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NATION OF MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER MEIGS HAIG, JR.,
USA, TO THE RANK OF GENERAL, U.S. ARMY

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER MEIGS HAIG, JR., USA, TO THE
RANK OF GENERAL, U.S. ARMY

OCTOBER 6, 1972

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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**NOMINATION OF MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER MEIGS
HAIG, JR., USA, TO THE RANK OF GENERAL, U.S.
ARMY**

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in room S-126, the Capitol, Hon. John C. Stennis, chairman.

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Hughes, Smith, Dominick, Schweiker, and Saxbe.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; Labre Garcia and John A. Goldsmith, professional staff members; and Nancy Bearg, research associate.

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee will please come to order.

General Haig, as with all the other witnesses, unless you have conscientious scruples or objections, I am going to ask you to stand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that your testimony in all these proceedings will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General HAIG. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; have a seat.

Members of the committee, as we all will recall, General Haig has been nominated for the rank of general and that nomination has been here with us the required length of time and you are here on that mission. Of course, we are also having this hearing about General Lavelle and any questions, I think, on that would be relevant by anyone who is coming in. But you were called here primarily because of your nomination to this very important rank.

I don't have any specific questions and you don't have a prepared statement, is that correct?

**TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. ALEXANDER MEIGS HAIG, JR., USA,
NOMINEE TO THE RANK OF GENERAL, U.S. ARMY**

General HAIG. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We have looked into your record, background, and qualifications, and I just want to ask you a question or two.

Frankly, General, and I am not complaining, I just think we have got to crank more and more discipline into American life, the Army included. I just don't think there is any substitute for discipline and I hope you would have purposes along that line. I don't mean just punishing people but letting them know in the beginning, you know, that certain standards have got to be met.

Do you want to enlarge on that or respond to that in brief, just how you feel about those things?

General HAIG. Mr. Chairman, I think there is one fundamental responsibility of anyone in a command position in the Army, in the Armed Services, and that is the responsibility of a commander to develop a unit that is ready to fight for the country; a unit that is combat ready.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General HAIG. Within those parameters, I do agree that discipline is an essential ingredient. In that context, I don't think you have a unit that is ready to fight unless you have a unit that has high standards of discipline, high standards of training and responsiveness; I think that is the task that we have today more acutely than we have ever had in the past. Of course, there have been complicating factors: The Army has been getting smaller in the post-Vietnam period and there have been difficulties within our society which have affected the Armed Services.

I think it is our task to get back the prestige of the service. The prestige will return as the Army performs properly and in a disciplined and efficient way.

In my case, I intend to do all I can to help General Abrams accomplish that mission. After all, that will be my responsibility if the committee sees fit to approve my nomination.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand and are totally dedicated to the concept of civilian authority over the military? You recognize that, understand it and agree to it?

General HAIG. I am in full agreement with that concept.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't mean by that that we favor someone standing at your elbow, some civilian, telling you what to do; but what we do mean is the ultimate authority and directives come from the civilian branch of our Government, headed, of course, by the President of the United States. You fully subscribe to that?

General HAIG. I fully subscribe to it, Mr. Chairman, and I think I have had an opportunity over the past 4 years to understand the essential validity of that concept.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

If General Abrams is confirmed as Chief of Staff, you say firmly that there is no reason there why the two of you could not work constructively in perfect harmony?

General HAIG. I am not aware of any, sir. I talked to General Abrams and I think we understand one another very well. I hold him in the highest respect today and always have in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no more questions.

Senator Smith, would you like to interrogate General Haig?

Senator SMITH. No, Mr. Chairman, I am glad to welcome General Haig here. I presume the record will carry his profile, that we will have the background information?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SMITH. May I ask the staff if the corrected profile has come in. I think there was an error.

Mr. BRASWELL. It has, Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. So that will be substituted for the record sent over, and I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. This biographical sketch and everything is available for the record now?

Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, it is here.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, I will put the general's biographical sketch in prior to his testimony.

(Biographical sketch of General Haig follows:)

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NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
September 8, 1972.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following-named officer under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 3066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 3066, in grade as follows:

To be general

Major General Alexander Meigs Haig, Junior, [REDACTED] Army of the United States (colonel, United States Army).

, 1972.
with the

Reported by Mr. _____ recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

RÉSUMÉ OF SERVICE CAREER OF ALEXANDER MEIGS HAIG, JR., MAJOR GENERAL, [REDACTED] AS OF OCTOBER 4, 1972

Date and place of birth.—2 December 1924, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Years of active service.—Over 25.

Present assignment.—Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, The White House, Washington, D.C., since June 1970.

Military schools attended.—United States Military Academy; The Ground General School, Basic Course; The Armored School, Basic and Advanced Courses; Naval War College, Command and Staff; and United States Army War College.

Educational degrees.—United States Military Academy, BS Degree; Military Science, Georgetown University, MA Degree; International Relations.

Major permanent duty assignments (last 10 years)	From—	To—
Staff officer, International and Policy Planning Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.	February 1962.....	July 1963.
Military assistant, Office of the Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C.	July 1963.....	February 1964.
Military assistant, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C.	February 1964.....	June 1965.
Student, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.	July 1965.....	June 1966.
G-3, 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Army, Pacific-Vietnam	July 1966.....	November 1966.
Commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Army, Pacific-Vietnam.	November 1966.....	March 1967.
Commanding officer, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, U.S. Army, Pacific-Vietnam.	April 1967.....	May 1967.
Commanding officer, 3d Regiment, U.S. Corps of Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.	July 1967.....	June 1968.
Deputy Commandant, U.S. Corps of Cadets, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.	June 1968.....	January 1969.
Senior Military Adviser to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the White House, Washington, D.C.	January 1969.....	June 1970.

Promotions	Temporary	Permanent
2d lieutenant.....		June 3, 1947
1st lieutenant.....	Dec. 3, 1948	June 5, 1950
Captain.....	Oct. 11, 1950	Dec. 3, 1953
Major.....	May 9, 1957	June 3, 1961
Lieutenant colonel.....	Feb. 2, 1962	June 3, 1968
Colonel.....	July 10, 1967	June 3, 1972
Brigadier general.....	Nov. 1, 1969	
Major general.....	Mar. 1, 1972	

Medals and awards.—Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), Distinguished Flying Cross (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters), Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device (with Oak Leaf Cluster), Air Medal (with 23 Oak Leaf Clusters), Army Commendation Medal, Purple Heart, and Combat Infantryman Badge.

Source of commission.—USMA.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hughes.

Senator HUGHES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General HAIG, how old are you?

General HAIG. Forty-seven; I will be 48 in December, sir.

Senator HUGHES. You have been in the service 25 years?

General HAIG. That is without the Academy time, 25 years or 28 years including my service at the Military Academy.

Senator HUGHES. General Haig, you mentioned some of the problems of society that relate to the military mission of the Army which will be your jurisdiction. Some of the questions I am going to ask you I have already asked General Abrams for the record but I wanted to simply get your opinions on them.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. There has been a lot of racial tension in the Army. It has cropped up in numerous regions of the world—in Europe, in our own country, in Vietnam and the Orient and, I suppose, everywhere we have concentrations of men.

What do you think we can do to get a proper racial balance among the officers and noncommissioned officers to handle the problems of equality in the service for men and women of all races?

General HAIG. Senator, I do think that the services carry the same problems that the society carries and in many respects are a mirror reflection of these general problems. We have some worrisome trends; sometimes there is a lag in effective response. I think in the area of race relations the Armed Services preceded most of the society in searching for ways to eliminate inequalities during the post-World War II period. There is no question, however, that this remains a live and active problem which demands the greatest amount of command attention and management. It is like the other serious social problems that the services have but I think it is amenable to serious command attention and management.

That would be an area that I feel would require a great deal of General Abrams' time. I have not been with the Army for almost 4 years. As a result, I have not had an opportunity to grapple with these problems in the kind of intense way that I should; I intend to.

Senator HUGHES. You are dedicated to that?

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. Are there enough black cadets in West Point? I see you were up there awhile.

General HAIG. Yes. I was stationed there some time ago.

Senator HUGHES. And proper in proportion to what we need?

General HAIG. I can't say whether there are enough; I can say there has been a large increase in acceptance of the applications of black cadets. We have a combination of problems. One is to be sure that the standards of quality are met; but I don't think there should be any other specific inhibitions to the entry of any race into the Academy.

(Additional information furnished:)

At the United States Military Academy, the current minority enrollment is 227, of which 101 entered the class of 1976. Of the 227, 141 are blacks, and 86 are others. The breakout of black cadets by class is as follows:

Class of 1973.....	27
Class of 1974.....	26
Class of 1975.....	43
Class of 1976.....	45
Total.....	141

Senator HUGHES. As long as the standards of equality are met in competition; basically, of course, there are a lot of political appointments but I think most of those political appointments are based on merit.

General HAIG. Based on criteria.

Senator HUGHES. Based on criteria. Do you think there is enough of a shortage that perhaps some of us ought to make an effort to find black rather than white cadets?

General HAIG. No; but I think it has to be a conscious effort to recognize that we do want the black leadership in the Armed Services and I should think it would be helpful to keep our eye out for qualified young men who would be interested in the military service. I think highly qualified blacks today are invited to participate in a full range of opportunities.

Senator HUGHES. They have a wide open field?

General HAIG. That's right, sir. But the competition is tough even for the highly qualified regardless of race.

Senator HUGHES. Yes. Do we have any black general officers in the Army?

General HAIG. Yes, sir; we have quite a few. There were four on active duty at the beginning of fiscal year 1972 and five additional black general officers on the current list. All have since been promoted so there are now nine on active duty.

Senator HUGHES. They are moving without any difficulty, then?

General HAIG. I think they are, sir.

Senator HUGHES. I see you served in Vietnam at the peak of the buildup over there; is that right?

General HAIG. That's right, sir.

Senator HUGHES. And you were in the field with a battalion?

General HAIG. With the 1st Infantry Division. I was 1st Infantry Division operations officer, then the commander of the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment and, finally, I was a brigade commander.

Senator HUGHES. Were you in World War II?

General HAIG. No; I was not, sir. I was in school at that time.

Senator HUGHES. The questions I am going to ask are not personal but they may sound that way.

General HAIG. I understand.

Senator HUGHES. Do you drink?

General HAIG. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator HUGHES. In moderation?

General HAIG. In extreme moderation. [Laughter.]

Senator HUGHES. I am a recovered alcoholic, and I found we do have our problems, not just enlisted men in the military, so my next question is related to the problem of alcohol and drugs in the military.

Are you familiar with the programs in the military in the field of drugs and alcohol?

General HAIG. In general, sir; but not to the degree that I will be when I return to the Army. In the past 4 years I have been aware of the problem, of course.

Senator HUGHES. You are aware it has been a major problem?

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. And it has been expanding as far as I can determine and my staff who have been studying it. A staff man recently spent 3 weeks going through the European command structure in the military. I haven't got a report filed with the committee yet, but I will have before next week is over; and it is very critical of what he found there, not at the top echelon of officers—our problem does not seem to be with men of your rank; it seems to be down at the company and battalion level. I do hope in receiving this appointment both you and General Abrams—I know from his experience in Vietnam and our people talking to him there, his extreme concern for these things and I am sure he will delegate a lot of that to you. That is the reason I am asking—

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES (continuing). These questions. You know that we have required treatment of the alcoholic and the drug dependent or narcotics addict within the military structure?

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. And that the Army is setting up programs in a number of regions over the world as well as in the continental U.S.?

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. Do you endorse those programs as much as you know about them—I mean the direction, not the exact program?

General HAIG. Yes, I do. I think it is again a problem that requires constant management attention. It has to be both efficient in a management sense and compassionate in a human sense.

Senator HUGHES. During the period you were in Vietnam, had the heavy incidence of fragging started yet?

General HAIG. No, sir; it had not. At the time I was there—

Senator HUGHES. You left in 1967, is that correct?

General HAIG. I left in 1967. The reports of fragging, I think, started to develop about early 1968. I wasn't aware of any in our unit. It doesn't mean that there might not have been some that were undetected but this situation was fairly divisionwide at that time—I was not aware of any disciplinary problems. As a matter of fact, I was quite impressed with discipline of the unit. I thought it was better than it had been in the unit I was with in Korea.

Senator HUGHES. You think the general breakdown, then, started after you left Vietnam? I am not talking about a total discipline breakdown but certainly there were some men who refused to go into combat, and there were entire units that refused to come into the field. Again, I talked to General Abrams about this.

General HAIG. Yes, sir. I have a hard time commenting on this responsibly because I was not there, at that time. I can say that during the period I was there my battalion, I thought, had the highest standards of discipline and morale that I could have hoped to achieve. That was also true of the brigade when I had multiple battalions under my command. As a matter of fact, I was very proud of the young American soldiers in Vietnam and their standards of discipline and their sense of mission.

Senator HUGHES. Did you have any problem with drugs that you were aware of as commander?

General HAIG. No, sir; I can only recall in a 6-month period in command of a battalion of one incident where a soldier was found either drunk on duty or under drugs. We thought it was an alcohol problem because he had some in his canteen. That was the only case of serious dereliction of duty in that line that I can recall.

Senator HUGHES. I had some in my canteen a time or two in World War II.

General HAIG. We have all been tempted. [Laughter.]

Senator HUGHES. It was not that. When you went that far there was no doubt you had a problem.

General, your time in Vietnam did not relate to the problems that I am concerned about. I am interested in trying to find out what happened, you know, at that particular point. It appears from our research that about July 1968 is when the big push in drugs started in Vietnam, which was about a year after you left, I guess?

General HAIG. That's right, sir.

Senator HUGHES. There may have been—undoubtedly there was—a lot of usage scattered around—experimental, this sort of thing. When you were there you were involved in the period of heaviest search and destroy missions, were you not?

General HAIG. Yes, sir, in war zone C. I spent most of my time in the field in war zone C.

Senator HUGHES. The next questions I have, General, relate to the National Security Council and the relationship of the diplomatic with the military. I don't know what you are privy to and what you are not, so I may ask questions that are completely beyond your scope of knowledge and all you have to do is say so.

I am concerned particularly in this period of General Lavelle's command when things went sour over there.

And that would cover the period primarily from the first two raids, November 7 and 8, on Dong Hoi and Quang Lang, up through March 9.

My concern relates to the coordination between the diplomatic and the military. Were you in a position in the structure in the White House to know if any orders were given to the JCS during a delicate period of negotiation?

General HAIG. Senator, first, I think it would be well for me to describe my role.

Senator HUGHES. All right.

General HAIG. I am Henry Kissinger's deputy——

Senator HUGHES. Right.

General HAIG (continuing). And as such I have general cognizance of the flow of business that is in the national security area and which involves the integration of military and political matters prior to presentation to the President.

On the specific terms of the Lavelle matter in general, I first would want to make it clear that I am not very familiar with the situation except in the broadest sense that any aware person would be who is in my business. In the NSC, we are not involved in the transmittal of operational orders in a chain of command sense. By that I mean that the line of command goes from the Commander-in-Chief, the President, to the Secretary of Defense.

In that context we do formulate policy recommendations for the President which include authorities for air operations in Southeast Asia.

Beyond that, you then get into the responsibility for articulating Rules of Engagement or specific authorities which, of course, belongs to the Secretary of Defense as the implementor of the President's decision.

We never interpose and I have never interposed myself in that so-called chain of command nor would I ever presume to.

I am confident that during the period that you asked about there were broad policy lines transmitted back and forth between the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Senator HUGHES. That is continuous and on-going?

General HAIG. It is continuous and on-going, some of which I am privy to, much of which I am not; so I don't think I can answer that question in a coherent and meaningful way.

Senator HUGHES. Let me point out specifically so perhaps you can say yes or no to it.

General HAIG. Yes, sir, fine.

Senator HUGHES. The reason I bring the question up is that in the President's speech on, I believe it was, January 25, he specifically mentioned the negotiations, the delicate negotiations that had been going on in a period from October to November. On the 17th of November, if I recall his statement accurately, Le Duc Tho became ill and notified us that he could not attend the secret negotiations.

The reason I ask the questions, obviously, is because the two raids took place on November 7 and 8. Now, the point I was going to ask about—are you privy to any instructions that were given to JCS or the Secretary of Defense, if that is the chain of command, in relationship to those negotiations during that period of time, specifically?

General HAIG. Yes, sir. I think you understand that as a member of the President's staff, it would not be appropriate for me to discuss matters involving substantive counsel and discussion with the President.

Senator HUGHES. I am aware of that.

General HAIG. Unfortunately, I am not a free agent in these matters.

Senator HUGHES. I am aware of executive privilege also, General. So you know if it enters that category in your own mind and relationship, you need have no hesitancy of stating it.

General HAIG. I will try to be as helpful as I can to you, but when it comes down to specific substantive matters that may have run from a Presidential adviser to the President or through him, and if there is a question that I think is on the border, then I think it would be best that I consult with counsel before responding, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield to me for just a moment?

Senator HUGHES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand Senator Hughes' position, his statement in question made clear that he didn't want to intrude on anything that is executive privilege and that you, as a witness and in your position, would have to decide that for the time being anyway, and just tell Senator Hughes.

Senator HUGHES. It is perfectly satisfactory to me, Mr. Chairman, if he wants to consult as to whether he can respond to that question or not; and if the answer is "No," then we can enter it into the record at a later time, and if the answer is "Yes," he can supply an answer for the record at a later time if that is acceptable.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. It is on the borderline so I am willing to accept that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator HUGHES. Then the reason I ask the question is that from time to time, according to Admiral Moorer, they had been notified, for example, when the President was in Russia and I think he said on a few other occasions. That is the reason I ask you the question as to whether caution was given to be especially careful in the conduct of activities during the sensitive period in October and November of 1971.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. What I was trying to determine was whether General Lavelle, in doing what he did on his own without knowledge of the diplomatic relationship, had upset that sort of a negotiating balance. That was the reason for my question.

General HAIG. I see.

Senator HUGHES. Admiral Moorer testified that Dr. Kissinger's office was not informed of, you know, whether to start with target A or B and so on. You know the old story in the Johnson administration; I think the President himself said that "we don't even hit an outhouse unless I give the order." And the point I am making, that apparently that sort of a policy changed with President Nixon. I make that as a statement; I am not asking you anything, just making a summation of my own so you don't have to respond to it. Admiral Moorer seemed to bear that out in what he was saying as to target A, B, or C. But he also said that he was not ware of the delicate negotiations last November himself. That was his response; he was not aware of it. He had no special directive from the Secretary. As a matter of information, General Haig, so you understand the context of what I am groping with in the previous testimony, I was wondering if the negotiations were so delicate, whether that communication had not been transmitted to the Secretary and to the JCS and to the field.

Obviously, all of this is in the range of your response, considering what you should or shouldn't say about it, so I just state it for what it is.

The Rules of Engagement, did they originate in the Pentagon or in the White House?

General HAIG. I think the best way to put this in proper context is to make clear how that system works. I don't know that it is any different today than it has been in terms of the system.

Authorities in a policy sense are, of course, transmitted from the Commander-in-Chief. Requests for new authorities come directly through the NSC system either as recommendation from the field and through the unified command or perhaps even from the civilian side of the policy community. Integration is made in the NSC system and recommendations and options are posed to the President.

He will then make a decision which can vary in character from a broad authority to one that is quite finite. Then this is transmitted to the executing authority, to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense then will delineate a whole range of very finite authorities which he holds and which we do not review and approve. That has to do with a number of safety factors, factors that would involve insuring that within the broader policy, there be no civilian casualties and matters along those lines.

So I think we have to be very clear that there is quite a bit of difference between the so-called Rules of Engagement and the authorities for air operations in Southeast Asia—

Senator HUGHES. And policy?

General HAIG (continuing). And the policy. So in that context I just wanted to be sure that it was clear. It is expected that the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will refine and put in the specific kinds of directions to our air people for implementation.

Senator HUGHES. Let me be more specific, General.

The general policy of air reconnaissance over North Vietnam, and arms support of aerial reconnaissance, lies with the President finally, doesn't it?

General HAIG. Commander-in-Chief, yes.

Senator HUGHES. The Commander-in-Chief.

General HAIG. Yes.

Senator HUGHES. The general policy of that?

General HAIG. That is correct.

Senator HUGHES. Who, then, if I follow you, transmits it to the Secretary, and the Secretary and the JCS make the refinements for carrying out the policy?

General HAIG. That is correct, sir.

Senator HUGHES. I see.

When requests for change in the Rules of Engagement come up through the pipeline—for example, limited duration, protective reaction strikes like Proud Deep in December—that is a direct presidential authority to carry that out, is it not?

General HAIG. I would like to answer that if I may in a general sense.

Senator HUGHES. All right.

General HAIG. That type of thing would ordinarily come to the President.

Senator HUGHES. Yes. That is what I am trying to determine. He would not undertake something like that without clearing it with the Commander in Chief, generally, broadly, certainly?

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. I have no questions about that or his right to do it. I am just simply trying to make a determination of the difference between a simple change in Rules of Engagement, and a major change—if there is a simple one and I am not sure there is anymore—which took place quite frequently, as I review the record, in small detail.

Now the details of carrying it out that might have originated within the military itself, rather than in a matter of policy at the top; is that correct, if I understand you rightly?

General HAIG. Yes; it could well have been.

Senator HUGHES. Who makes the decisions on the types of targets? Let me give you an example. As I understand the Rules of Engagement if the enemy system was activated against our aerial reconnaissance team—let's say, the recce ship and the two escorts or they were fired on either by triple A or SAM's, then under the authority they carried they could attack that site. We have those rules of engagement in the files so I am not trying to be technical with you; I am just trying to draw a picture for myself and you both as to what I am aiming at.

Tlen, we also have the evidence that other targets were hit—POL, trucks, truck parks and this sort of thing. If a decision positively was made to strike those targets, which are not within the general Rules of Engagement, that sort of thing would never come to the White House except in a report, would it, that you are aware of?

General HAIG. I am not sure I can answer that question in general. We have to be very careful in discussing the Rules of Engagement. They are broad authorities issued by the President and I am not speaking of any particular ones.

Senator HUGHES. No; the only ones I am particularly interested in are the recce missions right now, because those are the ones that were in question.

General HAIG. I am not sure that I understand what the particular question that you have is. We would be able to—

Senator HUGHES. I am not sure I do, after all that, so I can understand your statement.

I am really trying to find out if pilots go out and strike trucks and truck parks instead of hitting triple A sites and SAM sites?

General HAIG. If they were authorized to hit only a certain thing and they hit something else, if it is not reported as such, and keep in mind at the level that I am operating this kind of daily targeting is not something that I focus on.

Senator HUGHES. That is the point I am getting at.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. That is the point of my question. You wouldn't focus on it, and you wouldn't be aware of it?

General HAIG. Not unless somebody had done something extraordinary to bring it to my attention.

Senator HUGHES. All right. That is my point. Did the NSC monitor closely strikes against North Vietnam?

General HAIG. I think it depends a great deal on the daily reconnaissance flights and the reactions associated with those.

I would say we received little detail on——

Senator HUGHES. Did you know——

General HAIG. If it was an exceptional, limited duration attack, of course, we looked at it much more carefully because we had been involved.

Senator HUGHES. Were you informed that the JCS noticed the attack on the Moc Chau radar, for example, and sent instructions back that that exceeded the Rules of Engagement? Did that come to your attention?

General HAIG. I don't recall that, sir.

Senator HUGHES. You don't recall that ever coming to your attention?

General HAIG. No, sir.

Senator HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, I don't believe I have any more questions in relationship to that and I think I have gone through the other questions in relationship to the structure of the Army itself. I might ask just one final one if I could, what do you think of an all volunteer Army and our possibility of maintaining it? Can you give us any advice that might help us in legislation in the future and give us your own opinions about it?

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

I think there is only one criterion that the issue must be measured by and that is, have we got as effective a fighting force as we are able to muster as a nation. As you know, it is our policy to move toward an all-volunteer force.

I think the President is quite clear in his requirements to set that goal. Whereas the first order of business which is the military efficiency of the fighting force must be met, the size of the Armed Forces must in addition meet our studied requirements for what we need. The requirements are something dependent in many respects on the international climate, the international situation. If we are going to have an all-volunteer force, I am confident that it is going to be one that will be efficient. That poses problems of management and command. We are going to have to work hard and we will need assistance. The Army has asked for your help here for certain legislative assistance. From my perspective, I think it is important that we have this assistance to implement what is Presidential policy and what is national policy.

Senator HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, I have taken a lot of time. I do have two or three other questions that the last question brought to mind but if you want to go ahead, I will come back.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know the situation with the other Senators. Senator Dominick, do you have any questions?

Senator DOMINICK. Just a couple.

I would like to get General Haig's analysis of what the situation is in Vietnam at the present time, what the risks are. I am talking about the war scene in South Vietnam.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

This would be my own personal opinion based upon my own assessments, not as something that is necessarily Presidential business.

Senator DOMINICK. That is correct.

General HAIG. I think the military situation on the ground is quite good. The North Vietnamese offensive has been a very serious failure. On the other hand, it has been a very searing and draining experience for the South Vietnamese as well, so there are difficulties.

I don't think the battle is over. I think there will be another surge of enemy activity there between now and the U.S. presidential election. It won't be as searing as the first wave starting on the 30th of March and it will probably be more limited in some ways, targeted more on psychological objectives. Instead of trying to grind down the ARVN which they now are afraid to take on—they are sufficiently weakened so that they don't want to take on the main forces—they will try to get population centers and communications lines; I would think they will target things that would contribute to holding territory and resources associated with the possibility of a cease-fire. This is what our intelligence, in effect, tells us that they are trying.

So I would say that we will see from a rather high point it will be a little more amorphous than the clearcut conventional type fighting we saw in March and April.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator DOMINICK. I met General Weyand in 1967 when I was in Vietnam during the first time—were you there during any of his tours?

General HAIG. Yes, I was. I was the operations officer for the 1st Infantry Division when he commanded the 25th Infantry Division when they operated on our left flank on the Route 1 triangle up to the Cambodian border. We were just north of that operating on a parallel axis. He then became II FFV commander, succeeding General Seaman, and I operated under him as a battalion and brigade commander two echelons below. He was the corps commander—field force commander.

Senator DOMINICK. I want to say for the record I met him when he was there when he was head of the field force and I don't think I have ever had a better briefing from anyone in my whole life. He obviously understood both the military and political scene because I was somewhat discouraged over the fact of the number of forces we had in 1967 that were present in one province and yet couldn't seem to do anything about controlling it. When I went back in 1970 that picture had been materially changed and it seemed to me, at least, that the country as a whole was beginning to get some consciousness of their own entity.

Would you feel that this is true insofar as South Vietnam is concerned at this time or is it still pretty broken up?

General HAIG. No; I think the improvements since 1968 to date are dramatic with the Government's presence which has been extended into many of the areas that were absolutely enemy controlled at the time I was there or at least gray areas in which you could never be sure of the security situation. I think there has been a dramatic improvement. While this recent offensive has set that back somewhat, the setbacks have been very minor in the context of the overall improvements since 1968 and it was to be expected.

Senator DOMINICK. General, from an operational point of view, is it proper to say, as I gather from your testimony, that you had no knowledge of General Lavelle's interpretation of the Rules of Engagement?

General HAIG. Sir, not until it surfaced back here in Washington.

Senator DOMINICK. Those are all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SAXBE?

Senator SAXBE. Thank you.

General, we have at this time, in this country, a great drive for egalitarianism and it is expressed in the desire that there be civilian control in the military below the top.

Senator HUGHES. For what?

Senator SAXBE. Egalitarian movement in this country; but it is expressed in the military by the desire that we should have civilian control. Well, now, this desire seems to be fed by every mistake the military makes in policing their own household. Over the years we have seen quite a few instances where a man is guilty of wrongdoing in the military and his friends and fellow officers, classmates, and so on, find him a refuge.

Here was General Lavelle; everybody said that he had violated these orders, that he had done something which resulted in his dismissal. Well, no sooner did this happen then, by the disability route, he winds up in the catbird seat; he is retired as a full general and he is above this committee, really. There is nothing we can do about it. We can talk about his permanent rank.

This goes back a long time. In the Air Force after the war, General Meyers—remember that incident? The people who were involved just in the last 10 years in the PX, NCO on up and down the line, the NCO thing, the sergeants get tried, the officers get retired.

If we are going to be able to combat this feeling in this country, I think the military has to recognize that they have a responsibility of control and when somebody does something wrong they are going to have to light on him. The Meyers thing is the best thing that ever happened to the Air Force when they tried Meyers, if you recall, because—and there was a great division of opinion at that time—the old heads were still there—General Arnold and Spaatz and the others who wanted an independent Air Force and they at that time, you know, said, "This is going to wreck us if we expose what General Meyers has been doing in his trading with suppliers," and so on, "Why, this is going to wreck us." And yet there was another group that said, "Look,"—and I am sorry Senator Symington is not here because he was involved in this—there was another group that said, "Look, this will show our responsibility to clean our own house," and it did; and it was really the best thing that ever happened to the Air Force.

I am alarmed today on this Lavelle thing, anyway, that we don't slide back into the old idea that somehow if you expose an officer or if you discipline him or if you try him it is a reflection upon that service or upon the whole military structure.

I think it is just the other way around. If the military structure shows that they want to keep their house clean and move directly against people who are guilty of any kind of violation of orders, even on the highest scale such as General Lavelle, or on the lowest scale

down to the enlisted personnel who were falsifying the records, I think it would be a credit to the military; it would be appropriate for us to say, "Look, you don't need a commissar in every squadron. The military, through its own structure can take care of this."

I certainly don't believe that you can say to a commanding general, "Are you sure this is not going to happen again?" No one can say that; but I would like it a lot more if they would say, "Well, if it happens again I will tell you we are going to follow up on it. We are not going to let a man cop out. We are not going to try to keep it hidden," and so in your position that I hope you are going to serve in, and I believe you will, I think this is a message that you are going to have to take back to the other officers in the command level that the—at the general level, in the divisions and other commands—that the people of this country are just sick and tired of the back scratching of career officers, of the whitewash that usually results and that the military are going to have to exert command responsibility to clean these things up, otherwise they are just going to continue and continue.

I believe I know enough about your background and attitude from your answers that I am happy to support you in this job. The only reason I say this is because I don't believe it is being said often enough and I really applaud the decision of the President to move you in there over a lot of brass that frankly I don't think have ever gotten this message.

I am hoping that with General Abrams, in regard to the Army, this is just not going to happen and I am hoping that in the Air Force and in the Navy that the same message will get across.

That is all I have unless you have some comment to make on it.

General HAIG. No, sir; I have no comment on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some, Senator. I commend you highly for your sentiments. I agree with what you said substantially.

Senator Schweiker, we will come back to you a little later—I have some questions here. Off the record just a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to yield to you, Senator Hughes; you had some remaining questions. You proceed and I will come back.

Senator HUGHES. Thank you.

General Haig, my next questions have to deal with the National Guard and the Reserve, your opinions of what position they fill, what should be done with them in the future and how you should support them in equipment, and what kind of shape they should be in.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. If you would go through that for me—

General HAIG. Right, sir.

Today in the context of reducing the size of the Active Forces and the requirements in what we call a period of nuclear parity, there is I believe, a greater requirement than ever before to have a Reserve and Guard structure that is ready, well equipped and well trained.

Senator HUGHES. And ready to fight?

General HAIG. Ready to fight, on shorter notice than has ever been the case in our past history, and in that regard I think we have a great deal of work to do. I think General Abrams has a keen interest in that and I am very ready to help him and support him in carrying out those policies.

He also has had experience in this field. We are talking about levels of equipment and modernization of the Reserve structure, and we are talking about manning problems which are associated with the elimination of the draft and we are talking about the training standards—the ability to be sure that our Reserve Forces have sufficient opportunity to be combat ready. Today I think we are not as well cared for in this area as we should be. I know it is something that, General Abrams is going to give primary attention to, assuming that he is approved and takes over the command as I hope he will.

Senator HUGHES. I realize it is a political decision as to whether we ought to use our Reserves and Guard more than the draft, you know, in incidents like Vietnam; but do you have any opinions you would care to express, you know, if we are going to build up the Reserve and the Guard and support it sufficiently with equipment and finances and everything, which I happen to believe we should do, what is your opinion about a utilization of them in times of crisis then, limited crisis, let's say. I had better qualify it that way. We know what it would be in the case of a national crisis.

General HAIG. I think it is dangerous to generalize on that issue. I think it depends on the circumstances. If our military planning is properly done before the fact of a decision, we will know whether the decision entails the call-up or activation of a Reserve or Guard element. Once a need has definitely been established for a Reserve or Guard element, I think a political decision should be consistent with this need—yes, the Reserve components should be called up. There are other situations in which the emergency and the requirement for manpower could be such that we would have to use the draft. But, it will remain true that in reducing the structure of the Active Forces there are some Reserve elements which will have increasingly key roles in crises.

Senator HUGHES. Even more so?

General HAIG. Yes, sir, and more so; that is something that is definitive and known in advance of any decision: these are the parameters of the structure that we are now supporting and funding; the Active Forces as well as the Reserve. So it is something that I wouldn't want to generalize about and say, no, we should always turn to the Reserves or no we should immediately draft. I think the answer is that it depends on the planning, the crisis itself and a number of considerations related to how the crisis evolves and develops.

Senator HUGHES. My next question doesn't have anything at all to do with your nomination, but there are some things which have been troubling this committee, and I would like to ask your opinion about them.

We have been in a continuous struggle here with a close air support problem, and as you well know, the Army is struggling desperately for a helicopter fire power capability in combat. You have been experienced as a commander in Vietnam and I would like to have your own viewpoint on it.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

I can speak from that perspective with some degree of competence. But I cannot speak on roles and missions in the context of the current debate that may be raging within the Pentagon.

Senator HUGHES. I am just asking your opinion.

General HAIG. But in context of my experiences in Vietnam I would say the close air support that we had was absolutely essential and it was superb in every respect. If I had a fire mission in a crucial battle, my first confidence would have been for air support and I mean that even beyond my artillery and my organic smooth bore weapons. There was quite a bit of difference from what it was in the Korean conflict. In the Korean conflict I think we had some very serious problems. These gaps have in the interim been worked out through close cooperation. Quite frankly, the creation of the Readiness Command—formerly Strike Command—has caused teamwork to develop between the services that I think is quite good.

When anyone speaks in generalities he is subject to questions but I was very, very pleased, very confident in and had great respect and admiration for the close air support that I had in 1966 and 1967 in Vietnam.

Senator HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, I believe that is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Schweiker, do you have any questions?

Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really don't have too many questions.

General Haig is from my home area; I know well of his reputation and I will say I strongly support his nomination. I really don't have a question, General; I do want to make an observation as a result of some of the hearings we have been having.

It just seems to me that one of the real challenges of your new command is to find a way to make the chain of command more responsive from the bottom up. I won't belabor the point but I think this committee has sat through Pueblo, Mylai, and now General Lavelle and the orders go down the chain of command like greased lightning and come up like a tortoise in terms of a flow upstream; and I think one of the real challenges, and there are a lot of difficulties about how to do it, but you are the person who is responsible for doing it, it is to get a chain of command that can move up the chain of command with adverse or hostile or bad information as fast as an order can move down the chain of command.

This committee has a lot of different ideas about that. All I am saying is I think the problem is pretty well defined. I am sure the answer isn't but I see that as one of your responsibilities in your new position because I think that three times now it has been rather deficient and all; I just lay it on the table not for any questions or answers because it isn't an easy problem. I do hope you will address yourself to it and in the long pull give it some thought and consideration.

General HAIG. Senator, I appreciate that comment very much.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Thank you very much.

Senator Byrd, do you have any questions now? I yield to you if you have any.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Haig, I am happy to support your nomination and I congratulate you, sir, and am glad to see you.

General HAIG. Thank you, Senator.

Senator BYRD. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington, of course, you know this is General Haig. We have had questions around the table. I have a few

more questions but I would like for you to have a chance if you have any questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. General, I respect the superb record you have had as a military officer. The country relies on people like you to remain dedicated to the military service. I won't press you on this question, but it can only occur to any person who has visited Vietnam, as I have, seven times, the first time with General Taylor and Walt Rostow in 1961; periodically since.

As I understand it, the Vietnamese have about a \$3 billion gross national product at the most. We have about three-quarters of a trillion, and have spent \$150 billion punishing the Vietnamese people for their transgressions; and what is more important, we have lost over 50,000 lives.

Looking at your record, knowing of your political experience and background, and work you have done, I would ask why it is that a country with our gross national product, plus the capacity of our military leadership, plus the courage of our fighting men, we have lost 50,000 people and spent \$150 billion and still haven't solved whatever is the problem? It is a broad question—I have respect for Dr. Kissinger. You have been working with him. I would ask the same question of him, and ask it of you as a military man; what is your answer?

General HAIG. I would be speaking for myself, Senator, and not for Dr. Kissinger. I wouldn't presume to do that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I referred to him because you have served in that part also, and I have the greatest respect for him.

General HAIG. I think all I can say is that we have dedicated a large majority of our time over the past three and a half years to try to work out a responsible solution in Southeast Asia.

Senator SYMINGTON. To try to do what?

General HAIG. To try to work responsibly out of this dilemma that you have described.

I wouldn't presume to go beyond what I know that I found in 1969 when I became intimately involved in the policy considerations of the conflict. That was the situation, in effect, that Dr. Kissinger and I and, as a matter of fact, the President, found.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you were out there——

General HAIG. I have many personal ideas.

Senator SYMINGTON. Weren't you out there in 1966, in combat?

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Take it from there because the real escalation started in 1965. Why has this been so ineffectual for so long. This question is made to you on a personal basis.

General HAIG. It would have to be very personal.

I quite frankly think we could have gone about it, the way we entered it, if we had weighed the implications of judgments that were made in the context of entering it at all and the prices we were willing to pay before entering it and the way in which we intended to fight the war. If we had considered all those things and then

decided that it was worth entering, that it is conceivable to me that in 1969 we would not have been faced with what we were faced with.

Senator SYMINGTON. I beg your pardon, would you repeat that?

General HAIG. I think in 1969 we had a situation that was ongoing with a number of factors that had a momentum of their own that would not have permitted the kind of judgments I am talking about which we might have made in 1964, 1965. We didn't anticipate the costs and problems.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't follow you. You were there in 1966, also in 1967, and you are still in the picture. What was the reason after the escalations in 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968 we spent all that money but lost all those lives and still didn't do the job?

General HAIG. Again, I am speaking very personally.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right and this will not be published if you so prefer.

General HAIG. I feel there were a number of things that were overlooked in the early days. I don't mean that in a critical way but I think there was a broader context to the conflict than what we have referred to in those days as an insurgency and lower level conflict. We had to look very carefully at the source of the insurgency and the relationships between ourselves and the other major powers. There was a tendency to focus on an in-country situation and to limit our perspectives and the conduct of our activity to that kind of a local context.

Senator SYMINGTON. You had that experience and the whole venture has changed, not for the better, at least for us. What would you have done if you had been in charge in 1965. How would you have handled the war? Would you go for search and destroy?

General HAIG. I am not sure, sir. If you are speaking of the military context that is one set of questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I was speaking about. In other words, we back here were constantly told about the various victories, but it didn't pan out. The most significant paradox was the Tet offensive. I am just wondering how you feel about how it could have been, what we should do in the future. Do you believe we are on the right course now in the way you are handling it?

General HAIG. I wouldn't want to answer that in purely military terms because of political aspects of this thing which were the determinant factors both then and today.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you, gentlemen. I have questions here now along this line:

I want to call your attention to one of the documents we have here. It is a communication dated November 8, 1971, and I am going to be brief in these questions; I think you can be brief in your answers but certainly enough to give the subject matter attention—that was the date of one of these protective reaction strikes on Quang Lang Airfield.

This is from General Ryan to General Clay.

My question is going to be, are you familiar with this communication? Suppose you just read it through hurriedly; that is the communica-

tion that came in yesterday afternoon, a copy of it, at least, came in yesterday afternoon and I want to ask the general if he is familiar with it.

General HAIG. No, I am not familiar with it, Mr. Chairman. I wouldn't ordinarily be because that is a service message.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

If you are not familiar with it, it is subject to interpretation by the members here and we had some discussion of it yesterday afternoon and we will have more if anyone wants to.

There has been testimony here about the communications back from [deleted]. I am not asking you anything about what you said to the President about this or he said to you, staying out of that executive privilege field, but my question is, do you remember anything about that incident?

General Lavelle testified about it and others commented on it some. [Deleted.] General Lavelle refers to that as evidence, you see, that he was being urged along and so forth.

Do you have any comment on that as to what happened?

General HAIG. I would like to comment in general without getting into areas—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember the incident?

General HAIG. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that in the context of air support in Laos, it has always been an area in which there have been requests from time to time for additional air. When it gets to a head of state level why it comes to our attention. If it is in the context of Ambassador Godley requesting support from MACV, we would not necessarily ever be aware of that. There is daily coordination on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General HAIG. I am not sure I can answer your question in the context of the purposes you want served by the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, here is the thing: General Lavelle put in testimony on this as evidence, you see, of the fact that [deleted] and it was another instance in which he was urged to move forward, you see, and do a more urgent job. This was in Northern Laos; it wasn't in North Vietnam where the particular rules applied but does this strike any chord?

General HAIG. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your mind, was there any special order given about it?

General HAIG. I don't recall any. That doesn't mean that there wasn't at that particular time some desire to be sure that—

The CHAIRMAN. I say so far as you know.

General HAIG. No, sir; I don't recall that.

The CHAIRMAN. So you couldn't shed any light on that?

General HAIG. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any comments you want to make regarding your own nomination? We always ask that of everyone to volunteer such comments as he wishes, especially after he has been questioned.

General HAIG. No, only in the context it has been a great honor and privilege for me to be here this morning. If in your wisdom you see fit to recommend that I am approved, I look forward to working with the committee from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to have plenty to do. Sometimes even though we are not a group of soreheads, sometimes we are hard to please and I think openness and frankness are the best weapons you have to hit us with.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just level directly with us on things that come up. It leaves a good taste in our mouths. If you are confirmed, and I don't think the vote will be too close, we certainly wish you well in every way.

General HAIG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, any other questions?

Senator HUGHES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I would just like to ask him one final question. We do face a problem in this committee with the problem we have before us. We didn't seek it but it came to us.

The problems that I am having are two: One is the command structure out there in Vietnam. There seems to be a three route system of command affecting the bombing in Indochina. I frankly didn't realize that General Abrams didn't have a full and complete structure of command within his own group, and I don't like it, frankly. I don't like it at all. It is a hell of a way to run a war for a lot of reasons.

But the No. 2 thing is this request came to us from Sergeant Franks after going completely through the 7th Air Force without anyone saying anything, records being falsified, Sergeant Franks had gone to his immediate superior noncommissioned officer, then to his immediate superior commissioned officer and been told to go ahead and do what he was told so then he wrote a letter to me in the Senate.

No one said a damned word all the way down that line to anyone about violations or falsifications of the records.

We have had two high military officers here say to this committee that they couldn't guarantee that this wouldn't happen again. We would like to do everything we can to make damned sure that it doesn't happen again and I am sure you share that feeling.

General HAIG. Yes, sir.

Senator HUGHES. The reason I say all this is, what do you think is wrong that this thing can't be handled in-house? Why wouldn't an enlisted man protest or can an enlisted man protest without being punished when he feels an order is wrong?

You are a two-star general; we had another two-star general testify that by God he wasn't going to ask any questions of a four-star general who said, "Do it," even though he knew it was outside the Rules of Engagement.

You will be a four-star general with the right to give those orders and the right to be challenged, I hope, by someone you give them to if they exceed the authorities that everyone knows. Can you give us any recommendation at all as to an in-house system, a recommendation for change, a recommendation for study or anything that can help us in this deliberation? Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator HUGHES. I would like to have his opinion on it before he leaves.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

General HAIG. There were several questions.

Senator HUGHES. I hit a lot of things, I know, General.

General HAIG. But with respect to your question, "can we prevent its happening again" and, as I say, I am not an expert on this; I have not read the testimony and except in the broadest layman's sense I have not been privy to the esoterics of it. I do know this, however, that integrity is an essential element of discipline and of an effective organization whether it is military or civilian, government or private. No one can underestimate the importance of continual vigilance. At the highest levels you have got to give examples and you have got to insist on it. You have got to be ruthless about rooting out exceptions to it.

Senator HUGHES. You say you have got to be ruthless about rooting out exceptions?

General HAIG. That's right; that is my view. Now, in the context of the command line that you are discussing, we have been very conscious of this and have looked at it rather intensively. I can't get into it, I don't think, within the framework of my authority here to discuss such matters.

I think we can do a lot of things better. That is true of almost everything we do and I think we have got to work at it.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me; we are going to have to interrupt this or have an executive session here before the membership leaves or ask you to be a little briefer in your testimony. I think the thrust of the Senator's question was what can you recommend specifically be done to make it less likely or less probable that this thing would happen again.

If you can give something specific on that it would be very helpful to us, to the military and increase our faith in things, if you wouldn't mind.

General HAIG. Mr. Chairman, I would rather reserve anything on that until I have had an opportunity to look at this particular situation in a very close way.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator?

Senator HUGHES. Are you satisfied with the IG system in the Army?

General HAIG. In the Army?

Senator HUGHES. Yes.

General HAIG. Yes, sir; and that would have been part of my answer.

(Additional information furnished:)

The Army Inspector General System is designed to accomplish the mission of inquiring into and reporting upon matters influencing the performance of mission and the state of discipline, efficiency, economy, and morale of the Army. The Inspector General of the Army is a confidential agent of the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, United States Army, as provided for by Title 10, US Code 3039(a). He serves on the personal staff of the Chief of Staff which provides direct access with no intervening Staff agency influence. At other echelons this same direct personal relationship exists between the commander and his command inspector general.

The Inspector General complaint system has been established for the basic purpose of correcting injustices affecting individuals and of eliminating conditions detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the Army. All military and civilian personnel on duty with the Department of the Army have the right to register complaints orally or in writing with an inspector general. Persons desiring to submit a complaint are not required to submit to an interview by anyone prior to registering a complaint with an inspector general.

In the role of inspector, the IG looks at the total picture to determine the adequacy of resources and the soundness of guidance provided, and the effectiveness with which available resources are managed in the performance of the assigned missions. The IG keeps the commander informed of his findings concerning the state of the command, including not only manifestations of discontent, indiscipline, or noncompliance, but also the root causes of such problems. During inspections, emphasis is placed on contact with the troops in their work areas or recreation areas. A specific period is normally set aside to hear any complaints or requests for assistance from members of the inspected command. Prompt and effective resolution of any problem presented is the goal of the inspector general. When an allegation of a serious nature is made concerning a command and the allegation may properly be the subject of an inspector general investigation or inquiry, the investigation or inquiry normally will be made by the next higher command.

IG investigations and inquiries are made in an impartial, unprejudiced, and tactful manner and have for their purpose determination of the facts of the matter at issue. The Inspector General of the Army makes investigations or inquiries into any activity of the Department of the Army, including Reserve Components and civil functions, for the purpose of providing the Secretary of the Army or the Chief of Staff with a sound basis for just and intelligent action. Other inspectors general perform the same function for their commanders with respect to matters pertaining to their activities.

Senator HUGHES. It is different from the Air Force?

General HAIG. I am not familiar with the Air Force system.

Senator HUGHES. Excuse me. I don't want to take up the time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. I am not trying to terminate; we can go further.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't think it is any different in the Air Force and I think the Inspector General is the one, under General Ryan's instructions that promptly brought this thing to light after the sergeant wrote the letter. The systems are the same in the services.

Senator HUGHES. It is a little different, Stuart, in the testimony at least.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much. If there are no other questions, gentlemen.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee in executive session proceeded to other business.)

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