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# SOVIET ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

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## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

### JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

### CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JULY 17, 18, AND 19, 1973

Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee

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SOVIET ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

DOCUMENTS

HEARINGS

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# SOVIET ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

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TUESDAY, JULY 17, 1973

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 1114, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William Proxmire (vice chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Proxmire, Humphrey, and Javits; and Representatives Reuss, Widnall, and Blackburn.

Also present: John R. Stark, executive director; Loughlin F. McHugh, senior economist; Michael J. Runde, administrative assistant; John R. Karlik and L. Douglas Lee, professional staff members; George D. Krumbhaar, Jr., minority counsel; and Walter B. Laessig, minority counsel.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PROXMIRE

Senator PROXMIRE. The committee will come to order.

The Joint Economic Committee has taken the initiative over the years to analyze the economics of both the Soviet Union and Communist China. These undertakings have proven eminently worthwhile in acquainting the Congress and the American public realistically with developments in those countries.

This year the committee has just released a study on the Soviet economic outlook which we think is probably the most complete that exists outside of the Soviet Union itself. Obviously, the whole question of the Russian economy and their economic outlook has assumed even greater importance for us in view of the recent Brezhnev visit and the increase in agreements on economic matters between the two countries.

These developments have, as we know, given rise to important questions of public policy and it is our intention to explore these at our hearings. Among the questions that we will ask are the following:

1. Has the recent improvement in Soviet-American relations increased the possibility that fewer resources will be directed to Soviet military programs?

2. To what extent is poor economic performance in the Soviet Union likely to be a factor in both the reduction of Soviet military programs and in the possibility of improved relations with the United States?

3. What scenario can we expect in regard to U.S. agricultural exports to the Soviet Union?

4. Will the developing commercial relations between our two countries be as beneficial to the United States as to the Soviet Union?

These questions have a direct bearing on domestic and international issues before the Congress. We face an urgent need to reorder our own spending priorities and, in that regard, to shift some resources from military to civilian programs. Obviously, our ability to do this will be greatly influenced by what the Soviet Union does in respect to their own military activities.

Moreover, if we are to take advantage of a growing Soviet market for our agricultural products, we must, at the same time, be assured that these sales do not produce excessive pressures on our own domestic food prices or on our transportation system.

In respect to commercial relations, it is obviously very important to us to have a little clearer idea than we do now of what benefits will accrue to our economy in terms of employment, energy resources, and balance of payments benefits.

It would be hard to assemble a better group of witnesses to begin our hearings. Mr. David Rockefeller, chairman of the board of the Chase Manhattan Bank, has recently opened banking relations both with the People's Republic of China and with the Soviet Union. He has been helpful to this committee on numerous occasions. He is an outstanding businessman and economist and we welcome him warmly as our leadoff witness.

Mr. Kenna, as president of the National Association of Manufacturers, organized a meeting of some 700 to 800 American industrialists and Soviet commercial officials in Washington this February and has been instrumental in the summit agreement on the establishment of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council.

Prof. Abram Bergson of Harvard was perhaps our first leading economist specializing in the Soviet economy. He is said to have taught more of our economic specialists on the Soviet economy than any other individual in this country. Certainly the influence of his seminal works on Soviet national income places him in the forefront of Western scholarship on the Soviet-type economies. Some refer to him as the doyen of the field.

As our first two witnesses, Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Kenna have urgent business elsewhere, they have to leave, as I understand it, at 11 o'clock; we shall take their testimony first and question them before proceeding to Mr. Bergson.

As you know, gentlemen, we have a rule which we try to enforce of allowing 10 minutes for the opening statement. Your entire statement will be printed in full in the record. If you can appropriately brief it, we would appreciate it very much.

Mr. Rockefeller, go right ahead.

#### **STATEMENT OF DAVID ROCKEFELLER, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, NEW YORK CITY**

MR. ROCKEFELLER. My name is David Rockefeller. I am chairman of the board of Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., of New York. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Joint Economic Committee to discuss our trade relations with the Soviet Union.

Over the past 10 years, I have participated in a group called the Dartmouth Conference, which was organized in the 1960's by Norman Cousins to promote informal discussions between American and Soviet

citizens. Through these discussions, I have gained a better understanding of developments in the Soviet Union, and my interest in the country has been heightened by several trips there. The latest was in May of this year when I took part in the official opening of Chase Manhattan's representative office in Moscow, and also had the opportunity to talk with Prime Minister Kosygin and other Soviet leaders.

Through these and other contacts, I have formed three impressions about the Soviet Union that I would like to share with you today.

First, I believe that the changes we see taking place in the Soviet Union's relations with the West in general, and with the United States in particular, are genuine, fundamental, and deeply rooted in economic pragmatism.

The policy of economic isolationism that characterized the U.S.S.R. for many decades is being seriously reassessed. It has not brought the hoped-for benefits and rate of economic growth has been sluggish, if not declining, since the mid-1960's. As workers are expecting material improvements, the Soviet leaders are responding by placing a high priority on raising living standards and improving the quality of the diet.

In terms of technology, Soviet industry is generally conceded to be lagging behind the West. Increases in labor and capital inputs no longer can be expected to provide strong stimulus to growth as in the past. The need, as indicated in the latest 5-year plan, is to raise output per unit of labor or capital input. This means higher productivity.

Despite large capital outlays, productivity levels in the Soviet Union are still substantially behind those of the United States. A report issued last year by former Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson showed that labor productivity in the U.S.S.R. was 41 percent that of the United States in industry and only 11 percent in agriculture.

Their search for assistance extends to our country because the United States enjoys the world's technological superiority in precisely those economic sectors that the Soviet needs to develop—agriculture, computers, pipeline transmission, and heavy machinery for natural resource development. U.S. industry and our financial institutions also have the ability to handle very large projects.

In the past, when economic difficulties occurred, the Soviet policymakers exhorted workers to work harder and consumers to hold down consumption levels. Such belt-tightening programs now appear to be less acceptable. The preferred alternative is to turn westward in the expectation that improved economic ties with the United States and other Western countries will strengthen the Soviet economy. At the same time, the improvement in the world political environment, especially the ending of U.S. direct military involvement in Vietnam, has—I believe—made it possible for the Soviets to seek more enduring economic ties with this country.

The desire of the Soviets to use Western trade, credits, and technology to bolster their own economy hopefully could be accompanied by their giving lower priority to military programs. The large amount of resources they now devote to such economically nonproductive activities—which is reported to be substantially greater in relation to GNP than in the United States or any other major power—could better be utilized to strengthen their economic capabilities. I hope that this turns out to be so.

At the moment, however, I think it is premature to conclude that the military competition between the Soviet Union and the United States is at an end. Much will depend on the program of current and future negotiations on defense and security matters and on how agreed-to principles are in fact implemented.

My second main impression concerns the distribution of benefits from the expansion of United States-Soviet commercial relations. My own belief is that in the longer run we both stand to gain a great deal in terms of both long-run political and economic benefits.

Initially, however, opportunities for the political benefits appear to be the more significant, at least from our point of view. If the currently improved atmosphere leads to a world of real peace, then the present efforts at detente—of which increased commercial relations form an important part—will prove to be highly beneficial to the United States as well as the rest of the world.

I hope that this will occur but it is still too soon to be certain. We have witnessed a few abortive attempts at coexistence in the past and future efforts will be needed on both sides to make certain that the current initiatives work and are solid and permanent in nature.

On purely the economic side, the Soviets do appear to gain an advantage—if only for the short run—in increased trade. They stand to benefit from U.S. technology, which they urgently need to strengthen their economic structure.

Expanding their purchases from the United States through credit can increase the availability of goods in their domestic markets thus offsetting the negative effects of shortages of key commodities or products. The corresponding expansion of U.S. exports, while very desirable and by no means negligible, may be of less significance in relation to our economy than the imports are to theirs.

The major economic benefits to the United States will become more evident in the longer run, as commercial relations expand in scope and depth. In particular, the extensive natural resources that are to be found in the Soviet Union could help alleviate prospective U.S. shortages, especially of sources of energy.

While there could be a problem of too great a dependence on one source of supply if we were to rely too heavily on the Soviet to meet our domestic requirements, Soviet oil and natural gas resources would help the United States satisfy part of our increasing need for energy while seeking to expand our search for additional supplies domestically and elsewhere in the world.

Moreover, even if the two major gas fields in Siberia, which are currently under discussion, were fully developed and we were to get all their output, which seems improbable, this would only provide an estimated 4 or 5 percent of U.S. natural gas consumption by 1980. In short, the risk of excessive dependence does not appear to me, at least, to be too great.

Also, as trade ties improve, there will be growing opportunities for the export of U.S.-manufactured products, first for use by Soviet industry and later for use directly by the Soviet consumers. It should also be pointed out that if the United States fails to act now to gain a foothold in the Soviet market, the penetration by companies of other countries might well limit the ability of American companies to

participate fully in the growth of this market which is already weighted heavily in favor of Europe.

Western European nations presently export some \$3 billion of goods to the Soviet Union, mostly of machinery and equipment which U.S. producers are capable of selling. This compares with \$547 million of U.S. exports in 1972. The manufacture of these exports would create additional jobs for American labor if they were produced by us, and it would be a benefit to our balance of payments.

There is admittedly a degree of risk involved when we consider that political benefits are not yet assured and that major economic benefits are still in the future. However, it is in the best American tradition to welcome prudent risks for the challenging opportunities they bring. The world of business and the world of international affairs have always involved risks. We have learned to deal effectively with these in the past, and I don't see why we should not be able to deal with them in the future—especially when the risks of failure to act could also be great and when the possible benefits for us all are enormous.

One approach to large-scale economic ties with the Soviets would be the formation of multinational arrangements, supported by both the public and private sectors, to undertake the financing of major Soviet projects such as the exploitation of Siberian gas reserves. I personally believe this to be both necessary and desirable.

The third point I would like to make concerns most-favored-nation—MFN—treatment for Soviet goods. It is my own view that, despite understandable reservations, the United States should extend most-favored-nation status to the U.S.S.R.

I say this fully aware that this is a highly complex and sensitive subject, both here and in the Soviet Union. As you know, some of the agreements that have been reached—such as the trade agreement and the lend lease arrangement—are conditional upon the Congress granting MFN status. While the lack of such status may not actually be all that detrimental at present to Soviet sales to our market, it does threaten the potential growth of such exports and hence the ability of the Soviet Union to purchase American products. Moreover, it represents a real psychological barrier to improved relations because the Soviets are opposed to doing business with countries that discriminate against their goods.

I appreciate the fact that there are certain aspects of Soviet life that we as Americans don't like. There are, to be sure, many aspects of our society that they don't like. I personally favor the free flow of people and ideas across national borders and the full development of every persons' talents, in whatever fields they may lie. I welcome the recent statement by Secretary of State Rogers at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that human rights and freedoms must not be ignored and that more human and cultural contacts are needed.

The question, as I see it, is how best to promote such personal contacts and exchanges of ideas which are essential to the breaking down of barriers between East and West. Increased commercial relations are one important way of getting each side to better know the other. If the MFN issue proves a stumbling block to a broader range

of economic exchanges we may lose a good opportunity to refashion the world along more rational and more cooperative lines.

I fully recognize that commercial relations cannot be pursued in a vacuum. The ultimate objective of commerce is a better life for the peoples of the trading countries. Thus, it is important that, together with an increase in trade, investment, and credits, there should be an increase in the two-way flow of professional people, government officials, industrialists, and tourists, as well as of information and cultural contacts. The more we know about the Soviet Union and the Soviet people, the better we will be able to assess their future intentions. The more the Soviets know of the United States and the American people, the better they will be able to appreciate our system and values.

To achieve these goals, flexibility and compromise will be required on both sides. I believe there is already an indication that such flexibility exists and I hope that Congress will not delay further in granting most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, I support further efforts to expand commercial and other economic relations with the Soviet Union. I don't see this being done to the neglect of human values, but rather in the hope and expectation of reinforcing such values. I would not expect the Soviets to adopt our way of life, any more than we would want to adopt theirs. But I believe that increasing contact between two major societies will favorably affect the atmosphere for peace and benefit our citizens as well as theirs.

Thank you.

Senator PROXMIRE. Before we go to Mr. Kenna, Senator Javits very graciously came here this morning, although he is needed in the Foreign Relations Committee and is also handling the War Powers Act on the floor. I think out of courtesy, we will permit Senator Javits to handle his time however he wishes and we will go then to Mr. Kenna.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman, for your very kind consideration.

I shall ask only one question of Mr. Rockefeller, first expressing pride at my State in having so eminent a banker and leader as David Rockefeller, and the weight of the testimony which he gives before us and other congressional committees.

I also would like to join our vice chairman, who has told me something about the work of Mr. Kenna in organizing the very major effort in the Soviet-American economic relations field. I think businessmen should understand that we rate their service very high when it is as much in the public interest as that in which Mr. Kenna is engaged.

Mr. Rockefeller, I have just one troublesome question to ask you. I appreciate your desire to get early MFN for the Soviet Union. I am sure you appreciate, too, the feeling of 77 Senators and over 280 Representatives, who feel that we should not grant MFN unless there is satisfaction over the fact that the Soviet Union will not—in violation of the Declaration of Human Rights, which it signed, as we did—restrain or intimidate many of its citizens, particularly those of the Jewish faith who wish to emigrate. I am very hopeful some way can be found out of that dilemma, but I would not wish to underrate its impact.

Now there is much concern about giving the Soviet Union a lot, which you yourself acknowledged, especially when the benefits to us—both political and economic—may well be deferred benefits. You mention that in your statement in the following words:

The desire of the Soviets to use Western trade, credits, and technology to bolster their own economy hopefully could be accompanied by their giving lower priority to military programs.

To which we all say, "Amen."

Then you say:

There is admittedly a degree of risk involved when we consider that political benefits are not yet assured and that major economic benefits are still in the future.

And the implication, of course, we are giving them everything they want now if we give them the credit, et cetera.

"However," you say, "it is in the best American tradition to welcome prudent risks for the challenging opportunities they bring."

My question is this—and I am going to give you my standard and then see what you say about it—would you say that it is fair or unfair to give ourselves a policy which has not more than a 5-year swing? In other words, shouldn't we put some maximum limits on these relations, considering what we are going to give—which is immediate—and what they may give—which is prospective? Ought we not think of this in terms no more than a 5-year turnaround? Would your judgment tell you that that is a reasonable order of magnitude for how we think through credits, returns on their part, et cetera?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Are you saying, Senator, that either the U.S. Government or corporations not give credit in excess of 5 years?

Senator JAVITS. You know, I am a corporate lawyer myself; and I am not trying to be that doctrinaire, but I am just thinking of the order of magnitude in thinking through when we ought to begin seeing things coming back to us as compared to when we are paying them out. And on a credit-worthiness basis, taking those equations, would a 5-year swing give or take, always a little bit on each side, be a fair way to look at it?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. It might be a fair way but I am not sure it would be satisfactory to them. The difficulty is that the European countries have extended credit of much longer duration than that already in substantial amounts. As a matter of fact, some of the credits that have been given, I believe by Great Britain, have been as much as 15 years. Therefore, if we are going to be at all competitive with European nations and corporations, I am afraid, realistically, we are going to have to grant credits longer than that.

Indeed, some have already been granted, as you probably know, in relation to the Kama River Truck Plant, which is being financed partly by the Export-Import Bank and partly by the Chase Manhattan Bank. Our term runs for 10 years. This, of course, has to do with the export of equipment and capital goods from some 30 U.S. corporations which will enable them to build this plant.

Senator JAVITS. I was thinking also in terms of getting anything back on the political side, and using the 5-year swing idea. Do you think it is fair to expect that, assuming the period you are naming as a reasonable period, as 10 years, which I gather from what you say,

what about political returns? Do you think we have a right to expect those within 5 years?

In other words, when do we see the returns flow in?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I would hope we would see the benefits coming in long before then, long before 5 years. As a matter of fact, I think we already do. The very fact that General Secretary Brezhnev has recently been in this country and spent some time with President Nixon, following a similar trip to the U.S.S.R. by the President, and with an invitation already extended for President Nixon to return next year.

This certainly spells a relaxation of relationships that didn't exist previously. The fact that our bank and subsequently two other banks have been invited to open representative offices in Moscow after a great many years of very little contact seems to me to be an indication of improved relationships.

So, my own feeling is that while we won't know for a few years whether this is the real thing this time, rather than just a flash in the pan, I think there are already benefits. I don't think we should by any manner or means discount those benefits or assume that they are only going to be temporary in nature. I would hope they would be much more lasting.

Senator JAVITS. I am glad to hear you say what you did about the flash in the pan, because we all know from bitter experience that the Russians know when to smile and frown, and we can't put too much of our money on that cart.

But I did want to get from you some order of magnitude. Am I right in concluding, both from what you said and its implications, that Americans ought to see political benefits in a few years and economic benefits within a 10-year swing?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I feel that very strongly and I think it is quite possible that both will be flowing considerably sooner than 10 years.

Senator JAVITS. And that therefore in scheduling what we do, we ought to consider both those time parameters?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I think that would be very reasonable but we have to recognize that we have competitors in other parts of the Western World, particularly in Western Europe. Unless we offer terms which are reasonably competitive with the others, that probably the flow of trade will not be a very significant one.

Senator JAVITS. Would you mind if I interject one point about that? For 11 years—to my personal knowledge, because I was there in 1962—we faced the same thing. The Soviets have been talking about European competitors and reading us shopping lists from which they said they can buy anything anywhere. So why don't we sell them, too, the Russians were saying; they can get it anyhow?

But yet they still come here and are willing to put out an awful lot to deal with us. In my own judgment, there is a big element of respectability involved as well as competition, and personally I hope we won't overlean in our policy toward economic considerations. If we need to, we can live without the Russian trade.

I think, therefore, the Americans have the right to expect that we will have a view of our trade relations which includes total policy rather than just the fact we want some business.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Very good, hard-headed advice. I agree with you, Senator Javits.

Senator PROXMIRE. Now we go to Mr. Kenna. Mr. Kenna, you have an excellent prepared statement, too. It is a little more detailed than Mr. Rockefeller's, and we would appreciate it if you could summarize it and give it to us in 10 minutes or so.

I might say to the new arrivals, both Mr. Kenna and Mr. Rockefeller have to leave by 11 o'clock and Mr. Bergson will be our witness after that.

#### STATEMENT OF E. DOUGLAS KENNA, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS

Mr. KENNA. Mr. Vice Chairman and members of the committee, I am E. Douglas Kenna, president of the National Association of Manufacturers. We appreciate very much having an opportunity to make our views known on this very important subject.

We have become increasingly interested in international trade and international affairs in the past few years because of the great interest shown on the part of our membership. We are currently involved in mutually reinforcing projects on trade legislation, trade negotiation planning and nontariff barriers, multinational investment, and implications of taxing foreign source income, and monetary reform.

As you mentioned, Mr. Vice Chairman, we have become intensively interested in the Soviet-United States trading arrangements in the past few months and have been extremely active working in this particular field.

Specifically, today, I will confine my remarks to the political and economic importance of MFN treatment and to an assessment of the economic gains in expanding United States-Soviet trade for the U.S. economy.

I am prompted by very strong membership interests which initiated a series of activities recently, starting with the meeting that you mentioned between Soviets and United States trade groups. This was attended by a very large and interested delegation from the United States. Subsequent to that, we have forced an East-West Task Force to follow up on this particular meeting and this interest expressed by the U.S. business community.

This has resulted in a proposal being made to the Secretary of Commerce for the establishment and methods of establishing a joint United States-Soviet Chamber of Commerce.

I will furnish for the committee copies of this proposal for your consideration. A copy of the proposal is appended to my prepared statement.

Senator PROXMIRE. Yes, they will be. We will be happy to include that in the record with your prepared statement.

Mr. KENNA. Viewed from the Soviet perspective, the absence of MFN currently affects only about 10 percent of Soviet exports to the United States. This would include such things as plywood, cotton, manmade fibers, fabrics, and apparel, manganese ore, semiprecious stones, vodka, and fish products.

Over the next decade, this Soviet export product mix could change significantly with the shift in Soviet economic output. At the present,

most items impacted by MFN treatment are industrial products. For example, the exports from Czechoslovakia and East Germany are subject to much more substantial discrimination due to lack of MFN, impacting 73 percent and 85 percent of their exports respectively.

To some extent, these figures reflect differential rates of industrialization. Significantly, the Soviet Union is now actively engaged in augmenting its industrial growth rate. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union perceives nondiscriminatory trade access as to the United States—as embodied in MFN treatment—as the formal recognition by the United States of the trade agreement signed in October 1972, and a natural outcome of improved diplomatic relations.

The Soviet Union attaches paramount importance to a fair, equitable trade with the United States. It believes the extension of MFN to be an accepted principle in customary international law. Clearly, MFN extension would underscore the importance the United States attached to its stated objective aimed at a stronger, more peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union.

NAM believes one essential cornerstone of improved and expanded East-West economic interchange is the extension of MFN treatment to centrally controlled, nonmarket economies, not just the Soviet Union. In particular, MFN is vital to the successful continuation of trade expansion with the Soviet Union and other nonmarket economies.

In looking at the potential economic gains to the United States, I would like to make these remarks. In recognizing the relatively small volume of United States-Soviet trade, a valid question for U.S. decisionmaking is, "What is in it for us?" What effect will United States-Soviet trade have on the U.S. economy as a whole? Clearly, particular sectors, such as petroleum and grain, have already benefited from expanding trade with the Soviets.

However, we believe that as trade developments over the longer term, the multiplier benefits of expanded exports and imports will involve direct and indirect benefits to the U.S. economy as a whole.

Beyond the individual sectors which have already been benefited, the major economic interests in expanded Soviet trade would appear to be the following:

1. A surplus trade account over the intermediate term.
2. Export multiplier effect on domestic employment.
3. Greater economies of scale for domestic industry output.
4. Energy/raw material sourcing through development of Soviet natural resources.
5. Increased trade with other nonmarket centrally controlled economies of Eastern Europe—both the Soviet Union and Eastern European economies are seeking hard currency exchange in the West.

So, against this background of U.S. economic interest, the Soviets have already concluded transactions with U.S. companies in the following categories:

1. Large-scale petroleum and natural gas extraction facilities, including transmission and distribution systems.
2. Management control systems utilizing computer facilities.
3. Mass production machinery output such as truck and car assembly.
4. Animal husbandry as characterized by the U.S. agricultural business.

5. Tourist systems, including hotels, package tours, and transportation.

Therefore we feel clearly there are significant economic gains which the United States can achieve by providing goods and services that the Soviet Union is seeking. The projected acceleration of bilateral trade may be very impressive, carrying with it a potential trade surplus for the United States of at least \$1 billion annually by the end of the decade.

Depending on the key variables in trade, including MFN extension, three alternate dollar volume levels seem possible.

Should we continue on our present route, we would expect trade ranging up to \$800 million in annual turnover with changed credit and export structures; perhaps up to \$2 to \$3 billion in trade if MFN status is granted to the Soviets, and if Soviet foreign trade organizations give priority to exporting industrial products; and, with major joint venture development, up to \$4 to \$5 billion when we get into the massive developments of Siberian liquefied gas products.

Recognizing the chronic condition of the U.S. balance of payments, the potential positive contribution of this United States-Soviet trade surplus should be carefully weighed in the decision regarding MFN.

For almost two decades, Soviet trade with the industrialized West and Japan has increased at a faster rate than has world trade as a whole, a very fruitful development from which the United States was self-excluded. We now believe the real loser from these continued restraints on trade will increasingly be the U.S. producer and worker, not the Soviet consumer or the Soviet economy.

We must keep the obvious firmly in mind, and that is, if the United States is unwilling to sell the Soviets what they need, our trading partners, particularly Japan and Western Europe, are anxious to fill these increasing orders.

On the important source of energy, the abundance of Soviet raw materials in energy fuel sources and the Soviet's willingness to exchange these natural resources for technological assistance and development may prove to be the major common denominator over the intermediate to long term in United States-U.S.S.R. commercial relations.

Within each of these basic transaction categories cited above, including energy source development, additional approaches are being explored through licensing arrangements for technology exchange. In addition, some transactions are being considered as joint venture possibilities engaging in new dimensions of risk as well as opportunity for both sides.

Despite the positive gains to be derived from increased East-West trade, as outlined above, NAM believes relations with nonmarket, centrally planned economies must be approached with firmness, not with rose-colored glasses. American workers and manufacturers can benefit from increased trade with such economies, but proper precaution must be taken.

In a centrally planned economy where production and resource allocation are controlled by the state, there is no necessary correspondence between price and cost. In addition, such economies are state traders and internal and external prices may diverge significantly. Coupled with a desire to earn hard currencies, the nonmarket economy may be tempted to use its price obscured products for rapid interna-

tional market penetration. Such action holds the potential for market disruption within free market economies trading with the Soviet Union.

In this regard, the NAM believes the safeguard measures proposed in the administration's Trade Reform Act of 1973, H.R. 6767, and those measures outlined previously in the October 1972 commercial agreements, would minimize the danger of market disruption arising from trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

In conclusion, we believe that a rational approach to commercial normalization between the United States and the Soviet Union should not be construed as an end to all of our differences. The disparities between our economic systems will continue to complicate commercial transactions. Complementary demands in both consumer and non-strategic industrial sectors are likely to serve as a stimulus to increase East-West trade.

We no longer live in an era of stark, bipolar military confrontation. Rapid political and technological change hold an unparalleled opportunity, we believe, for promoting the progress toward the opportunity through the commercial field. Extension of most-favored-nation treatment with attendant trade safeguard and national security consideration factored in, will constitute a positive step toward new directions in East-West trade. Beyond MFN lie major challenges accompanying Soviet trade with the United States, which will be far more important to the long-term success of economic relations between the two countries.

Among these problems will be the resolution of legal and institutional impediments on both sides. The U.S. business community and the NAM believe we should get on with it now.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kenna follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF E. DOUGLAS KENNA

EXPANDED SOVIET-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

Mr. Vice Chairman and members of the committee, I am E. Douglas Kenna, President of the National Association of Manufacturers. NAM member companies, large, medium and small in size, account for almost 75 percent of the nation's manufactured goods, as well as the employment of approximately 15 million persons. NAM's own interest in international economic affairs, as related to U.S. industry, has grown sharply in the past few years. For example, NAM has developed a "systems" approach to international activities which involves mutually reinforcing project on trade legislation, trade negotiations planning and non-tariff barriers, multinational investment and implications of taxing foreign source income, and monetary reform. In addition, growing interest in commercial relations with the Soviet Union and other non-market, centrally planned economies has led NAM to begin an intensive study of this area of international economic relations.

Mr. Vice Chairman, NAM appreciates this opportunity to appear before your Committee. We are cognizant of the major policy decisions facing Congress as regards foreign relations with the Soviet Union and other non-market economies. In the aftermath of the recent Summit talks, we believe U.S.-Soviet relations to be in a crucial period of transition. It is in support of an emerging era of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States—underscored by the impressive series of commercial and military arms limitations agreements—that NAM offers the following testimony. Specifically, I am here today to express NAM's active support for extending most-favored-nation treatment to non-market economies and the implications of expanded East-West trade for the U.S. and the Soviet economies.

My remarks will cover the following general points:

1. Recent NAM activities related to trade expansion with non-market, centrally-planned economies, focusing on commercial relations with the Soviet Union.
2. The political and economic importance of most-favored-nation treatment.
3. An assessment of economic gains in expanding U.S.-Soviet trade for the Soviet economy.
4. An assessment of economic gains in expanding U.S.-Soviet trade for the U.S. economy.
5. The potential challenges and problems that may arise from increased economic ties with non-market economies, particularly as they relate to recent experience with the Soviet Union and methods to surmount these difficulties.

#### *Background*

During the past two years, relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union have decisively shifted directions. This was particularly evidenced by the establishment of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission at the May, 1972 Summit Conference and the subsequent signing of a comprehensive set of trade agreements on October 18, 1972 between the two governments. Through this agreement, a number of issues, including lend lease repayments, were resolved and foundations were laid for opening new channels for commercial relations with the U.S.S.R.

Prompted by strong membership interest, NAM initiated a series of activities aimed at promoting better industry understanding and awareness of the problems and opportunities surrounding expanded trade with the U.S.S.R. For example, NAM co-hosted a high-level conference on U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade in February 1973, providing industry with a forum for frank, two-way discussion workshops with U.S. and Soviet government officials, on prospects and issues surrounding expanded East-West trade. A special delegation from the Soviet Union, led by Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, V. S. Alkhimov, participated in the mutually productive and stimulating interchange. The overwhelming support and enthusiasm generated at the conference on behalf of U.S.-Soviet trade led to significant changes in Association policy. In April, 1973, NAM's International Economic Affairs Committee recommended, and the Board of Directors approved, a new policy position regarding trade with state-controlled, non-market economies. (See Appendix A.)

In accordance with this new policy and in order to effectively pursue interest expressed and activities initiated at the U.S.-Soviet Conference, NAM established a special task force on East-West trade. This group has done much to facilitate increased understanding of Soviet-U.S. economic issues. In addition, the Task Force has submitted NAM's proposed recommendations for the creation of the new private-sector organization established in accordance with the June 22 Protocol signed by Secretary of the Treasury, George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Trade Minister, N. S. Patolichev (which called for a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce). In addition to providing an organizational structure, this NAM proposal outlines extensive guidelines and recommendations to facilitate reciprocal commercial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would provide an independent organization for the private sector to channel in ideas on special problems into the Joint Commercial Commission. The new organization would also work toward bringing buyer-seller relationships between the Soviet Union and U.S. into clearer focus. For example, the U.S. sales representative often encounters layers of bureaucratic intermediaries without ever dealing directly with the final user of the product.

#### *MFN Extension: Political and Economic Importance*

Recognizing the Soviet Union's announced intention of placing "substantial" orders for U.S. machinery, plant and equipment and agricultural products, with sizeable benefits for U.S. exporters, the issue of most favored nation extension takes on paradoxical overtones. Since 1951, through the Trade Agreements Extension Act, (Section 5), the United States has denied the MFN treatment to the Soviet Union for political and security reasons. Now it appears, at least over the short term, to be more advantageous for the U.S. to extend MFN to the Soviet Union, than it is for that nation to grant comparable treatment. However, most-favored-nation in the context of immediate U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations is of more political and psychological than economic significance.

Viewed from the Soviet perspective, the absence of MFN currently affects only about 10 percent of Soviet exports to the United States. This would include plywood, cotton, and man-made fibers, fabrics and apparel, manganese ore, semi-

precious stones, vodka and fish products. Over the next decade this Soviet export product mix could change significantly with a shift in Soviet economic output. At present most items impacted by MFN treatment are industrial products. For example, exports from Czechoslovakia and East Germany are subject to much more substantial discrimination due to lack of MFN, impacting 73 percent and 85 percent of their exports respectively. (See Appendix B.) To some extent, these figures reflect differential rates of industrialization. Significantly, the Soviet Union is now actively engaged in augmenting its industrial growth rate.

Nonetheless the Soviet Union perceives non-discriminatory trade access to the U.S. (embodied in MFN treatment) as the formal recognition by the U.S. of the Trade Agreement signed in October, 1972 and a natural outcome of improved diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union attaches paramount importance to a fair, equitable trade with the United States. It believes the extension of MFN to be an accepted principle in customary international law. Clearly, MFN extension would underscore the importance the U.S. attached to its stated objectives aimed at a stronger, more peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union.

NAM believes one essential cornerstone of improved and expanded East-West economic interchange is the extension of MFN treatment to centrally controlled, non-market economies. In particular, MFN is vital to the successful continuation of trade expansion with the Soviet Union and other non-market economies.

As for the United States, we must ask ourselves to what extent the denial of most-favored nation treatment has actually contributed to our national security. Failure to grant MFN may have slowed down military and technological product development. But this is a dubious proposition in most areas where the free flow of information and ideas permits scientific innovators to monitor developments. Admittedly, trade and security safeguards in certain technologically sensitive areas remain necessary. However, the export control system applied to commercial exchanges involving strategic technologies and binding on transactions with all trading partners would be applied with equal stringency in trade with the U.S.S.R.

In addition to these more general considerations, failure to grant MFN has contributed to other deleterious consequences :

1. Along with export controls, lack of MFN has been a continual source of friction between the U.S. and her allies desiring to pursue trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

2. Indirectly, it may have inhibited the maturation of the Soviet Union and other non-market economies by limiting their access to consumer goods that would contribute to a rising standard of living.

3. It has contributed to the United States lack of business experience in trading with these countries, and contributed to the static levels of trade characterizing U.S. commercial relations with these non-market economies.

4. It has prevented U.S. businesses and corporations from establishing a viable market position as opposed to other Western European competitors.

#### *Assessment of Economic Gains in Expanding United States-Soviet Trade for Soviet Economy*

Assuming the extension of MFN, NAM foresees mutually beneficial economic relations unfolding over the longer run. However, the fruition and magnitude of a U.S.-Soviet trade relationship will depend on a reciprocal, two-way exchange through which the Soviets can earn hard currency. In this context, Soviet currency earnings will depend upon :

1. Soviet willingness to shift their exports of coal and gas from other markets, including other non-market economies, to the U.S.

2. The size of U.S. government and private sector credits and guarantees extended to the Soviet Union for the purchase of U.S. equipment and services.

3. Soviet ability to undertake production of industrial goods which it can market in the West.

4. Most favored nation treatment extended by the U.S.

Nearly all estimates of U.S.-Soviet trade levels have been surpassed in the past few years. In 1972, two way trade reached a volume of \$642.1 million, nearly tripling the previous year's level (\$218.1 million). This figure far exceeds the level of Soviet-American trade for any year since 1946, but does not begin approaching even conservative projections charting trade levels to reach \$4 billion by the end of the decade.

The recent increase in the volume of East-West trade reflects a number of policy changes in non-market economies undertaken by non-market economies. For example, the ninth Five Year Plan, initiated in the Soviet Union in 1971,

indicated a new commitment to improving the consumer goods: food, clothing, personal transportation and housing for the Soviet citizen. The implications for Soviet trade of this new Soviet willingness to seek Western sources for agricultural and consumer products as well as the greater autonomy which the Soviets have been granted to their newly organized production units are important reflections of this trend. The Soviets can be expected to remain major purchasers of U.S. and other Western grain surpluses for at least another year due to lower crop yields. Thereafter, however, their purchases are likely to be sporadic at best. Unfortunately, our initial commercial encounters with large scale grain transactions with the Soviets have had inflationary effects on U.S. food prices and have reflected (1) an unfortunate lack of coordination between government and industry, (2) a general lack of understanding regarding the sophisticated trading techniques of the Soviet Union.

In the final analysis the recent failure of the Soviet economic performance in both industrial and economic output has forced Soviet leadership to consider new approaches to economic change. Their probable options in order of possibility are:

1. A general priority reduction aimed at cutting strategic weapons systems outlay.
2. A general reduction in the size of the Soviet army (manpower).
3. Greater autonomy granted to local production units of the economy to permit improved efficiency through economic reform (with a corresponding reduction of Communist Party intervention and control).

The decisions taken on these economic options by Soviet leadership will greatly determine the outcome of U.S.-Soviet commercial relations.

#### *Assessment of Economic Gains in Expanding United States-Soviet Trade for U.S. Economy*

Recognizing the relatively small volume of U.S.-Soviet trade, a valid question for the U.S. decision-making is, "What's in it for us?" "What effect will U.S.-Soviet trade have on the U.S. economy as a whole?" Clearly, particular sectors, such as petroleum and grain have already benefitted from expanding trade with the Soviets. However, we believe that as trade develops over the longer term the multiplier benefits of expanded exports and imports will involve direct and indirect benefits to the U.S. economy as a whole.

Beyond the individual sectors which have already benefitted, the major U.S. economic interests in expanded U.S.-Soviet trade appear to be the following:

1. Surplus trade account (over the intermediate term).
2. Export multiplier effect on domestic employment.
3. Greater economies of scale for domestic industry output.
4. Energy/raw material sourcing through development of Soviet natural resources.
5. Increased trade with other non-market centrally controlled economies of Eastern Europe (both the Soviet Union and Eastern European economies are seeking hard currency exchange in the West).

Against a background of these U.S. economic interests, the Soviets have already concluded transaction with U.S. companies in the following categories:

(1) *Large scale petroleum and natural gas extraction facilities including transmission and distribution systems.*—For example, the Soviet Union is actively pursuing several multibillion dollar contracts for the development of Soviet natural resources, particularly liquefied gas. In return for payments and/or access to resources developed, the Soviets want foreign firms to supply needed facilities and technology. The current Northstar Project being negotiated by Tenneco, Brown & Root Inc. and Texas Eastern Transmission Company exemplifies such a project with enormous potentials for the U.S. Present estimates place the project's total worth at \$29 billion which includes revenues generated by Soviet LNG sales to the U.S. after the U.S. companies are repaid for their initial investment. As presently agreed, additional Soviet revenues generated from the project would be placed in U.S. banks usable only for the repurchase of U.S. equipment or services. The obvious job multiplier effects of such huge transactions, in addition to the important LNG benefit for our energy needs, should not be overlooked.

(2) *Management control systems utilizing computer facilities.*—For example, several U.S. companies have been approached to supply complete systems within the well-publicized, Kama River Truck Project. One NAM member engaged in the production of foundry equipment has been contracted to design the facilities for the plant, possibly leading to over \$200 million of foundry equipment sales.

(3) *Mass production machinery output such as truck and car assembly.*—This category includes special equipment for construction, mining and other projects sought by the Soviets. For example, last year a large mid-western based earth-moving equipment manufacturer sold \$40 million worth of crawler tractor and spare parts to the Soviet Union. In the recent past U.S. firms approached by the Soviets to develop complete "turnkey" assembly plants for cars and trucks have been discouraged by the U.S. Department of Defense.

(4) *Animal husbandry as characterized by U.S. agricultural business.*—The Soviets are intent on expanding their livestock herds and have been prime purchasers of U.S. agricultural commodities in recent months. Although recent cash purchases of grain have been unusually large due to Soviet crop failure, agricultural commodity purchases are expected to continue sporadically throughout the decade.

(5) *Tourist systems including hotels, package tours and transportation.*—U.S. travel companies and airlines are far ahead of their Soviet counterparts and will be relied on heavily to assist the Soviet Union's drive for increased tourism.

Clearly, there are significant economic gains which the U.S. can achieve by providing goods and services the Soviet Union is seeking. The projected acceleration of bilateral trade may be very impressive, carrying with it a trade surplus for the U.S. of at least \$1 billion annually by the end of the decade.<sup>1</sup>

Depending on key variables in trade, including MFN extension, three alternate dollar volume levels seem possible:

*a. Current Trends Project Averaging.*—Up to \$800 million annual turnover based on expansion of Soviet raw material exports, including diversion of oil and gas sales from other developed economies to the U.S., additional commodity credit corporation credits for agricultural imports (feed grains and soybeans), and expansion of tourism.

*b. Changed Credit and Export Structure.*—Up to \$2-3 billion if MFN status is granted to the Soviets and if Soviet foreign trade organizations give priority to exporting industrial products. U.S.-Soviet joint ventures in energy and raw material extraction, industrial production, shipping, and tourism development and increases in Soviet, gold exports could also push U.S.-Soviet trade turnover to this level.

*c. Major Joint Venture Development.*—Up to \$4-5 billion if (in addition to the activities cited above) several massive Siberian liquefied gas projects in West and East Siberia are consummated. These would probably bring about a very extensive American involvement in Soviet exploration, construction, and production activity and an equally unprecedented acceptance of risk by the U.S. government and private financial institutions.<sup>2</sup>

Recognizing the chronic condition of the U.S. balance of payments, the potential positive contribution of this U.S.-Soviet trade surplus should be carefully weighed in the decision regarding MFN.

For nearly two decades, Soviet trade with the industrialized West and Japan has increased at a faster rate than has world trade as a whole, a fruitful development from which the U.S. was self-excluded. We now realize that the real loser from these continuing restraints on trade will increasingly be the U.S. producer and worker, not the Soviet consumer or the Soviet economy. We must keep the obvious firmly in mind: if the U.S. is unwilling to sell the Soviets what they need, our trading partners (particularly Japan) are anxious to continue filling the increasing orders. Mr. Peter G. Peterson has stated, "there comes a point at which we must face the fact that business is business, and if it is going to go on in any event, we might as well have a piece of the action."<sup>3</sup>

On the important energy issue, the abundance of Soviet raw materials and energy fuels sources, (i.e. petroleum, coal, liquid natural gas) and the Soviets' willingness to exchange these natural resources for technological assistance and development may prove to be the major common denominator over the intermediate to long term in U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial relations. However, due to the fact that many of these resource deposits are relatively inaccessible, particularly in the Soviet Union, investment and improvement costs are likely to be high. In the case of long term development projects, the returns on such in-

<sup>1</sup> See speech Stephen Lazarus, Department of Commerce, Houston World Trade Center, March 1973.

<sup>2</sup> John P. Hardt and George Holliday, *U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy*, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973, p. 74.

<sup>3</sup> Peter G. Peterson, *U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relationships in a New Era*, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., August, 1972, p. 18.

vestment for the U.S. will be realized on a delayed basis with implications for the U.S. balance of payments.

At present 30 percent of U.S. oil requirements have to be imported. By 1980 this figure could easily rise over 50 percent with additional energy sources necessary. The choice between domestic alternatives for new investment and exploration or trade (with a resulting interdependence on other countries energy sources) is an important one to be determined by national priorities. Whether the U.S. should devote its capital to resource development (where energy sources are less assured in friendly third countries) before investing heavily in the Soviet Union (where abundant energy fuel deposits has been projected) is a valid question to be asked.<sup>4</sup> We must remember that through its own industrial needs, Soviet Union may experience an "energy crisis" of its own.

Within each of these basic transaction categories cited above (including energy resource development) additional approaches are being explored through licensing arrangements for technology exchanges. In addition some transactions are being considered as joint venture possibilities engaging new dimensions of risk as well as opportunity for both sides.

#### POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF FUTURE EAST-WEST TRADE

Despite the positive gains to be derived from increased East-West trade, as outlined above, NAM believes that relations with non-market, centrally planned economies must be approached with firmness, minus the "rose-colored glasses". American workers and manufacturers can benefit from increased trade with such economies, but proper precautions must be taken.

In a centrally planned economy where production and resource allocation are controlled by the state, there is no necessary correspondence between price and cost. In addition, such economies are "state traders" and internal and external prices may diverge significantly. Coupled with a desire to earn hard currencies, the non-market economy may be tempted to use its "price obscured" products for rapid international market penetration. Such action holds the potential for market disruption within free market economies trading with the Soviet Union. In this regard, NAM believes the safeguard measures proposed in the Administration's Trade Reform Act of 1973 (H.R. 6767, Titles II, V) and those measures outlined previously in the October 1972 commercial agreements would minimize the danger of market disruption arising from trade with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

Three additional considerations must be retained regarding balance of payments factors. *First*, the projected U.S. trade surplus with the Soviet Union will not continue indefinitely. It may be expected to last only until Soviet product quality and marketing technique improve and exports of machinery equipment and raw materials reach desired levels. *Second*, the Soviets will not be continuous and/or reliable purchasers of U.S. agricultural commodities and industrial equipment. Recognizing the nature of their state-directed purchasing plans, the Soviets will be sporadic buyers. *Finally*, problems arise related to the possibility of eventual Soviet equipment exports to the U.S. for the issue of patents licensing safeguards and protection against the re-export of U.S. produced goods of their copies. Although the Soviet Union recently entered the International Patent Convention, U.S. producers will still need to exercise extreme caution while exchanging technology.

Admittedly technological diffusion is an economic fact of life and its process is rarely one direction-oriented. (For example, U.S. steel and aluminum companies may benefit from Soviet processes). However, we must continually assess the possibilities of re-export and more seriously, what contribution U.S. technology, if exchanged, might make to Soviet economic *and* military development. In this context we believe that a reduction (but not an elimination) of risks is possible, providing a closely coordinated watch is undertaken by Congress, the Executive and the private sector.

In this same vein, U.S. companies engaging in trade with the Soviet Union must guard against early frustration and disillusionment. Soviet traders, with

<sup>4</sup> Proved and probable reserves of crude oil for the world are currently estimated at approximately 680 billion barrels. Of this total the U.S.S.R. has approximately 11 percent with the U.S. at 7 percent.

Estimates of natural gas reserves indicate a world total of 1,883 trillion cubic feet. The U.S.S.R. accounts for 33.8 percent of this total, with the U.S. at about 14.5 percent. The landed cost of LNG imports is expected to range between 87 cents to \$1.38 per 1,000 cubic feet compared with 20 cents to perhaps 50 cents per 1,000 cubic feet for current domestic natural gas.

the monolithic nature of the state behind them, have shown themselves to be extremely competent and cautious traders. On occasion, the Soviets have "whip-sawed" competing U.S. firms, regarding their individual bids. It seems evident that U.S. firms will be forced to compete more imaginatively with the Soviet Union than has been their experience in the past.

In conclusion, we believe that a rational approach to commercial normalization between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should not be construed as the end all to all our differences. The disparities between our economic systems will continue to complicate commercial transactions. Yet complementary demands in both the consumer and nonstrategic industrial sectors are likely to serve as a stimulus to increase East-West trade.

We no longer live in an era of stark, bi-polar military confrontation. Rapid political and technological change which characterize our polycentric age, hold an unparalleled opportunity for promoting the progress toward détente through the commercial field. Extension of most-favored-nation, with attendant trade safeguard and national security consideration factored in, will constitute a positive step toward new directions in East-West trade. Beyond MFN lie major challenges accompanying U.S.-Soviet trade which will prove far more important to the long term success of economic relations between the two countries. Among these problems will be the resolution of legal and institutional impediments on both sides. The U.S. business community and the NAM believe we should get on with it.

#### APPENDIX A

##### TRADE WITH STATE-CONTROLLED CENTRAL MARKET ECONOMIES

The promotion of trade between nations can lead to increased international cooperation and understanding while improving the standard of living of peoples throughout the world. However, trade with state-controlled central market economies can present unique difficulties which must be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. Adequate guarantees for industrial rights and the provision of arbitration procedures should be secured, and national security considerations should be continually assessed in light of the dynamic character and magnitude of threats to U.S. security. Particular safeguards should also be provided to prevent the potential market disruption which can occur as a result of trade with state-controlled central market economies. Regulations governing international commercial relations with such economies should conform with general U.S. trade policy except where provisions are made to reflect the above considerations. In the final analysis, ideological differences, while important, should not preclude mutually beneficial commercial relations which have been carefully assessed in the light of national self-interest.

#### APPENDIX B

##### PERCENTAGE OF U.S. IMPORTS (BASED ON VALUE) SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL DISCRIMINATION, BY SPECIFIED EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1951, 1966, AND 1970

Country	1951	1966	1970
U.S.S.R. ....	22	4	10
Czechoslovakia .....	68	56	73
East Germany .....	1 53	27	85
Hungary .....	56	36	43
Bulgaria .....	84	29	17
Rumania .....	2	37	42
Poland .....	37	(?)	(?)

<sup>1</sup> 1952.

<sup>2</sup> Not applicable.

Source: United States East European Trade, Malish, Anton F., Jr. U.S. Tariff Commission, 1972 (Washington, D.C.), p. 18.

#### APPENDIX C

##### PROPOSAL

Based upon historical precedents and in response to the recent Protocol agreement to study establishment of a "US-USSR Chamber of Commerce", this draft proposal is submitted to establish a Council on American Soviet Trade (CAST).

The primary purpose of CAST would be the active promotion of mutually beneficial commercial relations between the USSR and the US on a coordinated and cooperative basis. Specific objectives would include:

1. Research and development of advantageous trade opportunities between the two nations;
2. Investigation of and information dissemination of investment and joint venture techniques as well as accompanying financing for such endeavors;
3. Providing a clearinghouse for exchanges on information and activities of major trade associations related to US-Soviet commercial relations;
4. Aiding interested parties in setting up necessary branch offices and marketing mechanisms;
5. Providing an operative framework for beneficial exchanges of technology and other non-physical resources;
6. Encouraging inter-industry discussions between the USSR and the US on international economic issues and developments of mutual interest;
7. Providing a forum for advising participants on conflict avoidance and/or resolving contractual disputes arising between the two countries.

In accordance with the June 22 Protocol, the CAST would be established in the private sector. Formative discussions held within the US and the USSR should lead to a formal proposal submission to the Joint USSR-US Commercial Commission. A joint government-business commission could handle preliminary arrangements for establishing the new organization.

#### ADVANTAGES OF A PRIVATE SECTOR APPROACH

Any permanent organization to promote expanded trade and business opportunities between the United States and the Soviet Union should be established in the private sector. The private industrial and financial communities are best attuned to the needs and possibilities for increased trade and commercial opportunities. Business is sensitive to problems peculiar to trade with non-market economies and can work with government toward their resolution. The private sector possesses the immediate first hand knowledge to assist Soviet enterprises in locating the industry or corporation which would be suitable to their specific needs. The most effective decisions on methods to pursue trade, contacts and contract opportunities within the Soviet Union will also result from those most immediately involved in business problems addressing the difficulties directly. A private sector organization would be most conducive to rapid organizational and functional adaptation to changing economic needs as the commercial relations between the countries continue to develop. Perhaps equally important, establishing the CAST in the private sector will partially insulate it from some of the minor political complications that could arise if the Council were a government operated organization susceptible to potentially conflicting, non-economic issues.

#### STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE

Therefore, consistent with the economic agreements already signed, the proposed CAST would be organized and function in the private sector as generally follows:

##### WASHINGTON OFFICE

#### *I. Coordinating Council*

The Coordinating Council of CAST would be composed of twenty members of the US business and financial communities elected by participating members and reflective of the different economic sectors. In addition, one Soviet delegate will serve on the Coordinating Council in a representative and liaison capacity. The members of the Coordinating Council would meet on a regular basis to discuss and execute matters related to their functions.

The functions of the Coordinating Council would include:

1. To oversee and coordinate the activities of the daily operational bodies of CAST and its professional staff;
2. To develop an annual budget and dues allocation among member companies;
3. To serve as active liaisons with a counterpart body in Moscow;
4. To hold, from time to time, coordination and discussion meetings with representatives of appropriate government departments;
5. To review and evaluate continuing CAST operations; to initiate new activities as developing trade demands new functions;
6. To host annually, in conjunction with the counterpart Soviet body, a joint US-Soviet meeting of CAST (see below).

## II. Staff Director

Since members of the Coordinating Council would not function on a permanent staff basis, the Council would appoint a staff director to oversee and have operational responsibility for the Office described below. He would direct the operational working of CAST and serve as direct link between the Operative Bodies and the Coordinating Council. The Staff Director would also sit on the Coordinating Council to facilitate this liaison function.

## III. Operative Bodies

A. *Information Exchange Office*.—A trained and permanent staff of experts will comprise the Information Exchange Office.

This body will serve to:

1. Gather all relevant information, statistical and/or technical, concerning economic developments within the US;
2. Transmit such information to the counterpart agency in the Soviet Union;
3. Disseminate to all interested members similar information received from the Soviet Union;
4. Provide information relevant to a specific member company's request through use of the information exchange office in Moscow;
5. In conjunction with the Commercial Opportunity Office, make available all information on trade fairs and exhibitions within the Soviet Union.
6. Assist in obtaining advertising facilities for Soviet exporters interested in marketing products in the United States.

To facilitate the communication function of the Information Exchange Office, it will publish on a regular basis an economic report to be disseminated both domestically and through the proper Soviet channels.

B. *Commercial Opportunity Office*.—A trained and permanent staff of economic experts would comprise the Commercial Opportunity Office.

This body will function to promote expanded commerce between the two countries by:

1. Developing contacts with and serving as a clearinghouse for US private business and Foreign Trade Organizations in the USSR;
2. Facilitating export and import licenses and sources of export financing for commodity exchanges with the Soviet Union;
3. Researching and offering solutions for special problems that may arise in trade between an open market and a centrally controlled, non-market economy;
4. Providing guidance on regulations and restriction on imports in both countries and assuring that rates are no different than those placed on imports from third country markets;
5. Organizing US industry participation in trade fairs and exhibitions in the Soviet Union;
6. Handling operations involved in patenting Soviet inventions in the US and American inventions in the USSR;
7. Coordinating and expediting US-USSR contract negotiations where asked to do so by CAST members;
8. Researching and developing new areas of trade and investment opportunities between the two nations.

C. *Office of Business and Marketing Operations*.—A trained and permanent staff of experts would comprise the Office of Business and Marketing Operations. This body would function to facilitate the smooth operation of business and commercial endeavors for the Soviet representatives in the United States and arrange for similar U.S. representation in the USSR. The specific functions of the Office of Business and Marketing Operations would include:

1. To assist in arranging for adequate office space and business services in both the Soviet Union and the United States;
2. To invite and host Soviet commercial delegations to the US and coordinate US delegation visits to the Soviet Union;
3. To coordinate efforts with government commercial representatives in the Soviet Union;
4. To assist in obtaining visas and other accommodations for Soviet commercial visitors and US business members.
5. To arrange for translation services where needed on a two-way basis.

D. *Soviet Representatives*.—A high level Soviet representative would serve within each of the CAST offices. He would directly represent the Soviet branch of CAST, monitor US branch activities and serve as liaison to the Moscow organization. Provisions would be made for additional exchange personnel as needed for efficient operation.

#### *IV. Economic Forum and Arbitration Board*

The Economic Forum and Arbitration Board could be composed of legal, technical and economic experts from both the corporate and governmental sectors.

This body would function to discuss the rules and regulations governing business and trade practices in the US and the USSR, with the objective of avoiding possible conflicts in the implementation of contracts and agreements.

Where disputes do arise, the Forum could provide preliminary arbitration facilities and make recommendations on procedures for obtaining a definitive resolution of problems. This forum could also serve as final arbitration board if so provided in individual agreements.

#### *V. Selection of Membership and Staff*

A. *Membership.*—Membership in CAST would be open to all private US businesses interested in commercial relations with the Soviet Union and willing to meet specified obligations. Once members have joined, corporations and businesses will be coordinated by economic sectors.

B. *Coordinating Council.*—Members of the Coordinating Council would be elected by participating members with one Coordinator representing each industrial sector. The criteria for selection should include experience in commercial and trading activities and understanding of the special potential problems of such activities as regards US-Soviet relations.

C. *Staff Director.*—The Staff Director of CAST will be appointed on a permanent staff basis by the Coordinating Council. In addition to the qualifications specified for the Coordinating Council, the Staff Director should have ample experience in an administrative capacity.

D. *Operative Bodies.*—The designated Staff Executive Director, with the approval of the Coordinating Council, would appoint a director to head each Operative Body. These directors would staff their offices with trained and professional personnel whose experience is appropriate to the functions of each particular office.

E. *Economic Forum and Arbitration Board.*—The Economic Forum will be composed of people experienced in the economic, legal and technical problems of international economic relations and are to be appointed by the Coordinating Council.

#### *VI. Financing*

The Washington Office of CAST will be financed by funds collected from member companies participating on a dues basis. The system of dues allocation will be determined by the Coordinating Council upon the basis of budgetary needs.

#### *VII. Joint Annual Meeting*


One joint meeting of the Washington Office of CAST and the counterpart organization in Moscow would be held annually, alternately in Moscow and Washington, to discuss current and new commercial activities and any new developments in economic relations between the USSR and the US.

Attendees of this meeting from Washington would include all members of the Coordinating Council, the Staff Director, Directors of the Operative Bodies, one member from the Economic Forum, and invited guests from Government.

#### *VIII. Moscow Office*

This proposal recognizes that the Soviet counterpart to the Washington Office of CAST will be determined by consultations among Soviet officials. It is suggested, however, that the Soviet organization could structurally parallel that described above. This organization would facilitate maximum coordination and cooperation between the two bodies.

# COUNCIL ON AMERICAN SOVIET TRADE



APPENDIX D  
SOVIET TRADE WITH SELECTED WESTERN COUNTRIES  
(In millions of U.S. dollars)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Total trade with West:												
Exports.....	983	1,069	1,115	1,218	1,282	1,438	1,711	1,885	2,051	2,230	2,345	2,710
Imports.....	1,080	1,093	1,283	1,400	1,734	1,501	1,742	1,782	2,144	2,495	2,780	2,860
Turnover.....	2,063	2,162	2,398	2,618	3,017	3,039	3,453	3,667	4,195	4,725	5,125	5,570
United Kingdom:												
Exports.....	192	227	213	215	239	291	330	303	367	427	465	452
Imports.....	108	128	117	130	103	152	169	197	273	240	248	222
Turnover.....	301	355	330	345	342	443	499	501	640	667	713	674
West Germany:												
Exports.....	119	119	136	133	127	146	189	195	215	229	257	292
Imports.....	199	179	208	151	202	136	144	177	242	350	375	484
Turnover.....	318	298	344	284	329	282	333	372	457	579	632	776
France:												
Exports.....	74	79	85	104	106	111	130	145	137	141	140	216
Imports.....	130	120	154	71	69	114	160	188	294	323	319	313
Turnover.....	204	200	240	175	175	225	290	333	432	464	459	529
Italy:												
Exports.....	103	130	131	137	134	148	155	233	232	232	212	259
Imports.....	90	96	99	136	98	102	95	154	208	317	313	291
Turnover.....	193	226	230	273	233	250	251	387	441	548	524	550
Japan:												
Exports.....	76	113	113	128	165	185	239	353	391	357	379	419
Imports.....	62	67	146	165	193	177	224	165	185	254	345	396
Turnover.....	138	180	259	293	358	362	453	519	576	621	725	815
United States:												
Exports.....	25	24	17	25	21	34	47	39	43	61	64	60
Imports.....	60	51	27	28	163	65	63	63	57	117	115	144
Turnover.....	85	74	44	53	184	99	110	102	99	177	179	204

Source: Figures obtained from Department of Commerce.

Senator PROXMIRE. I thank both of you gentlemen very much.

In view of the limited time, I am going to suggest we have a 5-minute rule so all members of the committee will have an equal opportunity to question you. We start running the 5 minutes right away.

I would like to say we are honored to have former Ambassador Jacob Beam here this morning. We invited him to come to the witness table but he said he prefers to observe. Ambassador Beam was very gracious to me back in 1957 when he was Ambassador to Poland; since then, he served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and I understand he has had a vast experience and served this country well.

Gentlemen, I would like you both to answer something that I think is behind all of this. We may or may not express it, but the former chairman of this committee, Paul Douglas, I remember, was very much opposed to trade with the Soviet Union and he was opposed to it for the blunt reason, he felt it would strengthen it militarily, no matter when you traded or to what extent, directly or indirectly, would help develop their military power.

He used to quote something maybe Lenin never said, or maybe he did say—that when the Communists got ready to hang the United States, the capitalists would sell them the rope. And since we have David Rockefeller, of probably the most esteemed capitalist family in the country and also we have a spokesman for the National Association of Manufacturers, one of the most clearly capitalistic organizations, both testifying in favor of increasing trade with the U.S.S.R., maybe you gentlemen could hit this problem head on.

It bothers this Senator, and I think it bothers all Americans to a considerable extent. We have an \$80 billion military budget. The only reason for that budget is that we face the possibility of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, directly or indirectly. We have just been through an enormously expensive war, with our enemy, our adversary, supplied and financed to a considerable extent by the Soviet Union, in Vietnam.

Now we are being asked—the war isn't over yet—but now it is being suggested we provide credit to the Soviet Union and that we immediately establish commercial relations which will strongly improve their economy and their military position.

You spoke about risk, Mr. Rockefeller, but you didn't spell out in detail what you meant. I would like to ask Mr. Kenna, when he indicated that this may be a priority reduction aimed at cutting strategic weapons systems outlay, what that is based on other than just an assertion.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I think you put your finger, Senator, on one of the risks: That it will simply strengthen the Soviet Union and they will not reduce their military expenditures and therefore, in a sense, we will have helped our rival to no benefit. But I have come to the conclusion, having shared the other view for quite a long time, that the risks are considerably less great than the potential benefits.

I think in the first place, most of the things that they would be getting from us they can, indeed, get from others—from Western Europe or Japan—perhaps different quality in some cases, although by no means in all and perhaps less to their liking. Nevertheless, I don't believe it is realistic to think that by our cutting off the availability of

American goods that we are going to prevent them from accomplishing their objectives.

On the other side, I think that the prospects of establishing a new type of relationship with the Soviet Union—if we develop closer relations with them on all fronts, including trade—are well worth the effort. I honestly believe that we have reached a point in the world where both those who believe in Marxism, socialism, and those who adhere to our type of capitalistic or entrepreneurial society, have come to recognize that it makes sense for us in this relatively small globe to work together rather than to constantly be at one another's throat.

And although I don't believe that it would be wise for us at this time to unilaterally abandon our defenses, nevertheless, I think that the chances of really meaningful understanding between the two countries would be greater if there is more trade.

Therefore, with the exception perhaps of a few clearly strategic military items, where I think we should continue our restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union, I believe that the trade stands to benefit us through closer and better relations with the Soviets.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Kenna.

Mr. KENNA. Mr. Vice Chairman, I think this particular question which you raised is one that perhaps we had debated more vigorously than almost any other issue that I can recall recently.

Senator PROXMIRE. You say, "we"; you mean the National—

Mr. KENNA. National Association of Manufacturers. I think we would express particular hope and concern that we be involved in a continual assessment of national security in light of our current posture with the Soviet Union. We have actively recommended that the proper safeguards be put in place, both as far as national security is concerned, and as far as industrial rights are concerned.

We think that both of these things should be under continual review as we continue to expand our relationship with the Soviet Union.

I would think as far as national security is concerned that the technology transfer that we would see would certainly strengthen the manufacturing base of the Soviet Union. To that extent, it would certainly be of some aid to the Soviet Union, in that they would become a stronger nation and more capable, perhaps, of manufacturing certain kinds of goods and armaments.

I think in the case of strategic systems, it has been clearly demonstrated that the Soviet Union certainly is on a parity from a technical standpoint with the things we are doing in the United States, particularly when we look at nuclear systems and delivery systems.

Senator PROXMIRE. My time is up.

Congressman Widnall.

Representative WIDNALL. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Kenna, we are very grateful for your testimony here today. We realize the value of it as well as of the organizations that you represent.

Mr. Rockefeller, with regard to greatly increasing our trade with the Soviet Union, one question which must immediately come to mind is the manner in which the Soviets are to pay for the goods and services which they receive from the United States. I am under the

impression the public and private sectors will be called upon to extend vast credits to the Soviets, in order to finance this growth in trade.

Can you describe for us some of the basic means and the terms under which such credit would be extended?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Yes. I think that very large credits would be involved particularly in the development of natural resources, such as gas, which the Soviet Union has and which we would be interested in buying. Probably such very large credits would not be necessary for the development of factories or other exports from the Soviet Union which involve less sizable sums of capital.

In the case of natural gas, there are two projects, of course, that are presently under consideration, both of them in Siberia. One would result in sending gas to the west coast of the United States and the other to the east coast. In each case, we are talking in terms of perhaps \$5 billion of expenditures in order to develop the gas fields, provide the pipes to ports in the Soviet Union, and then to provide the liquefied natural gas ships which would transport the gas once it got to the Soviet ports.

My own feeling is that in order to finance projects of this size, assuming that we determine it is in our national interest to have them developed and the Soviets wish to proceed, which I think they do, I believe this will require international banking consortia. I don't believe that it is going to be possible to find exclusively in the United States, \$5 let alone \$10 billion that could be tied up for long periods of time in the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, I am not sure that it wouldn't be preferable to have other countries participate such as Japan and Western Europe nations, because if all the major non-socialistic industrial powers are involved, the risk down the road of the Soviets changing their minds and not letting the product be exported is greatly diminished.

It also has the further advantage that it would mean a less heavy concentration of dependence on the part of the United States in Soviet sources of supply.

Representative WIDNALL. There is one thing that I have always wondered about and never quite understood. How do you find out the value of a ruble?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Well, I think that is a very good question. If you go to Moscow and try to exchange American traveler's checks, you are given a very specific rate of exchange. But I think it is perfectly clear that if the ruble were sold in the open market, the exchange rates you get in Moscow would not prove to be very realistic ones.

There is, in fact, no way of testing it in the marketplace because the Soviets have not wished to make the ruble convertible. Until they do, they set the price and people accept the price or not.

Representative WIDNALL. Isn't this, then, one of the great hazards hanging over all of our trade relations with Russia?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I think there is no question about that and for that reason, I think it is likely that many of the important trade relations will be based on barter deals. You have probably read about some of the proposals of Mr. Armand Hammer from Occidental Petroleum, which, in effect, include exchanges of commodities and products to avoid precisely the issue you speak of.

Representative WIDNALL. Thank you. My time is up.

Senator PROXMIRE. Congressman Reuss.

Representative REUSS. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Mr. Rockefeller, I am personally very happy that the Chase Manhattan Bank has opened its representative office in Moscow, in May, and that you were there and you talked to Prime Minister Kosygin. It may interest you to know when a delegation of this committee, consisting of Senator Humphrey and myself, saw the Prime Minister at the Kremlin last winter, he said that there were three Americans whom he most admired—David Rockefeller, John Kennedy, and Richard Nixon.

Thus spaketh he.

In the Kama River Truck Plant financing, I understand that the Chase Manhattan Bank participated to the extent of some \$86 million, matched by the Ex-Im Bank for a similar amount.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. That is correct.

Representative REUSS. Can you tell us the respective interest rates charged?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. The rate that we charged was based on an interest rate picture in the United States which was quite different than it is today. The Export-Import Bank rate was somewhat lower. Clearly, this would be higher were the deal negotiated today.

On the other hand, it is over a period of 10 years. Whether interest rates will remain that high over that period seems to me to be another question. I certainly hope that they will not. Therefore, the rate over a longer period of time, we believe, could very well be a reasonable one.

Representative REUSS. The Chase Manhattan Bank's participation and particularly its interest rate have been criticized by some other bankers. According to a recent article in the Los Angeles Times, one banker, name not given, is quoted as saying:

That was a pretty sweet deal; it is likely a loss leader for an American bank. It is not economic when you have to pay 7.5 percent to borrow money overnight in New York.

Since this is anonymous, I won't carry it farther, except to ask this: Would you agree that American banks which participate in Soviet financing ought to charge market rates of interest and ought not to give subsidized, loss leader, or whatever you want to call them, interest rates to the Soviet Union?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I do indeed agree, but as in any deal, I think that one has to take a number of circumstances into account and the interest rate is not the only benefit to be derived. But I would also point out, as I did previously, that although it is true that the interest rates that we have to pay for money now are very much higher than the rate that we are getting on this particular loan, that was not the case when we made the deal.

I think it is also noteworthy that the same banker who made the particular observation to which you allude, himself visited Moscow shortly thereafter, presumably feeling that there was interesting business to be obtained.

Representative REUSS. My reasoning for not giving the Soviet Union, or any other foreign country, a loss leader subsidized rate of interest is largely that if there are some loss leaders in a lending institution's total portfolio then the rest of the portfolio has to earn higher

interest rates in order that the lending institution may make out overall.

With interest rates in the United States already high, I think most members of this committee would want to be sure that they don't go higher because the total pool which American lending institutions had to make available to borrowers is dissipated by cut-rate loans to non-Americans.

But I gather you agree with that.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I completely agree.

Representative REUSS. Is the Chase's Kama River Truck Plant loan guaranteed?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. No; it is not.

Representative REUSS. In other words, the guarantee was the Eximbank's half of it and you are on your own in your effort?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. This is right. I will say we take some comfort in the fact that payments are to be made to the Eximbank and ourselves. It seems to us a good deal less likely that they would pay one lender and not the other, and it seems to us that inasmuch as the Eximbank is a Government organization, that they are not likely to fail to pay it.

But I would have to say beyond that, that the record of the Soviet Union in living up to its agreements, once they are made, is excellent. We have had dealings with them over a long period of time and have never had any payment in default or even any deferral of payments. So we believe it is a good risk.

Representative REUSS. If I am not mistaken, not only in the case of your institution, but throughout, it is true that they have never defaulted, is it not?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. So far as I know, there are no examples of where they have failed to live up to an agreement they actually signed. They make tough agreements, but once they make them, they live up to them. That is our experience.

Representative REUSS. Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Senator PROXMIRE. Congressman Blackburn.

Representative BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

I, too, want to express the appreciation for you gentlemen taking your time to appear before this committee, but I am going to make a rather unflattering observation at this point and I hope you will be tolerant of it.

As I witnessed your testimony, and read both of your testimonies, I am reminded somewhat of the method used for capturing monkeys. You know, you cut a little hole in the coconut, the monkey sticks his hand in and balls up his fist to draw out the meat. He doesn't let go of the coconut, and before he lets up, he has been caught.

I have the feeling that you gentlemen, in your anxiety to make profits, are overlooking perhaps some rather fundamental concepts. Underlying the testimony of both of you is a premise I am going to challenge. That premise seems to be that the Soviet Union can get what it wants from other countries anyway, and they can achieve their objectives anyway without American help.

Now, when we consider events during the past 12 months, I think that that premise is pretty badly shattered. When the Soviet leaders have to come to this country as the only country in the world that can

provide them with the grain necessary to feed the population, I challenge your statement that they can achieve everything that they want anywhere else. Lenin himself made the statement: "Revolutions are born on empty stomachs."

The Soviet Union was facing a very imminent prospect of empty stomachs within their borders this past winter. No other country could have provided them with the grain necessary to feed their population. Australia and Canada, both advised the U.S. Agriculture Department that the Soviets were going to be in dire need for grain this past year, but we just sloughed it off and bailed them out.

Not only did we take the pressure off their leaders to feed the population, but we subsidized it and did it on credit. This reminds me of the observation the Vice Chairman made: That the capitalist would be the man to sell you the rope to hang him. We are going one step further: We are going to finance it for them.

How does this jibe with your assessments they are such a self-supporting nation, when they were facing the prospect of hungry bellies and they couldn't go out and buy their groceries with cash?

That is an interesting observation, I agree. There is no answer to it.

Senator PROXMIRE. I think the witnesses were wondering which one you wanted to answer.

Representative BLACKBURN. Either; both.

Mr. KENNA. I think we primarily are addressing ourselves to the question of what sort of technologies, what sort of machineries, and so forth, are available and would be available through an expansion of Soviet trade. Certainly, when you look at the productivity currently in the agricultural system of the Soviet Union compared to ours, there is no comparison, and this is for a lot of reasons.

My own observation has been—and I have had a great deal of conversation with the American businessmen about this sort of trade—that while they are very much interested in "coconuts," as you put it, they are also interested from a very pragmatic and hardnosed standpoint. When we look at doing business with the Soviets, there really is a triple element of financial risk, I believe. That is the risk assumed by the private banking sector, the risk assumed by our own Government banking institutions, and the risk that the companies must take if they engage in this sort of commerce.

I don't know anyone that is looking at this in any sense other than a very hard-nosed and practical sense. There is great concern about this, obviously. But I do think that looking at equipment available around the world today, looking at the technology available in most of the Western nations, I do think there are things available, there is farm equipment available; there are things of this sort available.

There are perhaps not some of the research technologies in the animal husbandry field or agricultural research that may be more advanced in this country, but I generally believe most of the kinds of things the Soviets would want to purchase are freely available to them and available with the same sort of credit terms we are talking about.

Representative BLACKBURN. Now, we are leading into the second part of our question, and I think Mr. Rockefeller would be the one to address himself to this. The prospects of proposals I have seen for current trade expansion in Soviet trade is generally a one-way street:

That is, American goods, American technology, financed by American capital.

So, we are not only exporting technology and goods, we are also exporting capital. This may show a short-term benefit as far as balance of trade is concerned, but the balance of payment problem is not going to be solved by financing these vast improvements in the Soviet Union. The net effect of this export will be to build up the industrial base within the confines of the Soviet Union.

How are we going to secure repayment? This is relevant to the question you raise, Mr. Kenna. How can we be assured of repayment of these debts, if everything we have sold them is located within their borders? We can't go in and repossess it. When we talk glibly about purchase of energy from the Soviet Union. I have seen no figures as to what price per thousand the Soviets would sell us gas for. I have heard a figure of \$1.65 per thousand, which is hardly attractive.

There has been no discussion as to what price we are going to pay for the oil, while they are going to be sitting on the spigot. How are we going to assure ourselves of repayment of these vast sums of money?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. On the question of the terms of the credit in relation to natural gas, we are still a long way from any agreement. Certainly, price is a major question. Also, there is question as to how much of the production they would permit to go to the companies that made the deal. Clearly, they wouldn't make the deal unless this was considered attractive to the companies involved, and also unless the U.S. Government determined that it was in the best interest of our country to participate in the development of natural gas resources there for our future use.

Representative BLACKBURN. I see my time has expired. I want to make this observation. Unless we can see some basic structural changes within the Soviet Union: That is, the method of governing themselves, the freedom of their people—and I am not narrowing this to the question of Jewish freedom to emigrate from the Soviet Union—I am thinking about the realistic prospects of liberalization within the Soviet Union itself. Until I can see some basic structural changes there, all I can see is the prospect of Soviet trade with the United States with us strengthening the hands of a very barbaric dictatorship, and I am not much encouraged along that line.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Could I make one comment on that?

Senator PROXMIRE. Yes, indeed.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I personally think it would be unrealistic to think that they are going to change their basic structure of government. They are pretty well entrenched and whether rightly or wrongly, I don't think that they are going to abandon socialism as a method of operating their country, although I do think that for the last 50 years, one has seen a good many modifications in the Soviet Union. And I think that one of the things that could bring about further modifications, particularly in their relations with the rest of the world, is the clamour of people within the country for higher standards of living.

They certainly have not got as high a standard of living as one might have expected after 50 years of their system. I believe the more their people get some of the good things of life, they will be less anxious to devote a large part of their gross national product to mili-

tary expenditures and expansion and they will be more anxious to live happy and comfortable lives.

Representative BLACKBURN. Here, again, you are making an assumption that I think is totally invalid, and that is that the Soviet leadership is responsive in a democratic way to popular demands. If that is the case, it hasn't been evident so far. The fact that they responded to popular demand only when they saw prospects of people going hungry in the last year, is the most popular demand they answered.

My time has expired.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. They certainly don't respond in our kind of democratic way to popular demand. There is no doubt about that. On the other hand, it would be unrealistic to think the leaders of the Soviet Union are unmindful of the pressures of their population. I suspect that they are a good deal more than perhaps they or we tend to recognize. I think this is one of the hopeful aspects of greater contact.

The more the people of the Soviet know something about the way people in the rest of the world, particularly in the United States, live, the less likely they are going to merely go on tightening their belts instead of living a better life.

Senator PROXMIRE. Gentlemen, the time is 12 past 11. I understand you have another appointment. Senator Humphrey has come in.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand.

Mr. KENNA. My time is a little better. I have another 10 or 15 minutes, if that would be helpful.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I would be happy to stay if the Senator has any questions.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, I thank the witnesses very much, but I arrived late because of another committee meeting that we have. We have our problems around here with other meetings.

My main concern, if I might just ask for your commentary about it, about the relationship, economic relationship with the Soviet Union, does not bear on whether or not they will repay or whether or not we will benefit in terms of some of our needs. I think we could benefit; I believe that there could be arrangements made that would fasten down the payment about as well as we can get from any other country.

As a matter of fact, there is evidence both the Mainland Chinese Government and the Soviet Government are pretty good on payment. For what reason, I don't know, but they seem to pay their bills, at least the bills that relate to their new regimes; that is, since the Communist takeover.

What I am concerned about is whether we are negotiating with the Soviet Union as intensively as we are involved in economic relations for the reduction of arms—I will put it directly. We are off on a spending spree on military items—defense expenditures represent a tremendous section of our budget. We say we have to do this because we live in an uncertain and insecure world and one of the areas of uncertainty and insecurity is the powerful military establishment of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union responds by saying they build their fleets, their airpower, their missiles, in part because of the growth of American military power and, of course, because of the difficulties that they are

having with the People's Republic of China along that vast frontier.

What I see is a pattern of our engaging in an international operation; as we have done here at home, we are trying to finance domestic programs that cost billions and military programs that cost billions at the same time. In other words, to have both the fire power and the good life.

It seems to me that there is some danger in the present situation of our being engaged in an international financing credit operation with the Soviet Union, where they want to build up their resources, understandably develop their resources, where it is to our advantage to see they develop those resources, particularly if we can get the opportunity to purchase some of them, or if they use them in terms of repayment for our credit, but they continue to go on with their military expansion.

In other words, they get the best of two worlds as far as they are concerned: No. 1, military expansion; No. 2, development of their domestic resources. Our credits, our helpful financing, both public and private, to Soviet economic expansion and development of their resources, does not compel them to take a good hard look at how much they are spending or, in my book, wasting on vast amounts of military expenditures.

The only way I see we are going to bring this armaments race under control is for both of these countries to shape up to the financial insanity in which we are presently involved, where we are spending ourselves into oblivion, literally, trying to maintain a domestic economy on the one hand, we at a high-type of domestic economy, doing everything we possibly can for the good life; and they on the other hand trying to develop their resources, which is very costly, at the same time going right on producing nuclear missiles, nuclear submarines, huge bombers, vast troop deployments.

We are involved in it; they are involved in it. We borrow the money to finance what we are doing for ourselves in part and we borrow the money to help them finance what they want to do.

This is what bothers me. It is not the economics. May I say, Mr. Rockefeller, I happen to believe in the East-West trade; I think it is what you indicated, a chance for a hope for a better world. I think it conditions the environment for peaceful existence and coexistence. But what worries me is that I don't see we are cutting into the weaponry, cutting into the military expenditure.

I told Mr. Kosygin when I saw him in December just what I am saying now, if they cut back on their expenditures in the military and we could cut back on ours, two things would happen: They wouldn't have to borrow as much from us and we wouldn't have to go in debt as much as we are, that both of us would benefit. And security is relative.

If we both make 25-percent reduction, we would both be better off and they would have to borrow less to finance their developments and we would have to provide fewer credits to finance our arrangements with them and to take care of ourselves.

What is your view on that and what can we do about it?

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Senator, I share your concern. I think this is the most concerning thing in international relations today, the competitive arms race between our two nations. All I would say is that by withholding exports from the Soviet Union, which we have done for

the past 25 years, we have certainly not stopped the arms race. On the contrary, it seems to have continued.

I think it is worth at least a good hard try to establish a new relationship with the Soviets, which would have to be a complete one; it can't be just on the economic front. There obviously have to be efforts in the political sphere and, of course, here is where the SALT talks and other negotiations to try to reach some kind of arms limitation on mutually acceptable basis are so important. I certainly would not favor the establishment of economic relations without concurrently making every effort to find means of reducing armaments expenditures.

Senator HUMPHREY. My concern about this is whether or not we sort of regulate the flow of credits on the basis of accomplishment or progress in the arms control area. Because I think that we have to recognize that there are certain objectives the Soviets have. I am not extolling them for them, even though I hope they are not successful. They would like to get, very much, the United States totally out of Europe; no doubt about that.

This has been a long-range objective and we seem to be cooperating in some areas of that. I am not about to cooperate on that myself.

I think they would like very much, in a sense, to neutralize Western Europe. I don't think there is much doubt about that and they may very well succeed if we don't watch out with our practices, embargoes on exports, and whatever else we do. I think they would like very much to get vast credits. They can get credits not only from us but from Europe. They have Eurodollars. The Europeans are perfectly willing to do a lot of financing.

I understand they financed billions of dollars in short-term credit in Eastern Europe this past year.

But my real concern, and I know there is no immediate answer and I recognize the validity of your earlier comments; namely, that we tried the other way and it didn't work. But I happen to believe Brezhnev has to deliver. I think he remembers Khrushchev very well, because he had something to do with seeing Khrushchev went into political oblivion.

I happen to believe the Russians looked at Mr. Gomulka in Warsaw in December 1970, and saw what happened to him. And when Gierek came in with the promise of not only a better life, but more of the good things of life, consumer goods, with uprisings in the factory towns of Poland, the Russians did not move in any troops as they did on Czechoslovakia.

Within 4 months, Mr. Brezhnev called a meeting of the Party Congress in April 1971 and said:

Look, the Poles aren't going to get ahead of us; I am going to promise you more food, promise you automobiles, and promise you all kinds of consumer goods, and we are going to have a better life.

He made a political promise. And in the Soviet Union, when you lose an election, you don't have a chance to recycle, you are out. I don't think he wants to lose. I think that is why he came here.

Don't misunderstand me; I think that is a healthy development. But as long as he needs something, I hope that we understand the importance in this Government of really insisting on arms control and that means we have to discipline ourselves, because I am not at all sure.

we really believe in it as much as we write about it. That is my concern. We are worried about nuclear arms, to be sure, but conventional arms, deployment of forces, I am not sure we have really been willing to use, rather ironical or paradoxical, a simile, I am not sure we have been willing to bite the bullet.

Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I agree with you, Senator. I do feel, though, that the very pressures you speak of in Poland—and I think they are being felt in the Soviet Union—may be the hope for the future. These pressures are very real, and the Soviets, as well as we, are perhaps beginning to learn they can't expand all over the world and that they have limited resources. Perhaps this will bring about the kind of necessary arms reduction you speak of.

Mr. KENNA. Senator, I would like to make one additional comment on arms reduction. I don't really believe we could have confidence in SALT talks, in bilateral agreements on arms control between our two countries, and have confidence that these agreements were in fact valid, unless there were, along with that, an opening of the two societies to each other through commercial interests and through our exports with Russia. We would indeed have a great deal more confidence in these arrangements than we would have if we stood apart from them as we have.

Senator HUMPHREY. I don't want us to stand apart, I want to be very clear on that.

Mr. KENNA. I understand that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I happen to believe in the closer relationship. I believe in peace in the world.

Mr. KENNA. I know that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am concerned about lots of credit from ourselves for them to go on building these planes, go on building these missiles, go on building these fleets, and God only knows there has to be an end to it some place; you can't do it all. I just hope that these leaders, when they get together, not only talk about getting gas and oil, but how they get rid of some of these unbelievable military expenditures which have become like an anvil around the rest of the world community.

Senator PROXMIRE. Gentleman, thank you very much. We most appreciate your excellent testimony. It has gotten us off to a fine start.

Our next witness is Prof. Abram Bergson, professor of economics at Harvard University.

You have a brief statement. Five members of the committee are ready to question you. We also are expecting a vote on the floor, so Senator Humphrey and I have to leave and go to the floor and vote and come right back.

#### STATEMENT OF ABRAM BERGSON, GEORGE F. BAKER PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. BERGSON. May I say first that I am pleased and honored to appear before this distinguished committee to comment on the economy of the U.S.S.R. in the seventies.

The Soviet economy entered the seventies after a decade of quite rapid, though by no means unmatched, growth. During the sixties, the Soviet GNP grew at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent. That

tempo compares favorably enough with that of the United States, 4 percent, but was fully matched by that of Italy, 5.5 percent, and needless to say hardly compares with that of the West's stellar performer, Japan, which was 11.1 percent.

While comparison with the United States is of particular interest in this country, that with Italy and Japan has its point, for these countries have lately been at a stage of development more or less comparable to that of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet tempo was also fully matched by France's 5.8 percent but somewhat exceeded Germany's 4.8 percent. Like the United States, however, both these countries are more advanced economically than the U.S.S.R. and do not enjoy in the same degree as the U.S.S.R. the so-called advantage of backwardness—opportunities for technological borrowing from more advanced countries and the like.

Will the Soviet Union be able to sustain in the seventies a swift growth such as that achieved in the sixties? If the latest 5-year plan, which went into effect in 1971, is at all indicative, to achieve such growth is essentially the Soviet Government's aim, but the possibility of doing so has already been compromised somewhat by the extraordinarily bad harvest of last year. While that was due primarily to exceptionally poor weather, it reminds us that Soviet economic progress still is often hampered by the underperformance of agriculture.

But in seeking to sustain rapid growth, the Government is also encountering other and more deep-seated difficulties. Most importantly, by Western standards, Soviet growth has been notably costly in terms of labor and even more notably costly in terms of capital. In achieving its 5.5 percent yearly growth of output during 1960-70, the Soviet Union had to increase its stock of enterprise fixed capital by some 6.8 percent annually.

While the enterprise fixed capital stock of Japan grew still faster, the Soviet tempo is unmatched elsewhere among the Western countries I have referred to and nowhere, not even in Japan, is there such a large incongruity between the growth of capital and the growth of output. In Italy, enterprise fixed capital grew less rapidly than output.

In sum, in achieving rapid growth the U.S.S.R. by Western standards, has relied very heavily on factor inputs, especially capital, and has been able to realize only relatively limited technological progress, including both technical innovations and gains in organizational efficiency. That is by no means a novel situation in the U.S.S.R. The heavy reliance on factor inputs, as distinct from productivity-increasing technological progress, became a characteristic feature in the U.S.S.R. almost from the beginning of the 5-year plans under Stalin.

But the corollary of such high-cost growth is a very modest return to consumers, and while Stalin apparently did not find that too disconcerting, his successors have become increasingly committed to a policy of assuring very real progress in consumption standards for an ever more literate, sophisticated, and demanding population. The commitment, while still not irrevocable, appears underlined by the Government's reaction to last year's harvest failures, particularly the use of more than \$2 billion of scarce foreign exchange to purchase abroad the wholly unprecedented total of 31 million tons of grain. Under

Stalin, it was not unusual for grain to be exported in the face of domestic shortages.

The further corollary is that in seeking to sustain rapid growth, the Government in the future must somehow accelerate technological progress. To accomplish that on an economy-wide scale is not an easy task, and what success the Government will have with it remains to be seen, but the Government has clearly apprehended that accelerated technological progress is now a cardinal imperative. We must see in that light, I feel, developments that have been so much in the news lately, and which are of special interest to this committee.

I refer to the transformation that is in progress in Soviet economic connections with the West, including the United States. Our chairman has asked whether the new commercial relationship that we are apparently in the process of establishing with the U.S.S.R. will be as beneficial to the United States as to the U.S.S.R. The new relationship should it fully materialize, clearly will involve a considerable expansion of trade and, as the primers teach, that should be advantageous to both parties. Moreover, comparative benefits from such transactions are not readily quantifiable, but it is fairly evident, I think, that the U.S.S.R. has more to gain than we from the new relationship.

That would be true even if the expanded trade were continually in balance, for the opportunity that such trade would provide for increased specialization and accelerated technological borrowing should be especially valuable to a country such as the U.S.S.R. which has long been more or less isolated from world markets and, despite very real innovative accomplishments, continue to lag technologically behind the United States.

The gains to the U.S.S.R. will only be relatively the greater if, as seems inevitable, Soviet imports from the United States are for a time, financed substantially by credits, and arrangements are also made for the import of U.S. technology directly as well as in the form of U.S. machinery and equipment.

Senator PROXMIRE. If I might interrupt, that is a rollcall. I am going to leave and turn the committee over to Congressman Reuss and be back shortly.

Representative REUSS [presiding]. Please proceed, Mr. Bergson.

Mr. BERGSON. We must not exaggerate the Soviet benefits from the new relationship. The U.S.S.R. has accomplished much in economic isolation from the West, and even if it should continue to be isolated from the United States, it clearly would still be able to draw extensively on Western goods, technology, and credits through expanded commercial relations with other countries, particularly Germany and Japan. But for the U.S.S.R. increased commerce with the United States clearly has a value of its own, the more so at a time when the Government must find new sources of sustained economic growth.

Our chairman has also inquired whether, because of domestic economic difficulties, the prospect has been enhanced that the U.S.S.R. will devote fewer resources to military programs. As will be evident from all that I have said so far, I agree that the Soviet Union is experiencing economic difficulties domestically. Indeed, as seen here, the difficulties may be more profound than often supposed but, if experience teaches anything, it is, I feel, that the Soviet Government is most reluctant to limit defense expenditures in any consequential way purely for economic reasons.

Should political circumstances permit, however, the Government no doubt would find limitation of defense expenditures advantageous economically. In effect, the tension between the conflicting concerns for rapid growth and improved consumption standards would be somewhat eased through the restriction of resources committed for defense. As for the political circumstances, relations with the West apparently are on the uptick. Perhaps I should remind you though that the Soviet Government, in determining defense outlays, is also much concerned about its relations with China. There, for the time, no amelioration appears to be occurring. Circumstances are relatively favorable to negotiation with the U.S.S.R. over defense limitation, though reaching mutually satisfactory agreement remains a difficult task.

I am taking the liberty to insert in the record an article that I have recently published which elaborates more fully than I have been able to do here on the forces shaping current Soviet economic trends.

[The article referred to above follows:]

SOVIET ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES: TOWARD A NEW GROWTH MODEL  
(BY ABRAM BERGSON)

# Soviet Economic Perspectives

EDITORS' NOTE: Soviet leaders in recent years have shown signs of responding to mounting pressures for change in the configuration of the USSR economy and in its external relationships. The three articles below examine several critical dimensions of this metamorphosis, and articles in subsequent issues will examine other aspects. In the first contribution here, Mr. Bergson argues that the escalating economic costs of forced-draft growth are compelling the Soviet regime to shift from the traditional Stalinist model toward a more balanced approach to economic development. Mrs. Schroeder focuses on the dilemmas facing the Soviet leadership in the consumer sector as it attempts to overcome the results of decades of investment neglect and the inflexibility of the management system in order to satisfy increasingly sophisticated popular demand. In the final article, Mr. Fallenbuchl expands the perspective to the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance; he traces the legacy of the Soviet command model in the East European economies and examines the economic forces tending to give the USSR a pivotal role in an increasingly integrated Comecon.

## Toward a New Growth Model

By Abram Bergson

An attempt to peer into the long-term future of the Soviet economy is always timely, but it is especially so after the launching of a new five-year plan proclaiming rather novel priorities.<sup>1</sup> Such an attempt should properly rest on substantial statistical projections of a kind that still remain to be made for the USSR. Even on the basis of limited inquiry, however, it is clear that the Soviet economy has for some time been in a high degree of flux. The resulting change in structure may be more profound and enduring than many commentators on the new plan have supposed. Indeed, the famous Soviet model of economic growth that Stalin initiated with the five-year plans

*Mr. Bergson is George F. Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.). His many books and articles on the Soviet economy include Planning and Productivity Under Soviet Socialism, 1968.*

appears at long last to be passing from the Soviet scene.

Like any relatively modern economy, that of the USSR consists of a myriad of activities, but the results of all these are summarized in the country's real national income. Hence, the trends that are relevant to the present inquiry may be explored by focusing on movement in that cardinal indicator and particularly its best known variant, the gross national product (GNP).

<sup>1</sup> This article is a revised version of a concluding discussion presented at a symposium on Soviet economic prospects held in Brussels on April 14-16, 1971, and published in Y. Laulan, Ed., *Prospects for Soviet Economic Growth in the 1970's*, Brussels, NATO, 1971. The revision has provided an opportunity, among other things, to correct a transcription error affecting the estimated magnitude of Soviet capital stock in 1970 and to take account of a revision in Stanley H. Cohn's calculations of the Soviet gross national product. These modifications are reflected in Tables 1 and 2 in the ensuing discussion.

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## Toward a New Growth Model

Inquiry into the future must begin with an analysis of the past. Therefore, let us at the outset look at trends in Soviet national income since the completion of the initial postwar five-year plan in the year 1950.

### Past Trends

After 1950, as is well-known, the national income at first increased rapidly, though probably not quite as rapidly as is often supposed. During 1950-58, according to Stanley H. Cohn's well-known calculations, it grew at an average rate of 6.4 percent a year (see Table 1).<sup>\*</sup> That is somewhat lower than the rates indicated by other Western data, but it must still be much nearer the mark than the official Soviet claim of 10.9 percent. (This figure relates only to "material output," and such Soviet data must for familiar reasons be treated very skeptically.<sup>2</sup>)

Even according to Western calculations, the tempo of Soviet growth much exceeded that of the US (2.9 percent). But it is worth noting that the Soviet growth rate was nearly equaled or surpassed by the growth rates of Italy (5.6 percent) and Western Germany (7.6 percent). Moreover, it fell well shy of that for Japan. In these early years, Japan had not quite achieved the economic miracle that is now a hallmark there, but its rate of growth was already an impressive 8.0-9.0 percent.

Since 1958, as is well known too, Soviet growth has slowed. As Table 1 shows, the retardation is manifest in both Cohn's and the official Soviet data (curiously enough, it is more marked in the official figures than in Cohn's). Why the slowdown? The question has often been discussed, but there may still not be general understanding that no corresponding retardation occurred in the growth of inputs of the two principal productive factors generating output—capital and labor. According to both official Soviet and Western data, the available stock of capital increased during 1958-67 at about the

same rate as during 1950-58 (Table 1), and the tempo was extraordinarily rapid (a matter to which we shall return later). Similarly, Murray Feshbach's calculations with regard to employment (Table 1) show that it also rose at much the same rate during 1958-67 as during 1950-58.

The slowdown in output growth, then, was due essentially to a decline in the rate of productivity increase. While that is already evident from the trends in output and factor inputs, it becomes even more obvious if we average the rates of growth of capital and labor in a way that has lately become a standard practice in economics. Using this method, we can calculate the rate of growth of output per composite unit of labor and capital together, or "factor productivity" as it has come to be called. During 1958-67, that rate was significantly below the corresponding one for 1950-58 (Table 1). A computation of factor productivity for a non-market economy such as that of the USSR, it is true, is almost inevitably rather arbitrary, but the results obtained are still illuminating.<sup>3</sup>

Why the decline in the growth of factor productivity? There are, perhaps, too many reasons. For

<sup>3</sup> The arbitrariness derives in part from the difficulty of obtaining for the USSR meaningful factor income shares, such as are generated in a market economy, to use as weights in averaging the rates of growth of labor and capital. This paper employs weights of 0.6 and 0.4, respectively, for the two factors—weights suggested by relevant Western experience.

At least for the technically initiated, it should be explained that I felt it appropriate, in the case of capital, to adopt an income share that is gross of depreciation even though what is in question here is the growth of net capital stock over time. Also, inputs have been averaged "logarithmically"; hence, I have in effect assumed a so-called Cobb-Douglas production function, in which the "elasticity of substitution" of inputs of capital and labor is taken to be unity. However, the elasticity of substitution in Soviet circumstances may be less than unity. Under such a condition, the growth of calculated total inputs would tend to slow down even though the rate of increase in inputs of individual factors remained unchanged, and the tempo of factor productivity growth would not decline as much as it does in the present calculations. But the problem of declining factor productivity, to which the text turns next, is then transformed, at least in part, into one of a declining rate of return on capital, and much of what is said, I believe, is still relevant.

Inasmuch as we shall later employ the Cobb-Douglas function in projecting future Soviet economic growth, a word or two about the impact that an elasticity of substitution less than unity would have on these projections seems in order as well. Since under such a circumstance the calculated tempo of factor-1 productivity growth rises for past years, one might well assume that higher rates would result for the future, too, but there are also indications that the rate of growth of total inputs of labor and capital will decrease. Therefore, trial calculations for projections of total GNP growth based on an assumption of an elasticity of substitution less than unity suggest that such projections might be less favorable to the USSR than those made here, which are based on an assumption of an elasticity of unity.

<sup>\*</sup> Readers should be alerted to a very specific usage in the author's presentation of growth statistics. He always includes the base year as well as the years for which performance is being examined: e.g., growth "during 1950-58" signifies output increases in the years 1951-58 from levels achieved in 1950.—Eds.

<sup>2</sup> For a recent appraisal of the official data, including the nature of the Soviet concept of national income, see Abraham S. Becker,

"National Income Accounting in the USSR"; Stanley H. Cohn,

"National Income Growth Statistics"; and Abram Bergson,

"Soviet National Income Statistics: Summary and Assessment,"

in V. G. Tremi and John P. Hardt, Eds., *Soviet Economic Statistics*, Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1972.

**Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for the USSR, 1950-75**  
(average annual rates of growth, in percent)

	1950-58	1958-67	1967-70	1970-75 (Planned)
National income, Soviet official data <sup>a</sup>	10.9	7.2	7.3	6.7 <sup>b</sup>
GNP, Cohn calculations	6.4	5.3	3.4 <sup>c</sup>	n.a. <sup>d</sup>
Capital investment, Soviet official data <sup>a</sup>	12.9	7.6	7.5	6.7
Gross investment, fixed capital, Moorsteen-Powell calculations	11.4	6.9 <sup>e</sup>	n.a.	n.a.
Gross investment, Moorsteen-Powell calculations	12.2	6.1 <sup>f</sup>	n.a.	n.a.
Fixed capital stock including livestock, Soviet official data	8.3 <sup>g</sup>	8.3 <sup>h</sup>	7.5	n.a.
Net fixed capital stock, Moorsteen-Powell calculations	10.0	9.4	n.a.	n.a.
Net capital stock, Moorsteen-Powell calculations	9.0	9.0	n.a.	n.a.
Employment, Feshbach calculations	1.8	1.7	1.7	n.a.
Total input of capital and labor	4.6	4.6	n.a.	n.a.
Factor productivity (GNP per unit of labor and capital)	1.7	0.7	n.a.	n.a.

<sup>a</sup> National income "produced" unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>b</sup> National income "utilized for consumption and accumulation." For 1965-70, such income grew at an average annual rate of 7.1 per cent. The corresponding figure for national income "produced" was 7.7 per cent.

<sup>c</sup> This figure is for 1967-69.

<sup>d</sup> "n.a." means "not applicable" or "not available."

<sup>e</sup> Investment in fixed capital only; during 1950-58 exclusive of investment in private housing as well.

<sup>f</sup> These figures cover 1958-66.

<sup>g</sup> These figures are for 1950-59 and 1959-67.

SOURCES: Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1960 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1960), Moscow, 1961, p. 85, and subsequent volumes in the same series for 1962, p. 535; for 1967, p. 613; for 1968, p. 49; and for 1970, pp. 60, 478, 533; Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie, *Kapitalnoe stroitelstvo v SSSR* (Capital Construction in the USSR), Moscow, 1961, p. 40; *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1971-1975 gody* (The State Five-Year Plan of Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1971-75), Moscow, 1972, pp. 62-75, 345, 352.

<sup>h</sup> Stanley H. Cohn, "General Growth Performance in the Soviet Economy," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 17; Richard Moorsteen and Raymond P. Powell, *The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1962*, Homewood, Ill., 1966, pp. 323, 341, 360; *Two Supplements to Richard Moorsteen and Raymond P. Powell, The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1962*, New Haven, Conn., Economic Growth Center, Yale University, 1968, pp. 11, 18, 24; Murray Feshbach, "Estimates and Projections of the Labor Force and Civilian Employment in the USSR: 1950-1980," Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, February 1970, processed.

one, in 1956 Nikita Khrushchev initiated a reduction in working hours which ultimately led to the establishment of an approximately 40-hour week in industry in place of the 48-hour week that had prevailed in the early 1950's. That reform had already had some impact before 1958, but its principal effect came in subsequent years. Thus, it would have tended to reduce productivity growth in the post-1958 period compared with the pre-1958 one.

Another cause lay in the proverbial vicissitudes in agriculture—most importantly, Khrushchev's heroic interventions, notably the great New Lands Program. This innovation had a favorable outcome at first, but progress became relatively slow and uncertain after the great crop of 1958.<sup>4</sup>

Still another element in the slowdown has been the well-known deficiencies of the Soviet system of

central planning: the failure of enterprise managers to behave as desired because of ineffective incentives and the often fallible direction and coordination of superior agencies. These difficulties are by no means new. On the contrary, they date from virtually the earliest days of Soviet planning. But, as has often been argued, they may have become increasingly costly as Soviet central planning had to cope with the ever-growing complexities associated with continuing industrialization: the increasing number of plants that have to be coordinated, the increasing number and variety of products whose output has to be determined, etc.

Last but not least, there was the varying impact in the USSR of so-called "catch-up" phenomena in the wake of World War II. As is widely recognized, countries ravaged by the war for a time experienced a speedup of economic growth because of such factors as the restoration of partially-destroyed productive capacity at relatively limited investment cost, the acceleration of technological progress through application of innovations made in other countries less affected by the war, and so on. By

<sup>4</sup> Note, however, that chiefly as a consequence of the New Lands Program the cultivated land area increased sharply during the years 1950-58. If our calculation of productivity were extended to include agricultural land as an input (as might be proper), productivity growth during 1950-58 would be somewhat reduced as compared with 1958-67.

## Toward a New Growth Model

the same token, the progressive exhaustion of such advantages necessarily proved a source of retardation in later years. By 1950, the USSR had already surpassed its prewar level of national income, but recovery from war damage remained to be completed in some areas. Thus, "catch-up" phenomena still exerted an appreciable influence on growth. By the 1960's, however, such factors no longer were as potent as they had been previously.

### Some Alternative Projections

So much for past trends. What of the future? One possible answer may be found in the new five-year plan itself: during 1970-75 national income is to grow at nearly the same rate as it did in the 1960's (Table 1).<sup>5</sup> Interesting as a Gosplan projection is, however, we must seek somehow to arrive at an independent evaluation.

To that end, we ought to begin, I think, with Feshbach's forecast that employment will grow in the 1970's at a rate of 1.2 percent a year, or somewhat less rapidly than during the 1950's and 1960's. What of the other principal input, capital? Can Soviet capital stock still be expected to grow at such notably high rates as prevailed during the 1950's and 1960's?

A clue is already provided by available data on the rates of growth achieved in the volume of capital investment in those years. According to both official Soviet and Western data, the rate of growth of investment, while fully comparable to the rate of growth of capital stock during 1950-58, fell well below the tempo of the latter in later years (Table 1). During any year, investment represents new additions to total capital stock; thus, the rate of growth of investment is not at all the same thing as the rate of growth of the capital stock itself. Indeed, the two might temporarily tend to diverge widely. But in the course of time they must nevertheless tend to converge. Hence, if investment continues to increase at a reduced rate like that of the 1960's, the rate of growth of total capital stock will inevi-

<sup>5</sup> As noted in the table, official rates of growth cited for past periods relate to national income "produced," but that planned for 1970-75 relates to national income "utilized for consumption and accumulation." The growth rate for the latter is only 0.4 percentage point below the actual growth rate of national income "utilized for consumption and accumulation" during 1965-70. Therefore, the projected retardation of growth is even less than a comparison with the rates of growth for national income "produced" in past years might suggest.

tably tend to drop also. In fact, if the official data are indicative (Table 1), the latter had already commenced to decline in the late 1960's. Moreover, the new plan apparently projects a tempo of investment growth actually somewhat below that of the 1960's.

Because the question at issue here is central, however, we must again strive to arrive at our own assessment. To do so, let us look at several alternative projections that I have made for the general Soviet economy (see Table 2). While these projections are quite hypothetical and might properly be viewed as exercises, they may help to clarify the implications, and thus facilitate appraisal, of alternative hypotheses regarding the future growth of the Soviet stock of capital. In this way, they may also serve to structure speculation about the future increase of national income.

The projections begin with estimates—sometimes rather crude—of the GNP and its disposition in terms of major uses in 1970, and of the capital stock in that same year,<sup>6</sup> and they assume that employment will grow subsequently at the rate already mentioned of 1.2 percent a year. As for the capital stock, two hypotheses are explored. The first postulates that it will continue to grow at a rate of 9.0 percent a year in the 1970's; the second, that the rate of growth will be only 6.0 percent. In effect, the former assumes that the decline in the rate of growth of investment in the 1960's will prove only transient, while the latter assumes that the decline will persist and indeed become more pronounced.

Under each hypothesis, three-possible alternative rates of increase in factor productivity are explored. Specifically, it is assumed that factor productivity will increase at alternative rates of 3.0, 2.0, and 1.0 percent a year (these rates compare with actual growth rates in factor productivity of 1.7 percent in

<sup>6</sup> The absolute figures underlying the percentages in Table 2 are in 1964 adjusted rubles and are taken or estimated from data in a variety of Western sources, including principally the works of Cohn and of Moorsteen and Powell, cited in Table 1; Abram Bergson, "The Comparative National Income of the USSR and the United States," in Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, National Bureau of Economic Research, *International Comparisons of Prices and Output*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1972; and various RAND studies of Soviet national income. They also draw upon Stanley H. Cohn, "The Economic Burden of Soviet Defense Outlays," in the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970; but it should be noted that the correspondence between the tabulations of GNP by use in 1970 for this paper and those for 1967 in Cohn's essay is to some extent misleading. Cohn's data are in current adjusted rubles, while those for this article, as indicated, are in 1964 adjusted rubles.

1950-58 and 0.7 percent in 1958-67). In conjunction with the average rate of growth of inputs of labor and capital combined (a figure calculated in the same manner as previously described), each of these hypothetical rates of factor productivity growth results in a particular rate of increase in GNP (Table 2).

It is also illuminating to carry the projections somewhat further. From the indicated rates of

growth of GNP, we can calculate hypothetical levels of output for 1975 and 1980. The stock of capital in these years can also be determined once the rate of increase from that of 1970 is specified; so, too, can the annual net investment in 1975 and 1980 if the capital stock is to rise by the required amount each year.<sup>7</sup> Net investments, of course, must be

<sup>7</sup> See below, fn. 9.

**Table 2: The Soviet Economy in 1970 and Alternative Projections for 1975 and 1980**  
(in percent)<sup>a</sup>

**A. With the Capital Stock Growing at 9.0 Percent a Year**

	$\Delta = 3.0$ percent <sup>b</sup>			$\Delta = 2.0$ percent		$\Delta = 1.0$ percent	
	1970	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980
Consumption	56.5	71.1	96.5	65.8	80.0	60.2	65.2
Government							
and defense	13.3	19.0	27.1	18.1	24.6	17.2	22.3
Gross investment	30.2	52.1	80.2	52.1	80.2	52.1	80.2
Net investment	20.2	36.9	56.8	36.9	56.8	36.9	56.8
Depreciation	10.0	15.2	23.4	15.2	23.4	15.2	23.4
GNP	100.0	142.8	203.8	136.0	184.8	129.5	167.7
GNP, average yearly increase in percent from previous date		7.4	7.4	6.3	6.3	5.3	5.3
Net stock of capital, Dec. 31	290.4	446.9	687.7	446.9	687.7	446.9	687.7

**B. With the Capital Stock Growing at 6.0 Percent a Year**

	$\Delta = 3.0$ percent <sup>b</sup>			$\Delta = 2.0$ percent		$\Delta = 1.0$ percent	
	1970	1975	1980	1975	1980	1975	1980
Consumption	56.5	81.8	111.0	76.3	96.2	70.8	82.8
Government							
and defense	13.3	18.0	24.2	17.1	22.0	16.3	19.9
Gross investment	30.2	35.2	47.1	35.2	47.1	35.2	47.1
Net investment	20.2	22.2	29.4	22.0	29.4	22.0	29.4
Depreciation	10.0	13.2	17.7	13.2	17.7	13.2	17.7
GNP	100.0	135.0	182.3	128.6	165.3	122.3	149.8
GNP, average yearly increase in percent from previous date		6.2	6.2	5.2	5.2	4.1	4.1
Net stock of capital, Dec. 31	290.4	388.6	520.1	388.6	520.1	388.6	520.1

<sup>a</sup> All figures except those for average yearly increase in GNP from the previous date are in percent of total GNP of 1970—i.e., total 1970 GNP=100.0 percent.


<sup>b</sup>  $\Delta$  is the projected rate of increase in factor productivity.

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financed, and in real terms such finance must come from the very output that the mounting capital stock makes possible. Hence, the volume of current output that must be allocated to net investment in 1975 and 1980 can be established. With depreciation allowed for at the 1970 average rate, gross investment can likewise be determined. To complete the tabulation of the GNP by use in 1975 and 1980, it remains merely to allow for dispositions to government administration and defense. It has been provisionally assumed here that these will absorb the same share of output as they did in 1970. The residual thus represents the volume of output available for consumption.

This residual is of particular interest here along with the growth rate of output. (Note that in Table 2 all data on output uses and on the capital stock, including those for 1975 and 1980, are expressed

as percentages of total 1970 GNP. This may seem odd, but it facilitates comparisons of interest.) Under each of the two assumed rates of capital stock growth in Table 2, the rate of increase of both GNP and consumption varies depending on the rate of increase in productivity. For any particular rate of productivity increase, however, the rate of growth of output, logically, is always greater with the capital stock rising at 9.0 percent a year than with the capital stock rising at 6.0 percent a year. On the other hand, the increase in consumption when the capital stock grows at 6.0 percent is always greater than it is when the capital stock grows at 9.0 percent. Although, in the latter case, consumption still rises markedly when productivity grows by 3.0 percent, the gains in consumption are quite modest with lesser rates of productivity growth. For instance, with productivity increasing by only 1.0 percent,



A section of the turbogenerator shop of the Leningrad Electrosila Machine-Building Amalgamation where giant units for atomic power stations are assembled.

—Photo by V. Tselik, from *Novosti*, via Sovfoto.

there is hardly any gain to speak of in per capita terms, for the indicated growth in consumption would barely exceed the rise in population, which is expected to amount to 3.9–6.1 percent over the period 1970–75 and 3.4–6.6 percent over the period 1975–80.<sup>8</sup>

In effect, then, the extra increments of output produced when the capital stock grows at 9.0 rather than 6.0 percent a year are, in every instance, more than totally offset by concomitant increases in requirements—chiefly those for investment to render possible the higher rate of growth of the capital stock in the first place. These additional requirements are always incongruously large, but they become more and more so the slower the rise in productivity and output.

The inordinate demand on output to meet current investment requirements is but a corollary of a cardinal feature of Soviet economic growth which is already evident but merits underlining: the capital stock has risen not only rapidly but distinctly more rapidly than output. This was already true in the 1950's when output increased at a relatively rapid pace, but it was even more the case in the 1960's when the growth of output had slowed. In any economy, such an incongruously rapid growth of the capital stock can be assured only through the allocation of an ever-increasing share of output to current investment. To be sure, this observation is simply an arithmetic truism, but it does help to explain the rising share of output which, as our data clearly imply (Table 1), investment was already absorbing in the 1950's and 1960's.

We must also see in this light the further projected increase in investment—*i.e.*, from 30.2 percent of 1970 GNP to between 39.4 and 47.8 percent of GNP in 1980—that is indicated when we extrapolate to the future on the basis of a 9.0-percent tempo of growth in the capital stock. At that rate, the capital stock rises more rapidly than output even with the most favorable hypothetical rate of productivity increase, and the disparity between the growth of the capital stock and the growth of output only widens if the rise in productivity is viewed less optimistically.

What about the alternative projection which assumes that the capital stock will increase at only 6.0 percent a year? In that case, the tempo of growth of the capital stock is only matched by that for the GNP when the rise in productivity is 3.0 per-

cent; when the rise in productivity is just 2.0 or 1.0 percent, the rate of growth of GNP will be less than that of the capital stock. In neither of the last instances, however, is the difference nearly as marked as when the capital stock rises by 9.0 percent. Thus, though gross investment as a share of GNP may rise, its projected levels for 1980—25.8 to 31.4 percent, depending on the increase in productivity—turn out to be much lower than those required when the capital stock grows by 9.0 percent a year.<sup>9</sup>

## Implications

The foregoing exercises are just that, but they still afford insights into why the Soviet government has lately been acquiescing to a retardation of the extraordinarily rapid expansion of the country's cap-

<sup>9</sup> Note that for 1970-75 the differences between the two sets of projections given in Table 2 with respect to the growth rates of investment and, by implication, of consumption might be deemed to be somewhat understated because of the manner in which net investment in 1975 and 1980 has been arrived at. Thus, net investment in each of those years has been taken as simply equal to either 9.0 or 6.0 percent of the capital stock on January 1 of the given year, the particular figure depending on the rate of growth of the capital stock in question. In effect, then, under each hypothesis regarding the growth of the capital stock, net investment increases from 1975 to 1980 at the same tempo as that of the capital stock.

Such a correspondence of the rates of growth of net investment and the capital stock is to be expected over the long run, but inasmuch as we start with 1970—a year when, at the current rate of net investment, the capital stock rose by 7.5 percent—net investment at least for a time must increase at an even higher rate than 9.0 percent if the capital stock is to grow at an average annual rate of 9.0 percent from 1970 to 1975. Similarly, net investment could rise for a time at less than 6 percent and still assure a 6-percent rate of growth of the capital stock from 1970 to 1975.

While there is no logical bar to the achievement of the rates of investment listed in Table 2, it might perhaps be more reasonable to assume that investment will grow at a constant rate during 1970-75—*i.e.*, at a tempo which would produce the hypothesized rate of increase in the capital stock, on the average, over the five-year period. Under such an assumption, investment in 1975 would have to constitute 40.6 percent of GNP, instead of the 36.9 percent shown in Table 2, to guarantee a rise of 9.0 percent a year in the capital stock; but it would need to be only 19.2 percent of GNP, rather than the 22.0 shown in the table, to insure a growth of 6.0 percent a year in the capital stock.

According to the same reasoning, the calculations for 1975-80 contain an element of bias too, though of a contrary nature. Thus, if we alter investment's projected share of total GNP in 1975 as just indicated above and then apply to 1975-80 the same methodology for computing investment as we just did for the 1970-75 period, we come up with the following results: investment in 1980 would need to be only 53.7 percent of the GNP, instead of the 56.8 percent shown in Table 2, to assure an increase of 9.0 percent a year of the capital stock; however, it would have to be 31.9 percent of GNP, rather than the 29.4 percent shown in the table, to guarantee a rise of 6 percent a year in the capital stock.

<sup>8</sup> Murray Feshbach, "Population," in *ibid.*

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ital stock despite the fact that such expansion has been the primary means by which the government has over the years endeavored to achieve a rapid growth of output. More important, the projections suggest that the retardation will probably be allowed to continue.

To expand the capital stock by 9.0 percent a year has always been an onerous undertaking for the USSR, but it would become even more so should the government seek to maintain that tempo in the future. The chief costs, of course, have been and would continue to be borne by Soviet consumers. But while Stalin freely sanctioned such deprivations, soon after his death the Soviet government avowedly committed itself to a different policy, and that policy has now been reaffirmed in the five-year plan just promulgated for 1971-75. According to its own language, the "chief test" of the plan will be whether or not it assures "the rise of the material and cultural level of life of the population."<sup>10</sup>

The Soviet people, to be sure, have come to understand that improvements in consumption standards do not inexorably follow government commitments to provide them. Nevertheless, these standards have by all accounts tended to rise since Stalin, and sometimes markedly. It would be surprising if the government in the years ahead decided, except under great duress, to suspend such rewards for any length of time for a population which is now relatively educated as well as conscious of Western living standards, and which has elite groups who themselves have become increasingly materialistic. Such a governmental decision would be especially surprising in circumstances where a full reversion to the techniques of rule of the days of the "cult of personality" no longer appears to be a feasible alternative.

The implementation of the government's commitments to consumers obviously will not be made easier by the 1972 crop failures, still much in the news as these lines are written, but the government's reaction to these failures also underlines that at least a partial shift in priorities has occurred. Re-

portedly, nearly \$2.0 billion of scarce foreign exchange has been allocated for the importation of some 28 million tons of grain. Under Stalin, needless to say, concern for alleviating the impact of harvest losses was hardly so intense.<sup>11</sup>

If the tempo of capital-stock growth is permitted to decrease, of course, the growth rate of output will likely do the same. Our projections only underline the evident at this point. But the government has already acquiesced in a retardation of output growth. Given its heightened concern for consumers, it may well find it expedient to continue to do so in the future.

But what about productivity? Do not our projections show that if productivity grows rapidly enough—say by 3.0 percent—the capital stock, and with it output, could continue to grow at high rates even while the needed improvement in consumption standards is realized? Theoretically, that is a possibility, and the Soviet government, always concerned about raising productivity, has understandably become even more so as the investment costs of sustaining the further growth of the capital stock have become ever greater. As the just concluded US-USSR economic accord underlines, the USSR, once so uneasy about economic relations with the West, is now actively seeking to promote them. It hopes that productivity growth will be helped by the increased exchanges, and especially by the more accelerated importation into the USSR of advanced Western technology that the agreement makes possible. The Soviet government has been trying to speed up productivity growth in other ways as well. Of late, it has placed increasing stress on domestic technological innovation, and at the same time it has sought, through the much-discussed planning reforms launched in the fall of 1965, to remedy the perennial deficiencies in economic administration, such as those to which we have already referred, and thereby to increase the efficiency of the system.

Thus far, however, the planning reforms do not appear to have been highly effective.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, the

<sup>10</sup> *Gosudarstvennyi piatiletnii plan razvitiia narodnovo khoziaistvo SSSR na 1971-1975 gody*, Moscow, 1972, p. 73.

<sup>11</sup> This, it will be recalled, is not the first occasion since Stalin's death that the government has imported grain on a large scale to offset harvest losses. However, the current imports much exceed even the purchases made in response to the exceedingly bad harvest of 1963 (16.8 million tons during 1963-65), and they apparently will suffice to make good all the 1972 losses.

<sup>12</sup> In the aftermath of the recent harvest failures, the government is also reportedly revising its investment program in order to assure more funds for agriculture. This initiative should be taken into account when we come later to a consideration of the prospects

for productivity growth in the economy generally, though its implications in that regard are perhaps not so evident as is sometimes assumed. Thus, while some analysts have argued that any substantial revision of investment allocations under the current five-year plan might in itself tend to impair efficiency, it is also possible that additional allocations to agriculture might be relatively productive in view of the chronic shortage of capital there.

<sup>13</sup> See Abram Bergson, "The Current Soviet Planning Reforms," in Alexander Balinsky et al., *Planning and the Market in the USSR: the Sixties*, New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1967; Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Organization and Management as Factors in Soviet Economic Growth in the 1970's," Laulan, op. cit.



Assembly of "Zhiguli" automobiles at the Togliatti plant.

—Photo by V. Budan, from TASS via Sovfoto.

acceleration of technological progress in any wholesale way in a complex, modern economy such as that of the USSR is not an easy task. While productivity may increase more rapidly in the future than it has recently, that is not saying a great deal. Certainly, the government would have difficulty achieving a tempo of productivity improvement much higher than the more buoyant rates of the 1950's. Should the government seek to sustain a superhigh rate of capital-stock growth at the expense of consumption, big gains in productivity would be all the harder to attain, inasmuch as frustration of consumer aspirations for rising standards of living could not help but affect labor incentives adversely.

Though the changes introduced in the wake of the planning reforms announced in the fall of 1965 were hardly revolutionary, the reforms themselves did represent something of a break with the past. Hence, we should not be too surprised if, in search of additional sources of productivity gains, the government should initiate still further reforms in plan-

ning. Perhaps it will at long last even make the kind of wholesale shift to "market socialism" that many thought was being initiated in 1965. But only time will tell just what further changes, if any, might be introduced, and how productivity might be affected thereby.

Our projections have assumed throughout that the Soviet government will devote to public administration and defense a constant share of output corresponding to that of 1970. Defense is by far the more important claimant here, and the USSR could obviously find additional resources for both investment and consumption, should it be prepared to limit allocations to that competing use. While the Soviet government has always seemed reluctant to restrict defense expenditures on purely economic grounds, it might in the future—political circumstances permitting—find such grounds more impelling than it has found them in the past. Indeed, we may wonder whether it has not already found them so in view of the apparently increased flexibility that it has manifested lately in, for example, arms-control negotiations.

To conclude, then, I have referred often to the extraordinarily high tempo of capital-stock growth that has prevailed hitherto in the USSR—a tempo which has surpassed that of output growth even when output was increasing relatively rapidly. I have also discussed a corollary of that incongruity: the rising share of output absorbed by the investments required to sustain such rapid growth of the capital stock. While the pattern of economic growth that emerged in the USSR under Stalin's five-year plans—and has come to be called the Soviet model—has many facets, a central characteristic has been the imbalance manifested in such disproportionately rapid growth of capital stock in combination with a rising share of output going into investment. (The latter phenomenon is perhaps even more familiar in the alternative guise of an inordinately high tempo of growth in "heavy" as compared with "light" industries.) As so characterized, however, the Soviet model has clearly been undergoing a process of erosion lately. Notably, unbalanced growth has apparently been giving way to relatively balanced growth in the very sphere—capital formation—where the imbalance had previously been most striking. The prospect is that this erosion will continue. In the USSR at least, the Soviet model may not survive its dictatorial originator much longer.

Representative REUSS. Mr. Bergson, just referring to the last statement you made about the Soviet military commitment, do I understand you to say that because of the existence of the perceived Chinese threat to the Soviet Union, you don't regard prospects for arms and military personnel reduction by the Soviet Union as very favorable?

Mr. BERGSON. Well, Congressman, I think they have become more favorable than they were just a few years ago, in view of the evident improvement in relations with the West. But I do feel that the Soviet concern with China is a constraint on what they will do regarding defense. Their overall defense policy embraces their relations with China, as well as the West. I don't mean though to write off the possibility that they will agree to limit defense expenditures.

Representative REUSS. Well, here we get a little beyond economics into military strategy and policy, but are there ways, in your judgment, in which the Soviet Union could respond to relaxation of tensions with the United States and the NATO countries, while at the same time not lowering its guard, as it sees it, against the Chinese on its other border? The Soviet Union could move troops out of Eastern Europe, I suppose, and put them down somewhere else.

Mr. BERGSON. Representative Reuss, without pretending to be a great authority on military strategy, I do feel that there is some give in the situation, in the sense that it is, for instance, entirely conceivable that the Russians would find it expedient, advantageous, to limit their posture relatively to the West without concomitantly feeling they were exposing themselves increasingly to the East.

Representative REUSS. Congressman Widnall.

Representative WIDNALL. Thank you, Congressman Reuss.

Thank you, Mr. Bergson, for coming in here and giving us your testimony today. I am sure it is going to be quite helpful to us.

I would like to ask this question: The thought occurred to me that it would be very advantageous for us to condition our U.S. trade on the payment of 1 percent of any of the amount in gold. I don't know whether this is possible or not, but it would seem to me that is something that could aid us with our problem materially, aid in connection with our balance of payments. It is a very modest amount which would be coming from the second nation in the world with respect to gold supply, gold hoarding.

Unfortunately, as far as I know, there are no figures that have been substantiated as to the amount of the Soviet gold supply. Do you have any information on that?

Mr. BERGSON. Congressman Widnall, that is a rather novel proposal. I am not aware that it has been advanced previously.

Representative WIDNALL. It has not.

Mr. BERGSON. My instinctive reaction is one of some uneasiness about it, frankly. I would wonder whether this could, for one thing, make a very significant contribution to our international economic position. Offhand, I would rather doubt it.

The Russians must pay in one way or another for their purchases from us. They may initially use credits, but in time they must reimburse us somehow.

The price of gold in the open market is high at this moment, but the Russian payment in dollars, in foreign exchange, in one way or another, would improve our position in any case, and I rather doubt that

the payment of 1 percent of what they have to pay us in gold would result in additional material gain in our international position. Of course, if we only credit the Soviet gold shipment at the official price, we realize a small gain at the expense of the Russians, but I doubt that the Russians would agree to that.

Representative WIDNALL. I think it would be helpful, as far as our own country is concerned, if we could get something by way of part payment at a time when we are economically unsettled and when certainly our own dollar is being panicked overseas by others who are doing it not so much because they feel the value of the dollar isn't there, but because they feel they have us on the ropes and now they can just make us take more all of the time.

Mr. BERGSON. Well, Congressman, if we allow our trade to expand as we apparently are doing, the Russians in due course will have to reimburse us in either goods or hard currency exchange.

Actually, the Russians have been exporting some gold in order to obtain hard currency exchange in recent years, and from their standpoint I don't think it would be a matter of great moment within some limits, if they were to move a little bit in one direction rather than another in settling their international accounts, but, to repeat, I don't think they would agree to settle for the gold at the official price.

Representative WIDNALL. One further question. Do you think the Soviet Union can provide a long-term market for U.S. agricultural products, one which will convince the U.S. farmers to expand production with the knowledge that an eager market is there, ready to absorb production in excess of domestic needs?

Mr. BERGSON. The Russians do seem, Congressman, to be moving to a position in which they are becoming a chronic net importer of agricultural goods. Their requirements are fluctuating very widely. We have to bear in mind that their domestic production is still very much affected by the weather, and their harvest accordingly fluctuates rather widely.

In arranging our own affairs and in reacting to the evolving Russian interest in agricultural imports, we will have to take into account these fluctuations. I am among those who feel our reaction last year was not optimal from our standpoint. It is a little difficult for us to serve fully as an ever-normal grainery for the Russians. While we certainly could adapt to a progressive increase in exports to the Soviet Union in the course of time, we have to bear in mind that the Russian requirements will very likely vary appreciably from year to year.

This, I think, requires us to organize our exports to the Soviet Union in a way so that we will not be too vulnerable to these fluctuations. The fluctuations are wide enough so that I don't think we can count fully on the ordinary processes of the market to do the job.

Representative WIDNALL. What changes have taken place in the multilateral export control group comprising the NATO countries and Japan, and in the U.S. unilateral export control system over the past 5 years? How much more do you believe export controls need to be liberalized to convince the Soviets that the United States wants to be its viable trading partner to the mutual benefit of both countries?

Mr. BERGSON. Well, Congressman, it is my understanding we have in the last year already liberalized our controls appreciably and I think this has been very favorable to the development of our trade relations

with the Soviet Union. I have not examined in any detail our control list as it now stands, as it has been revised within the last year, and I am not sure what further items might be removed. I would assume that this list must be continually under review in the light of our changing relations with the Soviet Union. I am not sure at this point, though, that the list we impose is much more restrictive than that which has for some time been maintained in Western Europe. That may provide some benchmark which we would have to consider in determining our commercial policy with the Soviet Union.

Representative WIDNALL. Thank you. My time is up.

Representative REUSS. Congressman Blackburn.

Representative BLACKBURN. Thank you, Congressman Reuss.

Professor Bergson, I found your testimony extremely interesting. I am wondering this: When we talk of the grain failure in the Soviet Union, do you have an opinion as to how much of that failure was due to perhaps inefficiency in management as it was to weather? Was it a combination of these things?

Mr. BERGSON. Congressman, it was a combination, clearly, but the weather was extremely bad in 1972. The Soviet grain harvest is very vulnerable to the weather. In an appreciable part of even their better grain areas, the rainfall is still only rather marginal, in the sense that while it is OK if it is average, if it goes below average, the crop is sensitive to it. The average tends to be at the lower level of what is required for a good harvest.

Now, the weather was exceptionally bad in 1972. But there is no question that the organizational arrangements have not been especially favorable to high productivity in agriculture.

Representative BLACKBURN. Wouldn't that same observation hold true throughout all of their industry? You mentioned the high capital investment they have been making and yet they haven't been getting the return in productivity a highly advanced Western nation would get for the same capital investment. Isn't that traceable to an inherent inefficiency in their economic system?

Mr. BERGSON. I fully agree with you. Their system has not been functioning very efficiently. It has been much more successful in pumping a lot of capital into industry and into the economy, mobilizing resources, pumping them into the system, than it has been in utilizing the capital and resources generally.

This was a characteristic of the growth model that came into being under Stalin; and Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Kosygin inherited this model. They have been trying to make it work, but they have encountered, I think, increasing difficulty because the model it has operated allows such a limited return to consumers. The fact that the growth was so costly, productivity gains were so limited, you had to invest so much capital to achieve it along with labor, meant that the returns to the consumers tended to be very modest.

Under Stalin, they were very modest indeed. Now the government has felt increasingly committed to ensure respectable gains in consumption, and this has posed a great dilemma to the government. I think it is the cardinal problem the government faces, along with the difficulties in agriculture; namely, that the old Stalinism growth model does not allow the return to the consumers that the Soviet Government feels increasingly committed to provide.

Representative BLACKBURN. Doesn't this pose a very important question?—and I think we are both hitting at the same point—Soviet leaders themselves fear if they begin to liberalize the management of this economy, that is, if they remove the political stranglehold which to date dominates every aspect of their life, whether it be economic, military, political, what-have-you, their political considerations are menaced. If they begin to relax the political domination of every decision that they make, and permit some liberalization in the economic field making the decisions, they face a threat to their political system. Don't you think that is the real problem the Soviet leadership faces? Wasn't that the problem they faced in Czechoslovakia, for example?

Mr. BERGSON. Well, Congressman, with regard to Czechoslovakia I think they are, first of all, very cautious. It is clear—Brezhnev and Kosygin have been very cautious in regard to economic organization. They are proving to be quite conservative, if you like, orthodox, from their standpoint, in regard to economic organization. I do think that there are political sources of that caution, in the sense that the thoroughgoing economic reform involving reestablishment of markets on a considerable scale might involve some political risk. I agree.

I do feel, though, that the problem is not simply political. The government is cautious partly for valid reasons in that it is not entirely sure how a market system within the framework of socialism, which is not the same thing as a market system within the framework of our Western mixed economy, how that will work.

With regard to Czechoslovakia, Khrushchev and his successors no doubt have been uneasy about the kind of economic reform, economic liberalization the Czechs were in the process of instituting. But my own feeling is, I think it is shared rather widely by persons who have followed these developments, is that the primary reason for the Soviet intervention was military and political.

The Soviet leaders were concerned about the political liberalization that was occurring in Czechoslovakia, the threatened reestablishment of a free press, multiparty system, and I think they were concerned about what that would mean for the political and military security of their system generally.

Let me add just one point. They did accept a thoroughgoing economic reform in Hungary. The Hungarians introduced an economic reform—it still isn't fully understood in the West—which was just as radical economically as the reform the Czechs wanted to institute and the Soviet Government, the Politburo, accepted that.

The Hungarians, I am sure, feel they got the reform into operation by the skin of their teeth. They introduced their reform just before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. That is, the Hungarians introduced their reform in January of 1968 and the invasion came in August of 1968. If they had delayed until after August, they probably never would have been bold enough to introduce their reform, but the fact is they introduced it and the Soviet leaders have accepted it.

Representative BLACKBURN. Don't you feel any realistic chance for evolution in the Soviet Union toward a more liberal society, political as well as economic, probably lies in the economic pressures that the Soviet leadership is going to feel?

Mr. BERGSON. I agree this is one of the most hopeful features in the Soviet scene. The circumstances which we have been discussing create pressures for rising productivity, and these I do feel are among the more hopeful forces that may affect the political situation in time. This is a very tenuous connection that we can't speak of with great confidence but nevertheless it does seem to be a connection.

Representative BLACKBURN. We can keep our fingers crossed.

Thank you, Congressman Reuss. I want to get under 1-minute speeches, so you have to excuse me.

Representative REUSS. Thank you very much, Mr. Bergson, for your most helpful presentation.

I am afraid our senatorial friends are delayed on the floor. So, again, we want to express our appreciation.

We will now stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning in this room.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, July 18, 1973.]

[The following information was subsequently supplied for the record:]

RESPONSE OF DAVID ROCKEFELLER TO ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS POSED BY THE COMMITTEE

*Question 1. Assuming the 1972 grain sales did not maximize the U.S. market advantages, how may we improve future dealings?*

Answer. We need to know more about agricultural conditions in the Soviet Union in order to assess marketing possibilities for U.S. farm products in the U.S.S.R. An exchange of agricultural information was a part of one of the agreements signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev. We also need to encourage more U.S. production of food and feed to satisfy domestic demand and to meet export opportunities.

*Question 2. If we do not know the external debt of the U.S.S.R. with Western Europe and Japan, how can we assess the credit worthiness of the Soviet Union?*

Answer. The credit worthiness of the U.S.S.R., or any other country, is not solely determined by the level of external debt. A stagnant country with no exports might be a very poor credit risk even through its level of outstanding external debt is low. A dynamic economy, such as Japan, has in the past been able to absorb and service a very high level of foreign debt. In the case of the Soviet Union, their past performance in meeting all foreign obligations makes them a good credit risk. This assessment will be continually evaluated in light of any new foreign borrowings and any changes in the economic structure of the country that bears on the external sector.

*Question 3. What would be the effect of passage of the Jackson amendment?*

Answer. Assuming the Soviets do not further liberalize their emigration restrictions, the effect of the Jackson amendment would be to very markedly slow the growth in United States-Soviet trade and other economic relations. It could also retard the increase in personal contacts and the spread of ideas between the two countries.

*Question 4. What other options are open to the U.S.S.R. if American credits are not available through the Export-Import Bank?*

Answer. If American credits are not available, the U.S.S.R. could purchase machinery and equipment from the other developed countries of Western Europe and Japan, to the extent that it is available. If not available, they would be forced to use less technically developed products.

*Question 5. To what extent may we expect equity participation in joint ventures or co-production projects within the Soviet Union?*

Answer. Equity investment, domestic or foreign, is not part of the Soviet system and this situation can be expected to continue in the foreseeable future.

*Question 6. How will the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council improve U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial relations? Will small businesses have equal access to data and trade facilities? Is there a danger that a Soviet trade lobby will be built up in the United States?*

Answer. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council could be a most effective intermediary for improvement of trade relationships between the two countries. Through the Council, small business should be able to gain useful information on market developments in the Soviet Union. On the possibility of a Soviet trade lobby developing within the U.S., I don't see this as a likelihood. Both countries have much to gain from expansion of trade relationships between them.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,  
August 7, 1973.

Mr. JOHN R. STARK,  
*Executive Director, Joint Economic Committee,  
U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. STARK: We are pleased to enclose NAM's response to the additional Committee questions on the Soviet Economic Outlook. We look forward to seeing the hearings when completed.

Sincerely,

NICHOLAS E. HOLLIS.

Enclosure.

*Question 1. Assuming the 1972 grain sales did not maximize the U.S. market advantages, how may we improve future dealings?*

Answer. (a) Future sales of U.S. agricultural products to state purchasing, non-market economies such as the Soviet Union should be carefully approached with the benefit of better and earlier coordination between government agencies and the private sector. For example, the delay in concluding the U.S.-Soviet maritime agreement until several months after grain sales may have generated transportation problems in meeting shipping contracts. Sophisticated management, weighing pertinent supply and demand factors, coupled with more effective use of intelligence on market conditions, should govern such transactions. Administrative safeguards, governing procedures and governmental subsidy programs, should be periodically reviewed on such transactions to (1) assure that domestic needs and interests are accurately assessed, (2) governmental programs are properly designed to serve their stated purposes. Efforts should be directed toward achieving a growing export market and encouraging domestic production to meet increased consumption levels.

(b) In addition, the Congress might consider modifying the scope of the Webb Pomerehne Act (as recommended in S. 1483) to permit additional companies the ability to establish joint export associations. This would waive certain antitrust prosecutions for companies cooperating together in commercial dealings with monolithic, non-market economies.

*Question 2. If we do not know the external debt of the U.S.S.R. with Western Europe and Japan, how can we assess the credit worthiness of the Soviet Union?*

Answer. The relationship between the western, industrialized nations with relatively free market economies and the Soviet Union characterized by a non-market, centrally-planned economy suffers ambiguities, particularly regarding credit worthiness. Some information traditionally used to determine credit worthiness is not available on the Soviet Union given the nature of their system. However, there are negotiations in progress between the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry to determine if general U.S. information requirements can be met.

(a) Recognizing the excellent credit record the Soviets have developed on repayment with Western industrialized countries, more coordination among Western governmental agencies extending credit might be developed to access credits and debt burden of the Soviet Union (through a Berne Union arrangement or the O.E.C.D.)

(b) All available sources of information on productive capacity and output of the Soviet Union might be utilized to indirectly assess its ability to meet credit obligations.

Although no firm judgment on this question can be made at this time additional information should be forthcoming. In the interim, it would be well to recognize that "barter-term" agreements are likely to predominate on many transactions.

*Question 3. What would be the effect of passage of the Jackson amendment?*

Answer. As noted in testimony, this amendment would seriously inhibit expansion of U.S.-Soviet commercial relations and jeopardize overall U.S.-Soviet detente since (1) MFN extension is regarded by the Soviets as a pivotal part of the 1972

Economic Agreement, (2) MFN is regarded as an important symbol and operational tool according to nondiscriminatory trade access for the Soviets to the U.S. market. Without MFN, the Soviets could not develop balanced trade with the U.S. and would probably turn their commercial attention elsewhere to more reciprocal trading partners.

The Jackson amendment would also decrease U.S. competitiveness vis a vis other foreign countries vying for Soviet contracts. In addition, the United States could forfeit a real balance of payments improvement—projected medium term trade surplus with the Soviets.

Other important problems which would be exacerbated by the passage of the Jackson amendment include:

(a) Destabilizing the basis of world trade system. MFN treatment is a central condition to expanding reciprocal world trade (GATT negotiations are based on MFN). Application of MFN principle to old trading partners, but not to new ones, appears indefensible and could be dangerous and unstabilizing.

(b) Linking of commercial and domestic political issues. Use of economics as a tool to try to achieve political change is reminiscent of "Cold War" era and sets an undesirable precedent for use on other issues. This technique could be used by other nations and justified upon the basis of U.S. example.

(c) Possible ramifications on other U.S.-Soviet agreements, negotiated within the context of an overall lessening of tensions. This spirit is jeopardized, as are other specific improvements, if key parts of these agreements are repudiated.

*Question 4. What other options are open to the U.S.S.R. if American credits are not available through the Export-Import Bank?*

Answer:

(a) Credit arrangements and "swap" transactions may be developed by individual firms dealing with the Soviet Union.

(b) Private sector financial institutions have already expressed interest in providing additional sources of credit for U.S.-U.S.S.R. transactions.

(c) Limited financing through Western European financial institutions and Eurodollar market.

*Question 5. To what extent may we expect equity participation in joint ventures or co-production projects within the Soviet Union?*

Answer. This subject is difficult to comment on. We have had limited discussion with Soviet officials regarding joint foreign/U.S.S.R. ownership of investment, originating with the conference NAM co-sponsored in February, 1973. However, there have been few actual foreign ownerships of production facilities in the past since this practice is usually precluded by their economic system. However, joint efforts in the construction of facilities and cooperation (technical advice) in production processes is underway. Other new techniques are open to further exploration and will be developed as specific business opportunities arise.

*Question 6. How will the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council improve U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial relations? Will small businesses have equal access to data and trade facilities? Is there a danger that a Soviet trade lobby will be built up in the United States?*

Answer. (See NAM Task Force recommendations for the Council on Soviet-American Trade which were developed pursuant to the June 22 protocol calling for the early establishment of a new U.S.-U.S.S.R. business organization—submitted as attachment to the testimony.)

NAM believes the organization should have a broad-based membership which provides access and participation to both large and small businesses. We have been working with the formation committee for the new organization, chaired by Mr. Donald M. Kendall, Chairman of PepsiCo, Inc.

If properly conceived and implemented, the new organization could (1) improve availability of business facilities; offices, visas, telex, staff, and other services in Moscow, (2) research new commercial opportunities, (3) coordinate information exchange on U.S. and Soviet markets, (4) possibly assist the early resolution of contract disputes and settlements, and (5) aid the growth of understanding and a cooperative spirit between the two nations.

We believe the danger of a Soviet trade lobby should be minimal. The organization will likely be engaged much more in operational than in policy-influencing activities. Similar organizations, which currently operate with other nations, do not appear to have evolved into trade lobbies. We believe existing business organizations should lend active support to the successful launch of this needed organization. Recognizing that its initial functions and staff capabilities will be modest, existing national organizations should be encouraged to access the new entity to their information on U.S.-Soviet trade.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,  
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS,  
Cambridge, Mass., August 1, 1973.

SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE,  
*Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, New Senate Office  
Building, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR SENATOR PROXMIRE: Thank you for your good letter. I too was disappointed at the prompt conclusion of our panel discussion, for I had hoped to have a greater opportunity than the brief question period allowed to elaborate on the summary statement that I had submitted to you.

You ask whether "we may be discouraging arms control by improvement in commercial relations." There is perhaps such a possibility, but I doubt that it is a very real one. As I pointed out in my statement, the Russians are finding it increasingly difficult to reconcile their proverbially competing claims of defense, economic growth, and civilian consumption. They are obviously eager to expand commercial relations with the West, particularly the United States, to quite new levels, in the hope that the conflict in claims might be eased through increased international specialization, and imports of Western technology and capital.

Heretofore, however, they have shown a remarkable ability to support an appropriate defense establishment despite limitations in their overall economic means, and we must assume, I think, that they will continue to be able to do so in future. Moreover, the Russians have already increased markedly their economic ties with advanced non-Communist countries other than the United States (chiefly the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan). They can achieve much of the economic stimulus that they seek through such connections.

In sum, if the transformation of commercial relations with us now in progress should be aborted, the Russians might find their overall economic capacities more restricted than they otherwise would be, but the impact should be modest for an economy that is now producing a GNP of some \$710 billions, by a wide margin the second largest in the world, and about 60 per cent of ours. If past experience is any guide, furthermore, limitations in overall economic capacities in the USSR would be more apt to impinge on the civilian than the military sector of the economy. To a greater degree than in the past, though, allocations to economic growth might suffer as well.

In responding to your question, I have focused on the economic impact in the USSR of the on-going expansion of its commercial relations with the United States. Needless to say, any substantial increase in such ties would also have an impact on our economy, and as generally assumed, that too would no doubt be favorable. As I argue in my statement, however, the gain for us probably would not be nearly as great as for the Russians.

But you have inquired especially about the consequences of the expanded commercial relations on the Soviet attitude towards arms control. From that standpoint, I should mention, though the fact will hardly be news to you, that if that expansion should now be seriously impeded by any actions we take, that would necessarily have political consequences. What these might be is conjectural, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, at least in the short run, there might be some fall-out adverse to arms control.

Mr. Stark has also sent me some questions regarding our developing economic ties with the USSR. Perhaps it will be just as well if, so far as I am able, I respond to these here. I refer to questions 1 through 5. I don't think I am able at this stage to contribute very much on question 6.

*Question 1. Assuming the 1972 grains did not maximize the U. S. market advantages, how may we improve future dealings?*

Answer. I agree that the 1972 grain sales left something to be desired from the U.S. standpoint. On the Soviet side the sales reflected an exceptionally severe harvest failure, of a sort that should not recur too often, but a review of the arrangements for grain sales to the USSR is clearly in order. I cannot pretend to any great expertise in this area, but I understand efforts are already being made to improve our current reporting on Soviet agriculture. That would certainly be to the good. I should think that some arrangements might also be made to monitor more effectively than has been done heretofore Soviet activities in respect to grain purchases.

We may also have to review arrangements to limit exports in exceptional circumstances. As I say, the Russians should not soon again have a harvest of the 1972 sort, but that is not ruled out. There are perhaps limits to the degree to

which, under a market system, we can serve as an ever-normal granary for the USSR.

*Question 2. If we do not know the external debt of the U.S.S.R. with Western Europe and Japan, how can we assess the credit worthiness of the Soviet Union?*

Answer. The Russians have a good record regarding repayment of credits, but their external debt is certainly among the facts that should be considered in judging their credit worthiness. That seems especially in order since credits now being discussed are sometimes of rather novel magnitudes. Some data, however, have been compiled on the Soviet external debt (See "Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies", pp. 691-692, 702), though Soviet secrecy in this area is a handicap.

*Question 3. What would be the effect of passage of the Jackson amendment?*

Answer. The Jackson amendment seems to deny MFN and U.S. government credits and credit guarantees to any country with a "non-market economy" which restricts in any consequential way the right of its citizens to emigrate from that country. The Russians, to repeat, are very eager to expand their commercial relations with us, and the extent of such expansion will clearly turn in good part on the availability to them of credits and MFN, especially the former. But, under the prevailing Soviet authoritarian political system, there are I think very real limits to the degree to which the USSR would be willing to liberalize emigration in the interests of commercial relations with us. The Russians have, it is true, already liberalized emigration somewhat, and at least partly in response to the Jackson amendment. Possibly they would be prepared to go further in that direction, though how far is an interesting question.

Should the amendment be enacted, therefore, much will depend on how it is interpreted. But if the Russians should have to be found not to conform to it, prospects for expanded commercial relations with them necessarily would be much dampened. Presumably there would also be adverse consequences, at least in the short run, for our political relations with the USSR. We cannot rule out either that, in the circumstances, the Soviet government would find it in order further to restrict, rather than liberalize, emigration.

I do not wish at all to be construed here as contending against the Jackson amendment. I for one, have come to feel, however, that some clarification might be to the good if it could be achieved without any consequential emasculation.

*Question 4. What other options are open to the U.S.S.R. if American credits are not available through the Export-Import Bank?*


Answer. What is in question here, I believe, is the situation that would arise if the Jackson amendment were enacted, and the Russians should be found not in conformity with it and so be denied MFN and official credits and credit guarantees. A corollary presumably is that the Russians would then suspend payments under the Lend-Lease settlement of last year, for that settlement is conditional on the Russians' receiving MFN. Whether the USSR, despite the provisions of the Johnson Act, would be considered as eligible for long-term private credits here is a legal matter on which I am not too clear. The USSR apparently has had access to such credits lately. Whatever the legalities, private interest in granting credits of any sort to the USSR no doubt would be cooled in the circumstances envisaged.

*Question 5. To what extent may we expect equity participation in joint ventures or co-production projects within the Soviet Union?*

Answer. The Russians, to my knowledge, have not allowed foreign firms to have an equity participation in a Soviet company since the twenties. Such participation would be hard for them to swallow ideologically, though that does not mean it is excluded. It has been allowed in Yugoslavia and, I believe, in Rumania.

Yours sincerely,

ABRAM BERGSON.



# SOVIET ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 1973

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:15 a.m., in room 1114, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William Proxmire (vice chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senator Proxmire.

Also present: John R. Stark, executive director; Loughlin F. McHugh, senior economist; Michael J. Runde, administrative assistant; John R. Karlik, professional staff member; George D. Krumbhaar, Jr., minority counsel; and Walter B. Laessig, minority counsel.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PROXMIRE

Senator PROXMIRE. The committee will come to order.

Yesterday this committee heard testimony from David Rockefeller, Douglas Kenna, and Prof. Abram Bergson on the subject of the Soviet Economic Outlook.

The improving economic relations between the two countries makes this subject more important than ever to us in formulating our own policies. We face a need to learn more about the Soviet economy and its prospects.

As I indicated yesterday, there are three focal points that bear directly on U.S. policy, and I hope that we can discuss them today and learn more about them. These questions are:

1. Has the recent improvement in Soviet-American relations and the poor Soviet economic performance enhanced the prospect that fewer resources will be directed to Soviet military programs?

2. The issue of Soviet agriculture and the conditions and the extent to which American farm exports will be to the Soviet Union in the future.

3. Are the new commercial relations between our two countries likely to be as beneficial to the United States as to the Soviet Union?

Our first witness today is Ray S. Cline, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. Mr. Cline has served the U.S. Government in various posts and we look to him to discuss these economic questions in relation to the developing political context.

Our second witness, Prof. D. Gale Johnson of the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago, also serves currently as a consultant for the Council of International Economic Policy. Since receiving his Ph. D., at Iowa State University, Professor Johnson has

become one of our leading specialists on foreign agricultural policy and performance, including Soviet agriculture.

Our third witness, Prof. Holland Hunter of Haverford College, has been concerned with Soviet economic performance in the planning process, with special attention to transportation. His current detailed assessment of the early Stalinist years may provide us a useful perspective on the "historic" changes under Leonid Brezhnev.

Gentlemen, we welcome you all, and will begin with Mr. Cline.

We have a policy in the committee, at least while I am chairing, of trying to confine opening statements to 10 minutes. Anything that you cannot get in in the 10 minutes will be printed in full in the record.

I see, Mr. Cline, that you have a sizable prepared statement. I doubt if you could read that in 10 minutes, or if you did, we could not understand what you were reading. So if you abbreviate that, the entire prepared statement will be printed in full.

**STATEMENT OF RAY S. CLINE, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. CLINE. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

I would like to ask you to incorporate the prepared statement in the record and will make brief remarks summarizing the highlights of it and give a little context within which I think we can review the whole problem we are discussing this morning.

Senator PROXMIRE. Very good.

Mr. CLINE. If I may, I would like to congratulate you and this committee and its staff on the publication of this weighty volume, which is an excellent, substantial study of the Soviet economy. It combines expert area knowledge and theoretical insight into the Soviet economy, and it gives a great deal of detail and reveals a wide vision of Soviet affairs.

I am sure it will be studied thoroughly in many parts of the world, both in the West and in the East, perhaps most intensively in the East, where the thoroughly objective economic analysis free of ideological distortion which this volume represents has not been quite so firmly established in scholarly tradition, as I believe it has in the United States.

I do not pretend to have read every word in this volume, but my scanning of it conveys to me a very clear message about the Soviet economy. It tells the story of an economy operating under unusual and difficult constraints.

The reasons for this condition this year are twofold: Poor weather which spoiled last year's grain crops in an extraordinary way, and the malfunctioning of the economic system. We in the West have troubles of our own. I suppose the history of nations is trouble and efforts to overcome it. Nevertheless, it is clear that our system of producing economic goods is more efficient and above all more innovative than the Soviet command-economy described in this volume.

Moreover, the West is pragmatic enough to experiment with economic institutions and improvise economic procedures when they are needed to meet challenges. The Soviet Union is extremely conservative in these respects, odd as that may sound for a regime with a revolutionary creed. Soviet institutions, policies, and processes, though only

about 50 years old, have become sacrosanct and relatively unmalleable. Those among Soviet policymakers who might for efficiency consider moderate changes in the system are either afraid of adverse, short-term effects that inevitably appear in the course of any reorganizations, or they seem resigned in the face of Marxist ideological fundamentalism, or they are unable to motivate the bureaucratic machine to alter vested interests in the status quo.

The prepared statement which I presented to the committee in advance, Mr. Vice Chairman, which I will not read, explains the reason why the U.S.S.R. will have to look to imports for its main resource to meet the most pressing Soviet civilian economic needs.

The reason is that Soviet leaders are not likely to divert substantial resources from defense expenditures to the civilian economy in the near term, nor embark on major basic economic reforms designed to add greater incentives for modernizing their agricultural and consumer goods production.

The critical need in the U.S.S.R., as we see it, is to adopt basic structural economic reforms which would provide adequate incentives to introduce new technology and improve quality, both in their agriculture and in their nondefense industry. The decision to reform or not to reform is a crucial political decision as well as an economic decision. Since in the U.S.S.R. these decisions are made by a very small group of leaders, of course, it is impossible to predict exactly what the composite thought of that small group would be.

Still, we know something about them and it does not look as though meaningful, far-reaching economic reform is an early prospect. All that can be expected is tinkering with minor details, what you might call minireforms.

The critical question, then, becomes: What have the Soviet leaders done and what can they be expected to do in the future to relieve their current shortfalls and increase productivity and growth of the economy as a whole? The answer to this question provides the basis for answering the two specific long-range questions that the committee wisely selected for discussion: Has the poor Soviet economic performance and recent improvements in Soviet-American relations enhanced the prospect of less resources being directed to Soviet military programs and will the new commercial relations between our two countries benefit both countries?

The defense issue is the topic of various papers in the volume and these papers show that there is some disagreement on the size of military and space expenditures and the burden they impose on the Soviet economy. But the consensus appears to be that defense, including space, absorbs more or less 10 percent of the U.S.S.R.'s gross national product, probably a little less rather than more. Such a burden is heavy, but we believe it is a burden that is not too heavy for a great populous, proud nation with the particular historical experience of the Soviet Union and its perception of its defense needs.

We do not doubt that the Soviet political leadership would like to achieve the desired defense posture with as little outlay as possible. We may even suppose that the leaders would be reasonably satisfied with the level of supply of resources they have built up over the past years and that they realize the importance at this juncture of relieving acute consumer goods shortages and enabling the economy as a whole to achieve a more normal growth.

In fact, it is reasonable to expect the share of defense in the gross national product to recede slightly over the years to come, simply because a high plateau has been reached and the rest of the economy will benefit from further incremental growth. But this definitely does not mean, at least in the near-term, large-scale shifts of resources from defense to civilian economy. The U.S.S.R.'s leaders wish to negotiate from a position of strength and they insist on a global role in international affairs, which presupposes corresponding investments in the accoutrements of power.

Modern arms development, including activities in space, are very costly, increasingly costly, and investment in advanced weapons requires long leadtimes. Soviet leaders, whoever they are, will not wish to neglect dangers of power conflicts that might arise towards the end of this decade or in the 1980's, even though both sides might hope to avoid them.

On purely economic grounds, a shift of resources from the military to the civilian economy takes time and may create a degree of frictional underuse of labor and plant and equipment during the transfer. The defense economy also is relatively efficient in carrying out the orders of its military customers while the civilian economy is far from efficient. Some of the choice inputs into the defense economy, talents as well as material, may actually lose some of the quality it has, once this activity is enmeshed in the cumbersome civilian economy.

Soviet leaders, above all military leaders, will not wish to impair their defense industries which are well set up; instead, they will try to get the civilian economy to improve its operations. Thus the conclusion we reach is that improvement will mainly have to come from imports of goods and services from abroad.

By importing advanced equipment and technology from the United States and other capitalist countries and by following the managerial methods that are being practical in the West, the U.S.S.R. hopes to make an economic quantum jump. As to how, my prepared statement submitted to the committee quotes Lenin as saying: "Take with both hands all the good things from abroad, and in particular, "take American technology and organization."

This prescription for Soviet ills is of long standing. No doubt the techniques that have made our economy productive will also benefit the Soviet economy. The U.S.S.R. will, however, find that the transfer of techniques from the environment for which they were invented to very different Soviet surroundings is difficult and will not produce effectiveness in the same order. This leads me to the second question on the benefits of increased trade from the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

If "benefit" is understood in a business sense, it is obvious that deals entered into by present negotiators should be profitable to the partners on either side. It does not even matter whether the particular detailed arrangements in any one transaction are more advantageous or less to one partner or the other. Under market conditions, exchange of goods and services is of general profitable and beneficial effect.

There are real difficulties, however, in achieving mutually advantageous trade arrangements between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. A "businesslike" approach, to use a favorite Soviet phrase, is required to find ways to overcome the very real obstacles.

There are a variety of ways in which trade with the Soviet Union will be of benefit to the United States as well as to the U.S.S.R. U.S. exports to the Soviet Union will increase domestic employment and help improve our balance-of-payment position. We are, of course, not going to give our goods away to the Soviet Union for free. They will have to pay for what they get and to do so they will have to ship to us goods we want and need on terms competitive with those offered by other suppliers.

In this regard, most-favored-nation treatment, which the administration has been urged be accorded the Soviet Union, will be helpful but may not in itself provide Soviet traders a guarantee of successful entry in the American market.

There is every reason to believe we, as well as the Soviet Union, should benefit from such trade as it takes place.

Now, I would also like to add that trade does contribute to political as well as economic improved relationships. Opening up markets and sources of supply to each other relieves the pressure points between the two countries and extends the stake which each has in an expanding network of mutually advantageous relationship.

I do not, of course, wish to imply that major differences between us will not remain, nor do I wish to suggest that the Soviets will change their basic ideology to conform to ours, just as we do not expect to change our philosophy to conform to theirs. The U.S.S.R., like the United States, is for good reasons interested in relaxation of tensions. As General Secretary Brezhnev reiterated in his speech only a week ago, on July 10, 1973: "We firmly adhere to Marxist-Leninist ideology, the capitalist states have their own bourgeois ideology." And Brezhnev has, of course, made it clear which side he thinks will ultimately be triumphant. It is still in effect the same philosophy that Stalin referred to 46 years ago when he made a statement famous in Marxist doctrine:

Thus, in the course of further development of international revolution, two centers will form on the world scale, a socialist center binding to itself the countries that gravitate to socialism, and a capitalist center binding to itself countries that gravitate to capitalism. The struggle between these two centers for the possession of the world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and Communism in the whole world.

As long as it is peaceful, we do not need to fear such a contest. In fact, we may sell our equipment and technology to the Soviet Union to our advantage, just as we did in the years of the first 5-year plan that followed Stalin's speech which I have just quoted. We may gradually pave the way for an international climate that will one day permit the two countries which, after all, were allies in two World Wars, to engage in mutually beneficial trade without today's heavy arms burden and without the barriers of ideology which make this new and improved relationship still difficult today.

In conclusion, I would like to say that, given the promising new beginnings in political relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., there is no reason why these two largest economies in the world should not and cannot trade with each other to their mutual advantage.

The aim stated in President Nixon's communique with Brezhnev a few weeks ago of \$2 to \$3 billion of trade over a 3-year period is realistic. Such exchange will benefit both sides, contribute to the welfare of the citizens of the two countries and help further the relaxation of world tensions and permit improved relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.  
 Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Cline.  
 [The prepared statement of Mr. Cline follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAY S. CLINE  
 UNITED STATES-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Now, after the quarter-century of turbulent international relations following World War II, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are attempting to make their relationship with each other "normal," in particular their economic relations. This paper appraises the position of the U.S.S.R. in the world economy and assesses the prospects for the development of economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Present efforts to develop more normal relations should not be thought of as a "return to normalcy" because U.S.-Soviet relations have never been what could accurately be called "normal."

At times the two countries were in quite close contact. We supplied equipment and technology for the U.S.S.R.'s rehabilitation in the 1920's and for its industrial development in the 1930's, and in the 1940's we provided vast amounts of Lend-Lease materials which helped not only to fight the common enemy but also were used in reconstructing and modernizing the Soviet economy after the war. However, in the mid-1930's economic relations were limited not because of any particular U.S.-Soviet tension but because during those years the U.S.S.R. consciously disengaged itself from the world economy. After World War II relations were, of course, reduced as a result of the hostile, competitive atmosphere of the Cold War.

Thus, if we use the word "normal" we envisage for the future not a repetition of this or that past phase of U.S.-Soviet intercourse but relations characteristic of advanced industrial powers, in particular powers of such continental dimensions as are both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The word "normal" can be applied to relations of this type even in the presence of such unusual contemporary conditions as widespread inflation, floating rates of exchange, limited convertibility, all kinds of interventions by governments, etc. The world economy has been able to make rapid strides in spite of these difficulties.

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have some features in common that have always produced a degree of mutual understanding and affinity. They occupy vast domains, their domestic markets are large, and as a result they are able to support huge enterprises. In the Soviet economy, for reasons Marxist or Russian, there even exists what has been labeled "gigantomania," frequently without due regard to optimality of operation. "Better nearly always means bigger," said Brezhnev in addressing the 24th Party Congress in April 1971.

It was Lenin's admiration for the productivity of American big business which set the tone for the following decades; the expression "trust" was used as a name for Soviet enterprise conglomerates. It is worth mentioning that only a few months after the October Revolution Lenin, in a variant of his definition of communism (Soviet [political] power plus electrification of the entire country—and "electrification" was meant as shorthand for technical modernization), devised the following formula: "Take with both hands all the good things from abroad: Soviet power plus Prussian railroad discipline plus American technology and organization plus American mass education, etc., etc., . . . [is equivalent to] socialism."<sup>1</sup>

Now, 56 years later, socialism is considered fully built in the U.S.S.R., mass education has been achieved, but American technology and organization are still very much admired and sought after. And they are in particular demand for gigantic projects such as the Kama truck plant or the various efforts to exploit Siberian gas and oil.

By following as best it can Lenin's advice to "take all the good things from abroad," but, even more important, through enormous efforts by a talented and high-reaching people, the U.S.S.R. has firmly established itself as the second superpower in the world. It should, of course, not be forgotten that the country of Lenin had been a great power for two or more centuries. It was Russia—in alliance with other European nations—that defeated Napoleon. The Russia of 1913 ranked fifth among the industrial nations of the world, even fourth in

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in O. Anweiler, *Geschichte der Schule und Pädagogik in Russland*, 1964, p. 79.

machine-building. Its military establishment was by far greater than that of the U.S. though it was inferior in naval strength. The economic power ratio on the eve of the First World War was, in terms of the much adduced and abused GNP, about 40 to 100 in favor of the U.S.

Now, 60 momentous years later, Soviet Russia continues to be a great military power; it is said to have "approximate parity" vis-a-vis the U.S. In the realm of economics the proportion to the other superpower, the U.S., is not much different from what it was in 1913. Using last year's GNP, the ratio was 47 to 100. Given the difficulties of such comparisons over time and space, a few percentage points this way or that are quite meaningless, but the general scale of comparison is revealing.

Nevertheless, there have been fundamental changes over the years. Let me mention first the demographic ratio. In 1913, Russia, in its present boundaries, had a population 64 percent larger than the U.S.; today, the difference is only 18 percent (though the gap now appears to be widening once again). National income and wealth have increased greatly on both sides, as they have in the entire world; our GNP, in real terms, is six times as large as it was in 1913, that of the U.S.S.R. 7½ times as large. These rough measures are indicative of a revolution in life styles. Up to 1920 more than half of the American population was living in rural areas; only in 1961 did the U.S.S.R. reach the 50-50 mark of rural versus urban dwellers.

Furthermore, in the past 60 years America has moved from a private enterprise economy with little government intervention to what is called—for lack of a better word—a mixed economy—while the Tsarist economy, itself characterized by much state property and state interference, was abolished in favor of a system in which the government owns all means of production, employs practically the entire labor force, and administers all economic activities with hardly any regard to market forces. The Soviet economy, finally, is more inward-looking; it is much less enmeshed in economic world affairs than either its Tsarist predecessor or the U.S. and other Western-style economies.

Let me illustrate this last point by a few figures, beginning with foreign trade. In general, the larger an economy the smaller the ratio between its foreign trade and its GNP. For the U.S., in 1972 the ratio of exports to GNP was 4.3 percent (imports to GNP, at 4.8 percent, were comparable). In the Common Market the ratio was 16.9 percent, but if trade among the Community countries is taken out, only 8.8 percent. In Tsarist Russia it was roughly 6.6 percent in 1913; in the U.S.S.R. of 1972 the ratio was only 2.8 percent.

More meaningful for comparative purposes is perhaps the share of a country in world exports; in 1972 the U.S. share was 12.2 percent, U.S.S.R. 3.8 percent. Two-thirds of Soviet foreign trade is carried on with other Communist countries, and because in their trade negotiations the world market prices used to value their exchanges are bargained up on both the export and import sides, the real Soviet share in world commerce is probably lower than 3.8 percent, perhaps as low as 3.4 percent. (The ratio of foreign trade to GNP should likewise be revised downward.)

Many more figures could be cited not only on merchandise trade but also on services rendered to foreign countries, on the transfer of technology, and on the flow of factors of production, i.e., capital and labor. That the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. play a different role in world economic relations is well enough known. It may be worth adding, however, that in 1971 the U.S. had assets abroad valued at \$180.6 billion. At the same time, U.S. liabilities to foreigners had a value of \$122.8 billion, leaving net assets in our favor of \$58 billion. Very little is known about foreign assets or liabilities of the Soviet Government, but they are extremely limited.

Statistics on movements of people across frontiers are not satisfactory anywhere; Communist regimes in particular withhold most of their data. Migrations have been substantial in the West; millions have taken up permanent or temporary residence in other countries. There has been a very large flow of so-called guest workers from Mediterranean countries to some northerly countries in Europe. Since the U.S.S.R. and its Eastern European associates experience to different degrees underemployment, unemployment, or scarcity of this or that type of labor, it would have been expedient to induce workers to move to other Communist countries with job openings. This, however, has been the exception rather than the rule.

In short, the U.S.S.R. has far fewer international ties than Western-style countries. There is even little integration between the U.S.S.R. and other Commu-

nist countries, in particular, among the various members of the CEMA<sup>2</sup> organization. To quote a Hungarian economist, Tibor Kiss, who recently published a book on CEMA:<sup>3</sup>

"The actually prevailing methods of national economic planning are . . . featured by the presence of some autarkic tendencies. Every country wishes to meet domestic demand for consumption and investment goods to an optimum extent out of home production and every country strives after a balanced development of the various branches of production, even at the expense of a lower average of economic efficiency. These endeavors, as a rule, act against any really efficient coordination of national economic plans, and also reinforce certain built-in autarkic tendencies, strengthening the existing barriers between national markets. Thus in spite of all promising possibilities of further progress, the situation will continue in which it can be hardly expected that inter-CMEA plan coordination will develop into a joint planning in the foreseeable future.

"In conclusion we have to state that exaggerated centralization of export and import activities, adherence to a strict license system even in the trade between CMEA countries, and the great divergences between domestic and foreign-trade prices, together with an excessive protectionism, have resulted in so high a degree of isolation of the national markets as to nearly frustrate the projects of economic integration. Under such conditions no rational exploitation of the comparative advantages can be spoken of, no international specialization and cooperation of production in the true sense can be achieved, and no steady increase of economic efficiency can be censured. The benefits of the technological revolution cannot be enjoyed either.

"Owing to the distortion of the categories of money, credit and interest, practically no capital movement is taking place within CMEA. The granting of long-term credits, mentioned in connection with investment cooperation, is a sporadic occurrence.

"There is hardly any migration of labour within CMEA. For a long time, such migration was considered to be incompatible with the socialist system. . . ."

This lack of cooperation and intergration even within the so-called Soviet commonwealth cannot be attributed to a Cold War between the U.S.S.R. and its associates or among them. The Cold War between East and West was, of course, a reality and has helped reduce the commercial intercourse between the two groups for many years.

In the new atmosphere of the past year or two, intercourse is being intensified now, but the experience of the CMEA countries among themselves points to limits and constraints. One should not overlook differences in attitude and institutions that will in future tend to hinder a rational and profitable exchange of goods and services and of human and material resources between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. along the lines of Western-style market economies.

Kiss mentions "autarkic tendencies" and one may ask whether an ideological commitment to self-sufficiency is one of the reasons for the inward-looking nature of the Soviet system. There is an element of truth in this contention, but in reality the Soviet attitude toward foreign trade is far from consistent. Marxism as such is certainly not averse to foreign transactions. Marx himself praised the emergence of a world market as historical progress. The special methods of conducting foreign economic relations are not so much ideological tenets as what the leaders believe to be efficient means of control, namely, through foreign trade and foreign exchange monopolies, limitation of "capitalist" participation to what was called "concessions" in the 1920's and now "joint ventures," and severe restrictions on Western businessmen working in the U.S.S.R.

Self-sufficiency has been practiced, sometimes more, sometimes less, though not as a principle of the Soviet Founding Fathers. It gained influence in the mid-1930's after the traumatic experience of selling grain—and whatever else was possible—for machinery during the Great Depression in the West and a (self-inflicted) famine in the U.S.S.R.; it abated during the Second World War and rose again during the Cold War. The motivation has been a mixture of aversion against the capitalist markets—which are hard to comprehend, difficult to deal with, and often hostile—and against foreign entanglements either to avoid any dependence, particularly in strategic respects, or from a time-honored protectionist or mercantilist nationalism also observed in the West. In addition, there has

<sup>2</sup> Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

<sup>3</sup> Tibor Kiss, *International Division of Labour in Open Economies with Special Regard to the CMEA*, Budapest, 1971, pp. 170, 175.

probably been a reluctance (quite understandable in a proud nation) to expose inferior Soviet craftsmanship to the eyes of sophisticated Western nations. Whenever the U.S.S.R. believed it had produced—if only in small numbers—a creditable piece of equipment (without military application), it exulted in selling samples to the advanced West.

On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. has always been eager to avail itself of the advanced technology of the West by importing equipment and techniques. Lenin was the first to endorse such a policy, as previously indicated. In doing so, he continued a tradition going back to the Ivans and to Peter the Great. His successors have followed suit, Stalin as well as Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Of course, foreign goods and technology had to be paid for, and so—disregarding occasional grants or the reparations after the Second World War—arrangements had to be made to provide commodities for export. Exports have been viewed not as opportunities for profitable deals or for employment of labor and machinery but as the unavoidable necessity to obtain the wherewithals for imports.

Over the past decades, Soviet foreign trade policy vis-a-vis the advanced West and the U.S. in particular has been a sequence of invitations to trade and withdrawals into isolation. At present we are in a phase of invitation and we hope it will become the beginning of a meaningful integration of the Soviet economy into the economy of the world as a whole. On the other hand, there exists a danger that, if the present Soviet advances toward the West, toward the U.S. in particular, should come to nothing, the U.S.S.R. would again withdraw into its shell.

The economic reasons that motivate the Soviet Government in its present endeavors are by now known to the world at large, and the splendid volume that has just been issued under the auspices of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, together with the statements made in the course of these hearings, makes it unnecessary to go into details. In a nutshell: the Soviet economy is growing but not as rapidly as the Soviet leaders wish and certainly much more slowly than the current Five-Year Plan, 1971–1975, had prescribed. The latter was and remains predicated on excessive rates of productivity growth. Moreover, the actual growth is bought with unnecessarily large inputs of both capital and labor. Living conditions do improve over the years but they are still low and susceptible to ever-recurrent setbacks in the inefficient farm sector.

The leadership is thus faced with the necessity to take measures conducive to increasing Soviet productivity, narrowing the technological gap between East and West, satisfying consumer needs for the sake of labor and social morale, and strengthening the economy in general. Such measures may fall into three categories: reform of the Soviet system; transfer of resources from the defense establishment to civilian investment and consumption; and imports of technology, equipment, and other goods and services from abroad. The policy-makers could move on all three fronts or only on one of them.

A reform of the economic mechanism toward a market system (albeit a socialist market) is not in the wind, barring a sudden change in the mood of the country and the advent of leaders willing to act accordingly. When Brezhnev and Kosygin took over, they initiated a number of procedural changes in planning, administering, and managing the economy. They rescinded organizational changes that their predecessor had made and they introduced regulations intended to improve the success indicators and incentives for enterprises and ministries. These so-called reforms were very cautious and were to be implemented very slowly; the new administration never aimed at market socialism. Its goal was only to operate the existing system more effectively. Since then the 1965 reforms have faded away; in fact, they have never been fully implemented. In this respect the Soviet economic and political system is by far more conservative than Western society which, without revolution from below or above, has constantly reformed, experimented, and extemporized.

As noted above, the Soviet Government could transfer resources from military (and space) programs to be used for civilian purposes. The Joint Economic Committee has, understandably, always been interested in this issue; the volume published by the Committee three years ago had the title *Economic Performance and the Military Burden in the Soviet Union*, and the present volume contains several articles touching upon defense expenditures. Whether the U.S.S.R. is spending 10 percent on its military and space establishment or less than 10 percent, we do not doubt that the political leadership would like to achieve the desired defense posture with as little outlay as possible. We even suppose that the military leaders may be quite satisfied with the supply of resources they have received over the past years and that they realize the importance at this junct-

ture of relieving acute consumer supply shortages and of enabling the economy as a whole to return to a more normal growth. Thus, political as well military leaders (some die-hards excepted) are likely to welcome savings as long as they do not affect the balance of strategic power to the U.S.S.R.'s disadvantage. In fact, we may expect the share of defense in the GNP to recede slightly over the years to come.

This does not mean, at least in the near future, large-scale shifts of resources from defense to the civilian economy. The U.S.S.R.'s leaders wish to negotiate from a position of strength, and they insist on a "global" role for their nation, which presupposes corresponding investments in the accoutrements of power. Moreover, modern arms developments (including activities in space) require long leadtimes. While the present holds the prospect of further negotiations and continuing detente, the longer term is always uncertain. Soviet leaders, whoever they are, will not wish to neglect dangers that might arise toward the end of this decade or in the 1980's.

On purely economic grounds, a shift of resources from the military to the civilian economy takes time and may create a degree of frictional underutilization of labor and plant and equipment during the transfer. What is even more important, the defense economy is relatively efficient in carrying out the orders of its military customers while the civilian economy is far from efficient. Some of the choice inputs into the defense economy, talents as well as materials, may actually lose some of their quality once they are enmeshed in the cumbersome civilian economy. The leaders—above all the military leaders—will not wish to impair defense industries fairly well set up; they will rather require the civilian economy to improve its operations. Such adjustments will be expected to come about not in the spirit of the market economy, i.e., by competition for a clientele of ultimate and intermediate customers through a wide choice of goods and services at the lowest possible cost, but in a technocratic manner, namely through acquisition of the latest piece of equipment and the latest method of management and production on the (tenuous) assumption that they would also be the economically most rational improvements.

Here the third approach to the Soviet economic policy problem enters: if more rapid progress is not sought by way of basic reforms or at the expense of the defense posture, it may still be achieved through imports. Such imports would relieve the temporary scarcity of grain and would back up the government's program for a larger supply of meat and dairy products. They would, above all, consist of equipment and techniques to modernize and streamline vital sectors of the civilian economy, including the badly lagging energy sectors.

Up to now, I have discussed the economic considerations that are quite visible behind the Soviet desire to normalize the relations between the two countries. They are compelling indeed, and they are bolstered by political considerations. They have been translated into action at a time when the U.S., also for political and economic reasons, is interested in more normal relations with the U.S.S.R. and likewise with Eastern Europe. With political rapprochement under way, there is no reason not to reap the benefits that closer economic relations may bestow on the economy, benefits in employment (with corresponding profits) in our own supply situation insofar as we can use Soviet products and services, and—last but not least—in helping to solve our acute balance-of-payments problem.

In the recent past, U.S.-Soviet trade developed as follows: In the year 1971 our exports amounted to \$162.1 million or less than three-thousandths of our total exports; our imports from the U.S.S.R. to \$57.3 million or one-thousandth of our overall imports. The following year, 1972, exports—including the grain to prevent serious bread shortages in the U.S.S.R.—rose to \$546.7 million, i.e., 1.1 percent of our exports; imports remained low at \$95.5 million or two-thousandths of total imports. In the past five months of this year, our exports—again chiefly grain—amounted to \$550.5 million, our imports still to only \$75.1 million. These figures are in current prices; in real terms, they would be less as a result of rising prices between 1971 and 1973.

Forecasting foreign trade is uncommonly hazardous, particularly when it starts at an artificially low level; a few large deals may swell the trade flow. It might be useful, however, to advance a theoretical calculation which is suggestive of future trade possibilities. In 1972 Yugoslavia, a moderately industrialized Communist country with Western as well as Eastern ties, bought in the U.S. merchandise which amounted to 0.7 percent of its GNP; it sold 0.6 percent of its production to the U.S. Let us assume that our exports to and imports from the

U.S.S.R. would grow to only half the ratio of U.S. trade to Yugoslav GNP. The result—purely theoretical, of course—would be U.S. exports of close to \$2 billion a year and imports of about \$1.7 billion. To achieve such a volume would take quite a few years and the creation of a more systematic division of labor between the two countries. If the hypothesis became reality, our trade with the U.S.S.R. would amount to between 3 and 3½ percent of our foreign commerce. Considering the size of the Soviet economy and its position in world industrial output, American-Soviet trade should be much larger; Japan, for instance, with only 43 percent of the Soviet population, supplied us with \$9.1 billion worth of goods in 1972 and purchased \$4.9 billion in this country.

This calculation is hypothetical but it shows the great possibilities that lie dormant in U.S.-Soviet economic cooperation. Their realization will require action on both sides, and I consider it important that we face the issues soberly and without wishful thinking.

Soviet import requirements both for capital goods and consumer supplies, not to mention technical and managerial know-how, are very large indeed; it will now be up to the Soviets to establish priorities and adapt their shopping list to their ability to pay and to service and repay their debts. They will be helped by current payment flows in their favor; tourism should provide the U.S.S.R. with a net dollar balance (as is the case with its associates in Eastern Europe). By and large, the U.S.S.R., with its foreign trade and foreign exchange monopoly, has been in effective control of its balance of payments, though at times—particularly now—it has had to fall back on foreign credits.

Payment and repayment can be effected in four ways:

First, there is the sale of gold in the free gold market and transfer of the proceeds to whomever the creditor may be. The U.S.S.R. now produces about 250 metric tons of gold a year. Its gold reserves may be in the neighborhood of 2,000 metric tons. The Soviet cost price is still very high; it used to be a multiple of the official gold price that prevailed until 1971. But by now the market price is in the neighborhood of \$125 per troy ounce. At this price Soviet gold reserves are worth \$8 billion. Soviet annual output of 250 metric tons at the price of \$125 per troy ounce would amount to \$1 billion or 720 million rubles, i.e., slightly less than three-fourths of the U.S.S.R.'s 1972 balance-of-payments deficit vis-a-vis all advanced industrial countries of the West (the total deficit was 1 billion rubles or \$1.4 billion). The U.S.S.R. had avoided selling gold between 1966 and 1971; in 1972 it reportedly sold about 150 metric tons of gold at rising prices on the free gold market. This market is rather thin and fickle and I leave it to others to judge how much Soviet gold it would be able to absorb without a significant decline in prices. Speculation on or in gold is outside of my purview.

A second method is payment in hard currency proceeds from Soviet exports to European and Asian countries. Multilateral payment flows are a normal and mutually advantageous procedure in international commerce, and as Professor Gregory Grossman has pointed out<sup>4</sup>—they characterized American trade with Tsarist Russia as well as with the U.S.S.R. between the two World Wars; Russia offset its import surplus vis-a-vis the U.S. through an export surplus with Europe. This method, of course, requires an export surplus with Europe. In 1972 the U.S.S.R. reported an import surplus in its dealings with what it calls “industrially developed capitalist countries” as a whole, which includes most of Europe. The import surplus amounted to exactly 1 billion rubles; 385 million rubles in U.S.-Soviet commerce, 615 million rubles in the trade with Western Europe, Japan, and other advanced countries. The U.S.S.R. is eager to obtain equipment and technology from many countries and this includes, e.g., U.S.-invented machinery produced in Europe with American parts by multinational corporations. At present, therefore, the U.S.S.R. cannot solve its payment problems by the traditional multilateral payment pattern. As time goes by, this pattern may be resumed. This will occur only, however, if a healthy liberal trade philosophy and policy is maintained by all concerned. A crude neomercantilist aversion against import surpluses in countries which would supply the U.S.S.R. with the hard currency to pay for Soviet imports from the U.S. would dampen the prospects of multilateral settlement.

The third method of paying the U.S. on current and capital account is through direct shipments of Soviet goods to America. I wish to deal with barter-in-time as a separate fourth method; I am now discussing normal U.S. imports

<sup>4</sup> In his paper on “U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Relations” in *The ACES Bulletin*, Spring 1973, pp. 3-22.

of Soviet merchandise at routine payment procedures. This is the real problem in U.S.-Soviet economic relations, a problem that presupposes action by the U.S. as well as by the Soviet side.

One aspect of it has to do with commercial policy. As everybody knows, the U.S. withdrew most-favored-nation status from the U.S.S.R. in 1951. This means that products from the Soviet Union must pay duty at the tariff rates prescribed in the Tariff Act of 1930 rather than at the reduced rates applicable to products from most other countries. The Soviet Government views the denial of MFN status in the U.S. not only as commercial discrimination but also as a blot on its escutcheon; in its opinion, a great sovereign people have the right to be accorded MFN treatment.

Once most-favored-nation treatment is granted and discrimination in the U.S. ended, the Soviet side will face the real test, the test of competing in sophisticated markets. Among the goods the U.S.S.R. plans to offer—aside from many raw materials and other goods that now enter the U.S. duty-free—is merchandise such as electric motors, metal-cutting tools, mining equipment, hydrofoil boats, transistor radios, plywood, and motion pictures. As the studies by Malish<sup>5</sup> and by Gross<sup>6</sup> point out, the U.S.S.R. has been able to sell plywood and motion pictures to the U.S. despite the lack of MFN treatment while it has not been able to sell more than insignificant amounts of the other goods in Western countries where it does enjoy MFN status. In other words, for the Soviet exporters non-discriminatory entry into our markets is only the beginning.

The basic problem remains: In the U.S.S.R., as the second largest industrial country in the world, able to offer on competitive terms to the U.S. (or other advanced countries) commodities other than precious metals, ores, undressed furs, or fuels? I do not wish to repeat what is general knowledge, that is: the shortcomings of industries run by the state and the rigidity of a governmental foreign trade monopoly. Nor is it my business to advise the U.S.S.R. on how to run its economy. The Soviet Union is a sovereign nation and must solve its economic and other problems in its own fashion. But if a fruitful commercial intercourse is to develop between this country and the U.S.S.R., a commerce "normal" for advanced industrial nations, the U.S.S.R. will have to inaugurate a whole series of measures leading to the export not only of raw materials but also of quality manufactures along with, where it applies, reliable and fast installation and repair service, including the supply of spare parts. It is quite possible that such goods actually do exist in the Soviet economy—hydrofoils seem to be among them—but they have to be found and then presented in the way Western customers expect. It may be possible, even desirable, for the U.S. to help the U.S.S.R. market such goods, preferably through private firms which will offer for this type of service.

This is, perhaps, the place to add a word on the implications of a "normalized" U.S.-Soviet trade. We are very much interested in expanding our exports, not because of an idleness of men and machines—in fact, the U.S. economy seems overheated—but because of our balance-of-payments deficit. But we do not favor exports for exports' sake. We expect payment. Nor would a very businesslike Soviet Government think in other terms. The balance-of-payments problem is a problem *now*; and while long-range credits are not ruled out to stimulate U.S.-Soviet cooperation, they themselves would not help balance our foreign payments now. And since we wish to be paid—and the other side is also anxious to pay—we must avoid becoming merchantilists and be willing to accept imports. Trade, freely conducted, is beneficial for both partners and if we are interested in larger exports—real exports, not grants—we must agree to imports under fair competitive conditions.

Let me, finally, say a few words about the fourth method: barter-in-time. In some respects, such deals may appear to be appropriate for U.S.-Soviet trade. The U.S.S.R. has deposits of raw materials which, at the right price, might interest the U.S. The U.S.S.R. needs capital and modern equipment, and technology. U.S. business is capable of supplying all of this on credit, even long-term credit—though apparently not without support on the part of the U.S. Government. These investments, along with the concomitant transfer of American technology (a unique technology in some fields, e.g., the laying of pipelines in Arctic regions), would be made without acquisition of property rights on Soviet soil; the U.S.S.R. would always remain in full control of the installations on its

<sup>5</sup> Anton F. Malish, Jr., *United States-East European Trade*, Staff Research Study No. 4, U.S. Tariff Commission, Washington, D.C., 1972.

<sup>6</sup> *Loc. cit.*

territory. Repayment would be effected with the raw materials that the installations extract and transmit, and exporting such raw materials would be a job the Soviet foreign trade monopoly is best suited to handle. Thus, after repayment—and in some cases perhaps simultaneously—the U.S.S.R. would have no difficulty marketing the commodities produced as a result of U.S. investment. The American side, in turn, if all goes well, would be assured repayment in due time in a desirable commodity.

Such schemes may have some advantage in certain circumstances, but will have to be judged on its own merits. We must determine how large the investments that the American economy is supposed to undertake will be and what will be the price of the commodity (including the usual overruns in capital requirements and cost). Other crucial questions must be asked. Are there cheaper alternatives in other parts of the world or even on American soil? The commodity sought after may indeed be in short supply now and in the near future. Will it still be scarce after the planned operation becomes reality? And assuming that the deposits are indeed as ample as believed, will the installations be ready in time (or, to be more realistic, one or two years later than planned)? Finally, are there risks not only of an economic but also of a political character? These questions must be considered "in a businesslike atmosphere," to use an expression of which the Soviets are fond and which, indeed, is indicated for discussion of such vast proposals.

They are bound up with another problem. Ours is, as I said, a "mixed economy." The Government plays an important role but basically it is a system in which private enterprise competes in more or less free markets. There is no reason whatsoever why part of our foreign economic relations should not take place with an economy run by a state, as long as we can be sure that business remains business. In other words, we must guard against the danger that friction which arises in purely commercial affairs spills over into politics, and that political differences—which occur even among allies—endanger or damage commercial ventures, particularly in view of the government backing that some of the deals would require on the American side. We have dealt with state-owned economies before. Our economic relations with the U.S.S.R. were, on the whole, beneficial for all concerned. It is of great importance to enter into deals with due regard to the realities of prospects for mutual benefit.

In conclusion, given the promising new beginnings in political relations, there is no reason why the two largest economies in the world, whatever their basic philosophies, should not and cannot trade with each other to their mutual advantage. While it will take time to build such a trade up to what I called more "normal" proportions, the target in the President's Communique with Brezhnev, namely, U.S. exports to and imports from the Soviet Union of \$2-3 billion over a 3-year period is realistic and achievable. What will count in the end is not only the volume but the soundness of the deals. An exchange of goods (or services) for which each side has cost advantages, absolute or relative, bestows benefits on both sides, will contribute to the welfare of the citizens of both countries, and can further relaxation of tension and improved relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Johnson, please proceed.

#### STATEMENT OF D. GALE JOHNSON, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

I shall restrict my comments largely to discussion of Soviet agriculture, though I will discuss very briefly the other two important questions that you indicated in your opening statement.

Senator PROXMIRE. I might say, also, with respect to your prepared statement, the prepared statement will be printed in full in the record. I take it you will summarize it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Very much so; yes. It is difficult for a professor who is—

Senator PROXMIRE. You are so used to making a 50-minute lecture.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. To get down to 10 minutes, but I will try.

Soviet agriculture is obviously a topic of real interest and concern in the United States and other parts of the world today, as well as in the Soviet Union. I shall try very briefly to provide what I think is a perspective of that agriculture and then turn to the question of what are the possibilities for trade in agricultural products, largely, of course, from the United States to the Soviet Union.

The performance of Soviet agriculture in recent years, I feel, can be described both in terms of the bad and the good. We should not continuously overestimate the bad, although I will comment on that first.

In terms of inadequacies of performance, there are four points I think are significant. The first is that it is a high-cost agriculture. The prices paid to the farms in the Soviet Union are now very high, a complete turnaround from the policy of Stalin, who exploited the peasants in the Soviet Union to an enormous extent. This is not, I think, any longer the case.

A second inadequacy is the very high degree of instability in crop production, due in large part, though not exclusively, to climatic variability. Some of the instability is a result of the farming practices followed in the Soviet Union, but a lot of it is due to the fact that most of the geographic area of the Soviet Union is either hot and dry or cold and wet. These are two very serious limitations.

A third way in which the structure and performance of Soviet agriculture adversely affects the rest of the economy is in the ineffective use of the large labor force that does exist on the farms, since each year several million workers are sent from the cities to the farms at critical periods of time, apparently both in the spring and in the fall.

Finally, the agriculture represents an enormous investment drain on the Soviet economy. It is still, I think, something of a remarkable setting in which the society as productive as the Soviet Union still invests 27.5 percent of its total investment in agriculture. This is in contrast to agriculture's share of investment in the United States of only 5 percent, even though our agricultural output is higher than that in the Soviet Union.

It is not only that the share of total investment in the Soviet Union is above that of the United States, but the absolute amount, if we take the estimates included in the compendium, is from three to four times as great as it is in the United States.

Senator PROXMIRE. The absolute amount is?

Mr. JOHNSON. About three or four times as large. The investment in Soviet agriculture each year, or at least that undertaken now in this plan, is to be about \$34 billion a year, compared to about \$8.5 billion a year in the United States. Yes, \$34 billion compared to \$8 billion in the United States.

Senator PROXMIRE. Comparable units of measurement?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Insofar as you can make them, but I think these are not unreasonable. It is using the official exchange rate.

Senator PROXMIRE. Sorry to interrupt you, but I have been well aware, as others have, of the terrible disparity of manpower. They have six or seven times as many people on the farm and produce less food than we do. But I had no idea there was this colossal disparity in investment.

Mr. JOHNSON. On the more positive side, with respect to Soviet agriculture, is the output growth, which has been at a level that compares favorably with the other parts of the world for the last 20 years. In other words, since Stalin's death and for some adjustment for climatic variability in the two decades, the rate of output growth has apparently been about 3.5 percent per annum, and this is higher than in the Common Market and higher than in the United States.

The increase in livestock production, which is a critical element in the current Soviet plan, has been even higher, about 4.5 percent per annum.

Yet this performance has not been adequate to satisfy what have been the accepted needs of the Soviet population, and it is my anticipation that the Soviet Union will still rely on the rest of the world, which means primarily the United States, for grain imports at least over the next 3 or 4 years.

Very briefly, the reasons are that the Soviet Union still has a very low per capita level of consumption of meat, the lowest in Eastern Europe and substantially lower than in Western Europe. The demand for meat is growing very rapidly. In fact, my analyses indicate that the growth in demand for meat over the period 1971 to 1975 will be substantially higher than that envisaged in the ninth plan.

In other words, the growth in demand has been underestimated in the plan, and there will be, as there has been over the past year or two, substantial pressure on the planners to maintain a reasonable level of output expansion of livestock products, and in fact, the 1972 poor crop makes meeting even the ninth-plan goal exceedingly difficult.

Apparently, in the decisions of the past several months, Soviet planners have committed themselves to preventing a destruction of the livestock herd as a result of the poor 1972 crop. In 1963 and 1964, Khrushchev did permit the livestock herd to fall. The present planners are apparently working hard and so far have been effective in preventing that. As a result, with the enormous expenditure of financial resources that they have already made, I think they will continue to make those investments. Otherwise, what they have done this year would be largely for naught.

So at least for the next 3 or 4 years, I expect substantial feed exports from the United States to the Soviet Union.

Very briefly commenting on the other two points that were raised, namely, the relationship between trade and military priorities. I am an optimist, as I say, in this direction, in the sense that I think that increasing trade, extension of credit, and the wide-ranging discussion of political-military issues between the United States and the Soviet Union do significantly affect the probability of military confrontations. They certainly do not guarantee that such disasters might not occur, but in a setting in which there are improving relationships, I think the probabilities of our coming into serious conflict are reduced. How much, no one knows.

With respect to the gains from trade as it expands between the Soviet Union and the United States, it again is my view there will certainly be a sharing of the gains. It is impossible to say exactly how they will be shared, but while the Soviet Union needs a variety of things, which it can most easily obtain from the United States, namely, a variety of high-technology products and services, it also needs our

grains and feedstocks. But there are a wide variety of raw materials, particularly energy sources which the Soviet Union has, which, as I develop in my prepared statement, may well provide substantial advantages to the United States, particularly, I think, if they open up, if it works out that way, another source of natural gas and petroleum products. This additional source will have implications with respect to our bargaining position in the rest of the world on these materials.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my comments. I would like to request that a paper by a colleague of mine, Prof. Arcadius Kahan, dealing with the state of Soviet agriculture, which I think includes material that is relevant to my own prepared statement, I would request that this might be included.

Senator PROXMIRE. How long a paper is this?

Mr. JOHNSON. About a dozen pages.

Senator PROXMIRE. Without objection, that will be printed immediately following your prepared statement.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson and the paper by Mr. Kahan follow:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF D. GALE JOHNSON

##### SOVIET ECONOMIC PROSPECTS FOR THE SEVENTIES: SOME COMMENTS AND EXTENSIONS<sup>1</sup>

Any individual who has an interest in the economy of the Soviet Union once again finds himself in debt to the Joint Economic Committee for organizing an excellent collection of papers on the Soviet economy. As has been true on previous occasions, the present volume brings together an enormous amount of highly useful and well organized information and analysis relevant to an understanding of the second largest economy of the world. I want to express my personal appreciation to the many scholars who devoted their talents, time and energy to the production of the numerous outstanding studies included in the volume.

I will first make some comments about Soviet agriculture; these remarks are intended to complement and extend the material in the two first rate articles on agriculture. I will then comment briefly about some of the problems involved in the sale of farm products to the Soviet Union. Finally, I shall discuss some of the longer run implications of expanded trade between the Soviet Union and the United States, with special reference to military intentions and the relative magnitudes of the gains from trade as shared by the two economies.

##### SOVIET AGRICULTURE: PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS

It is important to achieve the proper perspective with respect to the performance and prospects of Soviet agriculture. It is quite appropriate to note the numerous weaknesses of that agriculture: Costs of production are high; output is subject to major swings resulting from climatic variations; a very large fraction of the labor force is still required for agriculture and nonfarm production is annually adversely affected by the necessity to ship millions of workers from the cities to the farms; and the share of agricultural investment to total investment is very high and is planned to increase to 27.5 percent of the total by 1975. In the United States investment in agriculture accounted for approximately 5 percent of total private nonresidential investment in 1972. The average annual level of investment in agriculture during 1971-75 in the Soviet Union is planned to be \$34 billion; this annual rate is almost four times the 1972 investment in U.S. agriculture of \$8.7 billion. Yet as estimated by Whitehouse and Havelka (*SEPS*, p. 345) net farm output in the U.S. was approximately a fifth larger than in the Soviet Union in 1966-71.

<sup>1</sup> Testimony given before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, July 18, 1973. The comments represent personal reactions to *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, A Compendium of Papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 93d Cong., 1st sess., Joint Committee Print, June 27, 1973. Reference to the volume henceforth will be as *SEPS*.

In spite of these weaknesses the rate of output increase for agriculture compares very favorably with that achieved in other industrial countries. Diamond and Krueger (*SEPS*, p. 317) estimate that farm output increased by 3.8 percent between 1951 and 1971. Even if one discounts the favorable climatic conditions of 1971 you find an annual output growth rate of about 3.5 percent. Over roughly the same period of time farm output increased by about 2.7 percent annually in the European Economic Community and 2 percent annually in the United States. Livestock output in the Soviet Union increased by 4.5 percent annually in the European Economic Community and 2 percent annually in the Soviet agriculture, the positive aspects should not be ignored.

Yet there can be no doubt that agriculture is a major problem area for the Soviet economy. I do not refer solely to the enormous grain imports of the past year. These imports resulted largely, though not entirely, from the poor 1972 crop. The difficulties facing Soviet planners can perhaps be seen by an effort to determine the probable role of the Soviet Union in the grain market over the next three or four years. While no one knows whether USSR will have another poor wheat crop in the near future, the most probable course of events is that the Soviet Union will return to its position of a small net importer of wheat, if not in 1973-74, then by 1974-75. With an average wheat crop in 1973 the Soviet Union might be a net importer to rebuild stocks. Apparently stocks of wheat suitable for food were nil in the fall of 1972; this may be one of the reasons for the large wheat imports. It seems reasonable to assume that at least for the next few years wheat stocks will not be permitted to fall to such low levels as in 1972.

I think there are grounds for believing that the Soviet Union will be a net importer of feed grains and oilmeals for a number of years. I shall try to indicate why I believe this to be probable.

In 1970 the grain crop was the highest on record; in 1971 the second largest crop was harvested. Yet in 1971-72 the USSR had net imports of approximately 4 million tons of feed grains. In these circumstances the importation of 4 million tons of feed grains takes on substantial significance. If it were true, and subsequent events indicate that it was, that in both 1970 and 1971 several million tons of wheat were used for livestock feed, the feed grain imports in 1971-72 take on added significance. In two years of record grain crops, current grain and feed output was too small to provide the feed for the desired livestock output.

Was there a shortfall in livestock production in 1970 and 1971 that an effort was being made to overcome? In terms of the 8th Plan and the 9th Plan, the answer is no. In 1970 meat, milk and egg output exceeded the 8th Plan target for that year and 1971 output of meat and eggs appeared to be equal to or perhaps slightly greater than the plan for the first year of the 9th Plan. Milk output may have lagged in 1971, but here the major shortcoming is in the marketing system and not in production.

But it is fairly clear that the two recent plans have underestimated the growth in demand for livestock products, especially meat. The official prices of meat and milk in the state stores have not been increased since 1962. Thus prices have not acted to equate supply and demand in the state store system. The imbalance in the growth of demand and supply became evident as early as 1969 in the collective farm markets. Prices in these markets rose relative to state store prices in 1969 after several years of stability. The price ratios increased further for most livestock products in 1970 and appeared to stabilize in 1971; these ratios have undoubtedly increased in the past year.

The 9th Plan assumes an increase in per capita meat consumption of approximately 21 percent. The planned growth in per capita income was 35 percent. By implication, the Plan assumed that for each 10 percent increase in income that meat consumption would increase by 6 percent. The income elasticity of 0.6 is almost certainly too low. A number of estimates of the income elasticity of demand have been made by Soviet economists; only one of the estimates that I have seen indicates an elasticity of less than 0.7 and others range up to 2.0. From what we know about meat consumption relationships in other countries, it is not unreasonable to assume that the income elasticity for meat is unity—a 10 percent increase in per capita income would result in a 10 percent increase in meat consumption, if the meat were available.

If the income elasticity for meat is unity, this means that per capita demand would increase by 35 percent by the end of the current plan. Even if the planned level of meat production were met, the supply increase would be much smaller than the demand increase. The discrepancy is so large that the alternatives facing the planners were all quite unpalatable. Meat prices could be increased—and substantially—but this was apparently ruled out, perhaps in part because of the

Polish riots. The excess demand could have been accepted, with ever growing queues at the state stores and rising prices in the collective farm markets. The third alternative, and the one chosen, was to make a major effort to increase supply. While there were some meat imports, the major alternative chosen was to import feed grains in late 1971.

As of late 1971 it appeared that if meat supply were to keep pace with the demand that perhaps 10 to 15 million tons of feed grains would need to be imported annually for the rest of the plan period if climatic conditions were normal or average.

The poor crop in 1972 obviously complicates life for Soviet planners. Even with the large grain imports, including about 5 million tons of feed grains, and some soybean imports, meat output in 1973 is planned at a level below 1972's. Thus instead of keeping pace with the growth in demand, supply will fall even farther behind in 1973. Even if the 1973 grain crop equals the plan, substantial grain imports will be required to move up to the 1974 planned level of meat production. If an effort is to be made to reduce the discrepancy between demand and supply at the official prices, feed grain imports of as much as 20 million tons would be required in 1973-74. This is not a projection; it is an indication of the magnitude of the problem faced by Soviet officials.

Why does the Soviet Union find itself in the situation that with normal weather it is unable to provide the feed to meet its livestock goals? It is not that the goals, if put in terms of per capita consumption, are unreasonably high. The Soviet Union has nearly the lowest per capita level of meat consumption in Eastern Europe—and this would continue to be true in 1975 if its 9th Plan goals are met. Its milk production per capita is low by comparison with Western Europe, but is at approximately the same level as the rest of Eastern Europe. A large fraction of its milk output is fed to livestock, however.

The most probable reasons for the shortfall in feed supplies are poor quality of most feeds, especially with respect to protein content; high feed-livestock conversion ratios, and inability to obtain reasonable yield levels for many feed crops. The high feed-livestock conversion ratios are in part due to the poor quality of feed, but also reflect management practices plus the failure of the industrial sector to provide farms with antibiotics, mineral supplements and vitamins. The low level of protein production could be offset by imports of soybeans and similar products and if this route were taken, feed grain imports could be reduced by the ratio of two to three tons for each ton of high protein feed imported.

Inadequate performance of the livestock sector cannot now be blamed on low livestock prices. Livestock prices are high in comparison with all other countries. Even if one discounts the official exchange rate of the ruble by a major fraction, livestock prices are substantially higher than in Western Europe. The high livestock prices reflect both rather high consumer prices and the enormous subsidies for meat and milk paid to make up the difference between the farm prices and the prices that can be realized by the processing sector. Such subsidies may now amount to as much as 13 to 15 billion rubles annually.

If the Soviet Union fails to improve the quality of its feed supply, to increase significantly its feed output, and to improve feeding efficiency, it will be forced to decide between two quite unsatisfactory choices: Large imports of feed or accepting a much slower growth of meat supply than of meat demand. If it accepts the latter, it must then decide between raising consumer prices or accepting a growing level of unsatisfied demand at existing prices. I suspect Mr. Matskevitch is happy that he no longer has to face the most unappealing prospects.

I have spoken of grain and feed imports by the USSR in terms of possible courses of events over the next three or four years. There are so many uncertainties in the situation that it is impossible to look further ahead. There are many opportunities for increasing livestock output through the more effective use of internal resources. While past experience indicates that progress has been slow in taking advantage of these opportunities, it should not be assumed that circumstances will not change. It may be that the enormous budget burden of meat and milk subsidies plus the added difficulties of large foreign exchange requirements may induce changes in organization and structure that were unimaginable in the past. I have no idea of what the changes might be, but I do not believe that we can entirely rule out fairly dramatic changes. The costs of continuing acceptance of an increasingly untenable situation may eventually overcome ideology, even very strongly held ideology.

The large scale imports of grains in 1972-73 were successful in preventing a significant slaughter of the livestock breeding herd such as occurred after the poor crops in the 1960s. I believe that this difference in response to similar cir-

cumstances represents significant change in priorities. Food imports were made not simply to maintain the supply of bread but to provide feed to save livestock and thus prevent the long, difficult and expensive process of rebuilding the livestock herd.

#### SELLING GRAIN TO THE SOVIET UNION

The administrative structure responsible for grain imports into the Soviet Union fits the economist's definition of a monopsony buyer. A monopsony buyer has the power to influence the price that it pays for a product. When monopsony power is buttressed by secrecy, the potential price influence is enhanced. This is not the place to delve into the role of the wheat export subsidies in the large U.S. sales to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1972, but it may be noted that the enormously successful grain purchase operation, as viewed by the interests of the Soviet Union, rested primarily upon two considerations, namely that the Soviet Union was represented by only one buyer—and an exceedingly competent buyer it was—and by accident or design it was able to keep from all grain sellers the true extent of its need or the level of its probable purchases.

There is probably nothing that can be done to prevent the Soviet Union from having a single purchasing agency. Some might argue that the alternative would be for the United States to be represented by a single selling agency, but there are a variety of reasons to oppose this approach. While hardly conclusive evidence that having a single selling agency would be inadequate to solve the problem, it may be noted that countries so represented were no more effective in dealing with the Soviet buyer in 1972 than were the U.S. exporting firms.

What can be done, and should be done, is to work out some rules of the game that would eliminate as much as possible the secrecy or lack of information. As I understand it, one of the recent agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States calls for exchange of crop forecasts. If such forecasts are made available to the public in the United States on a prompt basis, the effects would be highly desirable. Equally helpful would be timely information on grain stocks in the Soviet Union, though I do not see this as a likely possibility for several years. Another approach would be to negotiate an understanding with the Soviet Union that they would announce at the beginning of each importing year an approximate range of the quantity of grains and feed materials that was planned for purchase from all sources.

This is only a very limited treatment of a highly complex subject. My purpose has been to call attention to an issue that exists and a problem that will be with us so long as the Soviet Union is an important but variable importer of grains and feedstuffs or any other agricultural product.

#### TRADE, ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND MILITARY PRIORITIES

One of the important responses of the Soviet Union to its recent economic difficulties has been to put much greater emphasis upon trade with the private enterprise economies, especially the United States, and upon the acquisition of advanced technologies and credit. While I have no way of knowing all the factors that have been responsible for the improvement in Soviet-American relations, I am confident that the desire for access to advanced technology and credit and to increase trade have been factors of importance.

It is not possible, in my opinion, to state categorically whether improved Soviet-American relations and the apparent difficulties in Soviet economic performance will induce the Soviet Union to devote fewer resources to military programs. Of the two factors, I think the improvement in Soviet-American relations is far the more important. The level of economic output in the Soviet Union is such that policy makers have considerable flexibility in the decision as to the fraction of output that is to be devoted to military purposes—if there is general agreement among the population that such commitments are necessary. However, just as the improvements in Soviet-American relations and in Chinese-American relations have led many Americans to question the size of our military budget, it is reasonable to assume that similar reactions will occur in the Soviet Union. I say that fully cognizant of the differences in forms of government. In partial support of my contention, I refer to the rather similar patterns of decisions in the two countries on foreign aid over the past several years. And I think that the factors that resulted in reductions in net new foreign aid have been similar in the two countries.

It is, of course, quite naive to assume that expanding trade, by itself, will significantly reduce tensions among countries. But the factors that are resulting

in increased trade, the extension of credit and the wide ranging discussions of political and military issues between the Soviet Union and the United States do significantly affect the probability of military confrontation. And progress on these various fronts do result in some increase in the costs of military adventures of sufficient scale to undo the progress already made or being made.

#### SHARING THE GAINS FROM TRADE

One of the great intellectual contributions of the classical economists was to show that trade was beneficial to both parties involved. This analysis, however, did not clearly identify how the benefits would be distributed among the trading units. It is possible to say that a small nation will gain more from a reduction in barriers to trade than will a large nation. The reasons are fairly obvious—the large nation is likely to have a wider range of natural resources and broader distribution of human skills and a market large enough to permit fuller exploitation of the advantages of specialization in production. While clearly the United States has a larger economy than the Soviet Union, the economy of the Soviet Union is enormous in size compared to all economies other than our own. The Soviet Union also has a large and varied natural resource base. It has a huge market and whatever gains there may be from specialization in production are likely to be as fully available to the Soviet Union as to the United States.

A priori there seems little basis for anticipating that the gains from expanded trade will differ significantly between the two countries. And looking at the probable composition of trade between the two countries does not seem to me to change this approximate conclusion. The Soviet Union will tend to emphasize the purchase of technology, either through specific machines, entire plants or by licensing arrangements. It may also rely on the U.S. for some time as a source of feedstuffs, especially high protein feeds, and as a source of food and feed when adverse weather strikes. The United States is likely to depend upon the Soviet Union as a source of supply for raw materials, especially energy materials. Because of the implications of a reasonably assured source of energy from the Soviet Union to the prices of energy materials in world markets, one can argue that the net economic gain from trade for the United States would be quite substantial. While the skeptic might argue that we should not rely on the Soviet Union as a reasonably assured source of energy, it may be noted that the record of the Soviet Union in living up to its commercial and financial agreements is excellent and the recent history of our relations with certain other major suppliers is such as raise questions about their reliability as an assured source of supply. In this situation opening up a new source of supply has substantial potential advantages.

Thus I am not concerned that the improved commercial relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will redound primarily to the benefit of one party. It is increasingly evident that if the United States does not expand its trade with the Soviet Union that other countries will fill the role that we could fill. There may be some time delay, which would work to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union, but I do not see how any one can doubt that in time Western Europe and Japan could provide most of what the Soviet Union could purchase in the United States, with the possible exception of certain farm products. And the credit needs of the Soviet Union do not appear to be so enormous but that they could be met by a group of countries that did not include the United States. I think that there are obvious political and economic reasons why the Soviet Union wishes to improve commercial relations with the United States. But the economic advantages are not so great but that most of the advantages could be obtained by dealing with other nations.

#### SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS

I believe that the improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States that has occurred over the past two or three years has great potential to benefit all of mankind. A small part of those benefits will be economic in nature. Much more important is the potential for further gradual reduction of tensions throughout the world. Obviously conflicts of various kinds will continue to arise. No one should expect that on all counts the objectives of the two societies will always be congruent. But the more ties and interconnections that develop, the more likely is it that efforts will be made to solve conflicts through discussion and diplomacy rather than by other means.

THE PRESENT STATE OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE<sup>1</sup>

By Arcadius Kahan

In order to provide a balanced view on the performance of Soviet agriculture and its major problems, one would have to abstract from the 1972 experience, in order not to repeat the pattern of Soviet official behavior. Soviet policy makers tended in the past to react to the size of the harvest and predictably to become frantic in the face of a major setback, complacent and self-assured after every major success. The problems of Soviet agriculture in the 1970's supersede the immediate question of the frequency of poor or abundant harvests.

It is, therefore, necessary to indicate the major problem areas of Soviet agriculture; perhaps they can simply be listed in the following order.

(1) The shortcomings in arrangements to reach a more efficient use of the human, land and capital resources such as:

(a) The present system of utilization of labor in agriculture, both given the land-labor and capital-labor ratios.

(b) The inadequacy of the existing incentive system, which is still insufficiently tied to the tangible performance of the state farm worker or collective farmer.

(c) The inadequacy of present forms of charging for the use of land and capital in agriculture.

(d) The inability to benefit fully from economies of scale, since neither the socialized farms nor the private auxiliary plots are of optimal size.

(e) The presence of a prohibition of interfarm sales, which increases costs and often prevents real specialization of farms.

(2) The shortcomings in farm organization with particular emphasis on local decision-making.

(a) The constraints upon local farm management imposed by the centrally set control of production goals and delivery quotas.

(b) The constraints upon local farm management by a system of prices that still quite often provides the wrong signals in terms of economic scarcity. The greater territorial differentiation of delivery prices among various zones did not eliminate the danger of following wrong signals that originated in the center.

(3) Vestiges of the past, among which the following appear to be of major consequence:

(a) Insufficient level of modern scientific thinking, not only pertaining specifically to particular technological improvements, but more generally to relationships that involve the substitution of resources in agriculture.

(b) Basically still hostile attitude to the activities on the private auxiliary plots of collective farms and state farm workers, on the assumption that an adversary relationship exists between this activity and the performance of socialized agriculture.

(c) General unwillingness to expand the social overhead capital in agriculture, while concentrating on direct investment in agriculture.

For obvious reasons, one cannot deal adequately in a short presentation with all or even most of the above enumerated problems. Instead, I will attempt by focusing upon one of the major tasks of Soviet agriculture during the most recent period, perhaps to illustrate the bearing of the above upon the solution of the major task.

I would like to define the major goal of Soviet agriculture of the current period as the task of supplying the population with an adequate and varied diet, with special emphasis on the supply of livestock products. Apart from the problem of the relative costs of such a supply, the first prerequisite for the expansion of the livestock output and its major constraint appears to be the production of feed.

Not much could be said about natural pastures as a source of feed. Out of officially classified 274.5 million hectares of pastures in the Soviet farms the socialized sector received 50.9 million tons of feed units (a Soviet feed unit is the equivalent of the nutritional value of a kg of oats). How much privately owned livestock benefited from pasture is not reported directly in the official statistics,

<sup>1</sup> Given at the Sixth National Convention, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New York, April 21, 1973.

although one source indicates the pasture feed utilization by the private livestock in 1970 to have been about 24.7 mill. tons of feed units.

Leaving aside the area of pastures and accepting the somewhat exaggerated claims of the official Soviet statistics for the year 1970 (it was both claimed as the highest yielding year during the whole U.S.S.R. history and let us not forget also a terminal year in a five-year plan period), we can nevertheless learn something about the sources of the feed supply in Soviet agriculture. The following table reproduces the sources of green feed that was utilized by the socialized sector (state and collective farms) of Soviet agriculture in 1970.<sup>2</sup>

AREA AND UTILIZATION OF GREEN FODDER BY THE SOCIALIZED SECTOR

	Area (in million hectare)	Utilized output (in million tons of feed units)	Utilized yield feed units per hectare
Pastures.....	274.5	50.9	0.185
Meadows, perennial and annual grasses.....	79.9	44.6	.56
Corn for silage.....	18.0	27.5	1.53

Source: TsSU SSSR: Selskoe khoziaistvo SSSR. Statisticheskii Spravochnik. Moscow 1961, pp. 96, 109, 332-333.

It might be of interest to note that during the decade 1961-1970 the volume of pasture feed, green fodder and hay increased by only 10 per cent while the average for the decade remained at the 1961 level, and the output of corn silage decreased over the period, thus canceling out a part of the total green feed increase.

The reported volume of "feed concentrates" or grain feed utilized in 1970 by the socialized sector was about 78 million tons of feed units to which straw of about 13 million tons of feed units ought to be added in order to reflect the contribution of grain. This figure exceeds the reported gross output of feed grains (barley, oats, corn). If seed, exports and a minimum of industrial use is accounted for, the data would suggest that during 1970 the socialized sector may have utilized for feed purposes up to 20 million tons of food grains. Preliminary and obviously tentative estimates for the decade of the 1960's indicate a yearly average use of over 9 million tons of food grains only by the socialized sector for feed purposes. That this is not inconceivable is borne out by the huge, unexplained residual of wheat left on the Soviet farms that appears from the official data on production, state procurements and exports. This particular residual of wheat is quite puzzling in view of the still relatively tight supply of food grains for use by the population and for exports that marked most of the period 1961-1970. It is clear that without data on the various types of state grain reserves one could not resolve the wheat utilization puzzle, and this is outside of our present purview.

The data on the use of grains for feed that reflect increasing allocations since 1965 (from 46 million to 78 million tons), clearly indicate that the prevailing policy of the Soviet decision-makers and planners puts the burden of producing feed for the expanding livestock herd upon the grain crop rotation rather than on the meadows and pastures and expects to achieve its objective via the increase in the production of grain. I would like to emphasize that this particular decision was reached without a proper analysis of alternatives of which the improvement of meadows and pastures is a possible one, but rather as an extension of previous, largely successful attempts to increase the production of food grains, thus more by inertia than by a re-examination of the means to achieve a different objective.

In this context the so-called "virgin land" program of the 1950's, the corn program (another brain-child of the Khrushchev era) and the presently followed policy of irrigation and amelioration of lands already within the crop rotation have to be considered phases of one continuum.

The so-called "virgin land" program (just in order to refresh our memory) resulted in plowing under approximately 38 million ha. of the so-called virgin lands and reducing the fallow by at least 10 million ha. (during some years the reduction amounted to over 20 million ha. of the fallow). The expansion of the area allowed for the location of grains on the "new lands" of Siberia and

<sup>2</sup> To arrive at the total utilized output and utilized yield per unit of land, one would have to add the utilization of feed by the private households.

Kazakhstan and for the placement on some of the previously grain-producing area of feed crops such as silage, perennial or annual grasses. Thus while the actual area under grain increased by about 10 million ha., the area under feed within the planted area was increased by at least 38 million ha.

That the yield of green feed is nothing much to write home about, we have already seen. Thus the net benefit consisted primarily in increasing in absolute terms the output of grains by expanding the area and by utilizing the climatic phenomenon of lack of simultaneity of draughts or other calamities between the European and Asiatic parts of Russia. Although this did not eliminate entirely the yearly fluctuations of output, it perhaps made them more intensive, but clearly at a higher average level of output. While the dispersion of the area of grain output had a favorable effect, no major improvement of land utilization took place in some of the old grain-producing areas so far, although some payoff of the recent program of land improvement could be expected in the future.

If one abstracts from the increase in output due to the expansion of the planted area under grains, the logical source for the past increase in yields has to be sought in the utilization of higher yielding varieties of grain. This is a very slow and tortuous process in the Soviet Union. There is available evidence that the increase in grain yields during the 1950's was in part due to the wide utilization of grain varieties that started to be developed around 1970 and begun being introduced in the 1920's. The introduction of new grain varieties in the 1960's involved a similar time lag.

So far the most responsive grain crops have been winter wheat and spring barley. While winter wheat yields were on the increase for some time, the spring barley increase is of very recent origin, no doubt a result of the intensive search to meet the demand for feed grains both inside the Soviet Union and within other socialist countries. At this point it is difficult to assess the actual or even potential impact of a growing supply of mineral fertilizer upon grain yields. We lack the detailed information pertaining to the fertilizer use for different grain crops by region. There is no doubt that the effect would be a positive one. However, to speculate about its magnitude would be tantamount to engaging in wishful thinking, and would depend upon the decisions where to use fertilizers that are at the present made primarily in Moscow instead of at the farm level.

It would be presumptuous to assume that the expansion of grain production in the Soviet Union or the actual net utilization of the crop has reached its limits or exhausted its possibilities. Certainly the amount of waste could be effectively reduced, provided resources are committed toward this end. It is, however, my considered judgment that in spite of the compelling reasons to increase the supply, no spectacular increases in the average grain yields are to be expected within the next 4-5 years. The effectiveness of additional capital inputs seem to be rather limited in the short-run. The already high costs of producing food grains or feed grains ought to compel Soviet planners and decision-makers to concern themselves with alternatives to increase the feed supply and re-examine their present policies of reliance upon grains and its present distribution as the increasing and preferred source of feed. If expansion of grain for feed was profitable because of the short time-horizon of the decision-makers, a change in the time horizon might lead to a revision of the priority of grain feed over other sources.

The grain problem, however, is only a part, admittedly an important one, of the goal to assure the Soviet population of an adequate supply of livestock products. At least two additional problems have to be considered. First, the efficiency of converting feed into livestock products and the second, the sectoral distribution of the producers of livestock output. With respect to the first problem it is interesting to note that the level of efficiency of converting feed into livestock products is very low, judging by official data. In other words, qualitative improvements in this process are of utmost urgency and importance. Thus, much of the investment related to livestock production would have to be re-oriented into areas directly affecting the conversion of feed into livestock products, whether improvements in the quality of the herd,<sup>3</sup> processing and storage of feed, etc. The obstacles in this area are manifold, some institutional and attitudinal, some economic organizational.

Let me just briefly provide an example of the above-mentioned. There is a clear dichotomy between the negative or at best indifferent attitude of the state to private livestock (including the breed of private cattle) on the one hand and the

<sup>3</sup> The official Soviet statistics notwithstanding, the livestock is still mostly of undifferentiated breeds. There are at least three definitions of breed cattle and while the official data report 99 percent of the livestock as breed cattle, the actual percentage is closer to 10-15 percent of pure differentiated breeds.

massive yearly purchases of calves by the socialized sector from the private owners of livestock. Therefore, apart from whatever shortcomings result from the absence of differentiated breeds of dairy or meat cattle in the socialized sector proper, a huge number of the private herds' offspring is continuously being utilized in the production of meat and milk. There is no doubt that even according to official Soviet data the households of the collective farmers and state farm workers produce livestock products (perhaps with the exception of milk) more efficiently in terms of the feed consumed and the quality of the products than the socialized sector. Not only do they meet their own consumption needs but serve as an important supplier of livestock products for the urban population. According to official data the private households still produced in 1970 36 percent of milk, 35 percent of meat, 53 percent of eggs and 10 percent of wool, and all this from 24.9 percent of the total estimated feed supply of the USSR in 1970.<sup>4</sup> It is also not surprising that the volume of meat deliveries per animal to the state are the highest for the private producers, in spite of obvious discrimination in the supply of feed to this sector. Therefore, at least as far as red meat and eggs are concerned the discrimination against the private auxiliary plots is at cross-purposes with the objectives of increasing the supply of livestock products.

But the problem of livestock output raises still another important problem, the one of specialization and scale of operations. The existing system that prohibits interfarm sales of feed, forces most farms to grow their own, and clearly affects the level of efficiency of farm operations and of specialization. The system of state procurements of feed and its redistribution is both expensive and inefficient. Thus, a replacement of the rigid procurement system of feed by a liberalization of direct interfarm feed sales would most probably allow the farms to achieve a higher degree of cooperation and specialization; it would eliminate considerable waste and perhaps affect the size of operations of particular farms forcing them to make adjustments toward a more optimal size of their operations.

From the point of view of particular periods, let us say the one of the 1960's versus the one of the 1950's, the record of performance of Soviet agriculture as measured in terms of growth of output or value of inputs, the 1950's appear to us more impressive. However, one ought to realize that the sheer removal of some typically Stalinist constraints upon the agricultural sector by itself made an important contribution to growth. In addition, the provision of even modest direct investments yielded a high rate of return. The situation of the 1960's was more complex. The yield of the previous investments mix declined, the choices to be made with respect to new investments were more demanding, the increase in incomes of the farm labor force had less impact upon the level of productivity, since the reduction of the farm labor force collided with the imposed immobilization of the labor and land resources in the collective farm sector and its awkward organization of farm work. The result, an aging, still low-skilled labor force that earns an income in the socialized sector of agriculture that is on an hourly basis lower than its actual net earnings on the auxiliary garden plots. To say this is not to deny the real progress that was achieved by the government measures to increase the incomes of agricultural labor, but to state the gravity of the dilemmas facing Soviet agriculture at the present and in the near future.

Thus the slow progress of Soviet agriculture during the decade of the 1960's is indicative of the underlying imbalance existing in this sector of the Soviet economy. Just as I have tried to point out the expected benefits of free interfarm sales for both achieving a higher degree of specialization and for the increase of livestock output, I believe that one of the solutions in Soviet agriculture is to allow interfarm movement of such factors as land and labor, left to the discretion of local farm management and not inconsistent with broad national economic objectives formulated in the general plan and exercised by a system of state-determined prices or payments for major inputs, such as land and capital.

The problem of fluctuations in the level of output under the existing rigid system of centralized planning and procurements, indicates at least to this observer, that an alternative liberalization of the system which would provide greater autonomy at the local farm management level and allow even limited mobility of the factors of production among farms would not accentuate the existing fluctuations, but might possibly help to alleviate some of them in addition to the raising of levels of output, productivity and efficiency.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Hunter, please proceed.

<sup>4</sup> See: A. I. Tiutiunnikov: *Kormovaya Baza Promyshlennogo Zhivotnovodstva*, Znanie, Moscow 1971, p. 7. The statistical handbook of the Central Statistical Authority imply a private share in the utilization of the total supply of up to 28.5 percent.

STATEMENT OF HOLLAND HUNTER, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS,  
HAVERFORD COLLEGE, HAVERFORD, PA.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Senator Proxmire.

My prepared statement is too long to read so I will try to summarize it and get within the time limits.

First, have improved relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. enhanced the prospect that fewer resources will be directed to Soviet military programs? My answer is "Yes." These improved relations have, at a minimum, enabled each side to rethink its security situation. Our security requirements depend mainly on the size of the Soviet effort, and vice versa. If they level off, we can level off. If they lower their effort, we can lower ours. This is what SALT II and MBFR are all about. If we are careful, we can save a good deal of money. While the atmosphere now is greatly improved over what it was 5 or 10 years ago, this obviously does not guarantee quick and painless agreement on the content of prudent and symmetrical arms reductions. Nevertheless, I am one of those who would push hard for mutual and balanced reductions wherever possible, and not just in Europe.

I then argue that both sides can maintain present levels for much less than it took to build them up originally, and suggest that improved relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. give Congress an opportunity to provide guidelines for SALT II that will encourage real economizing on both sides.

Soviet military expenditures have already leveled off except for the outlays devoted to developing new weapons. In the R. & D. area, Soviet efforts to keep up with U.S. military technology have led the authorities to spend a lot, and the ruble outlays have been growing rapidly. But what counts here is performance, not input costs. If 10,000 people spend 10 years developing a new military tank, say, it is not necessarily four times as effective as another tank developed over a 5-year period by 5,000 people. Expenditures for national security should be based on estimates of military strength that reflect anticipated performance rather than the other fellow's internal domestic costs.

My prepared statement argues that Soviet research and development efforts have not been very impressive, and that one of the potential benefits that would follow from reduced defense outlays in the U.S.S.R.—and therefore be attractive for Soviet policymakers—would be an opportunity to reassign defense-related R. & D. resources to the civilian economy. Some of the people and equipment are so specialized that they would find little civilian use, and all would suffer some decline in productivity as they moved out into the clumsy environment of the ordinary Soviet economy. Nevertheless the economy's growth rate and living standards would clearly benefit.

In addition the evidence is now clear that a growing labor shortage in the U.S.S.R. means that military manpower has acquired new value as a Soviet domestic resource. The benefits to the civilian economy if draftees were released would now be far greater than when Khrushchev demobilized some 800,000 men in 1959-61. Still another domestic Soviet pressure comes from the way that defense cuts into the fixed capital investments which embody new technology. It would be too strong to say that the Russians are over a barrel, but they certainly won't find it easy both to take another lap in the arms race and carry through a large program of reequipping industry.

Soviet authorities are now interested in obtaining a whole new "vintage" of industrial technology. Under the first two 5-year plans before World War II, the U.S.S.R. obtained from the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States a large stock of then-current capital plant and equipment, embodying the technology of the late 1920's. Since World War II, however, a further stage of industrial revolution has spread across North America, Western Europe, and Japan, without deeply penetrating the U.S.S.R. Once more the U.S.S.R. wishes to get fully up to date.

One important new aspect of Soviet efforts to import advanced technology is their intention to apply the technology to sectors that will generate Soviet exports. Large diameter pipelines are only the most vivid example. It's by no means clear that the U.S.S.R. will be able to operate this new technology really effectively, but now you have a situation developing in which the U.S.S.R. and its major trading partners will have a joint interest in Soviet success in mastering modern industrial technology.

Meanwhile the short run Soviet need is for substantial additional commercial credits—

Senator PROXMIER. Would you repeat that? Why do we have a joint interest in the Soviet Union?

Mr. HUNTER. Take petroleum and natural gas in particular. There are two papers in the compendium which give considerable detail on how, in order to reach those deposits and get the oil and gas and bring it out, the U.S.S.R. is going to have to learn how to do some very difficult things, which they haven't yet succeeded in doing.

Now, on credits, it seems to me that up to a point they are a necessary and desirable feature of normal commercial trade. Their healthy use requires, however, much more detailed economic information than the U.S.S.R. has supplied in the past, especially if the loans are to be guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank. I believe I speak for many economists in urging this committee to urge the executive branch to build expanded release of economic data into the new commercial arrangements with the U.S.S.R. Four practical reasons come immediately to mind.

(1) In evaluating proposed joint ventures, U.S. firms need technical and cost data from the field location itself.

(2) Before entering into large credit arrangements, banks and other creditors need information on the Soviet balance of payments, foreign exchange reserves, and outstanding obligations, so that stable and mutually acceptable conditions can be maintained.

(3) A large mass of normal commercial information on sales prices, costs, and inventories will be needed to support the efforts of the U.S. firms, Government officials, and all who participate in promoting the growth of Soviet exports.

(4) U.S. manufacturers contemplating long-term sales arrangements need fairly detailed information about past rates of consumption, probable services lives, and prospective future demands so that their offers can reflect sustained expectations rather than high-cost one-shot deals.

In connection with improved reporting, it is important to note the admirable precedent established by the recently concluded agreement for exchange of information on crop prospects. It grew out of the

persuasive efforts of Senator Humphrey and Congressman Reuss during and after their trip to the U.S.S.R. in late 1972. Moreover their "Observations on East-West Economic Relations: U.S.S.R. and Poland," a trip report dated February 16, 1973, and available as a Joint Economic Committee report, is a significant, informative, precursor of the volume we are discussing, as is the study by John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday, "U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy."

The other side of the coin here involves the benefits to the United States that may come from our new commercial relations with the U.S.S.R. Probably the most fundamental benefit over the long run is likely to flow from the general tendency of substantial normal trade relations to build up restraints against disruptive actions by one side against the other.

I suggest in my prepared statement that a more productive society is likely to be a better neighbor, and that we should try to persuade the Soviet authorities that they can maximize these opportunities through opening really flexible trade channels.

In my prepared statement I suggest that the U.S.S.R. could improve its long-term creditworthiness by giving clear evidence of a shift of resources away from the military.

Now when we come to Soviet economic prospects, we find some paradoxes.

For half a century, the U.S.S.R. has sought to catch up with and surpass the West. The U.S.S.R. has now caught up with the United States militarily and surpassed other powers.

Senator PROXMIRE. You say the U.S.S.R. has caught up in what respect?

Mr. HUNTER. Militarily, and surpassed other powers militarily. But the system that has brought the U.S.S.R. such massive military strength has not enabled the U.S.S.R. to catch up with advanced economies in living standards or economic effectiveness. It thus appears that the Soviet system will need to be modified if the U.S.S.R. is to catch up economically.

The trouble is that Bolsheviks do not believe in making haste slowly. Pressure from above has marked the Russian style intermittently since Peter the Great. Soviet plans have been overambitious ever since 1928, and the targets for 1975 are still so overambitious that they can't all be reached.

Paradoxically, however, it is now abundantly clear that relaxation of pressure for growth will in fact yield better growth, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Innovation, creativity, adaptability cannot be coerced. Khrushchev used to inveigh against the steel eaters who trudged straight ahead like a horse in blinkers. But the fault lies, rather, with the party leadership which pulls the horse forward so tightly that he hangs back.

As I see it, the U.S.S.R. is using self-defeating instruments for mobilizing slack. The endless party pressure to uncover reserves and put them to use forces everyone down the line to create and protect secret reserves, or safety factors, and to resist pressures for change.

The Russians would gain, then, from "trying softer," and also from accepting world performance standards in normal commercial relations. Completely nonideological matters like adequate supplies of

spare parts, prompt servicing arrangements, meticulous attention to quality standards, and sensitive attention to customer needs, are central to success in international trade. They impose an objective discipline on would-be traders from all countries. If the party permits and encourages Soviet producers to respond creatively to external trade opportunities, domestic Soviet economic performance will be improved, to the mutual benefit of all concerned.

But can the leopard change his spots? We cannot expect the party to abandon its basic tenets. "Creative Marxism" may nevertheless suggest ways to modify the system enough to absorb technological transfers in the short run and develop self-sustaining capacity for technological progress in the long run. As the Russians say, "We will live and we will see."

Thank you.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you, sir.

I thank all three of you gentlemen for very helpful prepared statements.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOLLAND HUNTER

The compendium we are considering is a solid collection of wide-ranging analyses that will be very useful for the Congress, United States businessmen and all who are interested in the current situation and prospects of the Soviet economy. In fact it will be useful for Soviet economists as well, since in many respects it is more thorough than what most Soviet economists have available to them. The reconstructed 1966 Soviet input-output table, for example, as worked out by Professor Trembl and his colleagues, is an analytic tool with many highly productive applications. One might almost say that it symbolizes the high-technology imports the Soviet economy needs.

The papers provide a substantial foundation for responses to the specific questions on which the committee has requested comments. In this initial statement I will draw on the papers to suggest a few major propositions, subject to amplification and correction by my fellow panelists in our subsequent discussion. The concern here is with the impact on Soviet military programs of recent political and economic developments, and with the benefits that may flow from new commercial relations between the USSR and the United States. My remarks also extend to brief reflections on some paradoxes surrounding Soviet economic prospects for the 1970's.

#### PROSPECTS FOR LESS SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING

First, have improved relations between the United States and the USSR enhanced the prospect that fewer resources will be directed to Soviet military programs? My answer is yes. These improved relations have, at a minimum, enabled each side to re-think its security situation. Our security requirements depend mainly on the size of the Soviet effort, and vice versa. If they level off, we can level off. If they lower their effort, we can lower ours. This is what SALT II and MBFR are all about. If we are careful, we can save a good deal of money. While the atmosphere now is greatly improved over what it was five or ten years ago, this obviously does not guarantee quick and painless agreement on the content of prudent and symmetrical arms reductions. Nevertheless I am one of those who would push hard for mutual and balanced reductions wherever possible, and not just in Europe.

Soviet authorities may now be more willing to devote fewer resources to Soviet military programs in view of the fact that maintaining stocks is less demanding than building them. They have put a lot into building up stocks of hardware over the last decade or so, and now face only modest servicing and maintenance requirements. In both countries the current balance can be maintained at its present level for far less than the United States and the USSR have spent in creating it. Messrs. Campbell, Earle, Levine, and Dresch, point out in their very thoughtful paper (pp. 136-137 in *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, hereafter abbreviated SEPS), that what counts in a confrontation is the size of the stocks on each side at the time. Complexities arise, of course,

in maintaining a balance as the levels change over time. A careful strategic balance at a lower budget level could be maintained if the path to it could be negotiated. At present, however, the United States is "modernizing" its strategic forces at substantial expense, and the USSR can be expected to follow suit, as it has done for the last twenty-five years. Soviet leaders are not likely to devote fewer resources to military programs unless they have some assurance that the United States will cut its spending too. Improved relations between the United States and the USSR give Congress an opportunity to provide guidelines for SALT II that will encourage real economizing on both sides.

Soviet military expenditures have already leveled off except for the outlays devoted to developing new weapons. The evidence for both the leveling off of straight military outlays and the upward trend of development outlays lies in both the scant official Soviet data and the Western estimates presented in Herbert Block's paper (*SEPS*, pp. 177-96) and discussed in several others. In the R & D area, Soviet efforts to keep up with United States military technology have led the authorities to assign a very large number of men and women, along with the necessary facilities, to work in Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation. Similar extensive efforts are being made in civilian industry, and the ruble outlays have been growing rapidly. But the Campbell group suggests (*SEPS*, p. 138), that what counts here is performance, not input costs. If ten thousand people spend ten years developing a new military tank, say, it is not necessarily four times as effective as another tank developed over a five year period by five thousand people. Expenditures for national security should be based on estimates of military strength that reflect anticipated performance rather than the other fellow's internal domestic costs.

The plain fact is that Soviet expenditures under the "Science" category have not produced very impressive results. Here one must distinguish between scientific knowledge and its successful application in actual production. The USSR has shown first-rate abilities in pure science but has a very lopsided record in applied technology. The spectrum of results runs from missiles, aircraft, tanks, and submarines that evidently deserve respect, through a broad range of industrial and agricultural civilian technology where products and processes are rarely impressive, on down to many aspects of ordinary household life, especially in the countryside, where modern science has as yet had little impact.

One should also distinguish between creative innovation on the one hand and mastery of new approaches on the other. Modern societies vary in the speed with which they build new products and processes into their economic activities. The Japanese, who long ago were seen as mere imitative suppliers of children's toys and cheap consumer goods, have recently shown extraordinary ability in bringing new approaches from the frontiers of science through the laboratory into the factory and out to the consumer rapidly and at low costs. It is here that the Soviet system displays weakness.

From several different standpoints, the papers in this compendium lay bare the difficulties that Soviet authorities have had in stimulating technological progress. Not the least of the potential benefits that would follow from reduced defense outlays in the USSR—and therefore be attractive for Soviet policymakers—would be an opportunity to reassign defense-related R. & D. resources to the civilian economy. Some of the people and equipment are so specialized that they would find little civilian use, and all would suffer some decline in productivity as they moved out into the clumsy environment of the ordinary Soviet economy. Nevertheless the economy's growth rate and living standards would clearly benefit.

#### IMPACT OF RECENT SOVIET ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

A second question concerns the extent to which recent Soviet economic difficulties may enhance the prospect that fewer resources will be directed to Soviet military programs. Here the key consideration appears to be manpower. The Soviet economy has entered a new era. From the late twenties through the middle sixties, Soviet output expansion was constrained by limitations associated with the capital stock rather than by shortages of ordinary labor. Now labor has joined other limiting factors and often appears to be the binding constraint. For almost forty years the authorities could draw labor from agriculture for non-agricultural expansion, and raise the participation rate by drawing women from the household into the labor force. Now, as the paper by Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy shows very clearly, these pools are dry. This means that military manpower has acquired new value as a Soviet domestic

resource. The negligible pay and modest subsistence rations of Soviet domestic make up a minor portion of the Soviet military budget in rubles. But as Earl Brubaker says, (*SEPS*, p. 164), "the costs of Soviet military manpower have been rising very much faster than the official accounts show, since an accurate valuation would include the increasing hidden tax on conscripts." The benefits to the civilian economy if draftees were released by the military would now be rather substantial. It is not poor Soviet economic performance but demographic and economic evolution that has created this situation. Nevertheless, the attractiveness for Soviet authorities of transferring manpower from the military to the civilian economy is now far greater than when Khrushchev demobilized some 800,000 men during 1959-61.

One should not infer, however, that the economic situation will force the Soviet government to curtail its military expenditures. The USSR has been able over the last two decades to support simultaneous increases in national defense, capital investment, and personal consumption. As James Noren and Douglas Whitehouse put it, "despite the slowdown in growth, during the 1960's Soviet industrial growth has been sufficient to support simultaneously an increasing defense effort, a rising level of living, and an expanding industrial base" (*SEPS*, p. 233). It also appears that when there are short run changes in the proportion of total GNP going to national defense, they influence the volume of capital investment without having any marked effect on consumption (see Stanley Cohn's paper, *SEPS*, p. 151). We note therefore, an intricate relationship: spurts in the defense share of total output draw resources away from the production of producer durables, that is, from the fixed capital equipment that enlarges the economy's capital base. But it is growth of this capital base that underlies the future Soviet capacity to cover the claims of defense, consumption, and growth. Moreover it is primarily in fixed capital equipment that new technology gets embodied, so that "rising demands for weapons limit the application of the fruits of technological research into the production process." (Cohn, in *SEPS*, p. 155).

#### PROSPECTIVE SOVIET GAINS FROM TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS

A third area of interest concerns the benefits to the USSR that are likely to flow from the commercial relations now opening up with the United States. Evidently Soviet authorities are chiefly interested in obtaining a whole new "vintage" of industrial technology. Under the first two Five-Year Plans before World War II, the USSR obtained from UK, Germany, and the United States a large stock of then-current capital plant and equipment, embodying the technology of the late 1920's. Since World War II, however, a further stage of industrial revolution has spread across North America, Western Europe, and Japan, without deeply penetrating the USSR. Once more the USSR wishes to get fully up to date.

One can question, however, following the SRI study (*SEPS*, p. 141), the extent of the long run benefits obtainable by this route. Perhaps the importation of technology tends to smother creativity among domestic engineers and applied scientists. Acceptance of models already in production guarantees a continued lag behind the frontier. Moreover the imported advanced equipment, unless matched with high-quality inputs, skilled labor, and efficient surrounding organization, is not likely to yield Western results.

One important new aspect of Soviet efforts to import advanced technology is their intention to apply the technology to sectors that will generate Soviet exports. Large diameter pipelines are only the most vivid example. Shortfalls in performance would, however, impair future Soviet export prospects. On a more general plane, the issue extends to the USSR's ability to follow along the path that many other countries have taken. For a generation now, product and process innovations that began in the United States have spread fairly promptly to other economies where, after a few years, they have been mastered. As Europe and Japan have shown, the products can then be successfully sold to the United States. Franklyn Holzman (in *SEPS*, p. 687) cites Raymond Vernon on this point; it has also been observed by Baranson and Junz in *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 1971, No. 2. Thus the USSR and its major trading partners will have a joint interest in Soviet success in mastering modern industrial technology.

Meanwhile the short run Soviet need is for substantial additional commercial credits (See Noren and Whitehouse in *SEPS*, pp. 237-38, and John Farrell, pp. 690-95). Such credits, up to a point, are a necessary and desirable feature of

normal commercial trade. Their healthy use requires, however, much more detailed economic information than the USSR has supplied in the past, especially if the loans are to be guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank. I believe I speak for many economists in urging this committee to urge the executive branch to build expanded release of economic data into the new commercial arrangements with the USSR. Four practical reasons come immediately to mind.

(1) In evaluating proposed joint ventures, U.S. firms need technical and cost data from the field location itself.

(2) Before entering into large credit arrangements, banks and other creditors need information on the Soviet balance of payments, foreign exchange reserves, and outstanding obligations, so that stable and mutually acceptable conditions can be maintained.

(3) A large mass of normal commercial information on sales, prices, costs, and inventories will be needed to support the efforts of the U.S. firms, government officials, and all who participate in promoting the growth of Soviet exports.

(4) United States manufacturers contemplating long-term sales arrangements need fairly detailed information about past rates of consumption, probable service lives, and prospective future demands so that their offers can reflect sustained expectations rather than high cost one-shot deals.

In connection with improved reporting, it is important to note the admirable precedent established by the recently concluded agreement for exchange of information on crop prospects. It grew out of the persuasive efforts of Senator Humphrey and Representative Reuss during and after their trip to the USSR in late 1972. Moreover their "Observations on East-West Economic Relations: USSR and Poland," a trip report dated February 16, 1973, and available as a Joint Economic Committee report, is a significant, informative, precursor of the volume we are discussing, as is the study by John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday, "US-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy," June 10, 1973, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

#### THE UNITED STATES INTEREST IN TRADE WITH THE USSR

The other side of the coin here involves the benefits to the United States that may come from our new commercial relations with the USSR. Probably the most fundamental benefit over the long run is likely to flow from the general tendency of substantial normal trade relations to build up restraints against disruptive actions by one side against the other. Trade is certainly no guarantee against friction or even war. The UK and Germany were major trading partners on the eve of the first World War and the U.S. was trading with Japan in 1941, to mention only two examples. For the United States and the USSR, on the other hand, it has been the lack of normal commercial trade for twenty years that has symbolized and sustained the suspicions and fears that can gradually be cleared away by open contacts.

The normal trade now in prospect between the United States and the USSR will make the Soviet economy more productive, and this too can benefit the United States. When an economy becomes more productive, opportunities increase for fruitful exchange with other economies. Customers have more purchasing power and turn out more desirable goods and services. The members of a highly productive society can lead fuller lives and perhaps make better neighbors than those struggling to catch up under grim conditions. The spread of modern technology and effective economic methods thus furthers the potential for world peace. We all know the potential can be misused, but at least the potential is there.

Progress along this road, in turn, requires the exchange of knowledge, new ideas, and methods, openness in making comparisons, and freedom to search out untried approaches. By these means many societies all around the world have been making very impressive progress. There are thus practical, business-like, apolitical grounds for designing the new commercial channels between the United States and the USSR so that they will maximize these opportunities. Restrictions that close off information, hamper comparisons, and throttle the exchange of relevant evidence will limit the gains that can be achieved. An economist would therefore see strong grounds on which the United States could press Soviet authorities to help fashion some new open, flexible, trade institutions.

United States negotiators should stress the link between long-term U.S. credits and the structure of Soviet priorities. Long-term economic plans require stable security expectations that will justify the commitment of resources in joint projects. It therefore becomes important that means be sought for providing reciprocal assurances concerning national security programs. The USSR could substantially improve its creditworthiness in normal commercial relations with the United States if Soviet authorities made available more facts about its military programs. Clear evidence of a shift of resources away from the military would counter the concern that U.S. credits will merely permit the USSR to continue large defense programs indirectly supported by us. If SALT II and the MBFR negotiations led to smaller national security budgets on each side, U.S. willingness to join in long-term economic ventures would obviously increase.

With voluntary, uncoerced trade, both sides by definition benefit from the exchange, but economists have not yet found practicable ways to measure aggregate gains from aggregate trade. It is frequently suspected that the gains from trade are unequally, perhaps unfairly, divided. Nevertheless the practical question for each country concerns its alternatives. I would restate the question and ask, not how the gains from trade will be divided between the U.S. and the USSR, but how U.S. gains from trade with the USSR compare with U.S. gains from trade with China, the third world, Europe, Canada, or no foreign trade at all. I see no reason to doubt that sensible U.S. businessmen will select a combination of exports to the USSR and imports from the USSR that compares favorably, at the margin, with these alternatives.

Some Americans may be damaged by imports from the USSR, and they should be considered too. Imports can displace domestic production, causing unemployment and disrupting an industry. The papers on "U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations," and "USSR-Western Industrial Cooperations," pp. 638-59 and 712-18, in *SEPS*, indicate that careful provisions are being made to minimize these contingencies. A slow increase in U.S. imports from the USSR will allow time for appropriate adjustments to be made on this side. Drastic disruption will not be permitted. Given time for adjustments, people in the United States have a long record of successful adaptation to change, whether caused by foreign trade, technological progress, shifts in consumer taste, or exhaustion of resources. Government's role is not to prevent these changes, but to extend a helping hand to those who are adapting to them.

#### PARADOXES IN SOVIET PROSPECTS FOR THE SEVENTIES

Soviet economic prospects for the 70's depend in a very central way on policy choices open to the Soviet leadership. For half a century the USSR has sought to catch up with and surpass the West. The USSR has now caught up with the United States militarily and surpassed other powers. But the system that has brought the USSR such massive military strength has not enabled the USSR to catch up with advanced economies in living standards or economic effectiveness. It thus appears that the Soviet system will need to be modified if the USSR is to catch up economically. As Paul Cook very properly points out (*SEPS*, p. 4), the Soviet economy is not at present in a crisis. "Only if one looks to the future is it possible to predict that if the present situation persists the Soviet Union will be falling even further behind the West economically." Politically, their present difficulties are no doubt "causing some diminution of self-confidence among the leaders," along with chagrin and even frustration.

If systemic change is necessary for further economic progress, the 64-ruble question is: "will the Party permit it"? John Hardt concludes his perceptive summary with the very cautious phrase "perhaps we should not discount the prospects for significant change in the Soviet domestic economy" (p. XVII). On the other hand Franklyn Holzman says (*SEPS*, p. 683), "at this point it seems highly unlikely that the USSR will adopt far-reaching reforms in the foreseeable future." This is not the place to lecture Soviet authorities about their problems, but perhaps a review in this forum will clarify our own thinking.

Bolsheviks do not believe in making haste slowly. Pressure from above has marked the Russian style intermittently since Peter the Great. Soviet plans have been overambitious ever since 1928, and as Gertrude Schroeder notes, "Gosplan clearly was under strong pressure to make the plan for 1971-75 as taut as possible" (*SEPS*, p. 17). The planmakers were able to hold the degree of overambitiousness below the extremes that used to prevail, but the targets for 1975 still embody "overambitious goals for productivity gains and material savings" (Noren and Whitehouse in *SEPS*, p. 233).

Paradoxically, however, it is now abundantly clear that relaxation of pressure for growth will in fact yield better growth, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Innovation, creativity, adaptability cannot be coerced. Khrushchev used to inveigh against the steel-eaters who trudged straight ahead like a horse in blinkers. But the fault lies, rather, with the Party leadership which pulls the horse forward so tightly that he hangs back. The SRI group argues (*SEPS*, p. 135), that there is a lot of slack in the Soviet economy but that Soviet policy-makers lack the instruments to mobilize this slack. As I see it, the USSR is using self-defeating instruments for mobilizing slack. The endless Party pressure to uncover reserves and put them to use forces everyone down the line to create and protect secret reserves, or safety factors, and to resist pressures for change.

In many areas of the economy, reducing pressure would both lower demand and increase supply. In labor force management, for example, Murray Feshbach and Stephan Rapawy describe the pressures that frustrate really effective use of labor (*SEPS*, pp. 487-91). Similarly, the regime's seven-year efforts to induce economic reforms illustrate the same paradox. As Gertrude Schroeder says (*SEPS*, p. 22), "the bureaucracy leaves nothing to chance!," even the innovative efforts of production officials. They are kept under such tight reins that their creativity is smothered.

Soviet experience suggests that greater leeway for private initiative would in fact improve the performance of state enterprises. Here the material in Zev Katz's essay (*SEPS*, p. 89-94), is most instructive. His findings update the well-known research of Joseph Berliner and confirm the continuation of practices that took root in the 1930's. The authorities reluctantly permit a good deal of private initiative, since it supplies the grease that makes the State wheels go round. A smaller degree of ideological repugnance would permit state-owned enterprise to perform more effectively.

In still another dimension, Soviet commercial relations with the West also contain some paradoxical possibilities. Acceptance of world performance standards could do much to improve Soviet economic performance. Completely non-ideological matters like adequate supplies of spare parts, prompt servicing arrangements, meticulous attention to quality standards, and sensitive attention to customer needs, are central to success in international trade. They impose an objective discipline on would-be traders from all countries. If the Party permits and encourages Soviet producers to respond creatively to external trade opportunities, domestic Soviet economic performance will be improved, to the mutual benefit of all concerned.

But can the leopard change his spots? We cannot expect the Party to abandon its basic tenets. "Creative Marxism" may nevertheless suggest ways to modify the system enough to absorb technological transfers in the short run and develop self-sustaining capacity for technological progress in the long run. As the Russians say, "we will live and we will see."

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Cline and Mr. Hunter, you both seem to agree in general that the Soviet Union feels that they have achieved a degree of military parity; you both seem to agree that they are unlikely to increase their military spending; you both seem to feel that they are unlikely to increase it, at least they have reached a plateau and in terms of their total economy, the military spending will remain at about the same level.

Is that your view, too, Mr. Hunter? I am quoting more directly from Mr. Cline, but as I followed you, I thought you said something like that.

Mr. HUNTER. Both countries are spending an enormous amount—

Senator PROXMIRE. You did indicate they felt they had caught up with the United States militarily?

Mr. HUNTER. Sure. SALT I, represents, I think, an agreement between the two sides that we have achieved sufficiency and they have achieved sufficiency and if possible we would like not to have a new round in the arms race, and SALT II, I think, involves detailed examination of ways to pin that down. It is such a reciprocal process that it is unlikely either side will go down precipitately unless they are sure the other side does, also.

Senator PROXMIRE. You say SALT II would be a way of trying to pin that down. I agree with that part of it, perhaps but I would disagree that they have any basis, or we have any basis, real basis, for saying they have achieved military equality or military parity with us.

I don't see how you can possibly compare it. Take the fact we have 16 aircraft carriers; they don't have any. We have four times as many long-range bombers as they have. They have much greater megatonnage in their strategic weapons than we and we have far greater diversity in warheads and more reliability.

We are comparing things so different, it is hard to say they are ahead of us or behind us or equal to us.

Mr. HUNTER. You get much more informed judgment on this from people in the military field, as I am not, but I think you are right that the situations for which each side has prepared itself are quite diverse. For example, our aircraft carriers have a mission which the U.S.S.R. evidently has not in the past seen any need to try to deal with. Each of us confronts different geographic and other kinds of military threat.

Senator PROXMIRE. What I am trying to get at is this: It would seem to me the logical layman's view is that both countries have capability superior to that of any other country, maybe China, maybe one of the European countries is the third country in the world, but it is never really discussed because they are so far behind militarily. So the present arms race begins and ends with their concern with us and our concern with them.

It would seem under the circumstances that any conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union would rapidly become a nuclear conflict since we both have the capability of devastating the other country, destroying the other as an organized society many times over.

It just makes sense, both this country and the Soviet Union, from every logical standpoint would be inclined to reduce military spending in the future and to build up their economies. It would seem that our bargaining power is stronger than theirs because they have a weaker economy, less productive economy, and greater needs for investment in various sectors and have farther to go, and in the long run they may fear, say, the Chinese—well, in the long run, if they are going to have the military power vis-a-vis the Chinese, they have to build their economy now.

Building for 1970 confrontation with the United States which would be suicide for either country, it doesn't make any logical sense. You would think the logical thing for them to do would be to reduce their military spending, transfer as much of their resources to building the economy as possible, so they are prepared for a Chinese challenge 20 or 25 years from now, plus all of the other very obvious benefits they get from concentrating more of their resources on their economy.

Mr. Cline.

Mr. CLINE. May I comment on both of the remarks you just made. I think you are correct in saying that it is useless to try to make quantitative comparisons with respect to equality or even parity, which is a vague word for "equality," I guess. The "in" word is "strategic sufficiency" on both sides.

But what both countries want to do is have a guarantee of their national security and in modern strategic thinking, deterrence is almost as important or more important than fighting capability.

The question is the perception of each national leadership as to what will give this national security, this strategic sufficiency.

I am not quite as optimistic as you are about the easy possibility of reducing those expenditures in the Soviet Union.

Senator PROXMIRE. I don't mean it is easy, but if the Soviet ruling clique can think logically, I would say the arguments are very powerful for them to do so.

Mr. CLINE. There certainly is a logical course of reasoning which you have outlined. On the other hand, the history of the last 25 years doesn't give a great endorsement to the influence of logic on some of these patterns. Everything we know about present Soviet military production planning indicates they intend to develop new weapons, that they have research and development and that plans for replacement of present weapons with more modern weapons are all well in hand and probably will go forward, unless there is some extraordinary strong pressure to hold down those costs.

Now, in a mutual context, which Mr. Hunter spoke about, there may be some modest reduction in future requirements. But my statement was intended to say those would probably be modest reductions and would be more reduction in contemplated further growth than very large absolute reductions in strength. This result would derive, not from any lack of perception of economic needs for the civilian economy, but from a strong and pervasive tradition that military security come first in priority in the Soviet Union.

Senator PROXMIRE. This brings us to the question of our policies, and how we influence their policies. We understand, as has been said, the Soviets should divert resources from the military. As the Russian economy grows, the growth should go logically to the other sector. And in order to do that, they want to obtain technology from the West.

But our concern is that the opposite may occur. In other words, as we provide them technology, as we provide them computers and industrial technology and know-how they may be more likely to build up their military and make the holddown in the military spending less necessary.

The real pressures on the Soviet Union to hold down military expenditures are not any feeling about what the Presidents may do, or Members of Congress may say, but it is the fact that they have their own pressures within to provide better life for their people. It is popular for a foreign dictatorship to do that. And as we ease that pressure by providing our feed grain exports; as we ease that pressure by providing our know-how in technology, doesn't it mean that they are going to very likely have less pressure to reduce their stress on the military?

Mr. CLINE. My feeling is that these factors will not operate as you suggest, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Senator PROXMIRE. Why?

Mr. CLINE. The argument I have been trying to make is that the Soviet leaders are responsive to the military planning mechanism which they incorporate in their top leadership council, which bases the economic investment in military strength pretty much on their perception of the specific security needs for the Soviet Union. Thus when they have been in much worse economic straits than they are, now they still maintained a strong defense capacity.

Senator PROXMIRE. You mean this is absolutely isolated, there is a plain, firm dichotomy there is no influence from the side of the non-military? Certainly, in our system we don't have that. I think even in a closed system, a dictatorship, you have to have that consideration.

Mr. CLINE. That would be absurd to say there is no influence, Mr. Vice Chairman, but I think the history of the last 25 years indicates a very high priority for military strength because they feel their whole system and their relationships with other nations benefit from the sense of security and the achievement of what they hope is a rough parity with us.

The only serious effort to take money away from the military was made by Khrushchev, as one of my colleagues mentioned, and it was short-lived and not very successful. In fact, he reduced expenditures on conventional forces largely to pay for a buildup in strategic armaments. The reduction in the number of men under arms became one of the complaints against Khrushchev which led to his downfall. I think Mr. Brezhnev will move very cautiously in making any reduction to what his military colleagues tell him is a security need of the Soviet Union, unless they are very carefully tailored and paralleled with U.S. reductions.

Senator PROXMIRE. Can any of you gentlemen give us any idea what proportion of the Soviet military budget is really directed in a sense against confrontation with this country; that is, strategic, and what proportion of it is conventional and therefore directed more likely against—much of it, at least—China?

Mr. CLINE. I don't believe those categories are very easy to use, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Senator PROXMIRE. Wouldn't it be sensible to have categories like that so we have better understanding of how our policies might affect them? It seems to me their reaction to us would generally be a strategic reaction and their reaction to their only other real threat, the Chinese, would be conventional.

Mr. CLINE. We do have breakdowns of Soviet expenditures in this vein; however, the China threat is also a strategic threat.

Senator PROXMIRE. Strategic, but they have certainly the capability of countering overwhelmingly a Chinese strategic threat, but they do have a very understandable and real conventional threat from China.

Mr. CLINE. Right. But they also deploy a great deal of their conventional force in Western Europe against the NATO forces.

[The following note was subsequently supplied for the record by Mr. Cline:]

Some Soviet force elements could as well be used against China as against the United States or Western Europe—heavy bombers, missile launching submarines, and certain ICBM's fall into this category. Ground forces, which cannot be shifted quickly from one theater to another give a better index of Soviet military priorities.

Speaking very broadly, I think it is fair to say that the U.S.S.R. deploys about three-fourths of its forces in the Western part of the U.S.S.R. counterposed to NATO forces and the United States, while there are only about one-fourth in Asia. Even this generalization needs to be modified by a recognition of the fact that some of the strategic forces in the Asian part of the U.S.S.R. are undoubtedly targetted against the United States. I believe these facts may give you a rough order of magnitude in what is a complex technical problem of evaluation.

While Soviet forces deployed against China have more than doubled since the buildup began in the mid-sixties, the buildup was accomplished in the main

by additions to total Soviet forces. It did not occasion any meaningful reductions in Soviet forces against NATO. The buildup against China may have delayed some steps in modernization and improvement of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, but improvement has continued and in recent years we have seen additional tanks, new air-defense missiles and additional nuclear capable rockets added to the equipment of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.

Senator PROXMIRE. How about the argument that has been made in the past by some of the witnesses that have appeared that when we increase our military spending, we don't improve our security, in a sense we worsen our security, because we have an immediate reaction on the part of the Soviet Union; they increase their military spending.

Is there any possibility that we can induce them to reduce the military expenditures by cutting our defense program?

Mr. CLINE. We think this is a real possibility and, of course, that is why we are engaged in this extensive program of negotiation, exchange of information and views on military threat.

Senator PROXMIRE. So far I must say I am puzzled as to what progress we have made. The information that seems to be available to us is that SALT I didn't result in any strategic or other reduction. In fact, it resulted in an increase. With the Vietnam war over, we spend more in the strategic area and that follows the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I. So it did not result in any discernible progress. Isn't that right?

Mr. CLINE. Mr. Vice Chairman, I don't entirely agree with that. I think it illustrates the point I tried to make earlier.

Senator PROXMIRE. We are spending more than we did before.

Mr. CLINE. Right. But the savings as a result of SALT I are expenditures we would have had to make if no limitations had been created. For instance, ABM, which both countries have agreed not to invest in. Those were very costly systems and that amount of money is saved.

What you are speaking of is increased cost in other weapons systems which have not yet been sufficiently limited.

Senator PROXMIRE. I am not sure. Those ABM systems were so Rube Goldberg, and it seemed to this Senator, ridiculous. We exhausted the arguments against them; it was pretty much overwhelming. In the other areas of offensive missiles, it seems that all of the arguments on the Hill, as well as the policy adopted downtown and the proposals made to us, suggest we have to increase even further in spite of the fact we have this overwhelming sufficiency and so do they. After SALT I has been completed.

Mr. CLINE. On the offensive weapon side, SALT I, of course, was an interim agreement establishing a ceiling but not making any reductions. We hope that in the ensuing negotiations, some improvement in those arrangements can be made, but that remains to be negotiated.

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me move quickly to another part and get Mr. Johnson in on it, too.

Mr. Cline argued, Mr. Johnson, that the U.S. export will increase our employment and help in our balance of payments. In a country that has been chronically plagued with high unemployment, that is a pretty good argument, but today that is not as persuasive an argument. In fact, there is a contrary argument and there are many people who have argued before the banking committee, at a hearing yesterday, and have argued before the country that the Soviet grain trade last year was the root of our inflation to a very considerable extent.

The GAO study indicated it undoubtedly contributed seriously to inflation.

Couldn't it be argued that by exporting feed grain to the Soviet Union that we are damaging our economy by aggravating inflation? The concern with unemployment which I feel just as strongly as anybody else is now that the economy may be heated up so much we may have shortages of labor and aggravated in that way, too. How about it?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think we run into difficulties if we try to adapt trade policies too much to the problems of the moment. I do not see that we are faced with a long run—

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me interrupt to point out the problems of the moment are the problems that usually the Congress and the country and the President deal with. The problem of the moment is the shortage and the universal agreement—we haven't seen what phase IV is going to do—but what it bottoms on, the one policy everybody seems to agree on, is we slap a stiff export license on feed grain exports to the Soviet Union and elsewhere. This is going to skyrocket prices in other countries in the world but it is going to take care of American consumers.

Citizens of other countries don't vote in this country.

The way that we can in a painless political way deal with inflation is to cut down exports. Now, what does that kind of policy do vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as we reduce our soybean exports to them, or what we plan to provide for them this year, our corn exports to them?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, clearly the issue of imposing export controls and, in fact, having done it does have some longrun adverse implications to our relationships with the people with whom we have traded in the past or hope to trade with in the future, at least. On this score, I find that they are perhaps a fairly costly way of dealing with our own domestic problems.

But getting back to the earlier part of your question, whether or not it is in our interest to trade at a substantial level in grain with the Soviet Union in the next years ahead, I look at it somewhat in this way.

First of all, barring another crop disaster in the Soviet Union or China, for that matter, their demand for grains from the United States and the rest of the world, while it will be substantial for the next 3 years, in my opinion, will be significantly less than it has been in the past year. There really has been nothing like the Soviet grain purchases of 1972-73 in the history of the world. In 1 year, they bought half of the world's normal exports of wheat. Nothing like that has ever happened before.

It was the enormity of it, which for their own internal reasons—

Senator PROXMIRE. Nothing like that has happened before but there are lots of indications it can happen again, at least if we permit it to happen, happen in an even more aggravated way. Have you noticed the terrific increase in meat consumption in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Europe? It has been geometric and you pointed out in your prepared statement no country has a relatively lower consumption of meat than the Soviet Union, so there is a colossal potential here. And as they develop that appetite for meat over the next several years, they are likely to urgently, almost desperately, need more feed grain, need it from this country.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I estimated—estimated isn't the right word—projected that they might buy as much as 15 million tons a year.

Senator PROXMIRE. This isn't just a Russian phenomenon, it is world-wide, and it is something that increased well over 100 percent in the last few years, far, far faster than we can possibly increase supplies. So if we are going to have an evenhanded policy toward all of our friends, as well as our possible adversaries in exporting feed grain, it is likely either to involve rationing in this country, or very high prices in this country, another form of rationing, or it is going to mean we are going to be an unreliable supplier to these foreign countries. There is no easy, simple solution, is there?

Mr. JOHNSON. I would agree there is no easy, simple solution, but I feel that if there are not major crop failures this year in Europe, including the Soviet Union, and with continuing favorable weather in the United States, that while we are likely to have a somewhat tight grain supply situation for the next 12 months, it will not approach what we had during the last 12 months, unless there is a substantial effort by a number of countries to build up stock. I think that is a real danger.

Senator PROXMIRE. What we need in this kind of situation and need very badly—and I am not so sure all of you men touched on this—is data. We need to know what their needs are going to be. We need for them to come forward with accurate, honest statistics. They can't predict the weather any more than we can, but they can at least indicate what their projected demand is likely to be, and we can try to fit our own policies into that.

Can we expect to get that from the Soviet Union? It is a closed society. If they release this kind of statistics, it will have an effect perhaps on their prestige with the Communist countries. They tended to lie about statistics in the past, deliberately. We know that. How can we know they are going to give us information we can count on, and rely on it?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I suspect we won't know until we have had some experience with the kind of information that they apparently will release, or have said they will release, as a result of the agricultural agreement, which Mr. Hunter commented on, that they will provide crop forecasts. They have agreed to exchange information in crop forecasts.

We are reasonably confident such forecasts do exist and they are probably relatively reliable, at least they are distributed internally.

And over time, although this is no help for this coming year, we probably would get a picture of how reliable their measures are, how they compare with that of other countries. I assume they entered into that agreement seriously, that they do intend to provide, at least much of the information they, themselves collect. Just as we publish our crop forecasts, I am assuming this is a commitment on their part to, in effect, publish their own.

It is true, as late as 15 years ago, the size of the grain crop was considered to be a State secret. That has changed over time. I assume up to the present time the crop forecast has been considered as State secret. Apparently, they are committing themselves to remove it from that category.

Senator PROXMIRE. Before I go to Mr. Hunter, let me ask Mr. Cline and come back to Mr. Hunter in a minute.

The feeling on the part of many people is that our wheat arrangement with Russia was a disaster for this country in many ways, not only economically, but in many other ways. That it was badly timed, that we should have been able to see the adverse effect on this country.

Some argue that it was related to the negotiations going on between our Government and the Soviet Union with respect to the Vietnam war?

Was this one of the considerations with the Kremlin putting some pressure on North Vietnam to agree to a cease-fire in return for our generous wheat sale terms?

If this was the case, the administration ought to say so, because it would be a good explanation of a sorry deal and all Americans, regardless of how we think the war should have been ended 4 or 5 years ago, at least it is going to be over now and it may well be that the administration's arrangements with the Russians on wheat was one of the pressures that we exerted. Can you say anything about that?

Mr. CLINE. Yes, sir. Mr. Vice Chairman, I can say that to the best of my knowledge no such tie-in existed between the trade arrangement and the many negotiations which were being conducted parallel, except in the sense we wanted, as we have said many times, to maximize normal commercial intercourse between the two nations as part of the general relaxation of tension.

I think the difficulty in that period was that the exchange of information on the crop situations and forward projections, which we hope will come about as a result of the agricultural treaty, did not exist, that we had rather crude methods of measuring current agricultural production in the Soviet Union, although we can usually find out retroactively fairly soon what the production was. This was not possible in June and July when the negotiations and trade deals were made in that year.

The forecasts were very general. We all knew that there were severe limitations, difficulties in the way of the Russians in harvesting a good crop, but it was not until after they moved very quickly and with some secrecy in making purchases that the full extent of their shortfall became absolutely clear.

There were warnings that they might have a very serious shortfall as early as the spring of that year, but I would like to remind the committee that these predictions, even by the Soviet Union, are far from infallible. And even this week we are revising intelligence estimates based on much more information than we had even a few weeks ago, on what the current crop is going to be.

A couple of weeks ago, the weather conditions looked excellent and the people were predicting reaching the planned goal of a gross harvest of 197.4 million metric tons. Since then there has been rain in some areas which lodge—that is, flattens—the crops, making them difficult to harvest, and some drought in other areas where new crops are just getting well started.

So the predictions are going down and a modest change in estimates about the weather may make 5, 10 million tons difference in production.

This is not a finite situation statistically, in which you can be very sure very far in advance as to what happens.

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me get back to Mr. Hunter because he was the first one to bring forth detailed information, more detailed than we had in the past.

Do you feel we may be able to develop that? Leaving aside the point Mr. Cline raised very properly and legitimately, we can't predict droughts and excessive rain.

Mr. HUNTER. It might help for the Congress and the general public to put in perspective the problem of data from the U.S.S.R. Twenty-five years ago there was practically nothing released by Soviet authorities and therefore we were in the dark on almost everything. Since then a great many things have been released by Soviet authorities and in general people who take the trouble to study carefully get their doubts down to a pretty low level, at least on the things that are released.

I hope now that we can enter a new stage of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the outside world, in which in their own self-interest Soviet authorities would release a great deal of additional information. I hope that, as part of our commercial relations with them, we can persuade them that it is in their own self-interest to release information on, for example, their balance of payments. There is quite a list in my prepared statement of things related to trade and, of course, agriculture is one of them.

Senator PROXMIRE. It would be nice if we could get data so we know what kind of reserves we might build up. I would think they would have long term, at least, records indicating the drought cycle and the rain cycle, and so forth, so that we would be in a position to take advantage of it.

Mr. HUNTER. Isn't it in the interests both of the U.S.S.R. and all of its trading partners?

Senator PROXMIRE. But, frankly, what appalls me is we can understand why we didn't have much information, right kind of information, about the Soviet need, but we certainly should have had better information about our own. This country, which has been hurt so badly by exporting too much grain last year and, as a result, having this colossal inflation we have had, much of which has been in food, and much of which has been traced directly to that, as Mr. Johnson said, unprecedented purchase by the Soviet Union.

Let me ask something else related to that. How could the United States get in a position to try to sell agricultural products, including the Soviet Union, followed by recent control on exports? Why this, you know, this terrific emphasis on selling agricultural products as really the answer to our balance of trade and now we have to slap a restriction on imports? It is so inconsistent.

Mr. CLINE. Well, sir, obviously, the reason is conflict between the international effect of the sales, which is all to the good from our foreign trade point of view and some other points of view, and the national concern about domestic economic cost factors, and so forth, which you described very eloquently.

I cannot really comment on how those conflicts should be resolved. Obviously, there is a basic judgment which has to be made as to the net benefit to the United States. I think the administration and the Congress should obviously try to calculate that net benefit, which is a very sophisticated judgment in each case.

Senator PROXMIRE. Without being too sophisticated, it just looks like a blunder.

Mr. CLINE. I can only comment from the foreign affairs point of view, that we wanted to sell our agriculture product because there was a great demand for it; it improved our balance of payments; and, in fact, tends to win us credit and customers and even political benefits because of the immediate use to consumers.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Hunter, yesterday Mr. Rockefeller, David Rockefeller, indicated that if we do not grant the U.S.S.R. most-favored-nation treatment, we lose a good opportunity to refashion the world along more rational and cooperative lines. Do you agree with that?

Mr. HUNTER. The most-favored-nation treatment is something the Russians feel is very important, even though it only affects 10 percent of what they might sell.

Senator PROXMIRE. I have a lot of trouble with the semantics of that most-favored-nation. To think we are going to give the Soviet Union the most-favored-nation designation we are spending \$80 billion a year because we are afraid they are going to destroy us. We just financed, Heaven knows how many billions in Vietnam because they were financing and supporting our adversary, our enemy. We are going to give them most-favored-nation treatment. Is there any country that should not get most-favored-nation and, if so, shouldn't we get a better word to describe that kind of agreement?

Mr. HUNTER. We certainly should because, basically, what it has meant from the very start is equity and uniform treatment for all trading partners.

Senator PROXMIRE. I suggest the State Department might consider changing that term because it is amazing what a term can do.

Most favored nation, I think, is losing you at least 15 to 25 votes in the Senate and maybe more in the House, just because of the name.

Mr. CLINE. I think you have a good point, Mr. Vice Chairman. It is important for the record to understand that when we say we want to extend most-favored-nation treatment to the U.S.S.R., we mean we do not want to discriminate against them.

Senator PROXMIRE. I know; I am one of the Senators who is opposed to providing most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviets, at least unless they permit their Jewish citizens to emigrate and I feel very strongly about that. But, as you say, it isn't what the words seem to imply.

Mr. CLINE. What it really means is charging the same tariff rates on imports from the Soviet Union that we charge non-Communist countries. Without it, we can't expect indefinitely to have a developing commercial relationship with the U.S.S.R.

Senator PROXMIRE. What it is, is no discrimination.

Mr. CLINE. No discrimination is a much better description. And it is an important element in the terms of the package of hopeful, improved relationship, which includes settlement of our lend-lease debt, better commercial representations in Russia for U.S. firms, U.S. commercial office being established, third-country arbitration on trade disputes, and the target of tripling our trade, more than tripling our trade.

This is an attempt to regularize, or if you can use the phrase, "normalize" with a country which we never had normal economic relations with, to put our dealings with the Soviet Union on a com-

mon international commercial basis, rather than such a highly discriminating one.

Senator PROXMIRE. That is much better.

Mr. HUNTER. Couldn't we add to that list of elements that we are talking to the Russians about, a change in Soviet domestic priorities that would free-up some of their resources for the civilian economy, and an increase in the openness of the Soviet economy, both of which, I think—

Senator PROXMIRE. And as Senator Humphrey so eloquently emphasized yesterday, we would hope that one of the purposes of this would be that this would result in better agreements on arms control and an end to this arms race, which is so enormously burdensome and dangerous.

Mr. HUNTER. Right. Because I don't see how we can expect Moscow to shift resources away from the military there unless they see that we are at least not spending more money.

Senator PROXMIRE. Yes.

Mr. CLINE. Do you have a name to suggest for MFN?

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me think about that. I would like to. I appreciate your asking very much. We will work on it.

Mr. HUNTER. Could I offer one other suggestion, just as an economist, and that is that it is probably very difficult for Soviet authorities to make explicit arrangements with us about their emigration regulations. If in fact Soviet practice is such that people come out at the rate that they have in the last year, isn't that something the United States would feel was acceptable?

Senator PROXMIRE. What is that again?

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I would sympathize with the Soviet difficulty in negotiating a treaty explicitly about Jewish emigration—

Senator PROXMIRE. This is a specific discrimination against Jews in the Soviet Union that we are concerned about. The Jackson amendment which 77 of us in the Senate are co-sponsoring.

Mr. HUNTER. But there are many other ethnic minorities in the U.S.S.R.

Senator PROXMIRE. That is right. We are concerned with the discrimination against the other ethnic minorities, too. It is not confined to Jews, but that is the most conspicuous and that is the largest group that is being discriminated against, in at least the most systematic way.

Mr. HUNTER. There might be sort of an administrative way of having an understanding that wouldn't require explicit Soviet legislation.

Senator PROXMIRE. But I don't understand that. It seems to me to argue because they always followed a bad policy, because it is a little less than—it makes it all right.

Mr. HUNTER. My guess is that the United States is not likely to get very far in insisting on that kind of explicit Soviet statement.

Senator PROXMIRE. Why not? I can't understand their policy in this respect. How can it possibly serve their interest to keep a minority, whether Jews or other minority groups, within their country when these people are terribly bitter and disaffected and want to go to another country, and want out? How does it really serve their interest as compared to their being able to get into relations with this country,

reduce their armaments, get food, have trade that will benefit them economically in so many ways?

This should be an easy decision. Maybe because of pride they have to work it out carefully, but I don't see why it should be so difficult a decision for them.

Mr. HUNTER. Remember what happened in East Germany until the wall went up in 1961; look also at what has happened in Cuba since 1959, when Castro did permit those who didn't want to stay, to leave, and he lost a large proportion of the medical profession and other professions.

Senator PROXMIRE. Maybe I am badly misinformed. I had no idea there were hundreds and thousands of people, or perhaps millions of people, who want to get out of the Soviet Union, as there was in East Germany. East Germany, vis-a-vis West Germany, was so sharply contrasting, and after all, this had been one country just a few years ago.

West Germany is so prosperous today, as you and I know. They have a higher per capita income than the Americans have and East Germany, of course, was a country in terribly poor circumstances, so there was a clear, sharp desire for national reasons, for economic reasons, to move. But you don't have that in Russia.

Mr. HUNTER. Certainly not on the same scale, but it is symbolic and it is embarrassing, and I would just guess that Moscow would find it extremely difficult to enter into an official engagement with the United States which, as they say, involves substantial change in their own internal affairs.

Senator PROXMIRE. I agree with that; they couldn't do it quite that way, but they could ease up greatly in other easements.

Some Europeans have stressed improvement in a wide range of civil rights, whereas we focus attention on emigration. Does the European broader emphasis have something to recommend it?

Mr. CLINE. I believe it does, Mr. Vice Chairman. I think we obviously want to support improvement in civil rights in every category in order to meet the international standards and to improve, if you like, the terms of trade in human terms, between the Soviet Union and the United States. We feel that stressing increased exchanges and contact of peoples and cultural contacts and emphasis on civil rights, which is concomitant with the other steps, is a very sound policy.

We agree with our European allies in trying to achieve high standards in our discussions in the general European content of the negotiations now underway.

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me ask each of you—I don't want to take too long; you have been excellent witnesses—but I do have a few more questions. Let me ask each of you to comment on this, starting with Mr. Johnson.

It seems to me that we are in a very strong bargaining position. The Soviet Union needs our technology; they need our capital; they need our credits badly. Their economy has much farther to go than ours does. Are we in this strong bargaining position and if we are not, why not? What can we do about it?

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I think we are in a relatively strong bargaining position in some areas, such as computers and on agricultural products. We have clearly more to offer than most of the other countries

in the world. But in many other areas of high technology, products, which the Soviet needs so badly, given time I do think they can acquire those from Japan or Western Europe, and probably from a consortium—I don't mean it in the literal sense of countries, but by dealing with the major economic powers of Western Europe as well as Japan.

I assume relationships with respect to credit could also be worked out. After all, there are a few currencies around the world slightly stronger—

Senator PROXMIRE. Don't we have any kind of clout with Japan and West Europe? The argument is made constantly, if we don't sell to the Soviet Union, strategic, military, or whatever it is, the European countries are going to. We are supplying the defense of Japan, spending billions to do so, providing \$14 billion a year for NATO on overall defense of Europe, and they follow policies which may strengthen the Soviet's, at least potential, military power.

Don't we have any kind of capacity to influence that, if no other way, simply by reducing our commitments?

Mr. JOHNSON. I assume we do have some.

Senator PROXMIRE. And require free European countries therefore to provide more of their income for defense and therefore they would have less to sell to the Soviet Union; also underlying the fact that it doesn't make any sense for them to trade with the Soviet Union at least in strategic areas if they have to spend a great deal to defend themselves against the Soviet Union?

Mr. JOHNSON. But I think with respect to each of these areas that you mention, Western Europe, Japan, we also have other important objectives that we wish to achieve, and I doubt if we can treat relationships, our relationships and their relationships, to the Soviet Union as being a sole or primary objective.

We have many trade and economic relationships with Japan and Western Europe that we wish to develop, going into a round of negotiations on trade in these areas, and I suspect to have any kind of success, there we will have to give a great deal of emphasis to the multiplicity of our joint objectives with these countries to achieving anything in that arena.

If we were in a position where I assume we could concentrate solely on the relationships between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world in our dealings with the major economic powers, we might be able to achieve something.

Senator PROXMIRE. I am not talking about solely, I am just talking about the argument you get all of the time when we talk about cutting back our commitment to NATO; not eliminating it, of course, the air support, naval support, substantial manpower commitment, cutting it back after 26 years, and if necessary doing it unilaterally, and if they need more let the Western European countries which are so affluent now provide more of it.

And in doing it, recognizing, after all, they are really taking advantage of Uncle Sam now, Uncle Sugar or Uncle Sap, and they are doing it by persuading us to provide so much of their own defense and they go ahead and sell whatever they wish to, and have for years, to the Soviet Union.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; that is the point I was going to make. I think our efforts during the so-called cold war period indicated with respect

to commercial relations we had very little luck in determining what the other countries sold or provided to the Soviet Union and with the general reduction of tensions, which I really honestly think has occurred, I think we will have less luck in the future of influencing the policies of other countries with whom we are basically very friendly.

Senator PROXMIRE. I see. I think your answer in general is, our bargaining power may seem strong, but we are not the only country in the world; other countries will sell to the Soviet Union and they will buy as any prudent buyer will, from the countries where they get the best deal. Our negotiation position, vis-a-vis our economic competitors is not particularly impressive, even if you recognize our military commitments. Is that correct?

Mr. JOHNSON. Right.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. My feeling is there is both positive leverage and negative leverage to be brought to bear. If you think first about the negative leverage, if the United States were to withhold the things U.S.S.R. would like to buy from us, and in other ways try to make it tough for the Russians, I don't think U.S.S.R. will respond very well to that kind of pressure. They can probably continue to grow at 5 percent a year or so, even without these imports.

They can continue following on in a clumsy way after the United States and Western Europe and Japan, picking up our technology 5 or 10 years late. They have done that in the past; they will stubbornly persist that way in a rather embittered manner.

A more positive way of trying for leverage might be to request uniform arrangements, say to them in effect, you are no longer venturing out into hostile enemy territory. Stalin used to talk about hostile capitalist encirclement and I agree, I think that era has simply ended. But as the U.S.S.R. comes out to join the club, there are uniform standards of information, of treatment of human beings, uniform ways of trying to be equitable as among nations, and among business firms, and among human beings. I would appeal to them with a carrot rather than a stick and suggest, that, in effect, what they can see is an opportunity to save time, to raise domestic productivity, to get the fruits at long last of this difficult half century they have gone through.

There is a potential there, I think, which someone like Brezhnev perceives as an opportunity and would respond to as long as it is put to him in terms of equity and uniformity and joining in a reasonable international framework.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Hunter, in your study of the 56 years of the Soviet Union's existence as such, do you find a pattern of more cooperation and response when we have used the carrot or when we have used the stick? When we have been tough?

Mr. HUNTER. They haven't had much experience with carrots.

Senator PROXMIRE. We have experienced it with carrots in this sense, when we have cut back our military expenditures which we did enormously after World War II; we cut them down to a fraction of what they were, much lower than I certainly think they should have been.

Mr. HUNTER. My reading of that whole period is that the U.S.S.R. was frightened and felt a need—first of all, to get the atom bomb.

Stalin said as much in his speech of February 9, 1946. And then the Korean gambit was foolish, ill-advised, but that scared us——

Senator PROXMIRE. Foolish and ill-advised for whom?

Mr. HUNTER. For Stalin.

Senator PROXMIRE. Yes.

Mr. HUNTER. Then the U.S.S.R. went ahead on the hydrogen bomb before we did and that scared us. Then the U.S.S.R. pushed ahead on the Sputnik and that scared us. So then we went ahead on the inter-continental ballistic missiles, because we knew they might, though it turned out eventually they hadn't yet. And then our starting that way, together with what President Kennedy brought, in trying to get conventional forces to be alongside the nuclear forces, induced the U.S.S.R. to follow along in the latter half of the 1960's to get a whole lot of missiles.

It is very much a chicken-and-egg proposition; there is always something that you can point to on the other side that they have done or are about to do.

But my understanding now really is that the U.S.S.R. has been educated through SALT I to understand notions of deterrence and sufficiency and that we need not be condemned to so-called worse case guessing about the future.

Senator PROXMIRE. When are we going to get some results on this? Everything you pointed to so far has been in the escalation. Whether we have gone up or not, they thought we did, so they did. Whether they have gone up or not, we thought they did, so we did. SALT I seemed to be a step in the right direction.

As I pointed out earlier, it didn't result in reduction of arms at all; the burden became worse. When can we expect results from SALT II, results in the sense of being able to reduce our strategic expenditures?

Mr. HUNTER. It is not easy to persuade the American people to reduce their concern for national security.

Senator PROXMIRE. Not the American people. It is the President of the United States. I am not talking about President Nixon; it is Kennedy, Johnson; it is Eisenhower. It is the President who can do almost anything he wants to with strategic weapons.

President Truman cut them back very sharply and then reversed his position. This is one area where I think the American people have had a consistent position of favoring a reduction of spending.

I send a questionnaire to my State every 6 months. The most popular program for reduction after foreign aid, which everybody wants to reduce, is defense spending. The most popular program is health but the second least popular program is defense. The solid, overwhelming, consistent majority of my constituents, want to reduce military spending. In every category, people of various incomes, every part of the State, and I think our State is fairly typical—maybe a little different from Texas but not much in this respect.

Mr. HUNTER. There are lots of United States——

Senator PROXMIRE. So I don't think there is any problem with the people in this.

Mr. HUNTER. How about the Department of Defense? There are lots of dedicated men and women who have devoted their careers to national security. I would like to think that they conscientiously would eagerly participate in working out a mutual and balanced and

careful reduction, but I can understand why they would want to make sure it was symmetrical and why they are going to be hard to convince.

Senator PROXMIRE. I understand they don't want to reduce the number of generals and admirals and limousines and helicopters, and planes, and vacations, and other gravy-train items they have over there in the Pentagon.

Let me ask Mr. Cline.

Mr. CLINE. May I return to your original question?

Senator PROXMIRE. Yes, I hope you will. I didn't mean to get off the subject.

Mr. CLINE. This is about the bargaining position.

Senator PROXMIRE. Yes.

Mr. CLINE. I think the answer I would give is that we are in a good bargaining position with the Soviet Union, but that it is very important to recognize two truths about that situation.

First, we are not in a one-for-one bilateral contest with the Soviet Union exclusively as has been suggested in some of the discussion. We are in a very polyglot, multilateral economic, political, military world situation. So it isn't a "Shoot-Out at O.K. Corral," where one side must win and one side must lose; it is bargaining we are talking about, getting advantages and giving advantages, trying to make them reasonably reciprocal.

Senator PROXMIRE. That is a good modification.

Mr. CLINE. The second point I want to make is that I believe often in dealing with the Soviet Union we tend to project our own habits of mind and views onto the Soviet leaders. I think it is very important that we try to view these problems from their historical and personal and political traditions. I think that these leaders are suspicious of the outside world. There have been reasons which they have used to justify that suspicion and cause them to move with caution. "Their Pentagon" has dedicated people who believe there should be lots of armed forces and generals and plenty of strategic strength to defend their national security.

So because we may, from one point of view, perceive a logical course in this direction—and I do perceive such a course—I do not think we should move with anything except care and cautious attention to the actual developments in the Soviet Union as we go along down this path of restraining the military expenditures and insuring that they are reasonably symmetrical.

Senator PROXMIRE. Certainly, in the sense that we are the country that can produce a surplus of agriculture, that there is great demand throughout the world; not only in the Soviet Union but elsewhere, there is increasing demand in this country for it, this would put us, it seems to me, as a seller, strictly on economic terms and in very strong economic position without the necessity for providing particularly generous credit terms except as was necessary to sell. And making those terms sufficiently realistic so that we can expect to be paid in full with the interest rate at the market rate, and so forth.

Mr. CLINE. Strictly on economic terms, I think you are right. What I am trying to suggest is, I think this is a mix of economic, political, and strategic problems, in which probably best of all—

Senator PROXMIRE. In strong economic terms, and it seems to me we should take advantage of it to advance our own political interests, to wit, arms control and the others we have discussed today.

Mr. CLINE. It is certainly an objective.

Senator PROXMIRE. We ought to tie this in.

Mr. CLINE. May I say one additional word, Mr. Vice Chairman. In opening this session you referred to the fact that I had worked for many years for the Government. You were kind enough not to point out it was more than 30 years, and I would like to mention that I worked for some of that time for President Eisenhower and part of that time when he was Chief of Staff for the U.S. Army as General Eisenhower.

I well remember one of his stories about U.S. bargaining in World War II when the people we were concerned with usually were the British, and bargaining over relative contributions of resources for World War II.

He said that he always discovered that after an international negotiation with the British, the British came back to London and said, "Well, we won about 2 or 3 out of the 100 points we went to that conference with. It was a jolly good conference."

He said the Americans came home and said, "We lost three points in that damned conference. We got robbed. They stole our shirts."

So I suggest we have to be a little reasonable about balancing benefits in international negotiations, so that most of the parties concerned can in some way feel that the net effect is a gain in international stability.

Senator PROXMIRE. Like everybody, I love President-General Eisenhower. He was a great and good man. But I must say my own feeling is, if they only got 3 out of 100 or so items, it undoubtedly cost a whale of a lot more than the 97.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. It has been most enlightening and helpful and very enjoyable.

The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning when we hear from Steven Lazarus, Director of the Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce; Professor Foy Kohler, Center for Advanced International Studies, and former United States Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.; and Professor Gregory Grossman of the Department of Economics, University of California at Berkeley.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, July 19, 1973.]

[The following information was subsequently supplied for the record:]

RESPONSE OF RAY S. CLINE TO ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS POSED BY THE COMMITTEE

*Question 1.* Assuming the 1972 grain sales did not maximize the U.S. market advantages, how may we improve future dealings?

Answer. If the full extent of Soviet and other foreign demand for and purchases of grain had been known publicly earlier in 1972, U.S. market prices probably would have responded by rising faster than they did. Thus, the Soviets would have paid more for grain, farmers would have benefitted from higher prices, and subsidy payments would have been lower.

Two steps have since been taken by the U.S. Government which will improve public knowledge of world production, consumption, and trade trends.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. agricultural cooperation agreement of June 19, in addition to cooperation in technical and scientific research, provides for the regular exchange between the U.S.S.R. and ourselves of forward estimates on production, consumption, demand, and trade of major agricultural commodities. This endeavor should help us to keep better abreast of crop developments in the U.S.S.R. and their implications for world trade. However, it must be recognized that the world demand and supply situation for agricultural products will remain difficult to predict because of agriculture's extreme dependence upon weather, which is difficult to predict accurately.

Secondly, exporting firms are now required under the Export Administration Act of 1969 as amended to report on a weekly basis on export sales and destinations of wheat, other food—and feedgrains, and soybean and cottonseed oils. These reporting requirements are also stipulated under the Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973.

*Question 2.* If we do not know the external debt of the U.S.S.R. with Western Europe and Japan, how can we assess the credit worthiness of the Soviet Union?

*Answer.* Although official Soviet figures are not available, published reports of creditors and other financial information do provide some estimate of existing U.S.S.R. external debt with Western Europe and Japan. In addition, projections of Soviet debt to be contracted, debt service due, and Soviet export earnings are available. These published estimates and projections, taken together with conventional indicators of debt-service capacity (e.g., ratio of debt service to exports earning hard currency, rates of debt amortization, estimates of foreign reserves and gold production) contribute to an assessment of Soviet credit-worthiness.

Another indication of credit-worthiness is the Soviet Union's credit standing among most Western credit sources. The Soviets have in the recent past generally been viewed in Western financial circles as conservative debt managers. No information is available indicating defaults or rescheduling of commercial debts. It is generally believed that the U.S.S.R. intends to protect its existing good credit reputation and can use its centralized administrative controls to do so.

*Question 3.* What would be the effect of passage of the Jackson amendment?

*Answer.* The Jackson amendment would prohibit most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment and U.S. Government credit or investment guarantees to any nonmarket-economy country which denied its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate or which imposed more than nominal fees as a condition to emigration. The President would be required to determine and report to Congress whether or not a particular country imposed such restrictions.

In regard to the Soviet Union, enactment of the amendment would raise definitional problems. For example, the phrases "right or opportunity to emigrate", "more than nominal", and "charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire . . . to emigrate" do not lend themselves to easy interpretation.

If, however, the President did determine that the Soviet Union imposed restrictions on emigration such as are outlined in the Jackson amendment, there would appear to be the following effects:

1. The President's authority to grant credit and investment guarantees to the Soviet Union would be suspended. The President did determine in October 1972, that it was in the national interest to allow the Export-Import Bank to extend such credits to the Soviet Union.

2. It would not be possible to bring into effect the US-Soviet Trade Agreement of October 1972, which includes reciprocal MFN treatment. Two further observations can be made in regard to non-implementation of the Trade Agreement:

Since our trade with the Soviet Union is expected to produce substantial, annually recurring surpluses over the coming years, our balance of trade and our balance of payments might suffer.

Payments under the Trade Agreement for the settlement of the USSR's Lend Lease obligations would be suspended since those payments are dependent upon the granting of MFN. This would leave unpaid the sum of \$674 million out of an agreed settlement amount of \$722 million.

Testifying before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 1, 1973, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Walter J. Stossell said ". . . we have no way of predicting with certainty how the Soviets would react to a legal US proscription on a matter affecting their internal jurisdiction. On the other hand, we have the experience of recent years in which improved relations and expanded trade have coincided with significant and favorable changes in Soviet emigration policy. It seems reasonable then to

postulate that a more effective way of fostering the evolution we favor is to continue in a positive rather than a punitive way."

*Question 4.* What other options are open to the U.S.S.R. if American credits are not available through the Export-Import Bank?

Answer. Should Exim credits not be available, the Soviets could turn to a wide range of alternative means of financing their steadily growing imports from the West. A prime source of financing the Soviet deficit will continue to be government-guaranteed medium and long-term credits. These are mostly supplied by the large commercial banks in Western Europe, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Short and medium-term non-guaranteed credits—including financing provided by Soviet owned banks operating in Western commercial centers—are also available in the Eurocurrency market. U.S. businesses and banks may also significantly raise their lines of credit to the U.S.S.R., although more general credits not tied to specific commercial transactions are still prohibited by the Johnson Act.<sup>1</sup>

The U.S.S.R. may be willing to sell gold. As some experts have noted, two hundred tons could be sold annually, without reducing Soviet reserves.

The above options exist, but it should be noted that the main purpose for the granting of credits through the Exim Bank is the promotion of exports from the United States. In many cases, therefore, where credits would be denied by the Exim Bank, alternative credits could be offered by export credit agencies of other Western supplier countries, with the resulting loss of exports by the American firms.

*Question 5.* To what extent may we expect equity participation in joint ventures or coproduction projects with the Soviet Union?

Answer. The Soviet Union's current policy toward business arrangements with the United States (and other Western firms) is one of encouraging industrial cooperation projects. To the present time, however, the U.S.S.R. has firmly held a position of allowing none of these arrangements in the U.S.S.R. to involve equity ownership by the Western partner in the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet policy of retaining complete equity ownership and management control over its business arrangements with Western firms is rooted in ideological considerations. A substantive change in the long-standing Soviet opposition to foreign equity participation in industrial ventures does not seem imminent.

Although the Soviets have not yet shown themselves to be as flexible as other East European countries in this respect, examples can be found of (a) joint companies outside the U.S.S.R., usually formed for marketing purposes, (b) production-sharing with partial manufacturing or assembly within the U.S.S.R., (c) Soviet purchase of equipment and technology with partial repayment from products of the new installation; (d) natural resource development projects, providing raw materials in return for commodities from abroad, for example, the gas deliveries to Western Europe in return for wide-diameter steel pipe.

We believe that the possibilities defined above offer adequate scope for US firms desirous of entering into industrial cooperation ventures in the Soviet Union. We think that a business contract spelled out in specific terms offers the best protection to an American firm contemplating such cooperation. We have not given special encouragement to equity-type deals because we are not convinced, given the economic policies and practices of the USSR, that an American firm would enjoy a full role in management and decision-making comparable to that it could expect in a market economy country.

*Question 6A.* How will the proposed U.S./U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council improve U.S./U.S.S.R. commercial relations?

Answer. One of the commercial benefits of the June visit of General Secretary Brezhnev to the United States was the signing of a protocol pledging to discuss the establishment of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council within the private sector of the United States. As provided by the protocol, Commerce Secretary Dent consulted with the U.S. financial and business community on the desirability of such an organization. An Executive Committee is now in existence, and is formulating proposals governing the nature and functions of the Council. The Council will be organized in the United States by the private sector.

<sup>1</sup> The Johnson Act does not apply to US banks operating abroad. Accordingly, loans by American banks operating in the Euromarket need not be tied or related to specific exports. In general, however, interest rates for such loans are higher than those granted by other Western credit institutions. Since the Soviet Union has been particularly sensitive to interest rate charges, they have tended to prefer lower-cost official export credits to these commercial loans. This increases the likelihood of a loss of US exports in the event Export-Import bank credits are refused or are not available.

As proposed, the Council will have three basic functions: (1) liaison with governmental and other interested entities such as the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the National Association of Manufacturers; (2) informational services, including providing commercial information on economic developments, trade fairs, and commercial exhibits in both countries, and dissemination of information on market potential and business opportunities; (3) operational functions, including providing logistical, legal, and other services to officials and businessmen of both countries. Initially, the Council hopes to sponsor exchange visits by businessmen and trade-oriented specialists to and from the Soviet Union, hold a seminar on doing business with the Soviets, and publish in Russian a manual on American industry.

*Question 6B.* Will small businesses have equal access to data and trade facilities?

Answer. The commercial promotion facilities of the Department of State and Commerce are of particular importance to the small or medium-sized firm seeking to exploit the Soviet market. Trade missions and trade fair participation sponsored by the Department of Commerce are excellent mechanisms for seeking out trade opportunities. The commercial office planned in Moscow and the East-West Trade Center in Vienna will have space for small exhibitions, symposia, etc. and will provide many essential services to U.S. businessmen. These facilities will be of special benefit to those firms not prepared to undertake the expense involved in opening offices in Moscow.

In view of the scale of Soviet requirements, the Soviet disposition to deal with the largest and best known American firms and the heavy entry costs associated with developing markets in the U.S.S.R., it is apparent that larger U.S. firms will be at an advantage. Nevertheless, hundreds of small and medium-sized U.S. firms have in the past been able to find profitable sales opportunities in the U.S.S.R. and we believe that with the new U.S. government facilities these opportunities will be greatly widened.

*Question 6C.* What are the dangers of a Soviet trade lobby developing in the United States?

Answer. U.S. companies doing business with the U.S.S.R. already number in the hundreds or low thousands. For most of these companies, this business will never exceed more than a small part of their total sales. Accordingly, they do not tend to regard the Soviet Union as a special situation that necessitates the creation of a lobby organized for the particular purpose of promoting trade with that country.

Certainly the full exploitation of the trade possibilities with the U.S.S.R. calls for the reduction of the remaining obstacles to this trade, as is provided for in the Administration's Trade Reform Act of 1973. Firms interested in the Soviet market understandably support the passage of those provisions of the Act relating to state-trading countries but we see no evidence of a lobby forming to press Soviet trade at the expense of the broad national interest of the United States.

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RESPONSE OF D. GALE JOHNSON TO ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS  
POSED BY THE COMMITTEE

*Question 1.* Assuming the 1972 grain sales did not maximize the U.S. market advantages, how may we improve future dealings?

Answer. Several steps can be taken. One is to drastically change the authority for the use of export subsidies, either abolishing such subsidies entirely or prohibiting such subsidies unless the domestic price is at the price support level. A second is to maximize the amount of information that we have about Soviet crop conditions and prospects. I comment on this point in my testimony. A third step would be to reach agreement with other sellers to share information promptly concerning actual or prospective sales to the Soviet Union. In the past, the various selling agencies in Canada, Australia, the Common Market and Argentina and the private firms in the United States have held such information quite closely. Finally, we might try to negotiate an understanding with the Soviet Union that they would announce at the beginning of each importing year an approximate range of the quantity of grains and feed materials that was planned for purchase from all sources.

*Question 2.* If we do not know the external debt of the U.S.S.R. with Western Europe and Japan, how can we assess the credit worthiness of the Soviet Union?

Answer. I suspect that with a little effort we could obtain a reasonably accurate estimate of such external debt. But I believe the best measure of credit

worthiness is the past record of meeting obligations and on this score the record of the U.S.S.R. is outstanding. Obviously the officials of the U.S.S.R. know that if they default on financial obligations that the long run implications would be exceedingly serious.

*Question 3.* What would be the effect of the passage of the Jackson amendment?

Answer. I believe that matters such as the conditions under which Jews or any other minority group are permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union must be handled diplomatically rather than by passage of legislation in the United States. I find it difficult to believe that any Soviet government could publicly and openly accept the conditions specified in the Jackson amendment. Passage of the Jackson amendment would have the result, in my opinion, of both impeding the improvement of political and economic relationships between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and slowing down the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union.

*Question 4.* What other options are open to the U.S.S.R. if American credits are not available through the Export-Import Bank?

Answer. As I understand it, the primary purpose of the Export-Import Bank is to assist U.S. firms to finance their exports by providing short and intermediate term credit. Unless the level of lending by the Bank is greatly expanded, I do not see how it could be much of a factor in U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade. I assume that most of the credit involved in such trade will have to be obtained in the regular credit markets and I think that this is how it should be.

*Question 5.* To what extent may we expect equity participation in joint ventures or co-production projects within the Soviet Union?

Answer. It is unlikely, in my opinion, that the Soviet Union will agree to equity participation in joint ventures during the present decade. I would think that there would have to be substantial changes in the planning structure and the criteria used for determining prices of both inputs and outputs before a Western firm would want an equity position involving a major financial commitment. The value of an equity position could be reduced to zero by the establishment of inappropriate prices, whether by design or accident. Until the Soviet price system is much more closely tied to basic market conditions, there seems little prospect that a joint equity venture would make much sense.

*Question 6.* How will the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council improve U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial relations? Will small businesses have equal access to data and trade facilities? Is there a danger that a Soviet trade lobby will be built up in the United States?

Answer. I believe that the creation of new institutions, such as the Trade and Economic Council, has some small possibility of improving relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., including commercial relations. We clearly need more forums in which problems can be discussed. As commercial relations expand, and it seems quite certain that they will for at least a few years, an institution that provides a basis for the discussion of mutual problems seems highly desirable.

Small businesses always have problems of achieving equal access to data and facilities. This is largely true because they often cannot afford to invest the necessary minimum amount required to obtain the available information. Thus even with the best of intentions on all sides, small businesses will not have equal access to data and trade facilities.

I assume that as trade relations improve, there will be a Soviet trade lobby created in the United States and that there will be an equivalent to it created by U.S. business and farm groups in the Soviet Union. I do not see the creation of such a lobby as a danger but as simply something that we should expect. It may be that I have misinterpreted the question with respect to what was meant by "a Soviet trade lobby."

Perhaps it was intended to cover a U.S. group that would argue for expanding trade with the Soviet Union. If there are barriers to trade with the Soviet Union imposed by the U.S. government that have a particular adverse effect upon either exports to or imports from the Soviet Union, I would also expect such a lobby to arise. But again I do not see this as a special danger since lobbies exist on virtually all other aspects of trade and commercial relations.

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## SOVIET ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 1973

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,  
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 1114, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William Proxmire (vice chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senator Proxmire and Representative Brown.

Also present: John R. Stark, executive director; Michael J. Runde, administrative assistant; George D. Krumbhaar, Jr., minority counsel; and Walter B. Laessig, minority counsel.

Senator PROXMIRE. The committee will come to order.

Our first witness this morning is Mr. Steven Lazarus, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East-West Trade, Department of Commerce. Mr. Lazarus also heads up the new export control program for agricultural products and acts as the secretary for the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission and the East-West Trade Council. Mr. Lazarus came to his position of many hats from the Maritime Commission but retains the active duty status as a captain in the U.S. Navy.

Our second witness is currently professor of International Relations at the Center for Advanced International Studies at Miami University. Mr. Kohler represented the United States in Moscow in 1946-49 and 1962-66. As career Ambassador, Mr. Kohler served as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, until he retired.

Professor Gregory Grossman of the University of California at Berkeley is a well-known authority on the Soviet economy and comparative economic systems. Professor Grossman edited "Value and Plan: Economic Calculation and Organization in Eastern Europe" and wrote "Economic Systems" among his many publications.

Gentlemen, unfortunately there is a vote scheduled on the floor of the Senate at 10:15, and we may have to recess briefly at that time. And then we will come back and resume the hearing.

Mr. Lazarus, you may go right ahead.

### STATEMENT OF STEVEN LAZARUS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST-WEST TRADE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Mr. LAZARUS. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman, for the opportunity to discuss the commercial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. I am particularly pleased to be part of a panel which includes such distinguished Soviet specialists as Ambassador Kohler and Professor Grossman.

I have prepared a prepared statement for the record. I would observe, however, after following the course of the hearings during these last 2 days that the ground has been rather thoroughly covered. The testimony of the last 2 days, taken together with the committee's compendium entitled "Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies," which I am pleased to note includes a paper prepared by five young members of my staff, provides a comprehensive foundation for a subject which has a number of new dimensions, is not universally understood, and merits rigorous study.

My understanding of the ground rules today is that I am to offer a short oral presentation. I will, generally, follow the outlines of my prepared statement; but I thought it might be useful for the committee if I included some observations on my daily work in East-West trade for I am in the unusual position of facing the operational problems inherent in this commerce every day of my working life.

The summit agreements of May 1972 and June 1973 embody steps back from confrontation, hostility and distrust and moves toward the possibility of cooperative engagement, mutual benefit and overall restraint. An expansion of United States-Soviet trade and commercial relations is made possible by and simultaneously accelerates this movement.

Since World War II, the Soviet Union has achieved significant economic and industrial growth despite great handicaps and a self-imposed policy which restricted the development of logical external commercial relationships. Recently the Soviet economic growth rate has been slowing, and the present leadership has perceived that their current economic development goals can only be met through a policy of economic reform or of economic cooperation with the West, particularly with the United States. Only the most tentative and cautious reforms appear to have been adopted. Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. appears to recognize the fact that the United States possesses the world's most advanced technological base and sufficient financial resources to support a substantially increased export program.

A major policy objective of the United States is to at least restore equilibrium to its trade account. A successful program of export expansion can contribute importantly to the accomplishment of this objective. The Soviet requirement for Western products and technology provides a new and potentially large export market for the United States. The Soviet desire to expand energy production can provide the United States with profitable exports of drilling equipment, transmission and construction equipment and oil recovery systems. The Soviet requirement to expand agricultural production can provide the United States with a continuing market for agricultural products and fertilizers. The Soviet objective to improve its transportation systems can provide the United States with sales of mass production machinery for automobile and truck plants. The Soviet need to improve economic planning, management control, and communications systems can provide the United States with a major market for computers and associated electronic equipment. Eventually, the expanding desire of the Soviet people for consumer goods can provide the United States with a new market for a wide variety of light manufacturers. Most of these potential exports not only would contribute positively to the

trade account but would provide thousands of man-years of work for American labor.

U.S. trade with Soviet Union has been and will for the next several years continue to be heavily weighted in favor of the United States. In 1972, the United States exported \$547 million worth of goods to the Soviet Union while importing only \$95 million worth of goods from the U.S.S.R. This represented the largest single positive bilateral contribution to our 1972 trade balance. This type of imbalance cannot be expected to continue over the long-run because the U.S.S.R. will not have adequate foreign exchange with which to purchase U.S. goods.

The United States, however, will have a major requirement for raw and semiprocessed materials which can be provided by the Soviet Union. The Soviets are already important suppliers of U.S. requirements for chrome ore, diamonds, palladium, and platinum. The U.S.S.R. has the potential to become an important supplement to the Middle East as a supplier of energy materials to the United States. If, as is currently predicted, the United States faces its largest balance of payments deficit in the area of energy materials, the Soviet Union represents the single economy which can both provide energy in sufficient quantities and absorb American manufactured and agricultural goods in return.

While there is no certain proof, there is some reason to believe that the Soviet requirement for external financing and technology has influenced and will continue to influence its international posture. It could be argued that the U.S.S.R. has pursued a more moderate policy, particularly in the Middle East, since the May 1972 summit meeting.

This opportunity will not last indefinitely. Other industrialized trading countries are aggressively competing for Soviet trade, and have been doing so for several years. The delicately balanced relationship which U.S. diplomacy has achieved among itself, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China now facilitates the expansion of trade and commerce. This relationship is subject to stress and change. The present opportunity to expand U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade and commerce could decline.

Finally, we all share the same planet. The associated problems of resource depletion and industrial pollution cannot be adequately solved without comprehensive international cooperation. The mutual interest of the United States and the Soviet Union in these problems is very real and growing. It would be difficult, however, to achieve effective cooperation in these areas in the absence of basic economic cooperation.

The Bureau of East-West Trade was formed within the Department of Commerce primarily as a consequence of the Soviet-American Trade Agreement of October 1972. It serves two principal purposes—to promote the expansion of exports to nations with centrally planned economies; to provide assistance, advice, and information to U.S. businessmen engaged in such trade. During the past year, the Bureau has helped 389 U.S. companies to market their products in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe by means of participation in trade fairs and trade missions. It has provided substantial—as distinguished from casual phone calls—assistance and advice to another 240 companies. In addition to the provision of technical, political, and economic data,

the Bureau recommends a cautious and skeptical approach, which I believe has relevance for the deliberations of this committee. It consists of 10 rules for doing business with a centrally planned economy:

1. Do not begin unless you are prepared to invest substantial front-end investment without early return.

2. Do not begin unless you are prepared to negotiate the first transaction for 1 to 3 years.

3. Do not begin unless you are prepared to commit substantial amounts of senior executive time.

4. Do not begin unless you are prepared to walk away from a negotiation at any time. If you go to Moscow with the idea that you must come home with a contract in your pocket, the chances are you will make a very bad deal.

5. Do not negotiate concessionary terms in order to establish a position; you will simply lose respect. Each transaction must stand on its own.

6. Do not reject unusual transactions out of hand. Barter, long term, switch transactions and coproduction agreements can be profitable.

7. Concentrate on personal relationships and the establishment of mutual trust and respect. This, plus quality performance, are the bases for follow-on business.

8. Substantial market research is feasible; good advance work is imperative. Do not make a trip to Moscow without adequate preparation.

9. Negotiate contacts with a maximum degree of specificity. The Soviets have the reputation of living up to the letter of a contract, but of being rather unsympathetic toward items which were inadvertently overlooked.

10. U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade is not El Dorado. It is not about to soar into the tens of billions. It is a good potential market, but one that takes a lot of time and effort and which should be looked at with cold objectivity.

As you can see, at the operating level we are not euphoric about this trade. We see it with all its wants. We think, on balance, it is worthwhile pursuing—but that pursuit should be undertaken with an attitude of cold objectivity, after obtaining as much information as possible, and after a realistic appraisal of the chances for success.

The larger purposes of the Nation will be served if each such transaction is negotiated in a tough-minded fashion with equal advantage accruing to each side.

Thank you.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you, Mr. Lazarus. Your entire prepared statement will be printed in full in the record at this point.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lazarus follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN LAZARUS

Mr. Vice Chairman, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to talk about the subject of East-West trade.

The Moscow and Washington Summits stressed cooperation; the furtherance of mutual interests, benefits, and restraint; and withdrawal from confrontation, hostility and mistrust. An important product of this policy has been the expansion of U.S.-Soviet commercial relations. Normalized commercial relations, and the public and private institutions developed to support them, may operate as a moderating influence on international behavior and increase the prospects for international cooperation.

## ECONOMIC GAINS TO THE U.S. THROUGH EXPANDED TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The United States is seeking to expand its level of exports to foreign countries in order to help correct recent and serious deficits in its balances of trade and payments. In this important respect, trade with the Soviet Union offers substantial economic benefits, for the Soviet Union contains large and relatively untapped markets for U.S. technology, equipment and agricultural products. Expanded exports to the Soviet Union can be expected to generate new sales opportunities both for business firms already exporting and for new-to-market firms. Export expansion will create new jobs in those U.S. industries which are competing for socialist markets.

The Soviets have moved away from a policy of economic autarky and are seeking to import the Western technology plant and equipment which are needed to fulfill their ambitious, long-range plans to develop and update both industry and agriculture. They are also developing natural resources not currently needed in the domestic economy or committed to East Europe. In the long run, exports of these raw materials will generate the foreign exchange needed for a continuing economic relationship with the West. In the short run the Soviet Union is seeking Western financing in order to obtain technology and equipment necessary to build extractive and processing industries.

For the United States, this situation has resulted in a steady increase in exports to the Soviet Union, although in absolute terms, the U.S. percentage is quite small. While U.S. commodities make up an average of 14% of the import volumes of the industrial West, the U.S. share of the Soviet imports from the West is approximately 4.5%. Trade with the Soviet Union accounts for less than 1% of the U.S. total trade turnover.

U.S. exports were \$161 million in 1971, climbed to \$547 million in 1972, and have already reached \$550 million in the first five months of 1973. Sales of wheat, corn, and soybeans were responsible for a large portion of this rapid increase; however, data for 1973 indicate that U.S. exports of non-agricultural products and technology may reach \$360 million, reflecting an increasing level of manufacturing and other non-agricultural contracts.

The balance of trade is running 6 to 1 in favor of the United States. In 1971, trade with the Soviet Union showed a surplus of \$110 million. In 1972, the surplus was \$450 million, which represented the largest single contribution by a foreign nation to the U.S. balance of trade for that year. For the first five months of 1973, we ran a trade surplus with the Soviet Union of \$475 million, and the figure may well reach between \$750 million and \$1 billion by the end of the year, due to last year's grain sales and the steady increase in sales of machinery and equipment, generated by such projects as the Kama River automotive complex.

While large grain sales can bring short and medium term gains to the U.S., depending on current Soviet harvests, the growing sales of manufactured and high-technology goods present the best long range prospects for a continuing balance of trade surplus. This is especially true, since imports from the Soviet Union are primarily industrial raw and semiprocessed materials, and a limited number of manufactured products. U.S. sales of extractive, processing and transmission equipment for development of Soviet natural resources and fuel reserves, in particular, can contribute to a trade surplus for the next several years. Joint development of the vast Siberian fuel reserves could moderate an anticipated payments deficit with the Middle East generated by significant imports of oil and gas from that area.

Many U.S. firms will benefit from this Soviet market. Large U.S. corporations have signed a number of sales contracts and license agreements in the past three years, and some medium size firms have also successfully negotiated contracts.

A substantial number of medium and small size firms receive benefits of U.S.-Soviet trade through domestic sales to larger corporations engaged in this trade. For example, the Kama River truck project has resulted in contracts worth in excess of \$180 million for U.S. companies, and many small firms, acting as suppliers or sub-contractors, will also benefit.

Companies which have signed contracts with the Soviet Union are widely distributed throughout the United States. Products involved are comparatively labor-intensive, while Soviet exports to the U.S. are primarily raw and semi-processed materials. A billion dollar increase in U.S. exports of manufactures, for example, would yield approximately 60,000 jobs for U.S. workers.

The U.S. can compete effectively in world markets for sales of products which the Soviet Union is already importing in large quantities from other industrialized Western countries. These products include: machine tools for metalworking, lifting and loading machinery, products and equipment for polymerization, iron and steel tubes and pipes, textile machines, off-road tractors, and computers and statistical machines.

In addition, there is a strong Soviet demand for technology and equipment in which the U.S. holds a world lead, including agricultural machinery, automotive and petrochemical technology, and computers, telecommunications, and electronics equipment and technology. There is a potential handicap in delay. Many Western European countries and Japan are developing or consolidating production and marketing capabilities in these areas.

Long-run trade projections indicate that the objective of a \$2 to \$3 billion U.S.-Soviet trade turnover (imports plus exports) for the next three years, expressed at the Washington Summit, is a feasible though challenging goal. Achievement, however, depends upon the normalization of commercial relations to that U.S. businessmen will be able to compete on an equal footing with other Western traders doing business with the Soviet Union. Normalization would involve the granting of most-favored-nation tariff treatment, equitable export control procedures, and the availability of government and private credit and guarantees.

Because the Soviet Union must export in order to buy, the above projections necessarily assume a long range growth in Soviet exports to the United States. The immediate significance of MFN tariff treatment, however, is political and psychological, rather than economic, since analyses indicate that the economic impact of MFN by itself would be relatively small in the short term. Of greater importance will be the Soviet ability to generate foreign exchange through sales to third country markets, and the extent to which the U.S. will be able to supply medium to long term credits.

#### ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO THE SOVIET UNION THROUGH TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES

The Soviet Union has a predilection for mammoth manufacturing projects. The construction of such installations involves a long-term commitment of production capacity, technological and manpower resources, and training facilities, which most Western European and Japanese firms are often not prepared to make. In addition, when certain contracts involve barter or counter-purchase, large U.S. companies are often better able to market Soviet goods for resale or utilize them internally.

U.S. industries in general, have a history of filling orders more rapidly than Western competitors—an important Soviet consideration in meeting annual and five-year goals, and in the minimization of cost escalation.

The availability of credit is of major importance to the Soviet Union. Western European countries and Japan have extended medium and long-term credits to the Soviet Union for nearly a decade, and already have a large public and private exposure. The U.S., along with the international Euro-currency market, is the largest remaining potential credit pool, and its interest terms are competitive with rates available in West Europe and Japan.

The Soviet Union considers the U.S. as a logical partner in joint resource development projects which combine some or all of the elements listed above.

Finally, the Soviet Union appears to attach considerable value to a substantial level of trade with the United States as a necessary superpower attribute. This seems to be an objective distinct from the Soviet desire to achieve a sense of economic parity through U.S. MFN treatment.

#### INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIONS

Trade between the U.S. market economy and the centrally planned and administered economy of the Soviet Union demands a stronger U.S. governmental role than is usual in our international relationships. The comprehension of this role has led to the creation at the government-to-government level of basic guidelines for East-West trade which will allow individual U.S. firms to conclude transactions without finding themselves at a disadvantage in dealing with the powerful socialist State trading organizations, or played off by these organizations against other Western competitors. A Government role is necessary if Soviet policies are to be adjusted which pose unreasonable barriers to U.S.-

Soviet trade expansion. A U.S. Government role is necessary to foster East-West trade initiatives within the context of overall foreign policy.

To fulfill this role, the Government has taken a number of steps.

A joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission was established at the Moscow Summit in May 1972 to negotiate trade agreements and to oversee their implementation. The Commission is the ongoing mechanism for commercial dialogue between the two countries at both the policy and the staff levels, and a forum for problem-solving and discussion of operational matters. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade agreement of October 1972 was negotiated within the context of this Commission. The agreement contains provisions for prevention of market disruption, U.S. business facilities in Moscow, improved U.S. commercial representation, and subject to Congressional approval, MFN tariff treatment. It also contains provisions for arbitration of commercial disputes in a third country and other measures to normalize commercial relations. The Joint Commercial Commission is scheduled to meet again in October, 1973.

The President in March established the East-West Trade Policy Committee, chaired by Treasury Secretary Shultz in his capacity as Presidential Assistant. The Committee includes the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy, and the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

The Washington Summit included several trade-related agreements, such as the convention on taxation and the protocol on expanded U.S. business facilities in Moscow. Another protocol called for consultations on a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce. This Chamber will be a private sector contact point for information on markets, foreign exchange and customs regulations, legislation on protection of industrial property, visas, insurance, transportation, and other operational matters.

The Bureau of East-West Trade was organized last November as a separate unit within the Department of Commerce's Domestic and International Business Administration. Within the Government, it has had a major role in implementing East-West trade policy. At the intergovernmental level, it contains the executive secretariat for the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commercial Commission. The Bureau is the major government mechanism for assisting U.S. firms interested in East-West trade. For example, it publishes summaries of the Soviet economic plans, results of market research, reports on trade opportunities in socialist markets, detailed background information, and also experienced-based reports on what to expect at each step of a new trade relationship. In the past 12 months, 389 U.S. firms have participated in trade fairs, trade missions, and other events in the Soviet Union and East Europe through Bureau efforts; several groups of socialist officials have come to the U.S. under Department of Commerce sponsorship for business talks with U.S. officials and U.S. businessmen. The Bureau administers an East-West Trade Center in Vienna which contains exhibit space, telex, telephones and other facilities in order to assist U.S. businessmen trading with the Soviet Union and East Europe. The Center also offers advisory and translation services, reference materials, and a base from which to contract the financial institutions and East-West trade agents located in Vienna.

Pursuant to a Congressional Mandate, the Government has been reducing its unilaterally imposed export controls to levels now exercised by most Western nations belonging to COCOM. Since October 1972, a list of 550 restricted items has been pared to 73 items. The decontrol process has been neither superficial nor precipitous. Each item has been carefully screened, not only by the Bureau of East-West Trade, but by other government agencies, including the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission.

#### CONCLUSION

In drawing up a balance sheet of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of expanding trade with the Soviet Union, one must look at the future. What if we expand our trade with the U.S.S.R.? What if we don't?

It is reported that the Soviet Union is contemplating reform in its foreign trade organizational network and practices. These reforms could place a greater degree of initiative in the hands of end-users. Consequently, greater decision-making authority could go to Soviet technical and managerial personnel who would have a stronger vested interest in maintaining trade with the West. This type of reorganization has already occurred elsewhere in Eastern Europe, with similar

results. A by-product for U.S. traders would be broadened contacts with Soviet end-users, or at least officials nearer to Soviet end-users in the trade network, rather than with highly centralized foreign trade organizations.

An expanding economic relationship does increase the flow of people and goods to the Soviet Union, and concomitantly, the flow of ideas about our life and our system. In return, more Americans gain a better understanding of a different socio-economic system.

If Soviet efforts to broaden commercial relations with the U.S. are not successful, one Soviet alternative is to intensify economic control over the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and revert to a policy of regional autarky. This would have the effect of closing up U.S. markets in the East European countries as well as in the Soviet Union.

If we do not expand this trade we could conceivably deny ourselves substantial longer term economic benefits, including the Soviet energy alternative. There would be little chance for development of institutionalized economic relations with the Soviet Union, or for development of Soviet institutions with vested interests in maintaining mutually profitable trade ties with the United States.

Economic isolation, as we have seen, generates political isolation, hostility and suspicion, and restricts the flow of contact which could conceivably ease such tensions.

Restricted economic contact would also perforce limit the level of international cooperation which could otherwise be brought to bear on a series of world-wide problems, the most serious of which being resource depletion and industrial pollution. This would occur at the very time we need efficient planning at the international level to meet the future needs of a still expanding world population.

Expanded but well considered trade with the Soviet Union seems to weigh heavier in the balance of considerations. With the combined skills, efforts, and thinking of the U.S. private sector, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. executive Branch, we can benefit from such a relationship.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Kohler, please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF FOY D. KOHLER, PROFESSOR, CENTER FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, CORAL GABLES, FLA., FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION AND FORMER DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS**

Mr. KOHLER. Mr. Vice Chairman, I, too, am happy to be with the committee. Over the years I have had occasion both in an official capacity and now in an academic capacity, to cooperate with the committee. And I think the considerations in this field of East-West relations and comparative Soviet and American economy, that the committee has made, are invaluable, including, of course, the latest compendium and these hearings.

I wish that I might have heard all of the testimony. But I look forward to reading your hearings and getting it.

I have submitted a prepared statement, Mr. Vice Chairman, for the record. And I will try to highlight it for the purposes of this discussion in the 10 minutes that you would like.

There are a few points. I want to say at the outset that as one who has worked in this field for most of his adult life, I am very happy about the general progress that has been made in this field of easing our relations with the Soviet Union, and very particularly in expanding the range of contacts, now also into the commercial field.

There is only one aspect that also worries me, because I think over the years our relationship with the Soviet Union has been plagued by the tendency, especially of American public and official opinion, to go from angered disillusionment to great euphoria. And I was glad to

hear Mr. Lazarus' restrained approach to the problems that he faces in the trade field.

I think it is worth noting that the Russians on their side have been very careful to keep the Kremlin interpretation of this better relationship in a Kremlin-oriented focus. After President Nixon visited the Soviet Union last year, they carried on an enormous campaign around the country to give, if you will, their explanation of "peaceful coexistence." And to this end, they activated not only the Communist Party with its quarter of a million functionaries and 14 million members, but a society for internal propaganda that they have known as the Znaniye Society. Suslov himself, the senior member of the Politburo and their principal ideologist, set the tone in instructing this Znaniye Society what they should say. He pointed out, first of all, don't forget that a great struggle still lies ahead. We should have no illusions about the imperialist system and its policy. He says that—I will quote him:

Since the futility of the attempt at military, political and economic pressure on the Soviet Union and the Socialist community as a whole is becoming increasingly obvious as the situation in the world arena changes in Socialism's favor, it is precisely the struggle in the ideological sphere—the sphere where peaceful coexistence between capitalism and socialism does not and cannot exist, that is assuming particular urgency.

Secretary Brezhnev himself, at a banquet for Castro within a month of President Nixon's visit, was even more specific. Talking at a Kremlin banquet he said that:

While striving for the confirmation of the principle of peaceful coexistence, we recognize that success in this important matter in no way signifies the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle. On the contrary, it is necessary to be prepared that this struggle will intensify, will become a still sharper form of the antagonism between the two social systems. And we do not have any doubts about the outcome for this struggle, for the truth of history, the objective laws of social development are on our side!

Now, there is nothing really surprising in this. And I think we should understand it realistically, rather than ourselves having illusions about it. It is essential, I think, to understand that the Soviet Government and the Soviet rule is that of a minority political party whose principal preoccupation from the beginning has been to maintain that minority monopoly of political power, and the security of the country as a base for a Communist system in a world that is conceived to be full of very hostile capitalism imperialists.

Consequently, Lenin, at the very beginning, laid down the dictum that political considerations take precedence over economic considerations, or economic policy. I think the greatest example of that is Russian history from the period from 1921 to 1928, when he put a semi-reversal, to what he called a form of "state capitalism" into effect, where free enterprise was allowed in agriculture and internal trade and in small industry.

We had another example of this, a very dramatic one, when the Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan, which you may recall was open to all countries of Europe. The Soviets actually attended the original meetings of the European countries, but walked out because they were unwilling to join in a cooperative effort with the capitalistic powers of Western Europe, and because they were unwilling to have their need examined by an international committee of European countries rather than being based simply on their own claims.

After World War II, we had a small example in the international field. We had allowed ourselves to become highly dependent on Soviet supplies of manganese, and to a lesser extent, chromite. In 1948, for example, we imported 500,000 tons of manganese, 95 percent of which came from the Soviet Union. Then came the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, and we put on export bans. So in March of 1949 this supply of manganese to the United States was cut off abruptly by what the Soviets referred to as an "unofficial" embargo, in retaliation for our own acts. We scrambled around and found other sources of manganese, and to this day we still don't rely on the Soviet Union to any great extent for this commodity.

Lenin's dictum remains basic. I was very interested to note that in his talk with American businessmen at the Blair House, Secretary Brezhnev himself was careful to say, despite his sales approach, that "the political field holds first place, but is supplemented by economic cooperation and trade."

Now, it is true that this ideology has declined, that is, in effectiveness as a political instrument, but since the Soviet rule bases its legitimacy on the ideology, they are bound to proclaim its continuing validity. And indeed the more it declines the more they enforce its acceptance. We saw this in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and we see it today in their crackdown on their own intellectuals and dissidents. Indeed, one may say that their "peaceful coexistence" campaign abroad has been paralleled by a tightening up on their "vigilance" campaign at home.

Of course, another constant affecting Soviet policy, about which you have heard a great deal from economists this week, is this simple economic reality that here is a country which, with roughly half of our GNP, tries to rival us in military and science and space fields. Now, it is true that the Soviet economy is a directed economy. It is capable of great achievements, but those achievements contrast with the poverty of everyday life. And to a great extent, this is the result of very deliberate decisions. In Stalin's day, he could very easily establish priorities for what he wanted to do, which was to create a heavy industrial-military-oriented base. The peasantry was milked for food and raw materials, and the consumer was left to fend for himself. But the result was a very imbalanced economy.

This imbalance in the Soviet economy has been aggravated by the compartmentalization of the economy, and particularly by the absolute secrecy that surrounds the whole military-industrial complex. So tight is this secrecy that in spite of their keen interest in developing science and technology generally, the Soviets have been unable to bring themselves to open this sector up so that the consumer sector, the light industry sector, gets a spinoff like we do from our military and space programs. This imbalance has also been aggravated by the nature of the planning system. Frequently they simply—the handful of people who plan—simply don't realize what is going on abroad. A graphic illustration of this was the chemical industry. I remember back in 1948 and 1949, we sat there in Moscow realizing that the planners in Gosplan just did not realize that there had been a revolution in chemistry. It remained for Khrushchev to put on a crash campaign many years later to try to catch up. But they still lag far behind.

Also, as the Soviets have rebuilt since World War II, the economy has become complex. And by the time I went back in 1962, they were

beginning to have an internal economic debate, obviously with an eye to what was happening in Yugoslavia, about introducing some features of a market economy, what they called a Socialist market economy. Before long, Prime Minister Kosygin proposed some reforms—he outlined them first in 1964, and developed them more thoroughly in 1965—in which sales and profit indexes would be substituted for these quantitative norms of production.

Senator PROXMIRE. May I interrupt at that point?

Mr. KOHLER. Yes, sir.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Kohler, there is a rollcall on the floor. I will be back in about 10 minutes.

[A short recess was taken.]

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Kohler, go right ahead.

Mr. KOHLER. Senator, I was talking about the attempts of Prime Minister Kosygin to institute some kind of reforms that would get away from quantitative norms, and give a little more play to sales and profits and market factors, and give much more decisionmaking to industrial management. You have had a lot of testimony on that. And you have an excellent paper in the compendium, so I won't go into any of those aspects. But to make a long story short, the real reason the plan failed was that if this kind of authority and autonomy were given to industrial management, the party feared that it would lose control. Consequently, for the most part, these reforms have been abandoned, watered down and emasculated.

It is true that the proposal has led to the introduction of certain cost accounting practices. There has also been certain reform of wholesale prices, undertaken in the late sixties, but they are still arbitrary prices. The latest thing they have tried to do is to order in April of this year the merger of a lot of their industrial plants into "production associations," with their own research and development facilities. The plan itself calls for a 2-year period. I am rather skeptical that it will work, because there are so many vested interests and so many bureaucratic interests in the way.

But even so, I think we should bear in mind as Americans that this is a strong economy second only to the United States. In many basic lines, the Soviet Union produces as much or even more than we do, such as coal, steel, glass, cement, and machine tools. While their overall output is only one-half of ours, their consumer goods output is less than one-third of ours. And the service sector contributes very little to the GNP. Consequently, this is a lean and muscular economy. And when we talk about "poor Soviet economic performance" we are really talking more about their ability to grow and develop than we are about their capacity to produce. And we are also talking about these critical deficiencies—this imbalance in and the inefficiency of the operation of the economy. And it is true that these problems explain a number of aspects of Soviet policies—the desire to import industrial plants and machines that incorporate advanced technology, the effort to establish agreements for scientific and technological cooperation, even though the price they have to pay is broad cultural exchange agreements which allow penetration of their closed society. And it is also a factor in bringing them to the negotiating table in the arms field, like the nuclear test ban treaty, and so forth.

Now, these pressures will continue to operate, and they will make the Soviet leadership want to avoid a new spiral in the arms race.

However, it seems to me that the history of the SALT negotiations indicates that they long ago made a basic decision that they must overtake and if possible surpass the United States in the military field if they are to be accepted as a real super power.

We tend to forget how humiliated they felt as a result of the American intervention in the Middle East back in 1958, and the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962. These are well known stories, and I won't go into them for those purposes at the moment. But these experiences certainly brought about a realization that bluff based on potential doesn't work, and a determination on the part of the leadership which succeeded Khrushchev to get themselves into a position where the Soviet Union in future confrontation or conflict situations would not be the party to back down. And surely the inability of the Soviet Union to help Egypt in 1967 or to do anything about the resumed bombing of North Vietnam in May 1972 are illustrative.

For a good many years it has become clear that the basic decision of the present Soviet leadership is that the Soviet Union must achieve super power status. This has been apparent in remarks by Secretary Brezhnev and Prime Minister Kosygin since the 23d Congress of the Communist Party back in 1966. By 1969, Foreign Minister Gromyko was authorized to state the basic thesis: "The Soviet Union, which, as a large world power, has widely developed international connections, cannot take a passive attitude toward those events that might be territorially remote but that touch on our security and also the security of our friends." Secretary Brezhnev himself, speaking at a military maneuver, declared:

At the present time no question of any importance in the world can be resolved without our participation, without taking into account our economic and military might.

In brief, the Soviet conventional forces have always been formidable and adequate. The Soviets have achieved ICBM and SLBM equality, and as President Nixon has made clear, Brezhnev has assured him they will build up to these figures, and otherwise go ahead in areas that are not forbidden by the agreements. The naval buildup is going on at an astonishing pace.

Now, since Moscow believes and indeed proclaims that it is precisely this growing power of the Soviet Union that has brought the United States to the negotiating table, I don't think there is likely to be much change in presently planned military, foreseeable military programs, if they can possibly help it.

The Soviet Union is a great country, two and a half times the size of ours. It is true that much of it lies in an inhospitable climate and other parts are barren. On the other hand, it is true also that much of it is simply underdeveloped and underpopulated. Anyone who flies across Siberia, which is their principal underdeveloped region, can certainly see the timber resources. You can't see the claimed underground resources. But you can see factors that bear on this, the remoteness of the resources areas, the lack of economic infrastructure and population, and the location of these reserves in what are permafrost areas where conditions for exploration and engineering and construction are very difficult.

Consequently, for the first 40 years of Soviet rule, the planners more or less left Siberian development out. However, this view has under-

gone a 180° turn since the Sino-Soviet conflict erupted at the end of the 1950's, and particularly since March 1964, when Mao Tse-tung staked out claims to a great deal of Soviet territory in this area. Siberia has been moved up on the priority list for internal investment, and approaches have been made in Western countries for joint ventures to develop Siberia. A few transactions have been concluded. But they are on a relatively small scale.

While the principal reason for this intense concern about underdeveloped and underpopulated Siberia is the image of the teeming masses of China just on the other side of unsettled borders, the Soviet literature does make it clear that they are also interested in the dispersal of industry. The 20th Congress of the Party in 1971 called for such dispersal, and Defense Minister Grechko wrote that:

The movement of production forces to the East, bringing them closer to the sources of raw material and fuel and their dispersal location by economic districts significantly raise the defense capability of the Soviet homeland and make our industry less vulnerable in the event that the imperialists initiate a missile-nuclear war.

Mr. Vice Chairman, just a few comments on the Soviet-American trade aspects of this, and I will end my statement.

Senator PROXMIRE. This is an excellent statement, Mr. Kohler, and I hesitate to press you to conclude it, but in fairness to the other witnesses, so that we can have time for discussion, I would appreciate it if you could abbreviate it.

Mr. KOHLER. I think the burden of what I want to say—

Senator PROXMIRE. I read this prepared statement, incidentally, last night. And it is very interesting.

Mr. KOHLER. Thank you.

I want to say that Americans have played a great role in the development of Russia and the Soviet Union in the building of railways and enterprises there in the past. This has never involved any measurable capital investment in the Soviet Union. I think that the history of our trade relations since World War II is an abysmal one. And I do hope that the Congress will clear the way for normal trade. On the other hand, I see no real reason for preferential or concessional treatment of the Soviet Union. I think it is very important that we make the distinction between restoring normal conditions of trade, including normal credit financing, that we distinguish this from the question of the vast kind of investment in Soviet development that Chairman Brezhnev has in mind when he talks about large-scale, long-term credits and joint enterprises. And I think that distinction is essential for us to keep in mind. Trade itself will serve our purposes well. I think we have exaggerated our concern about technology. An illustration is our failure to sell them a color television system because a few components were under our banned list, so they have turned to the French system. In the computer field they are so far behind that I don't think we have any problem there at all.

A lot of questions arise about these proposed long term ventures, such as the deals for liquified natural gas. These are remote areas. I don't intend to answer the economic questions, but there are a lot of them, including the source of investment capital. I am afraid it would have to be public funds to a great extent. Others include: whether the alternative use of these public funds might have better prospects from

our point of view, or the extent of the Soviet reserves—we don't really know that—nor do we know whether or not the Soviets may have competing energy requirements themselves.

On the political side, there can be changes, of course, in Soviet leadership and in policies, and in the world situation that affects the relationship. However, I would say that, on balance, if economic studies prove that such investments in energy sources for the United States would be better in the Soviet Union than elsewhere, the political considerations should not preclude deals being made. On the other hand, I see no reason in the world why political considerations should overcome negative economic prospects.

Thank you.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much Mr. Kohler. Your prepared statement will be printed in full in the record at this point.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kohler follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF FOY D. KOHLER

##### SOVIET ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: POLITICAL ASPECTS

Mr. Vice Chairman, I am happy to have been invited to participate in the Joint Economic Committee's discussion of "Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies." I have long had a high appreciation of the Committee's work in the field of East-West economic relations and of its studies and comparisons of the United States and Soviet economies and have been privileged over the years and in various official capacities to cooperate with the Committee's efforts. The latest compendium of papers, as supplemented by your present hearings, will be an invaluable resource for all those involved in considering the future of economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As I understand from your letter to me and conversations with members of the Committee's staff, what you would like from me would be a sort of political overview of the subject. I hope I can make a contribution in this respect, but as far as the basic data and detailed economic analyses are concerned, I must myself rely on the able and distinguished experts who have contributed to the Committee's published Compendium of Papers and to these hearings.

##### IMPROVEMENT OF US-USSR RELATIONS

I want to make it clear at the outset that, as one who has spent much of his adult life trying to broaden contacts between the American and Soviet people and ease the relationships between the two societies, I am happy about the progress which has been made during the past couple of years. Leaving aside the strategic arms agreements, I particularly applaud the many accords concluded during President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union, in May 1972, and General Secretary Brezhnev's return visit to the United States, in June of this year, expanding, prolonging and institutionalizing the number and range of contacts between American and Soviet institutions and individuals, initiated on a smaller scale in the biennial exchanges agreements originally negotiated in 1958. I likewise welcome the extension of these contacts into the financial and commercial fields foreseen by the complex of agreements relating to trade relations.

However, Soviet-American relations have been plagued over the years by the tendency, especially on the American side, of public and even official opinion and expectations to fluctuate between naive euphoria and angered disillusionment. I therefore, consider it essential that we understand realistically what was done and what was not done, what was said and what was not said at these meetings and what the Soviet interpretation is of what was done and said. I am confident that, if we do have such a realistic understanding, continued and consistent progress in improving the relationship between the two countries and peoples will be promoted, rather than impeded, in the long term.

##### THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE"

The Soviet leadership has been at considerable pains to keep developments in a Kremlin-oriented focus on its side. On the heels of President Nixon's

departure from the Soviet Union last year not only the Communist Party but also the formidable domestic propaganda apparatus known as the Znaniye Society were mobilized to conduct an intensive, nation-wide campaign to impress the Kremlin's interpretation of the summit talks on all Soviet citizens, and to warn them against "misinterpretations." The Party line was given to key representatives of Znaniye's two and a half million "ideological workers—propagandists, political information workers, agitators and lecturers" at a Congress in Moscow on June 20, 1972 by the senior member of the Politburo and top Party ideologist, Mikail Suslov. Suslov declared that despite the successes of Soviet foreign policy activity:

"... protracted and persistent struggle still lies ahead to establish stable peace in the world. The hotbeds of imperialist military aggression in Indochina and the Near East have still not been extinguished. We have no illusions about imperialism, its antipopular nature and policy and its anticommunist ideology."

Suslov then set the task in the field of foreign policy propaganda:

"The Znaniye Society is faced with the task of demonstrating in a profound and well-argued manner the realistic and scientifically substantiated nature of Soviet foreign policy, its class and internationalist essence, its firmness and principle-mindedness in solving international problems and its accord with the fundamental interests of the Soviet people and the interests of the peoples of the world socialist system and of the entire revolutionary anti-imperialist movement.

"It should be stressed, Comrades, that in all our ideological work the slightest slackening of the struggle against reactionary bourgeois ideology is impermissible. Since the futility of attempts at military, political and economic pressure on the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole is becoming increasingly obvious as the situation in the world arena changes in socialism's favor, it is precisely the struggle in the ideological sphere—the sphere where peaceful coexistence between capitalism and socialism does not and cannot exist—that is assuming particular urgency."

Secretary Brezhnev was even more explicit. Within a month after President Nixon's departure, Cuba's Fidel Castro arrived, in his turn, for an official visit to the Soviet Union. He was given an effusive welcome, including not only an award of the Order of Lenin, but the mobilization of thousands of Moscow workers to hail him along the road from the airport to Kremlin. Speaking at a Kremlin banquet for Castro on June 26, Brezhnev proclaimed the Soviet Union's "great sympathy for fraternal Cuba and the cause of the Revolution, the first socialist revolution on the American continent . . . fighting strenuously against a strong class enemy and, in your case, in close proximity to the biggest imperialist power." "Socialist Cuba is not alone," Brezhnev declared.

"It is a strong constituent of the world system of socialism. Its international positions, its interests and security are reliably safeguarded not only by the firm policy of the Communist Party of Cuba and the heroism of its revolutionary people but also by the support and political weight of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. We stated this many times before and we are repeating it with a full sense of responsibility now. . . ."

Turning to broader horizons, Brezhnev went on:

"We soberly and realistically evaluate the current situation. Despite the successes in relaxing international tension, a hard struggle against the enemies of peace, national and social liberation faces us. Marxists-Leninists do not entertain any illusions in relation to the anti-peoples essence of imperialism and its aggressive aspirations. . . ."

"While striving for the confirmation of the principle of peaceful coexistence, we recognize that successes in this important matter in no way signify the possibility of weakening the ideological struggle. On the contrary, it is necessary to be prepared that this struggle will intensify, will become a still sharper form of the antagonism between the two social systems. And we do not have any doubts about the outcome of this struggle, for the truth of history, the objective laws of social development are on our side!"

#### PRIMACY OF POLITICAL FACTORS IN SOVIET POLICY

During more than a quarter century of dealing with Soviet affairs, including seven years of residence and travel in the Soviet Union, it was increasingly borne in on me that there are a few rather simple, fundamental factors which anyone who wants to understand that society must keep constantly in mind. The first of these is the nature of the Soviet political system. It is essential to understand

that the USSR is ruled by a political minority that seized power some fifty-odd years ago and has hung on to it ever since. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has some fourteen million members, or about 5 percent of the population. In a sense Marxism has been "Russified" or "Leninized" to a point that, as a political system, it could be described as simply a more ruthless and efficient version of the authoritarian rule of the czars. But the czars ruled with the authority of the accepted doctrine of the divine right of kings. Today's Soviet rulers must find legitimacy for their minority rule in Marxist-Leninist doctrine—materialistic in concept, authoritarian in practice, conspiratorial in action, messianic in spirit—which proclaims as a matter of historic inevitability that the communist system is destined to rule the world, but also teaches that it is communist duty to give this historic process a shove on every opportune occasion.

Naturally enough, then, the primary preoccupation of the Kremlin leadership has been from the beginning, and continues to be, the maintenance of Communist power in the Soviet Union (and now in what they call the "socialist commonwealth") and the security of the country as the communist base and stronghold in a world conceived to be full of hostile "capitalist-imperialists."

Lenin laid down the dictum that these basic political considerations predominate over economic policies. Indeed, Lenin provided the most dramatic example when in March 1921 he proclaimed his "New Economic Policy" (NEP) to stem the chaotic decline in production and supply created by the "war communism" of the first years of the Bolshevik take-over. Under NEP, the state retained control of basic industries and transportation, as well as foreign trade. However, internal trade, agriculture and small industry were permitted to return to private enterprise. The new policy even allowed the granting of economic concessions to foreign capitalists and businessmen. It is interesting to note in passing that a number of Americans took advantage of these provisions. Among these were Averell Harriman, who participated in a manganese-mining concession in the Caucasus, which he had the foresight to liquidate before Stalin came to power; and Armand Hammer, who built and operated a pencil factory in Moscow—still in existence—in return for which he received enough Romanov art and jewels to open the now well-known Hammer Galleries in New York City. NEP, frankly described by Lenin as a form of "state capitalism," in fact promptly eased the crisis and led to a gradual restoration of the basic economy. The foreign concessions were terminated after Lenin's death in 1924 and internal free enterprise was gradually suppressed by taxation and confiscation and finally ended in 1928 as Stalin launched the first of his five-year plans and set about the forced collectivization of agriculture.

Hardly less dramatic an example was Moscow's rejection of the Marshall Plan in July 1947, despite the colossal needs of the war-ravaged country which had lost 20 million of its population, scores of its cities, thousands of its villages and a large percentage of its industrial plant. Before he walked out of the Paris Conference, then Foreign Minister Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Union would not participate in joint and cooperative planning with the Western European countries and would not accept any outside investigation and evaluation of its needs "for American aid in the form of credits and deliveries of goods." The fact that Moscow compelled the Eastern European countries also to withdraw indicated that it wanted no interference in the process of establishing Soviet domination in this region of Europe.

After World War II, the United States relied primarily on the Soviet Union for its supplies of manganese (and to a lesser extent, chromite), critical to steel production. Of 536 thousand metric tons of manganese imports in 1948, nearly 500 thousand came from the Soviet Union, and advance orders had been placed for some 400 thousand tons to be delivered in 1949. Shipments were abruptly suspended in March 1949 by an "unofficial" Soviet embargo. Moscow let it be known that this action was in retaliation for the ban imposed by the United States, after the communist take-over of Czechoslovakia the previous year, on the export of "war potential" industrial goods to the Soviet Union. Small-scale shipments were gradually resumed in September 1949, after the United States approved the delivery of some oil field machinery to the USSR. Meanwhile, however, American importers had engaged in a mad scramble to locate and develop other and more dependable sources of supply and imports of Soviet manganese have constituted an insignificant proportion of our requirements since that time.

It is pertinent to note that Lenin's dictum remains valid for the present Soviet leadership. Despite the sales-pitch nature of his 90-minute talk to the 50-odd American business leaders assembled at Blair House in Washington on June 21,

1973 Secretary Brezhnev was careful to say that, of course, "the political field holds first place but is supplemented by economic cooperation and trade."

It is true that Marxist-Leninist ideology has declined in effectiveness as an instrument of political power. Even in the Soviet Union, it has not been able to prevail against the great literature of the nineteenth century Russian "enlightenment" which exalted the individual, or against the growing awareness of the Soviet peoples—through wartime contacts, foreign radio broadcasts, exchange programs—of a "better" world outside. And in that outside world, the doctrine has generally lost out to the greater force of nationalism. The more the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology declines, the more frantically the Kremlin leadership feels impelled to proclaim the ideology's validity and force its acceptance. Thus we witnessed the Kremlin's alarm and tragic decision to suppress the movement toward "liberalization" and "humanization" of communism in Czechoslovakia and the new efforts to suppress and control intellectuals and dissidents in the USSR itself. Indeed, the intensification of Moscow's "peaceful coexistence" campaign abroad in the past two years has been matched by a parallel intensification of its "vigilance" campaign at home. The previously flourishing underground press (known as *Samizdat*—self-publishing) has been largely suppressed. The well-known "Chronicle of Current Events," for example, which managed to get published regularly for over 5 years—and to find its way into the world press—has not appeared since November 1972. Moreover, the man responsible for this dubious accomplishment, KGB Chief Yuri V. Andropov, has recently been promoted from candidate to full member of the ruling Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

#### THE SOVIET ECONOMIC REALITY

Another constant—and perhaps the most difficult problem with which the Soviet leadership has to cope on a day-to-day basis—is a simple and harsh economic reality. The Soviet Union covers more than two and one-half times the area of the United States. True, much of the land is located in inhospitable climates and considerable portions are barren. But much more of this vast area is simply underpopulated and underdeveloped and cries out for development capital. Yet the Soviet leadership is driven by doctrinal concepts to rival the United States in military and space programs, spending on them roughly the same as the United States—and it is trying to do this on a 1972 Gross National Product of \$580 billion against the United States' \$1118 billion. Moscow, with its total control, can concentrate its resources on priority projects to a degree the United States can normally match only under conditions of war mobilization. However, the operation of this system has led to a striking imbalance in Soviet social and economic development. The contradictions we see in Soviet society, in particular the contrast between the accomplishments of advanced science and the poverty of everyday life, are largely a result of deliberate policy decisions by the Soviet rulers.

Under the command system of economy, Stalin could establish the priorities to create a heavy-industry base: more oil, more coal, more electric power stations, more iron, more steel, more heavy machines and machine tools. The best of the country's human and material resources, its scientific and technical skills, and practically all investment funds went to these priority projects in the military-industrial field. The peasantry was milked for food and raw materials, and the consumer was left to fend for himself. But inevitably as the basic industrial plant was built up, and particularly after it was restored and expanded following World War II, the economy automatically became more complex and difficult to manage. Diverse interest groups began to compete for their share of the budgetary pie and applied increasing pressures against the country's narrow resource base.

This imbalance in the economy has been aggravated by the strict compartmentalization of the Soviet economy, and particularly by the shield of absolute secrecy which surrounds the military-space industrial complex. The result has been a deprivation of the civilian sectors of the economy of the best human and material resources of the country or even of any meaningful spinoff of advanced scientific knowledge, useful technology, or effective management practices. Acutely desirous of achieving military parity with the United States and of restoring the image—and hopefully this time the reality—of Soviet scientific-technical superiority achieved with the launching of the "Sputniks," the Kremlin has apparently concluded that the best bet is not to destroy this pattern. Thus, the many schemes to raise the general level of Soviet science and technology—

by the creation of a State Committee on Science and Technology in the early 1960's, by a drastic reform of the organization of scientific institutions and research agencies in September 1968, by vastly increased budgetary allocations—have stopped short of bringing the military sector into the general economic management structure. Brezhnev himself talked obliquely about the problem in his report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU in March 1971 when he said: "Considering the high scientific-technological level of the defense industry, the transfer of its experience, inventions and discoveries to all spheres of the economy acquires primary significance." But while the defense industries have been ordered to devote any excess capacities to the production of consumer hardware, there is no evidence that the doors have been, or will be, opened from the defense sector outwards.

The imbalance in the economy has also been aggravated by the inadequacy of the central planning system and the inefficiency of the bureaucratic economic management structure. I remember, for example, that during my first tour in Moscow after the war, we observers in the Embassy were struck by the fact that the Soviet planners had simply not realized that a revolution had taken place in the chemical field, particularly in petro-chemicals. It remained for Khrushchev to discover this slip and to put on a great campaign in the 1950's to try to do something about it; but too much time had been lost and the Soviet Union still lags far behind in this field. The long neglect of agriculture—the assumption that the land and peasantry could take care of themselves or production problems could be solved by the quackery of such "geneticists" as the famous T. D. Lysenko—was clearly a mistake of still greater import for the development of a balanced economy. Khrushchev's stormy campaign to plow up the virgin land in lower Siberia and Kazakhstan in the mid-1950's paid off briefly with a 50 percent increase in grain production. But after 1958 production actually started to decline, as these lands, not unpredictably, developed dust-bowl characteristics. Finally, the ordering of production purely on the basis of quantitative quotas or "norms"—and rewarding managers and workers on their success or failure in meeting these norms—removed any incentive to produce either quality goods or a variety of goods. The result was that by the 1960's literally billions of rubles' worth of shoddy merchandise began to accumulate which even the underprivileged Soviet consumer would not buy.

By the time I went back to Moscow in 1962 cautious debate had already started in the economic journals about the desirability of reform and improvement in economic management. The initial proponents were such economists as Yevsey Liberman and Vadim Trapeznikov, both of whom had obviously had their eyes on the experimentation with a "socialist" market economy being tried in Yugoslavia. It became clear that competent administrators like Prime Minister Kosygin realized that something had to be done, that some free-market factors had to be introduced to make the system operate more automatically and more efficiently. It also became clear that any moves in this direction would be opposed by vested interests, who had achieved very satisfactory positions under the old system, and by many bureaucrats, who feared they would be dislocated from their various planning and control jobs.

In December 1964, Kosygin had outlined to the Supreme Soviet, as a part of the new leadership's program, proposals for economic reform, under which sales and profit indexes would be substituted for quantitative norms of production, industrial management would be given considerable autonomy and decision-making authority, and direct contractual relations would be permitted between producer and retail distributor. In September 1965, he developed these proposals somewhat further at a Central Committee Plenum. But his proposals have been repeatedly watered down to meet the resistance of opponents and are still regarded as experimental in nature.

Management has not been given the authority and the autonomy that real economic reform would require, for the good reason—as seen from the Kremlin—that this would inevitably result in a weakening of Party control. Neither have market factors been allowed to operate in the price field. While the Government undertook a complete revision of the wholesale price structure in 1967-68 to bring it more into line with world standards, it is still an arbitrary and centrally prescribed list. However, even as emasculated, the reforms have resulted in the placing of most of the economy on a cost accounting basis and some measures have been introduced to take account of quality as well as quantity of output. More recently, in the hope of improving management practices and the introduction of science and technology into the production process, a Party-Government decree of April 3, 1973 ordered the merger of existing enterprises into "produc-

tion associations" with their own research and design facilities, apparently in emulation of the giant corporations of the West. Whether, unlike previous reorganizations, this move will bring about any basic change in the nature of the vast bureaucracy, both Government and Party, which operates the Soviet economy, seems open to doubt.

Despite these observations, I think we should bear in mind that the basic Soviet economy remains a powerful production machine, second only to that of the United States. In many basic lines, the Soviet Union produces as much as or even more than we do, notably in coal, steel, glass, machine tools and cement. Overall production amounts to over half that of the United States, despite the fact that production of consumer goods is less than one-third the American level. The service sector contributes only a fraction of the "service" input to the United States GNP. In other words, this Soviet economy is much leaner and more muscular than our own. When we talk about "the poor Soviet economic performance," we are talking more about the rate of growth and development rather than ability to produce, and about critical deficiencies in balance and in efficiency. It is certainly true that these problems and the pressures they create against a narrow GNP base help to explain some aspects of Soviet policies in relations with the West: the desire to import industrial plants and machines incorporating advanced technology and the effort to establish agreements and arrangements for scientific and technological cooperation. Desire for access to technical and scientific education and experience is also a factor in Soviet willingness to conclude broad "cultural" exchange agreements, despite the resulting penetration of the closed Soviet system. Even more important, the Kremlin's growing realization of Soviet financial, economic and technical limitations relative to the United States has been a major factor in bringing Moscow to agree to such developments as the partial nuclear test ban treaty, the ban on weapons of mass destruction in space and on the seabed, and acceptance of the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

#### SOVIET MILITARY PROGRAMS

These pressures will continue to operate in the directions indicated and to make the Soviet leadership want to avoid provoking a new spiral in the arms race. I doubt, however, that they can be expected to result in a significant diversion of resources from military programs as presently foreseen. The history of the SALT negotiations seems to me to reflect a fundamental decision of the Kremlin leadership regarding the Soviet role in the international arena: that the Soviet Union must "overtake and surpass" the United States in military prowess across the board to gain unchallenged acceptance of its "superpower" status.

Americans tend to forget—if they were ever aware of—the feeling of humiliation engendered in the Kremlin by the American intervention in the Middle East in 1958 and the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962. In his period of "Sputnik diplomacy," Khrushchev had arrogated public credit for frustrating the ill-considered British-French-Israeli foray into Egypt in 1956 and had stepped up military and economic aid programs to project Soviet influence into the vacuum created by the collapse of British and French power in the area. In the face of this challenge the United States proclaimed the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, authorized by a Congressional Resolution of January 30, 1957, under which American marines were landed in Lebanon in 1958. Khrushchev ranted and accused, demanding a summit meeting "to stem the beginning military conflict"; but when he was rebuffed, he did not act.

When Khrushchev then turned to the West with his missile-flexing tactics, his attempt to browbeat President Kennedy at Vienna and his challenges to and harassments of the Western allies in Berlin goaded us into action. A crash program was launched to produce and deploy our Minuteman missile force, and our ground and air forces in Europe were reinforced. By 1962 the Soviets had been faced down in Berlin and the world was discovering that the actual missile gap was on the Soviet side, not ours. And when Khrushchev was caught trying to redress the balance by surreptitiously introducing IRBMs into Cuba, he suffered the ignominy of being obliged to withdraw them.

These reverses not only brought about a realization in the Kremlin that bluff based on potential doesn't work, but confirmed that missiles alone are not enough and that a world power position requires a world-wide naval presence. This lesson—and the fact that Soviet naval power is still inadequate—was surely driven home again by the inability of Soviet forces to protect Moscow's Arab clients in June, 1967 or to challenge the United States' mining of ports and

blockade of North Vietnam in May, 1972. These events have undoubtedly strengthened, rather than diminished, the resolve of Khrushchev's more sober successors to achieve a global position where the Soviet Union will not be the party obliged to be passive or to back down in future conflict situations.

Both General Secretary of the Party Brezhnev and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin referred to the growing world role of the Soviet Union, and of its military strength as a "shield" for "revolutionary gains" in their speeches to the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March-April, 1966. By 1969, Foreign Minister Gromyko was authorized to state the basic thesis, in his report of July 10 to the Supreme Soviet, that: "The Soviet Union, which, as a large world power, has widely developed international connections, cannot take a passive attitude toward those events that might be territorially remote but that touch on our security and also on the security of our friends." . . .

Commenting on the large-scale "Dvina" military maneuvers on March 14, 1970, Brezhnev put the thesis more positively, declaring: "At the present time no question of any importance in the world can be resolved without our participation, without taking into account our economic and military might."

In the Soviet Communist Party's principal periodical *Kommunist* for May 1972, General A. A. Yepishev, head of the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces, elaborated in military terms:

"In the present era, which is characterized by a strengthening of the positions of socialism and by sharp antagonism between the two social systems, a deepening of the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has logically taken place. . . .

"It must be seen that socialism's military might objectively assists the successful development of the revolutionary, liberation movements and that it hinders the expropriation of imperialist counterrevolution. In this lies one of the most important manifestations of the external function of the armed forces of a socialist state."

In brief, Soviet conventional forces have always been formidable and are more than adequate to cover requirements on both the European and Chinese fronts. ICBM and SLBM equality has been achieved, or at least accepted by the SALT agreements, and President Nixon has cited Secretary Brezhnev as making it "absolutely clear that they are going ahead with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements." The Soviet naval buildup in recent years has astounded the world and clearly has a top priority today. Indeed, in a speech in Moscow on June 11, 1971, Brezhnev served notice that naval parity may well be an upcoming item on the negotiation agenda. "We have never considered and do not now consider," he declared, "that it is an ideal situation when the naval fleets of the great powers cruise for long periods miles and miles away from their own shores. We are prepared to solve this problem, but to solve it, of course, on an equal basis."

Since Moscow firmly believes, indeed loudly proclaims, that it is precisely the growing power of the Soviet Union that has brought the United States to the negotiating table and "is compelling American ruling circles to engage in an agonizing reappraisal of values," there is not likely to be much change in the Soviet military posture. This conclusion would seem to be underscored by the recent elevation of the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal A. Grechko, to the ruling Politburo.

#### THE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM

The Soviet Union's principal underdeveloped region and its principal development problem is, of course, Siberia, long-neglected and stigmatized as the prison for Russia's dissidents. I had an interesting discussion some years ago with a Deputy Mayor of Khabarovsk, the key Siberian city at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. We compared the settlement of our American "Wild West" with the settlement of the Russian "Wild East." The Mayor readily agreed our problem had been made easy by the possibility of enrichment by gold strikes, or the knowledge that at worst free land would be available for settlement and cultivation. In the Soviet Union he could offer no private gain other than higher pay. But higher income was a limited incentive, unless something worthwhile was available to spend it on. This meant that, in advance of migration and settlement, he had to try to provide better and more adequate housing than was available elsewhere, convenient transportation, educational facilities, good markets with equipment and food and such amenities of life as radio, TV, opera, ballet, theater and sports. With limited funds available, this was an almost

impossible task. Consequently, workers have tended to take the higher income for a few years, then return with their savings to a more comfortable life in European Russia and it has been difficult to maintain even the present thin population level.

The extensive timber resources of Siberia are readily apparent to any traveler who flies across this vast and virgin area. Soviet geologists have long claimed that the ground also holds rich reserves of oil and gas and metals. These resources are, of course, not obvious to the casual observer, and published Soviet estimates have varied from time to time over the years. What is observable is the remoteness of the claimed resource areas, the lack of economic infrastructure and population and the location of the major claimed reserves near the Arctic Circle, where permafrost conditions present great complications for exploration, engineering and construction of all kinds. These obstacles sufficed to cause the Soviet planners to leave the Siberian development more or less out of their calculations for the first four decades of Soviet rule, and the various Republic authorities of European Russia still argue that investments in their regions will produce the same results at a fraction of the investments required in Siberia.

However, Moscow's approach to Siberia has undergone a 180 degree turn since the emergence of the Sino-Soviet conflict toward the end of the 1950's, and particularly since Mao Tse-tung's public assertion, in March 1964, that Soviet territories "east of Lake Baikal" had been torn from China by Czarist conquest and confirmed by the type of "unequal," colonialist treaties which Lenin had denounced back in 1917. Mao referred specifically to the Amur River area, Sakhalin and Turkestan, as well as to the Soviet Far Eastern cities of Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, saying: "We have not yet presented our account for this list."

At the turn of the 1960's, a Siberian branch of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences was established in the central Siberian city of Novosibirsk, to be followed by the establishment of a Far Eastern branch in Vladivostok in 1970. In the last two five-year plans Siberia has been moved up on the priority list for investment funds. Development is already well underway in the Western Siberian oil fields, lying roughly between the Ob and Yenisei Rivers, and oil and gas pipelines are already delivering these products to Moscow and on into Eastern Europe. The second large claimed reserve, located in Yakutia in eastern Siberia astride the Lena River, seems still to be in the stage of exploration and testing. In recent years Moscow has been suggesting to Western countries and to Japan projects for the joint development of Siberian resources but the terms so far proposed have not proved attractive to outside entrepreneurs. Moscow's concept is that the outsider would provide most of the great quantities of capital, know-how and equipment needed—such as mining, oil-drilling and road-building machinery, pipelines and transport. These entrepreneurs would then take their payment in the form of a percentage of the production of the new installations, ownership and control remaining throughout in Soviet hands.

Some relatively small-scale transactions have been concluded. Western European countries have supplied pipe and related equipment for the West Siberian project and are receiving gas and oil in payment. In the Far East, Japan has participated in the exploitation of timber resources, taking lumber and wood products in return. Japan has also been considering joint projects for oil and gas development in Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East, but the magnitude of the capital investments required and the high price of the oil and gas Japan would receive seem so far to have precluded conclusion of any major agreement.

While Moscow's almost irrational preoccupation with China—the nightmarish vision of China's teeming millions just across the disputed borders of an underdeveloped and underpopulated Siberia—is certainly the main reason for Soviet eagerness to speed the development of the Eastern regions, it seems not to be the only one. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union carries on a large-scale and active civil defense program. One of the directives of the 24th Congress of the CPSU, in March-April 1971, called for "further improvements in the location of production forces," i.e., wider dispersal of industrial centers. Hailing this decision in a book published later that year, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko wrote that

"The movement of production forces to the East, bringing them closer to the sources of raw materials and fuel and their dispersed location by economic districts significantly raise the defense capability of the Soviet Homeland and make our industry less vulnerable in the event that the imperialists initiate a missile-nuclear war."

## SOVIET-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

For well over a century American know-how and American equipment have played a notable role in Russian development. In the 1840's, when the Czarist Government first became interested in building railways, it sent study missions abroad and ended up by employing Major George Washington Whistler, then Chief Engineer of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, as its principal adviser. Whistler stayed in Russia for seven years, planning and supervising the construction of the St. Petersburg (Leningrad)-Moscow line and the huge Alexandrovsky railroad foundries and ships, built by American engineers and staffed initially with American technicians. Later, Americans contributed technical advice and sold much machinery and equipment for the construction of the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways. To this day a Russian locomotive whistle has what is to me a very nostalgic tone, recalling my boyhood days in Ohio.

During the Russian development boom after 1890, American industrial and agricultural machinery was imported in large quantities. Russia became in fact our biggest customer for farm equipment and more than a third of American agricultural machinery used outside the United States was said to be found in that country. A Russo-American Black Sea Steamship Line was established to handle the mounting goods traffic. Such firms as the International Harvester and Singer Sewing Machine companies established branch offices in Russia.

There was, of course, a hiatus in the economic relationship during World War I, the Russian Revolution and the ensuing civil war. However, during its industrial build-up in the late 1920's and early 1930's the Soviet Union again leaned heavily on American technical advice and imported vast quantities of American equipment. The American engineer, Hugh L. Cooper, builder of Muscle Shoals, directed the construction of the Soviet Union's first large hydroelectric project, the Dnieprostroy dam. Ford, General Electric, du Pont, the McKee, General and Freyn Engineering companies and dozens of other well-known American firms played major roles in the building of automotive, machine tool, steel and aluminum plants. Thousands of American experts and skilled workers were engaged in these projects. Stalin himself later acknowledged the overwhelming American impact on Soviet industrialization. So great was the Soviet admiration for American know-how and technology that Moscow found the means to make cash payments, despite the fact that the trade was essentially a one-way street. Some private American credits were extended in connection with these deals, but no capital investment was involved. In 1930, trade between the two countries reached a level of \$138 million and the Soviet Union was taking 3% of United States exports. Strangely enough, although prospects of even more trade were held out as a reason for United States diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, the level actually dropped to the \$20 million range in the 1930's as the Soviet Union digested its previous imports and strove for self-sufficiency.

During World War II a great stream of American goods flowed to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease, to a total value of about \$11 billion. Most of this was, of course, for arms and supplies required in the war, but a residue, estimated at about \$2 billion in value, was considered to be useful in the Soviet Union's post-war civilian economy. Recurrent negotiations for a Lend-Lease settlement were unsuccessful, the break-off figures being a Soviet offer of \$300 million and an American demand for \$800 million. A reasonable compromise has finally been negotiated and included in the trade agreement package.

In the period of growing antagonism after World War II, trade fell to an insignificant level and has remained so ever since. The United States adopted severe export restrictions which denied to the Soviet Union not only strictly strategic items, but most of the advanced American equipment the Soviets were interested in; and particularly after the Korean War, discriminatory measures were imposed on imports from the Soviet Union and on access by Soviet ships to American ports. If the Congress approves the necessary provisions, the complex of economic agreements negotiated and signed in the latter part of 1972 would clear away most of the debris which has cluttered the path of commerce between the United States and the Soviet Union in the past quarter of a century.

## THE BENEFITS OF NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS

I believe it to be in the national interest of the United States that a basis for normal trade relations with the Soviet Union be restored. In addition to the

profits and related benefits to our own economy to be expected from increased exchanges of goods, expanded trade would open up another area of contacts between the two countries and thus help promote the opening up of that closed and controlled society. It would also pay some dividends in maintaining those feelings of respect for American ability and efficiency, and associated good will toward Americans in general, of which we who have lived in the Soviet Union became so conscious.

The reopening of trade channels is thus a benefit to us in itself, and I believe that we should not try to attach political conditions. Much as I sympathize with the feelings of the sponsors of the proposal now under consideration, I believe it would be a mistake to link the specific subject of emigration with the pending trade bill. I can think of many repressive practices I would like to see ended in the Soviet Union but I do not consider trade legislation an appropriate or effective tool to use for this purpose—indeed, I doubt that it would carry the weight of even the one linkage presently proposed.

Even if the existing arbitrary barriers to normal commerce are removed, it seems most unlikely to me that trade between the United States and the Soviet Union can ever reach the billions-of-dollars level some hopefully predict or constitute more than a fraction of our total foreign trade. There are some basic limiting factors, notably the lack of Soviet products of interest to American buyers and the nature of the Soviet trading system. Practically all Soviet trade is conducted through bilateral agreements and an effort is usually made on both sides to keep these bilateral accounts more or less in balance. Consequently, American exports to the Soviet Union can exceed the level of imports from that country only to the extent that Moscow is able and willing to pay in gold or to divert foreign exchange from its trade with other countries. Moreover, despite some lip-service to growing global interdependence, I believe the established Soviet basic policy of economic autarchy will not be significantly modified. Within the limits of its ability to pay, the Soviet Union may import plants and equipment to produce consumer goods, but it will certainly not become an important market for consumer goods manufactured in the West. I suspect that most of the American businessmen who have been rushing off to Moscow since last year will find little to justify the expense accounts they have run up, other than their personal education.

Assuming that American inventiveness and ingenuity, private and governmental research programs and the dynamics of the market economy system will keep us in the lead in science and technology—as they always have and must continue to do—I think we have had an exaggerated, sometimes even harmful, concern about the sale of modern industrial and electronic equipment to the Soviet Union. There must, of course, be a ban on the export of items of direct military application. But for most equipment of general industrial application, the American manufacturer is probably the best judge. In most cases, he knows that in dealing with the Soviet Government he is helping to create another producer, rather than establishing a continuing market. He also knows what he has in the works for his own production tomorrow. When I was in Moscow in the mid-1960's the Soviet authorities were deciding to introduce color television. With their penchant for things American, they were particularly interested in adopting our system. RCA was interested in selling them the know-how and equipment, but a few components were under export ban at the time. I argued the case vigorously with Washington, but by the time the question could be battled through our own zealous custodians of the lists, it was too late. The Soviet authorities had turned to the French and adopted their SECAM system, compatible with ours only by the use of supplemental equipment. The United States thus lost not only a major sale, but the possibility of gaining some influence on and some access to this important means of communication with the Soviet people.

The state of Soviet missile and space vehicle art makes it clear that the military sector of the Soviet economy has developed some advanced computers and the knowledge needed to use them. However, use of computers in the non-military economy lags far behind (an estimated 2-3000 in 1968, as against 50-70,000 in the United States) and only recently has the Soviet Union begun the production of so-called third generation models. The lag in the production of software and of technicians is still greater. A visiting American scientist once solemnly assured me that he had seen a Russian girl with an abacus checking the results on a computer in the Dubna Atomic Research Institute. During a return to Moscow a few years ago, I had a talk with the President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. At one point the discussion turned to computers and the importance of knowing how to use them. Vaguely remembering leafing through

our Bulletin. I told him that just at the University of Miami, we offered some 25 courses in computer programming and use. Obviously impressed, he repeated the words "25 courses" with some awe, paused, then quickly said, of course Soviet universities had such courses, too. On my return to Miami, I re-checked the University Bulletin and found that I had grossly understated; there were not 25, but 50 courses offered. All in all, I think we can be reasonably relaxed about Soviet rivalry in the computer field.

I can see no reason for or national interest in extended preferential terms to the Soviet Union beyond those granted to other trading partners. Insofar as credit and other facilities are made available, I believe we should, as a matter of deliberate policy, favor the consumer and agricultural sectors of the Soviet economy. I regard as a serious mistake, for example, the action of the Congress in 1967 and 1968 in banning any American participation in the construction of a passenger-automobile factory in the Soviet Union. Trade is not only profitable and beneficial to our own economy but it can be used purposefully in political terms—in the case of the Soviet Union, to raise the pressure of consumer demand for the allocation of limited resources to the civilian sector of the economy. This obliges the leadership to consider where the funds can be found, and there are only two significant sources—military and science programs. In the present case, just to produce 500 thousand automobiles, roughly a twentieth of our production, the Soviets are paying out \$800 million abroad. For every one of these dollars, it costs them several dollars (in rubles, of course) at home just to build a plant and the Soviet components. This causes diversion of both foreign-exchange and domestic-budget resources. This program also leads to a whole set of new problems: building roads, gas stations and motels and, finally, having to deal with air pollution—all of which will force even further diversion of funds and effort.

The failure of the Soviet system in the agricultural field—the inability of Soviet agriculture to provide an improved diet to the Soviet peoples, or even to consistently feed the population—is a spectacle of international import. This situation has at times been useful in relieving the excess stocks from our super-abundant production and the Soviet Union may provide a market for our feed grains for some time to come. In the longer term, however, the introduction of some stability and greater efficiency into Soviet agricultural production will be essential in a world of mounting populations and mounting hunger. In my view, the recent deal for American help in the development of improved fertilizer production in the Soviet Union points in a desirable direction and merits encouragement.

#### THE PROBLEM OF U.S. INVESTMENT IN SOVIET DEVELOPMENT

The development of normal economic relations with the Soviet Union seems to me, then, as very much in the interest of the United States. American investment in Soviet development of the magnitude Secretary Brezhnev has in mind when he speaks of "long-term and large scale deals" is an entirely different matter, involving many other considerations which must be carefully weighed. Aside from the investigations of this Committee, I understand that studies are being undertaken by the various governmental agencies concerned. Most of the problems raised are economic in nature and I have neither the knowledge nor access to sources of information which would enable me to provide solutions.

The principal "deals" presently under discussion, and for which two separate consortia of American enterprises have filed letters of intent with the Soviet authorities, involve the investment of American know-how and capital in the development of facilities for the production and export of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from both the Western and Eastern Siberian fields. Published estimates of the capital requirements of the two projects are vague, and sometimes contradictory, but generally indicate 5 to 10 billion dollars. The looming energy crisis is cited to justify the deals, but supplies of Soviet LNG would not be expected to become available until after 1980. Some obvious questions arise. On the economic side, these include, notably:

*Source of Investment Capital.* Clearly the American firms involved could not finance such large-scale projects from their own resources or raise credits of this magnitude from private banking institutions. Indeed, it would be interesting to know whether private capital would be risked in these ventures without Government guarantees. It seems likely that the answer would be negative and that

the funds required are expected to come from United States Government sources or to be insured by official guarantees.

*Alternative Use of Funds.*—It has been suggested that because of the huge investment required and the costs of transport involved, the price of the product would be much higher than present levels. The question is thus posed as to whether the same public funds invested in research and development would not contribute to more economic sources of energy, and to earlier availability of energy supplies.

*Extent of Soviet Reserves.*—There has been no independent exploration and testing of the claimed magnitude of Soviet oil and gas reserves. If past history of Soviet secrecy practices is any guide, it does not seem likely that a meaningful outside survey and verification would be authorized. Thus, the outside entrepreneurs and investors will probably have to rely primarily on Soviet estimates.

*Soviet Energy Requirements.*—Some experts have suggested that the Soviet Union, still developing and only beginning to enter the automobile age, will face its own energy crisis in about 7–8 years. Since this would roughly coincide with the beginning of operation of the projected facilities, it seems possible that a conflict could arise between Soviet domestic requirements and export commitments.

On the political side, there are also a number of problems. Political considerations have always taken precedence over economic factors in the determination of Soviet policies and action, in both domestic and international aspects. While we certainly hope that the present trend toward a more stable East-West relationship will continue, this cannot, of course, be guaranteed. It also seems probable that, within the time frame contemplated, there will be changes in the composition of the Soviet ruling elite, particularly since most of the present leaders are in their upper 60's. Moreover, Soviet media have been building up expectations of economic benefits from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. economic relationship well beyond foreseeable prospects, basing themselves to a large extent, it must be admitted, on highly optimistic statements by Americans. To a degree which seems unprecedented to anyone who follows the Soviet press, Secretary Brezhnev has been linked personally to these expectations; thus, failure of these expectations to be realized could well entail difficulties for him. In any event, in the absence of constitutional continuity in the Soviet system, changes in leadership can well mean changes in policies.

Against these possibly negative factors the existence of long-term, large-scale, mutually beneficial economic arrangements between the United States and the Soviet Union would undoubtedly be a factor encouraging restraint in Soviet conduct, thus promoting a stable relationship between the two countries and a more peaceful atmosphere in the world at large. If expert studies should determine that the economic benefits to the United States of such ventures in the Soviet Union would exceed those expected from available alternatives, then political considerations would not, in themselves, preclude an affirmative decision. On the other hand, political factors alone would not warrant the conclusion of these arrangements if the economic findings were negative.

In any case, I think it essential that we make a clear distinction in our own minds between the desirable restoration of normal economic relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union and the problematical question of large-scale, long-term American investment in the development of Soviet resources.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Grossman, please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF GREGORY GROSSMAN, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS,  
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY**

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

I am privileged to be here, as I am to be the consumer and beneficiary of the excellent compendia on the Soviet economy that your committee sponsors. I particularly would like to single out the latest one, "Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies," which I find to be as good as any before.

I have submitted my prepared statement for the record.

Senator PROXMIRE. Yes, it will be printed in full in the record at the end of your oral statement.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, Senator.

In my remarks this morning I may touch on quite a few points that the previous two witnesses have already touched on, but I will try not to overlap too much with their testimony, except perhaps to give somewhat different emphasis and a somewhat different point of view.

Needless to say, all of us are very pleased with the marked improvement in the relations between the United States and the two Communist states, the People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., in the last year or two. The broadening of economic relations with the Soviet Union and the beginning of economic relations with the People's Republic of China are healthy developments and should lead to better relations in the world at large.

But the important policy problem facing us is: How and how far should we as a country, and the U.S. Government as our government, let these developments proceed? What should be the particular channels into which these developments should be directed? And finally, what are the limits of prudence in developing normal relations with the two countries?

I will, however, restrict my remarks this morning to the Soviet Union. As we all know well, the Soviet authorities would like to bring about maximum economic ties between their country and the United States, and especially—as preceding speaker has just stressed—a massive inflow of capital for the development of Soviet resources, and together with the capital a large inflow of technology. The big question before us as a country is: Should we oblige, how far do we go along? It seems to me that this is one of the most difficult questions for us to analyze and on which to make up our minds.

In this connection it is important to bear in mind that there is, after all, a difference between private economic interests engaged in normal commercial and financial activities and acting in search of profits, and national economic and political interests.

Now, the Soviet interest in a large-scale development of economic relations with the United States is quite obvious. You have already heard from the other witnesses this morning, as well as from the speakers during the last 2 days, about the technological gap, the growing cost of developing resources, and the other important dynamic factors which have contributed to a slowing down of Soviet economic growth, and to an increase in its cost—in terms of investment and effort for every additional percentage point of growth. These points are, incidentally, treated fully in the compendium.

The point I should like to stress in this connection, however, is that parallel with this retardation of growth there is what might be called an escalation of claims on Soviet resources. This is to say, various political groups within the Soviet leadership seem to have been pressing harder and harder on the available resources in order to serve their interests, and to attain their own particular objectives.

As many observers have noted, the current 5-year plan is a very ambitious plan. One possible explanation for this is that the plan was the product of a political compromise. There may have been a deliberate attempt to anticipate a large pie 5 years from the time the plan was drawn up so that the segments of this pie going to the different political interests would also be large enough to prevent any serious difficulties within the leadership. To those of us watching the Soviet economy, the

5-year plan is so egregiously overblown that it is very difficult to come up with any other explanation, I must say.

Now, given the economic difficulties, and particularly the escalation of claims on Soviet resources, the policy of involving the West, and especially the United States, in Soviet economic development makes very good sense from the Soviet side.

This policy, which one might call staking on the West, is in effect an alternative to other possible courses of action, measures which would involve rather a more profound change within the Soviet system itself, both economic and political. Mr. Kohler has just spoken about the problem of economic reform. This is, of course, what I am alluding to. The staking on the West, as Mr. Kohler has also stressed, is in a sense an alternative to the more far-reaching reforms domestically, it is therefore a conservative policy, one of minimum regret, of minimum shaking up of the existing structure of power and privilege within the Soviet Union. Hence it is, from the point of view of the imperative necessity of maintaining a political balance within the Soviet leadership, a less objectionable policy than a far-reaching economic reform would be.

It is much less fraught with risks—social, political, and economic—than would be the kind of profound economic reform that might be necessary to give a new boost to Soviet economic efficiency.

Now, if we look at it this way, then we can, perhaps, provide a tentative answer to the first question that your committee has posed to its witnesses; namely, what might be the effect on the volume of military outlay in the wake of better Soviet-American economic relations?

Those who argue that the close relations between our two countries may lead to a greater sense of security on the part of the Soviets, and therefore to a willingness to reduce military outlays, are in a sense correct, but they are looking only at one side of the coin, as well as only at one part of the international picture.

Today, the Soviet confrontation with China is at least as important a determinant of the size of the Soviet military establishment as is the confrontation with the United States. The détente with the United States does not—to put it cautiously—do much to improve relations between the Soviet Union and China, and therefore to reduce the need for military strength. If, as I have just suggested, the policy of staking on the West economically rests on a balance of political forces within the Soviet leadership, this is another way of saying that a price must be paid to certain elements. And this price, of course, would be in some measure paid from the additional resources accruing to the Soviet economy by reason of close relations with the United States and the rest of the West. If this is so, then we need not expect a reduction in total Soviet military outlay, as a result of closer economic ties with the West.

The policy of staking on the West is a conservative alternative also in that it brings in its wake, as the previous speaker has correctly stressed, certain conservative and, I would say, even reactionary tendencies in the domestic political picture. We are even now witnessing growing repression of the various dissident groups that the more conservative elements in the Soviet leadership would like to suppress. Further development of economic relations with the West may well have the effect of strengthening this tendency. Moreover, should a considerable number of Westerners work in the Soviet Union, the response of the police may well be to crack down, to create a kind of curtain be-

tween the Westerners and the Soviet population, and thereby also, of course, to tighten things in general.

Now, as to the second question that your committee has posed—is the interest of the United States in the expansion of the economic relations with the Soviet Union as great as that of the Soviet Union—I should think that there can hardly be any doubt that it is not. It is difficult for me to imagine that our economic interests could possibly be commensurate with those of the Soviets in this matter. This is not to say, however, that the problem is not a very major problem, but I think it is primarily a major political problem, a major problem of international relations to which, with your permission, I would like to turn for just a moment.

Like the previous speakers, I am looking forward with satisfaction to the expansion of commercial relations between the United States and the Soviets. In this connection, if I may add parenthetically, I don't think that the MFN issue is of great importance, in the sense that it affects our trade with the Soviets only minimally. The additional total resources that the Soviets might get from MFN would be minute at best. So I don't think that issue is significant from the standpoint of the volume of trade between us and them.

Much more important is the other part of the Jackson amendment, to which I will turn presently.

Senator PROXMIRE. Once again, Mr. Grossman, I don't like to press you too much, but we would like to get into the questions as soon as possible.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I will conclude very quickly.

Let me just say in summary fashion that I don't think that from the standpoint of the American economy there is much of a bonanza to be expected from trade with the Soviet Union. This includes the effects on the balance of payments, since any large increase in our exports would have to be on credit.

What is, however, most important from our standpoint is that we must face a series of other decisions associated with trade and credit. First and foremost, should we come through with a massive flow of capital to the Soviet Union, this will be a significant boost to the Soviet economy, one that surely will be beneficial to it for decades to come. Is this what we want? There is a tendency today to look at the Soviet Union as a new-found friend. I think this is a little premature. Perhaps we should continue to see the Soviet Union as our rival, a rival with whom we hope to have much better relations.

Second, as I have already mentioned, the success of the Soviet policy of staking on the West reinforces the conservative trend within the Soviet system domestically. It may even reinforce the element of secrecy; excellent examples are the secrecy that the Soviets still keep at home over the amount of their purchase of grain in the West, or on the value of the lend lease settlement.

Now, in this connection I would say there is logic to the other half of the Jackson amendment, the one that speaks of credits and credit guarantees, and ties them with the opening of the Soviet borders. Certainly if we should send large amounts of our capital there, at the very least we would not want to send it to a country which is pursuing the kind of reactionary policies that the Soviet Union has been recently

practicing at home, and which obviously it can pursue only if its borders are tightly closed.

The big issue, in my opinion, is our commitment of large amounts of capital in the Soviet economy. Between countries, in our day and age, the debtor has the upper hand; this has to be borne in mind. What should concern us is that not only would we be giving a big boost to the Soviet economy but also that our investment may in future years limit our freedom of action in international relations. If we become the holders of a large Soviet debt, then we may well find it much more difficult to maneuver freely in the international arena. Where this is likely to be felt most of all is in our relations with China, for the Soviets may be tempted to use the leverage of their debt to us to limit the expansion of our relations with China.

There are, of course, other difficulties, but in order to save time I will pass over them.

In conclusion, I would like to return to the proposition that private gain is not necessarily congruent with the national interest. For this reason I would urge the U.S. Congress to take a hard look at the channels through which private economic relations with the Soviet Union will be unfolding: Whether our laws requiring disclosure of such relations are adequate, or whether we might not want to strengthen them, and whether we might not want to place certain limits on the flow of capital to the Soviet Union. The danger, as I tried to point out, is that in the future we may find our foreign policy unnecessarily complicated, and our good relations with the Soviet Union once again endangered, by the problems that our holding of a large Soviet debt is very likely to create.

Thank you.

Senator PROXMIRE. Thank you very much, Mr. Grossman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]

#### PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREGORY GROSSMAN

Your Committee is to be commended for sponsoring its latest study of the Soviet economy and for holding these hearings at such a crucial moment in international relations. The study, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies* (hereafter, SEPS), is a first-rate collection of papers on the present condition of the Soviet economy and on its prospects for the near future. The editor, Dr. John P. Hardt, his associates, and the authors of the individual papers have earned the gratitude and appreciation of all of us who are profoundly interested in the subject matter and take close to heart the improvement in relations between the United States and the USSR. It is to be hoped that SEPS will be noticed by policy makers in both Congress and the executive branch of the federal government, by the leaders of American public opinion, and—not least—by the rapidly growing number of American businessmen who are involving themselves in commercial and financial relations with the USSR. From being unduly bearish on trade with the Soviets, our business community has become remarkably bullish, thanks in part to superb salesmanship by the Soviet side. As someone has recently aptly put it: "the old nonsense is being replaced by the new nonsense".

For the American policy maker a correct understanding of the accomplishments and prospects, the strength and the weaknesses, the momentum and the limitations of the Soviet economy is today of crucial importance. The future of our world hangs on the evolution of the relations between us and the Soviets, and at the very heart of these are economic matters.

#### STATE OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

The impression that one receives from reading SEPS is that of a Soviet economy that has made great strides in recent years in many important respects, not the least of which is the very respectable rise in consumption levels since,

say, 1965. That the past year (1972) was a very bad one for the economy—and the effects will be felt for quite some time yet—does not vitiate the impression of progress. Nor is there any reason to believe that, despite the difficulties in which the Soviet economy currently finds itself, progress will not continue at some significant rate into the near future.

Some of these difficulties are not minor, however, as various papers in SEPS make clear. To mention only a few of the most important ones: There is now taking place a significant retardation in the growth of the labor force in the state sector (which includes nearly the whole nonagricultural part of the economy), which is primarily due to the exhaustion of employable reserves of manpower. At the moment, the demographic trend is actually favorable, but it will turn sharply unfavorable to the growth of the labor force at the end of the seventies (Cf. Feshbach and Rapawy in SEPS.) There is a general shortage of basic materials, and a serious energy crisis may be developing, which would certainly be a major retarding factor. (Cf. Campbell in SEPS). The experience of 1972 has demonstrated to the Soviet leaders that the agricultural base of the economy must be greatly strengthened to minimize the likelihood of similar, or even smaller, setbacks in the future. For these and other reasons, the current Five-Year Plan (the Ninth, 1971–75) is falling substantially behind schedule—as indeed many Western observers expected from the start, quite apart from the crop failure of last year. At the same time, the absorption of labor into industry is proceeding faster than anticipated, so that the industrial labor productivity, an important measure of the plan's success and a portent for the future, is not growing nearly as fast as projected.

These difficulties are reflected in the U.S.S.R.'s international accounts. The crop failure, as is by now well known, has occasioned the purchase of grain and other agricultural commodities in the West, for cash or on short-term credit to the sum of about \$2 billion for delivery during 1972–73. The purchases for delivery during the coming crop year, 1973–74 are expected to be a good deal smaller, but because of the intervening sharp rise in commodity prices, the hard-currency cost may not be very much less. One of the papers in SEPS mentions the estimates that by 1973 the Soviet long- and medium-term debt to the West may have surpassed \$3 billion (of which some 20 percent may be in self-liquidating contracts), and that debt service may approach one fourth of the value of Soviet exports to the West (Farrell, pp. 695–696). These are large commitments for the Soviet balance of payments. The availability of spendable hard currency may also soon become (if it is not that already) a major constraint on Soviet economic growth. On the plus side one should mention the very high price of gold in world markets, where the U.S.S.R. is a large seller, and the less spectacular but still large increases in the world-market prices of a number of the basic commodities that the U.S.S.R. exports.

Still another serious problem facing the regime in the laxness of discipline throughout the economy. An economic system like the Soviet requires a high order of obedience to directives and regulations, but at the same time presents limitless opportunities for private gain in breaking the law. There has always been much corruption, graft, and grey and black marketeering in the system, so that the vivid account presented by Dr. Katz in SEPS may or may not represent a significant heightening of the problem. But a problem to the authorities it must be, even if much of the illicit activity has its constructive side. At the same time, the black market and the graft represent a vested interest in the existing institutions, which is not to be ignored.

#### CLAIMS ON RESOURCES

These difficulties do not in themselves generate the escalation of claims on resources of the Soviet economy that has been apparently taking place in recent years, but they must aggravate them. To be sure, there is nothing new in the heavy demand that is placed on resources by Soviet leaders; though the problem does seem to have assumed some new dimensions lately. First, the political leadership evidently estimates the political cost of any significant decline in per capita consumption—or possibly even of a significant retardation in the growth of per capita consumption—to be unacceptable. Proof of this is the above-mentioned large outlay in hard currency for the purchase of agricultural commodities (a large portion of which is livestock feed), substantial additional expenditures of hard currency, as well as Comecon rubles, for a wide variety of other consumer goods, and, further, large outlay (or borrowing) of hard currency for the purpose of importing capital equipment for consumer goods production. Next,

the defense effort has apparently been increasing faster than GNP since the mid-sixties (papers by Cohn and Block in SEPS). Continuing pressure, in this direction within the Soviet leadership seems quite likely, what with the persistent conflict with Communist China, the bargaining over arms limitation with the West, and—if circumstantial evidence be permitted—the recent accession of Marshal Grechko to the Politburo. (He is the first military figure to be in the Politburo in fifteen years. It might be assumed that his purpose is not to preside over the dismantling of the Soviet defense establishment.)

Last and not least, there is a steeply increasing demand for resources for capital formation. In the past, though the fifties and most of the sixties, the Soviet capital stock grew at the remarkably high rate of about 9 percent per annum (by Western computation), which of course is now one of the explanations for the rapid growth of over-all production at the time. But given the retardation in the increase in non-agricultural labor, as well as some of the other difficulties mentioned, and barring a sudden (and unlikely) rise in the efficiency with which the economy functions, even maintenance of the same rate of increase of the capital stock will cause a significant decline in GNP growth. Yet, the rate of growth of the capital stock has already probably declined, and cannot be brought back up without a very large increase in the allocation of resources to investment and away from consumption and defense. In sum, keeping gross investment even at the present high ratio of about one third of GNP is not likely to prevent a considerable drop in the rate of growth of the capital stock, which in turn will most probably lead to a fairly substantial drop in the rate of growth of GNP. Thus, the rate of increase in total resources available to the competing claimants may decline markedly, while the intensity of the claims, as we have noted, need not abate. (This argument rests on interesting, even if only illustrative, calculations by Professor Abram Bergson, as published in *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1973.)

Much of the investment in question would go into strengthening agriculture and ancillary activities, and into building up the energy base and the closely related transportation and other infrastructure facilities. In part the benefit would accrue to the balance of payments, thanks to expansion of capacity for both exports and import substitution.

#### ALTERNATIVE POLICIES

As has been suggested, a critical factor is the efficiency with which the economy operates. One way to raise the efficiency of the Soviet economy is to change some of its institutions, so that it will function in a much less centralized and cumbersome way, with greater responsiveness to demand and technical progress, greater effectiveness in foreign markets, more initiative and flexibility in general. This is what is meant by an economic reform in the East European context. The USSR launched one in 1965, but it was only a partial one and has had little effect on efficiency. The current prescription is computerization and mathematical planning; but the hopes pinned on it are probably excessive, as Professor Schroeder persuasively argues in her fine article in SEPS.

There is no assurance, of course, that a far-reaching reform of the kind just mentioned would in fact appreciably raise efficiency. The leaders may well be right on purely economic grounds in not opting for one. But it must be also noted that far-reaching economic reform would, sooner or later, shake up many powerful and privileged elements of Soviet society. In other words, rejection of such a reform is essentially a conservative position—in the sense of preserving the existing structure of power and privilege in government and the party, among management groups, and probably also within the working class.

Be that as it may, having rejected a far-reaching reform with all its economic and political uncertainty, the Soviet leadership has opted for the only other major course that bore some promise of countering the unfavorable trends in the economy: massive help from the West. This policy is especially attractive in that it could at once bear both economic and diplomatic benefits. Economically, it would pour large amounts of capital into the Soviet Union precisely at the time when it is greatly needed. Moreover, the borrowing would be largely self-liquidating, in that much of the repayment would be in the very commodities that the Western-financed and established projects would generate (“product pay-back”). At the same time, the capital projects would bring a large flow of up-to-date technology into the Soviet economy, thereby narrowing the technological gap with the West and bringing many additional benefits. They would build up whole industries and vast regions. Lastly, they would build up export

capacity for the long future, thus helping solve the chronic shortage of hard currency. There is no denying that this is a promising way out of the straits in which the Soviet economy is now (or is about to enter), provided of course the Western side cooperates. However, a really massive resort to Western assistance is unthinkable without a major involvement of the United States.

#### POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

A major advantage of this strategy of staking economically on the West is that it is not incompatible with a conservative policy domestically, contrary to what one might surmise at first glance. It does not, at least in the foreseeable future, require a drastic restructuring of domestic economic institutions, though it may require some adjustments, and it does not harbor the uncertainties and risks associated with a far-reaching economic reform. It does of course imply increased contact between Soviet citizens and Westerners which may have important effects on the population in the long run. But in the short run the risk to domestic political control is minimal, for only a relatively small and select group of Soviet citizens would be involved, and the usual police methods can be used to insulate the bulk of the population from contact with the West. At the same time, the very promise of additional resources and a higher growth rate can be employed to placate the more sceptical elements in the regime, not to mention political concessions, such as the tightening control over dissidence that we have witnessed in recent years. Perhaps also indicative of this kind of compromise is the accession to the Politburo of Mr. Andropov, the head of the secret police, in addition to Marshal Grechko, in the spring of 1973.

There is nothing new in this. A more liberal policy towards the West has often been combined with a more reactionary policy at home, contrary to what a Westerner might expect. The opening to the West at once creates the need for greater security at home, and enables the regime to pursue it with less unfavorable reaction abroad. Political compromise within the leadership has the same effect.

The potential political benefits on the international plane are also important. Being deeply involved in the Soviet economy, the Western powers, and especially the U.S. and Japan, would become the USSR's political allies against China, which would now be isolated. So would be Eastern Europe in some measure, and in any case the economic bargaining power of the more developed East European countries vis-a-vis the USSR would be weakened now that more equipment and industrial products would become available from the West.

#### EFFECTS ON SOVIET DEFENSE OUTLAY

Allow me to turn now to the two specific questions that the Committee has posed to me in its letter of invitation. Has the recent improvement in Soviet-American relations . . . enhanced the prospect that fewer resources will be directed to Soviet military programs? May I somewhat rephrase the question as follows: Will the large-scale economic relations between us and the Soviets that they would like to promote in the wake of the recent improvement in Soviet-American relations . . . etc.? To my mind, the answer to this question is not easily found. Insofar as the better relations with this country allow the Soviet Union to feel more at ease in the world, especially if that indeed has the effect of isolating China, the ultimate outcome may well be that it will allot fewer resources to military programs. But other considerations must be weighed as well. Should the USSR be eminently successful in obtaining large-scale assistance from the West for its own purposes, it will have more resources over-all. And then internal political considerations may dictate that a part of the increment be devoted to military use. In any case, the chief trade-off in the Soviet economy is between investment goods and defense goods (as Professor Cohn argues in SEPS), so that an inflow of investment goods from the West would, in the short or medium term enable a redirection of Soviet resources more easily to defense than to consumption.

#### QUESTIONS FOR THE U.S.

Your second question is: Are the new commercial relations between our two countries likely to be as beneficial to the United States as to the Soviet Union? Setting aside for the moment the large projects of development of Siberian energy resources with American capital the answer cannot be anything

but "hardly." Surely some benefit is to be derived from such commercial relations, as from any trade, but neither the size nor the composition of the trade would seem to be of extraordinary significance for us. Our exports to the USSR are not likely to be more than a few percent of our total exports, and even so only with the inclusion of grain and other agricultural commodities and with the aid of credits to finance the sale of equipment. In a world short of food and at a time of sharply rising food prices at home, the Soviet market for our agricultural exports could hardly be described as vital to our economic health.

As for the sale of equipment to the USSR on credit, there are some questions to be asked. Given the high level of Soviet indebtedness in hard currency, how much further will the USSR be willing to go into debt? In other words, how lasting will this market be? And how will the USSR repay all it owes? For instance, should the free gold market break, the Soviet balance of payments with the West will be severely affected. Further, at a time of inflationary pressure is a substantial outflow of capital desirable? (It goes without saying, of course, that to the extent sales to the USSR are financed by our credit, they do not do our balance of payments any immediate good.) And in any case, is the Soviet Union, a relatively rich country that invests (in real terms) about as much as we do per year, the most deserving recipient of capital in a capital-poor world? Should we lend to the Soviet Union at the low interest rate of six percent when our own homeowners and businessmen have to pay much more, and when in the Soviet economy, by existing directive, incremental applications of capital must earn at least 12 percent?

For the near future it is almost certain that—quite apart from any sales on credit—we will be exporting a good deal more to the Soviets than we will be importing from them. This has been the traditional pattern of American-Soviet trade, and for good reasons it is also the most likely now. Any bilateral balancing of this trade is most unrealistic, although the Soviets keep bringing it up as a kind of sales pitch for their goods. In sum, our volume of purchases from the Soviets will not be the main determinant of our sales to them for some time, nor are these purchases likely to be of major significance to the American economy (still leaving aside large imports of natural gas and oil).

Will much larger trade with the USSR improve our over-all relations with that country, or the opposite? It is obvious that peace promotes trade, but the converse—that trade promotes peace—is far from certain. Trade generates friction and conflict; witness our difficulties with our two good friends, Canada and Japan. History provides little reassurance that trade ensures peace, and Russia's own history least of all. Germany was her largest trading partner just before each of the two World Wars, while China was her largest trading partner (and Russia China's) before the break between Moscow and Peking around 1960.

Even more bothersome is the question whether capital flow promotes peace between countries. Again, the record of modern history is hardly reassuring. How can we know that massive amounts of American capital will in fact serve to improve our relations with the Soviets? Here, in my opinion, we ought to proceed with the utmost care. We must not assume that the private interest of our corporations and banks, however alluring the prospects of profit for them may be, is equivalent to national interest. A large and lasting creditor position vis-à-vis the Soviets may become a considerable problem to us. The danger is not so much that they will repudiate the debt—though even this is not out of the question—for repudiation is a tactic of the weak, not of the strong. The danger rather is twofold: by its very existence the debt will create an interest group, which the Soviets at some point may be tempted to manipulate to their own advantage. This would involve them in our political process to a much greater extent than they already are involved, with consequences that might be rather unfortunate for international peace. It would be much wiser to keep this temptation from them. Secondly, the same circumstances may well limit our freedom of action in international relations, for example, in trying to improve our relations with China. In other words, by taking on the role of the Soviet Union's banker we may be reducing our options in the world. It must be remembered that in the era of superpowers it is the debtor country that has the upper hand; witness the vexed and still uncertain closing of the Soviet debt on Lend-Lease account.

Do we want to become dependent on the USSR for a substantial part of our energy supply and other essential goods? Again, it is probably the better part of wisdom to avoid doing so. Even if the Soviets never "turn off the tap," a sensitive bond of this kind is as likely to lead to friction and the bad feelings

as it is to good fellowship. The cause of peace is safeguarded better by not putting good relations to undue tests under sensitive conditions, than through an all-out "mutual involvement." It seems to me that those who advocate the latter are stronger in hopeful sentiment than in political realism.

Political realism would dictate that the capital that we might sink in Siberia to develop another country's resources for her be invested into the development of our own energy resources. Whether or not we come out ahead economically this way, I do not know (though informed opinion does not expect Siberian gas and oil to be cheap), but I would regard it as secondary, for we would come out ahead in preserving good relations with the Soviet Union and peace in the world.

In conclusion, it seems to me that the Congress might do well to consider what are the prudent limits to our economic involvement with the Soviets. Just because they want to involve us deeply does not mean that we must go along. Just because our private firms and banks expect large profits does not mean that the national interest stands to gain commensurately. At the very least, the question of disclosure of economic relations between Soviet representatives and our private corporations should be carefully considered. Beyond this, the Congress may well look into legislative means of ensuring that the freedom of action of the United States in world affairs is not seriously impaired by our own commercial and financial successes.

Senator PROXMIRE. I thank all of you gentlemen for your most enlightening comments.

I would like to start off with Mr. Lazarus.

It appears that in the grain sales and the financing of industrial projects you have given the Soviet Union preferential treatment in price and interest rates and disclosure requirements, and so forth. Is this U.S. policy, and should it be U.S. policy, and should it apply to future grain sales or gas development, or should we prefer the developing countries our domestic markets, or Japan?

Let's start off with, is this U.S. policy?

Mr. LAZARUS. It is not U.S. policy to give the Soviet Union—

Senator PROXMIRE. Maybe I should start a little earlier, because I have assumed that my assertion is true, and you may strongly disagree with it. Did we or did we not provide preferential treatment to the Soviet Union in financing the grain sales and also in industrial sales?

Mr. LAZARUS. Well, I have to divide my answer in two parts, because I am somewhat more familiar with the industrial sales than I am with the grain—I assume you are referring to the Soviet grain sale of 1972.

Senator PROXMIRE. That is right.

Mr. LAZARUS. The bulk of the transactions concerning wheat took place before my initial involvement in this. But I do have some understanding of those transactions. And it is my understanding that they were not conducted on a preferential basis, but that the grains agreement comprehended regular CCC credits at regular rates.

Now, I have read the recently published GAO report, which asserts that the subsidizing of the sales took place longer and, in retrospect, at higher values than it should have. But when that transaction was consummated, it was consummated on what was then understood to be the same rates as any other transaction.

Senator PROXMIRE. So that any preferential treatment that the Soviet Union got on the grain deal other than credit or in price was an inadvertent mistake, and it wasn't a deliberately calculated plan?

Mr. LAZARUS. That is my understanding.

With regard to Export-Import Bank credit in support of industrial sales to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, the Ex-Im transactions are governed by almost precisely the same rates as govern

the transactions with other countries. Basically, they have been on the regular 10-45-45 break, which is 10 percent payment by the buyer, 45 percent loan, and 45 percent guarantee if it is taken up.

Senator PROXMIRE. Of course, I have been complaining about that for years. The Export-Import Bank does maintain a preferential policy in terms of our trade as compared with our domestic operations. The rates are below market.

Mr. LAZARUS. I think that one of the basic purposes of the Export-Import Bank is to motivate and animate and facilitate exports in the face of a declining export expansion program, and that it is necessary in order to assist the payments.

Senator PROXMIRE. Well, then the question of flexibility comes up. And that certainly could be argued previous to the two devaluations, with a raging inflation in this country, with our exports aggravating that inflation. I wonder about the wisdom of providing just general across-the-board subsidies to exports in this way.

Mr. LAZARUS. Well, you offer a number of points to take issue with in that assertion. First coming back to the original question, the industrial terms given to the Soviet Union are generally the same as those given to other recipients of Export-Import Bank credit.

With regard to export sales—and I understand you have in mind the agricultural sales basically—there is some question among the people with whom I have discussed this matter as to whether or not that market is that inelastic. In other words, even though the price of domestic agricultural products has gone up substantially, we still remain the only major reserve source of agricultural products. And consequently, an increase in foreign demand corresponds in the same ratio to domestic demand.

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me just interrupt to say, as I understand your response. It is that this government has been, and the policy is expected to continue perhaps, that we have no discrimination whatsoever with respect to foreign nations, that we should treat Russia as we treat our allies or developing countries or Japan or any other country, no difference?

Mr. LAZARUS. No, that is an overstatement of the policy.

Senator PROXMIRE. In what respect?

Mr. LAZARUS. Because contained in the Trade Reform Act of 1973 there is a special provision for concessions to developing nations, and that is a common characteristic of trade policy in highly industrialized countries. This is title VI of the Trade Reform Act.

But with regard to other industrial nations, I would say that our policy toward the Soviet Union is generally the same as our policy toward our other industrial trading partners, even to the extent of our solicitation of the authority to convey most favored nation treatment—the term MFN tends to be a code name and somewhat of a misnomer, because what it really means is nondiscriminatory treatment.

Senator PROXMIRE. It is a bad semantic contrivance, and it misleads many of us.

Mr. LAZARUS. But vis-a-vis the many industrialized countries of the West, our policy generally is, as best we can, to treat each objectively.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Kohler.

Mr. KOHLER. Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, I see no reason in our national interest, why we should give preferential or concessional

terms to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, I see no reason to continue the discrimination that we have imposed on them, other than a restricted list of purely military goods, or goods of military implication.

Senator PROXMIRE. In that light, let me just ask you before I get to Mr. Grossman—and he may want to rebut your response—do you agree with him that whether we provide most favored nation treatment to the Soviet Union has only marginal or slight affect, as I understand him to say, on our trade; it won't be significant; or do you think that there are elements that may not be technical and economic that may be symbolic and political that would quite seriously affect our trade?

Mr. KOHLER. In stating the question you have stated the answer. I cannot quarrel with Professor Grossman on the economic aspects of it. I think it is of great political importance, though, in bringing about an end of what is on its face a highly discriminating policy.

Senator PROXMIRE. If it is not of economic importance in that way, how would it manifest itself? They simply refused to sell us natural gas, for example, or refused to enter into helpful trade with us.

Mr. KOHLER. To start with, they wouldn't pay the lend-lease settlement; they linked that directly with this. They are capable, as we saw in the case of the manganese and the case of the Marshall Plan, of making political decisions even though it is economically harmful to themselves. I can't quite say what the results would be, but perhaps the whole trade deal would go down the drain, and that would be that, and they would turn rather to Western Europe and to Japan. As to the grain deal as such, I certainly am in no position to say. I would say, though, on behalf of the Kremlin, that I can't fault them for taking advantage of what has been our existing arrangement for a good many years. We may have made a mistake in this, but they came to the market and took advantage of subsidies that we have been providing for more years than I can remember.

Senator PROXMIRE. At any rate, you would argue that our policy is and should be one of equal and normal treatment of the Soviet Union with respect to our Government policies.

How about commercial policies? Should the Congress and the Government try to influence those?

We had Mr. David Rockefeller of the Chase-Manhattan Bank appear as one of our witnesses. And he admitted that a Kama truck plant was being financed on a long term basis at a 7-percent rate, which seems to be an extraordinarily good preference rate. Certainly anybody in this country would love to be getting a 7-percent loan from the Chase-Manhattan Bank on a long term basis to build a truck plant or anything else.

Mr. KOHLER. Well, I would suspect that this will catch up with bankers who are willing to make loans without Government guarantees before very long. They will find concessional rates don't lead to more business.

Senator PROXMIRE. You feel that Government policies are unnecessary to correct that?

Mr. KOHLER. I think this would correct itself.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Grossman.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Is there any particular part of your series of questions that you would like me to start with?

Senator PROXMIRE. I take it you might want to respond to Mr. Kohler's view that he disagrees with you when you argue that most favored nation treatment, whether we grant it or not, to the Soviet Union, wouldn't have a significant effect. He feels that the political effects might prejudice this quite severely. You seem to disagree. Do you still disagree?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I will put it slightly differently. I think you have pointed correctly to the fact that this was an economic argument, not a political argument. I don't claim to be a specialist on political matters. If I may be permitted a guess, my guess would be that a denial of MFN—speaking of MFN alone—to the Soviets will be only a small ripple in the development of our relations with them. I think they are much too realistic to junk a policy which to them has enormous importance.

Senator PROXMIRE. You have the precedent of lend-lease, which was a time, as Mr. Kohler pointed out so eloquently in his statement, a time when they desperately needed assistance, far more than they need it now. They had 20 million Russians dead and their economy was devastated, about the way that the rest of Europe was, and we offered this enormous lend-lease and they said no for political reasons. Wouldn't they do this again?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I wouldn't want to enter into a debate with Mr. Kohler.

Senator PROXMIRE. I am trying to get you into one.

Mr. GROSSMAN. I see you are, and with all deference to him, I would say that I would not agree with the analogy. I think that the passage of 25 years has completely changed the situation. After all, at that time Stalin was not after the kind of massive help from the West to which the present Soviet leadership has already full committed itself, committed itself both in the international arena and, what is equally important, within the halls of the Kremlin. Stalin, at that time, had a completely different policy, and it was perfectly consistent for him to reject our help. Whether it was wise or not is something else.

I cannot imagine the present leadership of the Soviet Union, having staked as much as it has on economic benefits from the West, junking the whole policy because of the denial of the MFN, which to them is worth pennies in terms of what they are after. So it is very difficult to expect that they will do it.

Now, it is true that a rebuff of this kind from our side would certainly be used by Mr. Brezhnev's opponents within the Kremlin to their own ends. But how this would come out I would not care to predict.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Kohler, I take it, on the basis of your experience in the Soviet Union, you think it would come out on the basis of the political considerations prevailing, is that right?

Mr. KOHLER. Yes. Actually, I see no reason from my point of view to deny them MFN treatment. I would say also that it is hard to isolate the MFN question as such. If the Congress should deny MFN to the Soviet Union, this would be interpreted—since a lot of public funds would go into any really big deals of the kind they are interested in—as a sign that there wouldn't be any big deals anyway.

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me ask you this: We had the announcement of phase IV yesterday by the President, and, among other things, it was a very complex and far reaching economic announcement. One of the

proposals that he made, one of the announcements that was made or was indicated by Mr. Shultz, was that our export licensing of soybeans and many other commodities, and the reduction of our exports, would continue for the rest of this year, in all likelihood, and very possibly, if necessary, would continue after that. What does this do with respect to our relationship with the Soviet Union in recognizing their great dependency right now on feed grains and their determination to secure feed grains?

Mr. KOHLER. Well, this opens up a somewhat broad question—the failure of the Soviet Union really—the Ukraine was once regarded as the breadbasket of Europe, as you know from history—to be able to improve the diet of its own people, which some of your studies indicate is a very poor diet indeed, or even to feed its own people. This is a really shameful spectacle. And I think that the world itself has an interest in this problem and that the Soviet Union should not be a drain on our superabundant supplies in the long term in a world of growing population and growing hunger. So I think they should improve their agricultural performance. What this would mean in the immediate future; much depends, of course, on their performance. They are a spasmodic buyer of American agricultural feed grains, at best, and have always been. It is when they have a disaster that they turn here, so that it is not a very dependable market.

Now, for some years to come, until they might finally get around to reforming their agriculture to produce their own feed grains, they would presumably be a market, because the Brezhnev-Kosygin government is trying to improve the supply of animal protein. They might be, if they got the money to pay for it, a market for some years to come for feed grains, whatever their domestic agricultural production might be. But in the long term they would try to produce these for themselves.

So a ban at this point might just mean that they would have to reduce their targets and slaughter a few more cattle and not feed as many over the winter, a few things like that.

Senator PROXMIRE. I take it you feel, on the basis of your colloquy with Mr. Grossman and your previous statement, that it would depend on whether our export licensing was evenhanded? In other words, we reduced the export by the same amount as the European countries and it would not be so bad.

Mr. KOHLER. They would complain about the discrimination, but otherwise they would have no complaint and they could well understand that we were looking after our own interests.

Senator PROXMIRE. There are few people in this country who can speak with greater authority about the Soviet Union in view of your two substantial tours there in the forties and the sixties.

First, as I understand it, as political officer, and then as the Ambassador and, of course, you have devoted much of your life since then to studying and reporting on the Soviet Union. And you confirmed something that many of us feared. In your prepared statement you go to say: "As a matter of historic inevitability that the Communist system is destined to rule the world." Also it teaches that: "It is the Communist duty to give this historic process a shove on every opportune occasion." Meaning if their economy grows and prospers and thrives, and we help it to do so, they are going to use this

power to the extent that it enables them to do so to rule the world, and then in your prepared statement you indicate that here is something else that I find rather chilling. You say: "The more the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology declines"—and let's put this in the context of the argument we got from Mr. Rockefeller and other witnesses yesterday that one of the greatest things that our trade will do and our association with the Kremlin will do will be to change their views, and the Marxist-Leninist ideology will tend to decline—but you say the more it declines "the more frantically the Kremlin leadership feels impelled to proclaim the ideology's validity and force its acceptance." Well, that makes it sound to me as if any success we might achieve in challenging Marxist-Leninist dogma is really counterproductive. It is very hard for us to achieve a friendly and constructive and peaceful policy on the part of the Soviet leadership by anything we do. To the extent that we succeed with the Soviet people in any way, the Soviet leadership is going to fight as hard as they can against it. Do I misunderstand you?

Mr. KOHLER. Well, there is an apparent paradox or contradiction here, Senator, that all of us who have worked in the Soviet field have in mind. I hope I was careful to say that the Soviet leadership, the Communist leadership, proclaims the validity and tries to track down dissidents and unbelievers and whatever others. And this will be true. But by the same token, there is an evolutionary process of very long term that does go on. And that is why in another part of my prepared statement I was very careful to say that we can welcome the agreements that open up the society, that bring more contact with Americans, and so forth. I think it is true, as Professor Grossman said, that the immediate result may be that they crack down even a little more, but I think it is important, in understanding Russian history, to realize that this is a long term process we are talking about.

I sometimes say—I sometimes make a cryptic remark to the effect that we are about at 1850, and I will try to explain this very briefly. There was an evolutionary process that took place in Russia in the last century that dated roughly from the Napoleonic invasions until the February Revolution in 1917, not the Bolshevik takeover in October 1917, but the revolution of democratic forces who had a constituent assembly, and so forth. I think in a sense Stalin in particular set the clock back well over a century, and that's what we see today.

Senator PROXMIRE. The clock that was ticking toward a democratic evolution?

Mr. KOHLER. Toward a more democratic system, toward a freer society with more elements of public consent, and of public choice in it. This clock was set back over a century. And I think it is ticking away again. Roughly this is how I reconcile what seem like immediate contradictions with long-term prospects.

Senator PROXMIRE. But the people who are in a position to turn the hands of that clock back can still do it—and to the extent that we try to adopt policies to change their people's attitudes they are going to do it, that seems to be what you are saying.

Mr. KOHLER. There is some truth in this. On the other hand, having lived there in Stalin's day, and the Khrushchev-Brezhnev day, I can say that there is a great difference. The thick atmosphere of fear has gone, and the dissidents have published a great many things before

the police could stop them, and indeed they still are. You hear Sakharov and others who manage to get their word out. It is a long-range process. That is why I get perturbed about either the impatience on our side for an immediate change, or those who think there is no hope at all.

Senator PROXMIRE. There is one other question I want to ask you about your prepared statement before I get to other witnesses, too.

You also make a very strong case, and it is most interesting and helpful, because you aren't basically an economist, as I understand it.

Mr. KOHLER. That's right.

Senator PROXMIRE. You are somebody who has had great experiences in the political field, and I presume a historian, too. But you recognize the economic contradiction is in the Soviet operations, and the weaknesses and feebleness of much of their operations. And I take it that you would agree with Professor Bergson and respect his judgment, and the statistics would show that their argument is very weak.

We had some fascinating statistics. I hadn't heard before about the fact that their investment in agriculture is three to four times in absolute amount greater than ours; that their manpower in agriculture is six times as much, I knew that; and their output is 20 percent less. If they are such dwarf pygmies in agriculture, and if their production in industry is about 44 percent of ours, why should we assume if they are pygmies in these other respects that they are 10-foot tall in the military area?

When it comes to military power, if the quality of their industrial and agricultural production is so weak, why should we make the assumption always that they have this terrific military power, which assumption, incidentally, serves the interest of the Pentagon very nicely, and the industrial-military complex in this country well, but it just doesn't seem very convincing that the economy can be so inept and incompetent and unable to do a job in some respects, but terrific in these other areas, when it is a closed society, and what we can really tell about their military power is very largely guessing.

Mr. KOHLER. Well, in addition, you guess a great deal about the Soviet Union, this is true in all fields.

To reply to your question—and at the same time I will admit that those with special interests may be exaggerating it at times—but you have to understand the nature of society—I tried to deal with that, and in recent—

Senator PROXMIRE. Yes, as you used other terms—you said that "it is more lean and muscular than ours," the Soviet economy. In some respects, it is a lot fatter than ours. Their agriculture is a supreme example of that. If there is any way to define something as fat, it is something with terrific input and no output. And that is what they have got in agriculture.

Mr. KOHLER. Americans find it hard to believe the compartmentalized situation of the military and industrial complex from the rest of the economic society. It is fantastic that to this day, despite their increasing worry in the last 10 or 15 years about their lag in science and applied technology in their general industry, that they have been unable to bring themselves to break down the one guarded special sector into which they put all their best talent, all their best resources, all their best machines. You know this is fantastic, when you get right

down to it, that they are turning to the West for all the science which—I think you can judge by the results—we see in their military space program—

Senator PROXMIRE. There was a time when military strength depended upon the character and bravery and the capacity right on the field of military men. To some extent, that is still true. But to an increasing extent, it depends on the economic capability that lies behind it, and the capacity to produce submarines that are quiet and efficient, to produce missiles that are accurate, and that are reliable. This is an industrial, economic, and engineering capacity which, it seems to me if they've got it, I just cannot understand why they can't do a lot better than they are doing in an industrial way. And from what we do know about the military, they do have greater megatons than we, but in terms of the real payoff, their accuracy and reliability and so on, everybody tells us that it is far less, and therefore their military capability may have been badly exaggerated.

Mr. KOHLER. Well, I would certainly hope that our science and technology in the military field is as great as theirs.

Senator PROXMIRE. The military—which I suppose is understandable—always assumes that the enemy does the best you can envision, and then you have to build on that basis. And when you do attack, you can pour a tremendous amount of your own resources unnecessarily into the military.

Mr. KOHLER. I think you have to realize that this is another country. The way they separate their military and general industrial complex—it really is fantastic they have not broken it down. In my prepared statement, as you will notice, I said that they have shown a certain realization of this. Even Secretary Brezhnev himself made a statement that they ought to have some way to get this know-how and efficiency in science and technology in the military sector into other parts of the economy. He made this statement a few years ago. All that happened was that the party in government told the military and space industry that if they had excess capacity, they should use it to produce consumer hardware, washing machines, percolators, and so forth. But they have not included that sector of their industrial system in the whole management of science and technology.

Senator PROXMIRE. Everything we do to enable them to improve their management and technology, enables them to improve their agriculture and industry and would seem, according to the thesis that you have developed, very persuasively, to be directed in every way it can be toward giving them greater military power, so that they can match us and surpass us, and give the world revolution a shove.

Mr. KOHLER. Well, there could be some spinoff in the military field. But remember again—

Senator PROXMIRE. More than spinoff, the computers, if we give them computers and give them a high capability in the computer area, that would be enormously helpful in the missile field, would it not?

Mr. KOHLER. Some expert has got to tell me where the cutoff point is, I don't know, Senator. I would suspect that we are some generations ahead of where they are. And I think their lag in computers in their general industry, which does not seem to benefit from what must be better computers in their military sector, is so enormous that within reason, and within the determination of people more expert than

me, we shouldn't worry too much about—you know, the ordinary kind of computerization that has taken place in American economy in general. I see no harm in this. And I suppose the people who manufacture the things are the best judges as to how far they are ahead and how they intend to keep ahead.

Senator PROXMIRE. I'm not so sure.

Mr. KOHLER. I hope so. If not, I am lost.

Senator PROXMIRE. If they want to sell something, they will tell you almost anything.

Let me ask Mr. Lazarus. Mr. Lazarus, just 4 days ago, I understand, Mr. Dobrynin is quoted in the Washington paper as saying that the Soviet Union would become the No. 1 trading partner of the United States. That really surprises me a great deal, in view of everything else I have heard. Is this credible?

Mr. LAZARUS. Yes.

Senator PROXMIRE. Could we be the No. 1 trading partner of this country?

Mr. LAZARUS. No, that the United States will become the No. 1 trading partner of the Soviet Union—

Senator PROXMIRE. The way he put it, the Soviet Union will become the No. 1 trading partner of the United States.

Mr. LAZARUS. Not very likely. That is a misquote. I was there when Mr. Dobrynin said that.

Senator PROXMIRE. Who are their Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, trading partners?

Mr. LAZARUS. I don't know if I have them exactly in the right order, but it is West Germany, Japan, the United States, Italy, and France; some mix of those five.

Senator PROXMIRE. Primarily because of the balance involved, because this country and the Soviet Union are so much alike in resources and size, in so many respects, area and many other things—they are much bigger than we are in many areas, but there are many similarities. It seems to me there would be more of a natural trading relation with Japan and West Germany than this country.

Mr. KOHLER. Are you speaking of a natural trading relationship so far as we are concerned or they are concerned?

Senator PROXMIRE. Well, if there is no ideological factor involved at all, a country like Russia, that has the great natural resources and great agricultural resources, would seem to me to be a more natural trading partner with a country like Japan which has strictly limited resources, or West Germany, rather than this country.

Mr. KOHLER. I think that is true, and I think it is a point that Professor Grossman has elaborated on in a recent paper he offered. The trade between ourselves and the Soviet Union, as everyone, I think, that has testified has reported to us, is very imbalanced. The reason that we are going to be their largest trading partner this year is because there is a sizable carryover of agricultural commodities from the original feed grain transactions, plus between \$300 and \$400 million worth of industrial goods due to be shipped this year, so we will export something above a billion dollars to the Soviet Union, and take back perhaps somewhere between \$100 and \$200 million.

Senator PROXMIRE. Those are very small figures in American trade. We export and import over \$60 billion a year.

Mr. KOHLER. Our turnover is around a hundred billion, and their ex-

ports, as I recall, are around 46 to 50. Yes, these are very small figures vis-a-vis our total turnover.

Senator PROXMIRE. When would you estimate that they might become one of the most significant trading partners, how long, 10 years?

Mr. LAZARUS. Within our particular bureau—and it is not an estimate that is credited throughout the Government, but it is not one that is strenuously disputed either—we see the turnover with the Soviet Union as being around \$4 billion by 1980. That would be approximately \$2.5 billion in U.S. exports and \$1.5 billion in imports. And that still is a very small fraction of what our total trade would be.

Senator PROXMIRE. As far as we are concerned, it would be about 12th or 15th, or something in that order?

Mr. LAZARUS. Somewhere down there.

Senator PROXMIRE. And as far as they are concerned we would be close to the top?

Mr. LAZARUS. We would be an important exporter to them.

Senator PROXMIRE. There is one strong argument for the trade; that is: Our influence on them should be far greater under those circumstances, and their dependency on us much greater, than our dependence on them.

Mr. LAZARUS. If you adopt a policy of significant exports over imports over the long term, it is a policy that has a name in economic history. It is a mercantilist policy. And it is not one that can sustain a strong relationship over the long term, because they have to generate credit with which to pay—they have to generate foreign exchange with which to pay. We speculate about the trade between 1980 and the end of the century. And, personally, I see that as highly dependent upon whatever long-term energy arrangements we enter into with them.

Senator PROXMIRE. Mr. Kearns, the head of the Export-Import Bank, indicated recently in Moscow that the Soviet Union was not meeting our conditions, and we should be insistent. What specifically is our and their position? And if there is not agreement, how could the Occidental deal on urea fertilizer be approved?

Mr. LAZARUS. I hesitate to speak for Mr. Kearns, because I haven't had any discussion with him on this issue, but I will try to answer the question.

If I understand the concern, it is that there is certain information which is normally submitted when a nation is a member of the International Monetary Fund. It is information that has to do with gold reserves and the general level of debts to various other countries. In the operating agreement that was originally signed between the United States and the Soviet Union, these conditions which normally accrue to nations which are the members of the International Monetary Fund—and as you know, the Soviet Union is not a member—were not imposed in detail. However, the full faith and credit guarantee of the Soviet Union is a part of that operating agreement, and this is not a usual clause. As our exposure to the Soviet Union increases I think there would be some legitimacy if the Export-Import Bank registered some interest in those statistics and tried to reopen discussions about soliciting that type of information. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is quite reluctant to publish these statistics, and information on their gold reserve, I am told, is restricted as a matter of law. We are engaged right now in a discussion with them on this point.

Senator PROXMIRE. There is another preference for the Soviet Union—that is in the area of disclosure. Why should we give preference above all countries to the Soviet Union in this respect? Why should we not require data from them?

Mr. LAZARUS. I think it is a judgment that the senior personnel at the Export-Import Bank and the people on the advisory committee must make. In one case, you are dealing with members of International Monetary Fund, a multilateral association, and in the other, the case of the Soviet Union, you are setting up a bilateral arrangement. And the Soviet Union took the position in the original negotiation that the full faith and credit guarantee is at least equal to certain ways of meeting the International Monetary Fund conditions. The people who entered into that agreement made a judgment that this was so. It probably was. The Soviets are meeting their obligations consistently, and have been doing so for quite some time.

Senator PROXMIRE. Apparently Mr. Kearns doesn't think they are adequately.

Mr. LAZARUS. I think the situation changes as the exposure goes up.

Senator PROXMIRE. I yield to Congressman Brown after this question.

I want to ask you, your export control system has been modified obviously, and we now sell computers and truck assemblies to the Soviet Union. What are the new control criteria? Or are we just phasing out all controls?

Mr. LAZARUS. No. I hope you will allow me to take a moment and answer that question fully, because it is an issue to which I have devoted quite a significant time in the last year.

When the Bureau of East-West Trade in the Department of Commerce was formed, the judgment was made to include the preexisting Office of Export Control within it. The Bureau was set up primarily as a promotional instrument. It was judged a sound organizational move to give the supervisor of that organization an additional regulatory function. When I first was confronted with this idea, I thought it was an anomaly. I felt it would be extremely difficult to both promote and restrict at the same time.

I have found it is not that bad, because in administering the export control system, the position taken by our Department and generally throughout the Government, is that we will try to issue a license if warranted after some rigorous review. We will not simply reflectively denying let me offer an example. It does not have to do with the Soviet Union, but it is illustrative.

A major aviation company wished to sell three large aircraft to an Eastern European country. The country did not have the entire amount of foreign exchange with which to pay for the three aircraft. So several innovations were added to the transaction, one having to do with establishing in that country the capability of manufacturing certain parts, and shipping those parts to the original seller in partial compensation. The export control debate pivoted not on the sale of the three airplanes but on the introduction of this metal working technology into the country. The metalworking technology had to do with aluminum. The Soviet Union and other countries of Eastern Europe had been working in titanium for 8 years already. And aluminum metalworking

technology was judged throughout the industry and by certain industrial and academic specialists we brought in as obsolescent technology and not one that should be embargoed.

After 6 months of intergovernmental debate, a judgment was made to issue the license. It meant 4,500 jobs in a major city in an area of the country that had a high unemployment level. That is the kind of scrutiny we give these licensing operations.

Pursuant to a congressional mandate in the Equal Opportunity Act, the Taft-Mondale amendments, the Department of Commerce was directed: (1) To screen the unilateral control lists—there are two lists which are controlled, one on a multilateral basis and the second on a unilateral basis; (2) to delete from the lists any items which no longer carry a national security consideration, and (3) to adjust and moderate the procedures by which we administer the export control program so as to reconcile them with procedures utilized by our Western trading partners. That is the process we have completed, and we issued a special report on it to the Congress on May 29.

But I hasten to add, the rigorous export control or export administration program, as called for by the law, is still being conducted. And it is being conducted with some vigor.

Senator PROXMIER. Congressman Brown.

Representative BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

Mr. Lazarus, with reference to your testimony in your prepared statement about the Kama River project, why did Daimler Benz turn down the project?

Mr. LAZARUS. It is my understanding—and this was quite some time before I became very involved in East-West trade—that the company was asked to undertake the general management of the entire construction complex that will eventually consume about \$2 billion worth of resources when it is completed. And they simply did not feel that they had the managerial capacity, the financial capacity, or the sustaining power to conduct such a project. They had seen what had happened to the Fiat people in the construction of the Togliattigrad plant, and I assume—and once again I have not talked to any Daimler Benz officials—they felt it would be too risky an undertaking.

Representative BROWN. Risky in an economic sense, or risky because it tied up too much of their resources?

Mr. LAZARUS. I think one could say yes to both those points. They were worried that it would be a kind of tar baby and that they would sink so many of their resources into it that they couldn't extricate themselves profitably.

Now, there is a misimpression left in the copy of the statement which I have had corrected in the printed version. It suggests the Pullman Co. in the United States did pick up a similar kind of task. In actuality, the management responsibilities of the Pullman Co. in supervising the construction of the foundry at Kama River are substantially less than those which were originally tendered to Daimler Benz.

Representative BROWN. So we are not trying to compare projects of the same size?

Mr. LAZARUS. No, sir.

Representative BROWN. Is it your judgment that the Pullman Co. took it on because it was a smaller project, or because they felt that they

had greater resources than Daimler Benz, or what was the reason that the Pullman Co., took on the project?

Mr. LAZARUS. Once again, the answer to both of those questions is generally yes. It was a double project from the standpoint of Pullman with its Swindell-Dressler division and its Kellogg division; and furthermore, they did have the particular managerial skills that were eminently suited for that kind of work. It is interesting that they have been able to visit the site, when their predecessors were never taken there.

Representative BROWN. You may be able to answer my next question, but I'm not so sure. Why did Pullman get such a favorable loan? I understand that they got a 7-percent loan from Chase, as a matter of fact.

Mr. LAZARUS. Well, I think Mr. Rockefeller had some discussions on this. If I recall his testimony as it was reported to me, significantly easier money conditions were obtained at that time than are obtained today.

Representative BROWN. Wait a minute. The suggestion has been made that that was a sweetheart deal. I understand another major bank in New York has said that the Chase Pullman—

Mr. LAZARUS. I have heard those allegations, but I don't think Mr. Rockefeller would agree with them, and I would hesitate to comment on his understanding of that deal. He knows it far better than I do.

Representative BROWN. You don't think it was a sweetheart deal, or you just don't know?

Mr. LAZARUS. I don't think it was a sweetheart deal, but I don't have the kind of information available that Mr. Rockefeller does.

Representative BROWN. When was the loan made?

Mr. LAZARUS. Approximately a year ago, but I can't pin it down.

Representative BROWN. Were the interest rates a little better a year ago than they are now?

Mr. LAZARUS. Yes.

Representative BROWN. But then the interest rates have always been a little better than they are now. I don't know whether 7 percent is still that good a deal for that kind of a project.

Mr. LAZARUS. I think it was  $7\frac{1}{8}$ . But Chase is an establishment that is not in business to offer concessions. It is in business to make money, and it is hard for me to believe that they would engage in a sweetheart transaction.

Representative BROWN. Would there have been an advantage to them in trying to get into the market? Would that perhaps have been a motivation?

Mr. LAZARUS. Once again—and this is a very personal speculation—Chase has had a position in the Soviet Union for quite some time, not an office which they just acquired recently, but relations with the Soviet Union dating back years. And I don't think it would have been necessary for them to offer concessionary rates in order to confirm their position vis-a-vis the Soviet Government.

Representative BROWN. How has the project turned out for Pullman? Have they had some difficulties?

Mr. LAZARUS. Yes. The delegation of newspaper people stationed in Moscow were also invited to visit the site—I think that Naberezhnie Chelny is the location—and the general manager of the project com-

plained vehemently about a certain—how should I phrase it—lack of performance on the part of Pullman. This led to articles in both the New York Times and the Washington Post. It led to delegations of representatives from the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade visiting the United States, and lengthy consultation with Pullman, and at the end of those lengthy consultations, a protocol was issued agreeing that there was some fault on both sides. The problems have been remedied, and they are going together forward on schedule.

Representative BROWN. Congressman Blackburn has asked me to pursue a couple of questions.

What has been the history of Soviet performance in its postwar barter deals with regard to meeting deadlines for delivery of goods, assuring a proper quality and quantity of goods delivered, providing a trained labor force, and having an infrastructure sufficient to support large commercial operations such as truck and auto plants? And I don't mean to concentrate necessarily on you, Mr. Lazarus. Perhaps Mr. Kohler would like to answer the question, or anybody else.

Mr. KOHLER. No.

Representative BROWN. You would prefer to have Mr. Lazarus? I just don't want to discriminate.

Mr. LAZARUS. Most-favored-witness treatment.

Representative BROWN. Right.

Mr. LAZARUS. I have really very little information on Soviet performance since the end of World War II with respect to barter transactions. I am aware of certain gas-for-pipe transactions with West Germany. But as far as I know—and this is not really an answer that is founded on good information—it has been a satisfactory transaction for both sides; at least if one inspects the continuity of the relationship, one would think that neither partner had been particularly dissatisfied. The larger barter transactions with the United States are really in the embryonic stages of discussion. And it has simply been too early to test the ability to perform on either side. So I am sorry, I will have to give you an incomplete answer on that.

Representative BROWN. Has there been pretty good performance in such things as the truck and auto plant deals and their ability to support those particular commitments? Let me ask specifically, what has been Fiat's experience in constructing and helping to operate the Volga vehicle plant at Togliattigrad?

Mr. LAZARUS. My reading of Fiat's explanation is that it has been in the early stages a rather unhappy one.

Representative BROWN. For what reasons? Because of Soviet performance?

Mr. LAZARUS. I think a combination of difficulties on both sides. An enterprise that large calls for a systems manager. And this was not a mechanism adopted by the Soviets in installing that plant. From the very beginning, there was no single coordinator who really cracked the whip. And when you don't have that in a multifaceted enterprise that consumes hundreds of millions of dollars in resources, you are going to have delays and problems, and that is what they encountered. I think they are learning something with regard to economy.

Representative BROWN. Is it true that Fiat had to borrow a considerable amount of extra money to complete the project in order to purchase additional parts; that is, parts that were supposed to have been

provided by the Russians in order to complete the cars on the assembly line?

Mr. LAZARUS. I have heard that this is so, but I have no hard evidence.

Representative BROWN. Let me ask another question in a reverse way. How valid is the point that if the United States did not deal with the Russians—and I would like to direct this to Mr. Grossman or Mr. Kohler—it would simply hurt us, and not them, that they would make those arrangements someplace else, that therefore they can purchase the same goods elsewhere, and we are literally losing a market?

Mr. GROSSMAN. You are looking at me, Congressman. So perhaps I am expected to answer it.

I'm not sure what you mean by "deal," what do you mean, if we didn't deal with them?

Representative BROWN. If we didn't enter into trade relationships with them, would they make those trade relationships elsewhere, and therefore we would just simply be out of the business that we might otherwise have and the Russians would still benefit from trade with other countries?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I'm not quite sure that I fully understand the question. If you take grain, which has been mentioned here several times, there is nowhere else they can turn to really for such large amounts of grain. If you take, say, machinery equipment, I think the Soviets are going to buy in the cheapest market. True, today the Soviet are trying very hard to get us involved economically with them. I think today the word is out to be nice to Americans, to buy from Americans, and so on. But on a longer term basis, they are going to buy in the cheapest market. And, of course, you can't fault them for that. If we can compete with other producers of equipment we are going to sell to them.

Now, the big question is capital financing. As I was mentioning here earlier, I personally think that we should give a very close and long look whether we want to become a large-scale creditor of the Soviet Union, because it may greatly complicate our international relations later, and what is perhaps equally important, it may set back the improvement that we have accomplished in our relations with the Soviet Union.

But so far as deals are concerned, it is my understanding that the Soviets, of course, would buy lots of stuff for cash; if they need credit they can raise the funds elsewhere and they can raise the funds in Western Europe, or from Japanese banks. The Japanese have a lot of dollars.

Representative BROWN. Can I ask a question on that point, because I think it was in your testimony or Mr. Kohler's testimony that the suggestion was made, again on a conversion kind of question, that we should not in a capital-hungry world necessarily be dealing with the Soviets, that we ought to be dealing with other developing nations. It seems to me that it becomes a credit matter if the Soviets can develop the capital elsewhere, it sort of becomes desirable for us to deal with them and extend them credit, because they apparently have credit elsewhere; it is sort of like a small business loan—if you can get the money from the bank, maybe you don't need the small business loan,

but on the other hand you don't get the small business loan unless you can get the help from the bank in the first place.

What is in our best interest there, dealing with a very poor country, where the credit which is extended may be lost altogether, or dealing with a country like the Soviet Union which can get credit elsewhere and therefore apparently has a fair credit rating? Is that a fair analysis of the situation or not?

Mr. GROSSMAN. I certainly would not question that the Soviet Union has a good credit rating. Indeed their credit rating in the near future will be at least as good as it ever has been, for the very good reason that they are looking forward to getting billions and tens of billions of dollars from us, and they will be very careful to meet all their obligations. They are looking forward to much bigger stakes. What I meant by that phrase in my prepared statement that you were kind enough to cite was that the Soviet Union is a rich country; it is not a poor country. The Soviet Union every year invests in its own economy at least the volume of capital, in real terms, that we invest in ours. The Soviet Union is no Afghanistan or Bolivia.

If we take a worldwide view, it is quite reasonable to ask in a world where most countries and most people are poor, whether the Soviet Union really is the most worthy recipient of our largesse.

Representative BROWN. Wait a minute. My 10 minutes have already run out. But is it a question of largesse, or is it a question of a business arrangement in extending credit, or whether that credit extension is going to be honored?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Of course the rich are always better credit risks than the poor. This is why the small businessman often doesn't get a loan. But there is also such a thing as our national policy as against commercial and financial calculations. And I am not sure that we should provide large amounts of our capital to the rich when there are lots of countries that are poor and need it much more, or to a country with which we can very easily spoil relations by being its creditor on a giant scale.

Now, of course, they are going to pay. What interest they pay may be of some importance here domestically. But whether they are paying 7 percent or 8 percent or 9 percent, is not really one of the major issues, I should think. One of the major issues, on the other hand, is whether we want to underwrite the Soviet economy for the next 50 years or more. This is the big issue, and not whether they are paying 7 or 9 percent on our loans to them.

Representative BROWN. Just to comment on that, if I may. It seems to me that largesse is one thing and a business arrangement is another. And I gather that that relates to what Mr. Kohler testified to, and that is, that normal trade with the U.S.S.R. is in our interest. Do you mean only from a business standpoint, or only from a trade standpoint, or is it your conclusion that it is in our interest also in the long range politically? And can you clarify your reasons for that?

Mr. KOHLER. I would be glad to, Congressman Brown.

As you know, I do make a great distinction between clearing the board for normal trade relationships with the Soviet Union and investment. I think the main reason is because trade might be commercially beneficial. I assume that businessmen who deal with the Soviet Union will have their profits out of it, and that it will benefit our economy.

I do think that we also got some political spinoff on this. I think that it has been in our interest to expose this closed society to the West and to Western practices. I think the expansion of the kind of contacts that we develop under the exchange programs and which are now vastly enlarged, are very useful in this sense, and I think it is also useful that this be extended to the business and management communities, as it would be. It may also help to break down some of the strict compartmentalized situations that go on in the Soviet Union. I think trade also has a certain benefit in maintaining a certain amount of good will among the population in general as distinguished from the small number who rule the country.

Representative BROWN. All those folks drinking Pepsi Cola can't be mad at us, is that what you're saying?

Mr. KOHLER. I think there is some political spinoff, but I don't think it is enough in itself to make one give concessionary terms, or anything like that. I would like to see business on a business basis—the question is, what is in it for us, in terms of even these long-term deals? I don't quite see a parallel here between what we do with the lesser developed countries and what we do with the Soviet Union. If we invest in the Soviet Union, I think it should be because we expect to get benefits for ourselves. I am not an economist who can evaluate the kind of thing that is up now, but I have a lot of questions about it.

Representative BROWN. If I can tie the two things together in a way, are you saying that when we distribute our largesse to a distinctly underdeveloped nation and extend our credit, it may or may not be a good business deal, but it benefits us to some extent politically because we are lifting them out of a degree of poverty, and in the long run it could be a good business deal? But with the Russians where they are, fairly developed, it almost surely should be as a business matter with political overtones. And it will develop our markets, and therefore help us as a business arrangement, but the political overtones certainly have to be taken into consideration.

And then, if I add one other kind of nation to this three-level comparison, if we are dealing with the French or the British or the Canadians or the Japanese or the other free world trading partners, our objective there is usually almost solely economic benefit because we already have a viable and cordial political relationship. Are those fair comparisons to make?

Mr. KOHLER. They are indeed.

You state well what I do believe. I see no reason in our national interest to give concessionary terms to the Soviet Union as though it were comparable to a lesser developed country. I think it should be strictly in our interest.

We can benefit from a certain amount of political spinoff. But that is a long-term process, and not a very tangible benefit.

Senator PROXMIRE. At that point I think I agree with Congressman Brown, I think this is a fairly solid congressional sentiment. There seems to be a tendency on the part of the administration, Democratic or Republican doesn't matter, to give concessions here and there. Do you think that some kind of congressional legislation would be desirable to assert the will that we have nondiscriminatory relations, or do you think on the basis of past performance that wouldn't be necessary? You can tell by Congressman Brown's questions and mine

that we are very suspicious about these arrangements, and while we recognize that it is also constructive to have good trade relations with a country, especially a country that is the second most productive economy in the world, that nevertheless we are concerned and suspicious of any discriminatory concessions at the expense of our own taxpayers and consumers, and also at the expense of other countries that are our trading partners.

Mr. KOHLER. Mr. Vice Chairman, I would hope that the legislation would be limited to cleaning out the debris, and giving more-favored-nations treatment, and so forth. I have been reassured by what Mr. Lazarus said about Commerce's somewhat skeptical approach to this that you don't need to attach strings. And I don't think you should try to attach political strings.

Senator PROXMIRE. Of course, Mr. Kohler, you have been in the executive department of our service. We are congressional people. And the executive branch also wants the Congress just to let them handle things, turn over the money to you and keep our mouths shut.

Mr. KOHLER. I am aware that there is a certain argument that goes on in this field, but I think I can speak in a somewhat detached way, and I think it would be to the U.S. interest to have normal trading relationships established. As far as big credit deals and so forth, you people on the Hill control the money in any case.

Senator PROXMIRE. Not very well, I'm afraid.

The Washington Post reported 1 week ago that Secretary Rogers when he was in Tokyo proposed that Japan and the United States cooperate with the Soviet Union in the development of oil and gas resources in Soviet Siberia. Is this a policy, to discuss it with a foreign country? Of course, they always discuss it with a foreign country before they discuss it with us. You see what I'm getting at is, what are the implications for American credit extension to other countries? Do the Japanese really need us, or want us? They need oil and gas. They have the money, and enough industrial capability.

Mr. LAZARUS. Once again, not having been present, and only having had the benefit of the same newspaper articles that you had, Mr. Vice Chairman, I can tell you what I know about the situation, which is not necessarily the complete story. It is no secret that for the last 2 years, major liquified natural gas transactions between the Soviet Union and the United States have been under discussion. One such project is referred to as the North Star project. The reserve is located in western Siberia in Urengoy Valley, and its gas would be piped through a port near Murmansk and shipped to the Northeast quadrant of the United States.

The second project is called the Yakutsk project. It is in eastern Siberia. It involves a long transmission line to the port of Nakhodka and shipment from there to the west coast of the United States.

There have been a number of what I would term desultory conversations within our Government, and even between the Government of the United States and representatives of the Japanese Government, but always of the most tentative nature because of the knowledge that there were some very crucial questions that had to be answered before anyone could move forward toward the consummation. And a couple of days ago, there was a report out of Tokyo that the Japanese and the Soviet

Governments had signed a protocol that refers to the United States, it refers to triparty cooperation in providing these reserves.

Senator PROXMIRE. The Japanese and the Soviet Governments, you say?

Mr. LAZARUS. Triparty—the Japanese, the Soviets, and the United States. And it was only signed by two participants.

Senator PROXMIRE. Our Government must have had knowledge of it.

Mr. LAZARUS. I'm not convinced that we did. For the last 24 hours I have been trying to find out if we did, and as yet I have no evidence. In any event, it in no way commits, as far as I've been able to tell, the United States to anything. What is involved is not protocol, it is providing research and nothing more.

Senator PROXMIRE. Well, there is a strong implication that if it was triparty the United States would be involved.

Mr. LAZARUS. There was no U.S. participation.

Senator PROXMIRE. We have a terrific need for oil and gas, and we have the credits available.

The hour is getting late, and I just want to ask a couple of more questions.

I would like to ask you, Mr. Kohler, you say that the Soviet Union has in the past and will in the future give priority to political considerations over their economic considerations. The advice this committee seems to be getting, is that if we don't act as a Congress, we are likely to give economic and commercial preferences to the U.S.S.R.

In view of the enormously important political elements here involved, particularly with respect to arms limitations, and withdrawal of troops and other elements that are so vastly important to peace in the world, and to the enormous burden that we have to carry in defending ourselves against the Soviet Union, shouldn't we determine our relations with respect to the Soviet Union on the basis of our political interests, too?

Shouldn't we do this in a planned, careful, thoughtful way in which we bring these other matters into play and try to extend this possible economic and commercial advantage over the Soviet Union on the agreement?

Mr. KOHLER. To a certain extent, but I don't think you can link the two of them to start with. The whole trade question isn't going to bear the kind of political load that some people think they can put on it. It just isn't that important. Certainly I do think we should have a political interest—

Senator PROXMIRE. May I interrupt at that point to say that you argue that the Soviet Union will only enter into these things to the extent that they have political advantage. And their bargaining position is far weaker than ours for many reasons, all the evidence indicates that—so why shouldn't we have a concerted effort to make these agreements to the extent we can—I agree that they may not be necessarily decisive, but they might be helpful, in the long run—related to our political interests? Especially when you have something where the Soviet Union might also gain? They, too, want, as you agree, arms control, and the arms race is very difficult for them. Their long-term interests, I am convinced, are served by arms control right now, an arms control agreement. Might not this be one of the elements that could contribute to pushing them in this direction?

Mr. KOHLER. Yes. But I think that will work by itself, because there are considerations there that are of interest, both to us and to them. And I don't think we can link these things together that much. If you are looking at it from a political point of view, I would even say that we already have a lot of political benefits out of these packages of agreements that have been negotiated last year in Moscow and this year here. It has long been to our benefit and our interest to try to affect, if you will, the evolution of that society.

Senator PROXMIRE. Can you give us the specific political benefits that we have gotten out of it? Do you think the end of the Vietnam war was influenced in any way by that?

Mr. KOHLER. I think there was a certain help. I think that there are something like 16 agreements that extend, prolong, and institutionalize exchanges between Russians and Americans.

Senator PROXMIRE. The SALT agreements?

Mr. KOHLER. No.

Senator PROXMIRE. The agreement that accompanied SALT?

Mr. KOHLER. In medicine, and in environment, and in science, and in education, and in exchanges of students.

Senator PROXMIRE. You feel that those are related to the economic and commercial situation?

Mr. KOHLER. I think they are. For example, you asked me earlier about the consequences of Congress failing to act on MFN and related provisions that you need to act on. I think that we would find a cold chill setting in with respect to all those other agreements which I do regard as very much in our interest.

Senator PROXMIRE. Let me ask just one other question; then I have to go. There is a rollcall.

What significant changes or opportunities now are present in the American and Soviet relations that were not available when you were in Moscow under Stalin and most recently, and is the U.S.S.R. threat less of a threat to our security?

Mr. KOHLER. Mr. Vice Chairman, this is a question that I could write a book about, but I will not do it. At this particular moment a fundamental factor for the past 10 years in Soviet policy toward the West has been their obsession with the question of their relations with China. For that reason they have indeed modified their attitude to a very considerable extent, and they have made approaches that would not have been possible before. This is a situation that is likely to prevail for some time to come.

Senator PROXMIRE. This is the reason why détente is more possible, because of the Chinese problem with the Soviet Union?

Mr. KOHLER. It is very much the basic reason. There are others that could be cited but this is fundamental.

Senator PROXMIRE. I understand, Mr. Lazarus, you would like to comment on MFN. And if you do want to extend your remarks in the record, that will be satisfactory.

Mr. LAZARUS. No, I have three short observations. And they are based really on the discussion that you had with Professor Grossman.

Senator PROXMIRE. I am asking you to do that in the record.

Mr. LAZARUS. Certainly, I would be happy to.

[The following information was subsequently supplied for the record:]

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF STEVEN LAZARUS

## "THE IMPACT OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION TARIFF TREATMENT ON U.S.-SOVIET TRADE"

Mr. Vice Chairman and members of the committee, I have come to believe that the accordence of Most-Favored-Nation tariff treatment to the Soviet Union will strongly and favorably influence the future course of the U.S.-Soviet trade.

As U.S. Executive Secretary of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commercial Commission, I took part in the trade agreement negotiations of 1972. Throughout those negotiations, MFN status for the Soviet Union was the single issue which arose most frequently, and the Soviets took every available opportunity to reiterate their intense desire for nondiscriminatory tariff treatment.

Second, in my conversations with officials of Gosplan, they have indicated to me that it would be very difficult to include purchases of U.S. equipment in their Fifteen Year Plan if the United States continues to impose discriminatory tariffs on Soviet products.

In the short run, restoration of MFN status would account for an average of less than 10 percent of the increase in Soviet exports to the United States under normalized trade conditions. In the medium and long run, MFN treatment will become very important if the structure of imports from the Soviet Union shows an increasing percentage of manufactured commodities. A list of possible future exports to the United States submitted by Soviet officials and published by the National Association of Manufacturers, frequent statements by Soviet foreign trade officials, and the industrialized character of the Soviet economy suggest that such an increase is probable. As U.S. tariffs on many manufactured products are much higher for the Soviet Union than for nations which enjoy MFN treatment, the lack of MFN status would increasingly inhibit the Soviet Union's ability to export to and in turn, buy from the United States.

Finally, if MFN tariff treatment is not accorded to the Soviet Union, the Soviet lend lease payments will cease in 1975 under the terms of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Lend Lease Settlement of 1972. It is my personal, independent judgment that cessation of these payments would result in severe limitation and possibly suspension of Export-Import Bank financing and guarantees for U.S.-Soviet commercial transactions. Since U.S.-Soviet trade is heavily dependent upon Export-Import Bank financing, such an event would seriously impair the entire economic relationship.

Senator PROXMIRE. Without objection, I should like to add to the hearings record an interview of U.S. News & World Report with former Ambassador Beara, a commentary on the Soviet grain deal in the Baltimore Morning Sun, a paper submitted by the Hudson Institute on Soviet-United States joint natural gas development, and an updated selected bibliography of Soviet monographs supplied by Mr. Murray Feshbach of the Department of Commerce's Foreign Demographic Analysis Division.

[The information follows:]

[From U.S. News & World Report, May 28, 1973]

## WHAT BREZHNEV WANTS FROM THE UNITED STATES

INTERVIEW WITH JACOB D. BEAM, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW

*To assess the visit to Washington next month of Soviet boss Leonid I. Brezhnev, Ambassador Beam, for four years chief U.S. envoy in Moscow, came to the conference room of "U.S. News & World Report" for this exclusive interview.*

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, what will Leonid Brezhnev be looking for when he visits Washington?*

A. For many things. Generally, for a continuation of the summit relationship which has brought returns and political credit to both the U.S. and Soviet leaders. Specifically, he will hope to nail down most-favored-nation status in trade for the Soviet Union. Then he will want other understandings on trade and commercial matters, particularly on large projects—natural gas and oil among them.

The Russians would like to make big deals with us. Brezhnev always says: "We think big. We must because we have a big country."

*Q. Why are the Russians so insistent on most-favored-nation treatment?*

A. That's in large part a matter of prestige with them. They feel they are being discriminated against. Also, they feel that the agreement they made to

settle World War II Lend-Lease debts to us for 722 million dollars entitles them to most-favored treatment. It was an integral part of that agreement.

Actually, the most-favored-nation arrangement won't help them much in the short run, but will become of increasing importance. The raw materials they are sending us now are subject only to a very low tariff as it is.

*Q. What does Russia want to buy from the U.S.?*

A. Grains, industrial equipment, development equipment. The kinds of goods we would also like to sell them, of course, are consumer goods. We make that point again and again, but they say it's premature.

On the food side, they have bought some breeding cattle from us. They want to increase their own meat consumption. We can tie into this by selling them livestock feed on a long-term basis. That has been discussed and is likely to be considered during Brezhnev's visit here.

As for development equipment, their needs are enormous. Their rate of economic growth has turned down, and they had a bad harvest last year. Operating from a base like that, it would take them a very long time to develop resources, such as their oil and gas, without help from the United States, Japan or Western Europe. They just do not have the pipe, let alone the sophisticated equipment in the huge quantities needed.

*Q. How can they pay for the things they get from us—cash, gold, credit, or what?*

A. That's the problem, of course. They haven't got that much cash, or gold either. Credits, even long term, have to be paid.

Barter has been the easiest course for them. They would like to have us come into these huge gas and oil fields, develop them and, on the long term, take out our payment in gas and oil and minerals—whatever we are developing.

Their gas resources are immense, particularly in the fields of western Siberia. There are other fields in eastern Siberia, too, but they can't promise us that the gas there is unlimited. They say, over all, they have gas enough to meet our needs for 40 years.

Our job—the job of American companies—would be to make the pipes, the freezing plant, the tankers. Once the gas started flowing to us, then the dollars would flow to them, giving the Russians the money for more grain and more equipment. But all this will take a lot of credit negotiation. Some people say we'll be lucky to get gas from the Siberian fields coming to this country by the end of this decade. I'd say it's at least five years off.

*Q. What's the track record on the big international deals with the Russians in recent years—good or bad?*

A. I don't think we have enough trial runs to get a reading on that. The Italians had trouble getting started on that big automobile plant at Togliatti on the Volga, but they should break a little better than even. The West Germans have a deal to build a billion-dollar steel-pellet plant for the Russians in the Urals, but that is just starting.

The Soviet argument in urging us to get started on these huge deals for gas is quite simple. They say: "For heaven's sake, make a contract with us now, because the longer you wait, there will be inflationary pressures that will raise the cost of equipment and facilities. Make a deal with us now and you'll get the gas at a lower price than you may be able to negotiate five or six years from now." That's the way they talk. They're pushing us.

*Q. Did they push us a little too fast on the big wheat deal? Did we get taken on that one?*

A. I wouldn't say "taken"—that's much too strong. Perhaps we didn't do enough work on forecasting what would happen to the price at a time when the rest of the world needed wheat, too.

The Russians made very good bargains by spotting their purchases and keeping quiet about it. They bought as much as they could when the price was low. They acted like smart businessmen.

*Q. What are they going to use for money for our wheat and feed grains until they—or we—get the gas moving?*

A. I'm not certain. We don't think they have great quantities of gold. They've sold some, but the world gold market is sensitive to large sales.

The European countries can give the Russians longer-term credits than we can. European institutions have masses of dollars and want the business. The Russians are thinking about getting access to these so-called Euro-dollars through consortium financing.

*Q. How are the Russians as salesmen, as bargainers?*

A. They're very bad salesmen. They've given little attention to the selling side. It's not a part of their business practices, probably because the system discour-

ages sales risks. They prefer barter, and they really are great at buying. The Government owns everything in Russia, and there are no competitive companies there. So they call in all the competitive companies from the West, turn them loose on each other, and drive them all down so that few of them make much of a profit.

We suffer in this sort of bargaining from the limitations of the antitrust acts. Some years ago, one American company executive, engaged in bargaining with the Russians in competition with another American outfit, told me: "If it weren't for antitrust, I would go to my competitor and buy him out for a million dollars, then go back to the Russians and make a 3-million-dollar profit. As it is, neither one of us is going to make much of anything at all."

The Japanese, of course, use the "single window" approach and say: "This year this firm will take the Russian business and next year the other firm will get it"—all between themselves. So one firm deals with the Russians, and the Japanese do better. German and Italian firms also seem to have better discipline, less competition—no antitrust problems.

*Q. Is Brezhnev likely to be talking about a lot of things other than trade?*

A. Oh, certainly. One of the virtues of the present relationship is that it offers procedures and means for transacting all types of business of mutual interest. There will probably be intensive, continuing discussion of scientific and agricultural exchanges; of transportation, such as aviation and maritime questions.

The second phase of the strategic-arms talks [SALT] are just getting started. We have presented a detailed position, and although it is too early to hope for a treaty, the talks may be furthered by a joint statement of agreed principles, as was done on May 20, 1971.

The respective U.S. and Soviet programs at the Helsinki conference on European security and the Vienna conference on force reductions will also be reviewed.

Provided we can get over the hurdle of most-favored-nation treatment for the Soviet Union, the end communiqué will doubtless justifiably reflect the progress made in many areas of negotiation.

*Q. What is the big problem in the MBFR talks—the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Conference?*

A. It is mainly a matter of getting some kind of symmetry, of arranging a fair balance in withdrawing force from Western Europe. The Russians are obviously eager for a one-for-one reduction or, say, a deal like the one they offered us in 1955—a one-third reduction of all forces.

We cannot consider that as anything but unbalanced, since we would be obliged to withdraw our forces back across the Atlantic. Things get very complex. Barring small token cuts, a comprehensive agreement may take a long time, and of course we would wish to work it out with our allies.

*Q. Have these exchanges of the last 18 months really altered our way of doing business with the Russians?*

A. They most certainly have, and I hope so permanently. They reflect great credit on the initiatives taken by our President and on the Soviet leaders' responses. Reason has begun to prevail, but both sides must be on guard against inevitable disappointments.

*Q. With all these negotiations going on—the Nixon visit to Moscow, now the Brezhnev visit here—people get the impression that the cold war is over. Is that true?*

A. Well, I'd say it has been declared officially over, since each side occasionally accuses the other of reviving it.

*Q. Even if it's just a momentary pause, who won?*

A. If you cannot say for certain that the cold war is over—that is, that it won't be resumed one day—you can hardly say who won. But the Russians certainly gave us a lot of trouble in those years. In that sense they profited. We had very costly confrontations with the Russians. We had to put in more money, more effort—more lives—than they did. In Korea, in Vietnam, they fought with other peoples' soldiers. In the United Nations they frustrated our programs of co-operation, our efforts to get solutions to crisis situations they wanted to keep going.

Furthermore, just four or five years ago the Soviets thought they were sitting very pretty indeed. They had us almost politically isolated as a result of the Vietnam war—people just wouldn't speak to us. They also seemed to have the Chinese politically isolated. But now both the Peking Communist Chinese and ourselves have broken out of our isolation.

*Q. What are the Soviet objectives abroad today?*

A. I'd say the first Soviet concern abroad is defensive and, at this time especially, to seek political and strategic insurance against China. They often seem obsessed with China. It is an enormous problem for them, a rampantly heretic Communist country with vast human resources next door on a long border—the world's longest.

*Q. Are they afraid of a border war with China?*

A. I don't think so. They have more troops on that border than they have on European borders—about 42 divisions or thereabouts. But the borders seem fairly stable.

They are worried about the Chinese making a coalition with us or with the Japanese or the Germans against them.

*Q. How about a pre-emptive Soviet attack on China to destroy their growing nuclear capacity? Is that possible?*

A. I don't believe in it. How can the Russians fight China? If they went into the country they would become a thousand times more deeply engaged than we were in Vietnam. If they struck with missiles or air, they would completely destroy their international political program and draw Chinese mass counter-attacks against their own Far East. I just don't believe in it.

*Q. Couldn't they strike suddenly at China, just as they struck at Czechoslovakia under the "Brezhnev doctrine" in 1968?*

A. That's not the same thing at all. The Russians moved militarily into areas they dominated long before Brezhnev's time. But they do not pretend to dominate China, obviously a great power in mass terms of people and territory. The East Europeans have to move very carefully because they know the Russians could come in with forces, as they did in Czechoslovakia.

They are, of course, playing down what they did in Prague and Czechoslovakia now because they want to create a condition of *détente* in Western Europe. "*Détente*" is a political slogan which enables the Russians to draw maximum advantage from a change in pace.

*Q. How about the German situation, and Berlin? Do the Russians intend to stick by new agreements?*

A. Berlin is one place where you see real change in the cold war. To pursue their aims in Western Europe, the Russians had to ease tensions in Germany, which they did by agreements with West Germany in 1970 and 1971. But they may pay a price for this. Two Germanys are sovereign, and East Germany is more sovereign than it was before. There is no reason why the two sides should not be attracted to each other in various ways now. The Russians have most to fear from a united Germany, and that would include a Communist one.

The East Germans already are showing more independence—not by any means favorable to the West. On the traffic agreement along the corridors to Berlin, we understand they were particularly hard-nosed and had to be really told by the Russians to get in line.

As for Berlin itself, well, the main purpose of the Berlin Wall always was to keep the Communists in—and that still is the name of the Russian game.

Just because they now are letting out 30,000 Jews a year from the Soviet Union does not mean everybody who wants to can get out. Far from it. There were about 48,000 ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union who wanted to get out, and only bit by bit are they letting them go. Every time Willy Brandt [West German Chancellor] went to Russia, the Kremlin let out a few thousand.

The Ukrainians who want to leave are largely an issue between Russia and Canada. There are lot of Ukrainians in Canada, and the Canadians keep putting on the pressure to get their relatives out of Russia and into Canada. At the Helsinki Conference [on European security and cooperation] the Canadians are strong on demanding freedom of movement. Actually, Canada like the U.S., gives the Russians a list of separated families every year, and every year a few hundred get out.

REOPEN SUEZ? REDS "DON'T CARE"—

*Q. What about Soviet objectives in the Mideast—are the Russians applying a lot of pressure to get the Suez Canal open?*

A. No, they don't seem to care at all about reopening the Suez Canal. They have not supported our plans nor any other plans on this. They say it is strictly up to the Arabs—that if Egypt wants it, fine; otherwise, no. The talk about their need for the Canal so they could get their ships into the Indian Ocean and around to Hanói just has not proved out.

Anyhow, the Russians could overextend themselves by going into the Indian Ocean. Brezhnev has enough to do without trying to build up Russian power so far away as that. The Mediterranean build-up is quite enough of a strain.

*Q. Is the Soviet position in the Mediterranean one of their big gains in the cold war?*

A. It's certainly a gain. The Arabs had nowhere else to go, so this would have happened, cold war or not. In summer the Russians send in a lot of naval warships, and in winter they take them out. They have impressive capabilities in the Mediterranean now, and remember, the "Med" once was a Western sea.

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, just how great is the danger to the West. Would the Russians be likely to try cutting off the West's oil supplies?*

A. I don't think they would want to do that yet. If there were a danger of war between Russia and America as a result of Israeli-Arab war, then they might really risk something like that. I do not think we have even approached anything close to that. It is not the way Brezhnev is playing the game now.

*Q. What sort of fellow is Brezhnev?*

A. He's a shrewd politician and night fighter who has come to the top in a tough system.

I've seen him in meetings with the President, and [then] Secretary of Commerce Peterson and I were his guests in the Crimea last summer for a couple of days.

Brezhnev was a relaxed host with some charm—a good greeter with international guests. He was sometimes longwinded—prolix—in getting to the point, like all Communist leaders who probably have to have their position approved *in toto* by the Politburo. However, when he presents his case, he does it quite forcefully.

All his people defer to him—he is clearly the boss. But he is very careful to keep in touch with his fellows on the Politburo when he goes out of the country. He has spent about an hour a day on the telephone reporting back on these trips. He would probably do the same or better visiting here in the United States.

#### MEANING OF POLITBURO CHANGES—

*Q. Would this recent shake-up in the Politburo indicate that he will have a stronger position when he deals with President Nixon here?*

A. Yes. It shows he has scored across the board. The new men in the club include the Defense Minister, the Foreign Minister and the head of the KGB—the secret police. In another way, of course, it may dilute his power by enhancing the status of bureaucrats. There now are more people in the Politburo, 16 full members as compared to 14 before. Also [Yuri V.] Andropov, the secret-police chief, may have more power, and the military might get a bit more independence.

I'm not sure how the shake-up will come out in the end, but I do not think it visibly weakens Brezhnev. The new men are essentially administrators, so there's no indication of change in the probable succession. The eventual successor could be somebody completely unknown to us.

Brezhnev is 66 and his health is good. He reportedly suffered a hernia operation last year, but there is nothing else the matter with him that we know about. He could be around a while, but changes in political balance can happen suddenly. Power moves that way in Russia.

*Q. How does Brezhnev compare with Khrushchev?*

A. Brezhnev is not as impetuous or flashy as Khrushchev was. In some respects Khrushchev was quite a genius, but he was also unstable. He talked for the sake of talking, and Brezhnev does not. Brezhnev is the shrewd and careful politician. He wants to make Russia dominant as a world power, but he appears much more patient, much more responsible, in his application of Soviet power. He has developed over the years. He has more experience now.

*Q. Is he more of a team player?*

A. Definitely yes, although he now is far more the first among the equals than he was even 3 years ago. Brezhnev does not believe in the personality cult. True, you saw big banners bearing his picture all over the place this May Day, with a lot of praise in the press. But this rises and falls again with Brezhnev. It is not a steady build-up. He builds it up at a party conference or before he embarks on some important enterprise, such as his visit to the U.S. But then he lets it die down.

*Q. Would you expect a big change if Brezhnev were out?*

A. I would doubt it, but you cannot tell about that. This crowd seems to have a solid, pragmatic grip on things. Popular dissidence does not count for much, and

KGB chief Andropov was probably promoted to make sure that *détente* abroad did not mean unbounded relaxation at home.

I was in charge of the Embassy in Moscow when Stalin died, and that created a real change for a while. [Ambassador] George Kennan had been declared unwelcome a few months earlier. At the time of Stalin's funeral, people were worried about what was going to happen. For about three months after his death there was a striking relaxation—sort of like a Prague spring [the spring before the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia] in Moscow. Russians came to lunch or dinner at the Embassy and at the homes of Americans—came and gorged themselves. Even Vyacheslav Molotov [then Foreign Minister] was genial. That relaxation didn't last long. It started to freeze again in June, 1953, at the time of the Berlin uprising. The secret police boss, Lavrenti Beria, was also arrested at about that time, and uncertainty in the leadership caused a tightening up.

Actually, in the past 18 months there has been something of a relaxation, but not like the period after Stalin's death. People do fish for invitations to official functions or dinners at the U.S. Embassy—people who never came before, even when they had been invited.

*Q. What sort of people are today's Russians—the ordinary people on the street? How are they getting along?*

A. Pretty well, really. The way of life is better—maybe only about 2 per cent per year better, but you do see the results. It's enough to keep them relatively content. Russians do not have great expectations, and never have.

As a whole, they are an engaging but not notably industrious people. The Communist system reinforces that by assuring tenure to all but the politically suspect. The cost in absenteeism and inefficiency in production is very great. Too many people work on one job. In agriculture it takes six Russians to produce what one American turns out in a given time. Our industrial-labor productivity is a multiple of theirs.

*Q. How about the status of women in Russia? They talk a lot about that—*

A. Yes. But only one woman—Madame Yekaterina Furtseva, now Minister of Culture and formerly a Politburo member—has been very prominent.

Actually, working women are an economic necessity, because a man on the job cannot make money enough to support even two people, much less a family. The jobs they get are certainly not as high, on the average, as the jobs our women hold, but the percentage of women does run high in the professions. Medical interns are mostly women. But one rarely hears of women at the management level, really running a factory.

#### RUSSIA'S NEW GOALS IN THE WORLD

*Q. Mr. Ambassador, when all is said and done, is this the same old Soviet leadership the U.S. is dealing with—members of a tough clique who are out to conquer the world?*

A. No, not really. They would be satisfied with something they could claim as a dominating or at least equal role in world affairs. But they are not revolutionaries any more. They are hard-headed, practical people and know that total Communist victory is not going to happen—ever.

There is a greater sense of purpose in developing Russia, in gradually boosting the living standards of the people, but not at the expense of Russia's military and industrial position.

A Communist world—they recognize that as impractical as an immediate and realistic goal. As a political instrument, yes, it's important. But as a way of life, of world conquest—no.

[From the Baltimore Morning Sun, June 29, 1973]

#### GLUM AFTERTHOUGHTS ON THE SOVIET GRAIN DEAL

*Dr. Ernest Rubin is retiring from the U.S. Department of Commerce today after having sent 25 years in government service specializing in East-West trade, including 11 years as director of the Sino-Soviet division of the Bureau of Internal Commerce. He is interviewed on the Soviet grain deal by Herbert M. Bratter, the Washington correspondent for Bankers Monthly magazine.*

*Question—Much criticism has been made of the recent gigantic U.S. sales of agricultural products to the Soviet Union, particularly is contributing to the rise in the consumer prices (especially food) in 1973. Is this criticism justified?*

Answer—There is certainly a partial justification for the criticism. It will be recalled that in 1972 the economy was in Phase 2. The purpose of Phase 2 was to hold down the rate of inflation including food prices. Consequently, the very large sale of agriculture products, particularly grains, etc., must have had an effect on prices in 1973. This rise is, of course, also connected with Phase 3, which was adopted early in 1973.

One of the immediate consequences of this sale of grains was in the field of transportation. Acute shortages in railway cars developed here. Also international shipping freight rates rose sharply. Further, grain elevators and other suitable storage facilities for agricultural products were completely utilized. Grain stored in the open will suffer certain spoilage, thereby reducing supplies for domestic use and possibly leading to price increases. A further complication that could not be foreseen at the time of the grains sale is the appearance of a gasoline shortage in certain regions of the country. This shortage could exert further pressure on our total transportation system.

*Q. Are the Soviets to be blamed for the price increases?*

A. It will be recalled that the Soviets pursued their purchasing goals according to our rules. They applied for and obtained CCC credits for certain agricultural purchases. These were the "open deals." There were, however, various private arrangements by the Soviets with U.S. grain concerns which were "closed" or "secret" deals. Undoubtedly the aim of the Soviets was to keep information about their operations on a need-to-know basis because they did not want prices to go up. This is of importance because these deals involved huge quantities of agricultural products. Thus the U.S. government was not aware of the private deals and U.S. private firms did not notify the U.S. Government of these sales. It was the cumulative effect of the purchases, at fairly low prices, that started the chain of events leading to food and agricultural price rises in 1973. Incidentally, the U.S. taxpayer subsidized their deals.

*Q. Did the United States have knowledge of the severely adverse Soviet agricultural conditions in 1971-1972?*

A. Our Embassy in Moscow reported to Washington that the Soviets had suffered various agricultural crop failures in 1971 and in 1972. There were also reports in the trade journals, Reuters news service, and other sources to the effect that the Soviet agricultural situation was very poor in these years.

*Q. Could the United States have avoided some of the problems that developed because of the way in which the Soviets were able secretly to purchase food grains and feeds in the United States?*

A. Canada's Wheat Board might have served as a model to avoid the types of problems that were created in the United States. Under the Canadian system, transactions of this type and magnitude have to be approved by the Wheat Board. To avoid domestic problems the U.S. government has to know the nature and size of purchases by the Soviets or possibly the People's Republic of China and even some of the smaller socialist countries. The purpose of this information is to give the U.S. government a chance to assess probable economic and other consequences if such sales should materialize. The existing system in the United States is simply not adequate in dealing with purchasing methods adopted by the Soviets or other socialist countries. It might be indicated that the Soviets have in effect created a kind of market disruption in this country resulting from U.S. exports, rather than from dumping of foreign products in the United States, which is the classical kind of market disruption.

*Q. Isn't there a new regulation dealing with this problem?*

A. On June 13, 1973, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued Export Control Bulletin No. 84(a) which calls for monitoring exports and anticipated exports of certain agricultural products. The Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended in 1972, provides for controls over commodities in short supply in this country. By implication this authority presumably could be extended to cover situations involving sales abroad which would have inflationary impact on the U.S. domestic economy and/or adversely affect the national economic security.

*Q. Taking the recent and pending commercial transactions and agreements as a whole, which country stands to gain the most, the Soviet Union or the USA?*

A. There is no easy or obvious answer. Certainly from the standpoint of economic growth and development the Soviet Union is the bigger beneficiary. As for the U.S., aside from individual American companies which profit from specific deals, the benefits are primarily political.

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PAPER

LNG: A HAZARD FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

By

Nicholas A. Fedoruk

Barry J. Smernoff

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HUDSON INSTITUTE, INC.  
Quaker Ridge Road  
Croton-on-Hudson  
New York 10520

## LNG: A HAZARD FOR U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Introduction

The thrust of our argument is that the proposed LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) deals with the Soviet Union are perceived to be crucial to large-scale trade and technology transfer between the United States and the Soviet Union. Careful assessment of the potential dangers of LNG technology, however, makes it highly questionable whether the United States should place its important new relationship with the Soviet Union in jeopardy of such hazardous technology. We do not believe that it should.

We would like to clarify for the Committee what we see as the logic of the LNG deals from the perspective of U.S.-Soviet trade as well as the importance of these deals to the domestic plans of the Soviet Union. We go on to explain the foreseeable safety and environmental hazards of LNG and relate these to the political and economic risks of the particular Soviet LNG deal under consideration. Having made those arguments, we suggest a more appropriate alternative to LNG.

Soviet Economic Overview

At the recent February meeting on U.S.-Soviet trade sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers, G. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the U.S.A., made clear that the Soviet Union is interested in working out large-scale projects in connection with the general perspective for the development of the national economy until 1990. The Soviet Union plans a more rapid growth of foreign economic ties than the growth rate of the national income. The requirements of world standards and the world market will be more of a determining factor in appraising and planning the output of new products and the development of new processes. The foreign market will increasingly be considered an alternative in the making of decisions on the most expedient planning of investments inside the Soviet Union. As Arbatov makes quite clear:

We are planning to increase efficiency by improving the technical level of many sectors of the economy, including the processing of raw materials, machine building, management information systems and protection of the environment. This will create great demand for imports. As in the past we believe that imports will continue--more and more--to enrich the assortment of consumer goods and services.<sup>1</sup>

In fact it seems that the Soviet Union is looking beyond trade merely in terms of exchange of commodities. It is looking towards cooperation in the field of production with firms in the West whereby Soviet plants would function as subcontractors, or foreign plants would function as subcontractors to Soviet firms. There would be coordinated specialization of production programs by process stages and use of

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<sup>1</sup>G. Arbatov, "Economic Development of the U.S.S.R. and the Prospects for International Division of Labor," presented before the U.S.-Soviet Conference, sponsored by the N.A.M., February 27-28, 1973.

imported parts for Soviet products. There would be joint manufacture and marketing of products which could be done through the establishment of joint ventures.

Traditionally, however, the Soviet Union has sought the maximum security of an autarchic economy. At times they may have used trade temporarily to shore up what was still a basically autarchic economy. This was partly due to intense feelings of insecurity and vulnerability. It was also due, though, to the relative unimportance of foreign trade in solving the tasks of industrial construction facing the Soviet leadership. Now, the problem seems to be one of modernizing the Soviet economy so as to reestablish the previous record of sustained high rates of growth. Foreign trade with non-communist states is seen as absolutely necessary in achieving this goal. There seems to be a realization that national or even regional autarchy is hardly a realistic ambition in an era of dynamic, technological change. Soviet planners seem to have reassessed the role of foreign trade in a more sophisticated perspective, viewing it not as a mere transitional instrument for creating self-sufficiency, but as a permanent and continuing stimulus to economic growth and higher productivity.<sup>2</sup>

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, in his West German television speech, forcefully stated Soviet rejection of a policy of autarchy:

I would like to add that our plans are by no means plans designed for autarchy. Our course is not toward isolating our country from the outside world. On the contrary, we proceed from the fact that it will develop under conditions

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<sup>2</sup>See Business International, "Doing Business with the U.S.S.R.," November 1971.

of growing cooperation with the outside world, and not only with socialist countries at that but in considerable measure with the States of the opposite social system as well.

Other than strained political relations, one of the major restraining factors in the development of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union has been the absence of Soviet exports which would be attractive to U.S. customers. With the onset of increased concern by the United States about energy shortages, particularly gas and oil shortages, the prospect of large reserves of gas and oil in Siberia promises to add the necessary missing piece to improved trade relations.<sup>3</sup> Other than its potential oil and gas, the Soviet Union has relatively little to export in exchange for imports from the West on the scale they have been talking about. This has been further confirmed (inadvertently) by the Soviets themselves. In their Izvestiya article Alkhimov, Arbatov and Inozmtsev stated:

From this point of view we do not have "surplus" commodities, but should the American market display interest--and interest is being shown--we could increase the production for export precisely of those commodities in which American purchasers are interested most. At the same time, it would be possible to expand Soviet exports to the United States by introducing some new commodities, making special provisions for their production in the U.S.S.R.'s economic development plants. All this could therefore be done without any damage either to third countries or to American industry.

The Soviets are also anxious to develop these resources for their internal use. Until Siberia oil and gas fields can be produced

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<sup>3</sup>John P. Hardt, senior specialist in Soviet economics at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, sees the gas deals as the only realistic way to attain bilateral trade levels up to \$4-5 billion per year. J. P. Hardt and G. D. Holliday, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer and Diplomacy, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, June 10, 1973.

commercially in the 1980s, the Soviet Union will import increasingly large quantities of energy from North Africa and the Middle East. This will constitute a drain on Soviet reserves of hard currency:

Soviet oil resources are becoming increasingly stretched and while the Soviet Union as an exporter of oil is interested in higher prices for oil in world trade, as an importer it wants to spend as little hard currency as possible but to base its deal with the Middle East on a barter basis...whatever the political orientation of the rulers [of oil-producing countries] they will try, needless to stress, to strike the most profitable bargain for themselves; "proletarian internationalism" is a well known ideological slogan but economic transactions have a momentum and logic of their own. In other words, short of the annexation of some major oil fields the Soviet Union will have to pay for its oil imports.<sup>4</sup>

Thus there seems to be a perfect marriage of the needs of domestic and foreign policy for both trading partners.

The Soviet Union regards the involvement of the United States in developing the Siberian energy resources as essential and urgent. The Ninth Five-Year Plan Directives ratified in the spring of 1971 placed high priority on the modernization of the civilian economy, and the timely exploitation of the Siberian hydrocarbon resources with the United States is particularly important for this development. The deals would provide advanced American technology for the Soviet oil and gas industry, greatly expanded secure supplies of modern fuels to Soviet industry, and much of the vital foreign exchange for importing high technology from the West for the modernization of other sectors of the civilian economy.

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<sup>4</sup>W. Lacquer, The Middle East Problem, presented to the Symposium on National Strategy in a Decade of Change, Warrenton, Virginia, February 9, 1973. For a detailed analysis, see M. I. Goldman, "The Soviet Role in Oil, Economics and the Middle East," Middle East Information Series, May 1973.

Adding urgency to Soviet interest in these deals has been the progressive weakening of Soviet economic performance in the 1970s. The much reported crop failure of 1972 is only part of the problem. There has been a reported decline in the rate of industrial growth (1971: 7.8%; 1972: 6.7%; 1973: 5.8% is projected).<sup>5</sup> And this does not reflect the real picture. In the "leading edge" of the economy, which has been growing at a much slower rate than the old standbys (iron, steel, coal and hydroelectric).

Having realized that the surpluses of the Soviet economy have been largely squeezed out by now, and that they must, therefore, press forward with modernization to turn around the industrial production picture, <sup>the Soviets</sup> are pressing particularly hard for finalization of the gas deals as the keystone to expanded U.S.-Soviet trade relations. But this also implies huge investments by the Soviet Union, the use of scarce high test metals, sophisticated machinery, and highly skilled manpower. Thus, given the size of the project and its important interrelation with the rest of the civilian economy, the Soviet leadership may indeed be faced with an agonizing choice between guns and butter, or, in this case, gas.

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<sup>5</sup>The New York Times, January 14, 1973, section III, p. 56. To understand the inflated quality of these statistics, it is useful to realize that while the Soviet Union claimed that its economy grew at the rate of 4 percent last year, the best U.S. estimates are that, in fact, it grew at the rate of 1.5 percent. See H. B. Meyer, "Why the Russians are Shopping in the U.S.," Fortune, February 1973, p. 148.

### LNG Safety

Cryogenic technology makes possible the liquification of natural gas for economical storage or transport; a given quantity of natural gas occupies less than 1/6 of 1% of its normal volume when cooled to -270° F. Experimental work performed by the Bureau of Mines in the 1950s seemed to indicate that LNG spills on water or land do not involve serious hazards. More recently, however, large field tests have been run in which LNG spills on water result in either the development of large inflammable pools of LNG and evaporating methane or, in some cases, a flameless explosion resulting from superheated LNG. Underwater injection of LNG appears to definitely cause flameless explosions.<sup>6</sup>

The consequences of a LNG tanker collision or hard grounding in a harbor might be disastrous. The spilled LNG pools and evaporating gas clouds would envelop a huge area which would likely contain numerous ships, extensive port facilities, and a large population. The possibility of the LNG/gas dissipating without igniting in such a situation is miniscule, and the means for preventing, containing or fighting such a fire are all but nonexistent.<sup>7</sup>

The actual occurrence of an LNG catastrophe would be such an "unacceptable development" (in the words of a Distrigas executive) that the viability of the LNG industry might well be called into question. This situation is not unlike that of the nuclear industry, in which a serious nuclear reactor accident might jeopardize the entire development

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<sup>6</sup>See T. H. Ingram, "Peril of the Month: Gas Supertankers," The Washington Monthly, February 1973.

<sup>7</sup>Rudy L. Ruggles, Jr., private communication, June 28, 1973.

of nuclear fission energy. In fact, the sudden emergence of LNG as a major energy industry is similar to the fairly rapid growth of nuclear energy--which ~~can~~ only came about through "leapfrogging experience." We clearly cannot afford to place our relationship with the Soviet Union in jeopardy of this kind of technological uncertainty.

Let us imagine what might happen. Although the miserable state of LNG safety gives an increasing number of people pause, the Soviet LNG deals proceed smoothly and both projects are completed in the early 1980s. A few years later, more than 150 cryogenic tankers are plying the world's oceans carrying LNG from the Soviet Union, Algeria, and the Middle East to the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. In the late 1980s, a catastrophic LNG accident occurs in Boston harbor, leading to over 5,000 deaths in the immolation of more than 40% of downtown Boston. Public outcry in the United States forces termination of all LNG deliveries. The Soviets are asked to repay the long-term credits for the LNG projects in a form other than banned LNG. They reply that such payment is impossible, but are still willing to ship LNG. Swift erosion of U.S.-Soviet relations ensues as the Soviet Union exports part of the natural gas in question to Eastern Europe and uses the remainder internally, without converting the gas to LNG.

Now let us consider a more desirable alternative.

The Alternative: Methanol

Fortunately, there appears to be an alternative mode of importing the clean-burning energy of natural gas which is much safer than LNG and, over long shipping distances, seems to be less expensive than LNG. Natural gas can be converted into methanol, a relatively volatile liquid hydrocarbon fuel, which then can be transported in noncryogenic tankers as if it were crude oil or a refined petroleum product. Once landed at its destination, the methanol can be used directly as a sulfur-free fuel for electric utilities (nitrogen oxides are quite low, as well) or it can be converted into pipeline-quality synthetic natural gas (SNG).

While methanol is no more hazardous than gasoline or naphtha, either in storage or transport, it is not an exaggeration to say that LNG is ultrahazardous, in the technical and legal sense. If the proposed Soviet LNG deals were modified, becoming deals to import methanol converted from Siberian natural gas, the economics and environmental cost/benefit assessment of U.S.-Soviet energy deals would brighten considerably.

LNG cost escalation has been precipitous over the last four years, and is chiefly due to the immaturity of LNG tanker technology. The economics of Soviet LNG may also be more costly due to the harsh climate in which Siberian gas is produced.

Methanol economics<sup>8</sup> appear to have much less inflationary potential. Hence Soviet methanol might be (much) cheaper than Soviet LNG. This is a non-trivial point, since the anticipated \$20-25 billion, 10-year

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<sup>8</sup>See B. Dutkiewicz, "Methanol Competitive with LNG on Long Haul," The Oil and Gas Journal, April 30, 1973.

energy R & D program is expected to provide commercial coal gasification technology, opening up an alternative domestic source of pipeline quality gas which would be more reliable, economical, and safer than Soviet LNG.

Negotiating the Deals

Assuming that the United States considers it in the national interest to go ahead with the gas deals, substituting methanol for LNG, there are important issues involved in how we proceed in negotiating the credit provisions of these deals. On October 18, 1972 President Nixon declared that it is in the national interest to grant cheap credits to the Soviet Union for the purchase of U.S. equipment.<sup>9</sup> We would maintain that that is a highly questionable policy stance.

From the perspective of stimulating foreign sales of American equipment low interest rates offered by the Eximbank might seem in the national interest. But from the perspective of the general long-run foreign policy interests of the United States, it would seem to act to our disadvantage by lowering the pressure on the Soviet leadership to choose between guns and butter.

This pressure will be further alleviated if, as is now being discussed,<sup>10</sup> we also do not require the Soviets to make progress payments on their loans, but rather allow them to start repayment after the completion of construction. This would amount to giving the Soviet leadership a free ride for the next seven to eight years on making the hard choices between military priorities and the civilian needs involved in the gas deals.

From another perspective, the question has been raised as to whether we should give the Soviet Union preferential treatment concerning disclosure of business information.<sup>11</sup> It would seem quite clear after the

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<sup>9</sup>The New York Times, October 19, 1972.

<sup>10</sup>The New York Times, April 4, 1973. Report on the visit of the chairman of the Eximbank to the Soviet Union.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

shennanigans in which Soviet traders engaged in the grain deals, in which the secrecy of Soviet intentions played a major part, that we cannot afford to do business with them on any other than a business basis. The disclosure of information provisions in the Eximbank regulations are there for good reasons. We cannot afford any more peace gestures as costly as the grain deal, for which the American public and our allies are still paying (cf. the recent export controls placed on soybean products).

We should be firm in our dealings with the Soviet Union, particularly in the trade areas. We must not allow the Soviet Union to use political considerations to decrease the data made available to the Eximbank. We should require the same kind of access to Soviet territory and East European territory for Western businessmen and technicians as is the case in dealing with other major trading partners who are not in the Communist bloc. We should encourage an international division of labor through trade which reverses the economic autarchy and integration of COMECON, thus encouraging a free flow of information and people.

The increased people-to-people exchange would be politically advantageous to the West as would the free flow of information across cold war barriers. Better information on the Soviet Union's economy and resources would also enable us to take a tougher stance on political concessions in the trade area.

And at this point we can afford to be firm in our dealings with the Soviet Union. At this point, General Secretary Brezhnev's personal political position is intimately bound up with the success of his Peace Program and its showpiece, U.S.-Soviet detente. As stated in a recent broadcast to North America:

People everywhere associate Leonid Brezhnev with the beginning of a new phase in Soviet-American relations. Progress in these relations is essential to stronger international security as well as to the two countries.<sup>12</sup>

The commentator from Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn (International Affairs) might well have added how essential "progress in these relations" is to the personal security of Leonid Brezhnev.

The importance of detente was emphasized by the fact that, in spite of a poor economic performance for 1972 and agricultural failures, Brezhnev himself was glorified. The blame for the agricultural failures was placed elsewhere, on Minister of Agriculture Matskevich, who was replaced in this undesirable position by Politburo member Polyansky. Of course the sweetener that has made Brezhnev's opponents willing to overlook the domestic economic problems and to engage in these adventurous relations with the United States is the expectation that detente will lead to American assistance to the Soviet economy in vital areas. And of course, in this context, the most vital of all areas is Soviet oil and gas.

The importance of the success of detente and trade for Brezhnev is indicated by the political benefits he has derived from it, the political setbacks he has avoided because of it, and the political concessions he has been willing to make because of it.

The political benefits Brezhnev has derived from detente and trade have been particularly obvious recently. At the April plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU the record of the Peace Program was reviewed, highly praised, and recommended with still greater fervor.

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<sup>12</sup> FBIS, May 7, 1973, G3.

The success of Brezhnev's policy was organizationally recognized in the precedent-setting dismissal of two of his two chief opponents, Voronov and Shelest, from the Politburo. This precedent is, of course, most beneficial to the top dog in the Politburo struggle. Quite clearly, Brezhnev would not want to supply ammunition for his critics at this vital juncture in the power struggle.

Brezhnev is making his move and the Peace policy, particularly its U.S. component, ideally serves to bolster his success. Successful conclusion of long-term trade deals with the United States would open prospects for great improvement in the recently weak Soviet economic performance. And further development of the U.S.-Soviet detente would increase the prestige of the Soviet Union, further enhancing its claim to world leadership as the champion of peace.

On the other hand, many of Brezhnev's political moves have revealed the depth of his commitment to the new relationship and therefore his need to make concessions, if necessary, to support it. Most striking has been the gentle treatment of Watergate by the Soviet press. They have virtually ignored this juicy ideological morsel, only reporting the firing of Haldeman and Ehrlichman in the briefest terms. The few comments that have been made might well have been written by Ron Ziegler, so friendly are they to the American President. When asked about the influence of Watergate on his upcoming visit, Brezhnev replied:

America stays where it is, the time remains as it was. What do you expect, an earthquake?<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>The New York Times, May 21, 1973.

Under pressure, the Soviet leader has shown a willingness to compromise political questions in dealing with the United States. He has cooperated with the United States in its efforts to end the Vietnam War in a manner acceptable to the American leadership. He has also been willing to not enforce the emigration tax against Soviet Jews wishing to go to Israel. Most recently, the Soviet leader, in preparing for his trip to the United States, agreed to include the question of free flow of people and ideas in Europe as part of the Conference on European Security.

Given the above considerations, there would seem to be plenty of room for the United States to negotiate successfully in the new environment Brezhnev is trying to establish. Reduction of the chances of military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States is clearly in the interest of both parties in the nuclear era. But to secure the United States' national interest in such a world, we will have to negotiate like Yankee traders rather than Chinese Emperors. And the U.S. should be just as firm in dealing with the Soviet Union for political gains as Brezhnev's deep personal commitment to the new U.S.-Soviet relationship permits.

The Dangers of Pressing Too Hard

While we favor firmness in negotiations with the Soviet Union, we feel that this can definitely be taken too far. Increasingly, it seems that the great Soviet need for U.S. technology to improve economic productivity presents a unique opportunity for the extraction of diplomatic and political concessions.<sup>14</sup> The following scenario may prove instructive in appreciating that U.S. expectations of political gain must nevertheless be limited.

By the mid-1970s, the United States argues that on-site inspection is necessary for verification of gas reserves and improved cost estimates vis-a-vis the Siberian LNG projects.<sup>15</sup> In a related move, the U.S. demands on-site inspection to verify the Comprehensive Test Ban, which had been extensively discussed at SALT II. Moreover, the United States demands Soviet backing of the newly formed cartel of oil-consuming countries during the anticipated confrontation with OPEC, arguing that the Soviets should also be interested in facing down OPEC since they are importing sizeable quantities of oil and must conserve hard currency. Finally, the United States asks for the termination of the Soviet plutonium fast breeder program, arguing that its U.S. counterpart has been curtailed in the interest of nuclear nonproliferation, public safety, and environmental protection.

Leonid Brezhnev has just turned 71 years old and remains a hostage to his Peace Program based on political detente and economic cooperation

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<sup>14</sup>William Safire, "Nixon's LIB," The New York Times, June 14, 1973.

<sup>15</sup>John P. Hardt, "West Siberia: The Quest for Energy," Problems of Communism, May-June 1973.

with the United States. He feels compelled to respect these U.S. demands if the critically important Siberian energy developments--reaffirmed as high priorities in the Five-Year Plan for 1976-1980--are to proceed. Within the Politburo, intense opposition to granting the concessions finally induces a political realignment. Less than a year later, the aging Brezhnev is ousted and military and political hardliners, led by Grechko and Andropov, control the new coalition Politburo. Relations with the United States quickly erode even though the shaken Administration withdraws its trade-related political demands.

Clearly we must be sensitive to approaching this outer limit of negotiating pressure in seeking a quid pro quo from the Soviet Union.

Concluding Recommendations

In view of the preceding points we have come to three major conclusions.

1. The unique opportunity to cement the new relationship by summation of energy deals, if that is the appropriate mode of encouraging trade and technology transfer, must not be seized only to founder<sup>on</sup> the shoals of LNG hazards. Soviet methanol appears to be more economically desirable and certainly is less environmentally risky than Soviet LNG.

2. U.S.-Soviet economic relations should be developed in a smooth, evolutionary manner. Discontinuous and abrupt changes in the pattern of U.S.-Soviet trade and technology transfer might lead to political and/or economic backlashes which undermine the new U.S.-Soviet relationship. The adverse political/economic backlashes could emerge from either trading partner and, with each country, from broad coalitions across the political spectra.

3. Congressional involvement in the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations is necessary to provide the "wisdom of restraint" without which the U.S.-Soviet relationship is endangered.<sup>16</sup> This should apply not only to military and political considerations but also to the evolving economic relations inherent in U.S.-Soviet trade and technology transfer.

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<sup>16</sup> United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A report by President Richard Nixon for the Congress, May 3, 1973, P. 28.

## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF RECENT SOVIET MONOGRAPHS

(By Murray Feshbach)

This bibliography, as the previous two included in Joint Economic Committee publications, is limited primarily to a selection from among the monographs, which have been received by the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (formerly of the Bureau of the Census), U.S. Department of Commerce, primarily in the fields of Soviet economics, labor force, and population. With few exceptions, the current selection is restricted to those monographs which have appeared since 1967 and received since February 1968, the closing date of the previous bibliography included in *Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-1967*, May 1968, pp. 165-194 until the present closing date of April 1973. (Also see the cumulative bibliography to that date, in *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Part IV, 1966, pp. 977-1026.)

This new selection, as the earlier ones, contains relatively few purely technical books, and statistical handbooks are omitted entirely. It consists of 1,844 items, more than three times the number in the 1968 bibliography, and represents about 35 percent of the total number of items received during the period of selection.

The bibliography is arranged according to subject and sector of the national economy. Some of the categories used in the 1968 bibliography have been retitled and regrouped and new categories have been added in order to reflect current publication patterns and areas of interest. The arrangement within the subject listing and the sector listing is as follows:

## SUBJECT LISTING

Background, history.  
 Capital investment, new technology, technical progress,  
 Communist party.  
 Cost of production, khozraschet.  
 Economy—general.  
 Foreign trade.  
 Geography, urbanization, location of industry, regional economy.  
 Input-output, linear programming, mathematical methods, optimal planning.  
 International comparisons.  
 Labor.  
 Law.  
 Level of living, consumption.  
 National income, state budget, taxes.  
 Planning, reform, management.  
 Population, vital statistics.  
 Prices.  
 Social insurance, social security.  
 Sociology.  
 Statistics, accounting, data processing, automated system of management.  
 Wages.

## SECTOR LISTING

Industry—General.  
     Electric power.  
     Fuels.  
     Metallurgy.  
     Machine-building and metalworking.  
     Chemical.  
     Construction materials.  
     Logging, woodworking, and paper.  
     Light.  
     Food.  
     Mining.  
 Construction.  
 Agriculture—General.  
     State farms.  
     Collective farms.  
     Private subsidiary farms.  
     Other (irrigation, services, etc.)  
 Forestry.

Transportation—General.  
 Railroad.  
 Sea.  
 River.  
 Air.  
 Automotive.

Communications.

Domestic trade, public dining, and material-technical supply.

Housing, communal economy, and personal services.

Health services.

Education.

Science and scientific services.

Banking, credit, and insurance.

Government.

Armed forces.

Other.

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- (See also: 14, 596, 823, 924, 1060, 1088.)

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(See also : 251, 279, 486, 625, 636, 713, 876, 880-881, 897, 903, 925-926, 970, 1078, 1097, 1100, 1133, 1185, 1201, 1590.)

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Senator PROXMIRE. I want to thank you gentlemen very much for a very stimulating and helpful and informative session. You are a fine panel, all three of you.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[The following information was subsequently supplied for the record:]

RESPONSE OF STEVEN LAZARUS TO ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS POSED BY THE COMMITTEE

*Question 1. Assuming the 1972 grain sales did not maximize the U.S. market advantages, how may we improve future dealings?*

Answer. While the Soviets might have been induced to pay more than they did for the U.S. grain which they purchased, the U.S. economy nevertheless benefited substantially from these sales.

For U.S. taxpayers, the Soviet grain sales cut Government expenditures for subsidies on agricultural products and exports by a net \$457 million. For workers, the sales created jobs by generating approximately \$1.5 billion in additional rail transportation, shipping, and other economic activity. For farmers, the sales increased the value of the 1972 crops by more than \$1 billion. And the sales contributed approximately \$1 billion to the U.S. balance of payments.

Because of the temporary decrease in U.S. domestic grain supplies, prices to consumers have increased. On the other hand, these price increases have reduced Government subsidies to U.S. crop growers. Taxpayers' costs through these subsidies have been cut by some \$762 million for the 1972-73 farm program. Even with the usual grain export and transportation subsidies, the net savings to the taxpayers was \$457 million.

U.S. private companies concluded the grain transactions with the Soviets at prices then obtaining in the world market, and it can be argued that the agreed upon prices were too low given market demand. The U.S. Government, however, requires less market information and exerts less market control than do the centrally planned socialist economies. In this case, lack of such market control in our free enterprise society created the opportunity for the favorable price arrangements that the Soviets were able to obtain.

Future dealings in grain might be improved by developing more accurate data respecting Soviet requirements and informing U.S. suppliers (including farmers) in advance of Soviet contract negotiations. A related issue, of course, is the amount of grain which the U.S. can export abroad regardless of destination and what impact such sales will have on domestic prices. For example, in 1972, Asia was a major customer for U.S. grain. Grain sales to the Soviets were in addition to the usual U.S. sales to Asia and to other foreign customers. If the U.S. Government had known the impact of the Soviet sales, it is possible that it might have limited them through the imposition of export controls. Control of grain exports, however, is a very delicate and complex policy issue. It contradicts the free flow of commerce which has been the basis of U.S. economic strength, and therefore, it must be carefully considered within the framework of total U.S. economic policy.

*Question 2. If we do not know the external debt of the U.S.S.R. with Western Europe and Japan, how can we assess the credit worthiness of the Soviet Union?*

Answer. The present estimated level of outstanding Soviet hard currency debts is between \$3 billion and \$4 billion. West European and Japanese exposure in the U.S.S.R. for government guaranteed medium- and long-term credits at the end of 1972 totalled about \$2.6 billion. The difference is in short-term credits. The creditworthiness of the Soviet Union can be assessed on the basis of three factors: credit record, gold reserves, and the Soviet debt-service ratio.

The Soviets have an outstanding record for meeting their commercial payments on time and in full. Lend Lease presents a special case, as the Soviets claim it was part of the joint war effort. The experience of West European and Japanese businessmen, who have conducted a much more substantial volume of trade with the U.S.S.R. during the past decade than has the U.S., reflects an excellent Soviet payments record. As a result, they consider the Soviet Union a reliable credit risk. Soviet *gold reserves* were estimated at about 2,000 metric tons at the end of 1972, with a value of about \$7 billion at current market prices. The Soviet Union has in recent months sold gold for hard currency on the free market, and appears to be using some of its gold to help pay for purchases of U.S. goods and services. The Soviets could sell some 200 tons or more annually without reducing their reserves and perhaps more as the U.S.S.R. brings more gold fields and mines into production.

The Soviet *debt service ratio*<sup>1</sup> has risen from 11% in 1967 to 20% in 1972. This slow rise is due to the increasingly large proportion of outstanding long-term credits, relative to medium-term credits. The former now account for about

<sup>1</sup> The debt service ratio is defined as the ratio of payment of principal and interest to hard currency exports, expressed in percent.

90% of the total outstanding credits. The Soviet ratio of debt service on government-guaranteed, medium- and long-term credits may exceed 25% before long. For the U.S.S.R. a ratio of much over 30% could serve as an important constraint on the expansion of imports from the West. The Soviets are seeking to expand their exports in order to increase their foreign exchange earnings.

*Question 3. What would be the effect of passage of the Jackson Amendment?*

Answer. Passage of the Jackson Amendment would deny the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status. Since nondiscriminatory tariff treatment is a condition for implementation of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement of 1972, the Agreement would be effectively nullified. Commercial advantages which we have gained under the Agreement would be revoked. These include the right to arbitration of commercial disputes in a third country, improved commercial representation in Moscow, and other measures which would allow U.S. businessmen to trade with the Soviet Union on an equal footing with their Western competitors.

Passage of the Jackson Amendment would relieve the Soviet Union of its acknowledged obligation to repay at least \$722 million in lend-lease debt owed to this country.

By cutting Export-Import Bank credit as well as any other U.S. Government credit or guarantees, the Amendment would also remove one of the most important sources of finance for East-West trade.

We believe that the Soviet Union would regard the passage of such legislation as an unwarranted intrusion into its domestic affairs, and that the initial result of the Amendment's passage would be stiffening of Soviet emigration policies—a reaction directly converse to the interests of those whom the Amendment seeks to assist. We believe that the best prospects for a resolution of the problems of Soviet Jewry lie in quiet diplomatic efforts, and the Administration is continuing to pursue this problem by diplomatic means. We believe that only these means can bring about success.

*Question 4. What other options are open to the U.S.S.R. if American credits are not available through the Export-Import Bank?*

Answer. The U.S.S.R. can continue to utilize the U.S. commercial banks like any other banking customer. However, the amount of financing available from this source is not large when compared to the value of the U.S. goods and services which the Soviets have indicated they would like to buy.

The Soviets can also utilize the Eurocurrency market which is estimated at over \$75 billion. The Eurocurrency market is primarily a source of short- and medium-term funds, rather than the long-term credits the Soviets are seeking from Eximbank. It is also an expensive market, with interest rates of between 9 and 10 percent on transactions of up to six months. Longer term credits, of course, carry higher interest rates.

*Question 5. To what extent may we expect equity participation in joint ventures or coproduction projects within the Soviet Union?*

Answer. At this time Soviet law prohibits equity participation by foreign firms in joint ventures inside the U.S.S.R., and also management participation, as these terms are understood in the West. It does allow self-liquidating contracts in which the Western firm provides equipment and technology on credit and the Soviets provide labor and materials, and it is signing an increasing number of these contracts. Part of all of the repayment by the Soviets may be made in the commodity produced by the new plant or installation in such ventures. They are essentially a sophisticated form of barter arrangement, and not to be considered as co-production ventures in the strict sense of the term as it is used in the West.

However, second- or third-country joint ventures between Western firms and the U.S.S.R. have occurred. These involve joint ownership of firms located outside the U.S.S.R. which market Soviet-manufactured products. Such firms are chartered under the laws of the host country and can be regarded as Soviet investments in the West.

*Question 6. How will the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council improve U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial relations? Will small businessmen have equal access to data and trade facilities? Is there a danger that a Soviet trade lobby will be built up in the United States?*

Answer. The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, agreed upon at the Washington Summit, is still in the process of implementation. It is to be a non-

profit corporation which will assist the development of U.S.-Soviet trade cooperating and coordinating with the governmental and non-governmental organizations in both countries pursuing similar objectives.

As envisioned, the Council will collect and disseminate current economic and statistical data on both countries; information on laws and regulations governing investment, the movement of goods and capital and other regulations of interest to businessmen; and information on trade opportunities and market potentials in both countries. It will assist members and other interested U.S. and Soviet traders with respect to methods and formalities of doing business, and function as a focal point for the initiation of trade contacts between U.S. companies and representatives of Soviet commercial organizations. The Council will cooperate with other public and private organizations in promoting cultural, scientific, technological and commercial cooperation; and in encouraging the exchange of trade missions, trade fairs and related exhibitions. It will maintain liaison with government agencies, and bring to their attention any general problems with which members of the Council are concerned.

Offices have been proposed in both Moscow and New York. The services and facilities of the Council are to be equally available to all members, regardless of firm or organization size.

In the United States, an initial Board of Directors has been formed, consisting of 24 corporate and financial leaders of the U.S. business community. The Chairman is Donald M. Kendall of Pepsico.

The Trade and Economic Council might possibly encourage the development of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade lobby, but it is not likely that such a lobby would offset the advantages to be derived from the Council itself.

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RESPONSE OF FOY D. KOHLER TO ADDITIONAL WRITTEN QUESTIONS POSED BY THE COMMITTEE

*Question 1. Assuming that the 1972 grains sales did not maximize the U.S. market advantages, how may we improve future dealings?*

Answer. I cannot fault the Russians for taking advantage of our existing export subsidies. Consequently, the question of improving our handling of grain sales is one of domestic legislation and government administration in which I would not profess to be an expert witness. As a citizen, however, I was pleased to note that the export subsidies have been discontinued and presume this will continue at least as long as world prices remain high.

*Question 2. If we do not know the external debt of the U.S.S.R. with Western Europe and Japan, how can we assess the credit worthiness of the Soviet Union?*

Answer. The problem of assessing credit worthiness of a politically controlled economy, particularly in a country which practices secrecy to the extent that the Soviet Union does, is a very difficult one. The problem involves not only the external debts of the Soviet Union but such questions as gold and foreign exchange reserves, which are not published. My own feeling is that we should use any transactions with the Soviet Union as far as possible to induce that country to move toward greater disclosure of economic and financial information.

*Question 3. What would be the effect of passage of the Jackson amendment?*

Answer. It seems to me most unlikely that the Soviet Union will give up what it considers the sovereign right of the state to control the movements of its citizens. This is an old Russian practice. If the demand for free emigration should be attached to trade legislation, including the granting of MFN, Moscow's interpretation would probably be that the prospects for improved economic relations with the United States in effect are dim and particularly as respects the kind of long-term credits the Soviet Union obviously desires to obtain. Since the extension of MFN treatment is linked to the Lend-Lease settlement this latter would probably be the first casualty. However, there would be substantial non-fulfillment of the various exchange agreements which we regard as being in our political interest.

*Question 4. What options are open to the U.S.S.R. if American credits are not available through the Export-Import Bank?*

Answer. In the absence of American Export-Import Bank credits the Soviet Union might expect to receive some amount of private American credits on a commercial basis from American manufacturers and bankers. However, for large-scale terms, it would probably turn increasingly to Western European or Japanese sources.

*Question 5. To what extent may we expect equity participation in joint ventures or co-production projects within the Soviet Union?*

Answer. Soviet domestic spokesmen have carefully explained to the Soviet people since the Brezhnev visit that the proposed "large-scale, long-term" deals will not have the nature of concessions for foreign capital or of the exploitation of Soviet resources by "foreign monopolies." They make it clear that ownership and control of such ventures will remain Soviet and that foreign firms involved would simply receive payment for their equipment and assistance from the portion of the resources developed.

*Question 6. How will the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council improve U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial relations? Will small businesses have equal access to data and trade facilities? Is there a danger that a Soviet trade lobby will be built up in the United States?*

Answer. I do not know enough about the plans for the new U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council to offer a meaningful comment at this stage.



