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MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES OF THE PAST AND FUTURE

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HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 13 AND 14, 1974

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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(II)

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WASHINGTON, D.C.

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MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES OF THE PAST AND FUTURE

TUESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1974

U. S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn (chairman).

Present: Senators Nunn (presiding), and Byrd, Jr., of Virginia.

Also present: Senators Goldwater and Taft.

John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Robert Q. Old, Francis J. Sullivan, Charles J. Conneely, and John A. Goldsmith, professional staff member; Nancy J. Bearg, research associate; Roberta A. Ujakovich, research assistant; and Mary G. Ketner, clerical assistant.

Senator NUNN. This is a meeting of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel. We have invited all the members of the full committee this morning. I suspect some of them will be coming in, although I am sure that the Secretary would excuse them, particularly those who are working on the markup of the military appropriations bill this morning.

As we begin these hearings I want first of all to express my personal appreciation to Senator Stennis for naming me as chairman of this new subcommittee that involves manpower and personnel. And I want to pay a special tribute to Senator Byrd for agreeing to serve on it, and to Senator Dominick. Senators Byrd and Dominick bring to the subcommittee a vast amount of experience, certainly experience that exceeds that of the chairman, and I am going to rely on both of them for a great deal of advice and assistance as we go along.

I would like to welcome the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff here today. I see that you have Secretary Brehm here also, and I am sure he will add a lot to the hearings, since he is an expert in this area. I appreciate your presence especially in view of the tremendous demand on your time during this transition period for our Government.

The purpose of the hearings is to provide a background, a fundamental kind of underpinning for what this subcommittee will be taking on in the months and years ahead. I think it is particularly appropriate that we are meeting today after President Ford made what I considered to be a very positive statement on the economy, because everyone agrees our country is facing a grave economic

situation today, characterized by a runaway inflation. Federal deficit spending has been a major contributor to this inflation. The best economists in this country cannot provide us with easy solutions, nor can they give us any optimism that this difficult economic period will soon end. We can be encouraged, however, by the forthright approach to the problem taken by President Ford last night in calling for a domestic summit conference meeting on the overall economy.

So when we get down to the role of this subcommittee, and we consider that defense spending is, of course, a large part of the economy, and a large part of the Federal budget, and when we consider that 57 percent of the total DOD budget is absorbed in manpower costs, I think it brings us to a focal point, and demonstrates that we must very carefully review our manpower costs. We must do what we can to prevent the continued escalation of those costs that has taken place in the past. We must maintain a strong defense posture to survive in the world today. I know that the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs are strongly in favor of a strong defense posture; however, this rising and increasing manpower cost at some point must be very carefully examined if we are going to have sufficient funds left in the DOD budget to really procure the weapons we need and to maintain the essential research and development necessary without, at the same time, jeopardizing our overall economy.

We also need to get into many questions in this subcommittee—the question of force structure, the reasons and justifications for such things as 16 Army divisions which we are moving on now, and 13 Navy carriers, three Marine Corps divisions and wings, and 21 Air Force tactical aircraft wings. We will have to look into the deployment of our personnel overseas, including not only the 319,000 people we have in Europe, which I have already looked at in some detail, but also why we have the numbers we do in places such as Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and the other areas in the Pacific.

I am a firm believer in the total force concept when it comes to using the Reserve and National Guard for vital and needed missions. I am not for simply keeping large numbers of Reserves when their missions or units cannot be justified under today's national security requirements. I know the Secretary has been working in this area, and I believe he will have recommendations in the not too distant future on this. I believe we need to take the Reserves and Guard forces we have and make sure that they have a meaningful mission and make certain they have the equipment to do the job and can respond in a very short period of time. That is my overall philosophy, and I certainly think we will be getting into that in considerable detail.

I am deeply concerned, as are other Members of Congress, and particularly this committee, about the all volunteer force. It has clearly, in the opinion of all, driven up the manpower costs over the last several years. It seems to be a major contributor to the acceleration in manpower costs that have taken an increasing share of the Defense budget.

Some have estimated that the volunteer force costs about \$3.5 billion a year, but I know that at hearing after hearing we come up with one small item after another which really is part of the volunteer force—it is not considered in this overall computation of costs. Therefore I am not sure we have a very good fixation on what the total cost is.

In addition to the cost, there are other serious questions I have about the volunteer force, including the quality of the people who will make up this force. This does not simply go to the question of IQ, or the educational level of the new soldiers. Quality includes the whole spectrum of questions on the representatives, the motivation and the patriotism, as well as the skill of our armed force personnel.

Another major concern in this whole area of manpower is the combat and support ratio, and, of course, I have gotten involved in that. At this point I want to commend Secretary Schlesinger and General Brown and also Mr. Brehm for getting involved as they have in this combat support ratio. I know the Defense Department is already working on this, and also that the Air Force has done a good job in Europe under General Jones. They have reduced headquarters tremendously in the last few years, and I think this is a real positive step. I hope that together with Congress we can continue to work toward a much stronger combat support ratio. I believe that as the recent Brookings Institute report shows, at least in the opinion of those who wrote the report, we have to examine the fundamental question of what is the likely scenario in Europe, particularly since that is where so much of our forces go. More and more people have come to the conclusion that we are geared for too long a war there and that simply is not very feasible at this point. Whether or not that is the case, there is a strong enough case being made by many people in that regard. It makes me, as one Senator, think that we ought to look very carefully at our structure to see whether we can be in a better position to deter a war there by having a more positive and quicker response to any kind of conventional thrust the Soviet Union might make. Of course, we have been into that in considerable detail in the NATO report, and I have talked to each of you personally. However, that is a point I will continue to be interested in.

So there are many other things that we need to get into. One of them we started yesterday afternoon on the question of grade structure. I will not say this is a very pleasant chore for the subcommittee, because it is a very difficult and complex question that involves not only the question of economy and efficiency, but also the overall morale of the military services and the question of promotion. As I told Senator Proxmire yesterday afternoon, it is one thing to recognize that we have a very serious problem, and it is another thing to be able to come up with a solution that does not substantially jeopardize our morale factor in the military services.

So as chairman of this subcommittee, I do not have a ready answer to the grade structure problem. However, I would say that we are going to devote a considerable amount of attention to it, and particularly to the allegations about the number of generals and admirals exceeding by vast amounts the numbers that are needed now.

Another thing that concerns me particularly, that was brought out yesterday afternoon, is the question of so many generals and admirals being assigned to duties in agencies outside their own military service.

So these are things that we will be talking about.

I consider it a real privilege to chair this subcommittee. I believe since I have been here—in the brief 2 years I have been in Congress—we have spent most of our time, as Senator Goldwater knows, talking about weapon procurement, and we have had one debate after another on the floor regarding certain weapons systems, which those of us in Congress certainly do not have as good a grasp of as we would like to, and probably never will. At the same time, we do not debate very much the question of overall manpower and personnel, and yet that is where more than 50 percent of our budget is going.

So I hope at least to serve as a catalyst to promote the kind of meaningful debate which will bring out and air these positions in public and make sure they are properly decided, at least to the extent of our ability. I want to try and have as many open hearings as possible.

This is an area where there will be some national security matters and there will be some sensitivity, which will necessitate some closed sessions. To the greatest extent possible we will try to have open sessions so we can get this in public debate and so the media and the people of this country understand the vital questions concerning our military structure.

Mr. Secretary, I did not mean to take such a long time, but having you here gets us a large audience, particularly the news media, so the chairman must take advantage of your notoriety this morning.

Senator Goldwater, do you have any statement you would like to make this morning?

Senator GOLDWATER. No. I just want to comment that I think it is very wise that the chairman of the full committee has pushed for this. I am happy he has made you chairman. If my memory is right, I believe we have only had two hearings on personnel since 1958 that are meaningful hearings. Inasmuch as personnel is about 57 percent of our Defense budget, it seems to me that this becomes the most important part of our budget.

The subject of personnel to me throughout the whole structure of Government is a very vital one, and one that we have to attack. I am very happy you are holding these hearings. I expect to attend as many as I can.

I spent the last 5 years of my Reserve as Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Air Force. So I have an interest in this, and I thank you for inviting me.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. Secretary, we will receive whatever statement you have this morning. As I told you, the subject matter is very general in nature, and the hearing this morning is as much for the purpose of answering detailed questions as laying the foundation. After you get through with your statement we would like to hear from General Brown. Then we will go into questions at the appropriate point.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM K. BREHM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; AND GEN. GEORGE S. BROWN, U.S. AIR FORCE, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Goldwater. My colleagues and I are delighted to be here this morning to serve as the first witnesses before this new subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

This is the subcommittee's inaugural voyage, as it were, and we look forward to a prosperous and long association with it as we delve into the critical question of manpower.

Manpower goes to the heart of the force structure, and manpower issues must be intimately related, first, to force structure, and force structure in turn to the external capabilities which the United States wishes to serve to balance. Thus, manpower cannot be examined in the abstract. It must be examined in terms of the international environment.

If we do not change our commitments, and the military capabilities external to the United States increase, that tends to bring about an increase in manpower requirements. By contrast, if those external capabilities were to decrease with no change in commitments, that would permit a downward adjustment of manpower.

In recent years there has been a substantial downward adjustment of manpower. Our military forces are now some 40 percent below the Fiscal Year 1968 manpower level, which was the Vietnam high. We have reduced by 1,386,000 men. In addition—and this is a fact not widely appreciated—we are some 525,000 men below the 1964 pre-war level. The military manpower of the United States has shrunk by some 20 percent as compared to pre-war strengths.

There have been changes in the commitments of the United States. There have been changes in the capabilities of our forces. But the question that we must raise is whether the force structure has shrunk enough or too much. We should be careful to analyze whether indeed the forces that we possess are enough before further shrinkages in the force structure are driven by budgetary considerations.

We are attempting to do something about these matters within the Department of Defense by an increase in the combat capabilities, more efficient use of our manpower resources, and more efficient use of our financial resources against what is a fairly fixed ceiling in terms of constant dollars.

The effect of these actions will be to increase the combat ratios. Most notably, this has taken place during the last year in the Army, where there has been a major effort under General Abrams and Secretary Callaway to root out areas in which manpower is used with lesser effectiveness in order to increase the number of combat divisions available to the United States. As you will recall, the Army maintained 16½ combat divisions in fiscal year 1964. This has now shrunk to 13 combat divisions. During the course of the next year, we hope to increase this to 14 against a ceiling for the Army of 785,000 men.

Once again the Army has borne the greatest burden in terms of manpower reductions as compared to the pre-war period. We are some 200,000 men lower in the Army than we were then.

The need for a more efficient utilization of manpower and an increase in combat capability as compared to prior periods of time, I think, is underscored by the gradual approach of the Soviet Union to nuclear parity with the United States. There are continuing arguments of the relative strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union at the present time. What we can state is that the Soviet Union deploys the latest generation of ICBM's and introduces a larger number of submarines into their force structure. Any advantage that the United States may retain will gradually be eroded. As a result, we will be faced with a condition of nuclear parity at a date no later than 1980, if indeed we are not faced with that condition today.

As nuclear parity has come into existence, we have desired to raise the nuclear threshold and to hold this threshold at as high a level as possible. The way to keep the nuclear threshold high is by maintaining extensive general purpose forces capable of conventional conflict. The existence of such forces will, hopefully, deter any outbreak of hostilities.

I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, that we are in a position in which we must balance external capabilities. As the U.S. forces have shrunk in recent years, the forces of the Soviet Union have gradually increased. Today the Soviet Union maintains something on the order of 600,000 men in Eastern Europe as compared to the roughly 300,000 men the United States maintains in Western Europe.

While the U.S. forces in Western Europe have shrunk over the past decade and notably shrunk elsewhere in the world by a greater margin, the forces of the Soviet Union have been built up in Eastern Europe.

The Soviet military manpower as a whole has grown from about 3 million men over the last 13 or 14 years to about 3.8 million today. Soviet military budgets in constant rubles have been growing at about 3 percent a year. At the present time the intelligence community estimates the dollar equivalent of constant ruble expenditures at about 96 million U.S. dollars, as compared to the approximately \$80 million that the United States is spending at the present time.

Thus, there is some discrepancy between the expenditures of the Soviet Union and the United States. I do not wish to exaggerate the significance of those numbers. Quite obviously, when one translates Soviet manpower into U.S. dollars, the effect is to lead to a much higher cost than is valid, given the price ratios in the Soviet economy.

You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the issue of manpower versus manpower costs. We would like to preserve manpower. Therefore, we are very interested in economies in manpower costs that do not reduce the combat effectiveness of the U.S. forces.

This can be obtained in part by greater flexibility in the use of manpower resources. This committee is considering our proposed legislation that would permit us to alter the grade structure of the officer corps, and permit more selective retirements without the statutory entitlement to particular numbers of years service for officers in particular grades.

I think this is necessary to maintain the morale and retain at the same time the younger officers in the military establishment. If we were to reduce the number of senior officers by a process of attrition, we would freeze promotions. From the long-run standpoint of the United States, the freezing of promotions would be more harmful to the military establishment than some surgery at the higher levels.

These are, however, vexing problems. As you indicated, there is a conflict between the objective of efficiency and economy on the one hand, which is implied in appropriate officer-enlisted man ratios, and the requirements of equity, justice and morale. The requirements of morale are in many ways related to equity and justice.

In addition, we would like to have short-term flexibility in the civil service area, Mr. Chairman. I am aware that this is an area of some degree of political sensitivity. I believe that those political sensitivities are much more apparent up here on Capitol Hill than they are in the executive branch.

If we are to reduce the number of civil service personnel employed, once again we must retain promotion opportunities for younger people. We must be able to select and retain effective civil servants rather than having RIF's which result in the elimination of the younger members of the civil service corps, including the most promising members.

One other point that I might mention, Mr. Chairman, is the problem of the Reserves. You have alluded to this. We endorse entirely the observations that you made. We endorse entirely Mr. Laird's concept of total force. We wish the Reserve forces to be an effective supplement to and substitute for our active duty forces. This does create a number of problems. I welcome the interest of the committee in the particular problem associated with the Reserve area.

One problem which we hope the Congress will consider carefully is the availability of the Reserves. If the active duty forces are to rely upon the Reserve structures, they must be assured that those Reserve structures will be available in a period of national emergency. I think that one should underscore that a national emergency need not be of the all-out type that we have historically considered. If the Reserves are effectively integrated into the active duty forces, they must also be available whenever there is a less than all-out requirement for the use of military forces. At the present time there are severe limitations, legal and political, on the availability of the Reserve forces. I would comment that question to the attention of this subcommittee.

The Reserve forces are distressed with the relative unavailability of modern equipments. They receive their equipments through a hand-me-down process from the active duty forces. The lower the rate of procurement by the active duty forces, the greater the aging of what are frequently the obsolescent equipments available to the Reserve forces.

It is for this reason that in our procurement policies we must be prepared to lay out sufficient funds so that not only are active duty forces properly equipped, but the Reserve components are reasonably equipped at the same time.

As a result of the substantial curtailment of procurement expenditures that has occurred post-Vietnam, the trickle down or hand-me-down of equipments to the Reserve forces has in a number of respects been slowed down. This is another question that you will be interested in.

We need to have a proper balance between men and equipment in the Reserve structures. If one is to characterize the Reserve structures, they are short on equipment and, relatively speaking, rich on manpower.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my initial observations.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

As I told the members of the committee yesterday afternoon, I am going to try to impose the 10-minute rule so that we will all have a chance to ask questions, including the chairman. Therefore, I will ask Frank Sullivan to keep time.

First, on the question of civil service flexibility, has the Department of Defense sent anything over to us on that subject yet?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have sent it out of the building, Mr. Chairman. I do not know whether it has been waylaid on the way to Capitol Hill.

Senator NUNN. That has come as a result of a proposal from Capitol Hill as to the civil service flexibility?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, and we would be happy to provide some drafting service in that area.

Let me make an observation here that may be of critical importance to elected Members on Capitol Hill. One of the consequences of the inflexibility in the civil service system at the present time is that in order to reduce civil service manpower, the Department is forced to consider base closures or the closures of facilities, because we cannot reduce manpower in a selective way. As a consequence, we burn down the entire barn in a particular congressional district, when, if we had the authority to be more selective, that would be unnecessary.

I think the inflexibility of the system forces the executive branch to take actions more drastic than would be required if we had a degree of selectivity. For that reason, I would urge Members on the Hill to consider whether the present system does not create more political difficulties back in the districts than it solves.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, on that point I think this is certainly an area we all need to explore in the Congress. I do believe that that would probably go to another committee, though, probably the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, but we will follow it.

On the question of the Reserves and callup of the Reserve forces, I certainly am interested in seeing that you have the kind of flexibility you need there to make the Reserve forces truly meaningful in periods short of all-out conventional war. Do you have any kind of proposals you are working on in that regard? If so, what is the status of it?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have worked on some proposals which we are prepared to deliver through the executive branch. In addition, Senator Stennis, the chairman of the full committee, has re-

quested us to provide drafting service with regard to a limited call-up. We are in the process of providing such a drafting service for him.

In other Free World nations, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, the Minister of Defense has the authority to have a limited callup without the declaration of a national emergency. To the extent—and this is a subject in which you have been interested—to the extent that we have a close integration, of, say, the Reserve forces involved in airlift and the active duty forces involved in airlift, we must be assured that in a less than all-out conflict the crews are indeed available to increase crew ratios, for the aircraft. That could be achieved through a limited callup power by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator NUNN. I believe there is, in the law recently passed emerging from the conventional committee, something about the surge capability of the strategic aircraft. I think one of the requirements is that you advise Congress on the limited callup feature. I am particularly interested in that because I think it is ridiculous if we have a Reserve force, even if they are ready and even if they do have the capability, if they are beyond reach for political or legal reasons. In that case the situation begins to evolve between the active duty forces, who resist every effort to get the Reserves proper equipment, and who add on more active duty forces than perhaps are needed because of reluctance there to admit, or realistic reluctance to admit, that the Reserves can truly be called. I think that is the kind of impasse we are at right now, I would hope we can confront this issue head on and at least get all the cards on the table and not use this as a reason for increasing manpower at an alarming rate when we should use the Reserve for that particular mission.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. This Nation has many troubles, Mr. Chairman, but our chief trouble is not an increase in military manpower at an alarming rate. If there is alarm, I think it is because of the decrease.

Senator NUNN. Of course, there was a request, Mr. Secretary, for about 11,000 more this year in the Air Force on that very point, and that adds up to over \$200 million a year. I know you are learning, but overall on this particular mission that was not the case.

I would like to get your assessment of the overall fighting capabilities of our troops versus the Soviet Union. You have already alluded to the strategic parity that probably will be coming in the late seventies or early eighties. Could you give us your assessment in terms of land, sea, and air power as well as the strategic situation?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. Let me start with the air and sea. The United States continues to possess a qualitative edge with regard to air forces as compared to the Soviet Union. In Europe, although we are numerically inferior, the superiority of U.S. air power is widely acknowledged. That will be testified to by General Jones, and I believe has been testified to in the past by General Brown before he assumed his present responsibilities.

With regard to the sea, we continue to possess an edge over the Soviet Union in terms of the combat capability of U.S. naval forces

as opposed to Soviet naval forces. I would like to go into this in more detail because there is some perplexity on this point. The reason that we are concerned about our naval capabilities is the disproportionate dependence of the Free World on ocean communications. The ability of the Soviet Union to interdict commerce and military transport would bring about the severance of the bonds that hold the Free World together. For that reason, there is a higher degree of vulnerability of what we call the Free World due to this asymmetrical dependence on ocean communications. This, despite the edge that our naval forces continue to have. I believe that we are concerned in the naval area with whether our edge is sufficiently large to continue to guarantee the security of the sealanes of communication.

In regard to the air and the sea, I think that we tend to separate too sharply airpower and seapower. We have begun to examine more closely what we call the air-naval maritime balance. Our examination indicates that in some contingencies the U.S. Navy would not be forced to operate alone. In regard, for example, to the widely discussed war at sea, in which there would be no combat on land, the U.S. Air Force would be available to supplement U.S. Navy capabilities. For that reason, we must examine the overall air-naval balance.

If you recall the events of last October, there was concern about the security of the U.S. 6th Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. There was discussion whether, under first strike conditions, the U.S. 6th Fleet could survive. But that discussion was based upon two assumptions that I wish to emphasize at the present time. First, that the Soviet Union under those hypothetical conditions could use land-based air around the eastern Mediterranean, and second, that the United States would be forestalled from using land-based air in the Mediterranean region because of the nonsupport by our allies. Under those circumstances I think one drove home very clearly the point of the close interrelationship between air and naval forces, and we should be very careful not to put these different forces into separate boxes. There is a close interrelationship, and we want to encourage a greater achievement of cooperation and force interdependence.

Further, with regard to the land forces, I think it is evident that the Soviet Union continues to possess a preponderance of power in this area. The United States does have a total of 16 active divisions, including Marine divisions. The Soviet Union has 167 divisions. A Soviet division is not comparable to an American division. It is not comparable in terms of combat strength. There will be arguments whether a U.S. division has twice the capability or three times the capability of a Soviet division. But even using the latter figure, United States forces would come out to be something on the order of 45 or 50 Soviet division equivalents.

What we hope to maintain in Western Europe is an adequate conventional balance. But that conventional balance cannot be obtained by the United States acting alone, or even providing the preponderance of effort. We must have the full support of our European allies.

With that support we can have conventional forces in place that will maintain a high nuclear threshold and serve to deter whatever aspirations the Warsaw Pact may have for a forward move.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Goldwater, my time has expired.

Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, how many civil servants do you have in the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have approximately 1,800 at the present time, Senator. We have just ordered a 15 percent cut. We had about 2,000 some months ago.

Senator GOLDWATER. What could you live with?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Once again, I cannot give a definitive answer at this time. We can live with less. But as you will understand, the expansion of the OSD during an earlier period in times makes it very hard to contract and maintain effectiveness given the regulations under which we must operate.

Senator GOLDWATER. This particularly applies to the Air Force and to the Navy. I realize that every person on a naval vessel has a battle station, and that every soldier is trained for combat, but not every Air Force man is. I have often wondered why we do not extend the retirement age for enlisted people. For example, a man working on the line in the Air Force, or working mainly on a carrier, we see these men getting out at the age of 46, 48. Why can we not keep them? I know many of them would like to stay. They do not look for promotion. They like their job, and they do a good job. Is there any reason we cannot extend that?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that there is one constraint, Senator, and that is the desire in the services to have promotion opportunity for those below. But I think your question goes to the heart of the very significant issue of the whole retirement system for the military, which was established under different conditions.

We talked earlier, Mr. Chairman, about manpower versus manpower costs. The retirement system is part of the total system that does tend to increase manpower costs relative to manpower. To extend service tours is one way, I think, of reducing the overall manpower costs. It reduces them in a number of subsidiary ways, Senator, in that it reduces our recruitment requirements and thus permits us to shrink the training base and make other ancillary savings. I think that is a subject on which we would be prepared to accept additional legislation.

Senator GOLDWATER. Are we going to receive in the near future—or are you going to wait until next year—a new approach to retirement from the Pentagon?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I cannot answer that question at this time. I think we should provide you with an approach in what I will call the near future, but whether 6 months would be described as the near future or not is a question of your judgment. I do not have a precise date when we can provide that to you.

Senator GOLDWATER. I hope you can do it. My own thinking is in the direction of Civil Service retirement applied to the military, now that military pay has reached a more comparable situation.

How did the Department determine that 2,152,000 was the desired fiscal year 1975 end strength?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The way that was determined, Senator, was to work up from specific combat capability and aspirations for specific capabilities, manning ratios for particular equipments, and table of organization and equipment with regard to what kinds of combat capability we should strive to maintain under very severe budget pressure. The outcome is the 2.15 million figure that you refer to.

Later, on my own time rather than yours, Senator, I would like to talk about the question of stability for the services.

Senator GOLDWATER. What is the relationship between the total DOD military strength and the number of combat units that can be created within that total strength?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I can supply that for the record. It differs by service. It depends upon one's definition of combat capabilities. [The information follows:]

The strength which the Defense Department requests and the Congress authorizes is almost entirely dependent upon the number of basic fighting units of various types which are adequate to meet the potential threats. The obvious exceptions are the planning and R&D staffs, and such other auxiliary needs, that represent a level of effort rather than the size of the standing force. However, for the vast majority of the force, the relationship is a direct one.

Given the required fighting units, appropriate support and control organizations adequate to sustain combat are added. The amount varies considerably by Service. A fighter squadron, for example, possesses none of the organic means for avionics support, munitions maintenance, and so forth. A ship, on the other hand, possesses a considerable amount of support on board, as does an armored division. All receive augmentation, and just where the combat function stops is frequently difficult to discern. There is also a broad logistic, personnel and administrative tail which is structured to the size of the force and which is strictly non-combat, but without which sustained existence of the force would be impossible.

The subject is complex, and it cannot be stated with certainty that having asked for 2,152,000 people, the Department cannot do with one less. The main effort at this point is being directed at increased combat power, using whatever savings in support that can be identified. Real manpower savings and conversions have been effected in headquarters, communications, mission support and central support forces. The Department will continue to identify manpower economies in support functions and use them to increase the effectiveness of the force, thereby maintaining the equilibrium sought through the transition period ahead.

It should be noted that conversions are not a simple matter; they are dependent upon long term procurement plans which become locked in through the appropriations cycle. Similarly, there is an unavoidable lag in the ability of the training base to produce trained assets in response to a restructuring of the force. It is estimated that the personnel posture lags the restructuring by about 18 months.

Senator GOLDWATER. I know this is not an easy one, but it receives a lot of attention. How was the size of the support establishment in each service determined? Are you satisfied that each of the services are using similar criteria? Or can they?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We are satisfied that they are not using similar criteria and we are attempting to bring about greater similarity in the criteria using the most efficient service as the model. In a number of cases, one of the services will have a very high ratio of training personnel in their training establishment as compared to other services. We intend to bring that ratio down. One of the reasons for this is that we have a certain inflexibility in dealing

with officer strength. To the extent that we have greater flexibility in dealing with officer strength we can better deal with some of these issues.

Let me say in general that the support structure that has been determined by institutional pressures within the services as well as by concepts of efficiency. What we have attempted to do—and I mentioned this briefly to the chairman—is to provide each of the services with powerful incentives to reduce those support costs. The Army, as I indicated, is working very hard on the problem. The Air Force and the Navy have worked on the problem in the past.

Senator GOLDWATER. Last year—I think it was before you assumed your job—I raised the question that inasmuch as we now have four Air Forces, and we are the only Nation in the world that has four Air Forces, can we look at the possibility of training these four Air Forces in the basic skills of flying under one command I do not think you have that answer right now. I can tell you that we did not get a very good answer to the question last time.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I can give you a divided answer, Senator. Yes, indeed, we are very interested in that idea, and there has been some movement in that direction. As you know, the Army now trains Air Force helicopter pilots. We can move even further in that direction, I think, and make some savings. However, there are stronger service institutional pressures against a greater consolidation of training. In addition, it is a subject that has caused a high degree of consternation among some of your colleagues on the Hill.

Senator GOLDWATER. I know that, but I would hope that you would continue to study it. I have long felt that four Air Forces is a little bit rich even for as rich a country as the United States. I like the move of putting the helicopter training in the Army. They are doing a real good job. I hope you get the Navy and the Marines wrapped up in there also. To have four different ways of teaching fixed wing piloting in the basic skills to me is a waste of money. Of course, when they get to the need for landing on a carrier, that is another thing or close air support, or air-to-air missions, bombing missions, that is above and beyond. I am talking about what we used to call basic up through advanced training, and I would hope you would give that some study.

Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Goldwater.

Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, first, I would like you to know that I believe our country is fortunate to have a man of your ability and judgment as Secretary of Defense. I find myself in close agreement with your views and your appraisal of our needs for a strong national defense, and your appraisal of our defense posture.

There is one area where we are not in full agreement however, and that is one the question of total personnel strength for our Armed Forces. It seems to me that with the manpower costs taking such a high percentage of our defense budget, that you really must do something about reducing the size of our total personnel. I do not see how the research and development budget can be reduced much further, nor do I see the possibilities for great reductions in the procurement budget. So if there is going to be any reduction at all

it will have to come, as I see it, on the personnel side. You have, as I recall—in round figures—2,150,000 in the military in uniform.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. You also have a million civilian employees. Legislation already enacted however, reduces your total civilian employees by approximately 32,000, if I recollect correctly? I think that is a start in the right direction. But virtually no start has been made on reducing the overall size of our uniformed military personnel. Although the Senate felt that the total could be reduced by 49,000, when the conference committee finally completed its work the figure declined to about 2,500. But with the bulk of DOD's funds, in fact a good majority, going for personnel costs, it seems to me that something must be done with regard to this problem, although I am sure that the Defense Department does not take kindly to that viewpoint.

It is my impression, having been around military people and military bases in one form or another, and having been in the service that over the years a rather consistent military view point has developed. This viewpoint has essentially held that manpower has been a cheap commodity. It has been in the past, but that is no longer the case. Just as time has changed circumstances in areas of the economy. So too have times and conditions changed in the Defense Department. It seems to me, therefore, that the question of personnel is now one area that requires primary attention.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Senator, there are a number of observations that you have made with which we agree entirely. Let me reiterate the distinction drawn earlier between manpower costs and manpower. While we feel that further reductions in manpower might be unwise for the U.S. at this stage, there are opportunities for reduction of manpower costs without a reduction in manpower. We have a number of those proposals on the Hill at the present time.

As I indicated in my opening remarks, we have made a very vigorous start toward the reduction of military manpower. The forces have been reduced by 40 percent since fiscal year 1968. They are 20 percent below the prewar level.

Senator BYRD. If I may interrupt there, I do not think that is a just comparison. We had a half million men or more in Vietnam at that point.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is right.

Senator BYRD. That is not a just comparison.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. 40 percent from the fiscal year 1968 level and 20 percent below the 1964 level. Prior to the Vietnam War we maintained 2.7 million men under arms. That level of manpower was maintained all through the 1950's under General Eisenhower. Despite the emphasis at that time on American nuclear superiority and what was then referred to as the "new look," we maintained almost 2.6 million men under arms. We are substantially lower than we have been since prior to the Korean War. So there has been a very substantial downward adjustment of military manpower.

I would not argue that no further downward adjustments can be made. But as the committee goes into the relative balance, the force structure issues, and the force ratios between our own and external capabilities, I think that some of these issues will be illuminated to

a greater extent and we can get into discussion of details as to where manpower adjustments might further be made.

I have had the feeling, Senator, that we are on the thin side with regard to our general purpose forces, particularly with regard to our ground forces. The U.S. Army has been driven through a high degree of turbulence which is pernicious in terms of the ability to maintain combat capability. When we reduce the Army by 50,000 men or 100,000 men, the effect of this is to bring about a variation of forces all over the world. It results in the service devoting most of its attention to coping with that reduction in manpower rather than to maintaining a fine edge in its combat capabilities. That is, I think, a fairly serious consequence.

Some years ago the Congress decided on a reduction of 50,000 men average strength from the Army. It decided on that halfway through the fiscal year. As a result, we had to remove 100,000 men from the Army immediately in order to get that 50,000 man average strength reduction. A reduction of that sort not only causes this vast gyration of personnel, and runs up permanent change of station costs, which are substantial, as you know, but it also prevents the development of integrated units which have a degree of unity that gives them combat strength. Those are the kinds of concerns we have been pondering. What we have attempted to do with our 785,000 men level for the U.S. Army is to give them a period of stability in the baseline so that their attention could be devoted to the kind of issues that the chairman mentioned earlier, the increase in combat capability.

At the present time, with 13 divisions in the U.S. Army, I do not think that our ground forces are over strength, not for a Nation that wishes to be second to none. I would suggest that they are to some extent under strength. When one visits military establishments, one is not at all impressed by the buzz of activity there. One, therefore, infers that there may be wasted manpower.

The test of a military establishment is not the degree of activity during peacetime, it is whether those manpower assets are effectively employed during periods of emergency. Undoubtedly the military airlift command did not operate in terms of exploiting its manpower assets at maximum efficiency during last summer, but it did do so during October. When called upon, a military command must be able to respond immediately with a high degree of readiness. If it is incapable of doing so, it is then that the Nation is in trouble.

So one must live with apparent superficial wastes of manpower in peacetime in order to achieve the degree of efficiency in wartime that will permit the armed forces to carry out their mission.

Senator BYRD. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just following on from that last statement, Mr. Secretary, would you say, for instance, at the end of World War II the manpower situation was such that the degree of waste in military manpower was less than it has been in civilian circumstances since?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No. I think there was a high degree of waste in World War II with regard to expenditures on military manpower. We built up to something on the order of 12 million men.

Most of the men were milling around in one training establishment or another. The total strength of the Army reached 89 divisions, I believe—something on the order of 6 million men. I think World War II reflected the desire to have everybody participate. If one has the desire to have everybody participate in military service, one is bound to draw into the service greater manpower than is actually required for the particular mission. So in some ways we had a high training edge to our military establishment then, but it was larger than it needed to be.

Senator TAFT. I think you stated a few minutes ago that the U.S. forces of 300,000 in Europe have shrunken during the last decade. What were they in 1964?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Let me have slide 23.


[Showing slide.]

During the Berlin period they reached a peak of 460,000, Senator, if you look behind you at the chart. We did not retain forces in Europe extensively after World War II. They are not there as an aftermath of World War II. We went down to about 80,000 men post-war. Then during the Korean period, when General Bradley observed that the Korean War was the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time, we built up substantially in Europe, drew down during the 1950's, and peaked again during the period of the Berlin crisis. We reduced during the late sixties, and drew down further in the Vietnam period, and then have come back up to our 319 level. The Soviets have been increasing substantially since 1968.

Senator NUNN. Without objection, we will put this chart in the record.

Senator TAFT. I think that would be very helpful.

[The chart follows:]



Senator TAFT. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the ability of Reserves and that the restrictions on them made it difficult for them to be effective. Do you have any special comments or feelings with regard to medical Reserve units in that connection?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I have no special knowledge of that, Senator. But I will insert some comments in the record.

[The information follows:]

The readiness of Reserve medical units has, in the past, been adversely affected by the same kind of problems as many other Reserve units, including the lack of modern equipment. For example, when the 311th Medical Hospital (Field), U.S. Army Reserve, of Sharonville, Ohio, was mobilized in 1968, it had only 17 percent of its equipment, even though it was nearly up to its authorized personnel strength.

Although these deficiencies were corrected quickly and the 311th was operating in Vietnam by mid-October 1968, it is clear that we must ensure that Reserve units, medical and otherwise, upon which we rely in the future for rapid response in the event of mobilization, are, in fact, ready. We are working toward this goal, and the correction of equipment shortages is being emphasized.

Senator TAFT. I would welcome it. I have had some rather unfavorable experiences during the Vietnam War in that connection with units being called out that apparently were not in any shape to be called out from the point of view of their actual readiness, or even desire to meet the requirements. I certainly think that should not be allowed to continue in existence if we are going to be looking at availability of Reserve units. I would particularly like to make sure of availability in those areas.

What is the comparison—you mentioned the 1964 comparison and the 20 percent reduction—what are the figures with regard to the civilian employees?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The civilian employees are approximately the same as they were in 1964.

Mr. BREHM. We had just over a million in 1964. It is just about the same level today.

Senator TAFT. To what extent, in your plans for shifting and creating more combat units are the combat units in the new divisions simply transfers from the existing divisions?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have created additional combat units as a result of support reductions. We are transferring men from activities other than division strength to help build up the new brigades for the 14 divisions this year. In addition, through further reductions in headquarters and support and through an affiliate process—which, by the way, we hope will strengthen the Guard and Reserve—we hope to go to 16 divisions. That will draw, however, on the affiliation concept and existing strength in the Guard and Reserve units.

Senator TAFT. You mentioned the aero-naval balance overall. How does the B-1 fit into your thinking in this regard? The Soviets have apparently been using their bombers extensively in connection with such a type of operation. Are we planning to do the same? Does the B-1 make that much difference?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The B-1 would be primarily intended, at least during the first decade of its life, for its role in the strategic nuclear balance rather than its role in conventional conflict.

For conventional conflict we would probably make use of the then surviving B-52 fleet rather than the B-1, which would be reserved for its role in the SIOP. I think your question went to these conventional issues rather than to the broader question of nuclear deterrence. For the foreseeable future, the B-1's role in conventional conflict would be relatively limited.

Senator TAFT. Are there any other aircraft in production or in R. & D. that would be designed or expected to be employed in this role, other than Navy aircraft?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. In the aero-naval balance? Yes, indeed. At the present time we are looking at the possibility of putting the Harpoon on the B-52 aircraft, which would provide us with a long-range capability of going after surface vessels under hostile conditions. In addition, a very large section of the existing U.S. Air Force inventory would be quite useful for work reasonably close to shores. As the range of aircraft is extended, the parts of the ocean which cannot be reached by land-based air naturally shrinks.

We have a number of aircraft that could well be useful in that role. As you know, we have the YF-16 and the YF-17 presently under development, and we hope to choose one. The F-111, which is in inventory at the present time, has long legs and consequently could be used in this role as well.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Secretary, in mentioning the growth of the Soviet conventional forces, you made no direct reference to the other fronts the Russians are concerned about, particularly, of course, the Chinese front. I wonder if you would try to put that into some kind of relationship.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir. With the growing disharmony between the Soviet Union and China, the Soviet Union launched a buildup on the Chinese frontier. That buildup extended from 1965 to 1969 without substantial augmentation of forces in Eastern Europe. Since 1969 there have been buildups in Eastern Europe and along the Chinese frontier that have occurred simultaneously. The strength of those forces along the Chinese border at the present time are on the order of 43 divisions, as I recall it—approximately 562,000 men.

Senator TAFT. Some of the growth at least, but not all, is what you are saying, of the conventional Soviet ground forces do relate to that front?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Particularly during the 1960's the growth was related, I think, primarily to the altered conditions on the Chinese border. Since 1969 the growth has been more general.

Senator TAFT. Do you see any change in that which occurs as a result of the change in relationship between the United States and the People's Republic?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that what one sees is no longer a rapid growth in the strength of the forces along the Chinese border, but a gradual improvement of those forces, a continuing improvement which has gone on through this period of rapprochement between the United States and China. But is nothing dramatic that has been demonstrated.

Senator TAFT. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Senator NUNN. At this point we would like to get General Brown's statement. I wanted to have an opportunity for all the Senators—some of them had to leave—to question Secretary Schlesinger, and then we will come back to both of you. I know they have several more questions.

General Brown, I would like to welcome you to the committee. I would also like to take this opportunity to say that I think the Department of Defense is in extremely capable hands with Secretary Schlesinger and you as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the other members of the Joint Chiefs. It is particularly gratifying that we have no disruptions and no ominous sounds from other nations during our period of domestic turmoil here. I believe to a large degree this is due to the strong leadership we have in the Department of Defense, and I commend both of you for your excellent leadership.

General Brown, whatever statement you have, we would be delighted to hear at this time.

General BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I shall summarize it.

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today. It is appropriate that my first congressional appearance as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be to discuss our military personnel requirements. No resource is more important to the effectiveness of our military strength than the men and women in our Armed Forces. Accordingly, no subject is more important to peace than the adequacy of our military personnel.

The fact that personnel costs have increased and constitute 50.3 percent of the fiscal year 1975 defense budget is well known. This fact is, however, of continuing concern to all of us. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not view any element of our military strength as static, but rather as evolutionary and requiring constant examination and adjustment. The increased cost of manpower impacts not only on the numbers and availability of personnel, but also on the requirement to fund badly needed modernization of our forces unduly delayed by the war in Southeast Asia. Until July 1973, Selective Service provided a personnel base at a cost not directly associated with the value of the services provided by the young men of the Nation. However, if we are to protect our global interests, and be prepared to cope with prospective change, we must shoulder the cost of maintaining and modernizing our forces.

Military personnel issues can neither be identified nor solved in isolation. They are inexorably tied to the broader issues of strategy and threat. My purpose today, therefore, is to sketch briefly the relative balance of military force as it exists in the world today, to discuss in broad outline the manner in which personnel requirements are identified and to conclude with a few observations with regard to specialized personnel problems.

The overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union remains in a state of dynamic equilibrium. The Soviet Union has generated a momentum in new strategic offensive programs which, in the absence of successful negotiations or increased strategic programs of our own, could upset the balance at some time in the future. The Secretary of Defense has already discussed with you this balance in great detail. Suffice it to say, the Soviet Union now holds a significant numerical advantage in both ICBM's and

SLBM's measured by launchers, throw weight, or explosive power. This is offset by our equally significant counterbalance in areas of critical qualitative importance, for example, CEP, MIRV's, submarine quietness, and ASW. Likewise, we enjoy a numerical advantage in intercontinental bombers and numbers of strategic warheads. Currently, our strategic systems are fully capable of deterring attack upon the United States or its allies. Our advantages are, however, volatile assets which, over time, may evaporate. Continued congressional support for strategic development initiatives recommended by the Secretary of Defense, will insure that in the years to come, should negotiations on further strategic arms limitations not succeed, the United States will be better prepared to acquire sufficient strategic power to deter aggression or nuclear blackmail.

Our strategic forces are capital intensive and directly represent only about 5 percent of the active duty end strength requested in the fiscal year 1975 budget. The current state of the strategic balance, however, increases significantly the role of the personnel intensive general purpose forces in the deterrence of aggression below the level of strategic nuclear war. We increasingly rely upon ready, mobile, and versatile general purpose forces to deter conventional attacks upon U.S. vital interests.

Here again, notwithstanding Soviet numerical superiority, I believe we are fully capable of deterring overt Soviet aggression and defeating it in the event deterrence fails. The American fighting man remains better equipped and better trained than his Soviet counterpart. The Soviet Union maintains an impressive active duty force strength of about 4 million men backed up by a trained reserve of at least another 4 million who have served with the active forces in the last 5 years.

We do not plan to emulate the U.S.S.R. or the PRC where even larger forces are maintained. If we are to attempt to compete in terms of numbers with the Soviet Union, it would require far more than the entire DOD budget just to maintain equivalent general purpose force levels. Conscription and a rigidly controlled economy are burdens borne by the U.S.S.R. which appreciably reduce the costs of maintaining large general purpose forces. We must, however, maintain general purpose forces capable of protecting our interests, lest our adversaries be tempted by a perceived weakness to abandon reason.

The Soviet Union has undertaken important ongoing programs to qualitatively improve its large general purpose force. A new tank, a new armored fighting vehicle, and a new missile system mounted on an existing armored vehicle, as well as a new assault helicopter are currently being issued to Soviet ground forces. A substantial Soviet naval modernization program is underway. The naval capabilities of the Soviet Union are becoming more formidable every year. There are numerous indicators that the Soviet Union has begun to increase its emphasis on improving the ability of its tactical air force to engage in ground attack missions. The Fencer-A; the Mig-23; the SU-20; and the new V/STOL fighter are designed to serve as the fixed-wing complement on the Kuril class carrier. Collectively they establish a new dimension to Soviet ground attack capabilities.

More specifically, we must continue to equip, maintain, and deploy ready, trained, and disciplined military forces immediately available to respond to any challenge on our important interests. There is no better indication of our national will and our resolve to honor our treaty commitments.

Now, I would like to comment on the process for determining personnel requirements.

The development of overall force structure is achieved by a dialogue between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The product is submitted for approval ultimately by the Commander in Chief and the Congress. The cycle begins with the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense concerning military strategy based on the world situation and national security objectives as they are perceived from presidential statements, National Security Council policy, expressions of congressional will, and prior decisions by the Secretary of Defense. This iterative process results in the Secretary of Defense issuing Defense policy and planning guidance. Force planning then proceeds in the following manner:

1. The threat is examined and detailed threat estimates developed.

2. Against the threat, estimates are made of United States and allied forces needed to successfully defend against and thus deter an attack by a potential enemy.

3. The present and future forces and capabilities of our allies are then assessed.

4. U.S. forces and capabilities are also assessed.

5. The combined United States-allied capabilities are then compared with the threat and assessed as to adequacy.

6. United States force planning is adjusted and coordinated with our allies such that the combined capabilities are adequate to achieve mutual objectives against the threat at a prudent level of risk.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, all participate. This objective force is developed without specific dollar constraints, but the process insures that it is reasonably attainable from a fiscal standpoint. The objective force provides a basis for appraising the risks involved in the adoption of any lesser force levels.

Applying this information, the Secretary of Defense issues further force, fiscal, and support planning, and programing guidance. Upon receipt of this additional guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepares for the Secretary a Joint Forces Memorandum, which contains fiscally constrained force structure and levels, together with an appraisal of the associated risks. The services then develop and submit for approval their manpower requirements. Thus, the strategy, fiscal, and force planning goals, and the contribution of our allies, weighed against the threat, determine the mix of forces and the level of forces Congress is asked to provide in order to serve the Nation's needs.

Special personnel problems deserve some discussion.

The detailed responsibility for acquiring and training our authorized forces resides, of course, in each of the services. I, as chair-

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has no direct responsibility for the assignment, adequacy, or retention of the men and women of the services. I do, however, have an abiding interest in the people of the Armed Forces. The most efficient and most modern weapon is without meaning unless it is manned by proficient professionals willing to put nation above self. Thus, the personnel problems confronting the military services today relate not only to adequate numbers but most importantly, to quality, a factor which cannot be ignored in a time of complex tasks and highly sophisticated equipment.

The Congress has acted positively to assist our Armed Forces to achieve an all-volunteer force by raising the level of compensation, as well as authorizing incentives for enlistment. The services, in turn, are making progress in improving the quality of life of the young men and women in service. The success or failure of our national defense investment depends, in the last analysis, upon our success in attracting outstanding young men and women who will seek a full military career and accept the sacrifices of a life of service to their country.

In conclusion, those who would be our adversaries understand strength and firm resolve. We all hope to reduce the requirements for arms for eliminating the causes of war and by negotiating verifiable arms control agreements which do not diminish our security.

Until such time as we are certain that freedom can be maintained by other means, in my opinion, our surest guarantee against war is a ready and responsible military power capable of defending the United States and its vital interests.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to discuss with this committee our military personnel needs and to place these needs in a perspective of service to Nation and to peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[General Brown's statement follows:]

STATEMENT BY GENERAL GEORGE S. BROWN, USAF, CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today. It is appropriate that my first Congressional appearance as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be to discuss with you certain aspects of our military personnel requirements. No resource is more important to the effectiveness of our military strength than the men and women in our armed forces. Accordingly, no subject is more important to peace than the adequacy of our military personnel.

The fact that personnel costs have increased and constitute 50.3 percent of the FY 75 Defense budget is too well known to require discussion here. This fact is, however, of continuing concern to all of us. The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not view any element of our military strength as static, but rather as evolutionary and requiring constant examination and adjustment. The increased cost of manpower impacts not only on the numbers and availability of personnel, but also on the requirement to fund badly needed modernization of our forces unduly delayed by the requirements of the war in Southeast Asia. In reality, however, this increase represents less of manpower cost growth than a shifting of the burden. Until July 1973, Selective Service provided a personnel base at a cost not directly associated with the value of the services provided by the young men of the Nation. However, if we are to protect our global interests, avoid the specter of irrationality, and be prepared to cope with prospective change, we must shoulder the cost of maintaining and modernizing

our forces. As the Secretary of Defense has said, the difficulty with weighing the costs of deterrence against the risk of war is measuring the value of peace and freedom.

Military personnel issues can neither be identified nor solved in isolation. They are inexorably tied to the broader issues of strategy and threat. My purpose today, therefore, is to briefly sketch the relative balance of military force as it exists in the world today, to discuss in broad outline the manner in which personnel requirements are identified, and to conclude with a few observations with regard to specialized personnel problems.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

The overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union remains in a state of dynamic equilibrium. The Soviet Union has generated a momentum in new strategic offensive programs which, in the absence of successful negotiations or increased strategic programs of our own, could upset the balance at some time in the future. The Secretary of Defense has already discussed with you this balance in great detail. No useful purpose would be served by my restating or reemphasizing the points he has made. Suffice it to say, the Soviet Union now holds a significant numerical advantage in both ICBMs and SLBMs measured by launchers, throwweight, or explosive power. This is offset by our equally significant counterbalance in areas of critical qualitative importance, e.g., CEP, MIRVs, submarine quietness, and ASW. Only in the area of SLBM range does the USSR enjoy a temporary qualitative advantage. Likewise, we enjoy a numerical advantage in inter-continental bombers and numbers of strategic warheads. Currently, our strategic systems are fully capable of deterring attack upon the United States or its allies. Our advantages are, however, in light of ongoing USSR programs, volatile assets which, over time, may evaporate. Continued Congressional support for strategic development initiatives recommended by the Secretary of Defense will insure that in the years to come, whether or not negotiations on further strategic arms limitations succeed soon, succeed in the future, or do not succeed at all, the United States will possess sufficient strategic power to deter aggression or nuclear blackmail.

Our strategic forces are capital intensive and directly represent only about 5 percent of the active duty end strength requested in the FY 75 budget. The current state of the strategic balance, however, increases significantly the role of the personnel intensive general purpose forces in the deterrence of aggression below the level of strategic nuclear war. Neither the United States nor the USSR will be capable in the foreseeable future of executing a disarming first strike. This equilibrium reduces considerably the ability of our strategic nuclear forces to deter lesser forms of conflict. We must, therefore, increasingly rely upon ready, mobile, and versatile general purpose forces to deter conventional attacks upon United States vital interests.

Here again, notwithstanding Soviet numerical superiority, I believe we are fully capable of deterring overt Soviet aggression and defeating it in the event deterrence fails. The American fighting man remains better equipped and better trained than his Soviet counterpart. The Soviet Union maintains an impressive active duty force strength of about four million men backed up by a trained reserve of at least another four million men who have served with the active forces in the last five years.

We do not plan to emulate the USSR or the PRC where even larger forces are maintained. If we were to attempt to compete in terms of numbers with the Soviet Union, it would require far more than the entire DOD budget just to maintain equivalent general purpose force levels. Conscription and a rigidly controlled economy are burdens borne by the USSR which appreciably reduce the costs of maintaining large general purpose forces. We must, however, maintain and deploy general purpose forces capable of protecting our interests, lest our adversaries be tempted by a perceived weakness or by ambition to abandon reason.

The Soviet Union has undertaken important ongoing programs to qualitatively improve its large general purpose force. A new tank, a new armored fighting vehicle, and a new missile system mounted on an existing armored vehicle, and a new assault helicopter are currently being issued to Soviet ground forces. A substantial Soviet naval modernization program is underway and the naval capabilities of the Soviet Union are becoming more formidable

every year. There are numerous indicators that the Soviet Union has begun to increase its emphasis on improving the ability of its tactical air force to engage in ground attack missions. The FENCER-A, the MIG-23, the SU-20, and the new V/STOL fighter designed to serve as the fixed-wing complement on the KURIL-class carrier collectively establish a new dimension to Soviet ground attack capabilities.

In order to maintain a credible deterrent, we must continue to equip, maintain, and deploy ready, trained, and disciplined military forces immediately available to respond to any challenge on our important interests. There is no better indication of our national will and our resolve to honor our Treaty commitments.

DETERMINING PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

The development of overall force structure is achieved by a dialogue between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The product is submitted for approval ultimately by the Commander in Chief and the Congress. The cycle begins with the Joint Chiefs of Staff providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense concerning military strategy based on the world situation and national security objectives as they are perceived from Presidential statements, National Security Council policy, expressions of Congressional will, and prior decisions by the Secretary of Defense. This iterative process results in the Secretary of Defense issuing defense policy and planning guidance. Force planning then proceeds in the following manner:

1. The threat is examined and detailed threat estimates developed.
2. Against the threat, estimates are made of U.S. and allied forces needed to successfully defend against and thus deter an attack by a potential enemy by preventing him from being confident that he could achieve his objectives at acceptable cost.
3. The present and future forces and capabilities of our allies are then assessed.
4. U.S. forces and capabilities are also assessed.
5. The combined U.S.-allied capabilities are then compared with the threat and assessed as to adequacy.
6. U.S. force planning is adjusted and coordinated with our allies such that the combined capabilities are adequate to achieve mutual objectives against the threat at a prudent level of risk.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, all participate. This objective force is developed without specific dollar constraints, but the process insures that it is reasonably attainable from a fiscal standpoint. The objective force provides a basis for appraising the risks involved in the adoption of any lesser force levels in that the objective force is considered those minimum essential to support the national military strategy with prudent risk.

Applying this information, the Secretary of Defense issues further force, fiscal, and support planning and programming guidance. Upon receipt of this additional guidance, the JCS prepares for the Secretary a Joint Forces Memorandum, which contains fiscally constrained force structure and levels, together with a reappraisal of the associated risks. The Services then develop and submit for approval their manpower requirements. Thus, the strategy, fiscal and force planning goals, and the contribution of our allies, weighed against the threat, determine the mix of forces and the level of forces Congress is asked to provide in order to serve the Nation's needs.

SPECIAL PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

The detailed responsibility for acquiring and training our authorized forces resides, of course, in each of the Services. I have no direct responsibility for the assignment, adequacy, and retention of the men and women of the Services. I do, however, have an abiding interest in the people of the Armed Forces. The most efficient and most modern weapon is without meaning unless it is manned by proficient professionals willing to put Nations above self. Thus, the personnel problems confronting the Military Services today relate not only to adequate numbers but most importantly, to quality, a factor which cannot be ignored in a time of complex tasks and highly sophisticated equipment.

The Congress has acted positively to assist our Armed Forces to achieve

an all-volunteer force by raising the level of compensation, as well as authorizing incentives for enlistment. The Services, in turn, are making progress in improving the quality of life of the young men and women in Service. The success or failure of our national defense investment depends, in the last analysis, upon our success in attracting outstanding young men and women who will seek a full military career and accept the sacrifices of a life of service to their country.

CONCLUSION

Those who would be our adversaries understand strength and firm resolve. We all hope to reduce the requirements for arms by eliminating the causes of war and by negotiating verifiable arms control agreements which do not diminish our security.

Until such time as we are certain that freedom can be maintained by other means, in my opinion, our surest guarantee against war is a ready and responsible military power capable of defending the United States and its vital interests.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity you have afforded me to discuss with this Committee our military personnel needs and to place these needs in a perspective of service to Nation and to peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, General Brown.

On that latter point, I wanted to get with both you and the Secretary on the quality of the volunteer forces. You said in your statement that Russians were willing to bear the burden of conscription, which appreciably lowers their defense costs and allows them to have more manpower. By implication, I assume you are saying we are not willing to bear the burden of conscription in this country in order to reduce the cost and increase our military capability, is that right?

General BROWN. Mr. Chairman, I did not mean to imply anything. I just stated my thoughts. The administration, as you know, commissioned the Gates Commission to look at this matter. They made a recommendation, which was accepted by the Chief Executive and the Congress. And, I certainly support it.

Senator NUNN. Would the return to the draft strengthen our military capability and lessen our defense costs? I am not asking you whether you are advocating returning—I am not putting you in that position—I am just saying that hypothetically, if that policy were adopted by the administration and/or Congress, would it be capable of reducing our defense costs and increasing our military capability?

General BROWN. I will defer to the Secretary, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. One would have to have a change in existing legislation in order to bring that about, Mr. Chairman. At the present time, the pay of the military is tied to the pay of the civil servants, and the pay of the civil servant is tied to prevailing wages in the civilian sector. As a result, unless there were a change in existing legislation, whether or not one had the draft, pay increases for the military would continue. One would, therefore, have to have major legislative surgery. If such legislative surgery did take place, then one could reduce the personnel costs of the military establishment.

You mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, that the all-volunteer force was one of the driving factors in increasing pay. I think we must recognize that even prior to the movement toward the all-volunteer force, major increases in pay for the lower ranking military were

underway in order to remove the inequity that had existed for these people since the early 1950's. We have eliminated those inequities. Therefore, we could not reduce the costs.

Senator NUNN. I understand that the so-called Rivers amendment, passed before the volunteer force, is a driving factor in the military pay increase. The question I have is one of particular concern to the young people at some point, although I do not think they are aware of it. We have heard so much about the volunteer force. What would happen if we had to go back to the Vietnam levels of manpower right now?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I do not believe we could obtain a sufficient force at acceptable budget levels, and we would have to return to the draft.

Senator NUNN. We would have to return to the draft to get back to that figure?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. I have heard the figures of a \$30 or \$40 billion increase in the budget to get back to that manpower level based on the current pay level. Is that somewhere in the ball park?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I do not think it would be, based on the current pay level. We are able to raise about 2.2 million men, perhaps a little bit more, through the volunteer system at the present time. To obtain another 1.3 million men would probably not be attainable through the volunteer system.

Senator NUNN. So what we have is a peacetime volunteer force and not wartime volunteer force, is that not about right?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. That is correct. We have a force we hope will maintain the peace so we will not have to have recourse to the draft.

Senator NUNN. But if we did have any kind of war like the Vietnam war, your business judgment is we would have to return to the draft?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that that is a likely possibility.

Senator NUNN. Is the Defense Department capable of going back to the draft on a short time basis? Do you have alternatives that would perhaps bring this about, and could it be implemented under wartime pressures?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have pressed very hard to maintain the Selective Service System. We have continued to press for the \$45 million in authorizations for that system, so that we have a standby capability if the need should arise.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, do you visualize down the road that we may get into such budgetary constraint that we would, even in peacetime, have to go back to the draft? You are part of the policymaking. I do not think it would be fair to ask General that we may get into such budgetary constraint that we would, Brown that question, but I am certain President Ford will be listening to you very carefully on that subject. Are you examining that possibility, or do you think there is any call to examine it?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I do not think that that is a likely possibility for the immediate future. I think it relates to the issues Senator Byrd was raising. If budget constraints become such that

we are unable to equip our forces properly, and the only alternative we have is to underpay the men in the armed forces through conscription, we would have to consider that. But I hope that we do not have to come to that consideration.

Senator NUNN. There are no plans going on for that at the present time, no alternative planning going on in that regard in the Department of Defense?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. There are none, save in regard to the maintenance of the Selective Service System.

Senator NUNN. As an aid to this subcommittee, at some point I think I would request that there be some kind of alternative plan for the guidance of Congress, just to see what the alternative is. I am not certain this Nation, as a whole, is nearly as committed to the volunteer force as the policymakers have accepted, particularly outside the Vietnam area.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think they are legitimate questions. We recognize that there are advantages in the national service force as opposed to a volunteer force. I think the point that should be made is that because of the national disenchantment with Vietnam, the draft had pretty well outlived its short-term usefulness, and that it was creating more problems in that period.

Senator NUNN. Short-term usefulness?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Short-term usefulness.

Senator NUNN. That does not necessarily mean that it is the policy for us in the 1970's and 1980's.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that is right. What I did try to emphasize is for the foreseeable future, I do not believe we would find sufficient support on the Hill even if we should desire to go back to a system of conscription.

Senator NUNN. I hope you would not have your policy dictated by the lack of support you judge at this time, because I do not think there is as much lack as you might think.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think that your admonishment is well taken. We are going to prepare for you the kind of sketch of alternative systems for this subcommittee so that you have that available to you.

Senator NUNN. I think that would be very helpful, because we have moved into another era now. We are, as the President said last night, plagued with economic problems. I think there are a lot of other questions too that we do not need to get into today.

Let me move to another subject, the NATO structure. As you know, I have been very involved and interested in, and have talked to you and Secretary Brehm quite extensively on. Of the three major amendments passed this year in the military authorization bill, perhaps the most significant, or at least one of the most, was the required conversions of combat force troops to combat troops, permissive conversion, but required reduction of support troops. Do you have any plans now for tackling that subject, and if so, could you share them with us this morning?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We have plans, in the sense that we and the Army are working industriously on the problem, but I do not think we can give you a definitive answer today. It is our intention to comply with the numerical requirements of that legislation. We

entirely endorse the spirit of that legislation. We believe we can obtain a better posture, and indeed a greater ratio of combat to total force personnel through the kinds of changes that we suggest. I think Mr. Brehm may be able to shed some additional light on it.

Senator NUNN. I would like to hear him on that subject. The question of restructuring is what I am interested in, not just the question of 18,000 troops, but taking a fresh look at our European defense structure in the modern age we are in right now. That is the main concern.

Mr. Brehm, do you want to add something to that?

Mr. BREHM. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. As I think you know, we have done a fair amount of homework in two areas. One has to do with an examination of our headquarters activities in Europe as well as other places. We have also examined the ground forces themselves with respect to the relationship between the combat and the support elements. That homework, I believe, will be extremely useful to us in complying with the new legislation.

Senator NUNN. In this study are you going to be looking at the short war-long war kind of debate that has gone on for some time in relationship to our troop posture?

Mr. BREHM. Yes, indeed, that is a definite part of the consideration.

Senator NUNN. You will also, I hope be looking at the possibility of expanding the indigenous kind of logistic support in NATO rather than having so much support coming from our Armed Forces.

Mr. BREHM. Yes.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We are looking at that most energetically, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Who is going to be responsible for this particular endeavor? Are you going to take that on?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Mr. Brehm will be responsible for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He will be, of course, working closely with the services, and particularly the Army.

Senator NUNN. General Brown, are you familiar with this, and do you have any comment on it from the perspective of the Joint Chiefs?

General BROWN. I am familiar with these issues. The Joint Chiefs are all well aware. The Secretary has discussed the issue with us. Of course, we are all aware of the amendments you offered and the action on the Hill. It is healthy from time to time to take a fresh look at our deployment and force structure, including our logistic support base. The Chiefs welcome this examination and look forward to participating in it.

Senator NUNN. I know the Air Force has undertaken—General Jones briefed me on this back in February—to have much more of a coordinated allied effort over the entire central front. Certainly, I would hope the other services would follow that lead. I am not sure you have reached a perfect solution at this point, but you have made giant strides in that regard, I believe.

General BROWN. Principally General Jones achieved an awareness of a need for far greater flexibility in the deployment of forces in Europe. This indicated that the structure should be changed, as well as organization, communications, command and control, and

the whole thing. That action was a major milestone. Now we can go forward working with our allies to implement fully the specifics.

Senator NUNN. The other amendment, Mr. Secretary—I will address this to you, as I am sure you have already done work on it—is the tactical nuclear weapon situation in NATO. This amendment, of course, requires an intensive study and review of that posture throughout NATO, particularly the U.S. role. Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes. We have such an intensive study underway. As the amendment underscores, the tactical nuclear posture of the United States in Europe has been in place for 20 years. There have been major adjustments with regard to strategy, force balance, and in addition, communications, particularly transport. For this reason, we believe that we can make a major adjustment of some of our overseas deployments. I would not for the moment concentrate on NATO alone. I am talking about all of our overseas deployments. We will be dealing with the Armed Services Committee at large in a closed session on this issue.

Senator NUNN. Has there been any consultation with the allies at this point?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, sir. As you are well aware, a major element in the problem is the diplomatic element. There is a very high degree of sensitivity among our allies to downward adjustment in the U.S. tactical nuclear presence in Europe.

Senator NUNN. This all relates to the MBFR talks that are now going on, and I do not want to get into that. Would you give us the status of it without getting into the more sensitive areas? I mean the meetings, when they are going to take place, and whether we are going to be able to make positive moves in the direction of the MBFR results.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The talks are presently in recess. I think that I would characterize the tone of those talks as excellent until last spring, when some mild chill, if I may use that expression, began to characterize those talks. By and large, the Soviet Union has been inclined to wait, or inclined to be intransigent, depending upon one's view of the Soviet Union. We do not know what the Soviets are prepared to do. If the constructive tone of those talks that existed earlier does return, we could have an agreement in the next 9 months or a year for a significant reduction of the U.S. and Soviet forces.

Senator NUNN. Do you think perhaps our own domestic turmoil is contributing to their cooling off, or do you see more hope at the present time?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. One can only speculate on what the Soviet motives were during this period. It is at least plausible that because of the domestic uncertainties in the United States, the Soviets decided that a policy of general waiting might be their most advantageous strategy. One cannot be certain of that. Only time will tell, because these things appear only as a result of diplomatic contacts. The MBFR talks will reconvene in the middle of September.

Senator NUNN. One other question on NATO, and then I would like to go on to some other subjects. Congress also has expressed its interest on the question of the commonality of weapons systems.

I believe we have a mandated study on commonality in the authorization bill. What is the potential for arriving at a better coordinated effort in the area of commonality of weapons between the allies?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. This is an area on which we have placed tremendous stress. General Goodpaster believes, with commonality, he could increase the combat effectiveness of the existing forces by about 30 percent. That is a very substantial increase. But nations are jealous of their own prerogatives. Logistics are assigned as national responsibilities. Nations do tend to yield to domestic industrial pressures in the small, when in the large they would benefit from commonality.

Senator NUNN. Is that not particularly applicable to our own country as far as the overall benefit if we went to commonality?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. No, I think it is least applicable to the United States, because we maintain the largest military establishment. Your real problem, I think, comes when you have military establishments of 50 and 80,000 men that are forced to maintain their own logistics capabilities. Under those circumstances, one has none of the benefits of scale. The United States enjoys most of the benefits of scale by itself.

Senator NUNN. What I was making reference to, though, is that increased commonality from a national security point of view would be advantageous to this nation, would it not?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, indeed, but we must recognize that we face very strong institutional pressures within the Alliance. The question of adjusting the support base in the United States is relatively easy compared to the difficulty of bringing about the commonality among the various national logistics systems in Europe. That does not mean that we should desist in our efforts, but we should recognize that the institutional pressures are very, very compressive.

Senator NUNN. I understand now there are four NATO nations who are in the process of looking for a new lightweight fighter, and that consideration is on their minds. Is the Defense Department now working with them? I know we have not selected our own lightweight fighter. What are the constraints there?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I would describe our reaction as energetic. Others might describe it as eager.

Senator NUNN. I talked to several of their representatives when they were here and found them to be really, in my opinion, eager to try and work something out. However, the time differential between the decision making in DOD, and when they have to make their decision is such that—

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I am quite hopeful that in the area of the new fighter aircraft we will be able to achieve the kind of commonality to which you refer.

The biggest problem we have, I think, is that for the Alliance as a whole, we probably have excess capacity maldistributed among the various members of the Alliance, and cutting down that excess capacity is painful to each of the members.

Senator NUNN. Shifting to another area, what about the U.S. forces on Taiwan? Are they now being reduced?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. They are being reduced.

Senator NUNN. To what extent?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. We will insert some numbers into the record. The reduction has been on the order of 50 percent because of recent developments.

[The information follows:]

As of 31 July 1974, there were approximately 5,160 U.S. military personnel on Taiwan as compared to 8,785 on 30 June 1973. This is a 41% reduction during that period. Since 30 June 1972, when there were 9,440 U.S. military on Taiwan, the reduction has been over 45%.

Senator NUNN. How about the question of Korea and the forces in Korea? Do you see any possibility of bringing some of those forces home during fiscal year 1975?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I would not anticipate such a development in fiscal year 1975. I think it is a subject that bears continued scrutiny. As you know, we have reduced those forces from 60,000 men to 40,000 men at the present time. We are examining some adjustments in the composition of those forces. But the withdrawal of forces in that critical area of the world would have political effects which must be examined very carefully.

Senator NUNN. On the question of the recent changes in Cyprus and the Greek-Turkish relationships, how do you see that affecting our NATO posture at this point in time?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. At this point there has been some diversion of forces from their NATO commitments—basically a small diversion. We are hopeful that as a result of the changes in attitude out there, the harmony of NATO at the end of the process will be at least as great as it was at the start.

Senator NUNN. Is this going to affect the homeporting of our vessels in Greece? Do you think we will have more positive developments there? Have you seen any changes in that negotiation?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I have urged Admiral Holloway to review the entire homeporting issue with regard to the benefits that the U.S. Navy gets in terms of forward deployment as opposed to its impact on readiness. He will be reviewing that issue. I think it is fair to say that the altered tenor of the Greek Government results in less of a political constraint on our homeporting in that area. We must carefully examine whether the technical advantages of going ahead with phase 2 are still significant enough to implement that phase.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to close with your comments on our Reserve and Guard forces at the present and what you see in the future. I know you have a study underway now. What is the status of that study, and when do you think it will be available? Can you tell us anything about it at the present time?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. The study will be finished in December.

Senator NUNN. December?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. December.

Mr. Brehm, can you tell us about that?

Senator NUNN. Has the date slipped? I thought it was going to come in September or October.

Mr. BREHM. We were shooting originally, Mr. Chairman, for around August or September. The large study group of some 60

people that we had convened has been extensively reduced, and we now have a small team going over the findings of the original study group. Having examined that process in detail we feel that it will take another 2 or 3 months to act on it. We hope to have changes that might be appropriately reflected in the fiscal year 1976 budget. We are trying to tie to that milestone.

Senator NUNN. Are you considering hypothetically the point the Secretary and I talked about a few minutes ago about the possible callup short of a national emergency?

Mr. BREHM. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Are you assuming that as a possibility in your study?

Mr. BREHM. We are assuming that flexibility, at least we are assuming that that is a variable in the study.

Senator NUNN. I hope so, because I have found that that is one of the real problems the active forces have.

Mr. BREHM. Yes, I agree with that.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any other comments on the Reserves at this time?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I think I would amplify my earlier comment, that we hope and expect the reserves to be an effective substitute and supplement of the active duty forces. The reserves are variable in quality. There are a large number of high quality units in the reserves. There are, however, other units that for one reason or another have not been appropriately trained, they are not combat ready. We are working on those units.

Increasingly, I think that we will have more effective combat capability built into those units. This is a source of distress, I think, to at least a minority of those in some of these units. Some months ago the Army brought a reserve unit down to Fort Bliss, for example, and the members of the unit had expected the usual easy time, which meant that they would gather together for some discussions and then go over to Juarez in the evening. The Army took them out into the desert and worked them for 2 weeks. There has been substantial improvement, I think, both in the combat effectiveness of that unit and in its orientation. Increasingly we hope to do that with our reserve units, so that they recognize themselves to be a part of the total force concept. And when called upon to serve in this manner, I think they will have higher morale and probably a better selection of recruits for the reserve units. So I am very hopeful in that regard.

As you know, the quality of the Air National Guard and reserve has always been high. We had some problems in the last year because the air defense mission has grown increasingly less relevant to the strategic position in which the United States finds itself today. But those are high quality units, and what we are attempting to do is divert their energies to missions that are more relevant to current needs.

Senator NUNN. General Brown, would you like to comment on that, particularly the question of readiness of the reserve and Guard units we have now, and anything you would like to add for the record on this point? We would like a rundown for the record on how you rate the reserve and Guard units now.

General BROWN. I would just like to add to what the Secretary said. I visited an exercise in Louisiana last week, a BRAVE SHIELD exercise conducted under the Commander in Chief of the Readiness Command. It was the first time in a great number of years that a major unit in the reserve components had participated as an entity. The unit playing the defensive role in that maneuver was the National Guard brigade of the State of Louisiana. The Army now has what it calls "affiliated" units. It had been affiliated with the 101st Airborne, had worked with them in their training, and had loaned them equipment for some of this where they were short. They took to the field and stayed there for a period of several days. I must say the enthusiasm was infectious. They did a fine job.

Of course, they found many weaknesses, as any unit does going into the field. They had not exercised or trained other than in very small units up until this point. And then they got to work as a team. The air units, of course, as the Secretary indicated, have been very effective throughout the years. The affiliation principle between regular and reserve units has been working with the Air Guard and reserve for a number of years. It has recently been implemented within the Army. This is the first evidence I have seen of it, and I must say if it is a typical example, it is very effective.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, General Brown.

Could you add for the record, a chart showing the readiness ratings that you have now, the most recent one, on the Guard and the reserve in all the services?

General BROWN. I would be most pleased to.

[The information follows:]

READINESS STATUS OF RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD FORCES

The following data and charts depict the readiness of various units of the organized reserve and national guard. The material is organized in a narrative summary for each Service followed by a chart depicting the readiness categories of significant units.

Non-unit reserve manpower is addressed on a separate narrative and the Service figures are compiled on a single chart.

U.S. ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD

There are 33 major combat units in the Reserve Components of the Army. They include: 8 Army National Guard combat divisions, 21 separate combat brigades (18 Army National Guard and 3 Army Reserve) and four National Guard Armored Cavalry Regiments. There is a Service imposed limitation for most Army National Guard and Reserve units. This is an authorized level of organization designated as ALO-3 based on equipment corresponding to 80 percent of full manning.

58 percent of the units (deleted) reported attaining a rating equal to their ALO (c-3) which could be attained under authorization.

42 percent of the units are C-4.

Although most major combat units of the Reserve Components reported C-3 (marginally ready), this rating is based on full wartime requirements. Most RC units are capable of attaining a combat ready status after mobilization in time to meet mobilization requirements.

U.S. AIR FORCE RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD

The readiness posture of the Air Reserve Force (ARF), the Air Force Reserve (USAFR) and the Air National Guard (ANG), has been affected by the large number of conversions and the resulting equipment modernization within the last three years. [Deleted.]

The ANG reflects 87 percent of the flying units combat ready and 45 percent of the support units combat ready. Principal limiting factors for the flying

units being not combat ready are equipment on hand (6%), equipment readiness (5%), and personnel training (2%). Limiting factors for the support units being not combat ready are equipment on hand (22%), personnel training (18%), equipment readiness (10%), and personnel assigned (5%).

The USAFR reflects 89 percent of the flying units combat ready. The principal limiting factors for those being not combat ready are: personnel assigned (6%), personnel trained (3%) and equipment readiness (2%).

U.S. NAVY RESERVE

There are 68 ships in the Naval Reserve Surface Force. The composition of this force is as follows:

9 Coastal Minesweepers
22 Ocean Minesweepers
37 Destroyers

On 19 August 1974 only 2 ships reported C-1 (Fully Ready) overall. Of the units not ready 73 percent reported degraded [deleted].

The Naval Air Reserve Force consisted of 46 squadrons. On 19 August 1974 only one squadron reported C-1 (Fully Ready) overall. Of the units not ready 50 percent reported degraded training readiness as the primary reason for not being C-1 while 26 percent reported degraded supply readiness, 12 percent reported personnel and 12 percent reported equipment on hand as the primary reason.

With the exception of the NRF ships in overhaul (seven) and those ships scheduled for decommissioning in FY 75 (two), all units of the NRF may be expected to meet mobilization objectives established by the Navy.

U.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE

The 4th Marine Division (Rein) is capable of providing a full division with supporting Force Troops within prescribed mobilization time requirements. There are no serious logistics deficiencies in the Ground Organized Reserve.

The 4th Marine Aircraft Wing is capable of providing two fixed wing and one rotary wing aircraft groups. The number of ready groups is limited by aircraft on hand. New aircraft procurement, which would be accelerated after full mobilization, will alleviate this problem. Aviation logistic posture is degraded mainly in the area of Pre-Positioned War Reserve Stocks (PWRS).

The primary problem area of personnel shortfall evidenced in the charts would on full mobilization be filled from the Individual Ready Reserve manpower pool. Supplies and equipment readiness for ground and air units reflect only that used for training. The remaining supplies and equipment required for full mobilization of the ground reserve are held in PWRS.

Of the Marine Reserve ground units reporting C-4, not combat ready, (47 percent) personnel was listed as the reason. In the aviation units [deleted] percent report C-4. Personnel is listed as the constraint for [deleted] percent, equipment for [deleted] percent and training for [deleted] percent.

NON-UNIT MANPOWER POOL

U.S. Army Reserve

The trend for non-unit manpower pool strength is downward. Current projections for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Standby Reserve strength levels are sufficient to meet contingency requirements through FY 75. Thereafter the strength levels decline. Regarding maintenance of Military Operations Specialty (MOS) proficiency for non-unit personnel, there is no formal program which requires non-unit personnel to maintain MOS proficiency. A limited number of IRR personnel (based on fiscal constraints) receive refresher training annually. This has totaled approximately 40,000 individuals annually for the past three years.

U.S. Air Force Reserve

The USAFR has a highly trained resource in the Ready Reserve non-unit manpower pool which is made up of the Selected Reserve individuals assigned to a Regular Air Force unit to support the period immediately following a declaration of war or national emergency. In addition, the Ready Reserve includes a resource in the non-unit manpower pool designated as Reinforcement Designees which provides the Air Force with an added manning capability to meet contingency requirements within 60-90 days. Reinforcement Designees are partially qualified individuals who are required to maintain

their proficiency through correspondence courses, attendance at scheduled meetings, seminars, etc.

It appears that non-unit manpower pool strength level will remain relatively stable during the FYDP.

U.S. Navy Reserve

Recruitment and retention projections for the Naval Reserve, Individual Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve, indicate a downward trend in manpower strengths beyond [deleted]. However, the projected strengths will be sufficient to meet contingency requirements through FY 76. The Naval Reserve has no formal program for maintenance of military skills for non-unit personnel. Approximately 2900 Naval Reservists in a non-drill pay status are provided refresher training annually.

U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

The personnel in the Individual Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve would be used to fill organized reserve units to full strength upon full mobilization. There is no formal program for maintenance of military skills for non-unit personnel. The state of training of these categories of reserves varies due to the varying levels of individual participation in reserve programs and the length of time since the last active duty performed.

RESERVE NON-UNIT MANPOWER

	Individual ready reserve	Stand-by reserve	Total
U.S. Army Reserve:			
Officer.....	68,500	43,300	111,800
Enlisted.....	472,000	301,000	773,000
Total.....	540,500	344,300	884,800
U.S. Air Force Reserve:			
Officer.....	30,197	33,433	63,630
Enlisted.....	139,675	12,250	151,925
Total.....	169,872	45,683	215,555
U.S. Navy Reserve:			
Officer.....	24,845	24,552	49,397
Enlisted.....	137,980	24,127	162,107
Total.....	162,825	48,679	211,504
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve:			
Officer.....	6,179	3,507	9,686
Enlisted.....	69,508	55,555	125,063
Total.....	75,687	59,062	134,749

Senator NUNN. Do either of you have any other comments?

Secretary SCHLESINGER. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman.

Could I have Chart M-12?

MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES BY MANPOWER CATEGORY

[End strengths in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1973 actual	Fiscal year 1975 authorized	Change
Strategic forces.....	124	115	-9
General purpose forces.....	909	927	+18
Subtotal.....	1,033	1,042	+9
Auxiliary forces, support forces, and individuals.....	1,219	1,107	-112
Total.....	2,252	2,149	-103

I just wanted to indicate that there has been some progress made

with regard to the combat ratio issue. As you will notice from the chart, in the last 2 years there has been an overall reduction of 103,000 men in terms of military manpower as compared to our 1975 authorized level. Despite that decrease of 103,000, there is a small increase in the number of people in the combat forces, and a notable increase in the contribution to the general purpose forces. We are moving in that direction.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary SCHLESINGER. I might add that we live in a period of renewed goodwill, Mr. Chairman. This is the inaugural meeting of this committee. We hope that we will have a long and prosperous relationship with this committee, whether it will be a marriage or not.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate it and appreciate your cooperation and your being here. I, for one, am delighted that by all indications you will be continuing in your vital role supplying leadership in the Department of Defense. I look forward to receiving the reports that you have on the NATO amendment particularly.

And General Brown, we look forward to working with you and all the members of the Joint Chiefs.

Thank you.

The hearing is recessed.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., of the same day.]

MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES OF THE PAST AND FUTURE

TUESDAY, AUGUST 13, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess at 2:45 p.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn (chairman).

Present: Senators Nunn (presiding) and Byrd, Jr., of Virginia.

Also present: John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Charles J. Conneely, John A. Goldsmith, Robert Q. Old, Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; Roberta A. Ujackovich, research assistant; Nancy J. Bearg, research associate, and Mary G. Ketner, clerical assistant

Senator NUNN. Secretary Callaway, we are very pleased to have you here this afternoon to discuss the overall manpower and personnel picture of the Army. Secretary Schlesinger and General Brown gave us a very good overview of this issue, from a Department of Defense standpoint, this morning. We would like to delve into the specifics of these issues, from the Army point of view, this afternoon.

We are also happy to have General Weyand with us this afternoon and I know you will be able to give us the military side of this important issue. I am glad that both of you were able to arrange your schedules. I know it is very difficult to shake loose on short notice. I share the feelings of others that General Abrams is a great soldier, and I am glad the Army has other men like yourself who are ably carrying on while he recuperates. My best wishes to Gen. Abrams for a speedy recovery. I am sure I speak for the whole committee on that.

I hope to get into the question of the Army's force structure and readiness, as well as questions of quantity and quality of the All Volunteer Force. I know the Army is very actively pursuing improvements in its force problem. I trust we can cover the issues of civilian personnel and, in particular, the Army National Guard and Reserve posture as well. On the Volunteer Force, I repeat, Mr. Secretary, as I have told you both privately and publicly, I think the Army is doing a good job of implementing the policy laid down by Congress and the administration. I am not at all sure that the policy is correct, but any kind of criticisms I have of the Volunteer Force are not to be taken personally by the Army, because you are not supposed to come up with policy, you are supposed to imple-

ment it. I commend you for the enthusiasm you have displayed in implementing that policy.

I again want to express my pleasure that you and General Weyand could come today. You may proceed in any way you want to. I suggest you go ahead with any statement you have, and then we can get into questions after that.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD H. CALLAWAY, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ACCOMPANIED BY GEN FRED C. WEYAND, U.S. ARMY VICE CHIEF OF STAFF

Secretary CALLAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am delighted to be able to participate in this initial series of hearings held by the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee. And I say that purposefully, not just as an amenity normal for such occasions. The Army really is pleased that the Senate Armed Services Committee has seen fit to form a subcommittee specifically oriented on issues related to personnel matters. For the Army is people. When the Army is not actually fighting, the management of human resources is our single most important function. As General Abrams stated in testimony before your full committee earlier this year, "Unless we run our people programs well, the Army itself will not be well."

In an era where manpower costs are a major portion of the Defense budget, your responsibilities are both great and vital. In the 1960's the watchword in the Pentagon was "cost effectiveness"—in this decade we have come to think more in terms of "people effectiveness." To get the most out of every dollar it is essential that we get the most out of every person. The very creation of this subcommittee is itself strong evidence that Congress, too, perceives that critical change. So far as the Army is concerned, no work is more important than yours—and we are looking forward to working with you in the months and years ahead.

My prepared remarks will briefly and broadly meet the objectives you prescribed for today's hearings. Afterwards, General Weyand and I will sincerely welcome the opportunity of elaborating on any points you might wish to pursue in more depth.

Let me begin with a bit of background. Essentially, our current policies—as well as most of our problems—spring from the situation in which we found ourselves in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War. Historically, after all our wars, our country has let the Army decay—or worse. There were many signs around indicating that this phenomenon was on the verge of happening again. A number of articles and books proclaimed the defeat and predicted the death of the Army. As it turned out, the premortems were premature, but they were not entirely farfetched—the Army was indeed facing a time of trouble, and the outlook was not good.

Underlying everything else were the traumatic and precipitous reductions which had cut the Army by about half between 1968 and 1972. That rapid decline further aggravated the serious problem of personnel turbulence which had been an unavoidable aspect of the war itself. Additionally, the Army was faced with many of the same serious problems which were then buffeting our society at large—such as

widespread drug abuse, a vocal antiestablishment mood, and troubled race relations. Then, during this same period, the crucial decision was made to end the draft. Even if everything else had been on an even keel, that decision would have posed a severe challenge for the Army. But, on top of everything else, it looked to many like the final blow.

In the last year and a half, however—thanks in great measure to the support and wisdom of Congress—the bleak outlook has faded. The Army did not die. It is alive and well, and eager to continue its 200-year tradition of service to the Nation.

Nothing gives me more pleasure than recounting the achievements of the Army in fiscal year 1974. It is a success story that surpassed even our own most optimistic hopes. I think you are generally aware of the particulars, and I am sure you share in our pride of them. Let me just mention a few:

We not only met, we exceeded our end strength authorization.

We met or surpassed the standards established to insure quality in the force.

We reenlisted over 58,000 soldiers, well over 100 percent of our goal.

We recruited nearly 200,000 men and women, which comes close to equaling the accessions of all the other Services combined.

Not to be outdone by the Active Army, the Reserve Components had a good year, too. The National Guard ended up 8 percent above its authorization, while the Army Reserve exceeded its strength goal by 3 percent. Both have been able also to increase their minority and female content.

At this point, so you don't get the idea that we are becoming complacent, let me sound a warning note. The concept of the volunteer Army is still being tested. The fiscal year we are now entering will provide us a most severe test. As the last of the draftees leave the Army—a major exodus which will peak this fall—we will have a significant gap to fill. Our new accession requirements will exceed last year's by some 25,000. That will pose a real challenge; we will need all the momentum we have gained this year. However, if we can even come close to our goal we will be able to say, once and for all, that an all-volunteer Army is attainable. For, as we pass that low point a few months from now, the longer terms of service associated with the Volunteer Force will begin to have an impact. In fiscal year 1976, and for as far out as we can reasonably predict, our needs appear to be well within the recruiting capacity we have already demonstrated.

Not only should we find the numbers within reach, but we anticipate being able to increase our selectivity so that the quality of new accessions also rises. As a matter of fact, much of our emphasis for fiscal year 1975 and 1976 is being placed on quality improvement. We are initiating several major programs to do this. Among our goals for the Active enlisted force are:

Increase the high school content to 75 percent by the end of this fiscal year, and to 80 percent by the end of fiscal year 1976.

Achieve, by the end of fiscal year 1976, a level of about 10 percent who have one or more years of college.

Increase the percentage of those entering the Army in mental categories I through III-A from the present 51 percent to 60 percent by the end of fiscal year 1976. At the same time, we plan to cut the number of those in the lowest category from 18 to 15 percent.

Please note that when we talk of "quality" we are not using the term as a euphemism for "quota." What we want, and need, are quality soldiers—men and women—who are representative of the overall population. We have been the target of some criticism for the increased Black content in the Army. We do not consider that our present Black content is unrepresentative of the American people. Our fiscal year 1974 Black enlistments were about 27 percent, which indicates that group's sensitive perception of the opportunities available in the Army. Not in any way, shape, or fashion would we want to change that perception; it is another of our success stories. We are proud of it. Our obligation to the American people is to continue to provide them with a credible Army which is representative of them and acceptable to them. Our challenge, therefore, is not to reduce the appeal the Army has to minorities, or Southerners, or rural youth, or any other segment of our population which may at sometime become over-represented, but to increase our attractiveness to those segments that may become under-represented. As a good case in point, consider the issue of Black officers. Because of powerful competition from other professions, we have not been getting nearly enough young Black officers. The answer is not to reduce efforts to attract high quality white candidates, but rather to increase attempts to attract high quality Black ones. The ultimate aim is to have an Army which is both high in quality and truly representative of the American people.

For the long run, how we treat our soldiers will be one of the primary factors in determining how well the Army performs its various missions. In this country, we have usually been sensitive to the morale and welfare of men and women in uniform. Today, that tradition is more necessary than ever before. While our commanders must insist on proud and professional performance, they can never forget the importance of taking care of their people. Nor can we forget that taking care of our people includes taking care of the circumstances under which they live and work. Military ghettos and second-class citizenship are artifacts which are no longer acceptable. They have no place in today's Army. We have to treat our men and women as what they are—young citizens serving their country; valuable resources the Nation is fortunate to have, not cheap labor to be used for awhile and then discarded.

In this regard we will be proposing several programs aimed at elevating morale and welfare, and, hence, the Army's overall effectiveness. Just to cite a couple of examples, I might make mention of our hopes to adopt a 24-month tour in Europe for first term, unaccompanied enlisted men, and of the change to travel entitlements aimed at providing equal treatment and benefits to first term soldiers. Both these programs have as their underlying rationale the factors of fairness and equity—we simply must start treating our first term soldiers as full-fledged members of the Army team.

Senator NUNN. May I ask you, how does that 24-month tour compare to the present situation?

Secretary CALLAWAY. The maximum tour for first term enlisted personnel now can go as high as 36 months. Generally, however, it is approximately 30 months. A great many of our soldiers, because they have completed a first tour in a unit of choice in the U.S., serve a shorter term. This factor has reduced the overall average tour length to approximately 24 months. But where we have the first term soldier who has a longer enlistment tour, maybe a 4-year term or something of that kind, he frequently serves 30 months or more. We have found that that is a very long period of time for a man to be away from home. It ties in with the package that we have requested on entitlements and travel.

The basic problem is where a young man is married and is required to leave his wife and perhaps children, for a 3-year tour in Europe. His alternatives are not acceptable. One is to leave his wife—and we have recruited that man with his wife, we know he makes a good soldier with his wife. The other alternative is to go over there and pay for his own ticket for her and put her up on the economy and pay for travel and household allowance and things of that kind. What we are saying is that the first term soldier in a volunteer environment must be treated with equity. It is very different from the draft soldier, who had a different perception.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Secretary CALLAWAY. During the decades of the draft, we gradually came to look upon a citizen's initial years of service as a period of sacrifice he owed to his country. That perception was reflected in the way the Army managed its people. If a man was drafted, it was a sacrifice, and that was clearly understood. So if he was from Georgia and couldn't stand cold weather, he might be sent to Alaska without regard to what he wanted. Going to Alaska just increased his sacrifice. If he loved cars and mechanical things and wanted to be a mechanic, we might make him a cook. That increased his sacrifice. Legislation also reflected that frame of mind. Our first termers drew poverty wages; they had no allowances for family travel benefits; the Government would not sponsor their dependents at overseas posts. All of this was done because it was broadly felt that a draftee should serve an obligation, without regard to his own wishes or needs. This attitude may be appropriate during a war, or national emergency, when all able bodied men are expected to serve for a brief period, but it is clearly an inappropriate policy for attracting volunteers to enlist for a longer time during a generation of peace.

Let me read you some excerpts from a couple of recent letters.

Last month a young wife wrote this letter:

* * * My husband is an E3 in the U.S. Army. (He) has been in the Service for one and one-half years. We have two children, one is three years old and the baby is seven months. My husband loves his job in the Army as a military policeman. He joined the Army on his own and has an evaluation sheet of all outstanding. I'm very proud of him. . . . My husband left last night for Germany. . . . I'm planning on being with my husband, but with his rank it will take so long to save up enough money to send us over there. Is there any way possible that the privates can have help sending their families overseas? I don't want my children to forget their father. They, along with me, love him very much.

How can I answer her when I have no authority to provide the means to enable her to join her husband?

That was a typical letter; compare it with this next one, which tells of the reaction of the parents of a soldier whose problems we had the authority to deal with.

. . . Our family will always consider (what happened to our son) as our own "private miracle". . . . He was away from home for the first time after joining the Army, his marriage of two months was at an end, (and there were other serious problems). He was on his way to becoming completely "lost" because no one cared enough to lend a hand to a young man who desperately needed help. That's when we feel that God stepped in and, through Rev. (name) and you, pulled Jim out of a seemingly hopeless situation, and gave him another chance at a new life in new surroundings. His talks with the Colonel attending to the mechanics of the transfer helped sustain him until the transfer was completed. . . . We are delighted to relay the information to you that he has taken full advantage of this opportunity. He is quite conscious of this second chance and feels deep moral responsibility to succeed at the tasks before him. Since last October . . . he has been actively working at the following:

Co. Clerk . . . 25th Inf. Div.

Enrolled at U. of Hawaii in January; will have completed two yrs. of college by December.

Has attained (E-4) rating; has been recommended to (E-5) Board.

In June, was Soldier-of-the-Month and Soldier-of-the-Quarter.

And finally, Lay Reader at Lutheran Services, Base Chapel.

In short, his life has done an about-face. He is headed up once again.

What I am trying to say by quoting from these two letters is simply that we must take care of our people. All of our people need to know we care, but especially the first term enlisted men and women. We have to treat them with respect and concern because it is right. But, additionally, we cannot expect the youth of our country to continue supporting Army service unless their perception of that service is positive, unless they believe we care. That is fundamental to a volunteer force. We cannot run today's Army on yesterday's laws; what was tolerable in a draft environment is counterproductive in a volunteer environment. Bringing the basic benefits of first-term soldiers more into line with our recognition of the value of these new men and women is not only a moral imperative, it is a practical necessity, too.

The subject of force structure is inseparable from that of personnel management. If people are employed in inefficient or marginal organizations, then their efforts are wasted. In the past, in the days of the draft, such practices might have been looked upon as merely improvident; today they are nothing short of intolerable. To this end, the Army is deeply involved in a major effort to reconfigure itself.

The new direction of the Army is toward increasing its conventional combat power, toward improving its responsiveness, and toward expanding the range of its capabilities. Clearly, in today's world, our conventional ground forces must have more real strength; strength which is apparent to both friend and foe, which we can project rapidly and apply with great flexibility. The new Army structure calls for a total force of 24 divisions—16 Active and 8 Reserve Components—by the end of fiscal year 1978.

To meet these goals within an approximate strength of 785,000 and a more or less fixed level of funding, we must do two things: First, for the creation of more fighting units, we must generate spaces and dollars by eliminating every marginal activity, agency, or organization; second, we must bolster the responsiveness and

strength of the Reserve Components and integrate them more fully into the total force.

As a first step in this restructuring process, we are generating spaces and funds by internal belt tightening—reductions, realignments, reorganizations, and the like. No echelon in the Army is exempt from this process, beginning with the Army Staff in the Pentagon. From these savings will come the additional combat strength we need.

Changes in the role and structure of Reserve Components will be made right along with the changes in Active Forces. We always have to keep the total force in mind. In addition to the 8 Reserve Component divisions required to achieve the 24-division Army, three of the 16 Active divisions are planned to be rounded out by a Reserve Component brigade. In similar fashion, additional Reserve Component battalions and brigades will be trained and equipped to deploy as part of the Active divisions based in the United States. Moreover, as an increased share of the Active Army's strength goes into combat structure, the entire Army becomes more and more dependent upon the capability of support units in the Reserve Components. This increased reliance on the Reserve Components demands a heightened concern for their readiness and mobilization requirements.

To achieve the force we want—and which I believe the Nation needs—we obviously have a great deal of work to do. We know that, and we are already hard at it. We also know that we can do nothing without the support of Congress. In that regard, although we will have many requests for specific programs, virtually all of them boil down to just one overriding requirement. Stability. Long-term stability. We hope to be able to demonstrate to you, to your colleagues in the Congress, and to all who are responsible for raising and supporting the Army, the value of granting us an assurance of long-term stability. By that, I mean something on the order of a 4- or 5-year period during which our authorized strength is held steady at about 785,000 people and our appropriations are maintained somewhere near the current level, adjusted for inflation.

All sorts of advantages come from having a stable and predictable military end strength authorization. Take recruiting, for instance. Stability makes our job simpler and, hopefully, less expensive. It will surely magnify the chances of getting the numbers and quality we are seeking. It is just easier to hit a stationary target than a moving one. Our plans and programs can be established for the long haul; they will be better because we won't have to be tinkering with them repeatedly to meet year-to-year fluctuations.

As I mentioned at the outset, thanks to the decisions reached by the Congress in the recent past, the Army has enjoyed a period of relative stability for the last year or two. The results have been good. The country has a better Army than it did during the preceding years. What we are asking is that the stability be real rather than relative and that it be sustained so that we can make the Army even better.

Mr. Chairman, this statement has been very general, I know. But I hope it has conveyed some feel for the Army's philosophy in this most important of subjects.

General Weyand and I are eager to take your questions.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

General, do you have any kind of an opening statement you would like to make?

General WEYAND. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. I appreciate this excellent presentation, and I particularly appreciate your examples which make it a lot easier to understand some of the things the Army is going through.

This morning we had Secretary of Defense Schlesinger here, and one thing he pointed out that I don't think is emphasized nearly enough—because it is important—is that the overall manpower levels—I think he was speaking of the kind of services since 1968—have dropped 40 percent. Of course that was a wartime level. But since 1964, which was pre-Vietnam as far as American participation, we have gone down 20 percent, and that is overall. Do you have comparable figures for the Army itself?

General WEYAND. Yes; we do, Mr. Chairman. I probably should ask that we submit the exact figures for the record.

Senator NUNN. That would be fine, if you would give us an estimate.

General WEYAND. In 1964, I believe, 973,000, compared to the 785,000 requested this year. This is a reduction of 188,000.

Senator NUNN. How does this level compare to say, since 1950, the Korean war? Is this the lowest level the Army has been?

General WEYAND. Yes, it is, since 1950.

Senator NUNN. Since 1950. So for the last 25 years we are now at the lowest level manpowerwise we have been?

General WEYAND. Yes.

Senator NUNN. I was thinking pre-Korea.

General WEYAND. Just before Korea, yes.

Senator NUNN. So we are now about at the level we were in 1950—somewhere in that neighborhood.

General WEYAND. Yes, sir. That is just about it, about 25 years.

Senator NUNN. You can supply that for the record?

[The information follows:]

The Army's total strength of 783,000 at end FY 74 was the lowest level since the summer of 1950. Army total strength was 593,000 at the end of June 1950 and climbed to just over 800,000 by September 1950. By comparison to pre-Vietnam years, the Army's total strength at the end of June 1964 was 973,000.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, either you or General Weyand can answer any of these questions any way you would like.

You have to recruit more people in fiscal year 1975. What was the total number of new recruits that you had in fiscal year 1974?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, the recruiting of men and women in 1974 was 199,198, just under 200,000.

Senator NUNN. What will that figure be for 1975?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Our current estimates are 224,100, or about 25,000 more. Fiscal 1975 will be the largest number that we will have to recruit from now on, assuming a constant end strength.

Senator NUNN. So this year will be your greatest challenge as far as the number of recruits, then?

Secretary CALLAWAY. By all means, it will be. We estimate that we go down to about 188,000 in fiscal 1976.

Senator NUNN. Is that because the retention starts playing a part in it?

Secretary CALLAWAY. That is right. We estimate—and in all of this we are still guessing a little bit—but we estimate that those who are recruited now will be more likely to reenlist because they volunteer. Also our terms of enlistment—the draft, as you know, was a 2-year enlistment—are longer. We are getting more 3- and 4-year enlistments.

Senator NUNN. Are you going to be able to achieve this goal and still keep the quality up as your goal indicates?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Senator, for fiscal year 1975 it will be difficult. I will give you the same answer I have given to the House Armed Services Committee when they asked this same question. If it comes to a question of which we would rather have, a smaller, higher quality Army, or meet all of our goals with lower quality, I will, General Abrams will, General Weyand will, and the entire Army will opt for the higher quality and the less numbers. It is hard to make people really believe this when we are fighting so hard to get the numbers, because the numbers are also important. But numbers are something you can see. Quality isn't something that you can see as well. So naturally people emphasize numbers. But we are putting in very exciting programs, to us, for fiscal years 1975 and 1976, in increasing the quality. We have talked about it many times, and as you well know, quality does not just mean whether someone has a high school diploma or not. Quality to us means whether a man can perform his job, perform it well in adverse conditions, how well he is disciplined, and how ready the Army is. That is the area in which we think we are improving quality and working very diligently and I think effectively.

Senator NUNN. I believe Senator Goldwater and Senator Taft this morning brought up an interesting point to Secretary Schlesinger. It was in reference to the 20-year retirement having so many people in the military services who would like to stay in being forced out after they have attained a very high experience level. Does the Army have any kind of studies underway toward possibly going beyond the normal number of years in service so that there would really be a change in the retirement system?

Secretary CALLAWAY. I am not sure of a study. Let me comment, and then see if General Weyand wants to add anything.

Senator NUNN. First let me say that Secretary Schlesinger said one of the main problems there was the lack of promotional opportunities. I think with the Army it might be a little different from some of the other services; inasmuch as the Army had to recruit vigorously.

Secretary CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, we have two general problems. If we are speaking of officers, then we have had in the last few years a RIF or reduction in force of officers, mostly at the captain's level, when we reduced the size of the force from the larger numbers we had in Vietnam. And we called very few Reserves, so that there were very few people that went back to civilian life at the end. When we pulled down the numbers of men, officers did not get out at the same ratio as the enlisted did, and we had too many officers. We have too many good officers. If we hold more people in at the

higher level, it holds down opportunity for promotion and it tends to stagnate the force. That is a problem that we are going to study and look at. If you are speaking of the NCO level, if we get too many people that stay in too long, the physical quality of an NCO as a platoon sergeant, for example, who can run with his men and maneuver and be a physical leader as well as a mental leader might be impaired.

Senator NUNN. I think Senator Goldwater's question was aimed mainly at the technical skills rather than the people out in the field leading platoons. I think this was aimed mainly at the enlisted level rather than the officer level.

General WEYAND. The retirement policy for our noncommissioned officers is an enlisted policy in the sense that they can retire after 20 years with certain benefits guaranteed to them, but there is no bar to them staying on if there is a military need for them. The type of man that the Senator was speaking of I think more often than not, we want to keep, and we have that authority.

Senator NUNN. Under what provision is the extension?

General WEYAND. It is not an extension, it is simply that he is permitted to stay on beyond the 20 years.

Senator NUNN. How long can he stay on?

General WEYAND. I am not sure. We will supply that.

Senator NUNN. Will you supply that for the record and show us what his options are once he has achieved a certain level?

[The information follows:]

The length of service enlisted personnel may attain is controlled by their grade. The Qualitative Retention Feature of the Qualitative Management Program contains established maximum years of service points for each enlisted grade and is designed to prevent promotion stagnations within the enlisted force. The reenlistment ineligibility points are as follows: E9, 30 years; E8, 27 years; E7, 24 years; E6, 20 years; E5, 13 years; E4, 10 years; E3, 5 years.

Individuals who are performing satisfactorily may be retained to the reenlistment ineligibility point for the next higher grade. Therefore, individuals in grade E8 may be retained to 30 years and individuals in grade E6 may be retained to 24 years active duty.

Senator NUNN. General Weyand, how many divisions do you plan to eventually have, and what is your time schedule for working these divisions in? I know the Army has made considerable progress during the last year to use more headquarters and support personnel to more adequately man the divisions. I know Senator Stennis is very pleased with that, and I believe that is the attitude of the rest of the committee. On behalf of the committee may I commend you for your effort in that regard.

May I ask, what are your plans now?

General WEYAND. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. The plan is—and it is contingent upon a degree of stability—by the end of fiscal year 1978, which would be 4 years, 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1978, and we would have added three additional divisions to our force structure without increasing our current strength. That is going to take some doing. We have charted out the way that we plan to do that, and the types of units that we will reorganize, and the headquarters that we will deactivate. Some of this naturally is in the future. We may not be able to accomplish all of it. If we don't we are determined to find alternative ways of squeezing it out of our support structure.

So this year we will activate three brigades. That will give us a foundation for those three divisions. It is a very interesting and intriguing prospect for us, because for the first time, we will be incorporating in a sense, I say, integrating more formally than we ever have in peacetime, Reserve elements into active units. It will provide us an opportunity to explore to the fullest the potential that our Reserves have for giving us an increased readiness capability. There are many ramifications to it. But that is basically it.

Senator NUNN. Can you provide for the record the cost involved in the equipment it is going to take for these three new divisions and the cost of the construction, and so forth, versus the savings, so that we can get a dollar picture?

General WEYAND. Yes, I will.

[The information follows:]

It will cost approximately \$400 million to equip these new divisions. These costs reflect current dollars and do not include inflation for future years. The military construction costs to support the division stationing are projected as \$490 million through FY 81. These costs include \$128.3 million requested in the FY 74 and FY 75 budgets to station the initial increments of the three divisions. Additionally, there are 9,400 units of family housing programmed through FY 79 at the new division stations at an estimated cost of \$338 million. This latter requirement will be reevaluated annually and adjusted based on changes in the availability of housing in the local communities.

In order to determine the savings, the specific units to be cut from the Army support elements would have to be identified. Since the planning of these cuts is still ongoing, there is no way at this date to identify the savings associated with particular unit discontinuance.

Senator NUNN. What about the readiness of the Army divisions that we now have? Can you comment on that?

General WEYAND. I think we are both very proud of it. The Secretary has probably seen more actually than I have.

Secretary CALLAWAY. Senator, you have been to many parts of the world looking at our soldiers, and we always welcome you to make as many visits as you can. I don't know and I don't think anybody knows what the readiness is of any division until combat starts, and then you find it out very quickly. But there are ways to get some indications. There are alerts that are called, some such as the one in the Mideast, which was a general alert, and some are just tests that are given. You can look at how well tank crews perform with their tanks. You can look at how disciplined people are as they go through live fire problems in maneuvers and how well they take to command. You can look at the numbers of AWOL's and desertions and things of that kind. I would just say that the feeling throughout the Army is one of great enthusiasm for the readiness, the discipline and preparedness of the divisions that we have. We are very pleased with the progress we are making, we feel that the progress has only begun, that each month we are getting better and more ready and better trained.

Senator NUNN. Do you have an Army measure of readiness? I heard General Abrams a couple of years ago when we had a very low number of divisions that were so-called ready—I don't want to get into classified information here, but could you give us an indication of that and provide any additional information for the record?

[The information is classified and retained in committee file.]

Secretary CALLAWAY. The Joint Chiefs have a system for readiness which includes such things as strength, it includes such things as how many men are in their proper MOS, the job that they are trained for. It includes equipment and all of that. It is a very precise method of calculation. I would say, not being a part of the Joint Chiefs, the problem is that it is too precise, and it does not take into consideration the human elements of discipline and morale and things of that kind, because it is based on figures.

General Weyand is much more familiar with that than I am.

General WEYAND. Yes, we do have precise measures for the readiness of these divisions. They are really intended to be management tools in the sense that the Secretary says. They tell us the status of training, and the status of how many round pegs we have in square holes, that is, men who are being misutilized, what is the status of our equipment, the maintenance of it, and the equipment on hand, the state of training, whether or not they have completed certain training tests, and so on and so forth. In general, we look at that, and then we look at the commanders' objective assessment of that division, or unit. When you take all that into account you go back to your initial question: whereas a year ago or a year and a half ago only four of the divisions are what I would call combat ready; today of the 13, 2 of them are what a professional would term marginally ready. But both of those units are units that I would take into combat. They are much better prepared, better equipped, and better trained than the divisions that we have fought in combat before. So we have come a long way. Those divisions are continuing to improve day-by-day.

Senator NUNN. Two are marginally ready now. What does that mean about the others?

General WEYAND. That means they are either fully ready by those very severe measurements that I just mentioned, or substantially ready.

Senator NUNN. So you have made dramatic improvements in the state of readiness in the last 2 years?

General WEYAND. I believe so. I believe an awful lot of it is due—I not only believe it, I know it—to the stability that we have had, and the relative amenities over the past 2 years. For that, I thank the Congress. Part of it is also due to the volunteer Army. The very fact that we have men in the Army now who are there because they want to be, they are willing workers, just makes a difference in your professional system.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

I yield to Senator Byrd at this point.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

Mr. Secretary, in your statement you say: "Among our goals for the active enlisted force are: Increase the high school content to 75 percent by the end of this fiscal year." What do you mean by high school content?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Senator Byrd, by high school content we are speaking of the high school graduate content within the Army, within the enlisted strength of the Army. The numbers who come into the Army are a lower percent than that. Many receive further

education while in the Army. Last year we gave almost 50,000 high school diplomas. So our goal of 75 percent refers not only to those who attain their high school diploma, prior to entering the Army, but also those who earn their degree while in the service. It is our goal not only to get a higher percentage of high school graduates coming into the Army, but also to work with those who are in the Army to see that they get their diploma. So our goal—and these are only things that we were working toward, we really haven't announced this to the entire Army as a goal—is to increase so that 75 percent of the enlisted strength of the Army at the end of this fiscal year will have high school diplomas or equivalent, and 80 percent at the end of fiscal year 1976 will have that.

Senator BYRD. What percent of your enlistments will have that?

Secretary CALLAWAY. We are now requiring 55 percent of the new service enlistments to be high school graduates. We are hoping to increase that. We have some goals that I don't have with me. I will be glad to supply them for the record. But we are intending to increase that percentage of high school graduates.

Senator BYRD. I wasn't speaking of goals, I was speaking of what has actually been done.

Secretary CALLAWAY. Last year in fiscal year 1974 when we brought in 200,000 young men and women the percentage of high school graduates was slightly over 55 percent. I will supply that accurately for the record.

[The information follows:]

The high school graduate percentage for the approximately 200,000 new accessions to the Army in FY 74 was 59.8%. The high school graduate percentage for the approximately 182,000 non-prior service accessions enlisted in FY 74 was 56.1%. Approximately 17,000 of the new accessions to the Army in FY 74 were prior service personnel whose HSG percentage was 99.8%.

Senator BYRD. To refresh my memory, there was some legislation on the floor recently to eliminate that requirement, I believe. Did the Army ask for that?

Secretary CALLAWAY. The Department of Defense did ask to eliminate that requirement. The Appropriations Committee put the requirement in. The House Authorization Committee took it out. Then, thanks to an amendment by Senator Nunn, the language was changed, which was completely acceptable to the Army. Now we have some legal questions as to whether the Appropriations language still applies or not. It is not a problem for the Army, because we intend to be above that anyway.

Senator BYRD. How many men were enlisted in 1972? Do you happen to have that figure?

Secretary CALLAWAY. No sir. I can supply it for the record. I can also supply what we believe were the true volunteers during that time.

Was that fiscal 1972 that you would be interested in, or calendar? I have it here now. I have our estimate of true volunteers. The way we did this was by going by draft numbers, to find people that had a draft number so low that we thought they had to be true volunteers, and extrapolating that through the whole population. We think it was fairly accurate. True volunteers in 1972 were 107,572.

Senator BYRD. How about for 1973?

Secretary CALLAWAY. 133,861. This was nonprior service true volunteers.

Senator BYRD. How many did you have in fiscal 1974?

Secretary CALLAWAY. In fiscal 1974 it was 166,798. That is nonprior service males.

Senator BYRD. Do you have the percentage of Blacks in each of those years?

Secretary CALLAWAY. I can supply that for the record. Last year it was 27 percent roughly. But I can supply it for the record in each of those years.

[The information follows:]

The percentage of Blacks among non-prior service male true volunteers was as follows: fiscal year 1971 17.4 percent; fiscal year 1972 18.4 percent; fiscal year 1973 24.2 percent; fiscal year 1974 27.9 percent.

Senator BYRD. How do you find the Army's discipline today compared with 1972?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Senator Byrd, the feeling of so many was that a volunteer Army would be a permissive Army. I can understand how this got started. A lot of people thought we were enticing people into the Army with the slogan that we used to have, that you quoted to me before I ever became Secretary of the Army, that "Today's Army wants to join you." We have changed that, as you are well aware. But because of slogans like that, and because of the feeling that they have been in the barracks, no reveilles, and things like that, it was perceived by a great many Americans that the Army would be an undisciplined Army. To the extent that that was perceived by young men coming into the Army they tended to act that way, and there were problems which you are well aware of. I really feel, however, that the Army right now, and I think the young men who are being recruited and the recruiters, understand that you cannot have a Volunteer Force without discipline. You cannot have a Volunteer Force without soldiers who believe in what they are doing. There is no way to believe in what you are doing if you are part of an outfit that is undisciplined. A military outfit that is undisciplined is nothing, and you can't take pride in it.

General Weyand might want to comment further. I would say that my own evaluation in the year that I have been here, I see a great increase in discipline, morale, readiness, and training. Everywhere I see it is on the upswing. It will be better next year, I sincerely feel.

Senator BYRD. What is the average age of an enlistee?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Senator Byrd, it is quite young. It is younger than it was during the draft, perhaps a year younger. In fiscal year 1974 the average age for enlistees was 18.9 years.

Senator BYRD. Let's get to the question of bonus. Are many given a bonus to enlist?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes sir, particularly for the combat arms and for certain specialized skills.

Senator BYRD. You enlisted 170,400 in 1973, and you enlisted 166,798 in 1974. What percentage of those would have been given an enlistment bonus?

Secretary CALLAWAY. We will have to supply that, Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Supply that for the record if you will, sir.

Do you find that you are making increased use of the enlistment bonus?

Secretary CALLAWAY. I believe we are holding about stabilized on that. As you know, we received permission to give enlistment bonuses to certain other categories than we did originally. And to that extent we are making increasing use of it. I don't believe we are increasing in number. But I will supply that for the record.

[The information follows:]

In FY 73, 24,127 or 14.2% of the 170,400 non-prior service male enlistments were for the combat arms enlistment bonus, while in FY 74 12,860 or 7.7% of the 166,798 non-prior service male enlistees opted for the combat arms enlistment bonus.

The 6.5 percent decrease in bonus enlistments in FY 74, when compared to FY 73, is directly attributable to the tightening of bonus eligibility requirements. In May 1973 bonus eligibility requirements were changed such that only high school graduates in Mental Categories I-III were eligible for bonus enlistments; whereas for the most of FY 73 (Jul 72-Apr 73) there were no special eligibility requirements for bonus enlistments.

Senator BYRD. I thought the legislation required you to confine it to a combat enlistment bonus for three combat arms. I have forgotten what they are.

Secretary CALLAWAY. Infantry, artillery and armor are the three basic categories. This includes air defense artillery.

Senator BYRD. Have you gone beyond that?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes sir. At one point it was combat only, but fairly recently that was changed. In the noncombat arms, we have Pershing missile crewmen, the Nike test equipment repairmen, and the Lance missile systems repairmen. These are noncombat arms MOS's that are authorized effective the first of June 1974, this summer.

Senator Byrd, the projected number of combat arms bonuses for fiscal year 1975 is about 25,000. The projected number of total bonuses, accounting for all of the expanded skills, is about 33,000. That is out of a total of 224,000 of all men, women prior service and nonprior service, that we will need this year. So it is somewhere in the order of magnitude of 33,000. I will supply those exactly for the record.

[The information follows:]

Current estimates are that 24,600 enlistees will opt for the combat arms bonus while 8900 will elect to enlist for the bonus in the more technically oriented skill areas. In viewing these projections it must be remembered that we are breaking new ground. Our experience in the enlistment bonus area is limited—particularly in the technical skills area. The projections are based on the best historical data available, but quite obviously as we venture forward into the volunteer area will require revision.

Senator BYRD. That is for 1975?

Secretary CALLAWAY. For fiscal year 1975 projected, that is our estimate for 1975 under the program that is now approved which includes non-combat arms as well.

Senator BYRD. Do you still plan new enlistments of 225,000 in 1975?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes sir. That is nonprior service males, females, and prior service, altogether, 224,000.

Senator BYRD. That is close to a third of your total.

Secretary CALLAWAY. That is right. You see, this is the year all

of the draftees leave. As I explained to the chairman, fiscal year 1975 is our biggest year. If we keep the same force that we now have, this year is the year that we will have the greatest numbers to recruit.

Senator BYRD. You expect 33,000 of these to receive an enlistment bonus?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Approximately, yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. That is about 15 percent of what you will recruit?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes sir.

Senator BYRD. How does that enlistment bonus work? What is the amount of it?

Secretary CALLAWAY. The maximum amount that we are now paying is \$2,500 dollars, which we are paying to combat arms and certain of the other categories.

Senator BYRD. If you go into a city or rural area, and a boy 18 or 19 years old comes up and wants to enlist, how much will you pay him right there on the spot once he signs the papers?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Nothing on the spot. He gets paid when he receives his military occupational specialty. Let's say it is 11 Bravo, which is a light weapons infantry. He must go to basic training, complete that, and go to advanced training and complete that, and be awarded the 11 Bravo MOS. That is about six months. It can vary a little bit. At that time he receives the full \$2,500.

Senator BYRD. In other words, he gets \$2,500 in cash at the end of 6 months?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes sir, assuming that he is qualified and makes his MOS.

Senator BYRD. That is a whale of an inducement, it seems to me.

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes sir, we agree with you.

Senator BYRD. I would think that you ought to be able to get a good bit of quality for that inducement.

Secretary CALLAWAY. We agree. For the combat arms bonus, my recollection is that it is only available to high school graduates, and to mental category I through III. It is not available to other than high quality people.

Senator BYRD. That brings up the other question. As I read your statement, almost 50 percent are in category IV.

Secretary CALLAWAY. No, sir, 50 percent below the midpoint, which is category III-B and category IV. You see, presently we have 51 percent in categories I through III-A. We are trying to increase that to 60 percent. But there are also categories III-B and IV. The I through III-A is generally the top 50 percent of the military age population. And we are now getting, as opposed to the military age group, 51 percent. This is enlisted ranks, not officers. We intend to increase that to 60 percent. You know the Army doesn't take anyone in the category V. Category V is the bottom 9 percent of the Bell curve. In category IV, there is about another 20 percent. The Army is taking around 17 percent in that. So whereas the military age population as a whole was 30 percent below the category III as opposed to that 30 percent, the Army is only taking 17 or 18 percent of that now. We are tending to decrease that and increase the higher mental categories. We think this is important.

Senator BYRD. I also do.

Secretary CALLAWAY. The point I am trying to make, Senator Byrd, is that the Army is not taking lower than the average of the country. We are taking higher than the average of the country, which we think is appropriate.

Senator BYRD. The individual enlists for how many years normally?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Two years, 3 years or 4 years.

Senator BYRD. Does he get \$2,500 in either case?

Secretary CALLAWAY. No. The combat arms bonus is only for 4 years. We agree that that bonus is quite an incentive. So we use that to get a longer enlistment, and we use it to get higher quality, and we use it to get combat arms. Combat arms is not a skill that is as usable in civilian life, as we all understand. So we try to use that bonus to help us with the problems of that kind.

Senator BYRD. What was your turnover last year? Did you do it on a fiscal 1974 basis?

Secretary CALLAWAY. By turnover you mean how many people left the Army?

Senator BYRD. Yes.

Secretary CALLAWAY. About the same number as came in because we ended the year the same strength.

Senator BYRD. So that is a third?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes, it would be about 200,000.

Senator BYRD. 200,000 out of 800,000?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes, sir.

One of the goals I can see you agree with is to get longer enlistment periods. While we are extremely proud that we have made our end strength, I don't want anyone to say that was easy. You can only enlist some people for a 2-year period, and not three.

Here is an example. You take a young man who has just graduated from high school. Let's say he was the president of his class, and the top of his class. He can go to any college he wants to within reason. But perhaps he doesn't feel mature enough to know what to do with his life. So he gives us 2 years in the Army and gets that maturity and decides what he wants to do. Then he goes to college. He has given us 2 years, which is very valuable to us. And that kind of person is not interested in a 4 year enlistment; he is not willing to take 4 years out of his life before going on to college. But he sees the 2 years that he gives to the Army as being very valuable.

Senator BYRD. What about category III-C, and category IV, what do they usually take?

Secretary CALLAWAY. A great many of them take what is called Regular Army unassigned, which is usually a 2 or 3 year enlistment. One of the reasons for that is that the better enlistments require in many cases the higher skills. When I say the better, the more in demand enlistments require the high skills. So when you get the young man who is not eligible for the higher skill, and the various kinds of enlistments that we offer bonuses for, and that kind of thing, he is more likely to get into the manpower pool called the Regular Army unassigned.

We are working toward reducing the size of Regular Army un-

assigned. Again, if we had the best of all worlds, we would probably not have a category called Regular Army unassigned, and everyone would have to enlist for a skill that he was trainable for.

But again while we are very pleased with having made our end strength, it was very difficult, and we had to use a lot of different kinds of enlistments that fit different personnel.

Senator BYRD. Could you supply for the record, too, the recruiting costs for fiscal years, say, 1972, 1973, and 1974?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes sir.

[The information follows:]

Army recruiting costs (includes OMA and MPA) for fiscal years 1972-74 are:	
Fiscal year 1972.....	\$133, 416, 000
Fiscal year 1973.....	208, 055, 000
Fiscal year 1974.....	238, 286, 000

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, I know you have an appointment at 4 o'clock. Are you supposed to be there at 4? What time do you need to leave here?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, I am due there at 4, but this takes precedence over anything else.

Senator NUNN. I don't want to detain you, because we can get some of these questions answered for the record and we can carry on with General Weyand. So we will excuse you in about 10 minutes, if that is all right, and General Weyand can stay for just a few minutes.

General WEYAND. I think you ought to keep him here, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. The question I want to get into now—and I will address this to the Secretary, but General Weyand may answer if he wishes—is, what is your assessment of the fighting ability of the Reserve now, and how does that compare to 2 years ago?

Perhaps General Weyand can answer.

Secretary CALLAWAY. I think he can answer in more detail. But one of the really exciting things that has happened in the last year or two is that due to the reorganization of the Army—and you never think reorganizations amount to much, they are just changing around—but the reorganization of the Army put a four-star general in charge of Forces Command, and gave that command all of the prestige of four stars. A major part of his total responsibility is the Reserve readiness in the United States. It assigned to him readiness regions, each commanded by an Active two-star major general with a competent staff to work with the Reserve Components. These readiness regions, working with the National Guard and the Reserves, have established within a short period of time, really a little over a year, a rapport, and a belief in each other. It has just done more for readiness than anything we have seen. The level of training this summer by the Reserve Components that have been going to camp has been substantially better than last year. I think that the reorganization is the basic reason for it. There is a belief in and working relationship between the Active and the Reserves that I think is about as good as it has ever been in our history.

General Weyand will perhaps be able to speak in much more detail.

General WEYAND. It is too early to give you very precise measures, sir. The Secretary I think has hit the nub of the trend. It is very discernible upward in the readiness of the Reserves. Part of it, as he indicated, is increased attentiveness and assistance from the Active Forces. Part of it is that the National Guard and the Army Reserve have been under-strength. They too have suffered from the turbulence of the aftermath of Vietnam. This year, as we have told you, we were able to recruit sufficiently to reach and exceed slightly their authorized end strength, and pretty much their full strength. This shows too that they are able to train in a more meaningful way. But right now we are going through the summer training period for them, which is their intensive training period. Each one of those Reserve units is being evaluated by trained evaluators. I would think that by the end of September we will have for you a fairly precise measure. The ones I have visited have been working very hard. The 100th Division, a training division, is actually training our Active Army recruits, and training our ROTC cadets and doing a tremendous job.

Senator NUNN. Could you supply for the record the latest readiness chart that you have on the Reserves, plus any additional information you may have at the end of September to the committee?

General WEYAND. We will, yes, sir.

[The information is classified and retained in committee file.]

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, before you go, let me get involved with you just a moment.

Do you consider it feasible to be able to sustain a volunteer force if we have to go back to the Vietnam level of manpower?

Secretary CALLAWAY. I doubt it, Mr. Chairman. You know very well that we brought in every man that we could last year under our quality restraints. That is no secret. We kept quality high, and we released people in our trainee discharge program, and we did a lot of things to maintain quality. But maintaining that quality, we brought in really everyone that we could. We barely made that end strength. I think it would be unlikely that in the near future we could increase our recruiting that much. We have some programs under which, as we see the prestige of the Army coming forward, we think we are going to be able to increase quality, and increase the attractiveness of the Army. I can't comment on whether 2 or 3 or 4 years from now we would have such public support for the Army that that kind of level would be possible.

Senator NUNN. So you would have to go back to the draft if we had another altercation like Vietnam or anything on that level?

Secretary CALLAWAY. My present feeling is that if we had to go to the strength of the Army that we had at the height of the Vietnam war, at the present time I would have no recommendation other than the draft which would accomplish that.

Senator NUNN. Would we be drafting at the same levels, and so forth, that we are at now?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Senator, that would be a decision of Congress. As you say, that is a policy decision.

Senator NUNN. Does the Army have any alternative plans that you are working with? For instance, will we be paying everybody who went into combat under the draft a \$2,500 bonus?

Secretary CALLAWAY. No sir, I wouldn't think you would be paying a \$2,500 bonus. But I would think that the scale of pay would not be \$21 a month for draftees, although that would be a congressional decision. It is my thought that the Congress has pretty well expressed itself in the Rivers amendment some years ago on comparability. That expression by the Congress is that a serviceman is entitled to the same kind of pay that his job is worth, he is entitled to the same pay he had as a civilian. That is determined by the civilian market. I would be very surprised if the Congress would make the decision that those who enlist are entitled to today's pay and those drafted would be entitled to lesser pay.

Senator NUNN. I would agree with you on that, because it would be essential if we did have any kind of war at all—hopefully we will never have to test it—but do you have any alternative plan that you are working on if we have to go back to the draft?

Secretary CALLAWAY. We have mobilization plans for various sizes of the Army. This is more in the JCS level than my level, but I am not aware of any program which addresses the pay of the people who are drafted.

I will let General Weyand answer that.

General WEYAND. No, sir; we do not have any. We do have specific plans in various stages of mobilization and the numbers of men that would be involved, but not related to their pay. I assume that would relate to the circumstances of the time. It is inconceivable to me that we would pay men who were called upon to fight for this country less in wartime than they were receiving in peacetime.

Senator NUNN. I would agree with that. However, it seems since everyone has agreed that if we had any kind of a war we would have to go back to the draft, we should have a pretty viable plan ready just for that event. What I am getting to is, I am afraid the young people of today think that our Volunteer Force means if we do have another Vietnam there is not going to be any draft. I am not saying anybody has intentionally led them into that, because I think if you read very carefully you wouldn't come to that conclusion. It is very disturbing to me, knowing full well that if we go back to any wartime footing we will immediately have to go back to the draft. The draft didn't become unpopular in peacetime, it became unpopular only because of the Vietnam war, because there were inequities all through. It disturbs me to think that we have a whole group of young people who would be shocked if all of a sudden we got into a war and the Volunteer Force evaporates, and we are back to the full scale draft with exactly the problems we had before. Perhaps what we have is a peacetime force, and that may be very well what we need and the thing of the future. We may be able to make it work and I commend you for your effort. By the same token, knowing full well that once we got back into any kind of war, which I hope will never happen, immediately we would be right back with the draft system with all the problems and all the pressures we had in the Vietnam war. It just seems to me we owe the American public more of an explanation than they have been given.

Secretary CALLAWAY. You made a comment that in the event of any kind of war the Volunteer Army would evaporate.

Senator NUNN. The concept, not the people in it.

Secretary CALLAWAY. The people in it I think would fight, and fight well. It would be unlikely that they would be allowed to leave at the end of their term. So they would probably stay in if it were that kind of war.

Senator NUNN. I will accept that amendment of my remarks. I did not mean that they wouldn't be there and physically fighting, but I meant the concept of no draft—

Secretary CALLAWAY. There is also another alternative. And this would be an alternative for the Congress and the President to take. But as you know, in the Vietnam war, with limited exceptions, the Reserves were not called. There would also be the alternative of calling the Reserves and the Guard. But this would not support a World War II type of war with 10 million in the Army, but rather would support a war of the size of Vietnam or something of that kind.

Senator NUNN. I agree. I think it was a very bad mistake we made in the Vietnam war which put a lot of pressure on the draft and on the 18-year old people even though the Reserves had been paid for years to be ready. That evolution spread to the Volunteer Force.

Secretary CALLAWAY. There is one remark that I might want to make. Secretary Schlesinger may have made it already. He is very concerned about it. I will just speak for the Army.

As the Army develops more reliance on the Reserve Components, as we do the kind of things that General Weyand has talked about, as we meld them in with our divisions, as we have divisions with two Active brigades and one Reserve Component brigade, and we say that is a division that will fight, and we put it into our contingency plan, it is going to be very difficult for the Army to really put that into a contingency plan unless the Army feels that the callup of that Reserve Component can be done. I think Secretary Schlesinger may well be discussing with you and other Members of Congress a plan whereby the Army or the other services could be assured of that callup. You see, the whole contingency planning of the Army would be changed enormously if the Army felt assured that that third brigade was a part of that division as opposed to, say, well, maybe it is and maybe it isn't.

Senator NUNN. We have talked about that, and I got into it, as you may or may not know, in this Air Guard situation. I was convinced that the SURGE capability in the strategic airlift could very well be filled by the Air Guard, saving about \$130 million a year. We reflected that in the authorization bills that have passed and are now law. The big problem was with the Air Force—which is understandable, and I am sure it is the same in the Army and Navy. If we can't call them short of a national emergency, and the politics may dictate that the President doesn't want to call a national emergency for any reason, then we can't plan on them. Therefore, we have to go the active duty route. That is costing you untold millions and millions of dollars. I did ask the Secretary to confront that problem directly, and let's get it on the table and see what the problem is, and he is doing that. I think we will have a proposal here because, in my estimation, if we are going to have the Reserves

out there, we have some impediment to prevent them from being called by the President. Therefore all the force structure planning, in spite of us giving theoretical lip service to the total force concept, if everything is being planned on that basis, which I think it is now, would result in our not being able to call the Reserves short of a national emergency. Therefore, I contend—and I think you have just made it clear—that we are wasting a tremendous amount of money and that is a very important aspect. I think it would affect the Army greatly.

Secretary CALLAWAY. Yes sir.

One of the options we are considering—and I am sure the Secretary of Defense has talked to you about it—is some kind of option where at least certain Reserve units could be called, perhaps on the authority of the Secretary of Defense, without calling a national emergency, so that he could, when he needed the airlift in the case that you give, on his own call that airlift. The people in those units would of course have to clearly understand what their obligation is. So there is no misunderstanding at all. I think that is an option that perhaps he has discussed with you.

Senator NUNN. I think it is an option. He was talking about having a level up to which it could be called without having a national emergency, perhaps by numbers, or perhaps by units. We haven't gotten the plan yet. However, I would think that by having some kind of mechanisms like that we can make our Reserves, in a very short period of time, much more a part of our overall defense force. I do believe the Reserve forces now have the greatest potential for an increased state of readiness of any group we have.

I have a lot of other questions, Mr. Secretary, but I don't want to detain you, because I know you have other matters to attend to. I suggest that we supply these for the record and let you and General Weyand go ahead now, because I know you are very busy. I apologize to you for detaining you the 15 minutes I was late, but I had those votes I had to make first.

We will supply a series of questions for the record which Frank Sullivan will get to you. We appreciate very much your attendance. I think the Army is making giant strides toward becoming a viable, ready force that we all know we need, and I think both of you have a lot to do with it. Therefore, I congratulate you.

Secretary CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for letting us appear. There is nothing more important to the Army. We are very excited about this subcommittee. We think it will serve a very worthwhile purpose. We intend to work very closely with you. We look at you as one who has the same end in mind that we have and if, between the two of us, we can be more effective for our country, that is all we ask.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I would say that at some point I would like to get into, perhaps, the Army that is in Europe. We went into tactical nuclear weapons with the Secretary this morning. Sometime in the future, I would like to have more information on that.

Senator DOMNICK. I was interested in your description of the value of maintaining stability in the Army's strength and force structure.

To help achieve a greater measure of stability, I was thinking that a 2-year end strength authorization would be helpful, not only to the Army but to the Congress.

What would the major advantages and disadvantages be of such a proposal from your point of view as Army Secretary?

Secretary CALLAWAY. 1. A strength authorization provided for a several year period is most desirable as it permits greater flexibility for the efficient management of the Army. A 2-year congressional end strength authorization would be a major step in this direction.

a. Recruiting for a volunteer force is, to a large degree, attracting qualified applicants to fill predetermined positions at specific locations 5 to 6 months after entry into the Army.

b. Training of recruits is geared to prepare individuals to perform in these predetermined positions.

c. Reassignment of soldiers returning from overseas tours requires matching personnel to stabilized jobs to avoid additional reassignments and associated PCS funds.

2. Annual changes in the authorized end strength alter the number of recruits required and may cause shifts in the recruiting and training bases. More importantly, jobs at designated locations for which individuals were trained must be eliminated if the end strength is adjusted downward. The result is personnel turbulence, training/skill mismatch, personal dissatisfaction, turbulent use of training facilities and their work force, and breach of contracts between individuals and the Army. All of the Army's long range personnel management plans are predicated on the strength remaining approximately constant.

3. A 2-year congressional end strength authorization would also tend to focus the attention of Army management on the solution of longer range personnel problems.

4. The personnel flow accommodating force structure changes such as activations, inactivations and reorganization could be optimized to minimize personnel turbulence and save dollars.

5. Achievement of the long range stationing plan could also be accomplished more smoothly with less cost.

6. Stabilization is particularly essential during the next few years as the Army is reconfigured to provide more combat power.

Senator DOMINICK. What are your priorities for personnel legislation now pending before the Congress?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Personnel legislative items which are essential to the Volunteer Army and require priority attention are designed to improve career attractiveness and retain trained personnel. These items recognize our commitment to people and permit us to treat each member fairly and equitably.

The first item involves the extension of travel and transportation entitlements to our junior enlisted members. Today, when we order a junior enlisted member overseas, he is responsible to relocate his family at his own expense to a location of choice while he serves overseas unaccompanied. If we order him from the east coast to the west coast to meet a requirement, he must bear the expense of moving his family and household. If we order a member to perform essential Army duties, we should move his family to that location. It's the right and people thing to do.

To enable us to better manage our personnel resources and to improve the quality of the Volunteer Army, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act and the Uniformed Services Retirement Modernization Act will give us the necessary tools of management. Since not all personnel can serve a full career, these legislative items will provide necessary attritive procedures and will recognize the vested interest of service for both officer and enlisted members by providing severance and equity payments.

As a result of recent court decisions, the Army needs the legislative authority to reinstitute the mandatory urinalysis program to identify any drug abusers for rehabilitation and elimination of indiscipline.

The Army—Active and Reserve Components—faces a serious junior officer procurement shortfall beginning in fiscal year 1978. Since officer programs are long lead time, we have requested legislation to increase our ROTC scholarships by 3,500. These additional scholarships will be used for Active Army requirements and will allow the Reserve and Guard requirements to be filled by the overflow of nonscholarship students. The proposed legislation is presently under consideration by OMB.

I wish to thank the members of the committee and the Congress for judicious expansion of GI bill benefits for veterans. The education and home loan provisions of the GI bill are a vital incentive for Volunteer Army service. I know we can count on your continued support for our other priority personnel legislative items.

Senator NUNN. What will it cost to equip the new divisions you plan to form from making headquarters savings?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Approximately \$400 million.

Senator NUNN. If you have plans already to cut headquarters and move to 16 divisions in 1978, why don't you do it right away? In other words, what are the elements that slow down the movement to more divisions?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Our goal is to move towards 16 divisions as soon as possible. Accordingly, General Abrams and I have challenged commanders at every level to find additional resources to use in accomplishing our program. In so doing, I am concerned that we keep turbulence, so damaging to readiness and morale, at a minimum. The resources to assist, and perhaps even accelerate, our force improvements will come primarily from the elimination of marginal activities and from manpower savings in our trainee and training base accounts as we realize the benefits of longer terms of enlistment and increased stability, which increase only several years from now. Efficiencies in the use and reduction of facilities, and better use of operations and maintenance resources and equipment will save dollars. Elimination of marginally effective units will free manpower resources.

On the surface, these actions would appear to provide the resources to accelerate the move to 16 divisions. However, some tough challenges confront us. We have identified some potential reductions that require consultation with other military departments and the attendant need to develop new ways of doing business. In some cases, consultation with allies and host governments is required before we can move further. Others involve realigning our logistical

and depot system. Others require base closures and the need for consultation with Congress. It is very much like peeling an artichoke. As we remove one tier, the potential for further savings results, but you do have to remove the leaves before getting to the heart. The manpower savings from these and other activities—the sources of most of our savings—are not immediately usable in combat units. The “MOS Mismatch Problem,” already of concern to you, will worsen—although we can accept some round pegs in square holes, many of these soldiers require retraining. Should we accelerate unit activations, PCS costs will increase—this, in the face of current congressional action to reduce PCS costs, will be a significant limitation.

Stationing for the new combat units is another tough area. As you know, Forts Ord and Polk will accommodate two of the new divisions. They are now training centers—to prevent disrupting the training base to the degree that our ability to produce trained soldiers to fill increased combat authorizations is hampered, the transfer of training units must be orderly. Additionally, this orderly transition contributes directly to the achievement of One Station Training—a program essential to improvements in our training establishment. Although I am prepared to accept some temporary departure from my standards for quality of barracks and other facilities for our soldiers to accomplish the all important goal of attaining the 16 division force, some of the facilities, especially those at Forts Polk and Hunter/Stewart, are simply not ready and fiscal constraints stand in the way of our refurbishing them as fast as we would like to accommodate an accelerated schedule. Family housing is a similar challenge—we are looking at ways to reprogram assets but even if we succeed, construction time limits us. And we are yet unsure of how much help we will get from private firms building off-post housing, a situation especially acute at Fort Polk.

We cannot instantly increase our production capability. At the same time we are increasing active combat units which adds demands for additional major items, we are attempting to upgrade our early deploying Reserve Component units. We are studying how far we can stretch these resources, but we do not want our new units equipped with wooden guns and stovepipe tanks.

Whatever we do, we must not run roughshod over our people—commitments must be honored; turbulence minimized; and retraining accomplished in a timely way, not only to assure readiness is maintained but to avoid the serious morale implications which result when soldiers are malassigned. All of these considerations impact on the perception of our Army and consequently our ability to recruit in a volunteer environment. Certainly, acceleration is desirable, but it would be counterproductive if done at the expense of sound readiness and personnel policies, the objective of which is an Army of quality, well equipped, with well disciplined, highly skilled, and capable soldiers.

Senator NUNN. One of the major problems the Army has had over the years is the “MOS Mismatch” problem—round pegs in square holes. What kind of progress has the Army made on solving this problem?

Secretary CALLAWAY. It is tempting to tell you we have made great progress. For, in a way, we have. The "MOS mismatch" rate was 15.6 percent in June of 1972; it was cut nearly in half by June of 1974, or to about 9 percent. That is progress. But, to answer only in terms of statistics would be to evade the real meaning of the problem. MOS mismatch is not a numbers game; it is a human problem with human dimensions that just cannot be ignored. If we had only a single soldier malassigned, that would be one too many. In the days of the draft, when men were brought on board against their will to begin with, "MOS mismatch" was looked upon as more of a management failing than as a problem having real individual significance—the general assumption was that the man would be unhappy whatever he was doing, so his thoughts didn't matter too much. Such an attitude has no place in a volunteer force. Commitment is a two-way road. Many of our men and women come into the service seeking training in certain skills; we have moral as well as legal responsibilities to see that they work in their chosen field. And, while those who join for travel or other options are trained to fill the balance of our needed skills, the Army has the opportunity if not the obligation to give every soldier tasks that are challenging, that call forth his very best effort. Only then can we reasonably expect the best. Training a person for one job and putting him in another is hardly the way to get the most from him. On the other hand, putting him into a job he is prepared for magnifies the contribution he is likely to make. Therefore, I prefer to talk in terms of our "MOS match opportunity" rather than of our "MOS mismatch problem." If we approach the matter with genuine concern for the aspirations of each individual, we will have the opportunity to do the most good for the Army and for our people. Until we achieve a far greater measure of stability than we have had in the past, we will never be able to put every round peg in every round hole, but neither can we relax so long as we have anyone serving in a capacity not compatible with his desires and skills.

Senator NUNN. What is the current combat/support ratio in Europe as combat and support are defined in the fiscal year 1975 defense authorization law?

General WEYAND. The present data for Army combat to total force distribution for all Europe is 47 percent combat and 53 percent support forces as defined in the fiscal year 1975 defense authorization law. The figures for USAREUR only are 51 percent combat/and 49 percent support forces.

Senator NUNN. How will the ratio improve when the 18,000 personnel shift is completed? Are any other actions being taken by the Army to improve the combat/support ratio in Europe?

General WEYAND. The change in combat or support strength as a result of the fiscal year 1975 defense authorization law cannot be predicted at this time. The Secretary of Defense is charged with the task of apportioning the 18,000 man support force reduction among the services. The Army has not yet been advised of its share. If it is assumed that the Army is tasked to accomplish a 12,000 reduction, utilizing the definitions of the fiscal year 1975 authorizations law, the total Army force in all of Europe would be 53 percent combat

and 47 percent support forces. The USAREUR force would be 58 percent combat and 42 percent support forces. The US Army in Europe is continuing its ongoing effort to consolidate headquarters and support elements and to build combat units. During the last four years, this effort has resulted in a 6 percent increase in personnel in combat elements. The combat-support balance in Europe and worldwide is being studied in order to meet the Army's 16 division goal. The Army has accepted the mission of trimming and streamlining its logistical support. Significant changes in doctrine, structure and procedures are required for realignment of the support establishment.

Senator NUNN. What is the readiness status of U.S. forces in Europe?

General WEYAND. All major Army combat units in Europe are adequately prepared for combat. The major Army combat units in Europe are organized at an Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) The ALO of an organization is determined by the number of manpower spaces against which an organization is authorized to requisition personnel and equipment and becomes the unit's readiness goal. ALO 2 is 90 percent of required strength. As of August 1, 1974 all major combat units achieved an acceptable overall readiness condition.

Senator NUNN. Please comment on the discipline of Army troops in Europe and Korea. Is the drug problem easing off in Europe?

General WEYAND. The discipline of Army troops for both Europe and Korea is up to Army standards. The "hard drug" problem in Europe remains serious even though it may be easing somewhat; cannabis products are still the major substance of abuse. There are two things that concern me about drug abuse in Europe. First, the availability of a German manufactured prescription drug, Mandrax, appears to be on the increase. The ease of obtaining Mandrax, although it is controlled by German law, may lead to an increase in Europe's hard drug problem. Second, a recent decision by the Court of Military Appeals has resulted in the suspension of our urine testing program which makes the assessment of the drug problem and the identification of drug abusers more difficult. A legislative proposal which may allow reinstatement of urine testing is under consideration.

Senator NUNN. How is the morale of the U.S. Army troops in Europe?

General WEYAND. Morale is an individual property difficult to assess except in the grossest of terms. However, in my personal opinion, the morale in Europe has improved significantly. We are continuing our efforts to improve the morale in Europe through the improvement of material factors such as barracks and nonmaterial factors such as leadership and job challenge. The situation in Europe has greatly improved over the last few years and I am confident that the improvement will continue.

Senator NUNN. Please outline plans to reduce support and headquarters units and indicate reductions made to date. What will be the cost saving?

General WEYAND. On March 5, 1974 we announced a major reorganization and reduction of the Headquarters, Department of the

Army Staff. This action will be completed by end fiscal year 1975. As a result, the size of the staff and its Staff Support Activities is being reduced by 14 percent and over 500 military and civilian spaces.

On 27 June details of our actions to eliminate seven major headquarters and a number of support activities were announced. These reductions have commenced and will be freeing over 10,000 military and civilian spaces that are needed to increase the Army's readiness and combat structure. They will be completed by end fiscal year 1975. Much of the support activity reduction occurs in the Western Pacific and is illustrated by the following examples:

US Army, Japan (including Okinawa).

Reduce Okinawa Headquarters.

Terminate depot maintenance and retrograde operations.

US Army Support Command, Thailand.

Reduce Army support and redesignate as the Military Assistance Command Thailand Support Group.

Eighth US Army, Korea.

Reduction in headquarters staff manpower.

Consolidate headquarters signal activities.

Military manpower spaces, funds associated with civilian spaces, and materiel resources being freed by these actions are needed to help build our 16 combat division force and are being reallocated accordingly. With respect to reductions in headquarters to date, and not included in the 10,500 spaces discussed above, is a reduction of 4,900 spaces which is reflected in the fiscal year 1975 Budget. Of these, about 2,400 are job eliminations and the remainder were transfers. None of these spaces, of course, are available for reallocation to combat structure since they were end strength reductions associated with headquarters or transfer of spaces to other Army activities. The ability provided to the Army to reallocate its resources into combat structure has provided a decidedly positive incentive for management improvement, such as I have described, at all levels of command.

Senator NUNN. How many headquarters, in CONUS or overseas, will be eliminated? Which ones? What is the timetable?

General WEYAND. Seven headquarters, five overseas and two in CONUS, are being disestablished. In CONUS, the U.S. Army Intelligence Command at Fort Meade, Md., was disestablished on June 30, 1974 being replaced by a new and considerably smaller organization, the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency. The U.S. Army Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs, Colo., will be disestablished on January 4, 1975. Overseas, the Theater Army Support Command, Europe, and the Engineer Command, Europe, will be disestablished by September 30, 1974. U.S. Army, Alaska, U.S. Army Forces, Southern Command, and U.S. Army, Pacific, will be disestablished no later than December 31, 1974.

Senator NUNN. What other reductions will occur in headquarters?

General WEYAND. A series of broad, sweeping actions are underway designed to streamline our management and reduce staffs, headquarters, and support organizations. We are reallocating the identified manpower spaces and associated funds as they are needed to build a combat force of 16 divisions, and they are being reallocated within the Army to help. The headquarters and support reductions that I

have discussed follow hard on the heels of the 1973 reorganization of the Army in the Continental United States. The new CONUS organization reduces headquarters and staff layering and functionally orients our major commands. We are continuing to review our total force structure, with particular attention to the remaining management headquarters and their effectiveness in relation to recent organizational changes and needs of the Army. A significant part of this effort is the continuing review of our long range stationing needs. Our objective is to insure the most prudent size and number of installations under Army control. While no announcement of major realignments is anticipated in the immediate future, individual realignments may occur. As has been the case in these major realignments, we will advise the committee and interested members of Congress prior to final decisions being announced on future major realignments.

Senator NUNN. What can be done to reduce the number of military personnel tied up in training? As you know, this committee recommended a 7 percent reduction in the 500,000 military and civilian personnel involved in training in fiscal year 1975.

Secretary CALLAWAY. The Army is continually examining means by which the number of personnel involved in training can be reduced. In an effort to reduce the training base, the Army in the past several years has reduced the number of resident Programs of Instruction (POI) from 821 to 628. On a continuing basis we examine individual training for areas where we can eliminate, reduce, or consolidate courses. The following are examples of such actions:

1. Elimination of Branch Officer Candidate Schools (OCS) and consolidation to a single OCS with course length reduced from 23 to 14 weeks.
2. Elimination of Vietnam oriented as well as nonessential functional transition courses.
3. Consolidation of duplicatory courses identified by Interservice Training Review.
4. Elimination of courses which duplicate instruction in the Non-commissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).
5. Elimination of some graduate flight training courses and consolidation of aviation training at Fort Rucker AL allowing a reduction in manpower and other resources.
6. Over the past several years BCT course length has been reduced from 8½ to the current 7 week course; and the BCT structure has been reduced from 300 companies in fiscal year 1972 to 207 in fiscal year 1975. We are programed to reduce to 180 companies by the end of fiscal year 1975.

As a result of economies effected in the training base we have been able to support an increase in training requirements from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 1975 without an appreciable increase in resources. We share your concern in regard to reducing the numbers of people associated with training. We are currently implementing One Station Training (OST) which has the potential of allowing further resource savings as well as reduced initial skill training loads through the merger of BCT and AIT courses in selected MOS. A key factor

in full realization of these savings is revision of Public Law 51 and the mandatory 120-day training period for REP personnel. Paralleling OST is the planned reduction in the number of training centers under project CONCISE. It is expected that implementation of these planned reductions will produce additional resource savings in the training establishment.

The Army is aware of the significant investment in manpower and other resources devoted to training, and we are taking a very hard look to take advantage of any potential savings in this area. Any resource savings realized will be reprogramed to improve our combat capability.

Senator NUNN. What do you consider to be your most serious problems with the all volunteer force and what is being done to correct the situation?

Secretary CALLAWAY. We see no serious problems in the near future. As you know, we made our recruiting objective last year. However, there are several major challenges that we face this year. The biggest challenge is the requirement to enlist approximately 25,000 more people this year than we did last year. We think we can do it with the continued support of Congress and the people. In regards to the other areas, we must enlist more people into the combat arms, increase the overall quality, obtain more representative enlistments, reduce the present level of resources required to obtain enlistments and change the negative perception of duty in Europe. We are attacking each of these areas and feel confident we can meet and overcome each of these challenges.

Senator NUNN. What percent of the active force do women comprise? What percent of the active force do you expect them to be at the end of fiscal year 1976?

Secretary CALLAWAY. At the end of fiscal year 1974 women comprised 3.9 percent of the active force. By the end of fiscal year 1976 we are currently projecting women to comprise 5.7 percent of the active force.

Senator NUNN. How do retention rates compare now with rates shortly before the draft ended?

Secretary CALLAWAY. Our reenlistment rates as shown below are significantly higher than they were shortly before the draft ended. Although it might appear that the first term Regular Army reenlistment rate declined in fiscal year 1974 from that in fiscal year 1973, in fact the fiscal year 1973 rate is inflated due to the fiscal year 1972 early release program which reduced the number of fiscal year 1973 soldiers who were eligible to reenlist but retained all those who indicated a desire to reenlist.

ADJUSTED REENLISTMENT RATES

Fiscal year:	1st term		Career
	Regular Army	Draftee	
1969.....	17.1	9.4	63.7
1970.....	16.0	6.9	56.9
1971.....	16.7	4.4	58.5
1972.....	13.3	.8	45.4
1973.....	37.0	2.7	62.4
1974.....	28.8	6.9	72.4

Senator NUNN. What is the quality of new recruits? Will they fight, and are they dependable? Are there any signs that they are mercenaries, that is, joining for the money only?

Secretary CALLAWAY. The quality of new recruits is good. In fiscal year 1974, the majority of enlistees had above average aptitudes (52.5 percent mental category I-IIIa) while less than 18 percent were in mental category IV; 56.1 percent were high school graduates or higher. The Trainee Discharge Program screens out the new recruits who demonstrate a lack of motivation, discipline, or aptitude for Army life. This program is designed to place in units fully trained and disciplined soldiers who are dependable and will perform well in combat.

There are no signs that the new enlistees are mercenaries. Our experience shows that about 8 percent of total male enlistees enlisted under the combat arms bonus option and their loss rate early in service is not significantly different than enlistees who entered under other options. In my opinion, the most important motivator that attracts volunteers into the Army is the opportunity for personal development. This includes learning a trade or skill which can be used in civilian life and the opportunity for advanced education and training. We believe that soldiers are attracted by the pay, bonus, and benefits offered by military service as well as the opportunity for self-improvement the same as individuals are attracted by industry and other civilian activities.

Senator NUNN. In your opinion, what is the factor that attracts the most volunteers—money, educational opportunities, travel, whatever?

General WEYAND. The single most important motivator that attracts volunteers into the Army appears to be the opportunity for personal development. This involves the acquisition of a trade or skill useful in civilian life and the opportunity for advanced education and training. It is interesting to note, however, that an opinion research corporation nationwide study among young men, boys, parents, and educators indicate that various subsets of potential male volunteers differ in what they consider to be the prime motivating factor for enlistment in the Army. Whereas high school graduates indicate that the opportunity to become more mature and self-reliant is the most important factor in their decision to enlist, nonhigh-school graduates indicate that job training which will help them later to get a civilian job is the most important motivator.

Senator NUNN. What specific steps are being taken or would you recommend be taken to reduce personnel costs?

Secretary CALLAWAY. I'm glad you asked that question because we share your concern about reducing personnel costs and are proud of our accomplishments in this area. The Army took the initiative in reducing headquarters overhead through a streamlining of its organizational structure. In addition, we are targeting our efforts to convert support elements into more combat capability. We have pursued an aggressive civilianization program and we are attempting to reduce grade levels.

One of our management improvement actions—the one station training concept—will lead to a better utilization of our training establishment and produce a more effective fighting man. Further

training cost avoidance is being achieved from reduced input into basic training from more reenlistments and longer, more stabilized tours. Since we are manpower intensive rather than equipment intensive, as far as costs are concerned, we emphasize the maximum return on our investment in the soldier.

We have many management improvement programs designed to increase the efficiency of our operations from the company level to the overall Army team. These programs include Management Practices for TOE Units (MAPTOE) value engineering, cost reduction, Management Practices for TDA units (MAPTDA) productivity improvement, output measurement, Presidential management improvement awards, zero defects and defense integrated management engineering system—DIMES.

Since our product is a combat-ready deterrent force made up of people which will always be short on dollars, we will constantly strive to use innovative means to hold down personnel costs.

INFORMATION PAPER

August 15, 1974.

Subject: Combat Arms Enlistment Bonus.

Purpose: To provide information for Senator Taft, Jr.

FACTS.

Available statistics indicate there were 32,901 total enlistments in the combat arms during FY 74. Approximately 16,577, or 50.4% (16577/32901), of those who enlisted in the combat arms were qualified for the Enlistment Bonus Program under the requirement that they be a high school graduate, or equivalent, and be in Mental Category I, II or III. Of the 16,577 eligible, 12,860, or 77.6% (12860/16577), actually enlisted under the Enlistment Bonus Program. These figures do not include reenlistments, since reenlistees are not eligible for the Enlistment Bonus.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed until 10 a.m., Wednesday, August 14, 1974.]

MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES OF THE PAST AND FUTURE

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL
OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn (chairman).

Present: Senators Nunn (presiding) and Taft.

Also present: John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Robert Q. Old, Francis J. Sullivan, John A. Goldsmith and Charles J. Conneely, professional staff members; Nancy J. Bearg, research associate; Roberta A. Ujakovich, research assistant; and Mary G. Ketner clerical assistant.

Senator NUNN. The subcommittee will come to order.

Today we will continue our discussion of the overall manpower and personnel situation of the Department of Defense. We are very pleased to have Secretary Middendorf, Admiral Holloway, and General Cushman here with us today to get into the real facts and details of the Navy and Marine Corps situation. I know that the Sea Services have a somewhat different aspect to their manpower and personnel situation caused by their operation at sea and far flung deployment. I also know that you are becoming more and more technical, and for that reason you are perhaps having to have more and more skill in your service. I want to get into these matters today, as well as all of the other manpower-related issues.

I hope today we will be able to cover the overall Navy force structure situation as it relates to the mission the Navy has to carry out. I would also like to find out more about the overseas homeporting program, as well as the readiness and state of training of the various Marine units. Of course, we read the news this morning about the Greek and Turkish situation, and the Cyprus situation. To the extent we can in open hearing, if you have any thoughts on that subject, I am sure we would like to have them. I can bring that out with questions later if you do not have it in your prepared statement.

I am particularly concerned about the all volunteer force and whether the Navy and Marine Corps are able to get a sufficient number of high quality personnel, not just this year, not just the fiscal year 1975, but in the future. Manpower costs are a continuing concern and I would like to get your ideas on steps that can be taken to hold down the increase in manpower costs.

I do not believe anyone thinks we are going to be able to have a roll back, but I am very concerned about the projections in the out years that look like they are going to be staggering in terms of increases.

With this brief opening statement, Mr. Secretary, I would like you to proceed with any statement you have. Then Admiral Holloway and General Cushman, may present any statements they have after which we will get into the questions and answers. Would you care to lead off.

STATEMENT OF HON. J. WILLIAM MIDDENDORF, II, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY; ACCOMPANIED BY ADM. JAMES L. HOLLOWAY, III, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; AND GEN. ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, JR., COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Secretary MIDDENDORF. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee and the staff, on behalf of the Navy I am most pleased to be able to discuss this question today.

As Secretary of the Navy, I am charged with recruiting, training, equipping and maintaining our naval forces. I must admit that because the hardware programs that equip and maintain our forces involve high visibility single items, they seem to get more attention than our recruiting and training programs. This should not be the case. The best weapons in the world may not win a war if they are not operated by the best-trained people.

I will address manpower and personnel issues as they affect the three vital, interdependent areas:

Active military strength, civilian support, and reserve forces.

Personnel management is essentially a matter of having the right man in the right place at the right time. This is an oversimplification, but with all its complexities, this has high priority in the Department of the Navy.

The fact that personnel has a high priority is perhaps best exemplified by the amount we spend on people; 43 percent of the total Department of the Navy budget is listed as pay and related costs. For the Marine Corps, a personnel intensive service, the percentage of the total budget spent on people is nearly 79 percent. We cannot accurately predict the percentages to be spent on personnel in future years. We intend to hold to or decrease the present percentage if at all possible. I think Admiral Holloway in his testimony will give an estimate of this.

If we are to maintain the security of this nation, however, we must face the reality that good people cost money.

In order to meet our active military strength goals in an all-volunteer force, recruiting has taken on new importance. As the draft phased out and we were faced with recruiting in an open manpower market, we have had to dramatically increase the resources directed to this effort.

In the draft environment of a few years ago our dollar commitment to recruiting was far less than it is today. In fiscal year 1971 it cost the Navy \$548 to enlist one person. That figure was \$541 in fiscal year 1972. It jumped to \$804 in fiscal year 1973, as the all-volunteer environment became a fact of life. It was \$936 in

fiscal year 1974. In fiscal year 1975, the cost to enlist one person in the Navy is estimated to increase slightly, to \$959.

Referring to the point you made, Mr. Chairman, the cost of enlistment has gone up just as substantially. I just mentioned that in 1970 it cost the Navy \$548 to enlist one person. And last year it was \$936. That is almost double what it was 4 years ago.

Senator NUNN. If I might interrupt you on that point, Mr. Secretary, is that mainly recruiting costs?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. How do you define that enlistment?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. We have 6,000 men working in the recruiting area, and our budget is about \$107 million in that area. That is adding in everything, O. & M.N. and what have you, and that works out to about \$959, just under \$1,000 a man to bring them into the Navy.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. We foresee continued high recruiting costs associated with the all-volunteer force, and pay costs have also increased substantially. The basic pay for a recruit in 1970 was \$115.20 a month. Today it is \$326.10 a month.

The national economy, the natural tendency of young people to seek travel and adventure, and the degree of public willingness to support and serve in the armed forces—that is, simple patriotism—are variables which may have significant effect on recruiting. For the present, I can report that we have now reached a point which we consider a good balance between returns and expenditures. In the Navy, we have achieved close to our numerical goals, and after some initial difficulties, the Marine Corps results are improving and we are optimistic. And General Cushman will talk about some of the reasons we did not make our goals last year.

The Marine Corps has had some help in tipping the scale by use of the combat arms bonus and more recently, the expanded enlistment bonus.

But success in recruiting is not solely a matter of obtaining numbers. We must recruit the right kind of people. They must join for a sufficient length of time to justify what it costs us to train them. And we must convince the good ones to reenlist.

With respect to reenlistment, in my opinion, the Navy has made significant progress. Five years ago, our first term reenlistment rate in the Navy was 10 percent. That figure has moved upward; to 17 percent in 1971, to 23 percent in 1972 and 1973, and in the year just completed, to 32.9 percent.

I credit this successful trend, among other things, to the enlightened personnel policies of Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, who was Chief of Naval Operations 1970–1974. I have encountered criticism of his policies, but I am result-oriented—as the members of this committee are—and the fact that we are retaining key personnel in the service is a result that merits praise. I have also encountered critics who point out sensational reports about incidents aboard ships. It is my contention that these incidents are newsworthy because of their rarity. We are fortunate, in my opinion, that the Navy has been able to avoid incidents when 5,000 people are in cramped quarters, restricted to a 1,000 foot platform, for long periods of often tense times, in a sea environment away from home.

I do not want to paint too rosy a picture of retention: we still have "miles to go before we sleep," as Robert Frost said.

Looking ahead, an analysis of our accession requirements indicates that we will need more recruits in the years to come than we did in fiscal year 1974. The fact that we were unable to satisfy fully our specialty skill requirements in the last fiscal year highlights the challenge before us.

It is imperative that we do all we can to make a military career more attractive. Along these lines, loss of benefits hurts. As one example, the reduction of educational opportunities for enlisted members is disheartening to some of our very best people. This reduction seriously degrades our ability to retain them. One program I am referring to specifically is the associate degree program.

Senator NUNN. May I interrupt on that point, the educational opportunities.

What has caused that decrease, the budgetary restraints, or the Navy's own initiative to reduce that. Why do you have a reduction in educational opportunities?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. It is a combination of these things.

Senator NUNN. Has Congress initiated the reduction?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, the specific language in the bill has substantially reduced those programs.

Senator NUNN. Was that in the last year?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir. We did appeal this, and the reduction is not at the services' initiative in any sense.

Senator NUNN. Could you supply for the record the language in the particular—I imagine there was an appropriation bill—I think I recall it. At this point in the record, could you supply that, so we could have the details of exactly what the status of that is and what has caused that cut?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. We will, sir.

[The information follows:]

In the Report from the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives (Report No. 93-662 dated November 26, 1973) on the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1974, the following language appears at page 48 concerning educational opportunities and the budget restrains on that program:

ENLISTED PERSONNEL DEGREE SEEKING TRAINING

Each of the services has established baccalaureate degree training programs for enlisted personnel. In addition, the Navy, Army and Marine Corps have associate degree training programs. The following table shows the service budget requests for enlisted personnel full-time degree seeking programs:

Program	Navy	Air Force	Army	Marine Corps	Total
Baccalaureate degree:					
Training load	1.445	961	339	260	3.005
Cost	\$14.0	\$9.8	\$2.4	\$26.2
Associate degree:					
Training load	2.835	48	277	3.160
Cost	\$26.8	\$2.3	\$29.1
Total, training load	4.280	961	387	537	6.265
Total, cost	\$40.8	\$9.8	\$3.4	\$4.7	\$58.7

As shown above, the Navy enlisted personnel degree training program is more than four times larger than any of the other Service programs. The Navy justified their program on the basis that an opportunity to go beyond

the high school level is a very powerful incentive and attraction in the All-Volunteer Force. In addition, the Navy explained that even though the courses they take do not directly relate to increasing their skills in a professional area, it does make them, as all education does, more effective men after they have been subjected to academic discipline. The Committee does not agree with this concept, and has reduced the Navy request by 20 percent. This reduces the many years requested by 558, the Military Personnel appropriation request by \$6,800,000, and the Operation and Maintenance request by \$1,200,000.

The committee directs that full-time degree seeking training for enlisted personnel be limited to that training required to perform their military jobs. As an example, the Army provides college level training for selected enlisted personnel in the computer sciences discipline. Since these personnel have jobs requiring expertise in this field, the training is directly related to their job requirements and is justified. As discussed below, there are many opportunities for the enlisted man to advance his level of education without the Department of Defense having to assume the full cost plus lose the man's labor.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. We have dropped the size of our Navy down from 692,435 men and women in 1970 to 545,668 in 1974. This is a 21 percent decrease, and 475,000 of that number are enlisted men. Our civilian force has been reduced from 376,340 in 1970 to 323,556 in 1974, a 14 percent drop. One thing that the Navy and Marine Corps have done well during this period is to increase the percentage of women. We had 8,254 women in the Navy in 1970, and 16,782 in 1974. The Marines went from 2,418 women to 2,738.

In the Navy there is one women officer for every 3.68 enlisted women, while the ratio for men is one to 7.29 enlisted, so the women so far have just twice the chance of becoming officers. This is largely accounted for by the fact that 71 percent of female officers are in the healing arts meeting both Navy and Marine Corps requirements. In the Marine Corps, the officer women to enlisted women ratio is one to 7.15, while for males it is one to 9.11.

Senator NUNN. How about women on ships? Is there a trend, or a definite policy?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. It is the view of Congress that women should not serve in combat roles, and as a result no women serve on Navy ships, with the exception of *Sanctuary*, which is devoted primarily to the healing arts, and it would be like a Red Cross ship.

Senator NUNN. Do you define combat role as anyone on the ship?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. The definition of combat would be a situation where a person could be subject to hostile fire.

Senator NUNN. It seems like that could be everyone today in a nuclear age. I do not know how you draw the line. That is my point. Maybe you could supply for the record the definition of combat, how you draw the line, and the rationale for it. I think we would be interested. I know it is a difficult subject. I do not expect you to be able to define it this morning.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would like to supply for the record also the testimony before Mr. O. C. Fisher's subcommittee on the subject which we discussed a month or so ago, women in the Naval Academy.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

The Navy defines combat as an activity of a military unit in an environment which might expose the personnel involved to hostile fire of any kind. All personnel assigned to military units which may become engaged in combat activity must be trained for and be able to perform combatant duties.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. I should also mention that there is one trend—men, since we have gone all volunteer, and that is that we have seen a very sharp reduction in the average age of our Navy enlisted men coming in. The figure dropped down to 19.3 years, vice about 19.7 years 2 years ago. And we took in in this last fiscal year some 21,000 17 year olds, up significantly from the 11,600 of fiscal year 1973 and the 3,500 of fiscal year 1972.

Civilian personnel are an integral part of the total Navy manpower team. The management of these resources comes under two broad Congressional controls: the Authorization and Appropriation Acts and the Civil Service System governing personnel administration.

We have for years been successful in managing the work force size under the controls provided by Congress. Within this framework, we have had the flexibility to meet contingencies in support of fleet readiness, while preventing employment from rising beyond our fiscal authorization. In fiscal year 1975, Congress has added a new dimension by establishing numerical limitations on the number of civilians who may be employed by the Department. We see this new restriction as hampering the effective management of our work force, particularly the approximately 165,000 at industrial funded activities. The half of our civilian force, or 165,000, that are primarily employed in the industrial funded area are primarily employed in shipyards. This is crucial to our country at a time when we have reduced our fleet about 47 percent by deactivating the older ships.

We now need to rebuild the fleet, and to keep the limited numbers of ships we have—down from 976 in 1969 to 508 this year—in a state of readiness through overhaul and repair.

Under present regulations, we must administer our key civilian managers and professionals under the same Civil Service System that applies to all employees. While the System's protections and benefits are appropriate for the vast majority of our work force, it no longer serves the public interest for the management group. The proposed executive personnel system submitted to the Congress in July 1974 is a good beginning. I would go further, and suggest that all career management personnel be covered and that rewards and penalties be commensurate with the exercise of authority in these high positions. Specifically, we need to compensate the effective managers adequately and we need the authority to remove the ineffective. One advantageous authority would be management initiated retirements. We need a new, flexible personnel system for the proper management of our managerial personnel.

Turning now to the third element of manpower in the Department of the Navy, our goal is a total force with the Reserves effectively complementing the active force. I know you are interested in Reserves, and know about the total force concept. This policy has proven invaluable in the Marine Corps 4th Division wing team which General Cushman will refer to. In the Navy, we are still in a difficult transition period.

The Navy had an end strength in the Selected Reserve of 128,381 in 1970, and 114,864 in 1974. Comparable figures for the Marine Corps Reserve for those years were 47,880 and 32,190, respectively.

Senator TAFT. Could I interrupt at that point?

Senator NUNN. Go ahead, Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Is that reduction in the Reserve forces a planned reduction, or does it reflect in some way the elimination of the Selective Service? What is the explanation of it?

General CUSHMAN. May I answer that, Mr. Secretary?

With relation to the Marine Corps, this is inability to recruit the numbers we need in the organized Reserve.

Senator TAFT. In other words, it is not because of a statutory limitation?

General CUSHMAN. No, Sir, although the limitation each year has been tailored to cut the cloth, so to speak, in that there has been a steady erosion of the numbers we have been able to recruit. Each year Congress has authorized a number which is in the neighborhood of what we believe we can make, but they have not continued to authorize the strength which we really should have, which is about 45,000, in that neighborhood.

Senator TAFT. Thank you.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. The role of the Navy Reserve is being carefully reexamined with the goal of achieving optimum active and Reserve Force integration. In working toward this goal, new Reserve employment policies are under study in conjunction with a complete review of contingency requirements.

The Selected Reserve will be a key element in our military plans because of its capability to provide almost immediate operational support.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, what is the time element on this study, when you say a complete study of contingency requirements? Is this the overall Department of Defense study, or is this a separate study by the Navy.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Could I answer that, Mr. Chairman?

Senator NUNN. Certainly.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. This is a Department of Defense study, under the direction of Mr. Benowitz. The Navy has an admiral as a member of the study group who is keeping us informed within the headquarters structure of the Navy. Under the direction of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, we are overhauling our whole Naval Reserve concept.

Senator NUNN. That is a separate study?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir; it is. We are staying in step with the defense study, but looking at our own particular needs and our own requirements to improve ourselves in this area.

Senator NUNN. We understood yesterday—I believe Mr. Brehm said it would be due about December. They slid it back from September to December. Are you on that same kind of time frame with your collateral study?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes; we are, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. So by the first of the year we ought to have a pretty good look at both of those.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. The subcommittee would like to have a copy as soon as it is available.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. Although the President has the authority to recall not more than 1 million Reservists upon the declaration of a national emergency, there is an additional need to provide for

the limited, highly selective recall of Reserves. Such flexibility is believed necessary to meet specific requirements in a military contingency short of a national emergency.

Senator NUNN. On this point, could you furnish to the subcommittee for the record the kind of priority units that would be on the top of the list as far as what you would need in an emergency that was not an all-out national emergency as declared by the President? We are talking about this, and I understand we are going to get a proposal from the Department of Defense which is in the process of working its way through the executive branch. I would like to know from the Navy's point of view—I have some feel in the Air Force, because we have just been through a lot of debate on the strategic airlift, but I would like to know from the Navy's point of view what units would be the first priority units that you feel should be called under a scenario that was less than a national emergency.

[The information follows:]

The units which might be called and the priority of such activation would depend on the scenario envisioned. Additionally, the readiness of specified units at the time that the requirements exists would bear on the decision of which units to activate. The Navy is reviewing its mobilization requirements, beginning with "worst case" requirements, under the current OSD guidance. Following the approval of these requirements, partial mobilization requirements based on scenarios will be developed. Only then can a probable priority of units be developed. Generally speaking, however, the Navy's long range maritime patrol (VP) squadrons are expected to be considered an early response asset under most scenarios.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. In summary, it gives me pleasure to report that despite resource constraints, we are confident that with your support we will achieve an even more responsive, highly professional Navy-Marine team.

Admiral Holloway, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Cushman, Commandant of the Marine Corps, will address some specifics of important manpower and personnel issues within their services.

Senator NUNN. If it meets your approval, Senator Taft, I will go ahead with the other statements, and then we will come back and ask questions; however, if you have any questions as we go along, go ahead and interrupt.

Senator TAFT. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Holloway.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am honored to testify before this distinguished subcommittee in my first appearance before Congress as the Chief of Naval Operations. As we modernize our naval force, I am convinced that what we do in manpower matters will remain the stepping stone to our success. For that reason, I applaud the wisdom of Senator Stennis in establishing this subcommittee. It is to me a clear indication that our concerns in this area are certainly shared by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

My approach to this hearing has taken a dual course. First, I feel obliged to present for your consideration a reasonably full coverage of our major problems and future prospects in manpower and personnel. Secondly, Mr. Chairman, I also view this as an opportunity for you and the subcommittee to question me on my policies and

philosophical views in these matters. To accomplish the first objective, and with your permission, I would like to insert for the record a more lengthy and detailed statement.

Senator NUNN. Without objection, we will be glad to have that as part of the record.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I would like to present at this time only a short statement in order to leave as much time as possible for your questions.

Gentlemen, the subject at hand today coincides precisely with the highest priority I established upon beginning my tour as the CNO. I can best illustrate this fact by reading the first message that I sent to the major fleet commanders in chief, and I quote. (This message was addressed to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of the Atlantic Fleet, and of the U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.)

I consider that the key to continued progress in the United States Navy is the solution of our personnel problems. The success of our people programs is a prerequisite to continued improvement and advancement in all other areas of the Navy. The full potential of new ships and aircraft and the most modern weapons technology will never be realized if not properly maintained and effectively manned. The Navy must have quality people in the requisite numbers if we are to maintain our paramount position at sea with modern arms and high esprit. The most important single factor in the attainment of our personnel goals is stability. By recruiting capable and motivated young people, and reenlisting adequate numbers for a full career, we will minimize personnel turnover and reduce turbulence. The attainment of a stable force of professional Navy men and women will go far in resolving the pressing problems of material and training readiness in the fleet.

We are meeting most of our goals in recruiting, and improving our record of retention, but more needs to be done, particularly in the field of reenlistments. There have been some significant gains recently in the retention picture for some particular commands. In analyzing these sectors of success, the common element is clearly evident: The full involvement and personal commitment of the commander and his commanding officers.

To achieve these levels of success on a Navy-wide basis is going to require heightened realization on the part of our entire Navy, that the future depends upon a stable base of professionally motivated people, and that the attainment of this objective requires the highest priority of command attention, in terms of personal involvement and dedication.

I am sending this message to principal force commanders, rather than promulgating these views in a general message, because of my very strong conviction that this as policy guidance must receive personal attention at all echelons. This can only be accomplished through personal contact among all those exercising authority. I am convinced that it is only through involving the full chain of command that the individuals at every level of authority (commander, commanding officer, division officer, chief petty officers and petty officers) can be made aware of their full responsibilities in this task of the very highest priority. . . .

Mr. Chairman, that message addresses directly my three fundamental concerns regarding not just our active military personnel, but also our Navy civilians and Reserves—quality, stability, and personal involvement of command.

First, and implicit throughout my guidance to the fleet commanders, is a clear recognition of the unique demands placed on Navy people. Consider, if you will, our highly mobile forces as small groups of trained men integrated as teams and operating individual ships and units. These teams operate, singly and in concert, for months at a time without seeing their home ports and with limited opportunities to touch shore overseas. Even when not overseas, these units will be away at sea for weeks at a time. Of course, all of this is required because naval forces are by nature mobile, and because

we are a forward deployed force, maintaining the Nation's continuing seapower commitments overseas. But Navy personnel must be able to foresee with confidence that after a few years of sea duty, they can look forward to a regular period of shore duty. Thus, we must have a firmly established sea-to-shore rotation base.

This unique Navy requirement for maintaining a solid rotation base limits our capability to utilize civilians and women in substitution for our shore billets. However, having sea-experienced sailors in shore billets provides us with a quick-reaction mobilization base to draw upon when faced with crises. We did this in our buildup during the Vietnam conflict. More recently, during the October Middle East War, we drew from this base ashore to rapidly bring up our deployed posture.

Second, I would emphasize that we need quality personnel in the requisite numbers. In this the Navy is no different than other endeavors in life. Time and again I have seen that quality leadership, both officers and petty officers, strongly attracts quality young people for full, professional careers. In a lean military organization, I have observed that this effect is magnified. Quality is a self-perpetuating thing, something that works synergistically to produce what we are all after—and that is, of course, high esprit de corps and the best possible readiness for combat. In other words, the best defense for the dollar.

The third point I would like to make is my belief that the most important single factor in personnel matters is stability. In my message to the commanders in chief I used the word "stability" in the sense of strengthening our efforts in recruiting and retaining quality people and thereby reducing our personnel turnover. In reviewing the latest fleet commander's readiness reports, I see a common and continuing problem which impacts severely on our combat readiness. Although the aggregate enlisted manning strengths of fleet units are very high, the fleet—indeed, the entire Navy—is very short on critical technician and maintenance skills and experienced, supervisory petty officers. This is why, in my directive to the CINCs, I placed particular stress on the retention of quality personnel. For, in so doing, we can achieve a stable force of professional men and women who remain with the Navy for full careers. This stability will reduce our training costs and produce the kind of quality we need for maximum combat readiness.

Mr. Chairman, there is another sense of the word "stability" which I believe is highly germane to the subcommittee's inquiry. That is, we need stability in our policies. Such stability is essential to efficiency in our management actions. One of the greatest influences on our efficiency can come from early authorizations and appropriations from the Congress. Late enactments of budget bills force us to take cost avoidance actions which have undesirable impacts on our personnel programs. In this regard, therefore, we are most encouraged by the budget schedule set forth in the new Congressional Budget Act.

We are also encouraged by the recently enacted Bonus Revision Act and its positive effect in helping with our skill shortages. There are other examples of favorable, helpful actions of Congress. On the other hand, where there are rapid reversals of previously approved

benefits or opportunities, the impacts on our people are most negative. Any erosion of benefits or educational opportunities is seen by many of our career-motivated personnel as breaches of faith. Such actions also influence prospective enlistees. We are convinced that curtailment of advanced training and education programs strikes at the most powerful motivator of high quality personnel.

I am acutely aware of the fact that the cost of personnel programs and of manpower in general has been and continues to be high. This gives all of us great incentives for efficient management. The Navy is making significant progress in reducing the percent of its budget that goes into our manpower base. From 46 percent in 1970, manpower dollars have dropped to 4.4 percent today, and are programmed to decline to 42 percent in 1976.

Senator NUNN. On this point, Admiral, I would like to have an amendment to the record showing the details of how you accomplished that.

At that point also, if counsel could ask for a similar analysis by the other services, I think it would be a good comparison, so we can have that in the record. We will require that other material, but I think that is a significant point and I would like to know how you did it.

Does that mean you are getting more dollars from Congress, and thereby the percentage is reduced, or does it mean you are doing it through management?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. We like to think we are doing it through management, Mr. Chairman. I think that the facts that we provide will bear that out.

[The information follows:]

Since FY 1970, numerous actions have been effected to adjust the Navy military and civilian end strengths. From a combined military and civilian end strength of approximately 1,176,600 in FY 1970, Navy has deleted 231,000 military and civilian end strengths as projected in the currently programmed levels for FY 1976. A major portion of the reductions have impacted on military manning requirements and civilian shipyard/facilities related to forces. Additionally, there was the phasing out of manpower resources associated with the Vietnam conflict. Sizeable numbers of civilian and military personnel were no longer necessary after the termination of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. A substantial amount of manpower resources were saved as a result of Navy's shore establishment realignment. For instance, approximately 8,500 civilian and military spaces were deleted as a result of these realignment, closures, and consolidations. The modernization of the Fleet has resulted in a lesser number of ships having to be manned while working toward the objective of maintaining and rebuilding U.S. sea power through procurement of fewer, but more modern ships. Impacting upon all these strength reduction has been the objective to display for FY 76 a serious approach in implementing the total force policy. This, of course, includes the full utilization of the Naval Reserve community. As an example of the strength measures which have been effected, one need only look at Navy active duty military end strength 1970-1976. The end strength for FY 1970 was 692,000 and the end strength programmed for FY 1976 is 540,000. This is a reduction of approximately 150,000 military spaces. The projected officer strength for FY 76 is the lowest in the last quarter of a century and represents a reduction of over 20,000 since 31 July 1969. Enlisted strength requested for FY 1976 will represent a reduction of about one-third since the peak attained in July 1968.

In summary, the task of implementing all the actions associated with the huge Navy manpower strength reductions occurring 1970-1976 must be viewed in perspective. Each year there were force changes, manpower support reductions, training reductions, and command and base operations reductions. It is important to remember that these actions have been done in relation to each

other and must be viewed as such. They represent Navy management actions as well as those actions directed as a result of OSD and Congressional reviews.

What percent of the Army budget goes into its manpower base? (Describe in general terms those areas counted as part of the manpower base.) Provide specific percentages to include years 1970 and as programmed for 1976. If percentage declined between 1970 and 1976, provide details of how it was accomplished.

The percentages of Army budget related to manpower base for the years fiscal year 1970 through fiscal year 1976 are as follows:

	Fiscal year—						
	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976 ¹
Outlays ²	57	61	63	69	69	70	69
Total obligation authority ²	60	64	63	65	68	66	66
Total obligation authority ³	61	64	65	66	68	66	64

¹ Estimated.

² For the purposes of calculating the personnel and personnel related cost percentages, the manpower base includes MPA, NGPA, RPA, civilian pay, retired pay (Army portion) and family housing (Army portion) outlays or total obligational authority (TOA) expressed in current dollars and arrayed according to standard DOD convention. The percentages are displayed in both outlays and TOA even though the Army has in the past provided only outlay-based numbers. The outlay percentages are presented to maintain a consistent basis for comparison.

³ As an alternative computation using Navy methodology, the manpower base includes MPA, NGPA, RPA, civilian pay (direct hire only), training, recruiting and medical costs (nonpay) and family housing (Army portion) TOA expressed in current dollars.

The Army is people intensive rather than hardware intensive. Correspondingly, its manpower cost percentage has increased—not reduced—over the period fiscal year 1970 to fiscal year 1976 for two reasons. One, the compounding effect of annual pay raises and two, decreases in investment accounts combined with increases in operating accounts have driven personnel cost percentage gains. Reductions in both military and civilian strength levels have served to partially offset salary growth spurred by pay raises. However, as long as the investment (nonpay) share of the Army budget decreases or remains the same, reductions in manpower cost percentage will not materialize.

Manpower costs as a percent of Navy total obligational authority

End fiscal year:	Percent
1970	46
1971	49
1972	47
1973	46
1974	45
1975	44
1976	¹ 42

¹ Projected estimate.

Note: Manpower costs include military pay and allowances, civilian salaries, training costs, medical costs, recruiting costs, PCS and family housing.

PERSONNEL RELATED COSTS¹ WITHIN MARINE CORPS TOTAL OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY

Fiscal year	Amount (millions)	Percentage
1970 ²	\$1,857	70.5
1971	1,701	78.2
1972	1,714	81.4
1973	1,835	80.0
1974	1,948	78.7
1975	2,021	78.3
1976 (estimated)	2,040	75.6

¹ Includes MPMC, RPMC, civilian personnel (including reimbursable amounts, from HEW and MCIF), and family housing. Since retired pay is a separate DOD appropriation and does not affect Marine Corps' TOA, retired pay for former marines is not included.

² Includes \$31.687 million funded by O. & M.N.

The percent of the Air Force budget that went into our manpower base for fiscal year 1970 through fiscal year 1975 is reflected on the two following tables; summary of personnel and related costs, and appropriation details.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE—SUMMARY OF PERSONNEL AND RELATED COSTS

	Percent of TOA					Millions						
	Fiscal year 1970	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972	Fiscal year 1973	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975	Fiscal year 1970	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972	Fiscal year 1973	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975 ¹
Total military personnel.....	28	29	31	31	31	28	\$6,691	\$6,744	\$7,298	\$7,620	\$7,798	\$7,824
Total civilian personnel.....	13	14	14	13	15	13	3,063	3,198	3,363	3,342	3,621	3,689
Percent of total USAF.....	41	43	45	44	46	41	9,754	9,942	10,661	10,962	11,419	11,513
Additives:												
Retired pay.....							872	1,086	1,291	1,507	1,800	2,137
Military family housing.....							76	97	63	87	84	87
Total USAF budget.....	43	46	47	48	50	46	948	1,183	1,354	1,594	1,884	2,224
Total military personnel.....	27	28	30	30	30	27	6,498	6,524	7,040	7,336	7,479	7,476
Reserve personnel, AF.....							82	97	109	119	134	149
National Guard Personnel, AF.....	1	1	1	1	1	1	111	123	149	165	185	199
Total military personnel.....	28	29	31	31	31	28	6,691	6,744	7,298	7,620	7,798	7,824
Civilian Personnel.....	13	14	14	13	15	13	3,063	3,198	3,363	3,342	3,621	3,689
Total USAF manpower cost.....	41	43	45	44	46	41	9,754	9,942	10,661	10,962	11,419	11,513
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE—APPROPRIATION DETAILS

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¹ President's budget as amended.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Taft.

Senator TAFT. Along that same line, if you could try to identify to what extent that percentage is related to the fact that the Navy, I would say, is one of the more capital intensive services—I guess the Air Force is too—but as compared to the ground forces, I think that would be true. That is an element that I would ask be dealt with.

Senator NUNN. That is a good point. Certainly, all the services are not comparable in that area, but I think the trend would be very interesting.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I will furnish that, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. In the management of our civilian personnel strengths, the incentive to minimize cost also gives us an effective tool. That is, by keying our Navy civilian manpower to available program funds, we can very effectively control our end-strengths. We have proven this by being within 1.1 percent and .14 percent of our respective fiscal year 1973 and 1974 end-strength targets. Therefore, I am convinced that control of civilian personnel by authorization of end-strengths, rather than by dollars for the various programs, is counterproductive to efficient management.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Holloway, in your statement, you say that you can effectively control your civilian personnel through available funds and that the authorization of civilian personnel end-strengths is counterproductive to efficient management. In light of the rapidly fluctuating and increasing costs of both personnel and services, it would appear more difficult to control strength by funds. Would you explain the rationale for your statement?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. End-strength controls limit only the number of personnel who may be on-board as of a certain date in each fiscal year. This does not effectively control costs, but may in fact cause work force disruptions that may increase program costs. If an arbitrary end-strength is assigned, while the Congress approves procurement, R. & D. and operating programs, the appropriated funds will still be spent on personnel in one of several ways. First, a large number of temporary employees may be hired during the fiscal year to accomplish funded programs and then be released prior to June 30. Second, overtime may be increased substantially to perform required work. Third, managers, to achieve their program schedules and planned performance, must assign the work to contractor effort, even if it is more costly.

Each of these alternatives may prove counterproductive. Use of temporaries may involve substantial training costs and increase the personnel office and payroll overhead. Overtime rates are, of course, well above regular rates. In addition, when ceilings put pressure on program managers to go contract, an increased headquarters review effort is required to insure that work placed on contract meets required standards for contractor performance, and is not being placed with private industry simply to circumvent ceilings.

In addition to the above, fixed ceilings may prove costly by denying flexibility to adjust employment to meet workload changes, particularly at industrial activities and in managing effort in the Foreign Military Sales program. Changes may occur in delivery of components from private industry, in workload scheduling to achieve a more effective utilization of manpower and equipment, and in non-Navy funded work. None of these involves changes in Navy program dollars. However, if there is no flexibility to adjust manpower levels, delays in work accomplishment may prove costly and our ability to fulfill commitments to foreign governments will be impeded. In addition, costly and unnecessary reductions-in-force may be required at some activities in order to free ceiling spaces for allocation to high priority projects at other activities.

Allowing program dollars to determine manpower levels is far preferable. The majority of Navy civilians (166,000) are employed in industrial activities. Program managers will fund these activities only if they are less costly than other sources. Thus activity commanding officers must insure that personnel costs—and overhead costs in particular—are not excessive. Flexibility to adjust employment levels to meet changing customer demands is essential if these activities are to prove cost effective. As noted in the statement, Navy civilian employment has been at or near the budget estimate, and no runaway growth has occurred in the absence of ceilings.

It should be noted that the GAO has also consistently opposed civilian ceilings. GAO Report B-165959 of April 1971 states:

Personnel ceilings or hiring limitations, whether imposed by statute or by the Executive Branch, do not provide the most effective management controls over civilian personnel resources in our opinion.

A joint GAO/OMB/CSC Study on Productivity of June 1973 states:

Personnel ceilings have major adverse impacts on the efficient management of human resources.

Gentlemen, in all these important management policy questions, we seek the stability which can come from the understanding and steady influence of a subcommittee such as yours.

As for my general assessment and prognosis of the Navy as an all volunteer force, I believe the Navy is making impressive gains towards the goals I have expressed. My emphasis rests on the highest personal commitment of all levels of naval leadership to surge ahead in recruiting and retention of quality personnel. This is not a one-time surge, but rather will be a steady, purposeful awareness which will manifest itself in all of our leadership efforts.

Our outlook is one of cautious optimism. Although we attained 97 percent recruiting success during this past fiscal year, the all-volunteer force is still being tested. However, its successful fruition will be measured in terms of fleet combat readiness. It is in this area of career personnel retention, in addition to the recruitment of first-term enlistees, that we need all the help we can get from the Congress. This is the major challenge of the draft-free environment.

Our fiscal year 1975 goals are even higher than those of 1974. The Navy is at the low point in its congressionally-approved plan to give up a large number of old ships in being in order to invest in new ships and rebuild its total numbers, from our low of 508 towards 600 ships. In 1977, our total manning numbers must start to climb as we rebuild our surface fleet so essential to maintaining a reasonable balance with the expanding Soviet Navy. It is most important that this subcommittee understand and support this requirement. As our new ships come into the fleet, our recruiting and retention goals must remain high in order to properly man that restored and modernized fleet.

Despite the challenges, I remain confident that, with your continued strong support and that of all the Congress, we have a reasonable chance for success.

In concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would note that I have directed my staff to be available to the subcommittee and its staff as you move forward in your examination of Navy manpower and personnel.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Admiral Holloway's statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES L. HOLLOWAY III, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the honor and welcome the opportunity to review with you the current status and future prospects of Navy manpower and personnel programs. The Navy's objective continues to be the modernization and rebuilding of our combat forces in a manner which is responsive to the current and projected threats. A key to the attainment of that objective is people. We are dedicated to the continued procurement and maintenance of a highly trained and motivated group of men and women in numbers sufficient to accomplish the world-wide Navy missions.

As I will later discuss in more detail, this task is difficult and complex. It has been made more complex by the elimination of the draft, the inflationary efforts of the economy and the changing nature of society as a whole. The establishment of this distinguished Subcommittee by Chairman Stennis, and the hearing today, are gratifying and certainly indicate that our concerns are shared by you.

Today, I will address Navy forces and manpower in terms of organization and force structure; how we got where we are today and where we are going; the Navy approach to the Total Force Policy implementation—including trends in the strengths of our total manpower components—and various aspects of our efforts to improve our tooth-to-tail ratio and maximize our readiness capability. Additionally, I will discuss the challenges and problems associated with manning while we modernize our fleet. Hopefully, this will provide some insight into Navy personnel management problems and initiatives.

The primary function of the Navy is to organize, train and equip naval forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained operations at sea. The Navy's missions include the strategic deterrent mission which is accomplished by the highly able fleet ballistic missile submarine force. The sea control and sea projection missions are accomplished by balanced, mutually supporting and highly mobile naval forces consisting of task groups of carriers and surface combatants, and attack submarines, shore based ASW air squadrons, amphibious forces, and underway replenished and support forces. In peace time, our active naval forces maintain overseas deployments in order to reassure our allies, protect U.S. interests and to act as a deterrent against actions which are counter to U.S. national interests. Reserve forces are maintained to increase naval capabilities in the event of mobilization when they will contribute to the sea control and sea projection missions. Reserve forces for this purpose include land based ASW air, surface combatants, sea based tactical and ASW air, mine vessels and mobile construction battalions.

The naval force structure is organized to accomplish its missions under three major fleet commands located in the Pacific, Atlantic and European areas. The next subordinate command echelon includes the numbered fleet commands; the Sixth and Seventh Fleets are forward deployed in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific respectively, and provide forces for overseas presence and during international crisis such as the recent Cyprus conflict and evacuation. The Second and Third Fleets consist of naval forces operating in the Western Atlantic and Eastern Pacific respectively.

The fleet commands are backed up by functionally oriented training and logistics organizations. These organizations, called Type commands, are directly concerned with the equipping, logistic support, training and manning of the fleet units.

As you know, the Navy's force levels have been reduced significantly since 1969. During fiscal year 1975, Navy force levels will reach their lowest point in 25 years. How we reached this position and what we are doing about it are highly germane to any discussion of manpower and personnel. We emerged from World War II in a clearly superior position with no requirements for fleet modernization. We used this same fleet to fight the Korean War but were provided minimal funds to commence modernization. In the period following the Korean War, we continued to devote inadequate funds to modernization of our sea control and projection forces. This was because of the vast sums expended to produce the urgently required ballistic missile submarine force. Again, during our lengthy engagement in Southeast Asia, while continuing our commitments elsewhere, we incurred heavy operational expenses. This continued to deny us the funds necessary for fleet modernization.

Thus, we came to the end of the 1960's, the Navy found itself with a fleet of 976 ships which were approaching an average age of 18 years. The Navy then made the necessary decision that, if we were to solve the problem of obsolescence, we must give up a large number of ships and aircraft. We could then, within the projected austere budget levels, make available the funds needed for modernization and rebuilding of the fleet. With the agreement and full support of the Secretary of Defense and of the Congress, the Navy proceeded on this course.

By sacrificing current capabilities for modernization, we have reduced our ships by 47% and our aircraft by about 22% since 1968. The most important part of our Navy modernization plan is now underway. With the continued and essential support of the Congress, we will complete the plan to move from our current low point and rebuild towards approximately 600 modern ships. We can do this while holding the average age of the fleet at 14 years.

As the Navy's force levels have been reduced, so accordingly has its command structure. Our operational and support organizations have been consolidated and reduced drastically in the past two years to match the decline in force levels. It is with this streamlined organization that we seek to meet our challengers while modernizing our forces and maintaining our mission commitments.

Our declining strengths, both active and Reserve, and budgetary constraints—all in the face of an expanding threat—have emphasized the importance of a careful, well-defined implementation of Secretary Schlesinger's Total Force Policy.

Therefore, in October 1973, the Navy initiated a comprehensive review of its total capability to mobilize and execute its wartime missions. The findings of this review led us to undertake several actions. The first was the formulation of a Policy for the Utilization of the Naval Reserve, currently in the final phase of approval. This proposed policy recognizes the unique requirements of the Navy's forward deployment commitments. It emphasizes flexibility and mobility, and considers the Naval Reserve a part of the Total Navy Force. Secondly, we are refining our guidance for Total Navy Force structuring and sizing. We expect to complete our review of hardware requirements in a few months and then, by 1975, to derive Reserve personnel requirements in the context of a Total Force. Implicit in this effort is a recognition of the Navy's hardware orientation, its unique method of operations, and the continuing requirement to meet our overseas deployment commitments.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the same factors which prompted the Total Force Policy also emphasize the importance of maximizing our combat-support ratio. The Navy's manpower in Combat Forces has varied over the years between 47% to 50%. Immediately prior to the Vietnam War there were 49.8% in Combat Forces, about the same as the 49.2% in the currently proposed Budget. As new ships enter active service and we rebuild our manpower level while holding our support activities level, Navy combat manpower is planned to rise above 50%.

In the European area, we have an even higher proportion of manpower in Combat Forces: 57%. This is because most of our deployed forces are homeported in the United States and thus, some support overhead is excluded. I would emphasize that as we continue to evaluate our command structures and combat/support ratios, the Navy's principle objective must also continue to be that of enhancing our warfighting capabilities with available manpower.

As the members of this Subcommittee well know, the costs of achieving and maintaining our total manpower objectives are formidable. The salaries of Navy civilian personnel, and the pay, allowances, incentive programs and related expenses of our active and Reserve Navy personnel, all combine in a total of 10.369 billion dollars for 1975. Notwithstanding the decreased strength levels, these costs have continued to rise.

For example, in fiscal year 1970, the pay and allowances (exclusive of food and travel) for a force of 732,000 cost \$4.296 billion, a little less than \$5,900 per man. Today, the manyear programs of 552,000 for fiscal year 1975 is estimated to cost \$5.079 billion, an average of \$9,194 per man—an increase of 79%.

Feeding a Navyman today costs \$2.30 a day as compared to \$1.50 in 1970. In travel, the average cost of a move within the United States has more than doubled in the same time span, from \$541 to \$1,237. We expect these costs will continue to rise in the near future.

Our civilian blue collar employees have received annual pay increases based on prevailing rates in local areas for comparable skills. The graded employees have also received annual increases, which by Public Law, are based on Bureau of Labor Statistics indices.

In fiscal year 1970, the average civilian compensation was \$10,273 per manyear. This increased 25% to \$12,879 in FY 1973 and is projected to increase by 10% to \$14,194 through FY 1975. This FY 75 average cost excludes the wage board increase anticipated to be effective during FY 75, and excludes the Classified Pay Raise for October 1974.

These high costs of manpower continue to give us a powerful incentive for properly managing our civilian and military personnel resources. Accordingly, I want to highlight some of our major concerns in this Area.

First, I believe that the imposition of direct-hire civilian personnel ceilings on the Department of Defense in FY 75 will have substantial adverse effects and will most likely prove counterproductive. Ceilings, coupled with sizeable end-strength reductions, will cause the Navy's average civilian grade to rise because of higher attrition at lower levels. If we conduct reductions-in-force to spread the reductions evenly throughout the grade structure, we are confronted with substantial severance costs and decreased employee morale. Thus, it is far better to control costs by controlling program dollars—allowing the Navy to balance its work force within available funds.

With the removal of most ceilings two years ago, the Navy controlled civilian employment by issuing employment targets to its major commands. Emphasis was placed on matching civilian employment with available funds rather than applying specific ceilings. Thus, Navy commands were given flexibility to adjust manpower levels to meet funding and work schedule changes. In FY 1973, the Navy was 1.1% under its budgeted end-strength request. In FY 1974, the Navy was over its budgeted end-strength target by only .14%. Clearly, funding restraints provided a very effective control mechanism.

We also expect that civilian personnel ceilings will result in significant workload problems, particularly at Navy Industrial Fund activities and in the Foreign Military Sales program.

Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) civilian manpower is dependent upon the needs of program managers and their willingness to fund NIF operations as the most economical means of getting their work accomplished. If funding declines, civilian employment declines.

During the past few years funding has served as an effective restraint on civilian employment at NIF activities, regardless of any ceiling restrictions. NIF employment in FY 71, when formal ceilings were enforced, was 185,000. Ceilings were subsequently lifted, but civilian employment declined to 171,000 in FY 73. A further decrease to a level of 166,000 by end FY 75 was included in the FY 75 President's budget.

In the event of a significant end-strength reduction, the Navy will also have to substantially increase overtime at its industrial activities in order to accomplish priority funded fleet readiness programs.

The problem of ceilings at industrial activities will be compounded if the distribution of the 32,327 DoD end-strength reduction proposed by the House Appropriations Committee is implemented. 4,600 of the 8,000 Navy civilians end-strength reduction would have to be taken in Naval Shipyards to comply with the Committee's intent. This will seriously impact on our ship overhaul program by forcing deferral of ten scheduled ship overhauls into future years. (Additionally, if \$61,500,000 of Operation & Maintenance funds are not restored, the scheduled ship overhauls cannot be accomplished at either Naval or private shipyards.)

A similar problem is created in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) which is basically a self-sustaining program.

When the FMS program was relatively small, unexpected requirements could be accommodated within the Navy budget manpower plan. However, with the four and one-half-fold growth of the program since 1973, and the assignment of a civilian personnel ceiling in FY 75, such out-of-budget-cycle manpower requirements will be difficult to manage. Unless some form of exemption from ceiling is granted for these personnel, unexpected requirements will have to be accommodated either at the expense of Navy fund workload, or the foreign sales program delayed. The result could be embarrassment to the U.S. Government and, in some cases, the loss of potential savings in our own procurement unit costs.

In summary, we appreciate that civilian ceilings are intended to control civilian personnel costs. However, rigid ceilings will more likely prove counterproductive by requiring increased overtime costs, severance pay, costly delays and disruptions in work scheduling. Moreover, they can cause the loss of potential cost benefits which can be realized from the Foreign Military Sales program. And finally, the Navy's projected fleet readiness programs cannot be accomplished successfully under fixed ceilings with the end-strength reductions currently proposed.

Turning now to our military personnel, we acknowledge that our officer grade structure contains imbalances between the actual on-board numbers and our manning requirements. This situation is one which was expected from the recent and rapid decline in our force levels.

Since 1969, when peak strengths for South East Asia were reached, the Navy will have reduced the number of officers in the grade of captain from 4,270 to 3,940 by the end of FY 75— this is a net reduction of 7.7%. In the grade of commander we have come from 8,602 to 7,612, or 11.5%. In the grade of lieutenant commander, the reduction has been from 15,077 to 14,494, or 3.9%. The overall senior, control grade reduction will have been over 1900 officers since 1969, a net reduction of 6.8%.

Our total officer strength has been reduced steadily since 1972 and the number of new accessions each year have been necessarily lower than desired. It has been a management challenge to distribute these limited resources in a way that is most beneficial to the Navy as a whole. Our currently desired level of accessions to fulfill the first four billets is 8600. Accessions for FY 75 are planned at 7,058. Some billets will not be filled and some officers will receive excessively long tours at sea. In addition, the education pipeline must be severely restricted. These factors limit the Navy's ability to attain the quality mix needed for our complex weapon systems and ships.

The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), which is currently before the Congress, would provide grade ceilings within which grade

strength can be effectively managed in the future. The Captain/Commander non-continuation authority which is contained in that Act has also been introduced in the Senate as S. 3193. Passage of this Bill would give the Services the ability to better manage officer strength in the senior, control grades. In addition, we have implemented a management concept called the Operational Technical Managerial System to better utilize our officers with specialized skills.

Along with our reductions in the active portion of the Total Navy Force, we have also proposed reductions in the Naval Reserve. The overall Reserve strength has been gradually reduced from 129,000 drill pay spaces in FY 73 to a projected end strength of 108,313 in FY 75. The FY 74 end strength was 114,864. As I discussed earlier, our current efforts towards clearly defined goals will serve to better validate our Reserve requirements within the Total Navy Force.

Foremost among our challenges are the problems associated with active enlisted personnel manning levels. The Navy distributable enlisted manning shortfall at the end of June 1974 was 16,218 personnel. This equates to a manning percentage of 95.9%. This percentage masks a very serious skill mismatch, in that we have a 30,968 petty officer and designated striker deficit in 47 ratings, 27 of which are manned below 90%. These rating shortages manifest themselves in lack of unit readiness. Currently, many of the total Navy ships and squadrons, excluding units in overhaul, are reporting marginal-to-not-ready for combat—solely due to personnel shortages.

As with the officer corps, our active enlisted strength has been steadily decreasing since the Vietnam peak to the lowest total in twenty-five years. We anticipate staying near-level in the immediate future and then commence a steady extension to man our modernized forces.

In my view, a fundamental consideration in achieving that objective is our ability to do so in the era of the All Volunteer Force. In other words, and in the manpower manager's parlance, we simply must achieve our accession targets while maintaining our quality standards. During the past year, the Navy came very close to the required accession levels. We would have reached target if, late in the year, we had not been required to levy an additional quota on the recruiters because of unanticipated losses.

Our reenlistment picture has steadily improved over the last five or six years which, of course, has helped. The Navy has aggressively recruited prior service personnel in our attempt to maintain the experience level necessary for a viable career force. In this, we have averaged more than 600 prior service reenlistments per month during the past fiscal year. This not only helps with our accessions but also holds down training costs. We have attained our recruiting goals for women and, within two or three years, we will be at the maximum number which can be effectively utilized under current law prohibiting use of women on combat ships, while maintaining a suitable sea duty/shore duty rotation schedule for Navy men.

We are experiencing problems obtaining enough volunteers for entry level training and are undertaking management actions to improve this situation. It appears that, despite our best efforts, our difficulties will continue in obtaining volunteers for some of the unattractive skills—primarily, either ordnance-related or with low civilian applicability.

We must, and will, continue to ensure that sufficient high quality volunteers will select the six-man obligation program. We need this to meet our requirements for nuclear power operators and advanced electronics specialists. These highly trained men are vital to the future operations of the Navy. The skills they attain through the Navy are also in great demand in civilian industries. Therefore, recruiting and retaining personnel for these programs will remain a number one priority.

In the area of enlisted grade structure, we are presently reducing both the number of billets requiring petty officers and also the level of paygrade requirements for other billets. Upon completion of this scale-down in grade structure, the percentage of the total enlisted Navy billets which require petty officers is expected to be 61.5%, a reduction of 4%. In addition, the Navy is doing extensive work with a computerized model which utilizes feasibility

and cost-benefit analysis in deriving an optimum solution of paygrade structure.

The advancement system for the enlisted force has been fundamentally changed in an effort to remove any trace of cultural bias and to ensure that every man has the maximum opportunity for advancement.

Improved retention of our first term personnel, selective retention of the career force—including recruitment of prior service veterans—and channeling of personnel into skill areas where they are needed, are the solution to improvement of manpower quality deficiencies. We know, for example, that the opportunity for advanced training and education is a very powerful career incentive for high quality personnel. Thus, the recent reductions in this area are cause for concern. Any erosion of service benefits or opportunities influences not only our career personnel but also prospective enlistees. On the positive side, the recently enacted Bonus Revision Act was a much needed step in the direction of solving some of our skill shortages. We continue to examine other retention producing avenues.

I believe that our various initiatives to improve the stability and quality of Navy personnel will be enhanced by the consolidation of personnel management functions at New Orleans. The result should be greater efficiency and effectiveness of overall Navy personnel management.

Looking to the next few years, I do not foresee any easing of our recruiting problem. In fact, our required accession levels will be somewhat higher during the next two years. Our FY 74 recruiting statistics do give rise to optimism. However, our successes must be qualified by two facts of life. *First*, the attainment of 103% of the basic FY 74 goals pressed our recruiting assets to the limit. In fact, the mid-year add-on goal proved to be a larger task than our recruiters could manage in the lean spring months. The total attainment, with the add-on considered, amounted to 9% of desired levels. The important point is that the measure of success we enjoyed resulted from a year-long, maximum effort. *Second*, our FY 75 recruiting goals present a significantly greater challenge than FY 74 goals—indeed 40% greater, in the first six months, than actual attainment during the comparable period last year. Continued recruiting success in the draft-free environment will be measured against this challenge—and we are determined not to sacrifice recruit quality for the sake of numbers. We estimate that the recruiting market will be essentially unchanged in FY 75. Consequently, the gap between historical attainment and future goals must be narrowed by a combination of recruiter learning curve, better knowledge of the existing market, more efficient distribution of assets reflecting our increased knowledge, and finally, continued support of recruiting in recognition of its essentiality in maintaining the All Volunteer Force. The years beyond 1975 offer no prospect for relief. The projected goal trend through 1980 is increasing, and poses a greater challenge in every year than we faced in FY 74. Thus, our outlook toward this monumental task is one of guarded optimism. But with the essential support of this Subcommittee, as well as that of the Congress as a whole, I believe we will meet these challenges.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I have presented what I hope will give the Subcommittee a solid framework within which Navy manpower and personnel matters can be clearly perceived and further explored. Additionally, I am attaching pertinent tables for your consideration. I have also directed my staff to be available at any time to assist the Subcommittee as you move towards fuller examination of our problems and challenges.

In closing, I would reemphasize two ideas. First, the Navy is nearing the crucial mid-point in its decade-long plan to modernize and rebuild its fleet. Along with this must go the requisite rebuilding of our manpower level. Just as we received Congressional approval upon starting this plan, so too we need strong Congressional support to carry it through.

And second, a vital key to the Navy's future is the successful recruitment and retention of a stable force of quality, career personnel.

I am confident that the creation of this Subcommittee will give us a welcome lift towards achieving those two goals.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MILITARY/CIVILIAN COST COMPARISONS

[Average cost per person]

	Fiscal year—			
	1970	1973	1974	1975
Active Duty.....	¹ \$5,871	¹ \$8,507	¹ \$8,946	¹ \$9,194
Reserves.....	² 6,634	9,421	² 10,036	² 10,515
Civilian.....	1,021	1,651	1,646	1,668
	10,273	12,879	13,878	14,194

¹ Excluding PCS/subsistence.² Including PCS/subsistence.

Note cost trends: PCS travel costs expected to continue to rise due to drastic increases in shipping costs. Food cost increase expected—drought in Midwest—possible crop failures—heavy world demand—all tend to drive up process. Pay increases, may range 5.5 percent to 6 percent, expected in October 1974, will increase payroll costs.

NAVY MILITARY MANPOWER COMBAT/SUPPORT RATIO

Combat manpower is defined as all military serving in activities defined in the Defense Planning and Programming Categories of Strategic Forces and General Purposes Forces.

Combat military manpower as a percent of total end strength

End fiscal year:	Overall percent
1963.....	49.6
1964.....	49.8
1965.....	49.6
1966.....	50.8
1967.....	51.7
1968.....	50.3
1969.....	50.3
1970.....	46.8
1971.....	46.2
1972.....	46.7
1973.....	48.5
1974.....	48.4
1975.....	49.2
1976.....	49.1
1977.....	49.7
1978.....	50.4
1979.....	50.2
1980.....	50.6

1-NAVY RECRUITING FISCAL YEAR 1972-80

	In thousands								
	Fiscal year 1972	Fiscal year 1973	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975	Fiscal year 1976	Fiscal year 1977	Fiscal year 1978	Fiscal year 1979	Fiscal year 1980
Goal.....	¹ 94,438	138,522	² 98,640	118.7	122.1	115.9	114.1	110.8	122.5
Attained.....	91,618	126,374	101,907						
Percent attained..	97.0	91.2	103.3						

¹ USN programs only; prior to 1-Navy (Regular and Reserve) recruiting.² Not including 8,800 add-on in ACDU programs. ACDU attainment equaled 99,129 (96.8 percent) of 102,381 required for authorized Navy end-strength.

NAVY MILITARY OVERSEAS POPULATION

Major geographic area	Afloat and mobile activities						Total		
	Ashore			Homeported					
	June 30, 1974	June 30, 1973	July 31, 1972	June 30, 1974	June 30, 1973	July 31, 1972	June 30, 1974	June 30, 1973	July 31, 1972
Total territories and special locations.....	9,296	9,891	10,667	2,763	2,898	2,941	12,059	12,789	13,608
Total Southeast Asia.....	225	261	2,088		36	29	225	252	2,117
Total western Pacific.....	9,827	10,257	10,450	9,237	5,504	5,439	19,064	15,761	15,889
Total Europe and related areas.....	11,371	11,798	11,762	7,997	8,767	6,829	19,368	20,565	18,591
Total Near East and South Asia.....	515	673	382	344	388	218	859	1,061	600
Total other Pacific.....	512	599	599	14	14		526	613	599
Total Western Hemisphere.....	1,930	1,902	1,943				1,903	1,902	1,943
Total U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.....	3	4	3				3	4	95
Total undistributable afloat.....	371	343	115	88	72		459	415	115
Grand total.....	34,023	35,683	38,104	20,443	17,679	15,454	54,466	53,362	53,560
Total in gold flow area ¹	26,853	28,005	29,776	17,680	14,781	12,515	44,533	42,786	42,291

¹ All areas except Canal Zone, Guam, Midway, Wake Island, Puerto Rico, Samoa, Virgin Island, and Johnston Island.

OFFICER END STRENGTH BY FISCAL YEAR

	Actual					Plan		Fiscal year 1977 ³
	Fiscal year 1970	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972	Fiscal year 1973	Fiscal year 1974 ⁴	Fiscal year 1975	Fiscal year 1976	
Captain:								
URL prescribed number ³ -----	2,450	2,450	2,275	2,114	* 1,980	2,000	1,950	-----
MC/DC-----	626	671	655	661	708	759	745	-----
Total less MC/DC-----	3,848	3,578	3,575	3,291	3,089	3,181	3,022	-----
Total-----	4,474	4,249	4,230	3,952	3,797	3,940	3,767	3,767
Reduction during fiscal year-----		225	19	278	155	(143)	173	0
Commander:								
URL prescribed number ³ -----	5,210	5,210	4,949	4,792	4,468	4,255	4,154	-----
MC/DC-----	850	761	688	660	756	799	687	-----
Total less MC/DC-----	8,073	7,822	7,753	7,477	7,078	6,813	6,810	-----
Total-----	8,923	8,583	8,441	8,137	7,834	7,612	7,497	7,497
Reduction during fiscal year-----		340	142	304	303	222	115	0
Lieutenant Commander:								
URL prescribed number ³ -----	7,500	7,500	7,623	7,275	7,077	6,965	6,622	-----
MC/DC-----	1,854	1,894	2,060	2,144	1,922	2,383	+2,147	-----
Total less MC/DC-----	14,344	13,050	13,911	13,280	12,603	12,111	11,666	-----
Total-----	16,198	14,944	15,791	15,424	14,525	14,494	13,813	13,813
Reduction during fiscal year-----		1,254	(847)	367	899	31	681	0
Total Navy:								
MC/DC-----	5,918	5,586	5,547	5,881	5,175	5,467	5,453	-----
Total less MC/DC-----	74,618	68,971	67,382	64,459	61,817	60,697	59,047	-----
Total-----	80,536	74,557	72,929	70,340	66,992	66,154	64,500	63,000
Reduction during fiscal year-----		5,979	1,628	2,589	3,348	838	1,654	1,500

¹ Plan strengths: Captain—3,941; Commander—7,790; Lieutenant Commander—14,789; Total Navy—67,600.

² Achieve fiscal year 1977 control grade strengths by end fiscal year 1976.

³ Includes line LDO'S.

⁴ 40 under planned fiscal year 1974 end strength.

THE OVERALL RATIO OF TIME SPENT AT SEA AND ASHORE FOR OFFICERS

Most unrestricted line junior officers spend most of their time at sea. At more senior levels some officers will spend much larger percentages of their time at sea than others depending on specific talent abilities, desires and performance of the individual. In general under current policy, the longer the career the lower the total percentage of sea time, i.e.

Length of career	Percent of career on sea duty
5 year-----	All sea duty or preparatory training.
10 year-----	About 60 percent.
20 year-----	About 50 percent.
30 year-----	About 40 percent.
40 year-----	About 35 percent.

Restricted line and Staff Corps tend to have less sea duty averaging between 10 and 20% after transfer into the community. In many cases this is between the 5 and 10 year point in the unrestricted line career pattern.

RORMTS 05 and below years commissioned service	Aviation 15522 58 percent commander years at sea		Surface 7915 30 percent percent at sea		Submarine 3131 12 percent at sea		WT AVG (percent)
	Years	Percent	Years	Percent	Years	Percent	
5.....	5	100	3.0	60	5.0	100	88
10.....	7.5	75	5.0	50	7.5	75	68
20.....	11.75	59	9.0	45	12.4	62	55
30.....	12.75	43	9.7	32	12.8	43	39
40.....	13.75	34	10.4	26	13.8	35	32

TABLE 7.—Enlisted personnel average years at sea per 20-year career

12 to 14 years.....	BM, BT, BR, CS, EM, EN, FTB, FTM, IC, MM, ML, MT, OS, PC, PI, PM, OM, QM, CD, SM, ST.
10 to 12 years.....	ABE, ABF, ABH, AF, AG, AO, BU, CE, CM, CU, DK, DS, EA, EO, ETN, ETR, FTG, GMG, GMM, GMT, IM, HT, LI, MA, MR, MN, NC, OM, PT, RM, SH, SK, SW, TM, UT.
8 to 10 years.....	ADJ, ADR, AE, AK, AME, AMH, AMS, AQ, ASE, ASH, ASM, AT, AV, AW, AX, AZ, DT, DM, HM, LN, PH, PN, PR, YN.
6 to 8 years.....	AC, DP, JO, TD, MU.

NOTE.—9 ratings reduced from 12–14 year group to 10–12 year group (Occurring 1973.); 8 ratings rose from 6–8 year group to 8–10 year group; 6 ratings rose from 8–10 year group to 10–12 year group.

Driving policies—5-year maximum sea tour length; 3-year minimum sea tour length; CIVSUB actions; action to achieve additional shore billets (FMAG); 2-year minimum shore tour length.

Rating definitions:

AB—Aviation boatswain's mate; ABE—Equipment; ABF—Fuel; ABH—Handling; AC—Air controlman; AD—Aviation machinist's mate; ADJ—Jet; ADR—Reciprocating engine; AE—Aviation electrician's mate; AG—Aerographer's mate; AK—Aviation storekeeper; AM—Aviation structural mechanic; AME—Safety equipment; AMH—Hydraulics; AMS—Mechanical; AO—Aviation ordnanceman; AQ—Aviation fire control technician; AS—Aviation support equipment technician; ASE—Electrical; ASH—Hydraulics; ASM—Mechanical; AT—Aviation electronics technician; AW—Aviation antisubmarine warfare operator; AX—Aviation antisubmarine warfare technician; AZ—Aviation maintenance administrationman; BM—Boatswain's mate; BT—Boiler technician; BU—Builder; CE—Construction electrician; CM—Construction mechanic; CS—Commissaryman; CT—Communications technician; CTA—Administrative; CTH—Interpreter; CTM—Maintenance; CTO—Communications; CTR—Collection; CTT—Technical; DK—Disbursing clerk; DM—Illustrator-draftsman; DP—Data processing technician; DS—Data systems technician; DT—Dental technician; EA—Engineering aid; EM—Electrician's mate; EN—Engineman; EO—Equipment operator; ET—Electronics technician; ETN—Communications; ETR—Radar; EW—Electronic warfare technician; FT—Fire control technician; FTB—Ballistic; FTG—Guns; FTM—Missiles; GM—Gunner's mate; GMG—Guns; GMM—Missile; GMT—Technician; HM—Hospital corpsman; HT—Hull maintenance technician; IC—Interior communications electrician; IM—Instrumentman; JO—Journalist; LI—Lithographer; LN—Legalman; ML—Molder; MM—Machinist's mate; MN—Mineman; MR—Machinery repairman; MT—Missile technician; MU—Musician; OM—Opticalman; OS—Operations specialist; OT—Ocean systems technician; PC—Postal clerk; PH—Photographer's mate; PM—Patternmaker; PN—Personnelman; PR—Aircraft survival equipmentman; PT—Photographic intelligence man; QM—Quartermaster; RM—Radioman; SD—Steward; SH—Ship's serviceman; SK—Storekeeper; SM—Signalman; ST—Sonar technician; STG—Surface; STS—Submarine; SW—Steelworker; TD—Tradesman; TM—Torpedoman's mate; UT—Utilitiesman; YN—Yeoman.

TABLE 8.—Total Navy career manning percentages

Occupational group	Career manning percent ¹
Deck-----	BM—100; QM—77; OS—69 ; STS—81; STG—106; SM—89; EW—71; OT—76.
Ordnance-----	TM—87; GMG—82; GMT—80; GMM—82; FTB—120; FTM—84; FTG—75; MN—81; MT—96.
Electronics-----	ET—94; DS—92.
Precision equipment-----	IM—83; OM—79.
Administrative-clerical-----	RM—98; CTA—92; CTI—92; CTO—95; CTR—127; CTT—110; CTM—114; YN—95; PN—92; JO—86; PC—123; SD—280; DP—102; SK—96; DK—104; CS—96; SH—94; LN—79.
Miscellaneous-----	LI—97; DM—110; MU—103.
Engineering and hull-----	MM—75; EN—98; MR—68; BT—76; ML—77; EM—88; IC—70; PM—93; HT—70.
Construction-----	EA—92; BU—90; SW—98; CE—95; UT—88; EO—111; CM—105.
Aviation-----	AO—95; AC—87; AQ—96; AT—94; AE—88; PT—87; TD—93; ABE—72; ABF—78; ABH—108; PH—106; AG—95; AK—113; PR—94; AX—70; AZ—102; ASE—118; ASH—101; ASM—143; AW—85; ADJ—107; ADR—112; AMS—102; AMH—94; AME—103.
Medical-----	HM—102.
Dental-----	DT—106.

The specialized training area of the Advanced Electronics Field contains the following ratings which are listed above in the Deck, Ordnance, Electronics and Aviation Occupational Groups: DS FTB FTG FTM STS
STG MT EW AT AX AQ ET.

¹ Career manning is the ratio of the rating's inventory with greater than 4 years of service against the sum of CNO requirements for paygrades E5 through E9.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Admiral.
General Cushman?

General CUSHMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to appear before this committee on the occasion of its first hearings on manpower and personnel. I welcome the opportunity to provide some insights into the plans, policies, and programs relating to the manpower management of the Marine Corps.

The management of manpower includes procuring young men and women in appropriate quantity and of requisite quality to enter the Marine Corps, classifying and training them in appropriate skills, and ultimately assigning them to proper locations.

Manpower is highly dynamic; a significant number of marines leave our corps each year. This factor alone requires that we look well ahead and plan carefully to insure that we have the right number of marines with the proper skills and grades in the proper places at all times. To do this, we must always have well-defined, long-range objectives for our manpower.

Sudden and precipitous changes from these objectives, such as changes in authorized strength or grade structure, may create adverse long-term effects. For example, to meet a reduction in strength we obviously could simply cease procurement of new marines—but then there would be no new input into the career force from that year group in future years. Or we could arbitrarily release career marines to achieve the reductions—but this would require us to violate our moral sense of obligation to provide a measure of tenure to the career

enlisted marine and would also be inequitable to junior officers and reserve officers, since senior Regular officers are provided tenure by law.

Changes in the pattern of manpower management can be made effective only with deliberate, advance planning normally requiring much more than 1 year's notice. Frequent, unanticipated changes in manpower objectives and programs create confusion and uncertainty in the minds of individual marines. Such changes are adverse to effective utilization of manpower resources in terms of both marines and dollars.

Marine Corps manpower management practices have been traditionally directed toward maximum readiness of our combat forces at minimum cost and will remain so. Basically, the magnitude of the management task is prescribed by the force structure.

The National Security Act of 1947 establishes a minimum statutory force structure for the Marine Corps of "* * * not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and other such land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein * * *"

However, the act does not prescribe the strength required to man such a force to carry out its mission.

To maintain all three division/wing teams at a prudent level of readiness and with a full range of combat capabilities requires a minimum strength of 205,000 marines.

Recognizing current fiscal realities, I requested this year and have received authorization for 196,398 active marines. This is essentially the level at which our peacetime strength has remained since 1953; and we do not anticipate significant variations from this level in the near future.

We have also received an authorization of 34,958 for our Marine Corps selected Reserve as well as just under 21,000 direct and indirect hire civilians who provide support to the Marine Corps both in this country and overseas.

To support the roles and missions of the Marine Corps established by the National Security Act, we attempt to concentrate as much of our active strength as possible into the operating forces which include our Fleet Marine Forces, security forces and Marine detachments aboard naval vessels. Through these efforts, we will invest about 65 percent of our strength in this category.

The remainder of our manpower provides for logistical support, procurement, training, administration, and other supporting functions required to perform the overall mission.

In addition, the Reserve forces provide trained units and qualified individuals to augment the initial expansion of the Marine Corps in time of national emergency as well as a fourth division/wing team formed by the units of the organized Marine Corps Reserve.

We constantly strive to achieve the leanest possible supporting establishment while maintaining combat forces at the highest attainable state of readiness. We believe that for today's Marine Corps we have attained the optimum balance between operating and supporting forces, although whenever possible we will continue our past practice of converting supporting manpower allocations into additional combat strength.

Examples of improvements made in this area include a nearly 27 percent reduction in departmental headquarters elements since 1970 and the addition of 7,000 marines in combat forces during the past 4 years, while maintaining the same approximate end strength.

Senator NUNN. At that point, General, may I interrupt? What is your combat to supply ratio now?

General CUSHMAN. 65 to 35.

Senator NUNN. When you say operational, that means the same thing to you as combat?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. These are the Fleet Marine Forces. It also includes the security detachments whose probable involvement in combat, of course, is questionable, and the detachments aboard naval vessels that would enter into combat if the vessel were in combat.

Senator NUNN. Would you supply for the record your definition of combat, your definition of support, and a breakdown of that so we can put it in here?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

The Marine Corps definition of combat and support forces is based upon the Defense Planning and Programming (DPP) Categories as used in the annual Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report. The Marine Corps considers all forces not directly filling one of our statutorially prescribed missions as being in support. This includes our training establishment, base operations, non-deployable staffs and logistics assets as well as the individual accounts (transients, patients, prisoners, trainees, and students). The combat forces are defined as the Strategic Forces, the General Purpose Forces assigned to security for major Navy bases throughout the world.

A listing of the Marine Corps manpower, as requested in the 1975 Budget and the Defense Manpower Requirements Report, is as follows:

<i>Marine Corps manpower fiscal year 1975 President's budget request</i>	
Combat forces.....	122, 803
General purpose forces.....	113, 387
Land forces.....	84, 553
Tactical Air Force.....	28, 274
Naval forces.....	560
Strategic forces.....	223
Security detachments.....	9, 393
U.S. Navy bases.....	7, 847
Embassy guards.....	1, 546
Support forces.....	73, 595
Auxiliary forces.....	1, 670
Mission support forces ¹	14, 707
Central support forces ¹	21, 564
Individuals.....	35, 654
Total Marine Corps.....	196, 398

¹ Does not include security detachments at U.S. Navy bases or Marine embassy guards. These Marines are accounted for separately under combat forces.

Senator NUNN. If you would, I would like for you also to look into the definition that we wrote into the organization bill this year for the Army, and if you could, distinguish for us between your definition and the definition the committee wrote in for the Army as it is applicable to the Marine Corps.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. I can give you these figures. Out of a Marine Corps of 198,000, 110,000 in round numbers go to the Fleet Marine Force. All of these 110,000 are under the operational command of fleet commanders and are prepared for combat landings. I will provide additional information for the record here.

[The information follows:]

The precise definition of Army combat components inserted into Section 302(a) of Senate Bill S. 3000 is not compatible with the Marine Corps definition of combat forces, in three respects.

First, the definition does not include Marine aircraft units or ships' detachments aboard U.S. Navy vessels, nor does it include the few Marines in Strategic Forces. The Marine Corps considers these tactical air, naval, and strategic forces to be essential elements of the combat forces, and they would be so committed in the time of war.

Second, the definition excludes all units larger than battalions, thus omitting the headquarters elements associated with larger units, such as for regiments, divisions, and air wings. These headquarters are fully deployable and directly engage in combat operations. Therefore, the Marine Corps considers such operational headquarters to be included within combat forces.

Third, due to the statutory requirement for the Marine Corps to provide security forces at U.S. Navy bases, and the agreement with the Department of State to provide Marines as guards at U.S. embassies, the Marine Corps includes within combat forces the manpower dedicated to these two mission-essential functions.

Senator NUNN. My general understanding over a period of years has been that the Marine Corps does an excellent job in its combat support ratio. I would like to make sure as closely as we can that the definitions we start out with, are going to be as comparable as they can be depending on the definitions.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. I would like to point out, though, that we rely upon the Navy for many services which would count against that support—for example, medical services. And again, when we need a tank we buy it from the Army, they being the ones who developed it, and so forth. This reflects in large measure our interdependence with the other armed services, who help us out.

Senator NUNN. So you are saying that your combat support ratio would be higher than the Navy's, and perhaps the Army's to some degree would be lower because of this interim changeability?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. I would like any amplification of that you can give.

General CUSHMAN. We are so closely intertwined with and supported by the Navy that, while we can quantify it in some respects, in others we cannot really break it out. For example, dollars of the Navy budget devoted to the Marine Corps in the 1975 budget is just about \$1 billion. And what we call "green dollars" are \$2½ billion. So that gives you a pretty good base with which to buy air-

planes from the Navy, for example. Here I will provide additional information for the record.

[The information follows:]

CHANGEABILITY OF INTERSERVICE SUPPORT

In addition to the Marine Corps detachments providing security for Naval Bases or serving aboard Naval vessels, the FY 1975 Budget contains a request for 3,131 Marines who will be serving in either Navy or Secretary of the Navy billets. The Marines perform such duties as instructors in Navy Schools which have Marines enrolled, members of staffs where direct Marine Corps participation is essential to the Naval Service, and members of cryptological units.

Simultaneously, the Navy has programmed 5,399 Navymen to serve with the Marine Corps to perform such duties as engineers, chaplains, doctors, or corpsmen. Over and above this direct and mutual support, the Navy and Marine Corps provide each other with indirect support in areas such as aviation supply and maintenance.

Under the Single Manager Concept, the Marine Corps also receives support from the Army in such areas as artillery weaponry and engineering equipment; and from the Air Force in military airlift transportation.

All Services are intertwined in the research, development, test and education of weapons and tactics.

Senator TAFT. Along with that, give us some idea of manpower cost effectiveness—in other words—the ratio of the total budget divided by the manpower aspects of the budget. I think that might be helpful for comparison purposes.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

[The information follows:]

FISCAL YEAR 1975 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET AMENDED

Budget	Percent of total			Percent of total dollars which are manpower		
	Fiscal year 1973	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975	Fiscal year 1973	Fiscal year 1974	Fiscal year 1975
	Military personnel—Marine Corps.....	69.2	68.2	67.4	69.2	68.2
Reserve personnel—Marine Corps.....	3.0	2.6	2.8	3.0	2.6	2.8
Operations and Maintenance—Marine Corps (civilian manpower).....	19.5	19.9	20.4	7.8	7.9	8.1
Operations and maintenance—Marine Corps Reserve (civilian manpower).....	.4	.5	.5	(¹)	(¹)	(¹)
Procurement Marine Corps.....	7.9	8.8	8.9			
Total.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	80.0	78.7	78.3

¹Less than 0.1 percent.

General CUSHMAN. To further decrease our support overhead, we use such innovative techniques as the fleet assistance program. In this program, certain base operating tasks are performed by tenant combat units. This enables combat Marines to practice certain skills otherwise limited when in garrison, saving us about 5,500 Marines while still keeping the assisting personnel ready to deploy with their combat unit.

The cumulative result of our efforts has been to reduce us to the practical limit with respect to acquiring further combat capability within the present authorized strength.

Approximately 31,000 Marines, 16 percent of all our manpower, are stationed in foreign countries and aboard naval vessels, prin-

cipally as elements of the operating forces. Most of these Marines are assigned to those forward-deployed Fleet Marine Force combat units which are in the Western Pacific.

Senator NUNN. Let me back up just a minute, to the bottom of page 4, this fleet assistance program. When you say tenant combat unit, would you go into a little more detail and explain how that concept works?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. For example, the Second Marine Division is located at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. We have a base structure there which maintains the quarters, provides the utilities, keeps up the ranges, and so forth. With the presence of the division they need more manpower than if the base were in a caretaker status. Manpower is drawn from the Second Division stationed there in the form of working parties and range maintenance details to meet these requirements. So that the base primarily provides the permanent or fixed services, and the combat unit provides the labor and skills that are required solely due to their presence.

The price you pay for this, of course, is that they miss out on some training time during the time they are helping run the base. But this is on a rotational basis. When the unit leaves to go into combat or on exercises, they take their people with them. At that point the base may have some trouble struggling along, but since they do not then have so many people to take care of, it works out.

Senator NUNN. Do you find this to be a serious impediment to recruiting?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir.

Senator NUNN. It does not cause you personnel problems?

General CUSHMAN. No, sir.

[The information follows:]

What is the Army's concept of base operations support? Does the Army use a program analogous to USMC's fleet assistance program? If so, describe and compare it with the fleet assistance program. If not, why not?

The Army has a comparable program. Individuals and units whose individual and unit proficiency and readiness would be enhanced by performing certain base support functions are assigned to such duties. Approximately 9000 military personnel are performing base operations type duties in CONUS. The use of military personnel in base operations functions reduces the requirement to staff such functions with permanently assigned resources. Some examples where personnel are utilized in skill related functions are:

Engineer personnel and units supporting installation engineers.

Medical personnel and units supporting installation medical treatment facilities.

Maintenance personnel and units supporting installations maintenance functions.

However, because of staffing deficits in the base operations area, the Army does utilize military personnel in non-skilled related duties. To reduce this practice the Army has requested Congressional approval to substitute civilian manpower for military personnel being utilized in non-skill related duties. These programs have failed to obtain Congressional approval in FY 73, 74 and 75.

Senator NUNN. At this point I would like for counsel to request that the Army provide us with their concept of this, whether they use this at all, and if so, a description, and if not, why not. Also give us a comparison between the two. I personally think this is essential if we are going to do something about support. I can see why, if

other services do not do any of this, and the Marine Corps does, why it would place you at some degree of disadvantage in recruiting.

General CUSHMAN. No. However, something young prospective recruits may hear about is mess duty. But actually, they do not all dislike mess duty that much, and they do not catch it very often.

Senator NUNN. We would like as much detail as you can give us on this particular point, including the duties that they do perform, the mess duty or the range duty, or whatever.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

FLEET MARINE FORCE PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The Fleet Marine Force Personnel Assistance Program, commonly referred to as the "Fleet Assistance Program (FAP)," provides for the assignment of combat Marines to work in designated billets in supporting base units when in a garrison environment. Through this program, demands for personnel dedicated to base support activities are materially reduced, since personnel of tenant units, whose presence at the host base generates workload, perform certain tasks for the supporting base. It should be emphasized, however, that these personnel are not simply a source of working parties for menial tasks. Rather, the primary concept derives from the necessary expansion of certain base facilities due to the increased density of personnel while tenant units are present on the base.

Of equal importance is the fact that the program provides opportunities for combat personnel to perform skills which would otherwise remain relatively unpracticed in garrison. For example, the more common FAP billets provide the base with additional military policemen, administrative personnel, supply clerks, communications personnel, cooks, and postal clerks. Although "on loan" to the host command, the FAP personnel remain an integral part of their parent combat unit, available for immediate deployment as necessary.

The program materially contributes to the attainment of one of the basic goals of the Marine Corps, maximum utilization of manpower. It is a flexible program, developed mutually by host and tenant commanders to meet the requirements of each base complex. These mutual agreements have evolved billet requirements in both officer and enlisted grades in a variety of skill areas. The existing FAP program for Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, N.C. shown in the table below, provides a good example.

FAP BILLETS, MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C.

Billet description	Officer	Enlisted
Administration.....		2
Supply.....		15
Cooks and bakers.....		15
Postal.....		7
Motor transport.....		4
Clubs.....		12
Training/assistant.....		10
Military police and guards.....	3	
Marksmanship instructors.....		131
Special services.....		24
Miscellaneous.....	14	
Maintenance.....		31
Subtotal.....	17	318
Total FAP billets.....		335

Senator NUNN. I think the volunteer force is lending itself to less and less of that all the time, and, therefore, we are increasing the support, and, thereby increasing the cost.

General CUSHMAN. Somebody has got to cut the grass, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. That is right.

Senator Taft, do you have any questions?

Senator TAFT. No questions. Thank you.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. May I add something, Senator?

Senator NUNN. Certainly, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. To touch on that Navy manpower and combat forces, to put that in the context, it has been averaging about 49 percent, just under 50 percent. That figure has been constant since about 1964.

Senator NUNN. Does the Navy use this tenant combat unit concept, Admiral?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, we do. When ships are deployed, they are maintained by their crews. On the other hand when they come into port, many services are provided by the yard or the base where they are stationed. Furthermore, fleet maintenance assistance groups have been established at fleet centers in San Diego and in Norfolk to provide technical skill in helping to maintain the ships.

Senator NUNN. To the extent that there is an analogy in our services—and I know they will not be comparable—would you provide for the record at this point what the Navy does along this line, what is analogous to it.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, I will, Mr. Chairman.

[The information follows:]

The analogy is much the same as that previously explained by General Cushman. There are certain tasks aboard a ship that must be performed that do not necessarily require the expertise to be accomplished that may be a part of the technical training of the individual. This is particularly true of the house-keeping chores. Also, each man aboard that ship has a battle station and he may be required to perform a task at that battle station that is not directly related to his technical skill.

This same situation may also occur when a member is stationed ashore or his ship is in port. Some members may be used for Shore Patrol duty or as part of a garbage detail or used in the mess halls. These duties are temporary or of short duration and may have no relation to his training or technical skill. However, because of the very nature of the Navy operations, our use of personnel in these capacities may not be as great as in the Marine Corps or Army.

General CUSHMAN. Other overseas Marines provide security of naval stations and U.S. embassies or are assigned to such activities as military assistance and advisory groups, defense attache offices, and Navy, joint and combined staffs. No substantial changes to these overseas troop levels are contemplated in the foreseeable future.

The majority of these Marines are not accompanied by their dependents and serve a reduced tour of duty overseas. This policy enables us to maintain these forces in a high state of readiness for deployment, for crisis control or, if required, combat. At the same time, minimal demands are created for the establishment of overseas bases, housing, hospitals, schools, commissaries, and the like.

In addition, forward-deployed forces from combat divisions in the United States are maintained afloat in the Caribbean and with the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. These commitments are also expected to continue.

Sustaining a strength adequate to meet the manpower allocations which I have described poses a very real and serious challenge to the Marine Corps in a draft-free environment.

Senator NUNN. Excuse me just a minute, but we are having some interesting things come up, and I think it perhaps could be very important in the subcommittee's deliberations in the future. You say the majority of these Marines are not accompanied by their dependents and serve a reduced tour of duty overseas?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. What number of Marines are you talking about that are overseas now?

General CUSHMAN. There are about 40,000, I would say, that fall into this category. Of these, the 25,000 who are in Japan and Okinawa do not have dependents authorized. All of those who are on naval vessels, of course, when deployed, do not have dependents. Those who are on cruises in the Mediterranean on the Caribbean have no dependents. And that is about it.

Senator NUNN. What kind of tour of duty would those have, that are in Japan for instance?

General CUSHMAN. 13 months.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any kind of analysis on the turnover costs versus the dependent costs?

General CUSHMAN. No. Really though, it would be impossible to put up the dependents in Japan. The facilities simply are not there. No Government facilities, and none in the local community that can be afforded by those who might bring dependents over there to live on the economy. The economy is highly inflated.

It is almost impossible to build anything these days in Japan. For example, on Okinawa, cement is almost nonexistent. Without making any actual analysis, the prices would be out of sight, to build a commissary, and quarters, and all that sort of thing.

Senator NUNN. I would also like for the record for you to expand on this point and give us a breakdown of the number, the percentage, the tour of duty and any other details you might have on this, and also get a comparison, particularly with the Army on this point, and with the other services as well. I think it is an important area.

[The information follows:]

The programmed requirement for Fleet Marine Force personnel in Japan/Okinawa for fiscal year 1975 is 25,049 billets. It is estimated that 7,966 of these billets will be filled with Marines entitled to be accompanied by dependents if the Marine Corps so authorized it. However, facilities have never been constructed and the costs associated with initial set up would run in excess of \$350 million for family housing, commissaries and support. This figure could possibly be reduced if changes in force structure, troop deployments etc. affecting the other services freed up already existing facilities on Okinawa/Japan for Marine Corps use. Assuming these facilities were available and in place and the Marine Corps changed in part from a 13 month unaccompanied tour for all Fleet Marine Force personnel to a 36 month tour for those entitled to be accompanied by dependents (i.e., the 7,966 billets referred to above) there would be a significant difference in permanent change of station costs. Although there now would be fewer total moves per year, even after including the additional dependents, the PCS costs would rise because of the quantum jump in payments for household goods shipments. Quantitatively, total PCS costs would increase from \$37.1M per year to \$50.3M per year for these moves.

Question. What number and percentage of Army troops overseas serve unaccompanied tours?

Answer. Approximately 214,000 (77%) of Army troops overseas serve unaccompanied tours (includes bachelors).

Question. What are the tours of duty for accompanied and unaccompanied tours?

Answer. Accompanied tours are 36 months in the more desirable areas, for example, in Europe and Hawaii. Less desirable areas have shorter accompanied tours. Examples are Okinawa—30 months and Korea—24 months. Unaccompanied tours are 24 months in the more desirable areas. Less desirable areas have shorter tours, for example: Okinawa and Turkey—18 months; Philippines—15 months; and Korea—12 months. Bachelors serve the same tour (36 months) as accompanied personnel in Europe and Hawaii.

Question. What is the rationale for classifying tours one way or the other?

Answer. Tours are considered as accompanied when the dependents of a military member are present in the overseas command with the approval of the oversea commander. Unaccompanied tours are served by all other individuals except that bachelors in the more desirable areas, primarily Europe and Hawaii, serve the same tour as those with dependents. Unaccompanied tours are shorter than accompanied tours in order to reduce the period of separation of military members from their families.

Question. Where are the pertinent tour areas?

Answer. Principal oversea areas where Army troops are stationed with the tour lengths prescribed for these areas are as follows:

Country	Accompanied	Tour length bachelor	Unaccompanied
Germany.....	36	36	24
Hawaii.....	36	36	24
Korea.....	24	12	12
Alaska ¹	36	24	24
Belgium.....	36	36	24
Canal Zone.....	36	18	18
Italy ¹	36	36	24
Japan ¹	36	24	24
Okinawa.....	30	18	18
Thailand:			
Bangkok/Don Muang.....	24	18	18
Other areas.....	(?)	12	12
Turkey ¹	24	18	18

¹ Personnel in isolated and less desirable areas serve reduced tours.

² Not authorized.

The Air Force assigns personnel overseas to serve the tour of duty specified in DoD Directive 1315.7. The individual service member is given the option of serving the accompanied tour or the unaccompanied tour in those areas where dependents are authorized and support facilities are authorized and support facilities are available. Accompanied tours of duty vary from 36 months to 24 months with a limited number of locations with very few people assigned being 18 months (Saudi Arabia, Aleutian Peninsula and Aleutian Islands west of 162nd meridian). Unaccompanied tours vary from 24 months to 12 months. The tour length for any particular area is determined by the general desirability of the area, political climate, available support facilities, mission etc.

Based on a recent computer inquiry of the total Air Force personnel assigned overseas, the number assigned, unaccompanied and percentage unaccompanied follows:

	Assigned	Unaccompanied	
		Number	Percent
Officer.....	20,911	8,264	40
Airman.....	143,339	91,542	64
Total overseas.....	164,250	99,806	61

The Navy has approximately 83,000 billet requirements for personnel stationed at overseas locations. This includes ships homeported overseas, as well as installations outside the contiguous 48 states. Personnel on ships afloat, but homeported in the Continental United States, are excluded. It is not possible to determine the number of personnel overseas who are unaccompanied, since many personnel on unaccompanied tours may, in fact, have their dependents in the area at their own expense. Unaccompanied tours range in length from a minimum of 12 months to a maximum of 24 months and are consistent with policies established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator NUNN. Proceed, General. I hate to keep interrupting you, but I want to cover these points as we go.

Senator Taft, feel free to interrupt if you have any questions.

Senator TAFT. I will do so.

General CUSHMAN. Regarding your last question for the record concerning the length of overseas tours versus the presence of dependents, it is my understanding that the Department of Defense will provide this information to the Committee for all four Services.

Sufficient personnel must be recruited to maintain the enlisted force at its authorized strength and at the quality levels which insure continued improvements in our corps. To accomplish this, it has been necessary to adopt a more dynamic and aggressive approach in our recruiting effort and to request funds for paid advertising. We must compete more effectively in the recruiting market.

One long-term objective is reducing the number of new recruits required each year while concurrently increasing their quality. We have been making progress towards this objective over the past 3 years.

The first aspect of this objective can be accomplished by increasing the average initial term of service of Marine recruits, producing both direct and indirect effects over the long term. With respect to direct effects, the annual requirements for recruits is reduced. Indirectly, the level of experience of enlisted personnel is increased while concurrently the need for training personnel, support facilities, and recruiters is diminished.

We cannot expect immediate results from these efforts. The full benefits of such changes are only realized 2, 3 or 4 years in the future. However, between fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1975, we have increased the average lengths of enlistment from three to over 3.5 years and increased the proportion of the enlisted force with over 4 years of service.

Quality standards for initial enlistments have been tightened. We have established higher mental standards for recruits with the overall goal of obtaining 90 percent of them from the highest three of the five mental levels while seeking to obtain the maximum number of high school graduates. As a result, the proportion of recruits in the top three mental groups has increased from 80 percent in fiscal year 1972 to 92 percent in fiscal year 1974. Also, in fiscal year 1974, 54.4 percent of our recruits were high school graduates, a portion we hope to increase in the future.

Reenlistment standards have also been raised to insure that we retain only the best qualified, well-trained, career-motivated Marine.

Quality criteria which measure qualifications, education, and performance have been established at each retention/reenlistment point so that only the best Marines enter the career force and remains to retirement eligibility.

Manpower costs have risen dramatically over the past few years. For example, between fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1975, active military strength decreased by one percent while the total cost of military personnel appropriations increased by 18 percent. Today, over three-fourths of our total Marine Corps appropriations, are dedicated to military and civilian manpower.

We are continually seeking ways to diminish the rate at which manpower costs are rising. For instance, by the end of fiscal year 1975 we will have reduced the proportion of officers in our total force to 9.5 percent, resulting in a very favorable ratio of officers to enlisted personnel, one officer for every 9.52 enlisted men compared to the DoD of one to 6.75.

Senator NUNN. At this point, counsel, if you could get a comparison of each one of the services so that we can place it in the record, between the ratio of officers and enlisted men, the breakdown. This gets into the grade pay and the structure that we are going to have to get into and a great many of Senator Proxmire's objections. He has a pretty strong case here on some of those.

I believe you were here the other day when we talked about that, Senator Taft.

So at this point in the record I would like to have a comparison of each one of the other services.

NAVY OFFICER—ENLISTED RATIO PAY GRADE DISTRIBUTION

	Fiscal year—		Fiscal year—	
	1972	1975	1972	1975
Ratio.....	1:7.02	1:7.10		
Flag.....	315	285		
Captain.....	4,230	3,940		
Commander.....	8,441	7,612		
Lieutenant commander.....	15,791	14,494		
Lieutenant.....	17,750	14,826		
Lieutenant junior grade.....	12,302	12,137		
			Ensign.....	9,277 9,361
			W-4.....	123 110
			W-3.....	594 2,241
			W-2.....	3,124 848
			W-1.....	982 300
			Total officer.....	72,929 66,154

Question. What is the ratio of Army officers to EM?

Answer. The Army's officer/enlisted ratio, based on actual strength as of 30 June 1974, is 1:6.4. The projected (President's Budget) officer/enlisted ratio in FY 75 is 1:6.7. The Army was forced to rapidly build up during the Vietnam years and likewise reduce abruptly after Vietnam. During a rapid force buildup or reduction an "officer lag factor" distorts the ratio. A war time posture normally calls for an enlisted intensive force, consequently during drawdown enlisted personnel requirements decrease more rapidly than officer requirements. As a result, the officer enlisted ratio decreases during the drawdown. It should be noted that the Navy provides medical and chaplain support for the Marine Corps whereas the Army provides its own medical and chaplain support. We are continually examining the size and composition of the officer corps and the positions for which officers are authorized.

By the end of FY the Air Force will have reduced the proportion of officers in the active force to 17.0 percent, resulting in an officer-to-enlisted ratio of 1:4.87.

*Marine Corps officer to enlisted ratio fiscal year 1970-75*¹

Fiscal year:	
1970.....	1: 9. 41
1971.....	1: 8. 86
1972.....	1: 8. 99
1973.....	1: 9. 17
1974.....	1: 9. 07
1975 ²	1: 9. 52

¹ Includes all warrant officers.² Planned.

General CUSHMAN. I will provide detailed data here, then continue with my statement. In effect, since fiscal year 1972 we have replaced nearly 1,000 officers with enlisted men or women. Had we retained the fiscal year 1972 proportion of officers, the fiscal year 1975 military personnel budget would have been \$10 million greater.

Constraining "grade creep" or the increase in average grade also produces manpower costs savings. We have consistently sought to reduce senior officer and enlisted grades, effecting commensurate increases in junior officers. As a result, by the end of fiscal year 1975, 73 percent of our officers will be in the grades of captain and below while 54 percent of our enlisted personnel will be in the lower three grades. This will result in the Marine Corps having the lowest officer and enlisted grade average in DoD, which naturally leads to a lower average cost per serviceman.

[The information follows:]

Question. What number of active duty officers and EM does the Army have in each grade: What percentage of officers are in the grade of captains and below? What percentage of EM are in the lower three grades?

Answer. The numbers of active duty officers and enlisted personnel in each grade for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 (projected) are as follows:

	Fiscal year 1974 actual	Fiscal year 1975 President's budget
Officers by grade:¹		
General officers.....	466	459
Colonel.....	5,052	5,065
Lieutenant colonel.....	11,379	11,261
Major.....	17,656	16,902
Captain.....	31,852	32,056
1st lieutenant.....	11,985	10,727
2d lieutenant.....	13,057	11,616
W4.....	1,410	1,348
W3.....	3,506	3,366
W2.....	7,127	6,855
W1.....	2,082	1,895
Enlisted by grade:		
E-9.....	3,698	3,715
E-8.....	12,104	12,339
E-7.....	45,798	45,904
E-6.....	71,378	71,643
E-5.....	96,272	117,879
E-4.....	176,715	176,258
E-3.....	94,101	79,350
E-2.....	130,397	109,734
E-1.....	70,996	62,828

¹ Includes MC/DC; excludes civil works/Reserve components.

Based on actual officer strengths as of 30 June 1974, 67 percent of the officer force is in the grades of captain and below. The same captain and below content is projected for FY 1975. Reduced officer procurement in recent years, and for FY 1975, to achieve declining end strengths, drives the captain and below

content downward. In addition, the involuntary release in FY's 72 and 74 for the purpose of end strength reduction of approximately 10,000 officers, the majority of whom were in the grade of captain, lowered the officer content of captain and below. The Department of the Army is in the process of reducing headquarters which normally have a higher density of senior grade officers. At the same time combat organizations are being added which normally require a higher density of junior officers and enlisted men. Based on actual enlisted strengths, as of 30 June 1974, 40 percent of the enlisted force is in the grades E1-E3. At the end of FY 1975, 37 percent of the Army's enlisted force is projected to be in grades E1-E3. However, including the next higher grade of E4, thus considering the enlisted force below the grade of sergeant, the percentage jumps significantly to 63 percent. The E1-E3 content of the enlisted force in FY 74 is higher than is projected for FY 75 primarily because of the FY 74 manning shortfall in the grade of E5. As a result, there were fewer losses in the E1-E3 content through promotion to the higher grades of E-4 and E-5. Additionally, the extension of the phase point (time-in-serve) for promotion to E-5 contributes to the decrease in the number of E-5's in FY 74.

By the end of FY 1975, 63 percent of the Air Force officer force will be in the grade of captain and below while 33 percent of our enlisted personnel will be in the lower three grades (E-1, E-2, and E-3). Based on the FY 75 President's Budget request a breakout of the force, by grade, MC/DC included for FY 75 follows:

Officers:	
O-10-----	14
O-9-----	40
O-8-----	140
O-7-----	199
O-6-----	5, 837
O-5-----	12, 955
O-4-----	20, 852
O-3-----	37, 944
O-2-----	15, 477
W-4-----	43
Total-----	107, 300
Enlisted:	
E-9-----	5, 083
E-8-----	10, 165
E-7-----	35, 785
E-6-----	63, 791
E-5-----	103, 103
E-4-----	131, 472
E-3-----	108, 029
E-2-----	35, 823
E-1-----	25, 377
Subtotal-----	518, 628
Cadets-----	4, 417
Total-----	532, 045

The average officer grade in the Navy is Lieutenant, while the average enlisted grade is E-4.

Sixty-one percent (61 percent) of all Navy officers are in grades O-3 and below; thirty-nine percent (39 percent) of Navy enlisted personnel are in grades E-3 and below.

Senator NUNN. Also, on that particular point of comparison.

General CUSHMAN. While we have been endeavoring to reduce our average grade and improve our officer to enlisted ratio in recent years, we do not expect to return to the precise levels which prevailed prior to Vietnam. Grade structure requirements have changed in the

last 10 years due to changes in organizational structure and weaponry. Also, we found during the Vietnam buildup that we require a goodly number of career officers and enlisted career Marines to support rapid expansion in time of emergency.

Satisfaction of skill requirements involves attraction of the requisite quantity and quality of recruits and retention of qualified marines in the necessary skills at the appropriate experience levels. The recently implemented combat arms and expanded enlistment bonus programs should prove effective in assisting us in attracting recruits in those skills which have been difficult to supply in the past.

Also, we are optimistic that the new selective reenlistment bonus program will produce improved retention results in those skills which presently have fewer than necessary experienced career marines.

I hasten to point out, however, that monetary incentives alone are not sufficient to satisfy our recruiting and retention needs. We must offer today's youth a challenge, a sense of purpose, and a measure of satisfaction out of being a marine.

Within each occupational field, only the best-fitted marines are advanced in grade through uniform control measures established at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps for the junior grades and centralized selection boards for the grades of staff sergeant and above.

In addition, selective retention measures are constantly employed to weed out marginal performers. These devices include an enlisted performance board as well as policies which deny reenlistment to marines who have not attained the grade of sergeant by the 12th year of service. Also, all NCO's applying for reenlistment beyond the 20th year of service must obtain the authority of Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

With respect to commissioned officers, those of the same grade and service characteristics compete for advancement on a best-fitted basis. Those twice failing selection for advancement are involuntarily separated as prescribed by law.

In the final analysis, maintaining an effective Military Establishment does not depend solely upon sophisticated weaponry or even, in absolute terms, the magnitude of the force. Rather, it depends primarily upon the quality of the people who imbue it with the professionalism, leadership, and integrity needed to make it an effective force.

We believe that the long-term objectives of the Marine Corps and the immediate measures taken in implementing our plans constitute positive measures to that end.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, General Cushman. I will ask counsel to keep time and to interrupt me after 10 minutes.

General Cushman, how many people did you recruit this fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, and how does this compare with the number you have to recruit in fiscal year 1975?

General CUSHMAN. In 1974, we recruited fewer than we needed. The problems we had were primarily in the first couple of months of the fiscal year immediately after the law went off the books regarding selective service, and there was the sudden realization among young people that they did not have this to contend with any more,

that there was no law forcing them to join. Consequently, there was a 2- or 3-month vacation, sort of, in which they reassessed the future for themselves, in which we did not do very well. We dropped all the way down for those months to 60 and 70 percent of quota.

Then we got up steam and we were doing fine until this January when we were faced with a retroactive requirement that we had to average at least 55 percent high school graduates. Since we were already behind a couple of percentage points, we really had a tough struggle and we never did catch up. We ended up with about 85 percent of the requirement for the fiscal year overall.

The exact numbers I will have to supply for the record.

[The information follows:]

The exact requirement for non prior service males and females during FY 1974 was 56,010.

General CUSHMAN. For the coming year we are going to have to catch up. We ended up some 7,000 short. So we are really going to have to go. However, even with this higher new quota during the first month of this fiscal year we made just over 100 percent. We recruited something like 6,200 people, which is just about the maximum that we can handle in any one month in our facilities. If we can keep this up—we cannot on a month-by-month basis, it varies so much in the winter—we will come out all right and even catch up, overcoming what happened to us last year.

Our high school graduates for this first month—of course, July is a good month for high school graduates—are coming in at something like 63 percent of quota. And our mental group IV's were well down, around 7 percent, as I recall. I can check those exact figures for you, supplying them for the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

The exact percentage of mental group IV's, male and female non prior service, was 6.7%.

Senator NUNN. You are going to have to recruit more this year than your quota last year?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, in order to catch up.

Senator NUNN. You have to make up your shortages. Suppose there had been 100 percent recruiting last year, how do your raw numbers compare this year to last year?

General CUSHMAN. We would be recruiting about 7,000 less this year than we presently have established as a quota, because that is what we were short last year. The number would be lower, because we are slowly getting more 4-year enlistees. And next year it should be lower yet.

Senator NUNN. The Army has to recruit more in fiscal year 1975 than it did in fiscal year 1974, but you do not have to recruit as many, except for making up.

General CUSHMAN. Except for making up those losses that occurred, right.

We have been pressing for a 4-year enlistment, and we have been slowly increasing it, as I mentioned, over the last 3 years. So this will be good, not only in 1975, but in the years to come.

Senator NUNN. How about the Marine Reserve forces, do they have about the same degree of problems?

General CUSHMAN. We have more problems with the Reserve, because the incentives just are not there. There is no tuition assistance so that a fellow can keep going to school while he operates within the organized Reserve, the drill system, and so on. And there is just no motivation to join sufficient to get them in.

Senator NUNN. As far as the Marine Corps is concerned, do you see the Volunteer Force as being a viable policy for the long run?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. We have always been a Volunteer Force. We have never fooled ourselves that draft pressure did not assist us in getting those volunteers, particularly of course, in time of war. You may well have to have some sort of law on the books in that case.

Senator NUNN. If we had a conflict of any magnitude at all, a conventional kind of a conflict, would you have to go back to the draft law to sustain your quota in the Marine Corps?

General CUSHMAN. There is no way to tell. If the war started like Pearl Harbor, then the motivation in the entire country would be there. If it started with some sort of crisis management like Vietnam, then you have got a different situation. So I think it is pretty hypothetical to guess just how the feeling of the country might be. I think that would determine it.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, I will ask you a question. We have heard a lot about the naval comparison with the Soviet Union in recent months, particularly from your predecessor. How do you measure the Navy's fighting capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union at this point as to seapower?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, I like to think of our Navy's fighting capability in a somewhat different context than many people would want to, that is, comparing naval strength side by side, since navies really no longer simply fight other navies. The mission of the U.S. Navy is to maintain control of the seas, in furtherance of national policy. We do that in joint operations with the other services and in combined operations with our allies. In the event of war with the Soviet Union, these joint forces would essentially be opposing not only Soviet naval forces, but also Soviet air forces and those forces of her allies. So I would want to describe the U.S. Navy's total capability as its ability to carry out its wartime tasks and missions as prescribed by our current strategy. My evaluation is that the Navy can today carry out those tasks and missions, although very marginally in some areas. For example, we feel that our fleet ballistic missile force is very ready in terms of carrying out its tasks. On the other hand, I think we are probably marginally capable of keeping the sealanes open between the United States and Europe in the case of a NATO conflict. It is my view that we must have this capability to make the NATO strategy work.

Senator NUNN. On that point, are you considering NATO conflicts and including our allies in your statement?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, I am.

Senator NUNN. So you think that even with our allies help we have a marginal capability of keeping the sealanes open in a NATO all-out conventional conflict?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. When I say marginal, I mean that the losses would be very heavy on both sides, particularly in the initial phases.

Nevertheless I believe that we have the capability at this point in time to prevail in our tasks.

Senator NUNN. Do you also feel that way about the Middle East kind of scenario that we heard so much about from Admiral Zumwalt?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, that is a very difficult question to answer because of the conjectures involved; if we did this and the Soviets did that.

Senator NUNN. The assumptions are what are very difficult.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, they are. Let me say this, that the less naval capability that we can congregate in an area, the better we can assume a Soviet strong reaction. When we are talking of two great powers, nobody starts a fight if they think they are going to lose it. By having a strong Navy and the ability to concentrate those naval forces, I think we generally preclude Soviet involvement.

Senator NUNN. Some of the assumptions made by Admiral Zumwalt that were pointed out in the media to me, were examples of the very worst kind of assumption. I believe one of his assumptions was that we would get very close to Israel under some kind of conditions and yet we would have no air support from the Israeli Air Force, who had air superiority during the entire war. Do you share the assumption that Admiral Zumwalt made on this case that, in effect, said we could not do the job in the 6th Fleet?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. No, sir, I tend to feel that as we approach a crisis situation, our forces would not be committed, if it appeared that the odds were stacked against us to the extent we would probably lose.

One assumption made his analysis very pessimistic—and I think it supports my position that we must not look at naval forces simply fighting naval forces, as they did in the battle of Trafalgar. What tilted the balance against our forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, was not only the lack of air support from our allies and from the Air Force, because our allies might very well deny bases in Turkey and Greece, but was also the Soviet Air Force coming out of the Crimea against these forces. Had that occurred, my own view is that our forces could have prevailed, but I think they would have been severely attrited.

Senator NUNN. I had gotten such a different impression from Admiral Murphy on the scene and from Admiral Zumwalt here in Washington. We have seen so much publicity on the so-called Zumwalt theory of—I call it the worst case—that it has been somewhat disturbing to a lot of people in the country. And I do take note of page 2 of your text where you say: "If we are to maintain our paramount position at sea with modern arms and high esprit," to maintain our paramount position to me is not the same thing as your predecessor said we had. I just wondered if you wanted to clarify that.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. My statement was deliberate, Mr. Chairman.

I am nevertheless concerned with our current position, in that we have only 508 ships in our active inventory. In our program that we project in the 5-year defense plan, and which we will be presenting to Congress in both shipbuilding construction and aircraft

production, we will build up to a level of about 600 ships in the next 8 years. These will be quality forces, and will be well balanced.

Senator NUNN. This is part of the Navy plan as presented to Congress, to sacrifice numbers in order to get quality backup, and then build the quantity backup-

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. That also I do not think has been completely understood in the publicity at least that I read.

I want to get back to this in a few minutes.

Senator Taft, I have used up my time.

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Senator.

Would you comment, any of the witnesses, on the effect of increased computer technology and other technological changes on personnel requirements? Has this made a change in them?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. One way of answering that would be to describe the situation afloat. We have made great advances on board our ships and ashore too, in technology. But at the end of fiscal year 1974 we found ourselves with a shortfall in pay grades E-5 and above required to maintain and handle some of the high technology in the Navy. We met with our fleet commanders the other day when Admiral Holloway called them in, and this is the main thing that they talked about. We have got to have folks to handle the equipment. And this is where we are falling down right now. We have to get a little more training to fill up that pipeline.

Senator TAFT. I am concerned about that. I am also curious about whether the increased technological capacity means that we can afford reductions in total personnel numbers as well as the other problem. Do you see that as a factor, or is it going the other way?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. It has been a factor, Senator, in the very substantial reduction we have taken so far in our military forces, a lot of it as we have improved the quality of our equipment. The PF, for example, which we are developing, will require about 40 percent less people to maintain it than a comparable ship built 10 years ago. This is a very big improvement because of the economies of scale and the efficiency in working with these new equipments.

Senator TAFT. Let me ask Admiral Holloway in that regard, do the habitability requirements of an All-Volunteer Navy and up-to-date Navy have an effect on ship design, which are necessarily requirements in our competing forces?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, habitability considerations are very important to us, but we know that we can never attain the level of habitability to be competitive with either the Air Force, for example, or with nonmilitary maritime services, such as the merchant marine. I believe we once thought we could reach some level of parity. Now we simply do the best we can, without reducing the capability of our ships as fighting platforms. That is why we are concerned about the uniqueness of the naval service. Sea duty is not so much arduous as it is a deprivation of the normal things a young man likes. When his work is over, he wants to get out for a little night life. I remind people that we still do not serve liquor aboard ships in the U.S. Navy, and there are no libraries on our ships that can achieve these levels of habitability and still have

fighting ships. It is a sacrifice we have to make. Being aboard a U.S. Navy ship deployed is very akin to the Army being in the field under canvas.

Senator TAFT. This affects your tour of duty requirements too, I imagine.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. It does, Senator, and that is a very important point. That is why we strive to maintain a reasonable sea-shore ratio. A sailor that makes a 9-month cruise on a carrier to Southeast Asia stays aboard that ship for 40 days at a time, and then has 10 days in port. Of those 10 days in port, normally he will have 3 or 4 days of assigned duties aboard ship. This is a rather deprived existence, and after 3 or 4 years of this we feel that we must put him ashore with his family to give him some sort of normalization of his life.

Senator TAFT. There has been, I think, very little coverage specifically of the problems in the aviation field for either of the forces, the Navy or the Marines. Could you comment, Admiral or General, on the problems relating to aviation procurement particularly, or aviation manpower requirements, relating both to the pilots and the enlisted personnel.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. If I may initially, General Cushman.

We find we do not have as big a problem either recruiting pilots, or retaining them, as we do surface warfare officers. I believe that the reason we are able to recruit pilots is because it is a skill that they can use if they elect not to continue on a military career. Pilot training is very expensive, and very few people can afford to pay their own way through flight school. I believe we retain pilots because of the hazardous duty pay provisions, and to a certain extent, due to the esprit that is generated in a small group of people who are doing something special. Our figures in pilot retention are running about 44 percent in fiscal year 1974. They would run even higher, except that is 44 percent of those we consider eligibles. We drop out people who are below what we consider to be our standards. These people might apply, but we do not accept them.

Senator TAFT. How about personnel? Do you recruit people separately for your air forces, for instance?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. No, sir. A man simply enlists in the Navy, although he subsequently elects to be an airman or a seaman or a construction man early in his career. I do not believe anyone would enlist just to be around aircraft. Retention is a problem here, and we see a very sharp dividing line. In those skills such as jet engine maintenance, which are transferrable to civilian life, where a man might be learning a trade which would be useful to him after he leaves the service, we have fairly high retention rates. We do not have major problems. On the other hand, the flight deck crewman, the aviation bosun's mate, the man who stands on the flight deck as the aircraft lands, has a dangerous, arduous, dirty task, and one that is not transferable to any civilian pursuit. We find we have our problems in retaining those people.

This is not dissimilar to what we find in the case of our engineering rates, which are very dirty. It is very difficult to keep people in in that area.

Senator TAFT. Thank you, Admiral.
General.

General CUSHMAN. Our pilots go through the Navy school, and so do our enlisted aviation men. I subscribe to everything that Admiral Holloway has said.

I would like to make a slightly different point, however. And it also goes to your question about computers.

Both of those are factors that enter into the reason why we can never compare today's forces with those of, say, World War II or Korea, when it comes to ratios of officers to men, and so on. We now have in the aviation field two-seat aircraft, whereas formerly they were one-seat, and we have hundreds of helicopters where formerly there were none. The computer in our Marine Corps experience has never saved a single person. It has cost more people. But you can do jobs which are impossible or very difficult jobs very easily in a fraction of the time.

We did not have computers back 30 years ago. We had very rudimentary aircraft, and their maintenance was simple.

We did not have atomic weapons; we did not have NATO.

You could go on and on. But these two things are indicative of why you need a lot of officers where you never needed any before.

When it comes to recruitment, like the Navy, we do not have any trouble with pilots, but we do have trouble getting the skills and retaining the skills we need in aviation, and in computers. These are areas that are not only transferrable to the outside world, but are competitive. I mean the industry is competing for these people in the first instance.

Senator TAFT. Thank you very much, General. My time has expired.

Senator NUNN. Go ahead and complete your questioning if you would like.

Senator TAFT. I really do not have any other technical questions. I have a general question that I would like to put, and I know the chairman is interested in it too. We discussed it briefly yesterday.

Both of you gentlemen are members of the Joint Chiefs, and the Secretary is top level in the DoD. Could you comment, each of you, on the question of the relative strengths of the various services and how as members of the Joint Chiefs you arrive at that, or how you think you ought to arrive at it. We sort of keep these numbers for each of the services, and it may be that with radical changes in maybe the total number of personnel it ought to still be 2 million plus. Is the mix right, or do you think the mix ought to be changed? It seems to me we are changing roles all the time, and changing technological developments, and changing world strategic considerations, and we should not just swallow the figures that we had in the past as a matter of balance, just as we should not accept the particular dollar figures for the particular service. Could you comment on that?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I think in the case of the Navy our personnel strengths are driven by the force levels of equipment which we have. In this present period we probably have less flexibility in the numbers of ships and aircraft which could be made available

to the service than at any time since World War II. As the Chief of Naval Operations, I have pointed out that 508 ships, and the number of aircraft we have to maintain a balance, is marginal, and I would like to have more. It is interesting that we in these times cannot get more, except through construction, which is a time consuming process. We have hit sort of an equilibrium, in that as fast as we can produce new ships, we have ships reaching an over-age status and dropping out. So we are in a point of balance between 500-600 ships in the Navy today, and this tends to drive our manpower requirements to a large degree.

For example, we are approaching a force level of about 13 attack carriers. That is the total number of capable carriers we can put to sea. Ten years ago we could have run our number of carriers up to almost 20, because we had a large number in the Reserve fleet that could have been brought out. We had aircraft stored in the desert which could have been added to the active forces. That is not possible now. So in the case of the Navy, which you very properly described as being capital-intensive, or equipment-oriented, our manpower manning level is really based upon items of hardware and equipment.

Senator TAFT. You also, in your considerations with the other services, may be balancing your equipment against your personnel. Other services may be more personnel-oriented and more flexible in that regard.

General CUSHMAN. Could I say a word, Senator Taft?

Actually, these figures are reached in the joint arena, in the Joint Chiefs, by first assessing the threat. Then the Chiefs get together and decide upon what the force levels ought to be in terms of divisions and ships. There may be some disagreement, but it is ironed out. It is somewhat fiscally constrained because we notice that it is not a world where you can get everything you want. But nevertheless, it is usually a little bigger than the actual budgetary process permits, but it is within a very reasonable limit. In this way it is determined that with reasonable risk a certain number of Army divisions and Marine divisions and ships and tactical fighter wings, for example, represents a defense posture which can defend the United States. These forces can then be translated into numbers of people in an orderly fashion. There are many adjustments of one sort or another, of course, if you go into the budgetary process, where you actually ask for the money. But that is the basis for it all, the planning action within the Joint Chiefs.

Senator TAFT. Are both of you gentlemen satisfied with the relative strength that you have related to the other forces?

General CUSHMAN. I cannot speak for anyone but myself, but I am happy.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. On a relative basis, Senator Taft, I have no complaint.

Senator TAFT. Mr. Secretary, I should include the Department of Defense, because the civilian control eventually makes the decisions.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. I think the caveat would be that if the Congress, as the chairman just pointed out, is critical, it should recognize that we have cut from 900 ships to 500 ships on the theory

that we are going to build back now to 600 ships, and that if the Navy is not permitted to do this, I think it would put the country in jeopardy.

Senator NUNN. If you would yield on that point. Do you have any kind of chart showing the correlation between the additional ships you are going to put in the fleet? Are you saying we are going to go up in personnel for the next 5 years?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. I do not think we will have to substantially increase our personnel to man 600 ships. As I said, the new ships are much easier to maintain, and we will be able to effect manning economies.

Senator NUNN. Do you think the size of the personnel force we have is going to be able to take care of the additional burden as you have other ships?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. Within reasonable limits.

Admiral.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. We will be seeing an increase in personnel. But it will be a reasonable and modest one. We can furnish for the record the figures which will correlate ship strength to personnel strength in the future.

[The information follows:]

NET CHANGES TO END STRENGTH DUE TO SHIP LEVEL CHANGES (EXCLUSIVE OF SUPPORT MANPOWER)

Number ships	Fiscal year—				
	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Ship adds:					
Deleted].....	4,388	4,388	4,388	4,388	4,388
Deleted].....		10,193	10,193	10,193	10,193
Deleted].....			8,355	8,355	8,355
Deleted].....				2,923	2,923
Deleted].....					10,443
Total.....	4,388	14,581	22,936	25,859	36,302
Ship drops:					
Deleted].....	-6,661	-6,661	-6,661	-6,661	-6,661
Deleted].....		-7,214	-7,214	-7,214	-7,214
Deleted].....			-4,616	-4,616	-4,616
Deleted].....				-7,356	-7,356
Deleted].....					-5,697
Total.....	-6,661	-13,875	-18,491	-25,847	-31,544
Net change:					
Deleted].....	-2,273	-2,273	-2,273	-2,273	-2,273
Deleted].....		+2,979	+2,979	+2,979	+2,979
Deleted].....			+3,739	+3,739	+3,739
Deleted].....				-4,433	-4,433
Deleted].....					+4,746
Total.....	-2,273	+706	+4,445	+12	+4,758

*Includes 1 DLG returning from conversion.

Note.—In addition to the above, in fiscal year 1976 [deleted] patrol escorts and [deleted] amphibious ships are transferring from the active fleet to the Naval Reserve Force (-736). [Deleted]. There are no figures available for the past which correlate ship level changes with manning levels.

Senator NUNN. I would like to have that for whatever periods you have it broken down. If you have got 3 years, that is fine, or if you have got 5 years, we would like to have that. I would like to see your projections on that, and also your past, if you could relate that to the past.

Senator TAFT. I think that completes my questioning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Senator Taft, I have a good many questions. As long as you are here, any time you want to interrupt I would be glad to yield to you.

Senator TAFT. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. On the point that Senator Taft was asking you about a minute ago on force structure, it is my understanding, Admiral, that the projections this year were for a 15-carrier fleet. I heard you just mention 13 carriers. Is that a kind of change?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. It is a projection into the future, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Which is, the 15 carrier?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. The 13.

Senator NUNN. Is a 15-carrier now what we have budgeted?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. At our current force level.

Senator NUNN. And the reduction shows that we will be reducing to 13 carriers?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Our strength reduction shows us dropping down to about 13.

Senator NUNN. And what year would that be?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I would rather answer that in closed session if I may.

Senator NUNN. Fine. We will get into that later.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, why do you need 15 carriers?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Carriers operating in mutual support with surface combatants are the primary means of controlling the seas. Carrier force levels are based upon worldwide wartime requirements. Planned carrier force levels, [deleted] and 12 thereafter, are not adequate to meet expected wartime requirements, the primary factor in sizing forces. Furthermore present carrier forces are only marginally capable of meeting world-wide peacetime deployment commitments [deleted] and will be inadequate thereafter. The current pattern of peacetime deployments is best described as fixed, wherein naval forces maintain a continuous and visible presence in areas of high U.S. national interest such as the Mediterranean Sea and the Western Pacific/Indian Ocean. At least five carriers have been continuously deployed since 1950 in support of U.S. foreign policy. The National Command Authority through the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires the U.S. Navy to provide two carriers in the Mediterranean to fulfill the U.S. commitment to NATO and counter the permanent Soviet naval presence in that area, and three carriers in the Pacific theater to fulfill U.S. commitments in the Far East, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

As recently as May 1974 the Navy proposed maintaining carrier force levels at 14 in order to counter the continuing reduction in overseas bases and to more prudently balance Navy wartime requirements and peacetime commitments for carrier forces.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, please discuss your force structure plans for fiscal year 1976 in terms of ships, divisions and wings. What is the rationale for these numbers?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. The numbers of ships by type planned for fiscal year 1976 are summarized in the attached table. The Active Naval Fleet will consist of [deleted] ships including [deleted] carriers, [deleted] surface combatant types, [deleted] submarines, [deleted] amphibious warfare ships, [deleted] mine warfare ships, [deleted] surface patrol ships, [deleted] underway replenishment ships and [deleted] auxiliary ships. In addition to the active fleet, we will have a Naval Reserve Force of [deleted] ships and [deleted] ships in the Military Sealift Command for an overall total of [deleted] ships.

Our ship force levels are based upon worldwide wartime requirements. The planned fleet of [deleted] active ships falls short of what we believe is needed to provide an adequate margin of success in a worldwide war with the Soviet Union. The force is in fact barely adequate to maintain our present worldwide peacetime deployment commitments.

Force structure plans for fiscal year 1976 ships by category fiscal year 1976

A. Active fleet:	
Attack carriers.....	[deleted]
Cruisers.....	[deleted]
Destroyers.....	[deleted]
Escort ships.....	[deleted]
Submarines—ballistic missile.....	[deleted]
Submarines.....	[deleted]
Amphibious warfare ships.....	[deleted]
Mine warfare ships.....	[deleted]
Patrol ships.....	[deleted]
Underway replenishment group.....	[deleted]
Auxiliary ships.....	[deleted]
Total active ships.....	[deleted]
B. Naval Reserve Forces:	
Destroyers.....	[deleted]
Amphibious warfare ships.....	[deleted]
Mine warfare ships.....	[deleted]
Patrol ships.....	[deleted]
Total NRF.....	[deleted]
Total active plus NRF.....	[deleted]
Military Sealift Command:	
Total charter, nucleus, project, reserve.....	[deleted]
Overall ship total.....	[deleted]

Force structure plans for fiscal year 1976 project a reduction from 15 [deleted] carriers and a reduction from 14 carrier wings [deleted] carrier wings with the retirement of the last of the older and smaller modified Essex class carriers, Hancock and Oriskany. The Secretary of Defense recently approved force level plans calling for 12 carriers and 12 carrier wings from fiscal year 1977 forward. It is noteworthy that during this period we are converting present attack carriers to the multipurpose CV configuration to provide a more flexible response capability to the multithreat environment.

Major Navy squadrons by type planned for fiscal year 1976 are summarized in the attached table. The number of fighter and attack aircraft assigned to an aircraft carrier is a judgmental factor which depends upon such factors as the anticipated role of the carrier in a conflict scenario, the war's length and the aircraft attrition rate. The number of ASW aircraft assigned is determined also by a quest for balance between the threat and the available sea based and land based ASW air assets. While the selected balanced force of [deleted] squadrons per CV gives flexibility, it does not provide for peak demand or sustained tactical air wave in either sea control or projection scenarios.

Force structure plans for fiscal year 1976 major Navy squadrons in fiscal year 1976

A. Active fleet:

VF.....	[deleted]
VA.....	[deleted]
VS.....	[deleted]
HS.....	[deleted]
Recce.....	[deleted]
VP.....	[deleted]
AEW.....	[deleted]
Total active squadrons.....	[deleted]

B. Reserve Forces:

VF.....	[deleted]
VA.....	[deleted]
VP.....	[deleted]
Total reserve squadrons.....	[deleted]
Total squadrons.....	[deleted]

Senator NUNN. I will ask this of the Secretary, and if you would like to get the Admiral and General to give you some assistance on this question, you may.

The Reserve readiness posture, first of all the Navy and then the Marine Corps, how do you rate the readiness of your Reserve forces?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have Admiral Holloway and General Cushman answer that.

Senator NUNN. Fine.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, I would characterize an appraisal of the readiness of our Reserve forces as being very uneven. There are some units that are very ready, and others where we think we can make a substantial improvement in their readiness. The policy which we are developing now would have a greater participation by the active forces in improving Reserve readiness.

Looking at it as a total force, the U.S. Navy is made up of active forces and Reserve forces, and we must look at these forces in a complementary fashion, and have very specific tasks assigned to the Reserves, and make sure they are as ready as need be to perform those tasks and functions.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, on this point, would you supply for the record whatever you can in terms of the statistical—your latest analysis of the readiness of the various Reserve divisions?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir.
[The information follows:]

READINESS SUMMARY OF NAVAL RESERVE SHIPS AND AIR SQUADRONS

[11 Aug. 1974 Forstat Report—C-ratings]

Ships	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4	Total
Destroyers (DD's).....	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	37
Minesweepers (MSO/MSO).....					26
Total.....	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	63
Air Reserve squadrons:					
Helicopter carrier ASW (HS).....	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	4
Attack (carrier) (VA).....					6
Tac electronic warfare (VAQ).....					2
Airborne early warning (VAW).....					4
Fighter (VF).....					4
Lt photo recon (VFP).....					2
Patrol ASW (VP).....					12
Transport (VR).....					4
Carrier ASW (VS).....					6
Composite (VC).....					2
Total.....	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	[Deleted.]	46

*Transitioning to more modern aircraft.

**4 squadrons transitioning to P-3 aircraft.

Note.—C-1—fully ready; C-2—substantially ready; C-3—marginally ready; C-4—not ready.

Senator NUNN. General.

General CUSHMAN. The Marine Corps Reserve is ready in this respect: that while we are short personnel in the organized 4th Division/Wing team, we have in the individual Ready Reserve, and loaded on computers in Kansas City, the people who would fill the vacancies. So that we would have in terms of personnel a full pack. However, they would require training, and as we have always said, the entire division/wing team would not be ready for 60 days after mobilization.

The reserve wing has additional problems in that it does not have certain aviation equipment and airplanes. Some of the items we cannot afford, and we will probably never get them, namely, all-weather close air support from the A-6, electronic countermeasures from the EA-6. And photographic reconnaissance from the RF-4, they simply would not get those.

Consequently, they cannot provide the equivalent of a full active force Marine aircraft wing because of this shortage of equipment.

However, the organized Marine Corps Reserve can fulfill the mission of providing either trained individuals, squadrons and battalions to augment the active forces, or they can be mobilized as a full division and a wing of perhaps two-thirds the effectiveness of a wing in the active force.

You would not, therefore, want to commit them independently in an amphibious assault against strong opposition. But they would be an effective reserve to support and sustain the active forces.

Senator NUNN. Is there any possibility that you could move that time, with a lot of effort, from 60 days readiness to closer than 30 days? And if so, what would it take to do that?

General CUSHMAN. I do not think it is possible to deploy the entire reserve division and wing in the 30 days, because of the re-

quirement to transport the units and their equipment to their station of initial assignment and conduct the necessary individual and unit training. Now, the individual units are already quite well trained, as well trained as Reserves can be, at the level of company, battalion, and squadron, and as such they might be ready for deployment earlier. But they have not had extensive training operating together as a division and aircraft wing. So there is no apparent way to shorten the division/wing time, because the most they ever get is the 2 weeks training in the summer, and it is only possible to train together at the most on a regimental and aircraft group level.

Senator NUNN. The Army is experimenting with what they call the affiliated unit concept, a smaller decrease, putting in a battalion with this regular force and that kind of thing. Are you doing that at all?

General CUSHMAN. Not the way the Army is, I will supply the answer to that for the record here.

[The information follows:]

While the affiliated unit concept is a possible means for improving the quality of the Army's mobilization base and rapidly expanding their active forces in response to a NATO contingency, it would not be appropriate for the Marine Corps whose unique requirement is for immediately ready combat forces capable of rapidly responding to a wide range of possible contingencies. The Army concept affiliates combat units of the National Guard, not assigned to a Guard division, and service units of the Army Reserve in order to bring the active divisions up to full strength or to reinforce active divisions committed to NATO.

The Marine Corps requires three active, fully structured division-wing teams to respond to the world-wide minor contingency and initial major contingency requirements of the Unified Commands. As a consequence, if a portion of the active structure were maintained in the Reserve, the Marine Corps does not have a sufficiently broad manpower base from which to either support the rotation of forward deployed forces or quickly reconstitute the structure required to respond to those contingencies where mobilization is not authorized. Moreover, the Marine Corps, unlike the Army, has no Reserve units which are not an integral part of the Reserve division-wing team. In time of national emergency a requirement exists for the mobilization of the Reserve division and aircraft wing as a strategic reserve and sustaining base.

The Marine Corps places primary emphasis on developing its Reserve forces as the initial and primary source for the rapid expansion of the Marine Corps. In this regard, it is considered that the 4th Division-Wing team organization offers the best possible structure to maintain a viable, credible force responsive to the full spectrum of mobilization requirements. In peacetime it fosters team spirit and a sense of unit esprit in the individual reservist. On mobilization it provides the Marine Corps with perhaps the most flexible and versatile structure attainable to satisfy the varying requirements which might arise to augment the active forces; whether it be to activate certain individuals and skills; partially mobilize selected units; or provide the base for a fourth active division and wing. With this structure as the basis, the Marine Corps has developed an augmentation concept to provide the added combat and support capabilities required by the strategy but not programmed within the active forces. This concept is geared to specific types of contingency-mobilization situations. It provides for augmentation by qualified individuals, effective combat and support units, or a fourth division and aircraft wing with appropriate support depending upon the specific nature of the emergency. Where there are temporary shortfalls in the active forces, these organizations will be augmented by selected units of the Reserve. Since the active force shortfalls change from year to year, the requirement for selected Reserve unit augmentation varies proportionately. The concept also provides for employing members of the Individual Ready Reserve, of which we have a sizeable pool, to reconstitute those elements of the Reserve division or wing used to augment training and base facilities required to support the committed forces.

Senator NUNN. I would like for the record your reasoning on that, and whatever material you can supply as to why that would not work for the Marine Corps, in your opinion. It just seems to me, General, that the Reserves in any kind of conventional war need to be ready to go in a short period of time so we can justify their expense, unless you envision another World War II kind of scenario, which I cannot find any justification for. I know we have to be ready for a long-term war if one comes, but I know that considering our economic power here and looking at our history on long-term mobilization, it would be indeed foolish to challenge us on that kind of long-term basis. And yet, I find so much of our Reserve policy, our regular policy, our deployment, and our NATO theory and everything else based on what I call a World War II concept. I am not speaking of the Marine Corps, but I am speaking strictly in terms of that Reserves concept. I just cannot find any of our allies, the people right on the scene, that think we are going to have a war that will last longer than 60 days. Their logistics, their supply, their posture, and everything about our allies forces lead us to believe that at least they are counting on a long-term war. And if we get into a long-term war I think it is going to be America alone, unless we are prepared to furnish logistics to all of our allies over there. I note that most of our Reserve forces are aimed for Europe, so we have some square pegs in round holes, it seems to me, in our philosophy. It just does not fit together.

General CUSHMAN. I know the Secretary, of course, is trying to tell our allies that we do have to have a substantial conventional war capability.

Senator NUNN. They are trying to tell us, now, that they want a shorter term capability, that it would hit the initial thrust. I am not sure that the allies are not as close—I think they are probably wrong in not being more capable logistically, but I also think we are wrong in thinking terms of a war that is going to last several months when every experience in modern age has been a quick thrust, and I think that is the answer that is most likely. So I am not sure that the allies are completely wrong and we are completely right in this situation.

General CUSHMAN. We are looking at an alternative that we may not wish to provide.

Senator NUNN. For the record, if you could, explain how the Marine Reserve would fit into a modern-day scenario, and what kind of scenario that will be.

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. I will supply that for the record here.
[The information follows:]

There are several probable modern-day scenarios to which our Reserves must be prepared to respond. These run the gamut from a NATO war, through a confrontation with the Soviets outside of NATO, to a military action anywhere in the world where our national interests are threatened. Recognizing that each of these scenarios might require different forms and levels of military action, the first priority would still be to bring our active units with shortfalls up to full wartime strength. Since we maintain those units planned for initial commitment in a fully ready status, Reserve augmentation would only be necessary for a follow-on division-wing team. The level of this augmentation would be battalion, squadron, and separate company or battery. We are considering a

deployment readiness objective of M+30 days for all Reserve units of this size, although many of these units may be ready earlier. In any event, our recently conducted mobilization analyses have shown that all Reserve units will be ready at the time the active units they are augmenting are required to deploy. The same scenario under which active force augmentation might be required may also necessitate the generation of a fourth division and wing with supporting units; for example, as a strategic reserve or sustaining base in a NATO war, or commitment to combat in response to other contingency plans included in the scenarios. For these reasons, the structure of the Reserve division and wing will be maintained with as many organized units and staffs retained as possible to facilitate timely availability. The deployment readiness objective for our Reserve division-wing team is M+60 days.

Senator NUNN. And that would be quicker than 60 days?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir. Our requirement is to move the entire division-wing team ready in about 60 days, and I think we can meet that requirement. As you say, if the requirement was to be changed, we will have to take another look at how we are going to go about it.

Senator NUNN. I can easily see why it would take that long, and I do not have any answer for it. I am just posing the dilemma as I see it. I am not being critical of that. I just believe that we do have some overall philosophy that needs to be more consistently applied throughout the Reserve concept.

General CUSHMAN. You could use them to beef up the regular units very quickly.

Senator NUNN. That is what I envision, the affiliated concept. So if you could expand on that for the record I would like to have it. We will have later hearings on the point and go into considerable depth for the Reserves, but I would like to get that.

Admiral Holloway, what about the Naval Reserve, what would you use them for?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I think we would use the Naval Reserve in several ways. We would use individuals to first relieve regulars who are in the shore establishment. For example, a Reserve pilot would go to the training command and fill the training pilot's seat of a regular officer, who could then go out to the fleet and expand the pilot-to-seat ratio in a combat squadron.

A little further along in the mobilization period, we would put individual Reserves with special skills into the fleet itself.

We have a number of ships that are manned by crews which are partly Reserve and partly Regular, and upon mobilization the Reserve segments would report to those destroyers, and it would then be fully manned and ready for operation.

I have to point out that those Reserve destroyers would initially not be as capable as the Regular fleet destroyers which would have had the advantage of high tempo fleet operations, but they could certainly take over some of the less-demanding chores initially, perhaps further away from the scene of combat, and permit regular forces to proceed to the scene of action.

In the same way, we have organized squadrons which could be used en bloc for replacing regular aircraft squadrons that perhaps need to be brought back for reconstitution as the result of casualties.

So we have a program of the commitment of individual Reserves and also a program where organized units would contribute to the overall naval posture.

Senator NUNN. Are you satisfied that the Reserves could respond as quickly as you would need them to at this point?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, I am unable to answer that question, because I am asking it of my staff at the present time. And we are working very hard. And I am not at all satisfied with the answers I am getting.

Senator NUNN. I am glad you are asking that question. When you do get some answers, if you would supply them to us we would like to have them.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Thank you, sir.

General CUSHMAN. Mr. Chairman, I might interject there that the relation of M-day to D-day has an awful lot to do with it. If M-day equals D-day you may not have time to mobilize.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. To support what you said about a short war, Mr. Chairman, we in the Navy note that the Soviets have been developing what appears to us to be a very clear first-strike capability against our ships. And I am talking in a strategy sense now. They have put all their antiship weapons up on the deck with virtually no reload capability, which tells us that they are not configured for a long war. If they should go into action, they plan for a preemptive strike, since they just do not have the logistics to support a longer session at sea. Now, we have not been able to interpret just what their motivation might be on this. But it does seem to support what you are saying.

Senator NUNN. From everything I have read about it—and I am a long way from being an expert on the subject—it just seems to me that we are posturing in one direction and they are posturing in completely the opposite direction. Of course, being able to have a long war capability is a great advantage if there is going to be a long war fought. But if you lose the short war while you are ready for the long war there would not be a long war, particularly in the NATO kind of environment. I do not mean by that a total loss, I mean a grab for territory, say, an anticarrier strike by them, with a change in the world balance of power before we get into the use of nuclear weapons, which I think everybody would be reluctant to use at the outset. So it just seems to me that we need to do some rethinking in that regard. I know that the Secretary of Defense is doing some re-thinking, and I know you gentlemen are going to be called upon too. I do not know what the answers are, but I am just trying to play the Devil's advocate here a little bit to stimulate your thinking on it.

The Soviet anticarrier kind of first strike is certainly something that we all feel they are building up that capability for. Is that part of what you are talking about?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. They now have 1,400 antiship missile launchers. We will not introduce the first effective antiship missile into the Navy until next year with the Harpoon missile program. We do, however, have very effective attack aircraft that operate from carrier decks. A number of years ago when we abandoned the Regulus program and replaced it with Polaris, we made a decision to discontinue surface to surface missile development and to place dependence for the antiship capability on attack aircraft and our

submarines. We are correcting that as rapidly as we can. We think by 1980 we will be fully antiship missile capable.

Senator NUNN. General, the three Marine divisions and three wings, getting into the active forces, how do you rate those for readiness now?

General CUSHMAN. Well, the Marines in the western Pacific and on the east coast are ready to go. They are in top readiness condition. On the west coast, since they would probably be used to reenforce either the Atlantic or the Pacific, we have chosen to take the short-falls in recruiting that I mentioned earlier. So they are not as ready as far as their personnel strength goes.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, and Admiral, or whoever would like to answer this, I want to go into the Greek homeporting program a little bit. What has the Cyprus conflict done to the negotiations? If we get into classified material I would be glad to defer and ask later.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. Admiral.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I would like to reply to that, Mr. Chairman, in closed session.

[The information follows:]

Athens homeporting was planned in two phases. Phase I was completed in August 1972. It involved six ships, some 174 additional military personnel and 1,372 civilian U.S. citizens located in Athens. [Deleted.]

Senator NUNN. I refer to the Diego Garcia matter which is now under consideration. If we do go ahead with that military construction program in Diego Garcia, how many naval personnel do you anticipate will be stationed there, and how will this affect the overall personnel?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. There will be about 600 to 700 folks out there. It will be primarily a tank farm with a 700,000 barrel capacity. And we will dredge that harbor and put in a fueling pier there and extend the airfield runway about 4,000 feet. So it is really just an extension of what we have out there now.

As you know, that atoll is about 40 miles around. It is like a horse shoe, about 5 miles across, and the only place which we could find, I think in that whole area that would be nonprovocative. It is about 1,800 miles southeast of Saudi Arabia and 1,000 miles south of India. It cuts down the line of communications from the Philippines to supply, say, a task force that might be put into the Indian Ocean by about 3,500 miles. We have had a carrier task force in the Indian Ocean during a portion of 2 out of the last 3 years. And the Soviets are developing a capability in that area at a very rapid rate, particularly in the last 3 to 4 years, at places such as Berbera, Aden, and Umm Qasr.

Senator NUNN. What is the status of the Navy homeporting program at Bahrain, and how many ships do we have there, and if they are located, how many people are going to be involved? What is the personnel effect on this?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. To answer the first question, the status is that we are optimistic that we will have a new agreement with the Bahrainis. We have one ship, the *LaSalle*, homeported there permanently. Also, two destroyers are deployed there on a rotating

basis. And we believe we have very good relations with the Bahrainis. DoD has a school facility there that they use as well as we. There are 386 military and 262 dependent personnel involved in the *LaSalle* homeporting program.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, have you had any recent discipline problems on naval ships, and if so, what were the reasons?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do have discipline problems aboard naval ships. I think we always have had, and we always will have, because that is the nature of mankind. We have seen some different kinds of disciplinary problems, perhaps, recently. And I attribute them largely to the carryover into the Navy from the environment in this country. There is a tendency for young people to question authority. And we in the services get the product of the ethics of the American people at any time. I do not see in the Navy special disciplinary problems at this juncture. As I say, we always have had it, and I expect we always will have it. It has taken a somewhat different form. I feel we have it fully under control. I have talked to the fleet commanders about it as recently as 10 days ago, and they are very alert to my concern and the Congress's concern that we maintain proper discipline in our armed forces.

Senator NUNN. Could you give us briefly, you and General Cushman, your assessment of the all-volunteer force in terms of how it affects the readiness and the morale of our troops, and their effectiveness as a fighting force?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I think in the Navy, we are perhaps too early into the all-volunteer force to feel the full effect. In my view, we are getting good people, but we are falling short in the top quality that were attracted into the Navy prior to the all-volunteer force environment. For example, we are unable to fill all of the school space available for the young men who are just getting out of recruit camp because we are unable to recruit up to the level of school eligibles that we would like to have. On the other hand, I am convinced that in several years we will see a dramatic improvement in our retention rate, because we will have essentially brought into the Navy as recruits people who are more interested in the service as a career, and, therefore, will be more interested in staying on. There is no question, but that many of them will have been disaffected by the life, and disenchanted by things that have happened. But my own estimate is that we will see an improvement in retention.

I do think that should there be a requirement to quickly and substantially enlarge the Navy, we would have difficulty meeting new enlarged goals in the all-volunteer force environment. On the other hand, as I have said before, the Navy is very capital intensive. Our manpower is related to hardware, as fast as we could get it. It takes, as you know 5 from four to seven years between the time a ship is authorized and it is delivered to the fleet.

Senator NUNN. General Cushman.

General CUSHMAN. As to the all-volunteer force, as I mentioned earlier, we have always sought volunteers. What it is doing to the Marine Corps is making us recruit much more diligently and vigorously than we have ever done before. It has introduced higher costs

for personnel into the budget, running up to 75 or 80 percent for the Marine Corps, which means that every time I get cut a few dollars, I get cut a rifleman. There is just nothing else I can really cut. So, these are my concerns. The quality of young men and women is good. We have to work very hard to get that quality, but we are getting it. Being a rifleman is a young man's game. So consequently, we have quite a turnover. I am going to have to recruit every year long into the future, about 45,000 to 47,000 men. Even though we may do well with 4-year enlistments, that is what it will turn out to be.

We figure that if we shoot for reenlistment of between 20 and 25 percent, that will be about the absolute maximum we could take without clogging up our career force, which is about 45,000 people. So within these constraints we are doing all right, but we have to hustle to do it. I am concerned about the high cost of personnel, as I think we all are.

Senator NUNN. You are saying that the cost factor in the budgetary constraints are making you lose—what?

General CUSHMAN. Flexibility in my budget. Whenever I am cut and I cannot negotiate, I just have to cut a rifleman. I am down to the bitter end of the O&M funds and this sort of thing, and the personnel is 75 to 80 percent of the budget, so that is where you have to cut.

So this can give you some turbulence. That is my biggest problem, I think, with the volunteer force—the personnel cost.

Senator NUNN. What about the Marine Corps effectiveness as a potential fighting force as compared to previous times?

General CUSHMAN. It think it is as good as ever.

Senator NUNN. It is just more of a struggle down to this point?

General CUSHMAN. Yes, sir, to get the recruits. They used to walk in and sign up, and now you have to go out and really get them.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. Recruit them.

General CUSHMAN. We offer them a challenge and an opportunity. This requires considerable salesmanship.

Senator NUNN. This subcommittee is going to be following that very closely. Any time you have anything that is a fundamental departure from the traditions of this country as well as the military force, I think it is very important that we lay the cards on the table. If we start having some severe problems, I think it is essential that we vent them before hand. As I said yesterday, one of the things that disturbs me psychologically the most is the realization that this volunteer force grew out of the pressures of the draft in Vietnam, which did work very inequitably, and it affected young people the most. Young people, I think, basically are supposed to be the beneficiaries of this new law, so that they do not have to go if they do not want to. Yet, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, and everyone else agrees, some more reluctantly than others, that this is only a peacetime force. If we get into any kind of war and have to build our troops back, we are going to have to go back to the draft. It was not the peacetime pressures that caused us to go to the volunteer force, it was the war-time pressures. So I am afraid we are going to have a lot of disil-

lusioned young people if we ever do get into a conflict and they do have to go back to the draft when they have been told over and over again what a wonderful thing a volunteer force is. Therefore, it does not make an intellectually complete circle as far as I am concerned.

However, I would appreciate you keeping us up to date on any kind of development in this regard.

Mr. Secretary, a final question. What is the manpower impact of the nuclear Navy policy that recently became law as part of the Defense Authorization bill?

I am asking mainly, can the Navy get people of the high skill required for this new concept? If you would like for Admiral Holloway to take a crack at it, that would be fine.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. I would like to have Admiral Holloway answer it.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, this is the title 8 section of the bill that you referred to. We have looked at it very carefully. Our studies conducted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel indicate that we can man the fleet in the future with the number of nuclear-powered ships that would be brought in under the title 8 provisions without severe detriment to the other requirements of the Navy. This has been studied either twice or three times in the past 5 years, and although we have apprehensions that a large influx of nuclear-powered ships could give us severe problems, our analytical studies have not supported these apprehensions, and the Navy goals that this title 8 legislation would provide is attainable in a personnel sense.

Senator NUNN. A question arises, because of your previous testimony on the difficulty of recruiting the kind of technicians and technical skills needed for these ships, and now we are going into an expansion. Is that not going to greatly intensify this technician problem?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Yes, sir, it is. That is our apprehension. Nevertheless, most of the people we recruit for the nuclear program are recruited directly for the program. We make the commitment to the young man that he is a 6-year obligor. We have been fairly successful in these programs to date.

If I may, I would like to provide you for the record a more detailed rationale of our thinking along these lines.

Senator NUNN. Fine.

[The information follows:]

REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATORS

The planned increase in the size of the nuclear-powered fleet over the next 15 years, combined with a draft-free recruiting environment, has raised questions concerning the Navy's ability to meet the manpower requirements of its nuclear-powered ships. Analysis strongly suggests that meeting these requirements will represent neither a significant problem to the Navy Recruiting Command nor a significant drain on the manpower pool available to the conventionally powered fleet.

The requirements for nuclear-trained personnel are principally derived from the nuclear propulsion plant operator manning requirements for nuclear-

powered ships. In addition, adequate numbers of personnel are required to staff the training establishment and provide a base for sea-shore rotation.

The Recruiting Command will need to enlist between 6,000 and 6,500 recruits in the nuclear power program per year through 1980 to meet current planned expansion requirements. (Under Title 8 Provisions the requirement would increase by only about 1,500 per year by the late 1980's.) This will not likely present much of a problem. In FY 73, the Navy enlisted 5,212 men in the nuclear power program. The increases over this number that will be necessary in the future will not involve attracting more high quality people to the Navy. That is already being done in sufficient numbers. All that will be necessary is convincing more of these high quality enlistees to opt for the nuclear power program and its 6 year enlistment.

Ninety-four percent of nuclear qualified personnel are drawn from Mental Groups I and II, and virtually all are high school graduates. This of course reflects the very stringent entrance requirements for the nuclear power program. Nearly 33 percent of FY 73 accessions were Mental Group I and II high school graduates, and if Mental Group III U high school graduates are included, over half of the FY 73 enlistees were eligible for the nuclear power program.

In terms of raw numbers, the Recruiting Command enlisted over 29,000 Mental Group I and II high school graduates in FY 73, of whom 25,000 were true volunteers. Including Mental Group III U high school graduates, the Recruiting Command enlisted over 45,000 men during FY 73 with minimal qualifications for the nuclear power program. Of this number, at least 40,000 were true volunteers. Recruiters must induce between 15 and 25 percent of the qualified enlistees to join the nuclear power program.

More than half of the enlistees who begin nuclear power training do not complete it. Those who do not complete are generally not lost to the Navy. They are usually dropped from the program for sub-standard performance in "A" school of nuclear power training. These reasons normally are not sufficient to warrant discharge from the Navy. Thus, the nuclear power program will absorb only an average of 2,400 of the highest quality individuals every year rather than 6,300. This represents 9.6 percent of the likely yearly accession total for Mental Group I and II high school graduates, a drain that is unlikely to generate any significant hardship for manning the conventionally powered fleet.

Current annual loss rates for nuclear trained personnel range between 18 and 20 percent depending on the rating. In November 1972 the Navy began paying nuclear petty officer continuation pay. The effect of this special pay had already been felt in terms of increased reenlistment rates for men at the 7, 8, and 9 year reenlistment point (the group at which the continuation pay was aimed). If further decreases in loss rates do occur, this will reduce the training requirements.

The principal factor affecting retention that is beyond Navy control is the existence of attractive civilian job opportunities for nuclear power training graduates. The most direct competition will come from the civilian power industry. A large increase in the number of civilian nuclear power plants over the next 10 years will generate increased demand for nuclear technicians amounting to around 10,000 new positions. The Navy will train only about 25,000 technicians during this period if current retention experience continues.

Currently the Navy is the only organization providing formal training for nuclear power technicians which includes experience on a real reactor. In addition, Navy personnel have at least four years on-the-job experience before they can enter the civilian sector. Thus, Navy-trained technicians are a very attractive source of personnel for the civilian power industry.

Although improved civilian opportunities may decrease retention of nuclear trained petty officers, they will have an opposite effect on accessions to the nuclear power program. If Navy training has a high value to the civilian power industry (as it does today), this will increase the attractiveness of the nuclear power program to the potential enlistee. At least some of those entering the program with an eye toward using their training in the civilian sector probably will also become Navy careerists.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis has the following implications:

1. In the absence of any significant increase in the planned rate at which nuclear-powered ships will be added to the fleet, the Navy will be able to attract recruits of sufficient quantity and quality to its nuclear power program.
2. The nuclear power program itself is not likely to represent a significant drain on the pool of high quality personnel available to the remainder of the Navy.
3. Reenlistment rates for nuclear qualified petty officers have increased markedly over the last 12 months. Further increases, at least in the near future, may occur which would further strengthen the preceding two conclusions.

The above analysis was performed in September 1973 before consideration of the Title 8 Provisions. However, recent analysis has confirmed that the Title 8 Provisions would not significantly increase the annual accession requirements for the nuclear power program nor would it affect the ability of Navy to meet personnel requirements. In this regard, the additional nuclear trained personnel manning requirements aboard ships authorized under Title 8 Provisions would result in only a 3% increase over planned requirements (76/2310) in 1977, building up to a 26% increase (750/2835) over projected requirements in 1990.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, I have a question here that one of my colleagues has supplied, and I will ask it for him.

We both recognize that many personnel problems are brought on by instability of the force structure and the length of service. This problem area could be reduced in part if the Congress granted a 2-year end strength authorization. However, other problems might arise. From your vantage point as Secretary, what do you see as the process and conditions of such a proposal?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. It would be a tremendous help in planning, of course. It gives a great deal more flexibility. The consequence would be, of course, that the Congress would lose control over at least that fiscal constraint.

Admiral, do you have a comment on it?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I agree with you.

Secretary MIDDENDORF. Incidentally, let me just amplify a point that Admiral Holloway made very well.

We have, I think, approximately 109 nuclear ships now in the Navy, mostly submarines. With this new legislation I do not see it impacting on more than, say, a dozen or two dozen ships over the next several years. I think, as I mentioned, we are already short 10,000 E-5 and above ratings, important ratings, on our ships. It is going to be a continuing problem, but one we can live with, and I agree with Admiral Holloway on that. I think that a large part of that question would be, when we do decide to build a ship we have to recognize the premium inherent in the cost of a nuclear powered ship. It can easily be a substantial premium.

So looking at it from a capital-intensive side, we have to measure our assets or lack of them. Although it is an admirable goal to be all-nuclear, we do have to recognize the trade-offs, and we may well end up losing something if we push all the way in, if we do not weigh all the advantages pro and con.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I have some other questions, but we all have a time problem. I wanted to get out by 12 today, and I know you have other things, so we will supply these four or five other questions to you and ask you to provide them for the record.

Senator NUNN. There have been, in recent months, a number of press reports concerning discipline problems, both aboard ships and at Marine Corps bases. Could you give the subcommittee some background and facts on this matter?

Secretary MIDDENDORF. There are a number of ways in which disciplinary trends may be measured. Perhaps the most objective method is to examine the numbers of disciplinary actions instituted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, whether by court-martial or by nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ (10 U.S.C. §815). In this connection, available data reveals the following:

	Fiscal year—			
	1971	1972	1973	1974
Navy:				
General courts-martial.....	341	203	191	187
Special courts-martial.....	7,082	3,784	3,970	15,257
Summary courts-martial.....	6,181	4,890	4,658	13,809
Nonjudicial punishment.....	65,291	60,049	79,783	108,063
Marine Corps:				
General courts-martial.....	587	670	597	422
Special courts-martial.....	6,655	6,012	6,268	17,595
Summary courts-martial.....	7,916	6,418	6,664	14,960
Nonjudicial punishment.....	56,230	50,728	60,101	170,081

¹ Interim figures.

As these figures indicate, there has been a marked decrease in the number of general courts-martial, the level of disciplinary proceeding to which the most serious offenses are referred. There has also been a decrease in the number of summary courts-martial. The latter may account, at least in part, for the increase in special courts-martial and nonjudicial punishments. Summary courts have fallen into some disfavor in the last two years, as a result of court decisions casting doubt on the constitutionality of the summary court procedures established by Congress in the UCMJ. It is believed that, because of the uncertainty surrounding this procedure, some commanding officers either are referring to special courts cases which previously would have been tried by summary courts or are disposing of such cases by nonjudicial punishment.

Another statistical indicator, reflecting the trend of serious disciplinary violations, is the number of punitive discharges (both dishonorable discharges and bad-conduct discharges) awarded by courts-martial. The following data illustrates this point:

[The information follows:]

Fiscal year:	Navy		Marine Corps	
	DD	BCD	DD	BCD
1971.....	18	1,626	99	1,702
1972.....	25	585	126	1,962
1973.....	32	462	174	2,004
1974.....	18	490	104	1,976

The foregoing figures indicate that the incidence of serious crime is declining in the Navy. The press reports to which Senator Nunn refers reflect, not a widespread breakdown in discipline, but merely

increased visibility of isolated incidents. The overwhelming majority of personnel in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are well-behaved, well-disciplined individuals who are a credit to their service and their country.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Holloway, how would you rate Navy readiness?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Please refer to my evaluation given on page 167 of the record.

Senator NUNN. There have been press reports concerning an expansion of the number of naval shipyards. Are there plans to do this and could the Navy hire enough skilled shipyard workers even though there is an apparent shortage of these personnel in the country?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. There are no current plans to expand the number of naval shipyards; on the contrary, we have just completed the closure of two yards, in Boston and at Hunters Point in San Francisco; this has been done primarily because of the fewer number of ships now in the fleet. The Navy does have, under current study, the restoration of a limited new construction capability in a few of these yards, which are now employed solely in the overhaul, repair, and conversion of fleet ships. If the decision is made to resume new construction in these yards, we would accomplish this primarily by retraining current employees, with only a limited number of new shipyard workers needed to supplement the continuing overhaul and repair capability.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Holloway, how do retention rates compare now with rates shortly before the draft ended?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. In terms of Navy-wide percentage reenlistment rate, the first term rate is now higher than prior to the end of the draft—the 10 percent in fiscal year 1970 has risen to 32.9 percent in fiscal year 1974. It is important to note that we are most concerned with the reenlistment of requisite numbers of personnel in each rating. The requirements for each rating differ, therefore the Navy-wide percentage is relatively meaningless as an indicator of success in achieving our retention goals. For example, in fiscal year 1974, only 48 of 86 ratings in which first term reenlistments are normally expected, realized or exceeded their immediate reenlistment goals, and the total reenlistment requirements, including a prior service augment to provide for the numbers needed, were realized in only 18 ratings.

Senator NUNN. General, how do retention rates compare now with rates since the draft ended?

General CUSHMAN. Retention rates, since the draft ended, compare favorably as indicated in the table which will be inserted for the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

MARINE CORPS REENLISTMENT RATES FISCAL YEAR 1972-74

Fiscal year:	1st-term reenlistment rate	Career reenlistment rate	Total
1972.....	12.3	82.6	22.9
1973.....	13.0	81.7	26.0
1974.....	16.6	79.6	29.3

Senator NUNN. Admiral, you say you need stability in the number of Navy personnel that coincide with Secretary Schlesinger's comments yesterday. Without getting into what the proper manpower level should be, how can the Congress and the people be assured that stability does not lead to stagnation?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. The stability referred to is that which affords management the opportunity to plan long and short range programs to meet the overall objective of the Navy. Such stability would provide the basis for truly cost effective programs whose impact would preclude stagnation. Recent experience has seen precipitous end strength reductions and late cuts in appropriations which have resulted in severe personnel turbulence and reduced readiness; not to mention the real and implied costs that result from the efforts to correct these problems. Stability, and the clear perception of it, is necessary to meet the needs of the professionally aware men and women in the Navy today; because, Navy is in fact competing with the industrial sector of our society for essentially the same skilled and semiskilled personnel. In this competition Navy's nautical environment is a major disadvantage because of frequent and prolonged separations from family.

Senator NUNN. Admiral, what do you consider to be your most serious problems with the all-volunteer force and what is being done to correct the situations?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Our most serious problem with the all-volunteer force is to attract and retain adequate numbers of quality personnel in a stable career force. The problem is not primarily one of numbers, but one of satisfying particular skill requirements in the high skill areas and arduous sea duty oriented ratings. Solution of the problem lies in successful recruiting efforts and selective retention of experienced personnel in the proper rating mix. We must solve problems such as this without reducing initial lengths of enlistment to the point where productive time is lessened and the investment is not merited. Additionally, rapid turnover of first term men reduces operational readiness and increases long range enlistment requirements.

Navy is experimenting with a variety of enlistment options including length of enlistment, training packages and duty options. OSD has recently authorized a small enlistment bonus program for Navy to aid in filling our hard-to-fill skills. This will allow us to evaluate this incentive as part of overall Navy options.

Navy stability has been aided by the constant inflow of true volunteers over the past one and one-half years and the recruitment of a high number of school eligible and high school graduate personnel. In fiscal year 1974 approximately 68% of recruits were high school graduates.

Although recruiting remains a tough, sales-oriented operation, Navy efforts to meet the challenge have been reasonably successful. Upgrading the quality of recruiting personnel plus innovative paid advertising, fleet and naval aviation exhibitions, the Recruiting Assistance Program and other initiatives have assisted greatly.

Recruitment of physicians has been especially difficult and we are falling well short of goals, particularly with respect to general practitioners.

Retention of our experienced officers and petty officers remains as one of our most difficult problems in the AVF. Inherent in our Human Goals program is the emphasis on improved leadership as a vital component of our retention efforts. Additionally, the Selective Reenlistment Bonus will help considerably in keeping qualified personnel. Personalized detailing has also been of assistance as duty stations and choice of jobs have a large impact on the retention of our experienced personnel. Programs such as Selective Training and Reenlistment Program (STAR), Selective Conversion and Reenlistment Program (SCORE), Broadened Opportunities for Officer Selection and Training (BOOST), Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP), Associate Degree Completion Program (ADCOP) and the Naval Academy Preparatory School also have been important to our retention effort.

Assistance is also required from Congress. Many Navy men see recent cuts in educational programs, medical care programs and reenlistment travel payments as part of an overall erosion of career benefits, further threatened by proposed changes in retirement laws. We badly need a period of stable numbers and personnel programs in order to communicate the message that a service career is an honorable one which is both challenging and rewarding to the individual.

Senator NUNN. Generally, what do you consider to be your most serious problems with the all-volunteer force and what is being done to correct the situation?

General CUSHMAN. As alluded to in the statement, the most serious problem to the Marine Corps is the recruitment and retention of sufficient personnel to maintain the enlisted force at its authorized strength and at quality levels which ensure continued improvement. To accomplish this, positive steps have been taken to assure the attainment of the necessary number of quality young men and women recruits. For example, the recruiting service has been revamped to improve supervision and management to include the following.

First, reorientation of our recruiting schools so that they prepare recruiters to be salesmen.

Second, preparation of a Guidebook for Recruiters so that successful sales techniques are readily available to all.

Third, allocation of additional personnel to the recruiting force on a temporary basis to provide surge recruiting capacity.

And fourth, dissemination of new recruiting techniques to those trained under the old system.

Congress has approved a reprogramming request which permits investing \$4.6 million in general distribution paid print and outdoor advertising. For the first time, the Marine Corps will possess resources similar to other Services for competing in the labor market. This advertising campaign should help overcome a confirmed lack of awareness and misconceptions regarding the Marine Corps and the opportunities it offers.

We have established higher mental standards for recruits with a goal of 90% in Mental Group I through III, and we are seeking to obtain a maximum number of high school graduates.

To ensure the retention of only the best qualified, well-trained, career motivated Marines, the reenlistment standards have been revised in four ways.

First, for first reenlistments, at least 10 years of school or the ability to pass the high school equivalency test are required.

Second, an Area Aptitude score requirement of 100 or above in at least three areas has been established.

Third, second-time reenlistees are required to be high school graduates or the equivalent.

And fourth, performance criteria at selected retention/reenlistment points have been effected, to include these items as control factors.

First, no Marine failing to progress to staff sergeant by the 12th year is reenlisted.

Second, all Marines desiring to reenlist for service over 20 years must have Headquarters Marine Corps authority.

And third, an enlisted performance board has been established to monitor and isolate, for corrective action by the Commandant, those Marines who are marginal producers.

The attainment of the fiscal year 1975 Marine Corps end strength is a serious challenge. However, the necessary actions required for attainment of recruiting and retention goals are being taken.

Senator NUNN. Admiral Holloway, in your statement, you indicate that the Navy is at the low point in its plan to retire old ships and bring in more modern ships. You indicate that manning numbers must start to climb in 1977. Would you please tell us the number of new ships the Navy will be adding to the fleet over the next several years and what you believe the Navy strength requirements will be to man those ships?

Admiral HOLLOWAY. Please refer to my insert for the record at page 180, line 21.

Senator NUNN. General, please discuss your force structure plans for fiscal year 1976 in terms of division and wings. What is the rationale for the numbers?

General CUSHAMN. Within the limitations of fiscal guidance, the Marine Corps will, in fiscal year 1976, maintain three active and one reserve division/wing teams. Two active divisions and aircraft wings will be in a high state of readiness for immediate deployment as air/ground task forces to conduct operations at any level of conflict. The third active division/wing team will be available for immediate commitment in a low to midintensity level conflict. The reserve division/wing team will provide the initial and primary source for timely augmentation of the active forces during those times when national security requires a capability beyond that available in the regular component.

The fiscal year 1976 Marine Corps force structure has been developed in accordance with the following three policies:

First, Marine Corps combat forces will be maintained in the highest attainable state of readiness.

Second, these forces will consist of balanced air and ground combat, combat support, and combat service support units.

And third, the general support structure will be the minimum required to provide a training and logistic base fully capable of supporting the operating forces.

While every effort will be made to maintain Marine Corps combat forces in the highest possible state of readiness, the fiscally constrained end strength of approximately 196,000 active duty Marines during fiscal year 1976 will result in a certain amount of risk.

Maintaining the three active division/wing teams at a suitable level of peacetime readiness, with a full range of combat capabilities, requires a minimum strength of approximately 205,000 Marines. The end strength of 196,000 will result in some loss of flexibility for employment of Marine forces in contingency situations not requiring mobilization, and to some degree a loss in the capability and sustainability of initial forces required for mobilization situations pending augmentation from the reserve.

The rationale for three active and one reserve division/wing teams in fiscal year 1976 is based primarily on the following two considerations:

First, three active, fully structured, division/wing teams are needed to meet the requirements of the Unified Commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for both nonmobilization contingencies and to support the rotation of the one and two-ninths division/wing teams which are forward deployed.

Second, the existing general plans of the unified commands, particularly of the European and Pacific commands, could require the simultaneous employment of a minimum of two Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF's), each composed of one division and one wing, in various roles ranging from forcible entry by amphibious assault to reinforcement of United States or allied forces in inland areas. Geographically, these plans could task the two MAF's to be prepared for employment anywhere in NATO Europe, the Caribbean, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and the western Pacific. The three active division/wing teams meet these requirements. The Reserve division/wing team will initially provide the added combat and support capabilities which are required in a general war situation, but which are not programed within the active forces. This Reserve force may also serve as a strategic reserve and sustaining base.

Senator NUNN. Why do you need three Marine divisions and three Marine aircraft wings?

General CUSHMAN. Three Marine divisions and three Marine aircraft wings are needed to satisfy the requirements of the national security strategy by providing a ready Fleet Marine Force of combined arms capable of conducting operations at any level of conflict.

Existing general plans of the unified commands, particularly of the European and Pacific commands, could require the simultaneous employment of a minimum of two Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF's), each composed of one division and one wing, in various roles ranging from forcible entry by amphibious assault to reinforcement of United States or allied forces in inland areas. Geographically, these plans could task the two MAF's to be prepared for employment anywhere in NATO Europe, the Caribbean, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, and the western Pacific.

A worldwide emergency, therefore could, in fact, find all three active MAF's and the reserve MAF deployed in the execution of, or in readiness to execute assigned missions.

Current peacetime afloat deployments in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and Far Eastern waters are cumulatively equivalent to just under one-half of the ground combat elements of a MAF with associated aviation support. Given the composition of the corps under current terms of enlistment, the makeup of the enlisted career and officer corps, and the unaccompanied nature and duration of these operational deployments, the rough equivalent of one and one-half MAF's is needed to sustain these deployments; that is, four battalion landing teams deployed, four being trained and prepared for deployment, four recovering and regrouping from a deployment; again, all with associated aviation support. This deployment pattern is a day-to-day fact of life for the existing three divisions and three wings in times of lowest or no unusual tension. In times of increased tension, additional forces have been deployed to areas of probable conflict.

Looking beyond the current national military strategy, the three Marine divisions and wings comprise a fighting capability, both ground and air, which would provide the United States with a minimum capability to be postured and positioned as necessary for a real-time response to limited or minor contingencies in any area that can be reached by sea. The expression "minimum capability" is used here because, obviously, a force limited to three divisions and three aircraft wings cannot fully substitute for any substantial loss of present overseas-stationed forces.

The three Marine divisions and wings represent the most general purpose of general purpose forces and can instantly operate within the command and control system of the other three services. Structured, organized, equipped, and trained for the most difficult and complex of all military missions—amphibious operations—they are completely capable of performing in any less demanding ground/air combat role in any theater of operations.

Repeatedly in the past, the Congress has expressed its confidence that the Marine Corps—the only service whose force structure is sanctioned by an act of Congress—should be kept ready. We intend to continue to earn that confidence.

Senator NUNN. What specific steps are being taken or would you recommend be taken to reduce personnel costs?

General CUSHMAN. In the face of rising costs, the Marine Corps has taken the following major steps to reduce manpower expenditures.

First, we have reduced the percentage of the total force invested in the officer corps.

Second, we have reduced the average grade of both officers and enlisted personnel.

And third, we have reduced the number of permanent change of station moves.

These actions have succeeded in reducing the manpower share of all USMC appropriations from 80.0 percent in fiscal year 1973 to 78.3 percent in fiscal year 1975.

Senator NUNN. The Marine Corps fell short about 7,000 men from its end fiscal year 1974 strength. I understand you will have to recruit more men in fiscal year 1975 than in fiscal year 1974. How many recruits will you have to get in fiscal year 1975 compared to fiscal year 1974? Will you be able to get that number and still retain high quality standards?

General CUSHMAN. The Marine Corps ended fiscal year 1974 at a strength of 188,802—7,212 below its end-year authorization. That deficit was composed of a shortfall of 139 officers and 7,073 enlisted men. Recruiting accessions for non-prior-service males for fiscal year 1974 consisted of 46,634 of the 54,800 quota. This deficit was partially offset by more reenlistments and other gains than expected.

The fiscal year 1975 President's budget calls for the accession of 57,000 non-prior-service male recruits. The Marine Corps is confident that it can attain these recruits for the following reasons. First, improved management and supervision of the recruiting service has been implemented with emphasis on a more aggressive sales approach than in the past. Although these changes were started in the latter part of fiscal year 1974, the full impact will be felt in fiscal year 1975.

Second, Congress has approved a reprogramming request which permits investing \$4.6 million in general distribution paid print and outdoor advertising. For the first time, the Marine Corps will possess resources similar to the other services for competing in the labor market. This advertising campaign should help overcome a confirmed lack of awareness and misconceptions regarding the Marine Corps and the opportunities it offers.

And third, an improved bonus system has been adopted which concentrates money in the fields where shortages exist.

Illustrative of the effect of the aforementioned management actions, here are the actual results for July 1975.

First, 101.6 percent of the recruiting quota was attained.

Second, 41 percent of the next 3 months quota was already in the delayed entry pool compared to 29 percent last year, even though the quota for those 3 months this year is nearly 2,000 greater than last year.

And third, 25 percent of the next 6 months quota was in the delayed entry pool compared to 18 percent last year.

The Marine Corps is equally optimistic in the area of concern of recruit quality improvement. That optimism is based partly on the fact that the percentage of high school graduates already "pooled" is significantly higher than last year. It is also based on the continued emphasis we are placing on mental group I through III marines. In fiscal year 1974, this population comprised greater than 92 percent of new input versus only 85 percent in fiscal year 1973. The July 1974 percentage was 93.3 percent.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, Admiral, and General, we appreciate your being here with us to discuss this important matter that affects all of us.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., of the same day.]

MILITARY MANPOWER ISSUES OF THE PAST AND FUTURE

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 14, 1974

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:35 p.m., in room 212, Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn (chairman).

Present: Senators Nunn (presiding) and Dominick.

Also present: John A. Goldsmith and Francis J. Sullivan, professional staff members; and Mary G. Ketner, clerical assistant.

Senator NUNN. The subcommittee will come to order.

I have a brief opening statement to sort of bring everybody up to date on where we are, and then we will go on from there.

This afternoon we are concluding the first major hearings of the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel. I want to welcome Secretary McLucas and General Jones of the Air Force, and thank them for appearing before us today.

We have heard from Secretary Schlesinger and the Secretaries and Chiefs of the other services about the major manpower issues before us, and this afternoon I would like to get into the specifics of these issues from the Air Force's point of view. While the Air Force is a highly technical service, it is also the second largest service in terms of personnel. Thus, the Air Force has a particularly big challenge to get a large number of highly qualified technical personnel in a volunteer environment. I would appreciate receiving your views of the All-Volunteer Force issues as well.

We should also like to discuss your view on the Air Force's force structure, both in the strategic and tactical air missions and how well the Air Force today can carry out its missions. I hope we can cover, as well, some of the issues relating to overseas deployments, such as Thailand and Korea and, of course Europe, where I had the very great pleasure of meeting with General Jones earlier this year. The Air Force is organized somewhat differently than the other services, and this affects their combat-to-support ratios. I hope you will get into that and, in particular, the actions you have taken and plan to take to reduce the number of headquarters and support units, where I had the very great pleasure, General Jones, of visiting with you.

I know that General Jones has particularly done a very good job on that over in Europe in his NATO command before he assumed his present position.

I am particularly interested in what we can do to hold down the rise in manpower costs and I would like to get your views on the steps we can take in that area. I do not expect, nor does anyone else, that we can roll them back. But the question is, how fast are they going to increase in the future?

Senator Dominick, do you have any comments you would like to make?

Senator DOMINICK. I have no opening statement, Mr. Chairman, except to say that I think these are extremely important hearings. I congratulate you on the celerity with which we have gotten into them. I think to date we have gotten some very good and fine information, and I am sure we will today also.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Dominick. I appreciate your being here, and happy you are on the subcommittee.

Mr. Secretary, at this point if you do have a statement, we will be glad to get that, and whatever comments General Jones may have, and then we can get into questions. We will let you field them as you wish, either one or both of you.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN L. McLUCAS, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. DAVID C. JONES, CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE

Secretary McLUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a statement which I have submitted for the record. I would like now to bring out a few of the highlights in that statement rather than go through it in detail. After that I would like to have General Jones give his comments.

I welcome especially the formation of this subcommittee. As Senator Dominick has said, your swiftness in moving out with this activity is to be commended, because we think people are the most important part of the Air Force.

We regard ourselves as an elite force in many ways. That is an attitude we would like to maintain within the service, because we think that it helps in our recruiting of more good people if people look on the Air Force as a high quality, elite operation.

You asked about the All-Volunteer Force and how we are faring in this all volunteer environment. I would just like to say that during the first year of operating without the draft, from July of last year until June of this year, we were able to meet all of our quantitative goals. We got all the people that we wanted. And as far as quality is concerned, we are very gratified that there has been no apparent diminution in the quality before us. So in both respects, quality and quantity, then, we feel very good about what has happened to us.

You may know that some 93 percent of the people we recruited last year were high school graduates or equivalent. And we have about 16 percent minorities in the force that we recruited last year.

Senator NUNN. Did you say 90 percent high school graduates?

Secretary McLUCAS. About 93 percent. And we have increased the number of women. We found that we do not have trouble recruiting women into the Air Force. We intend to double the number of women. Right now we have about 24,000, and we are aiming for approximately 50,000 by the end of fiscal year 1978.

So the future looks good to us in terms of our ability to recruit, assuming that something does not go wrong that we have not anticipated.

To maintain this quality force costs a lot of money. Since 1968, when our percent manpower cost was 34 percent, it has grown over the years, until last year it was about 46 percent of our budget. But in 1975 we are taking actions that will bring that down to about 41 percent.

Senator NUNN. Let me make sure I understand that. In 1968, the percentage of your total Air Force budget in manpower was 34 percent?

Secretary McLUCAS. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. In fiscal year 1974 it was 46 percent?

Secretary McLUCAS. Yes, sir. And in 1975, 41 percent of the budget request.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Secretary McLUCAS. During this period from 1968, we have been cutting back on our total military manpower from just a little over 900,000 to the 630,000 1975 figure we submitted. And, in the authorization bill we were cut, I believe, about 3,000 military below that.

Over that period of 5 or 6 years since 1968, we reduced manpower 30 percent on the military side. On the civilian side we cut nearly 20 percent, going down to 287,000 this year.

One reason that the civilian cut has not been as large as the military, is that at the same time we have been taking these cuts we have been making military to civilian conversions. Since fiscal year 1972, we have converted some 13,000 nonmilitary essential spaces to civilian. We have another 4,000 scheduled for conversion during fiscal year 1975.

Also, we had to increase the number of civilian technicians to support our Reserve units. Because we have been building up the Reserves. So we have added about 10,000 people there.

As we have taken all these cuts, the one thing we have been concerned about is whether to take the cuts in the combat force or in the support force. Consequently, in both support units and in headquarters, we have been trying to find ways to save people. We have made significant cuts there.

At the same time that the active force has been going down, we have been assigning more missions to the Reserve Forces, and have actually increased the strength of the Air Reserve Forces during this period.

I think you will find—and I am sure General Jones will comment on this—that the capability of our strategic forces, our tactical forces, and our airlift forces, have been maintained, and in many cases increased during this period.

Also, as I said, the Reserves have been assigned important missions in air defense and airlift. We are working on making other assignments available to them.

You talked about some of the cuts overseas. During this same period—I am referring now back to fiscal year 1968—in the Western Pacific we have reduced our forces by 50 percent, and have brought that force level down to almost 36,000.

In Europe we have made a 13 percent cut, bringing that level down to about 73,000.

We have made cuts in Southeast Asia, and are down to a little less than 30,000 in that area.

You commented on General Jones' ability to cut headquarters USAFE. I am sure you remember he made a 50-percent cut there. Between fiscal year 1973 and 1975, we will have taken about 65,000 people out of support and headquarters units while maintaining total manpower in our strategic and tactical forces at a relatively constant level.

One question that we faced is, what is the optimum base structure that we should have. And obviously, during a period of manpower cuts we had to cut out a lot of bases. To put it another way, by closing bases we have been able to save manpower. During the period between fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1975, we have gone from about 198 major bases down to 148, a 25 percent cut in major bases.

We can normally reduce the enlisted force by not taking in so many new people, because there is always a big flow of people going out. So we have been able to maintain the levels that were authorized without a Reduction In Force—(RIF).

But in the officer category, of course, we have a little different situation. Up until last year we were able to make the cuts without RIFing. But last year, in June of 1974—I mean the last fiscal year—we RIFed 450 officers, and in July of this year we RIFed about 500 more. We are not sure what next year will bring, but we are hoping that we can control things so that no large-scale RIFs are necessary.

We have been concerned, of course, about the officer grade limitation. We appreciate the help that we have received from you on the committee in getting a continuation of our officer grades at the current levels.

Senator NUNN. We had hearings on that subject, as you probably know, Monday afternoon. We will probably present our recommendations to the full committee tomorrow morning.

Secretary McLUCAS. We appreciate your having those hearings.

We are looking forward to the overall Defense Department officer authorization, which would come under what we call DOPMA, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act. We would like, through the interim legislation, to just hold things as they are until that overall DOD act can be brought forward for full consideration by the Congress.

We have made considerable savings in our training activities. We have looked at the number of courses that we offer, and we have found in many cases that there was some overlap and duplication. Thus, we have streamlined those courses, and in the process, we have been able to reduce our training requirements significantly.

Similarly, we are looking at joint service training. There are certain specialties that could be trained cross service, among the different services. We find that there are possibilities for inter-Service training in certain kinds of technical training, and certain types of training that are of a lower skill level. So we think there is some mileage to be made there.

We are also looking at flight training as to whether there is any possibility for joint flight training among the services. Of course, in flight training we have made extensive use of simulators. We have found that we can reduce our training load considerably by using simulators.

With these brief introductory remarks, I would ask General Jones to speak.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here today before this committee. I would like to give you some impressions I have gained in about 6 weeks as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, plus some impressions I have had before.

While listening to the President the other night, I was struck by his comments on the problems of the economy, and inflation, and the need to work to help bring inflation under control, and particularly his statement that he wanted to insure that the U.S. military capability was unmatched or second to none. I want to assure you that I am going to dedicate myself to help meet both objectives. I can assure you that today the U.S. Air Force is second to none. We are going to be second to none in the area of economy, in trying to reduce overhead; and to provide the greatest capability for the dollar and for the manpower we receive.

With regard to strategic forces, probably our most important task is maintaining two legs of the strategic Triad. We consider that our missiles and our bombers are unmatched today. The keynote of our bombers is flexibility, great political utility, and to be able to deploy and perform strategic missions throughout the world.

In the missile force it is primarily readiness.

We have good programs in modernization, with Minuteman III, B-1, and airborne command posts to give better command and control, plus a number of other strategic initiatives.

Looking to the future it would be an oversimplification for me to say that we are in relatively good shape today—as we are—and then to predict dire results in the future, that our risks are going to increase, or the balance is going to shift. I think that will depend on many things: first, the job we have to do, and how we do it; the threat, whether or not the Soviets continue their very accelerated program in the development of new missiles and bomber aircraft. Secondly, success of SALT talks—and I want to assure you that we fully support the executive branch's move in trying to bring the strategic arms under control—and, finally, the use of technology on both sides.

What we want to provide for the President is options, options in capability and options in decisions for the future.

With regard to general purpose, although strategic is probably our most critical task, the most pressing tends to be in the general

purpose area. We have a combat tested, combat experienced force that is able to project itself wherever the executive branch, or the Congress says we should perform our mission.

We have, as a result of the war in Vietnam, deferred some of our modernization. That is why we have programs such as the F-15, the A-10, the lightweight fighter, the AWACS, and other systems under development, and some in production. One of the things we are working on is the squeeze caused by rising costs, not only in manpower, but in weapons systems development. And we are going to try to do the best we can to modernize at the same time we retain capability in all areas.

Strategic airlift is an area in which I think there is general agreement needs to be expanded. A number of weeks ago I established within the Air Force a large working group to take a completely new look at how we can enhance our strategic airlift. And we are working hand-in-glove with the Army and with others to try to clarify the requirements a little better, to see if we cannot reduce the tonnage that has to be carried in a hurry, and also to determine what are the best ways of enhancing strategic airlift. It is a little premature right now to say what our conclusions are, because we have not really arrived at conclusions. I would say, though, we see a role in strategic airlift for our tactical airlift aircraft, a fairly substantial capability there. We are looking at the role of the reserve forces, the Air Force Reserve, and the Air National Guard with a completely open mind to get the greatest capability at the least possible cost.

With regard to the total force, I want to assure you I fully support the Total Force Policy. I have believed in it ever since I was a young officer as a unit instructor and advisor to an Air Force Reserve organization; and we were in the same hangar with the Air National Guard. It may be significant that the first two operational units I visited after taking over as Chief of Staff were an Air Force Reserve outfit and an Air National Guard unit. I assure you that I consider the Air Reserve Forces as a part of the total blue suit inventory or blue suit organization. We are as interested in them as we are in the active force.

With regard to efficiency, and what we are trying to do, the Secretary went over many of the actions that have been taken in the Air Force. I think the Air Force has done a great deal. I can assure you that we will continue with many initiatives. I have in mind a number of substantial changes in organization, substantial changes in the way we do business, that I think will come to fruition in the not too distant future, to increase our capability at no increase in cost. There may be some dollar savings as well.

One thing I would like to say with regard to changes, though. We urge that we retain some degree of stability. I think that one of the reasons the Air Force has done fairly well over the years is that we have had a fair amount of stability. When I talk about stability, I mean not changing signals to everyone, changing the promotion system very significantly or imposing extensive involuntary reductions in force, as the Secretary mentioned. We would hope that any changes be accomplished in such a way that we can do it in evolution-

any fashion, so that we do not disrupt the force. I think we have an Air Force with good morale, good discipline, well-trained, and professional, although we are not without problems. From time to time individuals have problems, and even organizations have them, but on balance I think our people are well motivated and well disciplined. I think a great deal of it comes from stability in our force. And there are new people coming in.

I am convinced we could go to a hundred percent high school graduates, if we wanted to set that as a requirement. But I think that there are some people in this country who have not graduated from high school who deserve a crack at the Air Force.

The measure we use, though, in qualification is not so much whether they are a high school graduate or whether they are in a certain mental category, but how well they do on what we call the airman qualification examination, AQE. We test the individual's mechanical ability, his ability in the electronics area, administration, and so forth. All of our information indicates that we are right at about the optimum point of people who have the right qualifications and aptitude for the job. So I do not believe we are overqualified in the sense of having a too highly qualified or underqualified force. I think we are about at the right level.

Very briefly on NATO: I am continuing a very direct interest in NATO in order to try to bring about some of the changes that we discussed when you, Mr. Chairman, were in Europe. I fully concur with the actions of Congress on the 18,000 reduction in support personnel. I have asked the Secretary of Defense that we in the Air Force get part of that. Even though we have made some fairly substantial reductions in Europe in support, I think that we can make more. We think that you have provided the correct incentive by saying that what we save in support we can put into combat capability. That gives an incentive to the commander to really look at the support. We hope that we can do this to a great extent within the Air Force as a whole, and not just for Europe.

Mr. Chairman, that covers the comments I have.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, General Jones.

So many times Congressional committees tend to be critical of the services, and, of course, that is our job. I think we are partners, and we are supposed to point out any defects we see. However, I would like to commend the Air Force, and particularly General Jones, for the changes that he has made in NATO. I would like to give you a chance to expound on them a little bit for the record, in your first time here.

First of all, I don't know whether Senator Dominick has followed this, but General Jones has taken the unusual step of abolishing his own headquarters. I think that is probably unprecedented in the annals of military history. He moved his headquarters in Europe and effected a very substantial cost savings there.

I would like for you to sort of brief us on what was done while you were head of the U.S. Air Force in Europe, including the move from Wiesbaden and any other shifts from headquarters and from support troops.

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, when I first went to Europe I had a U.S. view of the problems, and had a feeling that the United States was defending Europe. I was working internally within the U.S. Air Force to improve our capability to defend Europe. It took me a while in the environment over there to realize that the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. military as a whole is just one part of the defense in Europe. We really have a minority of the forces; most of the forces belong to our allies. I realized that we would have a total capability only if we tried to work in unison. The Alliance has tended to build up in a fragmented fashion, with each nation going its own way, trying to do its own thing, with some international headquarters. But the major decisions on force structure, weapons systems and the rest are to be made at the national level. So it occurred to me, with my U.S. headquarters in Weisbaden, where I lived, and my NATO headquarters in Ramstein, that we were spending all of our attention working on a fragmented part of the problem rather than getting to the objective. The objective of the move to Ramstein was to join up so that we could have an integrated effort. And in the meantime we were able to save people, money, and get on an operational base, and out of a downtown area. At the same time we found that we could cut all the other headquarters in Europe very substantially and eliminate some.

Between the U.S. Air Force's Europe headquarters and the operational units, there are only a total of about 150 people in all of Europe in what you would call headquarters. There are a few people out in various sections of Europe—for example, in England, a handful, to make sure that we are working with the RAF and Her Majesty's Government—rather than a whole group of intermediate headquarters.

Senator NUNN. How does this 150 compare with the figure before you effected these changes?

General JONES. The reduction was about 75 percent in that number. So it was 600 in that group. But there were other headquarters. I would say that the total in the three remaining headquarters went from 600 to 150, but there were other headquarters and support that were reduced—so I would say that you are talking well over 2,000 reductions.

Senator NUNN. What happened to these people? Did they go into other units? Did you convert them to combat roles? What happened to them?

General JONES. We have had a slight reduction in the number in Europe, but for the most part the many people—and it is well over 2,000 that were saved, because we reduced the other headquarters, and so forth, and some other support—went to improve our combat capability. For example, when we converted from an F-100 to an F-111, an F-111 takes a lot more manpower, or an F-4 more than an F-100. When we got the shelters and spread out, that takes a little more manpower and supervision. As we received new weapons systems we needed a few more technicians. The electronic countermeasure equipment is getting much more sophisticated, it takes a few more maintenance people. So essentially, what we did was take the

support people for the most part and put them in the combat units in order to convert and allow us to get the higher technology.

So yes, although it did not bring in new total fighting units, it brought in new equipment and allowed us to operate it without increasing manpower that we would have required if we had not reduced.

Senator NUNN. I was also interested in the recent changes in the overall NATO command relating to the air force in Central Europe. I think you have a large role to play in that. Would you give us the details of what has happened in that regard?

General JONES. In Central Europe, an area that is not very large compared to the United States, we had the area divided in two parts. The northern part of Germany and the Low Countries which were under a British commander, tended to have different procedures and ways of operating than the southern part under an American commander. And after much work we got the NATO Council to approve integration of all six air forces. So my successor now is the commander of the six air forces—the NATO forces of those nations—that are dedicated to the central region; the British, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Canadians, the Germans, and the Americans in Europe. One of his main jobs and charges is to try to bring together the air forces of those six nations in the area of interoperability, commonality, and standardization. And I think that we will have a much more effective operation in Central Europe. The headquarters is now formed, and we have made it purposely small. It only has 3½ generals—the half general is one who has two jobs, and spends half time in that and half in the United States part, my successor—and three others, three different nations. So this is only one-half of one American.

Senator NUNN. What other nations?

General JONES. The British and Germans will always have one, and the Belgians and Dutch will rotate. The Canadians chose to have a colonel as their senior person. So there will be half an American and the other three countries provide one each.

Senator NUNN. In terms of combat effectiveness, if there were any kind of conventional strike or otherwise across the northern part of Central Europe, how would this unified command operate as compared to what would have happened prior to the unification?

General JONES. This headquarters can mass the force wherever the threat is. If there is an armored breakthrough in the north it can send the best air and as much as is needed into that area to block the armored thrust or whatever it is. Before there were some procedures, but they were very cumbersome, and you had two control systems. We have not solved all the problems yet, because it has just been formed, but the system is being developed now to where it would be easy to move from one area to the other under the same system, the same control procedures. So I think the effectiveness will go up a great deal. This headquarters will have less than 300 military people from six nations. So it is a small, hopefully hard-hitting, effective headquarters.

Senator NUNN. One small point, when you are talking about commonality, it is my understanding that some of the smaller NATO

countries are looking for a lightweight fighter now. I do not think the Air Force has made a decision yet. I was called on by some of them when they were here, and they were anxious, at least the representatives who were here, to work with the United States, to perhaps work with the Air Force in going along the same line for a lightweight fighter. I know the French are in very serious competition for that plane also.

Have you been in communication with the NATO people on that and these other countries, I believe Belgium and the Netherlands and Norway and Denmark? And what is the timeframe?

Are we going to be able to move along on enough of a timeframe of commonality to at least give them the option of moving in the same direction we are?

General JONES. Yes, sir. The decision is planned for January between the two aircraft that are flying now, the YF-16 and the YF-17 aircraft. There is no decision yet as to which one. But we have continuous contact with our allies in Europe, and one of the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, Mr. Shrontz, is going over in the next few days to continue discussions. We have made a determination that we will support the lightweight fighter in the U.S. Air Force inventory, and we have so recommended to the Secretary of Defense. We told our allies that it is our intention that we would bring it into inventory, of course, subject to appropriations and authorizations of Congress. I personally am much in favor of it. It will give us a high performance aircraft at lower price, and very importantly, it will allow us to get the standardization with our allies; not only will they buy it, but we intend to buy it.

Senator NUNN. Do you think it is moving in that direction, or have they made any decision? I understood their timeframe was before ours. They were going to try to decide in the fall.

General JONES. They wanted to decide in the fall. I think that most of the nations will wait until after the first of the year. But I think if they do decide this fall, it will be between an American airplane and a non-American airplane. And I doubt if delaying our decision until January 1975 is critical as to which airplane, because they recognize that both are very good. We do not intend to pick one of the two airplanes before then. We do not want to pick prematurely. It is only fair to both contractors and the air forces in the countries concerned that we not jeopardize a good try-before-buy decision, and a good competition for selecting one or the other.

Senator NUNN. They are aware that any purchase they made in the United States from one of our companies, if that was their decision, would count on this offset of balance of payments, are they not?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. At least that is their interpretation.

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Secretary McLUCAS. The offset was a very big part of the discussions we have had and are continuing to have. That is why our team is going over.

Senator NUNN. I think that ought to be strongly emphasized, because we like commonality as a general principle, and, of course, in this country we also like the business. Of course, none of the con-

tractors have anything to do with our section of the world, but I still think it would be very good for our country.

Senator Dominick.

Senator DOMINICK. Just a couple of questions.

Are we talking, generally speaking, about officer reduction creating a problem as opposed to the enlisted reduction.

Secretary McLUCAS. We were talking about that. But I did not mean to give the impression that the reductions that we have made have caused major problems. As I said, we did have to RIF about 500 people in each of two different fiscal years.

Senator DOMINICK. What kind of a force structure does that leave you with, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McLUCAS. We are left with a little over 107,000 officers and about 523,000 enlisted men and cadets.

Senator DOMINICK. And what do you have in the way of wings?

General JONES. Senator, 22 tactical fighter wings, plus the 396 B-52's and F-111's, is essentially the force structure we have today. We look forward to the lightweight fighter, and to the A-10, being lower cost aircraft. Also, the need in the Army for air support as they go from 13 to 16 divisions. We would hope that even with reduced manpower that we could gain in our shift from support to combat to bring that number up by going to a lower cost airplane, which tends to be less manpower intensive, fewer maintenance manhours per flying hour; and by reducing support. So our objective is to increase our capability within projected manpower resources. But it is 22 fighter wing equivalents right now.

Senator DOMINICK. Exclusive of training, what is your percentage of flyers to support?

General JONES. I think we would have to provide the specific percentage for the record, Senator Dominick. We have not sliced it quite that way in my look at it. But I will say that we are moving in the direction also of reducing pilots who are in the support areas. We have plans to reduce that further. So the trend is in the right direction. We have not calculated the breakout in the specific way that you have asked.

[The information follows:]

The ratio of operational pilot requirements to support pilot requirements (excluding training) is 3.52:1. The ratio is based on the pilot requirements in the authorized grades of lieutenant colonel and below as reflected in the end fiscal year 1975 column of the fiscal year 1975 President's Budget. Data used to compute the ratio are displayed below:

Operational:	
Force -----	10,807
Supervision -----	7,493
Subtotal -----	18,300
Training -----	¹ 5,031
Support -----	² 5,193
Total -----	28,524

¹ Includes 1,787 Instructor pilots for undergraduate training, 1,529 Instructor pilots for combat crew and advanced training, and a 1,715 manyear allowance for pilots undergoing combat crew and advanced flight training.

² Includes pilots in nonoperational jobs who provide the resource for support of war and contingency operations.

Senator DOMINICK. I was asked an interesting question yesterday. In my State there is a mechanized Army division which is being trained presumably for European combat, if that should ever occur, which I hope it will not. This newspaper reporter said, well, suppose there is a breakout in Europe, how long would it take them to get there?

It is a mechanized division. Do we have the capability to move them?

Secretary McLUCAS. You are talking of airlift now?

Senator DOMINICK. I presume that is the only way you can get them there fast enough.

General JONES. We have the capability to move. Our big problem is that it takes too long. Therefore, that is the reason behind our great emphasis in enhancing the strategic airlift capability. Within airlift we have divided into categories of what we call outsize—that is M-60 tanks and big things like that, which the C-5 is designed for—and oversize, the 2½-ton trucks and a lot of rolling stock, the bulk, and things of that nature. Our big shortage right now is in the oversize. That is what we call the long pole in the tent in the airlift area. With our current capability, it takes too long to get units, particularly mechanized heavy units in place, although we will get the 82d Airborne and 101st Airmobile, and units like that over much more rapidly. So what we are working on now is to cut the time for deployment to Europe by air.

Senator DOMINICK. Can you give me an estimate as to how much time it would take?

General JONES. I think the specifics would be classified as to how long it would take to get a division there.

Senator DOMINICK. Would you give them to me in a memo to my office?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

If the entire strategic airlift force were dedicated to the task, it would take [deleted] days to move a full-size non-prepositioned mechanized division from mid-CONUS to Europe. A "light" division such as the 82d Airborne could be deployed in somewhat less time and an armored division, with its larger and heavier equipment, would naturally take longer to move under the same conditions.

The 4th Mechanized Division is unique in that it is one of the divisions with large, heavy pieces of equipment prepositioned in Europe; therefore, the airlift task is considerably less. In this case, assuming that the Army is in an advanced deployability posture, we should be able to move the key fighting elements to Europe in [deleted] days.

Senator DOMINICK. It may be important.

General JONES. Of course, in the context of the total move, we could move one armored division all by itself much quicker than if we were reinforcing Europe and we were moving the Air Force, and we were moving infantry as well as armored divisions.

Senator NUNN. As a matter of priority, would you probably move the troops that had the deployed equipment over there?

General JONES. Yes, sir. The Reforger—

Senator NUNN. That is two divisions plus two brigades?

General JONES. Yes, sir. So that would go.

We have calculated, for example, that 918 tons prepositioned is equal to having one C-5 for 1 month to move it over.

Senator DOMINICK. Is it equivalent to having one C-5?

General JONES. To having one C-5 for 1 month, in the sense that in an emergency, being able to move that much in 1 month at the current utilization rates.

The pre-positioning does help a great deal. And that would be the first we would take over, Reforger and two plus ten's.

Senator DOMINICK. Looking at your mission, would you say that you have enough airlift capability now to do the job.

General JONES. Not within the time objective. We are not asking for a big increase in our organic airlift. What we are trying to do is to figure out how to better use what we have through better use of the aircraft, better utility, and more flight hours, whether it is in active service, or with the National Guard or Reserve. And stretching the C-141—it has more power than it has space—so we stretch it and we get about a 30 percent increase in its capacity.

We are also working with the airlines on how they can help us a great deal more. They can help us in transporting bulk and personnel to a great extent, but in the oversize cargo where our biggest shortage is, there is very little capability there.

And we are looking at a tanker cargo airplane and the role of the advance medium STOL aircraft in the strategic airlift mission. The AMST has good potential, and could take the oversized and even the big outsized direct to the troops in the front line as opposed to using a large airfield using the C-5.

So we do have a shortage in the sense of getting there fast enough, and we want to increase our capability within essentially current resources as opposed to asking for a big new buy of large airplanes.

Senator DOMINICK. Mr. Secretary, I notice in your statement you said that you have some problems of a shortfall in your Reserves. How much of a shortfall is that?

Secretary McLUCAS. The Air National Guard, which is a unit of some 92,000 people, is up to strength. The Air Force Reserve is about a 50,000 man unit. And it is short by about 3,000. It is not a large deficit.

Senator DOMINICK. Not a large deficit?

Secretary McLUCAS. No.

Senator DOMINICK. That is encouraging.

Secretary McLUCAS. It has improved considerably.

Senator DOMINICK. At the moment the Reserves can be only called up at the time, as I recall, when the President declares a national emergency.

Secretary McLUCAS. That is right.

Senator DOMINICK. Do you recommend any changes in this?

Secretary McLUCAS. I think so. I think it would be a good thing if we had some limited call-up capability in the Department. I would assume that the Congress would not be interested in us taking large actions. But to get the force on board and in an improved state of readiness for a short period, we think, makes sense.

General JONES. If I could add one point, I think that on the legislation the psychological effect may be as big as the operational im-

fact. The psychological effect on the active force, knowing that an element of the Reserve Force could be called up without having a national emergency, and the psychological effect upon the Reservists knowing that they may have to be called. I would think that would be equal to the actual authority. I would not expect the authority to be used very often. I believe active duty people, knowing that the authority exists, would be inclined to rely more on the Reserves. I think the psychological effect will bring them into the active force better, into being totally accepted.

Senator NUNN. On that point, Senator Dominick, we got into it at considerable length. I agree with what General Jones says. This year on the strategic surge capability, not just the Air Force, but the other services, even though we had a total force concept, seemed to have a real sort of hang-up on really implementing that with the equipment and the mix, because of the political ramifications of having to declare a national emergency in order to get these people involved. So the Defense Department, as I understand it, now is in the process of going through the Federal Government, through the bureaucracy at OMB or somewhere, a proposal that would address itself to this. I have not personally seen it yet. I think it is extremely important.

Senator DOMINICK. I am glad to hear it. I agree with the chairman very much, I think it is extraordinarily important. I believe we have a great Reserve capability there which we have never really used, and I would like to see us have it available for use and brought up every now and again.

The last time we did it, as I remember, was in the Vietnam situation, and the Korean situation, under President Johnson. Our Air National Guard went to Vietnam and did a very fine job, but a lot of them got sent down to Louisiana or Mississippi, and they were very upset over this. Now, that kind of a position would be obviated if they knew they were subject to call-ups without having an emergency declared. I hope that you will be coming up for proposed legislation on this, I really do.

Secretary McLUCAS. It is definitely working its way through the executive branch.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Secretary McLUCAS. I am sure you know that we had a large number of Reserves that participated in the Mideast airlift. But that was all voluntary.

Senator NUNN. The amazing thing about the Air Reserve and National Guard is that their record is so good. I think it is much harder to get the Army National Guard into the same state of readiness and know that they are ready, as it is the Air National Guard. And, of course, my position on the strategic air, as well as the tactical, is that without having the complicated weaponry and other things, this is really a good mix for the Reserve and Guard. I do appreciate very much the attitude of the Air Force in addressing this problem. We will look forward to receiving your proposal. I do not know whether it will be in this subcommittee, but at least the full committee will have it.

I have several questions, one of which is, on the Volunteer Force. We have heard, of course, the Navy, the Army and the Marine

Corps before you arrived today, and they have testified. Most of them admit very readily that they are having great difficulty in getting the highly technically trained personnel. The Air Force obviously is not having that problem. Could you give us, Mr. Secretary, your best estimate of why you are not experiencing this difficulty that the other services are experiencing?

Secretary McLUCAS. I think there are several reasons. So it is really a summation.

But for one thing, as I pointed out in the beginning, I believe that the Air Force has a reputation for being a highly skilled organization, and people like to join that kind of organization. I would like to think that because the people know that they will get good technical training, and they know that the record of our people leaving the Air Force and finding jobs is good, they are willing to come in. We also guarantee to many of these people the specialty in which they will train. A potential recruit can go in and check to see whether there is an opening. And we can get on the phone in a few minutes and tell him which class he can enter, and tell him exactly how he will progress. We think that the paperwork procedure that we worked out in the recruiting has a lot to do with it; that we can tell people what they are getting into. We also think that the overall package, the living conditions, the environment they live in, and all that is an attractive one.

So a lot of the things I am saying are subjective. But I believe that they add up to a facility with which we can attract people.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any advice you want to give to the Army and the Navy on that now?

Secretary McLUCAS. Yes. I think that there are many things, particularly in the way of letting people know what they are getting into, in effect guaranteeing a job in the area that they are interested in; also improvement in living conditions. I think in the Army's case particularly, some of the barracks and so forth have not been maintained adequately. So that the overall environment was not that good.

And another factor, of course, has to do with discipline. We think we maintain a higher state of discipline in the Air Force and people are attracted by that.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, how do you measure the overall fighting capability of our Air Force when measured against the Soviet Union at this point, without, of course, giving any sensitive information?

General JONES. I would put the balance decidedly in our favor. Although we are smaller in numbers, I think our quality is better. I think that our leadership, down even to the squadron and flight commander, for the most part has had combat experience. We have better technology. So I would say that on balance we are better. And on balance I would say that NATO air is better than Warsaw Pact air, even though there are problems on both sides.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, what about the readiness of our Air Guard and the Reserve right now compared to 2 years ago? Is it on the upswing, or how do you compare the readiness now with 2 years ago?

Secretary McLUCAS. Yes, I would say that it is on the upswing. As I mentioned earlier, we are doing better on recruiting, so that we do not have as many deficiencies. I think if you look at the inspections, the so-called operational readiness inspections, we have a very good record there. We use as nearly as possible the same criteria for checking readiness in the Reserve unit as we do in the active unit.

There are some things you obviously cannot do. For example, we give no-notice inspections to active units, and you cannot do that with Reserves because you have got to get them there. But by and large, they do measure up to these standards very well. So I feel very good about their state of readiness.

Senator NUNN. Could you furnish for the record your most recent examination on readiness of the Reserves and the Guard?

Secretary McLUCAS. Yes, sir.

[The information follows:]

Attached are summaries of representative reports of recent operational readiness inspections of two Air National Guard and two Air Force Reserve units.

Unit/location	Date	Gaining command
179 TFG (ANG) Mansfield, Ohio.....	27 July 74	TAC
176 TAG (ANG) Anchorage, Alaska.....	4 Aug 74	AAC
909 TAG (AFRES) Camp Springs, Md.....	11 Aug 74	TAC
924 TAG (AFRES) Houston, Tex.....	do	TAC

Unit. 179 Tactical Fighter Group (ANG)

Location. Mansfield Lahm Apt, OH

Gaining command. Tactical Air Command

Date of inspection. July 27, 1974

Summary of facts. This F-100 D/F equipped unit successfully completed the operational readiness inspection (ORI) and was rated satisfactory. The commander's Force Status Report of C-2 (substantially ready with minor deficiencies) was concurred with. Support provided by the parent wing at Rickenbacker AFB, Columbus OH was satisfactory. All major functional areas—Command, Operations, Logistics, and Support—were evaluated and rated satisfactory. The unit's primary non-nuclear strike mission was evaluated in the areas of low angle bombing, dive bombing, strafe, air to air and ground attack tactics, and gun systems reliability. All areas met or exceeded USAF readiness criteria. The unit had no major deficiencies or limiting factors. This was the first ORI since the unit converted from the F-84F.

Unit. 176 Tactical Airlift Group (ANG)

Location. Kulis ANGB, Anchorage AK

Gaining command. Alaskan Air Command

Date of inspection. August 4, 1974

Summary of facts. This C-123J equipped unit failed to successfully complete the ORI, was rated unsatisfactory, and a force status rating of C-3 (marginally ready with major deficiencies) was recommended. The major functional areas of Command and Logistics were satisfactory. In Operations, intelligence was rated unsatisfactory because of inadequate mission support. Although the air-drop phase of the flight mission was rated outstanding, short field operations were rated unsatisfactory because the unit achieved 66% effectiveness (75% is required) in short field landings. This is a critical pass/fail area and the reason for the ORI failure. In Support, security was rated unsatisfactory because of inadequate response to emergency operations, lack of required training, inadequate communications, insufficient physical security, and poor results on written examinations. The unit had one limiting factor: 60% manning of the life support function limited its effectiveness. Corrective actions are underway in all deficient areas and the unit will receive a reevaluation within five

Unit Training Assembly weekends. The ORI's of Oct 72 and Nov 73 were both rated satisfactory.

Unit. 909 Tactical Airlift Group (AFRES)

Location. Andrews AFB, MD

Gaining command. Tactical Air Command

Date of inspection. August 11, 1974

Summary of facts. This C-130B equipped unit successfully completed the ORI and was rated satisfactory. The commander's Force Status Report of C-1 (fully ready) was concurred with. Support provided by the parent wing, also at Andrews AFB, was satisfactory. All major functional areas—Command, Operations, Logistics, and Support—were evaluated and rated satisfactory. The unit's primary tactical airlift mission was evaluated in the areas of aeromedical evacuation, shortfield landing, personnel drop, night heavy equipment drop, and container delivery system drop. All areas met or exceeded USAF readiness criteria. The unit had no major deficiencies or limiting factors. The ORI's of Jun 72 and Jul 73 were both rated satisfactory.

Unit. 924 Tactical Airlift Group (AFRES)

Location. Ellington AFB, Houston, TX

Gaining command. Tactical Air Command

Date of inspection. August 11, 1974

Summary of facts. This C-130A equipped unit successfully completed the ORI and was rated satisfactory. The commander's Force Status Report of C-2 was concurred with. Support provided by the parent wing at Kelly AFB, San Antonio TX was satisfactory. All major functional areas—Command, Operations, Logistics, and Support—were evaluated and rated satisfactory. The unit's primary tactical airlift mission was evaluated in the areas of aeromedical evacuation, shortfield landing, day personnel drop, day heavy equipment drop, and night container delivery system drop. All areas met or exceeded USAF readiness criteria. The unit had no major deficiencies or limiting factors. This was the first ORI since the unit converted from the C-119.

Note: Through 20 August 1974, the combined ORI pass rate for 75 evaluated ANG and AFRES units was 96%.

Senator NUNN. Also for the record, if you could furnish us—I do not want you to go into any new study, but whatever information you have available on comparing the active duty personnel with Reserve personnel in terms of skill, age, quality, morale, discipline, motivation, et cetera. To whatever extent you have that information we would like to have a comparison.

Secretary McLUCAS. Yes, I would be glad to supply it.

[The information follows:]

Data available which compares active duty personnel with Reserve personnel is somewhat limited. In particular, comparable data for skill and age is not available.

To compare quality, two comparative standards are available—level of education (% of Non Prior Service Accessions identified as High School graduates) and average Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) mental ability scores. These data are:

NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS, AIR FORCE, FISCAL YEAR 1970-74

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Percent accessions identified as high school graduates ¹					
Active duty.....	93.0	87.0	83.0	88.0	93.0
Air Guard.....	96.0	98.0	95.0	91.0	² 71.0
Air Reserve.....	97.0	99.0	97.0	93.0	² 77.0
Average AFQT score trends					
Active duty.....	58.4	56.7	59.7	61.0	60.9
Air Guard.....	67.2	70.0	69.1	68.4	² 56.9
Air Reserve.....	68.5	57.3	64.3	63.6	² 49.8

¹ Includes graduate equivalency diplomas (GED's).

² Data for 1st 6 months.

Quality trends for the Guard and Reserve indicate a downward trend in FY 1974 but early FY 1975 field reports indicate that FY 1974 may have been the low point and quality is now on an upward trend.

Data on morale, discipline, motivation, and drugs/alcohol trends, have not been collected/assembled for the Air Reserve Forces on a national basis but have been the responsibility of the respective unit commander. However, Inspector General (IG) reports and verbal contacts with field commanders provide insight as to attitudes of both active and reserve personnel to recent trends.

The IG reports for the active duty forces indicate that morale, discipline, and motivation are very satisfactory. An inspector who had visited five bases and three major commands in the last five months reports he found no negative trends in these areas. Social actions and chaplain inspectors report there were no indications of adverse trends in drug use. In summary, investigations of the active force found no serious problem regarding morale, discipline, motivation, or drug abuse.

The IG reports for the Air National Guard indicate the conditions and prevailing attitudes are—with a few exceptions—very satisfactory. For example, a report of an inspection of an Air National Guard unit, conducted by Hq Ninth Air Force in July 1974, contains the statement: "The Unit displayed a strong sense of pride and esprit de corps."

Two ANG units from large populated areas were contacted for verbal input. The 126th ARWg, O'Hare Field, Chicago, IL, responded that, with respect to current enlistees, the overall general attitudes/morale are good. Drugs/alcohol is not a problem and has never been, nor is discipline a problem. Current projections are that as draft motivated enlistees exit over the next few years, the few existing problems being encountered will disappear. Retention is increasing and should continue.

The response from 195th Tac Alft Gp, Van Nuys, CA, was that general attitudes and morale are high among new accessions and the overall trend is good. Drug/alcohol is not considered a problem and is not projected as one. While discipline is not a problem, the general mood at all levels of questioning existing policies and procedures is a challenge. Overall retention rate is increasing, and grade relief is the greatest problem surfacing in terms of retention (i.e., for prior service accessions).

The Air Reserve reported similar conditions. Over the past 3 years there has been a steady and significant improvement in the morale of Air Force reservists in all units, and in all types of missions. Morale and discipline, which are difficult to separate because of the interdependence of one upon the other, were observed by Inspectors General of all commands to be significant enough for favorable mention in their inspection reports. This improvement was attributed principally to the increasing involvement with the active force from the inception of the "Total Force Concept" to its maturity as the "Total Force Policy." This policy brought new and more interesting missions to the Air Force Reserve. More modern weapons systems were introduced which put renewed vitality into the reserve program. Long awaited facility improvements throughout the bases and increased exchange and insurance benefits also have played an important part as has the relaxation of long established grooming standards.

Two Air Reserve Units from large populated areas were contacted for verbal input. The 433d Tac Alft Wg, Kelly AFB, TX, responded that the overall attitude and morale of airmen within the 433d is good. In a few isolated instances, morale has fallen down; this was attributed to leadership and command. Where leadership and command control are weak, morale suffers as it does in the active establishment. Elements of this unit have just recently deployed to various sites in the Civil Engineer and Fire Fighter career field, communications and Aerial Ports. In every instance their performance has been outstanding. The regular Air Force units supported have expressed their appreciation with particular emphasis on the can-do attitude of the Reserve unit. In addition, the unit recently passed an Operational Readiness/Inspection Management Effectiveness Inspection (ORI/MEI) with outstanding results.

Most airmen with a remaining obligation are desirous of fulfilling that obligation. The unit is well over 100% manned and the airmen with few exceptions have good morale and positive attitudes. The nonprior service retention rate is 45%. The career service retention rate is 75%. There were no major instances of alcohol or drug abuse.

Response from the 349th Military Alft Wg (Assoc), Travis AFB, CA, indicated that the 349th Wing morale is the best it has been since becoming an associate unit in 1969. Strong leadership, flying the C-141 and C-5, greater acceptance by active duty counterparts, and improved benefits have all contributed to increased morale. Reenlistment rate for nonprior service was 19% ; career, 95%. Attitude is 50% better than in a draft environment because they want to participate. There are fewer disciplinary problems. For example, between 1969 and 1972, approximately 30 airmen were involuntarily recalled to EAD due to failure to meet participation requirements. Between 1972 and 1974 there were only 16 airmen recalled involuntarily even though the total number of assigned airmen increased substantially. Air Force grooming standards present no problem to the non-draft volunteer, whereas there are still problems with the airmen with remaining military obligations who joined during the draft environment. Drugs and alcohol are not a problem. The educational and maturity level of our nonprior service airmen is lower under the no-draft environment, but disciplinary problems have not changed significantly. Overall, discipline is not a problem area.

Senator NUNN. We mentioned a little while ago, General Jones did, about the strategic air lift mix—what plans do you have for implementing the decision, which is now in the authorization bill on that subject as far as the study about the surge capability and where it should come from?

Secretary McLUCAS. We have made adjustments in the crew ratios. We think that is one of the best ways to get enhanced airlift.

General Jones mentioned the proposed stretch of the C-141 airplane and we are also interested in the AMST, Advanced Medium STOL Transport. We are also working with the airlines to try and develop some information as to how many civil transport aircraft the airlines would be willing for us to modify. This takes considerable study, because there are so many proposals as to how the commercial airplanes might be modified.

I should have mentioned in connection with the C-141 that we intend to put a refueling capability in it; and in the AMST. It would have in-flight refueling capability.

With the C-5, we are taking steps to make sure that that airplane is maintained in good condition. As you may remember, we had some difficulties with the wing which limits the useful life of the airplane. We have proposed modifications that we want to put in that would stretch the life of that airplane back into what we had in mind at the beginning.

Through a combination of these activities we expect that we can get the augmentation airlift that is needed.

Senator Nunn. What about the manpower? That is what I particularly had reference to, because we did have an amendment in the bill that related to the manpower, and the Congress expressed its opinion, as you know, about using the Reserve and Guard to the maximum extent possible for incremental and surge capability.

Secretary McLUCAS. Yes.

Senator NUNN. I believe you were mandated to have a plan and go into considerable depth on that.

Secretary McLUCAS. That is right. We have been working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on this, and we think that we do have a plan worked out which would give us manning up to four crews per aircraft where we get, depending on whether we are talking about C-5's or C-141's, 2.5 active crews and 1.5 Reserve crews, for a total of four, which we think puts us in good shape.

General JONES. But we are holding that in abeyance, in sense of response to the sense of Congress, we will not make that change but will respond within 180 days, which I believe we will beat, by a great deal. We will take a whole new look at it.

Senator NUNN. I would hope in doing this that you would assume, at least for one of the alternatives, that this call-up authority will be granted by Congress. I would hate to have this study and the whole thing projected on the status quo with the national emergency, and yet I know you have to have the other alternative if this called-up capability is not conferred.

General JONES. We are looking at the hybrid with or without call-up, and the whole spectrum. In a way it is sort of a start-over, in that there were two parts of the strategic airlift enhancement program, and it was obvious that we had to do a better job with Congress on it. That is on increased utilization rates for the C-5 and C-141, different ways to get it. So we are studying that problem, and also studying the use of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and its interrelation with all airlift capability. But I can assure you that we are not increasing the crew ratio today with the sense of Congress asking that we study it before we make a move.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, do you see any major changes in the deployment of the U.S. forces overseas in fiscal year 1975?

General JONES. With regard to Europe, I hope that the change would be in the structure of the forces with an increased combat capability and reduced support, and remain at the same level unless we get a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction agreement.

With regard to the rest of the world, we have come down substantially in the Pacific. As the Secretary mentioned, we are down under 30,000 in Southeast Asia, that is in Thailand and associated areas. We are carefully examining where we should go from here, with the intent over time to reduce that number even further.

Senator NUNN. How about Korea, do you have very many Air Force personnel there?

General JONES. We have about 7,000 in Korea. We would not expect any substantial change in that number unless there is a change in the overall involvement with South Korea. The larger number there is the Army, and a lot of our activities are directed to supporting the Army. So we do not project any substantial changes.

Senator DOMINICK. I had to step out. I am sorry.

Was that the Reserve or the regular forces that were in Korea?

General JONES. That is the regular active forces, yes, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. 7,000?

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Senator Dominick, I yield to you.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all I have.

Senator NUNN. General Jones, I know you have been involved in the European problem, the NATO problem of our troops, particularly drug and alcohol abuse. I am sure you followed to some extent, the court of appeals decision, at least one of the courts. I am not sure whether it was the court of appeals or the district court, outlawing or declaring unconstitutional the tests that were being ad-

ministered, the urinalysis tests. Do you have any up-to-date opinion of the seriousness of the drug and alcohol problem in Europe in terms of Air Force personnel or otherwise, and any opinion as to how this court case, assuming it may be affirmed by the Supreme Court, is going to affect the Air Force efforts in this regard?

General JONES. It is hard to predict how much it is going to affect us, because we had a very, very small number of people that were on hard drugs and a very small number detected in the urinalysis program. So it is sort of a projection of "what do you think the deterrent value of that would be." That, only time will tell. I doubt, with regard to the Air Force, it would be that big an issue because we do not have a hard drug problem in Europe.

Senator NUNN. The main problem is with the Army?

General JONES. They have the higher percentage of hard drug users. I must say they have a much higher percentage of those who are susceptible to hard drug abuse: the unmarried, young soldier. We have a much higher percentage of more senior people, technically trained, career types. I do not want to be critical of the Army. In fact, I think the Army has done a lot of work in Europe to bring this problem under control, but the number susceptible in the age group, single, is much higher than ours.

Secretary McLUCAS. Mr. Chairman, after looking at statistics in the Air Force on that, I did not have any trouble supporting the idea that we not reinstate that program even if we got approval, because as General Jones said, the number of people involved was very low; and second, the number of people that were turned up by other means was much higher than the number turned up by that particular analysis.

General JONES. Even though the total is still small, proportionately the number detected is higher by other means. However, I would like to add that I think in things such as this we ought to be consistent among the services. If we have urinalysis testing for the Army in Europe, we ought to have urinalysis testing for the Air Force in Europe. On many of our bases we have a soldier living in the next barracks to an airman, and it will be very difficult to tell him why—you can tell him you test by age or rank or something, but it is difficult to tell him, you are Army and we are Air Force, you do not have to test. So we would hope that this would be a unified Defense Department policy.

Senator NUNN. How about the alcohol problem, is that very serious in the Air Force in Europe?

General JONES. I think it is about the same as the national average. It is hard to tell. I think our Nation has a problem with alcoholism. I am not talking about the typical Bowery drunk. I think it is a problem throughout the country, and I doubt if it is any more of a problem in the Air Force than in our society in general. In some respects we may have less of a problem than society. Nonetheless, we have instituted many identification programs. I think the basic change has been in attitude, that alcoholism is an illness, and if an individual with this illness will come, we will help him be cured in an open handed method. If we determine that the individual is an alcoholic and is not interested in being helped—it is

not a permissive program. We have pilots who were alcoholics who have recovered and who are back on flying status—not many, because I do not think we have many pilots in that category. We have people in all areas. And, therefore, I think we are building credibility in our program. We do not demote people just because they have this problem, if they will come forward and ask for help in solving the problem.

So I do not think we have a major problem in the sense of relation to our population, but I think that our whole country has a problem. Further, I think the world has a problem throughout much of the world to include Europe. Many European nations have a problem.

Secretary McLUCAS. I was interested to see when I visited General Jones over there some time back, and we went to some of the details, that we had more people being treated because of alcoholism than we did because of what is normally called drugs. But the number is still a small number.

Senator NUNN. The Army, I think, has a real big problem with alcohol, perhaps even more than drugs, based on some of the hearings Senator Hughes has had and some of the testimony I have read. However, they are, as I said, making giant strides, and they seem to think this court decision is going to be very detrimental to their program.

Mr. Secretary, on another subject, how many Air Force personnel do we now have in Thailand, and what are the plans for those? Are we going to be withdrawing any in the near future?

Secretary McLUCAS. As we said earlier, there is something around 30,000 or a little less at the moment. Since we get our guidance through the National Security Council on this matter, I would only be making an assumption about what additional changes might take place. However, I would assume that it would be with continuing downward trends.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, on the broad subject that we talked about earlier—and it is a broad subject and a difficult subject—on the question of how do we prevent the continuing escalation of personnel costs, you mentioned, I believe, that you were going to try to bring your percentage down from 46 percent of the Air Force dollar to 41 percent.

Secretary McLUCAS. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. How are you going to go about doing that?

Secretary McLUCAS. Of course, we have quite a few more thousand people that are not going to be with us. In other words, the overall trend cuts are still taking place. At the same time we are finding ways to save in training costs, so that the number of people involved in training—or you might say the total fraction of a man's life that he spends in training as opposed to the fraction that he spends in active service—can be reduced. So in order to maintain a certain number of people in active service, you have a smaller total number, because there are fewer of them in training. So that is one of the more significant things that we are continuing to find ways to improve in the training area. And I am sure that it is going to be through a combination of things. But I would expect that there

will be continuing downward trends in our overall population. That is one way we will save money.

Senator NUNN. If you come up with any answers at any time about this personnel thing, we would like for you to feel free to submit them to us, because we are going to be concentrating on not rolling back, but trying to come to grips with the continuing portion of the defense dollar that is going to personnel.

How does the Air Force plan to use the selective early retirement bill if it is enacted? Are you going to be cutting back numbers or increasing promotion?

If you like, you can submit that for the record.

Secretary McLUCAS. I think I should.

[The information follows:]

Air Force will select 150 colonels and 240 lieutenant colonels for forced retirement in FY 75 if H.R. 11113 is enacted prior to October 1974. Enactment subsequent to that date will preclude separations in FY 75 as there will be insufficient time to accomplish necessary administrative and board actions including the minimum six months notification for discontinued officers; a feature of the legislative proposal. The Department of Defense has directed the Air Force to reduce 05/06 authorizations in the numbers selected for discontinuation, should we be able to exercise the new authority in FY 75. Consequently, younger officers would not be promoted to replace those who were discontinued.

The original concept behind the selective continuation proposal was to afford management the capability to fine tune hump year groups by the forced retirement of senior regular officers. Most importantly, this device would make it possible to induce involuntary losses in the higher ranks now protected by law during force reductions, thus obviating the need for always requiring junior reserve officers to bear the brunt of RIFs. It was also intended both as force structuring device and to a lesser extent, a means of controlling quality at the senior levels.

As the Air Force has always planned to use H.R. 11113 for these originally designed purposes and thereby maintain a stable promotion flow in terms of promotion opportunity and timing of promotion, we would find it difficult to exercise H.R. 11113 in the out years if the new authority were to result in loss of grade authorizations each time we used it. For FY 76 and beyond we would like to have the option to discontinue a senior officer in lieu of separating a junior officer without the promotion program being penalized.

Secretary McLUCAS. We have recently had a slight increase over prior years in Colonel retirements. Because of the current pay structure, the anomaly that we have is that if you can get out, then you can get the next cost of living increase, and that kind of thing. These increased retirements and the vacancies thus created have allowed us to advance slightly earlier those previously selected for promotion.

General JONES. Senator, may I make a remark in that regard?

One thing I am a great believer in, and that is giving incentives to the bureaucracy. And that is the way you really solve the problem, by giving the system the incentive to work it.

If we had a restriction that said for every colonel we retired early we lost the space, I think that would be a negative incentive to the bureaucracy. On the other hand, I am not proposing that for everyone we retire we promote one. But there should be some happy medium in there, or the system will not have the incentive to eliminate the man who is sort of marginal, and if you lose him, you do not get a replacement. So you can see the point I am making there, there should be some degree of incentive to the system.

Senator NUNN. I do see the point you are making. I think in the civil service area and in the military area and in all governmental personnel—and that is not just the Federal Government but the State governments too—we have a problem in personnel, and how we restore the incentives. I do not think we have it now at all, and I do not have the answers, but we would like to communicate with you on that point.

General JONES. I find in the system there are many negative incentives to do the wrong thing. The system tends to give us things like that.

Senator NUNN. Also, our budgeting process, which starts right at the top, is probably as bad an example of how you give or do not give incentives as any I know of anywhere in the world. We are at present way ahead of our appropriations process. Everybody is patting themselves on the back, and the fiscal year started—what, 40 days ago?—and yet we are doing better this year than ever before. We hope to have the money appropriated back retroactively to July 1 by October 1, and we will all pat ourselves on the back for doing a great job. The whole budget process, I think, is under review, and I think the new timetable will be much more realistic. Perhaps the question of 2-year authorizations on manpower could be examined. We talked about that this morning. Do you have any reaction to that idea, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary McLUCAS. I think that the short-term planning that we are now able to do is always less than ideal. So I would think that anything that would increase the period over which plans were made would be good.

Senator NUNN. That was not my idea, but it was discussed this morning. I think it is worthy of consideration.

Senator Dominick.

Senator DOMINICK. One question. General Jones said something which intrigued me. General, you said, if I understand you correctly, that when you have a marginal guy that decides to take early retirement, you do not necessarily have one to replace him. Would it not be good to get rid of a marginal fellow?

General JONES. I am in favor of getting rid of the marginal guy. However, in a large organization, we have gray areas. If for every person that you put out you lose that space, the system tends then to lean in the direction of keeping the borderline individual instead of leaning the other direction. So I am all for elimination of the marginal individual, and I am all for the advanced retirement provision. I am saying that I think it will be used more effectively if you do not incur a penalty to the system by losing that space. I am not saying that overall we should not be coming down. But using that as the way to come down will probably result in less effective use of that one tool.

Senator DOMINICK. That assumes that this system is right. I am still not quite sure it is.

General JONES. What I would like to do is give incentives to the system to be right. The system will, I think, tend to be right. But with a negative incentive, it is difficult to get the system to do the right thing. That is my point.

Senator DOMINICK. I will buy that.

Senator NUNN. General, at this point, we have completed most of the questions. We have a few more, but I know you are on a tight schedule. I have talked to Senator Dominick, and both of us would like it if you would agree to stay for a closed session so that you can brief us on the Cyprus developments to the extent possible.

General JONES. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Provide a break-out of all assigned Air Force pilots and other flyers, including enlisted personnel, by what they do (job assignment).

[The information follows:]

The information, as of 30 June 1974 follows:

Officer:

Pilot:

General.....	305
Colonel.....	3,171
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Lieutenant colonel and below:	
Aircrew.....	17,735
Operations staff.....	7,715
Nonrated duty (supplement).....	4,679
Other ¹	1,029
Subtotal.....	31,158
Total.....	34,634
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Navigator:

General.....	8
Colonel.....	587
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Lieutenant colonel and below:	
Aircrew.....	8,313
Operations staff.....	2,474
Nonrated duty (supplement).....	1,799
Other ¹	599
Subtotal.....	13,185
Total.....	13,780
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Flight surgeon:

General.....	15
Colonel.....	293
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Lieutenant colonel and below:

Flight surgeon duty.....	296
Medical specialist duty.....	332
Subtotal.....	628
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Total.....	936
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Flight nurses.....	181
Weather officers.....	59
Weapons directors.....	83
Missile officers.....	71
Communications officers.....	32
Logistics officers.....	15
Avionics officers.....	25
Intelligence officers.....	41
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¹ Advanced degree programs, professional military schools, technical training, and patient status.

Enlisted:

Flight engineer.....	2, 502
Loadmaster.....	2, 250
Flight mechanic.....	1, 557
Inflight refueling operator.....	1, 209
Defensive fire control systems operator.....	747
Airborne voice processing specialist.....	666
Inflight passenger service specialist.....	349
Pararescue specialist.....	343
Radio operator.....	310
Medical service technician.....	268
Airborne communications center specialist.....	106
Aeromedical specialist.....	90
Aerospace control and warning systems operator.....	281
Avionics communications specialist.....	134
Airborne early warning radar specialist.....	111
Electronic warfare systems specialist.....	170
Airborne weapons mechanic.....	178
Command and control specialist.....	92
Weather observer.....	60
Morse systems operator.....	123
Instrumentation mechanic.....	90
Other ²	542
Total.....	12, 178

² Personnel in 27 additional aircrew skills, such as optical instrumentation specialist, electronic intelligence operations specialist, motion picture camera specialist, etc.

Senator NUNN. At this point we will have a closed session.

Secretary McLUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that we in the Air Force feel that we are in very good shape from a personnel standpoint. We are not unhappy with the size of the force, with the quality of the force, with the structure of the force. We feel very good about the personnel picture in the Air Force. We would like to be able to maintain that in the future, perhaps taking cuts as technology allows us to do, or as the external situation might dictate. But by and large, I want to leave you with the impression that we think we are in quite good shape.

Senator NUNN. It is obvious, I think, that the Air Force is in a more comfortable position with the volunteer environment than any other branch of the service. I think that speaks well for your personnel policies and your missions.

Secretary McLUCAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the subcommittee went into executive session.]