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EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO U.S. POLICIES IN VIETNAM

GOVERNMENT

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 4, 17, 1973

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PREFACE

The past 12 months have seen the climax of American military action in Southeast Asia, an unprecedented worldwide criticism of the United States because of that action, the withdrawal of American military forces following a peace settlement in Southeast Asia, and the imposition, by the Congress, of a legislative ban on further military action by the United States in that area.

This past year represents, in short, a dramatic stage in an American policy which extends back to three previous American Presidents and over a 20-year period.

This volume of hearings and associated documents reflects a painful period for Americans concerned with their country's foreign relations. Most of the things said here about our role in Southeast Asia are sharply critical. But this is not the justification for holding these hearings or for printing them now. What has concerned me, and still does, is that these are European voices speaking (directly or indirectly through American observers) and Western Europe is America's best friend. What Europe thinks and says about the United States is important to *our* goals which are numerous and complex in Western Europe.

American goals in Europe are also changing. This was one obvious implication of the characterization of 1973 by President Nixon as the "Year of Europe." It has been a bad year, one can now safely say as its last weeks roll by. From criticism of the "Christmas bombing" which this volume depicts, to the abortive attempt to restore old relationships by the administration's call for a new "Atlantic Charter," to the bitterness engendered on both sides of the Atlantic by the October war in the Middle East, it has been one piece of bad news after another.

The "Year of Europe" proclaimed by our administration late last year was either too long or too short.

The proclamation excited more expectations than any series of speeches, consultations, and declarations could satisfy. Proper servicing of the relationship between Europe and America is as complex as the historical ethnic, economic, and political ties which bind us across the Atlantic. Even suggesting that 12 months of activity could contain that restorative effort was a disservice to our true interests in West Europe. And even the best intentions and the best performance during any year would have left an unfortunate implication: that the end of the year will mean another new direction to American efforts in 1974 away from Europe. (Why not a "Year of Japan" and a "Year of Latin America"?)

Yet Europe had most to expect from a redirection of American attention after the tragic years of Vietnam, for more was happening in Europe from 1964-72 when we were preoccupied in Southeast Asia.

An immense undertaking, perhaps the greatest of our century, was underway as the Six and now the Nine began to create an alloy of national elements which stretch back in history for thousands of years.

We Americans were deceived, perhaps, by the economic forms with which European unity began. Some people (on both sides of the ocean) thought that the European Community was fancy language for a trade bloc. Others (again on both sides of the Atlantic) thought progress toward political unity was too slow, too difficult, and too unlikely to be taken very seriously.

It would have been reassuring if the "Year of Europe" meant that we finally recognized that something fundamentally different *had* occurred in Europe. Instead, the Year seems to mean to our administration that we had better try to restore the American hegemony of the past 25 years on our European allies. The Kissinger speech of April 23 sounded unfortunate echoes of those past years. A new "Atlantic Charter"? Like the Anglo-American one of 1941? Did Dr. Kissinger's citation of a "global" America and a "regional" Europe represent a new perspective?

No. Our policy-making, imbued with WWII ideas about the American-European ties, should have recalled another, more appropriate catch-phrase from that period: Too little and too late.

We need some fresh insights into what is going on in Europe today. Particularly we need to reexamine the European Community which is larger in population than either the United States or the Soviet Union; which controls 40 percent of the world's trade; and which is on a one-way street leading to economic, monetary, and political union by 1980!

We must also find something new to replace the trans-Atlantic institutions, like NATO. The Europeans may have chosen wrongly in the Middle East war but NATO obviously wasn't the institution for discussing and making that choice.

Even with tranquility at home, and the best powers of national concentration, we would have had trouble in belatedly digesting these facts about Europe. We have not had that kind of concentration because we were desperately distracted on our homefront and elsewhere in the world. Renewed repression in the Soviet Union sours détente. A Middle East war embitters participants, their patrons, and the European onlookers.

Each new stress weakens us *and* our European ties. The "Year of Europe" is best forgotten as we enter its final month. More modest expectations abroad and a chance for slow recovery at home is what we need now. Europe remains America's best friend whenever we find ourselves in a position to deal again with friends.

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Europe.

December 4, 1973.

EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO U.S. POLICIES IN VIETNAM

THURSDAY, JANUARY 4, 1973

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order.

I am disappointed that a letter from the Department of State, which I received last night, announced that a witness will not appear this morning.

The subcommittee requested testimony on the European reactions to recent American bombing in North Vietnam. Our interest in that reaction is not academic. There are many important—even vital—American interests at issue in Europe today. The Conference on European Security has already started its planning sessions in Helsinki. Talks on mutual and balanced reductions of American forces in Europe will begin soon. The enlargement this week of the European Community to include, among other countries, Great Britain, portends enormous and complicated problems for our country. The administration has itself indicated that 1973 will be a year for concentrated diplomatic, economic, military, and political efforts in Europe.

Yet, all of these efforts can be seriously affected by the exceptionally sharp and predominantly negative reaction in Europe to the American bombing of North Vietnam cities just before Christmas. These reactions come largely from friends of the United States. They are not the voices of professional or even habitual anti-American spokesmen. Whether or not one accepts the premises of that criticism, its temper is a fact which can jeopardize the important bonds which tie our country to Europe.

REASSURANCES SOUGHT

I had hoped for a reassurance today from our State Department that these reactions are transitory. Even better, I would have welcomed an assurance that our Government understands the abhorrence expressed in Europe against the Christmas bombing. Finally, I would have welcomed a careful and thoughtful exposition of how our Government proposes to work under these difficult circumstances with our European partners in trade and in politics toward the goals of common effort and high dedication which have marked so much of our past relations with that continent.

We received yesterday afternoon or last evening a letter from David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, the substance of which is as follows:

As I mentioned to you on the telephone earlier today, Mr. Stoessel is now in California and had not expected to return to Washington until January 22. I have, however, been in touch with him by telephone today, and in view of your desire to have him appear before the subcommittee, he has adjusted his plans so as to permit his return to Washington at the end of next week. Mr. Stoessel would be glad, any time at your convenience on Friday, January 12, to discuss with the subcommittee in executive session the subjects identified in your letter.

(The full text of the letter follows:)

LETTER FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., January 3, 1973.

HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Secretary Rogers has asked me to thank you for and to respond in his behalf to your letter of December 30 asking that Assistant Secretary of State Walter Stoessel appear before your Subcommittee on Thursday, January 4. As you know, we did not receive your letter until yesterday, which accounts for the last minute nature of this response.

As I mentioned to you on the telephone earlier today, Mr. Stoessel is now in California and had not expected to return to Washington until January 22. I have, however, been in touch with him by telephone today, and in view of your desire to have him appear before the Subcommittee, he has adjusted his plans so as to permit his return to Washington at the end of next week. Mr. Stoessel would be glad, any time at your convenience on Friday, January 12, to discuss with the Subcommittee in executive session the subjects identified in your letter.

I hope these arrangements are satisfactory to you, and that the slight delay in Mr. Stoessel's availability will not prove any serious inconvenience to the Subcommittee's schedule of hearings.

Sincerely yours,

DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

MR. ROSENTHAL. I have responded to that with a letter to Mr. Abshire asking that Assistant Secretary for Europe, Walter Stoessel, testify next Friday, January 12, in open hearing and not in executive session as the Department proposed yesterday to me. I wrote as follows:

As you know, it is the policy of the subcommittee to proceed in open session except where discussion of security or diplomatic matters is of such overriding importance to make closed hearings mandatory. I do not see the existence of these factors in the areas we asked Secretary Stoessel to cover.

We would like to have a frank report from him about the nature of the European reactions to recent events in Vietnam, particularly the December bombing of North Vietnam and an assessment of how those reactions might affect the important issues between the United States and Europe. We are specifically interested in the public reactions to those events and their effects on the political climate in which those issues will be considered. Additionally, we would like a report on the status of our country's

relations with Sweden.¹ An open discussion of these matters serves two important purposes: first, Congress and specifically the Foreign Affairs Committee is better informed by open sessions which produce transcripts and hearing records readily available to all Members; second, the public benefits by a better understanding provided by such discussions of the diplomatic and political climate in which foreign affairs is conducted.
(The full text of the letter follows:)

LETTER TO STATE DEPARTMENT FROM SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., January 4, 1973.

HON. DAVID M. ABSHIRE,
*Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I was disappointed that neither Assistant Secretary Stoessel nor Acting Assistant Secretary Fessenden could appear this morning to testify on the effects of recent developments in Vietnam on American relations in Europe.

I am concerned also about the reference in your letter to the availability of Mr. Stoessel next week in executive session. As you know, it is the policy of the Subcommittee to proceed in open session except where discussion of security or diplomatic matters is of such overriding importance to make closed hearings mandatory. I do not see the existence of these factors in the areas we asked Secretary Stoessel to cover.

We would like to have a frank report from him about the nature of the European reactions to recent events in Vietnam, particularly the December bombing of North Vietnam and an assessment of how those reactions might affect the important issues between the United States and Europe. We are specifically interested in the public reactions to those events and their effects on the political climate in which those issues will be considered. Additionally, we would like a report on the status of our country's relations with Sweden. An open discussion of these matters serves two important purposes: first, Congress and specifically the Foreign Affairs Committee is better informed by open sessions which produce transcripts and hearing records readily available to all Members; second, the public benefits by a better understanding provided by such discussion of the diplomatic and political climate in which foreign affairs is conducted.

It is my wish that Secretary Stoessel and other officials knowledgeable about our European relations testify next week in open session on these matters.

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe.

MR. ROSENTHAL. Additionally, I asked the Library of Congress to submit and, if necessary, update the paper that they released on November 6, 1969, entitled "The Recall or Withholding of U.S. Ambassadors To Influence Other Governments or Express Disapproval of Their Actions."

I shall read the first two paragraphs of that paper because it is pertinent to one area of this hearing. I quote as follows:

This paper briefly explores a question which has apparently received very little direct attention from writers on U.S. foreign policy. In what cases has the United States sought to influence another government or to express disapproval of its actions by

¹ The United States, in response to statements on Vietnam by Swedish officials, withdrew its Chargé d'Affaires in late December 1972. The Swedish Government was also told its new Ambassador to Washington would not be welcome for the present. (See appendix, p. 69.)

Hearings on resolutions urging the restoration of normal diplomatic relations with Sweden were held in September 1973 and published under the title "U.S. Diplomatic Relations With Sweden." Copies are available from the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

recalling the U.S. Ambassador or by delaying the appointment or accreditation of a new one?

The question assumes that diplomatic relations take place without the presence of the U.S. Ambassador. For example, the U.S. Embassy might be headed by the deputy chief of mission or other officers designated as *Chargé d'Affaires*. Our question also assumes that the U.S. Ambassador is recalled or that the sending of a new Ambassador is delayed on the initiative of the United States, for the broad purpose mentioned.

I have asked the Library of Congress to bring this up to date to include the recent events concerning United States-Swedish relations. Without objection, the entire paper will be included in the record.

THE RECALL OR WITHHOLDING OF U.S. AMBASSADORS TO INFLUENCE OTHER GOVERNMENTS OR EXPRESS DISAPPROVAL OF THEIR ACTIONS: SOME SPECIFIC CASES

(Prepared by Ernest S. Lent, specialist in international politics, Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress)

NOVEMBER 14, 1969.

INTRODUCTION

This paper briefly explores a question which has apparently received very little direct attention from writers on U.S. foreign policy.¹ In what cases has the United States sought to influence another government or to express disapproval of its actions by recalling the U.S. ambassador or by delaying the appointment or accreditation of a new one?

The question assumes that diplomatic relations take place without the presence of the U.S. ambassador. For example, the U.S. embassy might be headed by the deputy chief of mission or other officers designated as *charge d'affaires*. Our question also assumes that the U.S. ambassador is recalled or that the sending of a new ambassador is delayed on the initiative of the United States, for the broad purpose mentioned.

Seven cases are cited in this paper. A more intensive study, utilizing the exhaustive published materials available, particularly for earlier periods, might well turn up numerous other examples.²

The United States does not always spell out its reasons for withdrawing or withholding an ambassador. There is much uncertainty in some of these cases on the precise ways in which the U.S. sought to influence another government. This paper does not undertake the large task of weighing the subtleties. In all but one of the seven cases, it seems perfectly clear that some such purposes were present. The case of U.S. relations with the Dominican Republic during the absence of an ambassador for some three months in 1963-1964 is not so clear. This case is tentatively identified as "possible."

I. CUBA, 1960-1961

The United States extended recognition to the "provisional Government of the Republic of Cuba" on a note delivered on January 7, 1959. This was five days after the victorious Fidel Castro had proclaimed Judge Manuel Urrutia Lleó to be Provisional President of Cuba.³

¹ A sampling of guides to diplomatic practice, treaties on diplomacy, texts on international law and texts on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has turned up only one brief discussion of a topic embracing this question.

Elmer Plischke writes, "It is somewhat exceptional for a state to bring an overseas diplomatic representation to an end without severing diplomatic relations." He cites an action by the Government of Iran in 1936 and the widespread recall or withholding of ambassadors and ministers from Spain in accordance with a 1946 United Nations resolution. *Conduct of American Diplomacy*, 3rd. ed., Princeton, New Jersey, Van Nostrand, 1957, pp. 299-300. Professor Plischke's summary of the Spanish case is quoted below in the Section entitled "Spain, 1946-1951."

Edwin S. Costrell, Chief of the Historical Studies Division, Historical Office, Department of State, recently advised that the Historical Office has made no study of this topic.

² The writer had the benefit of off-the-cuff leads, some of them not fully explored in the time available, which were helpfully suggested by three officers of the Historical Office, Department of State, and by area specialists in the Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service.

³ For diplomatic correspondence at this time, see Marjorie M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law*, Vol. 2, Department of State Publication 7753, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963, pp. 268-270.

The story of the development of increasingly acute tensions between the United States and Cuba in 1959 and 1960 is readily available in condensed form⁴ and need not be repeated here. On January 21, 1960, U.S. Ambassador to Cuba Philip A. Bonsal was recalled to Washington for "consultations." He returned to Havana on March 20, 1960. On March 29, Premier Castro announced that he would not send the Cuban Ambassador to the U.S. back to Washington unless the U.S. modified its "unfriendly" policies toward Cuba.

On October 20, 1960, U.S. Ambassador Bonsal was again recalled to Washington, this time for "an extended period of consultations." The United States has not had an ambassador in Cuba since that time. The U.S. severed relations on January 3, 1961. The previous day, Premier Castro said the U.S. embassy in Havana was the center of counter-revolutionary activities and would have to reduce its staff to eleven persons within forty-eight hours.

II. THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1963-1964

On September 25, 1963, a bloodless military coup ousted the democratically-elected government of President Juan Bosch. On the same day the United States suspended diplomatic relations and announced that it was halting aid to the Dominican Republic. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. withdrew its ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, as well as its economic and military aid personnel. However, embassy personnel below the rank of ambassador remained in the Dominican Republic, as did members of the Peace Corps.

Shortly after the coup in the Dominican Republic, on October 3, 1963, another coup took place in Honduras. A U.S. statement, read to newsmen on October 4, declared in part:

We view the recent military coups in the Dominican Republic and Honduras with the utmost gravity. The establishment and maintenance of representative and constitutional government is an essential element in the Alliance for Progress. Stable and effective government, responsive to the popular will, is a critical factor in the attainment of social and economic progress.⁵

The detailed account of U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin relates many ways in which the United States sought to influence the Dominican Republic during the period in which relations were officially suspended.⁶ Initially, the U.S. objective was a return to government by the party of the ousted Juan Bosch. However, the new military-backed civilian government fought back. It complained officially to the Organization of American States about U.S. "intervention." Little by little, according to Ambassador Martin's account, the United States reluctantly cut back its objective. On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated. On December 14, the United States, fearing that governmental instability might lead to a dangerous counter-coup in the Dominican Republic, recognized the new government. A statement by the Department of State read in part:

Both the Honduran and the Dominican regimes have issued decrees setting forth election timetables for return to representative and constitutional governments. Both regimes have given public assurances of respect for civil liberties, freedom of action for political parties, and that international obligations will be fulfilled.⁷

No U.S. ambassador presented his credentials to the new government of the Dominican Republic until March 23, 1964. This was more than three months after U.S. recognition. The new U.S. ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, had been confirmed by the Senate on February 19, 1964, but did not arrive in Santo Domingo until March 21.

None of the various sources we have consulted discusses whether the U.S. delayed the sending of a new ambassador in a further effort to influence the new government. The Historical Office of the Department of State is currently unable

⁴ Hubert Herring, *A History of Latin America from the Beginning to the Present*, 3rd ed., New York, Knopf, 1968, pp. 409-412. Often the facts cited in this section are taken from *Deadline Data, Cuba*, pp. 6-17, and this source, for the relevant country and data, is used frequently throughout this paper.

⁵ Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1963, p. 624.

⁶ Martin, John Bartlow. *Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis From the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War*. Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1966, Chapter 25 and 26. Unfortunately for our purposes, this detailed treatment does not include U.S. policy in the three-month period following the resumption of diplomatic relations on December 14, 1963.

⁷ Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1963, p. 997.

to supply an answer to this question.⁸ A more intensive study than the present one might establish the facts here. At present, we can merely term this a "possible" case.⁹

III. GERMANY, 1938-1941

Cordell Hull wrote in his *Memoirs*:

In November 1938, a savage pogrom against Jews in Germany broke out on an official scale in retaliation for the shooting of a member of the German Embassy in Paris by a German emigre Jew. Assistant Secretary Messersmith prepared a memorandum for me recommending that Ambassador Wilson be ordered home for consultation as a token of our disapproval of this wholesale inhumanity. I conferred with my assistants as to the advisability of this step. Against it was the fact that it would deprive us of an Ambassador in Berlin at a time when one was needed to keep in close contact with the aims and acts of the German Government and to give weight to any representations we needed to make. Favoring it was the fact that words seemed to have no effect on Hitler and his lieutenants; all they perceived was deeds; and, as a nation advocating certain standards of conduct, we could not let so despicable an action as that of the German Government pass unnoticed. We agreed upon Wilson's recall, and I recommended it to the President. He approved . . .

The statement, as the President gave it to the press on November 15, read:

'The news of the past few days from Germany has deeply shocked public opinion in the United States. Such news from any part of the world would inevitably produce a similar profound reaction among American people in every part of the nation.

'I myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth century civilization.

'With a view to gaining a first-hand picture of the situation in Germany I asked the Secretary of State to order our Ambassador in Berlin to return at once for report and consultation.'

Hitler retaliated by ordering Ambassador Dieckhoff home for consultation. Germany and the United States were to be without ambassadors to each other for the remainder of their peacetime relations.¹⁰

IV. HUNGARY, 1956-1967

The Kadar government of Hungary came to power on November 4, 1956, following suppression by Soviet troops of the Hungarian revolt. The new American minister, Edward W. Wailes, appointed on July 26, 1956, arrived while the revolt was in progress. He had not presented his credentials to the short-lived independent communist government of Premier Imre Nagy. Acting under instructions, he did not present them to the new regime. He left Budapest in February 1957, the Hungarian Foreign Office insisting he should present his credentials or leave.¹¹

The United States did not, however, sever diplomatic relations with Hungary. The U.S. embassy staff remained in Budapest. This situation continued until October 30, 1967, at which time Martin J. Hillenbrand presented his credentials as U.S. Ambassador to Hungary. In November 1966, the United States and Hungary had raised their diplomatic relations from the ministerial or legation level to the ambassadorial or embassy level, still without the dispatch of a U.S. ambassador.

The origins of this unusual situation are described in some detail by Marjorie Whiteman.¹² She includes the partial transcript of a news conference of December 2, 1956 in which Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is extensively questioned about it. There is no doubt that the United States was, at least for some of the period, expressing distaste for a government imposed on the Hungarian people by Soviet military force.

⁸ Byron Fairchild, Historical Office, Department of State. Telephone conversation with the writer, November 5, 1969.

⁹ A useful source for this case as a whole is Deadline Data, Dominican Republic, pp. 19-22.

¹⁰ The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 1. New York, Macmillan, 1948, p. 599.

¹¹ Whiteman, *op. cit.*, p. 398.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 398-400.

V. PERU, 1962

On July 18, 1962, Peruvian military leaders staged a successful coup. The Kennedy Administration the same day suspended diplomatic relations, deploring "this military coup d'état which has overthrown the constitutional government of Peru."¹³ Most U.S. assistance programs to Peru were suspended the following day.

The U.S. Ambassador to Peru, James I. Loebe, was recalled, and relations with Peru remained suspended until August 17, 1962. In resuming relations, the U.S. noted that the junta had promised elections and decreed the restoration of constitutional guarantees of civil liberties. The U.S. also resumed economic, but not military assistance. It did not for some time send a new ambassador to Lima. The new U.S. ambassador, J. Wesley Jones, was not appointed by President Kennedy until November 29, 1962, more than three months later.

Was the delay in the appointment of the new ambassador part of a U.S. effort to persuade the Peruvian junta that it should indeed move to assure a return of democratic government? An unpublished study in the Historical Office of the Department of State suggests that this was the case.¹⁴

Hubert Herring writes:

To the surprise of many, the promised presidential election of June 9, 1963, actually took place—perhaps because the junta had felt the sharp distrust of the public, and were cowed by the American government, which could both give aid and take it away. The elections gave the office to Fernando Belaúnde Terry. . . .¹⁵

VI. SPAIN, 1945–1951

Elmer Plischke summarizes the collective withdrawal and withholding of ambassadors and ministers from Spain under a 1946 resolution of the U.N. General Assembly as follows:

. . . On December 12, 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a resolution providing that all of its member governments immediately recall their ambassadors and ministers from Madrid. This resolution also barred Spain from participation in the specialized agencies and other technical activities under the United Nations so long as the Franco regime remained in power. This action was intended as a diplomatic sanction designed to induce reform in the Spanish Government, to evidence reproval for Spain's wartime aid to the Axis, and principally to prevent the Franco regime from endangering international peace. Diplomatic relations were not severed by this action, and United States representation was continued under a charge d'affaires. In November 1950, the General Assembly passed a resolution which revoked the 1946 resolution, and ranking emissaries were again accredited to Madrid. This later action did not imply approval of the Franco regime and its policies, but constituted an acknowledgment that the sanctions had not fully achieved their intended purposes.¹⁶

In reply to an inquiry of December 20, 1946 from the U.N. Secretary-General, the United States replied that it had not had an ambassador or minister plenipotentiary in Spain since the departure of Norman Armour from Madrid on December 1, 1945. The United States abstained on the U.N. resolution in 1946 and voted for its repeal on November 4, 1950. Stanton Griffis, the first U.S. ambassador to Spain in more than five years, presented his credentials on March 1, 1951. Marjorie Whiteman provides an extensive documentary record of the U.S. part in this collective effort to encourage the establishment of "a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed," as well as the considerations which influenced the development of U.S. policy.¹⁷

¹³ For the texts of Department of State statements during this period, as well as the immediate background of the coup, see Whiteman, *Ibid.*, pp. 310–312.

¹⁴ Peter V. Curl, Historical Office, Department of State. Telephone conversation with the writer, October 31, 1960.

¹⁵ A History of Latin America, *op. cit.*, p. 607. For Herring's account of the coup and its aftermath, see pp. 605–607.

¹⁶ Conduct of American diplomacy, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

¹⁷ Whiteman, *Op. cit.*, pp. 430–436.

VII. SWEDEN, 1969

The United States has not had an ambassador to Sweden since William W. Heath ended his service in that capacity on January 23, 1969. The United States has not severed relations with Sweden, but neither has President Nixon named a new ambassador to that country.¹⁸ The following account of the increasing ill-feeling between the United States and Sweden is extracted from a memorandum written in October of this year by Pauline Mian of the Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service.¹⁹

"In 1967, the Swedish government started granting asylum to American military deserters, who today number around 250. Also, in 1967, Sweden granted Lord Bertrand Russell permission to hold in Sweden his 'War crimes tribunal' against 'American crimes in Vietnam,' after permission was denied to him by several other European countries. In February 1968, the Swedish Education Minister Olof Palme—who has just been elected to succeed Tage Erlander as Premier—led a protest march against United States Vietnamese policy. Following this demonstration, the then United States ambassador to Sweden, William Heath, was called back to Washington for consultations, and remained away from his post for five weeks. The Swedes saw in the ambassador's prolonged absence from his post a sign of disapproval on the part of the United States, and on March 27, 1968, then Premier Erlander expressed little hope that relations would improve until the end of the war. On January 10, 1969, ten days before President Nixon's inauguration, it was announced that Sweden would establish full diplomatic relations with North Vietnam, thus making it the first West European country to do so. In a letter accompanying the announcement, Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson stated: 'As the negotiations in Paris are now entering a stage which, it is hoped, will be decisive for the peace in Vietnam, it would appear that the time has come to establish diplomatic relations.'²⁰ Robert J. McCloskey, United States State Department spokesman, issued a statement criticizing the Swedish decision: 'The United States Government does not believe this decision will help the cause of peace in Southeast Asia, coming as it does at a time when the Hanoi regime is still continuing its efforts to overthrow by armed force the elected constitutional government of South Vietnam.'²¹

"In addition to the opening of embassies in Hanoi and Stockholm, the National Liberation Front—the political arm of the Vietcong—has been allowed to open an information office in Stockholm. Sweden still has formal diplomatic relations with South Vietnam, but has not sought to accredit an ambassador to Saigon since 1967."

Mr. ROSENTHAL. This hearing will close after a statement by Mr. Frelinghuysen and response by myself, subject to being recalled next Friday if Secretary Stoessel is available and if the question of whether a closed hearing or open hearing is successfully resolved.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly appreciate the opportunity of testifying. I suppose that is what we could call my remarks since we don't have any witnesses before the subcommittee. It must be disappointing to the audience to get nothing but perhaps a little better understanding about how the congressional committee system functions. This meeting certainly is something I don't understand at all and my statement will concern itself with what is going on here.

I have served here for 20 years, am starting my 11th term, and this is the first time I have ever attended a meeting where we know there would be no witnesses. I would assume anyone in his right mind would simply call off the meeting if there was no witness.

¹⁸ Ambassador Jerome H. Holland was nominated by President Nixon and arrived in Stockholm in April, 1970 (Subcommittee Editor's note).

¹⁹ Report on the status of United States recognition of Sweden. Legislative Reference Service, October 3, 1969.

²⁰ *New York Times*, January 11, 1969, p. 1.

²¹ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1969, p. 23132.

I might say, for those who don't know, that there are 13 Members of the 93d Congress who served in the 92d Congress as members of the Europe Subcommittee. Of those 13 there are two here today. I might say this is not the Members' fault. Our subcommittee has not organized. Our subcommittee hasn't decided anything about holding hearings.

LETTER SENT TO STATE DEPARTMENT

What has happened is that our chairman has taken it upon himself to send a letter to the State Department—and I only found this out this morning—a letter dated Saturday, December 30, requesting a witness from the State Department for today. I spoke to the chairman yesterday because I had heard through the grapevine—I am the senior Republican on the subcommittee—I had heard through the grapevine there might be a meeting today. I asked my chairman what was going on, and said that I had no notice but I understood there was the possibility of a hearing. He told me on the floor yesterday that he doubted very much if the State Department was going to be able to send anyone up tomorrow and he assumed it would be held next week. There was never an indication so far as I know that the State Department was going to be able to comply with a request that they did not even receive until January 2.

Mr. Abshire pointed out that they responded as quickly as they received it, in his communication and by telephone I assume. Certainly the letter which he sent, a copy of which I received last night, says that Mr. Stoessel is on leave, and this letter says he is making a considerable concession to get back on January 12. But the impression is created that we should be fully functioning today. I think it is an outrageous abuse of authority by a chairman to simply go ahead, on the day when Hale Boggs is having a memorial service in New Orleans, with holding a mockery of a hearing because we have no witnesses. We have had no discussions as to the subject matter of the hearing, and we have quite obviously no one to discuss the matter with this morning. So I don't know what is going on, but I would think out of courtesy that members of the subcommittee should at least be informed what the plan is.

I might say I was in my own office until a quarter of 12 yesterday. There was no indication from anyone, including our friend Mr. Hackett, that there was going to be a hearing, or that an effort was being made to get a hearing. A green paper was left at my office by Mr. Hackett, after I went to the floor, saying "You are cordially invited to attend the following open session meeting of the Subcommittee on Europe, today's date, 10 a.m.; subject: To hear officials of the State Department."

This couldn't have been sent out on the basis that they had any indication there was going to be anyone here from the State Department today. And I had no indication from the chairman when I asked him what was going on, than for him to say he didn't think there would be anything until next week.

PURPOSE OF HEARING QUESTIONED

I repeat my question: What is the point of having a charade like this? What are we trying to do? I would assume we are both Members

of Congress, we are both members of the Subcommittee on Europe, and we both should be equally interested in subjects that might be discussed. What is the point of going off on an operation like this? Why do you act as if we had been imposed upon by the State Department because Mr. Stoessel hasn't been recalled from his leave to appear here today?

I understood the chairman was going to respond. I hope he will, I hope that if he does nothing else, that he would recognize there is some necessity for a reasonable degree of comity, a reasonable degree of communication between members of the subcommittee. What is the point of an exercise like this?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. When you have finished I will respond.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am not sure I have finished. It depends on what your response is going to be.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am happy to address myself to the questions sincerely and legitimately raised by Mr. Frelinghuysen, and my response shall be in a temperate vein as his remarks have been and without any personal or partisan considerations at any time.

Yesterday I was in constant telephone communication and in personal communication with Mr. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. During the morning and the early part of the afternoon he informed me that Ambassador Stoessel was out in California, presumably on a vacation, and it was hardly my intention to impose upon his personal life to have him come back for a hearing today.

ANOTHER WITNESS REQUESTED

When it was finally concluded at about 2 or 3 in the afternoon that Mr. Stoessel would certainly be unavailable today and neither of us would presume to intrude upon his vacation, I recommended to the State Department that Mr. Fessenden, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, appear here today.

Sometime in the late afternoon Mr. Abshire took up that recommendation, I am told, with the Secretary of State. I was subsequently notified late in the day that the State Department had no one other than Ambassador Stoessel available.

I suggested to Secretary Abshire that Mr. Fessenden was certainly well acquainted with all of the matters the subcommittee has under inquiry this morning and in view of the fact that he was Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, the subcommittee would be not only pleased but honored to have him appear here today.

Early yesterday evening I was formally notified by letter that the negotiations for an appearance of a witness here this morning had concluded, at least upon behalf of the Department of State, and that they would not make anyone available.

At that point I felt that the urgency of this situation required a public accounting because when I received the letter from Mr. Abshire yesterday he had in it a statement, which I had not agreed to, that the State Department would make Secretary Stoessel available next Friday "in executive session."

IMPORTANCE OF OPEN HEARINGS

One function of this subcommittee is to ventilate the important issues. We revert to closed sessions only when the overriding national concern makes it mandatory that the public be excluded from these hearings.

I also told Secretary Abshire yesterday that under no conditions during the dialog with the representative of the State Department would we engage in any matters concerning the substantive negotiations in Paris. What we were concerned with was the relationship with the Government of Sweden and in the reactions in other European capitals that could affect matters of important public policy between our respective governments.

The issue is not whether the subcommittee was considerate of Ambassador Stoessel's vacation. We are, and I would expect that I be given the kind of consideration that we are giving to him.

The issue is twofold: Whether or not the State Department had available any other person who could direct himself to the questions involved. The second part of the issue is whether or not these areas of concern are such that the American public has a right to see them ventilated in an open forum. Those are the two issues, not whether we want to intrude on someone's vacation.

The third issue that the subcommittee faces today—and I think we ought to address ourselves to—is that indeed it is inconvenient to hold this hearing on a day when a funeral service is being accorded to our departed and beloved Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, and whether or not the situation requires some modest inconvenience on the part of Members of Congress.

All of the members of the subcommittee have been made aware of the fact that a witness would probably not be here this morning, and I do appreciate Mr. Frelinghuysen joining with me and engaging in this discussion.

CONTINUING AUTHORITY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

There have been, I think, some questions raised whether committees have yet been formed and whether there has been a designation of subcommittee chairman and whether or not there is a valid authority to proceed as we are doing this morning. It is my own view that the urgency of the situation requires the House as well as the Senate to engage itself continuously in matters of great public policy. This meeting today is an affirmation of that position, and it is for that reason that I felt it absolutely essential to proceed at least in the formal opening of these hearings and into the establishing of a record.

It is also my further position that my role as chairman of this subcommittee continues without interruption from the last Congress and that there is a legitimate presumption of authority to act until I am either replaced by someone else or there is a designation of another person.

So it is my position that all of these three areas of valid concern, as raised by Mr. Frelinghuysen, have been adequately amplified and clearly stated.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I don't think anything I said questioned your authority to act. It is the wisdom of the way you are exercising the authority that I question very strongly. I would suppose as a normal procedure—and I probably am wrong because I don't know how this subcommittee does operate—that when there is any plan for a hearing that members are advised beforehand.

WHETHER MEMBERS WERE POLLED

I was not advised until yesterday afternoon that there was going to be a meeting at 10 a.m. I would have assumed since this notice arrived at my office before my discussion with you that this didn't really mean there was going to be a meeting because you yourself indicated there probably would not be one until next week. I would suppose that the 11 other Members who are Members of the 93d Congress are presumptively also members of this subcommittee, if they want to be. They may not want to be—I could certainly see reasons why they would want to get off a subcommittee like this. If they were notified that there was going to be a meeting, I would assume Mr. Hackett or someone would ask if they were going to be in town so they attend.

May I ask if there was any effort to poll the members yesterday? If so, what was the result? And was this before or after they were notified there was not going to be any witness?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In response to the specific inquiry as to whether or not there was a polling of the subcommittee, my colleague knows full well there is always a polling of the subcommittee.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Take it for granted that I know nothing about this subcommittee. If I don't know what is going on or how we got here, you can take it for granted I know nothing about whether there was a polling or not. If there was a polling, did someone call my office?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I would assume then in view of your statement you know nothing about the subcommittee.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Assume that to begin with.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I will begin at ground zero. The rules of the committee require that before a committee session can proceed for the taking of testimony at least two members of the subcommittee have to be present. My observation at the moment is that there are two members of the subcommittee present.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Presumptive members, if I decide to continue with this subcommittee. Again it is enough to make one want to get off, the way the subcommittee is being run. Let's assume there are two members of the subcommittee here.

SUBCOMMITTEE PRACTICE DESCRIBED

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It is also the practice of the subcommittee, and has been the practice, I think, of all of the subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to poll the members vigorously on their availability for a meeting. This was done yesterday afternoon. A poll was made of members of the subcommittee and at least four members of the subcommittee indicated they would be here: one member of the subcommittee said he would not be here; five members of the subcommittee said that they would be out of town, and three offices were not certain if the members would attend.

I might also add that when we poll members of the subcommittee, we regularly have a fairly high number of members who say they will be available and yet who, through conflict with other legislative activities and district activities, find themselves precluded from being here. But I can assure the gentleman from New Jersey there was a polling of the members and I was satisfied there would be a minimum of two members here in the event there would be a witness available.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't think we ought to talk nonsense, Mr. Chairman. I am here, my legislative assistant is here, and I can vouch for the fact that I was not polled. You didn't poll me yourself nor did Mr. Hackett. How can you say in the normal course there is a vigorous poll taking. There was an announcement delivered in my office there would be a meeting. Is that considered a poll, or that am I going to be able to attend? I didn't know myself whether I was going down to the funeral. So no one had the authority, had they been asked, to answer for me, and nobody asked me that question. My legislative assistant who received this green letter from Mr. Hackett says he did not indicate that I would be present at the meeting. He wouldn't have the authority to make such a statement, but had he done so, I would assume you could say that I had been polled.

SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF POLLED OFFICE

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee staff informed me that a member of the subcommittee staff called your office and advised them of the meeting and I am not sure I am at liberty to say what the response was at that time.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would certainly suggest that this doesn't involve the Nation's security; that you certainly could indicate what the nature of the response from my office was. Perhaps it was the young lady with the smirk over there in the corner who made the telephone call. Maybe she would be good enough to speak up, unless the chairman is reluctant to involve her, regarding a telephone call to my office. Were you the one?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think that question intrudes into personalities of either your office or my subcommittee staff.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am making the flat statement I was not polled, my office was not polled, and I did not indicate whether I was coming or not. So I am challenging the procedure under which the subcommittee is handling its responsibilities, if it is handling its responsibilities at all. I say that there had not been a poll, there had been no indication from members as to whether we were coming. In fact there was extreme doubt as to whether there would be a meeting, and this meeting should not have been held at all. We should be talking over this in either Mr. Rosenthal's office or, if he would be good enough to come, in my office. We would be saying in private "What in the hell is going on?" instead of having this audience, which I assume is astonished to be hearing this kind of discussion when they thought we were going to be talking about urgent significant matters involving European reaction to the bombing of North Vietnam.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Anything else?

TIGHTENING UP SUGGESTED

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I would suggest that we tighten up, and I would like a little elucidation from Mr. Hackett if he would be willing to speak up. I don't suppose it would damage his reputation if he had something put into this record as to just what he does consider a poll involves. Does it mean reaching a member and getting a definite response that he plans not only to be in town but to attend the meeting? Is it dependent on whether there is going to be a witness before they give an answer? What kind of a poll is made normally? And what kind of a poll was made with respect to this particular session?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. No member of this subcommittee staff will be permitted to say anything publicly for the record.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I think that is an outrageous position, too. Why in heaven's name not? What are we trying to do? Whose security are we trying to protect? Whose reputation are we trying to defend? It makes us all look foolish.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Can I speak without interruption?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't know. Why not?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee stands adjourned until next Friday at 10 a.m.

(Whereupon the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Friday, Jan. 12, 1973.)

EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO U.S. POLICIES IN VIETNAM

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1973

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE.

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman) presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee is in order.

We resume today our consideration of the effect of recent Vietnam bombing on the political climate in Europe and specifically on major American interests which will be the subject of negotiations during the new year in Europe.

At our first meeting on January 4, I announced that a State Department witness was not available. The Department subsequently agreed to send Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Walter Stoessel to testify but only in a closed session. I have rejected that proposal because I believe that the issues involved in this hearing deserve full and public discussion.

The Department of State has not yet eliminated the possibility of such public testimony some time in the future, and that matter is still under negotiation. I am optimistic that it will be favorably resolved.

Today we are fortunate in having as our witnesses three prominent religious leaders who have just returned from a week in Europe where they talked with many Europeans about recent developments in Vietnam and the reactions in Europe. Prof. Harvey Cox of Harvard, organizer of that trip to four European countries, will be our first witness. He will introduce his colleagues.

Professor Cox, would you and your colleagues sit at the table, and before we ask you to testify, Mr. Frelinghuysen wants to make a statement.

A POINT OF ORDER

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your inquiry 2 minutes ago as to whether I had any objection to television. You neglected to ask me before then, and you also neglected to ask if I had any objection to holding a hearing. I am going to make a point of order against holding a hearing.

We are both Members of the 93d Congress. We have not been reappointed to the Foreign Affairs Committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee has not been organized. We have no subcommittees. It may be that you will be chosen as chairman of this subcommittee, but I can

assure you that we Republicans do not know who will be members of the Europe Subcommittee.

I assume that you have sent out 13 notices and perhaps even polled the Members of the 92d Congress who were on the Europe Subcommittee. Yet I know of one senior Democrat who didn't even get a notification, let alone a request as to whether he was going to attend. I think it's unconscionable that we should be kept in such darkness. I would assume that comity would demand that we at least be asked whether we thought it advisable to hold informal discussions or what I suppose might be called hearings, in spite of the fact that the committee is not organized.

All I know about these individuals—the first time I heard that these individuals were coming—is that they were listed in the newspaper recently as nationally known religious figures prominent in the antiwar movement. I don't know what an antiwar movement is. I don't know why our subcommittee should be dignifying these particular individuals out of the many thousands who have recently returned from Europe. I would be interested in their views on an individual basis. It might be that they might have something useful to contribute should we be organized, but I am surely going to make a point of order. I would suggest as a bare minimum that the chairman have the courtesy to get in touch with the members of his subcommittee, or those whom he thinks may be members of the subcommittee, both to inform us as to what his plans are and to find out our reaction.

A POINT MADE EARLIER

I thought I had made my point when you attempted a hearing before. This is listed as a continuation of hearings held, and the chairman has referred to a previous hearing. There has been no hearing held. We made a mockery of the legislative process when we had a meeting with no witnesses, with the knowledge the day before that meeting was held that there would be no witnesses. Under the circumstances, you cannot call that a hearing, any more than you can call this abortive attempt to listen to individuals a hearing. We are not organized. I regret that these distinguished individuals sitting here in front of us find themselves confronted with a situation like this, but we are not organized in a way that makes it possible, unless there is agreement, for us to listen to you in a formal hearing.

So I am constrained of necessity to make a point of order against this so-called hearing. I suggest that we have no further attempts of this kind until our committee has its membership, and until there has been notification from Members as to what subcommittees they want to serve on. We don't know yet even what will be the size of the subcommittees, and here today are only four members out of a possible 13, if all Members of the 92d Congress who served on this subcommittee were asked if they wanted to attend.

So I regret that we make ourselves look foolish by attempting something of this kind. It could have been avoided quite easily had the chairman had the wits to inquire as to the attitude of the minority. I assume he has been in touch with the Members of the majority, but I can vouch for the fact that I haven't been approached at all. A young lady called and asked if I was going to attend this morning's

meeting, and I saw no reason why I should notify her whether I was going to attend or not.

I might say that I am here in spite of the fact that there is a meeting of the Committee on Committees at which committee assignments are being discussed right now. The Republican assignments to committees have not yet been completed, and I am obliged to leave that meeting in order to attend this travesty of the legislative process.

POINT OF ORDER OVERRULED

MR. ROSENTHAL. The chairman of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dr. Morgan, has authorized this meeting this morning and the previous meeting. The point of order is overruled.

MR. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I challenge that, too. I spoke to the chairman myself yesterday, and that is not accurate. He authorized the use of this room, and I am sure he does not want to involve himself. There is no way in which the Chair can overrule a point of order when there is no legality to what he is attempting to do. The rules do not permit Members of Congress to sit as subcommittees when the committee on which they are sitting has not been organized.

There is no foundation at all for forcing a hearing of this kind, and I protest vigorously. I also protest vigorously the allegation that the chairman of the full committee has authorized this. I spoke to him myself yesterday. At the most, he tacitly authorized a discussion by allowing this room to be used, but that's the extent so far as I know. I certainly think it is unconscionable if the Chair is going to overrule my point of order, and disregard the basic rules under which the House operates. He can go quite far in what he considers his authority, but let me remind him he doesn't have any authority at this moment except as a Member of Congress. The fact that he is in the majority as a Democratic Member of Congress gives him no right to hold a hearing.

MR. ROSENTHAL. The point of order is duly noted. It will be recognized in the record. It is duly overruled, and the hearing will commence.

Professor Cox.

MR. MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman.

MR. ROSENTHAL. Yes, Congressman Mathias.

A SIMILAR HEARING CITED

MR. MATHIAS. I would certainly like to back up what my colleague, Mr. Frelinghuysen, has said. One point I would like to bring to the attention of the chairman is that our colleague from California, Jerome Waldie, was in a very similar situation where the parent committee was not organized for the 93d Congress, and his committee was the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee. I believe today he has organized a subcommittee hearing, but the fact is that since we are not organized yet, like all committees are not organized, because he had to have a hearing he is paying for the hearing out of his own pocket, and this would cover the cost of recording and transcribing the proceedings, because the full committee is not organized yet. He estimates the cost at \$500.

So I would suggest that, since nobody knew about this hearing and it was not fully organized, if the chairman insists on having the hearing, that he pay for the cost instead of having the full committee pay for it because it is not authorized.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I appreciate the gentleman's comments. I suppose that's a matter the gentleman could take up when the full committee meets, and if that's the decision of the full committee, I, of course, would be obliged by it.

Professor Cox.

STATEMENT OF REV. HARVEY COX, PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, DIVINITY SCHOOL, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

BIOGRAPHY

Born in Chester County, Pennsylvania 1929. Married, three children. Professor of Divinity—Harvard Divinity School, where he has taught since 1965. Received AB degree—honors in history—University of Pennsylvania, 1951. BD degree—Divinity School—Yale University, 1955. Member of Baptist Church—Ordained 1956. PHD degree in History and Philosophy of Religion, Harvard 1963.

From 1955-58 Director of Religious Activities—Oberlin College. 1958-63 program associate for American Baptist Home Mission Society. Assistant Professor of Theology and Culture at the Andover Newton Theological School 1963-65. Served as a fraternal worker for the Gossner Mission in East Berlin from 1962-63. December 1962 attended New Delhi Conference of the World Conference of Churches.

In spring 1970 lectured at the Pontifical Catholic University of Lima, Peru. Associate Fellow at the Cambridge Institute. Served as an Editorial Board Member of *Christianity and Crisis*. Author of *God's Revolution and Man's Responsibilities*, 1965; *The Secular City*, 1965; *On Not Leaving it to the Sneaks*, 1967; *The Situation Ethics Debate*, 1968; *The Feast of Fools*, 1969; and Editor of *Church Amid Revolution*, 1967.

Reverend Cox. Mr. Chairman, we are appreciative of the invitation to be here. My name is Harvey Cox, and I teach at the Divinity School at Harvard University.

I want to start by introducing the two colleagues who are with me and identifying the other three members who are a part of our group which recently returned from Europe.

On my left is Sister Mary Luke Tobin, who is a Roman Catholic nun and is a member of the Order of the Sisters of Loretto; and to my right is Bishop Robert DeWitt, who is the Episcopal bishop of the diocese of Pennsylvania.

Also with us in the group that visited Europe were Bishop James Armstrong, who is the Methodist bishop of the Dakotas area; Rabbi Leonard Beerman, who is the rabbi of Leo Baek Temple in Los Angeles; and Prof. Robert McAfee Brown of Stanford University, who is a Protestant theologian and an expert on Vatican II.

PURPOSE OF THE VISIT

I just want to say a word about why we went to Europe and then come to the questions that I think this committee might be more interested in. When the bombing was resumed again at Christmas, many of us who have been working for the ending to the war thought that the time had come for us to appeal to a larger group, to appeal rather explicitly to the conscience of mankind, and especially to religious leaders of the various religious denominations in Europe. We really

wanted to suggest to them that this is now a matter which is not simply on the American conscience but really is on the conscience of the entire race, and to encourage them not to be reticent or hesitant in speaking up rather forcibly about what we take to be a gross violation of the conscience of mankind, especially in the use of annihilation weapons on civilian populations.

So we were moved to do that. We organized ourselves and were given considerable help in making our arrangements to see various people in Europe by the National Council of Churches; by Dr. Robert Bilheimer, who is the Director of the Office of International Affairs; and by various members of the Roman Catholic hierarchy here in the United States. We did not go as an official delegation of any particular body, but we did go with the blessings of some of these groups and certainly representing officially taken positions on the war and on the bombing which are clearly in the record and statements of which we have with us.

SEVEN CITIES, FOUR COUNTRIES

We visited seven different cities in Europe during a very hasty 6-day trip. We spent some time in London, in The Hague, in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Stuttgart, Bonn, and in the Vatican, and in each of these places we met with groups of religious leaders, Catholic and Protestant largely, and in some places with political figures. Although we had not anticipated meeting with political figures, we noticed when we arrived in Europe that many of them wanted to see us, and so we spoke with them as a kind of an extra on our trip. We met, for example, with the British Council of Churches in London, with the entire synod of the largest Protestant church in the Netherlands, of the Dutch Reformed Church, with the Council of Churches of the Netherlands, and with the Roman Catholic prelate, Cardinal Alfrink of the Netherlands. We met with the ruling body of the largest Protestant church in Germany, the so-called Evangelische Kirche der Rheinland; and in the Vatican we met with a special group called together by the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace, with representatives from other organs of the Roman curia and representatives of the religious orders.

Now let me turn for a moment to what we discovered, and then I would like to have my colleagues speak to this. We were enormously impressed at how quickly people responded to our visit, organized special meetings, brought together extraordinary sessions of synods, called together bishops, and so on, at very, very short notice. This is perhaps the first evidence we had of a rather remarkable unprecedented wave of concern, if not outrage and bewilderment, on the part of large numbers of people in Europe, and in this case especially religious leaders, especially focusing on the Christmas bombing.

MET POLITICAL PARTY OFFICIALS

For example, when we arrived in Holland, there was a call for us that early the next morning if we could work it into our schedule, representatives from five of the seven political parties of the Netherlands wanted to have a special meeting with us at breakfast. As you know, in Holland there are Protestant and Catholic parties as well as the Socialist Party. It included representatives of all of those who

told us that all of those parties in question had sponsored a demonstration the week before in Utrecht in protest to the war. This is the first time that the Roman Catholic Party and the Socialist Party had found themselves cooperating on anything, and they observed, while we sat at breakfast, how remarkable it was that parties of such disparate ideologies and background, including the minuscule Communist Party of the Netherlands, by the way, had all come together for the first time in this reaction to the American bombing. It was absolutely unprecedented that those disparate groups should find something to come together on, but the bombing did elicit that kind of response in the Netherlands.

That afternoon we met with Cardinal Alfrink, the Roman Catholic Prelate of the Netherlands, who had been one of the official sponsors of this demonstration.

Now, I want to give just two other examples of what, to me, seemed like an overwhelming impression of revulsion and bewilderment and anger on the part of the people we spoke with; really a kind of puzzlement about what was happening in our country.

A MEMBER OF BRANDT'S CABINET

In Germany, we were privileged to meet for 2½ hours with a member of Chancellor Willy Brandt's Cabinet who asked that his remarks be confidential, and whom I feel it is probably not wise to identify here because he asked that it be confidential. He was especially interested in what the response would be in the United States to a strong statement by the Chancellor himself, or by the Social Democratic Party, or even by the Bundestag, comparable to the statement made by the Canadian Parliament objecting in the strongest possible terms to the bombing.

However, one point that he made which I think made an impression on all of us—a very telling impression on all of us—was that he told us that he, as a young man, having come out of the German Army right after the Second World War, had been taught his democracy with the model of the United States as the teacher of the new Germany.

Now, as a Cabinet Minister in the German Government, he had to confess to us that his major fear in the current behavior of the United States in the world arena was whether millions and millions of young Germans, for whom democracy is at this point still only a tenuous idea, would be so disappointed and so disillusioned by the behavior of their teacher that it might have disastrous consequences for what is at best only the beginning of a firmly founded democracy in West Germany. That was a very sobering remark that he made.

He asked us also whether we thought world opinion meant anything to the United States anymore, and we told him that we thought it did. We told him that we thought we, in the United States, are not insensitive to the conscience of the rest of the world. We assured him that some kind of statement or expression of concern would be heard and would be responded to.

BOYCOTTING DISCUSSED

We were also astonished in both Germany and in the Netherlands with the kind of questions people raised with us about how they

might respond, how they might express their outrage. People asked questions about boycotting American ships, boycotting American cultural products, recalling Ambassadors, and things like this.

Our response to them was that we had no specific list of recommendations to make. We were there to ask for help. We were there to assure them that by speaking out they were not intruding into American domestic politics. That was our conviction. It remains our conviction today, that the destruction of Vietnam is not a domestic issue but an issue for the international conscience.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Other than on this subcommittee, I would say that is true. Go ahead.

Reverend Cox. I am simply telling you what we were telling them, Mr. Chairman. So we didn't bring with them a grocery list of things that they should be doing. They were suggesting these things but I think all of us on the delegation were surprised at the kind of suggestions they were making which would be new for many of these countries, for Holland or for West Germany.

One other thing. This will be my concluding remark. When we addressed the synod of the Protestant Church in the Rhineland, we discovered that even the anticipation of our coming had elicited from the entire Council of the Protestant Church in Germany, the Ev.KiD (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland), a very strong statement, of which we also have copies, condemning the American bombing. To my knowledge as a theologian, this is the first time in the history of the German churches since the Second World War that a specific, explicit statement condemning a policy of the United States has been issued. It's difficult to understand how much of a precedent it is when one doesn't realize the special history of the relationship between Germany and the United States.

Now I think I will terminate my remarks and ask, first, Sister Mary Luke Tobin to continue, and then Bishop DeWitt.

STATEMENT OF SISTER MARY LUKE TOBIN, REPRESENTATIVE AT LARGE, SISTERS OF LORETTO

BIOGRAPHY

Born 1908 Denver, Colorado. BA Loretto Heights College, Denver, Colorado. MA in History, Notre Dame. LLD—Notre Dame and Marycrest College, Davenport, Iowa. President of Sisters of Loretto 19—1970. President of Conference of Major Religious Superiors of Women's Institutes, 1964—1967. Auditor—Vatican Council II 1964—1965.

Currently, Representative-at-Large, Sisters of Loretto, Member of General Assembly and of Executive Committee of Sisters of Loretto. National Co-Chairman of Clergy and Laity Concerned, 1971. Member of Board of Directors of Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1972. Chairman of Committee on Peace and Justice of the Leadership Conference of Women Religious, 1972.

July 1970—One of the 10 member fact-finding team studying repression in South Vietnam—visited Saigon. March 1971—participant on Citizen's Conference on Ending War in Indochina—met with peace delegation in Paris. April 1972—Member of small delegation to Vietnam groups in Paris sponsored by People's Coalition for Justice and Peace.

Sister TOBIN. I was impressed by the immediacy of the response also. It reminded me, as I think back on it, of a movie scenario that was rehearsed, because immediately when we arrived in each city, someone met us, someone took us to rooms in which persons were assembled already, they were eager for everything we could tell them—

dismayed, puzzled, disappointed, hurt, I think, at the action of a country that they have come to regard as one of the great democracies of all history.

Among the experiences I would like to record just briefly, as a Roman Catholic, is our meeting with Cardinal Alfrink in Holland. He told us that he was highly shocked by the terrible inhuman military violence, and he expressed solidarity with the stricken people of Vietnam. He told us that he would do anything he could and he did put through some calls for us to try to arrange matters with the persons in Rome whom we were trying to see. We then went on to the other groups.

COMPARISON WITH WORLD WAR II BOMBING

I think another thing that astonished me very much was that when we began to put together the facts and the data, one striking assembly of facts I think that impressed the people in England so much was that during the Battle of Britain, 80,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on England. But in the Christmas war of a few days, 80,000 tons of bombs were dropped on Vietnam. I think, in England, this was a very striking fact that we were able to present.

But again I think the response from all of them was, you know, "Tell us what can we do, is blockade a good thing, is demonstration a good thing, what can we do that won't be counterproductive, what can we do that will be helpful."

In Rome when we met with the Pontifical Commission on Peace and Justice and the chairman said, "I have a world network of the Peace and Justice Committee, and I will be glad to send out to them any help you can give them." He wanted Dr. Cox to write on the principle of proportionality, which is one of the elements of the just war theory, the tremendous lack of proportionality between means and ends which has been a feature of the present war. That committee then, that network throughout the world, will receive any kind of facts or data and can be helpful in our search.

Reverend Cox. Bishop DeWitt.

STATEMENT OF BISHOP ROBERT L. DeWITT, EPISCOPAL BISHOP OF PENNSYLVANIA

BIOGRAPHY

Born, Jamaica Plains, Massachusetts March 12, 1916. Graduated from high school, Auburn, New York. BA, Amherst University 1937. Bachelor of Divinity degree, Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass., 1940. Ordained Deacon, June 1941. Ordained Priest, October 1941.

Curate at Christ Church, Cranbrook, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, 1940-44. Rector of St. Luke's, Ypsilanti, Mich., 1944-48, when he returned to Cranbrook as rector of Christ Church. Consecrated as Suffragan Bishop of Michigan on October 27, 1960, at St. Paul's Cathedral, Detroit, Mich., with specific responsibility to supervise urban work of the diocese.

Elected Bishop Coadjutor for the Diocese of Pennsylvania on December 12, 1963, and assumed duties on April 1, 1964. Following death of late Bishop J. Gillespe Armstrong, he was automatically elevated to the post of Diocesan Bishop.

Married Barbara Ann De Yoe in 1939: 5 children, 4 grandchildren.

Bishop DeWITT. I have been appointed the cleanup position in the batting order. I would just like to mention some things which I would like to underscore, some of which already have been touched upon.

In England, we discovered that the Archbishop of Canterbury, the head of the worldwide Anglican community of many millions of communicants, had indeed made a Christmas message to his people deploring the bombing in Vietnam, even though in this country we were not aware a person of that distinction had come out with such a statement.

In Amsterdam, reference was made to a group of political persons whom we met with, and they called to our attention the fact that there was a great deal of concern in Holland about the bombings over the Christmas period, and that there were active conversations taking place in Holland, and they asked us for our opinion on this, as to whether or not it would be helpful if the Netherlands were to recall its Ambassador. Indeed, the initiative had been taken by a group of individual citizens in the Netherlands making this proposal to the Dutch Government. They also told us that some of the groups in Holland concerned about America's role in Vietnam had prepared and were selling posters for people to place in the windows of their homes, the message on which posters was "Nixon Sign Now."

DISCUSSIONS IN DUTCH PARLIAMENT

They also told us that there had been a considerable discussion about this whole issue formally in the discussions in the Dutch Parliament. In The Hague, we had drawn to our attention the fact that there had been this large anti-Vietnam rally in Utrecht just the weekend before we arrived, numbering some 50,000 or 60,000 people, which was reported to us as the largest rally which had been held in the Netherlands; and I have a copy from a Dutch newspaper which has a story and also a very large-sized picture of that rally which was held there.

At the press conference which was held for us at The Hague, a comment was made by somebody about the landslide victory which President Nixon had received last November; and one of the reporters put the question to us, "Do Americans feel cheated because of that?"

A CARDINAL'S TELEGRAM

In Rotterdam, Cardinal Alfrink, to whom reference has been made by my colleagues here, gave us a copy of a telegram which he had sent to President Nixon on December 29. The telegram reads as follows:

His Excellency, President Nixon, Washington, D.C. Highly shocked by terrible inhumane military violence. I express solidarity with stricken people of Vietnam and request urgently immediate ending of the bombing because of humane reasons and to open better prospects for peace by nonmilitary means and by negotiations with all parties involved.

In Bonn, reference was made by Dr. Cox to our meetings there. We did have the better part of an hour with President Heinemann of the West German Republic, and he gave us copies of a Christmas message which he had delivered to the German people, and in this message he had made references to the war in Vietnam. It was reported to us that he had received some criticism for so doing because it seemed a little bit inappropriate for the President of the German Republic to usurp a position which typically would be carried by the Prime Minister, by Willy Brandt. It was interesting that Prime Minister Brandt

made a comment not much later than that in which he studiously avoided making any reference to Vietnam and was criticized for that. It was interesting to me that Saturday, the day after we returned back, a story was carried in the American press that Bonn had warned the United States, "End the war or face loss of friend," as it appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer, the account of that statement.

The Rhineland synod of the German Evangelical Church Dr. Cox referred to—a meeting which we were invited to and which Dr. Cox and Rabbi Beerman of our group were called upon to address—the president of the synod, in making some introductory remarks, referred several times in his remarks to the war in Vietnam as "this dirty war."

A QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE

In Stuttgart, reference was made to our having met with a Cabinet Minister of the Bonn government. I would like to point out a further observation about this. In his comments about the negative impact which America's war in Vietnam is having on the young people and young adults of Germany, resulting in a failure of their confidence in the democratic type of government, this minister made the comment that America is in danger of exporting the credibility gap.

And in terms of one other point I would like to draw attention to, he spoke about a very real generation gap in Germany, the dividing line of which would fall between those who had a clear remembrance of the Second World War and those who did not, and in terms of taking a posture of criticism of what any other national body is doing those who were older and who remembered Germany's role in the Second World War felt that it did not behoove them to take a stand of criticism—people who live in glass houses should not throw stones. Not so with the young people and young adults in Germany who have a very clear consciousness of what they think should and should not be happening in this world, and they are not only eager and anxious to speak out themselves, but feel that their Government should also.

A NEW GENERATION

One could not help but feel that the statement which issued from the Bonn government on Saturday last was the result of a recognition on the part of the Bonn government of the trend of the future that Germany increasingly will be represented by people who come from this younger generation who do not remember the Second World War but who are acutely conscious of the realities of the world in which they live now.

In Rome, comment was made about the meeting with the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace, and reference was made that the members of that commission were concerned about the Vatican taking as strong a position as would be appropriate with reference to America's role in that war and, therefore, for that reason were anxious to have any U.S. church statements, official statements, which have been made public, and requested also, as has been said, a statement from this group of ours on the principle of proportionality on the waging of war, and also requested that we give to them, which they would personally deliver to the Pope, a personal message from our own delegation. Copies of that also we have available here.

PRESIDENTIAL CARICATURES

In Rome one evening walking about the town, we saw on the wall in a courtyard posters which were pictures of President Nixon. On closer inspection, these pictures of President Nixon turned out to be caricatures in the shape of a skull.

If I might make three very brief general observations, it seems to me that Western Europe and the United States make up one community which we call the Western World. Any casual visitor to West Europe cannot help but be struck by the sameness culturally, the way in which, no matter if one's language is limited to English, he has no difficulty getting about. With the presence on all hands of American corporations, Coca-Cola, General Motors, Honeywell, the rock music which one hears on the radios, any American would feel at home anywhere in Western Europe; and since this is one community, this Western civilization community, therefore, no one part, in this case the United States, can be indifferent to the attitudes of the rest of that one community.

Secondly, with reference to the Vatican, in the group which met with us for 2½ hours in the Vatican, there was a young priest from India who was a part of the apostolate to youth in the Vatican. When a comment was made in our long discussion there about the fact that any statement issuing from the Pope would be heard gladly in the Southern Hemisphere of this world and throughout the third world, which makes up most of this globe, this young priest from India nodded very vigorously and very shortly after came into the conversation endorsing that concern, because American indifference to underdeveloped nations is an indifference which is not shared by Europe. The terror and the torture of the Christmas bombings has resulted, it would seem to me, in America largely in a disappointment over peace deferred, whereas the reaction to that same terror and torture of those same bombings in Europe seemed much more marked by moral outrage. Just as the Western World is one community, so we are discovering increasingly that this world is one community, and America will reap for a long time the harvest of resentment and hatred because of its callous indifference and its perpetration of genocide, genocide being characterized as the deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial or national group.

So, lastly, growing out of that point, the reaction of American minority groups, and especially American blacks, to that genocidal action is a very sober and very melancholy comment on the future of America's own most vexing and devastating domestic problem.

COMMITTEE AUTHORITY DISCUSSED

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let me thank you. I do have some questions, but first let me be very frank and apologize to you for my discomfiture that you suffered together with us in the discussion as to the jurisdiction of the committee to proceed. I am sorry that my colleagues are not here to have heard your very sobering views.

For your edification, the differences between the members of this subcommittee, I think, go to the heart of the role that Congress ought to be playing in the decisionmaking process. Secondly, our differences concern varying views of the urgency of the situation.

A new Congress traditionally takes weeks to organize. It's my personal view that Congress has a continuing responsibility between its sessions, especially in matters of pressing national concern. To effect this principle, I further believe that there is a presumption of continuity of the Congress' committees and subcommittees. Specifically, I believe that the committee has the authority to proceed with urgent matters. Other committees do.

The Armed Services Committee had the honor to meet with Secretary-Designate Richardson and hear him in closed session. Other committees of the Congress are proceeding.

I think one has to evaluate these things on the scales of justice and responsibility. We could await the development of the orderly procedure. On the other hand, Congress can assert its role within the bounds of propriety, as this committee is presently proceeding to do.

The full committee and the Congress ought to be afforded your views, which they will have by the transcript, and the printed record. The public is also entitled to your views. I think they are entitled to those views now rather than 2 or 3 months from now.

A PARALLEL RESPONSIBILITY

I do appreciate the personal inconvenience and sacrifice that each of you has suffered in coming here on short notice. I can only tell you that I am sorry that you were participants in this exchange. I suggest to you that your responsibility in pursuing the mission you did in going to Europe is parallel with our responsibility in Congress in permitting you this opportunity to present your views to us and to the American people. On behalf of the American people and those Members of Congress who are interested in your views I thank you for undertaking your mission and in bringing your views to our attention.

I have three questions. My reading of the European press and my conversations with Europeans and Americans in recent weeks indicate that the December bombing in Vietnam had a much greater impression in Europe than in the United States. If that is so, why, or is my impression wrong?

Reverend Cox. I could give my personal reading from that one week which is that it seemed much stronger in Europe than it did in the United States. I think the reason may be that Europeans have had the experience of living under bombing. It struck us very forcibly meeting with people in London and in Rotterdam and in Stuttgart that the experience of bombing is foreign to most of us as Americans but it is within the memory of people in Europe and they were horrified and all the memories came back when they read about the Christmas bombing. I think that is one of the reasons.

Would either of you like to comment?

Sister TOBIN. No one ever asked us: Was there bombing? Did this happen? They were totally informed, it seemed to us, and very intense in their shock, in dismay, and I didn't find anyone who wanted to know when did the things happen. They seemed to be very, very well informed.

WHAT IS HAPPENING TO AMERICA?

Bishop DeWITT. I think we would all agree with your reading on that and I think that almost everywhere we went, when we talked with people and the press, the question was put to us again and again: What is happening to America? As I believe I indicated, everywhere we went it seems to me without fail the latest news on Vietnam was front page news in every city. I think I would add one other factor as to the why of this and that is not only the arrogance of power on the part of this country but also the slumbering quality of insularism that we hear so much of by the bordering of the oceans makes us not as close to the realities of the situation as these countries in Europe.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Bishop DeWitt, that leads to my second question. Is the European reaction to the Vietnam Christmas bombing more serious than our Government seems to realize? I have a suspicion that many Europeans are prepared to reassess their relations with the United States today. Is that an overreaction in Europe or has something happened which we don't seem to understand, or at least our Government doesn't understand? Do you see the threat of a reassessment in this special relationship we have had with European countries?

AN EROSION OF PRESTIGE

Bishop DeWITT. I don't think there is any doubt. I don't think there would be any possible doubt that there has already occurred—how to assess it quantitatively I wouldn't know—some erosion of American prestige in Europe because of this. You do not have a Roman Catholic cardinal in Holland coming out and endorsing a large-scale demonstration against America's foreign policy without having this have an impact on millions of people in Holland, and so in every country where we were we saw this kind of open challenge.

I mean the Swedish reaction was rebuffed by the President in making the Swedish presence unwelcome here and the response to that was not a frightened one but rather Dutch people started petitioning their government to recall their ambassador. There seems no doubt about the erosion of American influence and prestige in Europe.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. One last question. Throughout the last 4 or 5 years we have repeatedly heard from those who supported our position in Vietnam that we had to stay there to conclude the matter satisfactorily; otherwise our friends wouldn't have confidence in us and our commitments would be open to challenge. Are we losing friends elsewhere by pursuing this alleged commitment in Southeast Asia?

Bishop DeWITT. If I might mention one quote, I remember in our meeting with representatives of the British Council of Churches the comment was made that people in England had long felt that America was stupid about its Vietnamese policy and now they felt that America was stupid and wrong. This is a very strong statement.

A CHANGE IN GERMANY

Reverend Cox. I think the change in Germany was to me the most dramatic. This is a country which has in all of the years since the Second World War thought of itself as having almost everything liberated in some sense by the United States with a special kind of

friendship and with a special reticence to make public criticism. That matter was under discussion when we were there and we could see from our conversation with the Cabinet Minister and from reading the press that this was a turning point in West German relationships to the United States. I don't think one should underestimate the care with which Chancellor Brandt made that statement and his recognition of what kind of difference this signals in the possible future direction of West German-American relations.

My own view would be that as far as losing confidence, having our friends lose confidence in us, there is no better way to pursue a policy of losing their confidence than to continue on the track that we are now on.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Congressman Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to express my appreciation to you for these hearings in spite of some obstacles and I think you have performed a service for the subcommittee and the full committee and the Congress, and also my appreciation to the witnesses for their appearance this morning. We appreciate it very much.

I want to get in mind the chronology of your visit. Did your entire visit occur during the bombing and before the bombing was called off?

Reverend Cox. No. We planned the trip during the bombing and actually arrived in Europe a week after the cessation of bombing north of the 20th parallel. We arrived there on the 8th of January and were there the 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th, that week; in other words, just last week.

Mr. HAMILTON. So the bombing was not going on while you were there; is that correct?

Reverend Cox. The heavy bombing north of the 20th parallel was not going on. The bombing south of the 20th and in the south was still continuing while we were there and was being reported and discussed.

Mr. HAMILTON. You mentioned your conversations with a variety of leaders who opposed it. Did you find any support for the bombing?

Reverend Cox. No.

Bishop DEWITT. None.

A RATIONALE FOR BOMBING

Mr. HAMILTON. The administration's position, of course, is that we bombed them back to the peace table and that Hanoi would not have come to the peace table the second time had we not bombed. How do you respond to that?

Sister TOBIN. We have been back and forth to the peace table many times and bombing halts have been cleared and started again many times, and I felt people in Europe were aware of that and I don't think they thought this was any great news. I think they realized that there had been intervals back and forth and there would be others. I don't think that made any impression on them at all. I didn't ever hear anything in that regard.

Mr. HAMILTON. They weren't persuaded by that rationale of the administration in any way so far as you could check?

Sister TOBIN. No; I don't think that entered into any of the conversation at all.

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you respond to that personally?

Reverend Cox. One of my major concerns, especially at the Vatican, was to remind the members of the Pontifical Commission on Justice and Peace that there is a very old Western moral tradition about what proportionate means are morally acceptable in any war, quite apart from the question of whether a war is just or not.

PROPORTIONALITY OF MEANS

There are means which are acceptable and means which are not, and this has been fairly well specified in international law and in religion and philosophical edicts over the years.

And I am deeply concerned personally as a student in this area to contrast, for example, the kind of outrage that quickened the whole world after the bombing of Guernica in the 1930's or the destruction of Rotterdam or the bombing of Dresden with the relative lack of international response or, let's say, relative lack of response in this country to the bombings over the Christmas holidays.

I am really concerned about what appears to be kind of erosion or an anesthetizing of moral consciousness about to what extent annihilation weapons can be used under any circumstances. I don't believe personally that this brought anybody back to the peace table, but suppose it did. Are there any limits whatever now on the weapons that our Nation will use even within a war, or have we now gone beyond that tradition of restraints in the use of weapons which has been institutionalized in international agreements to which our country is a signatory; for example, discriminating between civilians and combatants, the destruction of whole sections of cities, and so forth. I don't see how one can defend the use of B-52's and high-explosive bombs as a weapon which is intrinsically technologically incapable of making the kinds of discriminations which have been accepted as just and morally acceptable weapons in warfare.

That is an issue that we especially discussed with the Pontifical Commission, and we were asked specifically to prepare a statement on that for the Pope, and we still hope that the Pope will make some statement, not wait until the next bombing and then be glad that it stopped, but really to make a very clear statement that we have now really exceeded the bounds of acceptable proportionality.

AN ATROCIOUS WAY OF NEGOTIATING

Sister TOBIN. I would like to respond personally, also. I think it is outrageous that we would use that means of getting people back to the peace table and I think that any good accomplished by that is horribly outweighed by the destruction of human life. There is no kind of way in which I think the Christian arm or human conscience can tolerate that kind of atrocious means of negotiating.

Mr. HAMILTON. Once the peace negotiations broke off the first time in December or whenever it was—and that prompted the President's decision to launch this saturation bombing—what steps do you think we should have taken to get back to the peace table?

Reverend Cox. Well, I am really not here as an expert in what steps we take when we are in a war to encourage furthering negotiations or anything else. I think our position as those who are trying to repre-

sent the religiously informed conscience is that there are boundaries on the use of weaponry and technology which should be respected, which are a part of the international law and part of Western moral tradition, and it is our responsibility to remind people about that. We have a special responsibility and you have a responsibility. I would think it would be outstepping my own role as a theologian and as a minister to suggest to the State Department or the Pentagon how they should have proceeded.

I think it is very importantly a part of my responsibility to try to remind all of us that it is simply not the case that in the war anything goes. I had thought we had outgrown that, and we have signed as a nation certain codes and covenants which suggest that we do accept limitations in the use of certain kinds of armaments.

But there was no suggestion of that when during the Christmas holidays we created in effect a hundred Rotterdams, 5,000 Guernicas; and my own personal concern was that there should have been in our own Nation a kind of revulsion at least comparable to the previous levels. However, I think the escalation of bombing has really deescalated our capacity for that kind of moral judgment.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am curious as to why you went to Europe if the lack of reaction to the bombing in the United States impresses you. After all, we are the people who are responsible for it, our Government. You are religious leaders with a constituency. Why do you feel compelled to go to Europe instead of to your own constituency to evoke a response from the people that could be applied upon their representatives in the Congress and their officials?

AN APPELLATE PROCESS

Bishop DEWITT. I would say that it has something to do with an appellate process growing out of the fact that in this country it seems increasingly that it is very possible for the Government in some measure to manage the news by virtue of its capacity to manage events and therefore to seduce public opinion, to lull public opinion, in ways which are very detrimental to the conscience of the soul of America. People outside of the boundaries of our country are not subjected to that kind of insularism. They have a prospective which is not available to most of the people in this country.

Precisely for that reason, therefore, we sought out other people with whom we could identify as part of the worldwide community of faith, to help reinforce what to us is the very clear moral judgment which should be made on this war, the level of perspective.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am interested in your terminology of appellate procedure. Are you suggesting that you were appealing American political decisions to a European constituency for some determination?

Bishop DEWITT. I think what I am speaking about now is that in the court of moral judgment, we needed to appeal to a higher court.

Mr. HAMILTON. My impression is that, with your influence in the religious community and your leadership in that community, perhaps you could have more effectively appealed to the people who respect your judgment very deeply in this country, and it might have been more helpful to us, at least those of us engaged in the political process here, had you done that.

Bishop DeWitt. I think it is not a matter of leaving one thing undone in order to do another, but rather of doing everything one can think of.

A HISTORY OF MORAL OPPOSITION

The members of this particular deputation which went to Europe are for at least 6 years giving perhaps more than they could justify in doing and speaking in every way they could singly and corporately against America's policy in Vietnam. It is not that we had not done that. It was just we felt that it was not productive.

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand that, but your specific concern on this trip was the bombing, saturation bombing. That is what prompted you to go.

I am perhaps sounding more critical than I want to be, but that question was in my mind, and I generally commend you for the efforts that you have made and certainly your testimony here this morning.

I think that I have only one other question. That relates to your constituencies again.

Bishop DeWitt, as I understand it, you have a constituency as an Episcopalian leader; I am not sure about the other two witnesses. Do you find a lot of criticism within your religious constituencies because of the outspoken position that you have taken on this war, and specifically the bombing, or do you find very broad support within your—

Bishop DeWitt. Six years ago or now?

Mr. HAMILTON. Let's talk about the bombing, saturation bombing specifically.

Bishop DeWitt. I am aware of no concern whatsoever about the many things which I have been saying and doing with reference to the Christmas bombing, absolute silence in terms of any objection or criticism.

NO COUNTERCRITICISM

Sister TOBIN. I would say in my own position as the chairman of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Leadership Conference of Women, religious—this includes all the Catholic sisters across the United States, through their superiors—that group, the Leadership Conference and Justice and Peace Commission, of which I am the chairman, they want me to speak for the committee. They don't want me to even poll the entire membership. When I speak for the committee, that gets in the press right away. I am able to speak through the press.

Articles have come out on that heading. I have never received a letter or comment in criticism since I have been in that position about a year now.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you intend to have a report of any kind that might be appropriately submitted to either this committee or other concerned committees in the Congress?

Reverend Cox. We could do that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If you would, please be in touch with us so we can incorporate it into the record.¹

¹ See appendix pp. 63-65, for material submitted.

Without objection, we shall include in the record those documents that Bishop DeWitt referred to, together with a number of clippings and articles commenting on European reactions to the December bombing.²

Reverend Cox. Could I say one thing?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes, sir.

A ROLE FOR CONGRESS SEEN

Reverend Cox. First of all, we want to thank you for inviting us to come, and we hope that our testimony has been in some way helpful to you. I think one of the reasons why we again left our students and parishioners, to take a little time out so that we could come down here, so that we have some hopes about Congress at this point, and I think that you share them or at least articulated that before.

We are looking now to the legislative branch to take some leadership in this matter; and we encourage you, I encourage you, and I am sure we all do, to move as swiftly and resolutely as you can.

I hope our testimony has been helpful to encourage and support this, and if so, it has been worth the trip.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.)

² See appendix pp. 35 and 53, for press articles on American and European reaction to the December 1972 bombing.

APPENDIX

I. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL AND PROF. B. V. A. RÖLING, OF THE ROYAL DUTCH UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN, REGARDING AN ASSESSMENT OF U.S. POLICIES IN VIETNAM ON AMERICAN EUROPEAN RELATIONS

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
April 10, 1973.

Prof. Dr. BERT V. A. RÖLING,
Groningen,
Netherlands.

DEAR PROFESSOR RÖLING: Mr. Clifford Hackett, staff consultant of the Subcommittee on Europe, told me of your meeting in Amsterdam during the recent Europe-America Conference. I understand that you agreed during those conversations with Mr. Hackett to submit a statement for our subcommittee's hearings on the subject of "European Reaction to Recent Developments in Vietnam."

As Mr. Hackett explained, I believe, these hearings began shortly after the first of this year when the strong reactions to the December bombings in Vietnam appeared to have seriously affected American relations with Western Europe. Now that those events have receded somewhat, it is appropriate, I think, to consider the more complicated question of the long-term effects of Vietnam on U.S.-European relations. We would be happy to have your views on this subject in whatever detail you can provide.

We have also invited the Department of State to testify but we have not yet reached a mutually satisfactory basis for that testimony. The other witnesses so far have been three American religious leaders who travelled to England, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy in January, shortly after the end of the bombing.

I regret that your short visit to the United States in May will not allow you to appear in person before our subcommittee. I hope you can send us your statement by the end of May to allow an early printing of these hearings.

I appreciate your willingness to submit a statement and look forward to reading it.

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe.

RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT,
GRONINGEN, NETHERLANDS,
July 4, 1973.

MR. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
Chairman Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ROSENTHAL, I am sorry that your letter of April 10 could not be answered earlier. American-European relations are very important indeed, in the whole of international relations and alliances. It is essential, in my opinion, that these American-European relations are friendly, and intense, leading to cooperation and, in some aspects, even integration.

In the year just after World War II, Europe relied on the United States for protection against the Soviet Union. Factually, fear existed that the communist system of a centrally planned economy might prove to be attractive for a Western Europe suffering from the war-devastations. The Marshall-aid took away that fear. If economic circumstances are good, and a reasonable amount of social justice is realized, any danger that the masses would be attracted by a dictatorial system, as the Soviet one, is bound to disappear.

A second reason for fear was, in many circles, the threat of the military might of the USSR. In my opinion this fear was exaggerated at the time, and is exaggerated nowadays. But with the fundamental change, that the Western system appeared to be attractive for the Soviet population—as well in the Eastern European countries as in the intellectual Soviet circles—a balance of power is advisable. NATO provides that, and has still a function, not only for assuring this balance, but also to reduce, by mutual balanced reduction, the “overkill” in arms that at present exists.

In this picture of our world situation; a stable relation between America and Western Europe is essential. In this relation the US is the natural leader, in view of its might and its position in the world. That leadership needs, as a solid basis, European respect for American attitudes and actions. This existing respect has withered away during the Vietnam war. Many American actions there have been considered to be criminal, and as a former judge in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo 1946–1948) I could not deny the charge that “bombing to the conference table” (that is: bombing of the civilian population, in what has been called “coercive warfare”) is a criminal conduct.

The Dutch are a moralizing people. They are willing to accept leadership, but only if they can “look up” to the leader, not when they are ashamed of his actions. In the struggle between the Western democracies and the Soviet-system, we were accustomed to see horrible things (as for instance the invasion of Czechoslovakia) at the Soviet-side. Nowadays, in Vietnam at the time, and at present in Cambodia, we see naked force applied without good cause, and in a way which is repulsive.

Vietnam has done a lot of evil. I used to advocate close ties between the United States and Western Europe in my University lectures. I do not dare to do it yet, because the students would confront me with everything that happened in Vietnam. And I would be compelled to admit that willingness to realize closer ties with the US would mean disregarding and forgetting the abominable conduct, even condoning it.

It is easily understood that this is only grist to the mill for all those who do not want the sticking-together of the Western democracies. They have arguments now—Vietnam, Watergate, the ITT in Chile, the possible role of the CIA in Greece—which are difficult to counter. But we are at a loss, in a choice between interest and self-respect.

There should be leadership in the world. But the times have passed in which leadership was based “on the grace of God”. Nowadays leaderships needs an inner legitimacy. That legitimacy has disappeared. Only time will be able to heal the wounds made by Vietnam.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) PROF. DR. B. V. A. RÖLING,
Director.

II. PRESS REACTIONS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON THE DECEMBER 1972 VIETNAM CRISIS

(Compiled from reports from Foreign Broadcast Information Series)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PEACE COMMITTEE PROTEST

Prague CTK Radio in English, 1725 GMT, 22 Dec. 72

[Text] Prague Dec. 22 Ceteka—The Czechoslovak Peace Committee expressed "profound indignation" today at the "barbarous escalation of the aggression of American imperialists in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the criminal massive bombing of towns and killing of civilian population."

It urges President Nixon to "immediately halt the bombing of the DRV and sign without delay the agreement on the cessation of the war and restoration of peace in Vietnam reached last October 20. This would be in harmony with the stand taken by the 27th U.N. General Assembly, which condemned again settlement of international problems of dispute from the position of strength."

PRAVDA, ROLNICKE NOVINY COMMENT

Prague CTK Radio in English, 0956 GMT 23 Dec 72

[From the press review]

[Text] Bratislava Dec 23 Ceteka—"The world must not remain passive to the demented activities of the largest imperialist country, resulting in apocalyptic horror, pain, and unhappiness," says the Slovak communist daily Pravda today in a commentary on the Vietnam conflict.

"The American imperialism has unleashed the most destructive actions imaginable against the peace-loving people of Vietnam, actions which are without precedent in the history of warfare. Tons of bombs, hundreds of rockets and artillery rounds are killing the civilian population and changing whole towns and villages into ruins. Ever more strongly and with all resolution the protests of the world public condemn the brutality and cynicism of the American administration."

"The war in Vietnam shows in all nakedness the criminal nature of imperialism. The policy of imperialism ignominiously enters new human sacrifices into its ledger, and toys dangerously with the patience of the world's progressive forces," Pravda says.

The Slovak farmers daily Rolnicke Noviny says that "despite the American bombs, the spirit of the Vietnamese people is unbroken, and its strongest bastion—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—is still its invincible rear."

The daily points to the strength of the Vietnamese people, stemming from their resolution not to submit to new slavery, from their ingeniousness with which they deal with the most serious situations, and from the steady, all-round assistance given them by the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, as well as from the worldwide solidarity of all peace-loving forces.

UNITED KINGDOM

London Sunday Telegraph in English, 24 Dec. 72, p. 16

EDITORIAL: "CHRISTMAS MORALS"

[Text] If President Nixon's resumption of bombing leads to a resumption of the Vietnam peace talks, then it will be justified, Christmas or no Christmas. The American aim is not an ignoble one. It is to end the war on such terms that South Vietnam has a reasonable chance of escaping communist domination. This used to be called upholding the right of self-determination and earned much moral approval.

Critics of the President can justly and reasonably argue that the bombing will fail in its purpose, either because the North Vietnamese can never be bombed into concessions or because President Thieu's regime is not worth preserving at such a cost in human life. But such arguments cannot claim a monopoly of moral righteousness. It is possible to reach the opposite conclusion, as Mr. Nixon does, without being a moral ogre.

The Christmas season is no excuse for humbug and hypocrisy. Ending the Vietnam war on terms that paved the way for a communist takeover would result in horrible bloodshed. Reprisals against those who have resisted the North would be massive and murderous. Those who are shocked at the bombing should at least recognize that the alternative which they advocate is not without its own moral obloquy. The definition of tragedy is a situation from which there is no innocent escape, a problem for which there is no moral answer. Sentiment might counsel the Americans to postpone the bombing until after Christmas, as a gesture of good will.

But was there not something shocking about this demand? Were not those who made it simply asking the Americans to avoid casting a shadow over their Christmas dinner, since they do not want their consciences overburdened as well as their digestions?

Unfair? Very possibly, but no more so than the critics of Mr. Nixon whose good will cannot extend to according his actions a just assessment. They want him, like Pontious Pilate, to wash his hands of the Vietnam imbroglio, without regard for the bloody consequences. Such behavior would be applauded as fully within the Christmas spirit. If only it was as easy as that.

Is not the true Christmas spirit to seek to show charitable understanding for all those caught up in the tragedy of Vietnam, without seeking, at this season, to apportion blame? Surely even the Americans deserve the benefit of the doubt, a temporary respite from hate and calumny.

London Morning Star, 27 Dec. 72, p. 1

[Editorial: "Stop Them"]

[Excerpts] Appalling though the tragedy of the Nicaraguan earthquake is, the murderous bombing of North Vietnam is even worse.

Managua has been largely destroyed by a natural catastrophe. Hanoi's hospitals, schools and houses are being systematically blown to pieces as a result of a deliberate decision by Nixon.

While U.S. planes take off in a well-publicised relief operation to save life in Nicaragua, far more U.S. planes simultaneously set out to slaughter the people of Vietnam.

The British Government says it will send aid to Nicaragua. It does not utter even a whisper of condemnation of Nixon's massacres in Vietnam.

Mankind has not yet found a way of preventing earthquakes; only the sufferings of their victims can be alleviated.

But mankind can prevent the wanton and ruthless destruction of cities, towns and villages and their inhabitants by the cruel and callous men who misrepresent the American people.

Sweden's prime minister, Olof Palme, has rightly described the U.S. raids as an outrage to be listed with Nazi massacres in World War II.

Nixon's crime is as monstrous and as unforgiveable as any of those committed by Hitler and his gang. No one can pretend that they "do not know"—as some did when the Nazis were doing their evil work.

Nixon's guilt is blazoned across the newspaper front pages and the television screens every day in the horrifying reports of what is happening to the men, women and children of Vietnam.

So there can be no excuse for inaction. And if Nixon chooses the Christmas and New Year season to shower down thousands of tons of high explosive and napalm, that is all the more reason for men and women of good will everywhere to speak out and act against this barbarism.

Already, during the Christmas weekend, people all over Britain have demonstrated and protested against the bombing, and demanded that the prime minister and the leader of the opposition condemn it.

But the deafening silence of both continues. Heath is too concerned to suck up to Nixon in preparation for the meeting with him in February, and Wilson is too busy backing Israeli aggression in the Middle East to voice the feelings of horror felt by the overwhelming majority of the British people about what is happening in Vietnam.

They must be compelled to speak, and Nixon must be forced to end the bombing. The American rulers intend, in the words of a U.S. brasshat, to try to bomb North Vietnam back into the stone age.

It is they who are worse barbarians than ever existed in the stone age. For the sake of humanity's future they must be stopped.

YUGOSLAVIA

DRV BOMBING ENDANGERS SOVIET-U.S. DÉTENTE

Belgrade Domestic Radio Service in Serbo-Croatian, 1400 GMT, 26 Dec 72

[Text] As we have already reported, Soviet Premier Kosygin yesterday received the DRV ambassador and promised him friendly assistance to repel aggression and at the same time condemned the U.S. bombing of the DRV. Here is a talk by Bozidar Kicovic on the effect of the present U.S. bombing of the DRV and its likely effect in the future on Soviet-American relations:

The brutal U.S. bombing of the DRV certainly cannot remain without consequences for Soviet-American relations. What these consequences will be—serious or not so serious, of a long-term or a temporary nature, of a greater or lesser scope—all this will depend upon further developments. However, regardless of all this, what Nixon has done now certainly deviates from the spirit that prevailed during the Soviet-American summit meeting in Moscow in May of this year.

It is true, on that occasion too, the Vietnam problem represented a stumbling block. However, in the interest of strengthening the equilibrium between the two superpowers and providing new scope for their mutual cooperation, the Vietnam problem was, to a certain extent, bypassed. According to all available evidence, the Soviet side believed, and not without reason, that good results of the talks between Brezhnev and Nixon dealing with many fields would accelerate a cease-fire in Vietnam and (?contribute) to the establishment of peace in Southeast Asia, along with a respect for the sovereign rights of the peoples subjected to the aggression.

For this reason the Soviet leaders can now be disappointed with Nixon's step and this means that they will be much more cautious and will accept his promises and claims that the era of confrontation is giving way to an era of negotiations with less confidence. This very fact is perhaps sufficient to slow down, if not freeze, the reaching of an American-Soviet agreement, all of which would be damaging under certain conditions for the entire process of détente in the world.

The condemnation, which Brezhnev pronounced in his speech at the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the USSR and yesterday's reception of the DRV ambassador by Premier Kosygin which was accompanied by a very characteristic TASS report clearly demonstrate that Moscow does not want to and will not stand idly by.

However, at the same time, Nixon is given the opportunity to turn away from the very dangerous path upon which he embarked when he ordered a mass bombing of the DRV so as to force a unilateral solution. Thus, the Soviet side expressed its desire to preserve the positive trends in its relations with the United States, which, if they are not already, could be jeopardized.

SWEDEN

Stockholm Domestic Radio Service in Swedish, 1130 GMT, 27 Dec 72

[Excerpts] The Swedish press, with few exceptions, now condemns in more severe terms than ever before the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam. According to the Liberal Sundsvalls Tidning, for example, Nixon's Vietnam policy now appears in its true light—a combination of lies, half truths, deception and implacability. The bombings have been called the greatest genocide since the Nazis began to exterminate Jews in Germany. With every bomb that is dropped, U.S. policy in Vietnam becomes genocide on an even greater scale. The arms are now more effective, the reasons are equally hazy or (?strictly) mad, the severity in the implementation is equally cruel. It is a repulsive action, says the Sundsvall Tidning.

The judgment of future ages will fall heavily on those who carry the responsibility for the act of lunacy in Vietnam, says the Liberal Naerkes Allehanda which completely supports the statement made by Premier Olof Palme during the Christmas holiday in which he described the bombings as an outrage and compared them with the worst deeds by the Nazis during the war. Naerkes Allehanda adds: Mankind must, with a force that is not only capable of penetrating to the lonely man in the White House but also of forcing him once again to come

to his senses and protest against his evil deeds [sentence as received]. A united and strong world opinion is something that none of the great men of the world are insensitive to—history shows that.

The question of responsibility ought not at this stage become a matter of conflict, says Naerkes Allehanda. The protests and accusations against the United States do not vindicate the role of North Vietnam, but that is overplayed today. It cannot be put on a par with the role of the United States.

YUGOSLAVIA

CONSULATE DEFACED, DEMONSTRATION HELD

Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 1348 GMT, 27 Dec 72

[Text] Zagreb—The building of the American Consulate in Zagreb welcomed the day today daubed all over in red. During the night slogans were written over the large display windows and the walls, the entrance and the lettering on the American Consulate building were painted over in red. The slogans protest the terror to which the United States has subjected the DRV and the continuation of the unequal war in which the population of Vietnam is being deliberately exterminated.

Groups of young men and women made a protest march through the town this morning, carrying slogans saying, "Stop bombing the DRV" and "Vietnam today—tomorrow us" and so forth.

About noon a group of about 100 demonstrators arrived at the front building of the American Consulate in Zrinski Square where it stopped for a short time shouting slogans in protest against the U.S. actions against the DRV population. Apart from the shouting of slogans and singing of songs there were no other signs of protest in front of the American Consulate building where order was kept by public security officers.

A protest rally was held at the same time in the student center in Zagreb.

STUDENTS ASK SEVERING OF RELATIONS

Belgrade Tanjug Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 1529 GMT, 27 Dec 72

[Text] Zagreb—Zagreb students sent a demand to the U.S. Government from a mass protest rally today asking it to put an immediate stop to the bombing of South and North Vietnam. The resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam is described in the letter as one of the most disgraceful moves of U.S. President Nixon.

About 800 students of Zagreb's higher schools also demanded today that Yugoslavia and all peace-loving countries sever diplomatic relations with the United States.

An appeal was sent to the Yugoslav public and students to help freedom-loving Vietnam's struggle with money and voluntary blood donations.

Yugoslav radio-television was asked to throw out of its programs American films which promote false petit-bourgeois values and to begin instead to acquaint the Yugoslav public to a greater extent with the heroic struggle and suffering of the Vietnamese.

SLOVENE STUDENT PROTEST

Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian, 1830 GMT, 28 Dec 72

[Text] In our country—in Ljubljana and Maribor—several tens of thousands of youths and students have held protest meetings to express their most resolute disapproval over the continuation of the criminal war in Vietnam, to demand a halt to the bombing and to request that the massacre of prisoners be prevented.

THE TIMES

London Times in English, 28 Dec. 72, p. 13,

[Editorial: "Beyond Military Analysis"]

[Text] The resumption of the heavy American bombing of North Vietnam has caused so deep a revulsion of feeling across the world that many people will wonder what possible justification, if any at all, there can be for it in strictly military terms. What kind of balance sheet have the commanders in mind? What do they think they are trying to do?

A military rationale of battle operations usually makes chilly reading. The American losses may be considered first. To assess the loss up to date of B-52 aircraft and aircrews over North Vietnam as "militarily acceptable" makes little sense to anyone who does not feel professionally and strategically involved in Indochina. Yet in a specialized and limited sense it is arguably right. To launch wave after wave of bombers against some of the thickest air defences in the world means to accept the inevitable consequences that some will not return. The sense of shock generated in many American minds by last week's news that B-52's were being brought down sprang from an almost complacent American belief in the invincibility of the electronic countermeasures carried by the bombers and their supporting aircraft. But now the hard facts have to be faced.

Whether the bombing raids can be militarily justified in the terms of the Vietnam war as a whole is much more doubtful—and this is to disregard the political and moral arguments which are overwhelmingly against them. The bombing in Britain during the last war stiffened the resolution of the people and spurred them to fight on, as is well remembered. There is little indication that it will have any more telling effect in Vietnam. This is particularly true in view of the global sense of horror which has greeted the fresh bombing initiative in the North, and of which the North are well aware. They may suddenly feel that the world is on their side.

The amount of explosives dropped by the United States Air Force in Vietnam since 1965 has now passed 7 million tons, more than 80 times that which fell on Britain during the last war. Put still more dramatically, it is equal to more than 300 of the atomic bombs which fell on the Japanese in 1945. That the North Vietnamese are still fighting after this terrible pounding of their troops and towns is a simple, frequently remarked fact whose significance will not be fully appreciated until after the war is finished.

The United States seemed to have so much on its side, especially in the air. The military innovations of the Vietnam war have mostly been in this area. The guided bomb, the gunship, the use of the pilotless vehicle, the heavy reliance on the helicopter—all indicate the advantage which the Americans have taken of their near-total supremacy in the skies.

The faith which commanders have placed in air power was reinforced earlier this year by the considerable effect which the air force had in helping to halt the latest North Vietnamese offensive. All four major rail links to China were out, 1 in 10 North Vietnamese trucks were destroyed, 75 railway bridges bombed, all six big thermal power plants put out of action, more than 1,800 lighters sunk while trying to beat the American-laid minefields at sea, a fifth of North Vietnam's fuel storage tanks smashed, and countless roads and road bridges blown up.

These were all important military targets and, with the aid of the guided bomb, aircraft struck them with devastating accuracy. Undoubtedly their destruction must have drained, however temporarily, at least some of North Vietnam's fighting power. But there is a limit to what air power can do. There is still the belief that U.S. air power persuaded Hanoi to start serious peace talks this year and that it can do so again. As long as Washington believes this to be true, the bombing will go on—unless world protest becomes louder and more official than it is.

Yet after more than 7 million tons of bombs, will 10 million tons make a significant difference? History does not provide the indications that it will. In the wider setting, what America is losing politically, in the eyes of the world, is beyond all computation.

UNITED KINGDOM

London BBC World Service in English, 0210 GMT, 28 Dec 72

[Press review]

[Excerpts] The next biggest story is the continuing bombing of North Vietnam by the U.S. Air Force and this is one of the main talking points in the opinion columns as well.

The Scotsman says that anyone with ordinary feelings of humanity and with memories of the second world war must be moved by the reports of civilian casualties in Vietnam. Yet the paper says the bombing of Hanoi cannot be regarded as an isolated act of terrorism. It must be taken in the context of a war which on the communist side has been fought with ruthlessness. America's case is being harmed by President Nixon's silence, says the Scotsman. He might have known that the heavy and sustained bombing would provoke an outcry. Even those who sympathize with American policy are entitled to an explanation of the military and political reasons for the offensive.

The Financial Times doubts whether Mr. Nixon can justify a continuation of the aerial bombardment at its present intensity for very long. It says that one of the American explanations was that the bombing was intended to pre-empt preparations for a new offensive being carried out by Hanoi under cover of the cease-fire. The Financial Times goes on: But the 20,000 tons of bombs said to have been dropped on North Vietnam since the middle of December must very largely have achieved this objective. There can be few important military targets which have not been attacked.

FRANCE

Agence France Press (Agency) Review of Press

[Text] Paris, 28 Dec.—The U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, especially of Hanoi continues to be discussed in this morning's Paris press.

Le Figaro writes: The true problem which arises is not the outcome of the bombing campaign, which has been going on for more than a week and was only interrupted for several hours during the Christmas truce, but rather the time left to the Americans to continue their offensive if they truly want to begin new peace negotiations. It is not very logical to expect that the bombing will end soon. If the Americans and the North Vietnamese met in Paris tomorrow and were in a hurry to take out their pens, world opinion would quickly reach the conclusion that the United States had been defeated.

As to the North Vietnamese, they have now on two occasions thought they had been tricked.

On 31 October, while exhibiting their political cadres in the villages, they had the unwelcome surprise of seeing the Vietnamese Army forewarned.

On 16 December Kissinger went from amiability to verbal attack. One is becoming at least suspicious . . . one has the impression today that the Americans are still seeking peace, but by alternating tricks with the club. For 2 months Kissinger proposed the tricks. Nixon is now availing himself of the club.

L'Humanite writes: This attack by the B-52's on the center of Hanoi marks a new step by the Americans . . . The goal is a political one: to mold the Vietnamese to the American dictate; to make them accept—through force—the fundamental revision of the 20 October agreement. Once again U.S. imperialism is seeking an end through military escalation. It is only scoring its biggest defeat of the Vietnamese war . . . Hanoi may perhaps be razed, but the Americans will leave their strategic fleet there. On the threshold of the second week of the Hanoi battle, the biggest and most modern air power in the world has been held at bay in the sky over the DRV capital.

L'Aurore writes: Beyond statements called forth by circumstances, which are of necessity high-flown, Hanoi seems to be really afraid. One is afraid elsewhere, including in the United States, while at the same time one wonders about the last, thin chances for a cease-fire. Will the fragile flower of peace one day be able to bloom on so much accumulated debris? . . .

The Americans speculate on the concurrence of the PRC and the Soviet Union to urge Hanoi to be more accommodating . . . An impossible dialog when the B-52's are making their infernal rounds beyond the 20th parallel. The 172d session of the Paris Conference, which was scheduled to be held today, has been adjourned by the North Vietnamese . . . The door remains if only partly open . . . a feeble hope indeed which the tragic (?reality) is constantly belying.

SCANDINAVIA

AGENCY FRANCE PRESS (AGENCY) REVIEW OF PRESS

Paris AFP in English, 1728 GMT, 28 Dec 72

[Text] Copenhagen, Dec. 28 (AFP)—Danish National Trades Union Organization chief Thomar Nielsen said today he is to discuss with other European trades union leaders next week the resumed American bombings over North Vietnam and what possible action might be taken.

The announcement coincides with proposals by Danish dockers to boycott all American ships and cargoes.

Aalborg dockers leader Otto Mejlby, who suggested the move, said that, to be effective, such a boycott would need support of the international trades union movement. Mr. Mejlby has stated he is attempting to operate the boycott throughout Scandinavia and in West Germany.

Mr. Nielsen is to initiate his discussions on January 2 or 3, during celebrations here marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Danish Trades Union

Organization, which union leaders from throughout Europe are expected to attend. He said he was proposing no concrete action at this stage.

The boycott plans of the Aalborg dockers were today backed by their Copenhagen colleagues, who in a resolution said that such a boycott, to be effective, had to be supported by the international trades union movement.

RADIO PRESS REVIEW, 28 DEC PAPERS

Stockholm in English to Europe and Africa, 1100 GMT, 28 Dec 72

[Text] The Social Democratic newspaper Aftonbladet notes the American protest with satisfaction and says: The Swedish Government and the broad Swedish public that has become involved in the Vietnam issue can feel proud of the protest. Nothing less was expected than that President Nixon should feel smitten. That was the idea.

Olof Palme is supported by a majority of the Swedish people, says the Liberal paper Dagens Nyheter, which, however, feels important voices are missing in the international protest movement. This paper writes: West Germany has a leader who received the 1971 Nobel Peace Prize for reducing tensions in Europe. One word from Willy Brandt against the American bombing in Vietnam would have political and moral weight.

Another Liberal paper, Expressen, supports the Social Democratic proposal that all Swedish political parties back the suggestion to distribute petitions against the bombing. This paper says: Sweden is far from a superpower but here is the chance to do something toward [words indistinct] United States. As one free people to another we can call on commonsense [words indistinct] consideration (?and) the meaningless and terrible destruction of Vietnam.

BULGARIA

U.S. INTENTIONS VIEWED

Sofia BTA in English, 0807 GMT, 29 Dec 72

[Text] Sofia, December 29 (BTA)—In an article under the title "There Will Be No Exceptions" news analyst Vladimir Lankov emphasizes today in the Rabotnichesko Delo newspaper that not only the good will of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam are necessary for a forthcoming political solution of the conflict, but Washington's good will as well. "In the last 2 months, shielded by 'peaceful' declarations, the American Government have made a sharp turn in their Vietnamese policy, where the culmination point was President Nixon's order from December 18th to renew the cruel air raids over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," the news analyst writes.

"Now it is obvious that in fact Washington has never intended to approach the peace talks seriously. It simply usefully exploited these talks to deceive the American public demonstrating its 'good intentions' on the eve of the presidential elections. But gradually the course of the American ruling circles became harder and harder, and still more obvious became its purpose—to impose clauses favourable for the USA and Saigon by means of brutal military pressure over the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. But was not this the thing which the three last U.S. presidents on several occasions tried to achieve and never succeeded in doing?"

RED CROSS DECLARATION

Sofia Rabotnichesko Delo in Bulgarian, 27 Dec 72, p. 3

[Text] The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Red Cross has adopted a declaration in connection with the resumed bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the U.S. Air Force.

The declaration states that these barbaric actions are further proof of the impasse reached by the policy of strength of the United States. They will not overcome the heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people nor force them to abandon their positions at the Paris talks.

The Bulgarian Red Cross expresses its protest against these criminal actions of the American Air Force. At the same time, we call upon the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Red Cross League and the national Red Cross organizations to use all their authority and influence to stop the bombing and reestablish peace in Vietnam, the declaration states.

UNITED KINGDOM

London The Guardian in English, 9 Jan 73, p. 12

[Editorial: "Is the Bombing To Return?"]

[Text] Dr. Kissinger's "one more major effort" to negotiate a settlement to the Vietnam war has a ring of "or else" about it. The terms in which President Nixon finally talked to the congressional leaders—after apparently consulting nobody for some weeks—suggests that he has sent Dr. Kissinger to negotiate along lines predetermined in Washington. This must increase the chances that the talks will again fail. Obscurity clouds the reasons why the murderous bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong was stopped on December 30. [paragraph continues]

For the sake of face, President Nixon has to believe publicly that the B-52s blasted the Vietnamese back to the negotiating table. This in turn increases the temptation to use the same tactics again. Statements from the White House suggest that renewed bombing north of the 20th Parallel is a certainty if the talks fail.

The damage inflicted by the B-52s has been appalling. Their use is a lasting stain on President Nixon's record. Their devastating power may well have forced the North Vietnamese to call for a breather, since there is a limit to the amount of material punishment that even they can absorb. The frightening aspect is that, if the B-52s are used again, it could be from a greater height and with no concern for the nature of the targets below. Some reports suggest that part of the high loss rate came because the B-52s were flying lower to achieve (with tragically little success) accuracy in hitting strategic targets.

By ordering a mass evacuation of the city populations, the North Vietnamese have indicated that they are taking this possibility seriously. It shows too that, battered as they are, they will be unlikely to buckle to American demands at the negotiating table for a settlement which, to North Vietnamese eyes, is meant to leave President Thieu inaccessible in place. To support this reasoning, they can invoke the extraordinary conduct of Mr. Nixon during the period of the bombing.

President Nixon's deliberate isolation from the press, from all but a handful of his own advisers, and, until recently, from the leaders of Congress lends weight to the belief that his order to unleash the B-52s stemmed from tantrums of disappointment when Dr. Kissinger failed to bring about a settlement. It is possible that his secrecy was a cover for truly secret talks with Hanoi, but his behaviour encourages no confidence in that. It looks merely as if President Nixon was shutting himself off from both advice and criticism. As a result, he appears increasingly as a man who has worked only to make the war acceptable at home by withdrawing a large number of U.S. troops from the ground. He still appears to think a victory can be salvaged. It is a dangerously mistaken approach to delicate talks, and it has hideous implications for what may follow if the talks fail.

London The Guardian—17 Jan 73, p. 10

[Editorial: "After Vietnam: Who Will Defend Europe?"]

[Excerpts] The cease-fire in Vietnam, although now highly probable, is not yet certain. And a cease-fire, while immensely welcome, is not the end of the war. The peace agreement between the United States and North Vietnam may be near, but even that agreement cannot guarantee an end to conflict in Vietnam. Given an agreement, the scale of fighting, killing, and suffering may be drastically reduced. For at least a year or two a pause is likely in the conflict of Vietnamese with Vietnamese. And the deadly rain of American explosives, fire bombs and fragmentation weapons will cease. Some thanksgiving, therefore, seems imminent. It is a thanksgiving muted both by the terrible destruction wrought in the war and by knowing that the internal struggle will continue. But at least the horror of the American overkill will end.

The people most immediately affected are the Vietnamese themselves. Those least able to express themselves—villagers and townspeople in South Vietnam—may hope to lead a less insecure life.

In the North the damage is hardly less. Civil war has not broken trade or scattered families as in the South, at least since soon after the French left 17 years ago. But American bombing and coastal shelling have disorganised transport, killed and maimed many thousands of people and forced the country to a siege economy.

But, while the Vietnamese are the people most immediately affected, the consequences of the war reach right round the world. Never again, at least in this century, will the Americans commit themselves to land warfare outside North America or Europe. Even the European commitment has been damaged—more so perhaps than most Europeans have yet realised. And the foundation of the North Atlantic alliance, in mutual confidence between the U.S. and other governments, has been severely shaken. Whatever interpretation is put on the final phase of the war, with its brutal bombing round Hanoi and Haiphong, there is a cancer of suspicion that President Nixon consulted hardly anyone even in the White House. Are we to conclude that the American President, who commands a nuclear force now capable of destroying all civilised life, is not responsive to advice? The question is a dreadful one to ask, but it will have to be asked.

Over Vietnam the President is under no compulsion to consult anyone outside the United States. But, in deciding on December 16 or 17 to launch heavy bombing round Hanoi and Haiphong, he seems to have consulted nobody outside the White House and not many in it. Normally the secretary of state, secretary of defence, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other members of the National Security Council would be consulted. Normally, too, with a decision carrying heavy implications in foreign policy some of the senior congressional leaders would be called in. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 President Kennedy kept the National Security Council in almost continuous session, discussing and evolving the tactics which put heavy pressure on Mr. Khrushchev to remove his missiles from Cuba, but always left him a way of doing so.

No such consultation, so far as is known, took place in mid-December. The President decided on his own. Admiral Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apparently admitted last week in evidence to a congressional committee that he was not consulted on the December decision. His evidence was given behind closed doors, but according to a congressman present at the session Admiral Moorer said that the President simply ordered the activation of an existing contingency plan.

In justification of Mr. Nixon it will be argued that his decision got results. After the bombing the North Vietnamese returned to the conference table. That they did so, however, is not necessarily because of the bombing. Each side was trying to see what terms it could extract from the other. And, even if the bombing had had that consequence, it still seems a vile and inhuman act. It used grossly excessive force to achieve a limited diplomatic effect.

President Kennedy and President Johnson wanted to help prevent communist insurgents from taking over South Vietnam. The Pentagon Papers, published last year, revealed many misjudgments and subterfuges, but they did not invalidate the original American purpose. What went wrong was a failure first to realize that the social and political structure in South Vietnam was too weak—nearly always the Americans were building on sand—and secondly failure to realise that the war must be fought by a series of small actions in the swamps, jungles and paddy fields.

If a cease-fire comes and if the American forces finally withdraw, that chapter will close. But, as already stated, its consequences will be felt at least for the remainder of this century. Until 1945 the American tradition was to avoid external commitments. But in 1945 with the Russians on the Elbe and in Austria, the Americans knew that they could not leave Europe. Nor, with MacArthur dominating the Western Pacific, could they quickly leave Japan. A world role became acceptable to majority American opinion. The Korean war and its heavy casualties did not change that; Vietnam and the frustrating sense of failure there have changed it. Only in Europe can the United States be assumed now to accept a continuing defence commitment. Even there the day of departure must now be closer. While the Americans stay, questions of nuclear control will have to be reconsidered. When they go, who or what will take their place? The collective defence of Western Europe cannot be allowed to disintegrate entirely.

If the President acted alone in the December crises, could he act alone in a European crisis? Perhaps any contingency in Europe requiring urgent presidential decision is now remote. Let us hope that it is; and let us acknowledge that, if so, Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik deserves some credit. Nevertheless it has to be remembered that the President still commands the world's most destructive nuclear arsenal and that the American nuclear guarantee underpins the whole of NATO's strategy.

So far as is known, the nuclear "fail-safe" mechanisms to prevent unauthorized use of Polaris, Poseidon, Minuteman and other weapons are designed to stop a

general, admiral, airman, sailor, or silo commander mistakenly pressing a nuclear button. Whether there is a parallel "fail-safe" mechanism to prevent an impetuous presidential decision is not known. The National Security Council is supposed to sit with the President in any major crisis, but it has no constitutional or physical hold over him. The most effective preventative may be the existence of nuclear forces only a little less devastatingly powerful on the other side. The North Vietnamese had none, nor were any ever likely to be used on their behalf.

GERMANY

GERMAN PRESS REVIEW

This summary is prepared in the Press Office of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington, D.C. It is based on commentaries published in the West German press and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the German government.

JANUARY 17, 1973.

VIETNAM AND THE BOMBING STOP

Vietnam remains as one of the key topics in the German press. There were riots in German cities last week against the American bombing. In the preceding week, German authors, among them Nobel literature prize winner, Heinrich Böll, demanded that Chancellor Brandt join Swedish Prime Minister Palme in publicly protesting against President Nixon's policy. In *Die Zeit* (Jan. 12), another well-known German author, like Böll, a Roman Catholic, Eugen Kogon, defended the Chancellor's preference for quiet diplomacy instead of a public protest. Discussion in the press was given new impetus also by a speech made in the United States by Helmut Schmidt, now Minister of Finance. Although he devoted only a short paragraph to Vietnam and explained that it represented his personal opinion, the press generally took his words as an expression of Bonn's official policy. This interpretation was reinforced by Bonn's decision to print Schmidt's speech in full in the official Bulletin. Because of its importance to the Vietnam discussion, Schmidt's key words are given here:

"This war has never been a matter of the North Atlantic Alliance but it did originate in relation to another alliance of the United States. Neither have the NATO partners ever been seriously consulted nor have they volunteered to give thoughtful advice. But nevertheless: this war has become a political and a moral issue also to the European partners of the U.S. It is deeply disturbing not only your nation but also my people and the Europeans as a whole. I do not wish to give any impression of attempting interference and therefore do confine my personal judgment to one single sentence: This war must be ended, otherwise the danger of alienation might turn into reality and thereby deeply influence the development of European-American relations."

In further regard to Vietnam, the German Red Cross protested against the suggestion of the designated American Deputy Secretary of Defense, Clements, that conceivably the atom bomb could be used in Vietnam. (See *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Jan. 13/14.) Later denials of any such intention by the White House, although welcomed, failed to completely allay the suspicion that in the inner circles of top American leadership, there had been discussion of just such a possibility. The *Rheinische Post* (Jan. 13) commented:

"The denial by the White House put an end to the uproar, but not fast enough to prevent it from causing enough damage already . . . In regard to the Vietnam war the Federal Government has maintained an intelligent reserve. It sent Minister Bahr to Washington to present Bonn's reservations. Minister Schmidt repeated them in a public speech. This will have more effect than strident declarations from a distance."

On Jan. 15, a meeting of the Social Democratic Executive Committee under the chairmanship of Chancellor Brandt repeated the invitation to all participants in Vietnam to end the war as quickly as possible through a durable and just peace. The Committee expressly placed itself behind Minister Schmidt's comments. The *Nord Rhein Zeitung* (Jan. 11) said that the Federal Government can render the alliance partner effective help:

"Not by moralizing, but by showing without pity how deeply the belief in the morality of the United States has been shaken in Europe. In doing this, it is probably better to ring the Bonn alarm bell behind the political screen. But it is absolutely necessary that it be rung."

The Stuttgarter Zeitung (Jan. 15), in common with other papers, pointed out that the Vietnam war "over-shadows" and makes more difficult the attempts at détente, a war which for the moment binds the political forces of the United States and increasingly shakes its moral credibility. This naturally has effects also upon the position of its dependent European partners in the détente dialogue.

The German press has only begun to comment upon President Nixon's announcement on Jan. 15 that the United States is stopping the bombing of North Vietnam, but in view of the world-wide desire for peace in Vietnam, there is no question of the news not being received favorably. At this moment, only four quotations are available to the Press Review, and all are from papers which have to some degree supported American policy in Vietnam. The Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung (Jan. 16) said:

"Nixon's order to stop all bombing attacks on North Vietnam and also the artillery fire and the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors and waterways, does not yet mean the end of the thirty-year war in Indochina. But it is a necessary and hopeful step along the road to this goal, allegedly sought by all concerned."

Although most German papers from the beginning regarded the bombing of North Vietnam an ineffective political policy, the Allgemeine Zeitung of Mainz (Jan. 16) said Nixon was right:

"Nixon is a believer in *realpolitik*, even though through his carpet bombing he aroused over half of the world against him. The development in Vietnam, as indicated yesterday, seems to have shown him right."

Die Welt (Jan. 16), the leading German paper which has more or less consistently supported American policy in Vietnam, commented that it was not easy for Nixon to retain his calm in the midst of a world-wide outbreak of hysteria:

"He can now keep his 1968 promise to lead America out of the Vietnam morass in a fashion which does not mean betrayal of an ally. To preserve America's credibility among its allies required unpopular decisions. But this is a part of the law under which a great power has to act. Richard Nixon on next Saturday can begin his second term with newly confirmed authority."

The Frankfurter Allgemeine (Jan. 16) which last week tried to counter some of the anti-American comments in the German press by printing articles and commentaries on Viet Cong atrocities, said:

"Nixon's decision shows that Kissinger and Le Duc Tho have agreed on important matters of controversy in their new round of negotiations. For it is difficult to think that, after his disappointments of recent weeks, the President could stop the bombing as a sheer pre-concession to Hanoi. Furthermore: Nixon's decision also permits the presumption that General Haig could talk the South Vietnamese Chief of State into cooperating. Will Saigon receive a bit of recognition from Hanoi? Will a large part of the North Vietnamese troops withdraw from the South? These are the two points which must be at stake."

Americans who believe in their country and its leaders may find it difficult to understand German and, for that matter, world-wide criticism of American policy in Vietnam, particularly from people who depend upon American military protection and who, after World War II were given enormous economic help from the United States. Naturally, there is no single explanation to be found in the German press. Two divergent explanations are given here, one from Die Welt (Jan. 15) and the other from the Frankfurter Rundschau (Jan. 6). Die Welt said:

"The fact that in Moscow and East Berlin the button was pressed which heated up the 'protests' in the West is a sign that the communists in Vietnam are in a difficult situation. But it means still more. The Vietnam propaganda war in its deep mendacity has always been a means to sow discord between Americans and Europeans. It was designed to serve as a contribution to the communists' key goal: to force America out of Europe. The Russians never had any interest in the end of the Vietnam war and they still have no interest in it today. The war brings them many advantages, among others, the ability to mobilize confused European minds at a moment when the leading Western power has to defend vital interests."

The Frankfurter Rundschau (Jan. 6) based its explanation on the concept Americans have of themselves and their country. The paper agreed that President Nixon has placed no authors in jail or in insane asylums, nor has he had opponents tortured in prison:

"He has done something quite definite: He has had bombs rain in blanket fashion over thickly-inhabited centers. And the protest of Palme and others is directed against this action. It becomes no less repugnant or even bearable because other people elsewhere also commit disgusting crimes or because brutality in this world is a part of daily life . . . Most people in the world consider themselves better than all the others in other countries, but in the Western world there is scarcely a nation in which this idea permeates its entire history and decisions to the extent it does in the United States . . . Shortly before his death, Robert Kennedy expressed this idea when he said: 'This country is something special,' also in moral questions. For this moral stand, America waged two crusades in Europe."

The Frankfurter Rundschau went on to say that in recent years many Americans may have lost some of this belief but that a nation does not change its beliefs very fast and that in the American Government's declarations regarding Vietnam there was still talk of America's historical mission in Southeast Asia:

"Apart from the direct victims, no people after the war was dealt with so severely as we Germans; re-education is an American invention. Still today there is scarcely a country in which a German visitor can run up against so much arrogance and self-righteous tendencies toward moral lecturing than in the United States. America itself has set the norms according to which it wants to be measured and has to be measured. Whoever considers himself particularly beautiful, particularly intelligent, particularly good, and who says this to everybody until they are fed up with it, ought not to wonder if he is evaluated in a particularly critical fashion and if at the end, there is not much left of his beauty and goodness. This is certainly one of the reasons why American brutality in Vietnam arouses so much anger even though things are also not in order elsewhere in the world."

III. PRESS REACTIONS FROM EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ON THE END OF BOMBING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ON AUGUST 15, 1973

EXCERPTS FROM USIA SUMMARY OF WORLDWIDE TREATMENT OF CURRENT ISSUES—CAMBODIAN BOMBING—AUGUST 8, 1973

CAMBODIA BOMBING HALT APPROACHES

Scattered media comment reviewed the Cambodia situation as the August 15 bombing deadline nears. The two accidental bombings near Phnom Penh were deplored.

Paris: "Bombing One's Own Friends"

Independent-left *Le Monde* of Paris said today in a boxed commentary:

"A few hours after virtually eradicating from the map the village of Neak Luong and destroying one of the main naval bases of the Khmer Republic—its ally—the U.S. Air Force resumed its murderous pounding of Cambodia as if nothing had happened. . . .

"Could the revolutionary forces find better allies than those who bomb their own 'friends' . . . ?"

West German TV: "Douglas Proved Right?"

Washington correspondent Wolf von Lojewski asserted Monday night on West German television that "in a tragic way Supreme Court Justice Douglas was proved right: In massive bombing in a short time, many people were killed who cannot be revived by legal means."

Last night a West German TV correspondent reported from Cambodia that "all of Indochina is watching Cambodia and waiting for August 15," and that "total chaos among Government troops is feared more than the coming of the Communists." He declared:

"No doubt the U.S. missed its best chance to get into talks with Prince Sihanouk; now he tells them to talk with the Khmer Rouge. . . . The Chinese have made it clear that they will not agree to arrangements under which Sihanouk is not the Chief of State . . .

"It is said that Saigon might be willing to send its own troops to Cambodia. This would not only prolong the Cambodian war but maybe mark the beginning of a third Indochina conflict."

Social Democratic weekly *Vorwaerts*, out today, asserted that "massacre in Cambodia, massacre in Athens are different in their deadly dimensions, intentions and goals but similar in their inhuman senselessness."

It maintained that "help from the air can only delay catastrophe" for the Lon Nol Government, "and this cannot be changed by the coming Kissinger mission to China. . . .

"Nixon's orders to the bomber pilots are scarcely to be interpreted either in military or foreign policy terms, but rather as a demonstration of strength and stubbornness in a domestic political struggle."

Munich, "Kissinger Cannot Conceal Policy Collapse"

Independent *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* of Munich, reporting that Mr. Kissinger would go to Peking "last but not least to obtain Chou En-lai's support for a negotiated solution in Cambodia," added, "We fail to see what Nixon's emissary can do to conceal the collapse of U.S. policy in Cambodia . . .

"All partners involved are aware that Washington wants to drop Cambodia. But virtually never before has a great power lost so much face in such a process. Regardless of how questionable an ally Lon Nol is, the way he has been treated by the U.S. will produce an impact on the other Asian allies. Washington can only hope that Peking, Hanoi and Moscow will abstain from making its debacle too obvious . . ."

London: "Futile Last Days"

The independent Times of London said today:

"The last days of American engagement in the Indochina war are proving as sordid and futile as ever. . . .

"The only argument hitherto has been that bombing postponed the fall of Phnom Penh . . . and that it kept open for its hapless Government a negotiating base from which some compromise might have to be extracted to assure Cambodia's future. Those hopes have vanished."

The liberal Guardian of Manchester and London said today, "The most depressing aspect of the last week of bombing" in Cambodia "is that the United States appear to have learned little from involvement in Indochina. They are still thrashing about heavily and blindly."

Tokyo: "Some Suspect U.S. Intentions"

Moderate Yomiuri of Tokyo, Japan's third-largest newspaper, said today that the situation in Cambodia "is entering a new stage" with the suspension of U.S. military activities while "some people still harbor suspicion about Washington's true intentions because President Nixon has announced that the United States will continue to support the Lon Nol Government 'within the bounds of the law'."

Moderate Sankei of Tokyo asserted today that since Prince Sihanouk has refused to meet Presidential adviser Kissinger, the latter "is expected to meet another Liberation Forces representative when he visits Peking in the near future." However, the paper said, "since the military situation favors the Liberation Forces side, the United States and the Lon Nol Government may be forced to make considerable concessions."

Seoul: "Focus Now on U.S. Actions"

Seoul's independent, influential Hankuk Ilbo, in an editorial yesterday titled "Phnom Penh—A Candle Flickering in the Wind," held that "the only chance for survival for Phnom Penh appears to be negotiations with the Communists," and added, "Kissinger's visit to China may produce a breakthrough." It said further:

"U.S. decisions and actions now become focal points of attention in Southeast Asian nations, including South Vietnam."

Viet Cong Radio: "Bombings Meant to Destroy Lon Nol Army"

The Viet Cong radio charged today that "the U.S. bombing raids on August 6 and 7 against Neak Luong, where 542 soldiers and civilians were killed or injured, were aimed at terrorizing the people and destroying the Lon Nol army positions which, amid the CPNLF's present stormy offensive, were facing the danger of collapse.

"The Americans can neither justify their crime nor evade responsibility for it before the Cambodian people and other peoples of the world."

AUGUST 13, 1973

CAMBODIA: TWO DAYS TO BOMBING HALT

SUMMARY

Limited comment on the scheduled end on Wednesday of American combat air support to the Cambodian Government included interpretations of the final chapter of direct U.S. military participation in Indochina.

Some observers examining Administration alternatives saw hope for a settlement other than military defeat of the Lon Nol Government.

The London Sunday Observer judged it "quite possible that Washington will try to keep the war going for the time being until a somewhat better settlement is possible. One should not underestimate America's ability to do this. . . ."

The Washington correspondent of Figaro of Paris asserted that "Nixon and Kissinger are obviously convinced that Prince Sihanouk will realize before long . . . that he has every interest in negotiating with them before some Communist Khmer elements who do not recognize his authority become masters of his capital city."

Tokyo's Yomiuri warned that Soviet "reluctance" to see Sihanouk reinstated would mean "delicate bargaining for a solution among the U.S., China, the USSR, and North Vietnam."

London: "A Pathetic Epilogue"

In sparse comment on Cambodian developments, British media observers attempted assessments of Washington's position and possible alternatives.

The conservative Sunday Telegraph lamented: "It is a pathetic epilogue to a tragic story. The American people have had enough. Nor can they be blamed. The armed forces managed to maintain the tradition of blundering incompetence right up to the bitter end, even dropping their valedictory bombs on the wrong targets. . . ."

"The prospect, then, is grim. A year ago, a sense of crisis would have gripped the world since the U.S. is faced with the collapse of its Asian policies."

"Yet today, so numbed and anaesthetized is the American giant by its domestic sickness that it seems not to care. And if America does not care, who else in the West is likely to give a damn?"

The paper concluded that "all ears are tuned in to Watergate, impatiently waiting for the President's defense. So although the Vietnam bell tolls, the message of warning is neither heard nor heeded, except in Moscow, where the sound must be both sweet and welcome, more like a victory march than the dirge of defeat."

"U.S. MAY TRY TO KEEP THE WAR GOING"

The independent London Sunday Observer carried a correspondent's view that "the only country with the power to understand and then to help the Cambodians is America. The question is whether she also has the magnanimity to do so." He reasoned:

"Any Cambodian settlement now would go against Washington's and Saigon's ideas of their own interests. . . . It is therefore quite possible that Washington will try to keep the war going for the time being until a somewhat better settlement is possible. One should not underestimate America's ability to do this. . . ."

"America could help Cambodia get out of a war that threatens her survival as a country, but only by risking the comfort and maybe survival of President Thieu's South Vietnam."

The independent Times of London today carried this comment by Washington correspondent Patrick Brogan:

"Hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians have been killed or injured through American action and immense damage has been done. So far as anyone here can see, the only difference this has made is that Cambodia has been brought into the war. The situation in Laos is exactly the same as it was in 1963, and the only change in South Vietnam, after all the agony, is that the government there cannot hope to involve the Americans more deeply."

Paris: "U.S. Hopes to Negotiate With Sihanouk"

Moderately conservative Figaro of Paris today carried the report of its Washington correspondent, Jacques Jacquet-Francillon, that "as the end of the bombings draws nearer Nixon is not giving up the hope of negotiating with Sihanouk." He said "the analysis of the situation offered by U.S. Administration Asian affairs specialists is definitely more optimistic than the impression conveyed by international press reports" and cited three reasons:

"1. Phnom Penh not only holds fast but Cambodian Government forces . . . have managed to relieve a certain number of key positions around the Khmer capital."

"2. The Senate interdiction concerns solely bombing operations. It leaves the Nixon Administration virtually free to continue almost unlimited supply and equipment aid to the Lon Nol Government."

"3. The attitude of Prince Sihanouk is encouraging. . . ."

Jacquet-Francillon concluded that "rightly or wrongly, Nixon and Kissinger are obviously convinced that Prince Sihanouk will realize before long . . . that he has every interest in negotiating with them before some Communist Khmer elements who do not recognize his authority become masters of his capital city."

"This, of course, presupposes that the Lon Nol forces are still able to hold their own for a few more weeks with USAF support. It is a dangerous gamble, but Nixon has no other choice."

West German TV: "U.S. Objectives Still Unattainable"

The first network of West German television said yesterday:

"American involvement in Indochina used to be justified as an action in defense of people who did not wish to live under Communist rule and as the vanguard defense of the Western world. After 12 years, both objectives are as unattainable as ever. . . ."

Frankfurt: "No Proof of Domino Theory"

Chief editor Werner Holzer of left-center Frankfurter Rundschau, a critic of U.S. policies, wrote today that "it is doubtful that the fall of Phnom Penh would prove the domino theory." He added:

"Anyone who sees Indochina's leaders as mere tools of a Communist craving for power is drawing the wrong conclusion. Ho Chi Minh's successors in Hanoi and Sihanouk and his like have not fought the U.S. merely to accept new dependence. Peking and Moscow apparently are more aware than Washington how strong independent thinking is throughout Indochina."

In a syndicated radio-TV news panel show yesterday, Holzer, along with Craig Whitney of the New York Times and a Cambodian journalist, expressed doubt that the August 15 bombing deadline also marked an end of the U.S. involvement in Indochina. Saying it was possible that President Nixon might ignore the deadline, Holzer said:

"With the present U.S. Government one is never sure whether it will stick to the Constitution."

Rome: "Negotiate with Sihanouk"

The correspondent of right-center Il Tempo of Rome wrote yesterday:

"The Administration has won its tug-of-war with those who had demanded an immediate interruption of the Cambodian operation. But it is an irrelevant victory since Cambodia is now beyond any U.S. power influence and is involved in a game with a variety of contrasting military pressures and political influences. . . .

"The only way to save Lon Nol is to negotiate with Sihanouk and obtain consent to a truce from Moscow and Peking. . . . Washington's diplomatic strategy has only short-range objectives because this is the worst time to negotiate. . . ."

Moscow Radio: Reports of "Allegedly Mistaken Bombings"

Moscow radio on Friday cited "correspondents of foreign press agencies" as noting that "allegedly mistaken bombings" in Cambodia had become "increasingly frequent in the past few weeks. . . . But it is not hard to guess why the American bombs were dropped on the Lon Nol troops at a considerable distance from the action area where they were out of contact with the patriotic forces of Cambodia. . . . It is perfectly possible that the so-called mistaken bombings are a means against desertions and evacuation of positions."

On Saturday, Moscow Tass reported from Washington that "the Pentagon had been deliberately withholding from Congress and public opinion the truth about American air raids on Cambodian territory in 1969-1970 and supplying them intentionally with false information."

AUGUST 15, 1973

Duesseldorf: "Thailand the Next Target?"

Pro-Christian Democrat Rheinische Post of Dusseldorf said today, "Now that their military intervention in Indochina is ended, the Americans will ask themselves whether it was worth the material and human costs and the loss of moral prestige."

"In Cambodia, it was not."

"The Americans have failed to achieve their main goal—to prevent the Khmer Rouge from taking over the country."

"Now one can only warn Nixon against attempting to recover lost terrain by renewed military action—for which he is apparently seeking Congressional authorization."

The paper held that "in Cambodia as in Vietnam, the Americans have been forced to recognize that technological potential alone is not enough to win a war and gain popular support." It concluded:

"The U.S. failure in Cambodia should be a lesson for Washington in dealing with Thailand, which will probably be the next target of the Communists."

Frankfurt: "Sihanouk Can Offer Neutralization Package"

Military writer Adelbert Weinstein of the independent-right Frankfurter Allgemeine predicted today that "if Sihanouk prevails merely because the oppos-

ing side disintegrates, it will prompt South Vietnamese intervention." He reasoned that the continuing strategic threat to South Vietnam posed by North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia "might compel Thieu to shoulder the military burden America has discarded," whereupon Hanoi "would respond with a counter offensive."

Weinstein calculated that Sihanouk, "aware of this danger, will not maintain his anti-American attitude, because only Washington could dissuade Saigon from intervention in Cambodia."

He suggested that in return for their preventing a third war in Indochina, Sihanouk could offer neighboring countries and the big powers "his previous policy boldly widened and wrapped as a new package: Cambodia's neutralization within a neutral Indochina in the framework of a neutrality comprising all of Southeast Asia."

"Supported by Peking and accepted by the U.S. as a negotiating partner, Sihanouk would speedily win the neighboring countries' support for such a plan."

West German TV: "Sihanouk No Longer the Man?"

The Southeast Asia correspondent of West German television's first network observed Monday evening that "the name of Sihanouk is like a charm. Now that the leaders in Phnom Penh can no longer expect miracles from American bombs they are waiting for Sihanouk to do the trick. . . ."

"But perhaps he is no longer the man to prevent further bloodshed. Perhaps those jungle revolutionaries who have been in charge of the offensive during the past weeks are now much stronger than he is."

London: "Naive U.S. Decision"

The conservative London Daily Telegraph yesterday carried a Saigon correspondent's comment that "whatever the root cause" of the U.S. decision to end U.S. air combat support to the Cambodian Government, "History will surely rank this among the war's most naive decisions, tantamount to forfeiting a key segment of the contest."

The correspondent remarked that "unlike the U.S., South Vietnam cannot pack up and withdraw" and suggested that "in an effort to salvage what the Americans have abandoned, President Thieu is playing his biggest bluff yet . . . the possibility of South Vietnamese intervention" in Cambodia.

"U.S. IS SICK OF FOREIGN WARS"

London's conservative pro-U.S. Daily Mail asserted yesterday that "only one thing is certain in this Oriental tangle: America is sick of foreign wars and foreign responsibilities." It continued:

"More and more Americans are saying: 'What does it matter to us if the whole of Southeast Asia goes Communist? Is it worth risking a single GI for Cambodia?'"

"Will we live to hear Americans ask whether it is worth risking a single American life for Britain? . . ."

"Now that the Watergate comedy show is switched off for a moment, you can just hear the Kremlin purring as it prepares to lap up the cream."

Paris: "Isolation Without U.S. Air Support"

Middle-of-the-road Figaro of Paris yesterday ran the judgment of a Saigon correspondent that "it is difficult to see how the Government army can prevent the isolation and asphyxiation of Phnom Penh without USAF support."

Foreign editor Michel Tatu of independent left Le Monde of Paris yesterday considered the Cambodian situation in the context of East-West détente. He wrote:

"There is every indication that the current policy of détente will be prolonged because it suits the interests of nearly all governments under present circumstances. This is so true that an event which in normal times would doubtless have brought on a major international crisis—the last convulsions of the war in Cambodia—has not disturbed the fine balance among the major powers."

Tatu argued that in continuing "the murderous bombing" up to the deadline the U.S. was "needlessly prolonging the sufferings of the inhabitants and moreover violating its commitments under the Paris accords."

"Yet U.S. relations with the Communist big powers have not suffered much except for the forced postponement of Kissinger's visit to China."

Tatu said such "odd moderation" was due not only to U.S.-Soviet community of interests in Cambodia—including a "shared embarrassment at an inevitable takeover by Prince Sihanouk"—but to a decision by Washington and Moscow, "as early as 1972, not to allow their relations to be dependent on the ups and downs of the Indochina conflict, at least as long as Moscow did not encourage a massive North Vietnamese offensive."

"In short, Washington and Moscow have renounced participation in big wars but not in small wars."

TURIN: "ESCALATION AFTER SHORT PAUSE?"

The New York correspondent of left-of-center *La Stampa* of Turin reported yesterday from Washington that the "situation in Cambodia has seriously deteriorated and any solution is possible. . . . The bombing operation is being interrupted at a very delicate time." He said that "possible negotiations will depend on Sihanouk's good will . . . The danger of an escalation of the conflict after a short pause is close and real. . . ."

Rome: "Air War Did Not Stop Guerrillas"

Independent *Il Messaggero* of Rome wrote yesterday:

"The useless massacre is about to end. A horrified world has witnessed the 'mistaken' bombing of Neak Luong. This absurd technological warfare has not stopped Sihanouk's guerrillas . . ."

"American air intervention for a short time postponed the end of one of the most corrupt regimes in the history of Southeast Asia . . ."

"A satisfactory compromise will probably be reached . . . but real peace is impossible without an agreement among the great powers. . . . In the past few months all peace agreements have been evaded. . . ."

"The U.S. may have been counting on a disagreement between China and the USSR when it tried the Cambodian bombing tactic to avert a collapse of the pro-American alignment in Indochina."

Vienna: "Sihanouk Is the Man"

Socialist *Arbeiter-Zeitung* of Vienna argued yesterday that Sihanouk, "not a Communist but a neutralist," was "obviously the only man who can prevent further bloodshed and ensure that all of Cambodia does not fall to the Communists. . . ."

"If the Americans had not staged a coup to install the Lon Nol regime instead Sihanouk, who had been elected, he would be the logical partner for the U.S. to negotiate with."

Saying "the Nixon Administration has done its utmost to keep Lon Nol in power by large-scale supply of arms and by bombing his enemies, with or without the knowledge of Congress," the paper urged that "the time has come to drop" Lon Nol "and at last to enable the Cambodians to exercise self-determination."

Moscow Radio: End of Bombing Noted

Moscow Tass briefly noted today that "a spokesman for the U.S. Pacific Command . . . officially announced the ending of all U.S. military actions in Laos and Cambodia."

IV. AMERICAN PRESS REPORTS ON EUROPEAN CRITICISM OF U.S. POLICIES IN VIETNAM

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 29, 1972]

EUROPEAN PROTESTS MOUNT AGAINST U.S. BOMBING

FRENCH EFFORT TO REOPEN STALLED NEGOTIATIONS SHOWS NO SIGN OF BREAKING STUBBORN IMPASSE

(By Takashi Oka)

PARIS—While the Vietnam peace talks here remain at a complete impasse, the chorus of European protests against the intensive American bombing of North Vietnam grows louder.

A North Vietnamese source declares that Hanoi will not return to the conference table until American bombing north of the 20th parallel ceases. American sources here refuse all comment on the bombing, although they call on Hanoi to "negotiate seriously."

French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann, who saw American Charge d'Affaires Jack B. Kubisch Wednesday and the North Vietnamese delegate general the day before, is said to be trying to get both parties back to the conference table.

But in the absence of any precise word either from Washington or Saigon about the duration of American bombing attacks against North Vietnam, there are no discernible signs here of movement in this direction.

NO COMMENT AVAILABLE

American and French sources refused to comment on the content of Mr. Schumann's discussion with Mr. Kubisch, or on a report from Saigon that the United States would halt the bombing soon—at any rate before Congress convenes on Jan. 3.

But protests here and elsewhere in Europe have been mounting as the American bombing of North Vietnam continues. Newspapers here have daily carried eyewitness accounts by correspondents of the government-owned French News Agency in Hanoi, giving details of the bombing and of the casualties and damage it is causing.

CONDEMNATION APPLAUDED

A Gaullist deputy, Jacques Mercier, has sent Foreign Minister Schumann a written question asking what steps the government intended to take to "make known to the American Government the horror and reprobation the renewal of the bombing of North Vietnam arouses among the French, regardless of their political creed or religion."

The respected newspaper *Le Monde* applauded Premier Olof Palme of Sweden and the leaders of Norway and Denmark for condemning the American bombing and commented that "the leaders of the small Nordic countries are daring to say out loud what many others are thinking."

This frankness, the newspaper said, was preferable to the "prudent silence or the pious wishes of other friends of America," including France, who, "to remain in the good graces of their great ally, disown their proclaimed convictions and admit the inadmissible." (On the other side of the world the Seamen's Union of Australia announced a nationwide boycott of all American shipping in protest against the renewed U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.)

In London, the conservative *Times* asked editorially Thursday, "After more than 7 million tons of bombs, will 10 million tons make a significant difference? History does not provide the indications that it will. What the United States is losing politically, in the eyes of the world, is beyond all computation."

[From the New York Times, Jan. 3, 1973]

WAR RAIDS INCITE ANTI-U.S. FEELINGS IN ITALY

(By Paul Hofmann)

ROME, Jan. 2—The United States bombing strikes in North Vietnam have caused a wave of anti-American feeling in Italy that the halt of the raids above the 20th Parallel has not stopped.

Expressions of hostility toward the United States range from protests by newsmen, intellectuals and some Roman Catholic priests to attacks on American offices.

An anti-American demonstration received a seal of official approval in Bologna when the Communist-controlled city government formally voted to greet the new year by burning a "father napalm" figure symbolizing the United States in the main square, the Piazza Maggiore.

The cardboard figure carried a wooden scale model of an airplane, marked "B-52" with a tail assembly in the shape of the Statue of Liberty.

In the past, the Bolognese burned a cardboard figure representing the outgoing year.

Bologna, which has a population of 600,000, is the largest Communist-ruled city in Western Europe. It is also host to 1,000 American students who attend medical school or the local center of Johns Hopkins University, an American graduate institution on international affairs.

ACTION DRAWS PROTESTS

The innovation in Bolognese folklore elicited some protests. A former Finance Minister, Luigi Preti, who is a Social Democrat, wrote in a letter to Bologna's Communist mayor, Renato Zangheri, that he found it "disreputable" that an old, harmless custom had been turned into a political manifestation.

Mr. Preti, who is a member of Bologna's city parliament, suggested that the mayor convene that body for a discussion on Vietnam, and offered to expound an anti-Communist's view of that conflict. The mayor, in a counterstatement, reminded critics that President Nixon's decision to resume the bombings in North Vietnam in December had been attacked by the world's most influential newspapers, from The New York Times to Le Monde of Paris and Corriere della Sera of Milan.

Elsewhere in Italy, Communists and non-Communists are marching jointly these days in anti-American demonstrations. In Pisa, Palermo and many other cities, local units—especially youth groups—of Premier Giulio Andreotti's Christian Democratic party are among the sponsors of such rallies and parades.

In Rome, youthful leftists have during the last few days lit a bonfire in front of the United States Embassy, painted anti-American slogans on the American Express office, and hurled gasoline bombs at two local affiliates of United States concerns, International Business Machines Corp. and Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company.

Newsmen of various political and ideological camps throughout Italy are endorsing a statement condemning the bombing raids on North Vietnam. Editors and writers of La Stampa of Turin, a newspaper owned by the Fiat Motor Company, are circulating the statement.

Some United States residents of Italy said that they are sensing a new coolness among their local acquaintances. An American was told by an old friend, a professor of English literature who has repeatedly visited the United States: "America during those terrible last few weeks when the B-52's were pounding Hanoi has shown us a face that we hadn't known to exist, and it deeply frightened and repelled us."

Italy made representations in Washington during the bombings. The Communist party here asserted that this was a result of a broad mobilization of public opinion in Italy.

BRANDT'S SILENCE ASSAILED

BONN, Jan. 2—Chancellor Willy Brandt is coming under increasingly sharp criticism from European Social Democrats and Communists for not raising his voice against the recent intensive American bombing of North Vietnam above the 20th Parallel.

Today the Federal executive board of West Germany's Young Socialists, the junior arm of his governing party, accused him of "hush-up tactics."

Mr. Brandt has also been criticized for his silence on Vietnam by Swedish Social Democrats and by the East German Communist leadership.

Privately Mr. Brandt has been quoted by colleagues as saying that he found the bombing policy of the Nixon Administration "disgusting and unfathomable," and his ministerial aide, Egon Bahr, is expected to say more on behalf of West Germany when he confers with American officials in Washington later this week.

So far as the public record is concerned, however, Mr. Brandt is understood to feel that no German head of Government has the moral right to condemn other countries as committing war crimes after what was done by Germans during the Hitler era. For this reason he has avoided using what authority he might command even as the latest winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

OSLO PARTIES ASK BOMBING END

OSLO, Norway, Jan. 2 (Reuters)—Norway's eight political parties issued a statement tonight calling for a complete and final end to all bombings in Vietnam, followed by a full cease-fire and the speedy signing of a peace agreement.

A spokesman said at a news conference tonight that the statement was addressed to all parties involved in the Vietnam war.

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1972]

U.S. ALLIES OUTDO SOVIETS IN OUTRAGE

While the bombing of North Vietnam has rankled many of America's friends and allies it seems not to have deeply ruffled the Soviet Union. Seldom before, says Joseph Harsch (below), has one Western nation been so publicly criticized by the others. Anti-U.S. sentiment has been aroused also among workers in other countries, reports Ed Townsend not least in Australia where maritime unions boycotted American ships. But, urgently in need of U.S. grain, the Soviet Union still appears to be hoping for a Vietnam settlement and no great disruption in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, writes Leo Grulow.

(By Joseph C. Harsch)

The bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong has been stopped but the extraordinary shock waves of reaction which it set off continue to reverberate throughout the world.

Among the Communist countries and parties the usual and expectable protests seemed mild by contrast with the stronger expressions of outrage among countries which for years have been America's closest friends, supporters, and clients. The more dramatic reactions include the following:

Britain's former Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who consistently supported the American war effort in Vietnam when he was in office, canceled an American lecture tour in protest. A delegation from Mr. Wilson's Labour Party delivered a forceful protest to the U.S. Embassy.

In Australia, which has moved so close to the U.S. in recent years that even its mother country, Britain, has been pushed aside, dock workers have boycotted American ships in Australian ports. And the Australian Government has ended all involvement in the Vietnam war.

DENMARK BREAKS PRECEDENT

In Denmark, such a staunch supporter of the United States that a body of its citizens celebrate America's July 4 Independence Day, the Prime Minister asked his Parliament for a grant of \$700,000 for "humanitarian relief" to North Vietnam. Heretofore Denmark has divided its relief funds equally between North and South Vietnam.

Prime Minister Anker Joergensen said he was breaking from the principle of even distribution because the American bombing had created "an extraordinary and acute" need for aid in the Hanoi and Haiphong area.

Sweden's Prime Minister criticized the bombing so strongly that Washington submitted a diplomatic protest and told the Swedes to delay the departure of their new Ambassador to Washington. The Swedes will contribute to rebuilding the heavily damaged Bach Mai Hospital in Hanoi.

Norway's eight political parties joined in a statement calling for a final end to all bombings in Vietnam.

Canada's Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau sent "several messages" to Washington during the bombing in which he "deplored" it.

In Bonn "government sources" are quoted as saying that Chancellor Willy Brandt's "displeasure" over the bombing will be expressed in Washington by his close personal friend and Cabinet colleague, Egon Bahr.

Since the "cold war" began there has never been such strong disapproval of the deed of one of the Western countries by the others.

The nearest comparable outburst of community displeasure over the behavior of one of the Western countries was caused by the British-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in October, 1956—the so-called "Suez Crisis." At that time the United States voted with Russia in the United Nations for a resolution calling on the British, French, and Israelis to cease their military actions.

Also, when Washington authorized Gen. Douglas MacArthur to march for the Yalu at the climax of the Korean war the British government of the day asked anxious but private questions of the government in Washington. It did not protest out loud.

CLEAREST BREAK YET

But never before has a leading Western Country been so publicly criticized as in this case. And never before has there been such clear dissassociation from the policy at issue.

Perhaps partly the wave of revulsion was the result of the fact that hopes for an end to the war had been raised so high just before Christmas, only to be smashed in the rain of bombs on Hanoi. But the wave of revulsion was unique in its scope and intensity.

The fact of the destruction of the Bach Mai hospital coupled with reports of "pattern bombing" of targets within residential sections of Hanoi seemed to strike people and governments as peculiarly out of date and phase with these times.

There could be no doubt that American repute as a moral and high-minded country was severely damaged. Fairly or unfairly, even America's best friends overseas began comparing the bombing of Hanoi to Germany's bombings of Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Coventry.

The damage to America's good name may prove as severe as the damage Russia suffered from its suppression of the Hungarian rebellion against communism in 1956 or of Czechoslovakia's abortive reach for freedom in 1968. The Russians have been expected to behave ruthlessly. The Americans are supposed to behave in a more principled way.

But did the bombing make Hanoi more interested in a peace settlement?

As this is being written Henry Kissinger is getting ready for another round of talks in Paris. That is when and where all the critics of the Nixon bombing policy will discover whether it did in fact shorten the war, or lengthen it.

[From the New York Times, Jan. 8, 1973]

SWEDISH CHILLINESS TOWARD U.S. IS LIMITED TO VIETNAM

(By Alvin Shuster)

STOCKHOLM, Jan. 6—Swedes are out this weekend enjoying the mildest winter in 300 years and gathering signatures on a petition backed by all political parties calling for an end to the Vietnam war.

There is rare January sunshine on Stockholm's rivers and canals and no snow, and the ski dealers are unhappy. There is also an unusual diplomatic chill in the air—Swedish-American relations have fallen to a new low as another casualty of the Vietnam war.

As of Monday, neither country will be represented by an ambassador. The Americans have not had one since August and the Swedes have been told to hold back in sending a replacement for their envoy, who is departing this weekend.

This latest and most severe strain in diplomatic relations between Washington and Stockholm, long at odds over the war, developed quickly after the resumption

of American bombing of the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, with the collapse of peace talks last month. The reaction of the Swedes, among the most vocal and active opponents of the war in the West, was one of revulsion and shock.

SHOCKED BY HOSPITAL DAMAGE

Their anger intensified shortly before Christmas, with the news of the damage to a hospital in Hanoi that had been partly equipped by Sweden. And that night, after 9 P.M., with his sons in bed upstairs, Premier Olof Palme sat down at the kitchen table and wrote out a statement that linked the American bombing of North Vietnam with Nazi massacres in World War II. He set it aside, reread it in the morning, consulted a few associates—but not his Foreign Ministry—and then issued it to the press. The result was a violent reaction from Washington and a sharp diplomatic slap.

President Nixon heard of Mr. Palme's words just after they moved on news agency wires on Dec. 23 and ordered diplomatic retaliation. The Swedes were told that their new Ambassador, Yngve Möller, would not be welcome for the present and that the American charge d'affaires, John C. Guthrie would not be returning to Stockholm.

"NOT AN INSTANT REACTION"

Premier Palme reflected on the crisis in an interview in his office as he smoked his favorite American cigarettes. "It was not an instant reaction," he said. "It was building up inside of me since the bombing resumed. We had many discussions on it over a period of five days or so. And then, that evening, I knew what I had to say about it.

"I don't regret it because in this world you have to speak out fairly loud to make anyone listen. I can't keep silent on this issue and won't be pressurized into silence.

"I would prefer if the United States would recognize the fact that one can have a deep-seated difference of opinion with Washington that calls for arguments rather than diplomatic rebuffs. They serve no useful purpose."

Mr. Palme, who has not been a favorite politician in Washington's eyes since he walked with the North Vietnamese envoy in an antiwar demonstration here five years ago, sought to remove some of the sting from his controversial statement, which called the bombing a "form of torture" reminiscent of atrocities committed at Katyn, Lidice and Treblinka.

He said that the list represented "symbols of meaningless human suffering and violence" and did not intend to imply "literal comparisons" between the bombing and those past events and the politicians responsible.

The 45-year-old Premier, who traveled widely in the United States as a student and attended Kenyon College in Ohio, insisted in his excellent English that Sweden was not anti-American but anti-Vietnam war.

In his view, close and friendly ties would be resumed once the war was over because Sweden was "probably the most pro-American country in Europe."

Many Swedes, stopped on the streets or in casual conversation in bars and shops, make the same point. They talk of three million Swedes who emigrated to America, of the similarity in life-styles, and of the heavy injection of American culture into films, television, music and other areas.

But they are strong opponents of the American role in Indochina, with the depth of feeling depending largely on age. The young here are active and vociferous, raise money for the "liberation front" in South Vietnam and applaud Mr. Palme's positions. Many in the older generation are more reserved, largely because of their memories.

"I think Palme was too strong, although I am against the war," said Lars Hansson, a 59-year-old who was strolling along the banks of one of the many fingers of the Baltic Sea. "I don't think we should be so tough on the United States. I remember what it did during the Second World War, what it did for Europe afterwards. It's a good country."

Several Opposition politicians took the view that Mr. Palme had gone too far in the reference to Nazi atrocities, and his Foreign Ministry probably agrees. But they also feel, as does Mr. Palme, that the American reaction to his criticisms went too far, as well.

ALL PARTIES OPPOSE BOMBING

There is, however, a generally unified position on Vietnam within the political parties. All five parties, from the Conservatives to the Communists, agreed to support the petition now circulating, calling on the United States to stop all bombing in Vietnam and on "all parties" to the conflict to sign a peace agreement. Mr.

Palme hopes that two million of Sweden's eight million people will sign the petition.

One result of the present dispute has been to strengthen Mr. Palme's political position. His Social Democratic party, in power for 40 years, is in some trouble now because of inflation, running at up to 7 percent a year—coupled with virtual economic stagnation, with a growth rate last year of about 2 percent, one of the lowest in Europe.

The polls show that an election today—it is scheduled for September—would oust the Social Democrats. Mr. Palme needs all the support he can muster, and as a long-standing critic of United States war policy, he clearly reflects what most Swedes feel.

U.S. HELPS PALME

"Most of us did feel that the bombing was an outrage," said Lars Eric Thunholm, president of the Scandinavian Private Bank, one of the largest in Europe. "Many also think that Palme's wording was too strong in protest. But the United States helps him by taking such actions in return. He receives sympathy from people who might not give it otherwise. The United States should have done nothing in response."

"The fact that the bombing has stopped around Hanoi and that talks are about to resume has little bearing," said Gunnar Helen, the head of the Opposition Liberal party, as he sat in the futuristic new Parliament building. "Hundreds have changed their position from a sort of balanced silence to a clear outcry against the bombing. And that includes many of the older people who are now divorcing their memories of postwar America from what's going on now."

A HISTORY OF TENSION

The recent history of diplomatic relations between Washington and Stockholm has frequently been marked by tension. Sweden was the first Western country to give full diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam. She has granted asylum to more than 400 American deserters and has repeatedly attacked United States war policy in a spirit that Washington often regarded as one-sided for a nation that has professed neutrality for 150 years.

Moreover, Stockholm has sent large-scale relief and aid to North Vietnam. It does not do the same for South Vietnam, nor does it have a diplomat in Saigon. "We technically recognize the Saigon regime as long as it is in power," Mr. Palme said. "But it would not be acceptable to public opinion to have an ambassador there. We never had one and it's too late now."

The repeated attacks on United States war policy by Mr. Palme hardly surprised Washington in recent months, and it probably would not have reacted so severely had the Premier not implied a comparison between Mr. Nixon and Hitler. In 1968, after Mr. Palme—then a Cabinet Minister—appeared at the antiwar rally with the North Vietnamese envoy, President Johnson called home William Heath, then the American Ambassador. The post was not filled for a year, although Sweden maintained her envoy in Washington.

TENSION BUILDS ANEW

Tension began building again as the war continued and the statements by Swedish officials appeared to grow stronger. Washington was particularly angered by a speech made in May by the Minister for Education, Ingvar Carlsson, who appeared at a demonstration sponsored by the active liberation-front group here and the Swedish Committee on Vietnam.

"The war is not the only example, although the most brutal one, of the American craving to dominate other countries," he said before a crowd of 5,000. "The same feature, economic and technological supremacy—which easily turns to unmasked physical violence—is evidenced also within the American community in the relations between different groups of people."

As read by American officials, the speech went clearly beyond an antiwar speech and represented strident anti-American sentiments. Mr. Palme has denied that was the intention, but Washington remains unconvinced.

Moreover, there is unhappiness about some of the school workbooks distributed throughout Sweden. The book on Britain features on the cover a double-decker bus and guards at Buckingham Palace. The one on the Soviet Union shows little Russian dolls. The United States cover has black children behind a fence, suggesting a concentration camp.

A Conservative party politician disputes these American objections. "I've always followed the view that the Swedes were antiwar and not anti-American," he said. "But sometimes I do worry about the young generation. They may grow up in an atmosphere where they won't be able to make that distinction. But the sooner the war ends, the better chance of heading off future problems with America's image."

As it is, Americans who have long lived here report that they never encounter unfriendly acts from the Swedes. This is easily confirmed by visiting Americans.

NEW ENVOY UNHAPPY

Meanwhile, as the Swedes bask in what they call their "green winter," one of the unhappiest men in town is Mr. Möller, the Ambassador-designate to Washington. At 60, he was about to start a new career after 25 years as the editor of a suburban Social Democratic daily. He quit his job, resigned his seat in Parliament and worked this week in a fourth-floor office of the Foreign Ministry preparing for his new assignment.

"I'm a little disappointed" he said, "I had hoped to go to Washington and improve relations. And I'm still looking forward to it. I hope to go soon."

Another Ambassador did leave this weekend. Jean Cristophe Oberg said good-bye to his wife and children after his Christmas vacation. He returned to Hanoi.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1973]

VIETNAM'S INFLUENCE ON ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Helmut Schmidt, West Germany's Minister of Finance and previously Minister of Defense, delivered an address on the Atlantic alliance last Friday at Newberry College, in South Carolina, from which the following paragraphs are excerpted:

At this point I want to digress to the war in Southeast Asia. This war has never been a matter of the North Atlantic Alliance but it did originate in relation to another alliance of the United States. Neither have the NATO partners ever been seriously consulted nor have they volunteered to give thoughtful advice.

But nevertheless: this war has become a political and moral issue also to the European partners of the United States. It is deeply disturbing not only to your nation but also to my people and the Europeans as a whole. I do not wish to give any impression of attempting interference and therefore do confine my personal judgment to one single sentence: this war must be ended, otherwise the danger of alienation might turn into reality and thereby deeply influence the development of European-American relations.

... Mutual responsibilities also mean that it can be in the interest of neither to apply any kind of shock therapy. There will continue to be minor trade or monetary disputes and differences of well-considered and justified individual interests; but it just will not do for us to get lost in endless disputes over soy beans, potatoes or Arkansas chicken, and thus in the end to undermine the Atlantic Alliance.

Together Europe and America will have to seek a new approach if political practice is to reflect the interdependence of our political, defense, economic and monetary efforts.

V. STATEMENTS OF SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME ON U.S. BOMBING IN VIETNAM, DECEMBER 1972

STATEMENT ON VIETNAM BY PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME, DECEMBER 23, 1972

Things should be called by their proper name. What happens today in Vietnam is a form of torture. There can be no military motives for the bombings. Military spokesmen in Saigon have denied that there is any step-up of military activity on the part of the North Vietnamese. Nor could it be Vietnamese obstinacy at the negotiation table. Resistance against the October agreement in Paris comes primarily—as was pointed out by the New York Times—from President Thieu in Saigon. What is being done is that people are being tormented, that a nation is being tormented to humiliate them, to force them to submit to the language of force. That is why the bombings are an outrage. There are many of this kind in modern history. They are often connected with names—Cuernica, Oradour, Babij Jar, Ketyń, Lidice, Sharpeville, Treblinka. Violence has triumphed. But the judgement of history has been hard on those who carried the responsibility. Now there is one more name to add to the list—Hanoi, Christmas 1972.

EXCERPT FROM INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER PALME, DECEMBER 23, 1972

During a radio interview December 23, 1972, Prime Minister Olof Palme was asked whether his statement concerning Vietnam implied that the Swedish Government meant that president Nixon was a modern Hitler.

The Prime Minister replied: "No, I have not made a comparison with politicians or military commanders. I have compared the consequences on individual human beings of violence as senseless abomination. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true—as a Nobel Prize winner told me a couple of weeks ago—that the Vietnam war is the most up-setting development in American history since the Civil war with deep conflicts, deep effects on a whole young generation in America and in the world. But young people do not compare with the past. They see the present and it is terrible enough."

TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME TO PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON, DECEMBER 24, 1972

Mr. President, let me on a personal note say a few words with reference to your message. On this Christmas Eve I feel the deepest distress over the human suffering that continues in Vietnam. Many times in the past people all around the world have looked to the United States for moral authority and leadership in the fight for peace and in the protection of fundamental human values. Personally I am deeply indebted for the inspiration that American ideals of democracy have given me.

The Vietnam war as it has developed has just because of this created sorrow and disappointment, feelings that I know to be shared by millions of people in Sweden and in other countries. Such reactions are particularly strong among young people and involve the risk that they will loose faith in democracy and democratic values. On this day when people gather to express their longing for peace I wish with utmost sincerity to urge the President of the United States to cease the bombings which cause so much suffering and destruction and to renew the efforts to find a negotiated settlement which assures the rights of the Vietnamese to form their own future.

DECEMBER 29, 1972.—The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs confirms that the U.S. Department of State has expressed a wish that Ambassador Yngve Möller not go to Washington for the time being.

It has not been the intention of the Swedish Government to express its political view by delaying Mr. Möller's departure.

It is now not possible to indicate when Mr. Möller will be leaving for Washington.

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF A STATEMENT BY PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME
DECEMBER 30 AFTER THE BOMBING HALT IN VIETNAM

It is a very encouraging step in the right direction. I am convinced that the strong international reaction against the bombings have played a role for the decision. We shall, of course, continue our opinion movement for peace in Vietnam.

VI. STATEMENT OF SWEDISH GOVERNMENT ON U.S.-SWEDISH RELATIONS

[UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION]

EXCERPTS FROM THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT DECLARATION ON FOREIGN POLICY IN THE RIKSDAG, MARCH 21, 1973: SWEDISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS

During the last few years Sweden's relations with the United States have been in the centre of attention. The reason has been the American participation in the Vietnam war. With the support of an overwhelming public opinion the Swedish Government has taken a strongly critical attitude towards the United States' Vietnam policy. The intensity of our reaction has been based on an awareness of the suffering especially afflicting the civilian population as well as on a conviction that a small people must have the right to form its own future without interference from the outside. The American Government has reacted by scaling down the diplomatic relations.

We believe that the Swedish-American relations in the long run are better served if we make clear our determination to uphold principles fundamental to us than if we attempt to hide our views. We have noted the reassessment of important elements of American foreign policy which now seems to be under way. This ought to contribute to an international development characterized by détente. In this perspective we can hope that differences of view of the kind that have been caused by the Vietnam conflict will not need to arise in the future.

In this context it could be emphasized that the traditional, lively exchange between Sweden and the United States continues. The personal ties between the two peoples are strong. The American and Swedish societies have many common traits and are basically founded on the same democratic ideals. Both face the task to solve the many complicated technical and social problems of the modern industrial society.

In a time of increased international cooperation and interdependence diplomatic channels are valuable means of contact and information. No nation is served by weakening these channels. Not the least in situations where there are differences of political views we find it important to maintain the possibility of dialogue on a high level. It is our wish that normal diplomatic relations shall exist between Sweden and the United States.

VII. LETTER PRESENTED TO HOLY FATHER, THE POPE, BY VISITING
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 11, 1973

Rome, January 11, 1973.

The HOLY FATHER,
Vatican City,
Rome.

YOUR HOLINESS: We write to you at the culmination of a mission of desperation. We are seven Americans, representing the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faiths, who have been impelled by the horror of our times to seek help from religious leaders outside our own country, so that our own country may repent the folly of its ways. We have carried our concern to religious leaders in England, Holland and Germany, and conclude this trip with our appeal to you.

As in the time of Jeremiah, "Everyone deals falsely . . . crying 'Peace, peace' when there is no peace." (Jeremiah 6:13-14) Just after our national leaders told us that peace was at hand, the heaviest bombing raids in history were undertaken by those same leaders. Even in the midst of peace negotiations, the bombing continues and we fear its escalation on an even more massive scale than before.

We are grateful for the moral leadership you have given the world in condemning war—in your visit to the United Nations in 1965, in your encyclical *Christi Matri Rosarii* in 1966 delivered at a time when few others were speaking so forthrightly, and in your most recent pronouncements which have been increasingly incisive in their condemnation. Indeed, it is because you have already said so much, and because we believe that your voice is heard with more respect and moral authority than any other single voice throughout the world, that we presume to ask Your Holiness to speak yet again and even more specifically.

We realize that a word of love spoken on behalf of the Vietnamese will necessarily be a word of judgment spoken against our own nation, and yet we ask for that word of love and judgment, for here the pastoral and prophetic roles coincide.

We feel a desperate moral shame that our country has so utterly ignored the principle of proportionality in the present air war against Indochina, devastating wide areas and populations to a degree that cannot be justified by any conceivable good that could come from it. We fully share the conviction of the Council fathers at Vatican II that "Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their populations is a crime against God and man. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation." (*Gaudium et Spes*, para. 79.)

We feel that it is that "unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation" that is called for once again in connection with the specific bombings of which Americans were guilty in Hanoi during the Christmas season, and which continue this very day in other parts of Indochina. We implore you out of our great need, *de profundis*, and our national shame, to condemn these acts specifically, so that there can never be a resumption of such bombing by our nation or any other nation, for if you do not do so, we fear that our leaders may continue to destroy both the lives of the Vietnamese people and the moral conscience of the American people.

We feel also that these desperate times call for a symbolic act that could capture the imagination of the world's peoples and dramatize the evil that is done when men forsake reason and bomb civilian populations with immunity. Consequently, we implore you to go to Hanoi yourself, or at least to send a papal emissary, to view at first hand the devastation we have wrought, so that you can report to the entire world the true state of affairs, and move our nation into repentance and amendment of our ways.

We accompany this letter with a candle we brought to Rome as a gift for you. It is made from the mould of an anti-personnel weapon, the guava bomb, that our airplanes drop on Vietnamese people. It will not harm a tank or a military installation; it inflicts damage only on human flesh. It symbolizes all that is morally abhorrent in our presence in southeast Asia. We ask you to light it as a sign of peace, a modern equivalent of turning swords into ploughshares, thus transforming the bomb into a beacon—a beacon whose light can become a symbol of hope to give encouragement to us all in the midst of our desperation.

The voice of conscience and the gospel must be raised at this moment in history in such a way that not even the slightest doubt could remain in the heart of the simplest man, that all men of goodwill who hear the voice of Your Holiness can no longer tolerate the crimes we commit against God and our fellow men, and will make your cry their own, "No more war, war never again."

The Rev. Dr. James Armstrong, Bishop, Dakotas Area, United Methodist Church; President, Board of Church and Society (UMC); Chairman, Committee of Peace and Development (UMC); Member, Department of International Affairs, National Council of Churches; Delegate, 4th World Assembly, World Council of Churches.

Rabbi Leonard I. Beerman, Rabbi, Leo Baeck Temple, Los Angeles, California; Executive Board, Central Conference of American Rabbis and Committee on Justice and Peace; Executive Board, Jewish Peace Fellowship; Lecturer, Immaculate Heart College.

Rev. Dr. Robert McAfee Brown, Professor of Religion, Stanford University, California; Observer, Vatican Council II for the World Alliance of Reformed and Presbyterian Churches; Member, Academic Council, Ecumenical Institute for Advanced Theological Studies, Jerusalem; Delegate, 4th World Assembly, World Council of Churches.

Dr. Harvey Cox, Victor Thomas Professor of Divinity, The Divinity School, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Member, Working Committee on Church and Society, World Council of Churches.

The Right Rev. Robert L. DeWitt, Bishop, Episcopal Diocese of Pennsylvania; Chairman, Joint Commission on Church and Human Affairs, Episcopal Church, U.S.A.; Chairman, Committee on National and International Affairs, House of Bishops, Episcopal Church, U.S.A.

Mr. Bruno Kroger, Office of Information, United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.; Board of Governor, National (Interreligious) Public Relations Council in the U.S.A.

Sister Mary Luke Tobin, S.L., Representative-at-Large, Sisters of Loretto; Director, Citizen Action, Church Women United, New York City; Chairman, Peace and Justice Committee, Leadership Conferences of Women Religious; Member, International Affairs Advisory Committee, National Council of Churches.

Encl. One guava bomb candle.

VIII. STATEMENT OF U.S. RELIGIOUS REPRESENTATIVES USED IN EUROPEAN VISIT IN JANUARY, 1973

STATEMENT OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ASKING FOR HELP TO END THE WAR

We have come here to ask for help.

We come on a mission of desperation.

We are all members of religious communities in the U.S.A.—Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish. We have all actively opposed the American war in Indochina for more years than we like to remember. As we meet here, negotiations have begun again in Paris, as they have time and again for five years, but in Indochina the war continues to rage. Recently our leaders renewed the bombing of civilian villages, hospitals and cities with a new fury and on an enlarged scale. We are not comforted by changes in the tempo of the bombing. We have seen them come and go before. Nor do we believe that temporary pauses in the bombing of some sections while devastation goes on in others is the way to make peace. Vast sections of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos now smolder in ruins. Numberless innocent human beings have been killed or maimed or seen their homes destroyed.

We need *your* help because as Americans we have been unable to persuade our president and his advisors to stop the bombing and burning, and to end the war now.

We have come to you because we find it harder and harder to continue our efforts for peace without your assistance.

We are grateful for what many of you have done or said in the past to express the pain and outrage you feel for what our nation is doing.

But now we ask again, with renewed urgency: let our leaders know that the world is watching in shock and dismay; let them know that all bombing must stop, that peace *must* now be made.

Please do not feel for a moment that you would be intervening into the domestic politics of our country. You would not. The ravaging of Indochina is not a domestic issue. It is the legitimate concern of every human being on the earth.

We ask you, therefore, as brothers and sisters in faith, to seize every opportunity at the local, national and global level to speak out clearly against the American destruction of Vietnam.

We ask you to exhort members of your communions to refuse to participate in the bombing of civilians.

We ask you to urge the government of your own nation to bring to bear whatever pressure and persuasion they can on the American government to stop its war policy. We ask you to pray without ceasing that God will soften the hearts of our leaders so that they may lay down the weapons of death and to pray also that the Spirit will sustain the people of Indochina in their travail.

This world is too small, time is too short, to endure the continuance of this meaningless tragedy. Again, we come to you because we need all the help you can give us to stop the killing and to begin the healing.

Bishop JAMES ARMSTRONG.
Prof. ROBERT MCAFEE BROWN.
Rabbi LEONARD BEERMAN.
Prof. HARVEY COX.
Bishop ROBERT DEWITT.
Sister MARY LUKE TOBIN.

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