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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PART 7

WITH

WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE

JULY 25, 1972



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INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

TUESDAY, JULY 25, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

[This hearing was held in executive session in the 92d Congress, 2d session. It has been reviewed and cleared for open publication by the Department of Defense.]

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, in room S-126, the Capitol, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Jackson, Chiles, and Saxbe.

Also present: Senators Allott and Buckley.

Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Charles Horner, professional staff member; and Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk.

Others present: Richard N. Perle, staff of Senator Jackson; and George L. Patten, staff of Senator Chiles.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN

Senator JACKSON. The meeting will come to order.

This is a meeting of the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Government Operations Committee.

This hearing carries forward our inquiry into a range of issues bearing on international negotiation which this subcommittee has been examining for some time. The negotiations leading up to the SALT accords are bound to hold important lessons for future negotiations on arms control and on other key concerns.

We are happy to welcome to this hearing today William R. Van Cleave, who brings to his testimony a deep understanding of the central issues in the SALT talks.

Dr. Van Cleave is now associate professor, School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Southern California, a post he has held since 1967. He initially began research in nuclear arms problems in 1964 at the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute, where he is currently a consultant. During a leave of absence from the University of Southern California from 1969-71, he was Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense. In this capacity he served as an Adviser on the U.S. SALT delegation. Dr. Van Cleave's publications have appeared in many leading military

and strategic journals including *Orbis*, *Asian Survey*, *Survival*, *Military Review*, the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, and *Nuclear Journal*.

Dr. Van Cleave, we consider ourselves very fortunate to have your help in interpreting the process by which our Government concluded the SALT accords and in drawing some general lessons from those negotiations.

We will be delighted to have you proceed now in your own way, and of course we will have questions at the appropriate time.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Thank you, Senator Jackson.

I have prepared no formal statement, but to promote discussion I would like to make a few general observations about negotiating arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union, and to suggest what may be characteristic weaknesses in the U.S. approach to arms control negotiating, drawing as much as is permissible on our experience in the strategic arms limitation talks. Understanding that much of the SALT record remains private, I will base my observations on things that have already been publicly discussed.

It is clear that there are very significant differences in the approaches of the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiation and to arms control. Compared to the U.S.S.R., the United States has a politically naive approach to both. And judging from SALT, the more urgent the particular negotiations seem to us to be, the more naive we tend to be. Our driving assumption has been that arms control negotiations are a uniquely cooperative process, wherein compromise is a mutual objective and negotiation a non-zero sum game where both sides stand to gain mutually and equally. Arms control has, after all, become a normative term in the United States. Viewed as inherently good, arms control is difficult to see in the terms of political competition or a struggle for advantage.

The United States did not approach the strategic arms limitation talks as a bargaining process or a competitive one; instead we approached SALT as a cooperative process—as one in which both sides perceived the objectives and urgencies similarly. It was commonly believed that we and the Soviets shared an overriding common goal: strategic stability as defined by U.S. strategic and arms control concepts.

The Soviet Union, however, seems clearly to have regarded SALT as another competitive endeavor, where the objective is unilateral advantage and where one can gain at the expense of the other. Moreover, the advantages to be gained from the talks need not be confined to the narrow area of strategic arms. Since such United States-Soviet discussions are essentially political with far-reaching political implications, they provide an opportunity for gains in other political areas. Arms negotiation, like diplomacy and politics, is to the Soviets a means to maximize political or strategic advantage and gain where possible at the expense of the other side. It is, in this sense, a zero sum game. One cannot reasonably conclude from the SALT record that the mutuality of interest and objective assumed by the United States governs the Soviet approach to the negotiations.

The American approach to SALT, accordingly, was primarily analytical and technical, and the Soviet approach primarily political. The United States viewed SALT as if it were a scientific-analytical matter. The Soviets regarded it as a political process.

TECHNICALITIES OUTWEIGHED PRINCIPLES

The U.S. preparation for SALT, as it has been described by the President and by Dr. Kissinger, was an enormous analytical effort. This took place principally in the summer and fall of 1969, and included studies of a highly complex technical nature, which examined in detail various limitations, requirements for verification, and the way combinations or packages of arms limitations might be put together. These studies were probably necessary but, in and of themselves, could not possibly have provided an adequate understanding of SALT. In fact, it could be argued that they were in many ways counterproductive. Many of these studies turned out to be busy-work which kept the system overworked and inhibited hard imaginative thinking, perhaps by design. Our approach was hyperanalytic, with an excessive preoccupation with technical details and specifics at the expense of a thorough consideration of the basic questions involved and almost any consideration of the talks from a negotiating viewpoint. In the main, analysis was substituted for judgment and was conditioned by unarticulated major premises about arms control, strategic stability and Soviet objectives which were mirror images of our own views. Little attention was paid to the competitive aspects of negotiations as a political process or a bargaining process. We were consequently surprised and unprepared when the Soviets—as the President reported in his February 1971 Foreign Policy Report—refused to engage us in detail or specifics and instead took a political approach to offensive and ABM limitations.

The U.S. arms control community has always had an academic character and a hyper-rationalistic approach to arms control that assumes arms control to be an intellectual problem rather than a political one. This is reflected by a tendency on the part of the United States to look at arms control negotiations, including SALT, as if the outcomes should be objectively determinable. They become “talks,” therefore, rather than negotiations, which tend to be approached and conducted as if they were a kind of seminar where basic truths would be discussed and agreed upon, after which things would fall into place, not as the result of a bargaining process, but almost automatically as a result of analysis and logic. After all, laws of physics, technical facts, and certainly the conclusions of analysis should be the same for both sides. The talks, therefore, were approached more as if they were a dialogue than a negotiation. Dialogue, rather than actual negotiations, would produce agreement. In fact, as I think is clear from testimony already given before the Armed Services Committee, such a dialogue did not take place. Very little additional agreement or understanding of Soviet doctrine, concepts, and objectives came from the talks, which were less a dialogue about such matters than a U.S. monologue.

"SEMANTIC INFILTRATION"

So, the way we approached SALT was heavily influenced by our belief that arms limitations are objectively derivable from analyses and logic. One result of this is that U.S. negotiators and officials are impressed by and responsive to the logic of the other side. [deleted] With respect to forward based systems (FBS), forward based, that is, not short- or medium-range systems, it goes even beyond the "semantic infiltration" that Dr. Fred Iklé has described. We have in this case not only adopted Soviet semantics, we have allowed them to redefine the subject in a purely one-sided way that is fraught with political dangers for the United States and NATO. We show ourselves to be malleable and overly responsive to the logic seen in the other side's position. We find it very difficult to say "No, that is not in our interest," and apparently find it impossible to maintain such a position over any length of time. We also find it impossible to say nothing when the circumstances plainly dictate that there is nothing to be said.

SOVIET NEGOTIATING STYLE

This is in almost direct contrast to the Soviet approach. The Soviet Union does not approach or conduct arms control negotiations in that way, although it understands very well how to use U.S. characteristics to advantage. The Soviet approach clearly recognized that arms control is a form of competition, an arena of political contest, just as the Soviets—in contrast to the United States—have seen the strategic force balance as an expression of political power. While we dealt heavily—almost exclusively—in the analytical problems and technical details of specific arms limitations, the Soviets deemphasized those aspects and emphasized a broader, more general approach that was insistent, repetitious over a long period of time, and heavy with political overtones. The Soviet approach included positions that the Soviets must have expected to be non-negotiable. These extreme positions could then be used to cause changes in the U.S. position; or they could be removed at any time as major "concessions." The Soviets may have been surprised at the way some of these "non-negotiable" positions (for example, FBS and NCA defense) eventually became negotiable, but quite possibly they thoroughly anticipated it.

The observation was once made that negotiating with the Soviets is like putting a coin in a slot machine—sometimes you will get a payoff, but not very often. But if you put your money in and nothing comes out there is not much you can do about it. You can kick or cuss it, for your own release, but you cannot reason with it and expect to persuade it to make a payoff. That sums up our experience in negotiating with the Soviets; yet, we continue to conduct negotiations largely on the belief that logic and argument prevail.

NEGOTIATING WITH OURSELVES

In preparing for SALT and during the course of the talks, typically, most of the U.S. negotiating took place within the U.S. Government and the U.S. Delegation. We negotiated with ourselves and then

attempted to explain our auto-negotiated position to the Soviets. It was not a negotiating position. It was an end product.

The pluralistic nature of the U.S. bureaucracy and the interagency process as used for SALT could not avoid factionalism. Agreement was difficult if at all possible. While, on the one hand, it could be argued that this afforded the President and his National Security Adviser the utmost flexibility in final decisions, on the other hand it should be realized that alternatives presented to the President were the result of compromise, not resolution. In effect, U.S. SALT positions and proposals were already negotiated and compromised positions by the time they reached the Soviets. In addition, the presumed negotiability of a position and its apparent—one should say, superficial—equity and acceptability to the Soviets were major factors in determining U.S. positions; “negotiability” was more important than whether our positions conformed to any clear strategic policy or objectives. Negotiating proposals or positions were, therefore, not maximum starting positions at all, but were designed to be acceptable largely as they stood once explained to the Soviets. Logically, they could not be changed much because the analysis that went into them did not permit major modifications, and because our own decisions on their acceptability to the United States were taken on the packages as whole entities.

It is hard to believe that this process of preparation was of constructive help during SALT much less in the final crunch just before and at Moscow. If we compare the essential simplicity of the Moscow accords with the unbelievable complexity of the proposals prepared by our SALT establishment in 1969 and 1970 there is good reason to believe that the pre-Moscow process gave the President precious little insight into the real problems.

To continue, the U.S. proposals and positions produced by our approach were end positions within only narrow modifications. Generally no distinction was made between a starting and an end position. The idea of starting with more than we wanted or expected for the purposes of bargaining scarcely existed and whenever suggested could not survive the interagency preparatory process. The only approaches (not proposals according to the President) set forth by the United States that were clearly non-negotiable at the time—that is, qualitative limitations, including MIRV's, and reductions in offensive forces, described in the February 1971 Foreign Policy Report—were not set forth for bargaining, as can be seen by the rapidity with which they were dropped by the United States, but probably to describe preferred end results and to provide a record—for the U.S. Congress and public—that at least the United States tried to get MIRV limitations or force reductions.

SOVIET VIEW OF ARMS CONTROL

Another fundamental characteristic of the U.S. approach that exacerbates this problem is that the United States traditionally has attributed more importance to, and expected more from, arms control than has the Soviet Union. We look to arms control to *do* something specific about controlling arms and solving pressing arms problems.

Mistakenly, we have believed that arms control could compensate for inadequacies in strategic policy and arms control talks could help produce a convergence of strategic doctrine.

We certainly—as so many statements by the President and the Secretary of Defense have attested—looked to SALT as the means of solving or easing very important, even urgent, strategic force problems. And we communicated to all the sense of urgency we attached to strategic arms limitation. This in itself confirmed that we would be more willing to make concessions as the other side delayed and took positions that made an agreement difficult to reach. Paradoxically, the more we demonstrate a sense of urgency and need for an agreement, the less likely are we to get out of an agreement what we wish and the more likely is the cost of an agreement to be very high.

To the Soviet Union, SALT has been more opportunistic than imperative. Not opportunistic in the sense that it afforded an opportunity, as we saw it, to establish a stable strategic balance based upon agreed mutual assured destruction and parity; but rather as it presented a possible opportunity for advantageous competition where the Soviets might gain politically and strategically with virtually no risk involved. Consequently, there has been an enormous asymmetry between the two sides in negotiating and bargaining power.

RAPID CHANGES IN U.S. POSITION

The Soviets, unhurriedly, would need do little more than repeat basic principles, and insist on basically unacceptable propositions—for example, limitations on United States forward based systems and ABM-only limitations—while the United States moved from one position to another in the search for the one that would promote agreement. Whether regarded as concession, or erosion, or necessary change in position, the point is that U.S. positions changed rapidly over a 2½-year period—so rapidly that we probably created a picture of our eagerness for an agreement. In such a case, the Soviets could have only been led to expect that we would be willing to make more and more concessions.

Partly because of the very deliberate Soviet approach, their constant reiteration of basic principles or positions derived from them, and United States eagerness for agreement, U.S. negotiators are commonly inclined to construe any hint of Soviet agreement with a U.S. point—however trivial—very optimistically—as a Soviet concession or evidence of common ground—which warrants further concessions on our part to demonstrate seriousness and to keep the negotiations rolling along.

INFORMAL CONTACTS

Many of the hints of Soviet willingness to discuss or agree to something came from private conversations, the reporting of which is highly interpretive and subjective. In fact, such conversations run a great risk of being a one-way flow of information from the United States side and are generally only a Soviet means of working on the malleability and the impressionistic natures of many Americans.

In a similar vein, you have undoubtedly heard the discussions many times described as “serious and businesslike.” This in itself may tell

you little other than perhaps that the crudeness formerly associated with Russian behavior at such talks has changed and become more sophisticated. Unfortunately, there has been a real tendency on our part to confuse demeanor with substance and to read from a "serious and businesslike" or socially affable behavior a substantive desire to reach equitable agreements along the line of SALT objectives as we have defined them. This is little more than mirror-imaging. As we can now see, there is little basis for such an interpretation.

NO CLEAR U.S. STRATEGY

Compounding the problems of such an approach to negotiation was the lack of a coherent, overall strategy or set of agreed strategic objectives to control or guide our approach to SALT. We had no clear, carefully formulated strategic policy for SALT, by which proposals or particular issues could be judged; unless assured destruction alone—which President Nixon has publicly said to be unacceptable—without regard for other strategic and political interests, could be so construed.

In this respect, we not only assumed that similar assured destruction premises and objectives would guide the Soviet approach to strategic arms limitation, we expected SALT and, finally, an agreement to confirm this. As I testified this morning, there is nothing in the SALT record that warrants such a conclusion and the overall evidence is persuasive that the Soviet leaders do not share our assured destruction doctrine. That they do is an unsupportable notion.

LACK OF STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

It is true that assured destruction calculations were used consistently by the United States to test various limitations—indeed they were exclusively used. Limitations were deemed acceptable if, by our calculations, we could still meet the assured destruction criteria with the resulting forces on each side. Other strategic considerations, including even the so-called strategic sufficiency criteria adopted as basic national security policy only in 1969, scarcely ever entered in, and in the final analysis were ignored. There was nothing that one could call a coherent national strategy to guide the SALT decisions.

In a broader sense, also lacking were considerations of national strategy beyond the direct U.S.-Soviet strategic force confrontation, and considerations of the political implications of particular SALT agreements. It seemed implicitly assumed, following the views of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, that the strategic force balance had no important political meaning. The combination of an absence of an overall guiding strategy or consistent set of strategic and arms control objectives and the technical, analytical approach meant there was no clear overall picture at any particular time. Decisions tended to focus on narrow technical matters and limitations of a very specific nature. With this, it is clear that a process of piecemeal change by rationalization can take place wherein the quest for agreement may take precedence over well-considered national strategic and arms control objectives. When specific points are considered and decided one by one, and when Government agencies themselves cannot agree on the desirability, acceptability, or even the

meaning of some of the matters at issue, it is easy to lose sight of the large picture and to rationalize changed positions on any particular issue.

In addition to needing a guiding, coherent set of strategic and arms control objectives, other than merely reaching agreement, the U.S. should also have a guiding strategy of negotiation based upon well thought out principles. We had no such thing in SALT I.

SOVIETS KNOW WHAT THEY WANT

In contrast, the Soviets—and this is something we should bear in mind for SALT II and other negotiations such as MBFR—clearly had a guiding strategy for the talks. The Soviet approach was to establish at the outset certain basic principles, which were held together by a certain logic, and then to adhere strongly to these basic principles. The strategy included playing upon themes with political significance for the United States both in NATO—for example, FBS—and domestically—for example, ABM—consistent with Soviet strategic objectives. Where capitalizing on political pressures in the United States meant pushing limitations that the U.S.S.R. did not want, then of course this was avoided. An example of this was MIRV.

In approaching negotiations such as SALT and MBFR the United States should try to determine the basic principles the Soviet Union could be expected to advance and follow, and should also set forth basic principles of its own and then stick with them. This would promise a more fruitful approach than concocting highly integrated models of conceivable limitations and tradeoffs which probably will have little relevance to the negotiations that actually follow. The Soviet Union is not moved by the force of our analyses and is unlikely to negotiate on the basis of the model arms limitation packages that our analytical process turns out.

COMPLEX PROPOSALS

I would recall to you that into the summer of 1970, a good deal of the analysis that went on was still in building hypothetical complex packages that we somehow expected to be negotiated in toto. These were held together by such intricate technical arrangements that if one began to change any major part the whole package fell apart. Yet, because these packages were formulated and analyzed as end positions or final sets of limitations, the consequences of changes in them were not thought through.

The packages of limitations were formulated and evaluated as end positions. What would happen to them in negotiation was not considered. How they could be negotiated intact, or how they could even be explained very well in negotiations was most uncertain.

RECORD OF SALT

One of the best ways to test some of these observations without going into specifics of negotiating is to recall the record of SALT and some of the changes that took place. If we compare the expectations and

positions that the United States had when we entered SALT in 1969 with what we have now, the conclusion is inescapable that there has been an enormous change.

Prior to the preliminary SALT session in Helsinki, the United States developed several "illustrative" arms limitation packages, primarily for analytical purposes. These varied in their terms, from the more limited to the more comprehensive, so-called, but they reflected our thinking, and all of them reflected both the existing strategic balance in 1969 and the expectations of the time. In general they reflected our thinking in terms of freezing strategic offensive missile forces at levels existing then. Whatever the precise numbers, a freeze at that time would have preserved some U.S. numerical superiority in launchers [deleted]. In various approaches considered, ABM limitations were left open at levels to be decided [deleted].

EFFECT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC BUILDUP

Between the first and second sessions of SALT more arms limitations options were developed. Some previous requirements and positions were changed. Soviet momentum continued to change the balance.

Early in the second session of SALT in the spring of 1970, as President Nixon has revealed, we set forth alternative limitations packages, different in many important respects from the illustrative set of limitations discussed at Helsinki. One was based on quantitative and qualitative limitations, with the latter meaning essentially the possibility of MIRV limitations. The other proposed the establishment of an equivalent level of ICBM's and SLBM's but with reduced levels of fixed land-based ICBM launchers.

The Soviet Union during this period of time was unresponsive and continued to adumbrate and reiterate its basic general positions, or basic principles of strategic arms limitations, set forth at the outset. As the President publicly announced, the Soviet delegation avoided specifics or details, as it largely continued to do so throughout SALT, particularly when it came to numbers. After only 2 months, pressure grew for the United States to move again to a different position. Before the end of July this resulted in a new package of limitations that eventually became the August 4 proposal. The proposal, as the President said, took into account general Soviet objections to the two alternatives proposed in the spring and was designed to be acceptable to the Soviets. The United States moved toward Soviet positions in the provisions of the proposal, but not on the basis of Soviet compromises or quid pro quos. Yet, that proposal at least continued——

Senator JACKSON. This is August 4, 1970?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That is right, or July 24 when we actually first presented it and began explaining it to them.

WEAKNESSES IN AUGUST 4 PROPOSAL

At that time, we still expected that offensive limitations and levels of offensive systems limited on both sides must be equal. This proposal has not been officially released. Your chart relating to this proposal,

Senator Jackson, listed an equal aggregate number of ICBM and SLBM launchers of 1900, with an equivalent sublimit for both sides of 250 heavy ICBM's. An article by Hedrick Smith in the *New York Times*, July 25, 1970, conjectured that an aggregate limit of 1900 on ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers was proposed, with a sublimit on heavy missiles for each side. Such a limit he pointed out would require the United States to phase out some 300 units and allow the U.S.S.R. to build up another 250 units. Whatever the precise numerical limitations posed, it is clear that now the principle of equal levels of limited offensive forces was in effect, not only at the aggregate level but categorically for heavy missiles. If the Soviet Union were to have 250 heavy missiles, or what we called at that time modern large ballistic missiles, the United States had the right as well to deploy 250 heavy or modern large ballistic missiles.

Even so, this proposal at the time was not satisfactory to a lot of people in the Department of Defense and some elsewhere. It was put together hastily and not very thoughtfully. It seemed to abandon for the first time the principle that defensive levels depended upon the offensive levels permitted. It was highly controversial within the Government. Many thought that the proposal did not adequately provide for the survivability of land-based U.S. retaliatory forces, and therefore could be destabilizing. If the ABM alternatives were NCA or zero, even understanding that such alternatives were contingent upon acceptance of all other parts of the package proposal, then the United States clearly weakened its principle that defensive limitations were linked to and dependent upon offensive limitations. With such terms, too, many would think that we were giving up too much, for example, in area defense, for what little we bought. It did not seem to many to be a good deal, but it still preserved the equal level principle.

Of course, the Soviet delegation also rejected that proposal. At the next session, seizing upon our mistakes, the U.S.S.R. came back with a proposed treaty limiting ABM to the U.S.-proposed NCA defense level, allowing offensive levels to continue to increase.

NEGOTIATING DEADLOCK

As the President announced on May 20, 1971, a deadlock ensued. The next major change came with that May 20, 1971 announcement. We agreed to focus our attention first on negotiating defensive limitations. These then would be concluded together with certain measures on offensive limitations. The press speculated that this was in fact a change in the position that defensive limitations depended upon the levels of offensive forces allowed. And indeed it was a move in that direction although this change began with the August 4 proposal. Also changed, however, was the principle of equal levels and types of launchers. Now we would freeze at existing levels, or at Soviet numerical superiority.

DETERIORATING STRATEGIC BALANCE

At this point, you understand, in less than a 2-year period, the existing levels were no longer 1,700 ICBM's and SLBM's for us and

some 1,250 or 1,300 for them. It was 1,700 for us and on the order of 2,000 for them. So a freeze would mean a numerical launcher advantage and an overwhelming throw weight advantage for them, by agreement. The principle that defensive requirements were coupled to offensive levels was not yet entirely changed. As the press reported and President Nixon stated in his Foreign Policy Report, we still held to the principle that, at those levels, we required compensatory ABM defense for our retaliatory forces. Press speculation was that our position then was ABM defense for four ICBM sites. That such a position would not be firmly held should have been clear. The characteristics of our approach to negotiation cited above prevailed and the process of erosion by pressure and rationalization began. First, it was easy to forget that the United States had a 12-site Safeguard program and that we were proposing to forego it for only four sites of ICBM defense. It was easy to forget that this defense was directed against an offensive threat that was still growing. It was natural, instead, to compare ABM with ABM and rationalize that four sites to one was unfair to the Soviets (no matter that our ABM's were for different purposes and that Moscow area defense also covered [deleted] ICBM's). To point out that this was quite a concession compared with our Safeguard program for 12 sites and that the defense should be matched not with their defense but with the offensive threat did not make one popular.

Very soon newspapers were citing a U.S. position of three sites for ICBM defense. For a time it seemed that the United States was firm on the three sites for defense. The May 20 understanding was believed by many to imply at least a three-site Minuteman defense for the United States and the Moscow area defense for the U.S.S.R.—although an agreement would allow each side to choose between defending three ICBM sites and defending NCA. At this point there was nothing in the record between the rejection of the August 4 proposal and the May 1971 statement that would suggest that the United States could accept less than defense of three ICBM sites for us or more than the Moscow system for the U.S.S.R.

U.S. CONCESSIONS AND SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union obviously continued to insist on NCA and to reject ICBM defense. Soon it was reported that we might be willing to accept two ICBM sites and let them have NCA. Then instead of two ICBM sites or NCA defense it became two and two, but only if one were NCA and both were not ICBM defense sites.

If the United States insisted on some ICBM defense, the United States could defend one site but the U.S.S.R. would have to have the right also to a separate ICBM defense site. Everyone should have understood that that meant essentially three ABM sites for them and one for us, inasmuch as ICBM's are also covered by the Moscow system and that Congress almost certainly would not authorize the NCA defense. Now we see that is precisely what we have accepted. Only now the offensive levels coupled with this represent much more force imbalance than anything ever contemplated before, or anything deemed acceptable in the past. There is no question

that the agreements we have now concluded would have been considered unacceptable and would have been rejected in 1969, 1970, and well into 1971.

Now, most curiously, while the picture has worsened considerably for the United States on both the offensive levels and defensive levels, all of a sudden it is acceptable to everybody: the White House, the Defense Department, even the Chiefs. That strains credibility.

SHIFTS DURING SALT

Senator JACKSON. What you are saying, Dr. Van Cleave, is that we started out from a posture for SALT I that insisted on maintaining superiority on defensive systems—12 sites of ABM's—plus the maintenance of our offensive deterrent at 1,710 launchers—1,054 land-based and 656 sea-based. At the time, the total of Soviet land- and sea-based forces was substantially less than the 1,710 figure. Is that right?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Substantially less.

As I recall, when we began SALT I in the fall of 1969, they had on the order of about 1,050 or so operational ICBM's and had just begun getting into the "Y" boat deployment. On the order of, say 1,200 or 1,300, to our 1,700. The expected threat was sufficient to necessitate defense of land-based retaliatory forces. It was not superiority in ABM we sought. We did not compare ABM levels. We required ICBM defense against a Soviet offensive threat and area defense against a different threat.

Senator JACKSON. So what happened as the negotiations moved on to the signing on May 26, 1972, was that we went from superiority to inferiority.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That is right.

Senator JACKSON. In terms of numbers of missiles, and in terms of payload, we now end up with a situation of a quantitative disadvantage of 50 percent and a throw weight disadvantage of 4 to 1.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That is precisely what happened.

Senator JACKSON. I am trying to summarize the situation so that we get a clear picture. Most Senators, of course, are not on the Armed Services Subcommittee that I chair which monitors the SALT talks. So, on both defensive and offensive systems, we moved down step by step to levels which had been explicitly declared to be unacceptable by the executive branch.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Levels accepted today or the levels even deemed appropriate by some of the community in 1971 were not acceptable in 1969 or 1970, not even considered.

Senator JACKSON. You of course were a member of the staff during this period starting in 1969, and continued on through 1971, and it was obvious to you, I gather, that the Soviets simply decided that all they had to do was stay put. Step by step you observed the change of our positions.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. With no real change on their part?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That is right.

IS OUR DETERRENT CREDIBLE?

Senator JACKSON. So we end up with a situation where we have to ask ourselves whether we can, within the framework of the treaty which relates to defensive systems and the executive agreement which covers offensive systems, really have a credible deterrent?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I don't think we have sufficient confidence in having a credible strategic force deterrent against a plausible range of threats. I also don't think we have an effective negotiating policy for future strategic arms limitations discussions.

Senator JACKSON. As we go into the next phase of SALT?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That is one of the things that disturbs me most about the prospects of SALT II. We have less leverage now than we did before, and there should be less incentive for the Soviets to agree to something than they had before. I think that we have built a record giving the Soviet Union every expectation that it can take further advantage in the next phase of SALT. On both counts I have to be very pessimistic.

Senator JACKSON. The longer it is drawn out or protracted the more it will work to the Soviets' advantage?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That has been the record to date. I noted that we initially went into the SALT negotiations with the hope that through strategic arms limitations we could solve pressing strategic problems of our own. The Soviet Union was embarked on a dynamic program and was not looking to these negotiations as a means of solving such strategic problems, or establishing through them a stability as defined by the United States. Now we are looking even more to SALT II to solve even more pressing strategic problems than we had in 1969.

I wonder what incentives we are going to give the Soviets to agree. I wonder what further concession we will make in this effort.

SALVAGING SALT II

Senator JACKSON. Looking to SALT II, and beyond, do you have any suggestions as to how arms control negotiations could be better handled in the future?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I have suggested generally my views on this in my prepared statement this morning and responses to specific questions. In addition to what we should do in our own strategic programs, in solving our own strategic problems or at least clearly appearing willing to do so, and in being wiser about strategic doctrines and relationships, the first suggestion would be to maintain a clear guiding strategy. This should be an explicit overall strategy of strategic concepts and objectives, arms control, and negotiation. We cannot afford to let arms control negotiations guide strategy and direct important strategic decisions as largely we have done so far with SALT.

As part of this I would say that it is necessary to take a more political and more strategic approach, keeping in the forefront the overall picture in both areas. Quit getting lost in technical specifics. Quit making piecemeal decisions aimed toward easing agreement.

To contribute to these general goals I would make, offhand, several suggestions: Stop playing intellectual games and focus on tough, real-

istic bargaining. Stop mirror-imaging. Make assumptions about arms control and Soviet goals explicit and open them to critical examination. Open the negotiating record to critical examination. Make a determined effort to get the right people involved at all levels, including more qualified people on the NSC staff. Responsibility for SALT preparations and for guiding SALT should be clearly fixed. If it is to be principally on the NSC staff, the staff must become more competent and more representative, and less private and less incestuous. In any case, the delegation and delegates should not have this responsibility or as much influence over SALT decisions as they have had. They should be guided; they should not guide. The delegation was accorded too much self-direction when the talks were in progress. As a general principle, it is probably not wise to allow a negotiating delegation a great deal of influence in the policymaking and direction of the negotiations. There should be close direction of the delegation and discipline, especially in private discussions. Private discussions can become too easily a one-way flow of information or an undisciplined exercise in oneupmanship and self-elevation. That is to say, on the one hand, such conversations may unwittingly tip off many of our positions, even our fall-back positions, or tendencies, even perhaps before finally decided in Washington. On the other hand, the reporting of such conversations by individually written memorandums—MemCons, so-called—which are circulated in the Government may become very self-serving and unproductive. Worse, they may be misleading and counterproductive. An objective study of the SALT I MemCons would be very interesting, revealing, and possibly of considerable help in forming future guidelines for such conversations.

LEARN FROM SALT I

I would suggest very strongly that we try to determine and learn from the lessons of SALT I. It may well be that an "outside" or independent group should study the written records of SALT I to determine these lessons. I doubt that the "inside" group, the delegation and most of those directly involved with SALT, is in a position to do so.

Senator JACKSON. It might be helpful to my two colleagues who were not present this morning for you to comment on the question I raised this morning about the single option implicit in the doctrine of assured destruction. The President, in his foreign policy report to Congress this year, as you know, rejected a simple assured destruction doctrine. I wonder if you could comment briefly on that in the context of SALT I.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I would make the following general observations. Despite the rhetoric about the need for flexibility and despite the establishment of strategic sufficiency criteria as basic national security policy, the SALT options and agreements were, as I said, evaluated almost solely in terms of the assured destruction capability criterion. Whatever analyses or studies were conducted used assured destruction models to determine the acceptability of those options to us, and only that. Other considerations of strategic and political objectives were essentially ignored. The options and the proposals were not evaluated by the standards implied by the President's call for flexibility,

not even by the so-called sufficiency criteria, and most certainly not by any damage limitation measures. Even more fundamentally, the concept of mutual assured destruction and the belief in the similarity of concepts and strategic objectives between the United States and the Soviet Union have guided the U.S. approach to SALT from the start.

LIMITATIONS OF "ASSURED DESTRUCTION"

With the situation now, if one looks at the specific terms of those agreements, at the specific force relationships that exist today, and at the options that are now open to the Soviet Union, whatever the rhetoric about flexibility and sufficiency criteria, we are going to have to devote our energies and resources in the next few years to preserving the assured destruction capability, however unsatisfactory that is as a doctrine.

Senator JACKSON. As a doctrine of deterrence?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. As a doctrine of deterrence of direct attack on the United States, much less a doctrine of what we would want to do if that deterrence fails. As far as any doctrine of extending that deterrent to allies and to the protection of other U.S. interests goes, that possibility scarcely exists any longer.

Senator JACKSON. Which places the President in a rather non-credible position, especially since, with the number of reentry vehicles the Soviets would have if they continue their buildup, the survivability of Minuteman is far from a certainty.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. In a very few years, if fixed and undefended, we cannot have sufficient confidence in the prelaunch survivability of Minuteman.

Senator JACKSON. They could have an ability essentially to wipe out our land-based deterrent—missiles and bombers—and yet still have an overwhelming force remaining, compared with our limited sea-based force on station at any one time, about 24 Polaris boats, I believe.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, and even that assumes that those 24 are survivable and their payloads are deliverable, penetrable, and sufficient to be effective. Under certain circumstances the use of Polaris in an assured destruction mode could not be very credible, as the President has openly implied.

Senator JACKSON. That is right. The only choice left then for an American President is whether or not—in retaliation for a Soviet strike—he is going to order the destruction of Soviet cities, knowing full well that the Soviets have the ability in reserve to kill all human life on the North American continent. Obviously, the President left with only this one choice is placed in an impossible position and it is not the kind of deterrence we should—

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The threat of such automatic counter-city response may have been a credible threat when we had a free ride on retaliation, but now that we no longer have a free ride on retaliation it puts us in a position of being the initiator of a counter-city war with greatly reduced forces against a much higher level of threat on their side.

The Secretary of State has said that no sane national leader would

initiate such a war. So I guess we are left with the proposition that unless we have an insane leader we are not going to retaliate.

Senator JACKSON. Senator Chiles.

Senator CHILES. You said retaliate. The word you said before that was initiate.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That is right, sir. We would be initiating a counter-urban industrial or counter-population war. The old models were based upon the proposition that the Soviet forces would strike us essentially in an all-out strike and the only thing we would have to be concerned about is having sufficient forces surviving to retaliate and inflict unacceptable damage against Soviet cities. This retaliation of course would be a free ride insofar as the United States would be concerned, since they would have used essentially all of their long range strategic forces in the first strike. We now must be seriously concerned that we may soon have vulnerable forces, vulnerable to a small fraction of their forces, that would contribute to a very unstable and unsafe situation.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS IN SALT CONTEXT

Their first strike could be a substantially disarming counterforce strike against our land-based forces at least, preserving their own massive assured destruction capability, and—following the assured destruction model as we have been doing—we would then be in a position of not only the retaliator, but the initiator of a counter-city war. Now no one can say whether that scenario is a probable one or not, but the spectre of it, whether it is or is not probable, is going to have an enormous impact on American foreign relations and American determination. It is not a situation to be in with any confidence of security. I know that most people look upon a strategic nuclear attack as totally incredible. Why would anyone do such a thing? Why take such an enormous risk as this?

Well, we look on it that way because we have lived in a situation where it really didn't make any sense. When we get into a situation where it might make some sense that is a different picture. It certainly detracts from stability, especially given a Soviet preemptive damage limiting doctrine, and from the confidence and will of American leaders. It certainly changes extended deterrence premises and has political implications adverse to American interests.

STRATEGIC OPTIONS NEEDED

Senator SAXBE. The President in his statement, when he talked about this assured destruction thing, confused me at that point, and I am still confused because once we get into a nuclear exchange what other alternative is there?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The alternative to indiscriminate city destruction for which President Nixon has asked in his foreign policy messages. Flexibility to conduct meaningful and militarily relevant operations, hopefully to be effective and to limit urban damage, to control war termination, and to strengthen deterrence in the first place by having

credible response options and no tempting force vulnerabilities. We could go back to the concept McNamara set forth with the Ann Arbor doctrine that even in a strategic nuclear war more traditional military objectives can prevail. The point is, does a strike against cities, measured in population kill, have any strategic significance whatsoever? Is it any way we would wish to wage a war? The population kill criterion was initially brought forth as an analytical tool but only one analytical tool to help us evaluate the sufficiency of surviving forces. It was an analyst's tool, as it were. It was never meant at the time to be the strategic objective, much less the only one. It was not strategic doctrine. It was not meant to be the necessary way the political and military leaders would conduct military operations. But this is precisely what it has become. Especially when we are concerned about a situation where major components of our forces are vulnerable to a disarming strike by a lesser fraction of theirs, it is desirable and necessary that our residual forces be able to conduct operations more meaningful than the mass annihilation of civilians.

Senator CHILES. Can you give a concrete example of what you are talking about? Are you talking about if they decided to strike our military bases?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Strike our retaliatory forces, the vulnerable components of the retaliatory forces.

Senator CHILES. Or if they decide to strike the Minuteman sites.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The Minuteman sites, the bombers.

Senator CHILES. No population centers.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That is right.

Senator SAXBE. When you are talking about 50 megaton—

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. In such an attack they would not necessarily be striking with that, sir. They more likely would not be. A larger number of lower yield but more accurate RV's would be more effective, for attacks of that nature. We are talking about multiple reentry vehicles or an actual MIRV force rather than single 50 megaton or 25 megaton warheads—more warheads of decent accuracy but yields much lower than that range. If they must strike with such single warheads we are less concerned about the survivability problem, although with sufficient accuracy the force levels they have or can achieve now must be of concern even without MIRV warheads.

STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT

Senator JACKSON. We are talking about a potential single missile capability of 50 megatons. With that they could have perhaps 20 reentry vehicles per missile, though the most likely number, I think, is 10 or 12.

Senator SAXBE. Now, talking about the political aspects which have to be considered in anything that we are talking about here, do you think it is possible in an election year to have any reasonable approach from our side to a SALT agreement? In other words, can we really be objective?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It would be very difficult and probably not politically fruitful in this election year, but in general that depends on the

leadership. One recalls that in 1960 it did not seem to hurt political candidacy to emphasize and warn about strategic inferiority and promise to do something about it.

Senator SAXBE. At that time we obviously had a very heavy superiority in nuclear weapons and, as I recall, the discussion was kind of vague because nobody knew enough about it. What I am thinking of specifically at this time is that it seems to me that there was a determination to get an agreement, any agreement.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir.

Senator SAXBE. And a determination to gamble on that because the inclination of this Congress seemed to be, and the inclination of the political candidates seemed to be that we were peddling off things that we were not really going to do anyway; in other words, the ABM system. I don't think there is any inclination even now to build the capital defense permitted by the treaty.

The second thing was the attitude that has been growing in this country with a significant group, especially of the young, that nuclear war is just unthinkable, and therefore we won't come to grips with the hard facts of this thing.

Now I am not happy with that SALT agreement. I don't think there are a great many in the Senate that are happy with it. But the attitude seems to be, as Dr. Teller said, well, it is a poor agreement, but we ought to buy it. Now what is your attitude on this?

BE MORE OPEN ABOUT PROBLEMS

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Well, Senator, I agree that it is most unlikely that those agreements could be rejected. In fact, I think it is almost inconceivable that they are going to be rejected. Therefore, if I were to sit here and advise somebody to vote against them that would be quixotic in the extreme. I think, however, if we are going to accept them we should at least be very, very clear and very frank about the disadvantages of the agreements, about the risks that we are taking with them, about the way they do threaten to limit our options and create a period of instability and insecurity, perhaps even more so than that which would have existed without the agreements. I think that we should be very introspective and frank about weaknesses in our negotiating and in our views about SALT. We should ask ourselves hard questions of what we can do in terms of having firm, guiding strategic and arms control objectives, in terms of defense programs that are necessary given the terms of these agreements, and in terms of how we conduct SALT II. If someone wants to make nuclear war unthinkable it seems to me that the thing he should be very concerned about is the survivability of our forces and the effectiveness of the surviving forces so that there is no incentive for an attack on them, whatever the probability is in any case.

We are not proposing building up more offensive forces. We are proposing making the ones we have survivable and more flexible. I don't see why the American people should be against programs of that nature.

The same for the ABM. There has been a lot of emotion over that. If

you are going to spend money on strategic arms, isn't the proposition that we spend them on defensive arms potentially as politically palatable as spending on offensive arms once the anti-ABM emotionalism is swept away? That may be a politically powerful proposition if it is explained well.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP NEEDED

The second question is one that I remarked on this morning.

Given all the difficulties that we have had in SALT, and in our SALT preparations, why can't we admit them and make them clear so that we all understand them and can try to correct them? Would we not then be in a better position to approach SALT II?

At a minimum, we should get away from the overselling, get all of our problems on the table both in the strategic balance and in the negotiating, before accepting the agreements. Then, on that basis try to make the best we can of the situation.

INCREASE IN SOVIET RISK-TAKING

Senator JACKSON. Following this same point I wonder if you would comment further on another central issue which I think is constantly overlooked when we discuss strategic arms. We talk about the number of offensive missiles that they have and the number that we have, and it is then turned into a numbers game. But the purpose of an arms control agreement is to try to stabilize the international situation.

For example, the Soviets took Czechoslovakia in 1948 when they didn't have a single nuclear weapon. During the Cuban crisis of 1962, we had a 7 to 1 or 6 to 1 strategic advantage. Yet look at the risks the Soviets took. One has to ask how far will they push now, when they are no longer in an inferior strategic position, but in a superior strategic position?

Would you care to comment on that, and then I will yield to Senator Chiles.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think we really have to anticipate a much more challenging, active, opportunistic and risk-taking Soviet Union in the 1970's due to the change in the strategic balance and the apparently different political inclinations of the two countries. This is the most dramatic change in the military balance that has ever taken place, certainly in our history. With the central role that our strategic nuclear weapons have played in deterring a range of attacks and in giving confidence to others, it is almost an unimaginable type of change, which will have some very profound political implications. You must recognize that U.S. strategic nuclear superiority has been perhaps the dominant single factor of international politics. We may have believed it to be meaningless politically but to others it has been central. Strategic inferiority undoubtedly set limits on the risks the Soviet leaders in the past could take. That and other military limitations restrained Soviet opportunities and activities; yet there was still probing, challenging, bellicosity. The major military constraints are now largely removed. We must expect increased risk-taking, assertiveness, and activity.

CREDIBILITY OF U.S. CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Senator SAXBE. How much effect will conventional weapons have?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Inasmuch as we are in a period where the trend in the United States is clearly against maintaining large armies and against maintaining ground forces of any large size overseas, I cannot think that we are going to be able to depend on a conventional force defense.

The Nixon Doctrine is explicitly directed to Asia. But in Europe most are already willing to admit that Vietnamization implies an eventual Europeanization, that the Nixon Doctrine means future force reductions in Europe. Inasmuch as we haven't had a satisfactory conventional balance there at any time, this is going to make a deterrent and defense based upon conventional forces even less likely and even less believable.

There are some new developments in nonnuclear weapons. New precision guided munitions—the so-called smart bombs—remotely piloted vehicles, and the like. They undoubtedly mean that conventional weapons in some circumstances can be used much more effectively than before. These are limited circumstances, however. I doubt that these advances change the conventional force picture greatly. I also do not know what our policy is going to be in terms of providing air and naval and other technical support to combatants. In some small wars against powers other than the U.S.S.R., mobile, improved air and naval support could be effective. Against the Soviet Union in a determined or prolonged action, I do not imagine it would be sufficiently effective. Probably not against any determined Chinese effort in Asia. In Europe, given our current posture, a serious attack by the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact that is not nuclear from the outset seems too unlikely to base planning on it as we do. A conventional NATO strategy seems to me to be clearly bankrupt. So a strategy of reliance on conventional forces to support foreign policy, to deter, to respond to major threats does not appear promising. We need modernization of our tactical nuclear capability and our posture, especially in Europe, and especially because of the strategic balance, we need it very urgently. Given these SALT agreements, if we expect to continue to extend deterrence to allies, then modernizing our tactical nuclear weapons and posture should receive a top priority.

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN UNITED STATES

Neither the U.S. capability or will to fight major conventional war nor the strategic nuclear balance can look very good to our friends and allies. As I have said before, the changed strategic balance seriously reduces U.S. effectiveness and influence around the world.

Most people in the world do not think like U.S. systems analysts. All of our calculations that say it does not matter if the Soviet Union has even 2 to 1 strategic nuclear superiority, as long as we still have our assured destruction capability are of little reassurance to others. They see who is observably superior and they derive from this the limitation of U.S. strategic forces to minimum deterrence of attack on the United States only. Look at our charts and numbers, we say. This does not impress others. They are looking at the observables.

Senator SAXBE. Do you think this observable could lead to, for want of a better word, the Finlandization of Europe?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It could potentially lead to something like that, certainly, unless we can offer a better option than we are now offering.

Senator SAXBE. In other words, the Soviets would have their way.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Some are apparently already thinking along those lines.

Senator SAXBE. An accommodation.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That is right.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Senator SAXBE. Would this tend to cut Japan loose to nuclear activity?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think Japan is quite well aware that our strategic umbrella against the U.S.S.R. is very leaky and unreliable. It won't be very good against China either once China has even a minimum survivable retaliatory capability against our cities. Without a defense against that, we are not much more likely to be willing to initiate a strategic nuclear war with China than we are with the Soviet Union. I do not think that the Japanese Government would expect we would. Yes, this is likely to influence their views about their own nuclear options.

IS SALT I BETTER THAN NOTHING?

Senator CHILES. What about the argument that the agreement is better than nothing because we were not building, and, as you said yourself in your own testimony, they were moving very rapidly all the time. At the same time, because of our hopes or expectations or for whatever reason we were not moving. What about that argument?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Well, the argument is based on at least three assumptions. One, that they would continue the numerical buildup of these launchers at a rate equal to or greater than they have in the last 5 years. Had there been no agreement then, they would have added a thousand ICBM's, 40 to 50 more Y-boats, in the next 5 years.

Implied here, also, is that this type of buildup is threatening and modernization of existing levels is not as threatening.

The next assumption is that we would not respond to such a drastic continuing buildup. The President said the other day, however, that in the absence of these agreements we would have responded. Now the additional \$15 billion a year figure he used is incredible, of course, but nevertheless he said we would have responded.

The third assumption is that these agreements do in fact substantially change what the Soviets can and would have done in the next 5 years, an assumption that Senator Jackson has correctly questioned. Corollary to this assumption is the proposition that the agreements have so restrained the development of the threat—that is, what the Soviets can do in the next 5 years—that major U.S. responsive effort has been saved. That is clearly untrue.

Our projections of the last year or so have been that the ICBM launcher deployment rate is decreasing in the U.S.S.R. We were still worrying about new heavy missile developments, and mobile ICBM

deployment, which the agreement does not prohibit, but we felt that the SS-11 program and the initial SS-9 program had come to completion. We certainly did not forecast a continuing large scale buildup of ICBM launchers. Look at this year's defense report. What we expected and were most concerned about was the improvement of the existing levels of Soviet launchers in terms of new missiles, accuracy and multiple reentry vehicles. Those are the things that are not only allowed but encouraged by these agreements. It is difficult for me to see that there is much evidence to support the argument that the situation in the absence of the agreements would be much worse. It would be no worse than the situation in the presence of these agreements. If we would have responded in the absence of the agreements, and will not as effectively in their presence, the situation 5 years from now might be better without the agreements. Presumably, in the absence of agreement we would go ahead with at least the program for the defense of Minuteman and the treaty prevents us from doing that. The treaty and agreement constrain our options to respond to the threat more than they constrain the development of the threat.

So one could argue that the situation may be worsened by the agreements. Quite frankly, if we are going to accept these agreements, we must regard them as calculated risks that may be tolerable only if two conditions are met: There is a timely follow-on agreement that is more beneficial than these agreements and in the meantime we take the necessary measures in defense programs to safeguard our essential interests. It seems clear from what the administration has said that the acceptance of the risk presupposes those conditions being met. We should also make clear a willingness to terminate the agreements before 5 years if necessary. We should emphasize these conditions and stop talking about how much different the situation 5 years from now would have been, and how much we would have had to spend, were it not for the agreements. That is a credibility gap of the first magnitude, it seems to me.

Senator CHILES. Thank you, Doctor. I have enjoyed talking to you.

ORIGIN OF U.S. PROPOSALS

Senator JACKSON. Who worked up the SALT packages and where did they come from?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. They were a product of the interagency NSC system. The studies that produced the packages were originally tasked by issuance of NSSM's—National Security Studies Memorandum.

Senator JACKSON. Did the input into the NSC system come from the appropriate groups concerned with national security?

I am referring specifically of course to military inputs from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, intelligence inputs and so on.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir. The inputs were all there. But the disagreements were often strong and each participating agency produced and supported its own favorite package of arms limitations.

Senator JACKSON. How much, if you know, was really argued out around the table at the NSC level with principals—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the members of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of State, and so on?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The details themselves were presumably hammered out by the system before they went up to the principals, leaving them the major issues. One of the problems, however, was that the approach we took often involved such complex technical matters, which were so often addressed over and over again, without clear strategic and arms control objectives, that the issues were not always so clear, or were not resolvable at interagency meetings, whatever the level.

When there are several packaged proposals, heads of departments and agencies are not going to be able to take the time to sit down and understand every bit of them. The same is true with specific issues that are highly specialized or complicated, from SAM upgrade to corollary constraints to ABM capabilities of radars. We tried at the lower levels to isolate certain issues which were then discussed at the Verification Panel and National Security Council levels.

SUPERVISION OF NEGOTIATIONS

Senator JACKSON. Was it clear, during the course of the SALT negotiations, who was actually in charge of managing them? Formally, the responsibility rested with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, but I am wondering how those involved with the negotiations viewed this.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. While the Director of ACDA chaired the delegation and was personally responsible for managing the negotiations themselves, the overall responsibility remained with the White House. Formation of SALT options and positions were the responsibility initially of all participating agencies in the NSC system and ultimately of the White House, from where the final decisions had to come. The same was true for management of the negotiations, except that when the talks were being conducted the delegates, and principally Ambassador Smith, had an enormous amount of influence and a good deal of responsibility. They could and did lead the Government's position, influence and in practice direct the course of negotiations.

In the preparation for and management of SALT the White House retained the principal role. Dr. Kissinger and his staff decided the work to be done, the issues to be addressed, the agendas of interagency meetings, and usually the wording of directives, whether ad hoc or in the forms of NSDM's—Presidential decision memoranda. Unfortunately the NSC staff did not have this capability. The staff did not include the required competence.

Of the participants in the NSC SALT process, next to the White House, Ambassador Smith and the delegates were the most influential, more so than ACDA, per se, or for that matter than any department or agency. This was so both as a body and as individuals influencing the particular agency they represented. An interagency Backstop Committee, also chaired by ACDA, was set up in Washington to screen proposed formal statements by the delegation and to give it guidance, but unless the White House stepped in, it largely followed the delegation's wishes. All agencies had a say at all levels, of course, and consequently all had some influence and responsibility, but less.

Relatively, I don't think either the Department of Defense or the Department of State was very influential.

So I would say that immediate management of the negotiations rested with the Director of ACDA, with the advice and sometimes consent of the NSC system participants—both in Washington and at the site of the talks—and ultimate responsibility rested with the White House. Whether that rested principally with the President or with Dr. Kissinger, I cannot say. I don't know.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S ROLE

Senator JACKSON. How do you view the responsibility of the President and the NSC in connection with critical arms control negotiations, such as SALT?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The President has ultimate responsibility and must have. The National Security Council, per se, constitutes a high level sounding board where major issues can be discussed generally—not in much detail or necessarily in all significant aspects—and agency positions can be taken at the secretarial level. Unfortunately in my view, the NSC, which should have been mostly concerned with the overall picture and with providing a broad, guiding national strategy, dealt mostly with specific issues of SALT almost piecemeal. The President can use this sounding board as he wishes. President Nixon asked for no majority votes and did not make decisions based on such votes, or necessarily even a consensus. He made his own decisions, aided to one degree or another by Dr. Kissinger. Sometimes they reflected the sense of the NSC meeting. Sometimes they did not. But the responsibility was his.

At a lower level, the NSC staff played a major role, which being at the center of the bureaucracy and in theory not having the more parochial views of the separate agencies perhaps is as it should be. But the NSC staff was undermanned in quantity and if not quality at least in required backgrounds, expertise, and competence.

NO OVERALL STRATEGY

Senator JACKSON. Was there a clear ongoing strategic doctrine that was enunciated and was to be followed?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. No, sir.

Senator JACKSON. There wasn't one?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. No, sir. As I indicated previously the individual packages of limitations were analyzed quantitatively according to assured destruction population-kill and industrial-damage criteria, and *only* that as far as any doctrinal implications were concerned.

Senator JACKSON. The analyst would approach every problem—I gather from what you have said here—in terms of whether or not it met a minimum standard of assured destruction.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Of assured destruction. Some of us in the Defense Department remained very worried about the stability problem. We generally argued the stability problem but when it came down to the specific decisions on technicalities these types of considerations generally got lost in the shuffle. As to any other aspects of a national

strategy, at any level, or requirements for strategic sufficiency, they were virtually non-existent in SALT preparations.

Again, with the highly analytical technical approach, making decisions on changes on specific points, it is very easy to argue or rationalize that we don't really need some one particular thing if it seems to make negotiation of an agreement more difficult. The next thing you know this process has produced a position that does not make much sense for stability or survivability of forces, or other aspects of national strategy. Even when we tried to design alternatives that would have promoted stability through survivability of forces by the time they emerged from the interagency bargaining process they were changed in ways that detracted considerably from the original intent. For example, one such approach would have been based upon reductions of fixed undefended land-based systems to achieve lower but more survivable levels of land-based forces, through a combination of defense, mobility, and threat reduction—especially of the heavy ICBM's. When this came out of the system in the form of an optional arms limitation package all it would have done would be to change a large vulnerable force into a smaller less survivable force. By the time it came out, the necessary ABM defense levels had been lost. There was a provision against mobility options.

There is no overall guiding strategy to the process at all. The sufficiency criteria, for example, were the result of an enormous exercise of the national security machinery at the start of this administration and were firmed up by the summer of 1969. By the fall of 1969 we had forgotten the exercise had taken place as far as SALT is concerned. Whatever one thinks of the sufficiency criteria, they were presumably meant to define basic national strategy, yet as SALT guidelines they were nonexistent.

Senator JACKSON. Is it possible really for a nation to be able to negotiate effectively on strategic arms—

Dr. VAN CLEAVE (continuing). It has been for the Soviet Union.

Senator JACKSON. I meant to negotiate on strategic arms without having really worked out the problem and formulated a clear and concise strategic policy.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. No, sir.

U.S. STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS

Senator JACKSON. We really need to think through our long-range strategic requirements in order to maintain our own security and our commitments to our allies—to help maintain the kind of stability in the world that is necessary.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir. The assumption was all along that the Soviet Union shared our "mutual assured destruction concept" of stability. This was a facile assumption but it was the guiding assumption. We were unable in my view to cope with the fact that they had objectives other than those objectives and they let other objectives guide them. Moreover, while we were concerned about our allies in SALT, the long range security requirements of our allies and the effect on these of the agreements reached were not explicitly considered.

Senator JACKSON. This was corroborated, month after month, by the

massive buildup of the Soviet strategic arms, not only in terms of numbers but in terms of throw weight, is that right?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir. It was. You cannot find in Soviet behavior concepts of stability as we look at them. The Soviet Union even seems insensitive to our continuously expressed concerns about stability.

Senator JACKSON. Finally, when we prepare our negotiations in the strategic arms area doesn't it really require a full assessment of all relevant concerns, so that we can have a sound strategic policy formulated prior to the start of negotiations?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think it not only would be quite helpful, it would be mandatory if we were going to do it right.

Senator JACKSON. How would you regard the outcome of the SALT negotiations with respect to our concern for stability in this strategic balance?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think the terms of the agreements themselves are almost the antithesis of stability.

REPEATED CHANGES IN U.S. POSITION

Senator JACKSON. What impression did the Soviets convey to us as to their desire for agreements? Specifically, did they succeed in convincing our delegation that their interest in an agreement was very sensitive to the terms of the agreement?

Or turning the question around, what impression did we convey to the Soviets as to our desire for agreement?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. We stated repeatedly that our request for an agreement was indeed sensitive to the terms of the agreement but I have to doubt very much that our behavior, including the rapid changing of our positions, really corroborated what we were saying. The Soviet position was that we should talk about and agree upon certain principles first, and not bother about the details of the packages and numerical levels until we agreed on those principles.

After our August 4, 1970, proposal, the Soviet delegation did meet with us in small sessions on the technical details of our proposal. Largely these were sessions where they were asking questions and we were providing answers as we saw them.

Senator JACKSON. In fact, we put new proposals on the table before they really responded to the older ones?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think we certainly moved from our position in the first meeting in Helsinki to the two alternative agreements we suggested in the spring of 1970 to the August 4 proposal very rapidly, and more so than warranted by the talks and lack of Soviet responsiveness. For a short period of time after August 1970 we did hold pretty fast to the August 4 proposal. We did through the next session in Helsinki. But they outlasted us by continually talking about forward based systems, and ABM-only limitations until the May 20, 1971, agreement.

SOVIET NEGOTIATING STYLE

Senator JACKSON. I think it would be useful if the subcommittee had some feel for the actual conduct of negotiations. After we made a proposal did the Soviets come back with a counterproposal of their

own? Would you say the freedom to negotiate on the part of the Russian representative was the same as our own people, or more or less?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think the Soviets did not have any intention to move much. Their position was firm and the flexibility of their delegation was more limited. The Soviet representatives had a much tighter rein on them.

PREDETERMINING NEGOTIABILITY

Senator JACKSON. To what extent was the derivation of U.S. SALT proposals influenced by our judgment as to what was negotiable?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think, very, very strongly, based upon consideration of what was negotiable.

Senator JACKSON. On what basis were judgments as to negotiability formed?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Generally preconceptions ahead of testing them. Department of State representatives, Arms Control Agency representatives, and the delegates, in particular, had strong views of what was negotiable and what was not, and these things were given an enormous amount of weight overall.

Senator JACKSON. What is your view of the proper role or purpose of policy formulation and analysis of estimates of the acceptability of various proposals to the negotiating adversary?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It seems to me that we ought to try to get a picture ourselves of negotiability but I don't think that this should be the ruling consideration on what position should be advanced, particularly in a bargaining process when you must expect that you will not end up with what you start, and where a starting position will influence the end position.

I think the first thing to do of course is to determine what we find acceptable in line with our strategic concepts and objectives and proceed along that line. The negotiating process, particularly with the Soviets, is not one of persuading them of the logic of your analyses or the rationale of your position. It is again like a slot machine. You just do not know what you are going to get out. If they haven't sufficient incentive to agree through pressure or some other clear demonstration that agreement on what we suggest is a preferable option then they will scarcely be persuaded on the merits of your argument.

ESTIMATES OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

Senator JACKSON. In preparing for SALT and during the course of negotiations there were general expectations and projections about Soviet strategic objectives, were there not? Without getting into intelligence estimates, which are classified, could you comment on these expectations?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Expectations and projections were generally along optimistic lines about Soviet objectives being very similar to our own in terms of establishing some rough equality, and firming it up with an arms limitation agreement.

It was not generally expected that the Soviet Union had any intention of achieving some significant, measurable superiority.

Senator JACKSON. As I recall, it seemed to me that we have not been inclined to project beyond a certain point. Isn't that generally the situation?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir. With few exceptions, our projections for years have generally had the Soviet Union leveling off in strategic force deployments about where we thought they should level off.

Senator JACKSON. Being a subjective evaluation and not based on any objective facts?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It was mirror-imaging. That was simply what it was, along with what we perceived to be their economic difficulties, why they could not spend money on forces of this nature. We derived from the basis of our own concepts that they did not need what they eventually built. After all, why the SS-9? Or 1,600 assorted ICBM's? They are not needed, we say, for assured destruction.

Senator JACKSON. What is the line of reasoning of those who talked in terms of the Soviets merely seeking parity in numbers? We won't say parity in throw weight, but in numbers.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It wasn't so much a line of reasoning as it was an article of faith—

Senator JACKSON. That this was obvious?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE (continuing). Faith that the Soviets' fondest and supreme objective was to draw even with us. Those who rationalized this were very strong believers in "mutual assured destruction," and in the proposition that a technical balance could be agreed upon based upon mutually assured destruction at equal levels. I cannot over-emphasize how strongly this article of faith has been held in the U.S. Government and U.S. arms control community for a number of years.

NEGOTIATING UNDER DEADLINES

Senator JACKSON. I would like to get your comments on the final agreements, and how they may have been influenced by a deadline. Was it obvious to most people that we were the ones who were pushing hard to get an agreement? Did it appear as if our negotiators were under a deadline?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Very definitely.

Senator JACKSON. Could it have been obvious to the other side that this was the case?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It was most obvious to the other side that that was the case. There can be little doubt about it. We put ourselves in a position of being the ones in a hurry. We were pushing for agreements and willing to make concessions to get the agreements. Publicly the President of the United States said at least on two separate occasions that we would have an agreement within a certain period of time.

Senator JACKSON. And this of course further limited the possibility of getting concessions from them.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. All of these indicators mentioned were mutually reinforcing. None of the important indicators were going in a different direction. They were all reinforcing the same picture.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Van Cleave, once again, on behalf of the committee, I want to express our deep appreciation for what I think has been an outstanding professional and scholarly approach to the problems here. I want to commend you and compliment you for your assistance.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Thank you.

Senator JACKSON. The record will be left open for additional comments by Dr. Van Cleave and other matters that are relevant to the hearing here this afternoon. I suggest we include as an appendix to our hearing Dr. Van Cleave's statement this morning at the open hearing of the Committee on Armed Services, together with the record of the questions and answers at that hearing.

The committee will stand in recess.

(Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

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APPENDIX

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, JULY 25, 1972

Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., July 25, 1972.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in room 1114, New Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis, chairman.

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding) and Jackson.

Also present: John T. Ticer, chief clerk; Nancy Bearg, research assistant, and Richard Perle, special assistant to Senator Jackson.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order.

We are glad to have our visitors here this morning. This is an open session and we will proceed immediately.

We are pleased to have with us this morning a witness who has been intimately involved in planning for the SALT talks and who brings to his testimony today a keen analysis of the central issues in SALT. Since advising the SALT delegation, Dr. Van Cleave has had an opportunity to reflect objectively and with detachment on U.S. policy at SALT.

Dr. William R. Van Cleave is now associate professor, School of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Southern California, a post he has held since 1967.

Dr. Van Cleave initially began research in nuclear arms deterrence in 1964 at the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute, where he is currently a consultant. During a leave of absence from the University of Southern California from 1969 to 1971, he was special assistant, Office of the Secretary of Defense. In this capacity he served as an advisor to the U.S. SALT delegation.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Mr. Chairman, I regard it as a privilege to have the opportunity to testify before the committee. My testimony will be published in the *Proceedings*, and *Nuclear Journal*.

Doctor, may I add a word of welcome here. I am glad that you could come and that you are going to testify. I regret exceedingly, though, that I will not be able to stay. I am floor manager of the military procurement bill that is the pending business in the Senate now, and I am compelled to report to the Senate floor in the next few minutes. But I certainly will follow your testimony completely and I am sure it will be of value.

With that understanding, I am going to ask you and the committee to excuse me now for this other urgent and demanding duty and my interest is certainly continuing with your testimony.

Senator JACKSON (presiding). Dr. Van Cleave, you may proceed with your statement and we will have a period of questioning.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM R. VAN CLEAVE, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Mr. Chairman, I regard it as a privilege to have the opportunity to discuss the proposed strategic arms limitation agreements with you and to give you my views on them. Needless to say, my views are solely personal ones.

I apologize for the lengthy and somewhat repetitious nature of my written statement. It was hastily prepared. I will submit it but only summarize it in my remarks.

In the testimony so far you have heard two contrasting general approaches to the evaluation of these agreements.

SALT PROMISSORY IN NATURE

The administration and other supporters of the agreements have argued essentially that, whatever the defects of the agreements, they do constitute a worthwhile first step that will promote future agreements more clearly beneficial to the United States. They are basically promissory in nature. In addition, while the interim agreement does allow much higher levels of launchers and total throw weight of payload for the Soviet Union, and does give the Soviets considerable latitude in force modernization, and while the ABM treaty does forego light area defense for the United States and limits defense of retaliatory forces to only one ICBM site, the balance of forces established is still better than a no-agreement case. This argument compares the agreement levels with presumed 5-year no-agreement levels—it purposely ignores any comparison of agreement levels with levels that existed at the beginning of SALT—and holds that the agreements halt Soviet momentum and thereby curb the “arms race.”

Those who are unhappy with the agreements point to the specific terms of the agreements and their effect on U.S. strategic and political interests. While the extent to which the agreement will be promotional of further agreements is anyone's guess—the possibility must be allowed—but the evidence that good agreements will grow out of unsatisfactory ones and that the Soviets will be any more willing in SALT II than they were in SALT I to ease U.S. strategic problems is scant indeed. This approach is skeptical of hypothetical nonagreement projections and prefers to deal with the actual projections derivable from the agreements, which are really not much different from the nonagreement projections previously used by the administration. What now is most threatening are the normally expected improvements in Soviet forces, which the agreements seem to encourage. Moreover, the comparison that should be made is with the balance that existed when SALT began and earlier U.S. expectations about SALT. These comparisons show a rapid process of erosion of the strategic balance in the favor of the Soviet Union, and apparently a similar erosion of U.S. SALT positions and expectations.

AGREEMENTS UNSATISFACTORY IN AND OF THEMSELVES

The gap between these two approaches is bridged by the administration's acknowledgement, made most clearly by the SALT delegation, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the agreements in and of themselves are unsatisfactory unless certain future conditions are met. On May 9, the delegation formally warned that if “an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within 5 years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized” and that the United States would then have to withdraw from the agreements. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have insisted that the agreements are acceptable only if a vigorous R. & D. program and modernization of permitted strategic forces are conducted, the B-1 and ULMS are funded, and safeguards are built for the possibility of abrogation.

The apparent inconsistency between arguing, on the one hand, that the agreements “provide for a more stable strategic balance” and constitute “an important first step in checking the arms race,” and, on the other hand, that the agreements are tolerable only if such conditions are met, is eased by the recognition that the agreements are a calculated risk designed to enhance the prospects of a better agreement. Despite all of the rhetoric about how these agreements improve the strategic situation and curb arms competition—they do neither—the real argument for them boils down to, first, their promotional value, and, second, that value being worth the risks and disadvantages they entail.

What I would first say is that if you find these agreements acceptable—if the Senate consents to them, as I believe it undoubtedly will—it is essential that you recognize the calculated risk nature of the agreements and reflect that recognition in your advice on them, and in your subsequent handling of defense appropriations.

Agreements of this nature inherently include many uncertainties and ambiguities, combining prices to be paid, risks to be taken, and hopefully opportunities to be created. Any position taken on agreements, for or against, must be taken on balance. It cannot be unqualified. Your vote will have to be yes or no. If it is yes, I would argue that it must be "Yes, but . . ." and the but should be reflected in the required support for safeguards, defense programs, and the mandatory limited time of the interim agreement.

That, in my view, is the necessary minimum condition for acceptance of these agreements.

SALT GIVES UP TOO MUCH

Personally, of the two general approaches I described, I believe the second to be the more valid and to represent the closer approximation to truth. This will make it clear from the outset that I do not believe that we have good or sufficient reason to be happy with these agreements. I will go another step. Dr. Teller, as I understand, has argued that we should not be happy with the agreements, but, nevertheless—because we are left with little else we can do—we should accept them. In fact, that actually seems to be what the administration collectively is saying. I believe that, on balance, the agreements give up too much and are more likely to be detrimental to U.S. security and U.S. foreign relations than beneficial. Consequently, I could not personally recommend that they be approved and ratified.

I want to make it clear that that is my personal point of view for reasons set forth below. I wish also to be clear that I do not believe it is a very realistic position to maintain at this time. I do not support the agreements, but I really cannot imagine them, having been negotiated and signed by the President, being rejected by the Senate. I register my dissent to let you know that not everyone believes the agreements are in the best interests of the United States.

The most useful approach at this point of time would undoubtedly be for us to examine realistically the drawbacks of the agreements so that we are very clear about the risks being assumed, and then to turn to how we best provide for essential U.S. interests in the presence of the agreements and how we approach the next phase of SALT. I believe that our strategic problems with the Soviet Union and our problems in negotiating arms limitation agreements should be frankly open and understood if there is to be any prospect of future success. Personally, I am sorry that the full record of SALT cannot be made available to the public.

I would like to set forth now some general observations or points of view elaborating on what I have said and giving some of the reasons for my concern.

SALT DOES NOT SOLVE U.S. STRATEGIC PROBLEMS

1. The agreements are not of themselves good arms limitations agreements. Acceptance of them should not lead to the position that they are in themselves good agreements or promote complacency. The Defense Department is absolutely correct in insisting that acceptance of these agreements requires reinvigorated R. & D. and modernization programs. Those who have attacked these programs as inconsistent with strategic arms limitation should direct their unhappiness at the agreements, not at the proposition that they require such safeguards.

It should be made very clear that the agreements do not solve or even ease our strategic force problems. They do not arrest the expected development of the threat or competition in strategic arms. They do, unfortunately, accept higher numerical levels of the threat than we ever before contemplated and do restrict at the same time U.S. ability to cope with the threat. Their tendency, therefore, is toward less rather than more stability. Unless our expectations of their promotional value are shortly fulfilled and unless in the meantime we push compensatory programs, there is a strong risk that they could be wildly destabilizing.

EROSION IN U.S. POSITION

2. The current agreements, taken together, are in fact a light year removed from the outcomes contemplated in the studies and planning for SALT in 1969. While I cannot discuss earlier U.S. positions or proposals in open hearings, I believe I can say on the basis of information already publicly revealed that these agreements do not resemble those deemed acceptable in 1969 or 1970. There

has since the start of SALT been a constant erosion of U.S. SALT positions and expectations.

I state this frankly not to criticize the delegation or those responsible for decisions during the course of the talks, but to point out that, while we were engaged in SALT, the strategic balance continued to deteriorate rapidly, and to suggest that arms negotiations are a process in and of themselves, and that erosion of positions and expectations should be expected. I think that it is important for us to be aware of this in our approach to SALT II.

Moreover, the observation that such erosion occurred does not necessarily imply that it was wise or unwise, right or wrong. The criticism has been levied that concession after concession was made in the pursuit of an agreement. But specific concessions may be good or bad depending upon their nature, the available alternatives, and the eventual outcome. The agreements have to stand or fall on their own merits in the final analysis.

The same record shows that the United States tried to achieve better agreements but that more worthwhile ones (from our point of view) were rebuffed by the Soviet Union. Changes in U.S. positions or expectations may be regarded as erosion or as an attempt to find a common denominator upon which the two sides could agree.

A brief review of the course of SALT, based upon the public record, might help one draw his own conclusions.

INITIAL POSITION OF SALT

As SALT was about to begin in November 1969, the declared objective was to negotiate an agreement that would stabilize the balance at the same relative position that then existed. At that time, the Soviet Union had about the same number of ICBM launchers as the United States (some 1,050) and had just begun deployment of modern Y-class submarines and SLBM's. A freeze at that time would have preserved some U.S. numerical advantage.

In the spring of 1970, according to the President's foreign policy reports, the United States set forth in the talks two alternative comprehensive agreements, one that would include qualitative limitations, including MIRV, and one that would involve actual reductions in strategic offensive forces. When it became clear that the Soviet side was interested in neither approach, according to the President, the United States submitted a changed position taking into account Soviet objections. That proposal, known as the August 4 proposal, has not been made public, but according to press reports would have established equal levels of offensive forces limited at about the situation that then prevailed. With that proposal, equal ceilings then were substituted for a freeze that would have preserved some U.S. edge.

It is quite clear that the Soviet Union was not then, and has not been at any time since SALT began, interested in such equality, or in agreements at those levels.

The Soviet approach in the meantime, according to the President, remained very general and unspecific ("lacked the specificity and detail to permit firm conclusions about overall impact"), and focused upon a definition of "strategic" systems that would limit U.S. forward-based theater forces (but not those of the Soviet Union) rather than giving priority to the core strategic offensive systems. The U.S.S.R. also wanted a separate ABM limitation agreement.

At the same time, the U.S. position on ABM limitations continued to be that defensive limitations depended upon offensive levels permitted by any agreement. The United States might be willing to forego a light area defense in return for an agreement stabilizing the United States-U.S.S.R. strategic balance, but levels of defense of retaliatory systems depended upon the level of the threat.

In May 1971, the President acknowledged a deadlock, which, in an attempt to break, we would agree to concentrate "on working out an agreement for the limitation of deployment of antiballistic missile systems." Such an agreement would be accompanied by "certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons."

At that time, the Soviet Union reportedly had about 1,450 ICBM's and 400 SLBM's operational or under construction. News reports at the time speculated that the new U.S. position would freeze existing levels of ICBM and SLBM launchers and give an equal choice to each side of defending either its national capital (NCA defense) or three ICBM sites. (That level of ICBM defense presumably being necessary with those levels of strategic offensive forces.)

Now, the interim agreement on offensive forces permits the Soviet Union (by our calculations) something over 1,600 fixed ICBM launchers and 740 SLBM launchers on modern nuclear-powered submarines (or up to 62 boats or 950 SLBM's through substitutions for certain old systems). Neither diesel missile launching submarines nor existing types of SLBM's on such submarines are limited. The ABM Treaty would limit U.S. defense of its retaliatory forces to one ICBM site and would permit the United States to deploy a defense around Washington, an option that does not seem likely to be picked up.

One way of putting this is that in 2½ years of SALT the United States has managed to trade away Safeguard, and most of the important options to assure retaliatory force survivability, for a doubling of the threat. Another observation is that, if the news accounts of a year ago were correct, in 1 year's time the United States has changed from insisting on defense of three ICBM sites compared with a somewhat lower threat and Soviet defense of Moscow, to what in practical terms will be one ABM site for us against a larger threat and the equivalent of three ABM sites for the Soviet Union (considering that, according to public testimony, the Moscow defense may also defend some 300 ICBM launchers).

One might suggest that, on the basis of this record, future Soviet historians could regard this as the golden age of Soviet negotiation.

Two other points emerge from this.

INCOMPATIBILITY OF ABM TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT

First, an enormous change has taken place since the beginning of SALT. SALT 1972 is not SALT 1969. That may lend weight to the argument that we had best accomplish whatever we can now. It might also help put these agreements, and the strategic situation—and the process of negotiating arms limitations—in perspective. It certainly shows that there is ample ground for disappointment in what has been achieved in SALT and for insisting that we look to our own solution of strategic problems rather than primarily to SALT.

Second, it suggests that the ABM treaty and the agreement on offensive forces are not complementary but are incompatible. They do not go together. We are comparing levels of ABM with levels of ABM and offensive levels with offensive levels, which is politically important and which may be strategically important, but which blurs the really significant offensive-defensive relationships and the need to match defense to offense and vice versa. If ABM is to be limited as stipulated by the Treaty, the offensive capability permitted the Soviet Union is intolerable. If such offensive capability is to be permitted, higher levels of ABM are necessary to protect our retaliatory forces and other survivability options should not be precluded.

SOVIET OFFENSIVE SUPERIORITY

3. The offensive limitations agreement clearly does allow Soviet offensive force superiority.

It could be argued that the agreements do not themselves grant this superiority but only recognize an existing situation and at least freeze it before it becomes worse. There are major problems with that view:

First, politically and psychologically it is going substantially beyond recognition of the existing balance for the U.S. Congress formally to consent to it and for the U.S. Government formally to ratify it. To the world, we seem to be not only assuring an adverse balance but to be giving it our stamp of approval, codifying it as the law of the land, and proclaiming it to all. This cannot help but have a deleterious effect on our foreign relations.

As the Secretary of Defense testified just last February, drawing upon only one force component as an example: "if we were placed in an inferior position where the Soviet Union would have substantially more ballistic missile submarines than the United States had, for instance, using this as an example, this could have a tremendous effect upon the future course of the United States from a foreign policy standpoint and from the standpoint of the will and determination of the United States." That is essentially what the third Sufficiency Criterion means. Yet, the agreement accepts that unhappy situation.

Many will find in U.S. acceptance of these agreements acceptance of a position of relative weakness for the decade of the 1970's, and will make their foreign policy decisions accordingly. It will seem to affirm that the United States

is entering a period of introversion. The effects of this might be lessened somewhat by clear evidence that we do not intend to accept this permanently, but the acceptance of the terms of these agreements nonetheless will tend to be a dramatic testament to new Soviet strength and U.S. weakness.

THE CHANGING STRATEGIC BALANCE

Second, the terms of the agreement themselves could well make the balance more adverse than it now is by permitting the U.S.S.R. to build up its strategic offensive and defensive forces well beyond the existing situation, and by denying to the United States options necessary to cope with the growth and provide safe force survivability. While it is hoped that U.S. modernization programs will not be slowed by these agreements, the terms of the agreements do allow the threat to increase considerably and do require that the United States refrain from force survivability options during the lifetime of the agreement.

Third, to conclude that the situation 5 years from now would be much worse without these agreements requires the dual assumption that the Soviets will continue to deploy new ICBM's and SLBM's at a rate comparable to or higher than that of recent years (and that this represents more of a risk than Soviet force modernization), and that the United States does nothing in response. Yet, the President has suggested that we would do quite a lot of response (an additional \$15 billion per year more) if there were no agreements. It is difficult to see how these agreements change the threat \$15 billion per year worth. In fact, while limiting such U.S. response, the agreements do not much change the expected 1975-77 threat. If the Soviets do a lot in the presence of the agreements, and we do comparatively little—as seems probable—the agreements could lead to a situation in 1977 much worse than that without the agreements.

The case that the situation would be worse 5 years from now without these agreements is based upon new projections that the Soviets would build 1,000 more ICBM's over the next 5 years and would increase their fleet of Y-class submarines to over 90. This is not only a curious reversal of past perennial predictions that such construction would soon level off and stop (the President has earlier wondered why the Soviets should want higher levels of launchers), it seems inconsistent with preagreement projections and expressions of concern.

From the last 2 years' Defense Reports we get a picture of Soviet ICBM launcher construction coming to a stop, with no evidence that we expected—in the absence of these agreements—ICBM silo construction at the rate of 200 per year for 5 years. This year's report stated that the Soviets may have completed the construction of SS-9s, 11s, and 13s.

Y-class submarine construction, in contrast, was expected to continue at the present rate, which Dr. Kissinger has given as eight boats per year. In the spring of 1971 before this committee, the Secretary of Defense reported that the number of Soviet Y-boats "could reach 50 by mid-1975." At eight per year, that would imply 66, 5 years from now, not 90. This year's Defense Report projects 41 to 42 boats by the end of 1973, which implies some 69 boats 5 years from now if the Soviets were to continue their present rate of rapid construction. This range of projections is far from the now suggested 90 boats but not a lot different from the 62 boats permitted the Soviet Union by the terms of the agreement. And, so far as I can tell, the agreement sets no limits on the number of Y-class submarines the Soviets could have in various stages of completion at the end of the 5-year period.

By contrast, in this year's Defense Report, the Secretary of Defense emphasized not an expected continued buildup of strategic offensive missile levels so much as their expected improvement, which the agreement allows. He stated that "future significant development in Soviet forces will probably lie in qualitative improvements," which, he said, constitute our "greatest concern." Similarly, in this year's State of the World message, the President observed that "The Soviet forces even at current levels, have the potential of threatening our land based ICBM's." He further stated that the Soviets have the necessary technology for such improvements.

Finally, it must be concluded that, because of these considerations, the agreements do not promise a better situation 5 years from now, due to the agreements, nor do they themselves prevent a deterioration of the situation. Only we can do that.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES NOT KNOWN

4. We do not have as firm a foundation of knowledge about Soviet programs and capabilities as implied by the agreements or suggested by Dr. Kissinger at the Moscow press conference. And, despite 2½ years of strategic arms limitation talks, we certainly have no clear idea of Soviet objectives.

We are unable to know all we need to know about the qualitative capabilities of Soviet weapons systems, much less the nature and direction of Soviet R. & D., far less the extent of Soviet knowledge and the nature of Soviet interest in strategic forces. We have not been very good at predicting Soviet technology and objectives. Such matters are inherently uncertain. Our ability to assess Soviet weapons development contains many gaps, even in such critical areas as radar capability, missile accuracy, ballistic missile defense capability of SAM systems, warheads, and space activities. In testimony last year, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy acknowledged that "We have little knowledge of the Soviet warhead designs, of their vulnerability, or of Soviet testing and development philosophy."

ERRORS IN PAST ESTIMATES

Our projections of Soviet objectives and future capabilities have been seriously in error many times, a fact that should make us a bit humble about current projections and expectations. In 1965, even after the Soviet ICBM buildup had begun, Secretary of Defense McNamara publicly stated that the Soviets clearly had no intention of trying to close the gap in strategic forces or to compete quantitatively with the United States. Our projections of the Soviet buildup over the past several years regularly had it leveling off and stopping at far lower levels than were actually attained. When the buildup continued, we then predicted that the Soviet objective was to narrow the gap somewhat; then we predicted that it was, at most, to reach a rough equality in numerical ICBM levels (never in SLBM levels); and then to obtain an overall parity so that strategic arms limitations reflecting that parity could be reached.

The President recalled in his Foreign Policy Report this year that in 1969, we looked upon the drawing abreast of the Soviet Union in strategic forces as the opportunity for strategic arms limitations that would, for the first time, reflect a genuine parity. The Secretary of State acclaimed SALT in the fall of 1969 as the means to preserve the balance that then existed. The Secretary of Defense acknowledged in 1970, that we had not responded to the Soviet buildup because we believed that it was aimed at most at achieving numerical parity.

The fact is that all of our preparations for SALT in 1969 were based upon the premise, since proved erroneous, that the Soviet goal was only to narrow or at most overcome the strategic gap, that the Soviets had attained a strategic position satisfactory to them, and that Soviet willingness to engage in strategic arms limitation talks reflected the seriousness of their desire to reach an agreement establishing that position. The motivations we generally attributed to them, for no good reason, were mirror-image projections of our own, principally based upon mutual assured destruction concepts and the pressure of nondefense economic imperatives.

Neither the SALT record nor Soviet activities since SALT began supports such a premise.

DIFFERENCES IN U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

5. Similarly, our uncertainty concerning Soviet strategic concepts remains greater than our knowledge, yet we continue to assume in our strategic and SALT planning that Soviet concepts and objectives are similar to our own. The weight of available evidence, I believe strongly suggests the opposite.

For some time in the United States it has been commonly believed that there are certain truths about strategic stability and the optimum strategic relationship, which only need to be learned to be accepted. We have tried to read our truths into Soviet activities. Where they did not fit it was a matter of Soviet error or misunderstanding, rather than a deliberate, considered, or final rejection of these truths. Little thought seems to have been given to the political insensitivity of these truths or to the fact that they were formulated in a different set of conditions than we face in the 1970's. The development of hardened silo launchers for ICBM's and subsurface launching of missiles from submarines,

together with an early stage in the development of missile accuracies and ASW capabilities, seemed to guarantee the survivability of second-strike retaliatory forces. ABM was undeveloped and, compared to money spent for offensive forces, unpromising. There were few good prospects for damage limiting, for counterforce, and if one assumed that any efforts in those directions would only precipitate offsetting measures there was little reason to pursue such efforts. All of this led to the sanctity of assured destruction concepts, which—if followed by both sides—would lead to stability based upon mutual assured destruction. As Senator Brooke put it, "mutual deterrence depends on mutual vulnerability. It is in neither side's interest to threaten the other side's retaliatory forces."

Yet, developing a counterforce capability that threatens U.S. retaliatory forces is precisely what the Soviet Union has been doing. There is little evidence that the Soviets share our views on stability and preferred strategic relationships. And I know of nothing in the SALT record or the record of Soviet strategic force activities that persuades me that they do.

One of the major changes that should be made in approaching the next phase of SALT is in our general assumption of similarity of strategic concepts and objectives, or even compatibility of them.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

6. There is a growing recognition that the Soviets would realize and exploit a political advantage from some form of strategic superiority, or from the stalemate of U.S. strategic power. This itself is a reversal of the long prevailing notion in the U.S. that strategic forces confer no political benefits and have no political utility. The recognition is belated, but perhaps not so much that it is not useful to the formulation of U.S. and Allied policies. The realization that strategic superiority of the type the Soviet Union now seems to be seeking might also be usable militarily absorbs, I know, a good deal of the energies of the Department of Defense, but is not very widely accepted. One can only hope that the general recognition of this possibility is not too late.

Few seem to recognize this as a problem, probably due to lack of appreciation of the nature of the Soviet strategic buildup and to a residual conviction that deterrence will continue to exist and render a first strike irrational. Yet, Soviet strategic force development points clearly toward a possible future capability for a substantially disarming first strike with a fraction of the total force, enabling an overwhelming assured destruction capability to be held in reserve. Even if U.S. calculations show that surviving U.S. forces would retain some magical assured destruction capability (20 to 25 percent fatalities?), the question remains whether the United States would respond in such fashion given its reduced force, and only call down greater retaliatory destruction on itself. In other words, instead of the simple model of aggressive Soviet first strike and U.S. retaliation, we may face a situation where the Soviets could strike first and still retain their own assured destruction retaliatory force, leaving the United States in the position of being the initiator of nuclear war against civilian populace and the Soviet Union in the position of being the retaliator. This is to what the President referred when he asked in his 1970 foreign policy statement if a President should "in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?" In his 1971 foreign policy statement, he emphatically rejected this—yet, it is precisely the situation we seem headed toward, and one that these agreements promise to ratify.

INTERIM AGREEMENT CANNOT BE PERMANENT

7. Because of all of these considerations, as I suggested at the outset, acceptance of these agreements must actually be based on the premise that the interim agreement is in fact interim and will lead directly to a better agreement. The agreements must be believed to be both interim and promotional of better agreements in the near future, or, as the delegation stated, "U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized." Further, as I have argued, the minimal condition for the acceptance of these agreements is the pursuit of the programs not disallowed by the agreements, including R. & D. and modernization.

That these agreements will promote the necessary follow-on agreements is possible. But this is only a promise, and we must recognize, first, that the

promise may not be fulfilled, and, second, that its chances will be affected by what we do and do not do.

There is certainly ground for pessimism. If two and a half years of "serious and businesslike" negotiation could produce only these agreements, one may doubt the prospects that more beneficial agreements will necessarily follow. The President seemed to share this pessimism in his 1971 Foreign Policy Report when he said, "If all the effort that has gone into SALT were to produce only a token agreement, it could be counterproductive. There would be no reason to be confident that this could serve as a bridge to a more significant agreement."

When so much has been placed on the promise of a follow-on agreement justifying the risks of these agreements, we must very seriously consider the prospects of the Soviets agreeing to a future agreement that would correct the defects of the first and rescue the United States from a difficult situation. Why should they give up in SALT II what they gained or refused to give up in SALT I?

U.S. POSITION WEAKER IN SALT II

We will be entering SALT II relatively in a much weaker position than we entered SALT I. That is indisputable. What leverage will we have to encourage the negotiation of a corrective follow-on agreement? The only leverage we can possibly have, and the only prospect of a successful outcome for SALT II (however minimal), will be the clear demonstration that we intend to push forward to improve our forces and solve our own strategic problems in the presence of these agreements. If we do not show that we intend to disallow the Soviets meaningful superiority and substantial counterforce capabilities, I do not see that the Soviet Government will have much incentive to reach an agreement limiting those capabilities.

8. Finally, to wax a bit philosophically, we have clearly attributed too much to SALT and to what could be accomplished through strategic arms limitation agreements. From past official statements, the writings of some arms control specialists, and the news media, the theme issued that SALT represented about the last chance to do something about strategic arms control and the penalty for failing to do that something or other would be very high. The putative benefits from a SALT agreement and the dire consequences attributed to nonagreement were respectively grand and terrible indeed—almost apocalyptic in nature at times. This has been an exaggeration in the extreme. Inasmuch as the strategic balance and the state of our security 5 years from now will be determined more by what we do and not do than by the agreements concluded—although, in my opinion, the agreements may make the handling of these problems more difficult—one may wonder whether the real significance of the agreements lies in what they reflect rather than what they do.

UNITED STATES LACKS COHERENT NATIONAL STRATEGY

For various reasons, we have been unable to face realistically and cope with a dramatically changing strategic balance. We have not been able to firm up and hold to a coherent, agreeable national strategy, or to offer our citizens a strategic objective better than the guarantee of their assured destruction should deterrence fail. We have not even been able to maintain the four minimum criteria for strategic sufficiency that were determined just 3 years ago. We do not even use them as a measure of the effectiveness, success, or failure of these agreements.

We are evaluating these agreements by the narrow, shortsighted, and subminimal criterion of whether they leave us with an assured destruction capability. We are, in other words, using what was originally intended to be one analytical tool to use in evaluating forces as the sole strategic objective. And it appears that our energies over the next few years will be devoted primarily to the maintenance of that capability.

I do not believe that we can afford to rely upon assured destruction as the sole standard of strategic force sufficiency. Nor should we allow the Soviet Union a counterforce capability, measurable superiority, or the ability to limit our strategic flexibility and to coerce. The trends seem to be, however, that we are doing all of that. I cannot imagine that most U.S. citizens will long remain satisfied with this situation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SITUATION WITH AND WITHOUT SALT

Senator JACKSON. Thank you, Dr. Van Cleave, for an excellent presentation here this morning.

I have a number of questions that I would like to ask.

One method of assessing the impact of the SALT accords on Soviet programs would be to compare what they are free to do under the agreement with what we have projected that they might have done in the absence of the agreement. Speaking generally, and without getting into precise estimates, how does the lower end of the spectrum of official estimates of the Soviet strategic offensive force for mid-1977 compare with the force permitted the Soviets under the SALT accords?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Senator, I don't think there is much difference in these two levels. It depends upon what estimates and what projections we look at. The argument that the situation would be much worse 5 years from now is based on new projections that the Soviets would build 1,000 more ICBM launchers in the next 5 years and build up to a level of 90 or more Y-class submarines. As I stated this is a curious change from past perennial predictions that such construction would not continue at the rates we experienced in the 1965 to 1969 period. According to the last two defense reports and other pre-agreement public reports, except for construction activity related to a new, heavier ICBM, Soviet ICBM launcher construction was slowing down with no evidence that we expect ICBM silo construction at the rate of 200 per year in 5 years. Y-class submarine construction, of course, was expected to continue at the present rate but Dr. Kissinger has given us eight boats a year. As I noted in my statement, recent, pre-agreement projections seemed to place expected levels of Y-boats 5 years from now in the neighborhood of 66 to 69 at that production rate.

It is clear that for the past 2 years expected modernization of Soviet forces has been regarded as the most likely contingency and the greatest matter of concern to us and this is not at all stopped by the agreements. The significant and disturbing fact is that the threat permitted by the agreements, no matter with what it is compared, is too great, particularly when we have denied ourselves important counter-measures.

Senator JACKSON. That is especially true of the land-based ICBM forces.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Have estimates been subordinated to the need to defend the SALT agreements?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I have no way of answering that question.

Senator JACKSON. One begins to wonder, though, when one looks at what has been used to support the administration's momentum argument.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I have no knowledge of the reasons or basis for the projections given, although to one on the outside their credibility does not appear very great. I do not think they contribute to a proper evaluation of the agreements.

RETROFITTING OF SS-9'S

Senator JACKSON. The Soviets are very likely going to deploy a new missile as a follow-on to the SS-9. Under the terms of the interim agreement they are free to retrofit their 313 heavy silos to accommodate this new missile. How would the deployment of 313 new "heavy" ICBM's over the next 5 years compare with what the Soviets could do in absence of the SALT agreement?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I don't see any difference between the two myself.

Senator JACKSON. It is virtually the same?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Virtually the same. In fact, to deploy 313 such missiles in 5 years would be to exceed somewhat the rate of deployment of heavy ICBM's to date. Again, though, I think we really have to expect maximum Soviet effort in the next few years to be in the modernization and improvement of existing forces toward a counterforce capability. They have sufficient force levels to afford that capability and they need now only improvements in those forces.

Senator JACKSON. The fact is that the introduction of MIRV into the Soviet force will require a very large retrofitting program. That alone will take up a large portion of their resources in this area alone. As you testified earlier, this is the more probable course they would follow, even without a SALT agreement; isn't that correct?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I agree, sir; I see nothing in the current agreements that would make me change my expectations of the Soviet activities over the next

5 years, or the development of the threat—unless, of course, it is in what we have and will deny to ourselves.

Senator JACKSON. How does a deployment of 60 heavy ICBM's per year compare with the history of the deployment of the SS-9 force?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Sixty per year is, if we consider that the SS-9 deployment began around 1964, and looking only at SS-9 deployment, a somewhat greater pace. Looking at all ICBM deployment, SS-11's and 13's along with SS-9's, it is less than the peak ICBM deployment pace.

UPGRADING OF SOVIET FORCES

Senator JACKSON. Is it correct that an aggressive Soviet program of qualitative upgrading in which they were to replace SS-9 missiles with a follow-on, and SS-11's with a follow-on, could absorb virtually the entire Soviet ICBM production capability as we have seen that capability demonstrated in the past?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I should certainly imagine it would.

Senator JACKSON. Do you agree with the statement that the interim agreement halts the momentum of the Soviet ICBM program over the next 5 years?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I do not and if one takes the February defense report's expression of what constitutes greater concern, I think it would support that statement.

Senator JACKSON. Based on the statement of the Department of Defense itself?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That's right.

Senator JACKSON. In October, 1970, I asked Ambassador Smith what options would be open to the United States if the Soviets, without adding to their land-based missile force, improved it qualitatively so that it threatened the survival of Minuteman. Ambassador Smith replied as follows, and I quote:

"You can harden to a certain extent; you can under the present proposal put in as many as 250 large missiles of any sort you like under any conditions of hardening you like. You can also become less vulnerable by switching to some form of seaborne missile system."

In view of the fact that the right to deploy credible hard point defense was given up sometime ago and we later gave up the right to deploy 250 large, hardened missiles or to deploy a seaborne missile system, or by unilateral declaration, to deploy land mobile ICBM's, how are we to defend the Minuteman force from an upgraded Soviet offensive force?

VULNERABILITY OF MINUTEMAN

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. If these things are given away, it seems to me the answer is clearly that we cannot. Certainly we cannot defend the force, and we have apparently by unilateral declaration given up mobility for the duration of the agreement. I am aware that there are options that have been suggested, such as converting the Minuteman force to surface ships, aircraft, things of that nature, which presumably would be allowed by the agreements, although to my knowledge these have never seriously been considered major options for improving Minuteman survivability.

The question of Minuteman vulnerability, as you well know, can get involved in an inordinate numbers game depending upon the assumptions about the threat and so forth.

What should perhaps bother us more than anything else, I think, here is that having given up the options to defend Minuteman force, and having given up other attractive options for survivability, including the option of mobility by our own unilateral statement—

Senator JACKSON. By going to sea, for example?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Even giving up going to sea in terms of substituting more submarines and SLBM's for some of Minuteman.

Senator JACKSON. We have given that up.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir.

DISABLING ALTERNATIVES

What we should be very concerned about, therefore, is that we may find ourselves faced 5 years from now with an increased upgraded Soviet offensive

force and very little alternative to launch-on-warning, which is not a desirable policy. Yet that seems to be the trend—giving up the survivability options.

Senator JACKSON. That would hardly be stabilizing, would it?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I would think people should be very concerned about that eventuality.

Senator JACKSON. The world as a whole ought to be deeply concerned that having given up means by which we can defend Minuteman—the ABM or the flexibility of moving some of that force to sea—our remaining option is a destabilizing one. Certainly, it should not be reassuring to people who say they are deeply concerned about the danger of accidental nuclear war. Launch-on-warning is one of the most destabilizing things one could imagine, isn't it?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It is certainly inconsistent with the President's repeated requests for flexibility of forces and for strategic options.

Senator JACKSON. I take it, then, that you are deeply concerned at the prospect, in the 1975-77 period, of a vulnerable Minuteman?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, I am.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have any proposals that you would like to outline in connection with SALT II that might be useful in reducing the vulnerability of the Minuteman force?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I have no well thought out SALT II proposals on this. One of the major reasons, is that it is now going to be very difficult to come up with any realistic proposal to reduce the threat to the survivability of forces by a follow-up SALT agreement. A MIRV ban is unrealistic, and coupled with what it would do to the effectiveness and adequacy of surviving forces would not do it anyway. We are either going to have to build up or convince them to come down. I don't know how we are going to convince them to come down, to reduce the threat to our forces that they have built, particularly since all of their activities are looking as if they are pointed in the direction of a counterforce capability. It seems to me that we are left with a large measure of wishful thinking if we expect SALT II to solve such problems.

It would seem to me we have to put our attention now on whatever we can do to insure the necessary survivability and flexibility ourselves, including rethinking our attitudes about defense and about assured destruction.

Senator JACKSON. When you talk about counterforce, you are talking about a first-strike capability?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir; in the connection of a Soviet threat to the survivability of our forces.

Senator JACKSON. I think it is important for the public record, Dr. Van Cleave, that you expand on precisely that point.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. What I am concerned about here is not counterforce capabilities per se. I would like to see counterforce capabilities emphasized more for the United States. They are essential to any flexibility.

What I am concerned about is the Soviets having a significant—even though perhaps partially disarming—first-strike counterforce capability.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY

Many people now begin to appreciate the political implications of apparent first-strike disarming capability on the part of the Soviet Union. Not enough people, I think, yet recognize the possibility of the military implications of having this type of situation and yet I think it is clearly what we are going to be faced with.

If we look back at the way our strategy of assured destruction was developed, it was essentially based on a very simple model, which was that the Soviet Union would launch a strike at the United States and the only thing we had to be concerned about was that we had a sufficient force surviving to retaliate and inflict unacceptable urban and population damage in the Soviet Union. The very simple model presumed that essentially all Soviet forces would be launched in point of time before all of our response, that we would be free to retaliate and that the threat of this retaliation would rest not only on capability but also on its credibility.

If we now get into a situation where a Soviet first disarming strike could be conducted with a fraction of Soviet strategic forces, with a large Soviet assured destruction force held in reserve, then our assured destruction retaliatory capability doesn't seem to me to be very credible.

What we have then is not a situation of retaliation with a free ride. With only a reduced assured destruction force remaining, the United States is left in a position of being the initiator of a counter-city war at a time when that is the last thing I should think we would want to do.

Senator JACKSON. Could you sketch out a scenario that would cover what you have been discussing? I think it is a very important point.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Even if U.S. calculations show that surviving U.S. forces would retain some magic assured destruction capability, 20 to 25 percent of Soviet population, or whatever, the question now is more one of whether it is credible that the United States would so respond with the reduced force and only call down on itself retaliatory destruction.

The President himself has said that he has to have other options than that. The situation here is that the land-based retaliatory forces, if they are not survivable, may well be vulnerable to a Soviet counter-force-only strike with a small fraction of the Soviet strategic forces, perhaps as low as one-fourth, maybe even one-fifth depending upon what they do in MIRV's and accuracy and so forth. The question is, would we use our surviving force to destroy Soviet industrial urban complexes when we would be faced at the time with a Soviet residual assured destruction force far greater than our own. It is the threat of that type of situation that may make us feel very, very insecure during the mid-1970's period and the later years of the 1970's and the spectre of that type of scenario cannot help but have the most profound political implications for our Government, our foreign relations, and Soviet behavior.

Senator JACKSON. As far as our diplomacy is concerned?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. As far as anything we do in any confrontation or contest with the Soviet Union and as far as what any of our allies or any of the other nations in the world do when they are choosing how to conduct their own foreign and defense policy.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, let us suppose that, between now and 1977, the Soviets develop the capability to knock out Minuteman and our land-based bomber force, leaving us with whatever Polaris boats happened to be on station. I take it that it is your judgment that this remaining force is hardly a credible deterrent for an American President in dealing with the Soviet Union, especially since the Soviets would have their SS-11's and Y-boats in reserve, a force which could knock out all of our cities and certainly all human life in North America.

In your judgment, that is hardly a credible deterrent, is that right?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I should think that would be a wholly unsatisfactory situation and yet that is one I see us heading toward.

Senator JACKSON. That is what you foresee unless some very strong measures are taken?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That's right.

Senator JACKSON. This could well be the kind of situation we could find ourselves in by the end of 5 years or even before, is that what you're saying?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That's right, particularly with the Soviet Union having a 62-boat force of Y-class submarines with an overwhelming retaliatory capability.

You recall the 1969 Safeguard debates really presented the threat only in terms of the SS-9. The SS-11 was never at that time expected to figure into the problem of Soviet counterforce capabilities and yet according to testimony by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, now we have the spectre of an accurate SS-11 force which may even have multiple reentry vehicles, and that means it is not any longer solely a counter urban-industrial force if it ever was.

Senator JACKSON. So that in the time frame that we are talking about here, we have to recognize the fact that unless strong measures are taken, the Soviets could be in a position to knock out Minuteman and our land-based bombers?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That's right.

SOVIET RISK-TAKING

Senator JACKSON. In your judgment, when the Soviets know they have this capability, and they know we don't have the means to provide for the survivability of our own land-based strategic forces, what impact will this knowledge have on Soviet diplomatic, military, and political behavior in the world?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I would expect to be faced with a Soviet Union that is much more adventuresome and willing to take risks than anything that we have had in the past.

Senator JACKSON. The level of Soviet risk-taking will go up?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The level of risk-taking will go up considerably.

Senator JACKSON. When the Soviets faced a confrontation with the United States in Cuba in October of 1962, as I recall, we had about a 7 to 1 strategic advantage over the Soviets. Isn't that correct?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Thereabout, I would say, in intercontinental force.

Senator JACKSON. Nevertheless, one would say that Cuba involved a high level of risk-taking on Moscow's part, since they were trying to sneak missiles into Cuba in order to tilt the strategic balance. Isn't that correct?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Yes, sir.

Senator JACKSON. What you are saying, then, is that even when the Soviets were in a nuclear inferior position, they nevertheless took risks which were considered dangerous both to the cause of peace and to our vital national security interests.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. That's right.

Senator JACKSON. Would you say that their risk-taking and their intransigence, and their toughness in negotiations during confrontations are all going to increase?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I would say that. I would say that we had a difficult enough time checking the Soviet Union and extending strategic deterrence to allies when we had a 5 to 1 superiority. I can't imagine what it is going to be like with the situation that these agreements seem to freeze.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Van Cleave, it is said over and over again we have enough nuclear warheads to kill everyone in the world five times over. This is the standard response that is made when one talks about the need to improve our strategic forces qualitatively and quantitatively.

Some of these people say there are over 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe alone, and that is enough, by itself, to deter the Soviets. I would appreciate having your comments on this so-called "overkill doctrine."

"OVERKILL" FALLACY

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The "overkill doctrine" was developed several years ago on a very simple proposition that numbers of nuclear warheads could be compared with the amount of population in urban centers and if there were more than enough warheads to kill a number of undefended Soviet cities we had overkill. No strategic considerations were involved and the U.S. apparently struck first. The crux of the matter, however, is that the United States has a very clear second strike doctrine and the number of surviving warheads is the important consideration; it is not the number of warheads we have now. Indeed, the number of warheads we have now is almost irrelevant to this type of consideration; it is the number of warheads we expect to survive. We deploy forces to deter, to promote stability, and hopefully to be effective if deterrence fails. We don't know how many warheads it takes to deter—nobody knows that—but what we do know is that 7,000 tactical nuclear warheads in Europe, if that is what there is, would be considerably reduced by any expected serious Soviet first strike in Europe, and the same thing with the strategic forces. In both cases our concern is with the surviving forces and the credibility of their employment. Moreover, while we might put 16 missiles on one Poseidon boat with 10 warheads each and count that as 160 warheads, it might look to the other side as one aim point.

Senator JACKSON. But an adversary who strikes first has a tremendous advantage; isn't that true?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I am concerned about the capability to reduce my force levels and force effectiveness and I can't determine that capability by comparing numbers of warheads. I can look at his capability, including the combination of warheads, accuracy and payload, and I can look at the vulnerability of my systems. That is the strategically relevant thing.

Senator JACKSON. We have to ask not only how many warheads we will have left after a first strike but also how many effective delivery vehicles we will have left after a first strike.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. And not only that, what can I expect to do with them. If I base deterrence solely on the threat of counter city retaliation, the simple fact that this might be a convenient tool for an analyst to evaluate strategic forces doesn't mean the President of the United States is going to want to conduct mili-

tary operations according to that standard. So I have to know what I have left, what the effectiveness of the delivery vehicles might be, what the probability of penetration is and what range of targets I can attack.

SOVIET ABM SYSTEM

Senator JACKSON. Do you believe that, in the absence of a SALT agreement, the Soviets would have deployed a nationwide ABM system?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. In the absence of a SALT agreement?

Senator JACKSON. Yes; in this time period.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. In this time period?

Senator JACKSON. Five years.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. No; I certainly don't think so in that time period, not an active deployed nationwide system—I don't see how they could. Although I do believe that the Soviets are more interested in defense than we are and I doubt that SALT has changed that.

Senator JACKSON. It would be pretty difficult to deploy a nationwide ABM system in the Soviet Union in the next 5 years.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. On the other hand, the Department of Defense is on record many, many times testifying that the Soviet ABM radar base that currently exists lends itself to at least a thick regional defense in the Moscow area and that certainly is not limited by the agreement.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Senator JACKSON. Do you have any reason to believe the Soviets accept a simple doctrine of assured destruction?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. None whatsoever. I know of nothing in their literature, nothing in their doctrine, nothing in their force activities, nothing in the record of the past 2 years that would support that.

Senator JACKSON. The overall strategic capability that they have developed to date, would indicate just the reverse—

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. They are not playing the game by our rules; that is pretty clear.

Senator JACKSON. Did any of your discussions in SALT reflect in any way on this particular aspect of strategic doctrine, that is, the Soviet attitude with regard to assured destruction?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I cannot comment in open hearings on any discussions that actually went on during the strategic arms limitation talks. I could only say generally that I haven't changed my view on the basis of my participation in them.

Senator JACKSON. Should the President be left with the single option of striking Soviet cities with submarine-launched missiles in the event that the U.S. land-based deterrent is destroyed in a Soviet first strike?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think that would be an intolerable situation. The President himself has said that. Further, I wouldn't expect the President to exercise that option if that were his only option available.

Senator JACKSON. What other options should he have available to him if we are going to have a sound strategic policy?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It seems to me we have to have the options of conducting limited strategic operations, particularly counterforce, and of limiting damage to ourselves in a significant way, and I think we ought to look very seriously again at our position on defense, including civil defense. I think we ought to look very seriously at the capabilities we have for rapid force reprogramming and retargeting and for the ability to conduct timely counterforce operations; and, furthermore, I don't think that doing that, contrary to existing majority opinion, would create a more destabilizing situation in our strategic relationships with the Soviet Union. It is quite clear to me that is the way they are going. I don't see that anything they have done in the last 5 years suggests otherwise.

Senator JACKSON. Then you don't accept the view that Soviet behavior reflects only what we do?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think that is an erroneous mechanistic proposition.

Senator JACKSON. The action-reaction model?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I think one could very clearly make use of that action-reaction the other way around and have much of the record support that the Soviets

take the opportunities that we present to them, not for the purpose of stability in our terms but for their own purposes. We don't know what the Soviets' intentions were when they started their strategic force buildup; it may even have been as we expected in the 1960's, simply to achieve a situation of rough equality with us in numerical indexes, probably because they didn't expect that we would give them the opportunity to reach strategic superiority; but when it became clear that our declaratory statement of the 1960's represent our policy, and the opportunity arose that strategic superiority could be gained, the Soviet leaders seized the opportunity.

The same thing goes for a counterforce, first strike. If we indicate clearly we are not going to defend our retaliatory forces, we are not going to take the necessary survivability measures, I think we merely encourage development of a counterforce capability rather than the prevailing concept that our abstinence discourages it. It doesn't make any sense to me.

U.S. STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Senator JACKSON. Are you satisfied that these agreements leave us in 1977 with adequate forces to enable the President to carry out other options?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Not the agreements by themselves. On the other hand, the agreements by themselves do not necessarily preclude all modernization necessary to carry out many options.

Senator JACKSON. Let me put it this way: Do you feel that under the treaty and under the interim agreement we have left to us the means by which we can provide for a credible strategic deterrent?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Well—

Senator JACKSON. I am not saying we will necessarily do it. But given what is permitted in the agreements could we do it if the right decisions are made?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. We have to approach the answer to that by asking deter what? If we mean deterring, for example, attack on allies such as NATO by the threat of U.S. strategic action, I don't think that deterrent exists any longer and I think the agreement tends to guarantee that it won't exist and tell the world it won't exist. This is the nuclear umbrella type of deterrent. If we mean deterring the type of counterforce only attack or types of situations that would arise in a crisis, this depends upon our ability to guarantee that we have no vulnerable tempting forces. The agreements themselves do not do that. They do not promise the situation will not deteriorate. In terms of deterring all-out attacks on the United States, I think there are things we can do even with the agreements and should do that would indeed increase the chances of a credible deterrent against that type of an attack in 1977. It is just a matter of whether or not we are going to do these things or whether we are going to be very complacent about the fact that we have reached strategic arms limitation agreements, whether we are going to continue putting an awful lot of importance on reaching future strategic limitation agreements as the way to solve our strategic problems.

The case can be made, disregarding Safeguard ABM, that the position we are in now is that we are not going to be ready to deploy new programs in the next few years and what we need to do now is to conduct a very vigorous program in research and development especially in those various areas where we have options for survivability of forces and those areas where we could increase force effectiveness and flexibility. I think if we push on those programs during the next 2 or 3 years it is the minimum conditions we have to do in the presence of these agreements.

Senator JACKSON. In other words, to really achieve a survivable force that will be credible in the eyes of the Soviet Union?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It is the minimum that we can do and, also, it is the only thing that I can see that will at all hold out any hopes for a beneficial follow-on agreement.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Van Cleave, you are spending the summer in Europe teaching. What have you observed of European reaction to SALT?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Many of the people I have talked to in Europe, and this includes some defense and foreign policy specialists, are quite concerned about the implications of these SALT agreements and what it means for the United States to accept this drastically changed balance. They are very concerned themselves about the implications for Europe, for extended deterrence, very concerned about what indications these may give of the major trends that I noted in my opening remarks.

Senator JACKSON. Especially by the people who have the responsibilities in connection with defense planning?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. By people who work on defense problems. I found that much attention is given not only to the changed strategic balance but also to anything that will give them perception of the way we are regarding the strategic balance and the decade of the seventies. Many of them tend to look at the agreements this way.

There is wide knowledge of statements by U.S. officials about the changed strategic balance implication. They are quite well aware that Dr. Kissinger has said, for example, that it is a more difficult decision for the President of the United States to risk general nuclear war when the strategic equation is this than it was throughout most of the postwar period. Therefore, the possibility of defending other countries with strategic American power is fundamentally changed and no amount of reassurances on our part can change these facts.

OUTCOME AT SALT II

Senator JACKSON. Would the present agreements be acceptable as a permanent agreement?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Definitely not. The present agreements, as I said before, may be acceptable as a calculated risk only upon the premise they are indeed interim agreements. In my view, the two agreements themselves don't even go together.

Senator JACKSON. Do you have any reason to believe the Soviets will be more generous in SALT II than SALT I? If not, what moves on our part would be most effective in getting from SALT II, the kind of permanent arrangement which will provide both sides with survivable strategic forces that can protect their vital national interests?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Personally I am afraid there is not a lot of evidence that one can adduce to reach the conclusion that the Soviet Union will be more malleable in terms of helping us solve our strategic problems in SALT II than the Soviet Union was in SALT I. If there are any prospects of success at all, I think it will come only from a clear demonstration that we are now going to turn our attention to solving our own strategic force problems, that we are going to push the modernization programs that are consistent with the agreements, push the research and development we are allowed to do, particularly toward survivability and flexibility options. If we don't push these things strongly—indeed it seems to me, the agreements require a new reinvigoration of R. & D. and force modernization—and make clear the intent of the United States to abrogate both agreements, when required, we will not reach a more beneficial agreement.

Senator JACKSON. You said a moment ago that the two SALT agreements don't even go together. I wonder if you could elaborate a bit on that point?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. What I mean by that is simply that with the restrictions on defense, on ABM, in the ABM treaty, the offensive levels allowed by the agreements are intolerable. With the offensive levels allowed by the agreements, we need a much freer rein on defense. That was always the position of the U.S. Government, to my knowledge, in the past. The levels of defense and the levels of offense had to be linked and the current levels of offense seem to me to be totally intolerable with the restrictions we have put on our defense, particularly when we have given up, as well, other important options for survivability.

CREDIBILITY OF U.S. ABM

Senator JACKSON. On that point, what do you think of the limitation of 100 interceptors at each of the two ABM sites?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Well—

Senator JACKSON. Is that credible?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. I obviously don't think very much of it at all. On the other hand, I would say if we go ahead and build the structure of radar and other supporting elements, the interceptors themselves can be deployed very, very rapidly. The important thing is the radar support and if we will do it we are allowed quite a bit of development in that area.

Senator JACKSON. But we have always maintained that in connection with our hard point defense, that we need far more than 100 interceptors to have a credible ABM defense at a given site. Isn't that correct?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Well, 100 interceptors per se is just not strategically significant in site defense or defense of retaliatory forces. About the worst thing one can do is to limit the defense to a particular level, then allow an offensive threat that is greater than that.

We have told the Soviet Union or anybody else what margin of forces they need to overcome it.

Senator JACKSON. The public gets the idea that we have two sites now that can help protect our retaliatory capability—the one in North Dakota to defend ICBM's and the Washington, D.C., site to protect the vital decisionmaking process.

In your judgment are these ABM defense arrangements credible or effective?

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The ABM defense arrangements for the defense of our retaliatory forces are not very effective in a strategic sense. They are important to keep the program alive and to give us operational experience. I think continuation of that program is absolutely necessary if we are going to keep options open in 1975 to 1977 and I believe very strongly we have to keep ABM defense options open for that period.

Senator JACKSON. I was only addressing myself to effectiveness.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. The effectiveness of 100 interceptors—

Senator JACKSON. Under the limitations imposed.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. It isn't very much as far as ICBM defense goes. It could be significant for the defense of the NCA, particularly if we develop the type of radar capability that we possibly could for the area and deploy new, longer-range and improved interceptor missiles. If we did it right we could get an enormous amount of area coverage in the NCA defense that could be quite significant.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Van Cleave, we are in your debt for making this long trip to be here and to offer, I think, some extremely helpful comments. You have the unique advantage of coming from the academic world with a background of real experience in the decision-making process in the strategic arms field. This cannot help but aid us in the review and analysis of the testimony that has been offered here in connection with the ABM treaty and the interim agreement. So I want to commend you for your help to the committee by your presence here today, for your very fine statement and for your enlightening responses.

Dr. VAN CLEAVE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. Thank you.

The committee will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)

