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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 12, 1973

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CONTENTS

WITNESS

Page

Fraser, Hon. Donald F., a representative in Congress from the State of Minnesota ---- 2

LETTER SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Letter from the Department of State citing reasons for its refusal to testify before subcommittee ---- 7

APPENDIX

Statement of Hon. Herman Badillo of New York ---- 9
Survey on American attitudes toward Sweden, submitted by Hon. Donald M. Fraser ---- 11
Text of House Resolution 521 and co-sponsors ---- 20

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH SWEDEN

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1973

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee meets today to consider legislation recently introduced on U.S. relations with Sweden, by 27 Members of the House of Representatives. Yet, in fact, our subject concerns the consequences of Vietnam among the European countries.

Earlier this year, our subcommittee held hearings on European reactions to the December 1972 bombings in Southeast Asia and to other developments in that area. Our session today constitutes a continuation of those hearings with specific concern for the official American response to those reactions in one country, Sweden.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS

Our witness today, Congressman Donald M. Fraser, will describe, I am sure, the events which led us today to consider legislation to restore normal diplomatic relations with Sweden. In brief, those events consist of the U.S. failure to replace its Ambassador in Sweden, a post which has been vacant since August 1972. Later, we withdrew our second man, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and refused to accept the new Swedish Ambassador to the United States.

All of these events were presumably precipitated by the criticism of American policy in Vietnam by the Swedish Government. Yet there remains something inexplicable about these events. A peace settlement was reached in Vietnam and American military forces have left that country. Yet relations with Sweden continue in a state of calculated suspension.

We also asked the State Department to testify today for what we seek, essentially, is an official explanation for these acts directed against Sweden. The Department has refused to appear for reasons as remote to me as the explanation for our actions regarding Sweden since last year. The Department of State's letter to me, which will be included in the hearing record, gives two reasons for the refusal to testify:

(1) There is an election in Sweden this coming weekend, and testimony might be interpreted as interference in the Swedish election.

(2) Secretary of State-designate Kissinger has promised to review our policy toward Sweden.

My judgment is that our Government has already tried to interfere with the Swedish electoral process by our refusal to engage in normal diplomatic relations for over 1 year. As for Mr. Kissinger's willingness to reassess United States-Swedish policy after his confirmation, I must also note that he specifically refused to include Sweden among those countries where we have no ambassador and for which, Mr. Kissinger said last Friday, he would find envoys within 60 days. I conclude from Mr. Kissinger's remarks that the administration still intends to give some kind of special treatment to Sweden, even under a new Secretary of State.

We are indeed happy to welcome to the subcommittee hearing today the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Congressman Fraser, who will testify on his legislation concerning relations with Sweden. I hope that Mr. Fraser will also review for the subcommittee the action taken on identical legislation in the Senate.

Mr. Fraser.

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. FRASER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful for the opportunity to testify today in support of House Resolution 521, which urges the administration to restore normal relations with Sweden, and I congratulate you for holding this hearing to facilitate public airing of the important issues involved.

America's policy of not naming an ambassador to Stockholm is conduct unworthy of a mature and modern nation such as ours. It is a spiteful reaction to Swedish criticism—both official and unofficial—of our military activities in Southeast Asia, and in view of longstanding opposition to our policy there by numerous other countries, shows our policymakers to be both discriminatory and thinskinned in reacting to this particular instance of criticism.

Americans have been aware of Swedish opposition to our policy in Vietnam ever since we began the military buildup there a decade ago. Public demonstrations and official statements from Sweden left no doubt in our minds as to the attitude of the majority in that country. Throughout the 1960's, as deserters from our forces in Vietnam found haven in Sweden, we knew exactly where the Swedish Government stood on the subject. As a result, relations were strained, to be sure, but neither country went to the extreme of withholding ambassadors until President Nixon became particularly irked over a statement made by Prime Minister Palme last December 23, on the renewed bombing of North Vietnam at the very moment the U.S. Government was assuring the world that "peace is at hand." The Prime Minister said, in part:

STATEMENT BY PALME

What happens today in Vietnam is a form of torture. There can be no military motives for the bombings. Military spokesmen in Saigon have denied that there is any stepup of military activity on the part of the North Vietnamese. Nor could it be Vietnamese obstinacy at the negotiation table. Resistance against the October agreement in Paris comes primarily—as was pointed out by the New York Times—from President Thieu in Saigon.

What is being done is that people are being tormented, that a nation is being tormented, to humiliate them, to force them to submit to the language of force. This is why the bombings are an outrage.

The portion of Mr. Palme's statement which the U.S. Government apparently found the hardest to take was his placing the bombing of North Vietnam in the same category as outrages perpetrated by the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and South Africa through the years. The United States thereupon ordered its Chargé d'Affaires, who was home for Christmas, not to return to Stockholm, decided not to appoint an ambassador to Stockholm for the time being, and notified the Swedish Government that the newly appointed Swedish Ambassador to Washington was "unwelcome at the present time."

That was 9 months ago. Since then a cease-fire has come into effect in Vietnam, the bombing has stopped, and U.S. forces have been withdrawn. But, although U.S. officials have made peaceful visits to Hanoi, and Vietcong representatives are free to walk the streets of Saigon, the United States still has not seen fit to mend fences with a noncombatant, a neutral—Sweden.

VIEWS ON VIETNAM IRRELEVANT

In introducing House Resolution 521, it was not my intention to endorse the statements made by Prime Minister Palme. Nor am I here for the purpose of defending their substance today. My views on the Vietnam war and on Mr. Palme's criticism of it are irrelevant to the purposes of this resolution. My purpose is to gain acceptance of what I regard a fundamental premise of diplomacy: that the extension of recognition to a foreign government and the exchange of diplomatic representatives with that government do not necessarily imply that the United States approves of the form, ideology, or policy of that government. A resolution to this effect was, in fact, passed by the Senate in 1969.

There are numerous examples of acceptance of this premise in our foreign relations. We have extensive relations, including the exchange of ambassadors, with governments whose form, ideology, or policy do not meet with our general approval. The Soviet Union—with whom the administration is making maximum efforts to expand détente—is an example. We express official abhorrence over racial apartheid as practiced by South Africa, yet there is and always has been an American Ambassador in Pretoria. The Greek Government ignores our pleas for a restoration of democracy but we go to great lengths to maintain a cooperative relationship, even to the point of holding fast to our military alliance with it.

NO CONSISTENT POLICY

We also have not made a consistent practice of retaliating against those governments who have been the most severe in their criticism of our Vietnam policy. We continued to promote détente in the face of vitriolic Soviet denunciations, and opened our contacts with the People's Republic of China to the widest extent possible despite hostility to our actions in Vietnam expressed in the most intemperate language. We have lived for a decade with outspoken antagonism toward Vietnam policy from our oldest ally, France. We have conducted diplomatic business as usual with Japan, our chief Pacific ally, as it traded with North Vietnam.

An obvious question arises. Why Sweden? Is its Prime Minister rabidly anti-American? Hardly. Olof Palme said recently to an American journalist, "My attitude toward the United States has always been very positive. I was educated there, I love the country and I love the people, so I have never been against the United States. I have been against the Vietnam war which I think is completely out of line with the American tradition——"

Is Sweden an ally of North Vietnam? It is one of some 45 non-Communist countries with which North Vietnam has either de jure or de facto diplomatic relations. A list of these countries includes such friends of the United States as Canada, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries. Sweden has a program of humanitarian assistance to North Vietnam emphasizing medical supplies, food, and reconstruction aid, a program not unlike the one envisaged by our own Government for North Vietnam. Sweden has even been helpful to the United States by passing mail from POW families for delivery through the North Vietnamese Embassy in Stockholm.

CRITICAL OF SOVIET UNION

Does Sweden single out the United States for criticism? The Government has publicly expressed its disapproval of the authoritarian nature of the regime in North Vietnam, and the largest public demonstration in Swedish history was held in 1968 to protest intervention in Czechoslovakia. On that occasion Foreign Minister Nilsson denounced "the Soviet Union's brutal aggression against Czechoslovakia."

Early this year, Prime Minister Palme said Sweden "has not forgotten Czechoslovkia." And only last week Foreign Minister Wickman observed that the Soviet Union "lacks the inner strength to tolerate dissenting voices in its own society."

Recognition of Sweden's neutrality must always be a major factor in our relations with Stockholm. We could view it as an obligation for Sweden to remain silent in all international conflicts, but to do so would ignore the responsibility felt by Sweden and other peaceful nations to speak out on the moral values to which they are committed.

The United States has come a long way in its tolerance of neutrality on East-West issues since the 1950's, and I hope that our retaliation against Swedish criticism is only an isolated aberration from a trend that will continue. Surely we have outgrown the notion that the world must be divided in two totally committed camps.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF DIPLOMACY

I do not mean to suggest that we should view Sweden as a model nation whose example all the world should follow. Such a suggestion, if made, would also be irrelevant to the legislation before this subcommittee. I am simply urging the subcommittee to take a stand, through House Resolution 521, in favor of normal diplomatic relations with Sweden on the same basis on which nations throughout the world engage in diplomatic relations—neither condemning nor condoning Sweden by the exchange of ambassadors. Passage of this bill by the House would be an endorsement of the fundamental premises of diplomacy, and the dispatch of an American Ambassador to Stockholm would be a reaffirmation of maturity in our foreign relations.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Fraser, am I correct in stating that the Senate has approved a similar resolution?

Mr. FRASER. I know that a similar resolution was reported from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am not certain whether it passed the Senate itself.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think that is correct, that the Senate committee approved it.[1]

How serious, in your view, is the disruption of normal diplomatic relations with Sweden? We maintain our Embassy staffs in both capitals, so is it in fact a problem?

HOW SERIOUS A PROBLEM?

Mr. FRASER. I don't want to exaggerate the importance of the problem. It obviously causes some problem. I understand it has been made clear that the representation here in this country from Sweden is welcome only to see contacts at lower levels of the departments of our Government.

I think it is an irritant and it is an unhappy circumstance. What particularly bothers me is that I regard Sweden's concept of the role of government and the relation of government and individuals as one of the most civilized and advanced of any nation in the world. They embrace thoroughly the values which undergird the American system.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is part of the problem the effect of our actions on the U.S. image and the impression the United States leaves throughout the world? Does it make us look like a petulant nation? If one doesn't agree with us, with another country's particularly harsh criticism, will we respond in this childlike way?

Mr. FRASER. I think it looks petulant. I was interested in reading in an Air Force magazine in which the author of an article—I don't know who it was—made the comment that he thought the United States overreacted to Sweden. We have a wide range of contacts with Swedish people. We have, I think, some cooperation in the military sphere, so to act in this case on the basis of a statement honestly expressed by the Prime Minister does seem to me to be quite out of place and could only be interpreted as a form of petulance.

[1] The Senate passed the resolution on October 4, 1973. It was reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 2, 1973 by a vote of 14-3. (Senate Report 93-374.)

ARE WE INTERFERING IN SWEDEN?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you have any feeling or any view as to whether or not the United States is interfering in the Swedish electoral process by refusing to designate an ambassador, at least until after this weekend when their national election will be held?

Mr. FRASER. I don't want to overstate it, but since the Watergate hearings, I have the impression that Sweden is on the enemy list the same as those in the United States opposing the administration were put on the enemy list. I think it is the same kind of reaction and my own impression is that the hope is that it will have some effect in Sweden itself.

The President's action may become a political liability to the present Swedish Government and the present party in power.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Congressman Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is a pleasure to welcome you before the subcommittee, Mr. Fraser.

I see in front of us H. Res. 521, H. Res. 523, H. Res. 535, and H. Res. 531. Are they all identical in language?

Mr. FRASER. I think they are the same resolution resubmitted because of the number of sponsors or cosponsors.

THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Rosenthal said we are discussing a resolution to restore normal diplomatic relations with Sweden. Of course, that is not the function or within the capacity of this committee. I think what you are suggesting is that that normal relation should be restored, as I understand it.

Mr. FRASER. I think under the Constitution that is the limit of our ability to act on that.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I really have no questions. Let me mention the quote you used of the Prime Minister of Sweden. I do think his remarks were unfortunate and unfair and I do think they were provocative. At the same time I agree that our reaction was probably excessive, and that nothing much is gained by not having ambassadors in both capitals. I doubt if there are seriously adverse reactions in Sweden or elsewhere if we don't have an ambassador there. I view with sympathy the suggestion that we resume ambassadorial relations and I hope the Secretary of State, if he is confirmed soon, will resume negotiations along that line.

Mr. Rosenthal said the reasons for the State Department's refusal to appear were remote——

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I said "remote to me."

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I don't know what "remote" means. I can't follow the reasoning. I would like to submit for the record the letter from the State Department. It doesn't seem to me unreasonable, in view of the fact there are going to be elections in Sweden this weekend, that the State Department doesn't want to be put on the record now discussing the pros and cons of whether we should have an Ambassador there. I would like to ask that the letter be submitted for the record.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Without objection, it will be included in the record.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., September 11, 1973.

Hon. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to your request that the Department provide a witness to appear before your Subcommittee this week on House Resolution 521 calling for restoration of normal diplomatic relations through an exchange of ambassadors with Sweden.

As you know, Sweden will be conducting nationwide elections this weekend.[2] Hearings such as you propose will be widely reported in Sweden and any statements made by an official spokesman for the Department of State concerning U.S.-Swedish relations would probably lead to charges of interference in Sweden's electoral process. Such a development would not be conducive for future good relations between our two countries.

In addition, Secretary of State-designate Henry Kissinger indicated before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that the status of our representation in Sweden would be a matter he would review if confirmed.[3] Pending such a review, the Department would be reluctant to engage publicly in the kind of examination of our relations with Sweden which your hearing would entail. We, therefore, hope that you will understand our inability to accept your invitation to testify on this subject at this particular time.

I regret the negative nature of this response and hope that you will continue to let us know whenever we can be helpful.

Sincerely yours,

MARSHALL WRIGHT,
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No further questions.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If you were to make a recommendation as far as timing is concerned, what is your feeling as to when the subcommittee might take action on this resolution?

Mr. FRASER. I don't think there is any special timing. I don't think that the subcommittee should act with any reference to the election in Sweden. I think the subcommittee ought not to try to be involved in the election, not that it would, in any event. I think the subcommittee should act in whatever would be regular, normal timing.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very, very much and we are very honored that you have found the time to testify before the subcommittee.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:30 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

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[2] The elections of September 16, 1973, resulted in a tie in the Swedish Parliment with Prime Minister Palme's Socialist bloc and the opposition parties each gaining 175 seats. Palme is expected to continue in power for the foreseeable future.

[3] Secretary of State Kissinger was confirmed by the Senate on September 21, 1973.

APPENDIX

Statement of Hon. Herman Badillo, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York

Mr. Chairman, I am very encouraged by these hearings on the urgent need to restore normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Sweden and I commend this subcommittee for taking the initiative on this important issue. Also, I appreciate this opportunity to submit this statement in support of H. Res. 521, of which I am a co-sponsor.

Presumably the tension between the United States and Sweden had its inception in the remarks of Prime Minister Olof Palme about the bombing of various parts of Indochina by the United States. Mr. Palme very aptly referred to the illegal and immoral bombing policies of this country as similar to outrages committed by other nations in the past. Although the Swedish Prime Minister was simply exercising his right to express his nation's grave concern over the continued involvement of the United States in Indochina and was just one of many foreign and domestic leaders who criticized our government for its various ill-conceived war policies, Mr. Palme was singled out for special treatment by Mr. Nixon and his advisers. With typical emotional over-reaction which has marked most of his public career, Mr. Nixon refused to nominate someone to replace the American Ambassador who had retired from Stockholm in the summer of 1972 and requested the Swedish Government not to send a new ambassador to Washington.

MOTIVATION NOT UNDERSTOOD

It is difficult to understand the motivation behind Mr. Nixon's diplomatic blunder when you consider the fact that other nations, such as Canada, France and India, were critical of U.S. involvement in Vietnam yet no recriminations were made against them; when you take into account the fact that U.S. B–52s were being shot out of the sky by missiles supplied to Hanoi by the Soviet Union and thousands of South Vietnamese were being killed by bullets supplied to the Vietcong by the Peoples' Republic of China at a time when the President was moving toward detente with these two nations; and when the United States maintained normal diplomatic relations with certain nations, such as Greece and Brazil, who openly repressed those basic civil rights of their citizens which are protected by international agreements. Perhaps Mr. Nixon was piqued by the fact that Mr. Palme was basically correct and that his statements reflected the sentiments of many in the family of free nations.

I am convinced that the criticism which Mr. Palme directed toward the United States was motivated by his deep, personal concern over the distorted priorities pursued by the Nixon administration in Southeast Asia and the corruption of those principles of basic human decency normally observed in this country with which the Swedish Prime Minister became familiar during his undergraduate days in Ohio. As he declared in a magazine interview earlier this year:

> We have been used to looking to the United States for moral leadership and authority when it comes to questions of peace and the preservation of basic human values. And just because of this we feel our sorrow and our disappointment when something like the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong happens.

Surely there was no sinister purpose or objective underlying Mr. Palme's timely and very apt criticism and his comments were certainly consistent with the long tradition of neutralism, the respect for human dignity and the protection of the victims of aggression of Sweden.

But the policy of the United States toward Sweden goes far beyond the personal displeasure of one American president. What is really at stake—and what has been very seriously damaged—is the future of American diplomatic relations with progressive, industrial nations of Western Europe. These nations—as does any free state in the world—desire to pursue their own, independent foreign

policies, free from the pressures of the United States. Further, the present administration's policy seriously questions the ability of this country to fulfill its international commitments and our capacity for a continued leading world role. Is it possible that the United States expects silent acquiesence by other nations for certain policies which we pursue? Are our traditional allies to be punished for expressing criticism of or reservations over independent actions which the United States takes?

There is no question but that our present Swedish policy must be carefully re-examined and that steps must be promptly taken to repair the damage which Mr. Nixon has wrought and to restore relations between our two countries. As John Kenneth Galbraith has so perceptively noted in a recent statement:

> "Surely, the time has come to concede that the Swedes were not only right but helpful, and to take steps to repair relations with the country to which we owe so much. . . .

Our present posture does nothing more than demean the United States in the eyes of the world and further tarnishes our image in many lands.

Mr. Chairman, I urge that H. RES. 521 be expeditiously and favorably considered and that the Congress prevail upon the administration to immediately undertake the restoration of full, normal relations with Sweden.

Thank you.

Survey on American Attitudes Toward Sweden
Submitted by Hon. Donald M. Fraser

Committee on Foreign Affairs,
October 5, 1973.

Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal, *Chairman,*
Subcommittee on Europe, Foreign Affairs, Committee,
House of Representatives, Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The attached study of American attitudes toward Sweden commissioned by the Swedish Information Service, bears on your recent hearings on my resolution on restoration of normal diplomatic relations with Sweden.

If you agree, I think it would be useful to include extracts from the study in the appendix of the hearing record when it is published.

Sincerely,

Donald M. Fraser,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements.

Attachment

Highlights of Survey on American Attitudes Toward Sweden

introduction

The Swedish Information Service has retained Response Analysis Corporation to provide a profile of the attitudes and knowledge level of American adults about Sweden.

Objectives of the Study

The basic objective of the research is to provide the Swedish Information Service with an accurate picture of the feelings and opinions about Sweden held by the American public in general, as well as by the more influential or more sophisticated segments of the public. The research is also intended to measure knowledge—and misperceptions—of Sweden held by the public at large and by the more influential members of the public.

Both these objectives, of course, are oriented toward the goal of providing you with information and research-based insights that will be useful in shaping the communications strategy and themeing of the Swedish Information Service.

The Samples and Study Methodology

Findings are based on interviews conducted in May and June 1973 with samples of three different groups of American adults:

1. Face-to-face interviews in the home, with 1,002 adults who are a cross section of all adults age 18 and older. Interviews were conducted between May 14 and June 3, 1973 by ORC Caravan Surveys.* This is the *general public* sample.

The *general public* findings are reliably projectable to 137 million adults age 18 and over.

2. Nationwide telephone interviews with adults who live in Census tracts where the median annual income is over $15,000.

These telephone interviews were conducted by Response Analysis' trained interviewers from our Princeton office between May 7 and June 15, 1973.

A random digit dialing plan was used to assure that unlisted and newly listed telephone households were included in the sample.

*ORC Caravan Surveys is a survey research service which combines questions from several clients and thus reduces the interviewing costs for all of them. This service was used in the interests of obtaining quality, national data for lower study budget.

FINDINGS IN BRIEF

The American public has high regard for Sweden and its people. Forty-six percent of Americans believe Sweden would be a good country in which to live; only 14% do not think they would like to live there.

These findings are from a nationwide study of American attitudes toward Sweden and Swedish foreign policy conducted for the Swedish Information Service by Response Analysis Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey, a leading attitude research firm. The Survey was conducted in May 1973. Findings are based on over 1,000 personal face-to-face interviews with a representative cross section of American adults and another 2,000 interviews by telephone with special samples of upper income Americans and community leaders.

Overall, Americans see Sweden as a technologically advanced, aesthetically pleasant country whose citizens are well taken care of by their government.

Sweden's criticism of U.S. involvement in Vietnam has not damaged Sweden's reputation among Americans. Fewer than one American in ten believes that Sweden's opposition to U.S. Southeast Asia policies is an expression of anti-American feeling..

A large majority of community leaders knows that Sweden has opposed U.S. involvement in Vietnam. However, the bulk of the American public is not sure what position Sweden has taken on U.S. Southeast Asia involvement.

Sweden has granted young men from the United States permission to stay in Sweden to avoid serving in Vietnam. A majority of the community leaders who were interviewed (55%) approves of the fact that Sweden offered shelter to such Americans. However, among the American public, more people are against Sweden granting shelter (43%) than in favor (27%).

Before they learned that the Swedish Information Service was sponsoring the survey, community leaders ranked four European countries (Sweden, France, Switzerland and Poland) on a series of questions. Sweden is ranked tops for taking the best care of its people. Sweden and Switzerland share the top position for political freedom and having the most highly educated people. France and Sweden are considered to have the most advanced technology. France and Sweden rank considerably behind Switzerland for being the best friend of the United States.

In addition to investigating attitudes toward Sweden, Response Analysis also questioned Americans about their knowledge of different aspects of life in Sweden.

Americans have some correct impressions about life in Sweden, some wrong impressions, but most often they lack specific information about Sweden.

All respondents who were interviewed by telephone were administered a series of special questions to permit us to identify two types of adults:

The 484 adults who scored high on the special questions became the sample of *influential adults.*

The 1,533 adults who did not score as highly on the special questions became the *upper income* sample.

The upper income sample is projectable to approximately 15 million Americans who live in *upper income* census tracts; 11% of American adults live in these areas.

Pilot Survey

A Pilot Survey was conducted in Princeton, New Jersey (an upper income community) among a sample of 213 adults in April 1973 to help evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the telephone interview as a method to gather comprehensive research data. Findings from this study are reported separately. Results from the Pilot Study closely parallel the results from the survey of influential adults.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank the Swedish Information Office, the Consul General and the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs for their guidance, cooperation and assistance at key phases of this project. We would also like to recognize the contribution of Professor W. Phillips Davison, Columbia University, who was a consultant on this project.

This study was directed by Dr. Herbert I. Abelson, President of Response Analysis and James H. Fouss, Vice President.

Impressions

Americans feel that the Swedish people have genuine freedom of speech.

Community leaders know that the Swedish government is a parliamentary democracy and that Sweden is not a one-party state.

Americans know Sweden was neutral and stayed out of World War II.

Many Americans feel that the Swedish government owns most of the industry in Sweden. At the same time, many believe that Sweden is a socialist country. A warning must be added because the meaning of socialist was never defined in the question.

Areas Where Americans Lack Information

Americans are not familiar with the fact that Sweden is not a member of any military or economic block, such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, or the European Common Market.

Americans do not know very much about Sweden's social security system.

While Sweden is the best known Scandinavian country, a significant number of Americans (42%) cannot name two Scandinavian countries.

A majority (73%) of Americans cannot think of the name of any Swedish *city*.

A leading topic of conversation when American adults discuss Sweden is the attractiveness of Sweden as a vacation or tourist destination, although few Americans (3%, or approximately 4 million adult Americans) have ever been to Sweden. In general, most American adults have had minimal contact with Swedish people, although one-third of the community leaders have had any form of Swedish acquaintances and 20% have Swedish business acquaintances.

Although only a minority of community leaders has had personal contact, a large majority of community leaders (85%) says people like themselves are good friends of the Swedish people. They also think the Swedish people are friendly toward Americans.

Results of the Response Analysis survey also show that newspapers, in fact, are the primary source of information on Sweden for most American adults, followed by news magazines. Television is a less frequent source of information on Sweden for the American public.

HIGHLIGHTS

In this section we review the principal findings from the study conducted in May–June 1973. Findings are from interviews with samples of three different groups of American adults:

1. Face-to-face interviews in the home with 1,002 adults who are a cross section of all adults age 18 and older. This is the *general public* sample.
2. Nationwide telephone interviews with adults who live in Census tracts where the median annual income is over $15,000. All respondents who were interviewed by telephone were administered a series of special questions to permit us to identify two types of adults:

   The 484 adults who scored high on the special questions became the sample of *influential adults*,

   The 1,533 adults who did not score as highly on the special questions became the *upper income* sample.

I.—Knowledge About Sweden

Page[1]

A. Relationship with the Swedish People:

1. The *general public* has had minimal immediate contact with the Swedish people. A small minority (12%) has been to Europe and only 3% have been to Sweden. Most Americans do not have a close relationship with Swedish friends or business acquaintances 24–27
2. On the other hand, *upper income* and *influential adults* have had a fair amount of contact with Sweden and its people. Many *influential adults* (52%) have been to Europe and one *influential* in eight has been to Sweden. One-third of the *influential group* has Swedish friends and one-fifth says they have Swedish business acquaintances 24–27

[1] Page numbers refer to original survey.

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
Been to Europe	12	37	52
Been to Sweden	3	8	13
Have Swedish friends	7	22	32
Have Swedish business acquaintances	3	10	20
Related to a Swedish citizen who lives or works outside Sweden	1	2	2

Page

B. Knowledge of Sweden's Location and Cities:

1. A large majority of the *general public* is not aware of the name of any Swedish city and 42% do not know the name of two or more Scandinavian countries. *Influential adults'* level of knowledge of Sweden's location and its cities is at a much higher level. For instance, 72% of *influential adults* name Sweden as a Scandinavian country, and 46% know that Stockholm is one of the cities in Sweden. *Upper income* men and women are almost as knowledgeable as the *influential adults*

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
Knowledge of Scandinavian countries and Swedish cities:			
Sweden	45	69	72
Norway	38	60	74
Denmark	29	43	66
Don't know names of 2 countries	42	20	8
Stockholm	26	38	46
Gothenberg	2	5	7
Malmo	(1)	3	4
Uppsala	(1)	2	4

[1] Less than 0.5 percent.

C. Sweden's Form of Government and Economic System:

1. The *general public* has no important misconceptions regarding Sweden's political system—they just aren't familiar with it. For instance, 39% say they don't know if the Swedish people have freedom of speech on all issues or not 33

Influential and *upper income adults* are quite familiar with Sweden's form of government. For instance, 73% of *influential adults* believe that Sweden is a parliamentary democracy and 69% believe Swedish people have genuine freedom of speech on all issues 33

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
"In Sweden, all people have genuine freedom of speech on all issues":			
True	46	64	69
Not true	15	20	21
Don't know	39	16	11
"The Swedish Government is a parliamentary democracy, something like the Government of England":[1]			
True			73
Not true			17
Don't know			10

[1] General public and upper income adults were not asked this question.

Page

2. By a wide margin, *influential* and *upper income* people feel Sweden is a socialist country. *The general public* is more likely to claim ignorance on this and other subjects related to Sweden's government, economic system and social welfare programs---- 34

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
"Sweden is a socialist country":			
True	30	55	65
Not true	19	26	22
Don't know	51	19	13

3. Virtually the same proportions of *influential* and *upper income adults* believe "the Swedish government owns most of the industry." The table below illustrates the similarity of findings on this issue---- 34–35

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
True	28	39	41
Not true	14	27	30
Don't know	58	34	29

4. On balance, *the general public* is just not familiar with Sweden's social security system. Six men and women in ten say they do not know anything about Sweden's social security system for its people. *Influential* and *upper income adults* by wide margins recognize that Sweden has an advanced social security system. Less than 10% disagree with the statement that "Sweden has a very advanced social security system for its people."---- 32

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
True	33	63	73
Not true	8	9	8
Don't know	59	28	19

II.—Attitudes toward Sweden

A. Sweden's Overall Image:

1. The *general public*, by a three to one margin, thinks Sweden would be a good country to live in. *Influential* and *upper income adults* agree by even wider margins: 70% of *influential* men and women consider living in Sweden attractive, and 60% of *upper income adults* say the same---- 43

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
Say Sweden is a good country to live in	46	60	70
Do not believe Sweden is a good place to live	14	14	16
Don't know	40	26	14

Page

Sweden is considered an attractive country because people say Sweden takes good care of its people, is peaceful and is a progressive country ... 45

2. People's first thoughts about Sweden relate to the characteristics of its people, its climate and scenery and its "reputation for sexual freedom." Thirty percent of the *general public* has no "top of the mind" impressions about Sweden. Only 12% of *influential adults* have no opinion about Sweden ... 39

B. Sweden compared with France, Poland and Switzerland: [2]

1. Among *influential adults*, Sweden is selected much more frequently than Switzerland, France and Poland for taking the best care of its people. Sweden and Switzerland have the best image for having the most political freedom and having the most highly educated people ... 46–47

2. France has a somewhat stronger reputation than Sweden for having the most advanced technology ... 48

3. Poland has the reputation for having the highest percentage of state-owned industry. More *influential adults* select Sweden on this point than Switzerland or France ... 48

4. *Influential* and *upper income adults* choose Switzerland as the best friend of the United States more often than Sweden and France ... 49

C. American People and the Swedish People:

1. Large majorities of *influential adults* (85%) and *upper income adults* (83%) feel people like themselves are good friends of the Swedish people. Most *influential* and other *upper income* men and women also think Swedish people think of themselves as good friends of Americans ... 60

2. *Influential adults* believe Swedish people are friendly to Americans because of their personal contact with Swedish friends; Americans like themselves are friendly to the Swedish people because there is no reason not to be and Americans are friendly with everyone ... 61–62

D. Sources of Information:

1. Only a minority (22%) of the *general public* remembers recently hearing or reading something about Sweden. *Influential adults* (52%) are more likely to recall a news item about Sweden. People play back news about Sweden providing shelter for American young men, stories on sexual freedom and pornography in Sweden, and news related to Sweden's opposition to American Vietnam policies ... 51

2. *Influential* and *upper income adults*' main sources of information about Sweden are newspapers, news magazines and, finally, television ... 55

[2] The *general public* was not asked to compare Sweden with other European countries on specific points.

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
Yes, remember a news item about Sweden	22	37	52
Newspaper	(1)	19	25
News magazine		10	17
Television		9	11
No; do not remember (multiple responses)	78	63	48

[1] General public not asked about the source of this information.

Page

3. Four *influential adults* in ten have discussed Sweden with someone in the last six months or so. The conversation was most often about a vacation or travel to Sweden 59
4. *Influential adults* are as interested in more information about Switzerland, Poland and France as they are about information about Sweden. Half of the *influential* group does not have any further interest in information about these countries. People's information needs focus on travel, political and general types of information 57

	Influential adults (by percent)
Would like more information about:	
SWEDEN	25
Poland	24
Switzerland	23
France	19
Not interested in information about these countries	54

(Multiple responses)

III.—Familiarity with Sweden's Foreign Policy

A. Sweden's Position on Vietnam:

The Swedish government has repeatedly expressed its views on the Vietnam War. How much does the American public know about this policy? To help us understand the American public's understanding of and attitudes toward Sweden's foreign policy, we first measured people's attitudes toward the Vietnam War 65

1. Only a minority of the American public now feels U.S. involvement in Vietnam was justified. A majority of the American public says the war was not justified or has mixed feelings about the war. Opposition to the war is highest among *influential adults*. Half of the *influential* group says America's involvement was not justified; only one-third feels the Vietnam War was justified. Among the *general public*, 44% say United States involvement in Vietnam was not justified and 18% have mixed feelings about the war. Only 28% believe the United States was justified in intervening in Vietnam.

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
U.S. involvement in Vietnam was justified	28	29	34
Not justified	44	47	49
Mixed feelings	18	18	14
No opinion	10	6	3

2. These findings suggest there is a sympathetic climate for Sweden's foreign policy in this area. A large majority of *influential adults* (73%) knows Sweden has opposed U.S. involvement. However, among the *general public*, six adults in ten are not sure what Sweden's position has been on the Vietnam War. There is widespread belief among those who know Sweden's Vietnam War position that it is against American policy on *the Vietnam issue alone* and *does not express a general anti-American feeling*. Only one person in ten among the *general public, upper income* and *influential* groups feels Sweden's position on the war expresses a general anti-American feeling 67–69

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
Know Sweden has opposed U.S. involvement in Vietnam	37	60	73
Say Sweden's position:			
Is against U.S. policy on this issue alone	25	43	57
Expresses general anti-American feeling	8	11	11
No opinion	4	6	5
Say Sweden is in favor of U.S. involvement	2	2	1
Don't know Sweden's position on the Vietnam war	61	38	22

Page

3. The American public is more divided on the question of Sweden providing shelter for U.S. young men. *Influential adults* by a margin of 55% to 31% say Sweden should have provided shelter. Other *upper income adults* are somewhat more in favor of shelter for U.S. young men (46%) than against shelter (35%). The *general public* is least likely to think Sweden should have granted shelter for U.S. young men. In fact, 43% say "no" Sweden should not have provided shelter and 27% say "yes" Sweden should have provided shelter for American men 71

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
Sweden should have provided shelter	27	46	55
Should not	43	35	31
Mixed feelings	13	9	9
No opinion	17	10	5

B. The Policy of Neutrality:

1. The American public does not feel Sweden's policy of neutrality has hurt United States' interests. By a three to one margin, *influential adults* say Sweden's neutral policy is not hurting the U.S. Although the *general public* also agrees with this position, half are not familiar enough with Sweden's policy to have an opinion on this issue 76

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
"Sweden's neutral policy is hurting the interests of the United States and the rest of the Western World.":			
True	13	19	20
Not true	37	56	61
Don't know	50	25	19

2. In the minds of *influential adults*, Sweden is more closely linked to the U.S. than the Soviet Union. A majority of *influential adults* (68%) says Sweden has stronger ties to the U.S. than the Soviet Union 76

C. Sweden's Policies During World War II: Page

1. People generally know, especially *influential* and *upper income adults*, that Sweden stayed out of World War II by trying to be strictly neutral; a few think Sweden favored the Allies more than the Nazis. Only one person in twenty among the *general public, upper income* and *influential adults* groups says Sweden favored Germany in the war 75

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
Know Sweden stayed out of World War II	56	70	71
Think Sweden fought with—			
Allies	8	12	18
Germany	2	2	3
Don't know	34	16	8
Sweden tried to be strictly neutral during World War II	38	50	40
Favored United States, Allies	16	23	33
Favored Germany	4	5	7
Don't know	42	22	18

D. Attitudes Toward the United Nations and Sweden's Peace-Keeping Activities:

1. The American public is largely pro-United Nations. *Upper income* and *influential adults* by wide margins agree the United Nations has done enough good to make it worthwhile. People recognize that Sweden has carried out important United Nations peace-keeping activities. Two-thirds of *influential adults* feel Sweden has done important things in this area ... 77
2. *Influential adults* do not really know too much about Sweden's economic contributions to developing nations. They are more likely to be familiar with Sweden's activities in the environmental protection area. A majority of *influential adults* feels Sweden has been active on issues having to do with environmental protection 78–79

E. Membership in International Pacts:

1. The *general public* is not familiar with Sweden's membership in various international organizations. For instance, a majority of the public is not sure if Sweden is a member of NATO, the Common Market or the Warsaw Pact. A majority of *influential adults* is also unsure or wrong about Sweden's relationship to these economic and military pacts. One-third of *influential adults* knows Sweden is *not* a NATO member or in the EEC; one-half is aware that Sweden is *not* a Warsaw Pact country 73

[In percent]

	General public	Upper income	Influential adults
Say Sweden—			
Is NATO member	19	29	35
Is not	21	31	34
Don't know	60	40	31
Is Common Market member	22	32	40
Is not	19	30	35
Don't know	59	38	25
Is Warsaw Pact member	9	9	13
Is not	26	40	48
Don't know	65	51	39

TEXT OF HOUSE RESOLUTION 521 [1]

[H. Res. 521, 93d Cong., first sess.]

RESOLUTION

Whereas a close and friendly relationship has normally existed between Sweden and the United States over the years, virtually since the foundation of this Republic, and

Whereas this relationship has needlessly been disrupted over a period of almost a year, as evidenced by the absence of a United States Ambassador in Stockholm since August of 1972, and the tacit refusal of the United States Government to receive an Ambassador from Sweden since January of this year, and

Whereas the Senate has affirmed the position that diplomatic relations do not depend upon or connote approval of the views of the governments concerned: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House that the United States Government and Sweden should restore their normal friendly relations, and confirm this return to normalcy by appointing and dispatching ambassadors to their respective capitals on an immediate basis.

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[1] H. Res. 521 is identical to H. Res. 523, 531 and 535, all of which were referred to the Subcommittee on Europe. Co-sponsors of these resolutions were: Mr. Badillo, Mr. Hechler of West Virginia, Mr. Reuss, Mr. Harrington, Mr. Drinan, Mr. Nix, Mr. Denholm, Mr. Helstoski, Mrs. Chisholm, Mr. Rosenthal, Mr. Moorhead of Pennsylvania, Mr. McCloskey, Mrs. Schroeder, Mr. Meeds, Mr. Rees, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Bergland, Mr. Danielson, Ms. Abzug, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Edwards of California, Mr. Dellums, Mr. Stokes, Mr. Roe, Mr. Mitchell of Maryland, Mr. Riegle and Mr. Moakley.

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