they never used it. I know you are in a very difficult situation.

If I thought the South Vietnamese would put up a fight from now on, I would be willing to give them some help, but it does look gloomy.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR STENNIS

SECRET OBLIGATIONS MADE WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Stennis, you are recognized for 10 minutes.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, I think you and the President have done the right thing to bring out forcefully just what you think the situation is and make your request for what you think will meet it. But the situation is not easy and the sentiment is not running with you or your position.

I am going to mention something now that I think might turn this thing around some and that is the question of what promises if any, were made with reference to continuation of our assistance, either in the Paris Accords or otherwise.

In thinking about this matter, it is true that since those events happened, whatever happened, we have a new President, a new Vice President, and a new Secretary of State—I mean another person—and a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are all new officers. That leaves you standing at bridge. You were there.

I heard you mention this matter before and so let me direct your attention to that and what agreements, if any, call them "side agreements" expressed or implied or anything else in the Paris accords or otherwise, so far as you know, were made with reference to continued military aid.

The subject I am directing this to is South Vietnam.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is in connection with the war.

I understand your question, Senator. With respect to your first point of the sentiment as it runs in this country now, the President was fully aware of the way the sentiment runs and yet he felt that he owed it to the country and he owed it to Congress to state his best judgment of what the situation required and he will accept the verdict, but he had an obligation to state his and our best judgment.

With respect to the second point, Senator, I said in my statement that there are no legal obligations of which the Congress is not aware. The Paris accords themselves did not require any specific performance by the United States. The Paris accords permitted the United States to do certain things. They obviously did not require the United States to do those things.

For example, under Article VII of the Paris accords we were permitted to replace equipment on a one-for-one basis. We were not obliged by the Paris accords to do that.

On the other hand, it is also fair to say and it is also well worth remembering that at the time that the Paris accords were negotiated, the dominant feeling in this country was to remove American military forces and to obtain the return of our prisoners and I believe if you search the records, you will find many statements to the effect that the United States would give adequate aid, economic and military.

In that context, while the agreements were negotiated, there is no doubt those of us who participated in the negotiations and President Nixon expressed their view that if the agreement were negotiated in a manner wherein the South Vietnamese assumed responsibility for

their own defense, that the disposition of the Congress in our judgment was likely to be forthcoming.

We were, of course, in no position to make a commitment for the Congress. All the promises that have been made, that is even the wrong word—all of the implications of these remarks—have been repeatedly stated on the public record by President Nixon, by myself and by Secretary of Defense Richardson and we will be glad to submit a document that embodies all of these.

We rest our case, as I have repeatedly stated before the press and before committees, not on legal obligations and not on these so-called secret commitments which nobody has claimed or invoked, but rather, on the fact that a nation that has been 10 years in a country, that has lost tens of thousands of people there, and in which has a responsibility also for the fate of millions that relied on it, that that nation cannot simply walk away in the hour of travail.

That is the most compelling case.

As far as the legal obligations are concerned, you gentlemen know as much as we do and we have invoked no legal obligation and no commitment. However, there is one other thing to be said. It is generally assumed that when a nation signs an agreement, it will not stand idly by when that agreement is flouted with impunity, and two concurrent events happened, one the loss of our ability even to threaten any reaction to North Vietnamese violations, so that at this particular moment literally the entire North Vietnamese Army is in the South and, secondly, a corresponding decline in aid to South Vietnam, so that we did not compensate for it.

Now, whether we clearly accepted, so that there is no question about this, the view of the American public that American military intervention in South Vietnam should come to an end, it was one thing for the North Vietnamese to think this as a probability, it was another for them to know it as a certainty.

We are not claiming any legal commitments or other commitments that we have not submitted to the Congress.

Senator STENNIS. If I understand you and we have to move on time-wise—and I am in sympathy with the limitations of time—if I understand you correctly now, you say no legal commitment or obligations, but do consider there was a moral obligation that remains, as I understand?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS ON AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator STENNIS. Further, that you could document this with statements from various people who acted with you.

Now, if I understood you correctly on that, if you will do that, I think it would be very timely and very helpful, but I want to ask one more question. I am sure my time is up.

Secretary KISSINGER. Public statements of various individuals, statements that were made publicly by President Nixon, by myself and Secretary—then Secretary of Defense—Richardson.

Senator STENNIS. It seems to me that whatever documentation he was referring to, that would be timely and would strengthen their request here for the money.

Now Senator McClellan asked another question.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Are you able to submit that document now? Secretary KISSINGER. I will leave it with you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCLELLAN. That document will be entered in the record at this point.

[The document follows:]

PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF POLICY ON U.S. AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

President Nixon's Address to the Nation, January 23, 1973

"We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves. . . . We look forward to working with you in the future, friends in peace as we have been allies in war."

* * * * *

"This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained."

Dr. Kissinger's Press Conference, January 24, 1973

Question. "If a peace treaty is violated and if the ICC proves ineffective, will the United States ever again send troops into Vietnam?"

Dr. KISSINGER. "I don't want to speculate on hypothetical situations that we don't expect to arise."

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"The United States, as the President said, will continue economic aid to South Viet-Nam. It will continue that military aid which is permitted by the agreement. The United States is prepared to gear that military aid to the actions of other countries and not to treat it as an end in itself."

* * * * *

"What is permitted by the agreement is that military equipment that, as you said, is destroyed, worn out, used up, or damaged can be replaced.

"The reason for that provision is that if for any reason the war should start at any level, it would be an unfair restriction on our South Vietnamese allies to prohibit them from replacing their weapons if their enemies are able to do so."

* * * * *

"We believe that it would be unfair and wrong for one country to be armed by its allies while the other one has no right to do so. This is what will govern our actions."

Deputy Assistant Secretary William Sullivan on Meet the Press, January 28, 1973

Question. "There's also reports from Saigon today, Mr. Ambassador, that the United States has given official but private assurances to Saigon that we would intervene militarily again if Hanoi commits serious violations. Just what is our commitment? What would we do if a ceasefire breaks down?"

Mr. SULLIVAN. "I am not going to speculate on that, Mr. Rosenfeld. I think you have seen Dr. Kissinger's statement concerning the method in which the agreement has stipulated the requirements for carrying out this accord. There are no inhibitions upon us, but we are not going to discuss any hypothetical questions at this time about what the future prospects may bring."

Dr. Kissinger, Interview with Marvin Kalb, February 1, 1973

Mr. KALB. "Dr. Kissinger, shifting south for a moment, to South Vietnam, now that the peace agreement has been signed, how would you define the nature and depth of the American commitment to Saigon?"

Dr. KISSINGER. "We have been allies in a bitter and difficult war and we have a responsibility to give those with whom we have been associated an opportunity to shape their own future. Therefore, we have a responsibility to continue a program of economic assistance along the lines that have been developed.

"We also will, as the President pointed out in his speech announcing the peace, continue that degree of military assistance that the agreement permits and which is made necessary by the military situation.

"Now, the agreement permits us to replace weapons that are used up, destroyed, damaged or worn out. Needless to say, if there is no conflict, the amount of replacement of military equipment that is needed will be much less than it was during the war. In the longer term, it has always been our intention to enable the South Vietnamese to take over the burden of their own military defense and we believe we have left them in a position where they can handle most of the challenges that we can now foresee."

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Mr. KALB. "Dr. Kissinger, I think what I was trying to get at is what happens—and I suppose this question must be asked. In the best of all possible worlds the cease-fire is going to hold. In the world that we live in it may not. President Thieu said in an interview tonight on CBS that he would never call upon American airpower to go back. And Ambassador Sullivan said only last Sunday that there are no inhibitions—I believe were his words—on the use of this airpower. Is that correct?"

Dr. KISSINGER. "That is legally correct."

Mr. KALB. "Politically and diplomatically?"

Dr. KISSINGER. "We have the right to do this. The question is very difficult to answer in the abstract. It depends on the extent of the challenge, on the nature of the threat, on the circumstances in which it arises; and it would be extremely unwise for a responsible American official at this stage, when the peace is in the process of being established, to give a checklist about what the United States will or will not do in every circumstance that is likely to arise.

"For the future that we can foresee, the North Vietnamese are not in a position to launch an overwhelming attack on the South, even if they violate the agreement. What happens after a year or two has to be seen in the circumstances which then exist.

"Most of the violations that one can now foresee should be handled by the South Vietnamese."

Mr. KALB. "So that for the next year or two, if I understand you right, there would be no need for a reinvolvement of American military power?"

Dr. KISSINGER. "Marvin, we did not end this war in order to look for an excuse to reenter it, but it would be irresponsible for us at this moment to give a precise checklist to potential aggressors as to what they can or cannot safely do."

Dr. Kissinger, Interview with Barbara Walters, February 23, 1973

Dr. KISSINGER. "In the present circumstance, when you have a peace that has many precarious aspects, after ten years of war, of a war that annually cost ten times as much as one could conceive spending, not to consider what may be psychologically, politically, and humanely necessary, is simply a wrong allocation of priorities."

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Miss WALTERS. "In all the talk about rebuilding North Vietnam, there has been little discussion of rebuilding the South. What are the plans there?"

Dr. KISSINGER. "I think that we have an on-going program in South Vietnam and therefore there has been less need to justify continuing what we have been doing and we would expect to continue our economic assistance to South Vietnam."

"In South Vietnam the situation is somewhat different in the sense that the economy is already beginning to take hold and that one can visualize, over a period of years, a declining rate of American participation. But in the next few years we have to maintain our economic assistance to South Vietnam at roughly the level that we have been doing in recent years. And we will talk to other nations about aid to Indochina in general."

President Nixon's News Conference, March 15, 1973

"I will only suggest this: that we have informed the North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration and of what we believe it to be, a violation of the cease-fire, the cease-fire and the peace agreement. Our concern has also been expressed to other interested parties. And I would only suggest that based on my actions over the past four years, that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such expressions of concern, when they are made, with regard to a violation. That is all I will say about it."

Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Porter in Grand Rapids Speech, March 21, 1973

"President Nixon has made clear our concern at North Vietnamese infiltration of large amounts of equipment into South Vietnam. If it continued, this infiltration could lead to serious consequences. The North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard our expressions of concern."

Defense Secretary Richardson on Meet the Press, April 1, 1973

Mr. NESSEN. "Mr. Secretary, can you say that the United States will never under any circumstances send military forces back to Indochina?"

Secretary RICHARDSON. "No, I cannot give any categorical assurance, Mr. Nessen. Obviously the future holds possible developments that are unforeseeable now. But certainly we very much hope that this will not be necessary."

Mr. NESSEN. "And if I ask you the same question about, can you say whether the United States will never bomb again in North or South Vietnam, your answer would be the same?"

Secretary RICHARDSON. "Yes, but of course our hope and expectation is that the cease-fire agreements will be observed."

Mr. NESSEN. "President Nixon has warned several times North Vietnam that it should have no doubt about the consequences if it violates the cease-fire. What does he mean, what are the consequences?"

Secretary RICHARDSON. "This is obviously something that cannot be spelled out in advance, Mr. Nessen."

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"They have, I think, had some reason, looking back over the past, to know that the President has been willing to do what has been necessary in order to bring about a negotiated solution and to bring an end to the war."

Defense Secretary Richardson to the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2, 1973

Question. "There are reports out of South Vietnam today that President Thieu of South Vietnam says that the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have an agreement that if there is an offensive, that if the North Vietnamese do come in, that the United States will come back with its airplanes and with its air support? Do we have such a commitment?"

Secretary RICHARDSON. "This is a question simply of very possible contingencies. I wouldn't want to try to amplify on anything he said or to subtract from it."

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"We, of course, continue to adhere to the proposition that the cease-fire agreements not only have been signed but are in the interest of all the parties and our objective is to assure so far as is possible that they are carried out."

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"Our job is to reinforce the considerations that will, we trust, lead them to carry out the agreement."

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"If he [the President] had the constitutional power to carry on the war while winding it down, we think it's a natural extension of this to say that he has the constitutional power to take whatever incidental steps that are now required in order to assure that the ceasefire agreements are carried out."

U.S.-GVN Communique (San Clemente), April 3, 1973

"Both Presidents, while acknowledging that progress was being made toward military and political settlements in South Vietnam, nevertheless viewed with great concern infiltrations of men and weapons in sizeable numbers from North Vietnam into South Vietnam in violation of the Agreement on Ending the War, and considered that actions which would threaten the basis of the Agreement would call for appropriately vigorous reactions. They expressed their conviction that all the provisions of the Agreement, including in particular those concerning military forces and military supplies, must be faithfully implemented if the cease-fire is to be preserved and the prospects for a peaceful settlement are to be assured. President Nixon stated in this connection that the United States views violations of any provision of the Agreement with great and continuing concern.

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“ . . . this vigilance will require the continued political, economic, and military strength of the governments and nations menaced by any renewal of this aggressive threat. Because of their limited resources, the nations of the region will require external assistance to preserve the necessary social and economic stability for peaceful development.”

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“President Nixon reaffirmed his wholehearted support for the endeavors of postwar rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the Republic of Vietnam.”

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“The President [Nixon] noted that the assumption by the Republic of Vietnam of the full manpower requirements for its own defense was fully in keeping with [the Nixon] Doctrine. He affirmed that the United States, for its part, expected to continue, in accordance with its Constitutional processes, to supply the Republic of Vietnam with the material means for its defense consistent with the Agreement on Ending the War.”

Defense Secretary Elliott Richardson Interviewed by Newsmen prior to his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee on Defense, April 3, 1973

Question. “Mr. Secretary, under conditions might we have to begin bombing in support of the South Vietnamese?”

Secretary RICHARDSON. “It would be one of those questions that it’s impossible to answer in general terms. We can only see what develops, and hopefully, what will develop is the full and complete implementation of the ceasefire agreements.”

Question. “But is it possible that we will have to bomb either North Vietnam or in support of the South Vietnamese army again?”

Secretary RICHARDSON. “It’s certainly something we cannot rule out at this time.”

Dr. Kissinger’s Press Conference—May 2, 1973

Question. “You say if North Vietnam does not obey the call for an honorable cease-fire, it would risk revived confrontation with us. Could you spell out a little bit more clearly what you mean there?”

Dr. KISSINGER. “. . . Now, on the confrontation, we have made clear that we mean to have the agreement observed. We are now engaged in an effort to discuss with the North Vietnamese what is required to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement. We have every intention and every incentive to make certain that our side of the agreement is maintained, and to use our influence wherever we can to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement.

“But the United States cannot sign a solemn agreement and within weeks have major provisions violated without our making an attempt to indicate it. Now, the particular measures: Some of them are, of course, obvious, and we would prefer, as we state in the report and as we have stated publicly many times, to move our relationship with the North Vietnamese toward normalization, and to start a process which would accelerate, such as other processes normally have.

“So the general thrust of this paragraph is that the tension existing between us certainly cannot ease as rapidly as we want if the agreement is not observed.”

President’s Foreign Policy Report, May 3, 1973

“We hope that the contending factions will now prefer to pursue their objectives through peaceful means and political competition rather than through the brutal and costly methods of the past. This choice is up to them. We shall be vigilant concerning violations of the Agreement.”

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“Hanoi has two basic choices. The first is to exploit the Vietnam Agreement and press its objectives in Indochina. In this case it would continue to infiltrate men and materiel into South Vietnam, keep its forces in Laos and Cambodia, and through pressures or outright attack renew its aggression against our friends. Such a course would endanger the hard won gains for peace in Indochina. It would risk revived confrontation with us. . . . The second course is for North Vietnam to pursue its objectives peacefully, allowing the historical trends of the region to assert themselves.”

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"The funds required will not be drawn from any domestic programs. . . . We will observe Constitutional requirements at every step of the way. . . . We believe that the American people and the Congress will agree to provide the relatively modest amounts to help keep the peace that ended such a long and costly war."

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"The Republic of Vietnam will find us a steady friend. We will continue to deal with its government as the legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people, while supporting efforts by the South Vietnamese parties to achieve reconciliation and shape their political future. We will provide replacement military assistance within the terms of the Agreement. We expect our friends to observe the Agreement just as we will not tolerate violations by the North Vietnamese or its allies."

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"None of the country's major economic tasks can be accomplished without substantial economic assistance. With such aid, none of these problems is insuperable. South Vietnam has the natural and human resources to be economically independent and viable. What is needed is time for these resources, diverted or idled by the war, to be put back to productive use.

"The Republic of South Vietnam now seeks the economic counter-part to Vietnamization. As we helped them take over their own defense in conflict, we will help them now become economically self-sustaining in peace."

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"We have told Hanoi, privately and publicly, that we will not tolerate violations of the Agreement."

Dr. Kissinger's Press Conference, June 13, 1973

Question. "Do you feel now that with the signing of the document you have more or less ended your work in the Indochina area or that you will still have a lot of difficulties, especially concerning Cambodia?"

Dr. KISSINGER. "The remaining issues in Indochina will still require significant diplomatic efforts, and we expect to continue them. Of course, we remain committed to the strict implementation of the agreement, and we will maintain our interest in it."

President Nixon's Message to the House of Representatives, June 27, 1973, Opposing Indochina Bombing Halt

"A total halt would virtually remove Communist incentive to negotiate and would thus seriously undercut ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a ceasefire in Cambodia. It would effectively reverse the momentum towards lasting peace in Indochina set in motion last January and renewed in the four-party communique signed in Paris on June 13."

* * * * *

"A Communist victory in Cambodia, in turn, would threaten the fragile balance of negotiated agreements, political alignments and military capabilities upon which the overall peace in Southeast Asia depends and on which my assessment of the acceptability of the Vietnam agreements was based.

"Finally, and with even more serious global implications, the legislatively imposed acceptance of the United States to Communist violations of the Paris agreements and the conquest of Cambodia by Communist forces would call into question our national commitment not only to the Vietnam settlement but to many other settlements or agreements we have reached or seek to reach with other nations. A serious blow to America's international credibility would have been struck—a blow that would be felt far beyond Indochina."

Secretary Kissinger's Letter to Senator Kennedy, March 25, 1974

"As a signator of the Paris Agreement, the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the cease-fire possible and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. With these commitments in mind, we continue to provide to the Republic of Viet-Nam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic viability."

* * * * *

"We have . . . committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally."

Interview with Tran Van Lam, former South Vietnamese Foreign Minister, April 14, 1975, Saigon

Foreign Minister Lam stated that President Nixon promised to "react immediately and vigorously" to any large scale North Vietnamese offensive. But, he added, "no secret agreement was signed."

PROPOSED ACCOMPLISHMENTS WITH ADDITIONAL AID

Senator STENNIS. I have just one brief question. I think the chairman asked another key question that would help meet the situation you are up against and you have covered it perhaps as strongly as you could, but anything that you or General Weyand or any other witness could add to your answer as to what you expect to accomplish with this money, as to what picture you see in the future, with reference to this problem of about to lose this matter militarily—what hope or what ground could you give a Senator to stand on on the floor of the Senate and urge his colleagues to support this or the people, what ground of hope and expectation, and I know you can't be specific, but down the road 2 years or 1 year or—and you have covered fully the matter of possibly a chance for better negotiations, but can you add to that?

I am going to ask General Weyand the same question.

Secretary KISSINGER. I believe, Senator, that the military situation cannot be predicted with certainty until the outcome of the present battle becomes clearer. So the gamut of possibilities ranges from a military stabilization to a temporary military stabilization.

In any event, we believe that the significance of recent events will increase the possibility of negotiations and, finally, whatever the outcome, the best and most humane solution can be achieved through the appropriation of these funds, bringing about the most orderly evolution.

Senator STENNIS. My time is up and you can enlarge on that later, if you wish.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROOKE

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Brooke is recognized for 10 minutes. Senator BROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I presume that the President and you are concerned with the broader implications of the refusal of Congress to vote any additional military assistance to South Vietnam, but I cannot in good conscience vote for any further military assistance for I believe that further military assistance to Vietnam will just continue the killing that, unfortunately, has gone on for too many years.

As a practical matter, it would appear to me that further military assistance is not going to change conditions drastically in Vietnam and will only prolong the war.

As far as the implications, the broad implications, are concerned, do you think what are or will be the problems vis-a-vis the impact on our security arrangements elsewhere around the world resulting from a congressional refusal to vote additional military assistance to Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, I find that I can provoke most people to great expressions of displeasure by pointing out that there might be a connection between South Vietnam and other parts of the world. Nevertheless this happens to be my belief.

The spectacle of the United States simply walking away from people who have been encouraged in their fight, wisely or unwisely, the performance of the United States making for those people the decision that they should discontinue fighting when this is not what they themselves have decided, will have an impact on other countries—not necessarily tomorrow and not inevitably in any visible way, and not in the simple way that the old domino theory suggested—but in the sense that political leaders have to make their judgments about the United States. I do believe it will affect international stability; not in a way that cannot be recovered, but in a way that we had better face.

NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF A VIETNAM DEFEAT

Senator BROOKE. How should we proceed to limit the negative implications of the Vietnam defeat?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, this administration is dedicated to continue a foreign policy designed to bring about a structure in the world in which the peace can be preserved, in which the inescapable role of the United States for progress and security will be maintained.

It will be more difficult and some of the decisions will be harder, but we cannot tie the whole future of our foreign policy to the future of South Vietnam. Nevertheless, I maintain the request, even though I say it will have serious consequences if it is not voted—but if it is not voted, we shall go on and we shall preserve the basic structure of our foreign policy, particularly if we all use this occasion now to reestablish the unity between the Congress and the Executive without which an effective foreign policy is not possible at all.

Senator BROOKE. Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it be to our advantage then to cease stating that a strong linkage exists between Vietnam and our credibility elsewhere? Shouldn't we seek to convince others that such a linkage is minimal?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, our constancy cannot be achieved by rhetoric and problems cannot be avoided by definition. Each leader will draw his own conclusions and how they will act will depend on how we will behave in the future.

It is our belief that if Vietnam is to be defeated, it should not be because the United States refused aid to a people still eager to resist. If the Congress should go against our judgment, we will do our best to conduct a constructive foreign policy without recrimination, but we will have to face the fact that we will then confront greater difficulties, which we can meet.

Senator BROOKE. My point Mr. Secretary, is that we should cease and desist making strong statements linking Vietnam to our credibility elsewhere across the world.

Secretary KISSINGER. My point is, Senator, that it is not our statements that link it, it is reality.

Senator BROOKE. Well, I can agree with you that it is reality, but that still does not support the making of repeated statements emphasizing the linkage between Vietnam and our credibility.

Mr. Secretary, I am concerned about humanitarian aid and I would like to know how a level of \$250 million was arrived at. How will this aid be dispensed? Would it be channeled through the United Nations or AID?

Secretary KISSINGER. You hurt the AID Director to the quick. He insists that it be channeled through AID, but the proposal we have is to channel it through AID and through the American voluntary agencies. We can give you a breakdown of what is intended: \$202 million is for temporary emergency relief, some is for refugee resettlement; \$10 million is for emergency urban relief, but we can give you a detailed breakdown of how it is with these figures.

Senator BROOKE. Will aid be offered to refugees that are in Communist-held territory?

Secretary KISSINGER. The \$250 million that we are requesting from the Congress is for refugees in the non-Communist territory of South Vietnam.

Senator BROOKE. So you do not propose any aid for refugees located in Communist controlled areas?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is a matter—that is now being handled by United Nations agencies, but we feel quite frankly that some of the countries that have supplied military equipment might now supply some humane relief in those areas while military operations are still going on.

SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. PERSONNEL

Senator BROOKE. In your estimation can our personnel be withdrawn safely under present conditions in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Under present conditions our personnel can be withdrawn safely and they are being reduced.

Senator BROOKE. Is it logistically possible to evacuate a large number of Vietnamese?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, that depends entirely on the circumstances under which this evacuation becomes necessary. It is, logistically, certainly possible. The question we will face is the conditions under which it may have to be attempted. If it is unopposed, it will be logistically possible to remove a respectable number. If there should be opposition from some quarters, then we will have to make a new decision and then the complications will be much greater.

Senator BROOKE. Are there any indications that the Communists will allow an evacuation of a large number of South Vietnamese?

Secretary KISSINGER. Again, of course, it depends on the conditions under which this will take place. At this particular moment the only indications we have are that they are opposed to it.

Senator BROOKE. Finally, are any attempts underway to negotiate the conditions under which the North would allow an unhindered evacuation of a large number of South Vietnamese?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, the problem of evacuation, especially of South Vietnamese, is a matter of extraordinary delicacy because it involves the Government of South Vietnam and it involves also the other parties and, finally, it involves expectations as to the practical outcome, very difficult to discuss in open session.

I would be glad to make Mr. Habib available in executive session to go into greater detail on that.

Senator BROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PASTORE

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Pastore.

Senator PASTORE. Mr. Secretary, you have made a very compassionate plea and I think that few men are so gifted, but in reading your presentation very carefully I get the distinct impression that what we are talking about is more face-lifting rather than the survival of South Vietnam.

You say there is no connection between the \$800 million of equipment that was abandoned and yet the figure of \$722 million is pretty close to it. I am wondering now why nothing has been said in your statement about the withdrawal of American nationals that might not be essential to the conducting of the fighting that is going on in South Vietnam.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, the misjudgment which was made by the Government of South Vietnam was to believe that it would be possible, with the existing lines of communications of South Vietnam, to remove large quantities of equipment these long distances to the areas that they wanted to defend and, therefore, the abandonment of some of its equipment was, inherent in the area of original decision, which we have repeatedly stated was probably a mistake.

It is also interesting that some of the airplanes were abandoned because they couldn't fly for lack of spare parts. The figure, when the President determined the figure, as he stated before the Congress, he had essentially four choices. He could ask for nothing. That would have led to an immediate collapse in South Vietnam with very serious consequences. He could have asked for an immediate \$300 million that had already been authorized. Since that figure was already asked for in January, it would have been demonstrably insufficient.

He could have asked for that and said he would come back for more later. This would have meant that we would have spent the next 3 months in Vietnam debates, which I think it is in the national interest to end, up or down.

He therefore asked for the one figure for which we could testify and for which we had a study that could be defended. It was given to the President by General Weyand and represents General Weyand's and his associates' best estimates of what is needed to give the GVN a chance.

That this happens to coincide with the amount of equipment that was lost on—which figures differ wildly incidentally—is a coincidence. That did not apply to the President's decision.

Now with respect to evacuation of Americans, the Embassy has been instructed to reduce Americans in Vietnam to exactly the figure that you have indicated. We will not give the exact number, but to those personnel that are needed to conduct operations as of this moment with no supernumerary personnel, especially those that were active in those parts of the country that are now under Communist occupation.

Senator PASTORE. You had said and rightfully so, there is no excuse for American assistance. As I sit here now, do you think we can possibly save the new government?

Secretary KISSINGER. The issue is not any particular government.

Senator PASTORE. Can we say South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. As I said here, I believe that this is not the decision that we should make. It is a decision that we should let the people of South Vietnam make and not make it for them.

Senator PASTORE. But the taxpayers in this country are very much interested in what we have to pay to allow the South Vietnamese to make their decisions and that is the thing that is disturbing the American people.

Now I read from the paper only the other day and I would like to get your reaction to that, that the Swedish Government was commissioned to transport \$63 million in gold bullion as the personal property of Thieu. Now, is that true or untrue?

Secretary KISSINGER. I cannot believe that it is true, but I have no evidence one way or the other.

Senator PASTORE. But before the taxpayers began to pour in another \$1 billion in South Vietnam, isn't it necessary to find out whether or not these people had been stashing away money that we have furnished?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, to the best of my knowledge it is not true. It is in the nature of stashed-away money that you cannot easily get a reliable accounting, but to the best of our knowledge it is not true.

What I can say about aid is that without our aid there is no chance. With our aid there are some possibilities.

Senator PASTORE. Well, the remarkable thing of last Thursday evening, just before the President went on television, was an interview with General Ky and he kept pointing to his temple, saying that the trouble in South Vietnam is the loss of morale and not the lack of American equipment.

Now that, of course, leads to further disconcerting attitude on the part of the American public and I think we are entitled to know whether it is a lack of morale in South Vietnam or whether it is a lack of money or equipment.

Secretary KISSINGER. It is my judgment, Senator, that it is a lack of morale that has many causes, including lack of American equipment.

Senator PASTORE. Is my time up?

Chairman McCLELLAN. You have 3 more minutes.

Senator PASTORE. Now, Mr. Secretary, what we would like to know is how much of the \$722 million will facilitate the removal of American nationals out of South Vietnam? I think that that would be a more dramatic impression upon the Congress if we could feel that this would facilitate the removal of American nationals in a dangerous zone at this time who are not essential, of course, to the conducting of the operations.

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, it is difficult to give specific sums in that way, but we believe that the granting of our request would provide the best conditions for any evacuations that are undertaken and that may be contemplated.

Senator PASTORE. You were at the meeting at the White House yesterday with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the leadership of the Congress and there was some talk there about a contingency fund. Could you explain that to us, please?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, it was an idea that was put to us by the congressional leadership and it was not our suggestion, but as I understood it—and Senator Byrd who was present can correct me—as I understood it, the idea was to give the President a contingency fund for some general purpose and that he would have a considerable discretion to apply it as long as in his judgment it served that general purpose.

That was my understanding of the proposal. I believe that such an approach, if the sum were adequate, would be acceptable to the President, and in fact I know it would be acceptable.

Senator PASTORE. Would that be part of the \$722 million or all of it?

Secretary KISSINGER. We believe it should be all of it, but it is up to the Congress to make the decision, but this would be a way that the President would accept it.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Hruska was to be recognized next. However, I believe he has consented to Senator Hatfield preceding him.

Senator Hatfield.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HATFIELD

FALLACY OF CONTINUED AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator HATFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I cannot help but observe on this occasion it was 10 years ago that I cast my first negative vote on the question of aid to Vietnam. In that time my four children have grown up, knowing nothing but killing in Vietnam and the aid that the United States has rendered to sustain that kind of policy. Little did I think that 10 years later we had not yet achieved a peace which President Johnson promised the Governors Conference in 1965. Here we are administration after administration after administration later, still pursuing the same basic policy.

My question has to do with the statement you made on page 9 when you said "For a settlement to be reached which preserves—any degree of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam, the present military situation must be stabilized."

Now, let us use your phraseology, which I certainly applaud, that we must deal with the world of reality and not the world of fantasy. Do you mean to say it is the world of reality that you propose or you present to this committee here this morning to suggest that we continue to give aid to a regime that has lost two-thirds of the country's geography, in which its own Senate has unanimously called upon the President of the country to resign, and which many experts, including an article this morning in the New York Times, analyze the political situation as one that is paralyzed? Now you appear here this morning and indicated the road to peace is to give more support—ammunition, military assistance, humanitarian aid to that kind of regime.

Mr. Secretary, do you call that the world of reality?

Secretary KISSINGER. First of all, if I may make a comment about your opening remarks, Senator.

President Johnson spoke to you with 550,000 Americans in South Vietnam, and all of those have been removed and there is no Ameri-

can—there has been no American combat activity in South Vietnam for 2 years, so I would consider this a considerable change in the situation from the one which obtained when you first encountered South Vietnam.

Senator HATFIELD. But 2 million more South Vietnamese have been killed and the killing still goes on.

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course, it is always possible for the United States to take a position that the way to stop the killing is to stop giving aid to those who are defending themselves, and on that basis, that would be a doctrine for American foreign policy in which very little resistance would take place in the world.

Senator HATFIELD. Assuming they are defending themselves.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I don't happen to believe that a great national purpose is served in pursuing all of the causes of the situation and all of the decisions that led to the demoralization that occurred. Obviously if they were not defending themselves, we wouldn't be asking for aid.

But to answer your question, the request which we have made to the Congress is the one that we believe best serves the interest of the United States and best serves the interests of South Vietnam and, therefore, we believe it to be a realistic request.

CONDITIONS OF THIEU NEGOTIATION OVERTURES

Senator HATFIELD. Mr. Secretary, what is the basis for conditions for which Mr. Thieu would enter upon negotiations?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I believe that the necessity for a political settlement in Vietnam is inescapable for any government in Vietnam under present conditions. But even before present circumstances, he has said that he would enter negotiations without preconditions and implement the provisions of the Paris accords and he made that offer specifically some months ago.

Senator HATFIELD. So that the conditions are—

Secretary KISSINGER. And he repeated it recently. I suppose by this he means the institution of the National Council for Reconciliation and Concord and the provisions in the political sections of the Paris accord.

Senator HATFIELD. He would now support a National Council for Reconciliation?

Secretary KISSINGER. In accordance with the agreement, that is my impression.

Senator HATFIELD. Have you had any updating as to what conditions must exist before Mr. Thieu will enter upon political negotiations at this time?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, he has agreed to those negotiations without preconditions.

Senator HATFIELD. Have you discussed them of recent date with Mr. Thieu? Under present circumstances and conditions?

Secretary KISSINGER. We have discussed the political prospects, the problems of political negotiation, with the South Vietnamese Government, including President Thieu, recently and extensively.

Senator HATFIELD. And did they indicate any new position or new viewpoint under the present circumstances and conditions?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, it is somewhat difficult for President Thieu to conduct negotiations with the preconditions that have been

set by the other side, which are that he step down and that we stop all assistance of any kind to South Vietnam, which would have the practical consequence of amounting to surrender.

This is the status of the negotiations at this particular point.

Senator HATFIELD. So that political negotiations are impossible at this time?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would like to remind you, Senator, it used to be said in Cambodia that the obstacle to negotiations was Lon Nol. Lon Nol disappeared and the readiness to negotiate on the other side did not increase because there was no military situation that gave them the slightest incentive to negotiate.

If the other side believes that it can impose its terms, there will not be political preconditions. There will not be the political preconditions for negotiations and it is our view, therefore, that a modicum of military stabilization has to be achieved, if there can be a negotiation of anything other than the surrender of the existing structure.

Senator HATFIELD. So you see no possibility of political negotiations at this time?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, it depends, in part, on the actions of the Congress. If the Congress refuses assistance, the only political negotiations that will be possible will be to arrange the surrender of South Vietnam.

STATUS OF AMERICANS REMAINING IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator HATFIELD. How many Americans are there? We understand there are about 6,000 Americans in South Vietnam. Who are these Americans, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary KISSINGER. I don't have the breakdown with me. The number of Americans, this is Mr. Habib's great opportunity to brief me. We would like to give you those figures on a classified basis, but I can tell you now that the number is being reduced to the minimum level necessary for the essential tasks.

Senator HATFIELD. Is there a cash fund available in the Department of Defense or related agencies for emergency evacuation and military operations for such Americans?

Secretary KISSINGER. I frankly don't know this, but I am certain that if an emergency evacuation became necessary, it will not fail for lack of funds.

Senator HATFIELD. Do you know how much it would cost to evacuate the 6,000 or so Americans?

Secretary KISSINGER. I do not know. It is no longer 6,000 Americans, it has been reduced and it is well below 5,000 as of today and I don't know, frankly, the amount of money that is required.

The problem is, as the President indicated in his speech, the requisite authority under certain circumstances, but it applies less to the Americans than to the evacuation of South Vietnamese.

Senator HATFIELD. Is there any reason why they should not be evacuated beginning today?

Secretary KISSINGER. Who is that?

Senator HATFIELD. The Americans.

Secretary KISSINGER. The Americans, the number of Americans as I told you, Senator, is being reduced daily.

Senator HATFIELD. Do you have a time schedule at all that you would have for us today as to when they will all be evacuated?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, we do not contemplate the total evacuation of Americans from South Vietnam, because we have the problem of not producing the very panic which it is our intention to avoid. We will reduce the number of Americans to the minimum level that we think is compatible with the efficient operation and discharge of our current responsibilities in South Vietnam, and that is being carried out. I promised, on a classified basis, to give that schedule to the leadership. It will probably be tomorrow. The schedule will be made available.

Senator HATFIELD. Has there been any contact with the United Nations or any other international organization about humanitarian aid should bilateral aid no longer be feasible?

Secretary KISSINGER. We are in contact with the United Nations, but we have not made an arrangement for obvious reasons with the United Nations for United Nations aid in areas that are not yet occupied by the Communists.

I think the gentlemen of the committee must understand the extraordinary delicacy of the situation in which we find ourselves and how by our actions we could bring about some of the most drastic consequences.

Senator HATFIELD. That is all.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD
DURATION OF \$722 MILLION APPROPRIATION

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Byrd.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, the last \$175 million of the \$700 million which had been appropriated by the Congress for fiscal year 1975 was obligated only as of April 1. When will the full impact of that \$175 million be felt in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator Byrd, I really cannot give you a good answer to this. I think General Weyand would be in a much better position because he has a much better feel for pipelines and so forth than I do.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. Very well. That probably disposes of my next question, which is: When would the impact from a materiel standpoint be felt by the South Vietnamese of an appropriation of \$722 million?

Secretary KISSINGER. My understanding is that it is within 30 days, and, of course, it would give the opportunity to draw down their stocks with greater confidence. As it is now, they are expending ammunition at a rate by which they will be running out at the end of May or early June, and we will then face in Vietnam exactly the same situation we faced in Cambodia, where the Cambodian army defending Phnom Penh simply ran out of ammunition.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. Is it your contention that the appropriation of \$722 million would sustain the South Vietnamese in their efforts until such time as the Congress could give consideration to the fiscal year 1976 appropriation budget request, in which is contained a request for \$1,293,000,000 for military assistance in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is the judgment of General Weyand with, of course, the uncertainties of any military situation.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, the questions that this request posed to us are greatly affected by the fact that the South Vietnamese have virtually abandoned three-fourths of their territory and

over half of their people and almost \$1 billion worth of equipment to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong within the last 3 weeks, almost without firing a shot.

The Congress has appropriated \$700 million this fiscal year, 1975 fiscal year, and in view of the fact that the South Vietnamese have conducted a poorly implemented strategical military retreat and, in so doing, have become panicky and in the course thereof have virtually run over women and children in their efforts to get out of the way of the North Vietnamese and been taken in helicopters and ships, it makes it extremely difficult for those of us who would otherwise perhaps be sympathetic to appropriate additional moneys at this time.

But as I gather from the statement you have made, you feel that this appropriation is vital to the development of a military situation that would provide some incentive for the Vietcong and North Vietnamese to enter into negotiation with the South Vietnamese; is that correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct, Senator. In terms of the statistics you gave at the beginning, you are correct as far as territory is concerned. The Saigon Government still controls 75 percent of the people. The largest part of the population lives in the area now under the control of the Saigon Government. And the original conception of the retreat which backfired so dramatically was to preserve the richest and most populous areas, with those lines of communication.

With respect to your basic point, Senator Byrd, we understand and sympathize with the concerns which you have expressed. They are not trivial concerns and we are not challenging these concerns. If the South Vietnamese do not fight, then obviously the money, even if appropriated, will never be spent.

The question we have to decide as a people is whether we will make that decision for them and prevent them from doing it.

EVACUATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I realize that you are responding under some restraints but just how related is this request for \$722 million to the safe evacuation of American citizens now in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. We are attempting, Senator Byrd, to bring about the most controlled conditions for whatever contingency might arise, and it is obvious evacuation is easiest under controlled circumstances.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. That doesn't quite answer my question but I understand the circumstances under which you are testifying.

But you did state, in response to earlier questions, that this appropriation would, "permit most orderly transition." I didn't get the rest of your answer. Are we to understand that this \$722 million request is directly related to the safe evacuation, in the final analysis of the American citizens in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator Byrd, our objective is to bring about a military stabilization but, if that should fail and if the worst should come to pass, then this request will also be the most effective way to bring about the evacuation of Americans and those South Vietnamese to whom we have a moral responsibility.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. And in developing a stabilization of the military situation there, you are being given additional time in which

to effectuate the evacuation of these Americans; is that a fair statement?

Secretary KISSINGER. If the worst should come to pass; that is correct.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. Well, is this appropriation of \$722 million related to an evacuation of South Vietnamese nationals? The President has spoken in terms of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese nationals. We have heard figures ranging all the way from 150,000 to 1½ million. Does this appropriation request relate in any way to any plans that may be under development for the evacuation of South Vietnamese nationals?

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course, Senator Byrd, I would like to insist that when we speak of evacuation we speak of the worst contingency that could happen. We are not speaking of that as the only purpose of our request. Under the conditions of the worst contingency, this \$722 million will contribute to it, yes, although of course the care and feeding of these people then will require some funds that will have to go through AID and international agencies.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. I will not ask you the number that, or suppose I ask you the number—you obviously don't have to answer—what number with respect to South Vietnamese nationals that we are thinking about.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, we are talking of the record of a country that has over 15 years of involvement with people who have reason to rely on it, and whose future in our estimation would be hopeless. Those are the essential categories, and the figure I gave—if we could discharge our responsibilities to all of them—it would involve tens of thousands. However, the logistics problems involved and the circumstances that are likely to arise under that worst case are so severe that it is doubtful that all of them or even a majority of them could in fact be evacuated.

But again I would have to say that the United States has a moral obligation at least to make an effort for those whose lives are now in jeopardy for having associated themselves with us over a decade of our involvement.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. I think the record should show that I am sympathetic with those people. My concern is that if we involve American combat troops in the evacuation of South Vietnamese nationals, then we are just getting ourselves back into the war again.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, we have no intention of getting ourselves involved again in the war in Vietnam under any conceivable authority that would be granted. We would accept any restrictions that would make that very clear.

Senator ROBERT C. BYRD. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HRUSKA

EFFECT ON AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE PLANS OF VIETNAM SITUATION

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Hruska.

Senator HRUSKA. You have touched briefly in your principal statement on the many references in the press, such as those from Australia,

which say that the reversals suffered by Saigon have prompted calls for a reappraisal of Australian defense planning, and the extent to which that country can rely on the United States for military aid.

Similar press commentary comes from Manila. There also is a recent Hong Kong statement as to countries in their area. On the 9th of April, from London, Bernard Nossiter wrote that conservative opinion is nakedly gloomy. It holds that the imminent fall of President Thieu's government is a deadly warning to Europe that America has lost its will to resist communism's expansion.

Would you like to comment further and a little more fully on this subject?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, there is no question that issues which you have called to our attention are being debated at this moment in many capitals of the world and probably much more so than is publicly acknowledged, because those people who are most concerned have the greatest vested interest in ascribing to us a reputation about which they may be quite uncertain. That is a fact of the situation which we now face and it has two parts.

One is the assessment that other nations make of our past actions, regardless of whether they thought we should ever have been involved there, with respect to our judgment, our constancy, our wisdom, and all of this amounting to our general reliability.

The second question has to do with what conclusions America will now draw from this tragic experience.

Now, we have to face the fact that the questions you put to me are being asked around the world and not only by friends but also by adversaries.

With respect to the second point, what conclusions will America draw from this in the future, this administration is determined to restore, where it has been impaired, confidence in our actions, to prevent adversaries from taking advantage of the uncertainty that may have been created, so insofar as our foreign policy can do so, and I believe it can to a considerable extent, we are determined to repair the damage. But we owe it to our people to admit there has been damage.

Senator HRUSKA. There is frequent reference, Mr. Secretary, to a bloodbath, massive executions, the extermination of the so-called intellectuals, the members of the government, parliament and, newsmen.

In the light of what has happened in the northern part of South Vietnam and in other instances where there has been a Communist aggression, could you characterize as to the rate or massiveness of any such taking of human lives by the conquerors if they should prevail and take complete charge in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, on the basis of the reports, of confirmed reports we have from the areas that are occupied, the most endangered groups are not necessarily the intellectuals. The most endangered groups are those that have been associated in any way either with the Vietnamese Government or with the United States. And that over a period of a decade amounts to a very large number.

In Hue, in 1968, when the North Vietnamese took the town for less than 1 month, at least 5,000 were killed. All those who served in the

administrative machine of the Government of South Vietnam, in the various legislative bodies in the provinces, in the various police forces, all those who worked for the United States in its various programs, we consider to be seriously endangered.

In addition there are of course those that would be considered by the North Vietnamese opponents of the Communist philosophy, regardless of their association with the United States, and this may include many of the opponents of the present Government of South Vietnam. That number is very difficult to judge and with respect to those, the North Vietnamese can easily take their time, but it would be a dramatic and tragic experience for millions in South Vietnam if a takeover should occur.

Senator HRUSKA. My original question had to do with the reaction of various places as indicated in these news articles that appear from time to time in these later days.

Secretary KISSINGER. Our own reports go considerably beyond these news articles and include countries which one would be surprised would have any relationship to South Vietnam.

EFFECT OF AMERICAN ACTION ON WORLD OPINION

Senator HRUSKA. Let me ask more specifically. We are having, the world is having, difficulties in the Middle East, and you have had a very major role there. Is there any ground to believe that psychologically or practically the failure of the United States to come to the aid of a country fighting for its life would have an impact on the events that are shaping up for the future by way of negotiation in Geneva or elsewhere in regard to the Middle East.

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course in my last press conference I reaffirmed our basic commitments in the Middle East, including our commitment to the survival of the State of Israel. At the same time the impact of the United States to effect and to control events depends on the perception of all of the chief actors, and to the degree that the United States is considered to be not able to do so, turmoil in the world will increase inevitably.

With respect to the Middle East, it depends on so many intangibles that it is very difficult to predict, but I would say in general, we now face a more difficult problem everywhere.

I will also say that we will master the problem. I simply do not want to have the American people believe that we can avoid the difficulty by defining it away.

Senator HRUSKA. Of course our Congress has taken steps, and quite definite ones, with regard to Cyprus. That is even more pointed, is it not?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, the decision with respect to Turkey, as I have repeatedly testified, is extremely unfortunate. It weakens the eastern flank of NATO in the Mediterranean, it weakens the defense relationship with a country standing between the Soviet Union and the Middle East, and it raises doubts about our general perception of our national interests.

I therefore would respectfully urge the Congress to reverse this decision, and this indicates no lack of concern for the Greek people or for a solution of the Cyprus problem. It is in my view prerequisite to having an effective Cyprus solution.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MONTOYA

MILITARY POSTURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM AT TIME OF PEACE ACCORDS

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Montoya.

Senator MONTOYA. Mr. Secretary, on page 5 of your statement you say, "However, our two governments also recognized that"—and this is with respect to the Paris agreements—"our two governments recognized that since the agreement manifestly was not self-enforcing, Hanoi's adherence depended heavily upon maintaining a military parity in South Vietnam. So long as North Vietnam confronted a strong South Vietnamese army, and so long as the possibility existed of United States intervention to offset the strategic advantages of the North Vietnamese Hanoi could be expected to forego major military action."

Now, was it your feeling at that time that there was military parity in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. At the time of the Paris accords?

Senator MONTOYA. Yes.

Secretary KISSINGER. At the time of the Paris accords it was my belief that the South Vietnamese with the existing balance in South Vietnam would be able to maintain their security, and if the North Vietnamese had lived up to the Paris accords which prohibited the infiltration of additional personnel or materiel, the military situation in South Vietnam could have been maintained indefinitely.

NORTH INFILTRATION INTO SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator MONTOYA. Now, on April 5 in your press conference at Palm Springs, you stated that at that time there had been infiltration by North Vietnam into South Vietnam with approximately 18 divisions.

Now, why did that happen, if you say that we had military parity or perhaps you can tell us when that military parity started to disintegrate.

Secretary KISSINGER. The military parity began to disintegrate during the course of last year, when the accumulated cuts in American aid, some of which were due to inflationary pressures and to the rise in oil prices, began to force the South Vietnamese into a static defensive position while the North Vietnamese continued their infiltration. During the last year, for example, as a result of the shortage of ammunition and the relative instability of the situation, casualties began to mount drastically, and the South Vietnamese Army had 30,000 killed last year, which is at least one answer to the question of whether they were fighting. But this cumulative attrition, coupled with the lack of mobility, the shortage of ammunition and the shortage of spare parts, and the inability of the United States to deliver any new equipment gradually changed the balance.

Then early this year, as a result of many factors, the North Vietnamese changed what in our judgment was their original plan. You will remember that Secretary Schlesinger, early in March testified, or said in a press conference, that he expected only local offensives in South Vietnam this year. That was based on our intelligence accumulated until then.

Some time in January the North Vietnamese changed their approach and began a massive infiltration of all of their reserve divisions, including some recruits that had only one month of training.

Senator MONTOYA. How many men did they come down with?

Secretary KISSINGER. About 270,000.

Senator MONTROYA. And what was the strength of the South Vietnamese army at that point?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, the strength of the South Vietnamese Army—

Senator MONTROYA. I have figures of 250,000 to 400,000.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think the South Vietnamese Army was numerically larger than the North Vietnamese Army, but I think that is a deceptive figure because the South Vietnamese Army had to be strung along 500 miles of frontier while the North Vietnamese could always concentrate all of their divisions at whichever point they wanted to attack, and they were free of any danger of attack themselves.

I think the South Vietnam Army was something like 350,000 to 400,000 men.

Senator MONTROYA. Well, the main premise for optimism with respect to the Paris agreement was that military parity would be a deterrent to the North Vietnamese coming down into South Vietnam and that premise turned out to be false in my opinion because they did start coming down after the Paris agreements and in great numbers.

Secretary KISSINGER. The largest infiltration occurred in the last 4 months.

U.S. LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATION IN VIETNAM

Senator MONTROYA. And you made a statement in your presentation that the United States had no legal obligation to aid South Vietnam. Am I correct in that statement?

Secretary KISSINGER. I said it had no legal obligation that was not submitted to the Congress, but it is correct that we had no legal obligation.

Senator MONTROYA. And that the only premise for a moral obligation was, and I will read it to you as you stated it, "But we do have a deep moral obligation rooted in the history of our involvement and sustained by the continuing effort of our friends."

Now, how long are we to sustain this moral obligation, assuming that we had it since our initial involvement in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, I have said at press conferences and I will have to say it here, that it would be extremely tempting to give a terminal date, but the fact is there are many situations in the world where the threat is constant and where a terminal date can not be given unless the possible aggressor decides to give up his aggression.

We have had a commitment to Europe, in the entire postwar period, and we cannot give that a terminal date. We have a commitment to Israel and we cannot give that a terminal date.

Senator MONTROYA. Don't you feel that because we have been involved in South Vietnam and have expended over 50,000 American lives there and many of our troops have been maimed, that we have expended close to \$150 billion, that the American people have a right to order the Congress to enact a termination date of our moral obligation in Indochina?

Secretary KISSINGER. The American people have a right to urge Congress to do anything that the American people decide to do. And before the latest disaster we were prepared to discuss with the Congress, against our better judgment but in response to the feeling that you indicated, a terminal program for American military assistance.

Under present circumstances of very great danger, we could not give you a responsible terminal date and therefore what we are asking the

Congress now is in effect for emergency assistance, and the question of a terminal date could only be realistically addressed after we see what happens over the next few months.

Senator MONTROYA. In your statement you tell us that you want \$396 million to sustain South Vietnam for 60 days and of course the other \$326 million of the \$722 million is for the purpose of organizing ranger units and training more manpower for self-defense.

Now, in the light of this budgetary request, what happened after the 60 days? Are you going to come in and ask for more millions of dollars to sustain them?

Secretary KISSINGER. After the 60 days?

Senator MONTROYA. And in your understanding a moral obligation.

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, after the 60 days, depending of course upon the military situation and assuming there has been no negotiation, we would be requesting from the Congress the sum that we have already submitted, which is \$1.3 billion. This has been already submitted to the Congress and it is not a new figure.

Senator MONTROYA. Can you tell us of any other country in the world that has a moral obligation, or is doing something about a moral obligation to South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. There are few other countries; the tragedy of our situation is that there are few countries that feel any sense of moral obligation to South Vietnam—and yet many of these countries who have done nothing themselves for South Vietnam have the reactions that Senator Hruska correctly described.

Senator MONTROYA. I have one last question: In all seriousness, do you think that the expenditure of the money contained in this budget request will help the situation in South Vietnam and create an atmosphere whereby a political settlement can be made?

Secretary KISSINGER. In all seriousness, Senator, I recall no set of discussions between the President and his senior advisers that were more prayerfully conducted than these, and in which the President then decided that it was his obligation to Congress, to the people, and to history to ask for this amount, because it was his judgment—with which I fully concurred—that whatever prediction you make about the future, we will be better off with this sum than without this sum. There is really no intermediate sum that makes an equal amount of sense.

Senator MONTROYA. Thank you.

ORDER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS FOR AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Stevens has very graciously volunteered to defer his time for the moment and yield to the next Democrat Senator.

Before you begin, Senator, may the Chair observe: I understand from the Secretary that if we recess at 1 o'clock you can return at 2 p.m. for 1 hour. Is that correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. Can you make it 2:15 p.m.?

Chairman McCLELLAN. Whichever is more convenient for you.

Secretary KISSINGER. I will make it possible to do so.

Chairman McCLELLAN. As soon as Senator Inouye concludes we will recognize Senator Stevens. Following his questioning, we will recess until 2:15 p.m.

At that time, the Chair will recognize, in the order of seniority, those who are now present and have been waiting all morning. I think we will be able to conclude within an hour.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR INOUE

ABANDONMENT OF AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES

Senator INOUE. Mr. Secretary, at the time the administration submitted its supplemental request for \$300 million, I believe most people got the impression that the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were running out of ammunition, supplies, and equipment and yet according to the information received from the Department of Defense on March 31 of this year, we have delivered to South Vietnam \$430.3 million, which left \$269.7 million still undelivered, or unobligated.

As of 8 days ago according to the Department of Defense we have delivered \$468.9 million, leaving in the pipeline, or to be ordered \$231.1 million.

Second, as a result of the withdrawal of the last 4 weeks, about a third of the South Vietnamese Air Force has been abandoned or lost and yet much of it was never destroyed. Why didn't the South Vietnamese destroy the equipment as they abandoned it?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, with respect to the first point, I am not a good witness for the rate at which the Defense Department schedules its deliveries. It seems reasonable to me that when they had a total amount of \$700 million, that they would schedule their deliveries on a quarterly basis, and that therefore at any one time there would be some unexpended funds that had not yet been obligated.

I would assume that they were simply proceeding in scheduling the funds on a quarterly basis. It does not change the fact that in the judgment of the Defense Department, in all of the assessments that I have seen, the ammunition stocks of the South Vietnamese were running dangerously low and the purpose of the \$300 million appropriation, as I understood it, was to bring the ammunition stocks up to I think 14 days' supply, or some such figure, which General Weyand can give you.

Senator INOUE. In the last 5 fiscal years, we have appropriated \$9,716 million for military assistance purposes in South Vietnam, and I believe this is about four times the amount the North has received from their friends. Is that correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. I don't have the exact figures here, Senator, but as long as I have been here we have been engaged—I don't mean we and the committee—engaged in an endless debate on how you calculate the real costs. We for example include shipping costs in our expenditures and we don't generally calculate those in the North Vietnamese expenditures.

But the basic problem we face is that the strategic situation of the two countries is entirely different. The South Vietnamese had to defend their populated areas against guerrilla attacks and very extended borders against illegal infiltration.

The North Vietnamese had nothing to defend and they could therefore concentrate their forces in any one point that they chose. Whenever the North Vietnamese took a provincial town this had a profound

impact—and incidentally the first one they took was in January of this year—but the impact of their taking this provincial town had a severe morale effect on the South Vietnamese, and it appears in retrospect a very encouraging effect on the North Vietnamese who after that decided to go all out. So it is very difficult to make this assessment in terms of numbers because the strategic problem of the two sides was so different.

Senator INOUE. Even with the loss of 600 aircraft, the South Vietnamese still have the fourth largest air force in the world.

Secretary KISSINGER. I didn't answer your question of why the planes on the ground weren't destroyed. There is no excuse for that. They should have been destroyed.

Senator INOUE. But all of the advantages were never destroyed. The South Vietnamese still have a substantial number of aircraft.

Secretary KISSINGER. I have explained the state of panic and demoralization of these units that had been in these areas for many years, that were asked from one day to the next to abandon their defensive positions and move with their families over roads totally unequipped to handle even them, much less the families and the refugees.

It was a most ill-considered decision which had tragic consequences and in the ensuing panic many things were done for which there is no good explanation.

REGIONAL AUTONOMY IN CONDUCT OF WAR

Senator INOUE. Isn't it true that since the South Vietnamese maintained regional units, that the statistics on different sites may not be absolutely correct? For example, instead of having one consolidated air force, you have regional air forces under the command of regional commanders, and so you may have in one region a surplus of equipment and in other areas deficits?

Why can't we convince the South Vietnamese to have a consolidated air force and coordinated distribution of all equipment?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, the basic allocations were made by the general staff in South Vietnam, but then each of the military regions conducted its defense substantially autonomously, which partly reflects the nature of the country along 700 miles with very difficult communications.

The tendency of military commanders to hoard their supplies is not in my experience unique to the South Vietnamese. Whether the allocation of resources could from the beginning have been more efficient or not, I am in no position to judge. I never heard any essential criticism of it until the whole thing started unraveling, and when things go wrong, one always finds no dearth of explanations.

Senator INOUE. We have been trying our best in recent weeks to get some information on the exact status of the \$440 million that we appropriated for Indochina postwar reconstruction and all we have are rounded figures. We have no idea as to how these funds have been used and whether there are unexpended funds or how much is in the pipeline.

Before we appropriate additional funds as requested we would like to know how much is left over.

Secretary KISSINGER. Rather than read you the figures why don't we give you a breakdown at the end of the day of exactly where the \$440 million stands.

INDOCHINA POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION

Senator INOUE. All right. Will you also provide information detailing that portion of fiscal year 1975 and prior year funding for Indochina postwar reconstruction which is unobligated and therefore available for current needs, and also those funds which are obligated but could be deobligated now that conditions have changed. It would also be helpful if you would provide a listing of the individual expenditures proposed for the \$250 million you are now requesting. [The information follows:]

FISCAL YEAR 1975—INDOCHINA POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS LEVELS

[In thousands of dollars]

IPR, countries and programs, fiscal year 1975	Fiscal year 1975 programed levels	Obligated as of Mar. 31, 1975	Unobligated as of Mar. 31, 1975
Vietnam, IPR.....	¹ 264,300	197,174	67,126
Humanitarian assistance.....		17,290	
Agriculture assistance.....		101,918	
Industrial development assistance.....		42,283	
Miscellaneous assistance.....		31,603	
ICCS.....		4,080	
Cambodia, IPR.....	98,000	82,153	15,847
Humanitarian assistance.....	20,000	9,933	10,067
Commodity import program.....	63,000	62,100	900
Multilateral stabilization assistance.....	15,000	10,120	4,880
Laos, IPR.....	¹ 25,600	22,084	3,516
Humanitarian assistance.....	6,500	6,500	
Reconstruction and development assistance.....	8,000	7,534	466
Stabilization assistance.....	11,100	8,050	3,050
East Asia regional, IPR.....	3,000	1,401	1,599
Multilateral and specialized agencies, IPR (ICRC, UNICEF and UNHCR).....	7,000	3,500	3,500
AID support costs and operating expenses, IPR.....	42,100	31,423	10,677
Total IPR funds (NOA).....	440,000	² 337,735	102,265

¹ Excludes operating expenses input of \$17.7 from Vietnam, \$2.0 from Cambodia and \$6.4 from Laos.² Excludes \$2,223 640(c) shipping differential.

INDOCHINA POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION SUMMARY—PIPELINE ANALYSIS, MAR. 31, 1975

[Millions of dollars]

	Vietnam	Cambodia	Laos	East Asia regional	Multi- lateral agencies (ICRC, UNICEF and UNHCR)	Grand total
FAA APPROPRIATION FUNDS						
Prior year funds: Obligated ¹ (but unex- pended):						
Exchanged support fund (ESF).....						
Commodity import program.....	² 26.32	4.46				
Humanitarian assistance.....	3.92					
Project Assistance.....	7.81	.59	5.78	0.70		
Foreign exchange operations fund.....						
Total.....	38.05	5.05	5.78	.70		49.58

See footnotes at end of table.

INDOCHINA POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION SUMMARY—PIPELINE ANALYSIS, MAR. 31, 1975—Continued

[Millions of dollars]

	Vietnam	Cambodia	Laos	East Asia regional	Multi-lateral agencies (ICRC, UNICEF and UNHCR)	Grand total
Current year funds (fiscal year 1975):						
Unobligated:						
Exchange support fund (ESF).....		4.88				
Commodity import program.....	² 20.0	.90				
Humanitarian assistance.....	39.80				3.50	
Project Assistance.....	2.25	10.07	.46	1.60		
Reserve.....	5.00					
Foreign exchange operations fund.....			3.05			
Total.....	67.05	15.85	3.51	1.60	3.50	91.51
Obligated ¹ (but unexpended):						
Exchange support fund.....						
ICCS.....	4.10					
Commodity import program.....	² 70.10	³ 47.68				
Humanitarian assistance.....	15.55				3.50	
Project Assistance.....	5.88	⁴ 9.47	8.99	.72		
FEOF.....						
Total, FAA funds.....	95.63	57.15	8.99	.72	3.50	165.99
	200.73	78.05	18.28	3.02	7.00	307.08

¹ Obligated funds are needed to liquidate existing contractual obligations of the U.S. Government.

² The \$20,000,000 recently allotted to the Vietnam CIP was obligated on Apr. 11. Funds remaining unlicensed for the CIP as of Apr. 11 totalled \$43,500,000. At current licensing rates, we expect these funds will be sufficient to sustain licensing through the 1st month of fiscal year 1976. In the past we have carried more substantial amounts into a new fiscal year because of the time required to process new funds at the beginning of a fiscal year. This calculation does not take into consideration \$53,100,000 of POL reimbursements, \$54,000,000 of which are in bills which have been presented to AID by the GVN for payment already, which we have agreed to pay. We have deferred these payments in order to use our cash to pay for immediate emergency relief requirements.

³ Sec. 655 of the FAA places a dollar ceiling on economic assistance to Cambodia. This ceiling has been reached so that no further obligation of appropriated funds is possible. Because of a recent \$3,000,000 deobligation of ESF funds (which are treated as expended when obligated), \$18,850,000 will be carried as unobligated funds once bookkeeping transaction is completed.

⁴ Does not include \$10,600,000 in AID support costs and operating expenses.

⁵ As of Apr. 15, 1975, approximately \$30,000,000 of these funds will be required to liquidate existing contracts or grants with DOD, private suppliers, USDA, ocean carriers, etc.

⁶ Of this amount, approximately \$5,400,000 is needed to liquidate contracts and grants made with private voluntary agencies and suppliers.

Summary of emergency refugee requirements (April 1975–October 1975)

	Millions
1. Emergency transport: Emergency transport and evacuation costs.....	\$10.0
2. Temporary emergency relief:	
A. Temporary relief allowances (computed at \$10 each refugee per month less rice).....	60.0
B. Temporary refugee site development and camp construction (including Phu Quoc).....	100.0
C. Integrated relief and resettlement by voluntary agencies (estimated 10 teams, 1 for each 100,000 refugees at \$1.2 million per team).....	12.0
D. Refugee labor (nonskilled) for camp construction and maintenance (estimated 200,000 workers for 150 days at \$1 per day).....	30.0
3. Phu Quoc resettlement:	
A. Phu Quoc resettlement (estimated 110,000 refugees at \$200 each to cover housing, land development, road allowance, tools, et cetera, through resettlement).....	22.0
B. Phu Quoc resettlement village infrastructure (including classrooms, education materials, markets, access roads, water wells and other inter-hamlet infrastructure).....	6.0
4. Emergency Urban Relief: Emergency urban relief program.....	10.0
Total.....	250.0

REFUGEE PROBLEMS

Senator INOUE. As to the condition of the refugees, I am certain all of us concur with you that there is an increased need for assistance. However, the best information we gather is that at the present time voluntary agencies and private agencies in South Vietnam have been severely restricted and for that matter most of them are not functioning at all. Also our AID function has been sorely crippled.

If that is the case, how do you expect to have the \$250 million spent there?

Secretary KISSINGER. I frankly have to look into this. I was not aware of these restrictions, and I will have to look into that.

Senator INOUE. Isn't that correct?

Mr. PARKER. Senator Inouye—

Secretary KISSINGER. The basic answer is that it is not AID's fault.

Mr. PARKER. There are about 300 Americans still in the AID mission in South Vietnam at present. This number is being reduced. There are about 300 U.S. AID personnel. We can reduce this and we would like to discuss this on a private basis.

The voluntary agencies have some 2,000 local personnel and our latest count is some 40 to 50 Americans that are still working. Further, in contact with voluntary agencies and groups they are anxious and ready to go back in as soon as reasonably secure conditions prevail.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Parker, will you provide the committee a summary table noting the personnel sponsored by AID presently in Vietnam?

[The table follows:]

AID-SPONSORED PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

The following personnel of the Agency for International Development were in South Vietnam as of April 9, 1975:

AID employees and individuals on loan to AID from other Federal agencies	371
AID contractor personnel	250
Foreign nationals	890
Total	1,511

Senator INOUE. In the use of these funds are you anticipating calling upon the South Vietnamese Government to administer them?

Secretary KISSINGER. Substantially, yes, with our assistance and support.

Senator INOUE. With the difficulties that the Government is now facing, don't you somehow suspect that some of the funds may not reach the intended goal?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, that is undoubtedly a problem and we will have to do our best to prevent this from happening. But we believe that on the whole the South Vietnamese Government has up to now done a good job.

Senator INOUE. What type of commodities have been provided to South Vietnam under the commodity import program thus far in fiscal 1975?

Fiscal year 1975 through Mar. 22, 1975

<i>Net Licensing</i>	
Infant dietary formula.....	\$1, 552, 509
Animal feed supplies.....	422, 318
Live animals, gum and resins.....	(103, 206)
Petroleum nonfuels (L/Com procedures).....	(84, 362)
Chemicals.....	21, 315, 209
Plastic raw materials.....	15, 659, 235
Rubber manufactures.....	1, 478, 117
Yarns and fibers.....	15, 047, 108
Iron and steel.....	(6, 122, 769)
Miscellaneous metal manufactures.....	473, 996
Machinery.....	9, 114, 221
Electrical machinery.....	3, 286, 309
Transportation equipment.....	1, 333, 731
Paper and paperboard.....	(87, 125)
Wood pulp.....	598, 423
Machine spare parts.....	307, 311
Other miscellaneous commodities.....	1, 141, 592
Engineering services.....	76, 573
Total	65, 409, 190

Carry-in of \$241,0: \$52.6.

Requirement: \$3 million per week or \$45 million requirement.

Fiscal year 1975 CIP summary

Reimbursed POL.....	\$41. 9
Fertilizer.....	90. 1
General licensing.....	65. 5
Total	197. 5
Obligated (unlicensed).....	43. 5
Total availability	241. 0

ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

Senator INOUE. Is it true that up to now the South Vietnamese Government has given refugees the lowest priority.

Secretary KISSINGER. That I am told is not true. The lowest priority compared to what?

Senator INOUE. The overall Indochina reconstruction fund. Their reprogramming has not been to increase assistance to refugees.

Secretary KISSINGER. Because until now they haven't had a massive flood, since the Paris accords they haven't had a massive flood of refugees.

Senator INOUE. My time is up.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Stevens is recognized.

When he concludes we will adjourn until 2:15, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary KISSINGER. Let's make it 2 o'clock.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Stevens has some questions.

Secretary KISSINGER. In that case, we will have to make it 2:15.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS

USE OF RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS FOR DEFENSE

Senator STEVENS. Let me start out by saying for myself, and I speak for no one else as far as I am concerned, your role in this Paris accords and the distinguished achievements you made there in obtaining the return of our men and bringing our prisoners home, should not in any way be tainted by the problems that have occurred in the time that has followed, particularly in the last 4 months.

Let me ask you first concerning Senator Inouye's question, could the funds that have been made available for reconstruction efforts have been used by the South Vietnamese to purchase military supplies.

Secretary KISSINGER. I would not believe so. No, it would be illegal.

Senator STEVENS. It is my understanding that they could not but I wanted to make certain that there was no way they could have used that money.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think the Inspector General would absolutely prevent that.

Senator STEVENS. With regard to the situation that exists in South Vietnam today, would it be possible for you to tell us the relative strength of the South Vietnamese units as compared to the North Vietnamese divisions that have come south?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think that General Weyand can give you a more authoritative answer.

My impression is that the present force ratio is about 3 to 2 in favor of the North Vietnamese and it may be even higher, after the losses that the South Vietnamese suffered in the north.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Byrd asked you about the contingency fund concept. We have read about that discussion.

Could you tell me in event the Congress did determine to make a sum available to the President, is it your understanding that that money could be used either for the stabilization of the military posture as you put it, or for the evacuation of the American personnel and the friendly South Vietnamese in his discretion?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is my understanding. It may also be for humanitarian aid depending upon the size of the package.

Senator STEVENS. I am interested in the evacuation and the concept that was mentioned by the President and by you, Mr. Secretary. Has any attempt been made to secure any assistance of our allies in the Pacific area, either in the Asian or Pacific area to assist those South Vietnamese who may wish to leave in the event the worst occurs?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would prefer, Senator, to ask Assistant Secretary Habib to come back here in executive session for details of evacuation plans, but in the case of Da Nang, we called on other nations to assist and various countries in the area did so. Indeed I think there was even a British ship involved, and there were various other countries that were involved. I think it is safe for you to assume that we would follow similar procedures.

Senator STEVENS. Well, I don't want to press you on that, but at that time they were taking those people from Da Nang to the Saigon area, it was my understanding then.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator STEVENS. In the event evacuation would have to take place at the Saigon area, has any determination been made where the friendly South Vietnamese would go?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, this is a matter that we are in the process now of exploring. We are in the process of making very detailed and careful studies which we will get within the next few days.

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Secretary, my final question is this: As to the time frame involved, the President asked that action be completed upon this request by the end of this week.

Assuming that the Congress did act with dispatch, how long would it take to make this money available in whatever form it was determined it would be necessary and what is the timelag involved in appropriation such as this such as their utilization by the executive branch?

Secretary KISSINGER. If the Congress made the money available this week we would begin using it immediately. When I said 30 days I just assumed it would take a certain amount of time for certain types of equipment to arrive, but I am sure that it would be utilized immediately and some equipment would be airlifted there so there would be no timelag, and, of course, the impact would go beyond that because it would mean that existing stocks could be more freely used in South Vietnam.

Senator STEVENS. Are there any of these materials standing by ready to go if the money is made available?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think General Weyand is in a better position to answer this than I am. I simply don't know the answer to these questions.


Senator STEVENS. Thank you. I think you and the President both deserve the thanks of the American people and the Congress. It is a necessary dialog, and I think it is a role we will have to play in terms of your request and our consideration of it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman McCLELLAN. We will recess until 2:15, at which time Senator Hollings will be recognized to speak.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2:15 p.m. the same day.]



(AFTERNOON SESSION, 2:15 O'CLOCK, TUESDAY, APRIL 15, 1975)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE—RESUMED

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HOLLINGS

PROMISES OF ARMED STRENGTH TO VIETNAM

Chairman McCLELLAN. The committee will come to order.

Senator Hollings is recognized for 10 minutes.

Senator HOLLINGS. Mr. Secretary, did you at any time represent to President Thieu that the United States would use its armed strength or resume bombing if the situation developed as it has now in Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, we have reviewed all the records of conversations that we have had. We made it clear, and we indicated to President Thieu, that we would not take violations of the agreement lightly. We did not state specifically what we would do in those cases. What was said to President Thieu privately, mostly by President Nixon, exactly parallels what was said publicly in the various documents which we will submit here—by me, by Secretary of Defense Richardson and by President Nixon in his own press conferences.

Senator HOLLINGS. General Westmoreland and others advocated the resumption of bombing. You don't advocate that, do you?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, I do not advocate it, and I repeat, I have based our case on a moral obligation and not on a legal obligation that is unknown to the Congress.

Senator HOLLINGS. You don't think we let them down by not resuming the bombing or using our force but think we would be letting them down if we didn't give them the \$722 million in aid?

Secretary KISSINGER. I believe we would be letting down our obligations if we did not give the aid. I do not advocate the resumption of bombing.

Senator HOLLINGS. How about the aid now as given? You talked in your statement about 60 days worth of ammunition and supplies. Assume the Congress approves the \$722 million in military aid, what is the next step and how much more in next fiscal year and this time again next year?

Secretary KISSINGER. If the Congress approves the \$722 million and if the military situation is stabilized we would then of course go forward with our request for approximately \$1.3 billion for fiscal year 1976 which we submitted to the Congress prior to this offensive.

Senator HOLLINGS. So if we gave the \$722 million we would also have to give \$1.3 billion, approve that again for the next fiscal year?

Secretary KISSINGER. Depending on how the political situation develops.

Senator HOLLINGS. Do you have anything to suggest to the committee that would indicate changing the political situation we talked about? Obviously the North is determined to have a military solution. They haven't yielded one iota that particular drive of theirs. Is there anything that you can suggest to the committee that would diminish in any way the request for the following year of another \$1 billion or so?

Secretary KISSINGER. As I stated this morning, Senator, I cannot in good conscience tell you that if the military situation is stabilized, that there is a clear-cut terminal date other than one achieved by political negotiation.

As I pointed out this morning you can make other hypotheses and for all of them, including stabilization, we support this request.

Senator HOLLINGS. I am getting right to that point, whether or not the military assistance requested constitutes an attempt to bring us into a situation where we really can sustain in South Vietnam, or whether it is a means to have withdrawal with honor. The briefing the Secretary gave prior to the President's talk last week to the press doesn't necessarily comport with his statement here this morning to this committee.

Definite inference was given at that time that it was sort of an assistance to accord withdrawal with honor. Am I correct in that?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, I think you are partially correct, Senator, in the sense that no one can now say with confidence that the amount of aid that has been requested will in fact stabilize the situation. If it does not, if the worst should come to pass, then this amount will enable us to achieve a withdrawal under controlled conditions and I did make clear to the press that whatever theory is followed, the request is equally valid.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR VIETNAMESE SITUATION

Senator HOLLINGS. Do you blame the Congress for the present situation in South Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think, Senator, that when we assess the history of our involvement in South Vietnam there is enough blame to go around for everybody, and I feel very strongly that when the present phase is concluded the best national policy that both the executive and legislative can render is not to attempt to pin the responsibility on either one or the other but to look forward to where we go from here.

I think there have been congressional actions that have not helped, but there have been executive actions as well that haven't helped.

Senator HOLLINGS. And more than anything else, we should speak with a single voice and a single policy. That has been as much of a struggle between Congress and the Executive as between North and South Vietnam. At the time of the Paris peace accords no one expected that the agreement was anything but an arrangement for us to get our troops out, although I know you have to say otherwise.

At that particular time there were 100,000 North Vietnamese along that lengthy defense perimeter and they obviously had the capability and the willingness to wage further war. Everyone should have seen that. And what bothers me more than anything else in trying to do the

right thing is that we find that the executive is still not accurate or candid in their representation to the Congress, and I wonder what they are telling our allies.

You state here that you don't want another letter like the one you read into the record from the man in Phnom Penh. You preface that, of course, Mr. Secretary, by saying you are acutely aware of the emotions aroused and on the next page you arouse those emotions in reading this letter, where this fellow talks of our leaving in a cowardly fashion, that this great country would never abandon people who had chosen liberty.

Ambassador Swank stated our policy in January 1973 as forming a coalition government with the Khmer Rouge and not bringing liberty or self-determination to the Cambodians.

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, first of all, I don't know what you are referring to when you say the Executive isn't dealing now with the Congress in a candid fashion. If you will specify that I will be glad to answer.

With respect to that letter, as I understand the letter he doesn't say we are leaving in a cowardly fashion, he says for him to leave under these conditions would be cowardly, and obviously the situation for a Cambodian leaving his own capital is different from that of the American ambassador leaving that same capital.

I understood that letter to be not a reflection on us, that word cowardly not to be a reflection on us, but to be a reflection on himself were he to leave.

POLICY IN CAMBODIA

Senator HOLLINGS. What about the actual policy in Cambodia? That is where Congress and the Executive had a difference. We never wanted to go in and we got the executive branch out at the end of June, as I remember it, and then at the time of these peace accords you talked of the possibility of air power and U.S. intervention to offset strategic advantages of the North, and we in the Congress never sanctioned that. Secretary Richardson came before this committee exactly 2 years ago in May and asked for a transfer of funds and we asked if we don't give you the transfer of funds what will you do in Cambodia? He said, "We will continue it." That is the kind of struggle that we had to try to get our views and our policies by the Peoples' Congress known and that is the thing that I am alluding to at this time.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, with respect to Cambodia, you are quite correct in stating that we never committed ourselves to any particular political solution in Cambodia. The military operations that we had undertaken in Cambodia were designed to permit the evacuation of the American forces from South Vietnam and they were from that point of view extremely successful. That is to say, we cleared out these sanctuary areas and we picked up the supplies.

I think it is fair to say, and we owe it to the Cambodian people in their present tragedy to say, that the consequences of our confining our operations to our own objectives were not so fortunate for the Cambodian people because it helped contribute to this extended civil war to which we never committed ourselves.

So again in the case of Cambodia we had no legal obligation whatsoever.

Now, with respect to the bombing or to the possibility of American military action, as I pointed out this morning, it makes a difference whether a potential violator of an agreement knows you certainly can not, or thinks that you probably will not take such action. But this is one of those debates retrospectively which I don't think serves a great deal of purpose.

I have understood the congressional concern with respect to our military involvement, and at the time that the Cooper-Church amendment was put through, while the administration resisted it, it never stated that this amendment violated any commitments that the administration had made.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MATHIAS

CERTIFICATE OF ASSURANCE FROM PRESIDENT ON TERMINATION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAM

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Mr. Secretary, several months ago I introduced a bill that contemplated a termination of military assistance to South Vietnam at the end of this fiscal year. But it would have provided 120 days of additional military assistance on the condition that the President certify the additional aid would promote a negotiated end to the conflict. Am I to understand from your testimony here today that the conditions, although vastly different from the time I introduced the bill are such that the President would give a certificate or assurance of that nature with regard to the pending request for military aid?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, of course I would have to discuss this with the President but it is my judgment that he would very seriously consider that.

Senator MATHIAS. As far as I am concerned, I am prepared to give you a very prompt and a very favorable response to the request that you have made for humanitarian assistance, but I must say to you that I don't see how our obligation to the refugees in Indochina is abrogated by the tide of battle, whichever side of the line they happen to be on at any moment.

I share both your concern over the fate of the victims of war and your concern over the credibility of this country but it seems to me that on this issue the two questions are closely intertwined. I would say that I believe very strongly that we should cooperate not only with the U.S. voluntary agencies in connection with humanitarian relief but with the United Nations aid in doing the job, the High Commissioner on Refugees, and the World Health Organization.

I wonder if your thinking has developed to a point of commenting on cooperation in support of these agencies in dealing with refugees to whom we have obligations notwithstanding the fact that the territory in which they now live may be controlled by the PRG or North Vietnamese.

Secretary KISSINGER. We are in touch with these agencies and they have some funds at their disposal for these purposes. While the battle is going on it seems to us as I stated this morning that some of those countries that supplied the arms for the battle in the North might appropriately also contribute to the humanitarian problem. If we are discussing a longer term situation we have sympathy for your point of view.

ASSISTANCE FROM VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Senator MATHIAS. I am thinking of a longer term situation and I am glad to hear that you would view that with some sympathy. I do think that the long term is on us pretty shortly. Secretary Schlesinger has announced that the rebels have entered Phnom Penh and Cambodia for all intents and purposes and yet the Cambodians are still there and they are still hungry and they are still sick and they still need help.

The most practical way to get them that help and restore the credibility of America in the eyes of many millions of people is through cooperation with the agencies that are there.

Secretary KISSINGER. There are various levels of credibility and for various purposes, but with respect to Cambodia we would have no difficulty supporting humanitarian efforts under the current circumstances.

Senator MATHIAS. I noted very carefully that in the President's address to the Congress, the initial request for humanitarian aid was for \$250 million, and I understand the significance of that. But what portion of that would go directly to the Saigon government and what portion will go to the voluntary agencies.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think the overwhelming majority of it would be administered by the Saigon government, of course in close cooperation with American personnel there. I don't think that a great deal would go to voluntary agencies. There is no specific amount. We will be working with them but I think you have to assume that the greatest part of it would go to the Saigon government.

Senator MATHIAS. Are you convinced that the Saigon government is still sufficiently effective that the major portion of the \$250 million fund would actually reach people, or is their military concern, which would be understandable, so great that many of the social services and relief facilities would not be operating?

Secretary KISSINGER. Our impression is that it is still sufficiently effective. If for any reason that judgment would change then we can have another look at the most effective administration.

Senator MATHIAS. At that point you would be willing to look again at the UNICEF and the International Red Cross and similar agencies?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator MATHIAS. And what will be the status of the U.S. voluntary agencies in the territory controlled by the PRG and North Vietnam? Will they still be eligible for participation in this \$250 million fund?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, one has to look at this in terms of various situations that could develop.

Senator MATHIAS. I understand that.

Secretary KISSINGER. Under combat conditions it is a difficult issue for the United States to contribute for the relief of areas that have been overrun by forces in total violation of an agreement signed with the United States, and thereby easing the logistic requirement of the attacking forces.

In a situation like Cambodia where there is no longer—if that report which you tell me is correct and it is certainly plausible—under that hypothetical situation the humanitarian concerns would dominate.

Senator MATHIAS. For instance, we had representatives from the voluntary agencies before the Judiciary Committee last week and they stated that they were not only willing but anxious to enter the territories under control of the PRG in North Vietnam when they could get some assurance of security.

The Quakers, for example, said that they felt they had adequate assurances. Clearly the need would be great in those areas and I would hope that you could direct the Department to think in terms of this question even though I understand that at any given moment it is in a state of flux.

Secretary KISSINGER. There was a range of questions raised this morning that I took the liberty of suggesting to the chairman we might discuss in executive session and that Secretary Habib would be well qualified to answer, which has to do with various kinds of contingency planning, and I think this would be one of the questions which we could go into greater detail then.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BAYH

VIETNAMESE THREATS TO U.S. PERSONNEL

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Bayh is recognized.

Senator BAYH. There have been enough questions to cover the entire landscape, and we may be touching on ground that has already been covered. Perhaps in an effort to clarify a point or two, you could answer "yes" or "no" to this question:

Have there been direct or inferential threats from the South Vietnamese relative to the safe removal of American civilians from South Vietnam unless the \$722 million is forthcoming?

Secretary KISSINGER. I am not sure I understand. Have been what?

Senator BAYH. Have there been threats from the South Vietnamese relative to the safe removal?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, there have not been threats.

Senator BAYH. That is good to know because if that is what we are trying to accomplish—

Secretary KISSINGER. They are not being held for ransom.

Senator BAYH. You mentioned that the major goal of the accords in which you played a role, and we are all in your debt for doing that, was to stabilize the military situation, and thus get the North Vietnamese in a position in which they would negotiate the political differences with the South and that North Vietnamese have been unwilling to commence those negotiations. Is that an accurate statement?

Secretary KISSINGER. No. I think the negotiations started and I don't think the art of compromise is one for which the Vietnamese nation will go down in history, and therefore when these negotiations started in 1973 neither side distinguished itself by its flexibility.

There seemed to be a period in the spring of 1974 where some progress seemed to be possible. Then as the military situation began to change from the summer of 1974 on, it became more and more apparent that the North Vietnamese were really moving toward a military operation although we didn't think it would come this rapidly.

The 1973 accords had the problem that when you make an accord which one of the parties is totally unwilling to uphold from its side

and the other party is totally unwilling to enforce, the imbalance is almost inevitable.

NORTH VIETNAMESE WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE

Senator BAYH. What we are trying to accomplish now, as I understand your responses this morning with the \$722 million is to put our hand in the dike as far as the military situation is concerned, and hope that the North Vietnamese will respond to pleas to negotiate and deal in some manner.

Secretary KISSINGER. Having negotiated with the North Vietnamese for 5 years, I think they are peculiarly immune to pleas. I think their negotiations reflect their sense of the objective situation and obviously any negotiation that will develop now will to some extent reflect the military balance as it has developed, but we believe that the request we have made would enable negotiations to proceed under relatively the most favorable circumstances.

Senator BAYH. I want to say to you I don't make any apologies for the North Vietnamese at all.

Secretary KISSINGER. I know, I didn't take it that way.

Senator BAYH. I didn't interpret that, but I want to say directly, I am not an apologist for them and I wish the tide of battle were going the other way.

We are struggling to make some sort of considered judgment as to what it takes to stop the advance and what we can reasonably accomplish. If indeed the North Vietnamese were totally unwilling to compromise and completely willing to violate any agreements at the time of the accord, when the military balance was roughly equal, how in the world can we make a good faith judgment that \$722 million now with the battle going the other way, with the North Vietnamese being in possession of two-thirds of South Vietnam will make a difference? How is \$722 million going to create a better stimulus for the North Vietnamese to get right?

Secretary KISSINGER. There is no question that a negotiation now will be conducted under different circumstances than it was in 1972 and 1973. Nevertheless, the figure, as we were examining what request to make to the Congress, we could have come up with almost any number between zero and \$722 million. It seemed to us that a case could be made for knowing, and a case could be made for, what in the best judgment we could get that might stabilize the situation, and the President with my full support chose the figure that in his judgment was required, or that was the only figure he had that suggested that it might stabilize the situation.

If that turns out to be wrong, and if that doesn't stabilize the situation, it would still permit the most orderly transition to the other contingencies that can be foreseen. That was the reasoning that went into the making of the \$722 million request.

Senator BAYH. I can't speak for my other colleagues in the Senate but I for one would be willing to spend \$722 million if I thought it would stabilize the situation, and I would be willing to spend more than that if we thought we could actually guarantee a free Vietnam but what concerns me is that we are now in the position of throwing good money after bad and not facing the facts.

Secretary KISSINGER. If you are disposed like that, we could give you a figure that would give a pretty good, would give a better chance of stabilizing the thing.

Senator BAYH. I think we are kidding ourselves. I have asked myself and perhaps I should ask you just what would it take to accomplish our goal.

There is one element, you referred to twice this morning in your statement on page 4 and page 6. The President in his message to the Congress, used the same terminology and I will read it to you so it won't be taken out of context here.

In the face of this situation the United States, torn as it was by the emotions of a decade of war, was unable to respond. We deprived ourselves by law of the ability to enforce the agreement, thus giving North Vietnam assurance that it could violate that agreement with impunity.

ACTION BY UNITED STATES IF ACCORDS VIOLATED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE

Just what is this response? Were the accords predicated on being able to send planes back over North Vietnam. I know only one law that the President could be referring to, and that was passed by the Congress of the United States. It said that it was unlawful for the President unilaterally to send troops and aircraft, aviators and good GI's back into Vietnam.

Secretary KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator BAYH. Were the accords predicated on this kind of response? Did you and President Nixon have this in mind if the North Vietnamese violated the agreement?

Secretary KISSINGER. What we had in mind, what one has to keep in mind is not necessarily what we intended to do, but what Hanoi thought we might be capable of doing and it makes a lot of difference if Hanoi thinks that the United States will not, or if Hanoi knows that the United States certainly cannot, do certain things.

Senator BAYH. Mr. Secretary, you have been involved in foreign policy a lot more than I have, forgive me for interrupting, but as a foreign policy expert, do idle threats make for good diplomacy?

Secretary KISSINGER. In my judgment, if you ask my judgment, there was a possibility to give the North Vietnamese more to think about than in fact occurred. Nevertheless, at the time that the Congress passed this law, even though we opposed it, we never said that it ran counter to any commitments related to the accords and therefore this is now in a way a moot debate.

Senator BAYH. Well, the President does not think it is moot, because he suggested that law had denied us the ability to respond. I think the North Vietnamese can read the newspapers and they knew the American people wouldn't do that.

Secretary KISSINGER. The President was trying to explain the situation that led to the present state of affairs. As far as the administration is concerned, as I said this morning and as I repeat now, we will not prolong this debate beyond the period that is necessary for this particular emergency appropriation.

Senator BAYH. I don't want the Secretary to get the wrong idea. I wasn't bringing this up to relive it but I was trying to see in your judgment whether that kind of response was really a fundamental ingredient to doing what \$722 million would do.

Secretary KISSINGER. Generally when this nation signs a solid agreement it is assumed that it cannot be broken with total impunity without making a formal engagement to that effect. That generally is assumed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR SCHWEIKER

AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Schweiker.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Secretary, I was on the House Armed Services Committee back in 1963 when the first American GI was killed in Vietnam. I was also on that committee a few years later when Secretary McNamara, Secretary of Defense, came before us just like you are coming before us now, and sat right at the witness table like that, and said if we only send 100,000 troops and another billion dollars, the boys will be home by Christmas and he saw a light at the end of the tunnel. That was over 10 years ago.

Now, isn't really the problem here, Mr. Secretary, that no American President and no American Secretary of State is willing to admit the failure of American policy in Southeast Asia? Isn't that why we are here again after 13 years?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, first of all this President has no reason whatever from the point of view of his personal position, since he was not involved in any of the decisions that got us into Vietnam, or that withdrew us from Vietnam. Certain fundamental decisions were made starting in 1968 and those decisions were to withdraw American forces from South Vietnam. Those were accomplished, maybe more slowly than some people had hoped, but nevertheless the overwhelming mandate of the American people as we understood it was to withdraw American forces from Vietnam and to get our prisoners back.

So today we face a situation totally different from the one in which Secretary McNamara and others testified before you. We are facing a situation of great tragedy in South Vietnam in which I have not predicted any probable outcome but in which one of the ingredients is whether the United States, after 15 years of effort in which we strongly encouraged these people and in which our role was very major, whether it is we who should say they can no longer fight by not giving them the weapons.

In addition, whether we should deprive ourselves under these circumstances, which can well be extremely painful, of the ability to manage the evolution in the most controlled fashion possible.

So with all respect, it is a totally different situation from the more optimistic previous visits of administration spokesmen.

U.S. STATUS AS WORLD'S POLICEMAN

Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Secretary, now, through the course of your arguments here today you have continuously used the words "We should not make the decision for the South Vietnamese," or something to that effect, as being the single train of logic that somehow justifies this last request. It just seems to me if we really think that particular appeal through, it comes back to the fact that we are again assuming that we are the world's policeman, and if we only supply the gun, and if we only supply the ammunition the course is in their hands.

If you follow that logic that we should not make the decision for them and apply that logic around the world, that in fact is back to the

concept of being the world's policeman, and letting every other nation of the world set our foreign policy for us by always giving them the option and we should be policeman.

I don't see any difference between that argument and the fact that we are the world's policeman.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think there is an enormous difference, Senator. We have made a very serious effort to adjust our commitments to our capabilities, but Vietnam is not just another country now. Vietnam is a country where the United States has participated, has encouraged, has interfered in the formation of governments, and it is not, therefore, just another country which can decide whether the United States commits itself or not.

The argument that I am making today on behalf of Vietnam I would not make in other circumstances. It is not just any country. It is a country that with our encouragement has for over 12 years engaged in a certain effort and, therefore, you cannot generalize from that, that for the United States to attempt to go through his phase, through this tragic phase in a dignified and controlled fashion means that we are determined to be the world's policeman.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, let us follow, Mr. Secretary, if you will for a moment, the line that you just espoused, which is that this is related to Vietnam, and is not a policy around the world. If that line of reasoning is true, based on what you acknowledge in your opening statement about President Thieu and what we have all seen in Vietnam in the last 2 weeks about President Thieu when he unilaterally decided without consultation to our Ambassador and our people and our forces there to pull out of two-thirds of Vietnam, why on earth would we consider risking another \$1 billion, and a number of American lives in terms of evacuation of South Vietnamese on that poor performance record? Why wouldn't Mr. Thieu push the panic button once again if he did it once before? Why are we gambling on that, and that relates to Vietnam as a special case. Why should we be led to believe that he is going to act other than he did a couple of weeks ago

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, as I tried to explain this morning, he faced an extremely difficult situation no matter what he did. Nor is this aid tied to any one personality.

He couldn't consult with our Ambassador because our Ambassador at that moment was in this country trying to get the supplemental aid for Vietnam.

But in any event, I cannot guarantee you that the performance will necessarily be better. In that case much of what we are discussing will in any event be moot, and in that case at any rate the American performance and record will be clear.

I can only repeat what I have already stated. At this particular moment it appears that South Vietnamese units are fighting effectively. For how long this will go on it would be better to ask General Weyand.

Our request has attempted to achieve the best outcome in the various foreseeable contingencies, and it does not exclude the worst hypothesis.

POSITION OF U.S. CREDIBILITY

Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, Mr. Secretary, on page 10 you use one argument that has been used a lot by this administration to justify us giving this last measure of help and support by saying, "American

credibility will not collapse, and American honor will not be destroyed, but both will be weakened to the detriment of this Nation and the peaceful world order we have sought to build."

It strikes me, Mr. Secretary, that as much as many others have been talking about this around the world, that our leaders first pronounced it, that our leaders raised the credibility problem. We asked ourselves this question, and we keep repeating it, and repeating it as a spur for Congress to give aid and support because their credibility is weakened, when in fact it seems to me as if we are actually exerting the situation where we might make a self-fulfilling prophecy. We are talking so much about it ourselves that no wonder our credibility is challenged and we are creating a good deal of our own dilemma by making this statement and saying how much our credibility is at stake.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, this is obviously a question of judgment. If you saw the reports we see, you I think would probably come to the same conclusions.

I have made two points with respect to credibility. I wish you were right, and I wish we could achieve it by simply not talking about it.

I believe it is important that we face the fact that what happened in South Vietnam represents a problem for the conduct of our foreign policy. I have equally stated this morning that we will deal with this problem, and we will overcome it, but I will not deny it exists. So whether or not you appropriate this aid, we will deal with the problems that will result for American foreign policy.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Secretary, you say on page 9 that, "I do not agree with that proposition, however, nor do I believe that to review endlessly the wisdom of our original involvement serves a useful purpose now." That is really the argument that Secretary McNamara gave me 10 years ago, that we shouldn't question how we got there, we are only there, and we have got to do what we have got to do because we are there, which sort of preempts the whole field of logic, or reason, or questioning our policy.

Here on the twilight of Vietnam we are still using that line of reasoning that because we are there, we are there, and we shouldn't own up to maybe a mistake or own up to a bad policy, or question it.

I find that mistaken sentiment repeatedly expressed, and this is the time to quit. We should have questioned it 10 years ago.

Secretary KISSINGER. I think, Senator, that the difference between the problem we had then and the problem we have now is nearly total. The original involvement in Vietnam is in my judgment essentially irrelevant to what happens in a tragic phase in which the basic justification, if you reflect about what I have said, is totally different from the one that was made 10 years ago.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR EAGLETON

EVACUATION MEASURES

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Eagleton.

Senator EAGLETON. I fully appreciate the delicacies in talking about a potential evacuation, but I think we must address some of our attention to that possibility, and I do commend the President in his speech for asking for clarification from the Congress as to his authority to evacuate people from South Vietnam.

To be specific, is it your position, the administration's position, that authority is needed from Congress to evacuate foreign nationals?

Secretary KISSINGER. In the judgment of our legal experts, authority is needed to use American forces to protect the evacuation of foreign nationals or American forces that might find themselves in a hostile situation to evacuate foreign nationals. It is not needed to evacuate foreign nationals by civilian airlines.

Senator EAGLETON. I understand that. Civilian airlines today can go into Saigon and take anyone out that they desire, be he an American or foreigner. I am not sure I got your answer, but do you believe you need additional congressional authority to rescue South Vietnamese nationals?

Secretary KISSINGER. If we are going to use American military forces for that purpose, I believe we need additional authority. I am certain we need additional authority.

Senator EAGLETON. I concur.

Secretary KISSINGER. We do not believe we could do it under present authority.

Senator EAGLETON. Now how far can you go without authority, and how do you define the limits of your capabilities without any additional authority?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, in the case of Phnom Penh we took the view that we probably had the authority to evacuate Americans, at any rate we resolved the doubt in our favor, and we felt that incidental to that evacuation we could load on the helicopters additional personnel, that is to say, Cambodians that would not qualify for a separate evacuation.

Now, the numbers involved in South Vietnam in any conceivable South Vietnamese evacuation are such, and we hope that the numbers of Americans involved in relation to the potential South Vietnamese are such, that this would be a ridiculous fig leaf under which to evacuate South Vietnamese.

Senator EAGLETON. Now, the administration has submitted a bill to the Congress for its consideration, which is very open-ended. In my opinion, it gives blank check authority to rescue or to engage in evacuations in Southeast Asia. If you are given that kind of authority as reflected in the bill, I ask, would you use that authority to rescue foreign nationals in areas now held by the North Vietnamese? Specifically, for example, would you use it to go to Da Nang?

Secretary KISSINGER. Absolutely not.

Senator EAGLETON. Would you agree with me, however, in terms of a reading of the bill, where it says, "The armed forces of the United States to aid, assist in carrying out humanitarian evacuations," would you agree that that language is broad enough to permit such action from a legal point of view?

Secretary KISSINGER. I am not a lawyer, but a quick reading would suggest this to me, but we would be prepared to work with the Congress to make certain that our intent and the congressional intent would be reflected in the bill. We are not looking for authority to invade Communist held territory.

Senator EAGLETON. With respect to the deadline which the President set in his speech of April 19, this Friday, can it not be argued that if

that deadline is missed that we will have raised some expectations in Saigon which we have not been able to fulfill?

Secretary KISSINGER. Yes; but the countervailing considerations are that from our point of view internally, it is important that some terminal date be put to this debate, and from the point of view of South Vietnam it is important that the efforts do not take the form of Cambodia where Congress was deliberating while the thing was gradually unraveling. Since in South Vietnam the circumstances of unraveling would take much more dramatic form.

Now if the Congress has some alternative suggestions for a date, I am sure that the President would be openminded about this.

Senator EAGLETON. Well, what troubled me was that by setting specific dates such as April 19 we could have a self-fulfilling prophecy of disaster, and once that date came and went then a pervasive gloom would break out.

I realize the urgency of the situation, but as to the particular date in mind, I question its wisdom.

Secretary KISSINGER. The fact is that the South Vietnamese will be running out of ammunition as I understand it by the end of May or early June, and we will be using up equipment at a considerable rate in the interval.

It is, of course, a difficult problem if you can never predict the consequences that you foresee because you will then be blamed for those very consequences. Then it is awfully hard to have a discussion.

But I think on the level of debate that has so far existed between the executive and legislative, that I have seen, we can work out a mutually acceptable arrangement.

MILITARY OPPOSITION TO EVACUATION

Senator EAGLETON. Now my final question, Mr. Secretary, is this: You stated in answer to a question earlier this morning, the first session, that it was logistically possible to carry out an evacuation if such is unopposed. Now my question based on that statement is twofold: First, if there is opposition, military opposition to an evacuation, what magnitude of American military involvement would be necessary first of all to evacuate American nationals?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think that General Weyand is in a better position to give you the militarily exact answers to this question, or to these questions. My rough guess is that the evacuation of American civilians if properly planned, as it will be, can be accomplished with relatively small portions of this.

Senator EAGLETON. Even if there is opposition at that time?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, it depends on what kind of opposition. Under some of the worst conditions, yes.

Senator EAGLETON. Let me carry that same question one step further and then I am finished, Mr. Chairman.

Assuming there is opposition, and there is opposition of a substantial amount, what magnitude of American military involvement would be considered to evacuate 100,000 or more South Vietnamese?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, this would then turn into a very grave problem. It would not be a minor operation under those circumstances.

Senator EAGLETON. Without trying to pin you down, this would involve utilization of thousands of American troops?

Secretary KISSINGER. It is inconceivable to me that even with this authority the President would undertake this without prior consultation with the Congress.

Senator EAGLETON. Well, once the bill is passed, and once authority is given, the President can move and act on it and prior consultation means calling up a few Senators and saying, we are going to send in *x* number of troops to do some rescuing.

My point is that if there is substantial opposition, the task of rescuing 100,000 or more South Vietnamese would be a very massive military undertaking involving thousands of American ground forces, and the attendant air cover and the like.

Secretary KISSINGER. There are many situations that you can conceive short of massive opposition. I don't want to be evasive, but I would like to make Assistant Secretary Habib available in executive session on this particular problem, to give you some feel of what we are thinking about.

Senator EAGLETON. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR BELLMON
U.S. RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES IN AREA OF VIETNAM

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Bellmon.

Senator BELLMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you point out in your statement that the present situation in Vietnam is ominous. Could you go a little beyond Vietnam and give the committee some idea about what effect events in South Vietnam are having on relations with other countries, Japan, and Australia, and Indochina?

Secretary KISSINGER. I pointed out this morning, Senator, that in newspapers one can find accounts of the impact in Australia, the Philippines, Korea, and Thailand, and in reports we get from all over the world we find much more widespread indications.

They go to two questions. One is the issue that the word "credibility" tends to be confusing. It has to do with the wisdom, judgment, and constancy of a country that gets itself so involved.

The second question is, how will the United States react to such a setback?

Now the second question we can deal with in our situation, when people understand we have a serious problem. We will solve it, but it does exist.

Senator BELLMON. You also in your statement point out, or before I go to that, does this request for roughly \$1 billion in military and humanitarian aid in any way involve our relationships with these other countries?

Secretary KISSINGER. It is the administration's conviction that how we manage this phase of the Indochina conflict importantly affects the perception of at least some of these countries of the United States and, therefore, their future actions, and their perception of the views of their national responsibilities, at least as the executives sees them.

For all of these reasons the President felt that he had to put before the Congress his judgment as he saw it in terms of the overall situation.

Senator BELLMON. You have stated the military aid request of \$722 million will be used for weapons, ammunition, supplies, to equip four

divisions. I have no idea what the logistic laws of the situation are, but in your mind is there really time to get this equipment over there and promptly equip and train these units so that they can be effective in the defense of the Saigon area?

Secretary KISSINGER. This seems to be the judgment of General Weyand. I would recommend that you go into that in some detail with him tomorrow.

Senator BELLMON. I hope we will do that.

Mr. Secretary, back again to the larger perspective here. You sometimes have been called a "modern miracle worker" in diplomacy, and you brought about more normal relations with China and—

Secretary KISSINGER. If I may say so, not by me, but I may sometimes not have protested sufficiently loudly when it was applied.

Senator BELLMON. Also you helped bring about the agreement with Russia, but these are the same nations that have supplied the North Vietnamese. It is hard for us to understand if our relations with China and Russia are being improved, or being used here.

EFFECT ON DÉTENTE FROM VIETNAMESE SITUATION

Secretary KISSINGER. When people say we have been used, one has to ask the question of what have we given them. The second is we have never said that détente means that these will be cooperative relationships. Détente is composed of many elements in which ideological hostility and a certain amount of competitiveness continue.

The primary purpose of détente with the Soviet Union has been to try to minimize the danger of nuclear war and to ease tensions generally. What happened is that the level of military supplies from the Soviet Union has remained roughly constant over the years. The level of military supplies from the United States has declined.

The Soviet Union has not seemed to ask the question of a terminal date as consistently as we have. Whether that is a reflection on détente, or a reflection on relative endurance, or a reflection on the general judgment that nations make of the importance of certain areas, it is very hard to disentangle.

Senator BELLMON. You do not see then that the events in South Vietnam necessarily mean the end of détente?

Secretary KISSINGER. I do not think that they mean the end of détente, but as the President pointed out in his speech to the Congress, there has to be perhaps a clearer understanding on the part of our détente partners that there is a limit to the extent to which, to use the President's phrase, they can fish in troubled waters.

Senator BELLMON. To go back to Vietnam, perhaps this question should be asked of General Weyand, of what has happened to the civilians since the collapse of military resistance in the north, has there been a blood bath in the Danang and Hue areas?

Secretary KISSINGER. We have only fragmentary reports because most of our reports come from stragglers who have managed to escape from the territory. Some of those reports are pretty horrifying.

On the other hand, they apply to isolated instances and we cannot draw from them a generalized picture.

We have some examples of rather systematic assassination, for example, of people who serve in the national police and sometimes of prisoners, but I would not generalize this because they come from

widely scattered reports and we have not had an opportunity to evaluate it fully.

Senator BELLMON. Based on what has happened in an important part of South Vietnam and your knowledge of the country, can you sketch for this committee two scenarios?

I understand we will decide this issue by Saturday, but what will happen if the Congress approves this request for \$722 million and what will happen if we don't?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, if the Congress approves, there is a possibility of stabilizing the military situation, but all of the other possibilities, that is to say a negotiated solution or progressively worse circumstances can proceed under the most humane and controlled circumstances.

If the Congress does not approve our requests then fairly chaotic conditions are likely to develop quite rapidly, so that for every continuing issue that can be foreseen the failure to approve the requests would be infinitely worse than the approval.

Senator BELLMON. Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON

REMOVAL OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE REFUGEES

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Johnston is recognized.

Senator JOHNSTON. It has been reported in the press that the North Vietnamese have said they have no objections to our removing Americans from South Vietnam, but they have serious objections to the removing of South Vietnamese refugees, looking to the Cuban example. Would you say that is accurate?

Secretary KISSINGER. I have seen the same reports and I have seen no official indication, but that seems accurate, yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. If that is so, then can't we expect a rather major confrontation as we try to remove, say, 175,000 South Vietnamese, which is the figure I have heard? That is a major operation which could lead to a major military confrontation, could it not?

Secretary KISSINGER. It depends entirely on the circumstances in which it is carried out, but it is very hard to answer that in the abstract.

Senator JOHNSTON. I think this is implicit in the whole issue about refugees, but I assume these refugees would be resettled in the United States?

Secretary KISSINGER. A substantial portion of them, yes.

Senator JOHNSTON. Is there any other country to which they would want to go or which would be willing to receive them?

Secretary KISSINGER. We might be able to arrange some other countries, but it would be reasonable to assume that the majority would come to the United States.

Senator JOHNSTON. Mr. Secretary, I perceive from your persuasion that stabilize really means delay and there is no way to avoid military defeat in South Vietnam. Yet I see some rather strong arguments, nevertheless, that you have articulated for some kind of military aid. Those arguments would be something to do with the refugees. Two other reasons for aid would be for what it can do for our credibility, or how the United States is perceived in the world, and what it can do in negotiations.

Now, proceeding with the last point first, with negotiations, if we did stabilize the situation, what could the South Vietnamese hope to achieve in negotiations?

Secretary KISSINGER. I suppose they could hope to achieve an implementation of the articles of the agreement that called for a National Council of Reconciliation.

Senator JOHNSTON. Calling for participation of the South Vietnamese and the Government?

Secretary KISSINGER. That involved a third party arrangement. I think a public session is a bad place for me to discuss possible negotiating outcomes, but I think they would have a better opportunity to negotiate about the implementation of the Paris accords.

U.S. CREDIBILITY

Senator JOHNSTON. Now with respect to our credibility, you say the influence over other nations' perceptions of our constancy and determination—that perception has been hurt, according to what you have previously stated, by virtue of the United States already having failed to give the aid. Can we retrieve that perception and retrieve that credibility just by authorizing the payment of \$700 million?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would have to say this perception has been hurt in any event by the outcome and by some of our actions.

I think we can retrieve it to some extent and I want to emphasize again that we are not blackmailing the Congress with the argument that the situation will be irretrievable if the Congress does not follow our request.

Even if the Congress does not accept our request, we will manage the consequences that result from it, but you can make it somewhat easier for us by approving the request. But we are not defeatists regardless of the congressional action.

Senator JOHNSTON. Finally, there have been press reports about some countries reexamining their policy because of the lack of credibility on the part of the United States, notable and most recently the Philippines, with whom we have a mutual aid pact.

Now, is the cooperation of the Congress that important where you have a mutual aid pact? Does a country like the Philippines with whom we have this pact have to worry about the Congress that much?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, I think at some appropriate moment the country ought to have a discussion of what constitutes an obligation, because we talk a great deal about so-called secret commitments or about legal obligations, but what other countries gear their own actions to is our performance over a period of time regardless of what is written in documents.

Therefore, the unsettling effect insofar as there is an unsettling effect, has to do with our performance as a nation, and in that sense the foreign governments have to deal with us as a unit and not as a series of more or less disparate branches of the Government.

Disparate, this is a major national problem right now, which we cannot avoid by denying that it exists.

Now you can say, what difference does it make what the Philippines think about us because they probably get more out of this than we do. That is partially true. But it is also true as we have painfully learned, for example, in the Middle East war of 1973, that when situations become uncontrollable or are uncontrolled, the risk of war can escalate

very rapidly involving us, and economic consequences can result that affect immediately the United States and, therefore, the perception of our steadiness and our competence affects not just the military defense of allies, but the ability to control situations and even the economic actions of countries, or the actions that on the surface could affect some countries far removed from the immediate scene of the conflict.

Senator JOHNSTON. Then the Secretary of State or the President really needs to be able to commit this country, if not create binding obligations, at least commit and be able to rely upon those commitments. It that what you are saying?

Secretary KISSINGER. We have to restore a situation through close partnership with the Congress, and I am not saying this can be done by unilateral executive action, but we have to restore a situation where foreign governments feel that when they speak to the Executive, he represents a united expression and that they can count on an American performance over an appropriate period of time. But the Executive has a responsibility in this sense as well in making sure that there is enough congressional support. I am not putting the whole responsibility on the Congress.

Senator JOHNSTON. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR HUDDLESTON REPLENISHMENT OF LOST SUPPLIES

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Huddleston.

Senator HUDDLESTON. I have sat here and listened as twenty of my colleagues explored this subject, and I want to commend you for the tremendous job you have done during this long day. I kind of feel like the last American out of Saigon about this day's hearings. Rather than go over material that you have already covered, I would like to try to sum up in my own mind what I think the central problem relating to the question of whether or not the Congress of the United States should appropriate an additional \$722 million of military assistance to South Vietnam. As I understand your prepared statement you indicated that this amount of money would replenish lost material, would enable South Vietnam to carry on an intensive and sustained combat situation for approximately 60 days. We are talking about stabilizing the military situation there.

Now, is 60 days the magic figure? Is this the period of time during which you believe that if the situation is stabilized, the Vietcong would then be willing to negotiate a political settlement?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, we have always had this dilemma and we went through this for the many years we were negotiating the Paris accords. If you put a terminal date on this, nothing would be helped, so that as far as the Vietcong is concerned the most impressive performance would be if they thought that there is no terminal date and to the extent I give you a terminal date, I am undermining the case for the effectiveness of this.

But on the whole, I believe, as I have stated before, that this sum would provide the best conditions for orderly negotiations.

Senator HUDDLESTON. But what you are actually asking the Congress to do is not just to appropriate \$722 million, but to enter again into a situation that may last not 60 days or 6 months, but maybe 6

more years if it takes that long for the Vietcong to come to the negotiating table. They have been fighting now for 25 years and under worse circumstances than they are right now.

What leads you to believe if this situation can be stabilized that they will now, with their objective virtually in their hands, run for the negotiating table?

Secretary KISSINGER. I believe that the overall situation is such that the various parties may well draw appropriate conclusions. Of course, if the situation gets stabilized over a very extended period of time and if the military balance gets restored totally, then we have the situation which you described.

Senator HUDDLESTON. So we may well be involved not for 60 days but perhaps years if it is necessary, and you are not willing now—

Secretary KISSINGER. I beg your pardon?

Secretary HUDDLESTON. Will we be willing next year to look at the bottom line if we appropriate this money and there is still no negotiation by the end of 1976, or are we going to be faced again with another \$1 billion appropriation?

VIETCONG CAPABILITY

What about the capability of the Vietcong? Can we stabilize this with \$722 million? We couldn't do it with 500,000 troops.

Secretary KISSINGER. There is no way of escaping the problem, Senator, and I wish there were. If the Vietcong are determined to continue fighting and if the line is stabilized, we will continually face the problem that if we withdraw support Saigon will collapse, just as Moscow and Peking have faced the problem that if they withdrew support the Vietcong will have to stop fighting.

Senator HUDDLESTON. The people that I talked to back in my State are asking that very simple question. Aren't we in a position where the Vietcong really is calling the shots? They can either stabilize and stay stabilized from now on, which means a continued commitment on the part of this country, for a substantial amount of money, or they can go to the negotiating table whenever they are ready.

So the American people want to know whether or not after all of these years this additional funding will actually lead toward any conclusion that is any better than what is going to happen whenever we do stop. Is there an answer to that?

Secretary KISSINGER. There is no certain answer to that question. I wish there were.

Senator HUDDLESTON. So we should not go into this question of \$722 million as if this is a wrap-up bottom line proposition as far as the United States is concerned?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, I cannot in good conscience consider it that way.

Senator HUDDLESTON. You have been very reluctant today to indicate there should ever be any kind of a terminal proposition to our assistance to a country. As a practical matter, isn't there some limit to not only dollar expenditures but personnel, casualties, that this country ought to make and we can reasonably expect the American people to sustain in order to accomplish a desired objective anywhere in the world?

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course, what is even better is that we think it through before we get ourselves involved.

Senator HUDDLESTON. It is too late for that now.

Secretary KISSINGER. Once we are involved, certain inevitable consequences follow. I do not say that we must defend every country in the world; far from it. Nor am I saying that we cannot change, say, aid commitments depending upon the circumstances.

The United States, for example, the American people, I believe, made a decision in 1968 or 1969 that it wanted no longer to be involved in Indochina with military force, and we did our best. We can argue forever whether it could or could not have been faster, to extricate American military forces and return our prisoners under the conditions that seemed to us honorable. That was a mandate and we accepted it and did not challenge it regardless of the immediate consequences.

Now it is a question whether the United States will take it upon itself to tell those very people with whom we have been associated for over a decade that they can no longer defend themselves if essentially all it costs us is money. Money is not trivial, but it cannot compare in consequence to the human tragedies that may befall them. This is the balance we now have to strike.

I understand the questions you are raising and they are very serious questions. I wish I could give you a conclusive answer.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Wasn't our commitment or at least our understanding—I think this is what most people believed it to be, and I do—that we were there to give them a chance to defend themselves and not to do the job for them, not to defeat their enemies ourselves and to secure that nation? Had that been our objective we would have gone about it in a better way.

After these 13 or 14 years and after the amount of money and after the casualties that we have had there, the commitment of troops that we had, can we not say we have given them a reasonable chance?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, Senator, historians will have to debate this. Our judgment is that considering all factors, weighing your argument, that our request best meets this tragic situation that we now face which really should be seen in its full complexities. We can understand the force of your argument, but we have to put the best judgment of the Executive before the Congress.

Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you.

Secretary KISSINGER. We won't pursue the argument afterward, but it is a case we have to make now.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHILES
AID RECEIVED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Chiles is recognized.

Secretary KISSINGER. I don't want to be rude, but is there some possibility of winding this up by 10 minutes to 4 so that I could get back? I have stayed somewhat longer than we had planned.

Chairman McCLELLAN. You have been very patient with us. Only two more Senators are waiting to speak.

Senator CHILES. I think we will be able to accommodate you.

Secretary KISSINGER. The trouble is the length of my answers and not the number of questions.

Senator CHILES. I know this has been a very long day for you.

I have been reading your statement and listening to the answers to the questions. We continue to talk about, or your statement talks about

North Vietnam and the Vietcong and how they have violated the Paris peace accords, and also your statement points out that from the time of the Paris peace accords we were actually reducing our efforts and that was giving the South Vietnamese some difficulty.

However, we know full well the kind of arms and the kind of aid that North Vietnam was receiving from their friends. I can't understand why we are not talking about Russia more. As a signatory to the Paris peace accords, it seems to me very clearly Russia and China with the massive supplying they were doing to North Vietnam and to the Vietcong, it really precipitated this situation and yet in the world forum I find very little discussion about that, and in the President's address and in your statement today.

Secretary KISSINGER. The President referred to it, and I think there were two factors. I think the correct statement would be that the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent China kept their support about constant while we reduced ours, so the question is should they have reduced theirs as we reduced ours. That is an interesting question, but there are a number of factors.

One is that Hanoi has skillfully used the rivalry among the various Communist power centers for its own ends; but second, I think one lesson we must draw from this is that over a long period of time or over any period of time there is an incompatibility between détente and the fostering of crisis situations. From that point of view I agree with you.

Senator CHILES. That is what was concerning me, that in the President's address he was speaking of the need for a change in the trade bill and further movements toward détente, and at the same time we could see this situation developing and we don't know whether we would perhaps use our troops and get some kind of a safe conduct or some kind of an accord. If there is a change of power that there will not be this bloodbath and I wouldn't like to see the President sending notes on that, but it seems like now if détente means anything it certainly has to mean something in these areas or I don't know what other term we are using.

Secretary KISSINGER. Of course, Senator, the question is always—the impression is often left that we have paid an enormous price for détente and we are not getting reciprocity and that is not self-evident. To the point that we deprive ourselves of trading, as we did in the trade bill—although I am not suggesting for one moment that the trade bill had anything to do with the Soviet decision on resupplying Hanoi—I believe that probably the Soviet Union was as surprised by the events in Indochina as we were, and this was not a conscious plot of the Soviet Union to upset the Paris accords.

Nevertheless, the question you raise is one that goes to the heart of détente. We are in a partly competitive relationship. We do have an obligation to prevent the dangers of nuclear war but at the same time we cannot permit détente to be used as a strategic opportunity in particular parts of the world.

As a general proposition, I agree with the implications of your question.

Senator CHILES. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR THURMOND
ABILITY OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE SELF-SUPPORTING

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Thurmond is recognized.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, my questions are short and I don't think they will require long answers, so we can finish pretty quickly.

Secretary KISSINGER. Don't underestimate me.

Senator THURMOND. I want to compliment you and the President on the stand you have taken. General Weyand, as I understand it, made the statement that if we provide aid to South Vietnam there is a chance that it can survive, and without such aid there is no chance. Do you concur in that position?

Secretary KISSINGER. Precisely.

Senator THURMOND. When I was in Vietnam between last Christmas and the time Congress met, our Ambassador told us there that there is a good chance that South Vietnam could be self-supporting in about 3 years because of the large quantities of rice they produced and because of oil that had been discovered there. I talked with some of the oil people and they have found oil there.

So if we give South Vietnam this chance, it may be possible then that they can support themselves after 3 years, is it not?

Secretary KISSINGER. Senator, in fairness, I have to say as far as the oil is concerned my recollection is that the off-shore oil is now mostly off the shores that have been occupied by the Communists so that the assessment that our Ambassador made, which was correct at the time, we will have to restudy before we answer that question.

Senator THURMOND. I see. Thank you very much.

Now, I want to ask a few questions here which I want to go on the record, and I am not sure they have been answered today, and to go down for history.

Is this a civil war between the Vietcong and the people of South Vietnam or a war waged by the north against the south as was the case in Korea?

Secretary KISSINGER. I would say it is substantially a war by the North Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese, in which the South Vietnamese Communist forces are a very small fraction of the total.

Senator THURMOND. That was the same statement that was expressed to me by our able and courageous Ambassador in South Vietnam.

Mr. Secretary, could the North be as successful as they have if they had abided by the 1973 peace accords?

Secretary KISSINGER. Under no conditions—they couldn't have been successful at all. At the time of the peace accords, they had about 80,000 to 100,000 personnel in the country. Today they have about 300,000 to 350,000 in the country and their military successes would have been impossible if they had not totally violated the agreement.

Senator THURMOND. Is there any question or should there be any question as to who is responsible for the war that has been waged there between the North and the South?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, no. The war resulted from a decision of the Hanoi Political Bureau to unify the country as they saw it.

Senator THURMOND. Have the South Vietnamese at any point invaded North Vietnam?

Secretary KISSINGER. No.

Senator THURMOND. So that means the North Vietnamese have crossed the DMZ and come down with combat regiments to South Vietnam and waged war there in South Vietnam; is that correct?

Secretary KISSINGER. That is substantially correct.

Senator THURMOND. Now the vast supplies necessary for an offensive of this type, does it come mainly from the Chinese or the Soviets?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think the larger part comes from the Soviet Union.

Senator THURMOND. Certainly the complex equipment.

Secretary KISSINGER. Certainly all of the sophisticated equipment comes from the Soviet Union.

Senator THURMOND. Such as planes and helicopters and radars and equipment of a complex nature.

Secretary KISSINGER. And anti-aircraft and so on.

Senator THURMOND. Are there incentives for the North Vietnamese to negotiate?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think there are, and depending on the military situation, still some incentives for the North Vietnamese to negotiate if some degree of stability can be recreated.

KHMER ROUGE ATTITUDE IN CAMBODIA

Senator THURMOND. Marshall Lon Nol left Cambodia upon the urgings of both sides, the United States and the Khmer Rouge, with the hope some peaceful agreement could be reached if he left. Is there any hope of such an agreement?

Secretary KISSINGER. No; because the Khmer Rouge seemed determined to achieve total control by military force. Frantic, constant and repeated efforts have been made to negotiate with them and they have all been rejected.

Senator THURMOND. So the propaganda the Khmer Rouge put out on Lon Nol leaving did not have the effect which they had suggested it might?

Secretary KISSINGER. No. As soon as he had left they put his successor on the same proscribed list.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, which of the two Communist super powers, the Soviets or Red China, are more closely allied with the North Vietnamese?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, it is partly North Vietnamese skill to leave this question somewhat vague. I would perhaps give a slight edge to the Soviet Union but not an absolute one.

Senator THURMOND. Is the North Vietnamese brand of Communism closer to that of China or the Soviet Union?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, they have developed some variations all their own.

Senator THURMOND. What have been the most notable differences between the Soviet and Chinese brand of Communism evidenced in the last few years?

Secretary KISSINGER. Between the Chinese and Soviets?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, the domestic structure in the Soviet Union is perhaps somewhat more flexible than in the People's Republic of China. The control over the economy in the People's Republic of China is perhaps more total. In the field of foreign policy, of course, the two countries have been in rather strong opposition to each other.

Frankly, this is a question I would rather answer in executive session.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, will the loss of Indochina have any real effect on the rift between the two Communist superpowers?

Secretary KISSINGER. No; it won't heal it.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, why did we not get out of Vietnam in 1969 when President Nixon came into office?

Secretary KISSINGER. In 1969 when President Nixon came into office we were confronted with 550,000 Americans in combat there. Under those conditions, for us to withdraw all of our forces, and to sacrifice all of the people with whom we had worked, seemed to us to involve international consequences that were unacceptable for the security of the United States.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, why do you feel that the North Vietnamese have gone from the point of negotiations in 1973 to all-out war today?

Secretary KISSINGER. Because they thought that the balance of forces had changed in their favor.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, what would be the worst situation that would result from the United States failure to provide some of the emergency military aid requested by President Ford in the supplemental request?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, the worst situation that could result would be a repetition of some of the chaotic events of the northern part of South Vietnam, with, however, no place to go to this time.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, in what areas do you feel the Soviets will next test our will or resolve to support our allies?

Secretary KISSINGER. I don't think it is fair to say that the Soviets tested our resolve in Indochina. I don't think that they fully understood the consequences or fully expected us to lessen our support to this extent. But to the extent that the basic fact has been that American leadership has prevented a world war, to the extent our ability to maintain this may have become questionable in the view of some nations, there could occur local conflicts that are not sought by anybody that could escalate, or there could be deliberate decisions to test us. Where this would occur, I would not want to predict nor do I say it is inevitable.

It will be our duty regardless of the outcome of the war in Vietnam to preserve the global peace and we will do it.

Chairman McCLELLAN. Senator Young, do you have any final comments?

Senator YOUNG. I just want to commend the Secretary for the excellent testimony and his candid and forthright answers to very difficult questions. You make a better case for aid to South Vietnam than your predecessor did 10 or 12 years ago. But times have changed.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Chairman McCLELLAN. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow, at which time we will meet in executive session in room 1114.

[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., Tuesday, April 15, the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, April 16.]

EMERGENCY MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC
AND HUMANITARIAN AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM, 1975

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 16, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10 a.m. in room 1114, Everett McKinley Dirksen Office Building, Hon. John L. McClellan (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators McClellan, Magnuson, Stennis, Pastore, Byrd, Inouye, Hollings, Chiles, Johnston, Huddleston, Young, Hruska, Brooke, Stevens, Mathias, Schweiker, and Bellmon.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF GENERAL FRED C. WEYAND, CHIEF OF STAFF

ACCOMPANIED BY ERICH F. VON MARBO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

The committee heard the classified testimony of General Fred C. Weyand, Chief of Staff.

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

RESEARCH REPORT

BY
[Faint text, likely author name and title]

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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