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# NOMINATION OF TANKERSLEY, BROWNMAN, MARCY, PENISTEN, AND WEYAND

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KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY BEFORE THE

## HEARING COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

NOMINATION OF

WILL HILL TANKERSLEY, OF ALABAMA, TO BE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, VICE THEODORE C. MARRS, RESIGNED

HAROLD L. BROWNMAN, OF MARYLAND, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, VICE EUGENE E. BERG, RESIGNED

H. TYLER MARCY, OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, VICE DAVID SAMUEL POTTER, ELEVATED

GARY DEAN PENISTEN, OF CONNECTICUT, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, VICE ROBERT D. NESEN, RESIGNED

GENERAL FREDERICK CARLTON WEYAND, FOR APPOINTMENT AS CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

OCTOBER 3, 1974

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



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NOMINATION OF TANKERSLEY, BROWNMAN, MARCY,  
PENISTEN, AND GENERAL WEYAND

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1974

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Byrd, Jr. of Virginia, Hughes, Nunn, and Thurmond.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; W. Clark McFadden II, counsel; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; John A. Goldsmith, Edward B. Kenney, Don L. Lynch, and Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Nancy J. Bearg, research associate; Phyllis A. Bacon, assistant chief clerk; Susan J. Clark and Doris E. Connor, clerical assistants.

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee will come to order.

Senator Allen, I will get to you in a minute, but I will give you special welcome now. We are glad to have you here.

For the record, we have several nominations before the committee this morning. First, Mr. Will Hill Tankersley, of Alabama, to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

Next we will have Mr. Harold L. Brownman, of Maryland, to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics.

Mr. H. Tyler Marcy, of Massachusetts, to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development.

And then Mr. Gary Dean Penisten, of Connecticut, to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management.

They, of course, are all civilians.

Then we will have Gen. Frederick C. Weyand to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Gentlemen, the same questions will apply to all of you. So you might give attention here to what is going to be asked of Mr. Tankersley.

But first, we are glad to have the Senator from Alabama, Senator Allen, who is appearing on behalf of Mr. Tankersley.

Senator, will you proceed?

(1)

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES B. ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
ALABAMA

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Thurmond, Senator Hughes, and other members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before this distinguished committee.

I might say that Senator Sparkman, my distinguished senior colleague would be here, as a matter of fact, he would be the lead off witness, if he were in town. But he joins me in presenting and recommending Mr. Tankersley for confirmation for the position for which the President has nominated him.

So it is with a great deal of pleasure that I present to you this morning Mr. Will Hill Tankersley of Montgomery, Ala., whom the President has nominated Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

I might state that Mr. Tankersley is related to Senator Lister Hill, who served with great distinction as Senator from Alabama, far more than any other from the State of Alabama. He was a great patriot, and certainly a man of renown and distinction. Mr. Tankersley comes from that fine southern family, and I might say a patriotic family.

Parenthetically, I might add that Mr. Tankersley's predecessor, Dr. Theodore Marrs, is also a fellow Alabamian and a native of Montgomery. The President, in his wisdom, has seen fit to promote Dr. Marrs to another position and, inasmuch as Dr. Marrs has appeared before this committee on many occasions, I am sure you will agree with me, Mr. Chairman, that he will do a mighty fine job in his new assignment.

In my opinion, the President could not have made a better choice to succeed Dr. Marrs than Mr. Tankersley. Mr. Tankersley will assume his new position well versed in Reserve matters.

He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and also attended the Citadel and Auburn University, as well as the Institute of Investment Banking, Wharton School, at the University of Pennsylvania.

It is safe to say that Mr. Tankersley possesses the educational, professional, and military background and qualifications, and I might say the character. I know that the chairman and other members of the committee recognize that that is one attribute that any person in public life should value and should possess above all others. He has the qualifications, and he has the character to discharge the duties of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

He was commissioned a lieutenant in the U.S. Army Infantry in 1950 and saw combat during the Korean conflict some two decades ago. Mr. Tankersley served on active duty in the Army from 1950 until 1958. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Infantry School, Engineer School, Command and General Staff College, and the War College.

Mr. Tankersley has served as the commanding officer of the 375th Field Depot, U.S. Army Reserve, Gunter Air Force Station, Ala., and, from October 1969, through October 1973, was a civilian aide to the Secretary of the Army for the State of Alabama, receiving for his distinguished service in that position the Outstanding Civilian Service Medal.

In civilian life, Mr. Tankersley has been a securities dealer and broker and an investment banker, serving as vice president and director of Sterne, Agee, & Leach, Inc., in Montgomery.

Mr. Tankersley has also been very active in many civic and philanthropic activities in the Montgomery area, as a member of the Montgomery area chamber of commerce; the Tukabatchee Area Council, Boy Scouts of America; and the United Appeal. He also serves on the board of directors of the Montgomery Academy and is a member of the Montgomery Rotary Club.

I am confident that Mr. Tankersley will discharge his duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in a most exemplary manner. Again, it is a pleasure to present him to the committee and I endorse and command his nomination to you. As I say again, Mr. Tankersley has the support not only of Senator Sparkman, but of the entire Alabama delegation.

I would like to have incorporated in the record a very fine editorial of September 26, 1974 by the Montgomery Independent, a fine weekly newspaper in Montgomery, about Mr. Tankersley. I will not burden the committee at this time with a reading of the editorial, but I invite your attention to it.

The CHAIRMAN. We will put it in the record, Senator.  
[The article follows:]

[From the Montgomery Independent, Sept. 26, 1974]

#### COL. TANKERSLEY'S COMMAND

Had Will Hill Tankersley lived at the time of the Civil War, he would have buckled on his sword, raised a company of cavalry and joyously galloped off to battle, ecstatic at the prospect of combat. It is not that he is belligerent or belligerose; contrarily, a more civil and urbane man is not to be found. But Tankersley is, by training and fundamental inclination, a soldier, in the traditional sense, and a drum and bugle sets his blood racing. A friend of his who served with Tankersley in Germany was saying of him the other day: "He is the finest soldier I ever knew." No mean compliment.

In all ways, Tankersley is superbly qualified for the job he is about to embark on—that of principal adviser on reserve affairs to the secretary of defense. This involves looking out for 900,000 men and a \$6 billion budget, making it one of the top posts in the Defense Department.

A couple of his friends were thinking the other day that with that many men and that much money, we could make a damn good showing if they'd give us a rematch on the Civil War. Alas, Tankersley is passionately wedded to the U.S. Constitution and the belief that the military's most vital function is to prevent wars. Well, it was just a thought.

Senator ALLEN. Mr. Chairman, I am due in a conference on the public financing bill at this time, if you will excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your coming by, Senator.

Senator ALLEN. I appreciate the opportunity to testify.

The CHAIRMAN. If we have a vacancy on this committee and you are looking around for a place to go, we will be glad to have you here as a member of our committee.

Senator ALLEN. I thank you very much. I might take you up on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Tankersley, we will now hear from you. I understand that Mr. Brownman, Mr. Marcy, and Mr. Penisten are all present at this time.

Mr. Tankersley, you do not have to make any statement, but if you wish to say anything you may.

**STATEMENT OF WILL HILL TANKERSLEY, NOMINEE TO BE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS**

[The nomination reference report and biographical sketch follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
September 5, 1974.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Will Hill Tankersley, of Alabama, to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, vice Theodore C. Marrs, resigned, October 3, 1974.

Reported by Mr. Stennis with the recommendation that the nomination be *confirmed*, subject to the nominee's commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF WILL HILL TANKERSLEY

Present address: 1830 Croom Drive, Montgomery, Alabama 36106.

Born: February 10, 1928, Montgomery, Alabama.

Marital Status: Married to the former Theda Clark Ball; Three Children.

Education: 1950 B.S., U.S. Military Academy; 1970 M.S., (Economics) Auburn University.

Military: 1950-1958 U.S. Army Combat Infantryman Korean War; Ranger; Parachutist: U.S. Army Infantry School, Engineer School, Command and General Staff College, War College; Commanding Officer 375th Field Depot, U.S. Army Reserve, Gunter Air Force Station, Alabama. Colonel—USAR.

Employment: 1958—Present Vice President and Director, Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. Investment Bankers and Members of New York Stock Exchange, Montgomery, Alabama.

Professional Memberships: Security Traders Association of America; Alabama Security Dealers Association; Montgomery Security Dealers Association; Reserve Officers Association, Association of U.S. Army, Past President, West Point Society of Alabama.

Civic/Philanthropic Memberships: Montgomery Area Chamber of Commerce; Past Member of Board of Directors, United Appeal of Montgomery; Tukabatchee Area Council, Boy Scouts of America; Board of Directors, The Montgomery Academy; Member of the Montgomery Rotary Club and The Unity Club; Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army for Alabama, October 1969—October 1973, Department of the Army—Outstanding Civilian Service Medal.

Mr. TANKERSLEY. I would just like to say how flattered and honored I am to be before this committee, and how much I appreciate Senator Allen's endorsement, and the President's and the Secretary of Defense's nomination of me, and the chance to appear before you distinguished gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for your statement. I am sure every member of this committee thinks that this is an important office, and congratulates you on having been nominated. Your nomination has been here long enough for any opposition that existed to show up, unless it was too timid. Nothing has been filed here against you in any way.

We have a conflict of interest standard here in this committee, not law, but we operate on it as our own. You conferred with Mr. Braswell, and have met whatever requirements the committee has in that way, is that correct?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Yes, sir, I believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Braswell?

Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, that is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct as to Mr. Brownman?

Mr. BRASWELL. That is correct as to all the civilian nominees.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marcy?

Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Mr. Penisten?

Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say that I think the office you are holding is highly important. The Reserves are highly important. We hear a lot of talk about the number that we are going to set each year. I think the mission and the extent to which they are used is far more important than the number that we have in the Reserves. But that is just a back-drop. Your position is now going to be that you are their representative in the civilian functions of the Department of Defense. Do you expect to give this your full time and attention?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Keep this committee informed voluntarily of anything you think we should know?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. You can rest assured of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mean you will approve everything that the Reserves do, but you will be their representative and work to see that they get their rightful place in the Sun?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will have a hard time doing it, but you are certainly capable.

The Democratic Caucus of the Senate requires that all nominees agree to testify freely when requested before any of the various Senate committees. Do you say that you will comply with that request?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator THURMOND.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Tankersley, I want to congratulate you on your appointment, and I want to congratulate the President and the Defense Department for selecting you.

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I have had occasion to look into your record. You have a very fine record, and a splendid military background. The very fact that you attended West Point and the Citadel, the two best military colleges in the country, I guess is an endorsement for you, as well as other educational institutions.

The fact that you are a nephew of former Senator Lister Hill I think would carry great weight with those of us who served with him and held him in such high esteem.

If I did not know you at all, the endorsement of Senator Allen for which I have such high regard here in the Senate, is a strong endorsement for you.

But in your own right you have made a fine record, and it would be a pleasure for me to support your confirmation.

Mr. Tankersley, why did you accept this nomination as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. To have the satisfaction of serving my country by working in an area with which I have some familiarity and where the opportunity for making a meaningful contribution is great.

Senator THURMOND. In what ways do you feel your experience as an Army Reserve colonel will assist you in this new capacity?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. My service as a Reserve officer as well as a Regular officer gives me, I believe, a better insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the Reserve Forces. Having had a wide variety of assignments as a reservist, the problems of the Reserve Forces are not abstractions to me. If confirmed by the Senate as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), I will request transfer to the Standby Reserve active status list as a designated key Federal employee in which capacity I cannot be paid or promoted.

Senator THURMOND. As a man active in the Army Reserve program, do you feel you can be objective in making any hard decisions which might be required?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. When I take the oath of office for this position, I will become a fiduciary for the U.S. Government. Any decisions I make will be made in that context or what is best for the United States, regardless of who it affects.

Senator THURMOND. What do you see as possibly the greatest problem areas facing the Reserve and Guard forces today?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Training, equipment, and recruiting, in that order.

Senator THURMOND. What are your views on the recent announcement that the Defense Department is considering requesting from Congress authority for a callup of up to 50,000 Reserve and Guard units without a declaration of a national emergency or congressional approval?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. I think it's a good idea. It will add to the flexibility of our Defense Establishment and still allow the Congress to maintain its historic and very proper role of using the Reserve Forces of our country when no national emergency has been declared.

Senator THURMOND. What are your views on the total force concept?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. I believe that the total force is now DOD policy, as stated by Secretary Schlesinger, and represents one of the best decisions made in regard to structuring our national defense. The integration of Active and Reserve Forces into a homogeneous whole has unquestionably strengthened our ability to respond in emergency situations. A genuinely ready Guard and Reserve Force can be the best bargain in this country for national security—particularly in view of the high costs of active manpower—the Guard and Reserve Forces are particularly cost effective and, if properly supported and equipped can and should be a full partner in the total force.

Senator THURMOND. In the past the attention of the Congress, as it relates to Reserve and Guard issues has centered to a great extent on strength levels. Have you developed any viewpoints in this general area?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Strengths are obviously important, but without considering force requirements and the quality (training, equipment, morale, readiness, and responsiveness) of the forces represented by the strengths, they are meaningless. I am not being evasive when I say that I am not familiar enough with the overall force structure and strength levels of the Reserve forces to respond in a finite manner concerning strength levels at this time.

Senator THURMOND. Have you formulated any opinion on the late General Abrams' efforts to integrate Guard combat units into Regular divisions for mobilization purposes?

Mr. TANKERSLEY. I believe there are many benefits to be accrued by integrating independent Guard and Reserve combat units into Regular divisions for motivation purposes. Obviously, it will allow us to increase the number of Regular divisions available in the event of mobilization. There are a number of corollary benefits. Some of them are:

A. It will cause the Active forces to know more about the Reserves and vice versa. Thus strengthening the total force policy.

B. The Active Army general commanding a division which will be rounded out with Guard and Reserve units in the event of mobilization will take a keener interest in the training, equipment, recruiting morale, leadership and readiness of the Reserve unit(s) upon which he must rely for the effectiveness of his division.

C. Knowing that they will be part of a Regular division which will be employed very early in the event of hostilities, Guard and Reserve units will have a sense of pride and a sense of urgency they would not otherwise possess. All of the Guard and Reserve members would have prima facie evidence that when our country is concerned enough to send its very best in the event of war, the Reserves would be a part of this first team.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Symington, do you have any questions for the record that you wish to ask?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, Mr. Chairman. I congratulate Mr. Tankersley for being willing to take on a tough job. My own request would be that when he goes back to Montgomery that he gives my respect and affection to Lister Hill.

Mr. TANKERSLEY. You can be sure of that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ervin.

Senator ERVIN. I will make the same request of you that Senator Symington made of you, give Mr. Hill my kindest regards.

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hughes.

Senator HUGHES. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be a close vote, but I believe this committee is going to approve you. And we all will say, to give you a running start, that you are from Alabama and connected with Senator Hill.

One of the things that Senator Hill did—and I think it is appropriate to mention it now—he was one time head of the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Army over in the House of Representatives and through his influence with the Military Academy at West Point they restored Robert E. Lee's picture to the group of superintendents of the Academy. You can tell him that I repeated that for the record here.

Mr. TANKERSLEY. Yes, sir, I will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Good wishes to you in your assignment. Thank you very much.

Mr. Brownman, please come around and have a seat sir.

Mr. Brownman, you have been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Logistics. We consider this an

important assignment. It has to do with the spending of a lot of money; and, I hope, the saving of a lot of money too, through your guidance and supervision.

Do you have anything that you wish to say, Mr. Brownman?

**STATEMENT OF HAROLD L. BROWNMAN, NOMINEE TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY**

[The nomination and reference report and biographical sketch follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
September 17, 1974.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Harold L. Brownman, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Army, vice Eugene E. Berg, resigned, October 3, 1974.

Reported by Mr. Stennis with the recommendation that the nomination be *confirmed*, subject to the nominee's commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF HAROLD L. BROWNMAN

*Present Address*: 10401 Grosvenor Place, Rockville, Maryland 20852.  
*Born*: May 21, 1923, New York, New York.  
*Marital Status*: Married to the former Edith Heller; Three Children.  
*Education*: 1944 B.E.E. Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn; 1949 M.E.E. Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn.  
*Military*: 1944-1946 United States Air Force, Sergeant.

EMPLOYMENT

March 1973—Present: Deputy Director for Management and Services, Central Intelligence Agency.

Oct. 1970—Mar. 1973: Director of Special Projects, Central Intelligence Agency.

1967-1970: Vice President—Systems, LTV Electrosystems, Inc.

1958-1967: Assistant to Division Director, Airborne Instruments Laboratory, Division of Cutler Hammer.

1958: Program Director, Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp.

1957-1958: Lab Manager, Fairchild Controls Corp.

1955-1956: Research Engineer, Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp.

1954-1955: Senior Engineer, American Bosch Arma Corp.

1952-1954: Engineer, TELE Register Corp.

1950-1952: Engineer, SERVO Mechanisms.

1948-1950: Engineer, Fairchild Engine and Airplane.

1946-1948: Teaching Staff, Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn.

*Memberships*: Institute of Electronic Engineers; Sigma Si.

Mr. BROWNMAN. I am very pleased to be here and appear before this committee. I am most anxious to get your approval and confirmation in the Senate and take on the challenging jobs that Secretary Callaway has discussed with me prior to my nomination.

The CHAIRMAN. You have complied with the conflict-of-interest rule of this committee?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree to freely testify if called on to do so before any committee of the Senate?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond, I call on you now, please.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROWNMAN, I believe you will be succeeding Mr. Eugene Berg, who was only confirmed to this position last November.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I think it is unfortunate when we have such short tenure of office in these positions because it takes several months to become acquainted with the work, and then if one leaves he has to start all over again. Do you happen to know why Mr. Berg left?

Mr. BROWNMAN. No sir, I do not.

Senator THURMOND. Is it your plan to serve as long as your services are needed here?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, I plan to serve at the pleasure of Secretary Callaway and the President of the United States.

Senator THURMOND. Have you had a chance to discuss the requirements of this position with Mr. Berg or anyone else in the Defense Department?

Mr. BROWNMAN. Not with Mr. Berg. I have discussed the requirements of the position with Army Secretary Callaway, Secretary Staudt, and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger.

Senator THURMOND. I guess you have had the opportunity, then, to be thinking of what you would do as a manager of property and equipment in this position.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Some thoughts, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Is your office interfaced with General Miley's office as Chief of the Army and Materiel Command?

Mr. BROWNMAN. It is a very close interface. The Army Materiel Command under General Miley is one of the first indoctrination briefings I will get. In fact, there is one scheduled for tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

Senator THURMOND. You appear well qualified for the position. I will be glad to support you, and wish you great success in your work.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington, do you have any questions?

Senator SYMINGTON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ervin.

Senator ERVIN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hughes.

Senator HUGHES. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

The examination has been short, but that does not mean that we think shortly of the position you will fill. You will have problems with this mounting cost and everything.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to have a lot to cope with there, and we certainly wish you well.

We will excuse you from the witness chair now. Thank you for coming in.

Mr. BROWNMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marcy, have a seat.

Let Mr. Penisten come around at the same time. So many of these questions are exactly the same.

Mr. Marcy, you have been nominated to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development. That is a highly important position. What is your background of qualifications, briefly in this particular field?

### STATEMENT OF H. TYLER MARCY, NOMINEE TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

[The nomination reference and report and biographical sketch follow:]

#### NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
September 17, 1974.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

H. Tyler Marcy, of Massachusetts, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, vice David Samuel Potter, elevated, October 3, 1974.

Reported by Mr. Stennis with the recommendation that the nomination be *confirmed*, subject to the nominee's commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF H. TYLER MARCY

Legal Address: Stony Brook Road, Brewster, Massachusetts.

Born: September 14, 1918, Rochester, New York.

Marital Status: Married to the former Cynthia Spencer; Five Children.

Education: 1940 B.S., (Electrical Engineering) M.I.T.; 1941 M.S., (Electrical Engineering) M.I.T.

#### EMPLOYMENT

1972-Present: Self employed, Consultant.

1968-1972: IBM Director of Technology, Corporate Staff, IBM Corporation, Armonk, New York.

1962-1968: Vice President, General Products Division, Systems Development Division, IBM Corporation, White Plains, New York.

1957-1962: Laboratory Manager, IBM Corporation, Poughkeepsie, New York.

1956-1957: Assistant Manager Product Development, Corporate Staff, IBM Corporation, New York, New York.

1951-1956: Navigation Computer Character Recognition, Data Processing Systems, IBM Corporation, Endicott, New York.

1946-1951: Associate Director, Special Projects Department, M. W. Kellogg Company.

1941-1946: M.I.T. Servomechanism Laboratory.

#### PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES

Instrument Society of America (ISA): ISA President-Elect, President, Past President 1971-1974; Society Advisory Committee 1970-1971 (Chairman 1971); Board of Engineers Joint Council (ISA Appointment) 1968-1970; ISA Vice President Publications 1966-1968; Special Assistant to ISA President on Technical Affairs 1964; Technical Program Coordinator ISA Annual Conference 1963.

Institute Electrical Electronic Engineers (IEEE): Fellow 1967; Leadership in feedback control and significant contribution to the management of technical enterprise; Technical Operations Committee 1963; IEEE appointment to Board of AFIPS 1963; Chairman, Feedback Control Systems Committee 1960-1962; Charter Member AIEE Feedback Control Systems Committee 1946.

**STATEMENT OF GARY DEAN PENISTEN, NOMINEE TO BE AN  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY**

[The nomination and reference report and biographical sketch follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
September 17, 1974.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Gary Dean Penisten, of Connecticut, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, vice Robert D. Nesen, resigned, October 3, 1974.

Reported by Mr. Stennis with the recommendation that the nomination be *confirmed*, subject to the nominee's commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GARY DEAN PENISTEN

Present Address: 1161 Mill Hill Road, Southport, Connecticut 06490.

Born: May 14, 1931, Lincoln, Nebraska.

Marital Status: Married to the former Nancy M. Golding; Four Children.

Education: 1953 B.S., (Business Administration) University of Omaha.

Military: 1950-1963 USAR (First Lieutenant, Finance Corps).

EMPLOYMENT

Mar. 1972-Present: Manager-Group Finance Operation, Power Generation Business Group, General Electric Company.

Sept. 1971-Feb. 1972: Manager-Strategic Planning Operation, Industrial and Marine Turbine Business Division, GE Company, Lynn, Massachusetts.

Feb. 1967-Aug. 1971: Manager-Finance, Medium Steam Turbine, Generator Department, GE Company, Lynn, Massachusetts.

Dec. 1965-Feb. 1967: Manager-Program and Staff Management, GE Company.

Apr. 1963-Nov. 1965: Audit Administrator, GE Company.

Dec. 1958-Mar. 1963: Junior to Supervising Traveling Auditor, Corporate Audit Staff, GE Company, Schenectady, New York.

Aug. 1956-Dec. 1958: Cost Estimator and later Specialist-Cost Analysis, Room Air Conditioning Department, GE Company, Louisville, Kentucky.

Aug. 1953-July 1956: Training, Appliance Park Project, Major Appliance Division, GE Company, Louisville, Kentucky.

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Chairman, I had engineering development and management experience, most recently over 20 years with the International Business Machines Corp., in both divisional management and corporate staff management of the technical affairs of the IBM Corp.

The CHAIRMAN. How long, if at all, have you been with any of the services?

Mr. MARCY. Never, I have not been with any of them, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Why did you agree to take this position if approved? What is your idea about it? I think that is a fair question.

Mr. MARCY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I believe very strongly that the United States should have technically efficient and properly advanced Navy equipment, and I believe that civilian personnel should participate in the management of mili-

tary affairs. I believe that I have the technical ability to manage such technical affairs. When asked should I participate, I felt that I should, and wanted to.

The CHAIRMAN. Each of you now, you have heard my reference to this conflict-of-interest rule, you are familiar with it. Have you complied with it?

Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PENISTEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you will continue to do so as long as you serve?

Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PENISTEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how long you will serve in this office?

Mr. MARCY. As long as is the pleasure of the Secretary and the President.

Mr. PENISTEN. The same is true of me.

The CHAIRMAN. What prompted you to accept this nomination, Mr. Penisten?

Mr. PENISTEN. First, I was asked by my present employer, General Electric, if I would be interested. The inquiry came through them. When I thought about it, I recognize that the Government as well as industry and individuals are confronted with the problems of inflation, financial problems of a severe magnitude. From my experience I thought I could contribute, and I wanted to contribute.

The CHAIRMAN. As Senator Thurmond said, we have a great many civilians that come and stay a short time and move on. We do not like that exactly. I am not referring to any individual. Do you really think now that you have firmly in your mind that you will serve as long as the President wants you to?

Mr. PENISTEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Secretary?

Mr. PENISTEN. Yes, sir. I have no requirements in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. On this question about testifying if called on, will each of you testify before Senate committees?

Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you do that?

Mr. PENISTEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen.

Senator Thurmond.

Take Mr. Marcy first.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Marcy, I have had occasion to talk to you and also look over your record. It appears that you are well qualified for this position.

Mr. Marcy, what are your views toward the concept of "fly-before-buy"?

Mr. MARCY. As I understand the term "fly-before-buy" in research and development of military equipment, it fundamentally refers to adequate testing of equipment before substantial funds are appropriated for procurement. There are times when it is prudent to invest funds for long leadtime items before operational testing is completed in order to maintain a continuity in phasing of the program. When done, this should be decided on the basis of adequate component testing and only limited production expenditures should be permitted. The

phasing into production is best done to allow a slow enough buildup to permit equipment made to production designs and with appropriate early phase production tooling to be employed in operational testing and evaluation. Full scale production and the large expenditure of funds may then be permitted with an appropriate degree of confidence that major cost of functional problems have been solved.

Senator THURMOND. Would you provide for the committee your opinion on the "design-to-cost" development and procurement policy as a part of the R. & D. process?

Mr. MARCY. "Design-to-cost" development and procurement is an important management tool which permits the proper degree of long term planning to be employed to guide consideration of the number of items as well as their functional capability. I personally believe that the cost objectives should include more than R. & D. and acquisition since there are very important cost considerations in the planned operational use of equipment. Key among these cost considerations is the reliability and resultant readiness of equipment, the cost of maintenance and the number of people required in operation and supply. It is proper for development work to be guided by such cost objectives, albeit necessary to iterate as more is learned of the manufacturing and operational processes involved.

Senator THURMOND. Many in Congress are concerned about the fact we seem to get little in equipment despite large expenditures in research and development. Do you have any views on this issue?

Mr. MARCY. The effective use of money in research and development is a proper and important area for management review. There are frequently times when seemingly parallel work should be properly undertaken to test an adequate set of options and ideas. There are times when it is necessary to stop and go in development because the objectives have not been or cannot be met. The rationale for these actions should be clearly explained. When research is involved there is a very subtle process of guiding the course of investigation so as to optimize the relevance of the work. The cost of significant fundamental technical advance is almost always very high. The potential return to the armed services must be also high. There is opportunity for even larger costs because of the complex interaction between people, organizations and requirements. In undertaking this responsible role in managing the R.D.T. & E. money for the Navy, I intend to concentrate on timely and well explained decisions as well as good teamwork between the many groups involved so as to obtain the best return on dollars invested in research and development.

Senator THURMOND. With our current inflation problem, it is certain we will have to be making better use of our R. & D. dollars. Do you have any ideas as to how this might be accomplished?

Mr. MARCY. The current inflation presents a particularly acute problem in research and development. It is clear that not as much physical progress can be made in the fiscal year as had been planned at the time the budgets were assembled and reviewed. It is essential that this effect be anticipated and that the concept of priorities for funds be applied at many levels of project execution. It would seem certain that redirection of many projects will be required and no doubt some of these will require reprogramming of funds. It will be important to do this

work in as timely a way as possible and with a good level of communication between concerned management people in the Department of Defense and in the Congress.

Senator THURMOND. The Navy has experienced cost growth problems in its various programs due to inflation. For instance, in the 3 months from March to June 1974 the program cost of Trident grew \$3 to \$15 billion, attack submarines increased \$840 million to \$7.8 billion and the DD-963 program costs went up \$519 million to \$3.6 billion. How does the Navy plan to deal with these problems?

Mr. MARCY. I have not yet participated in the management of the developments in the Navy and I cannot therefore speak for the Navy and its plan to deal with these problems. They are certainly important and deserve the attention of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development.

Senator THURMOND. What experience in the field of research and development have you had in civilian life which you feel might be beneficial to this position? What lessons have you learned?

Mr. MARCY. After graduating from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (master's degree in electrical engineering, 1941) for a period of 13 years I participated in the development of military equipment. From 1941-1946 this work was at MIT on development of automatic hydraulic controls for anti-aircraft and Army tank fire control systems. From 1946 to 1951 I worked on projects concerned with the development of rocket engines, guided missiles and early elements of air defense. When first at IBM (starting in 1951) I participated in the development of the bombing/navigation system for the B-52. I thus have a strong base in my experience on military equipment and in many more areas than electrical engineering. In the subsequent period at IBM I was involved in commercial research and development. This was during a period of great change of technology as the industry moved from vacuum tubes to transistors and solid-state. Much attention had to be given to the total systems design including a penetrating analysis of its utility to the customer. Many laboratories were involved in synchronized work. Marketing, management production and technical groups had to be made to work together. Attention in a rental business has to be strong toward the operational effectiveness of the equipment. Engineers "live" with their designs beyond the release of the designs for production. This management experience seems appropriate for the difficult problems I expect to find in the management of the very large research and development activities for the Navy.

Most recently I have been president of one of the engineering professional societies (Instrument Society of America). This has been a valuable experience in getting things done as an elected officer in a volunteer group with strong attention of the executive board.

I have learned many things. Key among them is the importance of timely decisions, the fostering of effective teamwork between development groups, the necessity for independent evaluation and testing and attention to the complete solution of the crucial problems. Most important of all, however, is the need to recognize and stimulate the best efforts of individuals. I expect to continue to learn in this Navy position and to improve as time goes on.

Senator THURMOND. I wish you well in your work. I just want to

say that in my judgment, there is no more important position in the Defense Department than that of the head of research and development, whether it is the Army, Navy or Air Force, or Defense, whatever it is. The weapons we have today, the weapons with which we are going to fight wars, and the weapons with which we will maintain our freedom, are the results of research and development. The weapons we have today are the result of research and development 10 or 12 years ago. And so this work is highly important. I am sure you will give it the attention and the dedication that it deserves. I wish you great success.

Mr. MARCY. Thank you.

Mr. PENISTEN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, all your names have been here the required time, and the committee might see fit to pass on those names today. So the answers you are promising to give, get them in today, please, so if there should be anything raised on the floor we will have the record complete.

Are there any other questions by members of the committee of either of these gentlemen?

Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Marcy, I note you were born in Rochester, N. Y. That is where my wife and I first set up housekeeping. I, therefore, have great sympathy for you from that standpoint. I am sorry we did not get together, but you know how it has been around here lately.

I notice that you have a strong and excellent background in electrical engineering. I also notice that you worked a good deal at IBM. Why did you leave there?

Mr. MARCY. Senator, I was very happy in my work with the IBM Corp., and participated in some of the dramatic growth of the technical operations of the company, and finally obtained a position as manager of technology in the office of the chief engineer of the corporate staff. I have been with the company over 20 years. I concluded that at that time that there was not going to be any future opportunity for me in the company, and I had long before that decided that I did not want to be in a "shelf" position waiting for retirement. So I decided I was wasting my time and their money, and I asked to be relieved of my duties.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is a good answer.

I would address this question to Mr. Penisten as well as to you. Both of the companies that you have left do a great deal of business with the U. S. Government, specifically with the Department of Defense. I know as an independent manufacturer, when I was in business I often ran into a colonel—it never got much higher than that—who was a former member of one of the two great electrical corporations. IBM in those days was not up in that league, but it certainly is today. You would feel, would you not, that you have to bend over backward not to be influenced by your previous employment?

Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PENISTEN. Absolutely.

Senator SYMINGTON. Because otherwise the whole thing gets very involved and could turn into some of the scandals that Senator Prox-

mire has unearthed, which really are a shame from the standpoint of the people's opinion of Government per se. It is especially important now when, based on the article in the paper yesterday, the cost of some of the major weapons systems seems to be running all over the place. And in the case of at least one of the weapons systems involved, I note that one of the two companies that you have been with has a great deal of work there. We have to do what we can to get the most for the dollar, we have to do what we can, because the dollar is getting increasingly in trouble. Would you agree with that?

Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PENISTEN. Yes, Senator, I would.

Senator SYMINGTON. Your background is a little different from Mr. Marcy's. But I hope you will both do your best from that standpoint to get the maximum that you can for your dollar. Am I correct that you will do that?

Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PENISTEN. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. No further questions.

Senator ERVIN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hughes.

Senator HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following along with what Senator Symington was asking about, both of these men have tremendous qualifications for the positions to which they have been appointed.

Mr. Penisten, you say the inquiries for the job came through your present employer, General Electric, is that right?

Mr. PENISTEN. That is correct.

Senator HUGHES. What will your new job assignment be? What will you be doing? I know your title, but what will you be doing when you get over there?

Mr. PENISTEN. Having been there a short time, I have concluded that it involves accounting and budgeting at the Secretary level. It also involves establishing of rules, procedures and guidelines by which financial operations will operate.

Senator HUGHES. As you are aware, we will do a tremendous business with the companies you have been involved in. You have spent your whole life apparently, with General Electric.

Mr. PENISTEN. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUGHES. And we will be doing a tremendous amount of work with IBM some way. Is there any capacity in this assignment where you feel that you would be in conflict?

Mr. PENISTEN. No, sir, I do not believe that there would be. In the event that the situation arose that could have the possibility of conflict of interest, I would certainly withdraw myself from that decision, or make it absolutely clear that I in no way have a conflict of interest. I understand the circumstances, but, I am not going to be involved in such a thing.

Senator HUGHES. I am sure you would not, but I just wanted to be certain of what you are getting into, what you might come up against that some day. Sometimes it is pretty difficult when you have spent a whole lifetime in one structure, and then you come up against it. The psychological effect is tremendous. But your background and capacities make you an excellent nominee, and I just wanted to make sure that you know you would run into that in all probability.

Mr. PENISTEN. That is very likely the case. I think integrity has to be the key word in a financial manager. And I think I can live up to this.

Senator HUGHES. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Penisten, I believe you graduated from the University of Omaha in business administration.

Mr. PENISTEN. That is correct, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Which ought to give you a good foundation for financial work, is that correct?

Mr. PENISTEN. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Now, you came here from General Electric Co.

Mr. PENISTEN. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. As I understood it, you did not seek this job, but it sought you, is that your understanding?

Mr. PENISTEN. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. And you were recommended by the officials or somebody for this position?

Mr. PENISTEN. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. I have a few questions here for you to answer for the record. You appear to be well qualified from your biography here to fill this very important position.

I wish you success in every way.

Mr. PENISTEN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Penisten, what problems do you see as the nominee for Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management in the context of the current inflation problems facing the Nation?

Mr. PENISTEN. In these inflationary times the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management will be confronted with the difficult job of recommending financial resource allocations and developing plans for improved cost effectiveness. This problem is especially pronounced in the Navy since it is involved in several weapon system procurements with multiyear manufacturing cycles. This problem will receive my fullest attention.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel that better management in the office you are assuming could bring about significant savings?

Mr. PENISTEN. It would be premature for me to assure that better management would result in significant savings. However, I feel confident that there are areas where savings can be accomplished. It is my intent to apply the best possible management techniques and, as a result, to develop the highest level of efficiency in the office.

Senator THURMOND. What financial management tools have you used in the past which you think could be helpful in this new position?

Mr. PENISTEN. My prior experience has been directed to a broad range of financial management activities including accounting, budgeting, auditing and systems. I have also had the opportunity to develop judgment through involvement in major business decisions. It is the application of financial experience and good judgment which I consider to be my best tools.

Senator THURMOND. What is your opinion of cost effectiveness studies as a tool in financial management?

Mr. PENISTEN. Cost effectiveness studies can be a very helpful financial management tool if prepared accurately and viewed in the proper context.

Senator THURMOND. How can the Navy deal with the cost growth caused by inflation on programs which have already been allocated set sums for fiscal year 1975?

Mr. PENISTEN. This is an extremely difficult and important question which has no simple answer. The most effective program will be one that encompasses a broad range of actions. It is clear that all components of the Navy will have to be increasingly cost conscious. You can be assured that my fullest attention will be given to this extremely important problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McIntyre is chairman of our Subcommittee on Research and Development. I asked him to be here today if he could. He would have been if he could have been but he had another commitment with another committee. Senator McIntyre's subcommittee represents us, Mr. Marcy, in a large way in this research and development program. I am sure you will feel free to confer with him. He is no pushover and he's very knowledgeable on the subject matter too. I hope you will make contact with him, and that the two of you get on the beam. He is very understanding and very cooperative. Senator McIntyre gives a lot of time to these problems in the course of a year, so I hope you will seek an appointment with him.

Mr. MARCY. We did meet each other.

The CHAIRMAN. You have already seen him?

Mr. MARCY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. You are ahead of me.

Gentlemen, you see there is a general interest, if not a lot of time given to this hearing this morning, you see there is a lot of interest in your position, in you, and in your background. You come right out of a company which you have been with a long time, and you naturally have their viewpoint on a lot of things. It is like a lawyer, he cannot practice law for 20 years and then just walk out one morning and not continue to think in those terms. But you are on the spot to a degree, and you will be watched, because of your background.

Mr. MARCY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It is no reflection on you or your background either.

Last week I was in Mississippi at a large gathering of people from seven counties and I asked a knowledgeable person, what is the main topic of conversation and what are the people mainly thinking about?

He said, the high cost of living, and mistrust in Washington.

He just put it right out on the table to start with.

You are coming into that atmosphere, and you have to prove yourself and your office, too.

We are glad to have had you here. Is there anything else you want to say now in view of what has been said?

Mr. MARCY. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PENISTEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much for coming in.

Is there any witness here that wants to appear for or against these nominations.

The ceremony says, if not, forever hold your peace.

Members of the committee, we have the nomination for Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Frederick Weyand.

General, will you come forward, please, sir?

And with you is the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Callaway.

We are not going to put you under oath now or anything.

Senator ERVIN. I would like to say that the General has a most distinguished military record.

General WEYAND. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Members of the committee, I want to say this to General Weyand and Secretary of Army Callaway. The only complimentary editorial that I remember the Washington Post ever wrote about me was, they said I did not seem to be awed by the generals and the admirals. Here is a general that does not want anyone to be awed by him.

General, we have a lot of confidence in you. I was very proud of your appointment. I do not think it is one of my duties to try to select the Chief of Staff of the Army. But I do know in this case that you have such an outstanding record, and you are a real soldier—and also your association with the late General Abrams, who along with you and Secretary Callaway, had the big job of building things back here in the Army following the war, you have made a lot of headway on that. And I think you are coming in at a highly critical time.

This is an open hearing, I am going to have some questions for you later that will require a closed hearing, but this is an open hearing now. You do not have to make a statement, but if you have a statement, I would be glad to hear you. I want to give the Secretary an opportunity also.

Mr. Secretary, do you have a word by way of introduction or vouching for General Weyand that you wish to say? If so, now is the time.

#### STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD H. CALLAWAY, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Secretary CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to say a word of introduction, and then I would depart, unless you need me because the hearing is not mine.

Is that appropriate now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Secretary CALLAWAY. The loss of Gen. Creighton Abrams was a severe blow to all of us. Anybody who knew Abe feels a personal sense of that loss, because Abe had the rare ability to leave a little of the best of himself in everyone he worked with. His passing leaves a gap in our ranks that will be hard to close.

Many people would be happy to have even traces of all the qualities that Abe had in great abundance: integrity that went beyond mere ethics; competence that grew from a soldier's hard-won expertise; a broad and humane understanding of the world; a pride and self-respect that was infectious, but which could not diminish his essential

humility; a deep and refreshing well-spring of concern for people, especially his soldiers; the capacity to bring forth the qualities and talents of others, enabling them to exceed even their own most hopeful estimates of themselves.

General Abrams knew where the Army should be headed, and how to get it moving on the right course. He knew how to gain the support of those who worked for him and how to elicit the very best from the Army—to make it a source of pride not only for those who were part of it, but also for the American people—and he never lost sight of the perspective that the Army exists to serve the Nation.

Today, it is my pleasure to introduce to you an officer exceptionally qualified to fill the gap left by General Abrams' untimely death. General Weyand, more than any other officer in the Army, understands the direction that Abe was pursuing. He worked closely with Abe to turn the vision of a better, more capable Army into a reality. He shared Abe's goal—which was to provide the American people with the finest, most professional Army in its history. With your continuing support, I know that the country's defense needs will be met, and that the Army's goals will be achieved.

In my judgment, General Weyand is the officer best able to continue the momentum of the Army today, as it increases in combat capability without requiring significant increases in resources. He is the officer most able to continue the trend of readiness and flexibility. You have his biography. As you review it, I think you will agree with me that for the past dozen years, and indeed, during his nearly 34 years of service, General Weyand's assignments have provided the scope of responsibilities and depth of experience required of an Army Chief of Staff today.

As Chief of Legislative Liaison, he became fully attuned to the political sensitivities that affect the military, and the importance of civilian control of the military.

As a division and field force commander in Vietnam, he demonstrated sensitive concern for the needs and problems of our soldiers, and is in every respect an admired combat troop leader.

As Chief of Reserve Components, General Weyand became thoroughly versed in the opportunities and problems associated with the Army National Guard and Reserve. This experience is of great significance today, when the Army's Active and Reserve Components are more closely related than ever before in peacetime.

And, of course, his achievements as the last commander of the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam were remarkable, as he directed the return of our forces to the United States. His tactical, logistical, and diplomatic skills enabled our units and people to depart from Vietnam in an orderly manner, safely and with dignity.

In his most recent capacity as Vice Chief of Staff, he has demonstrated the validity and thoroughness of these years of preparation, as he repeatedly drew upon this vast treasury of experience and insight. I am convinced that he will make a superb Chief of Staff.

He is the right man at the right place at the right time to meet a truly unique challenge. The Army needs him as its Chief of Staff. I am pleased to introduce Gen. Fred C. Weyand.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we thank you very much for coming and for your statement.

General, do you have a statement? We would like for you to proceed in your own way.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. FREDERICK CARLTON WEYAND, NOMINEE  
TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY**

[The nomination reference report and biographical sketch follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,  
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,  
September 26, 1974.

*Ordered*, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Gen. Frederick Carlton Weyand, [REDACTED] Army of the United States (major general, U.S. Army), for appointment as Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3034. October 3, 1974.

Reported by Mr. Stennis with the recommendation that the nomination be *confirmed*, subject to the nominee's commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

RÉSUMÉ OF SERVICE CAREER OF FREDERICK CARLTON WEYAND, GENERAL  
[REDACTED] AS OF 26 SEPTEMBER 1974

*Date and Place of Birth*: 15 September 1916, Arbutle, California.

*Years of Active Commissioned Service*: Over 33.

*Present Assignment*: Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, D.C., since August 1973.

*Military Schools Attended*: The Coast Artillery School, Advanced Course; The Infantry School, Advanced Course; United States Army Command and General Staff College; Armed Forces Staff College; The National War College.

*Educational Degrees*: University of California—AB Degree, Criminology.

MAJOR PERMANENT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (LAST 10 YEARS)

Apr 61—Aug 64: Deputy Chief, later Chief of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C.

Sep 64—Mar 66: Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army, Pacific—Hawaii.

Apr 66—Feb 67: Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, United States Army, Pacific—Vietnam.

Mar 67—May 67: Deputy Commanding General, II Field Force, United States Army, Pacific—Vietnam.

May 67—Aug 68: Commanding General, II Field Force, United States Army, Pacific—Vietnam.

Sep 68—Mar 69: Chief, Office of Reserve Components, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

Mar. 69—June 70: Military Advisor, United States Peace Delegation, Paris, France.

Jun 70—Aug 70: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, United States Army, Washington, D.C.

Sep 70—June 72: Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Jun 72—Mar 73: Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (also Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, from Jun 72 to Oct 72).

Mar 73—Jul 73: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific.

GEN. FREDERICK CARLTON WEYAND, XXXXXXXXXXXX

Promotions	Dates of appointment		
	Temporary	Permanent	Other (ORC)
2nd Lieutenant.....			Mar 6, 1938
1st Lieutenant.....		Jun 28, 1946	Jun 24, 1941
Captain.....	Apr 5, 1942	Jul 15, 1948	
Major.....	Nov 17, 1942	Jul 2, 1953	
Lieutenant Colonel.....	Mar 4, 1945	Sep 15, 1961	
Colonel.....	Jul 20, 1955	Sep 15, 1966	
Brigadier General.....	Aug 1, 1960	Sep 11, 1968	
Major General.....	Nov 1, 1962	Sep 24, 1970	
Lieutenant General.....	Jul 1, 1967		
General.....	Nov 1, 1970		

*U.S. Decorations/Badges:* Distinguished Service Cross; Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters); Silver Star; Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster); Bronze Star Medal with V Device (with Oak Leaf Cluster); Air Medal (9 Awards); Joint Service Commendation Medal; Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster); Combat Infantryman Badge.

*Source of Commission:* ROTC.

General WEYAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I realize that it is not a normal practice to present a prepared statement. However, this is an unusual event, in that it is occasioned by the untimely death of a man so highly and universally respected and so keenly professional as General Abrams.

I echo the Secretary's comments about Abe. He was a great leader. And my respect for his capabilities as a soldier and for his compassion as a man is unbounded.

So I do appreciate your indulgence, and I will be very brief.

General Abrams had succeeded in turning the Army around. He had taken the Army which emerged from the turmoil of the Vietnam era and had instilled in it a sense of pride, a higher degree of discipline, increasing standards of professionalism and readiness, and, above all, a renewed belief in itself. He put us on a high road, a new direction leading to the kind of Army our Nation needs. His goal was to create a lean, capable, and ready force within a stable active strength of about 785,000 men and women.

Our hope was to field about the same combat strength in 1976 as we did before Vietnam, but with nearly 200,000 fewer men. That was what Abe had in mind—and that is what I had in mind—when he said that the Army should be and could be efficient in peacetime as well as effective in wartime. He charted the new direction. I fully believe in the objectives he was trying to achieve—and I can think of no purpose higher for me than to complete what he started. My every effort, if I am confirmed as his successor, will be bent toward building the type of Army Creighton Abrams envisioned.

I simply want to add a second thought, Mr. Chairman, of appreciation to you and your colleagues for holding these hearings. And I realize that you have a heavy load at this particular time. But it indicates the interest of all of you in reconstituting as quickly as possible the uniformed leadership of the Army. That is important, and the Army appreciates it.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

I notice you have been in the Army now for 33 years, is that correct?

General WEYAND. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you come in? I would like to get a little background, I like to see it in the record.

General WEYAND. Mr. Chairman, I like to think I have been in the Army for actually almost 38 years, 36 years. I came in through the ROTC program at the University of California. I received my commission as a second lieutenant in 1938, some 36 years ago this spring. I do not know if my record shows that I was in police work for a year after graduating from college, where I intended to pursue law enforcement, criminology.

I was called to active duty in 1940, and I have been on active duty since.

The CHAIRMAN. And that includes, of course, World War II, the Korean war, the war in Vietnam?

General WEYAND. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are in the war of the Pentagon and Capitol Hill and all the things that are happening today?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a member of the family.

This includes a time here when you were Legislative Liaison, does it not?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that? I remember it, but when was it?

General WEYAND. That encompassed the years 1961 to 1964, sir, a little over 3 years, as either deputy or as the Chief of the Army's Legislative Liaison Office, a very profitable 3 years.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe after the war in Vietnam you went over—or you might have already been there.

General WEYAND. Sir, I left Legislative Liaison—you may recall, you visited the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. That division was a year and a half in Hawaii prior to deploying to Vietnam. I trained it in Hawaii, took it to Vietnam, and commanded it there for an additional year.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I want to ask you, but this will be in closed session, I want to ask you something about your ammunition you have stored over in Europe.

But I want to bring up now, and we can discuss briefly, your plans here about the Army plan of 16 divisions. I want to make a point first that I would appreciate as one Senator very much what you and General Abrams have been doing, and the Secretary, too, about getting more of your men into combat units or units that are allied directly with combat units. And, of course, the Congress now has the responsibility of setting the numerical strength of the services. I do not want any discussion of the 16 divisions to say by implication that we have approved or disapproved the 16 divisions.

General WEYAND. I understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But as you build, you are trying to cut down on what we called the headquarters and support forces and go over in the direction of these combat units, is that a fair summary? You enlarge on that a little. I would rather you speak for yourself.

General WEYAND. Mr. Chairman, about the 16 divisions, as you well know, that involves an analysis of the threat—or I would prefer to call it the challenge—that faces our country and the Army's part in

meeting that. And from that analysis, as well as other relevant factors, General Abrams and I concluded that the downward trend in the capability of the Army, and indeed of the Defense Establishment, that began after the peak period in Vietnam should prudently be stopped. So we did ask that the end strength of the Army be held at about 785,000, which was about our strength of last year, and the lowest strength that we have had for some 10 years. But as I say, it seems prudent and reasonable in the light of our evaluation of the world situation that that be the case.

The Congress has accommodated that request.

At the same time, we felt that we owed the Congress and the people of this country something better in the way of effectiveness, and in the way of economy. And so in a sense, although it has not been made explicit to you, we have made a commitment that given the same resources, we will, through the instrument of adding infantry and mechanized divisions, increase the capability of the Army.

It is interesting to go back to 1964, which is often considered a benchmark period, because that was prior to the Vietnam buildup. In that year you may recall we did have 16 divisions in the Army. Our strength at that time was 973,000 men. In effect, what I am saying is that we are making a commitment to provide that same, if not increased, combat capability for almost 200,000 less men. Now, that is a commitment to you. More than that, it is a challenge internally to the Army that we believe is necessary to force us to discipline ourselves to move from ineffective forces, or unneeded forces, or forces that we can mobilize at some later time, to forces in being which are combat capable. And so the 16 divisions is really more related to the element of stability, and the end strength, and as I say, our determination to provide them from the resources given to us.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, I am glad you made that statement.

I will pass over a number of other things I have on my mind. This is a hearing on your nomination, and I do not want to get it off primarily on anything else. But I do have a question here of my own, and I have one from Senator McIntyre that I encouraged him to send when he said he could not be here himself. I want you to comment, if you will, assuming that you will be confirmed—and I do not think the vote will be close at all—I want you to comment on the military qualifications now of General Haig. The matter is not officially before us as it is not a nomination that comes to this committee, but it is a matter of interest, and it is on this Senator's mind, and others. You are the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army now—and by the way, you have been Acting Chief for how many months, about four?

General WEYAND. About four or five, yes, sir. I actually have avoided the use of the term "Acting Chief," but by statute I have filled in.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been the man that was acting in that capacity. Before that you were Vice Chief of Staff since last year.

General WEYAND. August of 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, on the military part of General Haig's qualifications, and so forth, will you comment? I think we are entitled to your opinion.

General WEYAND. I will be happy to give you my opinion of General Haig's qualifications.

The CHAIRMAN. And then I will specifically get to Senator McIntyre's questions.

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

In my opinion, he is an outstanding military officer. I have served with him and observed his performance in Vietnam. It fitted the word outstanding. He was indeed an outstanding leader of men, an outstanding tactician, although as has been commented upon in the news media, he has not commanded divisions and the like. I did see him in command of an infantry battalion. There was no question in my mind of his knowledge in depth of the fundamentals of combat and the principles of war. I saw him apply them with great effectiveness. There is no question in my mind of his natural leadership ability to motivate and lead men under great duress. He did become Vice Chief of Staff through a process of selection by constituted authority. As for myself, I never had any question at that point in time as to his qualifications to be the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. And indeed, he was confirmed after hearings by the Senate.

I believe that for the positions to which he has been nominated by the President, and accepted by the NATO countries, he is highly qualified.

I, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on behalf of General Abrams with his advice, did consider General Haig's possible nomination prior to the time that he was nominated. And I and the other chiefs wholeheartedly endorsed his qualifications for that particular assignment at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. What assignment?

General WEYAND. The assignment as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

On a more personal note, this last week at a luncheon where I met with General Lemnitzer, because I was curious about his evaluation of General Haig's qualifications, since he himself had been a distinguished predecessor—and one, I might say, who I respect greatly—I asked General Lemnitzer if he had formulated any views on the qualifications of General Haig for that position in Europe. And I was interested in hearing General Lemnitzer give that nomination his unqualified endorsement, based upon his personal knowledge of what the job entails, and then of his knowledge of General Haig's qualifications.

So I believe, sir, that pretty well expresses my personal opinion on the issue.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to get to the other Senators now. I have other questions to ask on other matters, too.

Senator HUGHES. Would the chairman yield for about a 30-second statement at that point as a matter of personal clarification?

The CHAIRMAN. I will be glad to.

Let me say this in the beginning. I have already said that I think it is relevant here to ask General Weyand, who has been nominated to Chief of Staff of the Army, questions about General Haig. And I am sure we all agree that we do not intend to let this hearing get off into one primarily about Haig or a rerun of Watergate either. I think we all feel that way about it. And I thought I ought to state it for the record.

Senator Hughes.

Senator HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect to the Chair and members of the committee and to General Weyand, I want to respectfully disagree with the statement of the Chair that General Haig does not necessarily come before this committee for confirmation. It is the opinion of at least the Senator from Iowa that he should come before this committee for confirmation. As the chairman knows, I believe I have requested at least one other legal opinion, which I have not been given yet, I am told that I will have it next week. With all of the knowledge of this fine gentleman before us this morning regarding General Haig, I do not view it as any substitute for the actual opportunity or responsibility of this committee to review the man's record personally and responsibility personally. I just wanted to introduce that into the record as a matter of one Senator's opinion at this point, since the subject did come before us.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair said there was nothing before us about General Haig's nomination, and that is true.

Senator HUGHES. Excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, that is true, there is nothing here about General Haig's nomination before this committee. But I think it is a relevant matter to ask the forthcoming Chief of Staff what his estimation of the situation is.

Senator HUGHES. I do not disagree with that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I made no statement or ruling either that there would not be a hearing or there would not be consideration. But there is no nomination here. There never has been a nomination for this position in Europe to come before this committee.

It started out with General Eisenhower. I remember when he testified here. He said he would risk his place in history on the success or failure of NATO. I thought then that that was a remarkable statement before he was President and a world hero.

But we will get back to that later. I will call on the other Senators.

Let me ask Senator McIntyre's question now because I told him we would. He said: While this is not the time to discuss General Haig's qualifications, I am concerned about one aspect of the situation as it relates to the Army overall.

As you know, General Haig had quite a record and spectacular rise from colonel to four-star general in the space of 5 years, the way he puts it. Is that not correct, General Weyand?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir, he had a very rapid rise from colonel to four-star general.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the leadup to this question here. He refers to it.

What in your opinion is the effect on morale in the Army Officer Corps when such political promotions occur? He has political in quotation marks. What is your response to that, as it relates to the Haig formula, of course?

General WEYAND. I would say that the effect on the morale of the officer corps has been either immeasurable in the sense of being insignificant, or in fact insignificant. I really have detected no problem in that regard. Many individuals do have opinions about that. But if a person can generalize about morale, sir, I am confident in expressing the opinion that it has in no way had an adverse impact on the morale of the officer corps.

When you mentioned that the word "political" was in quotes, I guess I would have to say that I think that is quite appropriate, because in my view this series of events in which General Haig was caught up represented the implementation of the authority and responsibility of constituted civilian authority. There has never been any question in the officer corps of its relationship and role and responsiveness to civilian control.

I think in this case General Haig, as has happened before in history, was called upon by constituted authority for a particular assignment, and he accomplished that. I think that the officer corps recognizes that.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean when he went to the White House?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

I had an occasion last week to talk to the student body at the Command and General Staff School. That is a group of 1,100 or 1,200 of our finest young officers in the grade of major. And the question was asked me about my personal view. I did not take a show of hands as to whether or not there was grave concern about these events, but I think you can tell when you are talking to a group of men like that, pretty generally whether they are disturbed or upset or uneasy or uncomfortable about a situation under discussion. I detected none of that.

So upon such things as that, sir, I base my evaluation of the morale question.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this, now.

You used the word "political," and you talked about General Lemnitzer. I have not talked about him, but I ran across General Johnson the other day, the former Chief of Staff, I believe Gen. Harold Johnson.

General WEYAND. Yes, H. K. Johnson.

The CHAIRMAN. We talked about this matter, and he gave a version to their position over there in which he said—if he does not mind me quoting him—that he considered the assignment himself a political liaison military assignment.

General WEYAND. No doubt.

The CHAIRMAN. Explain your version of that.

General WEYAND. It is that type of a job, sir. It is a job involving intercourse and the control indeed of some 15 nations, military forces. There is a very heavy international political involvement. As a matter of fact, General Lemnitzer likewise echoed the same thought that apparently General Johnson voiced to you, that the job did call for great diplomacy, and knowledge, experience, in international relationships.

I might say that you asked me earlier about General Haig's qualifications. I was struck when I was in Vietnam, and he was sent on several occasions there during a very difficult period of negotiations as the head of the Presidential missions to deal with the heads of state of Vietnam, Cambodia, and other involved countries. I saw it firsthand and was struck by this officer's self-discipline, his mental toughness, his lack of bias—I will call it selflessness—and his ability to carry sort of what I would call the unvarnished word and policy of this government. I thought that those were admirable attributes that will be needed in this new assignment.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you observed when you were in Vietnam, each of you at the same time, as I understood you?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get to the other Senators. I have some other questions.

Senator THURMOND, may I call on you?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

General Weyand, let me say at the outset that I was highly pleased that President Ford nominated you as Chief of Staff of the Army. It has been my pleasure to have known you for over 10 years, dating back to your service on the Hill as Chief of Legislative Liaison for the Army. Since that time it is my judgment that you have distinguished yourself in high positions of responsibility, which in my judgment enables you to bring to this job a wealth of experience.

I have in mind especially your service as Deputy Commander in Vietnam, and military adviser at the Paris peace talks, Division Commander of the 25th Division in Vietnam. And I believe I visited you when you were in that capacity in 1966, the fall of 1966.

General WEYAND. You did.

Senator THURMOND. Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific and Chief, Office of the Reserve Components. I believe you served in all those positions.

General WEYAND. I did, sir.

Senator THURMOND. In 1972 I cautioned the Army about withdrawing from Vietnam without scandal. After the wars end frequently it seems there is scandal with regard to getting equipment out and when the men depart, and so forth, and moving the returning equipment, and turning over the approval for such, and so forth. As the man in charge of the operation in Vietnam, I thought you did an excellent job.

General WEYAND. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I have never heard any criticism or any problems about the difficult job of vacating a country by a large body of men and equipment that occurred in Vietnam.

I have some questions here, Mr. Chairman, and if I go over 10 minutes, will you stop me?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator.

Senator THURMOND. First, General Weyand, since you have served as Vice Chief of Staff under General Abrams, I would be interested in having your views as to the current condition of the Army, with particular emphasis on the status of the all-volunteer force.

General WEYAND. Sir, the Army today is the most combat effective Army, in the normal terms that we measure it, that we have had in recent years, certainly within the last 4 or 5 years. We have had the experience of developing the all-volunteer concept, implementing it. I believe that we have been reasonably successful in that. It is a heartening thing to have in the Army young men and women who are in the Army because they want to be in the Army. It has given our officers and noncommissioned officers who are charged with leading those young men and women a great opportunity.

That has been, I think, of value to the Army, and I like to think of value to the Nation.

Without going into detail, which I doubt that you want, I just have to say that to this date the all-volunteer concept has been successfully implemented by the Army. I believe that continued improvements will be made, and the end result is going to be a more professional, effective, peacetime Army, more effective than any Army we have ever had in peacetime.

Senator THURMOND. General, I would like to ask you this question: Has President Ford's amnesty decision had any measurable effect on the Army?

General WEYAND. No, sir; a lot of discussion, but no measurable effect, sir.

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, the Pentagon recently announced that cost estimates of 42 major Defense Department weapons programs had increased \$16 billion from March to June 1974 as a result of a higher rate of inflation than programed by the Defense Department.

While the other services have a much greater share of this increase, the Army does have a number of major programs which would be affected. I have reference to SAM-D, which has a cost increase of \$1.5 billion, as well as cost increases in the attack helicopter, UTTAS and XM-1 tank programs.

Would you comment on this problem and how the Army would hope to meet it?

General WEYAND. I would say, Senator, that as you have reflected by your question, it is a very, very serious problem for the Army. It is one that we have not coped with to my satisfaction in the past.

As you know, these inflation costs apply to a period from 1976 onward. They are what we call escalation costs. And they are in the future, and they do indeed represent the cost of inflation.

Having said that, I accept the fact that we are in part responsible for inflation. We therefore have a responsibility, by increased effectiveness of our operations, of our research and development and procurement methods, to offset the cost of that inflation.

That is what we are trying to do. I believe that there are things that we will be doing that will assist us in our goal of greater effectiveness, greater economies. I think all of the senior leadership of the Army understands very clearly that the No. 1 problem of this Nation of course is an economic one at the present time, and probably has been for some time.

At the same time I do have to say that inflation is a fact of life, and the Army, as other institutions, is caught up in it.

Each of these major programs that you have mentioned has been subjected to cost overruns, schedule extensions, which have increased the costs, inefficiencies that have to be corrected.

Each of them is being challenged almost on a continuing basis, not only in terms of the cost of it, but the requirement for it, and questions as to whether or not a particular weapon system is indeed a system that will be decisive on the field of battle. If not, we cannot afford it.

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, in bringing about the All-Volunteer Army, we have greatly increased personnel costs, to the extent that they now consume nearly 60 percent of the defense budget.

Do you feel we can continue to pay these prices for people and still produce and maintain the sophisticated weapons systems required in these modern times?

General WEYAND. I would say briefly, sir, the Army is people, and I realize that in some cases equipment—well, it is terribly important. But if I have to put my money or my effort on something, it is going to be on people and their training, and their discipline, the developing of a professional force. I am confident that this Nation can do both, it can have those kinds of people in the Army in sufficient numbers to meet the challenge that we finally all agree upon, and at the same time we can equip those people with the equipment that they need to do the job.

I hope that we do not get down to the final point where we have to make the choice that you have mentioned.

I do not envisage decreased personnel costs either under a draft environment. If that were ever reinstated, I really do not believe that we can pay or would want to go back to paying our servicemen and women less salary than is paid for unskilled labor in the United States. These are good people, they are dedicated, they want to serve, and they are entitled to some adequate degree of compensation.

Senator THURMOND. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It has been my privilege to know General Weyand for a good many years. I knew him when he was training the 25th Division in Hawaii. I went out and watched his training of that division and believe that the magnificent work that he did there was shown by the performance of the 25th in Vietnam.

I also visited him in the field in the Iron Triangle, and was impressed with the superb morale of the troops, and the respect that they had for their commanding officer, who is here for confirmation this morning.

Watching him operate, I think the person I would compare General Weyand with more than any other officer I have known is a man from my own State, General Bradley. His record speaks for itself.

Later on I saw him in Paris when he was military adviser to Ambassador Lodge in the effort being made to achieve peace in Vietnam, and General Weyand was highly commended for his job there.

So I think that the powers that be, his superiors, made a superb choice, and I want to take this opportunity to congratulate him and wish him the best of luck in his new job.

General WEYAND. Thank you, sir. That means a great deal to me.

Senator SYMINGTON. General, I notice you were a lieutenant colonel in March of 1945, and you did not become a full colonel until over 10 years later, July 1955.

Also, you were a brigadier general in 1960, and you did not become a full general until 10 years later, 1970. That is sort of a normal pattern, is it not? I believe General Gruenther was a lieutenant for 17 years.

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is one of the reasons that some of us have questioned the rapid promotion of General Haig. With all due respect to your high commendations of him, I would not say that he is four times brighter than you, even though I have had experience with both of you.

But in any case, you believe in civilian control, do you not, of the military forces?

General WEYAND. I do indeed, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would be impossible for you to come before this committee and criticize the appointment, would it not, under that premise?

General WEYAND. Sir, that is hard for me to answer, because I do not criticize the appointment. But if I was critical of it, I would have to say that I am enough of a man, and I do believe enough in my responsibilities to the Congress and to the people, that I would say so.

The chairman mentioned my service in legislative liaison and I think before then, but it was at least during those years that I became very conscious of section 8 and article 1 of the Constitution, and of the heavy responsibility that the Congress does have for the security of this Nation. So if I held to myself some criticism that I thought would be helpful to you in trying to carry out your responsibilities, if I failed in that I would really think I am more cowardly than your previous words have indicated that I am.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are we to infer by that that you would prefer to refuse the appointment by the Commander in Chief rather than give an opinion in this matter?

General WEYAND. I am not sure that I understand that, sir.

Do you mean that I would refuse the position as Chief of Staff?

Senator SYMINGTON. That is correct.

General WEYAND. I doubt that that would be the case, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. The reason I ask this is that we have gone over and over and over a great many of the problems that have recently come up; and it would appear that General Haig, not as an Army officer, but in a civilian capacity, has taken a very prominent part in activities at the White House in recent months. There have been a good many articles recently which have questioned some of these activities, not necessarily critically, but from the stand point of clarification.

General Eisenhower was the first to hold the job General Haig has been appointed to, and then General Ridgway was the second, and General Gruenther was the third, and General Norstad was the fourth, and General Lemnitzer was the fifth, and General Goodpaster was the sixth and last.

General WEYAND. I believe that is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. This is a very important function. In a sense the man who has this position is the most powerful representative of the U.S. Government in Europe, would you not agree?

General WEYAND. I do not know how—I was hesitating because I do not know what you mean by powerful, sir. I think as an individual, if you are thinking of causing events to happen on his own, I would say the answer is "No." He obviously is a very, very important person in setting the environment over there, for example, and encouraging our other partners or allies to provide adequately for the common defense, and in military paths such as that he is certainly a very, very key individual.

So far as developing or being responsible for the development of our Government's policy with respect to all that, I have to say he is important, because he is not the most powerful man.

The CHAIRMAN. I was thinking of your work experience in the Embassy in Paris, and your knowledge of Europe, which is a direct result of that.

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was the premise of my question.

I cannot imagine a finer appointment than General Weyand, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to his confirmation and wish him the best of luck in a very difficult position.

General WEYAND. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator JACKSON?

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions to ask. I associate myself with all of the positive comments regarding General Weyand. I have known him for many years, I do not know how far back it goes. First it was in liaison on the Hill, and that would be about 1961 or earlier.

General WEYAND. Almost longer than we want to recall.

Senator JACKSON. Right.

Like Senator Symington, I watched his training job in Hawaii in building the 25th Division together, and then I visited him in Vietnam, as Senator Symington was able to do. I just have great admiration for his outstanding professional ability, integrity, and his character. He is a decent, honorable man.

Finally, I would say that I think it is wonderful to see a product of the Reserve Officer Training Corps, ROTC, become the top officer in his profession.

I believe you may be the first that came that route through ROTC. We have had other Chiefs of Staff who have been non-West Point, but I am not sure—have you checked that?

General WEYAND. No, I have not checked that, but I will, depending upon how this all comes out.

Senator JACKSON. I suspect you will be checking it out in a few minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. We could go on and on. The reason I do not have any questions is that when we are dealing with specific problems I will ask those questions at that time, but I have nothing but the highest regard for General Weyand as a man who is competent, and, as I said, a man of great integrity, and what more can I say?

If I talk any longer I will be going down the other way.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HUGHES, that brings us to you.

Senator HUGHES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Weyand, let me begin by saying that I not only endorse but support everything these gentlemen said about your appointment, and I look forward to supporting your confirmation.

It is a matter really of personal embarrassment to me that I find myself in the position now of having to ask you some questions under the circumstances regarding General Haig that I feel must be asked.

I want to make sure that the record is clear that I believe General Haig is the best person to respond to these questions, and should be asked them himself, but I would like to ask some other things.

You were asked about the Voluntary Army. But I might ask you. do you have any specific plans in regard to the Voluntary Army to insure its continued success, or improve on what it is doing at the present?

General WEYAND. I guess No. 1, sir, would be improving the quality, and that is attainable.

I think we would be doing that in any event. We will be doing that by gradually increasing the quality criteria for entry into the Army.

I suppose beyond that I would have to say that we are continuing to develop the same sort of enlightened leadership that will provide an environment in which these young servicemen and women will feel comfortable, they will feel a sense of identity and importance as individuals.

I say all that because those are the ingredients that are necessary to cause them at least in sufficient numbers to stay with us. That is important, because I mentioned earlier in a broader context our need for stability. When you think of that, I also think of it in terms of keeping these young people in the Army for a sufficient period of time to develop them, and also so that we can get a reasonable contribution out of them.

I think we know where we are heading with the Voluntary Army now to a far greater degree than we did a year ago. We are still experimenting in some areas, but I think we now know what it takes to motivate people, to attract them into the Army, and train them, so that we will continue to develop these programs that we now know work and have to be developed further.

Senator HUGHES. General, as you know, I chair the Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Military Services.

General WEYAND. Yes.

Senator HUGHES. I have been concerned about the July decision of the Secretary of Defense to suspend mandatory urine testing, as a result of a reversal in the courts, I understand—I do not mean that he voluntarily suspended it, but I am sure that he believed that as a result of the court's decision it would not be practical to go ahead with mandatory testing.

If that was his conclusion, I disagree with it. From indications that we have received from the Pentagon, there is again an upcurve in the use of narcotics and other drugs both in Europe and the United States. The suspension of the mandatory urine testing, or at least the anticipation that it would be suspended, I believe, has been one of the reasons for that upturn.

I believe that mandatory testing could be utilized without using the results in a punitive way. You certainly have a better background in this than the average individual, and I know you are aware that it touches on a lot of issues. It is a matter of internal discipline in the Army. It is a matter of using urine-testing results not only for rehabilitation, but eventually if necessary to remove from the Army those who do not respond to any sort of treatment.

Could you tell us what your opinion would be about resuming the mandatory urinalysis?

General WEYAND. I think on almost every point that you made, sir, that I am in agreement. I share your concern about the termination of the testing.

I also believe you are exactly right about the value of that testing, and it even goes beyond that.

Of course, when we are dealing with people, there are so many things about ourselves that we do not know. But an added effect, I think, of the testing was that in a sense it gave a man an excuse to duck the peer pressures on him, in that if he was pushed in or being pushed into

just experimenting with drugs, he always can fall back on the excuse, "look, I am going to be tested tomorrow," or at some time soon.

I realize that is a small thing, but still it is important. You know how difficult it is to deal with this drug and alcohol abuse problem. There is no one dramatic cure for it. It seems to be that progress in it is a culmination of a whole series of programs, some of which work and some do not, but together they seem to be helpful.

My opinion on the urinalysis testing is based upon my experience with it in Vietnam, a very important element and all that. So it may be that we are over an obstacle in terms of peer pressure and the interest of our young people in drugs, and the urge to sort of divorce themselves from reality now and then, which I deplore, but there it is. Maybe we have crossed some obstacle that makes urinalysis testing less important, but I am still not sure of that. I hope we can resume it.

Senator HUGHES. Thank you, General. I am very pleased with your interest, and also the fact that you agree that it is a useful tool for discovering those who are using drugs, as well as a deterrent and, as you pointed out, a means by which young men can resist the peer pressure to abuse drugs.

As the figures we have from the Pentagon indicates there has been a decided upturn in drug usage in recent months. The curve is there again.

I certainly agree with your decision that as soon as unauthorized testing could be resumed as a tool, it should be resumed.

I really appreciate your answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you yield to me before you leave that?

Senator HUGHES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure that I fully got all of your answer, but you were favorable to the idea of continuing these tests?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. For the purpose of discovery, though they would not be used except in accordance with the decision of the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, of course?

General WEYAND. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly back the Senator from Iowa and his interest in these activities. He has been very valuable in this field, both to this committee and to the other committees that he is a member of. He has worked on it very hard and effectively.

Senator HUGHES. I thank the chairman.

While General Weyand has this raging epidemic in Vietnam, and is seeing the implementation of these vehicles, and I am sure he knows better than anyone the tremendous response that resulted when this program was initially implemented, and we voted again to get it under control. I am appreciative of that viewpoint.

General, if I could turn back again to some questions regarding General Haig, just from your knowledge and your observation—I will try and stick to that standpoint—if you do not know, why just simply reply that way, because I am trying to push you for opinions—did you follow General Haig to the position of Vice Chief of Staff of the Army?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. He served right in front of you in that capacity?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir; he did.

Senator HUGHES. I was of the opinion that even though he had the appointment, and even though he filled the position by title, that he spent most of his time in relationship to the White House rather than Vice Chief?

General WEYAND. I really could not answer that, sir. I know that he did serve as Vice Chief of Staff. And I know in reviewing many of the decisions that were made prior to the time I took over that I found that he was the decisionmaker in those that you would normally find the Vice Chief of Staff considering. So certainly for some period of time—and I gather that it was several months, as a matter of fact—he functioned as the Vice Chief of Staff and carried out all of the responsibilities as Vice Chief of Staff.

Senator HUGHES. What was the highest field command General Haig held under you?

General WEYAND. Sir, I saw him personally as a battalion commander, and I believe that for a brief period of time he commanded a brigade in the First Infantry Division. But the record would have to show that; I am just not sure of that.

I recall going to a ceremony before he left South Vietnam where I believe he was given a Distinguished Service Medal by General Westmoreland, a ceremony out in the field. I am just not certain whether that involved a brigade command or not.

Senator HUGHES. No one is questioning, incidentally, General Haig's service or his capacity in the positions he held. I certainly am not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield?

Senator HUGHES. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nor am I.

Senator HUGHES. My questions are related to the fact that in this new command assignment which he has been given, he has not fulfilled, so-called, the steps up the ladder of the command positions from the brigade, division and on up the line, as yours have come since coming through as an ROTC officer. I think most of the standards have very ably been pointed out to us.

I am not questioning the President's right to make such a nomination. The Commander in Chief, that has that right. So that I am not raising the question. The questions are only related to my own responsibility as a representative at least of a segment of the people of the country in relationship to what we are doing overall.

There are a number of things that have arisen. I do not know whether you have any knowledge of them or not. But as you are aware, we are now getting downtown the first week of a series of so-called conspiracy and Watergate trials. General Haig was in a central position in the White House during a great deal of the time when these matters and events took place.

In fact—and this is a hypothetical question, because I have no answers, and I am making no accusations, I have no knowledge, I cannot do that, so I will have to raise the hypothetical questions—if in fact the testimony at these trials should reveal a central capacity of the general in relationship to any of the crimes or high crimes against this country that have been alleged, and if in fact they should be proven, then would that completely remove his capacity to officially act in his new appointment, or even if the implication is strongly there as alleged by witnesses that he was implicated?

General WEYAND. Sir, that part you just added on there gives me a problem, because I just do not think I am qualified to comment on that much of a hypothetical question. I was prepared up to that point when you said if an officer—in this case General Haig—was found guilty of criminal action or involvement in conspiracy, certainly I would have to say that that destroyed his capacity for service as a commissioned officer. But beyond that, having to do with implications—and I assume what you are saying there is unproven—

Senator HUGHES. Alleged facts which have not gone to trial or been proven.

General WEYAND. I simply do not know, sir.

Senator HUGHES. I appreciate your answer. I know that it is strictly hypothetical. As I said in the beginning, I do not expect you to respond to something that you feel either you should not under the circumstances, or that would be so hypothetical that it would be asking too much of you.

It is my opinion that it would have an effect, but that is my opinion.

In the next capacity, in regard to General Haig, you were in Vietnam when, after the election in 1968, the new Secretary of Defense, Secretary Laird, and General Haig, then on the NSC staff, I believe, went to Vietnam for early negotiations on the withdrawal. It was at that point that arrangements were made for the Cambodian bombing, that has since been revealed, across the border.

General Haig was there. Were you there at that time in those negotiations and request?

General WEYAND. No, sir.

Senator HUGHES. In what capacity were you serving then in 1969?

General WEYAND. In 1969, sir, I was in Paris at the peace talks, as Senator Symington indicated, as the military adviser to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

I left Vietnam in July of 1968 and, as I recall, the last visit that we had there of a Secretary was Secretary Clifford. So if I was there in the country at that meeting, I had a command that was called the Field Force Command, and I had several U.S. divisions and the Australians and New Zealanders and the Thais under my command. But I did not participate in any such meeting.

Senator HUGHES. You mentioned that you had observed General Haig as a diplomatic representative. Would you describe that?

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

That was in 1972, and there might have been a visit in early 1973, but I do not recall it. In any event, there were a series of Presidential missions headed up by, in some cases, Secretary Kissinger, and others by General Haig. It was during that period of the fall of 1972 when an effort was being made to finally reach an agreement upon Hanoi and Saigon and Washington.

Those visits were ones in which, as I recall, General Haig was coming out as an emissary of the President to discuss negotiating points with President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, I am sorry, your time has expired.

But finish your answer, General.

General WEYAND. I think that is it, sir.

So while I saw some of the results of that and was close to it, I have to tell you that I was not, for example, actually in the room when General Haig or this mission discussed these things.

Senator HUGHES. I will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For a couple of reasons I am going to make my questions very brief. But I do have several for the record relating to NATO and restructuring.

I would like to associate myself with all the positive remarks about your record. I certainly intend to support your confirmation both in the committee and on the floor.

One area of particular concern is the mandate that is in the last year or this year's fiscal year 1975 authorization bill on the 18,000 supply troops that have to be taken out of Europe and can be, in the discretion of DOD, converted to combat troops.

I note that you have had some role in the Army's end of that. I am very concerned—and my questions will indicate that—that this not be a numbers exercise. We all know that the other day we had nine different definitions of combat support. We did write our own definition in, but there still is an awful lot of numbers that can be played.

What I would very much like to see—and this is in terms of a request to you that you can respond to either now or later—does the Army take advantage of this 9-month period that we have in which to try to accomplish that—really, it is a 2-year period, but I think in the next 9 months before we get into the next debate about unilateral withdrawal it is going to be extremely important—will you take advantage of that to put some of your top brains, whether they are colonels or generals or whatever they are, on the restructuring of our troops in Europe?

I do not think we have 3 more years or 4 more years to address ourselves to that problem. I talked to Secretary Callaway about it, and I would like your response. My thinking is that it is extremely important that we look at our Army role as to whether we are in the right place, No. 1, as to whether we are prepared for the right kind of war, which is a particular concern to me, and No. 2, as to whether we are coordinated with our allies in terms of an overall fighting force, or whether we in the Army are simply holding one area.

No. 3, and also No. 4, as to whether we have gotten to the point where we are accepting tactical nuclear weapons as a convenient and easy excuse for not making the kind of changes conventionally that would be made if we really thought we were going to fight a conventional war.

There are many other questions that I have here, but rather than ask them now, I will insert them for the record, and if you have any response to that observation, I certainly would be glad to have that.

General WEYAND. My overall response, briefly, would be wholehearted agreement with you. I, too, am concerned about the flexibility of our forces with their deployment, with their combat capability in terms of after we have gotten all of the capability out of that force that can be gotten out of it. I know the answer to that is no.

It was my intent, prior to implementing any of the actions necessary to bring us to the point that you mentioned with respect to removal of support spaces, to discuss with you exactly what we have in mind so that there could be no question not only in your mind personally, but in that of the committee, about the issue of cosmetics or

playing with numbers. We simply are determined when we are through with this to have a solution that has no surprises in it for you, and that has your concurrence.

So my first visit over there is planned for the 20th of this month, and I am not presumptuous enough to say that I will go over there as Chief of Staff, but I do not think they could get me out quick enough to start that trip. At any event, that will be, not the opening gun, but it will be at that meeting that General Davison and our planners will decide the larger actions that have to be taken to comply with regulations.

Senator NUNN. General, I would urge you to look at the restructuring and not just the 18,000. I do not think the 18,000 or any number is nearly as important as the question of a fresh look at where we are in terms of our Army and conventional capacity.

I would certainly urge you—and this is certainly your decision—I have talked to enough people in Europe and over here that are expert in this area to believe that we do need restructuring.

I also have talked to enough to believe that we are not going to get it unless you pull some fresh blood in the Army that has no stake whatsoever in reserving the status quo in Europe.

I would hope you would have that decision if you are confirmed to bring in some young officers and to give them your personal guarantee that if they criticize very severely the status quo, it will not reflect in the future on their record, because I think there are enough outside critics, allies and otherwise, who will not even say what they think for the record. That leads me to believe, although I am no expert, that we have an awful lot of rethinking to do about the conventional war in Europe.

General WEYAND. Yes, sir.

I am certainly all for young blood as long as it is not too young. I guess I am at an age right now where maybe my view of young blood will be different than yours. But anyhow, I know that—

Senator NUNN. It does not matter whether it is young, it just needs to be fresh, and at least be protected blood, and if they criticize the Army position, this blood would necessarily be spilled.

General WEYAND. No, sir; I understand, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I submitted some for the record, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, Senator Nunn's will be included in the record for answering.

Senator NUNN. General Weyand, what is the status of efforts to meet the requirements of law concerning the conversion of support troops to combat troops in Europe?

General WEYAND. The OSD has asked the JCS and the services to conduct an analysis to determine how the conversion of the 18,000 support spaces to combat should be apportioned among the services. The Army completed its analysis and forwarded its recommendations to the OSD and the JCS on September 20, 1974. The JCS is currently staffing its recommendations to the OSD. Thus far, the OSD has not assigned service shares for converting the 18,000 support spaces to combat spaces. The Army has voluntarily agreed to reduce its support

base in Europe by [deleted] spaces in fiscal year 1975 and increase its combat strength accordingly.

This will be accomplished by increasing the authorized levels of some of the combat organizations presently in Europe and [deleted]. Additionally, in fiscal year 1976, the Army proposes to increase the authorized levels of additional combat units in Europe and [deleted]. Although personnel turbulence and stationing problems will be encountered, a total conversion of approximately [deleted] spaces can be sustained by the Army while retaining a supportable fighting force. If this threshold is exceeded, additional support elements must be added as combat forces increase. Thus, the total support reduction is substantially increased and USAREUR's ability to provide general support for its elements is sharply diminished.

Senator NUNN. I am interested in getting a fundamental thinking and restructuring of our forces in Europe. Do you believe this restructuring can and should be done to improve our conventional deterrent posture? It seems to me this will require going beyond both the minimum requirements of the Authorization Act and all the repositioning, restructuring, or rethinking of our entire combat and logistics structure in Europe.

General WEYAND. Yes. I wholeheartedly support the concept of increasing NATO's deterrent posture by increasing our conventional forces in Europe. We will make some significant increases in Army combat forces in Europe as we meet the provisions of your amendment to the Authorization Act. We are now deeply involved in planning these increases. Our tentative plans are [deleted]. Support structure spaces from Europe will be used to add combat units to our CONUS forces. While I support these moves, I must caution that the Army will pay a price and that some degradation in readiness can be expected. The force adjustments in Europe may not appear large but there will be an impact throughout the Army. The deployments, activations, inactivations and other adjustments will result in turbulence for our personnel and it will take some time to regain the stability we have recently enjoyed. How far the Army can go in increasing combat forces and reducing support forces in Europe while simultaneously retaining a viable warfighting capability has not yet been determined. We are examining the Army structure in detail, our forces in Europe included, and we plan to optimize the combat-to-support ratio within the Army. We are reevaluating work factors associated with support units to determine where these factors are understated. The Army's overall support concept is also being examined, and we expect to find ways to provide more support with fewer people. We will continue to assess the possibility of tailoring our European forces in an effort to enhance both their deterrent and warfighting capabilities. I assure you that when these and other analyses indicate that there are benefits to be realized from changes, we will quickly implement these changes. While the European force adjustments planned for fiscal years 1975 and 1976 do not represent an end-all, they are significant, and they will occupy our full attention and efforts in the coming months.

Therefore, I would counsel against the imposition of additional force changes until we have worked out the details of those presently underway, have assessed the full impact of these conversions on our war-fighting capability, and have had time to determine and recommend other appropriate changes.

Senator NUNN. How do you perceive the conventional balance in Europe? Does the United States and its allies have a really integrated ground force capability or is it more a collection separated force? In other words, can the United States and its allies fight together as a team on the ground?

General WEYAND. The ratio of conventional power in Europe is in favor of the Warsaw Pact forces. NATO has adequate ground conventional forces to conduct a credible defense provided that forces of our NATO allies are not diminished in size and that various NATO force improvement measures such as improvement of antiarmor capability, to mention one, are implemented. With sufficient warning time U.S. reinforcement units which would be deployed to strengthen the NATO defense would assist in correcting the imbalance.

The NATO ground force is a viable fighting force integrated at the appropriate command level. Although in peacetime NATO forces are under national command and are not controlled by the NATO command structure, NATO headquarters are involved in planning and training. Thru the media of regularly scheduled exercises the NATO staffs maintain their military expertise. The multinational NATO staffs do provide competent professional command and control organizations for the direction of NATO committed forces which would be under their command in wartime.

Senator NUNN. General Weyand, I have had some continuing correspondence with General Goodpaster concerning the ratio of combat to support troops. In his last letter to me he has made the following comment:

We hear proposals from time to time to limit the configuration of our conventional forces to a capability for a "short war only." But this, too, introduces an unwise risk of necessity for early nuclear escalation by shortening the conventional phase we can sustain.

The criticisms which I have heard reflect the fact that at present our NATO forces are configured for a long war, are support heavy and combat light. They are also located, according to this criticism, in the wrong positions to effectively meet a Soviet thrust. Provided these criticisms are valid, our forces would not be able to effectively meet a quick thrust, territory grab, truce, and negotiate type of scenario.

The drive to strengthen combat forces and reduce support forces has inherent in it the goal of strengthening U.S. and allied forces to meet that first 30-day period and prevent a successful "land grab" effort by the Warsaw Pact as well as sustain a sufficient effort until U.S. and allied forces can be mobilized and brought into battle. Thus, unless I misunderstand the drive to enhance our strategic airlift capability and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, the United States expects to be able to deliver men and materials in sufficient quantities and in a timeframe appropriate to a conventional war in Europe of relatively short duration. While I understand the need to have adequate reception facilities designated and prepared in advance, and manpower available to man those facilities, it also makes little sense to be prepared to receive reinforcements but unable to defend and protect the facilities necessary to reception.

I know this has been a long statement—but, it is a complex subject and I would like to have your thinking and comments on the direction you would like to see the Army take with respect to this problem.

Please respond to this general observation.

General WEYAND. U.S. policy is first, to preserve the peace in Europe, which we have successfully done since World War II, and second, to defend Western Europe should an attack occur. The direction we are taking with our forces in Europe supports these goals.

Now, let me address the question of a short war or a long war strategy. A short war scenario would present a quick buildup of Warsaw Pact (WP) forces without general mobilization, and a tank thrust across the border. The U.S. force in Europe is a tank heavy, mobile force trained and equipped to meet this thrust. At the same time should WP mobilization occur the same U.S. force overseas is configured to fill out a skeletal support system rapidly for accepting reinforcement combat units and materiel. This capability precludes the crumbling of NATO in the face of saber rattling in the form of a WP mobilization. Therefore, the U.S. force must be dual-capable; ready to fight today or build up to meet WP mobilization. Retention of these dual capabilities reduces the danger of nuclear escalation.

To be able to do all of this, however, requires an adequate support structure. Whether a war lasts less than 10 days or over 100 days, a minimum essential support force is required. This phrase may cause an image of a massive support force and a small combat element. Neither could be further from the facts. In fiscal year 1975, USAREUR will consist of 62 percent combat and 38 percent support forces, and this is before the fiscal year 1975 military authorization bill requirement is met. By fiscal year 1976, the 62 percent figure will rise above 70 percent. This will have been reached in spite of the requirement to support an army across the ocean from its CONUS base against a force that is on its own home ground. The light support forces in Europe make adequate training possible, but must remain capable of accepting reinforcements if that becomes necessary. When these conversions are completed, we must evaluate them to determine if readjustments in the force structure are needed.

With regard to the criticism directed against current deployment of U.S. forces in Europe, I would say that the Soviets and the WP need not necessarily direct their attack across the North German Plain. An attack may occur in the Central Army Group Area, where U.S. forces are concentrated.

The possibility of an attack elsewhere exists. However, NATO is an alliance, all parts of which are committed to provide forces to meet any common threat. The United States does not have the capability to man all of NATO's defense, nor is it expected to do so by our allies. The United States must be, and is capable of, doing its mission. We anticipate that our allies will do the same.

Should the United States decide on relocation of U.S. forces in Europe, this would require major shifts of large units and the monetary costs would be prohibitive. Extensive negotiations to secure the agreement of our NATO allies would be necessary and most national forces would be required to shift. Such shifts carry with them changes in structure and tactics to meet the requirements of the newly assigned mission and sector. Moreover, a shift in U.S. forces may lessen stability in Central Europe depending on how these moves might be perceived by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

With regard to a territory grab, truce, and negotiate scenario, an attempt to grab land in West Germany would precipitate a general war in Europe. I do not think the Soviets desire [deleted].

The reception facilities in Europe for units, men and materiel arriving by air from the United States in an emergency are protected by the present location of U.S. Army combat elements in Europe directly in front of them. This disposition in Europe provides assurance that these facilities will be adequately defended and protected until these additional units have deployed, been issued their equipment, and have taken their place in the battlelines. The prepositioned equipment stored in these facilities is designated for these units, which are our earliest deploying units. We envision that they will be in-theater within a very few days after the deployment decision is made.

In addition, U.S. force deployment policy in NATO is that U.S. combat forces will be used wherever necessary to stop the greatest threat.

We are continually analyzing our Army forces in Europe to determine how we can convert support spaces into combat power. As you know, we are now trying to meet the requirements for conversion mandated by the fiscal year 1975 military authorizations bill. Future conversions must be considered a step at a time. The resulting situation must be evaluated before further conversions are made.

In summary, given the present constraints, we consider that U.S. Army, Europe, is configured to meet a threat that ranges from a short to a long war. Our current deployments, and U.S. policy concerning deployments, are suited to preserve peace in Europe, and to protect U.S. interests. We are continually reviewing our force structure in Europe to determine where conversions to combat power can feasibly be made, while retaining ground forces capable of meeting the full spectrum of the threat.

Senator NUNN. The Army has an extensive logistics and training base and establishment. What steps do you see in the future to streamline this far-flung support base?

General WEYAND. There are a number of ongoing actions to streamline the Army's support base. One of these actions is the realignment/elimination of Army headquarters which has a worldwide impact. As a result of the in-process elimination of HQ USARPAC a series of far reaching events are taking place which not only affect the headquarters layering but specifically address the support base. Thousands of military and civilian spaces are involved. Military personnel spaces eliminated are being transferred to flesh out existing combat organizations or are being channeled into the forming of new units to bring the Army closer to its 16 division goal. Savings which accrue from associated civilian personnel reductions and cost savings attributed to the elimination of installation facilities or organizations are being used for the same purpose. Similar actions are going on in Alaska and the Canal Zone due to the elimination of Army headquarters.

In Europe, the Theater Army Support Command and the Engineer Command Europe have been eliminated and the functions formerly performed by these headquarters were absorbed by USAREUR. Savings realized are being used to upgrade the readiness of our combat formations in Europe.

A major follow-on action in Europe is currently in process. Streamlining combat service support in Europe is a subject of an intensive study within Headquarters, Department of the Army, and U.S. Army, Europe. Responding to a change in doctrine for the tactical echelons above division approved by General Abrams, a plan has been formu-

lated jointly by the two headquarters to adopt a parallel concept for theater logistic support. This plan is entitled "Logistic Echelons Above Division in Europe (Project LEADER)." The development and execution of Project LEADER expands the logistic support responsibilities of the corps, including the establishment of a general support level supply organization; incorporates maximum application of the direct supply support system; establishes a theater army materiel management center to provide the theater army commander with a selected item management capability; establishes a theater army area command to provide support in the area behind the corps' rear boundary; and exploits automated systems to provide improved logistics management. As a result of these changes, theater stocks will be reduced, overall logistic personnel savings will occur and supply support to forward units should be improved. Additionally, USAREUR compliance with statutory force structure constraints should be facilitated. Estimates of specific quantifiable savings are premature at this stage of the project.

It is important to add that the Army is not only streamlining its bases overseas but is proceeding with the same sense of urgency here in the United States. Major realignment actions are in progress. CONUS commands (FORSCOM, AMC, and TRADOC) have been extended to assume the functions formerly performed by USARL in Alaska, USARSO in the Canal Zone, and USARPAC for Hawaii, Johnston Island, Guam and the Pacific Trust Territories. A significant study concerning our future needs of posts, camps, and stations within CONUS is in its final stages and should be completed before the end of this calendar year.

The Army's depot maintenance base in CONUS will experience increased utilization in the future. This is partially due to decreasing requirements in the Pacific which permitted the phasing out of depot maintenance facilities in that geographic area and assigning that work to CONUS depots. Another factor is that depot maintenance which can be performed with equal or greater cost-effectiveness in CONUS versus Europe will be transferred to CONUS and consequently will allow for the closing of some plants in Europe.

In the area of training, the decision to conduct one station training, whenever possible, facilitates the elimination of duplicate facilities and personnel and allows for compressing of training installations, eases personnel administration, and permits more effective training.

Another highly promising action to save dollars and spaces is the interservice training review program in which all services participate to review and evaluate training consolidation studies and to exchange information on training technology. This program will permit the optimum utilization of equipment, systems, facilities, staffs, supporting establishments and cut operating costs through consolidation of training courses.

Another significant action is "Project 16-78 (Resources for a 16 division Active Army)". This study is specifically geared to identify within the existing Army structure the necessary resources in manpower, materiel and other innovations which are needed to bring us to 16 Active Army divisions. This study is a total in-depth examination of the entire Army. There are no "sacred cows", no parochial ways of doing things and no traditions which are being exempted from this all out drive to find resources to contribute to more combat power.

Senator NUNN. Under General Abrams the Army appeared to be making some progress in cutting down on its headquarters and top-level officers. Do you plan to continue those efforts and what sort of timetable do you foresee for that work to bear fruit?

General WEYAND. The effort to further reduce the headquarters structure will continue into the future and these actions should produce a reduction in higher grade officer requirements. We are expanding our investigation to look at the headquarters structure at the echelons below those included in the fiscal year 1975 analysis. We will continue to search out layering, duplication, and marginal contributors in order to streamline the headquarters structure. Our objective is to eliminate, reduce, or consolidate organizational functions to free manpower within our 785,000 end strength to increase combat power. As far as the specifics of a timetable are concerned, we hope to achieve some additional overseas headquarters eliminations by end of fiscal year 1975 and we are looking at the feasibility of follow-on realignments and reductions in fiscal year 1976.

Senator NUNN. Can all of the Army units in the United States meet their deployment schedules for a short, intensive war in Europe? In other words, are the Army units in the United States ready to go? Can the Army Reserve and National Guard units required in the first 90 days of a European conflict meet their deployment timetable?

General WEYAND. To answer this question, one must address the status of both Active and Reserve component forces.

First, the Active Army—the active Army units programed for European deployment under the conditions you outline can meet their deployment timetable. Although all active Army divisions earmarked for Europe are able to meet this requirement, one division would have to be deployed in a marginally ready status. This division is so evaluated due to its recent conversion from a test division to an armored division. While there are certain shortfalls of equipment and personnel within other Active Army units, these shortages are not so critical as to prevent their phased deployment to meet a short, intensive war in Europe. It should be noted that recent foreign military sales to Israel has caused a drawdown in some [deleted].

The outlook in our Reserve Component Forces is not so bright. The majority of the early deploying reserve forces are support units and can meet their deployment schedule in a marginally ready status. Personnel and training readiness have shown encouraging improvement in the past 2 years, the shortage of mission-essential equipment in these units is a major constraint to a better readiness posture. The many high priority demands made on major items of equipment present ongoing problems in the Reserve component modernization program and impair the operational readiness of our Reserve forces.

Senator NUNN. Is the Army meeting its combat arms manpower requirements under the All-Volunteer Force? What kind of racial mix is the Army achieving in its combat battalions?

General WEYAND. The Army met its combat arms training input requirement by enlisting and/or assigning about 37,700 nonprior service (NPS) males to combat arms training during fiscal year 1974. While we anticipate no serious problem of recruiting sufficient NPS males to meet combat arms training input requirement of about 41,700 in fiscal year 1975, we do anticipate a problem in meeting our requirement of 44,000 in fiscal year 1976. We are taking actions now to re-

direct our recruiting efforts to minimize or negate this problem before it becomes a reality in fiscal year 1976.

The racial content of combat battalions varies in the Army. The enlisted force black content averages 21.9 percent. Because of the high degree of turbulence resulting from both gains and losses to the Army, these percentages will vary somewhat in any given unit over time. It is difficult to generalize about racial content in combat battalions. Data for 238 combat battalions reflect the following black enlisted statistics:

Black content (percent) :	Number of Battalions
15 or Less-----	52
16 to 20-----	53
21 to 25-----	49
26 to 30-----	52
31 to 35-----	22
36 to 40-----	3
41 to 45-----	1
46 to 50-----	3
51 to 55-----	3

Senator NUNN. Manpower costs take up two-thirds of the Army's budget. What steps do you see can be taken to hold down the rise in manpower costs?

General WEYAND. As you are aware, the Army is people intensive rather than equipment intensive. Correspondingly, our personnel-related cost percentage reflects this in our budget.

The Army has taken several steps to hold down the rise in manpower costs. These include taking the initiative in reducing headquarters overhead, implementing an active civilianization program and streamlining organizational structure through consolidations and elimination of selected activities. However, we will not compromise on programs that provide a professional well disciplined combat ready force.

Senator NUNN. I understand the Army division in Korea is manned with about 25-percent Korean nationals. Could this division be redeployed quickly in emergencies to meet other U.S. national interests?

General WEYAND. The Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army (KATUSA) now account for about 20 percent of the divisions authorized strength. During the fourth quarter, fiscal year 1975 the division will [deleted] once the Army attains its 16 division force goal. There are significant economic, cultural and readiness advantages to continuing this arrangement with the ROK Government. If the Division were to be [deleted] from CONUS. Equipment readiness [deleted] is enhanced by the KATUSA program. The 2d Infantry Division, in its present position north of Seoul, has excellent [deleted]. Its present position is also ideally located in terms of mission, political and strategic impact and access to training area.

Senator NUNN. There have been recent press reports that the inflation has caused a \$17 billion increase in major weapons systems being procured. A number of these systems are Army systems such as the SAM-D, the new tank, new helicopters, et cetera. What does the Army plan to do to handle this problem?

General WEYAND. Your question highlights a significant problem that the Army must face if it is to provide excellent cost effective equipment to our forces. The costs of course are escalation of life cycle costs from fiscal year 1976 to completion of the program. I have not been satisfied with the way in which we have attempted control of

these costs in the past. We have taken actions to achieve economies and offset the costs of inflation. We are looking ever more critically at programs that may be too expensive in terms of combat effectiveness payoff. Army will develop and buy only affordable systems in terms of demonstrated battle field payoff.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HUGHES, you indicated that you had some more questions.

Senator HUGHES. I have two or three more, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You can go ahead and ask them.

Senator HUGHES. I think that they can be briefly answered.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator HUGHES. I would like for you to describe for me if you can, General, the importance of the NATO Commander in the case of an outbreak of conflict in Europe or the Middle East.

General WEYAND. The outbreak of conflict in the Middle East?

Senator HUGHES. Or in Europe.

General WEYAND. I guess to be meaningful, sir, I should try to supply that for the record rather than to describe it, because I do not think I can really do it justice.

[Additional information follows:]

With regard to the outbreak of war in the Middle East, the NATO commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe (SACEUR) would have no active role to play except when a NATO ally would be involved, such as Turkey, for example. He would probably be concerned if there were indications that the war might spread into the NATO area. He would also be concerned by any degradation of the NATO forces that might occur if a member of the alliance were involved in a Mid East war or was supporting a party to the conflict.

If war broke out in Europe through an attack on the NATO Alliance, he would assume overall direction of the NATO forces committed to the defense of Allied Command, Europe. This is a very important role in which he would provide broad strategic direction and general guidance to the Commanders in Chief, Northern, Central, and Southern Europe. SACEUR has a vital role in assuring unity of effort. His headquarters would provide the interface between the political alliance of national governments and the military force under his control.

Senator HUGHES. All right. Then I can ask you to answer a direct question in relation to that—

The CHAIRMAN. Your question relates to the Middle East and Western Europe?

Senator HUGHES. That is right, one or the other, or both.

The next thing is, would the NATO Commander be the natural field commander if there should be a conflict in Western Europe? Or what is the chain of command? That is what I want to know, really.

General WEYAND. The chain of command is an allied command. And I would not consider him the field commander any more so than I considered President, or General Eisenhower, the field commander. The actual command of the troops is exercised through a series of NATO commanders underneath the Supreme Commander. And when you get down to people such as General Davison, General Voot, the German General Ferber, one or two levels below—two levels below the allied commanders, they will be the generals exercising direct command over troops engaged in combat.

Senator HUGHES. And then the NATO command would be above that layer of field commanders?

General WEYAND. A very broad strategic direction, yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. In the present political circumstances of the world what is your opinion of the importance of the post of NATO Commander militarily?

General WEYAND. Well, I think it is terribly important, because you do have a number of nations there that have agreed to work in a common cause. But sometimes, depending upon what the particular problem is, there are disagreements, and again sometimes those disagreements tend to unravel the unity or the fabric of common defense. And I believe that these officers such as General Goodpaster and General Haig are very, very important in terms of bringing all that together. And I gather that much of it depends upon their developing personal relationship or professional respect, not only in the military commanders, but apparently, but more importantly, the political heads and representatives of those various governments. But it is a case of attempting to by persuasion and rationale to keep them together. They all have their problems very much as we have, whether economic or political problems. And I think this is what we mean when we talk about that job encompassing international political things, all this has to do with—well, you want a man who understands these things, you do not want a fellow who knows how to do squads right and squads left. It is not very helpful, sir, I realize that, but that is my personal view of it.

Senator HUGHES. I might just ask you in closing, do you see any major problem in the Army that this committee should be concerned about especially right now, that we should be looking into whether we are or not, do you have any major concerns that we could be helpful to you in any way with?

General WEYAND. Sir, just a broad one, the broad requirement or need for stability. I really believe that if we can have a stable force, that we can achieve the two things that, as I recall, the chairman commented on at the outset, an economical force, and a ready force, a force that will have the credibility, or an institution, the credibility that I think it has to be if it is going to be the kind of Army I want it to be, credibility in the eyes of the Congress and of our people. To have that the leadership of the Army has to convince the Congress and the people that we know how to run our business. I believe we do know how to run our business, given a reasonably stable set of circumstances with which to work. And that is broad. There is no one thing that I would point to, other than simply that anything that encourages stability here for a couple or 3 years I think you will see returned in good measure in terms of dollars and in terms of effectiveness. There are many other problems we have that the Congress should be looking at and will become involved in. But what I mentioned is sort of an umbrella.

Senator HUGHES. General, I thank you very much for your testimony. And I want to thank you personally myself as a citizen of the country for your service to the country, and your fine military record and the record all the way around that you have. And I would say to the chairman and the committee and to you that I believe the Army is in good hands with your appointment.

General WEYAND. Thank you.

Senator HUGHES. And I wish you well in this new position.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I have a very few more questions. And the Chair would hope that we might then have an executive session when we are through with questions, and pass on the nomination of the General and also the civilians.

I will make mine quite brief. I think your voluntary forces—talking about the problem, I think this question of all the services at the same time being limited to volunteer forces only for their personnel is a big, big problem. Certainly, you have my support fully, and I think that of this committee, including those of us who did not believe it was wise to go to that position. Now, I have the feeling—and that is the only thing that I claim that I do have knowledge of, I know a little about human nature—I have the feeling that you will continue to have a problem there, in spite of a lot of good work that has been done, and I think that will continue to be done. But I think you will continue to have a problem, and the other services, too. But I think that will have your personal attention.

I want to say to you what I said about General Abrams. I got to know him better after he was serving as Chief. After he passed away I made some remarks on the floor. I said that he was given the Army to run, and he ran it, and then did not try to also run the country. I believe that is your stature too, that you are big enough to really run the Army, and let somebody else run the rest of the country.

I think that is the way the military builds itself up, if I may pass that on.

I am proud to say that without making any comparison direct, I think that the chiefs that we have now—it is an outstanding group, including you, that our services are headed by. It is well too, that such a group came along.

What do you consider to be the Army's greatest strengths? What are the Army's greatest problems?

General WEYAND. The answer to both parts of that question is the same—people.

The Army's greatest strength is its people, for the Army is people. The institution itself can be no better than the men and women who form it, who give it life. Whatever is good or strong or commendable about the Army is that way because of them.

At the same time, our greatest problem is related to people. In a volunteer force, we have to recruit large numbers of high quality young men and women. They have to be thoroughly trained and properly assigned, according to their enlistment contracts. They have to be shipped overseas to meet our commitments around the world. They and their families require care and attention. We must manage their progression in the service, and we must administer to their personal and professional needs. Finally, we must pay them, and, as you know, overall manpower costs are the major part of the Army budget.

The Army is strong because of its fine people—and it will grow stronger in direct proportion to the degree of success we have in meeting the challenges posed in managing them.

The CHAIRMAN. At this point, are you satisfied with the quality and quantity of personnel joining the Army?

General WEYAND. We are satisfied with the quantity of personnel joining the Army. We were able to slightly exceed our end strength goal in fiscal year 1974 and we anticipate meeting our goals in fiscal year 1975 and thereafter. Although we have been satisfied with the personnel enlisting in the Army as we transition from a force supported by conscription to a force manned by volunteers, we are endeavoring to increase the quality of personnel enlisting in the Army. We have developed a coordinated plan of actions designed not only

to improve the quality of personnel to be enlisted, but to also enhance the quality of the enlisted force. We believe that we can improve the quality of the enlisted force and anticipate no major problems in recruiting higher quality people in the next few years as long as we have the full support of Congress and the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. The number of women in the Army has increased dramatically, and the current plan, as I understand it, is to have a force of 39,000 women by the end of fiscal year 1975. What are your thoughts on further expansion beyond current plans? Are special efforts being made to integrate women into specialties outside the areas traditionally involving women?

General WEYAND. Presently, our projected female end strengths are:

Fiscal year:	<i>Enlisted</i>		<i>Officer</i>
1975 -----	34,400	1975 -----	4,613
1976 -----	40,400	1976 -----	4,935
1977 -----	44,440	1977 -----	5,376
1978 -----	47,300	1978 -----	5,590
1979 -----	50,400	1979 -----	5,814

These are, of course, planning figures and are subject to change depending on factors such as:

- adjustments in force structure or end strengths;
- changes in policies governing utilization and assignment of women; and
- the number of qualified female volunteers.

Expansion in excess of the levels already planned is uncertain. As you indicated, increases are occurring at a dramatic rate and a careful appraisal of the results of that expansion is now underway. By early 1975 we should have a clearer picture of our long-range requirements.

We have opened approximately 90 percent of our MOS to women. Those few which are not opened to them are associated with combat or close combat support. While it is true that the majority of young women still enter the traditional skills, our recruiters are taking action to insure that the potential female enlistee is aware of the total spectrum of opportunities available to her in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been recent charges that Army recruiters are bending the rules in order to meet their recruiting levels. Are the charges true? If the charges are true, even in part, what steps are being taken to insure that these practices do not continue or are not sanctioned at any level?

General WEYAND. Although involving only a comparatively few recruiters, some degree of recruiting malpractice does exist. Steps taken to preclude malpractice include permanent Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) liaison with the Criminal Investigation Division Command, creation of a branch at USAREC headquarters to serve as the focal point for all efforts to eliminate malpractice, a mandatory review of at least 15 percent of all enlistment records to insure their correctness and accuracy, use of a liaison noncommissioned officer at training centers to identify and report all alleged instances of recruiting malpractice and irregularities to USAREC, and a personal interview with all enlistment applicants to ascertain any possible concealment and/or falsification of enlistment information. Also, recruiters found guilty of malpractice are relieved from recruiting duty and disciplined accordingly. Finally, the USAREC commander has established strin-

gent guidelines for malpractice investigations and followup action at all levels as appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN. In light of the international economic situation, what measures is the Army using to conserve energy, specifically oil and oil products?

General WEXAND. The Army's conservation objective is to consume 15 percent less energy based on its fiscal year 1973 consumption adjusted for changes in personnel, equipment, and facilities. The objective relates to total energy, not just oil or oil products. Currently, our greatest saving is in the oil and oil products as it was last year, but the winter last year was relatively mild. As you can tell from the weather forecast for tonight, our first freeze is upon us earlier than usual. This year we plan to continue our conservation measures put in effect last winter. In general they consist of the following:

(1) A maximum speed limit for government owned vehicles not to exceed 55 miles per hour. (Changed in September 1974 from 50 miles per hour)

(2) Maintenance of an effective program to encourage personnel to take advantage of carpools and mass transit systems.

(3) Maintenance of heating thermostats at 65° to 68° F. during working hours and not more than 50° F, during nonworking hours; adjusting heating thermostats lower than 65° to 68° F. in warehouses and for other similar space heating depending on the type of occupancy and the activity in the space; and maintenance of cooling thermostats no lower than 78° to 80° F.

(4) Reduction of lighting systems to that essential for efficient operations.

(5) Improved maintenance of heating and power systems to minimize energy transmission loss and effect maximum efficient utilization of energy resources.

(6) Maximum combination of operational and administrative flying requirements with pilot proficiency flying hour requirements.

(7) Improved motor vehicle management and fuel conservation by vehicle assignment controls, reduction of vehicle size, promotion of vehicle pooling, and other actions to foster economical government vehicle utilization.

The CHAIRMAN. Please give us a progress report on the Army plan to go to 16 divisions.

[Information follows:]

Since General Abrams' appearance before your committee on 22 February 1974, the Army has made significant progress toward the attainment of a force better tailored to the defense needs of the Nation.

As you will recall, he stated that 13 1/3 Active and 8 Reserve Component divisions provided the United States with a force which left no room for error in accomplishing our national strategy. For several years, our combat capability has only been marginally adequate to meet the perceived threat, leaving the United States with too high a risk. In the near future, that threat is more likely to increase than to diminish.

Predicated upon the best military judgment available, the force we need to meet the threat in the years ahead, with a minimum risk, would be about 30 divisions. Reality, however, has constrained us to a near-term goal of 24 divisions, 16 Active and 8 from the Reserve Components. That force, we think, will make the risk a prudent one.

Following General Abrams' appearance before your committee, we initiated an intensive analysis to determine whether we would have the resources to reach that 16-and-8-division force. We stressed the need for the Army to continue to identify marginal functions or redundant staffing and to use these spaces to

gradually build up the number of combat divisions. Our assumptions were that we would be given sufficient time to implement our plan, that we would have a constant end strength of 785,000, and that funding in real terms will be relatively constant.

We intensified efforts to streamline our command and support structure by reducing the size of the Army Staff in Washington and further realignments of field commands beyond those identified by General Abrams in February. These actions result in savings sufficient to reach our goal of a 16-and-8-division force by the end of fiscal year 1978. Recent favorable events have encouraged us to accelerate; we hope to reach that goal even sooner.

Therefore, during fiscal years 1975 and 1976, we plan to activate the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, the 24th Infantry Division at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning, and the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Polk and Fort Knox. Each of these divisions will have two active brigades. We plan to provide additional combat power for them by affiliating Reserve Component units. The expansion of our Reserve Component affiliation program within the 16-and-8 division plan is one more step—and a large one—toward integrating our total force.

This is where we stand today. When Secretary Callaway and I present our posture statements early in 1975, we will provide further details on the specifics on our move towards a more responsive and combat-ready Army. In the interim, if we can provide any additional information, I, and the members of my staff, stand ready to respond in any way.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been said recently that the combined effects of inflation and congressional cuts will cause the Department of Defense to fall at least \$11 billion short of funds to carry out its planned fiscal year 1975 procurement program. The brunt of this will obviously be borne to some extent by the Army. What are your thoughts on which programs could be slowed down or cut? Might manpower levels in the Army be reduced to help offset the dollar shortage?

General WEYAND. Obviously the Army's procurement programs are going to be adversely affected by the high rate of inflation. In order to attain and support the highest levels of readiness possible at this time, specific decisions on reducing or deleting certain programs have to be made. The Army is continually evaluating the funding status and will continue to do so. As the impact of higher prices becomes evident, those programs having a lesser impact on readiness will have to be examined very closely and hard decisions made. In the area of manpower levels, the Secretary of the Army and I believe it is essential that manpower levels not be reduced.

The CHAIRMAN. The question of readiness always seems to come up when an Army official appears before this committee, but it is important that the answer be kept current. How do you rate the readiness of Army divisions? Please specify for each division in Europe.

General WEYAND. All of the Army's divisions are currently rated combat ready but some are at a higher level of combat readiness than others. Eleven of our 13 active divisions are rated either fully or substantially ready. Our division in Korea which is augmented by Korean nationals is ready to accomplish its mission in Korea but it is organized at a reduced level of U.S. strength. The other division which is rated lower now is undergoing a conversion from a test division to an armored division and will require more training before it can be considered substantially ready. All of our divisions in Europe are currently rated substantially ready.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, the Defense Department has done away with the Chief of Reserve Components and a number of other general officer positions which we probably could do without.

However, I was disappointed that the position of Chief of Army Aviation was eliminated, and I wondered if you had any views as to how Army aviation matters will be properly coordinated without a central figure in charge.

General WEYAND. Senator Thurmond, General Abrams and I felt that—and we were not alone in this—we had the best thought, I think, of the other senior leaders, that Army Aviation had progressed to the point where it permeated the Army, that it no longer needed a central head. But we certainly recognized that there is a commonality of spirit among aviators, and there is just something about flying, and all of that, that brings them together. And we want to keep that. So at Fort Rucker we have, and will continue, to build that as our aviation center. The head of it will be sort of Mr. Army Aviation. And now at the same time in our Operations Directorate in the Pentagon we will have a senior aviator who insures that aviation is given the proper place in our strategic planning.

The same thing is true of other important directorates, in such fields as personnel, logistics, and research, development and procurement.

So we think that Army Aviation has now come of age, and that is the way we are going to handle it.

Senator THURMOND. Incidentally, I made an address at Fort Rucker in August. And I was very much impressed with the Army Aviation school there, and with General Maddox. He impressed me as a very able man. And I think everything I saw there is a credit to the Army.

General WEYAND. Thank you.

Senator THURMOND. I just have one more question, and the rest of them I have put in the record.

General Weyand, how will the Reserve and Guard forces be meshed into the 16 division force structure?

General WEYAND. Sir, briefly, each one of the three divisions that we add to the Army will have one brigade, that is, roughly one-third of those new divisions will be made up of Ready Reserve units. It is an aspect of this 16 division force that is terribly important in that it is another one of these pressures that forces the Active Army to take an interest in the Reserves, and also forces the Reserves to attain a degree of capability that they never attained before. So that is the way that is going to work. As you know, allied to that has been the reorganization of our structure in the United States, so that most of our high level active commands in the United States are intermeshed with the Reserve forces. That is true of our three armies, and of our nine regional commands.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent now that questions 8 through 14 be submitted to General Weyand to answer for the record to save time.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, what allocation has the Defense Department placed on the Army in the congressional required conversion of 18,000 support troops in NATO to combat forces?

General WEYAND. As mentioned earlier, the OSD tasked the Services and the JCS to conduct an analysis to determine how the conversion of 18,000 support spaces to combat should be apportioned among the services. The Army completed its analysis on September 20, 1974 and for-

warded its recommendations to OSD and the JCS. The JCS is currently staffing its recommendations. The OSD is expected to provide the services with their share of the 18,000 support spaces to combat spaces on or about December 1, 1974.

Senator THURMOND. What is your opinion on the proposed request to Congress for authority to call up 50,000 selected Reserve units in a crisis without either prior congressional approval or a declaration of a national emergency?

General WEYAND. It is recognized that this authority, if granted, must be used in a wise and judicious manner. The unwarranted use of this authority could have an adverse impact on the status of our Reserve Component Forces.

In past crises, volunteers from the Guard and Reserve have provided excellent support and augmentation to the active forces without mobilization. Whenever possible, this would remain our preferred source of manpower for smaller emergencies.

However, there are instances when we may need selective reserves quickly to protect our national interests. The proposed legislation would give us the capability to fill this need under most circumstances. If enacted, this request would provide a means of responding to emergencies in a selective manner and afford a realistic approach to planning the utilization of various selected Reserve forces in meeting a crisis. The mere fact that such a proposal is in the works lends credibility to the total force concept and to the expanding role of our Reserve forces in national defense. Such authority, in itself, reduces the chances of our forces being needed and assures us of a better outcome if they are.

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, are you satisfied with the results to date on the recent Army reorganization?

General WEYAND. The Army's CONUS reorganization of 1973 has met our expectations and we are satisfied with the results thus far. It has also paved the way for a number of follow-on management improvement actions. These improvements would have been difficult if not impractical to pursue under the previous configuration. The effort to devise an improved long range installation utilization and stationing plan, along austere lines, was, in large measure, a byproduct of the reorganization. A one-station training program for initial entry personnel is being implemented. Its purpose is to improve individual training while reducing personnel turbulence and time in initial training. The one-station training concept can be attributed to the focus of the new Training and Doctrine Command on the soldiers' professional development. Reduction in the size of Headquarters, Department of the Army and decentralization of responsibilities was facilitated by the alinement of major commands along functional lines. Likewise, the recently announced extension of CONUS major command responsibilities and control to Alaska, Panama, and Hawaii was made possible by their functional orientation. With regard to performance there is every indication that the reorganization and establishment of the new Forces Command is contributing measurably to improved readiness of CONUS divisions. Equally important, it is fostering a closer tie between Reserve components and Active Army units. From all indications the reorganization was a major step toward providing the American people a better Army. We are continuing to fine tune the reorganization, as the need is recognized, to achieve even greater efficiencies and bolster the combat structure of the Army.

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, what size troop reductions do you feel the Army could handle in fiscal year 1976 without significantly reducing readiness and combat and combat support units?

General WEYAND. Senator Thurmond, the subject of troop reductions is not one that the Army would like to, or should be contemplating. The readiness required of our current forces, plus the inevitable and unavoidable turbulence that will result from converting support troops to combat in Europe, and creating an Active Army of 16 divisions within our current authorized strength, strongly indicates that fiscal year 1976 will be a year when all our resources and efforts are needed.

The threat, or challenge as I previously referred to it, has not diminished. To the contrary, the U.S.S.R. has increased its force and appreciably improved the quality of its weaponry. To meet this challenge with our current force we are required to adopt a posture which premits "no room for error." To improve upon this capability and provide Congress and the country with an economical and effective force, we are moving toward the attainment of an Active Army of 16 divisions. The Army Staff will shortly be briefing Members of Congress on the specifics of creating this force within our current authorized strength of 785,000 personnel; however, the challenges associated with this necessary effort are apparent. It will take our best planning and implementing effort if we are to attain a minimum amount of turbulence and reduction of combat readiness during this time.

You are aware of the successes we have had in the area of headquarters reductions and the spaces these actions have freed; however, also associated with building this force are problems of which you should be aware—particularly in view of the impact that any troop reduction would bring. As previously mentioned, to accomplish the directed action of attaining a better combat-to-combat support ratio in Europe, the Army's current plans call for the conversion of [deleted] support spaces to combat. This will mainly involve the [deleted] well as activating the units necessary to establish our proposed 16 division force. Again, the staff is available to brief the specifics of our plan; however, these are the major actions which we propose take place the remainder of this year and during fiscal year 1976. We can expect personnel turbulence and stationing problems as we accomplish these actions, but we are planning as thoroughly as possible in order to hold these to a minimum.

In addition to personnel turbulence, stationing problems, and other related difficulties associated with conversion or the 16 division program, our authorized end strength will require us to accept less than the maximum level of readiness for the majority of our force. Our overall capability will not suffer during this period as long as we are allowed to maintain our authorized end strength of 785,000 personnel. However, any reduction in strength would have a magnified effect. It would require a case-by-case analysis to enable us to provide a more definitive answer, but you can be assured a strength reduction in fiscal year 1976 would produce problems which would be highly detrimental to the course the Army wants to take to fulfill our obligation to the country.

As I mentioned in response to Senator Hughes' question regarding major problems now facing the Army, our broad requirement is for stability. Given this, I am convinced that we can provide a force which

is economical, lean, ready, and creditable in the eyes of Congress and the people of the United States.

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, it has been reported in the press recently that transfers of U.S. Army tanks to Israel and other countries have amounted to the last 3 years' production of tanks. It was my impression the Army did not have enough tanks for its own requirements and I am wondering if the Army is concurring in these transfers?

General WEYAND. The Army has not concurred in these transfers with the exception of 165 unserviceable contingency M48A1 tanks to two countries. Since October 1973 the Army has shipped [deleted] tanks and has [deleted] committed and pending shipment to foreign nations. Of the total of [deleted] tanks, [deleted] will have come from the Army's inventory, [deleted] from the Marines, and the balance of [deleted] from new production. Of the [deleted] from the Army's inventory, [deleted] are M60 series tanks while the remainder are 90mm gun M48 series tanks. Counting back from July 1, 1974, the [deleted] tanks represent approximately the last [deleted] years of production if one includes the equivalent retrofit production of M60A2 tanks funded in fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973.

The Army does not have all of its required tanks. The Army is authorized 8,474 M60 series tanks based on the fiscal year 1975 President's budget AAO and currently has 4,973 M60 series tanks on hand, a fill of 59 percent. In addition, 3,176 M48 series tanks are on hand for a total of 8,149 tanks in the Army's current inventory. The Army requires a total of 10,007 tanks (fiscal year 1975 budget AAO), including war reserve stocks for Allies.

Whenever transfers of tanks from the Army's inventory were being considered by OSD, the Army assessed its inventory against its requirement and capacity to replace diverted tanks. Based on that assessment, the Army forwarded impact statements to OSD which indicated the degree of degradation such diversions would have on Army readiness. Those impact statements were weighed against the political exigencies for defense security assistance at Defense and State Department level. Decisions were made at that level to direct diversions of Army tanks.

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, the Defense Department notified me September 30 regarding the allocation among the services of the 32,000 civilian personnel reduction in fiscal year 1975 required by the appropriations bill. I note that the Army share of these cuts was increased over what the conference report suggested. The Army share of the 32,000 is 21,200 and I would appreciate having your views as to where and how these reductions will be made?

General WEYAND. Apportionment of the 21,200 reduction in end fiscal year 1975 direct hire civilian employment was determined by selective reductions as follows:

Elimination of special program to improve readiness.....	-15,600
Replace borrow troop labor.....	(-4,500)
Base operations support.....	(-9,000)
Depot maintenance and supply.....	(-2,100)
Headquarters and headquarters support reductions.....	-2,200
Other general program reductions.....	-3,400
Total .....	-21,200

Senator THURMOND. General Weyand, as you know, inflation has resulted in an estimated cost growth of as much as \$6 billion for programs already approved in the DOD budget for fiscal year 1975. Assuming the Army share of this cost growth would be at least \$1 billion, you are faced with approved expenditures for which funds are not available. Do you envision cancellation of some programs, possibly cutbacks or some other approach to meet this problem?

General WEYAND. The Army currently estimates a fiscal year 1975 loss of buying power due to inflation of about \$1.2 billion. To offset some of this loss the Army will be forced to make adjustments within programs, realine programs, and/or eliminate lower priority requirements. This area is a matter of continuing review. Decisions on alternatives will require careful consideration to avoid undesirable impacts on readiness. As the year progresses we will be in a better position to assess impacts on hard core requirements.

Senator THURMOND. I also ask unanimous consent that an article in Current News of Friday, September 27, 1974, from the Washington Post entitled "Weyand Named Army Chief, Insuring Abrams Revitalization Drive Will Go On," be inserted in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, Senator, it will be so ordered.  
[The article follows:]

[From the Wall Street Journal, September 27, 1974]

WEYAND NAMED ARMY CHIEF, ENSURING ABRAMS' REVITALIZATION DRIVE WILL GO ON

(By Richard J. Levine)

WASHINGTON—President Ford chose Gen. Fred C. Weyand as Army Chief of Staff, ensuring that programs designed to rebuild service morale and combat effectiveness will continue with little or no change.

Gen. Weyand, acting chief of staff since the death of Gen. Creighton Abrams Sept. 4, was a very close associate of the late chief, both in Vietnam and later in the Pentagon. "He's been very close to Abe in his thinking," an Army man said yesterday. "The two frequently came out with identical outlooks."

The President's appointment of Gen. Weyand, a 58-year-old infantry officer who attended the University of California rather than West Point, is likely to prove popular in the Army establishment. Gen. Weyand is generally viewed as a thoughtful and capable leader who has enjoyed a broad range of command, management, legislative and diplomatic assignments.

"Weyand was the overwhelming choice throughout the Army," said a general. "I haven't heard one rumble. Everybody's just delighted."

Until Mr. Ford named Gen. Alexander Haig to command North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe, many Army officers had feared that the White House would turn to Gen. Haig for the top Army job. In the eyes of many officers, Gen. Haig lacked the necessary experience to be Army Chief of Staff and, more importantly, became dangerously "politicized" as a result of his long service with Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon.

No such concerns surround the selection of Gen. Weyand, who in recent years has followed in Gen. Abrams' footsteps. As "Abe's alter ego," Gen. Weyand stands to inherit some of the deep support and affection in the officer corps that Gen. Abrams enjoyed.

For the past year, Gen. Weyand has been vice chief of staff, the Army's No. 2 man in this role. He has helped shape the Army's formula for rebuilding itself after the shattering effects of the long years in Vietnam. "He's just the guy who can carry on with what Abe started, with his assistance," says a staff officer.

The Abrams-Weyand approach has been rather simple—and, by most indicators, quite successful. There's been heavy emphasis on trimming headquarters and staff jobs, increasing the number of combat units, stabilizing leadership and recruiting volunteers for an Army that is spending more and more time in the field training. In the past 12 months, the Army got all the volunteers it needed, started building another division and significantly increased its combat readiness.

In a wide-ranging interview after Gen. Abrams' death, Gen. Weyand spelled out his views on the state of the Army and the directions it should follow.

The Army is in "better" shape today than before it went to Vietnam, Gen. Weyand asserted, "because we have more experience. The consistent story I get back from selection (promotion) boards is that we have a tremendous reservoir of talent in the officers grade."

As for equipment, he said, the Army has a "ways to go," though there aren't any major shortages. "We sure want a better tank," he said, "but the one we have is adequate."

What worries the tall, still-youthful-looking officer is the credibility of the Army, especially its top leadership, with the public and the Congress. "What a wonderful thing it would be if we could regain credibility and make it understood that guys like me can run the goddamn Army."

In looking ahead, Gen. Weyand believes that "we've got to be training to fight a variety of wars," always mindful that the "only major threat comes from the Soviet Union." This means, he says, that the Army has got to be prepared for heavily mechanized conventional warfare in central Europe, however remote the possibility in a period of U.S.-Soviet detente.

In addition, the Army must have enough flexibility in units and training to ready it for limited military action in other parts of the world—notably, the Mideast and Asia. Thus, he says, while "the bulk of our forces should be structured to fight the type of war the Soviets are likely to engage in," other units should be light, air mobile and built for quick reaction.

In working his way to the top, Gen. Weyand has touched all the right bases in the Army. Only his starting point—the Reserve Officer Training Corps, or ROTC, at the University of California at Berkeley—was rather untraditional. Including Gen. Weyand, only nine of 27 Army chiefs of staff have been non-West Pointers and only two earned their commission through ROTC.

He graduated in 1938 with a degree in criminology (his father was a police chief) and went on active duty in 1940, seeing service in World War II in the China-Burma-India theater. He commanded a battalion in the Korean war and got his first star in 1960. Among his assignments as a general officer have been chief of the Army Legislative Liaison Office (which means he knows Capitol Hill and how to lobby for money), and commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division, which he trained in Hawaii and led into Vietnam combat.

During the North Vietnamese Tet offensive in 1968, Gen. Weyand's sound tactical decisions on positioning troops were a key factor in protecting Saigon from major damage.

For over a year in 1969 and 1970, Gen. Weyand was military adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks, returning briefly to the U.S. for a Pentagon staff job before heading out once again to Vietnam. This time he served as deputy commander of the American forces, and Creighton Abrams was his boss. When Gen. Abrams was named chief of staff, Gen. Weyand succeeded him as the Vietnam commander, responsible for the final American withdrawal. A year ago, Gen. Abrams called him home to help him rebuild the Army.

And now, says an Army insider, Gen. Weyand can "just continue on without missing a step or a beat."

In another White House appointment announced yesterday, the President nominated David Bruce, currently chief of the U.S. liaison office to China, as U.S. ambassador to NATO. Mr. Bruce, a veteran diplomat, will succeed Donald Rumsfeld, who has been named a top White House aide.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there something else, General, that you wish to say?

General WEYAND. No, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much for coming in. And we are going to take that close vote here in a minute.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee went into executive session.]







