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FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 28, 29, AND 30, 1976

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on Defense Production

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
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FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

MONDAY, JUNE 28, 1976

U.S. CONGRESS,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION,
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met at 10:05 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 5302, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William Proxmire, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators William Proxmire and John Sparkman; Congressmen David Evans and Parren Mitchell.

Senator PROXMIRE. The committee will come to order.

Chairman Sullivan has asked me to continue with the preparedness inquiry which the Joint Committee began in the second session.

Today's hearings begin the second phase of the Joint Committee on Defense Production's inquiry into the state of the national emergency preparedness effort. In these 3 days of hearings we will be examining the organization, programs, and the management of the Federal agencies.

This, of course, requires looking at the State and local agencies and programs, for the operational heart of the national effort—the front line troops, so to speak—is the firefighters, the policemen, the hospital, and other emergency services personnel whom we rely on for support in a disaster. Without the local programs, and local people, there would be no meaningful preparedness effort in this country.

This kind of organization befits the American tradition of community self-help, but it is also eminently practical because it permits resources to be employed for any kind of emergency at a local, regional, or national level on an "as needed" basis. It permits emergency personnel to perfect their skills for the kinds of natural disasters most frequently in their areas. And, when funds are used for both natural and nuclear disaster planning, this system relieves us of the necessity of maintaining a large and costly, nationwide "exclusive use" civil defense force, as the Soviet Union does.

Now, a number of the basic organizational principles are undergoing change. On one side, we are told the Soviet Union spends over \$1 billion a year at the national level for nuclear attack preparedness, while the U.S. Federal figure has fluctuated between \$70 million and \$200 million annually. The implication is that we need to increase our Federal spending for this function by at least three or four times the average rate. That was the advice given to the committee last April by some members of a panel of experts. But first we need to know whether we are getting our dollars' worth for the money that we are already spending.

On another front, the Government decrees that funds used for nuclear attack preparedness cannot also be used for natural disaster preparedness even though, with some notable exceptions, the functions are the same or virtually the same. Most natural disaster operations are identical to nuclear attack operations as, for example, in terms of hospital services, provision of food and shelter for the homeless, emergency communication facilities, and the availability of trained personnel for firefighting, dike building, crime prevention, and similar tasks.

The notable exceptions to this common identity of emergency or disaster functions are fallout shelters, urban evacuation plans, and the maintenance of radiological monitoring equipment. With the increasing construction of nuclear powerplants and the increased probability of "melt-downs" or other nuclear emergencies not associated with nuclear attack, even this distinction begins to blur.

It is in the context of these and other changed circumstances that the Joint Committee wishes to examine the present condition of our preparedness programs and organizations. We need to determine what is going on now in order to be able to recommend any changes that might be needed to the legislative committees of the Congress.

Thus far our inquiry has revealed that the national preparedness effort has suffered from long-term neglect in nearly every level and branch of Government. Last spring Senator Tower, who is the ranking Republican member of the committee, and I asked the governors of 53 States and territories to comment on the adequacy and responsiveness of Federal preparedness organizations. Of the 49 who have replied so far, 98 percent indicated dissatisfaction with the Federal system that is supposed to support and provide guidance to State and local agencies.

On the other hand, we are also aware that there is great disparity between the levels of preparedness achieved by different State and local governments. Some have good protection, others who may need it more, do not. For example, one State has not had an emergency readiness exercise in nearly a decade. We need to know, then, how to assure minimum standards of emergency preparedness for all our citizens without creating yet another Washington bureaucracy.

Among the other questions to which the committee seeks answers or remedies in this week's hearings are the following:

What is the rationale for three separate Federal preparedness organizations?

Are Federal preparedness organizations duplicative?

Are there gaps between the Federal organizations?

Are resources committed to the most urgent preparedness priorities?

Are preparedness programs feasible and realistic?

Are they well managed?

Do the different priorities of the separate Federal preparedness agencies adversely affect State and local planning and programs?

Our guests today are Mr. Fred J. Shafer, Director of the Logistics and Communications Division, General Accounting Office; Maj. Gen. Leslie Bray, Jr., Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency; and the Hon. Philip E. Coldwell, Governor of the Federal Reserve Board.

I will ask each of the witnesses to summarize his statement in 10 or

15 minutes, if possible, and we will incorporate the entire text of the prepared statements in the printed hearings record.

First, we will hear from Mr. Shafer.

STATEMENT OF FRED J. SHAFER, DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY MARIANN THOMSON, WERNER GROSSHANS, AND CARMEN SMARRELLI

Mr. SHAFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, I welcome this opportunity to present the General Accounting Office views and discuss our study of current civil emergency preparedness activities. I have with me on my left, Mariann Thomson, who has been supervisory auditor on this work; on my right, Werner Grosshans, who's senior associate director; and to his right Carmen Smarrelli, assistant director, each of whom has been personally involved in the study.

I will eliminate from my presentation some of the background material which can be submitted for the record in an effort to shorten the presentation.

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, contains a statement of national policy and prescribes a series of actions which were intended to provide the Nation with a comprehensive civil defense posture. Although the nature of offensive weapons and the threat to the Nation have changed, the policy remains essentially the same.

As originally conceived, the act provided for comprehensive pre-attack preparations to protect both property and people and for post-attack organization and control of the surviving people and industry.

The Act of 1950 was a recognition of the potential future danger to the United States arising out of the first Soviet Union atomic detonation in 1949. The initial funds requested were for large-scale blast shelter surveys and for modification of existing structures to provide blast protection.

These measures were proposed at a time when the fallout threat was not a matter of general public knowledge and when the general concept of shelter was protection from the immediate effects of atomic blast, heat, and shock.

Following the Soviet Union detonation of a thermonuclear device and the recognition of the enormous destructive potential of the downwind fallout hazard of the newer weapons, blast shelters and evacuation were deemphasized and fallout shelters assumed the major role as the most feasible life-saving protection against nuclear attack.

Early in 1961 it became apparent that careful scrutiny of the program for civil defense had to be made. There was general feeling that past efforts, handicapped as they were by insufficient political and financial support, had not produced the type of program that could provide security against thermonuclear weapons. On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy delivered a message to the Congress on urgent national needs, in which he announced the initiation of a long-range program to protect the public from fallout.

The President stated:

This Administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.

We will deter an enemy from making a nuclear attack only if our retaliatory power is so strong and so invulnerable that he knows he would be destroyed by our response. If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute.

The President stated further that the aforementioned deterrent concept assumed rational calculations and that there still remained the possibility of an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war, or a war of escalation which could not be either foreseen or deterred. He also said:

It is on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable—as insurance for the civilian population in case of an enemy miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed—but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of a catastrophe.

The President concluded by recommending a “nationwide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures.”

By Executive Order 10952, as amended, the President in 1961 decided that civil defense functions would include among other things: a fallout shelter program; a chemical, biological and radiological warfare defense program; a warning and communications system; post-attack assistance to State and local governments; and protection and emergency operational capabilities of State and local governments.

The order had the effect of abandoning general attempts at survival from heat and blast effects, adding provisions for defenses against chemical, biological and radiological agents. It generally placed emphasis on providing primarily for post attack survival, continuity of government, and communications and an administrative base around which the surviving population could coalesce for effective action.

This revised policy as established by the executive branch seems to be the basis for the continuing civil defense and preparedness efforts we see today.

In October of 1971 the General Accounting Office issued to the Congress the results of its study of activities and status of civil defense in the United States. In our report we described the policy changes I have summarized and made the following observations:

Measures planned for a war-related emergency generally are limited to protection against nuclear attack.

There were no civil defense programs, other than research to protect people from the effects of attack with chemical or biological weapons.

Although the direct effects of nuclear weapons—blast, heat and shock—are recognized as major elements of the threat, the civil defense program includes no specific activity to mitigate them.

DoD had recognized the potential nuclear deterrent of effective damage-limiting measures but stated in its January 1969 program justifications that:

... on the basis of our present knowledge of military technology, we still see no practical way in which to do this (taking damage-limiting measures) against the kind of attack the Soviets could potentially mount in the 1970s. Accordingly, our best alternative is to continue to base our policy of deterrence on our assured destruction capability.

The fallout shelter program appears to be a result of identifying and developing shelter spaces in only existing facilities or in new construction.

The civil defense program was not aimed at adding significantly to the Nation's shelter capacity since it did not provide for constructing shelter space. (Since that time Federal agencies can incorporate shelters in federally financed buildings or projects.)

The civil defense program did not have a good working priority system. Because of limited financial and other resources available, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish priorities and stress the development of protection in those areas to be most likely at risk from fallout after a nuclear attack.

In general, in view of the changed conditions since the original legislation was enacted, GAO suggested that the national policy be reconsidered to provide better guidance to civil defense planning.

The level of funding for civil defense has not constituted a large part of our national budget. We have an indication that the Nation's interest in expanding civil preparedness activities can be piqued if there is an imminent threat. Following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, annual funding reached a high of over \$200 million. Even this funding level constituted only one-half of 1 percent of the total defense budget and was a minor item in terms of the total national budget. Nevertheless, even though the Russian nuclear capability is now greater than in 1962, by the early 1970's the annual expenditures were only about \$80 million, and the President's fiscal year 1977 budget would bring that figure down to \$71 million.

The response to imminent threat thesis seems to be the basis for the Nation's current civil defense posture. In his 1977 posture statement the Secretary of Defense stated:

The current civil defense program seems best suited to a posture of planning in peacetime for surging in a crisis. Such a program will keep peacetime civil defense costs low, while at the same time providing the basis to permit expanding the peacetime disaster preparedness base to provide an increased capability in times of nuclear crisis.

It is within the framework of the above analysis of policy changes that we have reviewed the present civil defense program.

What capabilities exist today? Our review concentrated on the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency [DCPA], and we also did some work at GSA's Federal Preparedness Agency [FPA] and HUD's Federal Disaster Assistance Administration [FDAA].

As our review progresses, we are finding some potential problems in coordination and in duplication of functions at Federal, State and local levels. But as was the case in our 1971 report, priority setting under conditions of limited funding continues to be a major problem. I will devote the balance of my comments to the priority problem.

As provided in the 1950 Act, civil defense is a cooperative effort between the Federal Government and the States. Thus State cooperation is essential to a comprehensive civil defense. We believe that this is both a strength and a weakness in the defense effort. A strength in that it involves the entire Nation as participants; a weakness in that accomplishment of national goals can be frustrated by local disinterest or disagreement. Given the limited funding available, we believe that

the Federal Government should establish national priorities which should command the funds in a priority order of preference. State participation should be encouraged, but we believe the needs and interests of the Nation should be addressed whether a particular State or region desires to participate or not.

Recognizing the States and communities' disinterest in nuclear preparedness, DCPA began promoting the concept of "dual-use" preparedness systems which would be useful during natural disasters as well as nuclear attack. Through this concept, DCPA was better able to sell its programs to the States and communities, and use of emergency plans and facilities during natural disasters was recognized as an exercise for nuclear attack. The dual-use concept was accepted by States and communities as more economical and practical since they could use their equipment, and organization, on a day-to-day basis.

The fiscal year 1977 budget could negate the dual-use efforts of DCPA, because it restricts DCPA's activities to nuclear preparedness only. A number of State representatives told us they would not participate in DCPA's programs at all under such conditions, preferring to use their limited resources for what they consider to be more important local needs. Most of those at the State and local level to whom we talked held the view that nuclear preparedness, if treated separately from other functions such as natural disaster preparedness, should be totally a Federal responsibility.

But even under the dual-use concept, the Federal-local efforts result in erratic response to national priorities.

Because participation in DCPA's programs is voluntary, many inconsistencies were found when comparing capabilities with population coverage. There are cases in which small villages have effective capabilities while cities have essentially no capability. Also, some States actively support all of DCPA's programs while others choose not to.

The crisis relocation planning and the fallout shelter programs are cases in point.

If the United States is attacked, citizens can count on either (1) evacuating to outlying areas where they may have to build their own shelters with soil or (2) going to the nearest shelter, which may not be marked, stocked, or equipped with sanitation facilities.

Crisis relocation planning is being done by State personnel under 100 percent DCPA contracts totaling over \$1 million a year. The prototype planning projects are almost complete, and DCPA expects to start plans for the remaining target areas in fiscal year 1977. It appears to us that this planning has been started without first solving some very basic problems, such as:

The projects are done only in areas which agree to them. California, for example, has refused to participate because it believes the entire concept is not feasible. If the Federal Government believes this program is vital to civil defense, what are the consequences of not covering such a densely populated State?

Most of the Nation's shelters are in urban areas. Therefore, many host areas do not have enough shelter spaces for their own population, much less the urban evacuees. DCPA plans to solve this problem by building expedient

shelters in host areas; that is, by having evacuees pile soil on top of existing buildings to increase fallout protection. I might say that the Oak Ridge laboratories have developed a concept of expedient shelters which would be somewhat more sophisticated than I have just described.

Relocation planning on the northeast corridor containing 50 million residents will have to be done on an areawide basis, yet plans and implementation can vary from State to State, and a relocation area for one State may be located in another, thus requiring area cooperation rather than local decision.

Concerning the fallout shelter program, if a crisis period does *not* precede an attack, people will be told to go to the nearest shelters. Yet DCPA expects local governments to mark and stock shelters *during* a crisis period.

Because of limited funds, DCPA discontinued the marking and stocking of shelters, except for radiological monitoring kits, in 1972. The \$125 million worth of food and supplies distributed in the early 1960's now belongs to the local communities, and some has been donated overseas. Many of the remaining supplies have reached their shelf lives, although DCPA says they are still edible.

Although DCPA no longer marks and stocks shelters, it continues to identify shelter space in existing buildings. More shelter spaces have been identified than needed for the Nation's population, but their distribution does not coincide with the population density. This work is done by summer-hire architect and engineering students, supervised by the Corps of Engineers, at a cost of about \$5 million a year. Presently, only high-risk and host areas are being surveyed so that the areas' shelter spaces will be identified before the relocation planning begins. Of the buildings located, almost half do not have licenses authorizing their use as shelters and less than half are marked and stocked. In its fiscal year 1977 budget, DCPA requested funds to mark shelters in the priority 1—counterforce—high-risk areas.

At the end of fiscal year 1975, 24 percent of the Nation's communities reported they had completed their marking plans and only 12 percent reported they had completed their stocking plans. Plans for stocking shelters in a crisis generally call for people to bring their own food or state that arrangements have been made with grocery stores to use their stocks.

At the regional level, FPA and DCPA work together to provide for continuity of government. FPA's guidance states that all Federal agencies having essential emergency functions are to have two teams designated for an emergency: one to stay at their regional office and the other to relocate to one of DCPA's Federal regional centers. These centers, located in non-high-risk areas, house DCPA personnel during peacetime. Of DCPA's eight regions, six now have adequate centers—which means they are built underground and shockproof, have effective communications capability, and have enough food, medical supplies, power, et cetera, to sustain operations for at least 30 days. In fiscal years 1960-75, over \$15 million was spent to construct the centers.

The adequacy of continuity of Government plans appears to be directly related to the adequacy of the centers. For example, DCPA's

Santa Rosa, Calif., facility is a dirt-covered hut containing communications equipment and some beds. Federal agencies in San Francisco, which would relocate—in theory—to the Santa Rosa facility, have not even designated their emergency teams. If the United States were attacked, it is questionable whether the Federal Government would continue to function in the two regions without adequate centers. Although DCPA's objective is to have adequate centers in all regions, funds have not been available.

Gentlemen, this has been a brief overview of changes and uncertainties in policy formulation and some of the problems with our civil defense program. On balance, however, the program as it does exist now constitutes a basic organizational structure which can provide for some national cohesion in a time of international nuclear crisis.

The basic questions to be considered are: (1) whether the national policy of protecting life and property from attack through civil defense should be reevaluated since, except for evacuation and attempts at fallout shelter identification, it has been virtually abandoned by budgetary and administrative actions in favor of postattack survival and organization; (2) whether even this basic structure can be maintained with the present level of funding; (3) whether given any prospective level of funding, the funds should be expended solely for those matters relating to nuclear attack with the possibility that States and local governments may be deterred from participation, and (4) in any event, whether national policy should be reconsidered so as to provide that the survival needs of the Nation as a whole can be addressed in appropriate order of priority.

That concludes my statement. If you have any questions, I will do my best to answer them or provide answers for the record.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Shafer, and I'm looking forward to your complete study, which I understand will be completed at the end of the summer.

Mr. SHAFER. Yes, sir.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Shafer follows:]

STATEMENT OF FRED J. SHAFER, DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS AND COMMUNICATIONS
DIVISION, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. Chairman, members of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, I welcome this opportunity to present the General Accounting Office views and discuss our study of current civil emergency preparedness activities.

I think it appropriate to preface my statement with the observation that civil preparedness and defense have not been prominent among national priorities. Whether this is due to public apathy; a lack of awareness of the potential threat; a change in the numbers, accuracy, and yield of nuclear weapons; a lack of awareness of the preparations that can be made or protective measures that can be taken; or to a belief that nothing can be done anyway; or simply that the Nation has more pressing needs, we are not certain. It is my opinion therefore that the hearings being conducted on the subject are timely and can perform a great service to the Nation by adducing evidence and authoritative opinions on the subject as a basis for establishing a comprehensive national civil defense and preparedness policy in the light of conditions existing in the 1970s.

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, contains a statement of national policy and prescribes a series of actions, which were intended to provide the Nation with a comprehensive civil defense posture. Although the nature of offensive weapons and the threat to the Nation have changed, the policy remains essentially the same.

The declaration of policy to the act expressed the intent of the Congress to provide a system of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack. The declaration further stated that the responsi-

bility for civil defense shall be jointly vested in the Federal Government and the several States and their political subdivisions. The primary role of the Federal Government was to provide necessary direction, coordination and guidance and to share the expenses on an equal basis with the States.

The term civil defense was defined to include among other things the procurement and stockpiling of necessary materials and supplies; provision of warning systems, development of shelters and control systems, and evacuation of civil population.

As originally conceived the act provided for comprehensive preattack preparations to protect both property and people and for post attack organization and control of the surviving people and industry.

The Act of 1950 was a recognition of the potential future danger to the United States arising out of the first Soviet Union atomic detonation in 1949. The initial funds requested were for large scale blast shelter surveys and for modification of existing structures to provide blast protection.

These measures were proposed at a time when the fallout threat was not a matter of general public knowledge and when the general concept of shelter was protection from the immediate effects of atomic blast, heat, and shock.

Following the Soviet Union detonation of a thermonuclear device and the recognition of the enormous destructive potential of the downwind fallout hazard of the newer weapons, blast shelters and evacuation were deemphasized and fallout shelters assumed the major role as the most feasible life-saving protection against nuclear attack.

During the 10 years after the enactment of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, the rapidity and magnitude of changes in the world situation complicated attempts to define the potential and the limitations of civil defense, the manner in which the program should be conducted, and the position of civil defense in a structure of national defense. In spite of changing views, basic research was conducted, civil defense offices were established, and initial plans were made.

From 1951 to 1958, under the Federal Civil Defense Administration, a number of programs were initiated, including an attack warning system, stockpiling of medical and other civil defense supplies and equipment, civil defense exercises, and research programs. No means was developed by the agency during these years to protect the population from atomic attack, however, and little provision was made for caring for survivors.

Early in 1961 it became apparent that careful scrutiny of the program for civil defense had to be made. There was general feeling that past efforts, handicapped as they were by insufficient political and financial support, had not produced the type of program that could provide security against thermonuclear weapons. On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy delivered a message to the Congress on urgent national needs, in which he announced the initiation of a long-range program to protect the public from fallout. The President stated:

This administration has been looking hard at exactly what civil defense can and cannot do. It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.

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It is on this basis that civil defense can be readily justifiable—as insurance for the civilian population in case of an enemy miscalculation. It is insurance we trust will never be needed—but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.

The President concluded by recommending a “nationwide long-range program of identifying present fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter in new and existing structures.”

By Executive Order 10952, as amended, the President in 1961 decided that civil defense functions would include among other things:

A fallout shelter program;

A chemical, biological, and radiological warfare defense program;

A warning and communications system ;
 Post attack assistance to State and local governments ; and
 Protection and emergency operational capabilities of State and local governments.

The order had the effect of abandoning general attempts at survival from heat and blast effects, adding provisions for defenses against chemical, biological and radiological agents. It generally placed emphasis on providing primarily for post attack survival, continuity of government, and communications and an administrative base around which the surviving population could coalesce for effective action.

This revised policy as established by the executive branch seems to be the basis for the continuing civil defense and preparedness efforts we see today.

In October 1971, the General Accounting Office issued to the Congress the results of its study of activities and status of civil defense in the United States. In our report we described the policy changes I have summarized and made the following observations :

Measures planned for a war-related emergency generally are limited to protection against nuclear attack.

There were no civil defense programs, other than research, to protect people from the effects of attack with chemical or biological weapons.

Although the direct effects of nuclear weapons—blast, heat and shock—are recognized as major elements of the threat, the civil defense program includes no specific activity to mitigate them.

DOD had recognized the potential nuclear deterrent of effective damage limiting measures but stated in its January 1969 program justifications that :

“ . . . On the basis of our present knowledge of military technology, we still see no practical way in which to do this [taking damage-limiting measures] against the kind of attack the Soviets could potentially mount in the 1970s. Accordingly, our best alternative is to continue to base our policy of deterrence on our assured destruction capability.”

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The civil defense program did not have a good working priority system. Because of limited financial and other resources available, GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish priorities and stress the development of protection in those areas to be most likely at risk from fallout after a nuclear attack.

In general, in view of the changed conditions since the original legislation was enacted, that the national policy be reconsidered to provide better guidance to civil defense planning.

The level of funding for civil defense has not constituted a large part of our national budget. We have an indication that the Nation's interest in expanding civil preparedness activities can be piqued if there is an imminent threat. Following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, annual funding reached a high of over \$200 million. Even this funding level constituted only one half of one percent of the total defense budget and was a minor item in terms of the total national budget. Nevertheless, even though the Russian nuclear capability is now greater than in 1962, by the early 1970s the annual expenditures were only about \$80 million, and the President's fiscal year 1977 budget would bring that figure down to \$71 million.

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The current civil defense program seems best suited to a posture of planning in peacetime for surging in a crisis. Such a program will keep peacetime civil defense costs low, while at the same time providing the basis to permit expanding the peacetime disaster preparedness base to provide an increased capability in times of nuclear crisis.

It is within the framework of the above analysis of policy changes that we have reviewed the present civil defense program.

Before moving on to a discussion of current civil defense and preparedness efforts, it may be useful to the committee if we summarize what various sources report as differences between the U.S. and Soviet defense efforts.

Various estimates show the Soviet Union spending 8 to 15 times more than the United States.

The Soviet Union has had extensive population evacuation plans for several years; the United States plans are in the developmental stages.

The Soviet Union requires three-fourths of all new industries to build their factories in small- and medium-size towns and hardens some essential production facilities; the United States does neither.

The Soviet Union has compulsory civil defense training at schools (beginning in the second grade), factories, and residential buildings; the United States has prepared instructional materials for use in interested schools.

U.S.S.R. civil defense personnel are organized into permanent detachments which train with regular Army units; U.S. personnel are organized only according to the State or community they serve and are not required to be trained.

The Soviet Union has constructed underground shelters, including some in subway systems, which have blast resistance; the United States merely identifies shelter space in existing buildings.

We cite these disparities, not to suggest that United States civil preparedness should match the Soviet effort. Indeed the Soviet effort may be nonproductive and wasteful. But the differing perspectives of the potential protagonists provides an interesting backdrop to the United States civil defense effort.

WHAT CAPABILITIES EXIST TODAY?

Our review concentrated on the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and we also did some work at GSA's Federal Preparedness Agency and HUD's Federal Disaster Assistance Administration.

DCPA, along with the State and local governments, is responsible for protecting lives and property in the event of an attack upon the United States. In fiscal year 1976, DCPA was appropriated \$85 million and had a staff of 653. FPA is responsible for developing broad policies for emergency preparedness programs and for coordinating those programs throughout the Federal Government. FPA's more specific responsibilities include continuity of government, resource management, and economic preparedness. FPA operated with a \$16 million budget and 628 people in 1976. FDAA is responsible primarily for providing natural disaster relief and also provides preparedness planning. FDAA's 1976 budget was \$150 million, which was primarily for relief assistance, but also covered its operations staffed by 161 people. As our review progresses, we are finding some potential problems in coordination and in duplication of functions at Federal, State and local levels. But as was the case in our 1971 report, priority setting under conditions of limited funding continues to be a major problem. I will devote the balance of my comments to the priority problem.

THE PROBLEM OF PRIORITIES

As provided in the 1950 act, civil defense is a cooperative effort between the Federal Government and the States. Thus State cooperation is essential to a comprehensive civil defense. We believe that this is both a strength and a weakness in the defense effort. A strength in that it involves the entire Nation as participants; a weakness in that accomplishment of national goals can be frustrated by local disinterest or disagreement. Given the limited funding available, we believe that the Federal Government should establish national priorities which should command the funds in a priority order of preference. State participation should be encouraged, but we believe the needs and interests of the Nation should be addressed whether a particular State or region desires to participate or not.

Recognizing the States' and communities' disinterest in nuclear preparedness, DCPA began promoting the concept of "dual-use" preparedness systems which would be useful during natural disasters as well as nuclear attack. Through this concept, DCPA was better able to sell its programs to the States and communities, and use of emergency plans and facilities during natural disasters was recognized as an exercise for nuclear attack. The dual-use concept was accepted by States and communities as more economical and practical since they could use their equipment, and organization, on a day-to-day basis.

The fiscal year 1977 budget could negate the dual use efforts of DCPA, because it restricts DCPA's activities to nuclear preparedness only. A number of State representatives told us they would not participate in DCPA's programs at all under such conditions, preferring to use their limited resources for what they

consider to be more important local needs. Most of those at the State and local level to whom we talked held the view that nuclear preparedness if treated separately from other functions such as natural disaster preparedness should be totally a Federal responsibility.

But even under the dual use concept, the Federal-local efforts result in erratic response to national priorities.

Because participation in DCPA's programs is voluntary, many inconsistencies were found when comparing capabilities with population coverage. There are cases in which small villages have effective capabilities while cities have essentially no capability. Also, some States actively support all of DCPA's programs while others choose not to.

The crisis relocation planning and the fallout shelter programs are cases in point.

If the United States is attacked, citizens can count on either (1) evacuating to outlying areas where they may have to build their own shelters with soil or (2) going to the nearest shelter, which may not be marked, stocked, or equipped with sanitation facilities.

Current DCPA planning calls for evacuating people from high-risk areas to low-risk host areas if there is a warning period of 2 to 3 days before attack. The 400 designated high-risk areas have been grouped into three priority levels on the basis of expected risk. The 57 priority 1 targets include ICBM complexes, SAC bases, and strategic missile submarine bases. Priority 2 targets include other military installations and Washington, D.C. Priority 3 targets are cities with populations of at least 50,000. Evacuating people from these areas would save them from the direct blast and fire effects of a nuclear bomb. But once evacuated, they would have to be protected from fallout. Maps showing evacuation routes and the host-area shelters to which evacuees should go are to be prepared and given to the local news media, ready for printing in case international tension develops to the point at which the President would direct evacuation.

Crisis relocation planning is being done by State personnel under 100 percent DCPA contracts totaling over \$1 million a year. The prototype planning projects are almost complete, and DCPA expects to start plans for the remaining target areas in fiscal year 1977. It appears to us that this planning has been started without first solving some very basic problems, such as:

The projects are done only in areas which agree to them. California, for example, has refused to participate because it believes the entire concept is not feasible. If the Federal Government believes this program is vital to civil defense, what are the consequences of not covering such a densely populated State?

Most of the Nation's shelters are in urban areas. Therefore, many host areas do not have enough shelter spaces for their own populations, much less the urban evacuees. DCPA plans to solve this problem by building "expedient" shelters in host areas; that is, by having evacuees pile soil on top of existing buildings to increase fallout protection.

Relocation planning on the northeast corridor containing 50 million residents will have to be done on an areawide basis, yet plans and implementation can vary from State to State, and a relocation area for one State may be located in another, thus requiring area cooperation rather than local decision.

FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM

If a crisis period does *not* precede an attack, people will be told to go to the nearest shelters. Yet DCPA expects local governments to mark and stock shelters *during* a crisis period.

Because of limited funds, DCPA discontinued the marking and stocking of shelters, except for radiological monitoring kits, in 1972. The \$125 million worth of food and supplies distributed in the early 1960s now belongs to the local communities, and some has been donated overseas. Many of the remaining supplies have reached their shelf lives, although DCPA says they are still edible. Through Army and Air Force veterinary services personnel, DCPA makes quality inspections of shelters on a sampling basis. These inspections are little more than box counts; boxes are rarely opened and food is rarely tested. DCPA plans to discontinue these inspections in fiscal year 1977 due to its funding cut. Since State and local civil defense personnel hardly ever inspect shelters—and often do not even know where they are—it appears that the quality of shelter stocks will not be tested until the shelters have to be occupied.

Although DCPA no longer marks and stocks shelter, it continues to identify shelter space in existing buildings. More shelter spaces have been identified than needed for the nation's population, but their distribution does not coincide with the population density. This work is done by summer-hire architect and engineering students, supervised by the Corps of Engineers, at a cost of about \$5 million a year. Presently, only high-risk and host areas are being surveyed so that the areas' shelter spaces will be identified before the relocation planning begins. Of the buildings located, almost half do not have licenses authorizing their use as shelters and less than half are marked and stocked. In its fiscal year 1977 budget, DCPA requested funds to mark shelters in the priority 1 (counterforce) high-risk areas.

At the end of fiscal year 1975, 24 percent of the Nation's communities reported they had completed their marking plans and only 12 percent reported they had completed their stocking plans. Plans for stocking shelters in a crisis generally call for people to bring their own food or state that arrangements have been made with grocery stores to use their stocks.

At the regional level, EPA and DCPA work together to provide for continuity of government. EPA's guidance states that all Federal agencies having essential emergency functions are to have two teams designated for an emergency: One to stay at their regional office and the other to relocate to one of DCPA's Federal regional centers. These centers, located in non-high-risk areas, house DCPA personnel during peacetime. Of DCPA's eight regions, six now have adequate centers—which means they are built underground and shock-proof, have effective communications capability, and have enough food, medical supplies, power, etc., to sustain operations for at least 30 days. In fiscal years 1960-75, over \$15 million was spent to construct the centers.

The adequacy of continuity of government plans appears to be directly related to the adequacy of the centers. For example, DCPA's Santa Rosa, California, facility is a dirt-covered hut containing communications equipment and some beds. Federal agencies in San Francisco, which would relocate—in theory—to the Santa Rosa facility, have not even designated their emergency teams. If the United States were attacked, it is questionable whether the Federal Government would continue to function in the two regions without adequate centers. Although DCPA's objective is to have adequate centers in all regions, funds have not been available.

Gentlemen, this has been a brief overview of changes and uncertainties in policy formulation and some of the problems with our civil defense program.

On balance, however, the program as it does exist now constitutes a basic organizational structure which can provide for some national cohesion in a time of international nuclear crisis.

The basic questions to be considered are (1) whether the national policy of protecting life and property from attack through civil defense should be reevaluated since, except for evacuation and attempts at fallout shelter identification, it has been virtually abandoned by budgetary and administrative actions in favor of post attack survival and organization, (2) whether even this basic structure can be maintained with the present level of funding, (3) whether given any prospective level of funding, the funds should be expended solely for those matters relating to nuclear attack with the possibility that States and local governments may be deterred from participation, and (4) in any event, whether national policy should be reconsidered so as to provide that the survival needs of the Nation as a whole can be addressed in appropriate order of priority.

That concludes my statement. If you have any questions, I will do my best to answer them or provide answers for the record.

Senator PROXMIRE. This is a disturbing and jolting report that you give us. I suppose we should have known it, but, if the United States should be attacked and we should be notified at 11 o'clock this morning that nuclear missiles were on their way and we had 15 minutes to act, there would be very little of what has been done so far that would protect or help us, as I understand it.

Mr. SHAFER. That is correct. Generally speaking, the area impacted by a nuclear blast would be unprotected, although a number of fallout shelters—

Senator PROXMIRE. There are a number of fallout shelters, but what you're saying is that we're basing our strategy on the notion that there may develop a situation so tense internationally, with the threat of nuclear war so much more imminent, that then, based on the framework we have now, we would be able to flesh it out, build it up and thus move into a situation where we might achieve some degree of protection in some areas.

Mr. SHAFER. Right.

Senator PROXMIRE. That strategy I'm not sure is logical. Looking at it from a standpoint of an adversary, it would seem to me to suggest that, if they want to hit this great country when it's most vulnerable, the way to hit it is suddenly and without any kind of a series of threats or buildup.

Mr. SHAFER. I would guess that would be true. It defies comprehension to think there would be sufficient advance notice that both first-strike missiles would pass each other in the air, but I think perhaps the national psychology has been affected by the comments concerning nuclear overkill—the idea that, if there is a nuclear war, the entire Nation will be devastated and nothing can be done.

However, the literature that we have read and the people with whom we have talked pretty much confirm that, even under the most adverse circumstances with a full nuclear exchange, a substantial portion of the population could survive.

Senator PROXMIRE. Maybe survive it, but as long as 15 years ago the Secretary of Defense said that 400 nuclear warheads would destroy this country or destroy the Soviet Union as an organized society, wipe out 75 percent of the industry and kill 35 percent of the people.

Mr. SHAFER. I think that's a concept, Mr. Chairman, that really has to be examined rather carefully.

Senator PROXMIRE. As I say, 400 warheads. We have far more than that, at least 8,400 nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union has a good number.

Mr. SHAFER. Our study hasn't gone into sufficient depth to confirm or deny that position, but a number of studies that have been conducted by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency and other agencies suggest that the potential for survival, even under existing conditions, for a substantial portion of our population, in the order of magnitude of 80 or 90 million people, is pretty good. The Russians apparently believe this because they have a very extensive program, including not only plans for fallout but—

Senator PROXMIRE. I want to come to that in a minute. If 80 or 90 million people survive, as I say, if you could have even 150 million people survive, the industry could be devastated and all of our big cities would be virtually eliminated and flattened.

Mr. SHAFER. This is true.

Senator PROXMIRE. Our industrial capacity would be enormously reduced. The struggle to survive would be taking virtually all of our energies.

Let me ask you about the Soviet Union. You spent a little time in your statement on the Soviet Union's relatively greater degree of preparedness, the fact that they are spending 8 to 15 times as much as we are. Is there any way we can make a judgment as to the degree to which this does provide them with an effective preparedness? Or would they be pretty much in the same kind of devastated position, in spite of the fact that they have devoted more resources to protection?

Mr. SHAFER. Well, again, the studies that we have examined, those of Dr. Leon Gouré of the University of Miami and others, suggest a strong Soviet program. But we can't verify it, if that's the nature of your question, and being auditors, we are always skeptical about the effectiveness of programs. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has engaged in a rather extensive program of both blast protection shelters and fallout shelters, development of evacuation plans, and industrial plant hardening and dispersing, which is rather difficult in a democratic society. Given the relatively lower level of economic activity in the Soviet Union, that is, their rather less productive base, the fact that they are devoting considerable resources to civil defense suggest that they are willing to sacrifice in other areas in order to build a rather comprehensive civil defense posture.

Senator PROXMIRE. Of course, they have always been far more defense minded than we have been.

Mr. SHAFER. That's true.

Senator PROXMIRE. They have always devoted more of their military resources to defense.

Mr. SHAFER. The thing we can't evaluate is how effective the Soviet civil defense capabilities are against conventional bomber attack as distinguished from nuclear attack and the extent to which their civil defense posture has been directed against one rather than against the other. Nevertheless, they have quite a comprehensive system, from all the information we have seen.

Senator PROXMIRE. On the issue of priorities you raised in your statement, do you presently have any data showing how much the Federal Government is spending on preparedness functions? For example, how much is spent on shelter programs, how much on strategic evacuation, how much on continuity of Government programs?

Mr. SHAFER. We do have some budgetary breakdowns out of the 1977-76 budgets which will give you some indication of where the

money is intended to go, but we haven't verified it. We can introduce that for the record if you wish or I can go over it now.

Senator PROXIMIRE. With the limited amount spent overall, I take it the shelter programs are, in the first place, rudimentary. Where they are not—and I take it in some cases they are not—you indicated that the emergency centers in the regions—six of the eight regions have stocked shelters and so forth—would be for a relatively limited group of people who would be the critical people in providing command and so on.

Mr. SHAFER. Some DCPA funds are now directed to development of prototype evacuation plans, in addition to fallout plans. When the evacuation studies are completed and standards developed, these standards will be fanned out to the State and local organizations for development of their individual plans. But I don't believe the prototyping is quite finished yet, and the prototype plan has not been disseminated to all the State and local civil defense organizations. A substantial amount of the current funds is directed to fallout shelter planning. Of course, looking at it another way, a substantial amount of funds also goes to salaries for the people who are maintaining the State and local organizations.

Senator PROXIMIRE. Well, give us as much as you can of what I have mentioned for the record.

Now, can you tell the committee how Federal preparedness moneys are distributed geographically, by State or region, for the record. You have indicated that in California, I guess, there's just nothing going on in terms of evacuation planning. They have rejected the program and feel it's a program that isn't going to provide any real protection, so they have done nothing. Is that about right?

Mr. SHAFER. We'd have to furnish it for the record. I do not have it readily available by geographic areas.

[The information submitted for the record follows:]

DCPA'S MAJOR PREPAREDNESS PROGRAMS

[In thousands]

Program	Estimate	
	Fiscal year 1976	Fiscal year 1977 ¹
Matching funds to States and communities for—		
Personnel and administrative expenses.....	\$29,600	\$20,100
Emergency operating centers.....	7,136	3,750
Warning and communications systems.....	4,919	5,688
Training and education.....	4,552	300
National shelter survey.....	3,228	4,593
Nuclear civil protection planning (relocation and in-place).....	3,134	4,776
Maintenance of radiological defense equipment.....	2,615	2,200
Warning and communications systems.....	1,728	² 7,277
Research and development.....	1,706	1,000

¹ Estimated in the fiscal year 1977 proposed budget totaling \$71,000,000.

² Includes \$6,800,000 for systems previously funded by the U.S. Army Communications Command.

DCPA'S MAJOR MATCHING-FUNDS PROGRAMS BY STATE

	Fiscal year 1975 obligations		
	Personnel and administrative expenses	Emergency operating centers	Supporting systems equipment ¹
Alabama.....	\$714,000	\$51,030	\$90,048
Alaska.....	288,000	93,387	23,571
Arizona.....	325,000	154,866	23,175
Arkansas.....	423,000	99,377	185,089
California.....	3,272,000	171,441	94,950
Colorado.....	300,000	52,983	69,650
Connecticut.....	400,000	68,060	2,481
Delaware.....	116,000	0	22,071
District of Columbia.....	181,000	0	1,113
Florida.....	991,000	272,899	108,074
Georgia.....	878,000	141,678	201,523
Hawaii.....	329,000	4,521	56,084
Idaho.....	108,000	322,551	103,397
Illinois.....	989,000	308,179	203,083
Indiana.....	282,000	8,562	64,368
Iowa.....	358,000	473,595	251,049
Kansas.....	292,000	726,316	152,112
Kentucky.....	359,000	38,077	129,793
Louisiana.....	547,000	9,462	(1,941)
Maine.....	410,000	27,348	48,306
Maryland.....	618,000	214,584	223,535
Massachusetts.....	902,000	39,675	38,586
Michigan.....	732,000	(20,162)	75,668
Minnesota.....	974,000	154,422	97,413
Mississippi.....	408,000	270,811	89,814
Missouri.....	355,000	257,778	352,129
Montana.....	210,000	110,284	149,433
Nebraska.....	279,000	158,722	109,392
Nevada.....	261,000	94,652	16,450
New Hampshire.....	86,000	3,866	9,957
New Jersey.....	910,000	148,425	22,162
New Mexico.....	121,000	22,059	17,113
New York.....	2,917,000	60,558	29,030
North Carolina.....	733,000	156,797	28,913
North Dakota.....	187,000	181,222	134,915
Ohio.....	466,000	16,144	440,562
Oklahoma.....	400,000	286,521	216,530
Oregon.....	220,000	120,388	79,862
Pennsylvania.....	908,000	360,608	104,222
Rhode Island.....	220,000	72,523	4,896
South Carolina.....	579,000	227,634	22,423
South Dakota.....	210,000	125,317	132,620
Tennessee.....	528,000	237,523	271,035
Texas.....	796,000	24,414	30,173
Utah.....	168,000	129,366	31,768
Vermont.....	98,000	4,725	2,565
Virginia.....	536,000	203,719	74,334
Washington.....	540,000	119,975	198,115
West Virginia.....	195,000	(8,520)	19,018
Wisconsin.....	636,000	59,129	70,872
Wyoming.....	96,000	30,316	4,331
Guam.....	32,000	(36,400)	0
Puerto Rico.....	421,000	0	30,509
Virgin Islands.....	50,000	0	893
Total.....	\$28,353,000	\$6,851,407	\$4,957,234

¹ Funds for supporting systems equipment are used primarily for purchase and installation of warning and communications systems and also are used for purchase of rescue equipment and other emergency supplies.

Senator PROXMIRE. Is there any other part of the country, besides California, any large area, that's taken a negative view?

Mr. SHAFER. One that comes to mind is that New Hampshire has a very low-key program, and the balance of the States have different

levels of activity. California has not participated in evacuation planning or fallout shelter planning.

Senator PROXMIRE. Recently we have heard civil defense described as a kind of civil weapon; a way of saving human and material resources to continue prosecuting a nuclear war after an initial exchange. This makes it like an antiballistic missile since it is damage-limiting. Yet you quoted this 1969 Pentagon statement to the effect that military technology is incapable of achieving this goal. Can you account for this revolutionary change in thinking? Is it a change in perspective or a change in technology or a reaction to Soviet civil defense plans?

Mr. SHAFER. I believe the 1969 statement was probably directed in a narrower channel in that, given the state of nuclear weapons, they felt in 1969 that there could be no comprehensive shelters provided against the blast and heat effects of a nuclear attack. Nevertheless, the concept of doing nothing more than providing for postattack cohesion of the surviving populace and industries, I think, is basically the posture of civil defense today. There is an organizational structure in place around which, if it survives, the Nation can marshal its remaining resources. But I think the 1969 statement was directed only to the possibility of protecting against the thermal and blast effects of a nuclear weapon.

Senator PROXMIRE. Congressman Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Shafer, I'm a little disturbed because I have long been worried about what we have been doing in the area of offensive weapons. Since I have been in the Congress, I have been concerned about pumping money into airplanes that don't fly and submarines that don't sub. I had hoped that when we got into this area we would find a much better record of performance, but apparently, based on your testimony this morning, what we've got is a mess, spelled with a capital "M".

As I understand it, the Federal Government is out looking for shelter sites where people are not. State and local governments are not marking the present sites that they have, so those sites are just about useless in terms of protection of our personnel and civilians. It seems to me we have a grand mess and I, for one, would like to know whether you have any specific recommendations you want to make in terms of trying to clean up a situation that is clearly a threat to American citizens.

Mr. SHAFER. Let me try, Mr. Mitchell, to put your comments in perspective. The present shelter program has, for a number of years, abandoned any attempts at protection from blast and thermal effects. Since the target areas are usually large cities or military facilities within reasonable proximity to large cities, it's true that, in terms of blast and thermal effects, the large cities—in fact all areas—are not very well protected. Exceptions are the several centers designed for the survivability of Government and military command and control.

The present program has been designed to identify those buildings that would protect against fallout. Since most of the structures in the United States are built in the urban and the immediately surrounding suburban areas, most of the fallout shelters have been identified in those areas. So if those areas are not struck directly by a nuclear bomb and thereby do not receive the blast and thermal effects, they would indeed be protected from the subsequent radiological fallout.

So it's not quite as chaotic as perhaps my statement would seem to indicate.

Mr. MITCHELL. I hope not.

Mr. SHAFER. The problem is that, if a city is hit directly by a nuclear bomb, the fallout shelters provide very little protection against the blast and thermal effects.

The second part of the program which now is getting underway assumes there may be, under certain scenarios of nuclear war, sufficient time in advance to evacuate populations to areas outside the areas of immediate blast and thermal effects, and this would be the inner city, the urban and suburban people, moving out to the outlying areas. Once they get out there, there has to be some provision for medical care, fallout protection, and sanitary facilities to enable them to survive in those evacuation areas for a period of time.

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank you. I missed part of your testimony. Perhaps you addressed this subject. I understand clearly what you're saying. We've got to get folks out of the area where the blast occurs. How do you get them out? Did you address that in your testimony?

Mr. SHAFER. No; I did not.

Mr. MITCHELL. As I recall it, in past history, that's been one of the major difficulties. When cities are hit, the roads get clogged. There's no effective means of getting people out of the cities and that's when the enemy comes in with his highest capability for doing damage. What's the system for getting folks out?

Mr. SHAFER. You're absolutely right. One of the major problems is how to evacuate the cities, and I wish I could answer your question, but just recently the United States has become conscious of the possibility and potential for saving lives through the evacuation method. The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency is only now completing its initial study designed to determine how that would be accomplished and what would happen to the populace once they get to the outlying areas. So I really can't give you a comprehensive answer to that question. It's one of the problems that has to be solved, and it is being worked on right now. It's one of the priority areas that I think should be addressed under whatever level of funding is authorized.

Mr. MITCHELL. I'm certain the chairman and members of the committee will pursue this with a great deal of vigor. It doesn't do a bit of good to put shelters out there and not have any effective means of getting people to them.

Mr. SHAFER. You're absolutely right.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do I have time for another question?

Senator PROXMIRE. Certainly.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Shafer, as I understand it, there are three Federal preparedness agencies involved in this whole problem area. I have been in Congress just long enough to become kind of cynical and jaded about coordination between Federal agencies. In your opinion, has there been any duplication or overlap or conflicting guidelines issued by the three agencies involved?

Mr. SHAFER. We looked at this very closely. I get concerned, for instance, when I see the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, which gets the big bucks for civil preparedness, located in the Department of Defense where the primary concern is the development of more

offensive and defensive weapons. So one has the tendency to feel that civil defense might be subordinated to what the military consider to be more pressing military needs.

I get somewhat concerned when I see the policymaking organization in the civil structure, the Federal Preparedness Agency, located somewhere down in the bowels of the General Services Administration, an agency as you know designed to assist the Government in carrying out its support function.

Then we have the third agency over in Housing and Urban Development. Now we tried to find, given the state of the programs as we examined them, that there was some lack of effectiveness here and I can't point to any. I feel that perhaps this fragmentation, if the program grows to something more meaningful than it is now, will have an adverse effect on the administration of the Federal civil defense program. But given its present level of activity, we really haven't been able to find any serious problems that have arisen from the top level down in terms of fragmentation of this program.

On the other hand, from the standpoint of the States and local communities looking up, we have received comments that to them it looks rather fragmented, that they have to look to one organization for this, and another organization for that, and to the third organization for something else. But even there, given the dual-use concept that has arisen, that is using the Federal matching funds and the State funds for both nuclear crisis and natural disasters, the thing seems to have jelled better in terms of the funds' use at the local level. Our concern expressed in the statement is that, if the Federal funds are restricted only to nuclear disaster use, this effectiveness at the local level is going to be dissipated.

We have found some weaknesses in administration of the program and some overlapping and duplication, and I'd like to ask my colleagues if they want to comment on that.

Mr. MITCHELL. Just before he responds, could I pursue this just a bit further with you? To the best of your knowledge, do we have a situation in which the three agencies come together on a regular basis during which time the policy decisions are hammered out?

Mr. SHAFER. They do have committee conferences periodically and, as I say, given the present level of effort in the program, we haven't seen where this has been ineffective. I do have concerns about this three-pronged organization if we decide to go into a comprehensive civil defense program. The basic problems that I cited in my testimony are not so much problems of how the structure is organized; they are problems of policy.

I think that the head of the DCPA and the head of the FPA have really not been given, at the national level, significant priority designations against which to apply their limited funds. Nor have they been given the authority to direct their funds to the assessment of national problems in order of priority because they must depend on State and local cooperation. In detail, however, we have found some areas of duplication and overlap that you might be interested in.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, just a point of inquiry. I see my time is up. Can he respond to that last question?

Senator PROXMIRE. Certainly.

Mr. GROSSHANS. Just to put it in perspective, maybe we can bring out the three agencies' staffing in the field.

FPA, the Federal Preparedness Agency, which General Bray will address following us, roughly has about two individuals per region out in the field. We're talking about the 10 standard regions. So we're talking about 20 to 30 people at most.

DCPA, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, has eight regions. They do not conform with the standard regions, and they roughly have about 36-plus people in each region.

FDAA, the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration under HUD, has roughly about seven to eight people in the 10 standard regions.

So you can see that, from the standpoint of the States and the local communities, DCPA's presence is much greater than that of the other agencies and therefore they would prefer—from most of the comments that we heard—to deal with one. Since they already deal with DCPA on a day-to-day basis, they can't see why they would have to deal with the others.

As for the problems of overlap we have a few examples that might help you. Under FDAA, the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, there's a new program underway in which each State is authorized a \$250,000 grant—this is 100-percent Federal funding—for planning purposes. This could create all kinds of duplication in the coming years because up until now most of the plans have been developed through addressing both the nuclear and the natural disaster type of planning. This is a source of duplication. The Disaster Relief Act also provides that each State thereafter can get up to \$25,000 for improvement of such plans.

There are examples of the type of thing you're seeking, such as DCPA's two emergency operating centers that have not been protected against the blast effect. This is the type of thing Mr. Shafer discussed—the Santa Rosa facility that has a quonset hut covered with dirt. Recent plans on both FPA's part and DCPA's part placed the new center in different locations. FPA was under the assumption and issued guidance that this would be located at Hamilton Air Force Base, a deactivated Air Force activity. DCPA, on the other hand, had plans to go ahead and consolidate its center with the new reserve center being built at Santa Rosa. This didn't come to light at the local level until the requests were submitted to headquarters.

There are a number of these types of problems. For example, again in the Santa Rosa area, DCPA's Region 7, emergency planning is considerably lacking. As Mr. Shafer explained, as the agencies—there are 23 agencies that come under this plan—are supposed to have emergency operating plans. They are supposed to have two teams, one to deploy to the Emergency Operating Center [EOC]—and the other one to function in a separate location. Only 2 of the 23 agencies have an active plan right now.

Mr. MITCHELL. Can you give us a separate statement on that, on the duplication and overlap, for the record?

Mr. GROSSHANS. We can give you a number of examples that might help to clarify this.

[The information submitted for the record follows:]

INADEQUATE COORDINATION AND DUPLICATION AT THE FEDERAL AND STATE LEVELS

Some additional examples of duplication between agencies and between the Federal Government and the States follow.

In the area of State-level emergency preparedness planning, both DCPA and FDAA provide financial assistance. From DCPA, States receive financial assistance in the form of matching funds for personnel and administrative expenses. Personnel receiving these funds are expected to devote some time to preparedness planning. At the same time, States are receiving grants up to \$250,000 from FDAA for natural disaster preparedness planning and are entitled to an additional \$25,000 to update their plans.

Local applications for DCPA assistance and other paperwork needed to participate in DCPA programs are reviewed first by the State and then by the DCPA region. DCPA could reduce its workload considerably if it allowed the States to approve or disapprove local applications.

Both DCPA and FPA operate damage assessment systems. The two agencies have recognized the need for clear delineation of their responsibilities for damage assessment.

Besides the problem of duplication, there is room for improving coordination among DCPA, FPA, and FDAA. Although FPA is responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness programs throughout the Government, FPA officials do not give special attention to coordinating with DCPA and FDAA—the two other agencies with primary preparedness responsibilities. For example, in one region FPA believes FDAA should have the same function in a nuclear attack as it does in a natural disaster, while FDAA believes it would have no responsibilities in a nuclear attack.

FPA is responsible for establishing economic stabilization and resource allocation policies. These policies would be extremely important in a nuclear attack, especially if urban areas were evacuated as DCPA's crisis relocation planning envisions. However, we have found little effort to coordinate FPA's responsibilities with DCPA's relocation planning.

Mr. MITCHELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PROXMIRE. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Shafer, I'm sorry I did not get to hear all of your statement. I have read some of it, in addition to what I did hear. You named three agencies.

Mr. SHAFER. The Defense agency is DCPA, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. The agency in the General Services Administration is the FPA. That's the Federal Preparedness Agency.

Senator SPARKMAN. And what was the last one?

Mr. SHAFER. The last one is the FDAA, the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, and that's located in the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Senator SPARKMAN. How about the coordination? Where is the primary planning responsibility, in the Federal Government or in the States or the local governments?

Mr. SHAFER. Well, I would say that it's a joint effort in that the civil defense needs of each of the various geographical areas are different. Therefore, for the Federal Government to put out standard plans for each of the different geographical and political entities in the Nation would not be practical.

What really happens is that the Federal Government puts out policy guidelines against which the States can react, and then, working, through the regional centers, the States and Federal Government are supposed to jointly participate in the planning. But the planning down at the grass roots level is essentially a State and local effort with encouragement, cooperation, and overall guidance from the Federal Government.

Senator SPARKMAN. If I understand it then, the Federal Government would put out what might be called a general plan and the State

and local governments then would come along and work out the definite plan for that particular area within the concept of the Federal plan.

Mr. SHAFER. That's correct, generally, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now what was it you said about HUD? Didn't you say something about establishing sites against the blast of nuclear weapons?

Mr. SHAFER. No. I think what you're alluding to, Senator, is the fact that, under the concepts of administering and planning our civil defense program to date, the basic direction has been to setting up a warning system, a communications system, and an administrative structure at the Federal level around which the Nation can come together to organize resources in case of an attack or potential attack. The thrust, in terms of protecting the citizens, has been to identify fallout shelters in existing structures and since most of the existing structures that would offer fallout protection are located in the urban and suburban areas, these areas are not very well protected from the blast and thermal effects of a thermonuclear bomb.

The current thinking is that there may be adequate advance warning to enable the evacuation of the urban and suburban population into the hinterlands where they would be protected from the blast and thermal effects of the bomb. This would require the development of a fallout shelter program and a means of sustaining those urban and suburban populations, as well as the rural populations already there, during the period of the crisis and perhaps for some time thereafter, depending upon the nature of the destruction—if it ever occurs.

Senator SPARKMAN. I can recall back quite a number of years ago when there was planning on civil defense and local defense. Right near my home town there is a rather steep mountain about 2,000 feet high and I remember there was a good bit of talk of going back in under that mountain and building shelters. Is that in line with what you're thinking now?

Mr. SHAFER. Well, my general understanding is that this concept you're describing could be a very useful and effective way of protecting even against some of the thermal and blast effects. The experts with whom we've talked have indicated that it requires a rather unusual geographical site to provide protection from a direct hit by one of the very large Soviet thermonuclear bombs in the 30-megaton range. But in general, I would say that the type of facility you have described, if appropriately built and protected, would certainly be the ideal sort of shelter, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you remember a book that was written back a good many years ago, I suppose when the first nuclear bombs were developed, called *No Place to Hide*?

Mr. SHAFER. I recall the title, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think there was another one, *On the Beach*.

Mr. SHAFER. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Aren't they actually pretty realistic?

Mr. SHAFER. As to the first one, I can't address myself because I don't recall the story. But in *On the Beach* the world had suffered a nuclear holocaust, the radiological fallout was slowly spreading throughout the world, and the only surviving population was located in Australia, where the radiological fallout was gradually closing in.

As I understand the studies that have been made by physicists and atomic and nuclear specialists, if a conflagration occurred with the present level of weaponry on both sides, probably the types of circumstances that were portrayed in the *On the Beach* story would not occur. As I said in response to Senator Proxmire's question, a substantial number of people would survive a thermonuclear war under present conditions as we understand them.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't remember who wrote *No Place to Hide*, but I think I'll try to look it up and reread it.

Mr. SHAFER. I think I will try to look it up, too.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, folks. I want to also thank, in addition to Mr. Shafer and Mr. Grosshans, Mrs. Thomson and Mr. Smarrelli. I understand you have done a great deal of very fine work and spent a lot of hours, and we appreciate all the effort you have put in on this.

[For responses to additional questions and answers for the record, see p. 193.]

Our next witness is General Bray. We are happy to have you, General Bray. You're an old friend of the committee. You have testified before us in the past. We welcome you once again.

General Bray, you're head of the Federal Preparedness Agency and as such the principal, No. 1 honcho, in all these matters. So you're the man on the spot. Go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF LESLIE W. BRAY, JR., DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

General BRAY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate this opportunity to participate in your review of U.S. preparedness planning and programs. You had earlier asked me to submit a report on the current state of U.S. preparedness programs and planning within 45 days. This has not been possible because of the necessity to incorporate the various views of other agencies involved in the Federal preparedness function. We are proceeding as rapidly as possible to collect the views of the other agencies and to complete the report. Civil emergency preparedness today faces great challenges, both with respect to how this important activity fits into our evolving nuclear strategy and also how it relates to maintaining our national strength and self-sufficiency in today's changing world.

You have asked that I address you on preparedness from my vantage point as Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency. I am happy to do this and I offer this statement and any additional insights as I can provide in response to your questions.

I would like to associate myself with the basic philosophy of preparedness as expressed by you, Senator Proxmire, in launching these hearings in April [and I paraphrase]: the protection of the lives and property of our citizens is the first function of Government. This extends beyond mere physical protection and survival. It includes the perpetuation of our values, our society, and our institutions.

It follows from this that civil preparedness is a shared responsibility of the various elements of Government—of the Congress and the executive branch, of the President and the Governors of the various States. Civil preparedness involves national readiness for a national

disaster. Unlike natural disasters, which often are major, but never national, civil preparedness must be ready for events that will affect most, if not all, of America.

[Additional material submitted follows:]

Of course, civil preparedness can and does include programs of a local nature such as actions to cope with a shortage of chlorine for municipal water systems.

These hearings are important in that they represent the exercise of that congressional responsibility and your continuing oversight role.

In a somewhat parallel context, I see the function of my agency as performing a similar oversight role for the executive branch. FPA's role is established in executive orders, which in turn have their basis in the statutes. These orders established FPA as the central point of leadership and coordination for national emergency preparedness within the Government, to include the States. To put this role into focus, let me describe how the overall function is carried out.

The responsibility for national emergency preparedness involves virtually every agency of the Federal Government. Based on the principle that emergency programs are best decentralized and associated with ongoing functions of professional offices, each of the major departments and agencies is charged with the preparation of emergency plans and the development of emergency programs for its specific functional area. Thus, plans for emergency food supply of the Nation are developed by the Department of Agriculture; plans for the management of critical transportation, by the Department of Transportation; plans for emergency health measures, by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; plans for the effective use of our manpower resources, by the Department of Labor; plans for vital production, by the Department of Commerce; and so on. Civil defense in the Department of Defense, and national preparedness plans for housing and related community facilities in urban areas in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, like industrial mobilization in the Department of Commerce, are all equally essential elements in this total preparedness. Civil preparedness in its full scope is not now, nor has it ever been, an activity relegated to one or a few specialized offices or services.

The broad basis of this responsibility and its functions are the foundation of the continuing effective civil preparedness effort. It is from this that the program derives its strength, its interface with the society in recognizing and planning for emergency needs, and its responsiveness when emergency occurs. Because civil preparedness is broad based, I am convinced that it is sound and can be depended upon whatever the emergency may be.

But it is this same broad-based comprehensiveness that makes coordination and direction difficult. There is always the problem of imbalance, the likelihood that some aspects of the effort will drift into decline while others are vigorously pursued, and the possibility that as the nature of the threat changes the emphasis will not shift to adequately consider the new dangers.

The FPA role is one of coordination, supervision, and overall policy guidance to insure that there is a consistency and common direction in the national preparedness plans and programs of the individual departments and agencies. I look upon this role as one of monitorship and

as a catalyst to insure that an appropriate level of preparedness planning is achieved.

In carrying out these responsibilities, the Director, FPA, issues annual emergency preparedness policy guidance to all Federal departments and agencies, which in turn report annually to him on their programs. These reports, and preparedness reviews conducted by the FPA staff, provide the means of monitoring the national emergency preparedness status and progress of the departments and agencies. In addition, FPA maintains continuing contact and liaison throughout the Federal family on all aspects of emergency preparedness.

A specific responsibility for working with the States to stimulate State and local participation in emergency preparedness measures is assigned to FPA. This responsibility is carried out primarily through the FPA regional offices working directly with State emergency coordinators and other local officials. However this responsibility does not involve FPA in the operational aspects of such programs as civil defense and natural disaster assistance.

In summary, I believe our foundations for civil preparedness to be sound, and our mechanisms for coordination adequate. There is always room to improve these mechanisms so as to strengthen the process and make it more manageable, and I'm sure this committee will want to address some of these possibilities.

The extent of the responsibilities I have outlined and their ramifications and implications are, I believe, obvious. It is my policy to pursue with purpose and vigor the activities for which we have leadership and coordinating responsibilities. It is my intention to extend and improve our capability and reputation for sound planning and quick response to meet any emergency situation that may arise. Now, Mr. Chairman, I will be glad to respond to any questions.

Senator PROXMIRE. General Bray, thank you, and permit me to make a brief statement before I ask you questions.

I'm sure you realize your statement is a big disappointment to the committee. We had been led to expect something more analytical, more specific, and more forthcoming. I have written to President Ford this morning and I hope he has the power to intercede with the Office of Management and Budget to break loose the report this committee requested of you 11 weeks ago.

[At the time of printing of this hearing record, the report had not been received.]

Now, turning to what is in your statement, I think this sounds like a very plausible theory of organization, but from what Mr. Shafer has told us and from what our own committee inquiry has revealed, the reality looks quite different.

The view we get is of, at best, fragmented and often nonexistent Federal leadership; of weak coordination among the three major Federal preparedness organizations; of a striking deemphasis on preparedness among other agencies which is reflected in reduced budgets in unfilled preparedness positions and in transferring designated preparedness personnel to routine departmental functions. For example, five preparedness personnel at the Interior Department spend at least half their time in liaison with the National Petroleum Council on nonpreparedness-related matters. In another department, the preparedness coordinator position is actually used to provide the Secretary another aide.

It is a picture which includes no comprehensive control over or even knowledge of how much the Federal Government spends each year on preparedness. At the same time there appears to be little or no followup by departments and agencies to remedy the defects which your staff reviews do manage to identify.

Now we have evidence to support each of these findings. Many of the same conclusions have been made by yourself in recent months, General Bray. And as recently as February of 1975 in a report prepared by Consolidated Analysis Centers, Inc., for the Federal Preparedness Agency, the authors stated:

The civil preparedness system as it exists today is fraught with problems that seriously hamper its effectiveness even in peacetime disasters * * * It is a system where literally dozens of agencies, often with duplicate, overlapping, and even conflicting responsibilities, interact.

The authors of the study then go on to analyze these many problems, which include what they call a "disconnect" between the Federal and State levels, poor information flow and analysis and fragmented policy coordination.

What is especially bothersome is that the Federal preparedness bureaucracy has grown while programs and program management have declined. So we are getting less for our money. For example, when the old Office of Emergency Preparedness was terminated in 1973, it had a staff of 334 persons in Washington and regional offices. Of these, 134 were transferred to the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration at HUD; 26 were transferred to Treasury along with the oil import monitoring function; and 167 were transferred to GSA to staff the new Federal Preparedness Agency which has now grown to 628, according to Mr. Shafer and 676 according to earlier testimony by you, General Bray. That's more than tripling in 3 years' time and some officials tell us FPA's actual personnel strength may be closer to 1,000.

As near as we can determine, there is no real Federal leadership in the emergency preparedness business at the present time. As a result, Federal programs are in a mess, as Congressman Mitchell said so well, and getting worse and their decline and fragmentation is affecting State and local programs, many of which are weak to begin with.

I recognize that you have the responsibility, General Bray, under a variety of Executive orders, to supervise, coordinate, and oversee the Federal preparedness effort. But the big question is: Do you have the necessary authority?

When you find an agency is shortchanging or not carrying out its assigned preparedness function, it must be difficult to get compliance from a cabinet member. What actions do you take to insure they fulfill their Executive order responsibilities? Have these actions been successful? Can you give us some concrete examples?

General BRAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Before I do, though, I would like to go back and comment on one aspect of your statement to put my answers into context: the increase in size of the Federal bureaucracy and the Federal establishment.

The figures which you quoted are actually correct to the best of my knowledge. They can, however, be very misleading because at the time that the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) broke up there were other activities supporting OEP that were not actually part of that structure. They belonged to other organizations such as the Depart-

ment of Defense, essentially a major communications organization, a major computer capability, and some housekeeping people required to run some underground protective facilities.

Since the breakup of OEP and the establishment of FPA, those functions have been moved from the Department of Defense to become part of FPA. That is why it appears that the Federal Preparedness Agency has increased in size.

As I have testified before each of the budget committees, in actual fact, though, the FPA has not added any new people at all in the last 3 years that I have been associated with it. There has merely been a restructuring from one department to another department.

Now, obviously that doesn't answer many of the other points which you raised, but I did want to point out that there actually has been no increase in funding level or increase in numbers of people associated with the Federal preparedness activity at the national level. There has simply been a shift from one department and agency to another.

Now let me address the specific question that you raised toward the end of your statement. You asked if I have specific authority to carry out my responsibilities and do I have any particular examples or specific instances showing how I obtain the support and cooperation of cabinet members when my review concludes that improvements are needed in the emergency planning activity of that particular department and agency.

When I talk about the term "civil emergency preparedness planning," I'm talking about a very broad subject involving transportation plans and communications plans and that involves virtually all of the Federal departments and agencies. I have adequate responsibility assigned to me by Executive order. That responsibility is to be the chief adviser to the President in establishing policies relating to civil emergency preparedness. It is my responsibility to be the central focal point for coordination, to be the catalyst, to make sure that nothing falls through the cracks between the various departments and agencies. When there is a conflict in assignment of responsibilities to each of the different Federal departments and agencies, it is my job to resolve it by designating one as the lead agency and another one as a supporting agency.

I think our present organizational structure and the present broad concept of how our Federal Government carries out its emergency planning is sound.

More implicit in your question, though, is do I have the authority; do I have the management tools to carry out these responsibilities?

I must say, Mr. Chairman, I think I have the management tools to maintain what I would consider an adequate or reasonable level of participation, but they are not as good as they should be. I think there's room for improvement.

This is certainly clear in the instances which you have pointed out, when we monitor the activities of the other Departments and Agencies. We do so by conducting rather detailed reviews of how each of the major Departments is carrying out its responsibilities. We call them "onsite readiness reviews." I make a very detailed report of that and send it to the Secretary of the Department involved. In most instances I get a good response from the Department or Agency involved when I point out a specific area of deficiency.

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me give you an example. Supposing you went to Secretary of the Interior Kleppe and said you wanted those people who were in Interior to work on the jobs they are supposed to work on according to the law and not be involved in the petroleum problems. It's a serious problem but for which we have other personnel assigned. What happens? Or have you done that?

General BRAY. Yes; I have had at least two meetings with Secretary Kleppe, not specifically related solely to that area which you mentioned but in a field close enough to it to make a proper context. I did receive at that level very much interest from Secretary Kleppe. I received from him indications of support. We have seen some movement in his Department in some specific areas that I pointed out to him at the times I have talked to him.

Senator PROXMIRE. Are those people now working exclusively on the work they are supposed to be working on?

General BRAY. No, sir. I could not say that the people are working exclusively in that area and I would say, Mr. Chairman, that I really doubt that I would go to a Secretary and say that I can determine externally whether or not a particular employee is doing something that I felt he should not be doing. I would generally express my comments on a broader basis than that and indicate my lack of satisfaction with the way a particular program might be going.

I didn't finish earlier, though. I don't believe all the tools are available to me that are needed to most effectively manage the sort of responsibilities that I have. Now, I have no problems about being part of the General Services Administration. I have received full and adequate support both from the previous Administrator of GSA and the present Administrator of GSA. Many different people involved in emergency planning, both at the Federal and State level, have said to me that they perceived the national action to disband OEP and to relegate this overall coordinating function to a lower level organization, was a lowering of its priority.

I might say to you that the last paragraph of the Executive order that accomplished that reorganization, said this action is in no way intended to reduce the emphasis or the priority or the urgency of such programs. I'm saying to you, though, that it has been perceived by people as being a lower priority. Naturally, if you were operating as a coordinator, the way your role is perceived by the people you're coordinating makes your job difficult, makes it impossible, or makes it relatively easy. I would not categorize it right now as being impossible. I do think it is more difficult than it was when the Director of OEP sat in the Executive Office of the President.

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me see if I can get at what we can do about this. As I understand it, there's no single focal point in the executive or legislative branches for consideration of the entire Federal preparedness budget. So you have no opportunity to advise on or even know about what other Agencies are requesting or receiving to carry out functions for which you have general responsibilities. Would you endorse a combined preparedness program budget, where each Federal preparedness element of whatever size fed in its budget requirements for central review as part of the overall preparedness package? I understand this works very well for avoiding gaps and overlaps between similar armed forces elements in the Department of Defense.

General BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I think that would be an overreaction. I think the problem as you stated it is correct. There is no single point of coordination for budgetary monitoring at this point within the Federal preparedness family. I know of no one that can tell you this morning precisely what was spent or what was requested by the Federal Government in total Federal preparedness programs either in the current fiscal year or in previous fiscal years. I think that's wrong. We need to have a central monitorship, a central focus in the budgetary process.

Similarly, in the congressional review there is no single congressional committee that has addressed itself to the overall funding level of national preparedness programs. I do not think it would be a good idea to consolidate all Federal civil preparedness activities. In the first place, Mr. Chairman, it would be very, very difficult to define.

Senator PROXMIRE. I don't know nearly as much as undoubtedly you know about the executive branch, but as regarding the legislative branch, where I have had 20 years of experience and worked on the appropriations committees as well as here on this committee, I can tell you that unless you do centralize responsibility and fix responsibility you just don't get the job done. If you fix responsibility in a particular committee and the personnel on that committee, and hold them responsible for getting results, you will get results; you are more likely to get results. But, if you don't, I think it's just a formula for not doing a job.

General BRAY. Mr. Chairman, to make sure we understand, I do support a centralized budgetary monitoring role, a focal point that has knowledge of all of the civil preparedness programs, one focal point to serve as the chief adviser to anybody in the review process, both in the executive branch and Congress. I do think that is needed. What I did not agree with—and perhaps you weren't suggesting it—was a full consolidation of the actual funding requests, say of Interior, HUD, Transportation, Justice and so on, in a single budget request. That would be a mistake.

I do think that it would be appropriate to have a single designated congressional source to review and be aware of all Federal preparedness budgetary requests. Such a focal point within the OMB review process would be useful and I think it would be useful for the Federal Preparedness Agency to be responsible for being the monitor and overall coordinator of all preparedness budget matters, but the funding should not be included in the Federal Preparedness Agency budget. I think the decentralized functioning and funding of the Federal departments and agencies is the proper and correct way to plan the budget for the preparedness programs. I simply think there ought to be a monitor with knowledge of the overall budget process to be able to advise everybody involved in the review process.

Senator PROXMIRE. My time is up. Congressman Mitchell.

Mr. MITCHELL. It's good to see you. The last time I saw you, you were testifying before the House Banking and Currency Committee on the strategic stockpile reserve. I think at that time you indicated we could sell some of those reserves. Is that correct?

General BRAY. That's right.

Mr. MITCHELL. You have to help me because I'm brand new on the committee and I need all the help I can get from all sources. Is there something called the Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies? Is there such an animal floating around?

General BRAY. Yes, Mr. Mitchell. It's a draft plan. It has not been approved. It's a plan that my agency has initiated simply because, as I told the chairman, we became aware that emergency responsibilities at the Federal level and between the Federal and State and local levels were not clear. We do have a draft plan.

Mr. MITCHELL. There is such a plan then. What does the plan provide for?

General BRAY. The plan provides for a full range of possible peacetime nuclear emergencies, all the way from a rather simple spillage or a leakage down to and including the possibility of blackmail threats of nuclear detonations and so on, including industrial accidents as well. What the plan attempts to do is assign responsibilities under different categories of situations. The plan will place one agency in the lead role, and others in supporting roles. The development of detailed, specific contingency plans would still be needed for each particular area. We call this Federal Response Plan an overall umbrella plan primarily for the assignment of responsibilities to eliminate possible overlapping, duplication or confusion.

Mr. MITCHELL. This sounds very encouraging. It sounds as though somebody is beginning to do some comprehensive planning in this area. It's in draft form?

General BRAY. I would repeat; it's a draft plan. It's under review at this point by the Federal departments and agencies and the executive branch.

Mr. MITCHELL. What's your timetable for finalizing it? When can I take a look at it?

General BRAY. Well, I'll have to provide the specifics for your record. I have been out of town for the last couple of weeks. We are in sort of the final stages of review. I would hope within a month or so we will be able to distribute the plan, but let me get a specific date for you and provide it for the record, sir.

[Information submitted for the record follows:]

The current draft, which is the fifth one, is dated May 3, 1976. It was sent to the involved federal departments and agencies on May 6 for their formal concurrence. It is anticipated that the month of August and part of September will be needed to resolve issues raised in the comments. This should then permit promulgation of the plan in late September or early October 1976.

Mr. MITCHELL. Could I ask you just one or two more questions? To the best of your knowledge, does the plan provide for radioactive waste disposal accidents? We had that occur in New England this spring I think.

General BRAY. Yes. Again, it would include the assignment of responsibilities, but not a detailed plan of action.

Mr. MITCHELL. I have lots more questions about it, but I will forego some of those questions. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a set of questions for the record which call for detailed information on this Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies.

Senator PROXMIRE. Fine.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now General Bray, educate me a little bit more. Is there something called Plan D?

General BRAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. What's that?

General BRAY. Plan D is a plan that has been in existence for quite a number of years, since in the mid-1960's. It's a plan in which differ-

ent responsibilities are assigned to departments and agencies in the event of an overall nuclear attack upon the United States.

Mr. MITCHELL. A crippling nuclear attack?

General BRAY. Yes. It is a nuclear attack situation.

Mr. MITCHELL. It's been in existence for a number of years?

General BRAY. Yes. We are in the process of updating it at the present time.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is being revised?

General BRAY. Yes.

Mr. MITCHELL. Why?

General BRAY. We're simply going back and looking over that plan and two or three other plans that had been in existence since the mid-1960's. We felt there had been sufficient change in-between with our relationships with the Soviet Union, the threat, the overall position of our country and elsewhere in the world, that warranted reviewing it for possible change. So it's simply an updating to make sure it's current with today's real world.

Mr. MITCHELL. In short, I guess what you're saying is that at one time we were assuming an understanding, an achievement of some sort of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. There was one plan in effect for that time period. Then it appears that détente thinking is out the window and we are now rethinking and relooking at this plan in terms of the Soviets being a real threat during this presidential election year?

General BRAY. Let me correct one thing. Our planning has always included the possibility that the Soviet Union or some other country may conduct a nuclear attack on the United States and Plan D was intended to outline responsibilities and situations to try to cope with that. The plan would still basically do that. It's simply to review our present executive structure and our present assignment of responsibilities to make sure nothing has fallen through the cracks and everything previously written is still correct. It does not reflect basic change in strategy.

[See Appendix II, p. 224 for further information on Plan D.]

Mr. MITCHELL. It has no relationship to the pronouncements being issued by the Secretary of State about the strong defense against the Soviets? I'm curious as to whether this is just a routine revision or did this revision occur because someone said "Look, the bad boys who became good boys are now getting to be bad boys again, so let's review the plan."

General BRAY. No, sir; it was not that. I was not instructed to do it on any policy change. It was simply my review to make sure the plans were current and up to date and accomplished the purposes for which they were intended.

Mr. MITCHELL. You had indicated that, among your other many responsibilities, you have to deal with emergencies or crises in terms of economic preparedness. You mentioned that the Department of Commerce gets involved there. What kind of crisis management efforts are pursued or are capable of being pursued, let's say specifically, through the Department of Commerce. This is a followup to your question, Mr. Chairman. If we've got Brezhnev and his hordes flying across the ocean, do you call the Secretary of Commerce and say, "Look, let's get cracking." What do you tell him to crack on?

General BRAY. Let me respond in three parts. First, we do have a very close and continued relationship with the Department of Commerce particularly in the implementation and management of the Defense Production Act of 1950 by which we provide priorities on normal defense contracts and other normal programs. Second, we also maintain very close relationships with the Department of Defense in what we call the defense industrial mobilization programs. That's to make sure we have adequate factories, adequate production capacity to meet our wartime—

Mr. MITCHELL. Let me interrupt you. I told you I'm a slow learner. Let's keep it focused on the Department of Commerce. That's kind of finite and I want to ask you specifically what constitutes this business of crisis management efforts with the Department of Commerce. Let's focus in on that one as an illustration.

General BRAY. I think, as an illustration—and again, let me point out, one of my responsibilities in terms of industrial preparedness of economic preparedness is in the Executive order that says I'm responsible for maintaining a research and development capability to help predict and monitor possible materiel shortages for the future. In other words, in the aftermath of the oil embargo, where are we next apt to run into materiel shortages? Is it going to be chromium, bauxite, zinc, lead—in what area do we have to work? We are quite concerned with developing our analytical capability and we are putting a lot of work into it along with the Department of Commerce which provides input data to us, and these econometric projections of where and how are we apt to run into a shortage, particularly a critical resource interruption.

Now when we do, Mr. Mitchell, we then try to determine how big the problem is and what sort of program should we have. Should we increase our stockpile, increase our productive capacity, try to develop substitutes or develop conservation programs? Those are the sorts of things we try to work out with the Department of Commerce and other interested departments as well, but I'll limit it just to the Department of Commerce.

As to crisis management, the one that comes to mind was the little incident a couple years ago when we had a truckers stoppage and we had all the trucks stop rolling on the highways. In managing that crisis, we activated in the Federal Preparedness Agency a situation room manned with representatives from Commerce, Justice, the FBI and all the other appropriate departments and agencies; we prepared specific contingency plans assessing how bad the situation was becoming, what options were available to the President or to the executive authorities, and how far could the situation deteriorate before we needed to take some other positive action? So we do have mechanisms already established in writing, already established in forms of committees working with other departments and agencies, in the crisis management role. And our purpose is first, to coordinate and make sure everybody in the Federal Government is using the same base of information; second, to assist in gathering the information; third, to conduct some evaluations, some analytical evaluations of the impact of this particular crisis; and fourth, to do the contingency planning outlining the options which we then provide to the decision-making authorities. That's our role, along with Commerce and other depart-

ments and agencies, in the area of resource interruption, as we call it, in the crisis management area.

Mr. MITCHELL. My time is up and I have a number of other questions which, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will give to General Bray to ask him to respond to them. Thank you very much.

Senator PROXMIRE. Fine. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. I have no further questions.

Senator PROXMIRE. General Bray, I want to thank you very, very much. As I say, we are disappointed that we don't have the report we requested. We hope we will have it just as soon as possible and in spite of my criticism of the operation, I think we are all very impressed by your remarkable grasp of the situation, your articulateness, your intelligence and your determination to do the best job you can under the circumstances.

General BRAY. Thank you very much.

(For responses to additional questions for the record, see p. 187.)

Senator PROXMIRE. Our final witness this morning is Governor Coldwell of the Federal Reserve Board. We are delighted to have you, Governor Coldwell. I understand that Mr. Grimwood is with you.

What you're testifying on I think is one of the most fascinating developments I have read of in a long time. I read in the *Washington Post* a few months ago about a \$4 billion cache in small bills—I think they said something like \$1 billion in ones and the rest pretty much in fives and tens that were out at the Culpeper relocation site in the event of a nuclear disaster, so, if everything else in the country were destroyed, we'd still have a money supply—no people, water or food, but we'd have a lot of cash. That fascinated me. I was very interested in that because it seems that the one area where we are prepared is to have these dollars, even though I don't know what we'd do with them. But the dollars would be there in the event we have an absolute total nuclear disaster. I was concerned that we would expend so much effort on that and so little on what seems to me to be the essential problem of saving lives and providing the necessities that people have to have. I'm sure there's some kind of an answer and you're a very skilled and able man and I'm sure you can give us a good answer. Go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP E. COLDWELL, GOVERNOR, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD; ACCOMPANIED BY GORDON B. GRIMWOOD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR AND PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR CONTINGENCY PLANNING

Mr. COLDWELL. Mr. Chairman, I'm happy to have this opportunity to describe to the Joint Committee the responsibilities of the Federal Reserve System in the emergency preparedness area and our plans to carry out those responsibilities if necessary.

Federal Reserve System involvement in contingency planning for an attack on the United States began in the early 1950's. It was formalized in 1956 when the Office of Defense Mobilization issued a Defense Mobilization order to the Board. That order was superseded by Presidential Executive orders, the most recent of which is Executive Order 11490 dated June 11, 1976.

The Federal Preparedness Agency has designated the Federal Reserve a Category A agency, which means that we have essential func-

tions that must be continued during an attack and in an immediate postattack period. The Executive order requires, among other things, that such agencies maintain alternate headquarters and sites for the storage of duplicate essential records.

More specifically, the Executive order charges the heads of the Federal bank supervisory agencies, including the Federal Reserve Board, with responsibility for developing emergency plans, programs and regulations to cope with the potential economic effects of mobilization or an attack. Functions which the order specifies must be carried on include (1) provision and regulation of money and credit; (2) acquisition, decentralization, and distribution of currency; (3) collection of checks; (4) fiscal agency and foreign operations; (5) provision for the continued or resumed operations of financial institutions; and (6) provision of necessary liquidity to those institutions.

These policies and plans are not directed at the areas of the country that would be devastated by an exchange of high yield nuclear weapons. Rather, they are aimed at the undamaged or lightly damaged areas where national survival might depend upon maintaining economic momentum and organized economic activity. This is a point that is often overlooked by those who, quite understandably, are preoccupied by the terrible problems that would confront us in the damaged areas. I should point out also that these plans are based on a general war—an "all out" nuclear exchange. However, we have examined the problems that would be generated by a limited exchange such as the one being examined by this committee. We have concluded that the same plans would apply, the difference being one of magnitude. The plans would be easier to implement, since presumably a large number of our normal operating facilities would survive, and problems of communication and control would be less difficult.

The Board and the Reserve banks have organized themselves to meet the responsibilities outlined briefly above by establishing alternate headquarters and duplicate record storage sites in nontarget areas. In the Board's case, we have been able to combine these functions at a facility which also operates our vital communications system on a day-to-day basis. Lists of officials and staff who would relocate to these sites when instructed to do so have been established and are kept current. Succession lists are maintained on a current basis. Delegations of authority which would be triggered by an attack have been made to Reserve banks that might be out of communication with the Board.

The problem of insuring a currency supply is made difficult by the facts that the only production source of Federal Reserve notes is the Bureau of Engraving and Printing here in Washington, and that almost all of the Reserve banks and branches are in potential target areas. We have established an inventory of the various denominations of Federal Reserve notes at our facility at Culpeper, Va., to provide a cushion until the Bureau could get back into production. Since we must assume that high-speed equipment at normal operating facilities would not be available, plans for maintaining the check collection and currency distribution systems involve a high degree of decentralization. Check agent and cash agent banks, each serving a small geographic area, have agreed to perform these functions in an emergency

for the Federal Reserve. Each agent bank has been furnished instructions and the necessary forms. Most importantly, we have informed the banks and other financial institutions about these plans in detail by distributing to each copies of emergency regulations, operating circulars, and operating letters. These plans and policies have been tested, to the extent that they can be, during national tests and exercises held over the past 20 years. In 1974 an interagency committee of the Federal financial agencies reevaluated the post attack financial policies and recommended no changes.

However, the basic assumptions underlying these plans, particularly those relating to national survival and continuity of government, have not been revised since 1966. In that period the political and military situations have changed materially. For that reason, as we informed the Joint Committee in our last annual report, Chairman Burns has asked that these assumptions be reexamined. We understand that General Bray is chairing an interagency steering group which is engaged in such a study. In the meantime, we plan to maintain emergency preparedness programs at the Board and at the Reserve Banks at their present levels until we are advised differently by the Administration or by the Congress.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, you have asked about the need for such emergency preparedness plans. In my opinion, the national emergency plans on the civil side of government are a necessary complement to the defense efforts on the military side. As long as there are such emergency plans, and in this disturbed and unsettled world they seem to be a requirement, the plans and programs I have outlined for the Federal Reserve are a fundamental feature underlying all other plans since the others assume a functioning monetary system. I will be glad to respond to any questions you have.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Coldwell follows:]

STATEMENT BY PHILIP E. COLDWELL, MEMBER, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

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Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Governor Coldwell.

As I indicated, I think it's ironic that the one kind of resource that we seem to have planned for carefully and effectively and protected is \$1, \$5 and \$10 bills, so in the event of a nuclear attack we would have the cash available. You do go much farther than that, of course, in indicating that the check system, the system of keeping records on the monetary part of our economy would be maintained. Can you tell me whether or not there are other similar places like Culpeper around the

country which provide alternative storage facilities and facilities similar to Culpeper in other Federal Reserve areas or elsewhere?

Mr. COLDWELL. Mr. Chairman, we have no other place that we have designated as an emergency storage supply for currency. We do have other places in our normal operating facilities which have some capacity to store in their regular vaults, but a good many of these facilities, as I pointed out in my testimony, are in high-risk areas.

Senator PROXMIRE. Now would these also be places where key Federal Reserve personnel could go so they would be protected?

Mr. COLDWELL. Yes, sir. For example, in the Dallas district, there is an emergency relocation site some 60 miles from the Dallas bank, but it is outside of the area of immediate target and essential personnel of the Dallas bank have been instructed to go to that relocation site.

Senator PROXMIRE. How do you determine the very delicate and really terrible kind of decision as to whose life is saved and whose isn't? Who would go out? Would the seven Governors of the Federal Reserve Board be among the first or the last? In the tradition of the captain being the last to leave the ship, would Governor Burns stand here in Washington until everybody else was gone or would he be there first?

Mr. COLDWELL. Mr. Chairman, that is a detail which, as you have already pointed out, would be a terrible decision to make. We make it on the basis of who can be most effective at the particular time at the particular location. For the regional banks, it's largely individuals who would be in charge of the policy making and the particular operating functions which could be performed.

Senator PROXMIRE. How about here in Washington? Would you and your six other colleagues be evacuated to Culpeper?

Mr. COLDWELL. There are evacuation plans but they are not precise as to the location for each member of the Board.

Senator PROXMIRE. You mentioned that Chairman Burns has questioned the assumptions underlying emergency preparedness for nuclear attack, particularly relating to continuity of Government. I think it was a breath of fresh air when the Joint Committee last year was informed that someone was looking at these assumptions. Are you at liberty to discuss the particular concerns that gave rise to Dr. Burns' request for a review? He told me he was very concerned about it.

Mr. COLDWELL. Well, I can give you a little of the history, Mr. Chairman, because I was a part of the process that brought this to Chairman Burns' attention. We had a deep evaluation of the cost of maintaining this process of emergency planning and preparedness in the Federal Reserve System, and that evaluation raised in our minds the question of whether we were really doing what needed to be done, and this raised the further question as to the level of the assumptions which, of course, were critical to the development of the whole process.

Senator PROXMIRE. Well, one of the immediate costs and, of course, I'm sure it occurred to everybody that read that *Washington Post* article¹ saying that you've got \$4 billion out there in Culpeper, is that you must have a somewhat costly security system. After all, that would make a pretty sweet heist. That would make the great train robbery in England, that was one of the biggest ever. I guess, small potatoes. I suppose it would be hard to cart away all that currency. You'd need a number of very large trucks to do it. At the same time, in all serious-

¹ Referring to Washington Post article of Thursday, February 26, 1976.

ness, I imagine you do have a rather elaborate and expensive security system because you have the currency, not because you have the other things—the records, which would be of no value to anybody stealing them but would be of immense value in maintaining order and control in our economy. Can you tell us what is the cost of protecting this nest egg?

Mr. COLDWELL. Mr. Chairman, the Culpeper facility itself was constructed at a very modest cost, given the size of the facility.

Senator PROXMIRE. What was that modest cost?

Mr. COLDWELL. We informed you at the time of your request, Mr. Chairman, that capital expenditures were \$6.9 million to construct the facility. What we constructed there was a facility for joint use, regular use in terms of the operation of our communications facilities, and standby use in terms of emergency functions.

Now as far as day-to-day operating costs in 1975, they were \$2.5 million. About \$1.2 million of that was for emergency preparedness protection.

Senator PROXMIRE. About \$1.2 of the \$2.5 million is because you have this large amount of cash to protect?

Mr. COLDWELL. Right.

Senator PROXMIRE. I think Chairman Burns requested this review nearly 3 years ago, in September of 1973. Have you any idea why it's taken so long to respond to that request, especially by a man as powerful and as effective as we all know Chairman Burns is? It seems to me when he asks for a review, he shouldn't have to wait 3 years for it.

Mr. COLDWELL. I don't believe I should comment as to why others have not finished the review. I know the review has been underway, Senator, and I can't tell you why the review hasn't been done.

Senator PROXMIRE. Are you confident there is a good faith review being made?

Mr. COLDWELL. I believe so, yes.

Senator PROXMIRE. I can't understand why it takes so long. It's not complicated as to what you handle before the board of governors several times a month.

Mr. COLDWELL. Perhaps I ought to let Mr. Grimwood make a comment here.

Mr. GRIMWOOD. If I may, Mr. Chairman, there were actually two reviews. The first request went to Mr. Ash and he wrote back and suggested that we do a review.

Senator PROXMIRE. That was when he was head of OMB?

Mr. GRIMWOOD. That is correct. He wrote back and suggested that we make a study on the post attack financial policies, which we did, and Governor Coldwell referred to that report in his testimony. Chairman Burns did not think that that met with what he really wanted to find out, so he made another request, this time to the head of General Services Administration, who had delegated responsibility from the President. That is the study General Bray is now chairing and I'm sure that it is a good faith study and review, and that it is going forward.

Senator PROXMIRE. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I'm rather intrigued by all of this planning, but it raises some questions in my mind. I wonder what plans are made for people who will be left with blank check-books and maybe the bank has been obliterated. Will the money be

taken out of that bank and stored away someplace? How are you going to carry on things during all of this time?

Mr. COLDWELL. Senator, our efforts have been to make sure that in each fairly small, discrete regional area there will be a bank which can operate for the Federal Reserve in clearing checks and in handling cash shipments. We, in turn, have assured those banks that we will sustain their liquidity either through a direct loan to the bank or by direct shipments from the nearest available facility.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, the Federal Reserve will assume the responsibility of making things as nearly normal as possible?

Mr. COLDWELL. That is correct, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I hand it to you for foreseeing and planning.

Mr. COLDWELL. We try. We obviously cannot guess every circumstance which might occur here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PROXMIRE. Before I yield to Congressman Evans, I can't resist observing that this is one area where we will have a relatively orderly situation, but just imagine the situation—with the cities leveled, with tens of millions of Americans dead, with others dying of radioactive disease, with factories leveled right and left with all this immense amount of property destroyed, wealth destroyed—the checking system, the banking system, the availability of dollar bills, and so forth will be there. These have always seemed to me to be the symbols of wealth rather than the reality. Somehow, I just have a vision of the reality being destroyed and crumbling and all we've got left are pieces of paper that don't really mean very much.

Mr. COLDWELL. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think this—

Senator PROXMIRE. The reason I say that is because this is a worst case situation I describe. As you say, you are prepared for an absolute all out nuclear attack on the United States. That's what you're prepared for.

Mr. COLDWELL. But even there, there will be areas which will be untouched or lightly damaged, and it's been our responsibility to make sure that the economy can recover. There's very little the Federal Reserve can do in the severely damaged areas. Our responsibilities will be to make sure that the economy can redevelop and that's the focus of our plan.

Senator PROXMIRE. Congressman Evans.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Governor Coldwell, you mentioned that you do have plans for alternate headquarters, alternate record storage, duplicate record storage in nontarget areas. Who has made the decisions as to where these nontarget areas presumably are in this country?

Mr. COLDWELL. That has been a decision of the emergency preparedness and defense establishment.

Mr. EVANS. Did you have any input? Did the Federal Reserve have any input into this type of decisionmaking?

Mr. COLDWELL. Well, I can't say that we have any expertise on the way in which bombs may fall, so I don't believe we really had much to say. This has been a defense matter, a military targeting question.

Mr. EVANS. Right. I presume you have some expertise in some areas at the Federal Reserve Board and so I wondered if any type of infor-

mation had been transmitted to the Board in terms of making these decisions. That was my question and I guess you have said no.

Mr. COLDWELL. I'm sorry. I misunderstood your question. We were given the information about the targeting areas.

Mr. EVANS. I understand also that Chairman Brown of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has said that the United States is currently retargeting some of our missiles against warmaking capability that we are interested in hitting in the Soviet Union. I presume the Soviet Union is constantly retargeting their launch vehicles also. Wouldn't it make sense that the Soviets would have some type of information as to where we would store information and records and so forth vital to our warmaking and recovery effort in what we would presume to be nontarget areas in this country? How do we get the idea that the Soviets feel these are nontarget areas?

Mr. COLDWELL. Well, I believe you're right, and I wouldn't downgrade the Soviet intelligence in that sense. I think they probably are retargeting and we have changed some of our assumptions on targeting areas in the United States and therefore have changed some of our relocation sites.

Mr. EVANS. So it's really a game then of trying to outguess the other side?

Mr. COLDWELL. It's an ongoing thing.

Mr. EVANS. How long would you estimate, if we did suffer a first blow from the Soviet Union or even a retaliatory attack upon this country, it would take to get back into the business of currency production?

Mr. COLDWELL. Probably a year to 2 years, Congressman. If Washington itself were badly damaged so that the equipment were gone and the trained personnel were gone, it would take a year to 2 years to get back into production.

Mr. EVANS. Are there other locations where high speed presses of the type used down at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing could be found or is this site in Washington the only one in this country?

Mr. COLDWELL. It's the only one, but there are some obsolete pieces of equipment which the Bureau of Printing and Engraving is considering storing elsewhere.

Mr. EVANS. And you would consider those to be backup presses although they are currently not stored in any type of hard sites in this country?

Mr. COLDWELL. I can't give you an answer exactly where they are right now. Two of them have been stored, but not in hardened sites.

Mr. EVANS. I understand you to say two presses have been stored?

Mr. GRIMWOOD. Two have been stored, Congressman, and eight remain to be removed and stored.

Mr. EVANS. But there are plans underway to make that move?

Mr. GRIMWOOD. Yes, sir.

Mr. EVANS. It would seem to make a great deal of sense for that type of move to be carried out with a great deal of urgency, in that here we have the possibility of storing an alternate source of printing of currency instead of storing billions of dollars of cash.

Mr. COLDWELL. We will be reappraising our storage of cash once the storage of the equipment takes place.

Mr. EVANS. When would that be carried out? Within the next number of months?

Mr. COLDWELL. Within the next year.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you. Well, we thank you very, very much, gentlemen. You have been most helpful to us. I must say I wholeheartedly agree with Dr. Burns in his skepticism about this operation and the assumptions behind it and I do hope, General Bray, that you will be able to make that report to Dr. Burns just as soon as possible. Not only is he a very important man in our overall economic situation, but he's an extremely wise and thoughtful man, one of the wisest in the Government, and I think his skepticism is certainly warranted. Thank you very much.

(For responses to additional questions for the record, see p. 278)

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning when we reconvene in room 1114.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to be reconvened at 10 a.m., Tuesday, June 29, 1976.]

FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 1976

U.S. CONGRESS,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION,
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 1114, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David Evans presiding.

Present: Congressmen David Evans, Garry Brown and Parren Mitchell.

Also present: Bill Kincade, staff director, and Rhett Dawson, minority counsel.

Mr. EVANS. The hearing will come to order. Senator Proxmire could not be here this morning because of a Senate Banking Committee markup, and he has asked me to conduct today's hearings.

Yesterday the Joint Committee began the public portion of its inquiry into the condition of the Nation's civil emergency preparedness effort, hearing testimony primarily on Federal organization and programs.

Today we will continue with another aspect of the Federal preparedness scene, hearing testimony on post-disaster rehabilitation programs from Mr. Thomas Dunne, Administrator of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration.

We will also look at local preparedness programs at the city and county level. For this purpose we are privileged to have as witnesses Mr. George R. Rodericks, Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness of the District of Columbia, and Mr. Cecil Russell, Director of Emergency Services of Huntington, W. Va., and president of the U.S. Civil Defense Council, an association of 2,500 municipal and county preparedness officials.

In the earlier hearing the committee examined different types of preparedness organizations and programs, as well as different levels of organizations. We will continue that focus throughout. But today I think it is important that we add another dimension to our thinking and address preparedness measures in terms of sequence. That is, how are preparedness tasks differentiated in time and how do agency responsibilities shift with changes in tasks from pre-disaster operations to disaster and relief operations to post-disaster rehabilitation.

A question which arose in yesterday's hearings which I believe will and should be another important theme in these discussions is how we set preparedness priorities. There seems to be feeling among some State and local officials that the Federal Government has, perhaps unwittingly, deemphasized preparedness programs across the board. Still others seem to feel that the Federal Government has become ex-

cessively preoccupied with civil preparedness for nuclear attack, even though the public utterances of Presidents and Defense Secretaries characterize nuclear attack as an extremely remote contingency.

On the other hand, Federal officials express concern that State and local agencies are not giving sufficient attention to nationwide emergencies such as nuclear attack. They observe that State and local governments favor programs aimed at recurring local and regional disasters, such as floods or earthquakes, while slighting their capability for other contingencies.

Somehow these differing perceptions and interests have to be harmonized into an integrated set of priorities if we are to have a common effort that welds together agencies and individuals at all levels of government. If we do not have common priorities and agreement on those priorities, then the so-called national civil emergency preparedness effort will continue to be a loose confederation handicapped by internal disagreement, with different segments pulling in different directions. With relatively few resources available, we can't afford that kind of disagreement over their use.

Our first witness today will be Mr. Dunne. He will be followed by Mr. Rodericks and Mr. Russell, both of whom bring extensive backgrounds in preparedness to their present assignments. I will ask each of you to limit your oral summaries to 15 minutes. Then we will follow with questions and answers.

Mr. Dunne, I would like to welcome you this morning, and ask you to proceed with your oral statement. I expect to be interrupted several times this morning with quorum calls and votes in the House of Representatives. If there are other members of the committee who are here, I will ask them to carry on. If not, Mr. Bill Kincaide, Staff Director of the Joint Committee, will go ahead with the meeting until I can return.

So if you would, please begin.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. DUNNE, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss disaster preparedness and the responsibilities of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration.

I wish to congratulate your committee for approaching the subject of preparedness from the standpoint of basic requirements rather than simply from an organizational point of view.

First, I would like to give you a brief summary of the program which I administer. The basic authority for the Federal Government's disaster assistance program is the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, which was enacted on May 22, 1974.

The purpose of the act, as set forth in Section 101, is to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to supplement the efforts of State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from disasters.

The word assistance is a very important one. Federal legislation recognizes that the first response and recovery efforts will come from the people directly affected by the disaster. Cities, towns, and counties respond daily to disasters which do not require outside assistance. If the occurrence is severe and widespread, local governments may turn to the State for help.

The State, in turn, may ask for help from the Federal Government. It should be noted that Federal disaster assistance under the act is initiated only upon a request from the Governor of a State and a declaration by the President. The Governor's request must be based on his finding that effective response is beyond the capability of the State and the affected local governments. The President's declaration of a major disaster is made upon his determination that the damage is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant Federal assistance under the act to supplement the efforts and available resources of the States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating damage, loss, hardship or suffering.

All of the authorities in the act are given to the President. The assistance authorities which are activated by the President's declaration have been delegated to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. She has delegated them to the Administrator, FDAA. As the Administrator, I also have the responsibility for appointing a Federal Coordinating Officer in each disaster. The Federal Coordinating Officer is the primary Federal official in the disaster area. His particular concern is coordination of Federal support of the State and local efforts.

The act provides for assistance to local and State governments, mostly for repair and restoration of publicly owned facilities. Generally, assistance is in the form of financial grants. The affected government, under its own regular management procedures, does the necessary work. Assistance is also given directly to individuals in the form of temporary housing, unemployment assistance, food and food coupons, and grants for other necessary expenses or serious needs. Disaster loans are made by the Small Business Administration and by the Farmers Home Administration.

The Disaster Relief Act also authorizes preparedness grants to the States for developing plans, programs and capabilities, especially for making use of Federal disaster assistance. All States—and other jurisdictions defined as "States" in the act—57 in all—except the Canal Zone, are participating. The average grant is \$248,000.

Mr. Chairman, you may have heard and probably will hear discussion on a number of issues related to preparedness: recommendations for more flexibility in the use of Federal funds for preparedness planning; recommendations for more effective coordination of preparedness at the Federal level; and recommendations for the reorganization of the executive branch. It is possible that many of these recommendations deal with the symptoms and not with the disease, if indeed there is a disease. I do not wish to imply that I have the answers.

Mr. EVANS. Excuse me, Mr. Dunne. I have to leave for a few moments. So if you will continue your statement, Mr. Kincaid will carry on at the beginning of the questions.

Mr. DUNNE. Certainly.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you.

Mr. DUNNE. In fact, we in FDAA have wrestled with the concerns expressed during Representative Leggett's hearings and which were summarized so clearly in his committee report.¹ But I don't believe that we can accept without challenge the premise that emergency preparedness will suffer seriously without change in authority or organization.

The position has been stated that there is a need for a higher level of preparedness support, both in funding and official emphasis. The need for greater flexibility in the use of Federal funds has been argued on the basis that emergency planning is much the same for all emergencies and disasters. There is strong and sincere support for more and better preparedness without a clear expression of how much more preparedness is needed and what it should be. I cannot accept as a principle that more of everything is necessarily good; more money, more activity, more priority, indeed more preparedness may not be the answer.

In your study, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that these basic questions could be addressed:

What does the Federal Government require of the State and local governments to assure the survival of the Nation in the event of a national emergency?

Who should be responsible for funding these activities?

What is expected of State and local governments in meeting local disasters?

What is the proper role of the Federal Government in supporting State and local governments in preparing for and responding to local disasters?

We ought to look at what is and what ought to be so that we can chart a more precise course than the general recommendations for more money and reorganization seem to suggest.

I believe that it is important, for example, that we identify specifically what is expected of State and local governments in their role of supporting the Nation in the time of an enemy attack or national emergency.

Under the present arrangement, this is by law a joint effort of the Federal, State and local governments. The question of who should bear the financial burden of this task should be re-examined. Can we as a Nation afford to have the level of funding for national emergency preparedness activities left to the persuasive ability of State and local government civil defense officials? We need to ask ourselves, for both national emergencies and the programs that I administer, who is responsible for what in the area of emergency preparedness.

There is a school of thought that emergency planning and organization is essentially the same for national emergencies as it is for localized disasters. I don't believe this is true. We may have become confused by the use of common terms and by examining the recognized similarities rather than looking at the differences.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that there is a fundamental difference between preparedness for national emergencies and preparedness for local disasters. I believe that Federal Government preparedness, and more particularly State and local government pre-

¹ Report [H.A.S.C. No. 94-39], Hearings [H.A.S.C. No. 94-42] by the Civil Defense Panel of the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services.

paredness, will suffer if this difference is overlooked and only the similarities are considered.

In my opinion, there are two distinct types of emergency planning, one is national in scope and the other is local in scope.

Let me illustrate the different approaches to planning and preparedness which this statement suggests.

In the event of an enemy attack, our Nation must respond as a unit in the effective allocation of its vital resources, which include people, materials, technology, and industrial production. An enemy attack may require a rationing system. It may require that States and local governments go for weeks without resources and assistance from the Federal Government. State and local governments will be required to contribute to the survival of the Nation as a whole and to carry out national programs and priorities, some of which may be disadvantageous to an individual State or local government. The Federal Government must exercise a national leadership and management role as well as provide logistics support and technical assistance to State and local governments.

When a flood or tornado hits a community, there is no national emergency in the sense that all sections of the country must go into emergency operations. People outside the affected area go right on with their normal ways of living. Their governments remain unaffected. The disaster-affected community provides its own leadership and management for its own reconstruction and recovery. The Governor may ask the President for assistance to help the State carry out its responsibilities in alleviating hardship and suffering. The Federal Government involvement is limited to the needs identified by the Governor in his request for help. Even in this country's largest natural disasters, there has been no need for a national rationing system, or for the declaration of a national emergency. In local disasters, the role of the State and local governments is dominant; the Federal role is secondary and supportive. The requirements for leadership and resource management remain with local and State governments. The Federal Government provides money, material, and technical support as needed.

In local disasters, the goal is to restore the affected area to its pre-disaster status. In a national emergency, particularly enemy attack, the goal must be survival of the Nation in the best possible posture. In other words, in local disasters the critical issues are: "What is damaged?"; and "What needs to be repaired?" In an enemy attack, the critical issues are: "What is left?"; "How do you save it?"; "How can it best be used in the preservation of the Nation?"

Most State and local government officials know how to manage their affairs. I firmly believe that they know, better than Federal officials do, how to manage their own resources.

In a local disaster, what they need is money and other resources to support their recovery efforts, not a new set of managers or management techniques.

Congress, in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, recognized this distinction. The act states that the authorized Federal assistance is to supplement State and local efforts. Regarding his prospective relationship with the Federal Government, the local official planning to meet local disasters should answer such questions as: "Where do I get help?";

"What may I do with it when I get it?" and "How must I account for it?"

In the event of an enemy attack, local officials are probably going to need more than the promise of money and supplemental resources. They will need new skills and new techniques to deal with the unique effects of nuclear weapons. They will need to rely heavily on their own existing resources and they will need to know how to use those resources in the manner which will contribute most to national survival.

I believe these differences are important to recognize. It would be nice if we could find the common denominators so that single plans would serve all emergencies. In FDAA we intend to continue to seek out these common denominators. But I believe that concentration on the commonalities alone could leave us less well prepared for either a local flood or a nuclear strike on our Nation by an enemy.

As your committee studies the issues you will probably examine the question of "dual use." The concept of dual use makes sense where it is applied with reason. Representative Leggett's study on civil defense recognizes the potential problem.

The report says: "The other horn of the dilemma is that preoccupation with natural disaster needs and consequent allocation of resources to meet those needs can be carried so far that the civil defense mission dries up. The State and local civil defense organization may derive half of its support funds from the Federal civil defense agency, but apply them only incidentally to civil defense purposes. In other words, the primary mission in theory can become secondary in fact."

Mr. Chairman, I realize that I have asked more questions than I have offered solutions. But I believe that if we know what the critical questions are, the answers will be much more readily apparent. We should be unwilling to grope for solutions to problems that we are unable to define. We may be lucky and hit upon the best balance between the idealism of the planner and pragmatics of annual budgets—and between reasonable protection and reasonable risk. But if we do find that balance, it will be by accident as long as our only motivation is to "do more."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to participate in this extremely important study. This completes my prepared statement.

I will be pleased to answer any questions.

[Complete statement of Mr. Dunne follows:]

STATEMENT BY THOMAS P. DUNNE, DIRECTOR FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss disaster preparedness and the responsibilities of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. I wish to congratulate your committee for approaching the subject of preparedness from the standpoint of basic requirements rather than simply from an organizational point of view.

First, I would like to give you a brief summary of the program which I administer. The basic authority for the Federal Government's disaster assistance program is the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, which was enacted on May 22, 1974.

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which do not require outside assistance. If the occurrence is severe and widespread, local governments may turn to the State for help.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to participate in this extremely important study. This completes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions.

Mr. KINCADE. Thank you very much, Mr. Dunne. On behalf of the committee, I would like to take up with you if I may, until Mr. Evans returns, some technical questions. I know Congressman Evans will want to address the policy issues. We are anxious to find out more about the role of your agency in functional and technical terms for the record.

I wonder if you could tell me what criteria are used for judging whether, after a natural disaster, the damages are beyond the capability of State or local resources to manage.

Mr. DUNNE. Do you have a couple of hours?

Mr. KINCADE. I gather they are extensive.

Mr. DUNNE. I will try and give you a brief overview. The act generally spells out the criteria without establishing definite thresholds. We do not use dollar thresholds, even though we do look at dollar estimates of damage. What we have tried to do is measure what the unmet needs of the people or the communities will be, after application of the available resources that the Governor tells us can be applied or will be applied to a given situation. We know that local governments have certain inherent resources that will be used—the police, the firemen, the health facilities, et cetera. We also know that communities will look at their budgets and, while they may be strained in today's financial crisis, that they will and have to, by law, spend money in meeting the effects of the disaster. We take a look at what assistance the States are able to provide under their legislation, and what their resource availability is.

We consider the amount of insurance, whether or not that's in force. We look at the impact in terms of hardship and suffering, which is very difficult to measure. You can measure loss and damage but it's hard to measure the hardship and the suffering.

After we get the available information, we analyze the situation not necessarily in terms of how many dollars are involved, but in terms of what is going to happen if the Federal Government does not pro-

vide financial assistance. Are people going to be without housing? Are people going to be able to repair their damaged houses? Are people unemployed? Are people going to be without food? We have to go through a series of questions such as these, using the description of the disaster area that is provided by the Governor.

We have found in applying this logic that approximately two-thirds of the requests that come in from governors are subsequently declared major disasters or emergencies by the President, approximately one-third are turned down or another, more limited, form of Federal assistance, such as SBA or Farmers Home Loan Administration loans is provided.

So what we do is attempt to measure the damage and loss and then try to determine what the need is. We then must decide whether it is necessary for the Federal Government to come in and supplement the efforts and resources that can be made available by the communities and by the States in question.

Mr. KINCADE. But it is basically a supplement. You're trying to meet the unmet needs which the local or State government can't handle?

Mr. DUNNE. That's correct.

Mr. KINCADE. I think that clears up a point. Many people certainly feel that, when an area is declared a natural disaster area, the Federal Government is going to come in and take care of the whole problem. But you're saying they act in a supplemental way.

I gather from your testimony that the bulk of the aid provided by your agency is either a grant or in kind. That is, you are not in the loan business, as the Small Business Administration or the Department of Agriculture might be.

Mr. DUNNE. You're correct that most of it is grant money, with one exception. Section 414 of our act allows FDAA to make loans to communities which have suffered disasters and experienced a substantial loss of revenues. So far we have not made one. We are discussing potential applications with five Idaho communities right now and also with the government of Guam and we are looking at an appeal in terms of their potential usage for it, but that's the only loan program.

Mr. KINCADE. Is this loan to the local government itself to offset loss of tax revenue or something of that sort?

Mr. DUNNE. Yes; tax revenue and other revenue. The idea is to put them into a better cash flow position.

Mr. KINCADE. And then, when they are back in that improved cash flow position and they have tax revenues coming in, presumably they will be able to pay off the FDAA loan.

Mr. DUNNE. Yes. I also might mention that the loan may be forgiven after a 3-year period under certain circumstances—but since we haven't made any loans—

Mr. KINCADE. In view of the uncertainties about natural disasters, how do you manage or project your budget each year? I note that you have turned surpluses in, I think, both of the last 2 years, if my recollection serves me.

Mr. DUNNE. Actually we don't turn in surpluses. What we do not spend is carried over into the next year. We develop our estimates by using historical data, from the last 3 years omitting any obvious aberrations, such as Hurricane Agnes. We look at the average number of declared disasters and the average cost of those declarations and throw in a factor for inflation, and say this is approximately what we

will need. It's not a bad system. The Congress has always been most cooperative. If we are going to run out of money, Congress allows us to come up and ask for more. I think that is a better management technique than appropriating, say \$1 billion and letting us work against that. We are asking for \$100 million for fiscal year 1977, but I was just looking at that again. Because of the Teton Dam disaster and Typhoon Pamela over in Guam and three more disasters, FDAA is spending at a rate in excess of \$250 million, while we are only asking for \$100 million. We will carry over some money into fiscal year 1977, but we will have to take another look at our situation halfway through the next fiscal year, depending on what happens in the next 6 months, to see if we are going to have enough money. But supplemental appropriations are not a problem for us.

Mr. KINCADE. That will take care of my questions. I think Mr. Evans probably had some policy issues he wanted to get into.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Kincaid.

Mr. Dunne, as I was going through your testimony earlier this morning, I thought that it raised a number of questions that I think are very central to this committee's inquiry and I wanted to get into some of those now. I wonder if you could tell me exactly what the Federal Government does require of the State and local governmental agencies to assure the survival of this Nation in the event of a national emergency?

Mr. DUNNE. Well, you're asking me a question that's probably more appropriately directed to those people who have to worry about national emergencies. The distinction that I hope I have made in my statement is that there is a big difference in trying to plan for and be prepared for a national emergency, which other agencies have to worry about, as opposed to a localized disaster situation, which may be a FDAA concern. I cannot hypothesize, Congressman, a national emergency declaration because of any natural disaster. In the 200-year history of our Nation we haven't had a natural disaster that shut down the country. Even under the worst possible circumstances I can't conceive of a natural disaster—an earthquake or flood or series of tornados—that would really shut down the country and put us into a rationing system or an allocation system or leave communities off by themselves to fend for themselves for a long period of time. That's the distinction I draw.

We see our role as being that of a support organization, coming in under certain circumstances, because of the magnitude of a disaster, to support the efforts and resources of local governments and State governments. So I'm afraid that the national emergency preparedness issue is more properly addressed by people who have to deal with that problem.

Mr. EVANS. All right. So you're saying, then you can't provide any answers in terms of what the Federal Government is doing to require the State and local governments to plan for the survival of this Nation, given a national emergency?

Mr. DUNNE. I think you are addressing the policies of DCPA and the Federal Preparedness Agency, which are dealing with State and local governments in preparing for national emergencies. You're asking whether or not DCPA's crisis relocation program is the answer, and whether or not the States and local governments are going to practice

that policy, whether or not a shelter program is still as adequate as it was perceived to be back in the 1960's. Those are questions for policy makers from the other agencies. In terms of FDAA's perspective, we don't believe we have any jurisdiction or any authority over national emergency preparedness policy.

Mr. EVANS. What do you believe to be the proper role of the Federal Government in supporting the State and local governments in preparing and responding to local disasters in that case?

Mr. DUNNE. Well, I think we have pretty well spelled it out in my testimony and it's pretty well spelled out by Congress. We are trying to provide or we are providing right now up to \$250,000 in grants to the States to develop programs, plans, capabilities, and organizations to be able to deal with natural disasters in their jurisdictions. Let me indicate what we hope to get from this. When the governor of a State makes a request to the President and it is granted by the President either in terms of a major disaster or an emergency declaration, what we hope the local and State government officials will know is what type of assistance is coming from the Federal Government, how they are going to get that assistance, how they can use that assistance—which is basically financial assistance—and how they are going to have to account for that assistance when the auditors come in to see if it was properly used. These \$250,000 grants are being used for other disaster preparedness activities. States are reviewing their legislative authorities for providing disaster assistance. We are allowing mitigation planning. We are allowing the development of procedures and organizational structures. It is not just one unit of State government that we are concerned with. We are asking the State as a unit: How are you going to handle things? How are you going to house people? What are your procedures? What are your programs? We're hoping that the answers will be developed with our planning grants.

[Additional information submitted by Mr. Dunne follows:]

Let me explain for your further background the way the \$250,000 grant provision developed. The original Administration bill provided for the States to play a much larger role in the administration of Federal supplemental assistance. The federal government was to provide funds and technical assistance and the states were to make and administer disaster grants or provide direct assistance to disaster victims and to stricken communities. The states were to have 90 days to prepare themselves for this role and the \$250,000 grant was to assist this preparedness effort. It was never intended to help states and locals meet their general preparedness responsibilities.

The Congress did not accept the Administration's proposal that the States assume a greater administrative role. But the preparedness grant provision was not deleted or even amended. The states, and the federal government, will certainly benefit from the grants. The state, like the federal government, has an option of providing supplemental assistance or not providing it. Under the grant, the states are developing procedures to receive supplemental assistance from the federal government and to give supplemental assistance to locals. We believe that this, rather than general preparedness, is the basic purpose for the grant.

Mr. EVANS. Is it your notion, then, that the State and local governments have an obligation and even a responsibility to the Federal Government to assist in the survival of this Nation in the event of a nationwide emergency? I think this is implicit in the 1958 amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 which makes civil defense a joint responsibility of the Federal, State, and local governments. It seems that this has perhaps been overlooked recently. I wonder if you're suggesting that preparedness has now become a one-way street instead of a two-way street.

Mr. DUNNE. Well, you just switched questions on me. You just went from natural disaster and localized disasters into a national emergency. I'm saying that I would hope this committee, and the Congress, and the executive branch will honestly review whether or not State and local governments should participate in any national emergency planning and if the conclusion is that they should decide what role they should have. Is it a support role or in effect are they carrying out the National Government's responsibilities? Because as I recall, the Constitution says that defense of the country is a responsibility of the National Government. There's no mention of local.

Mr. EVANS. Right. Then are you suggesting preparedness be a two-way street, with reciprocal responsibilities between Federal, State, and local governments? If I could get an answer to that question?

Mr. DUNNE. Certainly. I don't think that I implied otherwise.

Mr. EVANS. You don't feel that it's becoming a one-way street, in other words?

Mr. DUNNE. I don't know what you mean by a one-way street.

Mr. EVANS. Well, as I thought you had indicated there in the question, that I felt that it was implicit in the 1958 amendments to the 1950 Civil Defense Act that the main civil defense in this Nation was made a joint responsibility of the Federal, State, and local governments. I'm trying to find out from you whether you feel that this is now becoming a one-way street where the responsibility runs from the Federal level down to State and local governmental units. Or do you still see this as a two-way street?

Mr. DUNNE. Okay. You're off into an area in which I really have no expertise because I don't deal with national emergencies and I hope I made that clear to you, Congressman. It would seem to me from my limited knowledge of national preparedness activities, that if one level of the government dictates the policies it ought to provide all the resources. I think policy relating to national survival has to be dictated by the Federal Government. It's very difficult to say that there are going to be co-equal bodies dealing with national preparedness activities because the fact is that the authorities are vested in the Federal Government. What it seems we have in national emergency preparedness activities, such as nuclear attack is the State and local governments helping to carry out Federal policies and being paid only 50 percent of the cost of doing that. What I have raised in my statement is what I hope the Congress would take a look at, whether or not this is practical and pragmatic in today's environment and in the conditions which exist today. I don't know.

Mr. EVANS. I notice that Congressman Brown has joined us and I'd like to provide him with the opportunity to ask questions.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Dunne, I don't know to what extent you have explored this already or the chairman has explored it, so if it's repetitious I apologize. But OMB has basically said that they want to somewhat restructure the responsibilities and duties and functions of your side of the operation with the Office of Defense Civil Preparedness. Basically, it's their position that it's more cost-effective if you separate the functions on the basis of the nature of the disaster, whether it be nuclear or whether it be natural. It has seemed to me always that there is a more cost-effective alignment if we do it on the basis of function rather than on the basis of disaster.

That is, that all the planning protection, et cetera, would be done by the preparedness agency and all relief and recovery would be done by your agency. It seems to me there is a greater commonality in planning and protecting against nuclear and natural disasters, and greater commonality with the relief and recovery from either disaster than there is by dividing it according to whether it's military or nuclear or natural. Would you care to comment?

Mr. DUNNE. Yes. I disagree with you. I tried to point out in my statement that the easy way out is to accept the commonality question and ignore the substantive differences that exist between nuclear attack and localized disaster situations. The nuclear attack takes all the vital resources of the whole Nation. Natural disasters are local in nature. County "A" gets hit and County "B" doesn't. County "B" goes on and its government is unaffected. County "A" has to deal with that situation and may or may not have to turn to other bodies such as State or Federal governments for assistance.

What we are trying to do, Congressman, in our preparedness program is put the State and local governments in the best possible positions to receive Federal aid when it's necessary, to know what the laws are, to know what they can use Federal money for, and how to account for it. We are allowing them to do a lot of things that hopefully are not duplicative and we have gone out of our way to see that they do not duplicate the activities of other agencies.

I don't think approaching this on a commonality basis is terribly intelligent. For a number of years, as you recognize, Congressman, these functions were intertwined in the Office of Emergency Preparedness and prior agencies. There's nothing to indicate that the Federal Government did a better job or the State and local governments did a better job because the functions were combined in one agency. Indeed, I would say that, if you take a look at the 3-year record of the disaster program since it's been in HUD, that overall from the Federal Government's perspective it has improved. I also think that the State governments' performances in this area have also improved, and I think it's going to get better. It's difficult to assess how well the States are going to fulfill their roles in a nuclear attack situation or a national emergency, but in localized disaster situations I believe that the state of the art has been improved to some degree. It has been improved because the Federal Government is better prepared, and understands its role much better. Also, I believe the States now understand that just because a major disaster is declared they can't just dump responsibility on the Federal Government. It is primarily their responsibility. The differences are a lot greater than the commonalities and I would suggest that this committee would really address the differences rather than the commonalities.

Mr. BROWN. Well, I think in order to address the commonalities you have to address the differences because otherwise how do you arrive at where there is any commonality? You're speaking about a natural disaster that may occur in that county and that county, but it doesn't occur in every county, not at the same time, but it can occur to every county.

Mr. DUNNE. In the country?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Mr. DUNNE. A natural disaster?

Mr. BROWN. A natural disaster can occur in every county of the country.

Mr. DUNNE. I have never heard of it.

Mr. BROWN. I don't mean simultaneously.

Mr. DUNNE. I don't think I could hypothesize it.

Mr. BROWN. In effect, we are talking about a nationwide thing and, for instance, would you say Hurricane Agnes was kind of a local countywide thing?

Mr. DUNNE. No. It involved seven States and it didn't affect the resources of the Nation one iota.

Mr. BROWN. I guess what I'm trying to say, you don't have to prepare—you don't have to do the same kind of preparation for a natural disaster that you do for a nuclear disaster, but it seems to me there are many factors that are common to a natural and a nuclear disaster in the planning and preparation and the protecting against. This doesn't mean that you do everything everywhere, but it seems to me that the planning and protection function is the same for both natural and nuclear. On the other hand the relief and recovery aspects are also similar for both. This is a more logical separation than saying that the natural disaster and a nuclear disaster are so different that there's no way you can have the same agency do the planning and the protection against both types of disaster.

Mr. DUNNE. Let me take a position here. Somebody asked me whether or not FDAA is a preparedness agency. We are really a response agency, and I think that's what you're getting at. Preparedness to us is to be prepared to be more effective and efficient in delivery of Federal financial assistance and the preparedness grant that we make available to the State is to get them to be able to be better prepared to receive that assistance. That may seem parochial, but the fact of the matter is that's why I think we're a little more efficient than we were when all these functions were grouped together, because the organization at the Federal level had to be concerned about all kinds of different contingencies and all different types of emergencies and never spent full time on one thing. If there was a natural disaster they concentrated on that for a few weeks or months and then they came back and started dealing with resource allocation, and then there was another natural disaster and then the oil embargo and so on—they were never able to focus on a primary mission.

I think there's a lot of folly in trying to combine these activities while saying it's all the same type of preparedness because I don't believe it's all the same type of preparedness.

Mr. BROWN. But you're saying your basic role is preparedness to be able to deliver Federal assistance for recovery.

Mr. DUNNE. That's correct.

Mr. BROWN. Are you saying there's nothing that needs to be done in the way of plans and protection to mitigate damages?

Mr. DUNNE. No.

Mr. BROWN. From a natural disaster?

Mr. DUNNE. No. I hope I emphasized that the primary role is preparedness to deliver assistance. Certainly we take mitigation measures into consideration. We work with a variety of Federal agencies that do research and applied work in that area, including the Corps of Engineers, the Water Resources Council, the National Science

Foundation, and USGS, and we allow the States to address those issues in their preparedness activity under our grant. We are not just talking about one organization at the State level; we would hope that a variety of agencies and departments in the States are becoming involved under the planning grant program. So certainly warning, in terms of natural disasters, are of some commonality and I think I can list commonalities. What I'm suggesting is just by reorganizing and having one agency dealing with preparedness and thus separating preparedness for natural disasters completely from response to them I think we're going to run into a lot of problems if we do it.

Mr. BROWN. What are the features or the elements in the anticipation of a disaster, nuclear or natural?

Mr. DUNNE. Warning, probably, even though we can't say that with respect to earthquakes yet. Probably prediction. A prediction and warning are two separate things. Certainly emergency measures taken by law enforcement officers and by health officials can be included. Provision of shelter, because there can be need in a natural disaster for a shelter operation, although this is not always true. We're also talking about different types of shelter, depending on the situation. The mass feeding of people, I suppose, also falls into this area.

Mr. BROWN. Well, shelter is provided in advance so as to mitigate the loss. Is that not correct?

Mr. DUNNE. Not necessarily.

Mr. BROWN. Up until this point you're talking about things that precede the disaster.

Mr. DUNNE. That's correct.

Mr. BROWN. And with respect to all of those things, you will agree, will you not, that they are common to both a military nuclear disaster and a natural disaster? Isn't that true? If not, what are the differences?

Mr. DUNNE. There are some big differences in terms of warning and prediction although I really don't have expertise in the warning and prediction of a nuclear attack, but yes, there are some similarities.

Mr. BROWN. I think it's more than similarities. Point out the differences. Warning system, emergency functions system, prediction, shelter. Now point out in those four areas where the differences are as they would relate to a natural disaster or a nuclear disaster.

Mr. DUNNE. I gave you those as commonalities, not differences. That's what you asked me about.

Mr. BROWN. So at that point you're saying you do agree?

Mr. DUNNE. That's what you asked me. I gave them to you as commonalities, yes.

Mr. BROWN. So up to that point you would agree that there's still commonality between natural and nuclear?

Mr. DUNNE. Yes, sir.

Mr. BROWN. From that point on, what about the relief and recovery? What are the elements there?

Mr. DUNNE. First of all, if you're dealing with nuclear attack you're dealing with nuclear fallout. This requires very specialized skills that are not normally available in most communities. First of all, let me take it from a conceptual point. After a natural disaster you go and see what's destroyed so you can rebuild it, pure and simple. That's what the law tells us to do. After a nuclear attack, it seems to me you take a look and see what is left and what you can do with it, because the local and State governments may be fending for themselves for a

long period of time. Remember, if the country is under attack the national government is probably going to institute rationing and allocation systems, and local and State governments may have to fend for themselves for a long period of time. I would dare suggest that the authorities that are on the books such as Public Law 93-288 which deal with natural disasters will not be sufficient to deal with any kind of a nuclear attack. I think there's a difference and what I tried to point out in my statement, Congressman, is that for local disasters, the primary responsibility lies with local governments. By law that's what the Congress has said for 25 or 26 years. I happen to agree with that. The Federal role in natural disasters is supplemental—supplemental to the efforts and resources that are provided by local and State governments.

In a nuclear attack I believe that response is primarily the responsibility of the Federal Government. I believe from the day the Constitution was written that's what was intended by the forefathers. To what degree the policy of the Federal Government should be to use local and State governments in carrying out their responsibilities, is a big question mark and maybe that is a point that ought to be reviewed.

I'm suggesting that the differences between localized disasters caused by nature as opposed to the nuclear attack where the primary responsibility is the Federal Government are more than subtly different; they may be indeed substantively different. That's why I hope everybody interested in this area will take a substantive look at it to identify precisely what those differences are. Are we using the right policies? Are our laws adequate in the mid-1970's as compared with the 1950's? Are the organizations efficient and is the funding arrangement correct? Maybe we ought to change one or all of these things and maybe no changes should come out of it. I don't know. I don't claim to be an expert in national emergency preparedness.

Mr. BROWN. You mentioned maybe this ought to all be reviewed. Who should do this?

Mr. DUNNE. Well, I would hope that the executive branch, particularly OMB and the National Security Council would become involved since the security of the Nation is involved when we talk about nuclear attack. This Joint Committee can make a contribution through these hearings. As I said in my statement, I don't think there are real simple answers. I'm worried by people who try to be flip and say there are a lot of commonalities and we ought to have one reorganization and provide more Federal money. More of everything is not necessarily going to get our teeth into the tough answers that are going to have to be provided.

Mr. BROWN. Well, that is something—more of everything—that bothers me as well. It seems that what we do, we keep funding and providing for training, education and information, et cetera, going at parallel routes, when really there could be better and more cost-effective utilization of funds than having what appears to me on occasion a duplication of function.

Mr. DUNNE. I think if you saw my statement, Congressman, I pointed out what Congressman Leggett's committee said. I thought it was a very fair, even-handed statement. The report said that if the Federal Government civil defense agency is providing 50 percent

of the funds and you can't sell it at the local level, activity will all gravitate to the natural disaster preparedness and nuclear attack preparedness is going to suffer. I think we'd better be honest with ourselves. That is exactly what's happening. Local civil defense people are saying, "Look, I can't go to my city council and get my 50 percent match for the Federal share and tell them that we're going to build more shelters and we're going to have a crisis relocation plan, et cetera. If I tell them we're going to be prepared for the next tornado," or whatever happens to be a possible natural threat in that particular general region "then I have a reasonable chance of getting my money." If you authorize the blurring of the potential uses for national emergency preparedness planning funds, the emphasis will fall on natural disaster preparedness.

Now I believe—and I have never said anything different—that the dual-use of Federal funds is not inappropriate, if the concept is applied with some reason. If we don't devote too much time and energy to natural disaster preparedness while leaving the national emergency preparedness program of the country dormant, then I think it's reasonable. But once you start gravitating to one, you're in trouble, and you're not making very effective use of the tax dollar.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I have used more than my time.

Mr. EVANS. That's all right, Mr. Brown. I notice we have to vote again. Mr. Mitchell, do you have any questions?

Mr. MITCHELL. No questions. I came too late.

Mr. EVANS. If I might ask Mr. Kincade to carry on. There are some further questions that we would like to try to bring out at this point. We'll leave for this vote and return shortly.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, before we depart, in view of the fact that I know we have three conference reports coming up one after the other, so we wouldn't much more than get back here before we would have to leave again, if I don't get a chance to return, is it agreeable that Mr. Dawson could pursue some questions on my behalf?

Mr. EVANS. I am sure that would be agreeable.

Mr. MITCHELL. Obviously, I face the same predicament. I think we will be gone for the next 45 minutes, I'm afraid.

Mr. KINCADE. Mr. Dunne, just a couple more "housekeeping" questions, if you will. It's been a little hard for some of the members of the committee to determine whether the one-time FDAA grant of \$250,000 or thereabouts was for "preparedness" planning in terms that I think are generally understood or whether it was to improve the States' ability to request Federal "recovery" funds, as I think you perhaps have characterized it in your testimony. Could you clarify that for the record for us?

Mr. DUNNE. It's both, Mr. Kincade. I said that this is what I hope to get out of it—a better capability, but Title II of Public Law 93-288 lists a great number of things that can happen and I just want to read a few of them. I won't go through the whole list—disaster preparedness plans for mitigation, warning, emergency operations, rehabilitation, and recovery, training and evaluation and so on. The \$250,000 encompasses a great deal of activity, but remember, there are a great deal of agencies that could or should come into play during the natural disaster operations. We're not talking only about a unit of the civil defense, even though that may be the one that happens to be designated as the lead agency by the Governor. We are also talking about the

highway departments, the departments of community development, health departments, economic affairs departments—a whole range of agencies and departments that have parts to play in recovery efforts. What we hope to do is be able to get all the authorities and plans and procedures and programs in those various agencies to come together. To the degree that these include warning, public safety activities, et cetera, we are very happy. We hope, and we have gone out of our way to make sure, there's a limited amount of duplication of efforts being funded by other Federal agencies that also grant funds for preparedness planning.

[Additional information submitted by Mr. Dunne follows:]

There is a serious question whether every city and county in the country should prepare to meet a disaster like Hurricane Agnes. It is probably unwise for every city and county to base its civil defense plan on the assumption that they will receive a direct hit. These possibilities can't be ruled out, of course, but the probabilities may be so remote that spending money to prepare for them would not be very prudent. There is a difference, of course. If the nation has suffered an enemy attack, every city and county will be a contributor to national survival, even if they have not suffered damages from direct weapons effects. And so every city and county does have some civil defense preparedness responsibilities. But spending money to prepare for a natural disaster that is unlikely to happen is certainly questionable, especially if the preparations would have no application to the probable civil defense role of the community.

It would be better for the city or county to spend that money to improve their general management capability. It is our experience that otherwise well managed cities respond effectively and expeditiously to the unusual demands of disaster.

Mr. KINCADE. I just have two more quick questions and then I'll turn it over to the minority counsel. The response you give raises an issue which I think is very central to the committee's inquiry, that is, how you see the relationship between natural disaster readiness and recovery capability. I think this is implicit in the idea of providing a grant for—I don't want to use the term "dual use"—but for multiple purposes. Do areas with better preparedness programs have smaller recovery requirements? Are there any studies on this or do you see any relationship between the pre-disaster preparedness posture in a given region or county and the kinds of requirements for supplemental aid that you get from them after a natural disaster?

Mr. DUNNE. I don't think I could say that we have evaluated this to a degree that would allow us to give you an honest answer at this point. We do intend to evaluate this, but most of the preparedness grants are still in the process of being carried out. In other words, the award plans are going on now and the majority of the States will not finish until next fiscal year or going into the fiscal year after. I would say that the effectiveness of State and local government operating in disasters where the Federal Government is involved—and I can't speak to when we are not involved—depends upon the level of the official who is designated by the Governor or the mayor to work with us. If this official is down in the bowels of the bureaucracy, even though he may be officially designated, and the Governor doesn't know who he is, for instance, he isn't going to be terribly effective, nor is the State government's response going to be terribly effective. If he is only a part-time official in a local government, he's not going to be terribly effective.

Mr. KINCADE. I wasn't thinking so much of the institutional arrangements as the basic posture, although I know that's affected by

the institutional arrangements in a given locale. As an example of what I'm driving at, I understand that the tornado which devastated Lima, Ohio, 2 years ago did very little damage in a neighboring jurisdiction which had a good preparedness program and good warning system. Doesn't that imply that the requirements levied on you perhaps would be reduced by having more adequate preparedness posture?

MR. DUNNE. I'm not familiar with Lima, Ohio. Are you talking about Xenia?

MR. KINCADE. Perhaps it was Xenia.

MR. DUNNE. Half the town was gone.

MR. KINCADE. That's right and I understand another jurisdiction very nearby that was subject to the same tornado suffered relatively less damage because it had a better warning system.

MR. DUNNE. Well, maybe. I can't answer that. If the tornado hit the ground in one town and maybe it didn't touch down in the other. I'm not sure you can make those analogies without knowing the full history. I don't know. I would say that we're certainly hopeful that when States explore their authorities, for instance, and explore their capabilities, that they wouldn't run to the Federal Government unless there was a real need that it was beyond their effective capabilities to meet as the law states. I don't like turning down 33 percent of the requests. We have seen States that have, in their preliminary work, discovered that they do have more authority or the authorities have been changed, that they do have more of a capability than they previously required and they have undertaken more to help local governments themselves instead of running to the Federal Government. We've heard of one or two cases, but I can't honestly say.

MR. KINCADE. I wasn't thinking of the recovery capability but their preparedness capability. I'm trying to get at the relationship between the preparedness posture and their recovery needs. Does preparedness save us money in terms of what we have to provide in loans or grants after a disaster? Is preparedness cost effective in that you're able to reduce some of the damage, reduce some of the loss to property?

MR. DUNNE. I would say that if Congress is gutsy enough to keep the Flood Disaster Protection Act on the books for the next 15 or 20 years that we will see a substantial savings of both dollars and lives, particularly dollars. Because what we have been foolish about in the last number of years is we allow people to go back and live in a flood plain which is exactly where they are going to be flooded again. I can point to 20,000 communities which have already been identified as flood hazard areas. That is preparedness. One may not consider it preparedness because it does not carry that preparedness label, but that's preparedness in the best sense of the word—don't allow people to go back into hazardous areas if you know that the hazard exists and is likely to occur in a short period of time again.

MR. KINCADE. I think there are some limits. By that token, we wouldn't let people live in cities because they make prime nuclear targets too. I'm trying to understand what we are capable of doing in the way of damage prevention through preparedness. Perhaps you could supply something for the record upon further reflection.

MR. DUNNE. One thing that I'd like to point out, because you used the tornado as one of the cases. If you get an effective warning system you're probably not going to save any property, but you could

save some lives and I think there's a big distinction. There are some things that you couldn't do to protect property that you could do to save lives, and I think we ought to deal with that distinction. We try to when we evaluate.

Mr. DAWSON. Congressman Brown asked before he left if I could follow up on some of the questions he was asking on the similarities and differences between the nuclear disaster and what you call local disaster or natural disaster. And if I could concentrate primarily on your very commendable statement you quote Congressman Leggett's committee's report beginning with saying that it would be nice if we could find some common denominators. I wonder if we could go on with what Congressman Brown began and find the common denominators and I think he found that there was a substantial commonality in certain areas.

Mr. DUNNE. You mean what I rattled off to him—the warning and prediction?

Mr. DAWSON. You started down a road where you came up with prediction, warning, and emergency communications system and then you mentioned shelter, but with the caveat, of course, that shelter required for a fallout, as opposed to shelter required for a flood, is a different thing.

Wouldn't in the post-disaster area you also include evacuation?

Mr. DUNNE. Not post-disaster. Pre-disaster. You don't see much evacuation of an area after a disaster.

Mr. DAWSON. But would there be a difference or would there be a similarity to either type of disaster—natural or nuclear?

Mr. DUNNE. The word is the same. We have looked at evacuation situations, such as the evacuation of Darwin, Australia the day after Christmas 1974 to see if we could draw any analogies. I don't want to say it's a commonality or it's dissimilar in terms of preparedness planning because you would be doing it for different reasons. We evacuate a city such as Washington, D.C., every day when people go home and go out to Virginia and Maryland. That's evacuation.

Mr. DAWSON. And they say the work we do here is often disastrous.

Mr. DUNNE. There could be some commonality, but I'm worried about evacuation in natural disasters. We have done a study on this through the National Academy of Sciences and it raises 30 policy issues. One of the big problems it raises is that of legal authority to order evacuation. I assume for natural disasters that legal authority has to be vested in local and State officials. The President has zero authority to do it. In a nuclear attack he may have authorities that I'm not aware of. Consider the policy questions that may arise in pre-natural disaster evacuation. Insurance companies may cancel insurance, the mortgage companies and the banks may foreclose on loans. When you start to think about the potential disruptions you'd better be sure that your prediction is going to be 100-percent correct before you order evacuation.

Mr. DAWSON. Isn't the mechanism for getting the people out of the cities hopefully the same? They have either got to travel by foot or—

Mr. DUNNE. No; because I can't think of any situation, even the worst earthquake, where we would have to evacuate a whole city. You sure would have to if there was to be a nuclear attack. I assume you

would want everybody out. In hurricanes, when there's a warning from the National Weather Service, people voluntarily get up and leave. Somebody told me in Louisiana a couple years ago 100,000 people went 50 miles away. But there were also hundreds of thousands that didn't leave the shore. It wasn't a forced evacuation. I think you have to be very careful about suggesting that evacuation could be forced in a natural disaster.

We have seen a hurricane study on Dade County which said that because of the way the roads were structured there was no way to get everybody out within 48 hours. Now you don't have to get everybody out of Miami or Dade County because of a hurricane, but if you thought Dade County or Miami was going to be hit with a nuclear strike, I suspect you would want everybody out and would 48 hours be enough time? I don't see the evacuation question as an area in which there is a great similarity between nuclear and natural disaster situations, but it could be.

Mr. DAWSON. I don't want to take too much time here but I've got two more similarities I want to—or possible similarities I want to discuss with you, but I'm doing all of this with the understanding that the Leggett committee found that you have to be very careful about drawing these similarities for the fear that in doing so nuclear disaster preparedness will not maintain itself.

In that regard, before I go to two more similarities or possible similarities, what you're really suggesting, if you're going to try to come up with common denominators, is total Federal funding for nuclear disaster preparedness. What you're basically saying is that if you really think it's so essential, why don't you forget all the matching funds.

Mr. DUNNE. That may be a possibility. You would have to analyze the problem before you say how much Federal funding to apply or whether or not it should be 100 percent. What do you want the local and State governments to do and what is their role vis-a-vis the Federal Government in its posture and its policymaking? That's what seems to be up in the air, not how we should provide the funds; because funding mechanisms can be logically determined once you determine what unit of government has what responsibility and what authorities. That's what seems to me to be the unanswered question.

Mr. DAWSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Dunne, we're running somewhat late this morning due to the interruptions. What I would like to do at this point—I still have several questions remaining—but I would like to submit those for the record. Then if you would be so kind as to give us your prompt reply to them, we would appreciate it. I thank you for appearing as one of our witnesses this morning.

Mr. DUNNE. Thank you, Congressman.

[For responses to additional questions for the record, see page 282.]

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Rodericks, would you please come forward? Mr. Rodericks, we welcome you to the Joint Committee meeting this morning. In your capacity as Director for the District of Columbia Office of Emergency Preparedness, would you please proceed with your oral statement this morning?

STATEMENT OF GEORGE R. RODERICKS, DIRECTOR, DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

Mr. RODERICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. Kincaid and other members of the staff, for helping me prepare for today's session.

I shall not even attempt to read my statement. As you indicated that is in the record and I know you will give it consideration, but I would like to ask you to consider the fact that I am here as a witness who has worked in all phases of defense preparedness at the Federal level, the State level, and now in the local level, and for 21 years I have chosen this profession and worked at it very hard and like it and will miss it when I leave. I have worked with all of the leaders of the national program personally since Val Peterson in the early days of the Eisenhower Administration. The only national leader I have not worked with was Governor Coldwell of Florida.

So I would like to offer to you some observations in summarizing my statement to try to synthesize those experiences into two specific areas of concern which I have and have had for a long time and about which I have tried to make some changes as an individual within a bureaucratic structure and as president of the National and State Directors Association and as secretary-treasurer for 12 years.

Those issues are: The coordinated roles of the Federal agencies. Every President since President Truman, upon assumption of office, has looked at the existing authorities granted by Congress and reorganized the Federal apparatus for conducting those programs and carrying out the mission. The one thing which has remained constant with minor amendment has been the Federal statute.

The other activity which has fluctuated beyond all reason in terms of managing and developing a national capability has been the manner by which the Presidents have changed radically the structure at the Federal level. One of the things that did contribute, Mr. Chairman, to continuity of an understanding between the Federal goals and objectives, the will of Congress and efforts of State and local officials, was the fact that until recently the national office for coordinating and establishing policies for national goals was always in the Executive Office. Not only that, the national appointed head of civil defense was, until recently, a member of the National Security Council. When the Nixon Administration came in—and I'm not criticizing the Nixon Administration alone—I have criticized all administrations who made these radical changes—it got so bad that the Nixon Administration eliminated the national director of civil defense from membership on the National Security Council.

Since 1950 we at the State and local levels had a voice that we could communicate with here in the White House to have our concerns brought to the attention of the National Security Council and, as a matter of fact, to the President of the United States himself. We have lost that.

In the years since, we have lost the coordination and the cohesiveness of the Federal agencies themselves because they were fractured

and split. I will be more specific on that later. I will stop there on that subject but be prepared to respond totally.

[Additional information submitted for the record follows:]

Question: Please provide specifics on the loss of coordination and cohesiveness in the federal preparedness effort resulting from separation of federal agencies.

Answer: In July 1973, the Office of Emergency Preparedness was abolished. Its functions were transferred to HUD, Treasury and GSA. This action removed from the Executive Office the only federal coordinating agency for all federal emergency preparedness programs. The director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness was a statutory member of the National Security Council. With this single action the civil defense and natural disaster programs lost direct access to the President and his top aides in the White House. Our program also lost its representative on the National Security Council.

Without the White House level coordination and direction of the several emergency preparedness and assistance programs, cohesiveness, direction and interest diminished at every level.

Your committee staff suggested that I might comment on crisis relocation planning or the crisis relocation program because it is now currently being developed by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency as its new thrust for national defense.

A crisis relocation planning, Mr. Chairman—and I have said this directly to Governor Davis on every opportunity he gives me—and he gives me plenty of opportunity to talk with him. We are close friends but disagree sometimes in terms of where we are going. I tell him that this program is nothing more than a rehash of the old evacuation program of the late 1950's. I participated in the development of the evacuation plan for the District of Columbia during that period of time and there was no more abominable plan ever developed, no more ridiculous plan ever made by bureaucrats, and certainly the plan was not acceptable to anybody who had to execute it, including the Members of the Congress who at that time chastised me greatly for posing as a professional and at the same time endorsing the plan we offered to the community.

We have taken all those old plans and brought them to Governor Davis in the past 2 years and said, "Look at them. They didn't work. They weren't acceptable. What you're offering now is a substitute for nothing." There are very few programs of DCPA's in the country that are exciting anybody and so they are rehashing this old project. This project has sweetheart contracts in it in terms of the studies that around the country are trying to get some testing of this and some attitudes developed. They take, of course, those local areas of government in locations where evacuation is important for natural disaster purposes primarily and then reassure everybody that they are only making a study to see if it's feasible, but ask for cooperation because they are nice guys and that this study will help them make some ultimate decisions.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, they did the study and since the vehicle they are driving is still an old shift model—they got out of first into second quickly before we could catch up with them and they were in third and high and they were off and running with a new program.

I notice many of my colleagues sitting here who represent local communities. They will be more adequately able to speak to their concerns than I, but these are two of the issues that are among many troubling us. In closing my summary, let me say that I have looked at actions of the Congress in its efforts to launch nationally funded programs to im-

prove the safety, security, and health and welfare of our citizens as a result of many kinds of emergency situations, whether it was the Highway Safety Act, LEAA or the Emergency Medical Services Act in HEW, or Disaster Assistance in HUD or Civil Defense in the Defense Department. In each act, if one looks at them carefully, and in the committee reports, there's always a statement that these programs should be coordinated with like kinds of activities. That's great and that's because many of us who have testified have been in agreement with the Congress. You can't deploy programs supported by Federal funds at the State and local level without making sure that there isn't the duplication and the waste which is inherent now in all of these programs, without any question.

If I might add one last thing, I want to say no matter what the Feds say, when you get down to your local community, there is only one police department, only one fire department, one health department, et cetera, and they are the agencies which are going to react and respond to any kind of emergency. So what we are interested in, and trying to urge you to do, is to help us build that base, that operating base, that planning base, at the State and local levels with assistance by all these Federal programs. Let's not have the Feds continue to say to us that we can't build a base of one unit because if you take its funds you can't work with another program. That's one of the dilemmas we face.

Mr. EVANS. All right. Thank you, Mr. Rodericks for your testimony. I am going to ask Mr. Kincade if he would please begin asking some questions that we'd like to have you respond to. We want to hear your responses. As to any further documentation, if you would supply it for the record, we would appreciate it. I have to leave for a vote and I will return in a few moments.

Mr. RODERICKS. Thank you.

[Complete statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF GEORGE R. RODERICKS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: It is always a pleasure to be invited to appear before an important committee of the Congress and I thank you for this opportunity.

I have looked forward to this visit to bring to your attention my concerns regarding the subjects before you and to respond to your questions. . . .

At the outset I want to offer some bonafides as a witness in the matter before your committee. I know—however—that you will consider my thoughts on where we ought to go rather than where I have been.

My professional activity has been in emergency planning, crisis management, emergency operations, as well as serving as a consultant to private and government organizations. I served in the army for six years during World War II and for twenty years thereafter as an Active Reserve Officer. I am now in the Retired Reserves with the rank of Colonel.

My government service began as the executive director of the Rhode Island Veterans Bonus Commission, appointed to that position by the then Governor, now Senator John O. Pastore. Later I served as executive assistant to the Governor. My Federal service began when I joined the United States Public Health Service as a Public Health Advisor to State Health Departments for civil defense and emergency health services.

I transferred to the Government of the District of Columbia in 1957 as Chief of Emergency Health Services and in 1959 was appointed by the Board of Commissioners to the position of director of civil defense and have continued in that capacity to this date.

Currently I am serving as a member of two academies of the National Research Council . . . The National Academy of Sciences—Emergency Medical Services

Regional Communications Committee and The National Academy of Engineering—Metropolitan Communications Study Committee.

During my years in civil defense and emergency preparedness I have been honored by my colleagues in the National Association of State Civil Defense Directors by election to the office of President for one year and as Secretary-Treasurer for twelve years.

On February 17, 1976, I appeared before the Civil Defense Panel of the House Armed Services Investigations Subcommittee. I shall, today, offer some of my views, which I presented to the committee at that time, since I still feel strongly about the issues covered during those hearings. I know that your committee is aware of the findings and recommendations of Chairman Leggett's committee and I hope that you will support the actions in the Senate relating to the issues under consideration in support of the civil defense effort.

Now the questions before us are:

1. How adequate is the basic civil defense and emergency preparedness legislation?

In my opinion the basic legislation needs to be updated to meet the interests of the Congress to reduce duplication and to revise PL 81-920 to make it compatible with other recently enacted laws in the fields of natural disaster and emergency medical services to name only several of the related national emergency programs.

Public Law 81-920 contains constraints, legal restrictions and administrative processes which were developed twenty-five years ago and do not necessarily represent current thinking in terms of program effectiveness.

2. What is the impact of the proposed Administration budget cut in civil defense?

Well, the major impact of the proposed budget cut is clearly ----- that any cut in an already inadequate budget, by the Administration or the Congress, sends a loud signal to all concerned that a reduction in program activity is desired. Regardless of the rationale behind the cut, the signal will be so interpreted by State and Local officials who provide program direction and funding support for civil defense.

The current cadre size State and Local civil defense staffs, facilities and operations cannot move forward with the Federal partner narrowing its focus in a life saving defense program, which at its best, is not well understood by our citizens and government officials. We must continue to keep before our citizens the capabilities and need for emergency response systems. This can be done by encouraging the use of staffs and systems for emergencies of all kinds.

3. Do we need better planning and new programs in civil defense?

Well, your basic emergency planning capability is excellent but because of Federal funding limitations the planning is limited to a very narrow piece of the total emergency planning spectrum. One Federal plan developed a system of shelter in place and then abandoned the development of a continuing shelter capability in favor of massive evacuation. The problem with both plans is that neither has strong legislative or executive support and as a result now are underfunded and will not meet the stated objectives.

We urgently need new public actions to bring the message of civil defense activities to the citizens of the United States. Our entire program of public information about civil defense has atrophied, not because we do not have materials and crisis information, but rather we do not have a professional, aggressive and sustained program to deliver the product to our citizens in a 1976 package.

4. What are the prospects for public acceptance of increased civil defense efforts?

Public acceptance of measures which its government takes to provide for public safety, health and security are not always at a high level. What we need to do now is to offer actions which the public can really accept as being believable and within our capacity to execute.

We have the knowledge to support our life saving programs but have been unable to demonstrate this fact to the public except during periods of large scale disasters as well as many other major local emergencies . . . when to our credit . . . we have met the challenges.

* * * * *

In addition to the above questions and answers, I want to touch on two current concerns which I share with most of my colleagues.

Currently Federal agencies are promoting Civil Preparedness, Federal Disaster Assistance, Federal Preparedness, Military Support to Civil Authorities, Emergency Medical Services, Highway Safety, Weather Warnings and many other

related emergency programs, pursuant to Congressional Acts and Presidential Executive Orders . . . established over a long period of time.

Over the years, Congress has authorized Presidents to organize and administer a wide range of civil protection programs against the threat of enemy attack, acts of nature, major accidents and other catastrophic phenomena. Presidents, upon assumption of office, have almost in every instance reorganized the existing agencies and offices which manage the various emergency programs.

The new agencies develop new procedures and policies to accomplish the same missions as originally established by the Congress. Recent changes in the Federal structure went so far as to eliminate the long standing Executive Office for overall Federal Coordination and assigned Executive Office level functions to the General Services Administration.

While Presidents regularly change the emergency-planning and management organizations at the Federal level, the State and Local Government Officials direct their activities through long established agencies as originally recommended by the Federal Government. With the proliferation of Federal Agency responsibilities, the State and Local programs suffer from the lack of clearly defined Federal Emergency Program goals and the Federal Assistance required to reach the objectives set by the Congress and the President.

In my opinion, Congress has resumed its essential role this year by legislating needed updating and funding to provide continued encouragement to State and local officials for strengthening emergency preparedness and operations. Somehow we must convince the Executive Branch that it must join with the Congress and provide leadership by coordinating all Federal agency efforts by the Executive Office as was the situation several years ago.

* * * * *

I have also been requested to comment on the new Crisis Relocation Program recently promulgated by the Department of Defense.

This program, in my opinion, is nothing more than a rehash of the old civil defense maneuver called "evacuation". I firmly believe in the use of such a life saving contingency plan *provided that* crisis relocation planning is developed as a truly national program, fully mandated by legislation sponsored by the President and enacted by the Congress. Such legislation should identify the scope of the program, the responsibility and authority of officials at every level as well as the total funding to accomplish the mission.

The current crisis relocation program has been developed by well intentioned officials in the Department of Defense but, again in my opinion, the program will fail to meet its objectives until it is mandated by law and must have the involvement of other major departments of the Federal Government such as Transportation, Aviation, HUD, Military, Health, Agriculture, Communications and many others which regulate, control and manage essential resources.

The crisis relocation plans must be prepared by the Federal Government with the assistance and cooperation of our State and local organizations, both public and private. If we fail to make this a responsibility of the National Government then we can predict that our meager funds and State and Local resources will be wasted * * * and the credibility of civil preparedness programs will be further reduced once the citizens realize how futile the effort and how unreal is its thrust.

I have been unable to convince my colleagues at the Federal level that the crisis relocation program, currently being offered to State and Local Governments, will fail unless it is accomplished as I have urged earlier in my statement. State and local authority and funding appears to be inadequate to meet the program requirements for crisis relocation because of local competition for allocation of shrinking resources.

In summarizing my concerns, I suggest that most of my colleagues at State and local levels of government want all Federal Emergency Planning, funding and operations, coordinated at Executive Office level.

I respectfully urge that your committee support the current actions underway in this Congress to overcome the lack of Executive Office support for maintaining a modest but realistic program of civil preparedness. Activities for saving lives and property against the ravages of man and his technology as well as the rages of nature, will always be conducted, but the issue is, How well?

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these important issues with you and will assist you in every way possible to help you reach your judgment in the matters before you for action by the Congress and eventually by the citizens of the United States.

I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, by restating the need to have our Congress and the President send a signal across the country and the world, that is firm and clear * * * that a reasonable, aggressive but still low cost civil defense program is a matter that we can pursue in America with pride and resolve. Saving lives and critical resources is a high calling. And yet, sad to say, we have for some years failed to perform in our civil defense arena with the drive and energy which is our heritage.

Thank you Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

Mr. KINCADE. Mr. Rodericks, I know that the chairman is anxious to take up your opening of the discussion of evacuation planning, but I will confine myself to some of the points in your testimony, your prepared statement, if I may.

You pointed to what are, in your opinion, two basic flaws in our current approach to preparedness: A Federal Civil Defense Act that is not up to date and needs major overhaul, and a funding limitation on preparedness plans and programs that prevents them from meeting stated objectives. Can you provide for the committee some concrete and detailed recommendations for changes or reforms that are needed in these areas? If you wish, you may submit such proposals and recommendations for the record, if that's your preference.

Mr. RODERICKS. Do you want me to comment on them?

Mr. KINCADE. If you'd like to comment briefly on what you think might be indicated in these areas and supply more information for the record.

Mr. RODERICKS. I'd be glad to supply information for the record.

Mr. KINCADE. Well, then, if that's your preference, I will proceed with the next question.

Mr. RODERICKS. I would like to comment just briefly on that issue. I know you're running against time, so let me just submit something for the record on that question.

[Information submitted for the record follows:]

Question. Please provide any specific recommendations for reform of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

Answer. At this time I strongly recommend that the language contained in H.R. 12438, in the Senate of the United States, May 26, 1976, be adopted by the Congress as soon as possible. This language, amending the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was passed by the House and Senate this year but was amended by the Conference Committee, Senate Report No. 94-1004, June 28, 1976.

The language recommended for adoption is as follows:

Section 2 of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2251) is amended by inserting after the third sentence thereof a new sentence as follows: "The Congress recognizes that the organizational structure established jointly by the Federal Government and the several States and their political subdivisions for civil defense purposes can be effectively utilized, without adversely affecting the basic civil defense objectives of this Act, to provide relief and assistance to people in areas of the United States struck by other than enemy-caused disasters; it is therefore further declared to be the policy and intent of the Congress that the needs of the States and their political subdivisions with respect to preparations for other than enemy-caused disasters be taken into account in providing Federal assistance under this Act."

Current Acts of Congress authorize assistance to States and political subdivisions after disaster strikes. The language cited above would also authorize existing State and local emergency preparedness agencies to include other than enemy-caused disaster preparations without any additional cost to the respective Federal agencies.

Mr. KINCADE. You suggest that most limitations on preparedness programs could be overcome if more funds were available, but yesterday we heard testimony that indicated very strongly that even the current preparedness funds are rather carelessly spent due to weak and

divided management controls. Before we allocate more money for preparedness, don't you think it would be a good idea to tighten up the management of current programs, so we can be sure we are getting a full dollar's value for every dollar spent?

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes. Of course, there's no question about that. When I'm saying more funds, I really didn't mean to require additional moneys. I mean, of the moneys available for emergency preparedness and operation already appropriated, more of it should be put into the State and local effort because the State and local efforts don't have as many agencies directly receiving funds as the Federal agencies dispense it. There are these limitations which inhibit us from receiving some of the Federal funds and I submit that the Federal Preparedness Agency, by General Bray's testimony, has over 600 employees in Washington receiving very, very good salaries for doing very good work. I have no question about what they do. I only question the fact that very little of what they do has any impact on anything we do at the State and local level and maybe some of that money should be going into the priorities programs to assist State and local capabilities where needed.

Mr. KINCADE. In other words, you're questioning whether we are putting the money that we do have available in the priority areas, the true priority areas?

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes; because Mr. Dunne's program prohibits anybody in an agency in the civil defense agency, for example, that has a contract at the State level, prohibits anybody who's working on his project, who's spending 1 minute in that same office doing anything for any other emergency purpose, and the same with the DCPA. If we have a natural disaster, DCPA, if you can believe it, says the people we fund can only work a certain number of days on that disaster and then must be pulled out, irrespective of the need and so on. That's the money that needs to be put together in the same package.

Mr. KINCADE. In your testimony, Mr. Rodericks, you suggest that the States have single emergency preparedness agencies as a consequence of an original Federal recommendation. Are you saying that the Federal Government recommended the wisdom of a central emergency planning agency to the State and local governments and then took the opposite action by dividing its own preparedness activity into several parts?

Mr. RODERICKS. Absolutely. The early days of the Federal Civil Defense Administration went to the Council of State Governments and said:

What we need in America is uniformity. We need a model state act so that the whole thrust of our preparedness and operation program at the federal, state and local level be organized the same way.

The Council of Governors went to every State and the District and encouraged every State to adopt the model law which would create a single agency to do it. Some years after, the Federal Government, which had the same configuration, began to split up its Executive Office agency. Mr. Dunne said that he doesn't work with the State civil defense agency, even though it's statutorily established in States, but rather he goes directly to the Governors and in many instances the Governor is working directly with him.

Mr. KINCADE. Mr. Rodericks, yesterday General Bray told us there was a certain perception at the State and local level that the Federal

Government was downgrading the priority of the emergency preparedness efforts. Your statement seems to confirm this view of General Bray's, that there is a perception of deemphasis.

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes; and let me be more specific. In General Bray's case—not General Bray himself but the agency he heads. I fought, along with my colleagues, tooth and nail against taking the Office of Emergency Planning, which was in the Executive Office of the White House in the early days of the Nixon Administration, which coordinated and did all of the things General Bray does now, taking it out and putting it in General Services Administration. It was very difficult for State and local officials to see the Presidential direction and guidance to all the agencies given to the General Services Administration. It was commonly referred to in our ranks as: "Now we're down working with the janitors." That isn't a fair characterization but that was the perception out at the field because that's usually what our own General Services are doing—replacing bulbs, and building buildings, and cleaning, and so on.

Mr. KINCADE. Contributing to this apparent perception of deemphasis, you also mentioned that the stop-and-start approach to a number of Federal programs seems to confirm this view of the States that the Federal Government can't make up its mind.

Mr. RODERICKS. Well, yes. Across this country we really broke our backs during the Kennedy Administration to get support and organize the logistics for deploying a fallout shelter program of great magnitude. I will cite an illustration in this city, Washington, D.C. We actually secured written licenses, entered into by building owners, for 10,000 buildings in this city in order to make them eligible to shelter people and give the needed protection from fallout. We put stocks and supplies into almost 2,000 buildings. The value of the supplies was over \$1½ million and we operated a shelter inspection program, and yet when I went to the Federal Government after several years and said that the job of continuing to move supplies into buildings and from one building to another was more than we can stand, and that we needed matching funds—we appropriated \$10,000 for this locally—they said no; it's not a support program any more. We couldn't even get shelter signs to replace damaged ones.

Mr. KINCADE. Let me go on with this point you bring up of program continuity. I gather what you're saying is that there's a perception of a lack of strong, positive, and consistent leadership at the Federal level. Would that be a correct characterization?

Mr. RODERICKS. I have said that at every assembly with the DCPA leadership present, that we ought to stop acting like the guys hiding in the closet and get outside and speak vigorously. However, what restricts the leadership in DCPA and other agencies is that they have moved so far from the seat of power now that even their honest efforts can't reach the leaders in the Executive Office.

Mr. KINCADE. I see. Nevertheless, officials such as yourself at the State and local level are aware of the importance of preparedness, even if you have a perception of perhaps undervaluation at the Federal level. Since you're aware yourselves of its importance, how does this necessarily affect you? Does it affect your relationships with your own superiors, the mayors, and Governors you work with?

Mr. RODERICKS. Would you believe, Mr. Kincaide, that we here in Washington, D.C., with our home-rule government and our first-time

elected officials, that the city council of this city, the Nation's Capital, voted to eliminate civil defense in fiscal year 1977.

Mr. KINCADE. The entire program?

Mr. RODERICKS. The entire program, saying to me: "Mr. Rodericks, there doesn't appear to be any interest here in the Nation's Capital. We're cutting the budget." There are some sharp people on that council that have to be reelected now and they noted that OMB had recommended cutting DCPA to \$40 million, and only a herculean struggle among my colleagues and interested Members of Congress was able to get a vote out of the conference to get it back to \$82.5. Now the city council is reconsidering because we put some additional facts to them.

Mr. KINCADE. So, if there's a lack of strong voice at the Federal level, it's very hard for preparedness to have a strong voice at the State and local level.

Mr. RODERICKS. Of course, it is.

Mr. KINCADE. Let me just go on quickly with a few questions more on your testimony. I have an apology to make. Last spring, as you know, the committee sent letters to the Governors of 53 States and territories asking them certain questions about their preparedness programs. By an oversight of the committee staff, specifically myself, the District of Columbia was not included.

Mr. RODERICKS. That happens regularly, as you well know.

Mr. KINCADE. Perhaps I could now put some of those questions to you, if we haven't already covered them to some degree. Has your jurisdiction ever participated in joint Federal-State readiness exercises or in joint Federal-State readiness planning? That is, are you working closely with the DCPA and other Federal agencies on plans and exercises?

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes, indeed.

Mr. KINCADE. Would that be of a recent date?

Mr. RODERICKS. I'd say it's ongoing and it has been under both Federal contract programs, the Metropolitan Council of Governments, and the Federal agencies. It's an ongoing program in updating plans for this metropolitan area, including the city. We did participate in the national exercises until the Federal Government itself eliminated the State and local participation in national exercises. The Feds go on and on every year exercising civil defense plans but they will not let the States and locals participate.

Mr. KINCADE. You bring up a very interesting point. We had heard in the response from the Governor of one State—I believe it was Connecticut—that they had had State civil defense exercises in participation with the Federal Government until they were told that the Federal agencies believed that such exercises would have an adverse impact on our image in foreign affairs. Therefore they were told to cease this kind of exercise. Is that the rationale that you were provided for excluding the State and local governments from joint exercises?

Mr. RODERICKS. That is correct, and I want to just punctuate that by saying there is a lack of confidence in the State and local agencies, a feeling that we could not articulate what we were doing in such a way as to keep the national security posture of the country viable. They really believe we'd go wild and hurt their Federal program.

Mr. KINCADE. So the idea was that the State and local operations which are the heart of the preparedness effort would be an embarrassment to the Federal Government?

Mr. RODERICKS. No question about it.

Mr. KINCADE. Let me ask just one more question, if I may. Then the chairman has several on the issue of urban evacuation. I think you have probably already given us the answer to this in your mention of the Metropolitan Council of Governments. Do you, either on a periodic or ongoing basis, engage in joint readiness planning or joint readiness exercises with Maryland and Virginia?

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes. We have a group that we call the Tri-State Committee. It's made up of the State directors of both Virginia and Maryland, and myself, and we meet regularly. No activity which touches on contiguous borders is entered into unilaterally in planning of any kind without consultation with both States and then we have this Metropolitan Council of Government Disaster and Emergency Preparedness Committee made up of every local civil defense director in the entire metropolitan area and we meet monthly. We have a staff member provided by DCPA. So there is good coordination at the local level.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, Mr. Kincaide. Mr. Rodericks as you know, this committee is very vitally interested in determining the feasibility of some of the current emergency preparedness programs, in particular, the urban evacuation program known as crisis relocation planning to which you referred earlier.

Over here on the wall is a chart depicting the effects upon Washington, D.C., and the surrounding areas of a nuclear attack. Let me explain first of all some of the symbols. The red areas represent locations expected to receive nuclear blast overpressures of 2 pounds per square inch, as estimated by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. The blue shaded areas represent locations expected to receive at least an acute dose of radioactivity. This level is set at 750 rems. It is interesting to note that some of this fallout is the result of local nuclear explosions but some of it is fallout resulting from nuclear warheads dropped on the Whiteman Air Force Base missile complex in Missouri. That's approximately 800 miles west of Washington, D.C., but it's expected to be carried to this area by the prevailing winds.

The black crosses which you see on the map represent approximate locations of the hardened Federal Relocation Centers in the mountains to the west of Washington. In any attack aimed at destroying the U.S. warmaking capability, it is probably safe to assume that these relocation centers will be targeted also, causing additional blast damage and fallout. To the north of the area shown on the map, there will be blast damage and fallout from warheads targeted against Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Camden, and other industrial and military targets. The question in our mind, Mr. Rodericks, is where and how to safely evacuate people from Metropolitan Washington under conditions like these? Even with 3 days advance notice there just doesn't really seem to be any safe haven to which you can evacuate all the population of Washington. I wonder if you had any thoughts or suggestions.

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes. As I was telling Mr. Kincade while you were out, I went through this exercise in 1958 and 1959 here for the city, the evacuation plan for the Metropolitan Washington area into Virginia and into Maryland, so I have been all through the process, including a look-see at radioactive fallout. Those plans which were fully developed were never introduced to the public, because they were not credible to either Congress or the officials I report to. The officials on my own government at the time, the elected commissioners, would not accept the plans. We went so far as to have 6,000 highway signs made for streets in this city alone indicating the routes of egress and Maryland put up signs on the highways. They were not credible plans because one reason then is the same reason why now Governor Davis will not get this program to be bought at the local level, because in our judgment—and I say then and I say now to you, sir—it must be a federally supported program with legislation by the Congress, supported by the President, and it must be prepared by the Federal Government assisted by the States and locals. There's no way the local elected officials are going to face the people down in Virginia and say we're going to have to build expedient shelters or provide shelters for 800,000 citizens of the District—we took the peak population of this city—you take the permanent population, and then you take all the employees that are in here, then you add the visitors—and the peak population for planning figures is about 1½ million, which means on any 1 day of the year you can have that many people here in the city.

Most of the people would have to go into Virginia because Baltimore has to evacuate. As a matter of fact, evacuation plans had the Baltimore people coming down to Washington and our people going up to Baltimore which wasn't too good. It was not credible. Crisis relocation must be examined, in my judgment, by the Congress and the Defense Department to examine all of the issues. It must involve every Federal agency—Transportation, HEW—all of the main resources, et cetera.

I'll cite you an illustration, sir, of an activity that was almost equal to a part of evacuation. When we had the riots in Washington, for 7 days no stores were open. I hear Mr. Dunne here saying that a natural

disaster is not comparable. In Washington, D.C., for 7 days there wasn't a store open, not a market open, not a piece of bread, or a bottle of milk, or anything else, and I had the assignment to assist with the feeding of the people here. President Johnson called the Secretary of Agriculture—at that time I think it was Orville Freeman—and said to him: "We need food in Washington." Mr. Freeman called us, opened up the GSA warehouses and the trailers were on the road moving food to the District quickly. Our biggest logistics problem was how to handle the amount of food that was delivered in bulk. We used the churches and city facilities for storage and distribution.

Without that Federal involvement there aren't adequate local resources to plan for. Even expedient shelter takes lumber and plywood, so you can't do it all locally.

Mr. EVANS. Let me ask you, is the concept itself a feasible one, in your opinion, assuming it's federally funded and legislated?

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes, sir. I believe it is a contingency plan. We don't have many other contingencies that we can plan against to survive and I believe it's a feasible concept. I disagree only, again, in the low-level effort by which the Federal agency is trying to get the country to accept this.

Mr. EVANS. I understand that Washington is the only American city given a No. 2 target priority by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. Other cities throughout this Nation are rated at level 3 or priority 3. Do you expect that the Washington metropolitan area would get a high priority on funding for crisis relocation planning when the test programs are completed and the evacuation planning begins in earnest?

Mr. RODERICKS. No, I don't.

Mr. EVANS. Would you care to elaborate?

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes, sir. For all the wrong reasons, it won't. There are hundreds of Members of Congress here who must be completely made aware of the process for evacuation. There is the National Government itself here and I think the DCPA officials who have to try to sell this program are unwilling at this time to offer their product for that kind of scrutiny because it isn't a good product yet. So they will defer this. They will delay this and I think hopefully some of the people hope that there might be a ground swell established for it. Well, forget it. There will be no ground swell, in my judgment, for evacuation. So we will not have a high priority.

Mr. KINCADE. In the chairman's absence, Mr. Rodericks, you have said, on the one hand, you believe the concept itself is feasible but, on the other hand, that they will not, after the prototype programs, have a good product to sell. I believe that was the terminology you used. I take it what you're saying is that the concept is feasible but that we are some distance away from having a workable and implementable kind of crisis relocation plan.

Mr. RODERICKS. That's a better statement than the one I made.

Mr. KINCADE. What would be the particular problems that you would see in the current plans or prototype plans?

Mr. RODERICKS. There is a strong feeling in the United States—you will hear this from my other colleagues and you know it because we are all from somebody's home town—there's a strong feeling in the United States in national defense, that the protection of all of our people is a Federal responsibility and that we, the people, pay for defense through our taxes and by being drafted and going through rationing and in these actions we follow the lead of the Federal Government.

The protection and the survival of this country against an enemy attack never was conceived to be that of the local town council or the board of selectmen. They don't have the resources. They couldn't invest in the system to do it. We are paying our taxes to the Federal Government in great amounts these days.

[Additional material for the record follows:]

Question. Please elaborate on any particular, specific problems seen in prototype evacuation plans, based on your experience with past evacuation planning.

Answer. Until the President indicates that this Nation should develop crises relocation plans and the Congress enacts specific legislation to conduct a nationwide program—fully funded by the federal government—the small amounts of money now requested by DCPA will be spent to develop the theoretical, limited effort paper plans, which like other past plans, will not be realistically accepted by public and private sector leaders.

Mr. KINCADE. Basically, you're going back to the point that the Federal Government is looked to for both military and civil defense and that it is too much to expect local jurisdictions to develop what is basically a national type of civil defense plan and to get their publics and their constituents to endorse and follow that kind of plan.

Mr. RODERICKS. Provided in your statement what you're really saying is that you know the people will assist the Federal Government plan. At each local level, it's fair to ask them to participate in their piece of the total action, but when Public Law 920, if I may digress just a moment, started out making the total responsibility for national survival that of the locals it did not put the Federal Government into the original action program. The law wasn't amended, for almost 7 or 8 years, to make the Federal Government a party to the partnership. Again, we're in 1976 and we're talking about civil defense being still voluntary on the part of the local people for the survival of the people of our country.

Mr. KINCADE. Let me ask some of the rather technical questions that I think were on the chairman's mind when he first raised this issue. Do you know whether evacuation plans call for citizens to leave Washington by car or on foot? What kind of transportation might be planned? Will the use of highways and other arteries be restricted by the authorities?

Mr. RODERICKS. We are not currently engaging in crisis relocation planning in Washington, D.C., so I can only go back again to the one that we did, and that study showed with a different warning time—we were working on the strategic warning of 1 day and tactical warning of 3 to 6 hours because we were talking about manned bombers primarily at that time and a few missiles—the evacuation was planned to be on foot and by automobiles.

The plan raised an issue of two or three cars breaking down on the bridges at that time, and what happens to evacuation in a traffic jam.

The concept of traffic jams mitigated against rational solutions that called for the use of motor vehicles. We did plan to use trains, but trains—where are they? You have to go to Alexandria to reach marshaling yards and then you have to find enough engines. So evacuation was predicated on people walking as far as they could away from the city. At that time we were hoping to get 10 to 20 miles. Today, obviously, we have to go many more miles.

Mr. KINCADE. Going back to what you said at the outset, there is currently no evacuation plan in effect for Washington even though it's the only city assigned a No. 2 target priority.

Mr. RODERICKS. That is correct. I still have the paper plan which was never really approved and, of course, the citizens know nothing about it and that's just as well at this hour.

Mr. KINCADE. What would we do if there were a prediction of a nuclear attack in the next 24 or 48 hours? Improvise?

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes, improvise! We have gone through that, Mr. Kincaide, and you know when. The night President Kennedy announced that Washington, D.C., was within the range of missiles now in place in Cuba. For the next 48 hours to 72 hours we have estimated that 30,000 to 40,000 people left this city. Of course, you couldn't tell they were evacuating, but we found out from our colleagues in Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland that all the hotels in October were filled up and loaded with residents of Washington, D.C. There were more absentees from the Federal Government as people took leave going to visit relatives in bordering States.

Mr. KINCADE. Let me focus on that for a minute because I think that raises some important questions. You talked about perhaps as many as 30,000 to 40,000 evacuees, which by no means defined the city's population at that time. More importantly, isn't it possible that nuclear jitters in a superpower confrontation would lead to uncontrolled migration or evacuation? Isn't it very important to a successful evacuation that it be controlled rather than chaotic?

Mr. RODERICKS. I agree, and that's why I say the concept is feasible and it certainly would be under control. The more believable the threat, then the more controllable the actions on the highways.

Mr. KINCADE. As I understand the program to date, the idea is that selected cities which are given a high target priority, as estimated by our government, would be those that would be ordered to evacuate first, assuming there was adequate notice. Now, if people in certain cities, let's say, Baltimore and Washington, are ordered or authorized to evacuate, what is to prevent the people from other cities, such as Norfolk and Richmond and Charlottesville and cities down in North Carolina, from suddenly deciding that they don't feel their cities are safe any longer, from starting to evacuate, too, and from crowding our host areas, thus leaving inadequate shelter spaces and food and logistic support in your host areas?

Mr. RODERICKS. There is every evidence that that would happen, Mr. Kincaide. I must say that during the 1950's the Federal agency published regularly, openly, a critical target list of cities in America, and one of the greatest gripes on the part of officials in local communities was that their cities were not shown on that list. It was demeaning to them to think that their communities were so inconsequential in terms of its contribution to America that an enemy wouldn't want to bomb it.

Mr. KINCADE. In other words, it was a status symbol to be on a critical nuclear target list?

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes. And the government stopped publishing that list. They still have a list of critical targets but they don't publish it.

Mr. KINCADE. Yet the entire concept, as I understand it, is based on the evacuation of selected cities picked by national authorities. Now, if the selected evacuation is going to lead to uncontrolled refugees and migration, isn't that going to tend to upset the efforts to have a successful and controlled evacuation?

Mr. RODERICKS. There are two parts to your question as far as my answer is concerned. One, the current listing of critical targets that are known to the country and to the officials was developed in conjunction with State and local officials. In other words, DCPA made this list and then went to the State and local people and said, "You know your State well. Have we left any place off the list which you think we should record?" These lists were modified to include other critical areas which were added by both State and local officials. Many State and local people put them in there because of that reason, because if we don't have town "A" in the list but town "B" and "C" are in here, then people will all go to town "A", but the people in town "A" could go somewhere else.

Mr. KINCADE. Again, that suggests the need for an overall planning effort, not doing it piecemeal on a regional or State or local basis.

Mr. RODERICKS. Yes, sir. I'm prejudiced, Mr. Kincaide. I spent 4 years in Africa and Europe in World War II and I saw how the military had to control millions of people in relocation actions. Unless there's an organized structure for doing this, one that makes sense with some legal authority for doing it, chaos exists.

Mr. KINCADE. But it can't be merely a local structure. It has to cover virtually every contingency in every area.

Mr. RODERICKS. I believe it should be developed by the Federal Government with the cooperation and assistance of the local and have then an integrated system for doing this where all of the resources come into play.

Mr. KINCADE. I believe you said that under the earlier "paper" plan for evacuation from the District of Columbia area that the host areas were to be in Virginia, if I understood you correctly.

Mr. RODERICKS. Most of the host areas were in Virginia in the original one because Maryland had to evacuate Baltimore citizens and fan out in a 360° arc, so that left very little room for the people in Northeast and Southeast Washington to go into Maryland. So they had to evacuate into Virginia.

Mr. KINCADE. In view of the higher accuracies, the higher possible yields on current nuclear weapons, the greater numbers of warheads and the expansion of the current target list, doesn't this make Virginia seem much less attractive as a possible host area?

Mr. RODERICKS. Well, when that's all you have in terms of territory to move to, it looks very attractive. The issue then becomes, what am I going to do when I get where I'm going?

Mr. KINCADE. It may at least be better than Washington.

Mr. RODERICKS. I think that's pretty well accepted, yes.

Mr. KINCADE. Do you think we will have 2 or 3 days advance notice of a nuclear attack, which is assumed to make the crisis relocation plans workable?

Mr. RODERICKS. I think that's another contingency plan. A crisis relocation plan must be made up of a half dozen contingencies, in my judgment, and I understand what they're talking about when they say the rationale would be that the Soviets are looking at the same contingencies—of course, the Soviets, as I see it—are planning to overcome that time lag by currently dispersing industry and population. Anyway, I think it's a contingency plan that would have to be ready when the President makes a judgment that it's time to start some movement. Again, we can go to England, and if you look at what the British did when they were really assaulted, they didn't move everybody out, but their contingencies were for moving people to Canada and moving people old and young away from target areas. There are many, many examples of evacuation in wartime and I feel that our Defense Department has not examined those fully. I have suggested that they take a look at those as examples and learn by the experience. Apparently we're going to make a U.S. product without profiting from the experience of others.

Mr. EVANS. Pardon the interruptions, Mr. Rodericks. I had a couple other questions that I want to ask this morning. Successful evacuation seems to depend a lot on Soviet cooperation as to the timing of their attack, advance notice, target areas, accuracy, reliable warheads, and various factors of that type. Do you think that we can count on the Soviets to attack us in a manner that's most suitable for urban evacuation?

Mr. RODERICKS. Well, obviously, no, but I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, since we know every bit of their capability, there's no unknown capability, we are capable of planning and making the contingency plans to meet each of their capabilities if we have the national will to do it.

Mr. EVANS. So with planning, these capabilities can be dealt with, you feel?

Mr. RODERICKS. In my judgment, yes.

Mr. EVANS. Also, successful evacuation depends on citizens behaving in a very idealized manner, to say the least, so as to prevent disruptions. Do you think we can rely on the people of this Nation then to act in this very idealized manner that is often envisioned?

Mr. RODERICKS. I think we maybe cannot expect them to act in any idealized fashion, but certainly we are intelligent enough to know the reactions of crowds in moving away from danger spots and we can channel the people by organizing a system which would offer to them the prospect of survival if they execute the maneuvers. If they are believable maneuvers and they believe it can save their lives, I believe they will follow the procedures and I again draw on England, Russia, Germany, and Poland and other places when they had to have massive evacuation; when they knew the threat was real and there were prospects for survival at the other end, they did it with a minimal amount of objection.

Mr. EVANS. Going back to another earlier report, the 1957 Gaither report, it found the strategic evacuation to be an unworkable alternative. What in the meantime, since 1957, would you say has changed to make evacuation more realistic today?

Mr. RODERICKS. I think the election campaign of President Nixon and Hubert Humphrey and the campaign that President Kennedy

waged both brought to the national attention this tremendous change in the capability of the Soviet Union to rain destruction on America. I think the 1962 missile crisis convinced those who were of a mature age during that period. I think that after Cuba we went into a national period of revulsion because we finally knew that we are no longer safe. The ocean didn't protect us. I do believe in the value of a rational explanation and a continued exposition of this issue, which is not going on in our press. You see it in terms of foreign policy, in terms of State Department activities, without any relevance to what these things mean to our survival here. We are always talking about what's going to happen to the other guy. I think we are at the point where we can face up to the issue. It's the capability, sir, and I think Americans, because they want peace more than ever and because they know now we are more vulnerable, I do think they are willing to accept a low-cost insurance policy, but it must be believable. They must hear from Congressman Evans, for example, that he believes that for the people in his district that this is the right course. They are not hearing this, Mr. Congressman. There's so much doubt in our country because there isn't a well-charted course that we can all agree on even in principle.

Mr. DAWSON. I might ask, Mr. Chairman, if it's possible to submit questions in writing to all the witnesses?

Mr. EVANS. Without objection, that opportunity will be made available to all members of the committee. I would like at this time to thank you very much, Mr. Rodericks, for your willingness to answer our questions this morning. I think you have certainly shed some light on the questions that the committee had. We appreciate your willingness to come here and testify.

Mr. RODERICKS. Thank you. And may I say that again I treasure Governor Davis as a friend and colleague. My disagreements with him I have said to him directly in stronger terms than I have expressed here, so it will be no surprise to him when he reads what I have said here.

[For responses to additional questions for the record see p. 293]

Mr. EVANS. Thank you. Mr. Russell, will you come to the witness table? As soon as you get seated, Mr. Russell, would you introduce your colleagues this morning. Then you may proceed with your oral statement. If you'd like to condense it any for the record, we will be glad to accept a condensation.

STATEMENT OF CECIL RUSSELL, PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES CIVIL DEFENSE COUNCIL; ACCOMPANIED BY LEA KUNGLE, PRESIDENT-ELECT; AND HERBERT SIMPSON, PORTSMOUTH, VA.

Mr. RUSSELL. To my left is Mrs. Lea Kungle from Joplin, Mo., the president-elect of the Civil Defense Council. To my right is the executive secretary from Portsmouth, Va., Mr. Herbert Simpson.

Since you have a copy of our statement and presentation, I would just more or less review it in view of time and so forth.

I would like to say that we are an organization that's composed of approximately 2,500 municipal and county executives throughout the land and we cover approximately 90 percent of the population of the United States. We actually work for the local political subdivision.

I want to point out and emphasize that we are local people. We are local people who are employed by local government, but during a disaster we become a member of a multiple organizational team which includes Federal, State and local to get the job done of saving lives and protecting property.

We feel on the local level to build a common base for emergency preparedness that we have to build this common base on natural disasters. Now we at no time emphasize more of the natural disaster aspect than we do nuclear because we feel on the local level that nuclear preparedness is our prime responsibility but we need training and we need manpower and the finances plus the cooperation of the Federal and State government disaster agencies to be successful by working in natural disasters. How we respond the first few minutes could mean the difference in saving many lives and much valuable property in this country. We feel that it's very important to have an adequate warning system. We feel it's very important to respond as hastily and as effectively as possible and we feel that we have the recovery responsibility after other Federal agencies do come in and assist us if it is warranted.

Now there's been much said about the Leggett committee and the report of the Armed Services Committee which most everybody is aware of so I will just briefly hit that, but we of the U.S. Civil Defense Council have to concur with the report of the Armed Services Committee and feel that the local tax dollar and the Federal tax dollar must serve two purposes. It must serve this program on the natural disasters and the nuclear disasters. In other words, make the tax dollar do double duty. We feel there's been a lot said pertaining to our having two types of civil defense and apparently that is in the minds of a lot of people from other Federal disaster agencies. Some people feel that we have a civil defense which is the local responsibility and we have a military civil defense which is Federal responsibility.

Now we don't look at it in that respect. We look at it as one responsibility, one disaster preparedness responsibility on the local level. We feel the dual-use concept that the Office of Management and Budget has just recently narrowed down to single use, so that the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency is limited to nuclear preparation only, is rather ridiculous. I would like to mention to you or read to you a March 5, 1973 directive which stated in part:

At the Federal level, the civil preparedness program has been fully redirected to help local governments improve their readiness for lifesaving operations in any type emergency. The redirected program is dual purpose in that it takes into account all likely hazards, whether enemy attack or peacetime emergencies or disasters.

We see the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency has led local governments down that primrose path for several years. We have gone into great length of preparedness to handle all types of emergencies and we feel that this is more practical.

As you know, across this Nation there are hundreds of natural disasters such as tornados, hurricanes and so forth. Who do the local people look at? They look at us on the local level because we are doing the planning. We are involving them. We are exercising our plans on the local level and we are getting the news media to publicize the

exercises and so forth, and they look at us as the agency for them to seek recovery from, to look for their survival.

Now we realize also if a disaster is of a magnitude such as a large disaster, a tornado or something of that nature, and the damage is tremendous and we are unable to have the amount of resources that we need on a local level, then we must go to the State and subsequently we apparently may have to go to the Federal Government for assistance, but we first must utilize all of the available resources on the local level in that community and that State, which we do.

Now if it's beyond what we have available, then we go to the Federal Government through our governors of the respective States. You're aware that many Members of Congress and other highly trained people in the nuclear field in recent years have visited the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China and they have returned to tell us some very startling information as to how those countries are prepared. I feel that anything that any other country can prepare we can prepare and we can prepare it just as adequately as any other country.

The bad thing about our country is the fact that I think we have a tendency to downgrade our capability. We sometimes create a bureaucracy on the top echelon which has a tremendous amount of duplication and it makes it very difficult for us on the local level sometimes to know who to turn to when we go to Washington.

Now we understand also that Russia, the Soviet Union, spends approximately \$1 billion a year. The Leggett committee recommended \$110 million, which is quite a difference. So if you break that down, you're talking about approximately \$6 per person to 39 cents per person of the people in the United States.

Just recently I believe Mr. Colby, the former CIA Director, at a reserve officers association stated that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have developed civil defense capabilities far more advanced than the civil preparedness in this country.

The Honorable Paul Nitze, former SALT negotiator, says the thrust of Russia's strategic civil defense program is to build a war-winning capability and he felt the only way to dissuade the Soviets was to demonstrate resolve to match their deployments and preclude their winning an advantage.

So, Mr. Chairman, we submit that in order for us on the local level to accomplish what our people are demanding of us, I feel the following needs to be undertaken immediately to ensure the people of the United States that we can and will survive a nuclear attack as well as a natural disaster:

First, the Federal Civil Defense Preparedness Agency Federal funding for 1977 be no less than that of \$110 million;

Second, that dual-use concept be authorized under existing laws. And one of the most important things I think that all of us have been negligent through the years is not paying as close attention to civil defense and civil preparedness as we should have;

Third, the Armed Services Committee conduct oversight and review hearings each year on civil defense; and

Fourth, remove all termination dates from existing legislation.

Mr. Chairman, that is the end of my statement, the few remarks I have to make, so we open ourselves to any questions.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]

STATEMENT BY CECIL H. RUSSELL, PRESIDENT, U.S. CIVIL DEFENSE COUNCIL

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to present the views of the members of the United States Civil Defense Council.

My name is Cecil Russell, and I am the director of emergency services in Huntington, West Virginia. I am President of the United States Civil Defense Council, who I represent today with my colleague, Mr. J. Herbert Simpson, Executive Secretary of the United States Civil Defense Council and a past President.

May I take a moment to tell you our organization is composed of approximately 2,500 municipal and county executives from throughout the land and covers approximately 80 percent of the population of this country. We actually work for the local political subdivision, not the State or Federal Government: however, in a disaster, we become a member of a multiple organizational team which includes Federal, State, and local to get the job done of saving lives and property when disaster strikes.

I wish to first point out there is no way local civil defense can operate by merely waiting for a nuclear disaster to occur, like the Office of Management and Budget has mandated to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. We need training, we need manpower, and we need the finances, plus the cooperation of the Federal and State government disaster agencies to be successful. By working in natural disasters, even though it would not be of the magnitude of a nuclear holocaust, we are learning the basic procedure methods and the know how of handling major disasters in order that we on the local scene may be ready for a nuclear attack or nuclear accident. How we respond in those first few minutes could mean the difference in the saving of many lives and much valuable property in this country.

I should point out, at this time, there is not enough money in the Federal Budget to pay for State and local operational capability for civil preparedness. It has to be a partnership, which means that Federal matching funds and services along with those of the States and local governments must share the load if we intend to give the people of this Nation the protection they feel they already have and rightly deserve from their Government.

Recently, the House of Representatives Panel on Civil Defense, chaired by Representative Robert L. Leggett of California, held lengthy hearings on civil defense. Following these hearings, the panel recommended to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Forces that the DCPA FY77 Budget be set at \$110 million. This recommendation was approved by the Committee on Armed Services and sent to the Committee on the Budget and Appropriations, chaired by Representative Tom Steed of Oklahoma.

After hearings by the Steed committee, participated in by members of the United States Civil Defense Council, we were led to believe that the \$110 million figure would hold: however, we were stunned when the Steed committee voted to recommend the \$71 million of the administration.

On June 14, 1976 the full House of Representatives voted on an amendment by Representative Bill Chappell of Florida to increase the DCPA FY77 Budget to \$85 million, which cleared the House by voice vote. Strong support from the floor was offered by Leggett of California, Glenn Anderson of California, John McCollister of Nebraska, William Hughes of New Jersey, and Representative Don Mitchell of New York.

On June 16, 1976 the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, chaired by Senator Joseph M. Montoya of New Mexico, submitted to his committee the administration's OMB budget figure of \$71 million. Once again, local civil defense directors across the Nation felt they had been let down and immediately began contacting their own senators to increase this amount to the Leggett proposal of \$110 million. Following a great deal of debate, it was finally decided by the committee that a compromise figure of \$80 million against the amendment of \$85 million, proposed by Senator J. Bennett Johnston of Louisiana, was acceptable to the committee and this is where it stands in the Senate today.

We, on the State, and particularly the local level, of whom I represent today, are unable to understand the administration's stand on \$71 million for DCPA FY77. This action alone can and will destroy many local civil defense agencies throughout the land. It will cause a great deal of unemployment in many of our cities and will tend to break down the civil preparedness structure of many others.

This brings me to the dual use concept whereby the administration, through OMB, suddenly decided DCPA could not work in natural disasters anymore.

For years, local civil defense directors, who had been struggling in the natural disaster field, found support from DCPA by a directive dated March 5, 1973, which stated in part: "At the Federal level, the civil preparedness program has been fully redirected to help local governments improve their readiness for life saving operations in any type emergency. The redirected program is dual-purpose in that it takes into account all likely hazards, whether enemy attack or peace-time emergencies or disasters."

Every year, across this Nation, hundreds of natural disasters occur. Tornados, hurricanes, fires, floods, to name a few, take the lives and property of our people. Who do those citizens turn to first? Their local government, the ones they know, the ones they have read about in their news media, and who have held exercises on the local scene in preparation for such a day. But when that disaster is too large, we on the local scene must turn to the Federal Government for that assistance.

Dual use for disaster preparedness has led us to believe beyond a doubt that the training and preparedness methods learned from working in natural disasters has improved our chances for survival in a nuclear disaster. We, on the local scene, know that a nuclear disaster would be many times greater than any natural disaster that may occur. However, we believe that we now have the basic organization to handle such a disaster and we are asking the Members of Congress to help us improve and make better use of what we have in the way of preparedness today.

You are aware of the preparedness efforts of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Recent visits by Members of Congress and others highly trained in nuclear preparedness to these two Communist countries were startled at what they found.

The Soviet Union, according to information furnished by these groups, spend approximately \$1 billion each year on civil defense, while we, in this country, are asking \$110 million. The Soviets have dispersal plans for their workers and citizens away from key target areas. They have instructions on civil defense in their grade schools and compulsory training programs for adults. Recently, former CIA Director William E. Colby stressed the point, while addressing the Reserve Officers Association, that both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have developed civil defense capabilities far more advanced than the civil preparedness effort in this country.

The Honorable Paul Nitze, former SALT negotiator, says the thrust of Russia's strategic civil defense program is to build a war-winning capability and he felt the only way to dissuade the Soviets was to demonstrate resolve to match their deployments and preclude their winning an advantage.

Meeting in Washington, D.C., February 24, 1976, the National Governors' Conference unanimously adopted a resolution requesting President Ford to fund DCPA fiscal year 1977 budget to at least the fiscal year 1976 figure and to amend Public Law 81-920 to allow DCPA to work in natural as well as nuclear disasters.

Two other national organizations who certainly have a right to be heard on defense matters of this country, the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars, issued strong statements for an adequate, realistic civil defense program.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I submit that in order for us on the local level to accomplish what our people are demanding of us, I feel the following needs to be undertaken immediately to insure the people of the United States that we can and will survive a nuclear attack as well as natural disasters.

One: Federal DCPA fiscal year 1977 funding of no less than \$110 million.

Two: Dual-use concept be authorized under existing laws.

Three: Armed Services Committee conduct annual oversight and review hearings each year on civil defense.

Four: Remove all termination dates from existing legislation.

Gentlemen, this ends my statement.

Mr. EVANS. All right. I appreciate that. Thank you very much, Mr. Russell. I do know how concerned State and local preparedness directors are about the cuts in the budget at the preparedness agency. This committee cannot directly, of course, assist you in that we are not an authorizing or an appropriating committee but, rather, an investigative committee; but I do believe that the light we can shed on this problem of preparedness in our Nation, in general, at least can ulti-

mately bring funding for preparedness programs back up to a more satisfactory level.

As I understand the background, Mr. Russell, the decision by the Office of Management and Budget to cut DCPA funding was based on the assumption that State and local governments supported strong emergency preparedness programs and that the Federal Government could get sort of a free ride on this existing preparedness structure by cutting back on Federal funding and restricting their use to nuclear-attack programs only. But if I understand you correctly, you're telling this committee that the State and local governmental programs might not exist at all, if it were not for continuing and flexible Federal support. In other words, the Federal Government will get a free ride but on a dead or dying horse it helped kill, perhaps, and I wonder if this is the way that you see it.

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes, sir. That is the way we see it. We view it ideally as a completely coordinated program from the Federal to the State and local level. Now I have to say that in a lot of communities, local governments spend much more money than they receive in matching money from the Federal Government from DCPA. For example, in the preparedness program that we have in our community, I spend over \$200,000 more money than the DCPA ever thinks about reimbursing any part of.

Mr. EVANS. You're speaking of a township?

Mr. RUSSELL. Right. Practically every community in this country spends many more dollars than are matched by the Federal Government. Now the moneys that are matched by the Federal Government are exclusive moneys that are primarily for nuclear preparedness and when in programs such as our P & A, which is personnel administration moneys, which is matched, other things have to be justified under nuclear conditions.

Mr. EVANS. Could you tell us exactly what funds were cut out of the DCPA's budget for this year?

Mr. RUSSELL. One thing that we feel is very important to us on the local level is the training program, the public information program that the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency has which is referred to as a staff college. We understand that this has been drastically cut. We view—and you can even compare our country with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union teach their children how to survive in school. They have training programs for the adults. Now we had or we have, I should say, an excellent training program in the schools, but we understand this is going to be terminated because of the lack of funds.

Mr. EVANS. So they are, in effect, cutting funding for those programs which are most basic to State and local efforts?

Mr. RUSSELL. That's right, and they also have put a freeze on the additional personnel, any added people to our staffs.

Mr. EVANS. You have heard these other witnesses this morning. They have given us their experience on what it's like working with a three-part Federal organization. I wonder if you could give us your views on this issue, what kind of experience is it to work with these three-part Federal agencies?

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, sir, I have been in public life in public safety for approximately 30 years. I'm a former police officer and I have served in every position there is in a police department, so I have seen all

types of emergencies and all types of disasters. We have worked with the Marshall University plane crash, the Buffalo Creek disaster, the Silver Bridge, the Wheelerburg tornado, and things of this nature.

Now somebody on the local level must do the emergency planning and we are that agency. We are that agency to do the emergency planning for the survival to get the warning out to the people so the people can take the necessary precautions. That saves many lives. One example was in Omaha, Nebr., last year, the warning system, and disseminating, and getting the warning out to the people saved many lives. There were just a couple of people who lost their lives. We have found that it's very important to have adequate warning systems. We feel that our work with our State and practically every State—I don't believe every State responds in the same manner, but the State of West Virginia responds very adequately.

Mr. EVANS. What in your experience, in your own words, is it like for you to try to work with these Federal agencies? Maybe you could contrast that with when you dealt with the Office of Emergency Preparedness. What is the situation today compared to your past experiences?

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, actually, I don't have too much difficulty, but let me give you a little example. Back some years ago the police officers in the city of New York struck because they had so much paperwork and every day we're getting more paperwork, more forms to fill out, things that are more difficult. We are being restricted as to man-hours. We have to specify that the hours that we spend in our office is for specific purposes, for nuclear, at least 50 percent of it is for this. In other words, we are being very restricted as to what we actually can do.

Mr. EVANS. So the relationship is becoming more burdensome upon local and State personnel?

Mr. RUSSELL. In my opinion, yes.

Mr. EVANS. You make a point in your testimony that there's a very clear relationship between natural disaster operations and nuclear attack operations. Earlier today this notion was criticized. I wonder if you could tell us what you think are the major similarities and dissimilarities between the natural disaster and nuclear attack operations and do you think that these similarities are more important or less important than the dissimilarities?

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, I feel that the similarities are very important. Let's take, for example, if you had a gas leakage, toxic-type gas from a railroad car, and it was necessary to relocate—or as some people say evacuate—to a crisis relocation center. That is an emergency. That is an evacuation. That is something that we do on a day-to-day basis.

Now by doing this on a day-to-day basis we are building the common base. We are training people. We are testing our communications. We are testing all the elements of local government. We are involving all of the other agencies. We have a disaster agency within our community to handle that particular emergency.

Now during a nuclear disaster, if you were into a crisis relocation situation, then we would be involved in relocating our people. Now I am not involved in crisis relocation. So consequently, I cannot elaborate too much on that because I'm not too familiar with it other than some of the technical details we have heard recently.

Mr. EVANS. But you would say that the similarities are more important than the dissimilarities?

Mr. RUSSELL. Absolutely. It's the common base. Look at reality on the local level. Look at a little police department or a little fire department, the local departments of that government, how they respond, how they coordinate their efforts. We're emergency planners, so to speak, on that community level, and it's our job to prepare an emergency operating plan. This is reality. The trouble with a lot of people is that they live in ivory towers someplace. They don't understand what happens down on the local level. They don't understand the function of a police department or a fire department when they respond even to that day-to-day emergency. If it's a large scope or large-scale emergency, well, then, you're bringing in other agencies, other departments, and even State agencies to assist, and then it's our job to coordinate, to protect the people and see they are properly housed and taken care of and fed and so forth.

Mr. EVANS. I certainly think that we need to know what emergency preparedness on the local level means in concrete terms, especially so we can better understand what the Federal role in it should be. I think, as you have indicated, most communities have or are trying to develop an emergency disaster plan, an omnibus plan that provides for various types of disaster that a community might be able to expect, including a nuclear attack. I wonder if your community has such a plan. Could you tell the committee a little about how that plan is supposed to operate, how the development of the plan was funded to begin with?

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, first, let me say the development of the plan was funded through the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

Mr. EVANS. To what extent was this funded?

Mr. RUSSELL. Fifty percent to the local government, the local governmental agency, the Office of Emergency Services. That is what it's called in the State of West Virginia.

Mr. EVANS. And then just briefly how is this plan to operate?

Mr. RUSSELL. The plan is prepared by each department head in municipal government as to what his function would be in disasters and emergencies. Then, after the plan is prepared or drafted by that department head, we accumulate all the plans and review them and publish them into an emergency operating plan. Then we take the plan back to each department head and then we will have an exercise. We have two exercises a year of all department heads and the county agencies, the other agencies such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army, the welfare department—would have a job or a task to perform when an emergency occurs regardless of what kind of emergency it is, whether it's a natural disaster or a nuclear disaster.

The important thing is that each department head knows what his responsibility is or what his job is after the plan is established and prepared and that it is kept updated, current, which should be done at least once a year.

Mr. EVANS. So it's a constant revision by the department heads with their input and then actually carrying out a simulated disaster to see how the plan would function in reality?

Mr. RUSSELL. A plan upon a shelf is not working.

Mr. EVANS. And you would recommend every community carry out such an exercise at least once a year?

Mr. RUSSELL. Very definitely. I think you would find that this is done if you would investigate or check into most of the communities, the political subdivisions over the United States.

Mr. EVANS. I wonder if you could tell the committee what you would have to cut out of your own local community's disaster plan if Federal moneys are cut any further and if the Federal moneys were restricted to only nuclear attack planning.

Mr. RUSSELL. In my own office I will have to put out one staff member.

Mr. EVANS. What is your office currently composed of so we will get a view here of what impact this is?

Mr. RUSSELL. My office, as far as the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency is concerned, is staffed by three people, as far as that staff pattern is concerned. We actually have six people. We have two people who are in our office funded by the local government for other purposes that are not funded by DCPA.

Mr. EVANS. I see. So, as I understand, the preparedness budget is currently funded at the level of 50 percent Federal funds and it would require a 25 percent personnel cut, one of the four people, who would have to be eliminated given any further cut in Federal funding levels?

Mr. RUSSELL. Approximately, yes.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Russell, I appreciate your willingness to testify, your statements and answers to the questions. I have to leave for another vote and would like to try to summarize the hearings today. If you have any further testimony that you would like to present, we will leave the record open for any further submissions for the next several days.

[For responses to additional questions for the record, see p. 298.]

Before closing today's hearing, I would like to summarize what I feel are some of the lessons we have learned from today's testimony.

It appears from what we have heard that there is a growing difference in preparedness perspectives between the Federal level and the State-local level which threatens to undermine the basis of the joint partnership that has existed in this effort since 1958. We heard testimony implying that the State and local agencies may not understand their role and are not pulling their fair share of the financial load.

On the other hand, we heard testimony stating that the Federal Government has forgotten about the relationship between general or natural disaster planning and nuclear attack planning. We heard testimony that the Federal Government has forgotten that the preparedness structure at the State and local level is heavily dependent on Federal aid and may wither without this aid.

The testimony today, I think, also revealed that there are difficulties in terms of preparedness programs. Some of these difficulties are traceable to problems of weak or uncertain guidance and coordination. Some are traceable to repeated shifts of emphasis in program priorities. Some may be traceable to lack of adequate budget support by governments at all levels.


We will be looking further at these matters when the committee takes testimony tomorrow from additional Federal and State witnesses. But I think that it is not too early to say that most of the problems stem from long-term neglect of preparedness issues gen-

erally, and from a current lack of positive leadership in this important field. I hope we will hear some remedies for this situation when we reconvene again Wednesday. They are long overdue.

Thank you all for assisting the committee in this undertaking.

These hearings are recessed until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning, when we will meet in room 5302 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. That is the hearing room of the Senate Banking Committee on the 5th floor of this building.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearings were recessed, to be reconvened at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 30, 1976.]



FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 30, 1976

U.S. CONGRESS,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION,
Washington, D.C.

The Joint Committee met at 10:05 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 5302, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David Evans presiding.

Present: Congressman David Evans and Senator William Proxmire.

Also present: Bill Kincade, staff director, and Rhett Dawson, minority counsel.

Mr. EVANS. This meeting will come to order. Chairman Sullivan and Vice Chairman Proxmire have other committee assignments this morning that will detain them, so I have been asked to reconvene the Joint Committee's hearing this morning. Also, the House of Representatives has a very heavy workload this morning. There will be a number of very important conference votes out, so we will probably be interrupted a number of times. If that does occur, if you are reading your opening statement or making your remarks, please continue doing so and I will either have one of the other members of the committee carry on the meeting until I can return or else I will have one of the staff members, Mr. Kincade or Mr. Dawson, proceed with the hearing.

I think we are all aware that civil emergency preparedness is basically a simple issue in concept. But it involves a variety of agencies and programs that interact in a complex fashion. Furthermore, it has been complicated recently by a variety of developments, not the least of which is the growth in the number of emergencies where Government action is appropriate or required.

I believe it will be helpful, therefore, to review some of the issues and the questions which the Joint Committee is trying to address in its review of civil emergency preparedness. This will set the scene for this morning's continuing discussion of preparedness efforts at the Federal, State, and local levels.

It is important to remember that the emergency preparedness effort had its beginnings in civil defense against enemy attack. Over the years, however, a broad range of other, nondefense emergency situations has arisen to which basic civil defense techniques, plans, personnel, and programs could usefully be applied. The most familiar, of course, are natural disaster emergencies but we also have to deal with possible nuclear power plant accidents, terrorist and sabotage activities, resource interruptions and a variety of other events that could have widespread impact on the lives and welfare of citizens in a highly complex industrial society.

This growth in the range of emergency or crisis situations has led to similar growth in the services expected of emergency preparedness

organizations at the Federal, State and local levels. To some degree, however, the organizational system has not kept pace with the demands made on it and this is part of the problem we are seeing today. At the same time, there has been a growth in the partnership that was originally worked out among Federal, State and local governments. Yet here again there seems to be evidence that the partnership is under real strain.

So we find that the civil emergency preparedness structure and the governmental partnership that cements it together are endangered. Several of our witnesses have expressed real alarm over the future of the national preparedness effort. The causes cited for this declining state of preparedness are many. I will cite a few of the major ones the committee has heard about.

Civil emergency preparedness is an easy target for budget cuts at all levels of government because it is not a service for which there is consistent public demand. When funds are scarce, preparedness is first to be cut.

Civil emergency preparedness currently lacks the kind of positive and visible support from senior officials at all levels of government that it has enjoyed at times in the past.

Furthermore, there is widespread disagreement over preparedness priorities. Different officials and agencies favor different programs. And there is no forum or mechanism for establishing uniform program priorities.

At the same time, civil emergency preparedness does not seem to have strong public support, except possibly during and just after an emergency, though we have heard testimony that it could have public support if it got official support.

We have also heard that program priorities have become disconnected from real-life probabilities, so that we may be spending relatively more of our scarce resources on preparing for the less frequent or less probable disasters.

The organizational picture, which seemed to stabilize for a time in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, has become confused. State and local agencies are consolidated functionally but Federal organs are not. This seems to create problems for the State and local agencies in carrying out their missions.

Concurrently, Federal officials and agencies have been reduced in status, at least in apparent status, and they lack the real authority in the Government to carry out their responsibilities effectively.

The partnership of which I spoke earlier seems to be disintegrating. Federal officials are reminding State and local governments that non-defense emergency preparedness is basically a State or local responsibility. They add that the State and local governments are not always adequately supporting national emergency programs, as for nuclear attack.

State and local officials, on the other hand, point out that civil defense measures are compatible with other emergency preparedness programs and cannot be sold to their governments except as a package. They note, too, that the whole State and local structure, which is the heart of emergency operations, has grown up with considerable Federal help and the Federal Government can't just walk away from it all or it will collapse.

In this morning's hearings we will be looking for a better understanding of some of these problems. But we will also be looking for recommendations for ways to improve the situation. Some have suggested that there is a need for a complete overhaul of the basic legislation, primarily the Federal Civil Defense Act. That implies a complete rethinking of the whole civil emergency preparedness picture. Perhaps the solutions that worked in the past are just not adequate to altered circumstances and new demands. The committee hopes the experts from whom we will be hearing this morning will give us the benefit of their experience and thinking on the problem.

Our first witness this morning is Hon. John E. Davis, Director of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

Governor Davis, we appreciate your very extensive written statement which we will publish in full in the hearing record and I would appreciate it if you could keep your oral summary to 15 minutes at the maximum in the interest of a longer give-and-take session. Perhaps you would care to address some of the points I have raised. Certainly, in any case, you may begin.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. DAVIS, DIRECTOR, CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN E. HUNT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR; JACK RASKIN, COMPTROLLER; JOHN W. McCONNELL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, PLANS AND OPERATIONS; JAMES O. BUCHANAN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING; GEORGE W. JETT, GENERAL COUNSEL; AND OLIVER WILLIFORD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Evans.

I should like first to introduce some of the staff who are with me. Mr. John Hunt, former Member of the Congress who is Deputy Director; Mr. George Jett, to my left, legal counsel; Mr. John McConnell, who is Assistant Director of Plans and Operations; Mr. Jack Raskin, who's our Comptroller; and to the rear of me is Mr. James Buchanan, who is head of our research department, and Mr. Oliver Williford, who is an assistant to the director.

I am honored to appear today before the Joint Committee on Defense Production. As Director of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, I will outline briefly our role as it relates to overall U.S. preparedness. I will state major DCPA objectives and contrast U.S. civil defense with that of the Soviet Union. A more detailed presentation, together with supporting documentation, is being submitted for the record. Following this short statement, I will be pleased to answer any questions.

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency—DCPA—operates under the basic authority of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended. An Executive order assigned civil defense responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and others; and a Department of Defense Directive established our "charter" within the Department of Defense. Although DCPA is part of the Defense Department, it is civilian in nature.

In the Federal Civil Defense Act, Congress established the U.S. civil defense program as a joint responsibility of the Federal Government and of State and local governments.

Therefore, the major thrust of our work is with civil government—with the States and their local political jurisdictions throughout the United States.

The military services provide some operating support to our program. The central reason, however, for assignment of civil defense to DOD is that it is viewed within the executive branch and within the Department as “integral to the total strategic defenses.”

Let's define “civil defense,” as stated in the Federal Civil Defense Act:

All those activities and measures designed or undertaken (1) to minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an attack upon the United States, (2) to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack, and (3) to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack.

A civil defense capability requires organization, plans, training and exercises, shelter, warning, and emergency communications, and radiological monitoring.

It requires also emergency operating centers, broadcast station protection, and emergency services such as fire prevention and control, rescue, and health and medical care.

It requires supporting research and emergency public information.

Establishment of a total civil defense system is a complex undertaking; one that requires continuing attention.

To meet civil defense responsibilities, effective use must be made of all kinds of community resources including both manpower and materiel.

There must be close interplay within and between all levels of government, with business and industry, with organizations, and with the general public.

The essence of civil defense, or civil preparedness, is the “self-help” principle. This means creating the capability of communities, and of individuals and families, to help themselves in a civil defense emergency until outside assistance could become available.

To this end, DCPA provides guidance and assistance to State and local governments for development and maintenance of emergency operating capabilities.

Nearly 2,500 local governments participate in our matching funds program. In addition, another 2,300 participate in other elements of the program, for a total of nearly 5,000 communities and areas comprising more than 91 percent of the national population.

Is civil defense worthy of annual expenditures? Can civil defense really provide greater safety for the American people?

We sincerely believe the answer is “Yes.”

All information we have indicates that protection of life against nuclear attack is not an impossible mission. This is the DOD position.

While we cannot guarantee safety to any given individual, careful planning and preparations to meet the effects of attack can markedly reduce casualties.

Further, we believe evidence of a viable U.S. civil defense system is a deterrent to any potential aggressor.

Faced with the perils of the nuclear and missile age, we have three options: (1) take no action and assume the consequences, (2) stay put, dig in, and meet the situation where we are, or (3) try to evade or cope with the dangers.

In DCPA we have concentrated on the second and third options through provision for early warning, and then sheltering people in place or relocating them during a crisis.

Timely warning could help people avoid the direct effects of nuclear bursts: blast, heat, and initial radiation.

Fallout radiation resulting from surface bursts could result in a deadly hazard over much of the Nation.

To protect people in place, we have worked for more than a decade to create a nationwide system of public fallout shelters. Millions of Americans could be protected in these shelters which were identified in existing buildings.

To supplement in-place protection, we lately have initiated planning in areas we have determined would be at high risk in event of attack on this country.

Crisis relocation planning provides for movement of people from high risk areas to areas of lower risk if there is time. We are completing work in eight prototype areas, and will move on to other areas as soon as feasible.

Occasionally, we hear the argument that a strong U.S. civil defense program could make nuclear warfare "more credible" and thus could provoke attack.

To this we point out that the Soviet Union has made a large investment in civil defense.

In noting this strength, the Secretary of Defense recently said:

For a number of years, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources to their civil defense effort, which emphasizes the extensive evacuation of urban populations prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the construction of shelters in outlying areas, and compulsory training in civil defense for well over half the Soviet population.

The importance the Soviets attach to this program at present is indicated not only by the resources they have been willing to incur in its support, but also by the appointment of a Deputy Minister of Defense to head this effort.

Turning to the U.S. program, the President asked for \$71 million for DCPA for the coming year. Coupled with that was an understanding DCPA should adhere strictly to the intent of the Federal Civil Defense Act to "provide a system of civil defense for the protection of life and property from attack."

Because of the inherent peacetime usefulness of emergency systems—plans, facilities and equipment, and trained and experienced personnel—DCPA, with the tacit approval of Congress, has permitted State and local governments to make use of such systems in natural disasters, as well as providing for their use in event of attack. Funding of these activities by DCPA must be justified, however, entirely on the basis of their contribution to nuclear attack preparedness.

Much has been done in U.S. civil defense. Much remains to be done in "providing for the common defense."

Current program status is detailed in the more lengthy statement I am submitting for the record.

Thank you for your attention and your consideration.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]

STATEMENT BY HONORABLE JOHN E. DAVIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION, JUNE 30, 1976

Civil defense, as defined in the Federal Civil Defense Act, embraces measures to reduce the impact upon our population of enemy attack. It includes warning, sheltering, and other lifesaving operations, and extends through immediately essential repair or restoration of vital facilities. It does not include those logistical or economic operations that would contribute to rehabilitation and eventual recovery from enemy attack.

Legislative background, responsibility and authority for civil defense

The Federal Civil Defense Act was enacted in 1951. The Act was the first comprehensive national legislative delineation of civil defense functions.

The Act contains four titles with a Policy and Definitions section. The term "civil defense" is defined as the means, activities, and measures designed or undertaken (1) to minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would be caused by an attack on the United States; (2) to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by an attack; and (3) to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities or facilities destroyed or damaged by an attack. The definition has not been changed and remains valid today. The term "attack" is defined as an attack by an external enemy.

Title I of the Act is organizational and is now largely obsolete as a consequence of Reorganization Plan 1 of 1958.

Title II deals with powers and duties. Section 201 principally authorizes:

1. Preparation of plans and programs for civil defense.
2. Provision for warning and communications.
3. Study development of measures designed to protect life and property (research and development).
4. Training and education including support of travel to civil defense schools.
5. Dissemination of civil defense information to the public.
6. Procurement, distribution, and maintenance of radiological instruments and their donation to the States.
7. Financial assistance to the States for a variety of civil defense programs, including equipment purchases, on a matching funds basis.

Section 205 added in 1958 authorizes, on a matching funds basis, financial assistance for State and local personnel and administrative expenses to prepare plans and programs for civil defense readiness in the communities across the United States. This authority, as well as certain authorities under Section 201, operate under a four year authorization cycle, which incidentally expires on June 30, 1976. Legislation to extend these authorities is now before the Congress.

Title III covers emergency authority in case of attack. This title becomes operative only upon the proclamation of a "civil defense emergency" by the President or Congress upon a finding that an attack has occurred or is anticipated and that the national safety requires action under the provisions of the title.

Under these circumstances, Federal agencies are authorized to use their resources for civil defense purposes. Requisitioning is authorized. Financial assistance to people is authorized, etc. This authority is vested in the President, and he has not delegated it.

Title III expired in 1974. The Administration is now considering a proposal offered by the Federal Preparedness Agency to renew Title III authorities for an additional four-year period.

In 1958 two major revisions to the Federal civil defense program were adopted. One was Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 which dealt with the organizational placement of the civil defense function within the Executive branch. Reorganization Plan No. 1 transferred to the President the functions which had been vested in the Federal Civil Defense Administration under Title I of the Civil Defense Act. This permitted the President to redelegate these functions to various other agencies. The Reorganization Plan also consolidated two existing agencies into one agency to be called the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

Also, in 1958 the Congress enacted major modifications to the Federal Civil Defense Act. Public law 85-606 restated the statement of purpose of the Federal Civil Defense Act to provide that civil defense would be a joint Federal-State responsibility rather than a responsibility primarily of the States and their political subdivisions, and made other program changes discussed above.

During the 1950-1961 period, the States adopted civil defense legislation. In most cases the States followed a "State Model Civil Defense Act" which had

been developed jointly by Federal and State officials and which was then sponsored by the Council of State Governments. By 1961 all States had a Civil Defense Act and had developed civil defense organizations.

In July 1961 the President issued Executive Order 10952, the first in a series of orders implementing Reorganization Plan No. 1. It assigned responsibilities to the Department of Defense to develop and execute major elements of the civil defense program including fallout shelters, radiological defense systems and financial assistance to States and localities. The Executive Order also assigned the coordination function for the entire civil defense program to the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Executive Office of the President.

In 1964, civil defense functions were transferred from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army, and in 1972 the Secretary of Defense established the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) as a separate Defense agency and transferred civil defense functions from the Secretary of the Army to the Director, DCPA. A copy of DoD Directive 5105.43, dated July 14, 1972, establishing DCPA and providing its mission is attached.

Basic objectives of civil defense protection

Deterrence of enemy attack upon the United States is a national objective of the highest importance. As noted in the January 1976 Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress, discussing our strategic nuclear forces, "The first and obvious objective is to deter nuclear attack or the threat of such attack." The Report goes on to note that a ". . . second objective is to strive at all times for stability in the relationship between the strategic forces of the United States and the USSR. We seek a situation in which neither side will see any advantage in initiating the use of strategic forces."

The role of civil defense in the U.S. strategic posture has been described as follows: "Our Civil Defense Program is, and has always been, an essential element of our overall strategic deterrence posture. . . . The value of the current civil defense program is that it contributes to deterrence in a crisis and offers the prospect of saving American lives in the event that . . . attacks should actually occur." Indeed, civil defense has the potential to add from 30 to 100 million survivors in case of large-scale attack upon the United States.

In principle, the problem of saving life under attack conditions is soluble. There are two basic strategies for protecting threatened populations. One is to provide the best protection possible with the population essentially sheltered "in-place," at or near their homes, schools, and places of work. The second is for people to be evacuated from the threatened area. Time permitting, the second alternative has the greatest life saving capability for virtually all hazards.

These two strategies apply in both attack and peacetime emergencies. Tornadoes often cause hazards from which people must seek in-place shelter promptly, due to the swiftness with which the threat develops. In the case of hurricanes and floods, however, there is usually a period of hours or even days that can be, and often is, used to evacuate people from hazardous areas. Evacuations are also conducted where there is danger of release of chlorine or other toxic substance, and evacuation could likewise be appropriate in case of a terrorist threat to detonate a nuclear device in a major city, or to disperse radioactive material.

In the case of enemy attack upon the U.S. or a threat thereof, these options are outlined in the January 1976 DoD Annual Report as key program elements for protecting the civilian population:

—The continued development of plans for relocation of the population from high risk areas near key military installations and/or major metropolitan areas, including provision of fallout protection in areas where evacuees are to be temporarily relocated; and

—Protection for the population of high risk areas (essentially in-place) in the best available shelter against all the effects of nuclear attack in situations where warning time or other circumstances preclude relocation, and protection against nuclear fallout for the population in the remainder of the nation. Shelter facilities (in existing buildings) must be identified and plans prepared for their emergency use by the public.

Readiness to save lives in any emergency requires that people know what to do to protect themselves, and that key officials and forces of government be prepared to take action to support and assist their citizens. These people-oriented requirements obviously raise a need for planning, organizing and training—as well as for "hardware."

The lifesaving potential of an effective civil defense program in attack situations has been established by a number of detailed studies by both Department of

Defense and outside agencies. One source is PONAII, a 1973 multi-agency study sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the capability of the US to survive, continue the conflict, and recover following a large-scale nuclear exchange. The results of this study have been declassified in part.

PONAII shows that in a hypothetical 6800-megaton Soviet attack on the US, about two-thirds on military targets and the remainder on cities, some 46 percent of the population would be killed (94 million people) and another 17 percent injured. These results were for an essentially "in-place" posture, with 90 percent of the urban population in cities at the time of attack, and with effective use made of protection in existing structures, in both urban and rural areas. That is, most people knew "where to go and what to do" and acted accordingly.

Other studies have shown that fatalities in similar attacks, in which civil defense protective actions were taken, totalled some 125 million. An effective civil defense program, aimed at sheltering the population in-place, in best-available existing protection, thus has potential to save some 30 million lives. Actual (as opposed to potential) performance would be a function of what people in fact did, and of the overall effectiveness of civil defense, which is in turn a function of the effort and funding devoted to the program.

PONAII also established the lifesaving potential of pre-attack crisis relocation of people from US cities. If time during a crisis permitted, and if State and local governments were able to conduct operations to relocate 70 percent of the metropolitan population to safer areas, the study estimated that fatalities for this attack would total 22 to 29 million, depending on the level of fallout protection available to the evacuees. A capability to conduct crisis relocation operations thus has potential to save some 65 or 70 million lives, over and above those that could be saved by effective civil defense operations for in-place protection.

DCPA has conducted or participated in other studies, the most recent being a May-June 1975 study which examined the costs and performance of a number of alternative civil defense programs. The results were consistent with those of the earlier PONAII study. In general, well-functioning in-place protection could add some 90 to 100 million survivors—as compared, in each case, to having no civil defense.

The current U.S. civil defense program—Federal-State-local relationships in the civil defense program

The policy stated in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended in 1958, is that responsibility for civil defense shall be vested jointly in the Federal Government and the States and their political subdivisions. This policy is given effect in the matching-fund provisions of the Act, which authorize Federal assistance for communications, emergency operating centers, and other "hardware," as well as for State and local personnel and administrative expenses. However, there are also certain elements of the program that are authorized to be fully federally funded.

It is important to note that DCPA does not stand in a command or directive relationship to either the 50 States or the more than 5,000 local governments which participate in the civil defense program. Where matching funds are involved, the initiative lies with the local or State tax revenues. Where fully-funded program elements are provided, a given local or State government need not participate if it does not desire to do so.

Local emergency readiness in general requires capabilities to warn people of an impending threat, and advise them on what protective actions to take; to shelter or protect threatened people; and to conduct emergency operations as required to minimize or prevent loss of life and property. Readiness necessitates that during peacetime, planning be accomplished, and supporting hardware be in place.

Local emergency capabilities and readiness plans to protect the public must take into account assets that exist. These include, among others, local police, fire, and other emergency forces; shelter against nuclear weapons effects provided by existing structures; and the capabilities of non-governmental groups or entities—such as doctors, hospitals, and news media—that are essential when an emergency occurs. Certain other assets and capabilities required for civil defense must be specially developed.

A key ingredient in readiness for both peacetime and attack emergencies is that local executives be able to get advice and instructions to the public during a period of threat, and after an emergency strikes, and be able to direct and control operations by locally available forces. The Federal program therefore includes matching-fund assistance to local and State governments for developing protected sites (Emergency Operating Centers), with the necessary communications, from which

key officials of civil government can control and coordinate operations by local police, fire, and other emergency forces, and can communicate emergency information and action advice to their citizens, using local broadcast stations. The program further includes training and assistance in emergency planning for the use of locally available forces, as well as the conduct, on-site, of emergency exercises—to give key decision-makers an opportunity to respond to simulated disasters affecting their jurisdiction. Matching funds are also provided for communications equipment, warning sirens, and other hardware and services required for emergency readiness.

Basic local operating capabilities—the ability to make effective use of existing assets—are developed by a cycle of planning, training, exercising, followed by more planning, more training, and more exercising. These basic capabilities are applicable in any extraordinary emergency affecting a jurisdiction, and the effectiveness of soundly developed and well exercised emergency plans and capabilities is demonstrated a number of times each year, in tornadoes and other similar disasters.

The civil defense program also provides elements of readiness aside from those normal emergency systems provided in the community. These projects are fully federally funded and are attack-oriented. Thus the Federal Government maintains a nationwide warning system, through which attack warning can be promptly disseminated from a National Warning Center in the NORAD Combat Operations Center, near Colorado Springs, to over 1200 warning points throughout the United States; the system is also used to disseminate severe-weather warning, based on inputs from the National Weather Service. State and local governments are responsible to disseminate warning beyond the warning points, to subordinate warning points and ultimately to their citizens.

The civil defense program includes federally funded engineering surveys, to identify protection afforded by existing larger structures against fallout and other weapons effects. During the 1960's it included marking these shelters with the distinctive yellow-and-black sign, as well as provision of austere survival supplies for shelters. Direct assistance is provided to localities in developing "community shelter plans," the main product of which is standby maps and instructions for the citizens, for local publication during a period of international crisis, on "where to go and what to do" in case of attack. The program also provides radiation detection instruments and training on their use under attack conditions and in peacetime emergencies involving radiological hazards, as well as periodic maintenance and calibration for the instruments.

The development of emergency readiness in communities throughout the country thus requires combining both fully funded and matching-fund Federal assistance with local participation, funds, and effort. This local readiness includes many elements—from radiation detection instruments to Radiological Monitors trained in their use; from protection identified by shelter surveys to plans for the use of these shelters; from an Emergency Operating Center facility to the plans, organization, procedures, and exercising that put key local officials in position to direct and coordinate operations effectively in any type of emergency.

The DCPA "Standards for Local Civil Preparedness" establish standards or goals for both the tangible aspects of local readiness (hardware, trained personnel, plans) and those that are intangible—primarily the ability to execute emergency plans, by conducting coordinated emergency operations.

Developing emergency readiness in a specific jurisdiction requires that local officials recognize the need for readiness, that they be able to assess the level of readiness existing in their jurisdiction, and that they take specific actions as required to improve both tangible and intangible elements of readiness. A major approach that DCPA has developed to aid localities in these steps is called On-Site Assistance.

A Federal/State team of civil preparedness professionals works closely with local officials in assessing the status of local readiness, and in developing an "action plan" which spells out specific, feasible steps for improving readiness. This is analogous to diagnosing and then prescribing for an illness, except that the "patient" (the local government) plays an active role in both steps.

Carrying out the action plan (the treatment phase) requires effort by representatives of several levels of government, working together over a period of several months or more. Where a locality requires a working Emergency Operating Center, for example, a State representative may work with local officials to develop a suitable emergency organization for key executives. A DCPA Regional engineer may advise on designing the protection needed for the EOC facility

(normally located in a municipal or county building, e.g., in a court-house basement. Regional and State offices may assist in securing matching funds for the facility, and DCPA-funded university personnel will usually assist in conducting one or more on-site exercises, to train an operating staff and show local executives how the EOC provides them a central point for coordination and direction of emergency operations.

Similar cooperative effort is required in developing other elements of readiness, as may be required in a given community. The essence of the On-Site Assistance approach is to tailor support and aid to the specific needs identified for each community.

—Responsibilities of local and State civil defense directors and agencies

While assistance on-site by Regional/State teams is a method of proved effectiveness in developing readiness, it is clear that such teams need a point of contact in the locality before assistance can begin. More important, there must be someone to carry the work forward after the OSA team has left and between such follow-up assistance visits as may be made. This person is the local civil defense director.

Upwards of 5,000 local jurisdictions have civil defense directors, who in some cases are supported by sizeable staffs. The role of the CD director is often not well understood by local officials, both elected and appointed. There is a not uncommon misconception, for example, that the CD director has little to do in ordinary times, except perhaps to inspect radiological instruments or train monitors, but that if a major emergency occurs, his job is in some way to "take over," and direct the operations of government and other forces. This is sometimes coupled with the idea that "civil defense" is a special unit or group of people, perhaps similar to reserves of one of the military services, who are standing by to save the day in case of a major disaster.

Nothing would be farther from the truth. The role of the CD director is crucial, but is not that of a "commander" or director of operating forces. During emergencies, the director acts as principal aide or advisor to the chief executive, assisting the head of government in conducting coordinated operations. His (or her) major responsibilities are to assure coordination among the line operating departments of government, with non-governmental groups such as hospitals and medical professionals, and with higher and adjacent governments—and also to assure that authoritative emergency information and advice are provided to the public via local news media.

The role of the CD director in nonemergency periods is to take the lead—in behalf of the chief executive—in the community wide planning and other preparations needed to assure that the jurisdiction will be able to conduct coordinated operations should an emergency occur. He does not raise and train a private army for the conduct of emergency operations, although he should see to the training of Radiological Monitors, for example, most of whom are employees of local government, though some may be citizen volunteers. But the "troops" primarily relied upon for local operations in major emergencies are those who respond to lesser emergencies weekly or daily—the police force, the paid or volunteer firefighters, the public works department, the physicians and hospital staffs, and others with emergency response capabilities. And the commanders of these forces in major emergencies are the chief of police, the fire chief, the city engineer, and the hospital administrator—as they are on a day-to-day basis.

It is the need for coordinated emergency operations, involving all governmental and non-governmental groups with the capacity to save lives or minimize damage, that distinguishes extraordinary emergencies from the daily or weekly incidents that are routinely handled in communities. Thus the role of the local CD director is to build readiness for coordinated operations in emergencies. His (or her) major responsibilities therefore include:

- (1) Development of an Emergency Operating Center (EOC) facility, together with the staffing and procedures needed to permit coordination and control of operations in a major emergency.

- (2) Leading in development of local emergency plans, by coordinating work of planners from government departments and non-governmental groups with emergency assignments. An extremely important aspect of planning is to provide for giving authoritative information and action advice to the public before and during emergencies. Developing such an Emergency Public Information capability requires that local news media representatives be invited to participate in the planning.

- (3) Arranging for exercises for key officials and the EOC staff, based on a simulated attack or disaster affecting the jurisdiction.

(4) Developing unique capabilities not found in existing departments (e.g., developing warning and radiological monitoring systems).

(5) Administering the program (e.g., budgeting, securing matching funds).

Turning to the State level, the State civil defense director and his staff have responsibilities with respect to State-level emergency preparedness that are similar to those of directors at the local level. They must see to the development of an operating State EOC, lead in interdepartmental planning, and arrange for periodic emergency exercises for State executives and their staffs. Their major area of responsibility, however, is to assist local governments in developing readiness. This includes participation in joint Region/State On-Site Assistance projects, and administering financial and other assistance provided to local jurisdictions.

DCPA provides matching funds for the personnel and administrative expenses of both local and State civil defense directors, and one of the conditions of participation in this program is that an annual "program paper" be submitted, outlining the work proposed to be done by the locality or State in each fiscal year. Personnel must be hired under the provisions of an approved merit system, although the position of local or State director has been exempted from this requirement, so that it applies only to clerical personnel or to professional staff other than the director.

—*Responsibilities of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency*

As is true of State and local civil defense agencies, DCPA has responsibilities both for building readiness in emergency periods and for conducting operations during emergencies. These responsibilities are enumerated in Executive Order 10952, July 1961, which assigned civil defense responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, and in DoD Directive 5105.43, July 1972, which established DCPA and re-delegated to its Director the civil defense responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense set forth in the Executive Order.

Highlights of the readiness-building activities include development and execution of programs for shelter, radiological defense, attack warning, and financial and other assistance to State and local governments. In Executive Order 10952, these activities are all attack-oriented, but the 1972 DoD Directive also charged DCPA to provide natural disaster preparedness planning assistance to State and local governments. That assignment recognized the dual-use applicability of most attack-oriented civil defense capabilities in major peacetime disasters, and was in consonance with the 1972 Presidential direction to emphasize preparedness activities applicable to peacetime as well as attack emergencies.

Effective with FY 1977, it has been directed that the civil defense program be reoriented to focus Department of Defense support on those functions related to nuclear disaster preparedness. Under this concept, which is reflected in the January 1976 DoD Annual Report to the Congress, Federal assistance under the civil defense program is no longer to be provided to State and local governments to support development of the common disaster base needed for both natural and nuclear disasters. Rather DCPA support is to be concentrated on developing nuclear disaster preparedness at State and local levels, as an overlay to natural disaster preparedness systems provided by those governments. Accordingly, DCPA's Program Emphasis for FY 1977 stresses the development of plans, procedures, system, and capabilities for (1) Nuclear Civil Protection Planning (for the protection of the population either in-place or by relocation from risk areas during a period of intense international crisis); (2) direction and control of coordinated operations in an emergency (by key local or State officials in a protected Emergency Operations Center); (3) attack warning; (4) radiological defense; and (5) emergency public information—together with the emergency communications essential to the foregoing functions.

DCPA is responsible in emergency periods, pursuant to the 1961 Executive Order as since delegated, to "... develop plans and operate systems to undertake a nationwide postattack assessment of... damage resulting from enemy attack... including systems to monitor and report specific hazards resulting from the (use of nuclear weapons)." These responsibilities comprise in essence information gathering and analysis, plus providing timely reports to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For DCPA to be in position to provide such assessments and information requires that there be an effective nationwide network of radiological monitoring and weapons effects reporting stations, including instruments and trained personnel, as well as procedures for reporting fallout information. Also required are capabilities and procedures for reporting attack damage, as well as computer capabilities for calculating (estimating) damage pending availability of field reports.

DCPA programming system

DCPA has developed a programming system based upon the concept of management by objectives. The system is designed to permit DCPA resources to be applied to priority objectives, including both resources provided on a matching-funds basis (such as support for local and State civil defense staffs), and on a fully funded basis (such as shelter surveys or the provision and maintenance of radiological monitoring instruments).

DCPA issues an annual Program Emphasis paper for the guidance of its Regional Offices and of State and local governments in developing their programs—that is, in directing resources available to the areas of greatest need and importance.

An important feature of the system is the Program Status Report, which provides data for States and for DCPA Regions and Headquarters on the quantitative status of program elements for individual jurisdictions throughout the country, as well as summaries of this information.

The reporting system also provides data on the qualitative status of 55 elements of each locality's program. This data is developed by an on-site evaluation of local program elements, usually with the assistance of State or Regional civil defense professionals.

Attached is "Program Status (Local Level)," a summary of the quantitative and qualitative data developed by the program status reporting system.

—Present status of the civil defense program

Civil defense in FY 1976 may be characterized as a program which is sound in concept, which has made significant progress, and which is assisting a substantial number of U.S. jurisdictions to achieve substantial increases in readiness.

Highlights of program status include the following:

A total of 2,041 local-government Emergency Operating Centers, in localities including about half of the population, were operational or under development, through assistance by Federal funds. These EOC's have a good degree of protection against fallout, and over 2,100 additional EOC's were reported with a lesser degree of protection. EOC's were frequently activated by local governments to deal with emergencies such as hurricanes, floods, or ice storms, and many are used day-to-day for police or fire dispatching.

Six of the eight DCPA Regional offices are situated in underground Federal Regional Centers, with substantial protection against nuclear weapons effects, providing facilities for emergency operations by representatives of Federal agencies with emergency responsibilities.

The National Warning System (NAWAS) permits nearly instantaneous attack warning to be disseminated by dedicated landlines to over 1,200 Federal, State, and local warning points; severe-weather information is also transmitted over NAWAS, based on inputs from the National Weather Service.

Civil defense communications include voice and teletype circuits linking the National Headquarters, the eight Regions, and the States. The land-line systems are backed up by high-frequency radio links to 48 States.

Fallout protection and emergency power generators have been provided for 597 AM radio facilities, to permit broadcasting essential information to the public under fallout conditions.

Sets of radiological monitoring instruments have been issued for 54,347 radiological monitoring stations, and additional sets have been issued for over 145,000 shelters. Over 21,000 sets have been issued for use by State and local emergency services and vital facilities. Instruments are calibrated and serviced by State calibration facilities supported by DCPA contracts.

Shelter surveys have located 227 million fallout-protected spaces in 230,000 buildings, of which 118,000 have been marked with the yellow-and-black shelter signs.

Community shelter plans were completed in 4,350 local jurisdictions containing 160 million people.

On-Site Assistance projects have been completed through the stage of approval of an Action Plan in 976 jurisdictions containing over 53 million people.

Over 2,440 local jurisdictions, containing about two-thirds of the national population, participated in the personnel and administrative expenses program. This provides matching funds for the salary and related expenses of a civil defense Director and supporting staff. A total of 5,010 local jurisdic-

tions (including the 2,442 P&A participants) filed program papers, which are a condition of eligibility for Federal assistance.

Crisis relocation planning is a transition status from a test and developmental effort; eight pilot projects are being completed.

DCPA had developed a low-frequency radio warning system ("DIDS"). The first transmitter of ten projected for nationwide coverage was on the air for operational testing from 1974 through May 1976. This Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, transmitter can provide coverage over a 10-State area from North Carolina to Massachusetts, containing some 50 million people, and is designed to switch on warning receivers in EOC's, or commercial broadcast stations, and then transmit a voice warning message. DIDS can also activate local warning sirens. The prototype system has been moth-balled, however, pending evaluation of alternatives.

Key issues surrounding the civil defense program

Currently, there are several important issues surrounding our nation's civil defense policies. These include:

—The Soviet civil defense program and its strategic implications

The potential impact of the Soviet civil defense program on the strategic equation has recently been discussed by authorities both within and outside of the Government. The February 1975 DoD Annual Report noted that, "The Soviet Union for many years has given a great deal of attention to civil defense, including not only the construction of shelters and the training of civilians but also the preparation of plans for evacuation of the bulk of the population from its major cities in the event of a crisis. Thus, the Soviet leaders have the option to evacuate the cities or to shelter the population in place, depending upon their assessment of the situation at the time."

The January 1976 DoD Annual Report commented as follows on Soviet civil defense, in discussing significant developments in foreign strategic capabilities: "An asymmetry has developed over the years that bears directly on our strategic relationship with the Soviets and on the credibility of our deterrent posture. For a number of years, the Soviets have devoted considerable resources to their civil defense effort, which emphasizes the extensive evacuation of urban populations prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the construction of shelters in outlying areas, and compulsory training in civil defense for well over half the Soviet population. The importance the Soviets attach to this program at present is indicated not only by the resources they have been willing to incur in its support, but also by the appointment of a Deputy Minister of Defense to head this effort."

During hearings before the Senate Budget Committee on March 9, 1976, Senator McClure noted the extensive civil defense program of the USSR, and asked the Secretary of Defense for his "evaluation of their civil defense program and what that does to our evaluation of our overall military capacity." The Secretary noted that the USSR has mounted an extensive civil defense effort over a period of years, and said there was "... no question but that their plans, if they are able to execute them, do provide a high degree of survivability for their people and their capabilities." At the same hearings, General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented that "We recognize this civil defense imbalance." Also, when asked by Senator Muskie whether it would be possible to put together a civil defense program which would be as credible as the Soviet program, General Brown replied, "I think we can protect millions of people in this country.... [W]e cannot protect everybody, but we can protect millions."

DCPA believes that effective U.S. civil defense can be justified on its own merits, without regard to the level or nature of the Soviet program.

Also, it has been argued that the balance of terror (or mutual assured destruction), created by the strategic capabilities of the U.S. and USSR, is the surest guarantee of the continued well-being of the U.S. population, and the Soviet population as well, because both are in effect hostages. Thus it is argued that any move to reduce vulnerability by civil defense or otherwise does a grave disservice to the true interests of the population, because nuclear war may thereby be made more thinkable and less unlikely to occur. Civil defense may thus contribute to nuclear instability.

Another argument has been made that the U.S. should not develop a crisis relocation capability because moving civilians out of U.S. cities during a severe

crisis could well trigger a Soviet attack. The theory is that Soviet leaders, hearing of the outward movement from U.S. cities, would conclude that they were about to be attacked and must therefore lose no time in striking first. Crisis relocation, in short, has been equated with crisis instability.

Finally, it has been argued that an effective civil defense program will inescapably incur large and undesirable social costs. For example, it has been suggested that there would have to be intense involvement of the civilian population in military preparedness, perhaps even compulsory civil defense, and that a crisis relocation capability cannot be developed without extensive training, such as rehearsals of evacuation plans involving the public.

My views on the foregoing and related issues are as follows:

(1) If a nuclear war should occur, whether controlled or uncontrolled, effective civil defense could save millions of lives.

(2) That rather than contributing to instability or to the arms race, civil defense contributes to stability.

(3) That civil defense and arms control are not diverging or antagonistic objectives. DCPA believes that all elements of the U.S. defensive posture should be consistent with existing arms control agreements, and should facilitate advances in this area.

(4) That a moderate but effective U.S. civil defense program does not incur any large or undesirable social costs. The emphasis should be on planning and on related training and exercising primarily for key officials of government and for police and other emergency forces; studies and experience show that successful conduct of evacuation and other emergency operations is dependent on training for officials and forces, not for the public at large.

(5) That public reaction to a moderate but effective program can be expected to be approving. Experience and attitude surveys over a period of two decades show that while people do not hold intense views on the subject of civil defense, they are nevertheless strongly, almost overwhelmingly, in favor of the program.

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ASD(C)

Department of Defense Directive

SUBJECT Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA)

- Refs.:
- (a) Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 2251 et seq.
 - (b) Executive Order 10952, "Assigning Civil Defense Responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense and Others," July 20, 1961
 - (c) Executive Order 11575, "Providing for the Administration of the Disaster Relief Act of 1970," (P. L. 91-606), December 31, 1970
 - (d) Executive Order 11051, "Prescribing Responsibilities of the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Executive Office of the President," September 27, 1962
 - (e) Executive Order 11490, "Assigning Emergency Preparedness Functions to Federal Departments and Agencies," October 28, 1969, as amended
 - (f) through (n) are listed in Enclosure 2

I. GENERAL

Pursuant to authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under the provision of 10 U.S.C. the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) is hereby established as an Agency of the Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to DoD policies, directives and instructions.

II. CANCELLATION

References (m) and (n) are hereby superseded and cancelled.

III. MISSION AND SCOPE

A. The DCPA mission is to:

1. Discharge and perform the civil defense functions delegated to the Secretary of Defense pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order 10952 (reference (b));

2. Discharge and perform the disaster warning function delegated to the Secretary of Defense pursuant to Section 1(c), Executive Order 11575 (reference (c));

3. Provide natural disaster preparedness planning assistance to State and local governments in accordance with agreements between the Director, DCPA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, and the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and other Government departments and agencies and in consonance with policy guidance provided by the Director, OEP pursuant to Executive Orders 11575 and 11051 (references (c) and (d)).

B. The efforts and operations of DCPA will be designed to provide an effective and viable National Civil Defense Program in accordance with references (a) and (b). DCPA will, in addition, provide planning guidance and assistance to State and local governments in natural disaster preparedness in consonance with III. A. 3. above.

C. DCPA operations will be conducted within the United States and U.S. Territories and Possessions and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

D. As used in this Directive, DoD Components shall refer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments, and the Defense Agencies.

E. This Directive does not derogate the authorities and responsibilities set forth in DoD Directives 3025.1, 3025.10, 5105.22, and 5100.30 (references (g), (h), (i), and (j)).

IV. ORGANIZATION

A. DCPA shall consist of:

1. A Director, a Deputy Director, a headquarters establishment, regional offices and such subordinate facilities and activities as are herein or hereafter specifically assigned to the Agency by the Secretary of Defense.

2. Such subordinate activities as may be established by the Director, DCPA, for the accomplishment of DCPA's mission.

B. The chain of command shall run from the Secretary of Defense to the Director, DCPA.

V. RESPONSIBILITIES

The Director, DCPA, in coordination with Federal, State and local governments, shall be responsible for the development and execution of:

A. Civil Defense Preparedness

1. A shelter program including evacuation and movement to shelter;

2. A chemical, biological and radiological warfare defense program;

3. Steps necessary to warn or alert Federal military and civilian authorities, State officials and the civilian population of enemy attack upon the United States. (Responsibility for developing, deploying and operating military surveillance and warning systems remains with the appropriate military department);

4. Civil defense communications, including an appropriate warning network, communications between authorities, and communications procedures for reporting on radiological monitoring and instructions to shelters;

5. Emergency assistance to State and local governments in a postattack period;

6. Protection and emergency operational capability of State and local government agencies in keeping with plans for the continuity of government;

7. Programs for making financial contributions for civil defense purposes to the States;

8. Plans and the operation of systems to undertake a nationwide postattack assessment of the nature and extent of the damage resulting from enemy attack and the surviving resources, including systems to monitor and report specific hazards resulting from the detonation or use of special weapons. (Such assessment should address civilian resources, whereas the military departments retain primary responsibility for assessing damage to military resources);

9. Necessary arrangements for the donation of Federal surplus property in accordance with section 203(j)(4) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (40 U. S. C. 484(j)(4)); and

10. The establishment and administration of a Civil Defense Advisory Committee to advise the Secretary of Defense.

B. Natural Disaster Preparedness

1. A program to utilize and make available the civil defense communications system for the purpose of disaster warnings.

2. Programs to provide planning assistance to State and local governments in their development of natural disaster preparedness plans and capabilities in accordance with III, A. 3.

VI. FUNCTIONS

Under its Director, DCPA, will perform the following functions:

A. Civil Defense Preparedness

1. Emergency Management Assistance

a. Provide financial assistance to State and local governments for necessary and essential civil defense personnel and administrative expenses and other authorized programs in accordance with reference (a).

b. Provide guidance and assistance to State and local governments for comprehensive civil defense preparedness.

2. National Shelter System

a. In consonance with Presidential or Secretary of Defense policy guidance, develop national program objectives and requirements for implementation for the National Shelter System against the effects of enemy attack.

b. Establish protection standards.

c. Perform shelter survey and marking using as appropriate the capability of the Department of Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Navy Facilities and Engineering Command, including shelter surveys on military installations upon request of the installation commander or furnish technical support for survey work by installation personnel. DCPA will furnish technical guidance and materiel for marking of shelters on installations and shelter supplies as available and as requested by installation commanders.

d. Develop (1) guidance and provide technical assistance to State and local governments on survey design, construction, preparation, equipping and maintenance of shelters, and (2) methods of providing protection against enemy attack effects for use by State and local governments.

e. Develop techniques for the incorporation of protection into structures and encourage incorporation of protective features and vulnerability reduction into new and existing Federal, Federally assisted and military facilities as well as other new and existing facilities in accordance with references (e) and (f).

f. Provide guidance to the Defense Supply Agency for the procurement, storage, distribution, maintenance and disposal of DCPA supplies and equipment.

g. Develop plans for implementation during periods of international crises of an evacuation program and an expedient shelter program.

h. Maintain inventory data on shelter facilities.

i. Provide guidance, information materials, training and support to State and local governments relating to the development of shelters and shelter utilization plans.

3. Civil Defense Warning and Communications System

a. In cooperation with the Department of the Army and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications) assure the establishment, operation, management, and maintenance of emergency communications for civil defense purposes between the Federal Government and the States and correlate the civil defense communications system with other DoD communications systems.

b. Provide technical assistance to State and local governments in establishing communications systems to support civil defense operations.

c. Develop programs to utilize the skills and equipment of radio amateurs.

d. Maintain liaison within the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Combat Operations Center for timely dissemination of attack warning data.

e. In cooperation with the Department of the Army and in correlation with DoD communications systems, establish, operate and maintain a national civil defense warning system for the transmission of enemy attack warning information to all levels of government and to the public.

f. Disseminate appropriate information on civil defense posture.

g. Provide to the Department of the Army current forecasts of the resource support requirements for DCPA communications and civil defense warning systems for which the Department of the Army is assigned responsibilities.

4. Radiological Monitoring and Reporting

a. Procure, stockpile, grant or loan radiological defense equipment to Federal departments and agencies and State and local governments, and provide a system to store, distribute, replace, maintain and calibrate such equipment.

b. Provide criteria and guidance materials to assist Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments in developing, implementing, and operating radiological monitoring and reporting systems.

c. Develop and distribute guidance materials to assure standardization of procedures on use of radiological defense equipment.

d. Establish a system and procedures for reporting, analyzing, and evaluating radiological hazards resulting from an enemy attack.

e. Provide appropriate financial assistance to State and local governments for the maintenance of their radiological monitoring and reporting systems.

f. Plot the radiological information in an enemy attack situation and evaluate and analyze the broadscale hazards from radiological effects and make such information available to representatives of Federal departments and agencies, the military departments, DCPA regions and the States.

g. Provide guidance and assistance to State and local governments in preparing for and dealing with radiological accidents in accordance with agreements with other Federal departments and agencies.

5. Emergency Public Information. In consonance with the policy guidance of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs):

- a. Provide pre-positioned information and materials to be used in enemy attack situations.
- b. Provide policy guidance for broadcasting emergency public information on civil defense.
- c. Provide survival instructions and other emergency information on civil defense to the public by press, radio and TV directly or through State and local governments as appropriate.

6. Emergency Assistance to State and Local Governments (Postattack Period)

- a. Advise on measures to strengthen existing organizations and assure optimum effectiveness in utilization of resources for civil defense purposes.
- b. Develop plans to provide Federal support and assistance to State and local governments for civil defense emergency operations.
- c. Provide technical guidance and assistance to State and local governments to enable them to undertake civil defense emergency operations rapidly, and encourage industry, labor organizations, professional groups and civic organizations to develop technical information and furnish assistance in developing emergency operations plans.
- d. Determine quantities of supplies and equipment required to be stockpiled for civil defense purposes and coordinate the establishment of stockpile programs and deployment in an emergency, as appropriate.

7. Damage Assessment

- a. Determine requirements and develop systems for estimating casualties and damage to civilian resources resulting from enemy attack; advise and assist Federal departments and agencies and State and local governments in establishing damage estimation systems, and application of techniques and procedures.

b. Maintain a data base of resources and services necessary for preattack planning of civil defense emergency operations, vulnerability reduction, damage estimation, and program evaluation.

c. Develop and provide technical weapons effects information, maps, and instructions related to estimating damage and for use in emergency operations.

d. Provide information to civil government on detonations resulting from enemy attack (Nuclear Detonation Reporting System); process, analyze, and evaluate enemy attack damage and situation information.

8. Emergency Operating Centers (EOCs)

a. Develop and establish design criteria for EOCs; establish and operate DCPA EOCs.

b. Provide appropriate financial assistance to State and local governments for planning, constructing and equipping EOCs.

c. Develop and establish criteria and provide guidance on location of State and local EOCs and provide guidance on equipping such centers.

9. Training and Education

a. Develop and establish programs to provide training for civil defense emergency planning and operations personnel requiring specialized training.

b. Support State and local civil defense and disaster preparedness training programs through instruction of potential State and local instructors. (Training programs in natural disaster preparedness will be conducted in consonance with policy guidance of the Director, OEP.)

c. Establish, operate, and maintain the Civil Preparedness Staff College and training centers; develop and conduct courses to

familiarize officials of government, industry, and the military with the knowledge, skills, and techniques required by the Civil Defense Preparedness Program.

d. Provide appropriate financial assistance to State and local governments for civil defense training purposes.

e. Collaborate and maintain liaison with other Federal departments and agencies to utilize their training and education resources for civil defense preparedness purposes.

f. Provide technical guidance and assistance to non-government groups, associations, and organizations which conduct and sponsor civil defense preparedness training.

g. Establish general public education programs including the use of established school systems.

h. Prepare, publish, and maintain necessary and essential training materials for Federal, State, and local government use.

i. Formulate overall civil defense test and exercise programs:

(1) Direct, conduct, and participate in national exercises to determine adequacy, feasibility, and effectiveness of civil defense emergency operations, plans, activities, and systems.

(2) Coordinate with and provide Federal departments and agencies and State and local governments with assumptions, guidelines, aid, and situational material necessary for participating in national, State or local civil defense exercises.

j. Provide technical guidance and assistance to specialized professional groups, such as architects, engineers, and urban designers, whose expertise is related to shelter development.

k. Establish specialized education programs for professional persons, whose expertise is related to shelter development, including faculty of professional schools in selected universities.

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10. Public Information. In consonance with policy guidance of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and in accordance with the statutory authority (50 U.S.C. App. 2281(f)) to publicly disseminate civil defense information:

- a. Develop a comprehensive national public information program (to include preparation and distribution of information materials) on the programs of the DCPA.
- b. Advise and assist Federal, State and local authorities and agencies, as well as information media, businesses and industries, labor, and national organizations and civic groups in the preparation and conduct of activities in support of the national information program.
- c. Prepare and distribute emergency information materials dealing with measures and actions useful to individuals, families, and community groups at the time of a disaster caused by enemy attack.

11. Federal Assistance

- a. Assist State and local governments with Federal funds and, working through the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, with Federal surplus property for civil defense purposes.
- b. In coordination with the Director, Defense Supply Agency, participate in the DoD property utilization program for authorized purposes.

12. Research and Development

- a. In coordination with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, develop, establish, and administer research and development projects designed to meet existing and projected needs for civil defense planning and operations.
- b. Compile, review, analyze, and evaluate available research and data from research sources to determine applicability for civil defense purposes and to assure utilization by civil defense organizations.

13. International Activities

a. In cooperation with the Department of State and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) maintain liaison with and assist friendly foreign nations and international organizations in developing and improving civil defense programs.

(1) Represent the U.S. in NATO civil defense committee meetings, and in other international conferences, and develop and coordinate the U.S. position with respect to all phases of civil defense planning.

(2) Maintain a program for the exchange of public, technical and research information on civil defense with friendly foreign nations and international organizations.

b. Consult and cooperate with Canadian officials on civil emergency planning in order to achieve maximum degree of compatibility feasible between emergency plans and systems of the two countries in accordance with reference (1).

14. Civil Defense Advisory Committee

a. The Civil Defense Advisory Committee is hereby established to advise the Secretary of Defense on the Civil Defense Program for which the Secretary of Defense is responsible pursuant to Executive Order 10952 (reference (b)). The Committee Chairman will be the Director, DCPA. Members will include:

Representatives of the Secretaries of the
Military Departments
Representative of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller)
Representative of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Installations and Logistics)
Representative of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Systems Analysis)
Representative of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Representative State and Local Government
Civil Defense Officials

b. State and local government civil defense members of the Committee shall be nominated by the Director, DCPA, and appointed and requested to serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense.

c. The Director, DCPA, as Chairman will:

(1) Develop parameters and functions of the Committee consistent with 14. a. above.

(2) Coordinate, schedule, and prepare agenda for meetings of the Committee and provide administration and reporting requirements therefor.

B. Natural Disaster Preparedness Assistance

1. In accordance with agreements between the Director, DCPA, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OEP, and subject to the policy guidance of the Director, OEP, DCPA shall:

a. Advise and assist State and local governments in their development of dual purpose disaster preparedness plans (enemy attack and natural disaster).

b. Provide detailed assessment of the status of local government emergency preparedness to respond to major disasters and other local emergencies.

c. Assist State and local governments in their training of State and local officials for disaster emergency operations.

2. Make available and utilize the civil defense communications system for the purpose of natural disaster warning pursuant to Executive Order 11575 (reference (c)).

3. Assist State and local governments in times of emergency through loan of DCPA stockpiled supplies and equipment.

VII. AUTHORITIES

A delegation of the administrative authorities required by the Director, DCPA, to administer and direct the operations of the Agency is contained in Enclosure 1 of this Directive. In the performance of assigned responsibilities and functions of the Agency, the Director, DCPA, is specifically delegated authority to:

- A. Operate and control the activities and facilities assigned to DCPA.
- B. Have free and direct access to and communication with DoD Components and other executive departments and agencies as necessary in the performance of DCPA functions.
- C. As authorized and directed by the Secretary of Defense, prescribe DoD-wide procedures, standards, and practices governing the execution of assigned responsibilities and functions.
- D. Obtain from any DoD component information which is necessary for the performance of DCPA functions.
- E. Direct the consolidation, centralization, or elimination of DCPA facilities, operations, and functions in order to achieve maximum efficiency, economy, and effectiveness.
- F. Submit annually through the Secretary of Defense a written report to the President and the Congress covering expenditures, contributions, work, and accomplishments accompanied by such recommendations as deemed appropriate pursuant to Section 2258, 50 U.S.C. App. (reference (a)) and Section 5, reference (b).
- G. Prepare and submit the annual civil defense budget in accordance with the policies and procedures prescribed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
- H. Provide membership on the Joint United States/Canada Civil Emergency Planning Committee (JCEPC).

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VIII. COROLLARY RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The Secretary of the Army will provide communications support to the Director, DCPA, to carry out the assigned communications and warning responsibilities and functions of the Agency. Such support will include budgeting, funding, procurement, field (user) level of operation and maintenance. The Department of the Army will provide depot level maintenance support in accordance with the annual memorandum of instruction delineated in VIII.C. below. This support includes:

1. Direct support of DCPA's national, state and local communications and warning programs.
2. Planning, programming, detailed engineering, procurement, transportation, installation, testing, acceptance, manning, activation, operation, maintenance, training, logistics of assigned DCPA communications and warning systems (excludes investment funding and deployment for the Decision Information Distribution System (DIDS-CD)). Programming of major telecommunications requirements will be in accordance with DoD Directive 4630.1 (reference (k)).
3. Developing communications subsystem/project plans.
4. Maintenance of the DCPA Radiological Defense Instrumentation Test Facility (RADITF).
5. Providing priority to DCPA communications and warning systems.
6. Advising the Director, DCPA, of shortages of funds, personnel, or facilities which would prevent effective operation and maintenance of existing systems or prevent or delay scheduled implementation of new facilities; coordinating with the Director, DCPA, on adjustments in approved program funds, personnel, or facilities that would affect the schedule or scope of new projects or the fulfillment of ongoing projects.

B. The Secretaries of the Army and the Navy will provide, as available assets permit, engineering support to the Director, DCPA, to carry out the shelter survey and marking program and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) responsibilities and functions of the Agency. When such services do not interfere with primary military missions, engineering support will include shelter survey and community shelter planning activities, as requested by DCPA to support State and local governments in carrying out civil defense responsibilities; construction services, including planning, design and supervision of construction, and other technical support and services as requested by DCPA.

C. The Director, DCPA, will furnish annual memoranda of instruction, or their equivalent, within the DCPA 5-year program projection, to the Secretary of the Army describing program areas and types of support required. These memoranda will establish program details based on available funds for a particular fiscal year, together with suitable work orders and necessary funds to accomplish the work directed. (Manpower requirements necessary to perform assigned engineering support of DCPA missions will be prepared in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) and will be considered in the establishment of the Department of the Army civilian manpower ceilings.)

D. The Secretary of the Army will provide administrative support to the Director, DCPA, in accordance with agreements between the Secretary of the Army and the Director, DCPA.

E. DoD real property facilities used by DCPA shall be under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army and permitted for use by DCPA.

F. The Director, Defense Supply Agency, will, on a reimbursable basis, provide logistics support to the Director, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, for civil defense supplies and equipment. (Logistics support will encompass transportation services and all elements of supply management to include cataloging, procurement, sale, quality control, storage, distribution, inventory control, reporting, maintenance, inspection, surveillance of supplies in public fallout shelters and disposal service.)

IX. RELATIONSHIPS

A. In the performance of his functions, the Director, DCPA, shall:

1. Maintain appropriate liaison with other components of the DoD and other agencies of the executive branch for the exchange of information on programs in the field of assigned responsibilities.
2. Maintain close working relationship with the Department of the Army to insure integration of effort with respect to military support of civil defense and military support in natural disasters.
3. Make full use of established facilities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, other DoD components, and other Government agencies rather than unnecessarily duplicating such facilities.
4. Ensure that appropriate DoD components are kept fully informed concerning DCPA activities of substantive concern to them.
5. Coordinate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments, as appropriate, on actions that would require the employment of military forces or the use of military department resources.

B. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) will exercise primary staff supervision over DCPA on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. He shall prescribe principles and policies to be followed in connection with organizational and administrative matters related to the DCPA mission.

X. ADMINISTRATION

A. The Director shall be a civilian appointed by the Secretary of Defense.

B. The assignment to the Agency and its subordinate activities of other personnel will be in accordance with staffing plans approved by the Secretary of Defense.

C. Programming, budgeting, funding, auditing, and accounting activities of DCPA will be in accordance with policy and procedures established by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).


XI. IMPLEMENTATION

A. Specific assignments in further implementation of responsibilities and functions described herein will be issued by means of the DoD Directive System.

B. Assumption of assigned responsibilities and functions not already being performed by DCPA will be in accordance with phased schedules approved by the Secretary of Defense.

XII. EFFECTIVE DATE

This Directive is effective immediately.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Kenneth Bush".

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Enclosures - 2

1. Delegations of Authority
2. List of References

DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY

Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense, the Director, DCPA, or, in the absence of the Director, the person acting for him is hereby delegated, subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and in accordance with DoD policies, directives, and instructions, and pertinent OSD regulations, authority as required in the administration and operation of DCPA to:

1. Exercise the powers vested in the Secretary of Defense by Section 3101 of Title 5, U.S.C. and Section 302 of Title 5, U.S.C. pertaining to the employment, direction and general administration of DCPA civilian personnel.

2. Fix rates of pay for wage board employees exempted from the Classification Act by 5 U.S.C. 5102(c)(7) on the basis of rates established under the Coordinated Federal Wage System. DCPA, in fixing such rates, shall follow the wage schedules established by DoD Wage Fixing Authority.

3. Establish such advisory committees and employ such part-time advisers as approved by the Secretary of Defense for the performance of DCPA functions pursuant to the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 173, 5 U.S.C. 3109(b), and the Agreement between the DoD and the Civil Service Commission on employment of experts and consultants, dated July 22, 1959. This shall include the establishment of a Civil Defense Advisory Committee; State and local government civil defense members of the Committee shall be nominated by the Director, DCPA but appointed and serve at the pleasure of the Secretary of Defense.

4. Administer oaths of office incident to entrance into the Executive Branch of the Federal Government or any other oath required by law in connection with employment therein, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of June 26, 1943, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 2903(b) and designate in writing, as may be necessary, officers and employees of DCPA to perform this function.

5. Establish a DCPA Incentive Awards Board and pay cash awards to and incur necessary expenses for the honorary recognition of civilian employees of the Government whose suggestions, inventions, superior accomplishments, or other personal efforts, including special acts or services, benefit or affect DCPA or its subordinate activities in accordance with the provisions of the Act of September 1, 1954, as amended, 5 U.S.C. 4503 and Civil Service Regulations.

6. Perform the following in accordance with the provisions of the Act of August 26, 1950, as amended (5 U.S.C. 7532); Executive Order 10450, dated April 27, 1953, as amended; and DoD Directive 5210.7, dated September 2, 1966 (as revised):

a. Designate any appropriate position in DCPA as a "sensitive" position;

b. Authorize, in case of an emergency, the appointment of a person to a sensitive position in the Agency for a limited period of time for whom a full field investigation or other appropriate investigation, including the National Agency Check, has not been completed; and

c. Authorize the suspension, but not to terminate the services of an employee in the interest of national security in positions within DCPA.

7. Clear DCPA personnel and such other individuals as may be appropriate for access to classified Defense material and information in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.8, dated February 15, 1962 (as revised), "Policy on Investigation and Clearance of Department of Defense Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information" and of Executive Order 11652, dated March 8, 1972.

8. Act as agent for the collection and payment of employment taxes imposed by Chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and, as such agent, make all determinations and certifications required or provided for under Section 3122 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. 3122, and Section 205(p)(1) and (2) of the Social Security Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 405(p)(1) and (2)) with respect to DCPA employees.

9. Authorize and approve overtime work for DCPA civilian officers and employees in accordance with the provisions of Section 550.111 of the Civil Service Regulations.

10. Authorize and approve:

a. Travel for DCPA civilian officers and employees in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 2, Department of Defense Civilian Personnel, dated July 1, 1965, as amended.

b. Temporary duty travel only for military personnel assigned or detailed to DCPA in accordance with Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 1, for Members of the Uniformed Services, dated November 1969, as amended.

c. Invitational travel to persons serving without compensation whose consultive, advisory, or other highly specialized technical services are required in a capacity that is directly related to or in connection with DCPA activities, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5 of the Administrative Expenses Act of 1946, as amended (5 U.S.C. 5703).

11. Approve the expenditure of funds available for travel by military personnel assigned or detailed to DCPA for expenses incident to attendance at meetings of technical, scientific, professional or other similar organizations in such instances where the approval of the Secretary of Defense or his designee is required by law (37 U.S.C. 412). This authority cannot be redelegated.

12. Develop, establish, and maintain an active and continuing Records Management Program, pursuant to the provisions of Section 506(b) of the Federal Records Act of 1950 (44 U.S.C. 3102).

13. Establish and use Imprest Funds for making small purchases of material and services other than personal for DCPA when it is determined more advantageous and consistent with the best interests of the Government, in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7280.1, dated August 24, 1970, and the Joint Regulation of the General Services Administration -- Treasury Department -- General Accounting Office, entitled "For Small Purchases Utilizing Imprest Funds."

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14. Authorize the publication of advertisements, notices, or proposals in newspapers, magazines, or other public periodicals as required for the effective administration and operation of DCPA (44 U.S.C. 3702).

15. a. Establish and maintain appropriate Property Accounts for DCPA.

b. Appoint Boards of Survey, approve reports of survey, relieve personal liability, and drop accountability for DCPA property contained in the authorized Property Accounts that has been lost, damaged, stolen, destroyed, or otherwise rendered unserviceable, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

16. Promulgate the necessary security regulations for the protection of property and places under the jurisdiction of the Director, DCPA, pursuant to paragraph III.A. and V.B. of DoD Directive 5200.8, dated August 20, 1954.

17. Establish and maintain, for the functions assigned, an appropriate publications system for the promulgation of common supply and service regulations, instructions, and reference documents, and changes thereto, pursuant to the policies and procedures prescribed in DoD Directive 5025.1, dated March 7, 1961.

18. Enter into support and service agreements with DoD Components or other Government agencies as required for the effective performance of responsibilities and functions assigned to DCPA.

19. Exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary of Defense by the Administrator of General Services Administration with respect to the disposal of surplus personal property.

20. Issue appropriate implementing documents and establish internal procedures to assure that the selection and acquisition of ADP resources are conducted within the policies contained in DoD Directive 4105.55, dated May 19, 1972, the Federal Property Management Regulations and Armed Services Procurement Regulations.

21. Enter into and administer contracts, directly or through a Military Department, a DoD contract administration services component, or other Government department or agency, as appropriate,

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for supplies, equipment and services required to accomplish the mission of the DCPA. Enter into contracts for supplies, equipment and services for civil defense purposes and, subject to the limitation contained in Section 2311, Chapter 137, 10 U.S.C., to make the necessary determinations and findings required under that chapter.

The Director, DCPA, may redelegate these authorities as appropriate, and in writing, except as otherwise specifically indicated above or as otherwise provided by law or regulation.

This delegation of authorities is effective immediately.

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List of References Continued

- Refs.: (f) Military Construction Authorization Act of 1967, as amended (P.L. 89-568; P.L. 90-110), 50 U.S.C. App. 2287
- (g) DoD Directive 3025.1, "Employment of Military Resources in Natural Disaster Emergencies within the United States, its Territories and Possessions," August 30, 1971
- (h) DoD Directive 3025.10, "Military Support of Civil Defense," March 29, 1965
- (i) DoD Directive 5105.22, "Defense Supply Agency (DSA)," December 9, 1965
- (j) DoD Directive 5100.30, "World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)," December 2, 1971
- (k) DoD Directive 4630.1, "Programming of Major Telecommunications Requirements," April 24, 1968
- (l) Civil Emergency Planning Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada Effected by Exchange of Notes signed at Ottawa August 8, 1967. (Treaties and other International Acts Series 6325)
- (m) DoD Directive 5160.50, "Civil Defense Functions," March 31, 1964 (hereby cancelled)
- (n) DoD Directive 5160.61, "Delegation of Authority - Use of Civil Defense Communications System for Disaster Warnings," March 6, 1971 (hereby cancelled)

STATE REGION NATIONAL

(Identify State/Name or Region)
NEW JERSEY

PROGRAM AREAS (PERCENT COMPLETED) POPULATION COVERED (PERCENT POPULATION) EVALUATION (PERCENTAGE)

REQ.	PROGRAM AREAS	OBJECTIVE	POPULATION	0	20	40	60	80	100	A	B	C	D	E	N
219	PROGRAM MANAGEMENT	ALERTNESS (LOCAL JURISDICTIONS) EMERGENCY OPERATIONS SIMULATIONS DIRECTOR/COORDINATOR TRAINED STAFF TRAINED	7,171,112							8	27	11	17	3	4
219	OVERALL	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED ON-SITE ASSISTANCE / ACTION PLANS ADOPTED								17	19	10	20	6	22
219	OVERALL	EXECUTIVE SUPPORT TRAINING OF DIRECTOR ASSIGNMENT OF CP STAFF TRAINING OF CP STAFF								15	27	23	14	6	2
219	OVERALL	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED ON-SITE ASSISTANCE / ACTION PLANS ADOPTED								2	7	47	34	10	0
219	OVERALL	BASIS PLAN RCP, IN-PLACE RCP, RELOCATION PEAK-TIME DISASTER MUTUAL AID PLAN FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								7	49	20	20	4	0
218	SCHOOLS	EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTERS								2	17	23	47	2	8
218	DIRECTION & CONTROL	EMERGENCY STAFF COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY VEHICLE TRACKING SANITATION WATER EMERGENCY GENERATOR FUEL (14 DAYS) FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								0	2	0	3	88	7
219	ALERTING & WARNING	OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED WARNING RECEIVING CAPABILITY OUTDOOR WARNING WEATHER WARNING RECEIVING CAPABILITY FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								6	25	35	25	8	1
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								14	33	25	16	8	5
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								1	8	24	48	26	2
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								2	5	39	52	20	1
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								5	23	31	29	11	1
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								4	8	21	29	11	1
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								2	14	43	53	6	0
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								20	32	22	17	5	3
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								10	17	43	22	8	0
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								0	8	43	27	22	0
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								1	2	37	36	23	1
219	EMERGENCY INFORMATION	EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SOP								1	5	49	23	21	0

STATE REGION NATIONAL

(Identify State Name or Region):
TEXAS

PROGRAM AREAS	OBJECTIVE	POPULATION 11,197,434	PROGRAM AREAS (PERCENT COMPLETED)			POPULATION COVERED (PERCENT POPULATION)			EVALUATION (PERCENTAGE)					
			REL	0	20	40	60	80	100	A	B	C	D	E
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT	405 AUTHORITY (LOCAL, FEDERAL)		85						8	20	36	32	3	2
	405 CONFERENCES FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS		10						13	10	14	46	12	7
	405 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS SIMULATIONS		15						12	27	22	27	9	3
	405 DIRECTOR/COORDINATOR TRAINED STAFF TRAINED		75						2	8	16	33	28	13
OVERALL EMERGENCY PLANS	405 EXECUTIVE SUPPORT		85						5	5	16	35	29	13
	405 TRAINING OF DIRECTOR		85						13	18	34	32	3	1
	405 ASSIGNMENT OF STAFF		85						7	20	46	9	13	5
	405 TRAINING OF CP STAFF		85						12	14	38	8	53	1
SCHOOLS	422 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED		85						2	7	52	31	6	1
	422 ON-SITE ASSISTANCE - ACTION PLANS ADOPTED		42						1	4	23	62	7	1
	422 BASIC PLAN		85						1	5	29	39	24	
	422 ICP, IN-PLACE		85						1	5	29	39	24	
DIRECTION & CONTROL	422 EMERGENCY STAFF		85						7	19	21	44	8	1
	422 COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY		65						6	7	32	46	8	1
	422 VENTILATION		65						4	8	13	38	36	1
	422 SANITATION		65						4	8	13	38	36	1
ALERTING & WARNING	405 WATER		50						10	30	26	23	9	1
	405 EMERGENCY GENERATOR		80						6	11	56	20	7	1
	405 FUEL (14 DAYS)		80						6	11	56	20	7	1
	405 FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SSP		80						6	11	56	20	7	1
EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION	397 OPERATIONS PROCEDURES COMPLETED		85						2	11	44	32	10	1
	397 GUIDANCE MATERIAL PREPARED		85						3	9	34	40	13	1
	397 FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SSP		85						1	9	22	27	40	1
	397 FACILITIES/EQUIPMENT ANNEXES/SSP		85						1	9	22	27	40	1

Mr. KINCADE. Thank you, Governor Davis. I think that Representative Evans will be back with us shortly. Holding a hearing just before the recess when they're trying to clear the calendars in both Houses is not the optimum time. If it's agreeable with you, Governor, I would like to ask and minority counsel would also like to ask a few questions in the interim until Mr. Evans or one of the other committee members returns. Will that be suitable to you?

Mr. DAVIS. Fine.

Mr. KINCADE. Perhaps you could begin, Governor Davis, by giving us your evaluation of the current state of civil emergency preparedness in this country. Would you say we are in good shape or not, and what would you see as our particular strengths and perhaps some of our weaknesses where we need to do more work?

Mr. DAVIS. One of the most difficult tasks that I had or found that I had when I become Director of the agency was to make a determination of what was the status of our preparedness; what was the readiness of our States, but more particularly, the community, because the communities basically have the fundamental responsibility for that is where the people live and that is where most of our effort has been put forth.

So about a year and a half ago we identified the various programs that we wanted to see what was their level of preparedness, what was their status. And I must give credit to our comptroller, Mr. Jack Raskin, who on my urging and along with the cooperation of our regions, as well as the States and locals who joined with us in this effort, because it needed their participation. We took all the program elements and made a determination of their status.

We had to begin with the individual communities. They submitted a program analysis to us. First was the status of each of the individual programs from their management, from their warning, from their communications, from their internal community services like fire, like police, what was their participation, what was the medical participation, what was the condition of their radiological monitoring system and their emergency operating centers, what was the training of the individual himself who was responsible. So all these things were put forth in a composite to which the individual director judged his community, and out of this we developed a nationwide composite. You have it before you—and to me it's most revealing.

For the first time we could graphically portray the deficiencies and the things where our—

Mr. KINCADE. Could you tell us, Governor, which areas you found across the board seem to be in the best shape and which seemed to be perhaps a little weaker where there seems to be a little work that needs to be done?

Mr. DAVIS. As you look at the chart that shows our national composite presentation you will find a bar graph representing the percentage of the programs representing over 5,800 local jurisdictions. If you take the basic plan, for instance, for operating procedures, you will find that within the total of the communities it's nearly 80-percent complete. That means that in that particular area we are in pretty good shape.

Now if you move down to alerting and warning with operations completed, you will find that it's a little over 50 percent, which means

that there are deficiencies there to which we give attention and to which the local communities and States give attention.

If you look at "emergency information" procedures you will find that we are deficient there. The emergency information is information to go to the public for dissemination and utilization during an alert period, the time when it is needed. That is under 40 percent.

Mr. KINCADE. This is a very impressive program document. Can you tell us how it relates to your "management-by-objectives" method?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, we could now identify each individual community as to where its strong and weak points are and by this analysis we could then apply the small funds we have in trying to upgrade it. Many of these things do not require funding. Many of these things were in the nature of plans. Many of these things were just good hard work to be accomplished within a community.

So we can, No. 1, place our emphasis and our personnel in the region and in our national headquarters in managing the program through the States to the locals so they could give attention to bringing up these deficiencies to meet the standards that we created for local communities in order to have them be representative of a good preparedness community.

Then over on the right side you will see the qualitative evaluation. The other was quantitative. On the qualitative side, we gave ratings from A to E and the N being these communities that rely on others for support, and there were some in that category in the various elements of the program. We find that if you take "C" which became a minimum standard acceptable for the community, so that they would be representative of having adequate readiness, adequate preparedness, and if you go to the "A" and "B" evaluations and add those together, you will find that the total of these 5,800 jurisdictions would be about 50 percent "C" and above.

Therefore, it was obvious that we had nearly half that were down below in a lower standard. For the first time, Mr. Chairman, we had people beginning to look at themselves and where their deficiencies were, and the record as you can see showed itself. It wasn't to be punitive, but it was to be helpful guidance for us in management to attain these objectives. We could put our emphasis and we could have the effort of all people, both our national and the State and local level, to perform the job to achieve these standards that we had set and to which, incidentally, they had agreed on. It wasn't a federally dictated standard—it was a standard that we had worked jointly, cooperatively in meeting after meeting with State representatives and local representatives to decide what we wanted. The interesting thing is that we found that there was a feeling among those that were performing well that, let's get slower ones up. I think it was in the spirit of the Nation in which we went together in this joint effort. We have a printout for every State in the union—we have a printout for every community, and it was just something that geographically we could look at.

Mr. KINCADE. Thank you. I think probably Mr. Evans would like to pose some of the questions that are on his mind.

Mr. EVANS. Right. I think we can certainly all sympathize with the desire of the Department of Defense to get out of funding and assisting some of what are prominently civilian emergencies such as

natural disasters. I wonder what is going to happen to all of the assistance that your agency provided in this area in the past to State and local governments?

Mr. DAVIS. I don't quite understand the question. You're talking about it in terms of the change of the philosophy, so to speak, in our direction?

Mr. EVANS. In terms of the Department of Defense getting out of the funding of civil emergency preparedness, such as natural disasters, where you have been giving a great deal of assistance through your agency in the past to State and local governments. I'm wondering what is going to happen to all of that assistance that your agency has been providing in the past.

Mr. DAVIS. I'd like to make one clarification. The Civil Defense Act is limited to nuclear preparedness, as you indicated in your statement about the limitation or restrictions contained therein. The changing times brought the State and local communities with the directors having the responsibility for total preparedness as we know it. Yet our funds that have been appropriated were for nuclear preparedness. It was in compliance with the law.

However, for the past 5 or 6 or 7 years, under tacit understanding and approval both of the Congress and from the President, with a statement from the National Security Council, and approval by the Department of Defense Secretaries, we have used the capabilities we provided for total preparedness. That means communications. That means warnings. And the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 provided that our warning system and our emergency operating centers would be used for emergencies. The organization was used wherever possible.

Now where we did run into some problems was where we had our mission to perform and we found so many States, particularly diverting people that we funded into long periods of time in recovery efforts—this is more administration.

An illustration of this would be after Agnes. It caused tremendous paperwork in compliance with FDAA regulations.

Mr. EVANS. This assistance to State and local governments for natural disasters, would it be changed, switched to some other agency, or would this assistance just cease? What do you see happening?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think we have to get specific about the assistance being offered and given to the local communities, recognizing that in most instances it goes through the State civil defense organization and then funnels down to the local. Most of it, outside of our efforts, stops at the State level, except in the recovery stage when FDAA and other Federal agencies like Agriculture, Small Business, and HUD come in providing emergency resources for housing. So this makes the Government then funneling in its resources, doing their job as they are designed to do to assist in relief.

Where we come into conflict is purely the extra use of people basically at the State level for other things than our mission.

But I can say this: in the sense of the utilization—and this goes in 1975 and 1976—the system that we created, the civil defense created within the State and local governments and the Federal Government, the things that we support have been used effectively. In that period of time that I mentioned the emergency operating centers that I made reference to were activated into operational capability over 5,107

times. There were communications systems that were utilized—our national warning system and other parts of it—radio communications that we support—over 6,500 times, and the warning systems, including the sirens which we have authorized to be used for natural disaster warnings, over 4,900 times.

This is a record of utilization of the things that we supported and funded and created and helped create within the local government.

It's my belief, Mr. Evans, that in time of danger to our people, I don't care what system it is, it ought to be used to help save lives and save property.

Mr. EVANS. Right. I think we all agree about that. Let me ask you this question. You probably heard, as the committee has, that the limitation on the DCPA's role in aiding State and local governments may create a disaster in itself in terms of State and local organizations. Do you think that's a true reflection of what will happen?

Mr. DAVIS. Under the narrow interpretation of the DCPA mission, I do think it provides or will create a very awkward situation. It's not consistent with what State and locals are doing and what they want done and therefore, unless some changes are made—as you know, there's a congressional proposal now to amend the law to partially offset these severe restrictions which have been placed upon the agency.

Mr. EVANS. Let me ask another question. If the State and local organizations weaken or die, as they have said they might under the new restrictions, wouldn't the Federal Government have to help recreate them just to get an organizational base for a nuclear attack program that you have mentioned?

Mr. DAVIS. I believe that would be a very true statement. We have to take some assumptions that they have made as being true and only time, of course, would tell exactly what the outcome would be, but I have to at the moment believe that the locals and States will have extreme difficulties in trying to meet our requirements in providing solely for nuclear disaster preparedness.

Mr. KINCADE. I beg your indulgence again. Since Mr. Evans had to leave, perhaps minority counsel, Mr. Dawson, would like to ask some questions at this point.

Mr. DAWSON. In following up questions put to you by Congressman Evans, let me relay to you that Congressman Brown yesterday, when Mr. Dunne, of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration was appearing before us, tried to understand what the similarities and differences between natural and nuclear disaster might be; and Mr. Dunne stated his agency intended to review the similarities and differences between these two types of emergencies so as to find common denominators, but warned the committee very sternly that the effort to do that might tend to erode and only emphasize the similarities and detract from the primary mission of the civil defense effort.

Would you comment on this dilemma, on the similarities between these two kinds of emergencies and if you would, run through the types of activities that are common to both types of emergencies?

Mr. DAVIS. I respect Mr. Dunne and his viewpoints. However, I feel there's a tremendous similarity between what you do in a natural and a nuclear disaster in the sense of readiness and preparedness.

First, the State and local governments, because of efficiencies and because of the cost involved, could not afford two separate organiza-

tions. There the organizational side, in my judgment, ought to and should be the same.

Second, on warning, the implementation of that system certainly is the same in many ways—the requirements for immediate response to whatever the danger is.

Third, the similar communications are needed, required, and used.

Fourth, you need some central location to be a headquarters, command center, which we call emergency operating centers, from which the command authorities can manage the affairs if time permits before the emergency and certainly during and afterward.

Fifth, you need to have planning for the people within the community. I'm talking about the fire departments, the police departments, the medical facilities, the schools, business, and industry. It's a whole community effort and the involvements are with the same types of people and you go to them and say, You do this and you do that—in a different way because the similarities are totally the same.

You need and ought to have, particularly along the Gulf coast, evacuation plans. As I mentioned, we are doing evacuation planning and I like to believe—and this was the premise of my thoughts about this from the beginning when I took this over—that the things that happen within a community in terms of performance by a local director in the community for a natural disaster indicate to us how well they prepared for the conditions that prevailed as compared to conditions that we perceive would be under a nuclear attack. So it's good exercise. It's good practice to see if the systems work and it's proved out that those who have done good nuclear attack preparedness will certainly perform and have better organization during the natural disaster period.

Now it's certainly true that there are some dissimilarities and one is the radiological monitoring system that we develop within the local communities to measure and determine fallout. Remember that fallout can't be seen and it can't be touched and it needs a special instrument to make detection.

Now by coincidence I expect, we found a use for these in peacetime because we have nuclear powerplants and here's a new danger that has emerged. So where these powerplants have been installed and constructed we are involving local civil defense people in the total picture in the direction of health services in detection and having plans to provide a readiness in the event there's an accident. The same with transportation. So here again, there's a relationship between what we are doing in the nuclear preparedness with these radiological detection instruments for use in peacetime.

So you can go through this whole gamut of planning and find total similarities, in my judgment. Under natural disasters it's rather limited usually in nature. In other words, you can bring in a lot of outside help without restriction and do it very promptly. Under the conditions of nuclear attack, the community would be more isolated. They would have to depend upon their own resources, their own plans, and their own initiative to look after themselves.

There's sheltering that has to be done under natural disasters. We're talking about sheltering in nuclear preparedness. So anyone will have a difficult time convincing me that there isn't a total similarity of preparedness in both instances.

Mr. DAWSON. That's a very full and complete answer and I wonder if I might prevail upon your good nature a little more and ask, do you presently have any study underway in your agency which would allow you to specify these types of things that you're testifying to that would be able to document cases where the instances that preparedness for nuclear disaster has had a good effect on preparedness for natural disasters?

Mr. DAVIS. I made a point that at any time after there was a natural disaster, knowing that the local director would be involved, we immediately made a survey to find what was their involvement, how did they perform, did they use their emergency operating center, did they use their communications, did they use their warnings. When the dam broke in Idaho, here was, in a sense, a chance for the State to be involved and certainly warning went downriver, and we found they were there. Floods and tornadoes—I can give specific instances of newsprint with compliments on civil defense performance. As the indication of how often the system that we created for nuclear attack had been used locally, it runs in the thousands every year.

Mr. DAWSON. Would you mind please submitting something to that effect for the record?

Mr. DAVIS. Certainly. Illustrations of our utilization. We'll be very happy to provide that for your use.

[Information submitted for the record follows:]

Our data collection on a semi-annual basis includes specific identification of experiences where civil defense equipment and systems were used in actual emergencies. These emergency activities resulted from either the threat of or damage resulting from severe weather or industrial accidents. For example, between the period from February 1975 to January 1976, State and local Emergency Operating Centers were activated 5,107 times; Emergency Communications Systems were used 6,550 times; and Warning Systems were activated 4,951 times.

Here is a very limited list of some of the occurrences in various States where civil defense equipment and people were substantially involved:

In June 1975, during a series of severe storms with heavy rain and wind in New Jersey which resulted in flooding in the northern half of the State, the State Government EOC was activated as well as EOC's in 12 counties to assist local officials in alleviating the effects of the flooding.

During the five day period in September 1975, when about 70 percent of the homes in Trenton, New Jersey, were without water due to a crippled water supply system, civil defense volunteer personnel manned tank truck bucket brigades and civil defense kitchens during the emergency operation to alleviate the situation. Many were on the job for 24-hour periods.

Following heavy rains and resultant flooding throughout much of Pennsylvania in September 1975, the State EOC and 24 county EOC's were activated for conducting emergency operations.

Floods following heavy rains in part of West Virginia in August 1975, resulted in the State EOC and the EOC's in Ohio and Marshall Counties being utilized for emergency operations.

By mid-March 1975, 85 of the 95 counties in Tennessee were involved in varying degrees of flooding and tornado effects. Seven persons were killed, property damage caused by flooding and tornadoes was over \$39 million. Effective use of EOC's and warning systems reduced loss of life and excellent flood disaster preparedness plans were utilized in the disaster recovery effort.

The heavy rains and flooding resulting from Hurricane Eloise on September 26, 1975, resulted in activity of the State EOC and EOC's in six affected counties in the Florida panhandle. Effective use of warning systems resulted in no loss of life.

As a result of tornadoes in Illinois in July 1975, the State EOC in Springfield and the Fulton County, Illinois, EOC were activated for conducting emergency operations.

Between February 1975 and January 1976, Emergency Operations Centers in Wisconsin were activated 87 times for emergency operations. Such operations utilized the emergency recovery and operations capabilities of not only the State-level EOC but the local civil defense organizations, and were the result of various emergencies such as dry conditions bringing about drought and cattle starvation in northwestern parts of the State, early spring icestorms that cut off utilities and fuel supplies to many communities, and from the Indian takeover of a religious institution in northeast Wisconsin which received nationwide attention.

The effective use of warning systems, plus tornado preparedness actions and effective quick recovery actions kept casualties low in Oklahoma in December 1975. The Civil Defense Director of McAlester/Pittsburg County assisted the Wilburton Civil Defense by providing communications from McAlester to Wilburton. Sirens in both Wilburton and Tulsa were sounded. Both cities activated their EOC's. Three hundred Auxiliary Police, trained by Civil Defense, augmented Tulsa police and law enforcement.

Typical of the increasing role of local civil defense directors in all types of disasters were cases such as the coordination of local action in the following examples in the State of Texas: the floods and rail yard fire of 1975 and in the ammonia truck crash in May 1976 and the disastrous June 15, 1976, flood in Houston; the train derailment and chemical spill with resulting evacuation of Galveston County areas during Easter weekend, 1976; evacuation and local action during the same weekend when high tides and land subsidence endangered parts of Baytown.

During the floods in Montana in June 1975, the Missoula County EOC operated on a 24-hour basis. In Great Falls, the CD Director had activated all warning and evacuation plans using police squad cars and public address systems plus all news media to disseminate warning. Emergency disaster planning in Great Falls proved beneficial in conducting relief actions. Disaster operations were well coordinated.

As a result of tornadoes in Nebraska in May 1975, the State EOC was activated. Effective use of warning via NAWAS kept the death toll to a minimum in the Eastern third of Nebraska. Vehicles were obtained through the Excess Property Loan Program and used in Omaha. Reports indicated the Omaha warning plan was effectively implemented and the coordinated use of television, radio and DCPA-supported outdoor and indoor warning systems saved many lives.

Spring flooding in the Souris and Red Rivers in North Dakota during April 1975 resulted in Civil Defense led activity to alleviate the effects of the flood. The State EOC and EOC's in four affected counties were activated.

During late January 1975, the counties of Kuai, Oahu, and Maui, Hawaii, were affected by high winds, flooding (seismic sea waves) and a minor earthquake. EOC's were activated in these jurisdictions for coordination of relief activities involving Federal, State and local agencies.

Effective use of EOC's and Civil Defense communications was reported by Washington State during a disaster in December 1975 where damages due to snowmelt, rain, and resultant flooding showed 2,613 homes damaged or destroyed by high waters. Four hundred and forty-six farms were damaged and 70,000 acres of crops were lost.

The National and Oregon State NAWAS circuits were used extensively for flood warning and information reporting in December 1975. The River Forecast Center, Portland, provided extensive flood warning and advisory data via NAWAS and teletype.

Mr. DAWSON. Thank you. I'd like to ask a question in another area. The Joint Committee has heard that the DCPA has under review options which would substantially reduce the number of training programs and instruction at the national civil defense college authorized under Section 201 of your act. Would you comment on any review that you might have underway to make changes in this staff college?

Mr. DAVIS. We have our basic programs and priorities and you certainly recognize that training and education has been a significant part of our responsibility and a significant part of our program, but it basically came down to a point of money. We were operating at a very low level of effort at our 1976 funding. Therefore, there had to be

some cuts and the cuts were going to be across the board with a gradual reduction of all programs. We were going to maintain a capability within our staff college to teach but doing most of our instructions through the State organization and through our regions within the States.

We found that the staff college under the restricted conditions could better perform jobs like preparing materials rather than becoming a school to basically teach and we found that some of the courses could be taught and would be attended by more of our local directors if we had the classroom right where they lived practically within their State organization. So we would limit very much the instruction that would take place at the staff college and do most of our instruction and training out in the regions or the States.

Mr. DAWSON. Did you examine the cost effectiveness of having the opportunity to take the highest level of the civil defense matrix of this country into the staff college as opposed to getting down to the lower level of people via State instructions.

Mr. DAVIS. Yes. We have looked at how many people were going to the staff college, how many people could we serve as a part of the cost effectiveness, and we found that while the staff college was performing we weren't reaching particularly those that were at a distance. The cost of travel is expensive. The time that they had to spend there sometimes was limited and therefore, in order to expose more local directors to the training that they needed, the basic training, it was fundamentally more productive to go out within the States with this instruction.

Mr. DAWSON. Thank you.

Mr. KINCADE. I'd like to go back to the management program if I may, Governor Davis. I'm wondering whether the kind of data collection that's implicit in these very large program status documents imposes particularly burdensome requirements on the State and local emergency personnel who are likely to feed data into your program monitoring efforts, shall we say? Is it possible, for example, to say how many staff-years are required for a State agency to put together this information for responding to DCPA?

Mr. DAVIS. I think that anything basically worthwhile does require work and some time. The initial effort to get the inventory of where we were did require an unusual amount of time both on our part and the State and local communities. But once we completed this, it was my opinion and it still is, that having this to work with and with the improvements they added on, it would be a minimal amount of effort on their part.

Mr. KINCADE. Once the system is in place it should cause no great trouble to update it on an annual basis?

Mr. DAVIS. That was my judgment and I believe it's true.

Mr. KINCADE. And the big burden is out of the way now that you have gotten the system in place.

Let me go to something that I think relates to this and which Mr. Dawson touched upon. Witnesses have told us that public information and professional training are two of the most important ingredients of a successful preparedness program. I think that's evident. You have to have people, both public and the officials or professionals, trained to respond automatically without thinking a great deal about

what they are doing. I think it's somewhat like military training in that respect. You don't have time to figure out what to do. Will the program reductions affect these areas other than the Battle Creek case and, if so, how? Do you see, particularly since you mentioned that one of the areas that perhaps needed some attention is the education and information area, would you foresee that it might not receive that attention because of the reductions in your program?

Mr. DAVIS. Well, I think when I said our programs were at a minimal level in 1976 and when our budget was decreased we had to do some tightening of the belt everywhere, and one of the things—and unfortunately it was specifically mentioned by one of the House reports—was that education could well be more or less put off for the future. I personally don't believe that.

So we're trying to maintain the best kind of program we can but it will affect some of our State contracts which have been most productive I feel. We have been spending in the neighborhood of \$5 million for this education and information and we will not have that kind of money when we—

Mr. KINCADE. About how much do you think would be available?

Mr. DAVIS. We are working on it now. As you know, this year's budget has been acted on both by the House and the Senate and the conferees. It's \$82.5 million. It hasn't passed either House in final, but it's on that basis we're going to begin work. That just happened last week. So with the hearings here, I haven't had the time to really put together the picture of how this money will be distributed, but it will be less than last year.

Mr. KINCADE. Even with the kinds of amounts that are currently being talked about in the appropriations committees?

Mr. DAVIS. It will not be adequate to provide the sums of money we require.

Mr. KINCADE. Can you give us some indication, assuming that there will have to be this belt-tightening of which you speak, of the priority areas for cutting, so to speak? Which parts of your total program are going to suffer most, which are likely to suffer least?

Mr. DAVIS. There will be some reduction in what we would refer to as our national overhead. There will be a reduction in our contributions for emergency operating centers construction. We had a requirement for \$18 million that will be reduced down to about \$3 million.

Mr. KINCADE. From \$18 million down to \$3 million?

Mr. DAVIS. That was the requirement. We went down in our budget to \$7 million, and that will be reduced down to \$3 million. We will have to reduce some of our NCP planning. That's the National Nuclear Civil Preparedness Planning. That's in place. And also, our effort on behalf of crisis relocation which we are just moving into. The shelter survey effort which is finding protected places for people to go to will be reduced as will anything related to what we call natural disaster planning—restoration of emergency vehicles, for instance. We will not have money for that. We had an emergency water supply resource that we used. That will be eliminated this year.

So the funds are small. You just have to do some cutting and still keep our priority programs alive. Some things will have to go or be reduced.

Mr. KINCADE. Do you think that, in some of these areas, the State and local agencies—I would think particularly the State agencies—

will be able or will attempt to pick up the slack? Perhaps that's two different questions.

Mr. DAVIS. Will they pick up the slack? I question it very much because they too have been in a money crunch and, of course, their fiscal years and ours are not in harmony. As a result, they have their general commitment of money now. So anything that we receive and allocate probably cannot be made up by them. It's not likely.

Generally there's a philosophy, a general philosophy, in the States and among the local communities that programs associated with nuclear preparedness ought to be, and maybe rightly so, a part of the national responsibility because it's a wartime preparation. They generally look at it like national security, the Army and the Navy and the Air Force, although the law does not so state. It's a community or joint effort and they do contribute to our P and A funds [personnel and administration]—they contribute 50 percent—and in many communities much more than they receive from the Federal Government, but that is not the general rule.

Mr. KINCADE. That's an interesting point you raised. We have heard a proposal for total Federal assumption of the nuclear attack planning, that it become entirely federally funded and, I presume, federally managed with only Federal personnel. That would seem to some degree to go back on the kind of partnership approach established under the 1958 amendments to the Federal Civil Defense Act. Could you give us your views on the pros and cons of the total Federal assumption of the basic civil defense effort?

Mr. DAVIS. I'm State and local oriented because of my background I might say. I have had a long belief that the Federal Government can do many things in giving guidance and expertise and professionalism and a sharing of things learned from the experiences that only the national gets because it can be a national picture rather than a provincial one or a State one. However, from a philosophical sense, I believe that the law was a good one in 1950; the State responsibility concept was excellent. The only thing is that in these times there has been a lack of interest on the part of officials in many instances and a lack of money. Somebody I noticed said in their statement, when you look for cuts you look at those things that are less probable to cause the greatest damage. In an ongoing program if something doesn't happen your interest and support decreases.

So I believe philosophically the concept that it ought to be Federal, State and local participation is right.

Mr. KINCADE. On that basis, then aren't we likely to create two preparedness organizations, a Federal one for nuclear attack side by side with a State and local organization for natural disaster and other kinds of emergencies, a duplication of organization which would fail to make use of the commonalities which you have discussed earlier? Is that a possibility of Federal assumption?

Mr. DAVIS. I'm going to ask Mr. McConnell who's in our plans and operations office to answer that.

Mr. McCONNELL. I think the key word in your question is the term organization. The Federal Government can provide funds, guidance, expertise, and even do planning that pertains to actions that could be taken at the local level and they can even provide facilities, but the organization must be provided by the State and local governments and it must be parallel to the organization that operates on a day-to-

day basis. So unless the State and local governments can be brought into the picture in a meaningful way with their organization, the efforts of the Federal Government to create a capability is virtually impossible.

Mr. KINCADE. I think that says it very well. One of the things that have become noticeable to the committee, in reviewing the responses from the Governors of the States and some of the testimony from State and local officials, is that, at least according to their perception, they are running operational organizations. That is, they are responding on a very frequent basis to actual disaster or crisis situations. They see themselves as combat troops, if you will. Yet they feel that the Federal Government agencies assume that they are primarily planning bodies. So there's a kind of dichotomy in perspective here. They no sooner get finished dealing with one larger or smaller natural disaster than suddenly they've got to get back to the planning boards and try to satisfy Federal planning requirements. They feel that perhaps the Federal Government is not as conscious as it ought to be of their regular frontline, day-to-day responsibilities for meeting emergency situations. Do you think that this is a valid perspective, that there's some truth in what they say? If so, do you think it might be one of the causes of some of the friction we have heard about between the State and local agencies on the one hand and the Federal organization on the other?

Mr. DAVIS. I think that there is, particularly on the basis of our mission which of course is to create an operational capability for the local community to use and apply all of these things that have been created within the community. It's the time limit of the personnel being employed. Certainly we have tried to limit it and get them back on track doing the things that are associated with this larger responsibility.

Now at the moment, after a natural disaster—there's a regional effort, sometimes a single community—and once the repair part comes in, when you're bringing relief in, it's another ballgame so to speak that you're playing. I don't know how else you could give that relief except through the normal channels of Government, Federal Government I'm talking about. They were trying to give relief by the one-stop centers, and we have offered our services to FDAA to augment their staffs quickly to respond to that need. When they ask for aid, people are trained to do it and to respond and then when the situation is such that other people can supplant our people, they are released to go to their normal jobs. I think it's a great mutual effort by the Federal Government to help State and local communities and their people. Maybe Mr. McConnell has something to add.

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. Kincaide, the Federal civil defense preparedness effort has never professed to be able to provide operating forces. The program is designed to provide planners, organizers, coordinators, and managers who can be kept abreast of the technicalities of the situation to create the capability within the normal departments of government to do the operating.

Mr. KINCADE. I think the committee is aware of that. The question was really one more of perspective. Most of the State staffs are quite small. I don't know what the median figure is but somewhere in the range of a few dozen. When they have an emergency in the State, ice conditions on all the roads or drought, they suddenly have all of

their people, including those who are DCPA-funded, committed to dealing with that emergency. Then at the end of that, they find that they have the backlog of planning and paperwork that has perhaps been neglected and, with these very, very limited resources that are available to them, they find it onerous. I'm not endorsing that approach: I'm just suggesting that it seems to be a viewpoint that they have, that they are being asked to do more in a planning way than they can possibly cope with in terms of the limited resources, even granting some of those resources are fully funded by DCPA for the purpose of planning. I wonder if that isn't one of the causes of some of the friction. From what Governor Davis said there is perhaps a difference in attitude there.

Mr. DAVIS. I'd just like to add one thought that I have. We do not know when a natural disaster will occur. During the period of relief after the fact, when things are settled down to recovery, it's been my basic position—and I'd like to urge it on the States and the State directors to work through their system of government to have their staffs augmented by people within the State government who have a special expertise. This happens in some instances; they have emergency funds to hire people such as the stenographers and clerks. There are voluminous things I know they have to do and it's a time consuming thing to put it together. But if it's damage—let's say to the school building or other public buildings within a city and community where it requires engineering on roads and streets, or other civil projects—it seems to me that here's a good place for State planning by the State director to put together a standby contingency organization that would come in and provide assistance and not depend upon the few people that we fund there who are taking off their main job.

Mr. KINCADE. I think what you are suggesting is that while the norm or the expectation is that, in an emergency, perhaps a statewide emergency, all of the elements of State government will respond to the needs of the emergency preparedness activity, that they will devote equipment, personnel, or whatever else is required to handle that emergency. And perhaps that actually is not occurring. Instead, the State governments find or, rather, the State preparedness agencies find themselves having to operate only with their own personnel and are not being sufficiently augmented by police, fire, State health departments, State public works departments, and so on. Is that what you are driving at?

Mr. DAVIS. Right. During the recovery stage, it gets to be pretty much of an administrative job.

You have to give judgment to the damage, you have to estimate it, you have to put your claims in to FDAA, or if it is servicing people on loans, emergency kind of loans, that is the kind of thing—

Mr. KINCADE. If I understand the philosophy behind emergency preparedness at the State and local level, the personnel committed to that function are really not supposed to be handling the task all by themselves in an emergency, they are supposed to be augmented by the various other, regular functional departments who would operate in an emergency capacity. But, from what you say, a question arises whether there isn't sometimes the expectation that, when there is an emergency, State officials turn to the emergency preparedness

organization and expect them to do everything without assistance from other State departments.

Mr. DAVIS. Right. It is difficult to make a general statement, because each State handles it a little differently, and that is why the requirements that we have make it so difficult.

We talk about flexibility, and it is difficult. It is extremely complex. But I really believe that this whole thing that has created part of our problem has been a misunderstanding of communication. If people of good will sit down and look at their resources, it can be put together, but it has to be handled on a State-by-State basis of understanding.

We try to do it by agency policy statement. I will give you an illustration: We had identified—I won't call it misuse—but at least an extended use of people we were supporting, who were off the civil defense job we were trying to get done. Even during the period we were putting this together, we had difficulty because we didn't have enough time. Why? We are working on natural disasters or some other thing. So we run into this kind of dichotomy of what we are trying to do with our people, and what our responsibilities are.

So we said, as a policy, that about 10 days past the period of the actual incident, the catastrophe, our people could be used. Beyond that, they could be used, but on special request to our regional directors. We are trying to work with them, but still trying to have some kind of control of where our moneys were going, which we were given as a responsibility by the Congress and by the law.

Mr. KINCADE. Is it possible you are perhaps somewhat the victim of your own generosity, in that you provided people for temporary periods of time to help with actual natural disaster operations and then found it hard to retrieve them again for the planning function for which they were originally tasked?

Mr. DAVIS. I could only comment and say in answer to was it our generosity in trying to get a job done that sometimes the generosity becomes overextended, so we were trying to draw back and get a better balance on this as far as our efforts were concerned and our programs and our responsibilities, so they could be carried out.

Mr. KINCADE. I understand, Governor Davis, that your agency and the Federal Preparedness Agency and Federal Disaster Assistance Administration each have regional offices, that each agency has a different number of regional offices, and that they are located, some of them, in different cities, although serving generally the same region. Wouldn't coordination of the State and local agencies be improved if there were just a centralized regional office for preparedness, where DCPA, FPA and FDAA were all co-located.

Mr. DAVIS. We had eight regions and at one time it was pretty much the same with others, particularly FDAA, which was OEP [Office of Emergency Preparedness] at that time. Our people are located in protected Federal regional facilities. We have six of them completed. And most of them were put in areas that are a little bit isolated from the normal Federal Government regional offices. Denver would be an exception, and we are close by there.

So looking at our mission, I mean in the performance of it during the time of the most extreme case, under nuclear attack, it is a little difficult to try to get all of the things you want, during all times.

And therefore with our special communications and with the need for having a facility that is protected, in which the regional Federal representatives would relocate during a period of a crisis, to carry on the Federal Government, I think it would be a little difficult to co-locate Federal regional preparedness offices.

Now we could carry on with them through communications at the regional level as close as possible. But it does, I expect, make for a little difference in not working together as closely as possible if we were co-located.

Mr. KINCADE. But to try to co-locate them would mean perhaps bringing the other agencies into regional relocation centers and that might adversely impact on their regional coordination?

Mr. DAVIS. I think it would be a little impractical if they were co-located with us because many of them say they want to work more closely with the other Federal agencies.

Mr. KINCADE. One of the problems that has come to the committee's attention is that with the growth of preparedness programs, there seems to be more need for coordination perhaps than was true a decade or two decades ago, when the task seemed simpler. Is there currently any kind of ongoing or regular mechanism for exchange of views? I am not talking about the day-to-day business so much as asking whether there is any way that the Federal organizations can get together with representatives of the State and local organizations routinely or on a recurring basis and thrash out their problems, such as you have with the Interagency Emergency Preparedness Committee at the Federal level?

Mr. DAVIS. You mean working between the States and local communities and the Federal Government.

Mr. KINCADE. Is there a forum or mechanism whereby representatives of the Federal organizations can get together, perhaps not with all of their State and local counterparts but at least with people in a position to speak for them, basically to go over the problems that seem to have arisen in preparedness, to try to work out common solutions that would be both acceptable to the Federal Government and the State and local governments?

Mr. DAVIS. I think there is a sufficient forum for providing this. It may not be used, and that sometimes gets to be the problem, as much as it should be to properly get this intercommunication and the airing of the problems that exist.

Now we have, at the regional level, as you know, the regional councils, and they interchange for the total government as to what they are doing and how they are doing it.

For the State and locals, we work very closely with the civil defense associations, and I frequently bring them in jointly, and sometimes individually, and talk with them. I recognize I can't deal with all of them, but I deal with their officers, and through them, I hope it gets disseminated to their representatives.

When we have these meetings, we normally invite in, for instance, FDAA and FPA, to make presentations and get an exchange. Some of these problems you talk about may not have been identified as well as they should. They may not be discussed in detail, because normally in the intercourse of people, misunderstandings come from one believing

the other thinks something, but it doesn't come together, and without that you don't have the good relationships and the good understanding.

I think, too, that as our budgets have been shrunk, that has caused a little unrest and uneasiness about it all.

But I think there is a good enough forum in which all of these things can be discussed. As far as looking at the executive branch of Government and how it relates to the State and local governments, some of these things may not have been put in proper context to bring about solutions and understanding.

Mr. KINCADE. Thank you very much.

Mr. EVANS. Governor Davis, as you know a lot of attention has been focused on your agency's crisis relocation planning program, which I think now is a part of Nuclear Crisis Preparedness or NCP. Several of the State agencies have expressed skepticism about the feasibility of this plan. Earlier this week an official of the General Accounting Office told the committee his agency had reservations about the workability of urban evacuation in densely populated areas such as New England. Perhaps you or members of your staff could help put to rest some of these concerns, or fears, or doubts that some people have.

[See chart, p. 75.]

Here you see a chart depicting some of the effects on Washington and the surrounding areas of a nuclear attack.

The areas in red on that map indicate locations which your agency expects to receive nuclear blast overpressures of 2 pounds per square inch. The blue shaded areas represent locations expected to receive at least an acute dose of radioactivity at the level of 600 REMs. I think it is interesting to note some of this fallout would result not only from local nuclear explosions, but also from warheads dropped on the Minuteman missile complex about 800 miles away, at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. The prevailing winds would carry it eastward.

The crosses you see on the map represent approximate locations of the Federal Relocation Centers in the mountains to the west of Washington. These also would be likely targets in a nuclear attack aimed at destroying our warmaking capability and would hence cause additional blast effects and fallout. North of the area shown on the map will likely be more blast damage and fallout from warheads targeted against cities such as Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and other industrial and military facilities. What we are trying to find out is this: Where can civilians be evacuated in large numbers, in hundreds of thousands, without exposing them to blast and fallout effects?

Mr. DAVIS. Mr. Evans, I would like to ask Mr. McConnell, our Assistant Director for Plans and Operations, who works more intimately with this, to respond to that.

Mr. McCONNELL. First of all, Mr. Evans, you must understand that the risk map that we have produced in our publication called TR-82, depicts a maximized effect situation.

It includes a total massive attack on the United States. It also, for blast effects purposes, all weapons were depicted as air bursts, which of course would not be the case. For fallout prediction, all weapons were depicted as ground bursts. So we have depicted a maximized situation for planning purposes.

Now, we know that in certain locations in the United States where a medium-sized city, which may be a potential target area, is surrounded by small towns with populations totaling roughly equivalent

to that of the high risk area, evacuation could take place relatively simply by people being moved into those small towns on a 1-to-1 basis with the present population.

The public buildings that exist in small towns, such as schools, churches, and many other facilities, do present an opportunity for fallout protection.

Mr. EVANS. You are talking about small towns outside of the blast effect areas; is that correct?

Mr. McCONNELL. That is correct, yes.

Now as you move into highly populated areas, such as the Northeast corridor, running from Washington, D.C. through New York City, including Philadelphia and Camden and so forth, obviously the situation is much more complicated to attempt to find hosting areas for the people in those highly populated areas.

Mr. EVANS. This is the question we are trying to get an answer to; where can you move these people?

Mr. McCONNELL. We have one feasibility study on the entire Northeast corridor. We find it is possible, theoretically, to move the people on the highways available to outlying areas where fallout protection can be provided through expedient means. This is difficult in many cases to provide. It requires putting dirt on the roofs, and very unusual type activities. In some cases it requires loading those small communities at a ratio of four to five times their normal population.

Now I say that is a theoretical solution to the Northeast corridor situation, but it is the worst case situation in the United States.

We feel that, first of all because the Russians have an evacuation plan, if they would evacuate their cities in a crisis situation, we must offer the President an option to take somewhat similar action. Therefore we are obligated to develop a plan to get people out of high risk areas in that crisis period.

We know it can be done in many places in the United States, and simply speaking, just because it is complicated and we may not be able to find ideal solutions to the Northeast corridor situation, or to the Detroit-Chicago or California situation, we should not avoid giving the opportunity to other places in the country.

So we are starting with those. We have done the prototypes in nine places in the United States, from one end of the country to the other, including upper New York State, and as we move along we will try to find the best possible solutions to very complicated situations.

And it may be many years at this funding level before we can find a solution that is acceptable to the people involved.

Mr. EVANS. To what extent would people, let's say, from the New York area, be protected if they were moved west of New York City 100 or 200 miles or whatever, if all of that area is going to be an area which will receive a considerable amount of fallout from nuclear blasts that would occur to the west? You know, you really cannot secure a home or a gymnasium or whatever other types of facilities there might be in these towns against that type of fallout effect within a day or two, can you?

Mr. McCONNELL. That is not exactly true, Mr. Congressman. Many solutions can be found in a short length of time, in 24 to 48 hours, for expedient fallout protection.

Practically any home that has a basement, for example, is relatively easy to improve by providing a mass on the upper floor to give protec-

tion to people in the basement. And there are various other solutions that can be done in expeditious fashion.

Mr. EVANS. How long could these people exist in these receiving areas in terms of food and medical facilities and so forth, that might or might not be available to them?

Mr. McCONNELL. Our research is looking at this in the case of specific situations, and it would obviously require a revision of the market area distribution of materials to support people in the relocated mode. In the specific State that we have studied in particular, Colorado, they have found ways to divert the market distribution of food to outlying areas. Each case is a separate situation of its own.

Mr. EVANS. If an attack does occur, how feasible is it, I wonder, to reorient these market areas?

Mr. McCONNELL. Well, it is feasible. It is certainly not easy. And one has to realize that to consider a decision to relocate people is only short of accepting a full nuclear attack on the United States.

So it is a very drastic type situation with a drastic effect on the national economy. We are analyzing that, too.

If we could do it, if we could direct a relocation nationwide, it might have something near \$1 billion per day effect on the gross national product, and certainly would have a very lasting effect on the economy of the United States.

Mr. EVANS. Well, I am glad your agency is thinking along the lines of what, in maximum situations, might occur, because it seems, even though you hope the worst situation never happens, that in wartime and other crises in the past, you always have had the maximum effects that you plan for and then it is worse beyond that.

As you talk about the crisis relocation work, I wonder if you could explain in a little detail exactly how you would go about moving these masses of people out of urban areas to these relocation areas? Exactly how would that occur when you have a very large population, like New York City, for example, that depends on mass transportation, with fewer automobiles? How would that be accomplished in a short period of time?

Mr. McCONNELL. As I said, New York City is probably the most complicated situation in the United States. Each risk area is different. In the prototype cities of medium size, solutions were found, principally by use of private transportation and public transportation. As far as the feasibility study of New York City is concerned, they did find that there is sufficient public transportation—as you know. New York City has one of the lowest rates of private transportation in the United States—but there is sufficient public transportation, making two or three trips during a period of 3 to 5 days, that could move all of the people out of New York City.

Mr. EVANS. And the persons with private automobiles, would they be willing to allow their neighbors to go out with them and to return alone in their cars to take more people out to these relocation areas?

Mr. McCONNELL. I don't think that was figured in the statistical analysis of the feasibility study of New York City.

Mr. EVANS. For private automobiles, then, you are figuring on it being one trip by car with the family to which the car belongs?

Mr. McCONNELL. That decision was made by the local officials in the prototype cities where the planning has taken place.

Mr. EVANS. How would people be alerted as to where they would go to receive a mode of transportation to these relocation areas? How does that occur?

Mr. McCONNELL. One of the main elements of a crisis relocation plan is a public information document that can be distributed over the media in a short length of time, giving people this information.

As I said, the situation would be different in each city. It might include getting information over the radio and television, or going to your local fire station to pick up information. But in each city situation the method of notification of the people will be different.

Mr. EVANS. So people would be notified to come to some central location to receive information on how they should go about moving to these relocation centers. They would be told what possessions they could take with them, whether they could take their pets along and so forth? What type of planning is involved here? I mean what are you suggesting that people take to these relocation centers? How immediately should they move to these areas?

Mr. McCONNELL. That plan may be different in every city, depending on the decision of the local government officials who make that kind of decision.

Mr. EVANS. You have no guidelines that you offer?

Mr. McCONNELL. Oh, absolutely. We have a manual with example information and options to be selected by the local officials as to what decision they want to make on the type of material to take along.

To speak to one of your points, Mr. Evans, I tend to think rather than having people go to a central location to find information about the crisis relocation planning, that this would be distributed to them by the media, either by the radio and television, or by distribution of newspapers.

Mr. EVANS. One other question along that line. What happens when you are moving these people to the relocation centers, will that crisis relocation not interfere with the movement of military vehicles, for example, on highways?

Mr. McCONNELL. In every case where we have done planning, we have coordinated with the military installations nearby, and all crisis relocation for civilian planning has been dovetailed with the military. We have found no reluctance or difficulties that we couldn't overcome.

Mr. EVANS. Now getting back to you, Mr. Davis, for a moment, the Gaither report rejected urban evacuation as an unacceptable alternative in 1957. What has led to a change in this assessment in the meantime, since 1957?

Mr. DAVIS. At that time it was a fact dealing with tactical evacuation in 4 to 6 hours. Later it was reduced to minutes.

Now you can not evacuate any cities under these circumstances. So when we talk about a crisis condition that we believe would be created within the world, there would be at least—if you had the plans—a 3-day period and within that period of time, we could relocate our people until the thing blew over, or if an attack did happen they would have a much greater chance of survival.

So that the Gaither report dealt with a shorter period of time than we are dealing with today, as we develop the concept for evacuation.

Mr. EVANS. So I understand your crisis relocation then is based upon, if I am able to discern what you have said here, a period of warning time perhaps from 48 hours to 5 to 7 days?

Mr. DAVIS. And a longer period for planning, possibly when a crisis situation gets created. It is a little difficult to make precise determinations. But certainly I think in the negotiation of the relationships of world powers today, something would be occurring, that would indicate trouble is arising.

Now what it would lead to would again be up to the authorities to deal with their own people on how you would implement this evacuation.

But you do have a time element that is much more favorable as we perceive it.

I would like to make one comment on this plan. Most of them accept the concept. Many do not have the total detail, because we have been basically working on the nine prototypes. We have been trying to train people and have not gone to many areas. Washington, D.C. is one we have not covered. We have learned from the research and prototype effort as we have done it. We will not do it unless there is the cooperation and acceptance of the public officials within the community.

Mr. EVANS. I have some other questions which I would like to submit for your answers for the record, and I would also like to get a copy of your manual submitted for the record.

Mr. McCONNELL. TR-82, the high risk manual that depicts—

Mr. EVANS. I think the manual I am speaking of is the one we mentioned earlier that gave some guidance to these local communities in carrying out the plan.

Mr. DAVIS. Oh, yes. All right.

Mr. EVANS. I appreciate all of you gentlemen for joining us this morning and for your willingness to answer questions.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Evans.

[For responses to additional questions for the record, see p. 300.]

Mr. EVANS. I would like to conduct a panel session with the remaining witnesses that we have this morning, Mr. San Felippo, General Weller, and Mr. Mitnick.

STATEMENTS OF MILTON MITNICK, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL DEFENSE, STATE OF INDIANA; GEN. WILLIAM WELLER, ADJUTANT GENERAL, STATE OF COLORADO; AND RONALD S. SAN FELIPPO, ADMINISTRATOR, DIVISION OF EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT, STATE OF WISCONSIN

Mr. EVANS. Welcome to the committee this morning, gentlemen. Let's begin with your reading of the prepared statements which you have brought with you this morning. If you could summarize those statements to keep them brief, it would allow us a longer time for discussion and questions and answers.

Let's begin with Mr. San Felippo. Will you go ahead, please?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I brought a very short statement, in exactly the hope that we have more time available for questions and answers.

I am particularly pleased to appear before you today to discuss the situation. My name is Ron San Felippo, and I have been the Wisconsin Administrator of Emergency Government for the last 18 months. That is our State's disaster preparedness agency.

I wish it would be possible to say to you today that from our point of view the Federal preparedness program was delivering all it should, but it just isn't. Primarily, we view the situation as caused by the separation of the preparedness program into the three agencies that you have been holding discussions about this week.

We feel that enemy attack planning is certainly an essential component of an effective disaster preparedness program, but it is only one component and because of that, each of the States, because the economies of our times and just plain common sense, have gone to a coordinated agency philosophy, agencies such as the one I represent. Because of the fact that many of our personnel receive funding from DCPA, however, we are continually told by that agency we shouldn't be working on other than enemy attack situations, such as floods, tornados, droughts, ice storms, and the like, that do hit every one of our States on unfortunately a fairly regular basis.

Currently, all of the DCPA programs are limited to nuclear attack preparedness and we are forbidden involvement in natural disaster preparedness except during a time of actual natural disaster emergency, which puts us technically in the position of being told we can use the DCPA resources for a limited period of time in responding to a natural disaster but technically we can't plan on how best to use that resource in advance for a national disaster. In reality we do that kind of planning nevertheless. (Addendum)

In some of the testimony presented to this committee, the inference has been drawn that the States and local governments do not commit enough resources to disaster preparedness. Let me cite you our experience in the last year and a half.

In a period of 13 months, the State of Wisconsin has been afflicted with three major disaster situations. In May of 1975, 9 counties along the Mississippi river suffered flood damages totaling \$2,450,000.00. A Presidential Disaster Declaration was requested and denied. In August-September 1975, a flood struck 4 western Wisconsin counties causing \$5,242,200.00 in damages. And in March of 1976, 22 Wisconsin counties were devastated by a severe ice storm, causing \$50,479,339.00 in damages. The last two events were answered by the Federal Government with Presidential Disaster Declarations. However, the facts are that these three disasters, by a conservative estimate, caused \$58,171,539.00 in damages to Wisconsin governments and citizens. I am informed that, realistically, Wisconsin governments and citizens can expect federal assistance of all types in the last two Presidential Disaster Declarations to not exceed \$8,500,000.00.

In other words, we expect the Federal Government to give us aid in the amount of \$8,500,000.00 out of damages exceeding \$58,171,539.00. This means, out of our damages, the Federal assistance will amount to only 14 percent of the total. The remainder of the damages, i.e., 86 percent of the total, has to be borne by the State and local governments. I expect that this experience is rather general across the country and refutes the Federal contention that they bear the brunt of the cost of disaster preparedness and recovery actions. In fact, the Federal assistance role is minor when you consider the overall costs of disasters to our State and local governments.

We feel that given the current restrictions that have been proposed, the current very narrow interpretation by DCPA of their mission, that if these are carried out in my State, more than one-third of the local programs will be discontinued.

Now, we have at least two sets of planners to deal with, DCPA and FDAA, two sets of changing regulations, two sets of goals, and two sets of everything.

And supposedly this is all toward the same end, an all-disaster preparedness capability.

As an example of the mass of paper shuffle, we were shown this morning the program status report by DCPA. Our State was required to spend more than a month of activity on this in the last year. Because of what we have learned about how the information was gathered throughout the country, we very seriously question the credibility of the report. The same questions were interpreted differently throughout the different regions of DCPA, and the method of data collection was markedly different. In some of the regions the data was collected by mail, in some of the regions it was collected by individual questioning.

So we are very concerned, not so much for the concept of that kind of program, but for the method of administration used that we feel in some cases provides a poor product. And this is a consistent problem from our point of view.

Now this year we have been told that the primary activity for this year and the coming years will be the development of the crisis relocation planning concept. We have taken a good look at it, we think, and we are continuing to look at it. We are very interested in the concept of total disruption of our country in terms of economy and population, being undertaken by an agency such as DCPA without substantial congressional discussion prior to the actual beginning of implementation of it.

We are also concerned about the basic premise of the program; 3 days of advance warning. It would be very nice if a potential enemy would give us those 3 days. However, if we were heading toward a national attack, we think the possibility of our population being out on the roads perhaps 12 to 18 hours into the 3-day period would offer an excellent situation for the potential aggressor to not even give us the opportunity to go into our basements because we would be supposedly on our way somewhere else.

We have a substantial list of questions about crisis relocation planning. Perhaps we can get into some of that discussion during the discussion period today.

The key argument we hope to make in this discussion is that the Federal agencies should follow the lead of the State agencies, and go to a coordinated basis. Certainly enemy attack preparation is important, should have a priority, should be funded at a much higher level, we feel, than now, but it ought to be part of a coordinated activity. For the States to deal with different agencies, operating out of different cities, with different programs is just not the way to maximize the limited number of dollars that are available.

I would be pleased to provide any additional information. Certainly, I would have comments on almost any question that might come up during the discussion period.

Thank you.

[The complete statement of Mr. San Felippo follows:]

STATE OF WISCONSIN,
DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL AFFAIRS & DEVELOPMENT,
Madison, Wis., June 30, 1976.

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION

Ronald S. San Felippo, Administrator ; Wisconsin Division of Emergency
Government

Hon. Chairman and members of the committee: I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today as part of your examination of our country's ability to respond to disaster—natural or manmade. My name is Ronald San Felippo, and for the last eighteen months I have been the Wisconsin Administrator of Emergency Government, our state's disaster preparedness agency.

From a state's point of view, I wish that I could tell you that the Federal preparedness program was delivering all that it should. But I can't . . .

The separation of disaster preparedness programs and funding at the federal level into three major agencies has a substantial negative impact upon our program, an impact that makes more difficult our mission to plan for, respond to, and follow up after *any* disaster that might befall us. The greatest impact however, results from the separation of two of the three major federal agencies in this area. The Federal Preparedness Agency, because of its primarily federal mission, causes no real problems in relating to our program at the state level.

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration by far have the greatest impact upon us at the state and local level, and it is toward these two agencies my remarks will primarily be directed.

Enemy attack planning, while surely an essential component of an effective disaster preparedness program, nevertheless is only one component. Each and every State, realize that both the economics of our times, and plain common sense dictate that we cannot afford manpower and resources dedicated only toward a possible enemy attack, and therefore charge an agency such as the one that I represent with all-disaster preparedness responsibilities.

However, we receive fifty percent matching funding for personnel and administrative costs from DCPA. Because they narrowly define their mission, and say that they will even more so in the future, in their eyes we should not be working on planning and response to floods, tornados, major oil or chemical spills, and other perils to the health and welfare of our citizens. In practice, DCPA has made allowances for this necessary work, but indications are that this will change if they are given other directions. We have been advised that unless Congress intervenes, the current 50-50 funding will be reduced to only that portion of an activity or use of equipment directly relating to enemy attack.

Currently, all DCPA supported programs must be limited to nuclear attack preparedness, and forbidden from involvement in natural disaster preparedness—except during a time of actual emergency. Or in other words, following strict guidelines, we can use a DCPA partially or fully funded resource in responding to a natural disaster, but we can't plan in advance for how best to use it.

While FDAA is now providing limited funding for contract personnel to develop a state and local plan for natural disaster, DCPA is our only source for personnel and administrative cost assistance for planning. If DCPA follows through with their cutback, while FDAA has no intention of expanding their efforts, our overall ability will be badly hurt. This is an excellent example of non-coordination at the Federal level.

State and Local government must now cope with two sets of planners, two sets of continually changing regulations, two sets of goals, two sets of everything! And all supposedly toward the same end— an all-disaster preparedness capability!

In addition, in our part of the country, the Federal agencies regional headquarters are not even in the same city. DCPA operates from Battle Creek, Michigan, and FDAA from Chicago, Ill.

To top things off, this year DCPA tells us that their primary activity for the next few years will be toward the development of a concept known as Nuclear Crisis Planning, or NCP for short. NCP consists of planning for our country, with a few essential personnel excepted, relocating into rural areas at the order

of the President during times of "heightened international tension". Quite an undertaking for a 83 million dollar a year agency, if you consider the total relocation and delivery of all of the goods and services that our population would need to exist.

To carry NCP to its potential, as envisioned by DCPA, would require the expenditure of billions, not millions, and provide us with a plan that in the opinion of many wouldn't work anyhow—at the expense of the services we are now providing with the limited resources available. To my knowledge, there has been very little or no Congressional review of NCP, a plan that would totally disrupt our country upon order of the President prior to any declaration of war.

It's time for all of this to stop. We, the Federal, State and Local government should be in the business of disaster preparedness; but it should be on a coordinated basis, and be concerned with *all* disasters, natural or man-made. *One* Federal agency, working with each State disaster coordinating agency can provide an efficient program. The elimination of staff duplication, conflicting requirements and goals, and unclear national policies will result in a better product for our citizens.

As I mentioned earlier, we are attempting to plan for, respond to, and follow up after any disaster. I suggest one Federal agency to do the same. That agency to provide funding to the states for all-disaster planning and response, that agency to be under the periodic review of the Congress to insure that congressional intent is not misconstrued.

By taking the mission of FPA, DCPA, and FDAA and molding them into one, I believe we can provide an all-disaster planning, response, and followup capability that will eliminate many if not all of our current problems.

I would be pleased to provide any additional information or material that the Committee might find helpful, either at this or a later date. I know that I'm not speaking alone when I say that we are looking to this Committee with hope for the future.

Thank you very much.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you. General Weller.

General WELLER. Representative Evans, and respected members of the staff of this committee—

Mr. EVANS. Before you get started, General Weller, I have another vote to return to the House for, so if you will continue with your statement, and Mr. Mitnick, if you would continue with yours, I would appreciate it. Thank you, and I apologize.

General WELLER. I am happy to have the opportunity to testify today regarding preparedness efforts as they are understood, planned and executed in the State of Colorado, with a goal toward saving lives and preparing Colorado agencies and people to cope with disasters. I am informed that your committee is appraised of the response made by Governor Richard Lamm to your letter on this matter dated April 7, 1976.

I am Brig. Gen. William D. Weller, the Adjutant General for Colorado. By statute, I am designated the executive director of the Department of Military Affairs, one of 19 principal departments of Colorado State government. Also, by statute I am the director of the Division of Disaster Emergency Services, which division was created within the department as a result of enactment of the Colorado Disaster Emergency Act of 1973.

In the Administrative Organization Act of 1968, the Colorado Legislature confirmed several previous assignments to bring all types of disaster planning and response under a single coordinating head in the Department of Military Affairs.

The Civil Defense Organization became the Division of Disaster Emergency Services in 1973. Under the dual use concept then pursued by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, they were viewed to be the civilian component of the preparedness system charged as the plan-

ners and trainers for both nuclear and natural disaster preparedness programs through the full range of State, county, city and community echelons of government. Their communications and warning system combined with a very limited operational response capability furnished a contact capability for operating the State emergency operations center.

Local government organizations of fire departments, police departments, civil defense organizations, emergency medical and paramedical agencies, volunteer agencies, search and rescue groups and the National Guard were planned as operators of the emergency response system for disasters.

Colorado applied for and has received a 3-year grant under Public Law 93-288 through the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration to assist planning for natural disaster situations.

To effectively cope with disaster, regardless of magnitude, speed of onset, or cause, several essential processes are necessary. Preparedness must evolve from (1) an integrated plan; (2) a structure of people and equipment; and (3) unified direction and control from key officials and leaders.

Mr. KINCADE. Excuse me, General Weller. I hope you will be able to give us a summary. We will publish the full text of your testimony in the record, but if you would just highlight your testimony, what you feel is the most significant problems you are experiencing, that would be useful, so we will have time to get to all of the witnesses.

General WELLER. I think the portion of the statement I have read here is key to the discussion, sir.

Mr. KINCADE. Fine, if you want to continue, but I don't think there will be time for the full reading of the text. Under the committee's guidelines we have a 15-minute oral summary limitation.

General WELLER. Above all, in this matter of disaster preparedness, there must be a continuous effort or a follow-through in these three essential areas. This process must start at the Federal level and finish at the local entity level. Unified direction must emanate from all executives and those charged with executing the directions must understand their role in the response system.

Processes necessary to respond to a major catastrophe can be developed which may be useful as a means of coping with smaller ones. The impact of Federal agencies on preparedness was perceived somewhat differently in Colorado, however.

Then I go on to describe some of the situations in which the attempt to integrate planning of the DCPA organization and FDAA's program has run into some conflict.

In Colorado the impact of the Defense Preparedness Agency program was probably the first and most organized agency to undertake integrated and coordinated planning throughout the State. And it exists yet as the single agency that begins with the State level organization and extends through the county, local and community level organizations.

In bringing into being the play of the Federal Disaster Agency program, we found it necessary to limit some of the activities of the planners in the various programs to keep confusion out of the local level planning and the execution phase of the disaster operations as

they were foreseen from the natural disaster level, and as perceived to be necessary for the nuclear disaster level.

We had to establish rather rigorous guidelines for the planners working in both organizations, so that as the results were projected into the communities they did not represent divergent programs, but represented an integrated State program.

We were able to do this because we at the State level organization perceived one integrated plan for all kinds of emergencies.

I have cited here some examples of some gaps between the Federal legislation appropriate to the FDAA operation, and the implementation of that operation, and I have cited some examples of restrictions placed on the operation of the Disaster Agency by virtue of strict compliance with the DCPA Act as it is foreseen in the future operation.

I was asked to discuss the impact of the budget cuts as we foresaw them in Colorado, and I would like to go to that portion of the statement.

Now that I have given you some indication of our relationship with the various agencies, I would like to spend a few minutes on the effects I see that the Federal budget cuts of DCPA will have on our State and local preparedness effort.

First of all, in the Federal, State, local relationship, the primary responsibility for responding to a disaster situation rests with local government. DCPA has indicated that they will not continue to support emergency coordinators in our smaller—less than 5,000 people—communities unless they are involved in the crisis relocation planning, and in other communities—over 5,000—who do not devote at least one-half work-year toward local civil defense programs.

We also anticipate a serious reduction in personnel support in our larger communities. We feel that this will have a definite detrimental effect on our ability to cope with not only the threat of nuclear attack, but also with any type of disaster or emergency which may occur. We are vigorously involved in the nuclear civil protection planning effort and cooperation of Colorado communities is critical to the “host country” concept.

Second, the anticipated reductions in the DCPA sponsored training and field planning assistance to local government will have a deteriorating effect on our capability in emergency or disaster management, and there appears to be no other Federal agency which is now prepared to fill this void.

A third effect will be in the area of facilities and equipment. There currently exists the ability to improve a local government’s capability to respond to the needs created by a disaster by acquiring emergency-type vehicles and equipment through the contributions loan program (excess) and the surplus property program. These Federal programs are going to be seriously affected by the reduction in the DCPA budget.

Although this equipment may still find its way to our smaller and needier communities, the system that is presently being used may well be scrapped and this will result in the need to develop a new system.

Fourth, in the area of planning, the reduction in DCPA funds can only tend to increase the artificial barrier that now exists between peacetime and wartime planning efforts. And it will make it even more difficult to us at the State level to integrate continuity of govern-

ment and emergency resource planning, which has FPA interest, into our overall comprehensive plans.

Finally, we feel that our operational capability to integrate and to implement command and control initiatives will be impaired if DCPA becomes more restrictive on the development of our people, resources, and latitude of operations.

We feel that complete preparedness to cope with any disaster, emergency, or nuclear attack effects requires a total capability. Thus, the reduction in effort in selected areas will adversely affect the overall preparedness program.

We have made some recommendations here. Essentially they suggest a single agency at the Federal level to coordinate an integrated program for all types of disasters.

We think there has to be a continuity of organizational personnel in order that people who plan and people who carry out the directions of the Federal agencies are continually capable of understanding those directions in their completeness and in their intent, and that requires a continuity of funding in order to maintain the people on board.

We think it is necessary to provide a system for making equipment more freely available for the full range of disaster preparedness operations, not a piece of equipment dedicated to one operation, which can't be used in some other fashion.

We also think it is necessary to maintain the kind of funding that permits the continued acquisition of such equipment.

We think perhaps that we could get some better legislative and executive interest if a coordinated program existed was opposed to the inputs from three different directions now at the State level.

I have tried to give you some perspective of the problems we see from the State perspective. I hope that this testimony has been useful to you.

Thank you.

[The complete statement of General Weller follows:]

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM D. WELLER, ADJUTANT GENERAL OF COLORADO

Senator Proxmire, respected members of the Joint Committee on Defense Production, I am happy to have the opportunity to testify today regarding preparedness efforts as they are understood, planned and exercised in the state of Colorado with a goal of saving lives and preparing Colorado agencies and people to cope with disasters. I am informed that your committee is apprised of the response made by Governor Richard Lamm to your letter in this matter dated April 7, 1976.

I am Brigadier General William D. Weller, the Adjutant General for Colorado. By statute, I am designated the Executive Director of the Department of Military Affairs, one of nineteen principal departments of Colorado state government. Also, by statute I am the Director of the Division of Disaster Emergency Services, which division was created within the Department as a result of enactment of the "Colorado Disaster Emergency Act of 1973."

In the Administrative Organization Act of 1968, the Colorado legislature confirmed several previous assignments to bring all types of disaster planning and response under a single coordinating head in the department of military affairs. The Civil Defense Organization became the division of disaster emergency services in 1973. Under the dual use concept then pursued by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, they were viewed to be the civilian component of the preparedness system charged as the planners and trainers for both nuclear and natural disaster preparedness programs through the full range of state, county, city and community echelons of government. Their communications and warning system combined with a very limited operational response capability furnished

a contact capability for operating the state emergency operations center. Local government organizations of fire departments, police departments, civil defense organizations, emergency medical and paramedical agencies, volunteer agencies, search and rescue groups and the national guard were planned as operators of the emergency response system for disasters. Colorado applied for and has received a three-year grant under PL 93-288 through the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration to assist planning for natural disaster situations.

To effectively cope with disaster, regardless of magnitude, speed of onset, or cause, several essential processes are necessary, preparedness must evolve from (1) an integrated plan, (2) a structure of people and equipment, and (3) unified direction and control from key officials and leaders. Above all, there must be a continuous effort or a follow through in these three essential areas. This process must start at the federal level and finish at the local entity level. Unified direction must emanate from all executives and those charged with executing the directions must understand their role in the response system. Processes necessary to respond to a major catastrophe can be developed which may be useful as a means of coping with smaller ones. The impact of federal agencies on preparedness was perceived somewhat differently in Colorado, however.

I am sure you are aware of the evolution of federal agencies and legislation over the last twenty-five years to meet the very real need of preparedness.

No integrated plans existed at the federal level to deal with the spectrum of potentially extreme events. Guidance to planners at the state level in Colorado, where we are trying to integrate planning, was conflicting. Federal agencies stressed their own interests to the detriment of the integrated whole; it was difficult for us to adapt the detailed processes used for large scale nuclear planning to improve "flash" flood or tornado preparedness because of constraints that were imposed by the various federal agencies.

People, equipment and resources were not readily transferable between the peace time and war time planning needs.

Continuous follow-up seldom existed. When it did, it was normally parochial and was based on the interests of federal proponents. Planning for nuclear war was not stressed through channels of political leadership, it came down to people through civil defense channels. Effectiveness often hinged on the outlook, training and character of a local civil defense official. Executive branch influence came into play more often when natural disasters were severe enough for a "Presidential declaration;" but this was aimed almost unilaterally at the recovery process and did not influence the public outlook. At the federal level, executive emphasis was eroded by conflicting pressures in the disaster field. Public understanding in Colorado suffered as a result.

Colorado had promulgated civil defense and preparedness legislation as of 1950 and the Colorado Civil Defense Agency was established. Preparedness in event of nuclear attack was a real concern for Coloradans, but as deterrence continued to be successful, our civil defense organization become increasingly involved in providing other emergency services. We felt that this was a logical progression—to have one agency responsible for disaster preparedness regardless of the origin of the disaster, natural, man-made or as a result of nuclear war. Systems, organizations, facilities and equipment needed in these situations were remarkably similar regardless of disaster origin.

The Colorado Disaster Emergency Act of 1973, which replaced the Colorado Civil Defense Act of 1950, was adopted, with some changes, following example legislation of the council of state governments. This act of 1973 recognized this similarity and relationship, and created a single agency—the Division of Disaster Emergency Services.

During this evolution, a very definite federal, state, local relationship developed. Our Colorado agency had close working relationship with OCDM, OCD, OEP, DCPA, FDAA, OP/GSA, and FPA. However, we found that as the federal agencies have evolved, at the state level it was neither desirable nor economically possible to have separate state agencies organized in the manner of the Federal Government in this area of preparedness. In our dealings with these various federal agencies and in developing our state programs, we found that in some cases it was useful to place limitations on some of our programs in order to prevent confusion at the local level and to satisfy various requirements of the different federal agencies with whom we were working.

In doing this we found that the program emphasis of the various federal agencies at times created some overlaps and left some gaps in a total preparedness program. At the state level, we found it essential to sort out the overlaps, and fill in the gaps before these problems were allowed to reach the local level.

Some of the examples of overlaps we found were :

Both DCPA and FDAA encouraged the state to develop emergency plans ; the guidance for the development of these plans in many cases involved different thrusts to cover the same functional areas.

The training required at the state and local level was at times conducted independently or without coordination between federal agencies.

The guidance that DCPA, FDAA, and FPA provided on the development of organizational systems to manage a disaster or emergency at the state and local level tended to be in conflict at times.

This overlapping was not serious and was fairly easy for us to sort out because we had one organization. The gaps that existed in policy and guidance from these federal agencies were much more difficult to overcome. Here are some examples :

During disaster response and recovery—DCPA allowed state personnel funded under their program to spend only ten days managing disaster operations. On the other hand, FDAA did not fund state operational personnel. When urgent requirements developed, operational personnel with expertise were drafted from other state and DCPA oriented tasks. Since these problems occurred quite frequently, state and DCPA oriented preparedness programs suffered significantly.

Lack of follow-up once a project was completed. All too often a federal agency assisted the state in one project (shelter supplies, resource management plan) area and then deemphasized that particular element ; the state was expected to pick up the program and keep it current. However, as the federal emphasis changed, it was reflected in the state program. The project then atrophied as did the state expertise required to manage the system. The project was not maintained or sufficiently supported at the federal level and the state was left with an, as yet, unsolved problem.

In the overall planning effort, lack of integrated effort at the federal level led to conflicting policies and limitations of our efforts to integrate planning at the state level.

Emergency resource management planning, which was basically war oriented, should have been updated and re-oriented to include the use of these same systems for such peacetime crises as transportation disruptions, and fuel shortages.

Research on processes, funding, prevention, systems, facilities, and equipment was not comprehensive. The main emphasis was war related rather than covering the entire range or preparedness issues.

Training of disaster organizations at the local level also had a nuclear war orientation and tended to overlook the natural disaster threat since DCPA carried the financial burden and FPA and FDAA did not encourage any effort in this vital part of the overall program.

In Colorado, we have attempted to deal with the different emphases towards disaster emergency preparedness of the various federal agencies by :

Developing a comprehensive approach to preparedness through a broad structure of interrelated plans, and by integrating all aspects of preparedness in our assistance to local governments under DCPA sponsored field assistance and local planning assistance programs.

Ultimately, how people thought about disaster preparedness was crucially important, the public, when their interest was stimulated, tended to develop its own integrated planning, innovative solutions and rigorous follow-up. Preparedness was dependent on understanding and interest at the local level, so that continuous and effective adaptation to change was possible. But impending and recent budget cuts have magnified the above problems.

IMPACT OF BUDGET CUTS

Now to spend a few minutes on the effects of our past relationships with various federal agencies, I would like to spend a few minutes on the effects I see that federal budget cuts (DCPA) will have on our state and local preparedness effort.

First of all, in the federal, state, local relationship, the primary responsibility for responding to a disaster situation rests with local government. DCPA has indicated that they will not continue to support emergency coordinators in our smaller (less than 5,000 people) communities unless they are involved in the

crisis relocation planning, and in other communities (over 5,000) who do not devote at least one-half work year toward local civil defense programs. We also anticipate a serious reduction in personnel support in our larger communities. We feel that this will have a definite detrimental effect on our ability to cope with, not only the threat of nuclear attack, but also with any type of disaster or emergency which may occur. We are vigorously involved in the nuclear civil protection planning effort and cooperation of Colorado communities is critical to the "Host County" concept.

Secondly, the anticipated reductions in the DCPA sponsored training and field planning assistance to local government will have a deteriorating effect on our capability in emergency or disaster management, and there appears to be no other federal agency which is now prepared to fill this void.

A third effect will be in the area of facilities and equipment. There currently exists the ability to improve a local government's capability to respond to the needs created by a disaster by acquiring emergency-type vehicles and equipment through the contributions loan program (excess) and the surplus property program. These federal programs are going to be seriously affected by the reduction in the DCPA budget. Although this equipment may still find its way to our smaller and needier communities, the system that is presently being used may well be scrapped and this will result in the need to develop a new system.

Fourthly, in the area of planning, the reduction in DCPA funds can only tend to increase the artificial barrier that now exists between peacetime and wartime planning efforts. And it will make it even more difficult to us at the state level to integrate continuity of government and emergency resource planning, which has FPA interest, into our overall comprehensive plans.

Finally, we feel that our operational capability to integrate and to implement command and control initiatives will be impaired if DCPA becomes more restrictive on the development of our people, resources, and latitude of operations.

We feel that complete preparedness to cope with any disaster, emergency, or nuclear attack effects requires a total capability. Thus, the reduction in effort in selected areas will adversely affect the overall preparedness program.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Now, that I have expressed some of our concerns about the overall preparedness programs as we see them at the state level, I would like to offer some suggestions which I feel could help to alleviate some of these problems.

First, and most important, integrated planning at the state level cannot mature if conflicting policies are imposed from above. A system for better coordination of federal disaster policy is essential. Federal disaster preparedness policy makers must be placed in a configuration which will stimulate coordination and flexibility to react to change. Such a configuration should also have its own planning element so that gaps and overlaps in policy will be recognized and negotiated out. Such a configuration should aim at balanced policy output to bring resource management, civil disturbance, and other aspects of potentially disastrous situations into the same prominence as natural disasters and nuclear war preparedness.

Secondly, we need to have an organization of personnel throughout government who have the expertise to sustain a preparedness program and to cope with emergencies and disasters of all kinds and magnitudes. Along with the establishment of an organization, it is necessary to maintain a training capability for our people in this highly specialized and unique function. For example, the training of personnel to cope with natural disaster, a concern on the part of FDAA, could be conducted concurrently with nuclear attack, response and recovery training since the people involved will be essentially the same. Again, the guidance and direction must come from the federal level in order to achieve consistency and to avoid an unnecessary and unproductive division of labor. Then, we need the capability to acquire or transfer the use of essential hardware—facilities, equipment, and supplies—necessary to manage and cope with a disaster or nuclear attack. I would emphasize that this hardware tends to wear out or become obsolete. We, therefore, need an on-going and sustaining program to maintain currency. Assets not earmarked for utilization by DCPA and still needed for overall preparedness could be transferred so as to be under FDAA funding and control.

Thirdly, executive and legislative emphasis throughout the system will stimulate planning and operations, increase preparedness, and begin to reduce the rapidly rising costs of disasters. But in order to mobilize support from the

executive branch, more unified preparedness policy and less distracting influence is necessary. A configuration of federal agencies designed to permit better coordination and more flexible application of resources mentioned earlier will evoke more interest and support. Some form of more coordinated and flexible configuration would also help us develop a broader constituency of trained preparedness people at both the state and local levels. Better coordination, and executive and legislative emphasis will stimulate recruitment and interest at all levels of society.

Fourth, we need an overall and long range commitment on the part of the federal government to assure that the necessary follow-up in all areas of the preparedness program is maintained and to avoid a "hot and cold" approach to the threats which face us. It is much more productive to maintain a moderate sustained effort rather than to have to accelerate from time to time in order to make up for lost ground suffered as a result of indiscriminate cuts. The most critical loss in the "hot and cold" approach is that of experienced and dedicated people required to operate the system.

Finally, we need better channels of communication to the President and Congress regarding the problem associated with our preparedness capability. As a minimum, regular sessions by representatives of all key preparedness agencies, on a head-to-head basis, to iron out our problems of policy and direction must be held. Then, a means of periodic communication and reporting of joint, inter-agency planning and decision must follow.

Since I have attempted to examine the preparedness problem from the state perspective, I have purposely made only generalized comments as to the need for better coordination, flexibility, and integration among federal agencies. I have not attempted to define the specific agency or coordinating element which should be utilized to do this.

In closing, I would like to say that we who are in the preparedness business on day-to-day basis, we who think about the "unthinkable" are extremely concerned about our ability to serve our citizens in the next crisis—whatever that may be. I hope my testimony has been beneficial to your deliberations. I have appreciated the opportunity to appear before you. If you have any questions, I will be happy to answer them at this time.

Mr. KINCADE. Thank you very much, General Weller, particularly for the level of detail you supplied in the prepared statement. It will be very useful to us in developing our report on this matter.

Mr. Mitnick.

Mr. MITNICK. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of appearing before this committee. My name is Milton Mitnick, and I am the director of the Indiana Department of Civil Defense.

My presentation here, Mr. Kincaide, has been timed at 14 minutes. If you would like me to reduce it, I can. It is up to you.

Mr. KINCADE. I think that will be fine; if you could cut it by a couple of minutes that would be helpful.

Mr. MITNICK. All right, I will speak a little faster.

Whether my involvement is with natural disaster planning or nuclear civil preparedness planning, or economic stabilization and resource management planning, I wear but one hat. These areas of preparedness responsibility are not dispersed among three State agencies in Indiana.

Most States like Indiana have one agency designated responsible for all disaster preparedness planning and functions. Yet each of us must deal with three Federal agencies, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, and Federal Preparedness Agency, who are charged with the major Federal responsibility in emergency preparedness, as well as numerous other Federal agencies who have specific emergency responsibilities, that is, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Small Business Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et cetera.

The full burden for the operational coordination of work efforts and the application of recovery resources at times of disasters is charged to the Civil Defense Department, or its equivalent, of each State. Such a coordination effort by a State agency is a formidable task, yet it is a meaningful and proper way of harnessing the State's resources in responding to any major disaster, both rapidly and economically.

In reality, a State Civil Defense Department is required to offer the multiple disaster relief programs of a possible 33 Federal agencies to municipalities and individuals as a single program of relief. Therefore, why can't a coordinating agency or a mechanism be installed at the Federal level to monitor the operation of all the Federal agencies charged with emergency responsibilities and coordinate Federal assistance for an overall disaster preparedness program.

This is vital for several reasons:

(1) The States can only support one disaster agency, even with supplemental Federal monetary assistance.

(2) In emergency situations, each State must be free to employ its agency and its personnel according to the State's priorities, and not upon the direction and/or advice of a Federal agency whose priorities may very well be opposed to the State's immediate problems and/or interests.

(3) On a day-to-day planning basis, the States must not be subjected to various Federal agencies, each assigning their respective priorities, sometimes in conflict with another Federal agency's priorities. The Federal agencies, if coordinated properly, would not have clashing or different priorities for a State to fulfill.

(4) If the three main Federal emergency preparedness agencies—DCPA, FDAA, and FPA—were to coordinate and consolidate their activities from the spectrum of cooperatively funding the State's emergency preparedness efforts and jointly disseminate planning guidance, and so on, substantial savings would accrue in more efficient utilization of both Federal and State staffs. Carrying this concept to the fullest, substantial savings would accrue in both staff and facility outlays if at each Federal regional level, you can now reduce this to one agency. The same would apply at the national level.

These are some of the reasons and considerations paramount in the philosophy of the various States as they attempt to come to grips with this real problem. The States realistically do not have much hope that the Federal agencies themselves will "bite the bullet" and propose concerted and meaningful reforms in their various operations. Hopefully, Congress will take the initiative.

As a preparedness official I have experienced a number of Presidentially declared disasters—and many more non-Presidentially declared disasters—in Indiana. I believe that Congress is concerned with disasters in toto. As a State civil defense director, I ask that they hear my concerns and those of my fellow State directors, who ask that you support full spectrum programs concerned with all types of disasters. The action of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in the past 2 years has given support to total preparedness which they are now abandoning due to fiscal limitations; the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration grant planning program was made "free" to involve more States. The very existence in its present format of the Disaster Act of 1974—Public Law 93-288—indicate that Congress is concerned with disasters.

Public Law 93-288 is an excellent humanitarian law. Yet I would suggest that Congress take a good hard look at the implementing regulations of Public Law 93-288 to examine whether Congress intent is being satisfied.

The problem that prevails is when all parts of the congressionally directed programs are totaled up, we do not get a whole program. Even

with the interest of Congress, the programs of disaster relief have large gaps. To overcome these gaps laws will have to be changed necessitating that the Congress decide precisely what types of disaster programs are needed and then enact legislation to provide for those imperative humanitarian needs.

I would like to comment on nuclear civil preparedness planning. Although the civil defense evacuation plans of the 1950s and the 1960s concluded as a very expensive failure, it appears that the present staff of DCPA did not benefit from such an experience and desire to put the new "cloak" of NCP on the "old body" of evacuation.

Designing the process to move population centers of Indiana metropolitan areas into our rural areas and as a host State, accepting large populations from our sister States of Illinois and Michigan, is a sizable task.

Of this I am certain: The task is sufficiently great to assure the lengthy employment of hundreds of Federal employees, even though the "firing line" responsibility is to be laid on the various States and their small staffs.

Specific questions relative to NCP which occur to me include:

(1) Why would attack adversaries of the U.S.A. provide this country with 3 days—DCPA premise—to evacuate the cities prior to bombing?

(2) How can the commerce and industry of this country perform functions vital to a war effort if our centers of commerce and industry are evacuated or at least skeletonized?

(3) How can we assume that selected families would submit to separation, with wives and children moved somewhere to "safety"; with their husbands and fathers remaining in urban centers for performing vital services?

(4) How can we presume that our rural areas can provide the necessary life support needs for three evacuees from urban areas for each rural resident?

(5) How can we be sure that our rural and small community governmental services are prepared to cope with the myriad of social problems indicated by mass movements of people?

(6) How can we protect people moved from fallout shelter surpluses in "risk areas" to fallout shelter shortages in "host areas" if an attack produces fallout?

One thing I can assure you of, whether the Federal role on civil preparedness continues as it is now organized, or whether a unification change takes place, civil defense in the States and the communities will continue to do its jobs because State statutes and local ordinances require that it shall.

Furthermore, civil defense in the States and in the communities must contend with actual emergencies of every kind almost every day.

During the next fiscal year our Nation intends to spend in excess of \$100 billion on its defense budget. If the international situation is such that it requires this large amount of funding, certainly a requirement exists for beefing up the DCPA budget.

Up to now, the fully funded program and the loan arrangements from DCPA have included: A DIDS—decision information distribution system—warning system, which is now being mothballed; training and education, which may be curtailed considerably in 1977; public emergency information which has been neglected and forgotten for many years in favor of public relations; technical emergency information, about which I must ask: where are the instructor's guides and textbooks this program is supposed to furnish; the emergency water supply equipment, which is being closed out at this very moment; the broadcast station protection program, which is an activity that has been completely dormant for some years; the public fallout shelter sys-

tem, which was meant to be a fundamental and lifesaving resource is now almost dormant; community shelter planning, which has eroded to ineffectual pieces of paper because DCPA's budget has slipped so badly that it cannot be accomplished and publicized as it should be; crisis relocation planning, the new planning pet, and one which I support in principle as contingency planning, but which I am convinced will not and cannot work in this country's nonregimented society; surplus and excess property, both of which DCPA has completely misunderstood as to its economic impact in the communities and about which DCPA has been hysterically apprehensive that a few scandals might occur so both the surplus and excess property programs are now scheduled for total emasculation.

This is the sum total of the 100-percent federally funded civil defense programs and the loan arrangements.

The matching funds programs are 50-50 percent, and many of us think they should be 75-25 percent, increasing the Federal share. Most State and local directors would support such a program if we were allowed to retain our integrity and could avoid the constant reaching for a command role by DCPA over the States and political subdivisions.

The 50-50 percent financial assistance includes: Personnel and administrative—P and A—expenses, designed to provide staff and administrative support; systems maintenance service, which is a principal program and one which is a necessary support function, but will be limited because of budget shrinkage; emergency operating centers, for which support funds will likely be severely cut back in 1977; supporting systems equipment, which ought to receive much more attention than it will; staff college attendance, which may be eliminated altogether; other programs which were once considered to be essential, such as rural civil defense, medical self-help, and even the private shelters have been discarded and forgotten.

I don't think I need to remind you that some form of civil defense has existed throughout man's history. Federal and State civil defense agencies and their activities are rather recent developments. The only purpose they can have is to support local governments in their disaster preparedness activities. And I must add that along with their legally required administrative, monetary and physical resource support, they should provide that very scarce commodity of inspirational leadership, if they are to justify their existence.

On many occasions I have believed that it is demonstrably correct that if Federal and State civil defense should disappear completely tomorrow, local civil defense, a legal activity available to every local government, would continue to exist because of man's living requirements.

I trust I have not or at least I hope I have not bored you nor put you off with my little laying on of the truth. But of course my judgment of that possibility is probably biased.

But let me make it very clear that it is my conviction that the civil defense business so many millions of our citizens are engaged in is one of the best ways I know to serve one's Nation, one's State, and more importantly, one's neighbor.

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed with my counterparts from Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio much of what I presented here. All share my concerns.

That ends my formal statement. Thank you very much.
 [The statement of Milton M. Mitnick follows:]

MILTON M. MITNICK, DIRECTOR, INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of appearing before this committee. My name is Milton Mitnick, and I am the director of the Indiana Department of Civil Defense.

Whether my involvement is with natural disaster planning, or nuclear civil preparedness planning, or economic stabilization and resource management planning—I wear but one hat. These areas of preparedness responsibility are not dispersed among three (3) State agencies in Indiana.

Most States like Indiana have one agency designated as responsible for all disaster preparedness planning and functions. Yet, each of us must deal with three Federal agencies (Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, and Federal Preparedness Agency) who are charged with the major Federal responsibility in emergency preparedness, as well as with numerous other Federal agencies who have specific emergency responsibilities, i.e., USDA, SBA, EPA, U.S. Army COE, etc.

The full burden for the operational coordination of work efforts and the application of recovery resources at times of disasters is charged to the Civil Defense Department (or its equivalent) of each State. Such a coordination effort by a State agency is a formidable task—yet it is a meaningful and proper way of harnessing the State's resources in responding to any major disaster, both rapidly and economically. In reality, a State civil defense department is required to offer the multiple disaster relief programs of a possible 33 Federal agencies to municipalities and individuals as a single program of relief. Therefore, why can't a coordinating agency or a mechanism be installed at the Federal level to monitor the operation of all the Federal agencies charged with emergency responsibilities and coordinate Federal assistance for an overall disaster preparedness program.

This is vital for several reasons:

1. The States can only support one disaster agency, even with supplemental Federal monetary assistance.

2. In emergency situations, each State must be free to employ its agency and its personnel according to the State's priorities, and not upon the direction and/or advice of a Federal agency whose priorities may very well be opposed to the State's immediate problems and/or interests.

3. On a day-to-day planning basis, the States would not be subjected to various Federal agencies, each assigning their respective priorities. Sometimes in conflict with another Federal agency's priorities. The Federal agencies, if coordinated properly, would not have clashing or different priorities for a State to fulfill.

4. If the three main Federal emergency preparedness agencies (DCPA, FDDA, and FPA) were to coordinate and consolidate their activities from the spectrum of cooperatively funding the State's emergency preparedness efforts and jointly disseminate planning guidance, etc., substantial savings would accrue in more efficient utilization of both Federal and State staffs. Carrying this concept to the fullest, substantial savings would accrue in both staff and facility outlays if at each Federal regional level, instead of three emergency preparedness agencies, you can now reduce this to one. The same would apply at the national level.

These are some of the reasons and considerations paramount in the philosophy of the various States as they attempt to come to grips with this real problem. The States realistically do not have much hope that the Federal agencies themselves will bite the bullet and propose concerted and meaningful reforms in their various operations. Hopefully, Congress will take the initiative.

As a preparedness official I have experienced a number of presidentially declared disasters (and many more nonpresidentially declared disasters) in Indiana. I believe that Congress is concerned with disasters in toto. As a State civil defense director I ask that they hear my concerns and those of my fellow State directors who ask that you support full spectrum programs concerned with all types of disasters. The action of the defense civil preparedness agency in the past 2 years has given support to total preparedness which they are now abandoning due to fiscal limitations; the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration grant planning program was made free to involve more States. The very existence in its present format of the disaster act of 1974—Public Law 93-288—all indicate that Congress is concerned with disasters.

Public law 93-288 is an excellent humanitarian law. Yet, I would suggest that Congress take a good, hard look at the implementing regulations of Public Law 93-288 to examine whether Congress' intent is being satisfied.

The problem that prevails is that when all parts of the Congressionally directed programs are totaled up, we do not get a whole program. Even with the interest of Congress the programs of disaster relief have large gaps. To overcome these gaps laws will have to be changed necessitating that the Congress decide precisely what types of disaster programs they want and then enact legislation to provide for those imperative humanitarian needs.

I would like to comment on nuclear civil preparedness planning. Although the civil defense evacuation plans of the 1950's and the 1960's concluded as a very expensive failure, it appears that the present staff of DCPA did not benefit from such an experience and desire to put the new cloak of NCP on the old body of evacuation.

Designing the process to move population centers of Indiana metropolitan areas into our rural areas and as a host State accepting large populations from our sister States of Illinois and Michigan is a sizable task.

Of this I am certain: The task is sufficiently great to assure the lengthy employment of hundreds of Federal employees, even though the firing line responsibility is to be laid on the various States and their staffs.

Specific questions relative to NCP which occur to me include:

1. Why would attack adversaries of the U.S.A. provide this country with 3 days (DCPA premise) to evacuate the cities prior to bombing?

2. How can the commerce and industry of this country perform functions vital to a war effort if our centers of commerce and industry are evacuated or at least skeletonized?

3. How can we assume that selected families would submit to separation, with wives and children moved somewhere to safety with their husbands and fathers remaining in urban centers for performing vital services?

4. How can we presume that our rural areas can provide the necessary life support needs for three (3) evacuees from urban areas for each rural resident?

5. How can we be sure that our rural and small community governmental services are prepared to cope with the myriad of social problems indicated by mass movements of people?

6. How can we protect people moved from fallout shelter surpluses in risk areas to fallout shelter shortages in host areas if an attack produces fallout?

One thing I can assure you of, whether the Federal role on civil preparedness continues as it is now organized, or whether a unification change takes place, civil defense in the States and the communities will continue to do its job because State statutes and local ordinances require that it shall. Furthermore, civil defense in the States and in the communities must contend with actual emergencies of every kind almost every day.

During the next fiscal year our Nation intends to spend in excess of \$100 billion on its defense budget. If the international situation is such that requires this large amount of funding, certainly a requirement exists for beefing up the DCPA budget.

Up to now, the fully funded programs and the loan arrangements from DCPA have included:

A warning system, which is now being mothballed.

Training and education, which may be curtailed considerably in 1977.

Public emergency information, which has been neglected and forgotten for many years in favor of public relations.

Technical emergency information, about which I must ask, where are the instructors guides and text books this program is supposed to furnish.

The emergency water supply equipment, which is being closed out at this very moment.

The broadcast station protection program, which is an activity that has been completely dormant for some years.

The public fallout shelter system, which was meant to be a fundamental and life-saving resource is now dormant.

Community shelter planning, which has eroded to ineffectual pieces of paper because DCPA's budget has slipped so badly that it cannot be accomplished and publicized as it should be.

Crisis relocation planning, the new planning pet, and one which I support in principle as contingency planning but which I am convinced will not and can not work in this country's nonregimented society.

Surplus and excess property, both of which DCPA has completely misunderstood as to its economic impact in the communities and about which DCPA has

been almost hysterically apprehensive that a few scandals might occur, so, both the surplus and excess property programs are now scheduled for total emasculation. This is the sum total of the 100-percent federally funded civil defense programs and the loan arrangements.

The matching funds programs are 50 percent—50 percent and many of us think they should be 75 percent—25 percent, increasing the Federal share. Most State and local directors would support such a program if we were allowed to retain our integrity and could avoid the constant reaching for a command role by DCPA over the States and political subdivisions.

The 50 percent—50 percent financial assistance includes :
Personal and administrative expenses, designed to provide staff and administrative support.

Systems maintenance service, which is a principle program and one which is a necessary support function but will be limited because of budget shrinkage.

Emergency operating centers, for which support funds will likely be severely cut back in 1977.

Supporting systems equipment, which ought to receive much more attention than it will.

Staff college attendance, which may be eliminated altogether.

Other programs which were once considered to be essential such as rural civil defense, medical self-help and even the private shelters have been discarded and forgotten.

I don't think I need to remind you that some form of civil defense has existed in the life of man throughout his history. Federal and State civil defense agencies and their activities are rather recent developments. The only purpose they can have is to support local governments in their disaster preparedness activities. And I must add, that along with their legally required administrative, monetary and physical resource support, they ought to provide that very scarce commodity, inspirational leadership, if they are to justify their existence.

My final comment is, as it has been on many occasions, I believe it is demonstrably correct that if Federal and State civil defense should disappear completely tomorrow, local civil defense, a legal activity available to every local government, would continue to exist because of man's living requirements.

I trust I have not or at least I hope I have not bored you nor put you off with my little laying on of the truth. But, of course, my judgment of that possibility is probably biased.

But let me make it very clear. It is my conviction that the civil defense business so many millions of our citizens are engaged in, is one of the best ways I know to serve ones nation, ones State and more importantly, ones neighbor.

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed with my counterparts from Wisconsin, Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio much of what I presented here. All share my concerns.

This ends my formal statement. Thank you.

Mr. EVANS. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony this morning.

I think that is certainly very specific and therefore especially helpful to the committee. I trust it will be agreeable with you if we ask questions of you individually or as a panel, depending on the particular question. If that is suitable and agreeable with each of you, I would ask you to keep your responses as brief as possible, so we can cover all of the questions, and so each of you has a chance to voice his opinion. I would like to ask one question of each of you, and then recognize Chairman Proxmire for any questions he may have.

I think the thrust of what many of the States have told us is that if we have better natural disaster programs, we will automatically have better nuclear attack programs, because of the commonality of functions. The Federal officials sometimes are skeptical of this. They feel that the States are concentrating on natural disaster programs to the neglect of defense-related activity. Could each of you comment on this, perhaps beginning with you, Mr. Mitnick?

Mr. MITNICK. Yes, sir, I would be happy to. I will say this: If you remove from the State of Indiana, from local P and A participants,

tell them they can not participate in natural disasters, there will be no civil defense in the State of Indiana.

We must start as a base on natural disasters. We live with disasters daily. This is where the educational process starts. This is where our State starts. Every State agency in the State of Indiana having an emergency response capability is a member of a team which will respond to disasters. We don't want to differentiate between disasters. We feel a disaster, whether it is ruining the lives of people because of floods or because of tornados, is a disaster, and should not be set aside because it is not nuclear.

Mr. EVANS. General Weller?

Gen. WELLER. Mr. EVANS, I am happy to comment. I think we would still have a nuclear disaster planning program in Colorado. It would be somewhat reduced if the extreme bounds that are envisioned in the budget reduction were imposed.

I think there is a benefit from the planning for the nuclear program that naturally takes place in the operation and organization of agencies at local, city, and county levels that can benefit the total planning program.

And we need the flexibility of taking the benefits of one of those developments and applying it or using it or exercising it in the other. They are not necessarily, as we see it, two different directions, although I think under the Federal agency perception presently they are two distinct directions. But at the local level they are not perceived in that fashion.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. San Felippo?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. I think your question related to the compatability of the separate programs. I think there is no question at all that there is almost total compatability in these programs.

In my observation, just about everything we do, plan for, systems we operate in any kind of natural disaster, make our ability to respond to an enemy attack situation that much better. We have learned long ago that any plans that you write, if they don't involve the people who would exercise them, and if they are not exercised periodically, but put on the shelf for a day in the future that may or may not happen, just won't work.

So no matter what it is we are responding to in support of local government—and this is really what a State agency does, the people that make the daily decisions at the local levels are the people who are going to be operationally responding to any situation that may develop, including enemy attack. Our planning, our operating activity and our followup in all areas of natural disaster, I think, just strengthen our ability to respond to an enemy attack.

An additional point that I think is very important, is that it has been my experience that enemy attack preparation in too many areas in this country holds a very low credibility in the minds of the public. It is associated with a hardhat, a sandbag, and a shovel in too many cases.

The activities we are involved in in the response of State and local governments to natural disasters, I think, is strengthening in the mind of the public the necessity for a total disaster preparedness program, of which enemy attacks is an essential component. I was very surprised to hear some of the testimony yesterday suggesting that there is no

compatibility. I think disaster preparedness is a total thing, without even getting in the efficiencies and economies that may be involved.

Mr. EVANS. Chairman Proxmire.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First I should warn you that Mr. San Felippo is a dear friend of mine, and he is a man for whom I have the greatest admiration. He has been successful in business and has done a fine job in working in local and State government. I am very proud to represent him as one of my constituents.

Mr. San Felippo, in reading your statement it seems you come through very loud and clear. You argue that if we consolidate these agencies and if we don't try to prevent some of the federal money that is designed primarily to protect against nuclear attack from being used in other disasters, you will have a better overall performance, not only in the other disaster areas, but also in the nuclear area. Is that correct?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. I think that is correct. I think the recent ice storm we had in early March was an excellent example of this. This was probably the most widespread natural disaster we have had, covering 22 counties. And operating in that natural disaster I think is the best test, the best learning experience we could have possibly had in terms of increasing our ability to respond in the face of an enemy attack.

Senator PROXMIRE. What you learn under those circumstances is how people actually are going to respond to a disaster, who you can count on, who you can't count on, what you may need. Of course a nuclear disaster would be different in some respects, but there are also some similarities. You have loss of life, you have people hurt badly, you have food problems sometimes, you have electric problems, as you had in this case. In Wisconsin we had literally thousands of farms where the farmers had forgotten how to milk with their hands. When all of the electricity was knocked out the poor cows were really in bad shape.

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. I learned a lot about cows from this last one.

Senator PROXMIRE. I bet you did.

I can understand your viewpoint, but how about from the viewpoint of the Federal Government? We appropriate this money for the national purpose of protecting against nuclear attack. And we have an interest, therefore, in seeing that it is properly spent to meet that Federal purpose. Would you think it would be appropriate to reduce the amount of Federal matching and increase the amount of State and local matching? In other words, instead of a 50-50 proposition, make it less Federal money, more State and local money?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. I think perhaps what might be done in terms of responding to the argument that these moneys are appropriated specifically for enemy attack. Taking into consideration that State and local governments over a number of years have anticipated that percent of participation by the Federal Government in terms of what they are able to do and the kind of programs they are running, is to either allow for dual use in terms of the enemy attack allocated money, or say, fine. DCPA money in terms of administrative and supportive and operational assistance should be used only for enemy attack—but then provide additional moneys from the natural disaster agency,

FDAA, for the same type of assistance for the States to mesh them together. Because the States have gone to a coordinated agency this would pose no problem.

So you can argue it either way, and I would support either way; DCPA's money being used specifically for enemy attack, with FDAA money coming to the States to allow us to develop our natural disaster response capability or put it all together to consolidate and operate under a dual use "all-disaster" concept in terms of the funds that are available.

Senator PROXMIRE. General Weller, one of the concepts we got on the first day of the hearings, one of the apparent strategies rests on the recognition of the amount provided now, the level of resources going into civil defense is so low and the amount of effort is so modest that we are not in any kind of a position to respond effectively to an attack if it should hit 20 minutes from now or a half hour from now or even a week from now.

What they argued was that we are developing a framework, so that, in the event of a heightening of tension in the world and the likelihood of a nuclear accident or nuclear war developing, we would then be able to have a framework on which we could build, increase appropriations three or four or fivefold, maybe, like the Russians, to \$1 billion a year. How well suited is our present system to achieve that goal in your view?

General WELLER. Senator, we view the nuclear civil protection program as another alternative available to the people in Colorado.

We don't deny the existence of the shelter program, the usefulness of the shelter program. We have tried to include the usefulness of the shelter program in the nuclear civil protection planning program, which of course is the one causing evacuation.

In Colorado we think the evacuation program makes particularly good sense because most of our risk areas are concentrated in a relatively small area along the front range of the Continental Divide.

By going westerly, perhaps 40 or 50 miles, we escape the direct effect of almost any nuclear weapon directed at those risk areas. And so we support and have supported the planning for the nuclear civil protection program.

But if we don't recognize it as a total effort of the DCPA organization, it is certainly being intensified in the current planning process.

Senator PROXMIRE. My question was whether or not you have a framework now which would provide a good, solid, logical basis for expansion in the event that we should decide to step up this program, because the international situation provokes it?

General WELLER. We have that framework and I think it is active. There are some elements of it that need strengthening. The training portion of the program has not been as strong as it could be. Some people are leaving the program who have been in it for a number of years and who were convinced of the effectiveness of the program as a result of their experiences perhaps in World War II. Some of those people are beginning to leave the program, and the perceived need for the program may not be as clear as it was in 1950, when the legislation was developed.

But certainly the willingness exists in the communities and in the officials of the communities to continue planning for that as an ultimate emergency.

I think a statement made earlier today that in some areas it appeared that the Federal participation in the strictly nuclear portion of that planning perhaps could be increased, allowing the States the flexibility of using the participating funds to support and strengthen the natural disaster preparedness plan.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. EVANS. Yesterday we heard testimony that there was a decisive difference between natural disaster emergencies, which tend to be more localized, and nuclear attack emergencies, which would be a nationwide emergency. One involves a rehabilitation of damaged resources, the other one involves the survival of the Nation. In terms of operations or any other type of criteria, do you think this is an important distinction, Mr. Mitnick?

Mr. MITNICK. No, I don't. I think really that when you are talking about the rehabilitation or talking about the response to a disaster, this is the important thing.

We try to define, I suppose because the charter says there is a Public Law 920 and it shall be a disaster law, the other one a natural disaster, is very difficult for me as a State director and for my local directors to attempt to distinguish or say that we are going to have massive deaths naturally under nuclear attack, but we won't have massive deaths under a tornado condition covering 39 counties.

Now it is pretty hard for me to distinguish that. I can, but really I saw the April 3, 1974, tornado hitting 39 counties, 960 people seriously hurt, 48 people dead, massive amounts of destruction, and to me that is a disaster any way you look at it. I can't separate the nuclear from the natural disaster.

I feel very strongly we must respond to both. We do have a capability, and DCPA has provided us a skeletonized force to come into this program under increased readiness conditions and to increase our capabilities, but again I feel that we must not differentiate. They are common to each other, the nuclear and the natural disaster, because nowhere can a local director do anything but think of disaster as a whole program.

Mr. EVANS. Some persons have suggested that State and local governments are not pulling their weight in terms of funding natural disaster preparedness. But would you not agree that this is a State and local government responsibility, rather than a Federal responsibility?

Mr. MITNICK. Well, it is not a Federal responsibility, and it is not a Federal responsibility in the State of Indiana, because every State agency having a response emergency capability is on the State civil defense staff. And they do respond when we have a disaster, because we have a law, the Indiana civil defense law of 1975, and we do have a Governor's executive order 975, which lays out specifically what every department will do.

And this goes on into the local governments. The local governments will respond. They respond every day. You know a disaster takes place almost every day in a city or county, and it may be smaller than the idea of nuclear attack, but it is still a disaster, and responses are made and not enough credit is given to local governments in their daily function of responding to disasters.

Mr. EVANS. Let me get something clear here in my mind. I believe in your prepared testimony you suggested that the Federal share of the funding be increased from 50-50 to 75-25; is that correct?

Mr. MITNICK. This is some of the thinking by a number of the directors. I would be acceptable to a 75-percent increase in the Federal share and 25 by the local governments.

The reason for that is because of the small tax bases in many of the rural areas, they just don't have sufficient funds.

But what I am concerned about is if this proportionately goes up to 75 percent by the Federal Government, what other command role would the Federal Government and DCPA desire of the local governments and the States?

Mr. EVANS. Right, that is a question in my mind also, because as we are both from Indiana we hear a great deal of concern about Federal involvement, Federal interference, Federal paperwork. Our own Governor held recent hearings at Bloomington and Lafayette about Federal paperwork burdens within the last few weeks. Wouldn't Federal intervention increase at the State and local levels if Federal funding were increased? It seems as though we are saying we want more Federal funds, but we don't want more Federal interference.

Mr. MITNICK. I am saying, to go back to my earlier testimony, if a mechanism can be established for controlling the Federal agencies input into the States of their requirements, I think as we go along, a 75-25 percent share would be compatible. In the State of Indiana, Congressman, last year, we introduced enabling legislation that the State of Indiana is going to provide 25 percent of the local governments share of its civil defense budget.

In other words, 50 from the Federal Government, 25 from the State, and 25 from the local government.

This is how important we feel it is to give them a better capability for responding.

Mr. EVANS. Currently, do you feel the Federal Government has too much control over these programs at the State and local level?

Mr. MITNICK. I think they are attempting to tell me to do too many things which I don't feel are necessary. I like to measure the requirements of the Federal Government on how many lives it will save. And when paper requirements come out of the Federal Government and I assess those requirements, and I can't see any lives being saved because of their needs of the paper requirements, I say that program is not necessary.

This is the way I attempt to assess it. I say yes, they will attempt to do as much as they can to get control over us in the State. I think fellow State directors will say the same thing.

Mr. EVANS. Let me pose a question, then, generally to draw upon your collective knowledge and experience in this area. One of the big problems that we seem to face in national preparedness is that there is a wide disparity in the adequacy of various State and local plans. Some citizens seem to receive very good emergency protection; others seem to get very little, depending on where they happen to live. Could you suggest any ways of making preparedness programs more uniform? Should the Federal Government establish and mandate minimum standards for State and local programs?

General WELLER. Congressman, I would respond that perhaps the figures that we have been discussing here about preparedness in gen-

eral are those which complement the expenditures by local governments to improve or to assist the input of the Federal Government for specific programs.

The figures we furnished earlier to the committee do not include the local government expenditures in their police departments, fire departments, emergency organizations. They simply include the participation in those programs directed and responded to from the Federal Government standpoint.

As a result we are not seeing the total preparedness picture. We are seeing that that is somewhat directed and contingent upon the Federal input to our programs and the costs there.

Mr. EVANS. But would you agree there are differences among preparedness programs throughout the local communities across the Nation? I am trying to find out whether these programs can be made more uniform, if the protection afforded our citizens can be increased. In order to achieve that goal, are Federal minimum standards a desirable goal? Is that the best means to achieve the goal we are looking for?

General WELLER. There are differences of levels even in Colorado. I suspect that extends across the Nation. Perhaps that is a privilege we earn as being citizens of this country.

Mr. EVANS. So you would not favor Federal minimum standards?

General WELLER. I think Federal minimum standards perhaps in the nuclear program, because it is so intensely directed and so vital, would be acceptable.

Mr. EVANS. Yes; Mr. San Felippo?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. Mr. Chairman, in the DCPA program there are standards, there are requirements for participation. There are requirements for matching funds. Unfortunately under the current proposed cutback some of the areas having the greatest need would be the ones to be harmed the most in terms of the cutbacks, because they would not, under the guidelines we have seen, receive those funds. We do have standards.

I think what we are saying today is not so much that we differ tremendously with the Federal concepts, the Federal guidelines, the Federal program. We differ with how these concepts are being administered through the administrative agency, DCPA.

We don't question the concept of the need for national civil defense and the program and standards that we have been given. We differ in how these things are being implemented, what kind of paperwork is involved.

When we want a \$50 siren—my staff found out for a \$50 siren application or for a half million dollar application, they both required seven pounds of paperwork to send in.

These are some of the key things. We don't argue the need for the program—we agree to a great extent to that—but how the program is being administered, and how it comes to us.

The question of Federal control, the 75-25 percent, that would be fine at 75. It is probably not very likely. The 50-50, provided it allows us to provide to our citizens what we think we need, and that is an all-disaster capability, is what we are really looking at.

My suggestion to a great extent is given today's fiscal situation, we know there is not a lot of money available, but we are suggesting by

consolidating the three agencies the efficiencies of not having three separate staffs in each of the regions, sometimes in different cities, so there are extra costs involved, three sets of rules, regulations, printing, what have you, would free up a lot of existing money to allow us to provide a better program to our citizens.

Senator PROXMIRE. Would the Chairman yield for a minute?

Mr. EVANS. Certainly.

Senator PROXMIRE. I wonder if you could provide me with an estimate of the cost, to the extent you can, of the application for a \$50 siren? Seven pounds of paperwork sounds like it might be a pretty good candidate for Golden Fleece of the Month. I bet it costs several hundred dollars to get a \$50 siren, when you add up all of the time of the people working on it. Seven pounds of paper is a lot of paper.

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. This was a study done by my staff a year ago, and there was a lot of complaining about it. That particular requirement for that kind of program has been reduced. But the costs of our filling out the paper, the cost of developing a management program we saw earlier, our staff spent a solid month on it, and then found out it was administered differently across the country. In some regions it was done by mail, in our region we did it all by personal interviews, ranging up to 4 hours individually.

We can go back and pull that out. It was substantial. I think my colleagues have horror stories to tell you in terms of the paperwork that is involved.

One example is the drought situation that we have in Wisconsin. We applied to the Federal Government for assistance. The President granted some transportation assistance for hay. An estimate that was done by the local SCS people in Wisconsin last week was after it took 8 days for the declaration to get out, out of the 12,000 affected farmers in the 18-county region, the aid that was granted would affect 75 to 100 of them. It is this kind of thing I think that we are talking about.

Not so much the overall concept, which is good, and the congressional intent I think in both Public Laws 920 and 93-288 is good.

The question is how the administrative agencies are interpreting the congressional intent and how then by their interpretations the requirements are passed down to us at the State level.

Senator PROXMIRE. Do you agree with Mr. Mitnick's observation on the percentage—correct me if I am wrong Mr. Mitnick—the percentage of requirements that don't save lives? That seems to me to be a pretty good standard.

No. 1, do you agree with that standard, that you should apply the standard to the nuclear defense program. If the standard doesn't mean much, it shouldn't be applied.

No. 2, would you agree there are substantial portions of your requirements that would fall into this area of not seeming to achieve the goal of the program?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. I think I would agree with that. I would also state that I agree with a lot of the requirements, but the way they are administered is the problem.

Senator PROXMIRE. Is that because they are trying to achieve uniformity in the States?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. I think in many cases they are looking for a program that would be reasonably uniform across the country and I don't disagree with that concept, again.

Senator PROXMIRE. But that uniformity does require some work on your part, on General Weller's part, Mr. Mitnick's part, your agencies, and it doesn't meet the fundamental standard of saving lives in some cases; is that right?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. Some of the uniformity in my view is not directly related, or even indirectly related to saving lives.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Chairman, unfortunately I have to run to the floor for a vote, but I want to thank you very very much for conducting these hearings. You have done a marvelous job. I am sorry I have been so delinquent, but I had other hearings I had to go to.

Mr. EVANS. I understand how that is. Thank you.

Mr. Mitnick, I believe it was suggested in your testimony that the crisis relocation planning or nuclear disaster planning concept might be appropriate for a regimented society such as the Soviet Union, but may not be appropriate for a more open society such as we have in this country. Could you elaborate on that, and if you other gentlemen care to comment after he finishes, we would be pleased to hear from you, too.

Mr. MITNICK. I think the best way to elaborate on it is just talk to some of our Hoosiers in Indiana and talk to them about any subject, and they will give you 45 different answers about anything and pretty independent answers.

I will be very frank with you, I have been very fearful of talking to any Hoosier about this program, because I don't know if we have publicized this yet—it has been publicized in some of the papers, but nobody seems to be paying any attention to it—but I don't know how our people are going to react to it.

How do we move the massive population out of Marion County, for instance? I have some figures here, which I think you will find interesting. I happened to make some notes.

We will have to move 2,338,000 people out of our category 1, 2, and 3 areas into the host areas. At the same time I don't know how many million people—maybe Mr. Jones from Illinois can tell me how many he will send into Indiana, into our host areas, and how many the Michigan director is going to send to us.

But this gives you an idea. It is a mind-boggling academic or any other type of exercise you want to call it, of how do you provide the logistical support for this alone, the medical support, the food support.

It is really easy to state, well, we have made prototype studies. But you just tell America we want you to move out of your home today, immediately, 200 miles away, and I just wonder, Congressman, what kind of answer you will get, particularly from some of our Hoosiers.

Mr. EVANS. Yes; that same thought has crossed my mind several times in the course of these hearings this week, representing, as I do, the area where the Indianapolis Motor Speedway is. We have enough problems with 300,000 people 1 day per year, let alone, as you suggest, several million people and all of their belongings and so forth. Are there any further comments?

Mr. SAN FELIPPO. I have a couple of quick comments about the NCP concept. I think Mr. Mitnick has gone through some of the specific concerns we have, and I think he pretty accurately described them.

The question I would have that concerns me as I understand it some of the extraordinary powers the President once had expired over 2 years ago, and I have not heard any discussion of whether even if this

program were totally developed that authority exists for that kind of a directive in the first place.

The second comment is we always hear that the Russians have the ability to do this, and they have the centralized industrial base, and can order the population to suddenly leave their homes, split up their families, relocate into some rural area, for an indefinite period of time.

My question there is under our form of government, our free society, do we really want to have that kind of ability?

What would it cost us in terms of our freedom to have that ability to totally disrupt the country and break up families and order people out of their homes?

The third and last comment is we have been hearing all week about the scarcity of resources in this area, the fact that we spend very little money in terms of disaster preparedness, whether it be enemy attack or natural disasters. The concept of an evacuation plan, I think, is fine, and we would certainly support it if we had everything else done, if we had solid programs in all of the areas we have to deal with.

I think we could spend some of those critical resources on a plan like this then, but to have this be a primary emphasis, given the tiny number of dollars available to us, I think is awfully surprising and we ought to take a good hard look at it.

Mr. EVANS. General Weller, did you have a comment?

General WELLER. I think I expressed myself concerning the nuclear civil protection program. I would say that in Colorado we see a similar situation occurring, about 2 or 3 weeks in the year, in the skiing season and the opening of the spring mountain roads.

We actually displace probably a third of the population of the risk areas in those events, and we think it is entirely feasible to expand that.

[For response to additional questions for the record. See p. 359.]

Mr. EVANS. Fine. I would like to thank each of you gentlemen very much for your willingness to appear before us this morning. I appreciate your comments and I think they will be very helpful to the committee in its deliberations.

At this time the committee will recess, and I will also state that the record will remain open for any further submission of data or comments.

Thank you very much.

[Thereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the hearing was concluded.]

APPENDIX I

FRED J. SHAFER

Fred J. Shafer is Director of the Logistics and Communications Division in the General Accounting Office.

Mr. Shafer entered Government service in 1941 and served in the U.S. Army during World War II. He has received degrees in accounting from Southeastern University and in economics from American University. He has completed the executive programs of the Brookings Institution and the University of Michigan Graduate School of Business Administration.

Since joining the General Accounting Office in 1946, Mr. Shafer has held positions of increasing responsibility in the work of the Office. Prior to his present assignment he was the Deputy Director of the Logistics and Communications Division.

LESLIE W. BRAY, JR.

Major General Leslie W. Bray, Jr., USAF (Ret.), is the Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration. The Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) is responsible for preparing plans and policies to ensure the continued operation of the Federal Government in the event of a national emergency and to meet many other critical contingencies ranging from economic crises to nuclear attack.

The Federal Preparedness Agency is a successor agency to the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the Executive Office of the President. General Bray has been Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency and its immediate predecessor agency, Office of Preparedness, since October 1973.

General Bray's broad leadership experience and managerial expertise are essential qualifications in heading the Federal Preparedness Agency.

As Director of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives in the Office of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, General Bray evaluated and developed long-range concepts to improve the Air Force's effectiveness in meeting national security objectives. He performed additional duties as the Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on Vietnamization. Consequently, General Bray was recognized as the top-level Air Force manager for 1972, and received the Eugene M. Zuckert Management Award.

Born in Wichita Falls, Texas, Bray attended Arlington (Texas) State University and received his B.S. degree from the University of Maryland. He enlisted in the Army Air Corps in 1942 as an aviation cadet and won his wings and commission at Foster Field, Texas. After serving with the 10th Troop Carrier Group at Pope Field, N.C., and the 4th Combat Cargo Group at Syracuse, N.Y. Bray became the first and only commander of the 16th Combat Cargo Squadron in June 1944, serving in the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations.

Following World War II, Bray served as liaison officer at Randolph Field and then was assigned to Civil Air Patrol headquarters. He was reassigned to the Troop Carrier Command at Pope Field in 1946 before his transfer to Bergstrom Air Force Base (AFB), Texas. From 1947 to 1954, he was assigned to Strategic Air Command (SAC), serving with several organizations in various positions at Walker AFB, New Mexico and at Sid Slimane, French Morocco.

In 1954, Bray was assigned to Air Force headquarters at Washington, D.C., where he became Chief, Assignment Policy and Procedures Branch. After attending the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, he served in Japan in 1959 as Director of Operations, 483rd Troop Carrier Wing, and later in Okinawa as Detachment Commander of the 315th Air Division. He participated in training exercises in Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam before his assignment in 1961 as Director of Plans, Pacific Air Forces, at Hickam AFB, Hawaii.

In 1963, Bray returned to Air Force headquarters and served again at Ran-

dolph AFB before reassignment to the Washington headquarters in 1966 as Deputy Assistant for Joint Matters, Directorate of Plans. In 1967, he assumed duties as Assistant Director of Plans for Joint and National Security Matters, and became the Director of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives in February 1970. He was promoted to Major General in May 1970, and retired from the Air Force in September 1973.

General Bray's military decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross, Air Medal with one oak leaf cluster, and Air Force Commendation Medal.

He is married to the former Marie Harrison of Dallas.

PHILIP E. COLDWELL

Dr. Philip E. Coldwell is a Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.. Governor Coldwell received his B.S. and M.S. degrees at the University of Illinois, and a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Wisconsin. After several years of teaching at Universities in Illinois, Wisconsin, Montana and Louisiana, he joined the Federal Reserve System as an industrial economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in 1951. The following year Dr. Coldwell transferred to the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas where he moved progressively to director of research in 1954, vice president in 1960, first vice president in 1962 and finally president in 1968. It was from that position that he was appointed to the Board of Governors in 1974. Dr. Coldwell was formerly a director of the Dallas Council on World Affairs, trustee of the Southwestern Legal Foundation at SMU, public councilor of the Texas A&M Research Foundation and Elder of the Highland Park Presbyterian Church in Dallas.

During World War II, he served in the U.S. Navy as a fighter pilot.

THOMAS P. DUNNE

Thomas P. Dunne, 39, Administrator of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, is responsible for supervising the relief activities of governmental and private agencies following an emergency or major disaster declaration by the President.

Mr. Dunne was appointed to the position by the Secretary of HUD when Reorganization Plan No. 1 renamed the disaster functions of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and moved FDAA to HUD on July 1, 1973.

From March 1972 until joining HUD, Mr. Dunne had been Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations of the Economic Development Administration in the Department of Commerce. Starting in November 1969, he held a series of increasingly responsible positions in Economic Development, which included on occasion working with disaster devastated communities.

Prior to entering public service, Mr. Dunne was Midwestern advertising representative of *Nation's Business* from 1965 to 1969. He previously served as an advertising representative with several agencies, as an insurance agent, and as an accountant.

A native of Chicago, Mr. Dunne attended the University of Illinois and Southeast Junior College. He is married to the former Carol Lucas of Chicago.

GEORGE R. RODERICKS

George R. Rodericks was born in East Providence, Rhode Island, in 1916. He attended public schools in Rhode Island and Providence College.

Marital status. Married and has four children.

Private. 1935 to 1937, Howard & Lewis Motor Sales, Providence, Rhode Island. 1937 to 1939, Self-employed, Salesman. 1939 to 1941, Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Company, Providence, Rhode Island.

Government service.

Military. 1941 to 1946, Inducted into the U.S. Army. Served from January 1941 to December 1942. Commissioned 2nd Lt., Adjutant General's Corps, December

1942. Assistant Adjutant General, II Corps, Africa; Sicily; Italy. Commanding Officer 52nd MRU (Mobile); Italy; France; Germany. Military Government Officer, Italy; Sicily. Assistant Adjutant General, Hdqts. 5th Army, Italy. Assistant Adjutant General, Hdqts. 7th Army, France; Germany. Separated from active duty, Major, AGC-USAR.

U.S. Army Reserve, 1946 to 1968, Reserve Officer from 1946 to 1968. Adjutant, 1028th Military Government Group. Executive Officer, 435th Military Government Company. Faculty Member, AGC Branch, USAR School, Providence, Rhode Island. Plans & Training Officer, 805th Hospital Center. Executive Officer 2393rd Medical Training Unit. Executive Officer 395th Convalescent Center, Lt. Colonel, AGC-USAR. Retired Reserve, 1968, Colonel, USAR.

State of Rhode Island. 1946 to 1948, Executive Director, Rhode Island Veterans' Bonus Board. 1948 to 1952, Assistant Clerk, Superior Court, State of Rhode Island. 1952 to 1955, Executive Assistant to the Governor, R.I. 1955 to 1957, State Civil Defense Medical Coordinator.

Federal and District of Columbia Government service. 1957 to 1958, Civil Defense Advisor, Public Health Service, DHEW, Washington, D.C. 1958 to 1959, Civil Defense Coordinator, Department of Public Health, District of Columbia. 1959 to present, Director of Civil Defense, District of Columbia Government. (Civil Defense changed to Office of Emergency Preparedness—23 January 1976 by Mayor's Order 76-49) 1971, Chairman, D.C. Government—9-1-1 Task Force. 1972 to 1973, Chairman, D.C. Government—Interdepartmental Telecommunications Task Force. 1970 to 1973, Member, D.C. Government—Public Safety Group. 1973 to present, Director, Office of Petroleum Allocation, District of Columbia Government.

Civil Defense Training. Civil Defense Training Course for Food and Drug Officials, Providence, Rhode Island. Civil Defense Emergency Operations for Public Health Officials, Providence, Rhode Island. Special Course of Instruction in Civil Defense Operations, University of Maine. Radiological Health Course, Robert A. Taft Sanitary Engineering Center, Cincinnati, Ohio. Health Services Planning for Civil Defense, Battle Creek, Michigan. Civil Defense Emergency Operations, Battle Creek, Michigan. Radiological Monitors Course, Food and Drug Administration, Washington, D.C. Elements of Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, Washington, D.C.

Civil Defense and Emergency Services Organizations. Appointed by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia as Chairman, Civil Defense Committee—Metropolitan Washington Traffic Council, 1959. Elected Secretary-Treasurer, National Association of State Civil Defense Directors, 1960; reelected 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973. Elected President, National Association of State Civil Defense Directors, 1965. Appointed by the Surgeon General, Public Health Service, as a member of the State Directors Advisory Committee, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965. Chairman of the Civil Defense Technical Advisory Board of the Washington Metropolitan Regional Conference, 1962, 1963, 1964. Chairman, Civil Defense Advisory Board, Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968. Member, Civil Defense Advisory Board, Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, 1969, 1970. Member, Civil Defense Administrators' Committee, Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, 1971, 1972, 1973. Member, Disaster & Emergency Preparedness Committee, Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, 1974, 1975, 1976. Member, Energy Policy Advisory Committee, Washington Metropolitan Council of Governments, 1974, 1975, 1976.

Consultant, National Academy of Engineering, Committee on Telecommunications, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976. Republican and Democratic National Conventions, Miami Beach, Florida. Emergency Services, Operations and Negotiations 1972. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, Committee on Regional Emergency Medical Communications Systems, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976. Faculty Member, American Medical Association, Emergency Medical Systems National Seminars, 1974.

Guest lecturer. SEADOC (Civil Disturbance Orientation Course), Dissent and Disorder Management Group. Department of Army, Hdqts., U.S. Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia 1973, 1974, 1975.

CECIL H. RUSSELL

Cecil H. Russell, Director, Office Of Emergency Services, Cabell County, Huntington, West Virginia.

President, United States Civil Defense Council.

Attended public schools in Huntington, West Virginia, also University of West Virginia, Marshall University, Michigan Technological University Defense Civil Preparedness Staff College, West Virginia Police Academy.

Served in the United States Navy during World War II, being honorably discharged following the war.

Started Civil Defense career in 1955 training auxiliary police. After retiring from the Huntington Police Department was appointed director of emergency services in 1967. I have served the United States Civil Defense Council as a member of the training and education committee, legislative committee and constitution by-laws committee. Served as State Representative for West Virginia, a past president West Virginia Civil Defense Council, Member of Society of Radiological Defense, the Governors Committee Emergency Medical Services.

Honors: Certificate of Commendation from Federal Region II Office of Defense Civil Preparedness Agency for Outstanding efforts in promoting civil preparedness. Awarded certificate of accomplishments by the United States Civil Defense Council for contributions in building an outstanding civil preparedness agency for the County, State and Nation.

JOHN E. DAVIS

John E. Davis is National Director of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Department of Defense, with headquarters in the Pentagon. He was appointed by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in May 1972.

Prior to becoming DCPA Director—Mr. Davis, since 1969, was National Director of the Office of Civil Defense, an agency replaced by DCPA.

The DCPA mission is to provide federal assistance to increase the emergency capabilities of civil government throughout the United States, DCPA programs cover all aspects of civil preparedness, from peacetime natural disasters and other emergencies to nuclear attack.

Mr. Davis is a former two-term Governor of North Dakota and a Past National Commander of The American Legion and has been in public service as a mayor and a State Senator. He is President of the First National Bank of McClusky, North Dakota.

Mr. Davis served in the Army in World War II and attained the rank of lieutenant colonel of infantry. He won the Silver Star while serving with the 35th Infantry Division in Europe.

MILTON MITNICK

Milton Mitnick is the State Director of the Indiana Department of Civil Defense. He retired from the USAR in 1971 and presently holds a commission as colonel in the infantry of the Indiana Guard Reserve. He is a graduate of the Industrial College Armed Forces, Washington, D.C.; Industrial Defense and Disaster Planning School, Ft. Gordon, Georgia; Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, Maryland; Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He completed his undergraduate studies at Loyola University, Chicago. Mr. Mitnick is a member of the American Legion, Reserve Officers Association, Indianapolis Museum of Art, and the American Nuclear Society. He is the 58th recipient of Indiana's Distinguished Service Medal.

BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM DAVID WELLER

General Weller was born in Delta, Colorado, 4 March 1919. He attended the following schools. Trinidad Junior College, 1936-1938; Colorado School of Mines, 1938-1939; Field Artillery Officer Candidate School, 1942; Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, 1944; Infantry Refresher Course, 1955; Associate Command and General Staff Officer Course, 1966.

General Weller enlisted in the 168th Field Artillery, Colorado National Guard, on 3 December 1940, and entered active duty with his unit on 24 February 1941. He was accepted for officer candidate training while at Camp Roberts, California.

Upon completion of this training, he served in various assignments including service in the European Theatre of Operations from January 1945 to December 1945. He was released from active duty on 2 February 1946 in the grade of Captain.

General Weller was appointed in the Colorado National Guard and federally recognized as a Captain on 7 January 1948 and assigned to the 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry as a Company Commander. On 22 September 1949 he was promoted to Major and assigned as Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry, serving in such position until September 1955 when he was reassigned as the Executive Officer, 169th Artillery Group, and promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. Subsequent to that date, General Weller commanded on various dates the 144th Field Artillery Battalion, 188th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, and the 3rd Howitzer Battalion, 157th Artillery. On 24 May 1966 he was promoted to Colonel and assigned as Chief of Staff, Colorado Army National Guard, remaining in that position until 30 June 1971, when, at his own request, he was placed on the retired list.

On 1 August 1974, General Weller was recalled from the retired list, commissioned a Brigadier General in the Colorado National Guard, and appointed as The Adjutant General of Colorado.

Decorations and Awards

Bronze Star Medal, Army Commendation Medal, American Defense Service Medal, American Campaign Medal, European Campaign Medal, World War II Victory Medal, Army Occupation Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Medal with hourglass, Colorado Long Service Medal, Colorado Meritorious Service Medal.

Civil Affiliations

Colorado Society Safety Engineers, BPOE, National Guard Association of the United States, Colorado Civil Defense Association, Association of the United States Army, The Civil Air Patrol, Air Force Association, and the Denver Chamber of Commerce.

Committees

Military Advisory Council for Colorado, Colorado State Communications Advisory Committee.

General Weller is a Registered Professional Engineer in Colorado. Prior to his entry into full time State service, he was employed as the General Superintendent for the Western Colorado Power Company in Montrose, Colorado, having served in various capacities in that organization for nearly thirty years. He has a long term interest in community affairs, having served as President of the Montrose Junior Chamber of Commerce; Commander, B.A.B. Post #73 American Legion in Montrose and District Adjutant; Post Advisor and District Committeeman, Boy Scouts of America; Director and Secretary, San Juan Basin Rodeo Association; Director and President, Board of Education School District 9-R, Durango, Colorado; Regional Vice President, Colorado Association of School Boards; Director and President, Durango Chamber of Commerce; Director, Navajo Trails Association; Director, San Juan Development Corporation; Director, La Plata County United Fund; Director and President, Montrose Industrial Development Corporation; Director and President, Uncompahgre Investments, Inc.; and as a member of the Accountability Advisory Committee, School District REIJ in Montrose, Colorado. While in Montrose he served as a board member for the Montrose Christian Church, was active in the Montrose Chamber of Commerce and in the Montrose Rod and Gun Club. He is a member of the 63rd Infantry Division Association. He has been a member and officer in both the Durango and Montrose Lions Clubs and was active in the Rocky Mountain Electrical League.

RONALD S. SAN FELIPPO

Ronald S. San Felippo was born August 8, 1946.

WORK HISTORY

January 1975 to Present: Administrator, Division of Emergency Government, Department of Local Affairs and Development, State of Wisconsin. Appointed by Governor Patrick J. Lucey. Confirmed by Wisconsin State Senate. "To prepare the State and its subdivisions to cope with emergencies resulting from enemy action

and natural and man-made disaster, it is declared to be necessary to establish an organization for emergency government, conferring upon the Governor and others specified the power and duties provided by this subchapter". (WIS STAT 22.16)

January 1973 to January 1975: Wisconsin No Fault Insurance Company, Inc. Vice President, Marketing and Personnel.

July 1971 to July 1977: Member Milwaukee Board of School Directors. Elected 1971 to six-year term.

February 1967 to January 1973: The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. Supervisor, Agency Department.

1969-72: Member, Board of Trustees of the Milwaukee Public Library System.

1970-71: Treasurer, Wisconsin Library Trustees Association.

1969-70: Supervisor—Competition, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.

MISCELLANEOUS

Completed University of Wisconsin Supervisory Management Program. Attended UWM and Marquette University, majoring in Political Science. Member of the Wisconsin Academy of Arts, Letters and Sciences.

APPENDIX II

F.J. SHAFER

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Q. GAO testimony indicates an apparent breakdown in Federal-State cooperation in the fallout shelter program. The Federal Government is paying to locate new shelters for population which doesn't exist, at least not in the areas where the shelters are. The State and local agencies can't or won't mark shelters with signs or stock them with supplies. Does this mean that the effective use of these shelters is limited or restricted in the event of attack? If so, is it possible to estimate the availability of effective shelters or the incidence of non-effective shelters?

A. Under DCPA's present policy of waiting for a crisis period before marking and stocking shelters, the shelters' effectiveness would be severely limited if the United States were attacked without advance warning. The dissemination of public information through the news media would have to be extremely quick and extremely explicit to enable people to even find some of the shelters.

If a short warning period allowed time to mark the shelters and to stock them with water, the shelters could save many lives in areas not affected by direct blasts. However, such a quick response would not be possible unless local officials knew, or could immediately determine, the shelters' locations. We have found that some local officials do not know the shelters' locations.

For those populations not located near shelters, a short warning period will not greatly improve their opportunities for receiving adequate fallout protection. Some rural populations, for example, might not have access to good shelter facilities and might have to construct improvised shelters. The effectiveness of such shelters would depend, of course, on whether there was adequate time to advise rural populations on construction methods and to do the construction work. DCPA estimates that, of the 230 million shelter spaces located, about 60 million spaces in urban areas would be noneffective because they are excess to the urban populations.

2. Q. Does each preparedness agency work with a single official of the Office of Management and Budget in establishing its budget and functional priorities? If not, is there an adverse impact on management control?

A. The three preparedness agencies work with different officials in the Office of Management and Budget. Overall coordination and oversight of preparedness could be improved, in our opinion, if OMB established a central focal point for preparedness funding.

3. Q. Has GAO looked at the defunct "delegate agency funding" concept whereby the Federal Preparedness Agency was given funds that it distributed to other Federal departments for their preparedness programs? If not, will you do so for your final report? If so, do you think the program had merit in assuring that departments did not shortchange this function?

A. GAO has not looked at the delegate agency funding concept and does not plan to because the decision to eliminate this funding has already been made.

4. Q. The GAO testimony mentions several problems with urban evacuation plans. Would the success of such massive emigrations require careful rehearsal to succeed? Has GAO found any effort to exercise these plans?

A. The question of whether urban evacuation must be rehearsed in order to succeed can be considered only on a subjective basis. It cannot be answered until--and if--evacuation is actually carried out in the United States. We believe, however, that the success of evacuation does depend, to a great extent, on sufficient warning time and on accurate, realistic planning.

We have not found any effort to exercise evacuation plans, and we believe such exercises would be premature at this stage in the prototype planning. We also question whether public support would ever be adequate to carry out city-wide exercises.

5. Q. Can GAO determine how Federal preparedness monies are distributed geographically, by State or by region and provide it for the record?

A. The distribution of preparedness funding by State was provided to the Committee with the edited transcript.

6. Q. GAO testimony cites fallout shelter programs and urban evacuation plans as examples of programs that do not get across-the-board support from the states. Has GAO found any recurring justification for this position?

A. We believe the primary reason that some states do not fully support nuclear preparedness programs is that they are not willing to commit funds to prepare for such an unlikely catastrophe. Most States are willing to fund natural disaster preparedness because natural disasters are more likely occurrences.

Another reason for not supporting nuclear preparedness programs is the belief that they simply are not feasible. This is how California feels about relocation planning, which is carried out through federally funded contracts with States. Even though California was not asked to match Federal funds, the California Legislature refused to approve the contract.

7. Q. Has the GAO inquiry revealed anything to date in regard to the adequacy of training programs or the availability of trained emergency preparedness personnel?

A. We did not look specifically at the training programs. However, as reported by the States and communities at the end of January 1976, 87 percent of the State civil defense directors and 23 percent of the local directors had taken the training courses recommended by DCPA.

8. Q. Has the GAO been able to assess the adequacy of Federal management of preparedness programs? If so, what are the major findings?

A. DCPA's management of its financial assistance programs could be improved. The major problems found were inadequate criteria for approving financial assistance and State and local staffing patterns,

insufficient controls over use of the funds, and inadequate funding priorities. Basically, the amounts of matching funds which DCPA provides to States and communities are based on the amounts which the State and local governments are willing to fund, regardless of the areas' populations or relative risks.

We mentioned in the testimony FPA's role in coordinating the preparedness of other Federal agencies at the regional level. Also at the regional level, FPA is unable to carry out its responsibility for providing guidance to the States because it has only two professionals in each region.

We did not review how adequately FDAA manages its preparedness programs because the grant program--essentially its only preparedness program--has just recently begun.

9. Q. Can GAO provide for the record the preparedness budget breakdown by function, as suggested in the testimony?

A. This information was provided to the Committee with the edited transcript.

10. Q. Can you provide additional examples of coordination or program overlap, duplication, or conflict, as requested by Representative Mitchell (p. 36, Vol. 1, Hearing transcript)?

A. This information was provided to the Committee with the edited transcript.

11. Q. Will GAO study review Federal post-attack recovery plans or planning effort?

A. We did not review Federal postattack recovery plans in detail during this study, although we did look at FPA's plans for continuity of government. Our long-range plans include a survey of FPA's effectiveness in coordinating the emergency responsibilities of other agencies.

12. Q. Can GAO determine what percentage of available fall-out shelters would be destroyed by nuclear attacks as depicted in D.C.P.A. TR-82 (High Risk Areas) publication? Can GAO determine shelter capacity of currently designated relocation or host areas and whether any effort is underway to locate, mark, or stock shelters in these areas under the pilot programs?

A. The following figures were obtained from DCPA and should not be regarded as exact figures; they are rough estimates.

Of the 230 million shelter spaces which meet DCPA's standards, about 158 million, or 69 percent, are in the 400 high-risk areas and would be subject to destruction from direct attacks. On the basis of the 1970 census, about 134 million people live in these areas.

The exact shelter capacity of the host areas cannot be determined until on-site relocation planning is done and the host areas are identified. But DCPA generally estimates that the potential host areas have a population of about 50 million and have about 50 million identified shelter spaces. Some areas have fewer spaces than needed for their populations, and some have more.

The shelter survey is now concentrating on locating shelter spaces in the host areas. According to DCPA, the survey in the host areas is finding twice as many shelter spaces meeting DCPA's standards as had been found previously. Thus, although DCPA estimates a present host-area shelter capacity of 50 million, the capacity could be much larger when the shelter survey is completed.

In the proposed fiscal year 1977 budget, DCPA requested \$300,000 to mark 3,000 shelters in the priority 1 (counterforce) high-risk areas and surrounding host areas. There are no efforts underway to stock these shelters until a crisis begins.

13. Q. What data was reviewed by G.A.O. in assessing Soviet civil defense program?

A. Some of the studies we reviewed are listed below. We also reviewed data obtained by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

--"Soviet Civil Defense in the Seventies," by Leon Goure, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, Sept. 1975.

--"Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level," by Herbert Goldhamer, RAND Corporation, May 1974.

--"Civil Defense (Grazhdanskaya Oborona)," by P.T. Egorov, I.A. Shlyakhov, and N.I. Alabin (Moscow: 1970); translated by Scientific Translation Service, Ann Arbor, Mich., and Joseph Lewin, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Dec. 1973.

--"Soviet Civil Defense-Urban Evacuation and Dispersal," by Leon Goure, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, May 1972.

14. Q. Is G.A.O. studying the budget and other consequences of locating D.C.P.A. in the Department of Defense? If so, what are the findings?

A. No, we are not.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATIONFederal Preparedness Agency
Washington, DC 20405

AUG 20 1976


Honorable William Proxmire
Vice Chairman
Joint Committee on Defense Production
Room A-421, Senate Annex III
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Proxmire:

This responds to your request on July 12, 1976, for answers to 20 questions to complete the record of your June 28 hearing into Federal, State and local preparedness.

I am enclosing answers to all questions except 4 and 8. I am unable to respond to these questions except in an executive session in which the classified information involved in my response can be addressed.

Sincerely,


LESLIE W. BRAY, JR.
Director

Enclosures

Question 1

What has been done to eliminate duplication when agencies or departments appear to have overlapping preparedness responsibilities? It would seem, for example, that there is a definite overlap of responsibilities between the Federal Power Commission and the Department of Interior's Defense Electric Power Administration (DEPA). Has FPA reviewed their responsibilities, discussed them with the appropriate officials, and made sure each understood his role in time of emergency so that two bodies would not be issuing conflicting directives?

Answer

At request of the Office of General Counsel, Office of Management and Budget, FPA completed an informal study in November 1975 of the use made by FPA and predecessor agencies of Executive Order 11490, section 3013. The section provides that any emergency preparedness function under the order, or parts thereof, may be transferred from one agency to another with the consent of the agencies involved and with the concurrence of the Director, FPA. The study showed that under the umbrella authority, FPA and predecessor agencies have arranged for transfer, clarification or redelegation of a number of functions, using the mechanism of memoranda of understanding or agreement. On conclusion of this investigation, FPA

advised OMB that the authority is still being used, not only to resolve apparent duplication of preparedness responsibilities, but also to resolve, where possible, differences in interpretation of similar authorities.

Another mechanism that has been used to clear up fine distinctions in agency responsibilities such as between Agriculture and Interior over lumber and forest products is a document that clearly states all agencies' functions and responsibilities with respect to sectors of the industrial economy. This is OEP Circular 8500.4A, now being revised as FPA Circular 6, which designates Federal resource and claimant agency assignments for each standard industrial classification. The circular references the interagency agreements which have been most effective in delineating responsibilities, describes the obligations under the agreements to which the agencies have assented, and cites further agreements currently under development.

Department of Interior's Defense Electric Power Administration has authority for national emergency plans and programs for electric power resources under Executive Order 11490, part 7, and Executive Order 10480, part II, section 201(a)(1). Emergency Petroleum and Gas Administration (EPGA) has similar

authority for oil and natural gas. Federal Power Commission (FPC) has a supporting responsibility for national emergency planning for electric power and natural gas under Executive Order 11490, part 19.

Recognizing differing views held by DOI/DEPA and FPC regarding their respective emergency preparedness roles under a memorandum of agreement of September 14, 1972, FPA took the lead in arranging and chairing two exploratory meetings on November 4, 1975, and July 15, 1976, in which all concerned agencies participated - DOI/DEPA, FPC, Federal Energy Administration (FEA), and FPA. The positions of DOI/DEPA and FPC were considered in detail, and the relationships of DOI/EPGA and FPC to a lesser degree.

Obviously, a new, more specific procedural agreement is needed between DOI/DEPA and FPC, and the principals are between them working out such an agreement at this time. DOI/EPGA and FEA have similar problems, and a procedural agreement between them may be necessary in the future. As soon as the participating agencies are ready, another meeting will be held for reporting on their progress toward a memorandum or memoranda of procedures which will meet with FPA's concurrence.

Based on such experience, FPA also proposes draft amendments to Executive Order 11490 from time to time to reduce the more fundamental differences within the Executive Branch, which also involves a process of concurrence and resolution. Four amendments have been issued to Executive Order 11490 to date including a selective revision signed by the President June 11, 1976, to incorporate organizational and functional changes in Government. This is an ongoing program. FPA is currently preparing a draft amendment proposing emergency assignments for Energy Research and Development Administration and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, agencies created following the abolishment of the Atomic Energy Commission. This was made possible when FPA arranged and conducted a joint ERDA/NRC staff conference on a division of related responsibilities of the new agencies, and obtained submissions of proposed assignments.

Question 2. It appears that FPA retains the responsibility for preparedness policy coordination and supervision while other agencies at the state and Federal level retain all the operational preparedness responsibilities. When operational control is separated from policy control, doesn't that invite situations where there is doubt as to who has what responsibility, with consequences for both policymaking and implementation?

Answer. The separation of policy coordination from operational control has not presented problems relative to responsibility assignments because this approach provides a central authority readily recognized as the overall program coordinator and the mechanism for resolving conflicts of interests and other uncertainties arising among operational control agencies.

The complexity of the civil emergency preparedness program is such that, regardless of the organizational structure involved, questions will frequently arise relative to a variety of problem areas including those of responsibilities.

In a properly organized and competently run program, areas of responsibility will be clearly defined, and established channels will be available for resolving problems as they occur.

The basic consideration, therefore, is to design the program so as to achieve the optimum arrangement for overall program efficiency and competence. On the basis of experience to-date, the separation of policy coordination from the operational responsibilities appears to be such an arrangement.

Question 3

Within the constraints of security classification, please describe the current continuity of government plans and the role played in them by the Federal Relocation Arc and the Federal Regional Reconstitution Areas.

Answer

A program for continuity of the Federal Government to deal with the range of contingencies within existing attack capabilities must focus on provisions for a multiple management capability by the establishments of the Executive Branch to carry out the functions that would directly contribute to national survival and security immediately before, during, and after an attack emergency (actual or threatened). Plans have been developed accordingly.

Departments and agencies with such essential, uninterruptible functions--known as Category A functions--have emergency operating facilities scattered in a wide area around Washington to provide dispersed capability to carry out those functions which can not be suspended during the three critical periods. The "Arc" refers to these facilities.

Such organizations are required to be prepared to accomplish these functions from any one of three geographic locations-- from the regular office where day-to-day duties are performed, from the first alternate emergency operating facility (the consolidated emergency operating center), and from the second alternate emergency operating facility, separately maintained by each department and agency.

In an emergency, and on instructions, these three emergency operating facilities would be brought into operation by predesignated executive complements, known as teams, composed of the minimum personnel needed to perform the essential, uninterruptible functions when, and as may be required by contingencies of the emergency.

Additionally, all departments and agencies, not just those with Category A functions, are required under Executive Order 11490 to plan for and take such actions as may be necessary to continue as a viable part of the Federal Government, including the following: succession to office, predelegation of emergency authority, safekeeping of essential records, emergency action steps, and protection of Government resources, facilities, and personnel. Basic guidance for national level continuity of government is contained in OEP Circular 9100.2 attached.

At the regional level of authority, a dual management capability is also sought for those portions of government whose responsibilities include essential, uninterrupted functions. The phrase "reconstitution" refers to the fourth period after those immediately before, during and after an attack emergency. Planning for reconstitution is based on the concept of a time when the national will for recovery is emerging, the national goals and objectives for recovery are beginning to take shape, and actual operations for rebuilding the nation are under way. Planning for reconstitution has been started in all of the Federal regions and, with the assistance of the departments and agencies, an inventory has been developed of geographic areas which should significantly improve the regional readiness posture. These are the tentative "reconstitution areas".

(Currently under revision--
to be published as FPC-11)

OEP CIRCULAR 9100.2
April 12, 1972

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Washington, D. C. 20504

OEP CIRCULAR 9100.2

TO: Federal Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Continuity of the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government

1. Purpose. This Circular provides basic guidance to Federal departments and agencies on measures to be undertaken to preserve the continuity of the non-military elements of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government so as to assure the national level performance of essential functions under all emergency conditions including attack on the United States.

2. Authority. This guidance is issued pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order 11051, particularly Section 304; and Executive Order 11490, particularly Section 102(b).

3. Policy. It is the policy of the Federal Government to develop and maintain plans and programs to assure the continuity of the Federal Government under all emergency conditions including attack on the United States.

4. Background. Over the years since the inception of nuclear weapons, the Federal Government has sought to implement this policy through preparations to assure its survival in order to serve the needs of the Nation and its people. The most recent definition of these preparations is provided in Section 102 of Executive Order 11490 of October 30, 1969. This guidance amplifies that statement.

5. Concept.

a. General. To reduce vulnerability and better assure national-level performance of essential functions in an emergency, there must be preparations for providing

OEP CIRCULAR 9100.2
April 12, 1972

governmental authority and executive capability both at regular headquarters and at a suitable number of other separate geographic locations. The requirement for continuity is most urgent for those parts of government that must perform essential civil functions throughout the transattack and immediate postattack period of a nuclear war. To the extent possible, arrangements should be capable of being implemented, in whole or in part, during periods of tension or threat. The requirement for uninterrupted continuity is less urgent for those parts of government whose essential functions are directly related to needs arising after attack when reconstitution of the Nation must begin or is even well along. Preparations for fulfilling these requirements must be made in advance and must encompass the kinds of attacks that are regarded by official estimates as within probable capabilities.

b. Specific Categories. There are three categories of emergency responsibilities. They have been established by assessing both the national essentiality of the function to be performed by the department or agency and the degree of need for immediate capability to operate continuously. The categories are:

Category A. Organizations requiring a capability for uninterrupted emergency operations including the immediate preattack, transattack and immediate postattack periods.

Category B. Organizations with a requirement for postattack reconstitution as soon as conditions permit, unless otherwise directed by appropriate authority.

Category C. Organizations that are to defer reconstitution until directed by appropriate authority.

These distinctions apply within departments and agencies as well as among them. Thus, departments and agencies must determine the appropriate category of emergency responsibilities for their bureaus and other major constituent organizations by identifying the appropriate time for their contribution to the national-level performance of the essential functions by the department or agency.

OEP CIRCULAR 9100.2
April 12, 1972

Departments and agencies are listed by category in Appendix 1 to this Circular.

6. Responsibilities.

a. Federal departments, designated components of the Executive Office of the President and independent agencies in Category A are to be prepared to carry out national-level essential functions from any one of three geographic locations with the regular office as primary headquarters and the others as alternate headquarters.

b. Other components of the Executive Office of the President and independent agencies in Category B are to be prepared to reconstitute their organizations and to carry out emergency assignments at regular headquarters or a designated alternate location as soon as conditions permit, unless otherwise ordered by appropriate authority.

c. The remaining independent agencies in Category C do not have emergency assignments requiring advance arrangements for alternate locations but are to be prepared to resume activities in the reconstitution period when ordered by appropriate authority.

d. As further insurance against the possibility that all other continuity arrangements may become inoperative, those agencies in Categories A and B having suitable field organizations are to prepare them to accept interim authority for essential national functions. The specific geographic priority list for such delegation of authority will, to the maximum extent feasible, be in accordance with the sequence of regional office designations established by OEP. (Listed in Appendix 2.)

7. Implementation.

a. Organizations in Category A are to establish three executive complements or teams at the national level composed of the minimum number of personnel needed to perform essential national functions during an immediate preattack, transattack and immediate postattack period. In the event of an attack emergency, one executive complement would comprise the minimum cadre for continuous departmental or agency leadership from the National Office for initiating emergency operations during non-duty hours or directing them in duty hours; a second and a third would each report, on instructions, to separate designated emergency operating facilities outside the Washington, D. C.

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area, one of which is a consolidated emergency operating facility. The National Office and at least one of the other emergency operating facilities are to be suitably prepared for expansion of government activities during national reconstitution and recovery. It is desirable that maximum use be made of existing assets to provide Federal Government authorities and their staffs with protection, equipment and supplies, and communications capability suitable to the performance of essential functions. One or more individuals designated in the line of succession for the agency will be assigned to each of the three teams. Space for the Head of a Department or Agency is to be made available at each location. Supporting professional, clerical and service staffs are to be distributed and trained so as to achieve general parity of capability among the locations.

b. Organizations in Category B are to establish two executive complements at the national level with the capability of providing leadership and directing operations as soon as conditions permit in the postattack reconstitution period. One executive complement is to comprise the minimum cadre to reactivate the regular National Office if this proves feasible; the second is to report, when instructed, to a designated emergency operating area outside the Washington, D. C. area. Each is to be capable of forming the nucleus for agency reconstitution. These teams are to be composed of the minimum number of personnel required for initiating the resumption of agency functions. It is anticipated that they would be augmented as conditions permit. Each team will have assigned to it one or more individuals in the line of succession for the agency. Surviving supporting professional, clerical and service staffs are to be prepared to report to either location as directed. It is desirable that each location provide facilities, equipment, supplies, and communications capability suitable for the initiation and subsequent expansion of agency activities at the appropriate time.

c. Organizations in Category C are to be prepared to reactivate their regular agency structures when required by appropriate authority. However, since this may not occur until the reconstitution period is fairly advanced, the primary obligations of agency personnel are to make themselves available for other emergency duty and to cooperate with local, State and national authorities until such time as recalled to duty with their own agency.

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d. Continuity of Regional and Field Support. The capability required at regional and field level for performance of essential functions in the transattack and immediate postattack periods in support of national essential functions will be developed at two geographic locations per region. Primary capability to (1) act temporarily for the National Office in event of communications disruption or (2) act as the National Office in event of damage to all executive complements higher in the order of succession is to be achieved in the Uniform Federal Regional Council Cities (UFRCC) as listed in Appendix 2. Alternate capability is to be achieved at the Federal Regional Centers (FRC) as listed in Appendix 2. Plans for reconstitution in the UFRCC area should also be made, together with alternative plans for reconstitution at two other areas in the region. Capability to carry out essential regional functions should be developed to meet the requirements for continuous performance or reconstitution, as appropriate, while field activities designed to support a State in its essential functions should be related to the continuity of government arrangements of the individual State. Further guidance on regional and field continuity is provided in OEP Circular 9100 series.

8. Program Guidance. The several programs enumerated in Section 102(b) of Executive Order 11490 pertaining to continuity of government are to be undertaken in such manner as to support the policy stated in this Circular.

a. Succession to Office lists are to be officially recorded and appropriately disseminated; they are to include all Executive-level appointees plus such other professional staff executives as are necessary to provide leadership at locations from which national authority may be exercised. For national succession, a depth of at least 12 is recommended and, when possible, at least 5 of these should be outside the D.C. area. Where a suitable field structure exists, the successors outside D.C. should include all Regional Directors. Constituent bureaus, and other appropriate organizational elements, should provide comparable depth and distribution of succession. Further guidance is provided in OEP Circular 9110.1 series.

b. Predelegation of emergency authority is to be officially recorded and appropriately disseminated; it

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is to include identification of the limits of authority and of accountability, and the circumstances under which the authority is to be exercised. Any exceptions to the authority of designated successors to agency direction should be stated explicitly and should include the authority to redelegate functions and activities. Further guidance is provided in OEP Circular 9130.1 series.

c. Safekeeping of essential records is to be performed in accordance with policy guidance from OEP and with program guidance from the National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration. Records essential for the performance of transattack and immediate postattack functions are to be maintained at each location, national or field, from which national agency authority may be exercised. Records essential for functions in the reconstitution period may be maintained at accessible, dispersed locations.

d. Emergency relocation sites, supported by communications and required services for executive complements previously described, are to be maintained in accordance with criteria issued by OEP. Arrangements for emergency operations at regular headquarters, both in Washington, D. C. and in the field, are to make maximum use of existing space that is most suitable for the continuous performance of essential functions. Relocation sites have been selected principally from existing facilities. This practice should be followed where additional relocation sites are required, although opportunities provided by new facilities being established for other programs should be considered. Adaptability to expansion and operations in a reconstitution phase is an important consideration. Cooperation between agencies in the co-location of functionally related organizations is also desirable.

e. Emergency action steps are to be established and published for distribution to all appropriate personnel. These steps should include identification of emergency assignments, emergency duty stations, alerting or notification procedures, and other actions and measures to be taken under various Defense Conditions (DEFCONs), Conditions of Warning, actual attack, or official orders, including those related to agency reconstitution. Relevant civil defense instructions and procedures for reporting postattack availability are also to be included.


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f. Alternate headquarters are to be officially designated; and the order in which the headquarters may assume control, the circumstances under which the presence of higher authority relieves another headquarters, and the necessary verification procedures are to be specified.

g. Protection of Government resources, facilities and personnel is to be given continuing attention. This can be accomplished, in part, by taking advantage of opportunities to disperse resources or facilities; by achieving redundancy of essential equipment; by increasing the protective capabilities of facilities in the design stage; by informing and training personnel in personal and family protection measures; by periodic readiness exercises; and by training in emergency duties.

9. Reports. Reports on the status of the programs listed above are to be furnished in conjunction with the regular annual reports required by OEP Circular 5600.2. Rosters of successors and copies of agency directives issued, together with current changes, are to be enclosed so that OEP may maintain appropriate records.

10. Effective Date. This Circular is effective on date of issue.


G. A. Lincoln
Director

Appendix 1
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Categories of Emergency Responsibility

These three categories of departments and agencies are intended to reflect only the essentiality of their national level emergency functions.

Departments and agencies are requested to apply the criteria for Categories A, B and C to their own emergency functions and organizational components. Whenever this results in the desirability of a change in category for a department or agency, this finding should be forwarded immediately to OEP.

Assessments on organizational components are to be furnished to OEP for review, so that OEP may assure consistency of application across the Executive Branch. The initial assessment is to be submitted within 6 months after issue of this Circular and changes are to be submitted annually thereafter as a part of the annual report to OEP.

Appendix 1
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Category A

Executive Departments

Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice and FBI
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury

Independent Agencies

Atomic Energy Commission
Civil Aeronautics Board
Civil Service Commission
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Power Commission
Federal Reserve System (Board)
General Services Administration
Interstate Commerce Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Selective Service System
*Tennessee Valley Authority
U.S. Information Agency
Veterans Administration

*Regional emergency functions are so comprehensive as to have national significance

Executive Office of the President

The White House Office
Office of Management and Budget
Council of Economic Advisers
Central Intelligence Agency
Domestic Council Staff
National Security Council Staff
Office of Emergency Preparedness
Office of Science and Technology
Office of Telecommunications Policy

Appendix 1
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Category B

Independent Agencies

Export-Import Bank of the United States
Farm Credit Administration
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Trade Commission
National Credit Union Administration
National Science Foundation
Railroad Retirement Board
Securities and Exchange Commission
Small Business Administration
United States Postal Service

Executive Office of the President

National Aeronautics and Space Council
Office of Economic Opportunity

Category C

All other organizations and instrumentalities of the
Federal Executive Branch.

Appendix 2
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Emergency Succession to Authority for Conduct
 of Essential National Functions

The preferred order for regional emergency succession to authority for conduct of the essential national functions of departments and agencies is as follows:

Federal Regional Council
 Cities

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	3
Dallas, Texas	6
Denver, Colorado	8
Seattle, Washington	10
Atlanta, Georgia	4
Boston, Massachusetts	1
Chicago, Illinois	5
San Francisco, California	9
Kansas City, Missouri	7
New York, New York	2

OEP Region Headquarters

Federal Regional Centers

Olney, Maryland	3
Denton, Texas	6 and 7
Denver, Colorado	8
Bothell, Washington	10
Thomasville, Georgia	4
Maynard, Massachusetts	1 and 2
Battle Creek, Michigan	5
Santa Rosa, California	9

Alternate Headquarters for
 OEP Region

Question 5

Is there now available legislation that would permit the President to rule by decree if the Congress was unable to function? What are the relevant laws? Is additional such legislation expected to be proposed and, if so, in what form?

Answer

There is no legislation now available which would permit the President to rule by decree if the Congress is unable to function. There are, however, numerous statutes which provide the President with carefully delineated emergency authorities under certain conditions prescribed by the Congress.

Principal among these laws administered by FPA or other agencies are the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 USC 401 et seq.); the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 USC App. 2061 et seq.); the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act (50 USC 98-98h); the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (50 USC App. 2251 et seq.); the Trading with the Enemy Act; the Tariff Act of 1930; the Communications Act of 1934, Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 (72 Stat. 1799); Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 (87 Stat. 1089), and the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93-288).

Until recently, Title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act, as amended, also provided the President with certain emergency authorities upon the declaration by him of a civil defense emergency. This provision, Title III, of the law expired June 30, 1974, and has not, as of this date, been reenacted. FPA has drafted and submitted to the Office of Management and Budget a proposal to revise and reenact Title III. Re-enactment of Title III will not only insure the availability of powers essential to carrying out emergency actions, but also will provide necessary support and guidance for preparedness planning activities at all levels of government.

FPA has developed draft legislation in coordination with the departments and agencies for submission to Congress in national defense and other emergencies which are sufficiently grave in terms of national security as to justify emergency measures on a national scale; for which legislative action is necessary or desirable, and which cannot be implemented using extant authority. It is not contemplated that these draft proposals would be submitted to the Congress until the contingency in which they would be needed actually occurs.

Question 6

Do current post-attack recovery plans require congressional adoption before they can go into effect?

Answer

The nature and requirements of the post-attack society can not be completely foreseen so the essential elements in our national preparedness for a post-attack situation necessarily rely on a well recognized management concept. It envisions the creation of an emergency organization, fostering the resumption of work and production, stabilizing a money economy and the flow of incomes, re-creation of functioning communication and transport services, re-establishment of a legal and governmental system, maintenance of public morale, and stimulating the national will to re-create a functioning society. There is no post-attack recovery plan, nor is one contemplated, for which legislative action is necessary or desirable, that does not embrace congressional approval before implementation.

Question 7:

Within the limits of security classification, please describe the assumptions, objectives, and assignment of responsibilities of the Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies (FRPPNE) and of Federal Emergency Plan D.

Answer

Federal Emergency Plan D is based on an assumed international situation involving a nuclear attack on the United States with little or no warning, resulting in widespread destruction of industry, heavy casualties and crippling of government at all levels, thereby constituting a threat to the existence of the Nation. The purpose of the plan is to prescribe major Federal policies and actions, and to provide draft implementing documents that may be required by the Federal Government during and after a crippling nuclear attack on the United States. The objectives of Plan D policies and actions are to:

1. Ensure the continuity of government and order.
2. Support military operations and military alliances.
3. Ensure survival of the remaining population and recovery of the Nation.
4. Ensure the most effective use of resources.

5. Maintain free world unity.
6. Serve as a guide for coordinating individual agency programming actions and other readiness measures in order that the total national effort will be unified and properly interrelated.
7. Provide for emergency organizations which may be established as conditions warrant or require.

Federal Emergency Plan D is supported by emergency plans prepared under assignments of responsibilities to various departments and agencies in Executive Order 11490, as amended. The execution of such plans in a national emergency will require specific Presidential authorization.

The Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies is in draft form and is undergoing interagency coordination. As such, it is subject to change. When the plan is completed, we will be glad to furnish you a copy.

Question 9

What is the FPA reaction to GAO testimony regarding the apparent lack of any agreed priorities for the national preparedness effort?

Answer

The subject testimony raised the issue of whether national level significant priority designations should be given departments and agencies against which they should apply their limited funds for preparedness. The point was made by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Defense Production that there is no single focal point in the executive or legislative branches for consideration of the entire Federal preparedness budget. The Director, FPA, has testified on this subject before the Joint Committee. See pages 53-55 of Volume 1 of the transcript of the Hearings on Federal, State, and Local Emergency Preparedness.

Question 10

What is the FPA response to GAO testimony that civil defense seems to have switched from preparedness measures to save lives and property to postattack recovery measures?

Answer

We do not agree that civil defense has switched from measures to save lives and property to postattack recovery measures. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), under Executive Order 10952, has been responsible for civil defense programs in the Government. They have been designed or undertaken to accomplish the following objectives:

- a. Minimize the effects upon the civilian population which would be caused by an enemy attack upon the United States.
- b. Deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such attack.
- c. Effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack.

FPA provides broad policy guidance for the total civil defense program. We are currently coordinating with DCPA in development of the Crisis Relocation Program to ensure consistency with other preparedness policies and measures that may be employed in that time frame.

Question 11. What is the FPA role in anti-sabotage preparedness under Executive Order 10421? What has been done recently to carry it out? Does it include preparedness against acts of terrorism? Have any anti-sabotage or anti-terrorist plans been exercised?

Answer. The role of the Director of FPA in anti-sabotage preparedness under Executive Order 10421, as supplemented by Section 206(c) of Executive Order 11051, is to supervise, coordinate, provide policy guidance and evaluate programs of Federal agencies for the physical security (including sabotage) of facilities important to defense mobilization, defense production, civil defense and the essential civilian economy, including those facilities under the cognizance of such agencies. The Director of FPA is required within his overall role to (1) develop and promulgate standards of physical security for facilities with the advice and assistance of appropriate Federal agencies, (2) assign facilities to Federal agencies on the basis of interest and general cognizance of the agencies for the purpose of furthering physical security, (3) approve security ratings (based on the relative importance to defense needs and the essential civilian economy) as established by the Secretary of Commerce and make them available to agencies

concerned, and (4) keep the President informed and make recommendations as necessary.

FPA is assisted by the Department of Defense in the development and review of physical security standards for facilities. In addition to the general requirements of Executive Order 10421, Section 401(14) of Executive Order 11490 requires that the Secretary of Defense "advise and assist the Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA) in the development and review of standards for the strategic location and physical security of industries, services, government, and other activities for which continuing operation is essential to national security, and exercise physical security cognizance over the facilities assigned to him for such purpose." The Defense Industrial Facilities Protection Program (DIFPP) which is carried out by the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) responds to this overall requirement of FPA and DOD relative to physical security standards. Anti-sabotage considerations are an integral part of DSA's DIFPP.

FPA normally reviews and maintains surveillance over the development of facility security ratings by the

Department of Commerce through participation in the Industry Evaluation Board (IEB) activities (reference Section 4(d) of Executive Order 10421 and Section 902(3) of Executive Order 11490, as amended by Section 9(d) of Executive Order 11921).

The Federal Preparedness Agency is presently involved in exploring and developing anti-sabotage preparedness measures related to the problem of terrorism. The current area of concern is the vulnerability of electric power facilities to terrorist attack. The exploration of this area is being carried out as a joint effort with the Defense Electric Power Administration (Department of Interior), the Federal Power Commission and the Defense Supply Agency (DOD). Attention to additional areas of vulnerability is anticipated in the near future. The total anti-terrorist effort is also being closely coordinated with the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT). FPA is a participating member of the Working Group of this committee.

The FPA role in anti-sabotage preparedness under Executive Order 10421, is considered to include preparedness against acts of terrorism since terrorism is a politically motivated form of sabotage which

threatens not only defense production facilities but also facilities essential to the civilian economy as expressed by the Executive order.

No plans have been exercised by FPA in which anti-sabotage or anti-terrorism has been the primary consideration. Increasing emphasis, however, is being given to sabotage and terroristic elements in the scenarios of general war readiness exercises such as REX 76.

Question 12. Does FPA have a role in planning for industrial survival of a nuclear attack, in view of the fact that limited nuclear war assumes industrial facilities may be prime nuclear targets? Who is in overall control of industrial survival planning? Has anything been done in a concrete way in this area since the lapse of the National Industrial Dispersion Program? What, specifically?

Answer. FPA has an overall role in assuring industrial preparedness for war. Industrial survival or, more properly, industrial defense, is part of larger industrial preparedness which includes maximizing industrial effort in support of national defense in any war effort.

The National Security Act of 1947 is the legal basis of FPA's role in coordinating "military, industrial, and civilian" preparedness for war. The authority is extended through a number of Executive Orders (11051, 11490) which involve FPA in overseeing the activities of other departments and agencies in identifying critical industries/^{and}in planning their maintenance, protection, expanded output, etc. to meet military and essential civilian needs in wartime. Federal agencies are assigned preparedness responsibilities for the industrial sectors they oversee. A leading example is the Department of Commerce which conducts emergency programs for the production and construction industries. Similarly, the Department of the Interior conducts programs for

energy and minerals, the Department of Agriculture for food production, the Department of Transportation for transport services, etc. Each has responsibilities which involve it directly with its respective industrial sector in preparedness efforts. The Department of Defense also has extensive planning responsibilities involving industrial facilities considered critical to its specific needs. These efforts apply to various assumed emergency conditions, including limited and general nuclear war, with emphasis changing as national policy with respect to war conditions change.

In the more limited and specific area of industrial defense against nuclear attack, there was a major program of industrial dispersal and facilities protection which FPA's predecessor agency coordinated and which involved a number of Federal departments and agencies in extensive activity during the 1950s. (Reference Executive Order 10421.) Standards for anti-sabotage, anti-espionage, protection of records, and guard and other services developed then are still the basis of many physical protection plans. A number of industrial and trade associations were induced to promulgate facilities protection measures and these became part of standard security in offices, plants and warehouses. In some cases major industries developed hardened and underground facilities for their personnel, equipment and records. This Government program declined in the mid-1960s due in part to its becoming

acceptable industry procedure. A more ambitious program to induce critical industries to relocate away from urban centers had been planned. It was not implemented as a program when it was found that this phenomenon was already taking place in the evolutionary change of our society brought on by environmental concerns and the growth of dispersed labor-market areas.

Industrial preparedness in its broader aspects, to include mobilization base preparedness, is being revived today in cooperative efforts between FPA and DOD. And while no major directed effort is underway in the specific area of industrial survival, it is kept alive by the activity of individual agencies (notably DOD's Defense Supply Agency which administers a Defense Industrial Facilities Protection Program) and some industrial associations. DCPA has maintained an active industrial security training program. The Departments of Commerce, Transportation, and Interior have maintained some interest and involvement in industrial preparedness through their National Defense Executive Reserve training programs. It is felt that physical security and dispersal of industrial plants continues to advance, with minimum Federal promotion, as a result of industry measures such as installation of improved electronic

detection, natural dispersal away from urban areas, simplified construction methods and similar considerations.

QUESTION 13. FPA lost control of the funds appropriated for preparedness functions of other agencies, such as Interior or Commerce, when the "delegate agency" budget method was dropped. What was the justification for this change and what has its impact been?

ANSWER

The Committee Report of the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations dated July 24, 1974, stated:

"The Committee believes that these functions should be funded in the various agency budgets as they are for the other 24 Federal agencies having emergency assignments. The funds provided will provide for half-year financing in fiscal 1975 at the 1974 level of operations while the agencies work out direct financing."

Since the latter half of fiscal year 1975, funding of emergency functions has been assumed within the normal operating budget process of the agencies.

Question 14 (first part)

If the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency is Coordinator, responsible for advising the President on these matters under Executive Orders, why was he not informed of the planned cuts in the budget of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency until after they were decided on?

Answer

The President was presented the facts in this matter, and his decision was disseminated.

QUESTION 14 (second part)

What role does FPA have in the formation of DCPA and FDAA policies?

ANSWER

The Director of FPA issues annual policy guidance to the heads of the departments and agencies which is applicable to all aspects of preparedness under their purview. This guidance is applicable to all components of the Department of Defense, including Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and to all components of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, including Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. However, the total responsibility for policy guidance and operational functions under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 is solely that of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. The specific actions to implement the FPA policy guidance are the responsibility of the secretaries of the departments concerned.

Question 15

Since neither natural disasters or nuclear attacks are respecters of State or local boundaries, is there any mechanism for regional preparedness coordination? Does reliance on State agencies for disaster operations reduce cooperation across State lines? Can the rather small and far-flung Federal regional staffs take care of all these regional coordination problems? Has getting this kind of cooperation proved troublesome?

Answer

There are several mechanisms for regional preparedness coordination:

1. The FPA Regional Preparedness Committee, with membership from regional Federal departments/agencies, provides a forum for discussion, resolution, and coordination of problems in preparedness.
2. The FPA Field Board coordinates regionally the activities of Federal agencies in resource interruption crises. This board also works closely with the States of the region.
3. The National Association of State Directors for Disaster Preparedness (NASDDP) has regional meetings periodically at which questions of preparedness coordination for conflict or civil crisis preparedness are discussed and resolved. DCPA plays an important role here.

4. Federal Disaster Assistance Administration has held regional conferences with Federal agencies and States combined to review natural disaster preparedness plans and to train for actual natural disaster operations.

5. FPA Regions 1 and 2 have conducted joint Federal agency and State exercises in addition to REX.75 and 76 in which Regions 1 and 8 and Regions 3 and 10 participated with other Federal agencies.

6. The Radiological Emergency Response Planning (RERP) Advisory Committee, working with Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is involved in planning with States for emergency responses to nuclear accidents; interstate coordination is necessary because of overlapping or affected jurisdictions. FPA has found State-to-State cooperation to be excellent.

7. In preparation for a general war situation, the States have been asked by the Federal Government to develop standby emergency plans which can be activated under State authority in a national emergency. Regional Directors are frequently meeting with State Emergency Planning Directors to review carefully State emergency plans as they are being developed with Federal agency guidance.

In sum, the FPA regional staff is small but is effective because it can call on the whole Federal regional family for augmentation. We have built up through the years an excellent working relationship with other Federal regional departments/agencies and with the States so that getting cooperation and coordination has never been a problem.

QUESTION 16. Does the Federal Preparedness Agency's public budget figure of \$16 million cover all functions, including relocation sites? Are monies provided in the budgets of other agencies for FPA functions?

ANSWER.

\$16,000,000 is the amount of the FY 1976 appropriation for the Federal Preparedness Agency, including relocation sites under the responsibility of FPA. However, certain classified FPA functions are not included in this public budget figure. FPA is prepared to address the latter in a classified forum.

Question 17: The Director, FPA, issues annual emergency preparedness policy guidance to all Federal departments and agencies. Please supply recent examples of that policy guidance for the record.

Response: Attached are examples of guidance issued by the Director, FPA, to Federal departments and agencies for Fiscal Year 1976. This guidance was uniform for most departments/agencies. The letter to the Secretary of Defense transmitted, in addition to the general guidance, special guidance applicable to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (TAB A). The letter to the Secretary of Agriculture was typical of those sent to departments/agencies with additional involvement in NATO civil emergency preparedness planning activities (Commerce, Transportation, Office of Telecommunications Policy) (TAB B).

FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY

AUG 8 1975

Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The purpose of this letter is to provide general program guidance on civil emergency preparedness for FY 1976 and to supplement the guidance for FY 1975 previously provided in my October 3, 1974, guidance letter.

The Administrator, General Services Administration, has established the Federal Preparedness Agency as a successor to the Office of Preparedness, effective June 29, 1975, as one effort to highlight the importance of emergency preparedness and to emphasize the Agency's management and coordination role in all types of emergencies. However, the overall mission of the new Federal Preparedness Agency remains essentially the same as that of its predecessor.

There is a continuing need for achieving and maintaining a high degree of readiness to cope with various crises or a national emergency. Executive Order 11459 charges the Heads of Departments and Agencies with such responsibilities. Preparedness programs should be reviewed and analyzed to assure agencies' capabilities to carry out their designated responsibilities.

World and domestic events continue to dictate the need for maintaining emphasis on and improvement of civil emergency preparedness. Economic and security problems have been aggravated by basic resource shortages, disruptions or maldistributions. Such conditions make necessary the maintenance of a strong national security posture, and require that we take measures to minimize or prevent a costly dependence upon foreign nations for materials needed to insure national security.

In this context, the application of priorities and allocation authorities of the Defense Production Act, the maintenance of strategic and critical stockpiles, and the development of a strong industrial preparedness base, have assumed added significance.

In the past year, the U. S. has made a significant contribution in the Civil Emergency Preparedness planning activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, yet much work in this important area remains to be done. Specifically, the U. S. seeks to continue to strengthen the linkage between military and civil resource and service planning within the alliance.

Enclosure 1 provides specific guidance on matters which I believe deserve priority attention and concerning which I ask your personal support in Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977.

Enclosure 2 provides additional guidance for the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

You are requested to submit an annual report of your emergency preparedness activities covering Fiscal Year 1975 to reach the Federal Preparedness Agency by October 1, 1975. The report will be in addition to that submitted to the Joint Committee on Defense Production of the Congress and should focus on problem areas and recommended solutions thereto.

I welcome your suggestions, recommendations, and criticisms regarding all emergency preparedness matters with which we are mutually concerned.

I thank you and your staff for past dedication to and support of civil emergency preparedness, and I am hopeful that we may continue together toward the goals and objectives I described herein.

Sincerely,

Leslie W. Bray, Jr.

LESLIE W. BRAY, JR.
Director

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Willard B. French
Emergency Coordinator
OASD (COMPT), DOD

E (2) All FPA Prof. Staff
EG (2) EGG/FJHaase/ekh/x4541/8-5-75
EGG/Baird/Haase RewrE
EGG/FJHaase/ekh/x4541/8-7-75
EF

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Sincerely,

Leslie W. Bray, Jr.

LESLIE W. BRAY, JR.
Director

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. B. Wilson
Emergency Coordinator
Department of Agriculture

E (2)
EG (2)
EF
All FPA Professional Staff
EGG/Baird/Haase

Identical letter forwarded to:
Office of Telecommunications Policy
Department of Commerce
Department of Transportation

✓ EGG/FJHaase/ekh/x4541/8-6-75

30 8/6/75

GUIDANCE FOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES
OF THE
FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

FISCAL YEARS 1976 AND 1977

(NOTE: Recent predecessors to the Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration, were the Office of Preparedness, GSA, and the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Executive Office of the President.)

CIVIL CRISIS PREPAREDNESS GUIDANCE

1. Resource Crisis Management

The Federal Preparedness Agency is involved with other departments and agencies, and with the States, in planning and responding to current or potential domestic crises arising from resource shortages and interruptions to vital industrial services. The many aspects of the energy problem, the continuing materials shortages, and threat of widespread transportation interruptions are of current concern. Problems of food production, health, environment, and sanitation are matters that could develop into serious situations and must be monitored closely. This activity provides us and the involved Federal departments unique opportunities for improving Government plans and procedures, at all levels, to meet a broad range of resource emergencies.

Executive Order 11490 charges various Federal agencies with planning and preparations to meet serious resource shortages and industrial service disruptions in the economy. The Federal Preparedness Agency has the role under that same Order for assuring that these various plans are compatible, and, under Executive Order 11051, for assuring that essential needs are reconciled with available supply during national emergencies.

Crisis contingency plans have been prepared in a number of resource areas, but additional ones need development. Many States and localities have no crisis contingency plans. Almost all need to develop monitoring and response systems that will identify potential problems and assess the capabilities of local institutional and business communities to deal with those problems. Crisis readiness at these levels will support and strengthen our Federal preparedness.

FPA is taking significant initiatives tying our Federal regional crisis monitoring and response systems into improved similar State and local mechanisms. We ask your cooperation in advancing this effort. We call upon you to pursue efforts to keep the public and business communities informed on the need for resource conservation, fuel and transportation economies, and maximized production. To the extent that these measures may not suffice to forestall crises, we call upon you to prepare contingency plans and draft action measures with which to carry out your crisis responsibilities, and, further, to integrate the lessons of crises into your longer-term resource management plans.

Different aspects of this are touched upon in the material which follows. In any of the areas of approaching or actual resource crises, we ask that you give prompt and priority attention, including national staff and field support as appropriate.

2. National Energy Problems

Through the membership of the Administrator of General Services on the Energy Resources Council, FPA is involved with many of your agencies in various task forces to improve the Nation's energy self-sufficiency and ability to meet the threat of any future oil embargo or other energy-related crisis.

Of particular concern at this time is the developing serious situation in natural gas for meeting the Nation's fuel needs this coming winter. The Federal Power Commission has called attention to this problem, and with the Administration is seeking relief through legislation to deregulate the well-head price of gas so that it moves more freely through the interstate system.

But this action cannot come quickly enough to avoid many firm and interruptible contract curtailments in the months ahead. The Federal Energy Administration has called upon agencies to reduce their use of this critical fuel through conservation and the use of alternate fuels. It has also asked agencies to pursue programs for assisting local communities in meeting their fuel problems. General Services Administration adds its support to this by asking that agencies undertake programs of austerity and dual-fuel use in all Government buildings and facilities. We would like to make the Federal Government the model in reduced fuel use for State and local governments and institutions.

3. Transportation and Postal Service Interruptions

When rail, motor, postal and other major transportation interruptions threaten or occur as a result of strikes or other work stoppages, they affect all sectors of the economy, including essential Government operations. As such crises develop, FPA maintains contact with main operations centers such as those of the Department of Transportation and the U. S. Postal Service at national level and in the field and provides the conduit for channeling economic impact information from various Federal agencies and the field to the Domestic Council and the White House. FPA also establishes the priorities for movement services to be implemented by Transportation, and, with the Secretary's Office, readies Executive actions required to administer emergency authorities. Federal agencies with responsibility for major Government programs and for overseeing economic sectors impacted by transportation work stoppages will be called upon to participate in FPA national and field resource board activities in connection with such emergencies and should assure the readiness of their own communications and information processes to report on and respond to crises of this nature.

4. Industrial Production

Federal civil agencies have a responsibility under Executive Order 11490 for reviewing military and related requirements that may be laid upon sectors of the economy which they oversee, and for assisting in planning the readiness of those sectors of industry which constitute the production base to support defense and other essential needs during a national emergency. There will be renewed activity in this area as Department of Defense requirements are adjusted to new strategic needs and as new procedures are promulgated with respect to Defense Production Act support to assuring such needs. Federal resource agencies will be called upon to suggest new initiatives both with respect to Government incentives to improve the production base and with respect to earmarking civil facilities that may be pre-designated for defense and other emergency uses.

5. Resource Interruption Monitoring System (RIMS)

You are also asked to lend your assistance to State and local efforts for improving their information and analysis requirements. The Federal Preparedness Agency is seeking to establish in States

a capability comparable to our national Resource Interruption Monitoring System (RIMS) and to tie those systems into our Regional Offices for fast reporting and response when resource crises or other emergencies occur.

6. Costly and Dangerous Dependencies Upon Foreign Resources Needed in Common Defense

Department/agencies should continue to be alert to and identify conditions and trends which may lead to a costly and dangerous dependency upon foreign nations for supplies of materials needed in the common defense. When such conditions or trends are noted, departments/agencies should report promptly the facts to the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency, and make appropriate recommendations on how to prevent or to minimize their effects. Further, in this connection, departments/agencies, as appropriate, should continue to assist the Federal Preparedness Agency to develop and update supply/requirements data and assess technological, strategic, or economic information pertinent to the determination of the types, qualities, and quantities of strategic and critical materials to be added to or retained in the National Stockpile. This is a continuing priority requirement.

CONFLICT PREPAREDNESS GUIDANCE

1. Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies (FRI

The Federal Preparedness Agency, with the assistance of most Federal departments and agencies, has under development a Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies. Early promulgation of the basic plan is necessary so that important follow-on planning actions by concerned departments and agencies can be initiated promptly. Member departments and agencies of the Ad Hoc Working Group chaired by the Federal Preparedness Agency, which is developing this Plan, should continue to support their planning representatives in this effort on a priority basis. Target date for completion of the basic plan is April 1976.

2. Update of National-Level Plans and Planning Assumptions for Civil Emergency Planning.

In Fiscal Year 1976, the Federal Preparedness Agency will undertake the updating of the following basic civil emergency plans and related documents (target dates for completion as shown below):

- o Assumptions for Civil Emergency Preparedness Planning

Target Date - December 31, 1975

- o Federal Emergency Plan D

Target Date - June 30, 1976

- o The Office of Defense Resources (ODR) Manual for Emergency Operations in a Plan D Situation

Target Date - June 30, 1976

Federal departments/agencies will be called upon to provide input and assistance to the Federal Preparedness Agency for the above priority plan review and update effort.

3. Federal Preparedness Agency Readiness Reviews

The Federal Preparedness Agency has been conducting on-site readiness reviews in cooperation with the Category A Federal departments/agencies. These reviews, six of which have been completed to date, are designed to (1) provide the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency, with a partial basis for carrying out his responsibility, pursuant to Section 209, Executive Order 11051, for providing the President with overall reports and recommendations concerning the state of preparedness of Federal departments/agencies to perform their emergency functions, and (2) assisting Federal departments/agencies in optimizing their readiness status. These reviews are carried out at both the national level and the regional/field level.

In Fiscal Year 1976, readiness reviews are planned for the following-listed Federal departments/agencies:

- o Department of Housing and Urban Development
- o Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
- o General Services Administration
- o U. S. Postal Service
- o Veterans Administration
- o Energy, Research, and Development Administration
- o Selective Service System

Within 90 days after receipt of their Readiness Review Report from the Federal Preparedness Agency, departments/agencies should report to FPA on their work plan and progress made in overcoming deficiencies within their areas of responsibility.

Departments/agencies scheduled above should take prompt action upon receipt of this guidance to prepare their national and regional offices for review.

Other departments/agencies should initiate steps to upgrade their state of readiness using the Readiness Questionnaire, previously supplied on July 12, 1974, to each department/agency Emergency Coordinator, in anticipation of participating in a review at a future date.

4. Capability for Sustained Emergency Operations

In the readiness reviews referred to above, one of the major deficiencies noted was the lack of adequate facilities, including communications and information systems, for the conduct of sustained emergency operations at both the department/agency national and field levels. Federal departments/agencies should, in Fiscal Year 1976, initiate definitive action to upgrade facilities so that they are capable of conducting sustained emergency operations. Federal Preparedness Agency staff is available for consultation.

5. National Defense Executive Reserve Activities

The Federal Preparedness Agency will continue effort toward strengthening the National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER) program during Fiscal Year 1976. Departments/agencies that have NDER units should place increased and continuing effort on the recruitment of qualified Reservists to fill existing vacancies. A desirable objective is the participation of each Reservist in a minimum of one training seminar during the fiscal year.

6. Test and Exercise Activity

Federal departments/agencies will be called upon to participate in planned national-level exercises: REX-76, POLE VAULT-76, and NATO Exercise HILEX-VII. Conduct of these exercises contributes to the readiness of the United States and the Federal departments/agencies to participate in real world emergencies and leads to improvements in civil emergency plans and procedures.

In addition, Federal departments/agencies should conduct at least one intra-agency test of internal plans during Fiscal Year 1976 and continue participation in periodic communications exercises and tests sponsored by the Federal Preparedness Agency to ensure operational readiness of personnel and equipment.

7. National-Level Guidance to Field Level

During Fiscal Year 1976, Federal departments/agencies should ensure that their field organizations receive adequate guidance concerning their emergency responsibilities and functions. Agency field organizations are to extend full cooperation to Federal Preparedness Agency Regional Directors for Preparedness in the conduct of the latter's assigned responsibilities including active participation in and support of Regional Preparedness Committees' and Field Resources Boards' activities.

8. Data Base for Emergency Operations

Sections 3001 and 3002, Part 30, Executive Order 11490, and Sections 202, 203, and 205, Executive Order 11051, charge the Federal departments/agencies with developing and maintaining data,

both pre-emergency and post-emergency for use in the emergency central management of resources, damage assessment, and in support of emergency operations. Federal departments/agencies in Fiscal Year 1976 should concentrate on (1) determining, within their assigned responsibilities, what data for emergency planning and operations are essential; (2) collecting and collating such data, and (3) providing it to the Federal Preparedness Agency in accordance with the authorities cited. Program and technical staff of the Federal Preparedness Agency are available for consultation, as required. Proper compliance with this guidance item, of course, implies the need for the involvement of department/agency leadership in defining emergency information needs and active participation in the interagency coordination group concerned with meeting these needs.

9. Compendium of Essential Uninterruptible Functions

OEP Circular 9100.2 established a requirement for agencies to categorize their emergency functions and organizational components in accordance with criteria provided in that directive. The validation of essential uninterruptible functions is a necessary first step to (1) organizing for emergency operations, (2) determining the numbers and kinds of personnel required to perform emergency activities at the primary and alternate sites, and (3) defining training needs for emergency assignees. Federal departments/agencies with Category "A"-type emergency functions should, by October 1, 1975: (1) supply, where this has not been done, an updated, management-approved, listing of essential uninterruptible functions of their Category "A" organizational components to those in responsible positions for emergency planning within both their national headquarters and their field organizations; and (2) provide the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency, with a copy of such listings for inclusion in a compendium of Federal Essential Uninterruptible Functions, which will provide a concise package of statements reflecting what the Federal Government may be expected to do in the immediate preattack, attack, and immediate postattack eras.

10. State Comprehensive Emergency Planning

The Federal Preparedness Agency has entered into a contract with the Council of State Governments for the Development of Guidelines for State Comprehensive Emergency Planning and an outline State Comprehensive Emergency Plan. The study, undertaken

on July 1, 1975, is expected to be completed in nine months and has the objective of developing the necessary and optimum planning guidance and format for use by State planners in integrating the full spectrum of standby emergency plans into a State Comprehensive Plan. Contractor representatives and Federal Preparedness Agency staff will be in contact with Federal departments/agencies for information to complete the study. When called upon for assistance, Federal departments/agencies are urged to contribute fully and promptly to the study aims within their respective capabilities.

11. National Health Resources Advisory Committee

The Federal Preparedness Agency provides the secretariat for the Presidentially-appointed National Health Resources Advisory Committee established by Executive Order 11415. During Fiscal Year 1976 and Fiscal Year 1977, the Committee will hold meetings to consider such subjects as the capability of the health industry to respond to major national emergencies, medical training for emergencies, the national health resources data base for support of emergency preparedness and operations, emergency medical preparedness implications under the controlled strategic nuclear warfare concept, the manner in which Federal agencies are carrying out their assigned responsibilities for emergency health preparedness, and a follow-on look at airport/community emergency medical preparedness. Federal departments/agencies, in accordance with Section 4(b), Executive Order 11415, when called upon, should cooperate with the National Health Resources Advisory Committee and provide it such available information as the Committee may need for the accomplishment of its functions.

12. Crisis Relocation Planning

The Department of Defense, through the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, is in the process of developing an innovative program for the relocation of the population from high-risk areas in times of crisis. This program is to provide an additional option to the President as a part of civil defense preparedness. It will provide, also, a capability that could be valuable in certain peacetime emergencies such as disasters and nuclear incidents.

This planning has progressed to the point where active participation of a number of Federal departments/agencies will be necessary beginning early in Fiscal Year 1976. FPA is cooperating with DCPA in this planning and will coordinate participation by the departments and agencies.

Specific Guidance
to the
DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY

Nuclear Attack Effects Information and Assessment

Continue to coordinate development of DCPA nuclear contingency information and damage assessment procedures with the Federal integrated nuclear nonmilitary damage and residual assessment system with respect to the operating arrangements, information development, and vulnerability assessment in the following general respects:

a. Assessment Operations Arrangements

(1) Nuclear Attack Effects Criteria. Continue to collaborate with FPA, the National Military Control System Support Center (NMCSSC), and the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) in the development/refinement of the nuclear attack effects criteria used in estimating nuclear attack effects. Continue to take the initiative to develop accepted government-wide procedures for assessing additional casualties and damage from attack-ignited fires and fire spread and for projecting areas of fallout radiation impact.

(2) Procedures and Organization. In collaboration with FPA, continue the development of a government-wide integrated system which produces coordinated estimates of nuclear nonmilitary damage and residuals. The system must provide for rapid dissemination to the Federal Regional Centers of coordinated estimates of regional damage and residuals developed from centrally acquired attack data. It must also provide for the local acquisition of attack effects information and its forwarding through State officials to the FRC's where procedures, developed in concert with FPA and the other participating agencies, are in effect for its evaluation, processing, and introduction into the government-wide integrated system.

b. Information Development

(1) Preattack.

(a) Population. Continue to assist FPA in the acquisition of decennial Census data at the appropriate level of aggregation. ~~Develop procedures to~~ determine the degree of error (or confidence limits) caused by various levels of aggregation. Develop further for common use coordinated procedures for

estimating daytime shifts in population from its residential distribution and procedures for determining where people are at the time of attack with respect to seeking shelter upon attack warning wherever they were at the time. Coordinated procedures are also required for a full situation assessment in both host and evacuated areas when crisis evacuation plans for preattack population movement are executed or simulated.

(b) Civil Defense Capabilities. Continue development of procedures for providing and updating coordinated data on the civil defense operational capabilities including data on the strength and readiness of local emergency operating centers, local emergency personnel, stocks of emergency supplies and equipment, and commercial stocks of sustenance goods. Coordinated procedures are also required for reporting to the FRC the operating condition and status of both local and State civil defense operations.

(2) Postattack. The coordinated system for producing and forwarding, on a continuing basis, local postattack conditions must cover the condition and morale of the population, the areas subject to radiation denial or danger, the local viability and needs (including needs for military assistance) of the metropolitan areas, the operability of major production facilities, and the availability of surviving distribution pipeline inventories of vital sustenance and production support items.

c. Vulnerability Assessment. Reconcile as nearly as possible, in the course of its development, any unclassified characterization of areas subject to damage and denial in the event of a nuclear attack with the latest guidance prepared for all nonmilitary defense preparedness activities available from FPA HAZARD guidance studies published and under development.

d. Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies Planning

(1) Continue to carry out DCPA responsibilities for assistance to State and local governments in nuclear incident planning in relation to fixed facilities, as outlined in Federal Register Notice of January 24, 1973, and any subsequent revision.

(2) Support other Federal agencies with DCPA inputs in the preparation of operational response plans to be incorporated in the overall Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies (FRPPNE).

State Emergency Resource Management Plans

Collaborate with and support the FPA in continuing efforts to update State Emergency Resource Management Plans.

Realignment of Field Structure

Initiate internal planning with the objective of establishing ultimately for DCPA a regional structure consistent with the uniform boundaries and field office configuration of the Uniform Federal Regional Council Cities' concept.

Improvement of Operational Status of Certain Existing Field Facilities

As an interim step, pending accomplishment of the above objective, collaborate with FPA in the short-term goal of upgrading or replacing the existing FRC's at Santa Rosa, California, and Battle Creek, Michigan, with the aim of improving the existing capabilities in the Regions served to conduct sustained emergency operations.

FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY

AUG 7 1975

Honorable Earl L. Butz
Secretary of Agriculture
Washington, DC 20250

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The purpose of this letter is to provide general program guidance on civil emergency preparedness for FY 1976 and to supplement the guidance for FY 1975 previously provided in my October 3, 1974, guidance letter.

The Administrator, General Services Administration, has established the Federal Preparedness Agency as a successor to the Office of Preparedness, effective June 29, 1975, as one effort to highlight the importance of emergency preparedness and to emphasize the Agency's management and coordination role in all types of emergencies. However, the overall mission of the new Federal Preparedness Agency remains essentially the same as that of its predecessor.

There is a continuing need for achieving and maintaining a high degree of readiness to cope with various crises or a national emergency. Executive Order 11490 charges the Heads of Departments and Agencies with such responsibilities. Preparedness programs should be reviewed and analyzed to assure agencies' capabilities to carry out their designated responsibilities.

World and domestic events continue to dictate the need for maintaining emphasis on and improvement of civil emergency preparedness. Economic and security problems have been aggravated by basic resource shortages, disruptions or maldistributions. Such conditions make necessary the maintenance of a strong national security posture, and require that we take measures to minimize or prevent a costly dependence upon foreign nations for materials needed to insure national security.

In this context, the application of priorities and allocation authorities of the Defense Production Act, the maintenance of strategic and critical stockpiles, and the development of a strong industrial preparedness base, have assumed added significance.

Readiness reviews of Federal departments, which have been conducted during the past year, have revealed significant deficiencies which demonstrate the need for improvements in the manner in which departmental responsibilities for emergency preparedness, as referred to above, are being carried out. The following list of needs identifies the major causes for many of the deficiencies noted in the reviews:

- o More direct involvement by agency leadership.
- o An increased commitment of staff time to preparedness activities.
- o Reduction of turnover rate in emergency preparedness assignments.
- o Provision of definitive guidance to departments/agencies' regional/field levels concerning their assigned preparedness responsibilities.
- o Greater emphasis on making emergency preparedness a part of the regular functions of the agency.

In the past year, the U. S. has made a significant contribution in the Civil Emergency Preparedness planning activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, yet much work in this important area remains to be done. Specifically, the U. S. seeks to continue to strengthen the linkage between military and civil resource and service planning within the alliance.

The enclosure provides specific guidance on matters which I believe deserve priority attention and concerning which I ask your personal support in Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977.

You are requested to submit an annual report of your emergency preparedness activities covering Fiscal Year 1975 to reach the Federal Preparedness Agency by October 1, 1975. The report will be in addition to that submitted to the Joint Committee on Defense Production of the Congress and should focus on problem areas and recommended solutions thereto.

I welcome your suggestions, recommendations, and criticisms regarding all emergency preparedness matters with which we are mutually concerned.

I thank you and your staff for past dedication to and support of civil emergency preparedness, and I am hopeful that we may continue together toward the goals and objectives I described herein.

Sincerely,

Leslie W. Bray, Jr.

LESLIE W. BRAY, JR.
Director

Enclosure

cc: Mr. R. B. Wilson
Emergency Coordinator
Department of Agriculture

GUIDANCE FOR CIVIL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES
OF THE
FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
FISCAL YEARS 1976 AND 1977

(NOTE: Recent predecessors to the Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration, were the Office of Preparedness, GSA, and the Office of Emergency Preparedness, Executive Office of the President.)

CIVIL CRISIS PREPAREDNESS GUIDANCE

1. Resource Crisis Management

The Federal Preparedness Agency is involved with other departments and agencies, and with the States, in planning and responding to current or potential domestic crises arising from resource shortages and interruptions to vital industrial services. The many aspects of the energy problem, the continuing materials shortages, and threat of widespread transportation interruptions are of current concern. Problems of food production, health, environment, and sanitation are matters that could develop into serious situations and must be monitored closely. This activity provides us and the involved Federal departments unique opportunities for improving Government plans and procedures, at all levels, to meet a broad range of resource emergencies.

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a capability comparable to our national Resource Interruption Monitoring System (RIMS) and to tie those systems into our Regional Offices for fast reporting and response when resource crises or other emergencies occur.

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Department/agencies should continue to be alert to and identify conditions and trends which may lead to a costly and dangerous dependency upon foreign nations for supplies of materials needed in the common defense. When such conditions or trends are noted, departments/agencies should report promptly the facts to the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency, and make appropriate recommendations on how to prevent or to minimize their effects. Further, in this connection, departments/agencies, as appropriate, should continue to assist the Federal Preparedness Agency to develop and update supply/requirements data and assess technological, strategic, or economic information pertinent to the determination of the types, qualities, and quantities of strategic and critical materials to be added to or retained in the National Stockpile. This is a continuing priority requirement.

CONFLICT PREPAREDNESS GUIDANCE

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2. Update of National-Level Plans and Planning Assumptions for Civil Emergency Planning.

In Fiscal Year 1976, the Federal Preparedness Agency will undertake the updating of the following basic civil emergency plans and related documents (target dates for completion as shown below):

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Target Date - December 31, 1975

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Other departments/agencies should initiate steps to upgrade their state of readiness using the Readiness Questionnaire, previously supplied on July 12, 1974, to each department/agency Emergency Coordinator, in anticipation of participating in a review at a future date.

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10. State Comprehensive Emergency Planning

The Federal Preparedness Agency has entered into a contract with the Council of State Governments for the Development of Guidelines for State Comprehensive Emergency Planning and an outline State Comprehensive Emergency Plan. The study, undertaken

on July 1, 1975, is expected to be completed in nine months and has the objective of developing the necessary and optimum planning guidance and format for use by State planners in integrating the full spectrum of standby emergency plans into a State Comprehensive Plan. Contractor representatives and Federal Preparedness Agency staff will be in contact with Federal departments/agencies for information to complete the study. When called upon for assistance, Federal departments/agencies are urged to contribute fully and promptly to the study aims within their respective capabilities.

11. National Health Resources Advisory Committee

The Federal Preparedness Agency provides the secretariat for the Presidentially-appointed National Health Resources Advisory Committee established by Executive Order 11415. During Fiscal Year 1976 and Fiscal Year 1977, the Committee will hold meetings to consider such subjects as the capability of the health industry to respond to major national emergencies, medical training for emergencies, the national health resources data base for support of emergency preparedness and operations, emergency medical preparedness implications under the controlled strategic nuclear warfare concept, the manner in which Federal agencies are carrying out their assigned responsibilities for emergency health preparedness, and a follow-on look at airport/community emergency medical preparedness. Federal departments/agencies, in accordance with Section 4(b), Executive Order 11415, when called upon, should cooperate with the National Health Resources Advisory Committee and provide it such available information as the Committee may need for the accomplishment of its functions.

12. Crisis Relocation Planning

The Department of Defense, through the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, is in the process of developing an innovative program for the relocation of the population from high-risk areas in times of crisis. This program is to provide an additional option to the President as a part of civil defense preparedness. It will provide, also, a capability that could be valuable in certain peacetime emergencies such as disasters and nuclear incidents.

This planning has progressed to the point where active participation of a number of Federal departments/agencies will be necessary beginning early in Fiscal Year 1976. FPA is cooperating with DCPA in this planning and will coordinate participation by the departments and agencies.

FY 1976 PROGRAM GUIDANCE FOR U. S. PARTICIPATION
IN NATO CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING (CEP) ACTIVITIES

1. Purpose: To provide the FY-76 general program guidance to those departments and agencies with responsibilities for NATO civil emergency planning (CEP) activities.

2. References:

a. Letter, Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration, to heads of Federal Departments and agencies, dated August 7, 1975, regarding FY 1976 program guidance for civil emergency preparedness.

b. Memorandum, Department of State, Subject: "U. S. Government Responsibilities and Organizational Arrangements to Support NATO Civil Emergency Planning", dated April 23, 1974.

c. Memorandum, Office of Preparedness, General Services Administration, Subject: "Policy and Procedural Arrangements for U. S. Participation in NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Activities", dated December 12, 1974.

3. Program Guidance:

a. Primary:

(1) Develop a program to revitalize NATO's civil emergency planning in order to correct the present imbalance between the levels of civil and military preparedness.

(2) Improve the flexibility and the readiness posture of the NATO Civil Wartime Agencies (NCWAs) to meet a wide range of contingencies with emphasis on pre-hostility situations.

(3) Develop new initiatives and support, as needed, within each planning board and committee, current work associated with the U. S. objectives concerning increased civil support to NATO's conventional military readiness.

(4) Test the NATO civil emergency crisis management arrangements in Exercise HILUX 7 and initiate actions to continue these arrangements in FY-77 exercises.

b. Secondary:

(1) Complete work on merger of Central Supplies Agency (CSA) and European Supplies Agency (ESA).

(2) Continue work on the NCWAs Terms of Reference and war manuals.

(3) Complete staffing requirements for all essential NCA positions.

4. Implementation: In accordance with paragraph 6c, reference c, it is requested that each department and agency submit to the Director, Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration, a statement of their own program goals and objectives in carrying out the overall FY-76 program guidance. In addition, proposals for new programs to be introduced into the work of the planning boards and committees during FY-76 which will enhance that element of NATO deterrence provided by civil emergency planning would be welcome.

Question 18. Provide for the record a summary description of other kinds of emergency preparedness performed by FPA, especially economic preparedness or resource interruption crises. What kinds of "crisis management" efforts has the agency pursued or is it capable of pursuing?

Answer. FPA's involvement in various economic and resource crises not directly related to national defense derives from an assignment in Executive Order 11051. Section 101 of the order charges the Director of FPA to "advise and assist the President in the coordination of and in the determination of policy for the emergency plans and preparedness assignments of the Federal departments and agencies... designed to make possible at Federal, State, and local levels the mobilization of the human, natural, and industrial resources of the nation to meet all conditions of national emergency..." (emphasis added).

The same order requires that FPA develop "an overall emergency system" for reaching central program decisions for the utilization of resources in emergency. If emergencies were limited in their effects to one resource area, i. e., a nationwide railway strike to the transportation area, then the Federal response could be managed by the Department of Transportation. But experience has shown that emergencies are not so limited. They quickly spread to affect employment, fuel, agriculture, production, etc. In bringing Federal resources to bear to forestall or

overcome serious effects of such crises, coordination of effort is required. FPA and its predecessor OEP have been called upon to fulfill this role in a variety of economic and commercial crises.

The history of the preparedness agency's involvement in economic crises cannot be entirely separated from its involvement in industrial support to national defense. But beginning about 1969, it was involved in the task of coordinating Federal efforts to forestall and alleviate situations having little direct connection with national defense. The winter fuel oil shortage was followed by summer electric power outages and these in turn by coal miners' strikes and interruptions of national rail services. As the President's adviser and action office on emergency preparedness for resource matters, our agency undertook to prepare for and coordinate Federal measures in meeting various energy and transportation crises.

In August 1971, the White House called upon the preparedness agency to establish the management machinery to implement the program for restraining excessive wage and price rises in the national economy. It managed this unprecedented operation during the first phase, finally turning over operations to the Price Commission under the Cost of Living Council.

The preparedness agency managed the various aspects of the national energy crisis before and during the creation of the Federal Energy Office, finally phasing out the operations when the Federal Energy Administration was established. More recently, FPA has been involved in coordinating Federal interagency planning for such crises as shortage threats to municipal water systems, national railway and truckers' strikes, threatened food poisoning in grain storage, nuclear accidents and other hazards to essential industries, and support to many FEA contingency plans for response to energy shortages.

The case by case involvement of FPA in crisis management activity has entailed cooperation with State and local government, information monitoring at regional levels, national interagency contingency planning, and directed Federal operations.

Question 19

Does the FPA receive regular guidance from the National Security Council on its preparedness policies or functions? Please provide recent examples. Does the NSC review preparedness plans or programs? Please provide recent examples. Does the Director, FPA ever participate in NSC meetings? Is there a specific White House contact for preparedness issues? How has the growth of emergency preparedness functions influenced federal policymaking and program management?

Answer

The Director, FPA, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and their respective staffs consult frequently on a wide variety of matters having national security implications. To facilitate development of plans and to ensure their compatibility with national security policy, members of the National Security Council staff also serve with the Director, FPA, and representatives of other departments and agencies on steering and working groups. FPA is tasked by the NSC through study memoranda to review and develop national plans and policies.

Examples of such coordinated efforts are current NSC staff representation on working and steering groups chaired by FPA which are involved in: (1) the development of a Federal Response Plan for Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies, (2) a review and update of extant Civil Emergency Preparedness Policy and Planning Guidance Documents, (3) a review and update of the Federal Emergency Plan for actions in the event of a surprise nuclear attack on the United States, and (4) an examination of stockpile policy and the stockpile planning process. It is through NSC study memoranda, participation in FPA working and steering groups, and the final formal review process that NSC guidance is provided FPA in the development or review of national preparedness policies.

The White House point of contact for preparedness issues involving national security matters is the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In the continuous process of providing program management for preparedness policies, FPA endeavors to review and update such policies to reflect the requirements of the evolving world situation as it applies to the United States. Any growth or change in preparedness requirements which may occur as a result of the evolving international situation influences, to some degree, federal policy and preparedness.

Question 20

Please describe the preparedness categories assigned to Federal agencies and the criteria for such assignment and provide a listing of departments and agencies with their category designation.

Answer

All departments and agencies have been categorized according to the time sensitivity of the functions which they must perform during an attack emergency. These specific functional categories are:

Category A Functions. Functions that are of such a nature that they must be continued during the immediate preattack, transattack, and immediate postattack periods.

Category B Functions. Functions which must be accomplished during the postattack reconstitution period or as soon as conditions permit, unless otherwise directed by appropriate authority.

Category C Functions. Functions which may be deferred until directed by appropriate authority.

In making the assessment concerning what category functions a department or agency would have in an attack emergency, each emergency responsibility assigned to the specific department or agency by EO 11490, has been related to the following anticipated requirements:

1. Assuring current estimates of the situation; coordinated central assessment of the damage inflicted by nuclear attack; appraisal of the continuing threat to the nation; and an early assessment of remaining resources.

2. Supporting the President in reaching, informing, and instructing the public, and in strengthening national will and unity.

3. Providing recommendations and staff support to the President in his immediate postattack decisions, especially as these relate to the use and control of human and material resources.

4. Providing support to the President and to State and local governments in implementing continuity of government and survival actions and in preparing for national recovery. The President should have the means to direct, as soon as possible, the use of Federal resources surviving throughout the US and to guide the application of other surviving resources of the nation.

Further, in making the determination of category assignment, it was recognized that within a department or agency with Category A responsibilities there are also those functions that are not time sensitive that can be deferred until the reconstitution period. Deferred functions are identified as Category B or C functions, as described above.

Category A Functions (36)Executive Departments

Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury

Independent Agencies

Civil Aeronautics Board
Civil Service Commission
Environmental Protection Agency
Energy Research and Development Administration
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Energy Administration
Federal Power Commission
Federal Reserve System (Board)
General Services Administration
Interstate Commerce Commission
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Selective Service System
Tennessee Valley Authority *
U. S. Information Agency
U. S. Postal Service
Veterans Administration

*Regional emergency functions are so comprehensive as to have national significance.

Executive Office of the President

The White House Office
 Office of Management and Budget
 Council of Economic Advisers
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Domestic Council Staff
 National Security Council Staff
 Office of Telecommunications Policy
 Office of Science and Technology Policy

Category B Functions (18)Independent Agencies

Export-Import Bank of the United States
 Farm Credit Administration
 Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
 Federal Home Loan Bank Board
 National Labor Relations Board
 National Mediation Board
 National Mediation and Conciliation Service
 National Credit Union Administration
 National Science Foundation
 Railroad Retirement Board
 Securities and Exchange Commission
 Small Business Administration
 US International Trade Commission

Executive Office of the President

Council on International Economic Policy
 Council on Environmental Quality
 Council on Wage & Price Stability
 Energy Resource Council

Category C Functions

All other organizations and instrumentalities of the
 Federal Executive Branch.

PHILIP COLDWELL

BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTONPHILIP E. COLDWELL
MEMBER OF THE BOARD

July 22, 1976

The Honorable William Proxmire
Vice Chairman
Joint Committee on Defense Production
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

I am writing in response to your letter of July 14, 1976, requesting additional information for the record with respect to the Federal Reserve's emergency preparedness programs.

Before turning to the specific questions enclosed with your letter, let me review the assumptions upon which the Federal Reserve's plans are based. First, we assume, on the basis of study of many hypothetical attack patterns, that there would be large areas of the country which would be undamaged or only lightly damaged, and in which activity would not be affected, or only temporarily affected by radioactive fallout. Second, we assume that the social structure and the will to survive as a nation would continue to exist in these areas. Finally, we assume that disruption of communications and transportation would prevent any kind of centralized control of the economy, at least initially, and that contingency plans would have to be administered at the local and State levels.

With respect to your first question, we have considered the types of problems to which you refer and have devised plans to minimize this kind of behavior. The Department of the Treasury has issued and has disseminated to every bank in the United States its Emergency Banking Regulation No. 1 which would be triggered by any attack on the United States. This Regulation requires banks to remain open when it is physically possible to do so, restricts cash withdrawals, and specifies types of transactions for which transfers of credit and extensions of credit may be used. We would expect the commercial banks to administer this Regulation. The Board's Emergency Regulation No. 1, also in place, authorizes Reserve Banks to restrict credit to banks that willfully violate Treasury's Emergency Banking Regulation No. 1.

The Honorable William Proxmire
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With respect to Question 2, aberrant behavior also would be dampened by the immediate imposition of direct economic controls -- price, wage, and rent controls and consumer rationing -- for which the Federal Preparedness Agency has the planning responsibility. Again these controls probably would be administered initially at the local and State levels.

Questions 3, 6, and 7 all deal with the issue of public confidence in the medium of exchange. Federal Reserve plans to maintain or restore that confidence depend heavily on widespread previous public knowledge of the existence and the detail of plans to do so. We have done our best to assure knowledge of these plans by making sure that every commercial bank has copies of the pertinent emergency regulations and the emergency operation circulars of the Federal Reserve Banks.

There are no plans alternative to maintaining a functioning monetary system. In the absence of an acceptable medium of exchange surviving resources (including labor) could be allocated only if they could be commandeered by some authority and then allocated and rationed to survivors. This probably would be beyond the capability of national authority following a large-scale attack. It is more likely that surviving communities, however defined, would hoard resources and that a system of barter would develop within and between such communities. This would result in a rapid loss of economic momentum and a low probability of national survival.

The Federal Reserve has no responsibility for plans for income maintenance. Those agencies that presently have responsibility for transfer payments, such as Social Security, Civil Service and military retirement, welfare payments, etc., have prepared plans to maintain these payments. The Federal Reserve plans to continue to process those payments from surviving offices, relocation sites, or through a system of "agent" commercial banks.

The Federal Government has a responsibility for planning with respect to damaged or destroyed assets. The National Plan states that "the Federal Government would assure the equitable sharing of war losses throughout the economy to the extent possible not to guarantee individuals against losses but to insure the maintenance of a viable economy." Section 1702 of Executive Order 11490 states that "Heads of agencies shall, as appropriate, participate with the Federal Preparedness Agency (GSA)


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and the Department of the Treasury in the development of policies, plans, and procedures for implementation of national policy on sharing war losses." However, there are no plans in place to implement this policy. The Board for several years has listed this fact in its Annual Report to your Joint Committee as a major planning deficiency.

There are no plans for a general debt moratorium. The National Plan (page 105) states that "There would be no general moratorium, but limited moratoria on the payment of preattack debts could be authorized for hardship cases."

I hope that this information meets your requirements. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'P. E. Coldwell', written in a cursive style.

P. E. Coldwell

Mr. Coldwell

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. Does the Federal Reserve have any plans, or is it aware of any plans developed by federal departments or agencies, to prevent or minimize black-marketing, price-gouging, or other abnormal economic practices that might be fostered by supply constraints or disruptions following a nuclear attack?
2. Do Federal Reserve contingency plans foresee the implementation of wage and price controls to stabilize economic conditions during a post-attack recovery period? How would this be provided for?
3. The uncertainties fostered among survivors by either a limited or a full nuclear attack would appear to include possible public loss of faith in the normal media of exchange and in normal credit mechanisms, irrespective of the availability of currency and alternate Federal Reserve banks and record storage sites. Do Federal Reserve plans include any measures aimed at restoring the public confidence that is essential to the successful functioning of a monetary or credit system? If so, what are they?
4. Is the Federal Reserve required to formulate contingency plans for citizens and firms whose assets or sources of income (pension or welfare checks, rental income, stock and bond income, etc.) may be destroyed or rendered unavailable by nuclear attack? How would these individuals and firms be integrated into the restored monetary system?
5. Are mortgage or other debt moratoria called for in Federal Reserve planning or is this a responsibility of other agencies?
6. Federal Reserve planning appears to be based on the assumption that individuals and firms will react to a nuclear attack in a highly idealized manner, continuing to support a currency and credit system based on resources that may, in large part, be destroyed or otherwise unavailable, especially after a wholesale attack. Are there any alternate plans for managing the economy, in the event survivors do not respond in this idealized fashion and lose confidence in the normal currency and credit system?
7. If loss of public confidence impairs the functioning of the monetary system, how will other federal emergency plans be affected, since they assume the restored operation of the monetary system?

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

FOR

THOMAS P. DUNNE

QUESTION #1.

In your testimony before the Joint Committee you distinguished the preparedness for natural disasters from nuclear disasters on the basis that the former would not affect the resources of the nation. Further you distinguished a natural from a nuclear disaster by stating that the former was primarily a state responsibility to which your agency was to assist in preparing to accept federal monies after the response.

Some elements of the commonalities between the two types of disasters were posed to you. For a complete record, please provide the specific details of the differences and similarities in the planning and carrying out of the following functions, where appropriate, immediately preceding, during, immediately following (six days) and for thirty days after for all disasters:

- a. prediction
- b. warning
- c. shelter
- d. food and clothing
- e. damage assessment
- f. crisis relocation
- g. medical services and health
- h. debris removal
- i. flood control
- j. equipment loans
- k. search and rescue
- l. clearance of roads and bridge construction
- m. demolition of unsafe structures
- n. public information and assistance on health and safety measures
- o. repair, reconstruction, restoration or replacement of (i) facilities owned by the United States; (ii) state or local government facilities; (iii) privately owned facilities
- p. crisis and mental health counseling
- q. emergency communications
- r. command center operations
- s. coordination of public and private relief agencies and services

ANSWER:

In the testimony before the Joint Committee, the concerns raised were not related to the similarities, but to differences. There are fundamental planning considerations which apply to any incident, be it natural disaster or nuclear attack. The skills and needed resources must be identified. There is no question that many of the basic skills required in responding to a natural disaster or an enemy attack are much the same.

Local managers have to make decisions, firemen have to put out fires, policemen have to preserve law and order, medical personnel have to provide medical services, and machine operators have to operate equipment to remove debris. The skills used in ongoing functions of the private and governmental sectors can be readily adapted to meet these requirements. But most important for the planning process is a recognition of the environment in which the decisionmaking process will be applied.

In local disasters, if the necessary skills, funds or resources are not immediately available they can be brought in from outside the disaster area, and their availability is virtually assured. Natural disasters, to date, have not created unique requirements that are not within the means of the Nation as a whole to meet. Certain types of catastrophies do demand special contingency planning for unique requirements. For example, a catastrophic earthquake could create medical requirements never before experienced in this country. Plans are necessary to identify supplemental medical resources and to specify the means by which these resources will be applied at the scene of the incident. There is no need to plan for how doctors and other medical personnel are going to do their jobs; they already know how. What planning does need to address is the means by which these people will be provided with the resources they will need to exercise their skills effectively. The same holds true in most other functional areas. There is no need to plan for every detail to cope with such disasters. Only those unique requirements for skills and resources generated by the incident need to be addressed.

In an enemy attack involving the use of nuclear weapons, unique planning requirements are generated by the potential effects of radioactive fallout and electromagnetic pulse, for example. Many of the response activities (which will be carried out with or without plans) use the same skills, but local governments must plan to respond under unique conditions with limited, if any, additional resources. It is the unusual, the unique, the differences and not the similarities that must be planned for if the Nation is to survive. The firemen, equipment operators and managers know their functions, but with the added dimensions of a radioactive environment and limited resources, new approaches, skills and planning emphases are required. The emphasis has to be on planning to use remaining resources efficiently and doing that which is required by the Federal Government to assure the survival of the Nation.

A great deal of emphasis is being placed on the commonality or dual use of these skills. In my opinion, this is being done at the expense of failing to focus on the decisionmaking process in the actual environment in which decisions will be made. Anyone who attempts to plan effectively for the performance of a function while ignoring the conditions under which the function or skill must be performed is not completely addressing the problem.

The environment in which governmental managers at all levels will be operating after a nuclear attack upon this country will be such as to significantly alter their traditional bases for making decisions and their accustomed modes of operation.

Managers will be faced with restraints with which they don't have to contend in normal daily operations or even in most natural disaster situations--radiation, confinement, the effects of electromagnetic pulse, and limited availability of outside resources, if any, being a few examples. Operating under these special restraints calls for special planning and special skills.

Let's examine for a moment one of the functions which you have asked us to address--command center operations. A command center function can be performed from any location which gives the manager effective access to those people and resources which he must marshal and direct in coping with a situation. In natural disasters, the command center function may be performed from the mayor's office, if the conditions just mentioned are met--and in many instances this is the case. In nuclear attack planning, a command center is a facility to which key officials relocate so that they may carry out their duties protected from radiation.

There's a basic difference. Most managers will not willingly sacrifice their normal working environment, staff support and relationships. There are few command center facilities that provide for the housing of the entire administrative structure of an organization--command center operations by their very nature restrict the availability of staff support to decisionmakers. This is an unnecessary restraint on managers for most natural disasters, but it is an absolute requirement on them in nuclear attack situations. The "commonalities" which we are addressing are at such a high level of aggregation that they provide no effective guide for planning either for natural disasters or nuclear attack.

The functions listed below do have commonality in the basic skills required. However, it is important to recognize and identify the different environments in which these skills will have to be utilized and the different restraints placed on the management of the skills and resources. The planning environments in which these skills must be applied are vastly different--"general purpose" planning will just not meet the specific requirements of either type disaster.

a. Prediction - Prediction as it applies to natural disasters will most frequently be a forecast of an anticipated event at a specific time and place. It is inconceivable that a natural phenomenon could cause the entire United States to be placed in a state of readiness.

"Prediction" as it relates to national emergencies or enemy attack is not that clear a concept. In time of increased international tension, we may expect that government officials and the media will keep the public informed of the potential for enemy attack.

A fundamental difference is that a prediction or forecast of a natural event will be local or regional in scope whereas a prediction of a potential enemy attack will be national in scope. Planning to prepare the Nation for an attack and preparing for a localized disaster will have different planning considerations.

b. Warning - Warning is a notice of an impending event and a source of information which provides a basis to take action to protect against the consequences of the event. The mechanical systems to sound the warning and to carry the information are basically the same for natural disasters and enemy attack. The important planning consideration lies not in the commonality of the means by which to inform the public that a danger (natural or enemy) threatens, but in planning for telling the public what the danger is and what must be done about it. Instructions on actions to be taken in warning of a flash flood, hurricane, earthquake, tornado or an enemy attack could all be different. For example, in flooding and hurricane situations, instructions generally are to evacuate or to get above the probable water level, for a tornado to take shelter or get in a low place, and for an earthquake to vacate structures. Instructions on actions to be taken for an enemy attack will vary depending on the lead time.

The main focus in warning should not be on the commonality of the systems which disseminate information, but in planning the content of instructions on protective actions which are to accompany that warning.

c. Shelter - Shelter planning cannot be done in the general terms. Different types of shelters are suitable for different situations. Planners should know the type of use, the duration of use, the location, and the availability of support services and plan accordingly. Designation of shelters for nuclear attack and natural disasters requires different planning assumptions. Shelters for nuclear attack situations require a specified number of square feet per person; they must be relatively self-sufficient--that is, they must contain food, water, sanitary facilities. They must provide for protection against radioactive fallout, and their location is most frequently outside the presumed target area. Outside support and replenishment of resources for those shelters cannot be assumed in the near term. Shelters for disaster victims are potentially much more abundant since they have fewer minimum requirements. Such shelters can allow for people to come and go, they do not have to have food stocks, they may be in or near the impacted area and generally will not be used for as long a period as fallout shelters. Availability of outside resources to support shelter operations can be assumed, and only part of the population of the affected area will require such shelter. Experience has shown that few fallout shelters are used in natural disaster situations.

d. Food and Clothing - Planning for a natural disaster can assume there are nearly unlimited resources to be provided from outside the affected area by private relief and voluntary agencies, State and Federal Governments. Thus, the planning emphasis is primarily on identification of required resources, how to apply for and account for them (if necessary), and on their distribution. Food and clothing may be in critical demand after an enemy attack and their distribution may be further hampered by rationing and necessary decontamination precautions. A recent study, "Survival of the Relocated Population of the U.S. After a Nuclear Attack," prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, identified "severe food shortages" as one of the major problems second only to radiation and its effects. When

there is no assurance of outside resources being brought to bear, planning has to take an entirely different approach. Unlike a number of alternative means for providing food after a natural disaster, food preparation and service will take place under very demanding conditions. The provision of food services requires special consideration such as fire, ventilation, sanitation, serving and actually obtaining the food itself.

e. Damage Assessment - Damage assessment after natural disasters and enemy attack is substantially different. In natural disasters, assessments are made to identify what is damaged or destroyed so that determinations can be made on whether to repair or replace it. The objective is to restore the affected area to its predisaster status. After an enemy attack, the emphasis must be on what is left. The above-mentioned study places importance on making assessments of what is left and how it can be utilized. There is little initial emphasis on what is destroyed; only what is useable. The goal must be to take what is left and use it in the preservation of the Nation. Assessments after an enemy attack and natural disaster are different in scope, detail and skills required.

f. Crisis Relocation - Crisis relocation as envisioned by DCPA is of minimal value in planning for natural disasters. There may be common elements in the identification of evacuation routes and traffic control procedures, for example. Some have made the case for such relocations in response to an earthquake prediction. But even if such a prediction were made it would not require as massive a population relocation as may be envisioned for an enemy attack. Assuming, however, mass evacuation of an area to escape a natural disaster, there is still a basic difference in planning assumptions: in a natural disaster situation, outside resources can be depended upon for support of the relocated population. This assurance does not exist in the event of an enemy attack.

g. Medical Services and Health - Again, in the event of a natural disaster, the local medical services will be supplemented from outside the area, whereas there is no such assurance in the event of enemy attack. Medical response planning for an enemy attack will probably incorporate medical triage and altered policies for determining medical resource distribution priorities, as well as the unique requirements associated with the effects of radiation. The basic medical skills required to deal with the effects of a natural disaster and of an enemy attack are much the same but, for example, after a nuclear attack there may be special problems associated with radiation that would affect the accessibility of the services to the victims. Surgery and other medical treatment may be carried out under much less than optimum conditions, with little, if any, of the sophisticated equipment currently in use. These restraints do not have to be built into planning for natural disasters.

i. Flood Control - We find it hard to believe that flood

control is going to be very high on the list of priorities after a nuclear attack. Floods resulting from nuclear detonations will have done the damage long before the environment permits the freedom of movement necessary to begin repair of water control facilities. We see few, if any, similarities in planning for flood control and enemy attack.

j. Equipment Loans - Equipment loans are normally arranged by mutual aid agreements for localized emergencies. The use of equipment after an attack could have national priorities assigned to it and supersede local agreements. The ability to lend depends on availability of equipment. Planning assumptions based on having sufficient equipment is different than assumptions where limited equipment will be available.

k. Search and Rescue - Search and rescue operations will be much the same for both types of situations. There are only so many ways you can find and remove persons trapped in debris. The unique requirements imposed by a nuclear attack are the radiation and probable lack of outside assistance.

l. Clearance of Roads and Bridge Construction - Much of the discussion under "debris removal" above is applicable here. This type of activity requires the same basic skills for both situations, but after an enemy attack priorities may be different, for example, the need for certain roads and bridges for national defense purposes and attendant military involvement. Local street and bridge construction may have to await availability of materials and manpower. After natural disasters, the local government can immediately begin reconstruction, supported by State and Federal resources if required.

m. Demolition of Unsafe Structures - After a natural disaster, demolition is usually a high priority. Adequate equipment is normally available. After a nuclear attack, demolition of such structures will most likely be of much lower priority since there will be other demands on equipment and personnel. Another consideration is that many of the structures will be in areas contaminated by fallout and could not be given immediate attention.

n. Public Information and Assistance on Health and Safety Measures - For natural disasters, most of the necessary information is available in existing literature. Health officials in their regular work exercise the skills necessary to provide for such information. In particularly difficult situations, there are numerous resources outside the area that can be brought to bear. With respect to health and safety measures after an enemy attack, there are additional and unique requirements. Few people know how to deal with radiation. As

something that is not visible and is uncommon, it requires special precautions and very specific public information. The planning requirements are not focused necessarily on how the information is disseminated, but on what type of information is disseminated. This requires very specialized planning and skills.

o. Repair, Reconstruction, Restoration or Replacement of (i) Facilities Owned by the United States; (ii) State or Local Government Facilities; (iii) Privately Owned Facilities - Few, if any, communities plan for the repair, reconstruction, and restoration of their community before a natural disaster strikes. There are too many variables to make such planning useful. There is a need for them to know where to get help (primarily financial assistance) if their ability to cope with the situation is exceeded, what they can do with it when they get it, and how they must account for it. But States and most communities have the skills necessary to replace destroyed facilities. The key issue is where are the supplemental resources and how do I get them?

In an enemy attack the key issue is are there resources and can they be made available? The reconstruction of a target area would be much different for no other reason than the restraints placed by radiation for extended periods of time. The same would hold true for privately owned facilities.

p. Crisis and Mental Health Counseling - The disciplines involved in this activity are the same for both types of situations. However, the level of need, compared with resource availability and the methods of handling these problems, may vary significantly for nuclear attack and natural disaster. Most mental health problems after a natural disaster occur days or even weeks after the incident. Persons requiring such care can be dealt with by available resources or, if necessary, transported out of the area. Living in a crowded, confined fallout shelter area will undoubtedly create a number of mental health problems. These will be compounded by the threat of unseen dangers (radiation), the threat to the survival of the country, and feelings of isolation. Dealing with these cases in shelters may require physical restraint rather than therapeutic help. Again, it is unlikely that mental health specialists will be available either in sufficient quantity or at the places they are needed after a nuclear attack. Planning assumptions must assume few, if any, mental health resources will be available. These are all unique planning requirements that go far beyond those necessary for a natural disaster situation.

q. Emergency Communications - Emergency communications

equipment has a function in both nuclear war and natural disaster situations. The similarities are purely mechanical. The need for such equipment is much higher for use in a nuclear attack. It is the exception rather than the rule that there is a heavy requirement for emergency communications equipment after a natural disaster. In most areas after a disaster, there is at least partial availability of conventional means of communication. If not, equipment is readily available in the surrounding area. Our experience has been that the telephone companies are able to restore emergency lines very rapidly after a disaster. A requirement for emergency communication systems, if any, is usually of short duration; catastrophic disasters may be the exception.

Emergency communications after a nuclear attack are essential. There are special requirements placed on the equipment itself to withstand certain conditions, electromagnetic pulses, for example. Unlike conditions after a natural disaster, there may be no backup systems available. Electromagnetic pulses may create radio disturbances and problems not encountered in natural disasters. The equipment itself is not nearly as important as how it is used. In a nuclear attack, plans have to start with the assumption that the equipment will be used for only the most critical messages. In natural disasters, the equipment use can assume full utilization and, if conditions require, then the limitation can be imposed. There is no need to place such restraints on the equipment in natural disasters unless it is required.

r. Command Center Operations - This subject was discussed as an example in the introduction and will not be repeated.

s. Coordination of Public and Private Relief Agencies and Services - In natural disasters involving a Presidential declaration, the relief agencies have well defined functions and are coordinated. In non-declared disasters, they have well established roles within the communities in which they operate.

The services provided by relief organizations in an enemy attack would be much the same as in a natural disaster. Again, the major consideration is their supply of and access to the resources which they traditionally provide.

QUESTION #2.

In your testimony, you questioned all of the proposals for reform in the preparedness area, including reinstating "dual use" funding, the need to centralize policy coordination for the federal preparedness effort, and the need to raise the national priority of preparedness from its present low level. All of these reforms have elicited support in many quarters, judging from evidence available to this committee and from testimony given before the Leggett Civil Defense Panel. But in no case do you offer any cogent reasons for opposing these reforms. Instead we have your philosophical observations. Can you provide cogent reasons for opposing these reforms to overcome the record of advocacy for them presented to the Congress?

ANSWER:

Your second question stated that I questioned all the proposals for reform in the preparedness area, including reinstating "dual use" funding, the need to centralize policy coordination for the Federal preparedness effort, and the need to raise the national priority on preparedness. You have concluded that I have opposed the above-mentioned reforms.

Evidently, I did not communicate in my testimony the main point which I had hoped to leave with the Committee. I stated that "I cannot accept as a principle that more of everything is necessarily good ..." I further stated that "we ought to look at what is and what ought to be so that we can chart a more precise course than the general recommendations for more money and reorganization seem to suggest" (emphasis added). I concluded my statement by again saying "I realize that I have asked more questions than I have offered solutions. But I believe that if we know what the critical questions are, the answers will be much more readily apparent. We should be unwilling to grope for solutions to problems that we are unable to define. We may be lucky and hit upon the best balance between the idealism of the planner and the pragmatics of annual budgets--and between reasonable protection and reasonable risk. But if we do find that balance, it will be by accident as long as our only motivation is to 'do more'."

I am not against "dual use." During the hearings in responding to Congressman Brown, I said, "Now I believe--and I have never said anything different--that the dual-use of Federal funds is not inappropriate, if the concept is applied with some reason. If we don't devote too much time and energy to natural disaster preparedness while leaving the national emergency preparedness program of the country dormant, this I think is reasonable. But once you start emphasizing one, at the expense of the other, you're in trouble, and you are not making very effective use of the tax dollar."

If we sincerely believe in a Civil Defense program for our Nation, we should examine what that program should be and what is essential to its successful implementation. In focusing on these essential elements, if they contain collateral benefits

to natural disaster preparedness and response, then by all means they should be recognized and encouraged.

Dual use cannot be justified solely on the basis of a similarity of functions. There is a real danger that the concept of dual use can become an objective in and of itself. The requirements imposed by nuclear attack and natural disaster environments must be addressed separately. Each has its unique requirements and restraints. Planning for nuclear attack must incorporate a number of restraints not present in natural disasters such as the effects of radiation and resource availability and mobility. Just because a particular response pattern works well in natural disaster situations does not necessarily mean that it will suffice in a nuclear attack environment. But to justify any activity under a dual-use concept is dangerous in that the focus of the activity may become so blurred that it doesn't serve the requirements in either type of disaster well.

I am not opposed to "centralized policy coordination." But I am opposed to coordination for coordination's sake. Let's define what needs coordinating and how much coordination is needed. A lot of generalizations are being made about the need to coordinate preparedness activities. In light of the separate constitutional responsibilities of Federal and State governments, current legislative authorities and the demonstrated ability of Federal, State and local governments to react effectively to disaster situations, I cannot identify a need for more coordination of natural disaster preparedness. I am not qualified to address the war preparedness question. I am always open to specific suggestions on areas in which improved coordination will improve the response to natural disasters.

I am not opposed to a higher national priority for preparedness. But I am opposed to more funding and more preparedness efforts until we more explicitly define our preparedness goals and more precisely determine who is responsible for seeing to it that these goals are attained.

In my opinion, all the so-called reform proposals are only symptoms of a problem which has yet to be clearly defined. What is needed, and I believe the Joint Committee can make a major contribution here, is a thorough examination of the basic questions which I asked in my statement.

- What does the Federal Government require of the State and local governments to assure the survival of the Nation in the event of a national emergency?

- Who should be responsible for funding these activities?

- What is expected of State and local governments in meeting local disasters?

- What is the proper role of the Federal Government in supporting State and local governments in preparing for and responding to local disasters?

I do not want to appear antagonistic but I am seriously concerned about this continual emphasis on "reform" without addressing these basic issues and knowing specifically what it is we are reforming.

QUESTION #3.

3. Executive Order 11725 provides H.U.D. the authority to coordinate all the activities of federal agencies involved in natural disaster programs. How does that relate to Gen. Bray's overall coordination authority for civil preparedness under several other Executive Orders?

ANSWER:

Executive Order 11725 has been further updated by Executive Order 11795 which delegates most of the authorities in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93-288).

You asked how the delegation of the coordination of all natural disaster activities to HUD related to the Federal Preparedness Agency's "overall coordination authority for civil preparedness under several other Executive orders." Executive Order 11725, section 3, explicitly excludes those authorities related to disaster relief from the delegation to the Federal Preparedness Agency. The types of disasters envisioned in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 are those which clearly are first the jurisdictional responsibilities of State and local governments. The role of the Federal Government is to assist State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities. The Executive orders giving the Federal Preparedness Agency authorities all relate to situations which constitute a threat to national security such as an enemy attack. This distinction is quite clear and the separation of these functions is proper in light of constitutional responsibilities and related legislation.

There is no problem of coordination or duplication of effort. In a national emergency it is clear that FPA has the lead role, and when the President declares an "emergency" or major disaster under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 it is equally clear that FDAA has the lead role.

GEORGE RODERICKS



GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS



EXECUTIVE OFFICE
XXXXXXXXXXXX
300 INDIANA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

August 9, 1976

Honorable William Proxmire
Vice Chairman, Joint Committee
on Defense Production
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Proxmire:

In response to your letter of July 14, 1976, requesting a response to several questions relating to civil emergency preparedness, the following is submitted:

1. QUESTION: Please provide specifics on the loss of coordination and cohesiveness in the federal preparedness effort resulting from separation of federal agencies.

ANSWER: In July of 1973, the Office of Emergency Preparedness was abolished. Its functions were transferred to HUD, Treasury and GSA. This action removed from the Executive Office the only federal coordinating agency for all federal emergency preparedness programs. The director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness was a statutory member of the National Security Council. With this single action the civil defense and natural disaster programs lost direct access to the President and his top aides in the White House. Our program also lost its representative on the National Security Council.

Without the White House level coordination and direction of the several emergency preparedness and assistance programs, cohesiveness, direction and interest diminished at every level.

2. QUESTION: Please provide any specific recommendations for reform of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

2. ANSWER: At this time I strongly recommend that the language contained in H.R. 12438, in the Senate of the United States, May 26, 1976, be adopted by the Congress as soon as possible. This language, amending the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was passed by the House and Senate this year but was amended by the Conference Committee, Senate Report No. 94-1004, June 28, 1976.

The language recommended for adoption is as follows:

Section 2 of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. App. 2251) is amended by inserting after the third sentence thereof a new sentence as follows: "The Congress recognizes that the organizational structure established jointly by the Federal Government and the several States and their political subdivisions for civil defense purposes can be effectively utilized, without adversely affecting the basic civil defense objectives of this Act, to provide relief and assistance to people in areas of the United States struck by other than enemy-caused disasters; it is therefore further declared to be the policy and intent of the Congress that the needs of the States and their political subdivisions with respect to preparations for other than enemy-caused disasters be taken into account in providing Federal assistance under this Act."

Current Acts of Congress authorize assistance to States and political subdivisions after disaster strikes. The language cited above would also authorize existing State and local emergency preparedness agencies to include other than enemy-caused disaster preparations without any additional cost to the respective Federal agencies.

3. QUESTION: Please provide copies of former or draft Washington evacuation plans together with comments on why they were deemed unworkable.

ANSWER: A copy of Annex N, December 1, 1958, District of Columbia Survival Plan is enclosed. It was the judgement of this office that this plan represented a theoretical approach to massive logistical and financial problems. A review of this plan by many leaders of the government and private sector indicated that unless the President formally directed that this plan be made operational and provide federal resources to assist the District, Maryland and Virginia officials execute such a plan, no realistic actions could be expected of local authorities.

4. QUESTION: Do you believe a workable evacuation plan could be developed for Washington under current conditions? What would it entail in terms of federal aid, public drills or exercises, host area logistics, transportation, relocation site shelters, and similar considerations?

ANSWER: I believe that a workable evacuation plan could be developed for the Metropolitan Washington Area if the Federal Government provides the leadership and primary effort funding to supplement state and local planning, movement, shelter, public education and testing. Unless this plan has the support of the President and the Congress then we cannot realistically expect the State and local elected officials to sponsor and fund an acceptable evacuation plan.

5. QUESTION: In view of the fact that Washington is the only American city assigned a target priority of two, how many fallout shelters (in terms of locations or shelter spaces) could withstand blast overpressures of 2 pounds per square inch? Of 6 psi?

ANSWER: It is very difficult to respond to this question with the specificity requested. We do have some data which does present a profile of the overpressure problems in the District of Columbia.

- a. Within the Federal Triangle about 20% of the existing facilities could provide protection against 2 psi.
 - b. Outside of the Federal Triangle in the rest of the city area only about 5% of the facilities could provide protection against 2 psi.
 - c. We do not have specific data on buildings providing fallout protection with respect to 6 psi.
6. QUESTION: Please provide justification given for federal exclusion of State and local agencies from civil defense exercises and source of or documentation for this exclusion.

6. ANSWER: I cannot provide documentation of this exclusion of state and local agencies from National Civil Defense exercises and suggest that the Federal Preparedness Agency or the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency be requested to provide this information. I have been told repeatedly by top federal officials that these civil defense exercises are part of world-wide war plans testing and that non-federal, state and local civil defense personnel are not authorized to have access to the information.

In years past when state and local agencies did participate in these National exercises, the federal classified portions of the exercises were not made available to state and local participants but unclassified data was used to stimulate test actions at state and local levels.

7. QUESTION: Please elaborate on any particular, specific problems seen in prototype evacuation plans, based on your experience with past evacuation planning.

ANSWER: Until the President indicates that this Nation should develop crises relocation plans and the Congress enacts specific legislation to conduct a nationwide program -- fully funded by the federal government -- the small amounts of money now requested by DCPA will be spent to develop the theoretical, limited effort paper plans, which like other past plans, will not be realistically accepted by public and private sector leaders.

8. QUESTION: Are you aware of any provisions in evacuation planning for preventing uncontrolled spontaneous or contagious evacuation prior to or in the absence of official notification?


ANSWER: I have no information which would indicate that this real problem is being considered.

9. QUESTION: Can you provide a representative edition of the critical target list of cities in America published in the 1950s?

ANSWER: A search of the files in my office failed to find any copies of the old critical target lists. My staff members tell me that we disposed of these old records about ten years ago. I suggest that the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency or the Federal Preparedness Agency might still have copies in their libraries.

I trust that the above information will assist your Committee in its efforts to examine our civil defense readiness programs. If I can be of further assistance please call on me at any time.

Sincerely,


George R. Rodericks
Director

Enclosure

CECIL RUSSELL

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. QUESTION: If the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration were provided funds to give to state and local natural disaster programs to offset the loss of D.C.P.A. funds, would that solve local government program problems?
If this occurred, would grants from D.C.P.A. for nuclear attack purposes and from F.D.A.A. for natural disaster purposes create conflicts and confusion in program justification and administration?

ANSWER: If funds were provided to state and locals for natural disasters programs from FDAA, this would be fine. But, I do believe it would create confusion in program justification. Has anyone ever considered the merge of FDAA and DCPA? Nuclear preparedness is a must for this Country and we should be emphasizing this need loud and clear. But to build a common base for emergency operations it has to be done with other disasters, but keeping in mind the primary mission.

2. QUESTION: What portion of the Huntington, W. Va. preparedness budget is currently federally funded?

ANSWER: The total emergency preparedness budget for our Office (City and County combined) \$212,900, the portion of Federal funds that will be returned \$16,000.

3. QUESTION: One of the problems faced in the national preparedness effort is that there is a wide disparity in the adequacy of various state and local programs. Some citizens get very good emergency protection and others get very little, depending on where they happen to live. Can you suggest ways of making preparedness programs more uniform? Should the federal government mandate minimum standards for state and local programs?

ANSWER: Yes, if a political subdivision receives Federal Financial Assistance, I believe it should be mandatory for that political subdivision to comply with minimum standards that DCPA has recommended.

4. QUESTION: What, in brief, will be the actual impact on your local programs of the changed federal philosophy concerning natural disaster and nuclear attack preparedness?

ANSWER: In our community very little. We would continue on somewhat a limited basis.

5. QUESTION: Do local organizations have the management capability to keep pace with the D.C.P.A. management system?

ANSWER: The larger one's that have an adequate staff, but the small one man operations find it difficult.

6. QUESTION: Where are there specific cases of duplication or cases of gaps between the various federal preparedness agencies?

ANSWER: The cases of duplication seems to me to be with DCPA, FPA, FDAA.

7. QUESTION: What are some of the strengths and some of the weaknesses that you have experienced in the existing federal organization for preparedness.

ANSWER: Strengths:

1. Working together
2. Provide guidance
3. Financial assistance

Weaknesses:

1. Slow response
2. Lack of competent people

8. QUESTION: Looking at the problem from your perspective, what would be the optimum preparedness organization at the Federal level? What would you find easiest to work with and most effective?

ANSWER: Possibly merge FDAA and DCPA, clarify the responsibilities of FPA.

9. QUESTION: What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of county and municipal organizations? Where do you have problems that need correcting?

ANSWER: Strengths:

1. Interest among heads of Government
2. Competent people
3. Adequate funds

Weaknesses:

1. Lack of the above

10. QUESTION: What is your evaluation of the proposal made in testimony that all nuclear attack programs be fully funded and operated by the federal government under new legislation? This proposal would still permit local inputs to the programs.

ANSWER: I don't know how to answer this properly. I do know the Federal Government is responsible for the total Defense of this Country.

11. QUESTION: If a clean division were made, with all natural disaster responsibilities going to the states and all nuclear attack responsibilities resting solely with the federal government, would that clear up some of the present management and other problems?

ANSWER: Yes, it probably would, but again would this be practical. There is no reason why the tax dollar can't do double duty.

Hon. John E. Davis

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

1. In 1974, Title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act expired. In your view, what would be the effect of the nonexistence of the authority given the President under Title III if an attack were to occur?

Title III of the Federal Civil Defense Act was designed to provide necessary statutory authority to carry out civil defense activities in the event of an attack on the United States. Absent this particular statutory authority, the Executive Branch, in conducting civil defense activities, would be required either to rely on other more general emergency authorizing statutes, such as the Defense Production Act, or to rely on the concept of the "inherent power" of the Presidency. The idea of "inherent power" has, of course, been severely criticized and its existence questioned by a great many authorities. The lesson of the steel seizure cases is that Federal authority is at its optimum when Congress and the President act in concert under a statute in specific terms for specific purposes.

The authorities granted by Title III for civil defense purposes, as that term is defined in the Act, are basically those authorities necessary to implement measures designed to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by an attack. Other statutory authorities granted for other purposes, such as disaster relief or defense production, are designed to deal with those other purposes and do not necessarily grant the type of authority which would be usable for civil defense in an attack situation.

More specifically, Section 302 of the Act authorizes the President to direct any Federal department or agency to provide their personnel, materials, and facilities for the aid of the States; to provide emergency shelter; and to provide protective and other work essential for the preservation of life and property and for making repairs of communications, hospitals, utilities, etc. damaged or destroyed by an attack. Under this authority the President can use about any resource which the Federal establishment has, assuming it is not necessary for military defense, to aid the States and provide relief to the people in case of an attack. The cited specific statutory authority for the contingency plans of the Department of Defense for military support of civil defense was Section 302. The statutory authority for a number of Federal agency plans such as those of DHEW and Agriculture are based on this provision of Title III.

Basically, other authorities, including obligational authority usable in a Title III situation, such as a broad procurement authority, and authority to dispose of property, are granted with a waiver of the usual statutory procedural, or social purpose, or similar rules desirable under normal circumstances, but which would impede expedited action in an emergency. Constitutional rules, of course, remain applicable. The general authorities such as those in the Defense Production Act are inadequate to meet civil defense needs. What is needed is a specific statute to deal with civil defense requirements.

2. For a complete record, please provide the specific details of the differences and similarities in the planning and carrying out of the following functions, where appropriate, immediately preceding, during, immediately following (six days) and for thirty days after for all disasters:

All disaster plans should outline the emergency organization and responsibilities and cover the functioning of systems required in an emergency. A capability is required for direction and control by key officials, to warn the public and to provide emergency information and advice to the public. There is a common requirement to be able to conduct coordinated operations regardless of the type of threat or the speed with which it arises. The basic difference in planning for and responding to disasters is primarily one of the degree of effects of each type of disaster. Therefore, plans for disaster response and recovery operations must take into account the following factors:

- (a) Specific hazards to which a locality is subject.
- (b) Amount of advance warning time.
- (c) Nature of the disaster impact (blast, fire, radiological fallout, flooding).
- (d) Size of the geographic area affected.
- (e) Resources available to deal with the disaster (personnel, facilities, equipment).
- (f) Experience and training of personnel.
- (g) Communications.
- (h) Availability of outside assistance.

Specific Hazards to Which a Locality is Subject

The first step in developing plans is to determine the hazards to which a locality can reasonably expect to be subject. Only certain areas are subject to flooding or can anticipate being at high risk to the direct effects

of a nuclear attack. Because of the vagaries of wind currents, most would be subject to nuclear fallout. Plans must be developed based on this type hazard analysis.

Amount of Advance Warning Time

The amount of warning which can be expected will determine the protective actions which the public can take. Earthquakes, tornadoes or an attack out of the blue provide little or no time to alert the public. Therefore, people must seek protection in-place promptly. Conversely, hurricanes, floods or an attack preceded by a severe international crisis provide enough time to warn people to relocate to less risky areas.

Nature of the Disaster Impact (Blast, Fire, Radiological Fallout, Flooding)

Loss of life, amount of damage, protective measures which should be taken and the length of the recovery effort will all be influenced by the nature of the impact of a disaster. The high winds of a tornado, hurricane or nuclear blast not only destroy structures and injure the occupants within, but also cause injuries from debris generated by the high winds. Radiological fallout generated by a weapon ground burst is carried down wind in a manner similar to radioactive

isotopes released by a nuclear facility accident.

Fires and floods each generate their own peculiar threat to life and property.

Size of the Geographic Area Affected

The size of the geographic area affected by a disaster greatly affects the response and recovery effort required. A nuclear attack, flood or hurricane can affect large geographic areas, pose a threat to a great number of people, do widespread damage and require many emergency organizations to respond while a tornado or major fire is more localized.

Resources Available to Deal with the Disaster (Personnel, Facilities, Equipment)

A three alarm fire can strain or even overwhelm the resources of a small community whereas it is taken in stride by the emergency forces of a major city. Therefore, plans must be tailored to the resources available in an area to cope with various types of disasters. An emergency operations center where key officials can gather information, quickly reach decisions, communicate with the emergency services and provide information and guidance to the public, provides the best means to effectively coordinate disaster operations. Resources involve not only government

personnel, facilities and equipment, but that which can be made available by the private sector. Many large industries have police, fire, rescue, communications centers and heavy equipment which can be used to respond to disasters. Medical personnel, hospitals and other medical facilities are another resource required in a disaster. Contractors, trucking companies and in rural areas, heavy farm equipment are resources which can be used during and following a disaster. The voluntary agencies and service clubs can provide personnel, equipment and expertise in disaster operations. The commercial broadcast industry can be used as a means of providing warning and emergency information to the public. Effective disaster response and recovery efforts should incorporate all community resources.

Experience and Training of Personnel

The response of local officials and emergency services varies with their training and experience. Localities which have experienced a certain type disaster or have developed a high degree of competency through training, can be expected to respond more effectively in mitigating the effects of a disaster.

Communications

Rapid and accurate communications are the core of any effective organized response to a disaster. Disasters which generate high winds, the blast and heat from a nuclear detonation, fires, floods and earthquakes all can destroy the physical means of communications. Although total destruction is not likely in the case of natural disasters, provision must be made for protection of operators, emergency power and replacement-equipment. All disaster operations require procedures to handle overloads both between and within organizations and inquiries from the public for aid and information.

Availability of Outside Assistance

A localized disaster permits unaffected nearby areas to quickly render help. A widespread disaster such as a major flood or hurricane could isolate large areas and delay the arrival of assistance. The results of a major attack will be so extensive and fallout may not permit movement so that many areas may be forced to exist for days or weeks with only the resources locally available.

The planning factors outlined above, are closely interrelated; each affecting the others. Also, it can be seen that the personnel, facilities, equipment and procedures employed in responding to disasters are basically the same; requiring modification only as the effects of a disaster impact on an area.

Actions taken immediately preceding, during, immediately following and during the recovery period each impact on the activities which follow. Actions taken to warn the public and assist them in taking appropriate shelter or relocate to less threatened areas can reduce casualties. Action which can be taken to mitigate or deflect the impact of a disaster, such as moving property to safer areas, sand bagging dikes, etc., can reduce property damage. If preceding and immediately following a disaster, search and rescue operations are initiated as quickly as conditions permit, lives can be saved which would otherwise be lost and injuries can be treated before they become aggravated. If only the number of personnel and that equipment required at a certain place is sent rather than over-responding, then resources will be available for action elsewhere or at a later time. If material, supplies and equipment are not squandered in temporary repairs, which are not absolutely required, or used for non-essential activities, then they will be available for use in the recovery period. Plans, therefore, must not only relate to emergency operations, but must consider the effect emergency activities will have on subsequent recovery operations.

From all of the foregoing it can be seen that the basic similarities in emergency planning and operations are common to all disasters, whereas the differences are reflected in the type of disaster -- peacetime or war caused; sudden impact or one that strikes after a relatively long build-up period. Prediction and issuance of warnings for

peacetime disasters is the responsibility of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, whereas prediction and warning of an attack is the responsibility of the Department of Defense. Shelter against the immediate effects and fallout resulting from an attack differs from shelter provided to the victims of a flood. Peacetime disasters last over a relatively short period of time and involve much less damage when compared with a nuclear war disaster. The time span and magnitude of damage resulting from a disaster dictates the type and amount of resources required to respond to and recover from a disaster.

3. Can DCPA provide data, on an aggregate or state-by-state basis, for state and/or local expenditures, excluding federal matching or other funds, on either civil defense or all civil emergency preparedness functions for any recent fiscal or calendar year?

There is no accurate way for DCPA to determine the total amount of expenditures made by the states and all localities on either civil defense or all civil emergency preparedness functions. However, those localities which fill out program papers and the states report their expenditures by fiscal years as follows:

1972	\$53,363,000
1973	56,209,000
1974	64,719,000
1975	68,114,000

4. How many state and local preparedness officials attend the Battle Creek staff college each year? What percentage of annual total enrollment if state and local officials? How many state and local officials receive other types of federally sponsored professional training each year?

Of the 1855 attendees at Staff College in FY 76, 474 or 26% had assigned State level Civil Preparedness responsibilities; 722 or 39% had assigned local Civil Preparedness responsibilities. Approximately 65% of the annual enrollment at Staff College during FY 76 consisted of students with assigned local or State Civil Preparedness responsibilities. Others included foreign students, Civil Air Patrol, and similar groups with a related mission in Civil Preparedness. During FY 75, the State and Local Civil Preparedness Instructional Program reported 32,831 course or training activity completions throughout the U.S. by persons who had State or local Civil Preparedness assignments or responsibilities; there were 33,434 completions in the first three quarters of FY 76.

5. Has DCPA requested state and local preparedness agencies not to exercise civil defense capabilities? If so, what was the date and justification for the action?

Absolutely not. In fact, DCPA encourages state and local preparedness agencies to conduct exercises and to use civil defense personnel and resources in responding to natural disasters.

6. Is information available to DCPA on whether Soviet civil defense efforts are designed to serve emergency purposes other than nuclear or conventional war contingencies

This agency has been furnished several authoritative studies both classified and unclassified in nature regarding the extent to which the Soviet civil defense system is used for conventional war contingencies and other emergencies not related to enemy attack. However, a synopsis of current Soviet policy on the scope of use of its civil defense systems has been prepared by Dr. Leon Goure in his recent monograph "War Survival in Soviet Strategy: USSR Civil Defense" which provides what this agency believes is an accurate brief description on this question. Pertinent excerpts from Dr. Goure's monograph follow:

The Soviet Civil Defense Program provides for extensive training and exercises of civil defense formations in Emergency Rescue and Repair (SNAVR) operations. Indeed, this is the most heavily emphasized aspect of the training and exercises at industrial and service installations, and the greater part of the civil defense formations are for use in such operations. In addition to exercises, these units also receive practical experience while dealing with accidents at the plants and with natural disasters.

The improvements in the organization, training and equipment of civil defense formations and apparently some interest in justifying their peacetime utility have led to the recognition that they can perform valuable services in dealing with natural disasters. This interest was absent from the Soviet Civil Defense Program prior to 1972. Up to that time the role of civil defense in natural disasters was not specifically referred to in the doctrine, nor was any of the training designed to deal with this problem. There had been occasions when some local civil defense units were called out to deal with the effects of natural disasters, but this was done on the basis of the initiatives of local administrators and in a haphazard fashion. The main reason for this appears to have been the reluctance of administrators of production facilities to release personnel for such purposes.

The Soviet approach to this problem changed significantly after the summer of 1972 when large forest and peat fires had to be fought with the use of military and civilian civil defense units. This experience led to the concept of organizing "combined detachments" from among the civil defense forces, which were to be maintained in an "increased state of readiness" in order to always be on call to deal with natural disasters. Furthermore, the new general civil defense training program introduced in 1973 included for the first time a section specifically devoted to training in dealing with natural disasters, and it has been reported that "much attention" is being paid to this training. In his 1973 year-end survey of civil defense activities, USSR Civil Defense Chief Altunin wrote concerning the "combined detachments":

They had to be created in order to fight forest fires in the summer of 1972. And it is gratifying that these forces which were trained in all oblasts, krais and republics as well as at installations of the national economy, operating with military subunits, have already acquired a certain amount of experience in fighting fires, landslides, floods, and other natural disasters.

In recent years, Soviet publications cite the participation of military and civilian civil defense units in dealing with the effects of a variety of

natural disasters in various parts of the Soviet Union. These have included violent storms in the Baltic region, the city of Kharkov, the Brest region and Sakhalin Island, blizzards in the Caucasus, floods in the Belorussian, Uzbek and Kazakh republics, and along the Amur river; landslides in the Tadzhik and Kazakh republics, earthquakes in Dagestan and Tashkent (Uzbek Republic), and many large forest and prairie fires. For example, in the summer of 1975 civil defense forces were used to fight forest fires in the Urals region and along the Baykal-Amur rail line now under construction.

At the same time, local civil defense leaders, especially those in the technical services, have taken advantage of industrial accidents, breakdowns in services, or damage caused by local storms or fires to combine the normal repair work on electric power lines, gas mains, etc., carried out by the personnel with civil defense exercises.

7. What is the relation of Crisis Relocation Planning and the Community Shelter Program to Nuclear Crisis Preparedness? What are the components of the last named program? Can DCPA provide a N.C.P. fact sheet?

The term "Nuclear Civil Protection" (not "Crisis Preparedness") is one which DCPA has adopted to refer to the two basic options for protecting the population, namely, in-place protection and crisis relocation. As outlined in DCPA's FY 1977 Program Emphasis document, which is provided to the eight DCPA Regions and to the States,

The term Nuclear Civil Protection (NCP) refers to those plans and capabilities needed for operations during periods of severe international crisis or of attack upon the United States. NCP planning will provide the following two options: (1) Ability to protect the population essentially in-place, in the best shelter available at or near their places of residence, pursuant to a community shelter planning (CSP) allocation and the related nuclear emergency operations plan based on the allocation. (2) Ability to relocate people, should time and circumstances permit during an intense international crisis, either selectively, from high-risk areas near U.S. strategic offensive forces; or from all high-risk areas, including larger cities as well as areas near key military installations. Planning for the contingency of crisis relocation includes provision for protecting relocated people from fallout, based upon Host Area surveys of fallout protection.

It should be noted that the two options are complementary, not mutually exclusive. For example, capabilities for protecting the population would be essential for use in a rapidly escalating crisis that did not provide the several days needed for crisis relocation; or in a longer crisis in which the decision was not made to implement relocation plans; or in a longer crisis in which the decision was made to implement relocation plans, but time available permitted only partial relocation. Even where contingency plans for crisis relocation were fully implemented, there would still be present in risk areas the on-duty shift of essential workers, who would need in-place protection should the crisis escalate to attack.

Thus, some degree of in-place protection would always be needed in case of attack. Whether this would be for a few, many, or most of the population would depend upon the extent to which time and circumstances had permitted preattack (crisis) relocation.

A DCPA fact sheet (March 1976) on Nuclear Civil Protection is being transmitted separately.

March 1976

FACT SHEET ON NUCLEAR CIVIL PROTECTION (NCP) PLANNING

Background

In 1961, when the Federal Civil Defense Program was made a responsibility of the Department of Defense, the program's basic objective was to assist local and State governments -- financially, technically, and administratively -- in protecting their residents from the dangerous radioactive fallout that would follow a nuclear attack on the United States and blanket large areas of the country.

It was not considered economically feasible at that time for government to undertake major protective programs against the other, so-called "direct" effects of nuclear explosions -- initial radiation, blast, heat, and heat-induced fires.

As a first step in establishing its National Fallout Shelter Program, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) (redesignated in 1972 as the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA)) instituted the National Fallout Shelter Survey in late 1961. Since then, the Survey has identified areas of existing large buildings and other facilities -- such as mines, caves, and tunnels -- that would protect occupants from fallout radiation. Such areas were licensed and marked as public fallout shelters, and many were stocked with federally procured, austere supplies of water containers, basic food rations, and medical, sanitation, and radiation-monitoring kits.

Substantial progress has been made by Federal, State, and local government toward achieving fallout protection for the Nation. More than 230,000 facilities with fallout shelter space have been identified, with a capacity to shelter about 227 million persons. There is a deficit of public shelter space in rural and suburban areas; but a great deal of lower-quality shelter exists, which could be upgraded during a crisis to provide good fallout protection.

In addition to fallout shelters, other necessary components of a nationwide civil defense system have been developed, including warning and communications networks, radiological monitoring capabilities, and State and local emergency operating centers.

As the nationwide program of defense against nuclear fallout radiation moved forward in the 1960's and early 1970's, all State governments and most local governments expanded their emergency preparedness programs to include protection of residents from natural disasters and other peacetime catastrophes, as well as from nuclear fallout.

Nuclear Blast and Fire Protection

Throughout the 1960's, as the Federal Government helped local and State governments plan the protection of their residents from nuclear fallout radiation and peacetime-disaster effects, long-term research continued on how to protect people from the blast and fire effects of nuclear attack.

From these studies, supported by DCPA and predecessor agencies, these basic conclusions were reached in the early 1970's:

(1) An attack very likely would be preceded by a period of international tension or crisis. This could constitute "strategic warning," and provide time for protective actions to be taken.

(2) If an attack should occur, the primary enemy targets probably would be U.S. missile sites, military installations, and centers of industry and population (i.e., metropolitan areas). Approximately 137 million people live in areas designated at risk from the direct effects of nuclear weapons.

(3) Blast and fire would endanger mainly people living or working near military targets and in large metropolitan areas. These two types of location may therefore be designated "high-risk" areas for planning purposes.

(4) Extensive fallout shelter exists throughout the United States, and more is being identified (mostly in new buildings) as time goes on. Therefore, attention should now be given also to protection against nuclear blast and fire.

(5) It is technically feasible to build special underground blast-and-fire shelters in high-risk areas, but the public and the Congress would be unwilling at this time to underwrite such costs.

(E) It may be feasible, however, when an international crisis threatens to result in a nuclear attack, for residents of high-risk areas to be temporarily relocated in small-town and rural areas, where nuclear weapons probably would not be targeted, provided these people could be protected against radioactive fallout and provided with food, water, medical care, and other life support.

Nuclear Civil Protection Planning

The total effort to plan for survival of the greatest number of people faced with a probable nuclear attack is called "Nuclear Civil Protection (NCP) planning." This major DCPA program is directed toward providing decision-making officials with two basic options:

(1) Protecting people essentially in-place, at or near their places of residence.

(2) The orderly relocation of people, in time of international crisis, from areas of potentially high risk from the direct effects of nuclear weapons to low-risk host areas--and their reception, care, and protection in the host areas.

Much work has already been accomplished by DCPA under the first option of protecting people in place. As already noted, the National Fallout Shelter Program has identified shelter spaces for millions of persons. Starting in 1973, this work

was expanded to include surveying for best-available shelter from nuclear blast and heat effects as well as fallout in high-risk areas. These are called "all-effects" surveys. In low-risk areas, surveys continue to concentrate on best-available fallout protection.

As an adjunct to the shelter surveys, DCPA's Community Shelter Planning (CSP) Program has produced local plans over the past 10 years to move people to shelters in more than 2,900 counties with a total population exceeding 183 million. These plans tell people where to go and what to do in case of threatened nuclear attack.

Crisis Relocation Planning--Concept and Need

The work of DCPA under the second option, known as Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP), is much more recent. The CRP concept is still being refined, mainly through various pilot projects. CRP may be defined as the evacuation of high-risk areas when a nuclear attack threatens, and the temporary relocation of the residents of those areas into small towns and rural sites, called "host areas," where nuclear blast and fire effects are not likely to occur.

The crisis relocation option includes State and local planning for:

- (1) Allocation of risk-area populations to appropriate host areas.
- (2) Host-area reception and care, including provision of fallout protection and preparation of standby emergency information materials for the public.

(3) Logistical support of relocated people.

(4) Risk-area operations, including initial relocation of people, security measures to keep essential industry in operation in the risk areas, and furnishing of best-available blast protection for persons who would be in the risk areas in event of attack. Workers in key industries which must operate during a crisis period would be relocated, with their families, to close-in host communities from which they could commute to work during the crisis period.

Crisis relocation planning has peacetime as well as wartime value. It can be used to protect people not only from nuclear blast and fire, but also from the effects of: (a) slowly developing natural disasters, such as hurricanes and floods, and (b) certain types of peacetime accidents, such as those resulting in the release of harmful or lethal fumes into the atmosphere.

Planned relocation would not be practical, however, as a protective measure against sudden and unpredictable events, such as tornadoes, flash floods, earthquakes, or an enemy attack that occurs without warning. The probability of attack occurring without warning is considered low; and planners believe a period of rising international tension would be likely, including such telltale events as the evacuation of enemy cities.

Relationship of Civil Preparedness to the World Situation

Soviet leaders, it has been noted, have the option to evacuate their cities or to shelter the population in place, depending upon their assessment of the situation at the time . . . The U.S. should have a similar option for two reasons: (1) To be able to respond in kind if the Soviet Union attempts to intimidate us in a time of crisis by evacuating the population from its cities, and (2) to reduce fatalities if an attack on our cities appears imminent.

It has also been pointed out that if there were time before an all-out attack to relocate the bulk of the U.S. population from major metropolitan areas, some 70 million lives could be saved, over and above those that could be saved by well-functioning, in-place protection.

Implicit in this statement is the role of civil defense as a supporting element of national defense, and as a deterrent to hostile actions by a potential adversary which would threaten the lives of the American people.

Where We Stand on Nuclear Civil Protection Planning

To minimize the knockout potential of Soviet military power, NCP planners have designated approximately 400 "high-risk" areas for planning purposes throughout the United States, in three categories:

Category I -- Places which contain strategic offensive military forces, sometimes called "counterforce" areas.

Category II -- Other places of high military value, such as key military bases, and command and control facilities.

Category III -- Primarily urban/industrial complexes with populations of 50,000 or more.

As solutions are devised and tested for the special problems posed by the crisis relocation option of NCP, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency will provide guidance materials for local governments to use in developing Crisis Relocation Plans.

The following are examples of CRP progress so far, of activities underway, and of other activities planned for the near future:

0 In 1973, studies were made in Richmond, Virginia, and San Antonio, Texas; and a prototype approach to Crisis Relocation Planning was developed. These studies confirmed the feasibility and value of relocating residents of high-risk areas when a nuclear attack (or peacetime disaster) threatens.

0 In the summers of 1973 and 1974, more than 50 high-risk areas were specially surveyed for DCPA by Army and Navy engineers. In each place, existing buildings and other facilities were evaluated for the protection they offer against nuclear blast and fire and the effects of "probable" natural disasters. Results of these "all-risk" surveys have been furnished to the local civil preparedness officials in the surveyed areas, for their use in planning.

Q In 1974, nine CRP pilot projects were started in: Springfield, Mass.; Utica/Rome, N.Y.; Dover, Del.; Macon, Ga.; Duluth, Minn.; Oklahoma City, Okla.; Colorado Springs, Colo.; Tucson, Ariz.; and Great Falls, Mont. The work in these project cities will provide the basis for operational plans not only for the areas at risk, but also for the surrounding counties that would host relocated people.

Q Various possible methods of protecting relocated persons from radioactive fallout in host areas continue to be explored and evaluated. Such methods include use of public shelters surplus to local needs; upgrading the fallout protection or habitability of certain existing buildings, mines, caves, etc.; and as a last resort, arranging to build "expedient" fallout shelters.

Q DCPA currently is researching a number of particularly complex subjects necessary to developing workable Crisis Relocation Plans. These include analyses of food supply systems, transportation and communication networks, reception and care arrangements in host areas, sanitation, public safety, and medical aspects of CRP.

Q CRP training courses and materials are being developed. Ultimately, CRP training probably will be done under the surveillance of DCPA's eight regional offices.

Q The extent and timing of further CRP activity by DCPA will be governed by resources available. The ultimate intent is to develop both crisis relocation and in-place protection plans for all risk areas and associated host counties.

Special Northeast Corridor Study

Problems raised by dispersing people from urban high-risk areas to rural or semirural host areas are especially acute in the Northeast urban corridor from Boston to Washington, D.C. This is partly because of the very large population of this corridor in relation to possible host areas. In addition, a large amount of interstate population movement would be necessary, requiring extensive, carefully planned multistate cooperation.

According to the 1970 census, more than 60 million persons live in this area, of which about 47 million, or around 80 percent, live in areas where crisis relocation plans might be desirable. If all of these people were to be relocated to the remaining lower risk areas, there would be about four relocatees for each host resident, with the highest proportion being in New England.

Research begun in July 1975 seeks answers not only to the general questions on CRP already discussed, but also focuses more sharply on the large-scale problems of the Northeast megalopolis. Study results may also apply to such regions as the Chicago-Detroit corridor and California. Key questions being addressed include:

① How many people could physically leave cities such as New York, Boston, and Philadelphia by automobile, bus, or train over a three-day period during a crisis?

Q How far would these people have to go to find temporary lodging?

Q Is there a practical means of providing food and other necessities to the relocated people and their hosts?

Q In the nonmetropolitan areas to which relocatees may go, is there adequate fallout shelter in event the crisis escalates to actual attack?

Q In the high-risk areas, what essential facilities would need to be manned after most of the population was dispersed, and how many key personnel would be needed? What special protective facilities would they require? How many could commute from relatively nearby points?

Once the most feasible solutions to the many problems have been identified, the researchers will prepare guidance for use in relocation planning for large cities and densely populated areas, and will participate in field-testing the planning procedures in one large city of the Northeast.

8. Does DCPA have the responsibility for identifying, marking, or stocking fallout shelters and providing other logistic support for evacuees in host or relocation areas under CRP? If so, what effort has it made to this end in the prototype plan areas?

Authority for Crisis Relocation Planning (one of the two complementary nuclear civil protection options) is found in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, with Section 3(b) defining civil defense as including "... activities and measures designed or undertaken ... to minimize the effects upon the civilian population ... [of] an attack ... [including] the construction or preparation of shelters [and] shelter areas ... and, when appropriate, the ... evacuation of civil population ...". Executive Order 10952 (July 1961) made the Secretary of Defense responsible for these and other aspects of civil defense, which responsibilities have since been delegated to DCPA.

As the question implies, provision of fallout protection in host areas is an essential element of plans and capabilities for the contingency of crisis relocation. Without such protection, many persons could suffer sickness or death due to fallout radiation, the number depending upon the weight of the attack and its nature (e.g., the percentage of ground-burst detonations).

DCPA conducts a "host area survey" which identifies fallout protection in existing structures, as well as buildings whose protection could be increased by actions taken during a crisis period, e.g., by adding earth alongside or on top of buildings. (The answer to question 11 below discusses these and other techniques for increasing the amount and quality of fallout protection in host areas by crisis-period actions.)

When existing and crisis-upgradable fallout protection has been identified by surveys, the problem becomes one of providing in crisis relocation plans for the use of existing protection and, as necessary, for crisis actions to develop additional shelter. (In most though not all host areas, existing shelter would not be sufficient for relocated people from risk areas in addition to host area residents.)

DCPA no longer either marks or stocks fallout shelters in host areas. (Nor has DCPA marked or stocked shelters in host areas since about 1970; however, the FY 1977 program provides for a limited amount of marking in only those risk areas associated with U.S. strategic offensive forces.) As for other logistic support of evacuees in host areas, DCPA has done considerable research on these problems, and has solicited the assistance of other Federal agencies through the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA), of GSA.

The Research efforts have included projects in areas such as food system support for crisis relocation (further discussed in the answer to question 12 below), reception and care, health-medical problems, and production and maintenance of electric power. Research reports in these and allied areas have been (or as soon as available will be) supplied to cognizant Federal agencies.

Federal agency support of the DoD/DCPA program for crisis relocation planning is discussed in the CRP Subcommittee of the Interagency Emergency Preparedness Committee, this subcommittee having been established by FPA at DCPA's request. The basic approach so far taken by the Subcommittee is that contingency planning for crisis relocation of population is a DoD/DCPA civil defense program, under the Act and Executive Order 10952, as noted above. It is a program, however, which will require significant complementary supporting effort by a number of Federal departments, and the Subcommittee is to serve as the focal point for discussing and coordinating such supporting effort.

Host-area plans developed in DCPA's CRP pilot projects provide for fallout protection of evacuees, and for other logistic support. DCPA can, if requested, provide examples of one or more such plans. It should also be noted that emergency public information materials for risk-area evacuees stress that they should bring transportable food supplies, and also cover techniques for developing fallout protection in host areas.

9. How long does DCPA anticipate it will take to complete CRP for all jurisdictions volunteering to participate at current funding levels? What improvement in this time element could be achieved by what levels of increased funding?

DCPA's FY 1977 programming for Nuclear Civil Protection planning provides \$3.6 million for approximately 130 NCP planners, as well as an additional \$3.5 million for supporting shelter surveys, out of the total of \$82.5 million appropriated for civil defense. The efforts of the 130 planners will be devoted about 20 percent to planning for in-place protection, and about 80 percent to planning for the crisis relocation contingency.

DCPA estimates that an NCP planning force providing about 250 work-years annually, at a cost of about \$6.9 million, would require some seven to eight years to complete planning for the crisis relocation contingency. An initial capability would be developed within some three years or less, to be followed by development of more detailed operational plans primarily at local level (in both host and risk jurisdictions), which would result in substantially improved confidence of ability to conduct crisis relocation operations.

The seven to eight-year period just noted could be reduced to five years by increasing the average annual number of work-years to approximately 400, and annual investment to \$11 million. It does not now appear to DCPA that a nationwide crisis relocation capability could be attained in substantially less than five years, due to the need for host-area shelter survey data, as well as for developing special solutions for areas such as the Northeast and California.

The following caveats and relevant factors should be borne in mind: (a) The estimates just made are based upon limited experience in pilot projects, and are subject to refinement as additional experience is gained in relocation planning. (b) The quality and depth of plans, and the resulting level of confidence in ability to conduct relocation operations, is to a considerable extent a function of effort devoted. A larger effort invested in planning permits more on-site planning assistance to be given to local governments and to key public agencies and private concerns within the local jurisdictions; such assistance in turn results in a greater degree of participation in planning by such public and private groups, and more detail in their plans, and hence in improved confidence that such groups would be able to conduct relocation operations if the need arose. (c) The development of plans per se cannot be equated with attainment of an operating capability, especially as plans grow older, and are less and less familiar ever to those who participated in the planning process. Rather, the maintenance of a relocation capability, once plans are developed, requires periodic exercising of plans, involving key officials of State and local governments who would be responsible to conduct operations; exercising is not included in the manpower and funding estimates provided above. (d) Adequate shelter survey effort, particularly in host areas, is required to provide a basis for crisis relocation

planning. Host area surveys to support a seven to eight-year CRP effort would require investment of approximately \$5 million annually, while completion of the CRP effort in five years would require a survey effort nearly half again as great, or about \$7 million annually. There is also a requirement for additional survey effort in the risk areas, to identify best-available blast protection. This is estimated to total some \$24 million, the bulk of which should be programmed to follow the host area survey effort, over a period of perhaps 3 to 5 years.

10. What percentage of the U.S. population lives in the Northeast Corridor Detroit-Chicago and California areas described as unamenable to ideal evacuation solutions?

The populations involved are as follows (1970 Census data):

	<u>Population (Total)</u>	<u>Population of Areas Designated High Risk (Blast)</u>
<u>Northeast Corridor</u> (DCPA Regions One and Two, i.e., Virginia and West Virginia through Pennsylvania, New York and New England)	60.4m	46 m
<u>California</u>	20.0m	16.9m
<u>Chicago-Detroit Area (urbanized areas only)</u>	10.6m	10.6m
TOTALS	91.0m	73.5m
TOTAL U.S.	<u>203.2m</u>	<u>134 m</u>
PERCENTAGE	44.8	54.9

Special solutions are clearly required to develop Nuclear Civil Protection plans (for in-place protection and/or crisis relocation operations) for densely urbanized areas such as the Northeast Corridor, California, and the Chicago-Detroit area. A feasibility study is now in progress for the Northeast, and DCPA expects to commence one starting around October 1976 for the California area. Results from these two studies should be applicable to the Chicago-Detroit area. Preliminary indications are that it would require hosting ratios (number of evacuees divided by the host area residents) ranging from 4 to 6 in the Northeast Corridor and somewhat higher in California.

It should be stressed that such studies are not expected to produce plans or even the outlines of a final plan, for such areas. Rather, the feasibility studies are expected to illuminate the problems involved, and to develop options for consideration as a basis for development of actual plans. DCPA expects that the results of the feasibility studies will be used as a point of departure for analysis by the Regions and the States involved, leading to agreement first on broad-scale planning concepts and approaches, and later (c. FY 1978-1979) to development of initial plans, to be followed by more detailed local and State operational planning.

11. Please describe expedient shelter techniques.

Expedient shelter techniques comprise those actions that can be taken to develop, improve or enhance fallout protection for the populace during an emergency. Existing facilities in host areas, be they homes, schools, churches, stores, etc., already have some degree of inherent fallout protection. To improve or upgrade this protection requires that two things be done: (1) provide an overhead barrier which will attenuate fallout gamma radiation coming from sources on the roof and (2) provide a vertical barrier to attenuate radiation originating from ground sources. On an expedient basis, earth can be effectively used as a shield or barrier against radiation.

Occupants of a basement in an existing facility can upgrade their fallout protection by placing a layer of earth on the floor over the basement area. Because the basement is already belowgrade, the earth surrounding the basement exterior walls serves as a barrier and one only needs to improve the overhead protection. This is an effective approach and a 12-inch earth layer can increase the fallout protection in a fully depressed basement to levels of PF 100. If the basement walls are partially exposed, then the additional step of mounding earth against the sides of the exposed walls (creating an earth berm) needs to be taken so that the basement walls are no longer exposed.

For buildings without basements, similar upgrading techniques can be used by mounding earth against the exposed walls of the first story (to create a vertical barrier) and placing a layer of earth on the floor over the first story or on the roof (to create an overhead barrier).

Shelter survey results indicate that on the average, over 77 percent of the facilities likely to be found in host areas are upgradable so as to improve the fallout shelter potential. It takes approximately 0.9 cubic yards of earth per shelter space to accomplish such upgrading. This is a large but not insurmountable task. It is equivalent to approximately 35 to 50 buckets of earth and upgrading can therefore be accomplished in many instances without the aid of mechanical equipment.

If upgrading existing facilities does not produce sufficient shelter spaces, then other expedient techniques can be used for construction of family-type shelters. These include techniques such as excavating a trench using hand tools and then covering the trench with doors, logs or lumber which in turn is covered with earth to provide the overhead barrier. In the event that a high water table precludes trenching, other designs have been devised to use doors in conjunction with earth rolls (expedient-type sand bags) constructed from bed sheets or other cloth or wide sheets of plastic. Such shelters have been constructed abovegrade by unskilled families within 48 hours.

In areas where there is an abundance of trees, designs of shelters have been developed which utilize poles (cut from trees) to create walls as well as the supports for the overhead earth barrier. These designs are similar to those used by the Russians and illustrated in their civil defense publications. Designs for both belowgrade and abovegrade pole-type shelters have been devised. In addition, techniques for improving the ventilation by construction of special air pumps (fan) and for providing lamps for lighting purposes have also been devised.

Tests have shown that expedient shelters such as those described can be constructed by untrained families following a set of written instructions. These shelters can be constructed within a 24-48 hour period and provide excellent fallout protection with PF's often exceeding 250. No special tools or equipment is required for construction; only those items normally available to many families (shovel, buckets or pots, interior doors, bed sheets, bedspreads, etc.).

In summary, expedient shelter techniques involve movement of earth to provide the necessary barriers to attenuate fallout gamma radiation. Various designs for aboveground and belowground conditions have been devised, tested and proven to be practical from the point of construction time, ease of construction, and without necessarily requiring mechanical equipment.

12. Can DCPA provide current results of its research into realignment of distribution networks to serve relocated populations?

A September 1975 report from one of DCPA's research projects is being provided to the Joint Committee, pursuant to the request included in question 14 below. This report is by Dr. John W. Billheimer, and is entitled, "Food System Support of the Relocation Strategy."

The study is well summarized in two recent articles by Dr. Billheimer in DCPA's quarterly journal "Foresight" (copies of which are being provided to the Joint Committee).

As noted in one of the articles, a relatively simple distribution system adjustment is to use " . . . existing wholesale distribution centers to provide a highly increased level of service to those retail stores located in outlying host areas." This is attractive as it " . . . builds intelligently on the existing system without creating new operating entities. Corporate chains are preserved as distribution units, and most host-area retail stores will continue to be served by their pre-evacuation sources."

13. What lessons have been learned from earlier evacuation planning efforts? How have these been applied in CRP?

In the latter 1950's, the agency responsible for the civil defense program was the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, formed in 1958 by combining the Federal Civil Defense Agency and the Office of Defense Mobilization. One of OCDM's major initiatives was the completion of plans for tactical evacuation of U.S. cities after warning was received that a manned-bomber attack was underway. It was estimated that three to five hours would be available for rapid (tactical) evacuation, before the arrival of bombers, and that even in this comparatively short time, a substantial degree of evacuation could be achieved for many or most U.S. cities.

The developing threat of attack by ballistic missile was seen, by the early 1960's, as largely invalidating the concept of tactical evacuation, because the 30-minute flighttime of an ICBM would not permit significant tactical evacuation. The emphasis of the civil defense program was accordingly shifted to fallout protection, with the National Shelter Survey being initiated in the 1961-1962 period, and community shelter planning (that is, planning for the use of shelters identified by the Survey) being started in the mid-sixties.

Crisis relocation planning differs in many basic respects from the tactical evacuation plans of the late 1950's: CRP's are to provide an additional option, to complement plans for in-place protection. More fundamentally, crisis relocation plans are designed for implementation over a period of some three days -- in contrast to the three to five hours assumed to be available for the tactical evacuations of the manned bomber era. A more deliberate, orderly, and complete evacuation movement should thus be attainable. It is also important to note that not only would such a movement be initiated during a period of extremely intense crisis, rather than of attack and war, but it might well be the case that no attack would result -- that is, the crisis would hopefully be resolved by negotiation, and the U.S. metropolitan population could return home.

Despite the foregoing basic differences between the tactical evacuation planning of the latter 1950's and crisis relocation planning, the former effort has provided lessons for CRP in the mid/latter seventies. A basic concept is that capsuled in the statement that civil defense is "government in emergency." That is, the officials responsible to direct and control operations in a major emergency are the chief executives and key officials of civil governments both State and local. This is a concept seen as a truism today, and one which has proved its worth repeatedly in major peacetime disasters, including those involving large-scale evacuations, at times, of 100,000 or more persons, and in one case -- Hurricane Carla, in 1961 -- of between half and three-quarters of a million Gulf Coast residents. It is a concept, however, which was by no means self-evident in the latter 1950's.

Another legacy of the late-fifties tactical evacuation planning program is the approach and the formats used for planning. While these owe much to military planning doctrines, a great deal of effort went into adapting them in the many ways required for use in civil government emergency plans. The approach used in the late 1950's was a Federally-funded contract with each State to develop operational plans based upon tactical evacuation.

Other lessons learned, which are being applied in CRP, include: (a) The need to involve in the planning process, to the greatest practicable extent, those key officials who would be responsible to make the plans work should crisis relocation operations be undertaken (e.g., chief executives, chiefs of police, and others); (b) the need to exercise plans (as noted in the answer to Question 9 above), rather than regarding the plans as an end in themselves; (c) the need to provide for fallout protection for evacuees; (d) planning approaches for the reception and care of evacuees in host areas; (e) traffic and movement analyses; and (f) various analyses of resource and logistic factors.

The foregoing and related lessons are incorporated in CRP guidance now in the hands of Regional and State planners.

14. Please provide all DCPA manuals and planning documents used to provide guidance to jurisdictions for the CRP prototype program or other CRP efforts, as well as the Northeast Corridor feasibility study.

DCPA is providing separately both planning manuals and certain DCPA Research reports which, because they include prototype (illustrative) plan material and planning guidance, have also been provided to NCP planners.

The manuals include a working draft of January 1974, and a four-part working draft guide of January 1976. It should be noted that DCPA contemplates updating the more recent draft in several ways including the following: (a) Phasing of the planning process to permit attaining an initial capability within not to exceed three years, to be followed by more detailed local and State planning to attain an improved-confidence capability; (b) simplification of the planning process, due to reduction in the amount of planner effort now expected to be available; (c) incorporation of research results received during 1976; and (d) incorporation of recommendations by State and Regional personnel with CRP pilot-project experience.

The Northeast Corridor feasibility study has not yet been received although a draft report on its first phase has just (July 23, 1976) been submitted, and is under review. This is being supplied to the Joint Committee, but it should be understood that (a) the project includes two more phases (production of guidance on relocation planning for densely urbanized areas, and test-use of such guidance); and (b) the feasibility test results are expected to illuminate issues, present options, and otherwise provide a point of departure for analysis and development of actual contingency plans.

LIST OF ITEMS SUPPLIED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION 14 follows:

The Feasibility of Crisis Relocation in the Northeast Corridor, June, 1976, by Walmer E. Strobe, Clark D. Henderson and Charles T. Rainey of the Stanford Research Institute. prepared for the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Washington, D. C. 20301.

Guide for Crisis Relocation Contingency Planning, Working Draft, January, 1974, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Washington, D. C. 20301.

Guide for Crisis Relocation Contingency Planning, Part I: State and Regional Level Planning, Working Draft, January, 1976, CPG-2-8-A, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Washington, D.C.

Part II: Allocation and Emergency Public Information, Working Draft, January, 1976, CPG-2-8-B.

Part III: Host Area Planning, Working Draft, January, 1976, CPG-2-8-C.

Part IV: Risk Area Planning, Working Draft, January, 1976 CPG-2-8-D.

An Initial (Synoptic) Prototype State Crisis Relocation Plan, Working Draft, January, 1976, CPG-2-8-A-1.

Prototype Crisis Relocation Plan for Fremont County, Colorado, Working Draft, January, 1976, CPG-2-8-C-1.

Prototype Plans for Production and Maintenance of Electric Power in Crisis Relocation, Working Draft, August, 1975, CPG-2-8-6.

Food System Support of the Relocation Strategy, Volume I: Analysis and Case Study, September, 1975, CPG-2-8-1.

Volume II: Prototype Plans and Volume III: Planning Guidelines, September, 1975, CPG-2-8-2.

Reception/Care Planning for Crisis Relocation, January, 1976, CPG-2-8-3.

Prototype Reception/Care Plan to Meet the Welfare, Shelter, and Related Needs of Populations Affected by Crisis Relocation, Reception/Care Plan for Fremont County, January, 1976, CPG-2-8-4.

15. If Crisis Relocation Planning is a voluntary option for targeted jurisdictions, is acceptance of evacuees by host jurisdictions also to be on a voluntary basis? How would potential conflicts between jurisdictions be resolved? Do the President and/or state governors currently have the power to direct local jurisdictions to accept or provide support to evacuees?

Planning for the contingency of crisis relocation must clearly involve participation by both risk jurisdictions and the surrounding host jurisdictions. That is, the Nuclear Civil Protection planners funded by DCPA can provide the planning know-how, and the preponderance of the effort needed for detailed planning, but effective plans cannot be developed without significant participation by those who would be responsible to make the plans work should a crisis occur.

It is possible that some proposed host jurisdictions may decline to participate in planning, although no such reaction has yet been encountered. Rather, the reactions so far heard have been similar to those expressed by Hon. T. Herbert Fordham, Chairman of the Board of Commissioners of Laurens County, Georgia (one of the host counties for Macon), after discussion of CRP. After observing that it was not, after all, highly likely that the need would ever arise to conduct relocation operations during a crisis, he remarked that it was nevertheless something that could happen, and that he therefore believed " . . . It would be better to have the plan and not need it, than to need the plan and not have it."

Based upon reactions of other public officials in the CRP pilot projects, similar to those of Chairman Fordham in Georgia, and on experience with tactical evacuation planning in the latter 1950's, DCPA does not at this time anticipate any significant degree of refusal to participate in planning for the contingency of crisis relocation. If some jurisdictions do at first decline, it seems likely that they would reconsider after other nearby jurisdictions had developed such plans. (In case of a continued refusal to cooperate, DCPA might have to consider carefully whether to continue other civil defense assistance to such a jurisdiction, in view of the importance of crisis relocation planning as one of the two options for Nuclear Civil Protection.)

During the planning process, differences of opinion as to hosting and other operations would be resolved by discussion and negotiation of differences, or so DCPA's experience has suggested.

Should an actual relocation take place, the environment would of course be completely different than in peacetime planning, as would the attitudes of governmental executives and the population at large. Experience in peacetime disasters of all types, in particular Hurricane Carla in 1961, with its evacuation of half to three-quarters of a million Gulf Coast residents, is that virtually without exception, Americans "rise to the occasion" -- and exhibit a marked degree of helpfulness, cooperation, and altruism towards fellow citizens in distress.

Thus, DCPA believes that in the event, should a relocation ever take place under conditions of severe crisis, all concerned would do their utmost to help, and there would be little or no need to direct local jurisdictions to accept or provide support to evacuees. The President does not have power to require local jurisdictions to support evacuees; that is, with respect to local -- or State -- government executives he is not a civil commander-in-chief, even in time of war or confrontation. However, experience in 1861, 1941, and at other times is that in periods of grave national stress, virtually all local and State chief executives comply with the President's requests -- acting, that is, as though he were de jure a kind of civil commander.

Most State Governors do have powers to require that a number of actions incident to crisis relocation be taken -- for example, to require that specified areas be evacuated -- but as noted above, experience in peacetime disasters strongly suggests that in an obviously critical situation, there is little need to invoke mandatory powers.

What is important is that effective peacetime planning be done, to channel and make effective the massive outpouring of effort that can be anticipated in a crisis. And with respect to the peacetime planning, DCPA does not expect severe problems -- until or unless experience may show that this expectation is mistaken.

16. Does CRP contemplate long-term or short-term relocation of evacuees? What is the expected duration of relocation for planning purposes? On what is this period based? Does CRP provide for aid to host areas after a relocation has been terminated to enable local governments to return to normal?

For planning purposes, the expected duration of relocation is a minimum of one week and a probable maximum of two weeks; the possibility cannot be excluded of a situation requiring a longer period of relocation, but this appears unlikely. These planning assumptions are based on the judgment that crises as intense as those that could lead to a decision to initiate relocation (evacuation) have tended either to be resolved or to escalate to hostilities within a relatively brief time. There can, of course, be no guarantee that this would be so, which is why it is suggested to planners that the possibility of a relocation period exceeding two weeks cannot be excluded.

The rationale for the minimum period of one week is that an evacuation movement, once begun, is apt to have a considerable momentum. Thus, even if the crisis should be resolved on the day after the movement was started, and national authorities advised risk-area citizens to return home, there would likely still be a considerable outward movement, and many people might need reception and care in host areas for a day or two, prior to returning home. For this reason, it appears prudent to assume, for planning purposes, a minimum relocation period of one week.

The foregoing issues were discussed in detail with an ad hoc referent group convened by the National Academy of Sciences at DCPA's request. This group included Professor Leon Gouré, Professor Jiri Nehnevajsa, Brig. Gen H. A. Strack, USAF (Ret.) (under whose supervision the PONAST II study was conducted), and a number of others.

Crisis relocation plans will cover operations for return of risk-area residents to their homes, should the crisis be resolved peacefully. These should include actions to enable host-area governments to return to normal.

17. In the event an actual evacuation of an area or areas in a crisis proved unnecessary, how does DCPA contemplate restoring the credibility of the evacuation program?

This question is understood to speak to a situation in which a crisis escalates to such a degree of intensity that U.S. national authorities recommend crisis relocation from some or all U.S. risk areas (for example, a situation in which Soviet cities had been evacuated), with the crisis then being resolved by negotiation, so that risk-area citizens can return to their homes.

It is obviously impossible to predict just what the national reaction would then be. However, it appears not unlikely that the crisis relocation could be viewed by many, in retrospect, as having been unnecessary in that an attack did not in fact occur. It also appears likely, however, that many others (news media columnists and editorialists, other opinion leaders including national leaders, and many of the population at large) would view the relocation as having been necessary or certainly prudent, and perhaps as having helped contribute to a climate in which the crisis could be resolved by negotiation, without an attack.

It is even more difficult to attempt to speculate on how credible "evacuating a second time" might appear to a nation which had undergone the unprecedented (to the U.S.) experience of evacuating its cities the first time, with all the dislocation and upheaval which would be associated with such operations. However, it appears likely that if a crisis had in fact escalated to the point where U.S. cities were evacuated (in all probability following evacuation of Soviet cities), the world situation thereafter would be markedly different than before the crisis. One possibility would be a higher level of tension, resulting in a crash or semi-crash effort to develop civil defense shelter systems previously viewed as too expensive to be considered. (In the United Kingdom, one result of the September 1938 Munich crisis was a great acceleration of the civil defense program, which by the time war was imminent in early September 1939 had been developed into a real operational capability, able to conduct a crisis evacuation of some 1.5 million persons in the two days between the invasion of Poland and the declaration of war by Great Britain.)

Another possible result of confrontation so severe as to result in crisis relocation would be a substantial reduction in the level of international tension.

In preparing to develop a crisis relocation capability, it has appeared that the main problem was to develop plans and capabilities giving reasonable confidence of conducting relocation problems once -- at least the "first time", should the need ever arise -- without looking ahead to problems of a "second evacuation." However, it appears that developing plans and capabilities which would work well a first time should also maximize the chances for reasonably effective operations should a second extremely severe crisis or confrontation occur, with crisis relocation again being the tactic having the greatest potential for lifesaving.

18. Does CRP provide for "contagious" evacuation of areas not participating in the program or for areas not on the presumptive target list of areas recommended for evacuation during a given crisis?

It is conceivable that national authorities could recommend evacuation of certain areas but not of others, during an extremely intense crisis. If this should ever occur, there would undoubtedly be a considerable or even great degree of "spontaneous evacuation" from other cities -- in the absence of official advice to leave, or even despite official advice to stay.

At least, the lesson of the years since 1938 is that millions of people, in many different countries, have left their homes and livelihoods in the face of a threat seen as sufficiently threatening. This was the case to some extent during the 1938 Munich crisis, while in early September, 1939, some 2 million London residents spontaneously (and almost "invisibly") evacuated during the same period when the official evacuation scheme moved 1.5 million women and children to safer areas. In Paris, it has been estimated that only some 10 per cent of residents were still in the city when the Wehrmacht arrived in June 1940, while in East Prussia all but a few per cent of the population left during the winter of 1944-45, prior to the arrival of Soviet forces, despite extremely severe winter weather. Other population movements have occurred more recently, in the last stages of the Vietnamese conflict.

It has also been stated by Florida civil defense officials that a considerable amount of spontaneous evacuation was noted during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. This was not documented statistically. However, it was believed that the bulk of this movement involved tourists cutting short their vacations to return home, though some citizens of major cities in Florida also took impromptu vacations for several days during the height of the crisis.

It therefore appears only prudent to assume that a considerable degree of spontaneous evacuation would occur during an extremely severe crisis -- one much more severe than the 1962 Cuban crisis. In a case when national authorities had recommended relocation from one set of areas, but not from others, plans developed for host jurisdictions surrounding the latter (non-evacuation) areas could be activated if the load imposed by spontaneous evacuees warranted this step.

19. Does CRP contain any features that would prevent an adversary from concluding in a confrontation that U.S. evacuation of selected and presumptive target areas is a prelude to a U.S. nuclear attack, thus inclining the adversary to launch a preemptive strike? In other words, won't evacuation during a crisis tend to escalate the crisis and increase the risk of war by signaling an adversary that the U.S. is planning for war?

It should be noted that DCPA is not and does not purport to be a spokesman for the Department of Defense on strategic matters. However, the notion that relocation of people from U.S. cities during a crisis could escalate the crisis and incline an adversary to launch a preemptive attack is one which DCPA finds unpersuasive.

First and most important, since 1967 the USSR has invested substantial effort in developing crisis evacuation plans and capabilities, and it would appear that it would most likely be the USSR, not the U.S., which would initiate relocation from cities during a crisis. In such a case, subsequent relocation from U.S. cities would be in the nature of a counterevacuation, to redress in part the asymmetry in vulnerability caused by the Soviet evacuation.

It is difficult to conceive that Soviet initiation of city evacuation would incline U.S. leaders to consider a preemptive strike. Rather, if we had developed the capability, a U.S. counterevacuation would appear to be the response indicated.

Even in the seemingly most unlikely event that it was the U.S. which initiated crisis evacuation of cities, it is difficult to visualize Soviet leaders viewing this as a *casus belli*, and grounds for a preemptive strike. For one thing, the movement of U.S. civilians would be a relatively slow-motion affair, taking some three days, and perhaps more for the largest cities. Perhaps more persuasive to Soviet leadership would be the fact that their own civilians (as well as their capital wealth) would remain at risk to U.S. retaliation.

It would thus appear that whichever superpower initiated relocation, the rational response by the other would be to evacuate civilians from its own cities (provided it were able to do so) and to undertake or intensify negotiations to resolve the crisis.

QUESTION 20: In developing the TR-82 High Risk Areas manual, why was a 10,000 Roentgen cut-off point for radioactive fallout used when only 450 REM cumulative dosage over a two-week period is the median lethal dosage? Doesn't this choice minimize fallout-effects from postulated attacks?

ANSWER 20: In the development of the basis for TR-82, the question of criteria for a level of radiation exposure to be associated with "high-risk" from fallout radiation was addressed. For more than two decades it has been conventional to use, for unprotected humans, a value of 450R as the median lethal dose and a value of 250R as the median sickness dose. The National Shelter Survey (NSS), begun in late 1961, has identified and evaluated approximately 231 million spaces in existing facilities. The fallout protection afforded by these buildings has been evaluated in terms of a Protection Factor (PF). Fallout patterns used in vulnerability analyses are defined for an imaginary standard surface, i.e., the fallout material is assumed to be uniformly deposited on a perfectly smooth, infinitely large, plane surface, and radiation exposures are calculated at a height of three feet above this standard surface.

The Protection Factor (PF) is a calculated ratio of the radiation exposure received at the three-foot height above this standard surface to the exposure that would be received in the "real world" situation under consideration, assuming uniform deposit of the same amount of fallout. For example, a person standing in the middle of a large flat grassy area, or a person standing in the middle of a city street, would have a PF of 2 to 3. A person in the basement of a wood-frame or brick veneer two-story single-family residence built in the middle of the "ideal surface" would have a PF close to 25. The NSS adopted a standard of PF 40 as a minimum

value for listing in the standard NSS inventory. Basements of large concrete or masonry buildings have PF values ranging from 100 to over 1,000. Central areas of the middle floors of multi-story buildings have PFs in the range of 40 to 100.

If the median sickness dose of 250R is combined with the NSS standard PF of 40, a value for the unprotected standard surface dose of 10,000R is obtained. This value was chosen as delineating the "high risk" fallout area. Those counties whose population was calculated to have a 50 percent or greater probability, using a modified WSEG-10 fallout model, of receiving at least 10,000R dose from either summer or winter winds were designated as being at "high risk" from fallout from the attack--all weapons being assumed to be ground burst.

Report No. 42, issued in 1974 by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements titled "Radiological Factors Affecting Decision-Making in a Nuclear Attack," has been used for guidance in radiological defense operations. The report provides a table (shown below) to assist in decision making:

Medical Care will be needed by	Accumulated radiation exposures (R) in any period of		
	One Week	One Month	Four Months
NONE	150	200	300
SOME (5 percent may die)	250	350	500
MOST (50 percent may die)	450	600	---

Comparison of the "high-risk" area dose (250R in the first week in a PF of 40 shelter) with the above table shows that this definition of high risk defines the boundary of an area at which medical care will be needed by "some" and "5 percent may die."

Within this area, doses in the "standard PF 40" shelter would be higher and steps must be taken to plan for seeking shelter with higher protection, upgrading the protection of the best available shelter, or improvising expedient shelter with higher PF.

DCEA is continuing to develop rapid low-cost methods of both upgrading existing facilities and improvising expedient shelter. Simple measures such as covering the roof of a building with 12 to 24 inches of earth and mounding earth around the walls can raise the PF to values of several hundred.

QUESTION 21: Please provide a list of the High Risk Areas deleted from TR-82 after consultation with state and local governments.

ANSWER 21: The following are names of places removed from the listing of potential High Risk Areas after consultation with the DCPA Regional Offices and the State Civil Preparedness staffs, prior to the preparation of TR-82. In some cases these areas represented more than one potential target location.

Alaska

Atka
Adak
Cold Bay
Unalaska
St. Paul Island
Anchorage City
Spennard
Nauyaka Valley
Point Hope
Umiat
Big Mountain
Port Heiden
May Creek
Cordova
College
Fairbanks City
Skagway
Juneau City
Kenai
Homer
Ketchikan City
Kodiak
McGrath
Aniak
Talkeetna
Palmer
Nome
Unalakleet
Annette
Craig
Sitka
Yakutat
Mentasta

Alaska (contd)

Northway
Sears Creek
Barter Island
Fort Yukon
Aurora
Whitter
Yukon Koyukuk
Nenana
Hurricane Gulch

Arizona

Douglas
Gila Bend

California

South Lake Tahoe
Hollister City
Oro Grande
Big Bear Lake
Desert Springs
Indio City
Needles
Parker Dam

Colorado

Grand Junction
Montrose
Gunnison
Alamosa

Idaho

Pocatello

Indiana

Madison

Iowa

Clinton

Maryland

Westminster

Minnesota

Hibbing
Two Harbors

Nevada

Battle Mountain

Oregon

Cave Junction
Port Oxford
Hermiston

South Carolina

Anderson

Wyoming

Laramie

22. It appears that the direct effects data on TR-82 is based on 300-500 kiloton or submegaton nuclear weapons. Data from the International Institute of Strategic Studies indicates the USSR has very few sub-megaton weapons; moreover, the smaller weapons are in multiple re-entry vehicles (MRVs) and would tend to cluster with a larger aggregate effect. Is it realistic, therefore, to develop planning data based on an assumption of many small warheads that is at variance with actual Soviet force levels? What is the rationale for this approach?

The planning base for the information displayed in TR-82 was developed from various sources of information on the USSR strategic nuclear capability under SALT. The hypothetical attack postulated employed 1443 weapons with a total yield of 6540 megatons. The weapon mix was 240 20-MT, 176 3-MT, 185 2-MT, and 842 1-MT. This combination is achievable using a mix of the delivery systems available to the USSR: ICBM, SLBM, and long-range bombers. The attack is within the force levels described in a January 1976 Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, and also that shown in the Study by the Congressional Research Services of the Library of Congress, "United States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of Reference for Congress," January 1976, a committee print for the use of the Senate Committee on Armed Services.

QUESTION 23. Prior testimony before the Joint Committee by Dr. Richard Garwin indicated that only ground bursts of nuclear weapons would be effective against U.S. Minuteman missile sites. Yet TR-82 appears to show air burst attacks for these sites, thus underestimating actual fall-out effects from postulated limited nuclear war attacks on Minuteman silos. What is the justification for this choice.

ANSWER 23. In the development of the basis for TR-82, the question of conservative assumptions for both the ground coverage of blast overpressure and the amount of fallout generated by the weapons' detonation was addressed. As the primary interest was the extent to which the U.S. population would be affected by both blast and fallout, it was decided to choose two sets of mutually exclusive conditions.

To maximize the area covered by a given overpressure level the appropriate height of burst for the overpressure level chosen was used for each size of weapon. Weapon test data shows that as the detonation altitude for a given size weapon is increased, the ground range to which a given overpressure level extends, increases to a maximum and then decreases. The altitude for which the ground range is greatest is called the "optimum height of burst" for that overpressure level for that sized weapon. For example, for a 1 MT weapon detonated on the ground, the 10 psi overpressure level has a range of 1.9 miles. When the burst altitude is 7400 feet, the 10 psi range on the ground is 2.7 miles, its maximum extent. If the burst altitude is greater than 10,000 feet, the ground range of 10 psi is zero, i.e., the pressure directly below the burst is less than 10 psi. For the purposes of defining areas at high risk from the blast effects on civilian industrial/transportation facilities and military installations other than ICBM sites an overpressure level of 10 psi was chosen and weapon burst heights adopted to maximize 10 psi coverage. To delineate the extent of damage to population the coverage of 2 psi for this same burst condition is shown on the maps of TR-82.

To maximize the amount of fallout produced by the hypothetical attack all weapons were detonated on the ground in a second computer run. The results of the two types of calculations were then combined to produce the maps of TR-82. The use of ground-burst weapons in the ICBM site areas was judged to accommodate the requirement to "kill" the silos.

Thus, TR-82 depicts two mutually exclusive events--all air bursts to maximize blast coverage for civilian industrial/transportation targets (and military installations exclusive of ICBM sites) and all ground bursts to maximize the production of fallout (and "kill" silos). These assumptions were judged to provide a conservative basis for planning.

QUESTION 24: As a basis for CRP, doesn't the TR-82 High Risk Areas manual minimize fallout effects (in terms of actual Soviet force levels, anticipated ground and air burst assumptions, and radiation dosage cut-off points) in a manner that makes evacuation a deceptively attractive option?

ANSWER 24: In developing the basis for designating the High Risk Areas depicted in TR-82, DCEA chose a conservative point of view when faced with choices of alternative assumptions.

In selecting potential candidates for a list of those areas that might be chosen by an attacker, priorities were assigned in the following order:

- a. Strategic nuclear forces (ICBM, SAC bases, SSBN bases)
- b. Other high value military installations
- c. Military supporting industrial, transportation and logistics facilities
- d. Other basic industries and facilities which contribute significantly to the maintenance of the U.S. economy
- e. Population concentrations of 50,000 or greater (Bureau of Census urbanized areas)

Weapon assignments were based on projections of Soviet capabilities (circa 1980) under the existing Strategic Arms Limitations (SAL) agreements, the vulnerability and time sensitivity of targets, and with the objective of maximizing targets damaged and minimizing weapons expended. While population collocated with military or industrial resources would be at risk, it was not the objective to select population as a high priority target. The resulting hypothetical attack level is given in the answer to Question 22.

The question of the height of burst for the weapons targeted was chosen in a dual fashion as described in the answer to Question 23. To present

the most conservative approach, the maximum blast coverage was represented by air-bursting all weapons. The maximum fallout risk was derived from surface bursting all weapons. These two conditions, which cannot occur simultaneously, were then combined to give the "conservative blast-conservative fallout" representation in TR-82. If a weapon were actually air burst, the fallout it produced would be less than shown, whereas if the weapon were actually ground burst the extent of the blast coverage would be less than that depicted.

The basis of the criteria for high-risk from fallout is described in the answer to Question 20. Application of this criteria as in TR-82 shows that there are vast areas in the U.S. where the threat of blast effects can be avoided completely and the threat to human life from fallout from ground-burst weapons can become manageable if proper precautions are taken.

Effective relocation in a time of severe international crisis of the major portion of the population away from the blast risk areas and to regions where the high fallout risk can be avoided could save 50 to 70 million lives compared to an "in-place posture" for people in the blast risk areas. The effectiveness of such crisis relocation does depend on many factors including warning, communication, planning, transportation, fuel, food and water, and some fallout protection in the host areas, to name some of the more important.

25. Does current CRP research and planning indicate that CRP is equally feasible and effective for all-out nuclear attack, or is the assumption of a limited nuclear war scenario preceded by a period of crisis escalation necessary to the success of CRP?

The purpose of developing a crisis relocation capability is to provide a potentially very effective lifesaving option for national authorities, and for the nation at large. It is an option which requires substantial time for full implementation and hence full effectiveness. The desired goal is a nationwide capability for full relocation within approximately three days from the time that national authorities advise that movement begin. (This goal may not be attainable for the largest cities, whereas risk areas of small population -- say, from 100,000 down to 50,000 -- could probably be evacuated in well under a day.)

The relocation option does not, however, require that any specific scenario precede it -- provided, of course, that the length of the crisis is such that there is time to arrive at the decision to relocate, to inform State and local officials and the citizens, and then to complete the relocation movement and to develop fallout protection where and as required.

The decision to implement U.S. relocation plans could be taken regardless of whether tactical nuclear weapons had previously been employed (e.g., overseas) -- provided, of course, that national authorities viewed the risk of attack upon the U.S. as being great enough to warrant incurring the dislocations and costs associated with relocation. Relocation plans could be implemented for all U.S. risk areas if a large-scale attack were feared. It is also conceivable that plans might be implemented only for selected risk areas, seen as being particularly threatened; however, in such a case, as pointed out in the answer to Question 18 above, a substantial degree of spontaneous evacuation from other risk areas might well develop.

As for the effectiveness of crisis relocation, this should be similar for either all-out or limited attacks upon the U.S., from the standpoint of saving the lives of those people at risk from the blast, heat, and initial radiation effects of nuclear detonations. Not being within range of the direct effects would be an effective lifesaver for those involved -- provided, of course, that if weapons were ground-burst and hence produced fallout, evacuees in fallout areas had adequate fallout protection available.

The total numbers of lives that could be saved by relocation would obviously be far greater in the case of an all-out attack than of an attack on a more limited set of targets (such as our strategic offensive forces).

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

MILTON MITNICK

1. One of the problems faced in the national preparedness effort is that there is a wide disparity in the adequacy of various state and local programs. Some citizens get very good emergency protection and others get very little, depending on where they happen to live. Can you suggest ways of making preparedness programs more uniform? Should the federal government mandate minimum standards for state and local programs?

Answer: We believe the success of a local disaster preparedness program is directly proportional to the enthusiasm and aggressiveness of the local Director and the amount of backing provided him by his duly elected and appointed officials.

A poor local program is the result of a lack of these leadership qualities. We feel that overly restrictive federal regulations, unrealistic paperwork requirements and a tendency to overcontrol by federal agencies are a direct depressant of the local program.

Federal standards are established by the DCPA and are in the hands of local officials. A lack of enthusiasm or inability of the state organization to enforce these standards leads to a lackadaisical preparedness program. We do not believe the federal government should mandate a preparedness program to the state; it should be a mutually beneficial program. We further believe that if the federal government only supplies 50 percent of the funds they should only receive 50 percent of the community effort and not the 100 percent effort now demanded for participation in DCPA Programs by the county or city government.

A further problem is permissiveness. If restrictions regarding flood plains can be imposed on local civil defense to cause local compliance with flood insurance, why not make some degree of disaster preparedness participation a qualification requirement for revenue sharing or other federal financial assistance. Now, no local government nor even States are realistically mandated to participate in any kind of disaster preparedness, natural or attack.

2. What, in brief, will be the actual impact on your state programs of the changed federal philosophy concerning natural disaster and nuclear attack preparedness?

Answer: We have read the changed language of the amended bill but todate have received nothing to indicate any "change in basic philosophy" by DCPA, FDAA, FPA or any other federal agency.

We urgently request some evidence of "Changed federal philosophy" and information on how the "dual use" concept will be initiated.

If "dual use" indeed means that personnel, finances and resources can be utilized for all disaster planning equally then local participation should be enhanced. If we continue to be restricted to "nuclear" or "natural" disaster as separate and distinct programs then our participation will be limited. Any reduction in federal financial assistance reduces our ability to respond.

3. Do state organizations have the management capability to keep pace with the DCPA management system?

Answer: We feel that our state management personnel are the equals of DCPA management personnel. We further feel we have the capabilities to manage any program in our area of influence. Our problems have been piling up this year due to DCPA's extension of impractical and unauthorized attempts to control those areas of policy and operations reserved to the Governor of the State.

4. Where are there specific cases of duplication or cases of gaps between the various federal preparedness agencies?

Answer: We are required to publish and maintain three separate administrative plans: DCPA P&A Program, FDAA Individual and Family Grant Program and Emergency Planning Grant. There are provisions in the laws that we must submit additional administrative plans for each program in which we will participate. We are required to submit a State Natural Disaster Plan with annexes to FDAA and an Emergency Plan (Nuclear Disaster) with annexes to DCPA. Each of these are reviewed and certified current on a continuous basis.

FDAA and DCPA Regional Headquarters are in different cities. There are no provisions to hold joint meetings with state directors.

DCPA provides funds, guidance and equipment for Disaster Preparedness Planning and reaction. FDAA provides no money and very little guidance but expects to utilize DCPA funded assistance and the state and local organizations to accomplish their job of disaster recovery.

There appears to be a lack of uniformity in making a "Presidential Disaster Declaration."

Also, there seems to be a mistaken idea that FDAA concerns itself with natural disaster preparedness. Although FDAA's testimony before your committee clearly negates that idea still the notion persists. (see Senator Thurmond's conversation in the Conference Committee on H.R. 12438). FDAA is concerned only with natural disaster recovery and nothing else.

5. What are some of the strengths and some of the weaknesses that you have experienced in the existing federal organization for preparedness?

Answer: DCPA STRENGTHS

Provides funds, guidance and training in Nuclear Disaster Preparedness. This includes the fully funded National Warning System (NAWAS); Radiological Maintenance Services; Community Shelter Planning; Hardware, excess and surplus property programs; Communications and warning systems; Education and training both in the public school system and the university extension program.

DCPA WEAKNESSES

National and regional emphasis is constantly shifting. A program appears on the scene and remains until the majority of communities of 50,000 plus population have received benefits then a new program is introduced. Small communities receive benefit of these programs only as an afterthought or if there is some slack in the program.

There is a tendency to overmanage or overcontrol by the federal agency. Too much emphasis is placed on the restrictive aspects than on the accomplishment of objective. Threats of cut-off of funds are used extensively.

Top heavy organizational structure at regional and national headquarters. There are insufficient RFO's to assign one to each state but there are adequate numbers of these personnel to be assigned two and three deep in the command, operational and administrative levels of the regional office.

Equipment donation or financial assistance for purchase of same appear restrictive. Communications equipment is deemed necessary to the successful accomplishment of the Disaster Planning and Recovery operation yet financial assistance for purchase of radios is not allowed until the community establishes an approved EOC. Potential cost of an EOC is upwards of \$50,000; what is the rationale of building a \$50,000 EOC when all that is required is a \$1,000 radio or even two or three radios.

(5 continued)

FDAA STRENGTHS

An excellent law (P.L. 93-288) and adequate funding for their mission of Disaster Recovery.

FDAA WEAKNESSES

Regulations are too voluninous and too restrictive. Forty pages of regulations were issued to cover one paragraph (Section 408) of the law.

Assistance is primarily provided for government agencies with individual assistance provided by insurance, bank or SBA loans. In extreme circumstances a pauper can qualify for the 408 Program.

Overall guidance for Natural Disaster Preparedness is limited yet the state and local communities are expected to make an immediate response.

FDAAs pretentions are large but its performance is small. It will only assist the states when it can be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that there is no way whatsoever that the state can financially assist in a community's complete recovery.

FPA - Coordination exists between the Regional Director and State Director. There is no equivalent state or local function. FPA does not concern itself with any natural disaster preparedness.

6. Looking at the problem from your perspective as State Director, what would be the optimum preparedness organization at the federal level? What would you find easiest to work with and most effective?

Answer: A new Federal Disaster Administrative Agency should be created by either legislation or Executive Order. All disaster missions of preparedness, response and recovery and of civil defense should be given to it along with the authority to require all other federal agencies to participate in its missions when appropriate. All present budgets and unexpended funds should be transferred to it and its manpower authority should be no more than 50 percent of the total strength of the three agencies involved. The funds thus saved should be spent in the political subdivisions where the people are who need the disaster protection and not wasted on Washington based administrative personnel.

7. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of your own state organizations? Where do you have problems that need correcting?

Answer: STRENGTHS

- A. Total support of the Governor.
- B. A comprehensive disaster law that allows free transfer of personnel, funds and equipment between state agencies to this department in response to disaster.
- C. An executive order that directs the state disaster planning and recovery activities.

WEAKNESSES

- A. Lack of adequate staff in certain key positions.
- B. Limited field staff.
- C. Motivation and professionalism of some local directors and elected officials leaves much to be desired.
- D. Lack of a public information program.

CORRECTIONS REQUIRED

- A. Strengthen the local organization by increased emphasis on training and education of local directors and elected officials. A substantial number of elected officials do not consider Civil Defense a full-time position.

8. What is your evaluation of the proposal made in testimony that all nuclear attack programs be fully funded and operated by the federal government under new legislation? This proposal would still permit state inputs to the programs.

Answer: We do not desire a fully federal funded program operated by the federal government. We feel it must be a joint federal/state/local program.

9. If a clean division were made, with all natural disaster responsibilities going to the states and all nuclear attack responsibilities resting solely with the federal government, would that clear up some of the present management and other problems?

Answer: No, in fact, I see the problem compounded. County, city and state must be equal partners in disaster planning. The county and city initially must survive on their own in a disaster; it is only after the passage of time that state and federal response are brought on the scene. Actually, chaos would be created under the "clean division" concept. If disaster preparedness for attack and natural disaster are not combined into one all-risk program each will suffer with financial malnutrition and both would eventually die of monetary and leadership starvation.

10. Does your emergency preparedness unit receive adequate cooperation from other relevant state government departments? Could other state agencies provide personnel on loan to your department in times of crisis, emergency or disaster to obviate the need for extended use of federally-funded planning personnel for crisis operations?

Answer: Yes; Under Indiana P.L. 110 and Executive Order 9-75, each state agency responds to disaster. This department coordinates the state effort between city, county, state and federal agencies where there are numerous quasi-official agencies that meet with this department in frequent planning/coordination meetings and respond to disaster (i.e. American Red Cross, Salvation Army, Mennonite Disaster Service, CAP, etc.).

11. Please list in order of frequency the crises, emergencies, or disasters most often faced by your state emergency preparedness unit. Please list also in order of magnitude of crisis or disaster.

Fortunately the U.S. has not participated in a nuclear war. However, we feel this is a constant threat and must be a continuous planning element.

Frequency and magnitude are in the same numerical order:

1. Tornadoes and Wind Storms
2. Floods
3. Winter Storms
4. Crop Damage
5. Transportation Accidents
6. Fires
7. Wild Fires

BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM WELLER
 RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

State of Colorado



DEPARTMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
 300 LOGAN STREET
 DENVER, COLORADO 80203



July 29, 1976

The Honorable William Proxmire
 Vice Chairman
 Joint Committee on Defense Production
 Room A-421, Senate Annex III
 Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Proxmire:

In response to your letter of July 14, 1976, in which you requested considered replies to several questions, we are pleased to submit the following:

1. One of the problems faced in the national preparedness effort is that there is a wide disparity in the adequacy of various state and local programs. Some citizens get very good emergency protection and others get very little, depending on where they happen to live. Can you suggest ways of making preparedness programs more uniform? Should the federal government mandate minimum standards for state and local programs?

Some variation in adequacy of state and local programs exists because of varying degrees of perception for the threat of nuclear attack and the potential for recovery after such an attack and for the onset of natural disaster. Programs located in low risk, low vulnerability areas do not need to maintain the same level of preparedness as may be needed elsewhere. The question of what is adequate is particularly subjective and is also influenced by varying attitudes of dependence or independence from central authority that are present within our federal system. On the other hand, certain restrictions must be placed on these varying attitudes toward autonomy when other people or organizations will be asked to provide an interrelated defense network or pay large scale bills when disaster occurs. I feel, therefore, that a total system of uniformity is unnecessary and unwise; this would foster the attitude of resistance to strong federal control. I would suggest, however, the formulation of guidelines to cover most aspects of preparedness. These can be left to state and local adoption supported by a system for: 1. incentives towards adoption and; 2. for pressure through open and public discussion. But, a few requirements must be adhered to. Where the lives of others are placed in jeopardy or when significant federal financial help is expected, rules and standards should be mandated and enforced. All levels of government should be encouraged to develop integrated preparedness plans which incorporate rules and guidelines for nuclear and natural disaster, and which can be analyzed, discussed, tested and re-examined. A few standards should be

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insisted upon, but the process of preparedness and its constant updating is more important than any production set of rules.

The effects of preparedness for nuclear attack on the war strategy of the nation will require more strict standards in federal direction of nuclear preparedness than for natural disaster preparedness. The current standards promulgated by DCPA have been accepted at both state and local level. Many of these standards assist local preparedness for all kinds of emergency response programs. Therefore measurement against these standards provide an index useful in evaluating total preparedness programs without necessarily directing standards in other areas.

2. What, in brief, will be the actual impact on your state programs of the changed federal philosophy concerning natural disaster and nuclear attack preparedness?

In my view, the present federal philosophy concerning preparedness will result in a further reduction in preparedness for nuclear disaster at local, city and county levels. Unless adjustments are made between the DCPA program and FDAA program, significant reductions in local coordinator training and exercises which have been sustained in the DCPA program will occur, thus deteriorating total emergency preparedness as well as nuclear preparedness. State level emergency preparedness planning will not be seriously eroded and in the area of "crisis relocation" will be accelerated. Atrophy of our readiness posture will result from deep cuts in our local structures (people, expertise, facilities, and equipment) and reductions in our ability to provide training, planning, and operational control from the state level. But the federal philosophy should be thought of as a variable not a constant. FDAA may be induced, for example, to assume responsibility for certain local training, planning, and operating, regardless of near term changes in the federal structure, or announced philosophy. Hopefully, a variety of relatively small adjustments can be made in the system whether or not an optimum federal organization is achieved. I am certain that pressure to induce change and to stimulate coordination necessary to react to future change would be useful, regardless of organizational outcome.

3. Do state organizations have the management capability to keep pace with the DCPA Management System?

In general, state organizations exhibit somewhat different characteristics than does the DCPA management system. State organizations are not as deeply involved in national level nuclear technicalities, and expertise in various specialties is not so available. On the other hand, state organizations have developed a deeper understanding

of disparate conditions and attitudinal problems at the local level; they are closer to the "front line" of action forces and understand them better. Therefore, in some cases, there is a lack of congruity between existing national and state capabilities to respond in a given situation. No doubt, however, some state organizations have not developed the expertise, balance and maturity to deal effectively with nuclear disaster management or the full range of problems included in natural disaster management. Organizational capability at both the national and state levels can best be developed by utilizing "mission" type preparations, exercises, testing, and implementation across the broadest spectrum of disaster preparedness. DCPA, for example, should not be only concerned about how tasks are accomplished as long as they are carried out in an effective and timely fashion. A state system funded and organized to become involved with all disaster forms will be better prepared, will perform better and will develop managerial maturity earlier. Our Colorado organization is in close contact with the Region VI DCPA office where broad interest and understanding assists us in applying management capability.

4. Where are there specific cases of duplication or cases of gaps between the various federal preparedness agencies?

In general, limited overlap and wide gaps currently exist between federal preparedness agencies. Overlaps in organization and control have developed when federal agencies have adopted different approaches to achieve similar objectives; both have encouraged emergency plan development without integration at the material level of these plans. But to avoid competitive overlaps in the natural disaster field, federal agencies have concentrated on different areas of functional interest with an accompanying rigidity in outlook. As preparedness needs and federal funding have changed, this relative inflexibility has led to the development of large gaps. FDAA has concentrated on post disaster relief and is therefore not yet prepared to oversee non nuclear pre-disaster warning systems. People, resources, and equipment are not funded by FDAA for operational tasks, FPA has not stimulated resource management for peacetime application, research into all phases of disaster functioning is primitive in terms of its applicability to a variety of real disaster problems. The DCPA funded training and education contract will be limited to nuclear civil protection by DCPA's FY 77 program emphasis, a limitation objected to by local directors. Subsequent budget decisions indicate DCPA may totally withdraw training and education contracts. Either course produces a significant gap. Even if operational gaps do not worsen over the near term, efforts at prevention or lessening of disaster impact have not been substantively dealt with by any federal organization. Prevention, particularly in the natural disaster field, is not actively pursued. Very limited planning for prevention is underway at the state level but no one is funded locally

to work at prevention. These gaps can best be reduced by the establishment of a federal system for the coordination and the fixing of agency responsibility for each functional step, such as warning, evacuation, and relief, which must be taken in coping with an emergency situation. These functional steps have been generally identified and can be cross compared with agencies which assume responsibility. One federal agency must assure responsibility for the coverage of each important function that must be performed to cope effectively with disaster.

5. What are some of the strengths and some of the weaknesses that you have experienced in the existing federal organization for preparedness?

Each federal preparedness organization has developed strength in a particular field of concentration. DCPA has developed a structure of people, facilities and equipment and have established the need for disaster preparedness through state, county and local governments. Also DCPA has developed and distributed an extensive amount of training materials not only pertinent to nuclear disaster but much of which is basic to response in any disaster. This agency has also designed and supervised exercises for use at local levels to test response capabilities so vital to local governments when the need arises. All other federal programs basically terminate at the state level. FDAA has developed a working system to administer relief quickly and effectively and FPA has made a start at wartime resource management within the states. But these agency strengths have not been orchestrated so as to be fully complementary or so that the system as a whole can react to future change without creating greater weaknesses. Major current system weaknesses are:

- a. Lack of integrated planning and coordinated overall direction.
- b. A structure at and below the state level which has begun to deteriorate.
- c. Lack of flexibility in funding between federal agencies to preserve resources of high utility.
- d. Lack of national leadership identification with the preparedness problem.
- e. Little emphasis on planning for or implementation of preventive or mitigative measures.

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f. Although benefits of many programs extend to the local level, there is little direct contact, prior to a crisis except in the DCPA program.

These weaknesses can best be attacked by the establishment of a more flexible and integrated coordinating system.

6. Looking at the problem from your perspective as state director, what would be the optimum preparedness organization at the federal level? What would you find easiest to work with and most effective?

Many different organizations could be developed at the federal level to provide needed coordination, direction and flexibility. The organizations needed to achieve these characteristics must have access to the President at regular intervals, must have established and open connections with the executive departments involved in peripheral responsibilities and must have a unified approach toward Congress and funding. A single new department is often thought of as the best means of unifying effort and insuring coordination; this would probably be easiest to work with. But this choice proliferates executive agencies and draws away powers from established responsible agencies. Increased power within FPA as one agency to enforce coordination between the others is also a consideration, but this has the strong disadvantage or requiring a small agency to attempt to dominate two powerful departments deeply and competitively involved in broadly related areas. Another approach is to establish an interagency coordinating committee made up of disaster preparedness organizational heads, responsible to a disaster preparedness representative at the White House and responsible to legislative oversight. Such a committee would lack unified control short of the President, but the need for unified planning and budgeting in order to satisfy periodic legislative funding approval would ameliorate this problem. Whatever organization is finally decided upon should have a planning, processing, and follow-up staff and should require all other major agencies in the field to discuss in writing, on an annual basis, their means of contributing to such key preparedness problems as prevention, warning, assessment, evacuation, resource allocation and relief. Looking at the problem of organizing the optimum federal system for preparedness, I feel that even the optimum could have a variety of imperfections. But the system which will best provide for continuous coordination, integrated planning, and unified control should be developed. If it was in being, a single federal agency with total preparedness responsibility would be the easiest to work with. But to create such an agency would involve drastic reorganization with consequent discontinuity of state and local supported programs and the cure would be worse than the malady. Therefore, I recommend the interagency coordinating committee approach.

7. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of your own state organizations? Where do you have problems that need correcting?

The principal strength of the Colorado Division of Disaster Emergency Services is our capability to integrate the full range of disaster preparedness problems so as to provide a measure of unified planning and direction to local entities. We try to understand and cope with local problems in a meaningful way. Another strength is the talent and dedication of many of the local disaster personnel. Probably our greatest weakness is that despite our efforts to integrate, the state has not funded many positions within our division so as to develop "state" oriented viewpoints, or to provide overall management at our Emergency Operation Center. Most of our positions are federally funded, or partially so, and therefore, those who occupy these positions usually take on the biases of their sponsoring agency. There is almost no vertical movement of staff officers from local to state to federal agency, so biases tend to magnify with time. We find it extremely difficult to gain legislative approval for funding of disaster preparedness positions as long as federal agencies do so. Federal funds are needed here but in a balanced pattern between major federal agencies under state dedicated management so that there is adequate state control over federally funded work teams. A significant weakness at both state and local levels is the constant attrition of knowledgeable officials and preparedness personnel due to the elective process and changes initiated in response to that process. The disaster preparedness system must provide initiative and responsible service, to keep in tune with the desires and to assist in defining the needs of the public. At the local level there are many weaknesses. In many cases responsibilities of disaster personnel are poorly defined, people are inadequately paid and are often not professionally developed for their tasks.

8. What is your evaluation of the proposal made in testimony that all nuclear attack programs be fully funded and operated by the federal government under new legislation? This proposal would still permit state inputs to the program.

This proposal would tend to increase the isolation of all federally funded personnel and increase local insistence on independence rather than dependence on federal systems. Under current guidance in the DCPA program, federal support is directed towards large urban areas and further refined by risk areas. The guidance provides for concentration of effort in areas with high risk and population as viewed from the standpoint of nuclear attack. However, many smaller communities are subject to high risk due to natural disaster vulnerability and do require preparedness programs. Additionally, we would be less than pragmatic, considering the magnitude of a nuclear disaster, to conclude that areas of relatively small population or risk would not be involved in the aftermath of a nuclear attack. For this reason, federal support should extend to these areas as well. On

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the surface, this proposal looks inviting, but civil defense is all about civilians - most of whom are non-federal. A joint federally conceived, community implemented, and jointly funded program encompassing both nuclear and natural disaster preparedness is sound and when coupled with the daily available community emergency response agency capabilities will provide the most desirable and most economic preparedness

9. If a clean division were made, with all natural disaster responsibilities going to the states and all nuclear attack responsibilities resting solely with the federal government, would that clear up some of the present management and other problems?

Perhaps, but it would be unnecessarily duplicative and probably much more expensive in total cost. The nuclear effort would become increasingly isolated from public support while the state simply could not handle by themselves the costs imposed by natural disaster. Duplication of resources would still exist and little cross fertilization of ideas and techniques would exist. The best solution to the problem of division of effort is to form a truly representative partnership at all levels with federal agency, including at least FDAA and DCPA, state and local contributions.

10. Does your emergency preparedness unit receive adequate cooperation from other relevant state government departments? Could other state agencies provide personnel on loan to your department in times of crisis, emergency or disaster to obviate the need for extended use of federally-funded planning personnel for crisis operations?

Most state agencies are not well disposed to lend personnel, since this detracts from their own ability to produce the results for which they have been funded. They perceive such lending to be strictly a non-cost effective procedure within a strict budget which cannot tolerate the luxury of deficit spending. It is cost effective to have those who prepare plans participate in the execution of them. When the situation demands major staff effort (major disaster) the expansion of staff capability to cope with the situation can be expected from other state agencies to perform their specialized functions which are also necessary in order to cope with the disaster as long as it lasts. It would be unrealistic to expect other state agencies to mount a sustained effort over a long period. Postponement of planning effort costs nothing but time. Since planning is not necessarily a crisis procedure and is most needed on a long term basis, a state and federal agency partnership is the best solution. A balanced group, (funded by federal agencies and the state) if sufficiently large, is well equipped to shift personnel for crisis management if federal program flexibility is sufficient to permit it.

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I cannot rationalize any more productive use of a planner than participation in actual crisis operations.

11. Please list in order of frequency the crises, emergencies, or disasters most often faced by your state emergency preparedness unit. Please list also in order of magnitude of crisis or disaster.

Over a period of time, this agency faces many small crisis which never became really serious but which have the potential to develop into emergencies which would have important impact on local, state, and federal systems. These potential crises must be monitored full time as well as those which became real crises. Those crises which do occur and became real problems in Colorado are best categorized in three ways; they are events which are:

- a. high consequence - high frequency
- b. high consequence - low frequency
- c. high frequency - low consequence

These categories are shown above in order of their general impact on our state. They are shown with hazard priorities as follows:

- a. high consequence - high frequency
 - .Floods, large scale area coverage.
 - .Fires, urban and wild fire. (growing consequence)
 - .Extreme weather, weather storms, drought, hail.
 - .Landslides.
- b. high consequence - low frequency
 - .Nuclear war.
 - .Dam rupture from earthquake or other geologic action.
 - .Flash floods.
 - .Civil disturbance.
 - .Energy flow disruption.
 - .Mass transportation accidents.

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
- c. high frequency - low consequence
- .Lost persons and aircraft
 - .Avalanches. (growing consequence)
 - .Tornadoes. (possibly high consequence)
 - .Flash floods.
 - .Down slope wind storms.
 - .Earthquakes.
 - .Pollution. (growing consequence)

Strictly speaking, impacts cannot be effectively assessed in terms of frequency or magnitude separately, but they are listed in decreasing order as shown.


<u>FREQUENCY</u>	<u>MAGNITUDE</u>
lost persons and aircraft	nuclear war
avalanches	floods
flash floods	dam rupture - earthquakes
fires	fires
extremes of weather	extremes of weather
landslides	tornadoes
tornadoes	downslope windstorms
down slope windstorms	avalanches
pollution	landslides
earthquakes	mass transportation accidents
dam rupture	energy flow disruption
civil disturbances	civil disturbances
mass transportation accidents	earthquakes
energy flow disruption	pollution
nuclear war	lost persons and aircraft

If we can be of any further service in your deliberations, please feel free to call upon us.

Sincerely,



WILLIAM D. WELLER
Brigadier General, Colo ARNG
The Adjutant General



APPENDIX III

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

TESTIMONY BY DR. LEWIS V. SPENCER, PHYSICIST

Between about 1965 and 1975 I served as Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Defense (ACCD) of the National Academy of Sciences. This committee, whose members were drawn from various technical disciplines and technical organizations, gave advice primarily on technical problems relevant to the development of civil defense systems and countermeasures. The views presented here are my own, though no doubt influenced by the many conversations with other associates.

As a general reaction to the testimony before the Joint Committee, I feel that, despite some evidence to the contrary, this country has never made up its mind about civil defense: Is it a serious standby component of the defense effort? Is it a set of plans whereby nuclear age minutemen are enabled to improvise protection for the populace? Is it only an element of the fiction and mind-set of the 1950's and 1960's?

Without a definite point of view, the tendency of the country on this question is to drift: With no clearly understood goals, it is said each year, in effect, that since there was no disaster last year and things look pretty much the same this year, let us maintain last year's program but spend a little less on it. The resulting shrinkage leads to deterioration, and this combines with *déjà vu* to reinforce the process and ultimately erode the basis for support as well as any remaining capabilities for effective action.

If the position of the U. S. Government is firm that civil defense is a serious matter, then high officials must give attention to it, first rate administrators must be brought in, organizational changes must be made, and money must be spent.

By contrast, if the U. S. position is to keep options open by maintaining a sort of holding pattern, with undeveloped capabilities which are not permitted to wither away, the situation is somewhat simpler: Something should be done to rejuvenate many essential programs.

If there is agreement that civil defense is no longer rational by comparison with planes, ships, and missiles of increasing sophistication and shiny performance, the funds currently involved are hardly worth the Joint Committee's close attention: An announced phasing out along lines implicit in this year's OMB-DOD initial budget proposals is appropriate. Such an intent should be clearly stated publicly so that the populace would be under no illusions that the country retains a civil protection capability.

The question of gaps and overlaps between federal agencies which is prominent in the Joint Committee hearings seems to me to miss the main point: Reorganizations are relevant if civil defense is to be taken seriously, and then these form a subordinate component only of the resulting action. Similarly, negative comments about the current technical program of DCPA, the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, can easily miss an obvious point: The program is a reaction to external realities, as can be shown in detail. It satisfies with fair precision the boundary conditions within which the agency must operate. If these externally imposed conditions are not changed, the agency will be forced by

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circumstances into the same, or a closely similar stance in the future even if some perturbation occurs, to modify current momenta.

With these things said, I attempt in the following question-answer format to address some of the issues in more detail. The term "civil defense" is being used to refer to civil protection against nuclear attack. The remainder of disaster types may be referred to as "non nuclear-attack" disasters, i.e. "natural" and peacetime nuclear emergencies (PNE's). The first question is included only for completeness.

- (1) How did we come to have three federal organizations sharing responsibility for parts of the federal role in civilian protection against large and rapidly-developing disasters?

In 1961, President Kennedy divided the then civil defense agency (OCDM) into two parts, the Office of Civil Defense (OCD, now DCPA) and the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). The former, oriented primarily toward preparedness for immediate life-saving in nuclear attack disasters, was assigned to DOD (see E. O. 10952). The latter, oriented towards carrying out the federal role in other aspects and in all disaster types, was retained in the Office of the White House.

In 1973, apparently in a move to reduce the size of the White House budget, President Nixon abolished the OEP and gave its disaster responsibilities to the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), which was assigned to HUD, and to the Office of Preparedness, now the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA), which was assigned to GSA (see E. O. 11725, 11749). In this division that part of preparedness concerned with interagency assignments and relations, together with questions of continuity of government in very large disasters, was assigned to OP (now FPA). The FDAA assignment of the responsibility for managing non nuclear-attack disasters is in large part the provision of funds for recovery.

adequate avoidance of

- (2) Is there/overlap between FDAA, DCPA, and FPA responsibilities? Are these responsibilities complementary enough to prevent gaps?

My answer is "yes" to both parts of this question. One should note that immediate life-saving from any disaster is quite different from recovery. The former is a matter for police, firemen, National Guard, perhaps active and reserve military units, and others with properly specialized training. It also involves questions of shelter, evacuation, rapid communication, warning, and short-term functioning of vital equipment.

By contrast, recovery is a matter for evaluation of damage, planning related to past and future expectations, and the processing of loan applications for individuals, groups, communities, and regions. In this connection one should note that most disaster legislation is primarily recovery-oriented; it is not surprising that FDAA has been assigned the administration of most of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.

The large technical requirements for development of life-saving countermeasure systems which involve diversified technical areas -- nuclear radiation, blast, missiles, thermal, electromagnetic, and even earth movements -- have necessitated

a sizeable DCPA engineering-research program which has provided basic technical information for DCPA efforts, as well as guaranteeing agency competence to support local civil defense planning. OEP had no comparable effort, and an interagency agreement was negotiated in 1971 to assign some life-saving preparedness activities for "natural" disasters to DCPA, thus filling an obvious gap in federal support of local preparedness efforts.* Since FDAA and FPA have neither a comparable technical program nor life-saving expertise, the attempt this year by OMB and DOD to limit DCPA to nuclear attack problems would create a vacuum at this point.

Research on the various natural disasters is a very large enterprise which, however, connects rather tenuously with local civil defense preparedness. The DCPA technical effort could in principle be extended to improve the articulation, but this has never occurred because it would divert funds from a budget already too small to support the broad range of requirements for nuclear attack disasters.

FPA has put much of its recent effort into the development of federal agency assignments and interagency relationships for the special case of peacetime nuclear emergencies. This work does not duplicate that of other agencies, and it has implications also for large natural disasters and for nuclear attack disaster planning.

(3) Are there other problems with this tri-partite arrangement?

I see several, of more importance than gaps or overlaps. One is that there are two agencies in direct contact with, and often competing for the attention of, local and state agencies. This is most unlikely to lead to balanced support for both preparedness for overwhelming but improbable disasters, and the much more common smaller but highly localized disasters. Actually there is a tendency to put preparedness for immediate life-saving in undesirable competition with preparedness for recovery activities. Also, some duplication of regional personnel and facilities occurs.

A related problem is that of acceptance and support by the public, which ultimately influences Congressional and Presidential attitudes. It is difficult for any one of the three organizations to achieve and maintain strong support, and it is almost impossible for all of them to do so. From one to all of the three parts must eventually have serious support problems. Currently, it seems to me that DCPA is being affected by this.

A third problem, more subtle, is that FPA, the organization charged with inter-agency planning, does not have direct contact with operational grass roots disaster problems, those of life-saving as well as those of recovery. While the FPA currently has a vigorous and effective planning program, I anticipate future difficulties in achieving and maintaining realism in resulting plans which require fine-tuning in response to changing and accumulating experience.

A related problem for FPA is that of furthering readiness plans which disturb existing operations of other government organizations, or which are not funded externally to the affected agencies. For example, realistic preparedness by

*See, for example, Annual Report 1972, Appendix A, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

the Small Business Administration or the Economic Development Administration is difficult to develop without working-level communication between these agencies and a ready source of proven disaster expertise beyond that of FPA.

- (4) Would recombination of two or all of these agencies solve these problems and greatly improve this country's civil preparedness?

Not necessarily. In considering this question it should be recalled that for several years prior to 1961 a unified organization did exist. For various reasons the performance of this agency was unimpressive; and while I don't attempt it here, the circumstances merit attention.

On the other hand, I have always believed that the 1973 breakup of OEP was a mistake. That organization had achieved acceptance; and its capabilities were improving, as attested by the Senate Hearings of 1973 relative to the Camille, Agnes, and Rapid City disasters.* Further, the interagency agreement between OEP and DCPA indicated progress towards an effective cooperation between the two agencies.

An ostensible objective of Congress is surely a type of stable competence by any federal civil defense effort, based on continuing acceptance and support by the Congress and the President, as well as by the public. Periodic reorganizations such as have occurred in the past are symptomatic that we do not have this; and a new reorganization should in principle be obviously and clearly justified by improvements in performance, not alone by possible budgetary advantages.

The recent initial OMB-DOD proposals illustrate rather well what is most fundamentally wrong with the present situation. In addition to the many new problems generated by preventing DCPA from participating in natural disaster life-saving preparedness, the large budget reduction would have put a quick end to much of the remaining DCPA technical program and any related competence. This step is logical if the purpose is to save money by phasing DCPA out of existence, either because an organization for civil defense is no longer necessary, or because the country now has no need for civil defense itself. Since no attempt was made to justify the proposals as a phase-out, I conclude that the responsible high officials in OMB and DOD neither knew nor cared much about attempting to understand the extremely complex and difficult civil defense problems.

But this merely dramatizes what has been the prevailing circumstance; and the same could be said about the 1973 fragmentation of OEP and other, earlier, public statements and actions.

- (5) Turning to problems of civil protection in nuclear attack disasters, do present DCPA efforts constitute a reasonable program for the country?

They represent a program fashioned for the limiting case of extremely low budget. It should not be surprising that the process of optimizing a small and decreasing budget to deal with an enormous and complex problem, leads to a narrowly focussed emphasis on approaches which, given a "right" set of circumstances,

*Hearings before the Subcommittee on Disaster Relief of the Committee on Public Works, U. S. Senate, 93rd Congress, Parts 1 through 5, Serial No. 93-H6, U. S. Government Printing Office (1973).

offer great returns for very little cost. One can see this process in operation throughout the past 25 years. The federal civil defense agency, after its first unsuccessful proposal to construct blast shelters, focussed its attention on the following, in succession:

- a) finding (not constructing) blast shelter,
- b) tactical evacuation,
- c) citizen-financed home fallout shelters,
- d) finding and slanting group fallout shelters, and stocking them, and now
- e) strategic evacuation.

A program which makes effective use of all of the available types of countermeasure must cost more; and it puts heavier requirements on technical expertise. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that regardless of this year's OMB-DOD proposals, the technical capability of DCPA has been rapidly evaporating. Even without taking account of inflation, engineering R&D in DCPA has shrunk to the vanishing point as technical field after technical field has been essentially abandoned. Further, able program administrators, men with experience and technical sophistication, have been retiring without being replaced.

The conclusion follows that justification of the current DCPA program is closely related to a public decision either to phase out the U. S. capability for civil defense or to retain it only as a token effort, without significant capability. But independently of this, the present focus on evaluating and developing plans and information for strategic evacuation makes sense in that this is one of the not-very-many types of countermeasure which are potentially effective and available. Its effectiveness depends in large part on its use along with other countermeasures. Strategic evacuation cannot stand close examination as the sole mechanism for U. S. civil defense, without various types of in-place shelter. Further, the manner in which strategic evacuation is invoked requires careful consideration, for many reasons.

- (6) How can "limited" improvements be effectuated, without a major reorganization of the present arrangements?

Measures which well-nigh suggest themselves include the following:

- a) Extend by statute the scope of DCPA responsibility for life-saving preparedness to cover all types of disaster. That is, do not limit it to nuclear attack disasters.
- b) Support a technical program in DCPA which is large enough to backstop a multi-faceted competence, not only for the various nuclear disaster countermeasures but also for protection from natural disasters such as earthquake, tornado, and hurricane, to assist preparedness by state and local civil defense groups. The desirability of getting back at least to a situation comparable to that of 1964, which still did not officially include natural disaster countermeasures, is clear.
- c) Unify the budgetary process, if for no other reason than to develop a more general knowledge of the interrelationships between agencies. This should have the effect of reducing slippage or wastage between agencies.
- d) Authorize a small staff, either jointly or separately for FDAA and for DCPA, to be on call to assist with operations in disasters as they occur. The importance of having operational expertise is great, both to the agency preparedness efforts and to the public view of the federal effort.

- e) Request DCPA to plan and make recommendations for the updating and reclaiming of those countermeasure capabilities which have deteriorated in the past 10 years; those relating primarily to fallout shelters, including the training and certification of qualified civil engineers and architects. Then support suitable implementation of these plans.

- (7) What would be involved in "substantial" improvements in this country's civil defense capability?

This is a topic for more extensive study and debate, although some of the major elements are identifiable. In the hopes of avoiding overly controversial matters, I limit comments here to a few observations which are relevant to the problem:

- a) Not only have some countermeasure options been allowed to deteriorate, but some have never been fully developed. All-effects shelter location and corresponding slanting of new construction, high altitude EMP protection for important civilian equipment, as well as strategic evacuation, are all only partially explored. Equipment and expertise for selected combinations should be available, in addition to fallout shelter location and development through slanting of new construction.
- b) Trained reserves are important; and in other countries the civil protection training has been included as part of military training, with military reserves prepared thus to act in civil protection emergencies. Serious public examination of this option has never been pushed. I would anticipate counterarguments by military spokesmen, but doubt the logical force of their objections.
- c) The strategic aspect of civil defense is generally misunderstood. It relates not only 1) to large imbalances vis à vis civil defense capabilities of potential adversaries, but also 2) to high rates of change of civil defense status, and 3) to the magnitude and intensity of any international crisis. These dependences have not been adequately understood or studied.
- d) There are ways in which a civil defense effort compares with the Coast Guard or perhaps the FBI, both in regard to size aspects and also in regard to the importance of good balance between planning and a routine operational assignment. Thus, if the FBI could not supplement local police with trained operatives, it would never have achieved public acceptance. The routine Coast Guard operations on this country's waterways are the basis for its public support; and this organization becomes part of the military in event of a war threat.
- e) So much more is known now about the methods and cost of shelter location and slanting, and the target areas where this is particularly important and which determine regions of high radiation intensity, that it is possible at much less incremental cost than was once envisioned to upgrade this country's protection routinely. While improvisation is possible in crises, the survival of this country should not depend on it, particularly in highly technical requirements.
- f) Civil defense administration requires a mix of technical and legal-political perspective which is both rare and important to any such effort. This type of leadership would be essential to creative development of improvements involving substantial reorganization and upgrading.
- g) Nuclear-attack and non nuclear-attack disaster types are intimately related, so much so that interdependences are extremely important. While

this is relevant to the present arrangement, it is crucially important to the maintenance of a more significant civil protection capability. This argues for a degree of unification of presently separated civil protection responsibilities.

Dr. Lewis V. Spencer

Dr. Lewis V. Spencer is a nuclear physicist and Professor of Physics at Ottawa University (currently on leave), Ottawa, Kansas. He was chairman of the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences and holds two silver and one gold Commerce Department Medal Awards for Meritorious Service, and the Distinguished Service Award of the U.S. Office of Civil Defense.

Educated at Franklin College (B.S. in mathematics, 1945) and Northwestern University (M.S. and Ph.D. in physics, 1948), Dr. Spencer from 1948-1957, specialized in the development of basic scientific methods needed for calculating the penetration and diffusion of gamma radiation. His work resulted in a theory of cavity ionization which has become fundamental in the field of radiation dosimetry. He was awarded his first Commerce medal "for his contributions in the field of atomic research, particularly the invention and development of a technique for the calculation of X-ray and gamma ray penetration in large masses of material." He has also produced a systematic method for calculating protection from fallout radiation on which the United States and many other countries base their estimates for fallout protection.

Dr. Spencer is a member of Sigma Xi, the Washington Academy of Sciences, the Kansas Academy of Sciences, the American Physical Society, the American Nuclear Society and its Executive Committee of the Shielding Division. In 1959 he was an official U.S. delegate to the NATO Conference on Civil Defense in Paris. He has more than 50 technical publications to his credit.

Dr. Spencer is married to the former Elizabeth Williams and has five children.

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AGOH-DS

July 14, 1976

Congress of The United States
Joint Committee on Defense Production
Room A-421 Senate Annex III
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attention: Senator William Proxmire, Vice Chairman


Subject: Position Paper of Disaster Agencies for Michigan,
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota

Dear Senator Proxmire:

Pursuant to the request of your committee to Mr. Ronald San Felippo of Wisconsin, we are forwarding herewith a position paper outlining the concerns of our respective states in the area of emergency preparedness. We understand that this position paper will be included in the final record of hearings on federal, state and local emergency preparedness being conducted by the Joint Committee on Defense Production.

We appreciate very much this opportunity to express our deep concern for the future of emergency preparedness in our local communities, our several states, and in our nation.

I have been authorized by my counterparts in the above-mentioned states to sign this letter and forward the attached position paper in our joint behalf, so that the committee's deadline can be met. Their individual names and official positions follow mine in the signature element below.


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Deputy Director

CGJr:SAS

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POSITION PAPER

THE PROBLEM:

The federal program for emergency preparedness is fragmented and seems to be devoid of overall policy direction. Three major federal agencies are directly involved with disaster policy; each has its own "axe to grind." These are: Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), which is part of the Department of Defense; Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), which is a part of HUD; and the Federal Preparedness Administration (FPA), which is a part of the General Services Administration. In addition to these, over thirty other federal agencies are involved to some extent in the overall federal emergency preparedness program. Thus, a lion's share of the monies appropriated by Congress for emergency preparedness is being utilized to support three separate federal agencies with extensive operations at both the national and regional levels. Much of the money is dissipated through a duplication of effort within federal agencies, and thus does not reach the operational level where it is so desperately needed.

We believe that the need for consistent policy direction at the federal level can best be approached from our perspective with a discussion of four specific areas: 1) the propensity of diverse agencies to "misinterpret" congressional intent, 2) the failure of coordination among the federal agencies involved in emergency preparedness, 3) the demonstrated reluctance of the separate agencies to consider state and local autonomy in matters related to entirely legitimate state and local missions which are not directly related to the federally-supported mission. (Specifically, there is a tendency to program 100% of our time, even though we have separate missions laid on by state statute, which must be accomplished.) 4) Our thoughts concerning the wisdom of current DCPA emphasis on Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP) to the detriment of other programs.

DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC AREAS1. The Potential for Misinterpretation of Congressional Intent.

We offer two examples of what we believe to be misinterpretation of

congressional intent which, although they admirably suit the immediate needs of the federal agency involved, are detrimental to an effective overall emergency preparedness program.

- a. Until recently, DCPA had interpreted its mission as allowing DCPA financial support of some programs not directly or entirely "nuclear" in their thrust. With the recent budget "crunch," however, DCPA's interpretation has changed, to the detriment of state and local governmental units which had come to rely on DCPA support. Congress has shown its concern over this change by voting to allow "dual use" of DCPA funds (i. e., use for "natural" as well as "nuclear" disasters). Permitting "dual use," however, is a far cry from assuring that states and local governmental units receive the much-needed support. As a matter of fact, DCPA has made it clear that it will continue to interpret its mission narrowly, and deny the support for state and local organizations which we believe Congress intended. We believe DCPA's interpretation is understandable, however, at least in human terms. DCPA is a very large and complex organization (at least as compared to our relatively small state and local organizations), with extensive national and regional staffs. Senior staff people within DCPA are quite naturally single minded in their orientation toward a nuclear threat. A rationale has developed that provides primary emphasis on an entirely "nuclear" program, and also conveniently continues the DCPA staffing pattern at a high level. Unfortunately, this will also result in the demise of much-needed programs at the state and local level. From the DCPA perspective, and within the Department of Defense mission orientation, such an approach has the virtue of seeming reasonable, at least in the short run. The point is, of course, that what may seem wise and expedient to an agency whose policy perspective is limited to its own narrow mission, may fall far short of the intent of Congress, which has an overall concern for wise national emergency preparedness policy. The result is, of course, the continuance of hundreds of federal positions at the expense of state and local programs.
- b. We consider the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-288) to be a sensible and humanitarian law designed to provide needed assistance promptly and efficiently to relieve the effects of disaster. We believe the intent of Congress is clear in the

language of the Act; we question, however, whether that intent is adequately fulfilled by the administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act. Specifically, we cite Section 408 of the Act: Individual and Family Grant Programs. This section, which occupies half a page of print, states clearly a Congressional intent that grants shall be provided to "individuals or families adversely affected by a major disaster in those cases where such individuals or families are unable to meet such expenses or needs through assistance under other provisions of this Act, or from other means." A generous and humane law, we believe, to provide outright grants where the "need" would otherwise go unfulfilled. The difficulty, of course, is that the interpretation adopted by FDAA in its 40 pages of regulations which "clarify" Congressional intent, does not seem to carry out the spirit of that intent. For example, these regulations provide that eligibility for a Small Business Administration loan is sufficient to prevent a grant under this section, even though the SBA loan may appear inadequate to fill the "need." A homeowner with a moderate income and mortgaged property which has been destroyed by a hazard not covered in his insurance policy, may receive a further loan at a bargain interest rate (over 6%). The SBA loan provision has met his "need" by giving him an extra mortgage to pay. Does such a loan really fulfill the "need" sufficiently to prevent the grant, as the FDAA interpretation states? We suggest that it does not, and that the agency has strayed a measurable distance from the original Congressional intent in such cases.

2. The Failure of Coordination and Duplication of Efforts Among Federal Emergency Preparedness Programs.

In order to do our jobs in our states, we must meet separate and sometimes conflicting criteria established by the three major federal preparedness agencies: DCPA, FDAA, and FPA. Each such agency is of course charged with fulfilling the policy goals of its parent agency (DOD, HUD, and GSA respectively) and, quite frankly, we see little evidence of any real national policy direction. Rather, we see three federal agencies vying for fiscal support for their separate endeavors, and then spending major portions of monies appropriated to them for maintenance of their separate national and regional headquarters organizations. We know of no state in which the emergency preparedness program is fragmented along the lines of the federal model. We

simply do not believe it would be good management.

As State Directors, we must deal with three separate federal agencies, three separate regional headquarters (which are often not even in the same city), three separate sets of regulations, other publications, and forms. We are admonished that we should sprinkle the word "nuclear" in applications for assistance going to DCPA, but that the same word is taboo in materials going to FDAA. DCPA, which provides major subsidies to states and local governments in the form of hardware and personnel and administrative expenses, cautions us that such support is primarily for "nuclear" preparedness, and our failure to meet new and demanding criteria will result in the loss of DCPA support. (See discussion of DCPA "work plan" below.) FDAA provides a one-time \$250,000 grant to each state for the development of a comprehensive disaster plan, but otherwise provides no support to state or local disaster organizations, choosing rather to rely on hardware and warning systems provided by DCPA, and whatever local organizations exist.

As we suffer the loss of valuable programs formerly supported by DCPA, we find it particularly distressing to contemplate the amount of money spent in maintaining three separate federal agencies to handle what we see conceptually as one mission. We believe a more efficient stewardship at the federal level would make more dollars available at the "firing line" level -- our local disaster services agencies.

3. Disregard of State Autonomy.

Each of our states has levied statutory missions upon our state emergency preparedness agencies in addition to our missions related to DCPA, FDAA, and FPA. For example, we all respond routinely to emergency situations which fall short of FDAA standards for disaster declarations, and do what we can to arrange help or alleviate human suffering. Since it is somewhat difficult to plan for disasters, we need flexibility within our states in order to manage effectively, and accomplish our several missions. We find our flexibility being progressively restricted, however, particularly by DCPA.

As the manager of an administrative agency, any competent state director already has management tools and techniques in operation. With little warning, and no apparent regard for our ongoing management

programs, DCPA has required that we substitute DCPA's new management tool, a "work plan" for our own management programs, which had been approved by DCPA for FY77. Within the work plan, we are required to divide the time spent by each employee into "nuclear" or "natural" disaster preparedness. This even extends to clerical employees at the local level. Accordingly, we must determine how many clerical man-days will be spent on "nuclear" matters, even in a local one-person office. In most such operations, it is difficult even at the end of the day to determine if it has been a "nuclear" or a "natural" day. We believe that the distinction is difficult to discern, and we are offended by the abrupt substitution of what we consider an inferior management tool for our present management systems. We are advised, of course, that our failure to comply with the work plan requirement will result in loss of DCPA fiscal support.

We believe that the establishment of an overall national policy-making body in the area of emergency preparedness would tend to alleviate such problems in the future, and avoid the artificial labeling of people and activities as "nuclear" or "natural." The mission is complex enough without imposing artificial barriers.

4. DCPA Emphasis on Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP).

The announced primary emphasis of DCPA during the next several years is Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP).

CRP provides for the mass movement of population groups from urban nuclear target areas to rural areas. We believe it is appropriate that such planning be undertaken; but we do not believe CRP merits the high priority and financial support it is receiving.

We believe that adopting CRP as the major DCPA program during the next few years satisfies two basic criteria which are of primary importance to DCPA:

- a. It provides a purely "nuclear" mission for this agency which, after all, has a primary mission of preparing for nuclear attack.
- b. It will maintain national and regional headquarters at near their present high levels, and assure the continuance of hundreds of

federal jobs for the foreseeable future (at the expense, of course, of programs we consider vital.

We believe that the dollars programmed for CRP could be better spent in other areas, such as training and education, which is being drastically cut during the next fiscal year.

CONCLUSION:

We do not pretend expertise in how the federal government should reorganize its emergency preparedness programs. We do know what our problems are. As administrators for our state agencies, and as taxpayers, we are concerned at the waste and inefficiency which we see in the present fragmentation into three separate federal agencies. As citizens, we urge that a more clearly-defined and viable national policy be developed. We believe that Congress wants our nation to have an overall comprehensive emergency preparedness capability in every community. With wise policy direction and the thoughtful allocation of resources and priorities, it can be done.