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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

EXECUTIVE L, 92D CONGRESS, 2D SESSION

THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS (ABM TREATY)

AND THE

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (INTERIM AGREEMENT), INCLUDING AN ASSOCIATED PROTOCOL, SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON MAY 26, 1972

AND

S.J. Res. 241 and S.J. Res. 242

JUNE 19, 20, 21, 26, 28, AND 29, AND JULY 20, 1972

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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NOTE.—Sections of these hearings have been deleted at the request of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense on the ground that such deletions are in the interests of national security. Deleted material is indicated by the notation [deleted] or [Deleted.].

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

MONDAY, JUNE 19, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Symington, Pell, McGee, Spong, Aiken, Cooper, Scott, and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

The Committee on Foreign Relations is very pleased to welcome this morning the Secretary of State, Mr. William P. Rogers, and the Chief American Negotiator and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Gerard Smith.

It would have been better for the security of the world had we been able to hold this hearing sometime ago.

Many years of intricate negotiations, both tentative and formal, have passed to bring us to this point. The Committee has before it now the proposed treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles and the interim agreement on offensive missiles.

Now we have before us the prospect of further negotiations. The results, when added to the treaty and agreement before us, should at last bring the two superpowers and the rest of the world to a point at which worldwide destruction can be a more remote prospect.

Giving up the anti-ballistic missile, with the exception of the option on each side of the two sites, may be the most significant commitment made by the United States and the Soviet Union to the principle of co-existence. Insofar as each side is willing to abandon the effort to make itself invulnerable to attack or retaliation by the other, it also commits itself to peace and to the survival of the other.

DANGER OF HAVING ACTIONS BELIE WORDS

We must ask ourselves, however, whether we are not in danger of having our actions belie our words. Already there have been sounds of alarm and cries to abandon any euphoria. Some say we must have an accelerated program for the development of a new type of missile submarine called Trident and of a new supersonic bomber to replace our B–52 fleet, as well as other offensive weapons not covered by the Moscow agreements.

Can we in good conscience and good sense engage the Russians in an accelerated arms race at the same time we have each conceded the survival of each other's position and political system?

As we all realize, no one can be invulnerable in the world now. Indeed we are in a situation of mutual vulnerability. The anti-ballistic missile treaty before us has in it the central fact that the United States and the Soviet Union are indeed each other's hostage for reasonable behavior in a nuclear era.

More force, greater spending and additional weapons will not make either side more secure. More can only lead to a deepening of the balance of terror which has enslaved this world for more than a decade. A further drive for more to achieve a shifting parity can only heighten the possibilities of a holocaust which neither side should consider thinkable.

We must be able to trust ourselves to arrive at sound judgments and policies as we try to curb the disastrous arms race. We must listen to fear and foreboding, but to try to set a pace that will lead us with the Soviet Union to a less formidable future. We must not carelessly assume the worst of our foes and the best of ourselves while promulgating policies of mutual disadvantage.

During the course of our hearings we will explore the major issues surrounding the proposed treaty and agreement. We will hear comprehensive testimony on the implications of what has been proposed for the Soviet Union and for us. We will explore the possibilities of further agreement and what might be entailed in that. And we will give thorough analysis to the strategic questions that so clearly now are at issue.

HEARING PROCEDURE

I would like to suggest, if the committee is agreeable, that in the first round of questions, which I would like to limit to ten minutes in order to give everybody an equal opportunity, that we discuss the treaty first and then the agreements in order to keep some orderly discussions going and to avoid confusion. After that is done we can certainly explore at length the relation of the two, but I believe it would be helpful if we would start in this fashion. I hope that is agreeable to the Secretary of State and perhaps he could approach it this way. I think it would help our understanding of it and it certainly would mine.

(S.J. Res. 241 and 242 follow:)

[S.J. Res. 241, 92d Cong., second sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION Authorization of the President to approve an interim agreement between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized to approve on behalf of the United States the interim agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and the protocol related thereto, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, by Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, and Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

[S.J. Res. 242, 92d Cong., second sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION Approving the acceptance by the President for the United States of the interim agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms

Whereas an interim agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms and an associated protocol were signed on May 26, 1972; and

Whereas the said interim agreement provides that it shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each party, such exchange to take place subject to and concurrently with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles; and

Whereas this interim agreement is a significant first step away from an era of nuclear confrontation and toward an era of mutually agreed upon restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers; and

Whereas the new era toward which this agreement points can be a time when the dangers of war are substantially lessened and when nations can turn more of their energies to the works of peace; and

Whereas this agreement and the treaty limiting ballistic missile defense were made possible by the maintenance in the United States of a strategic defense posture second to none; and

Whereas the success of these agreements and the attainment of more permanent and comprehensive agreements are dependent upon the continuing maintenance of that strategic posture and a sound strategic modernization program: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That acceptance by the President for the United States of the aforesaid interim agreement and the associated protocol is hereby approved.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you. You have an opening statement I believe.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, sir, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do support the suggestion you made about the manner of proceeding and my prepared statement follows that same plan.

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before you in support of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

In his letter to the Senate of June 13 transmitting my report and its enclosures, the President urged your support so that the two agreements can be brought into force as soon as practicable. These agreements are important not just for our people; they are important for all people. They are important not only for the achievements they represent, but also for the opportunities they present. Strategic arms limitation is not a one-time effort but a continuing process.

These agreements are a significant achievement.

They constitute an unprecedented step in controlling strategic arms. They are tangible evidence that both sides are moving into an era of negotiation. The two sides now have an important investment in cooperation which they are not likely to risk lightly. The United States and the Soviet Union have thus indicated a recognition that their relations can be improved by cooperation in some areas even though there remain important differences in others.

This success in SALT recognizes that global security is interdependent, and that unconstrained weapons competition is contrary to the interests of the nuclear powers, and of the world.

During the SALT negotiations over the last two and a half years we have kept in mind the need for wide support, both nationally and internationally, for any agreements reached. To that end the Admin-

istration has closely consulted the Congress. We have also regularly consulted with our allies.

I believe there is wide support for these agreements. The Administration welcomes this opportunity to consider them with you. We are pleased to know that the Congress plans full consideration of these two documents, both with officials of the executive branch and with the public. This is a process that is fundamental to our American system. It will broaden the base of understanding and support for what has been achieved, and will assist in the search for additional strategic arms limitations.

Let me place the SALT agreements in perspective.

STRATEGIC SITUATION FACING ADMINISTRATION IN 1969

When this Administration entered office early in 1969, we faced a strategic situation in which the USSR was engaged in a broad and dynamic buildup of its strategic offensive missile launchers. It was clear that a rough balance in strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union was approaching. However, there was not then—and there is not now—any question that the United States could and would maintain strategic forces adequate to meet its security requirements, forces second to none. As President Nixon stated in his Foreign Policy Report of February, 1971:

> Both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a balance. The President further noted that any Soviet attempt to obtain a large advantage would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless.

Through negotiation—rather than competition—we had an opportunity to achieve a more stable strategic relationship with the USSR and to seek—over time—to create a situation in which both sides could use more of their resources for purposes other than building more strategic weapons.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

After thorough preparations by the new Administration, SALT began in November, 1969, in Helsinki. Initially, the talks concentrated on exploration of strategic principles and development of an agenda for future work. The next phases focused on comprehensive proposals. However, problems over definition of strategic systems and over the basis for limitation of such systems made clear that it would be extremely difficult to negotiate a single comprehensive agreement. The Soviets then pressed for an initial agreement limiting only anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. We believed that such an agreement would not make as great a contribution to stability as limitations on both offensive and defensive strategic systems.

This impasse was resolved by the breakthrough announced by the President on May 20, 1971. The two governments agreed to work out arrangements limiting deployment of ABM's, and at the same time to agree to certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

After the May 20 understanding, the principal issues were how broad a coverage of offensive forces could be agreed, and how to frame in concrete terms agreement in principles to limit ABM's to a low level.

These general questions contained numerous and complex specific issues, which took another year of hard negotiating to work out. The two agreements before you are the successful result of that work.

Mr. Chairman, a detailed analysis of the two agreements was made in my letter of submittal to the President, which you have before you. I believe it would be helpful this morning to consider what these agreements would do. I will touch on certain of their most important provisions. Following my statement, Ambassador Smith is prepared to join me in answering questions you may have.

APPROACH USED IN AGREEMENTS

Let me say as a preface to this discussion that in both agreements the U.S. has sought, where necessary, to set forth detailed obligations in the text of the agreements themselves. Where one of the sides preferred to put clarifying material or elaboration in agreed interpretations, and where this was sufficient, that approach was used. These agreed interpretations have been transmitted to the Congress; they include initialed statements and other common understandings. In certain cases where agreement could not be reached, U.S. views were stated formally in uniliateral statements. Those, too, have been transmitted to the Congress. There are no secret agreements.

I would like to address first the ABM Treaty.

COMMITMENT NOT TO BUILD NATIONWIDE ABM DEFENSE

Under this treaty, both sides make a commitment not to build a nationwide ABM defense. This is a general undertaking of utmost significance. Without a nationwide ABM defense, there can be no shield against retaliation. Both great nuclear powers have recognized, and in effect agreed to maintain mutual deterrence.

Therefore, I am convinced beyond doubt that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced by this treaty.

A major objective of SALT has been to reduce the tensions, uncertainties and high costs which flow from the upward spiral of strategic arms competition. While the cost savings from these first SALT agreements will be limited initially, over the long term we will save the tens of billions of dollars which might otherwise have been required for a nationwide ABM defense.

BREAK IN PATTERN OF ACTION AND REACTION

Furthermore with an interim limitation on offensive weapons—which we hope will lead to a more comprehensive and permanent limitation—there will be a break in the pattern of action and reaction under which each side reacts to what the other is doing, or may do, in an open ended situation. This cycle until now has been a major factor in driving the strategic arms race.

PROVISIONS CONCERNING DEPLOYMENT OF TWO LIMITED ABM SYSTEMS

The heart of the treaty is Article III, which spells out the provisions under which each of the parties may deploy two limited ABM complexes, one in an ICBM deployment area, and one at its national

capital. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers, and 100 associated intercepters, at each complex—a total of 200.

The two ABM deployment complexes permitted each side will serve different purposes. The limited ABM coverage in the ICBM deployment area will afford some protection for ICBM's in this area. ABM coverage at the national capitals will permit protection for the national command authority against a light attack, or an accidental or unauthorized launch of a limited number of missiles, and thus decrease the chances that such an event would trigger a nuclear exchange. In addition, it will buy some time against a major attack, and its radars would help to provide valuable warning.

ABM radars are strictly limited. There are also important limitations on the deployment of certain types of non-ABM radars. The complex subject of radar control was a central question in the negotiations because radars are the long lead-time item in development of an ABM system.

OTHER IMPORTANT QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS

The treaty provides for other important qualitative limitations. The parties will undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. They have also agreed not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher; nor to modify launchers to provide them with such a capability; nor to develop, test or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers; nor to develop, test, or deploy ABM missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

Perhaps of even greater importance as a qualitative limitation is that the parties have agreed that future exotic types of ABM systems, i.e. systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not be deployed, even in permitted areas.

One of the more important corollary provisions deals with prohibiting the upgrading of anti-aircraft systems, what has been called the "SAM-upgrade" problem. The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air-defense systems or components thereof, to perform an ABM role is prohibited as part of a general undertaking not to provide an ABM capability to non-ABM systems.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

The undertakings in the ABM Treaty, and in the Interim Agreement, have been devised so as to assure that they can be verified by national technical means of verification. For the types of arms control measures in these agreements, modern national technical means of verification are the most practical and a fully effective assurance of compliance. The treaty also contains the very important landmark commitments not to interfere with each side's national technical means of verification and not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede the effectiveness of these means.

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

The treaty contains another significant "first" in Soviet-American arms control. A Standing Consultative Commission will, on a regular basis, consider the operations of the treaty as well as questions of compliance. The commission will also have the function of considering proposals for further increasing the viability of the treaty. It will assure that even after the completion of the follow-on negotiations there will be a continuing strategic dialogue between the two powers.

DURATION OF ABM TREATY AND WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE

The duration of the ABM Treaty is unlimited. But it contains a withdrawal clause of the kind which has characterized post-war arms control agreements. Each party can withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such a decision, including a statement of the extraordinary events involved, must be given six months prior to withdrawal.

EXPRESSED INTENTION TO CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

The interrelationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms which the U.S. has repeatedly stressed is reflected in the expressed intention to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic arms. As was pointed out in my submittal letter, the special importance attached by the United States to this relationship was set forth in a formal statement by Ambassador Smith recording the position of the United States Government that if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized, and should that occur it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the treaty. Not necessarily withdrawal, but it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the treaty. I believe that this withdrawal right, which is exercisable on our judgment alone, fully protects our security interests in the event that the follow-on negotiations were not to succeed and that the strategic situation became such that we felt obliged to exercise it.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to the interim agreement and its protocol.

FREEZE ON NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS

This agreement freezes at approximately current levels the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers operational and under construction on each side for up to five years. We hope that it will be replaced well before that time by a more complete agreement in treaty form covering strategic expensive weapons.

Under the agreement, in Articles I and II, the parties undertake a commitment not to construct additional fixed ICBM launchers and not to convert launchers for light or older ICBM's into launchers for modern heavy ICBM's. This undertaking by the Soviet Union should be viewed in terms of the concern in this country during the past

several years about the continued buildup in numbers of Soviet ICBM's, particlularly the heavy SS–9 ICBM's. The growth in numbers of both light and heavy Soviet ICBM launchers has now been stopped.

The agreement does not specify the number of ICBMs operational and under construction when it was signed. We have made it abundantly clear to the Soviets, however, that we consider this number for the USSR to be 1,618. I would like to stress, however, that specifying the number of ICBM's in the agreement is not important, since national means of verification will reveal if any new ICBM construction, which is prohibited by the agreement, were to take place.

LIMITATION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN SUBMARINES

Article III and the Protocol limit SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines. The agreement contains undertakings not to build such launchers and submarines above a given number.

A ceiling of 62 has been set for the USSR on the number of operational modern submarines (Y-class nuclear-powered submarines). A ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers has been set for the USSR. This ceiling is to include all launchers on nuclear powered submarines (Y-class and H-class submarines) and modern launchers on older submarines (G-class diesel-powered submarines). There are only a few such launchers on older submarines.

In effect, the agreement freezes SLBM launchers at present levels except that additional SLBM launchers can be built if they replace older strategic launchers on a one-for-one basis.

The Soviets are permitted to have no more than 740 launchers on nuclear-powered submarines of any type, operational and under construction, unless they effect replacement in accordance with agreed procedures. The purpose of the figure 740—which is a negotiated figure—is to establish a clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids uncertainty or debate over the definition of "under construction."

To reach 950 SLBM's on modern submarines, the USSR must retire older ballistic missile launchers—specifically, those of SS–7 and SS–8 ICBM's on H-class submarines. The first SLBM launcher after the 740th launcher must be a replacement. The older ICBM or SLBM launchers being replaced will be dismantled beginning no later than the date on which the submarine containing the 741st launcher begins sea trials.

I might add that this one-way mix concept—permitting replacement of land-based launchers with submarine-based launchers—was first suggested by the U.S. early in SALT as a way of achieving greater strategic stability.

The USSR could retain the existing older launchers on G-class submarines, in addition to 950 launchers on modern submarines. However, any launchers for modern SLBM's on these older diesel-powered submarines would have to be included in the 950 ceiling.

MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT PROVISIONS

The modernization and replacement provisions of the interim agreement will permit both sides to improve their missile forces, but the restrictions on converting launchers for light ICBM's or older heavy ICBM's to launchers for the modern heavy ICBM's will place impor-

tant qualitative restrictions on Soviet programs. The conversion of current U.S. ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles and the conversion of current Polaris submarines to handle Poseidon missiles, as well as the construction of new submarines as replacements for older ones, will not be prohibited.

VERIFICATION, NONCONCEALMENT, NONINTERFERENCE AND STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

The agreement provides for application of the same verification procedures and commitments about non-concealment and non-interference as contained in the ABM Treaty. The Standing Consultative Commission will also be used to promote the objectives and the implementation of the interim agreement.

COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

There is a commitment to continue active negotiations for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The agreement also stipulates that its terms will not prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the follow-on negotiations.

OFFENSIVE ARMS LIMITATIONS TEMPORARY AND NOT COMPREHENSIVE

The offensive arms limitations are temporary and not comprehensive. They do not cover all strategic delivery vehicles. For example, strategic bombers, where the U.S. already has a very large advantage, are not limited by the interim agreement.

The interim agreement does not limit on-going U.S. offensive arms programs. It does stop the Soviet Union from increasing the number of its strategic offensive missile launchers. These limitations on Soviet strategic offensive forces, in conjunction with very low limits on ABM's on both sides, clearly advance U.S. security interests.

SUFFICIENCY OF U.S. FORCES

Looked at overall, our forces are clearly sufficient to protect our, and our allies', security interests. U.S. strategic forces are qualitatively superior to and more effective than Soviet strategic forces. The USSR has more missile launchers. The U.S. has more missile warheads. We have many more strategic bombers. Moreover, numbers alone are not an illuminating or useful measure for judging the strategic balance.

MORE SECURE AND STABLE RELATIONSHIPS WITH USSR

With these two agreements, we should have a more secure and stable strategic relationship with the USSR.

Both sides gain assurance that their strategic missile deterrent forces will not be rendered ineffective by the others' ABM system.

U.S. FORCE MUST BE KEPT UP-TO-DATE

But even with the advantages that these two agreements will bring, we must keep our strategic forces up-to-date if these are to continue

their central role for deterrence. Our forces must be adequate to deter attack on—or coercion of—the U.S. and its allies. The relationship between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital interests and those of our allies will not be underestimated by anyone. I am sure the Congress agrees.

Mr. Chairman, I have presented an overview of the basic undertakings of these agreements and of their significance.

WRONG TO ASK WHO WON OR LOST

I think it wrong to ask who "won" or "lost" the initial SALT negotiations. In matters involving the central security interests of two great powers, any arms limitation agreement must respond to each side's interest or it will not last very long. Both sides must gain from SALT or neither does.

NEW ERA IN ARMS CONTROL

With these two agreements we enter a new era in arms control, and what may have been difficult or impossible in the past may now be attainable. It should now be possible for both sides to agree to additional limitations, including reductions.

The security of the United States will be strengthened by these two agreements.

They will make possible a more rational and stable strategic relationship.

They should help to improve American-Soviet relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order.

The threat of nuclear war will be dramatically reduced.

These agreements will give the world greater hope for the future.

SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENTS URGED

Mr. Chairman, I urge that this committee and the Senate support the ABM treaty and its accompanying interim agreement.

TRIBUTE TO NEGOTIATING TEAM

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that I think it's appropriate to pay tribute to the negotiating team, Ambassador Gerard Smith and his colleagues, Paul Nitze, who is here today, and General Allison, Jeff Parsons, Phil Farley, who served as alternate chairman of the delegation, all of the members of the staffs who worked so diligently and capably and for such a long period on these agreements. Harold Brown, of course, was a member of the delegation. And I think they deserve a great deal of credit. Had it not been for them, these agreements would not be possible. I think it was an unusually capable team and it deserves the very sincere appreciation of all Americans and I am sure this committee joins with me in that sentiment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think that is a very clear and very good statement and I think it is a hopeful development.

HEARING PROCEDURE

For the benefit of the committee, before some of the members came in I announced we would try to proceed under the ten minute rule so everybody would have an opening opportunity. I will ask a few questions.

LIVES OF PEOPLE OF EACH COUNTRY HOSTAGE TO OTHER

Mr. Secretary, is it correct to say that this treaty assures the Russians that we will not attempt to prevent the effectiveness of their intercontinental ballistic missiles and we will not interfere with their intelligence gathering by satellite—what is generally called national means—and, of course, that the Russians assume the same obligation?

In effect the lives of the people of each country are hostage to the other and there can scarcely be a more effective guarantee of each nation's restraint in the use of nuclear weapons.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, I think that is an accurate statement, Mr. Chairman, and I think it is of great importance to realize the effect of this treaty for the reasons that you have mentioned, and that is why I say that I am of the conviction that it dramatically reduces the possibility of a nuclear war between these major nations.

The CHAIRMAN. If each side lives up to it, I think that is correct. It reminds me of the argument made during the very long hearings on the ABM. ABM was considered by many of the witnesses at that time as a destabilizing development. If it were permitted to proceed, it would contribute to the arms race rather than otherwise. Is that not correct, too?

You are in disagreement. You are undoing that. You are saying we will not proceed to attempt to create a regional defense against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir, I think with both sides agreeing as they have under this treaty that is a correct conclusion, Mr. Chairman.

OPTION TO HAVE TWO ABM COMPLEXES

The CHAIRMAN. While the option is given to have two ABM complexes, there is no requirement that each side proceed with that. They have the option of doing it if they like. If they both decide this system of defense is not an effective one, there is nothing to prohibit them from agreeing to have none at all; is that right?

Secretary ROGERS. That is right; but I think the assumption was in the discussions that probably both sides would proceed with——

The CHAIRMAN. That depends upon the development of the degree of confidence between the countries; doesn't it?

If, as nothing upsets or disturbs either country as to the goodwill or intentions of the other, this is a possibility at least.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, let me say, Mr. Chairman, the statement that you have made initially is correct, that there is nothing in this treaty that requires either side to construct the additional site——

The CHAIRMAN. That is a limitation only.

Secretary ROGERS. It is a limitation only. But, as I say, I think the negotiations did clearly indicate that each side was going to continue and I think that the Soviet Union felt that because we had an

ICBM site protected, that they felt for obvious reasons they wanted to have one of their ICBM sites protected.

The CHAIRMAN. That is true. It assumes, of course, that an ABM system is an effective one. If either side decides that after all was the wrong project and it wasn't really an effective one, it could easily be overcome. They are free to decide not to proceed. That is the only point I wished to make.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; I think it is quite clear that neither side would proceed if they thought the system was ineffective. I don't think either one would build an ABM system—an additional site—if they thought it was not going to be effective.

INSISTENCE ON OFFENSIVE WEAPONS PROGRAM QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. If this is the real meaning of the treaty, which to me is the most significant part of it all, I am unable to understand the insistence of the Secretary of Defense that we must go forward immediately with a very large accelerated program of offensive weapons beginning with the Trident, one of the most expensive, B–1 and F–14, and various other weapons systems. If this treaty is adopted, which I certainly expect it could be and I shall certainly support it, it seems that we ought to have a little time for each side to evaluate its effectiveness and to evaluate the attitude of the other side. To put it another way, when I read Mr. Laird's statement, as it was published, immediately it occurred to me that it raises the question of the sincerity of our undertakings. If this agreement is to be used as an excuse for a greatly increased arms race, it seems to me it raises serious questions of the seriousness with which we regard this agreement. I am still puzzled by that and worried about it.

You are familiar with the statement that the Secretary made, I take it.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I am familiar in a general way.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me refresh your memory with one very brief sentence.

Secretary ROGERS. Could I say, Mr. Chairman, I think that in some instances the newspaper stories do not accurately reflect what Mr. Laird said. But, in any event, I know what you are driving at; so you don't have to explain that.

We feel that this treaty and the interim agreement are agreements of considerable significance.

The CHAIRMAN. I do too.

Secretary ROGERS. We think that one of the reasons that we were able to achieve these agreements was because we maintained our strength and that we proceeded with an ABM system and we were able to negotiate from a position of strength.

Secondly, the proposals that have been made in the Defense budget are not new proposals, they are proposals that the Administration submitted before these agreements were completed. We think they are essential to our national security and should be supported by the Congress.

Third, we think at this time when we know perfectly well, particularly we know from the conversations between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev that the Soviet Union plans to continue to

build up its systems within the limitations imposed by these agreements, particularly the interim agreement, and he said so in no uncertain terms, made it perfectly clear to the President they were going to do that, so there was no misconception on our part that we should continue to have a defense posture that is strong and provides for our national security. We think any change in that course now would make the possibilities of negotiation in the second phase of SALT much more difficult.

Now, I don't personally state it in precisely linkage terms, I say we present these agreements to the Congress because we believe they are significant and we are pleased that the Congress appears to support them, and we also submit the Defense budget believing that it is in our national interest and our strength as a nation requires expenditures in that order of magnitude, and we think it is particularly important at this time that we not indicate to the Soviet Union we are all of a sudden going to undertake unilateral disarmament which makes the second phase of SALT unnecessary.

So I strongly support what the President said in his letter and when he said that just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was the essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to insure that more permanent, comprehensive arms limitations agreements can be reached.

I think that states it very well and I strongly support that position, Mr. Chairman.

DEFENSE SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY BEFORE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have no doubt that the Administration has coordinated its thoughts on this matter, but you said that the newspapers don't always report these things properly. I wasn't referring to a newspaper account. I want to read the record to see. This is a quote from the Secretary of Defense's statement after testimony before the Armed Services Committee, and I don't believe there are any grounds for questioning its accuracy. If so, I think the Secretary ought to correct it.

It reads as follows: On June 6th, Secretary Laird said before that committee:

> I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system, on the B–1 bomber and on the other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five year period.

I think that is accurate.

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir.

INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN TREATY AND ARMS RACE

The CHAIRMAN. If we were considering only the Interim agreement, I think there would be some logic in proceeding with these weapons systems. But if what I stated in the beginning is the real significance of the treaty, which I rate much more important than the interim agreement, which is supplementary and temporary in nature and subject to change, as you have stated, and if we are in good faith about

the treaty, then it makes the interim agreement of a very different character. In that case, to proceed in the normal traditional manner of an arms race seems to me to be out of phase with the treaty itself. There is an inherent inconsistency in that approach because there is no doubt that if there is no effective defense the existing weapons are quite sufficient to destroy and to mutilate irreparably each country. In all of the testimony we have had, when you put together the large numbers of nuclear weapons, as I said, each country's whole population is hostage to the other because they could be destroyed. It is an inconsistency which I, at least I, would like to have clarified. Perhaps it is the duty of the Congress to do that in dealing with the size and the cost of these ongoing weapon systems. But my time is about up.

I would end by saying that I have no question in my mind about the usefulness and the validity of the treaty itself and the numbers game that arises out of the interim agreement is an interesting one. But given the nature of these weapons, I am not worried about it other than the fact that we are going to use this excuse to greatly enlarge the store of destructive weapons. I don't think that would be in our interests or the Russians.

You say that you presume the Russians will proceed. It may well be, of course, that they will feel compelled to if we proceed. It is a case of tit for tat, as we always have.

But in any case, I hope we can in the Congress at least try to reconcile these two different approaches. I am very much in favor of the spirit and I think the meaning of the treaty itself.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a couple of brief comments.

SECRETARY LAIRD'S STATEMENT

As far as Mr. Laird's statement is concerned, the statement that you read, of course, is the accurate one, where he said: "some movement forward," I think are the words he used. Some of the reporting, particularly the headlines, did not carry out that thought. But I think that Secretary Laird was expressing the same thought that the President was expressing in the letter of transmittal. We think now is certainly the wrong time to unilaterally disarm. We have just demonstrated——

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody is proposing unilateral disarmament. That is a red herring. We are not proposing unilateral disarmament at all. It is a question of going forward with a vastly increased thing. Each of these Trident submarines is twice as big as existing ones and much longer range and it costs really ten times as much. It isn't unilateral disarmament not to go forward with that kind of weapon. I am not saying we should unilaterally disarm and no one else is.

SOVIET STATEMENTS AND IMPORTANCE OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, as I said, when you say we think or we conjecture that the Soviet Union may proceed, the fact is they say so, they told us—let me finish. Chairman Brezhnev told the President they were going to proceed with their programs within the limitations imposed by the interim agreement and he wanted to make it clear there was no doubt about that so we weren't misled.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't say you were mislead.

Secretary ROGERS. I am saying that is what he said. He explained to us that the Soviet Union was going to proceed within the limitations of the interim agreement, and we on our part should proceed with our programs. These are not what you suggested, greatly enlarged programs; they are programs that we submitted before these agreements were signed. So we do believe they are important. We believe they are important not only to the security of the United States but we think they are particularly important to the successful negotiations in the second phase, of SALT, and when I said unilateral disarmament, I meant that if we unilaterally decided not to proceed with offensive weapons systems that we had planned, based on these agreements, we would be making a mistake because the Soviet Union is not going to and we are prepared to work out mutual arrangements on limitations, further limitations of a permanent nature on offensive weapons. But partly because we had programs, on-going programs, particularly because we had an ABM program, we were able to succeed in these negotiations.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATEMENTS OF MR. KISSINGER AND MR. LAIRD

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to belabor, but at the briefing on Thursday this question was asked of Mr. Kissinger and he does not link these two together. This to me is a very significant difference. When he was speaking for the President at the White House at a public meeting. As you know, I asked him and he said they are not linked. He did not put it this way. Mr. Laird says he could not support the agreement if Congress fails to act. Mr. Kissinger said that these two stand on their own feet. This could be checked. He says the treaty is there and it is good or bad on its own feet. He said whether or not the weapons systems should be proceeded with stands on its own feet regardless of the treaty and that they should be judged on their merits. I say exactly that same thing.

If Congress thinks that the Trident, a submarine costing a billion dollars, is an extravagant waste of the taxpayers' money, they are quite free to do so and this in no way undermines or reflects upon the treaty. I think it is a rather significant difference to be told, "Now you want the treaty; we are all for the treaty, but if you are going to take the treaty you have to give us everything we want." I think this is a very bad way to approach it. I think the Congress ought to be free and feel free to exercise its own discretion whether or not it is profitable to go forward with a submarine of that size and cost, together with some of the planes.

There was great question before this ever came up whether the F–14 is any better than the Phantom jet. It costs four or five times as much. These questions should be free to be judged on their merits without tying it into the ABM limitations and saying if you want the treaty you have to give us the weapons. I think this is not quite playing it fair myself and I didn't understand Mr. Kissinger's briefing to say that.

Secretary ROGERS. My view is each of these stands, each of the two—I am speaking about the agreements on the one hand and the question of weapons on the other—stands on its own two feet. I think they should be judged on their merits.

Now, secondly, I think, Mr. Chairman, when you said that Secretary Laird said he won't favor ratification unless we get everything we want, that is not what he said. He said some forward movement on the programs.

The CHAIRMAN. That isn't what this says. I don't think that is a——

Secretary ROGERS. Do you want to read back what he said?

The CHAIRMAN. "I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system, on the B–1 bomber, and in other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five year period." I read that.

Secretary ROGERS. I think we are talking about the forward movement.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless we give him these weapons, he will not support the ABM treaty. I don't feel that way at all about it. And he is very adept at semantics on particular programs.

We now find bombing raids are called reaction strikes. I don't know whether he means what he says. As I read that language it means to me he does not support the ABM unless we give him everything he wants.

My time is up. I yield to Senator Symington who actually was at the meeting. I think he can give his own version of what the Secretary said.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, you are correct, that is what the Secretary said.

COMMENDATION OF AGREEMENTS AND AMBASSADOR SMITH

Now, I am glad to note, Mr. Secretary, that we reached these agreements and I congratulate Ambassador Smith for the fine job he and his people did.

I am especially glad to note we are going to cut down on ABM costs because I never thought the ABM was worth the staggering price. We would have knocked it out last year, in my opinion, except that the argument developed that it was a bargaining chip for SALT. It is clear most everybody is happy now. All the doves are satisfied because we have a treaty; all of the hawks are satisfied because the Secretary of Defense says he is not going to go along, and he is a very powerful man in the Cabinet, unless he gets the armament he wants.

Some of that armament we need; but some we need about as much as we need a hole in the head.

QUESTION OF COSTS AND VIABLE ECONOMY

In addition, there is that little problem of limited resources. It has been known for sometime that the cost of the new nuclear carrier in future production was going to be nearly a billion dollars for the ship alone.

But now we plan a tremendous new program on submarines, and each of these submarines is already going to cost hundreds of millions of dollars more than that latest figure on the new nuclear carrier.

At the meeting at the White House three committees were asked to come up. I am a member of all three committees. The President talked about 15 minutes. Dr. Kissinger talked for over an hour, and then

received questions. I left shortly before the end. To the best of my knowledge there wasn't a single question addressed to what is mighty important to true national security, namely, a viable economy. Not one question involved costs. All questions had to do with diplomatic matters and military matters, none about economic matters.

If these treaties are going to stand or fall on this also demanded tremendous escalation in the arms race, our economy, with the unprecedented deficit we are now showing, is going to get steadily into deeper trouble. Apparently as I read this proposal, it is going to be essential, for an indefinate future, for us to keep all of our people in Europe, because nothing was said about forward based aircraft. We are continuing to run a big war in the Far East. Whether or not we get out of Indochina is almost incidental to the tremendous build up of our fleet, and Air Force in Thailand. If in addition we are now going to spend over a billion dollars per submarine, that will be some five times the cost of any previous submarine.

How do you expect this economy to continue to remain viable under this heavily increased request for this type of and character of military appropriations as justification for making this treaty?

Isn't a viable economy with a sound currency equally important to national security?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, yes, of course, Senator, and we think the economy is viable. We agree that there have been problems and I think we all recognize them, but the economy is certainly in much better condition than it was and we think it is going to continue to improve.

Now, we think, as I have said in my statement, that these agreements are going to mean reduced costs, particularly in the long run, and we also think that the requests that have been made by the Administration for our defense establishment are realistic costs and we think they stand on their own merits. We didn't submit those requests after these agreements were reached; we submitted them beforehand because we thought they were important and they are permitted within the limitations of the agreements.

CHANGED EXPENDITURES FOR HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEFENSE PURPOSES

So, of course, I think all Americans are concerned about a healthy economy. I think we have a healthy economy. We have some problems. We have changed our priorities, as you know. The expenditures for national defense purposes in 1969 were about 45 percent of the budget. And they have gone down to about 31 percent of the budget or something of that order. And our expenditures for human resources have gone from 31 percent to 45 percent. So there has been a complete turnaround of the amount of money we are spending percentagewise for human resources contrasted with defense purposes.

Now I think that is a very significant fact, which people seem to ignore. It is true because of reasons that we know, and because of inflation, that the precise figures can be misconstrued, but the fact is the percentage that we are now spending for human resources is about 45 percent of the national budget.

Senator SYMINGTON. Don't you think a large part of that expense is because we have slighted, for so long, our social obligations over here in order to satisfy our apparent desire to rule the world, tell people how to live and govern themselves?

Secretary ROGERS. I don't agree with the latter, but I think it may be we neglected human factors in running the government and I am very happy I am a part of the Administration that has changed that.

TREATY'S TIE WITH INCREASED ARMS RACE UNFORTUNATE

Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad you feel the economy is in good shape, even though our debt continues to rise rapidly. Our large cities are bankrupt, freely admitted; our States are in deep trouble. They can't spend more than they take in. For such reasons, I think it unfortunate this treaty is tied, based on the statement by Secretary Laird, with such a tremendous increase in the arms race.

I must go to the floor to protest this morning against the deal made with Portugal re the Azores, also Bahrain. Apparently we are now going to take the place of the British in the Persian Gulf, regardless of what the Senate does or does not think about it. My leaving now does not mean I have any less interest in your testimony. Let me assure you you give me a deep satisfaction when you say our economy is in good shape and getting better.

Secretary ROGERS. Thank you, Senator. I am not sure in which place I would rather have you be.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, you pretty well covered the questions that were on my mind and what I have to say or ask briefly is likely to be partly repetitious.

NEGOTIATING FROM STRENGTH

First, does the Administration believe that we were able to negotiate these agreements because we have what the Mansfield-Scott resolution calls a defense posture second to none?

Is that right?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir, that is right.

Senator AIKEN. We have a defense posture second to none and does the Soviet Union also believe that it must negotiate from a position of strength?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I would assume so, yes, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. At the next round of negotiations which nation do you think will have the greatest strength from which to negotiate?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I think it is difficult to answer that question. We believe we are second to none. I am sure that the Soviet Union feels that it is strong and is able to negotiate from a position of strength; so we enter, assuming the Congress supports us on the requests we are making, certainly generally supports us—I don't mean to every item, but we get general support—then I would think we would both enter the second phase of the SALT talks from a position of relative strength.

Senator AIKEN. It will be of equal strength.

Secretary ROGERS. Well, as I say, I hesitate to say equal. We certainly are both in a strong position. We think we are. We don't think there is anyone ahead of us, put it that way.

ABM DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON

Senator AIKEN. The other question I was going to ask related to Secretary Laird's statement the other day in which he said in effect, as I interpreted it, he couldn't support this treaty unless the Congress gave him all he needed to maintain or increase strength. That would include the Trident submarine, the B–1 airplane—and I certainly couldn't put the submarine in the same class with other factors of defense—and also the ABM around Washington.

To comply with this treaty do we have to construct the ABM launchers, the radars, interceptors around Washington?

Secretary ROGERS. No, we do not, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. Then you would accept the treaty even if Congress didn't provide the money for the ABM defense of Washington?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, I don't want to put it in those terms.

In answer to the question the Chairman asked, I said that we feel that both of these should stand on their own merits. We think the agreements should be considered as agreements of great significance and should be supported and we think that the requests the Administration has made for appropriations also have merit and should be supported by the Congress.

I think though, Senator, I don't want to continue to refer to Secretary Laird's comments because I know he is going to be before this Committee and he is amply capable of answering these questions. But he didn't say everything he wants, he said forward movement on these requests. The headlines said everything he wants, something to that effect, but that is not what he said. What he said and what I say is that we should not abandon these programs which are very essential, we believe, not only to the strength and security of this nation but also to the success of the second phase in the SALT negotiation. So we would hope that Congress would give support to our requests.

Senator AIKEN. What he meant and what we agree with is that we should maintain defenses which would be in effect second to none.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. Has another site been selected for the ABM defense of Washington, do you know?

Secretary ROGERS. No, the locations have not, but I think there is an item in the budget, I am not sure, I know they haven't been selected yet.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SAM MISSILES

Senator AIKEN. In your statement you refer to the SAM (Surface To Air Missiles) missiles. Do you consider them especially effective? I note that the treaty states we are not going to have any upgrading of them to take the place of the ABM. Do you consider the SAM to be effective?

Secretary ROGERS. Well they certainly are effective to a considerable degree for the purpose intended, but they are not involved in this treaty at all except as I mentioned in my statement. That is that we wanted to be sure that the radars in connection with SAM's could not be used in any way to provide for more than air defense and the provisions in the treaty and the interim agreement, I think, give that protection.

EFFECTIVENESS OF LASERS AGAINST ABM SYSTEM

Senator AIKEN. I have been reading lately in several places about the effectiveness of the laser guided bombs in wiping out SAM's in North Vietnam. If a laser can be used in wiping out the SAM's, could the laser also be effective in the ABM system?

If the laser had come three years ago, one would have voted against the ABM system when it was first proposed.

Secretary ROGERS. Under the agreement we provide that exotic ABM systems may not be deployed and that would include, of course, ABM system based on the laser principle.

Senator AIKEN. Is the ABM system getting somewhat obsolete?

Secretary ROGERS. Excuse me?

Senator AIKEN. Is the ABM system getting obsolete? If the lasers can be used to knock out the SAM's, wouldn't they be effective against other types of missiles also?

STATEMENT BY HON. GERARD C. SMITH, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. SMITH. Senator Aiken, I think it is an entirely different problem with respect to the use of lasers to help guide offensive missiles and from their use to guide defensive missiles, but we have covered this concern of yours in this treaty by prohibiting the deployment of future type technology. Unless the treaty is amended, both sides can only deploy launchers and interceptors and radars. There are no inhibitions on modernizing this type of technology except that it cannot be deployed in mobile land-based or space-based or sea-based or air-based configurations. But the laser concern was considered and both sides have agreed that they will not deploy future type ABM technology unless the treaty is amended.

SUBJECTS OF NEXT ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS

Senator AIKEN. Have you decided what the subjects for discussion and possible treaty agreements will be at the next round of discussions, which I hope and believe will come this fall if the next round of discussions is dependent on Congress accepting this treaty?

Mr. SMITH. We have no definite guidance as yet, but I think one can anticipate that subjects such as the Secretary mentioned earlier, including reduction of forces, I hope personally that we will get into the question of a possible MIRV ban. There will be problems about how you control qualitive improvements, and basically I think the central problem will be to get an agreed aggregate on all strategic offensive weapons. The Interim Agreement just covers two types of strategic offensive weapons. I think our first business will be to try to extend that coverage so that it will include strategic bombers.

POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT WITH HANOI

Senator AIKEN. Do either of the witnesses believe we will come to some agreement with Hanoi within the next few days?

That may have some influence on the next round with Moscow?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I think anybody in Washington who has been in Washington for a long time, in fact almost anybody who has followed events in the world, would hesitate to make any prophecy about what would happen in that area.

Senator AIKEN. I didn't ask for promises.

Secretary ROGERS. Prophecy, I said.

Senator AIKEN. I thought you said promises.

Secretary ROGERS. We also have hope.

Senator AIKEN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

MEANING OF "SUFFICIENCY"

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was struck by the excellence of the President's word, "sufficiency" in moving into these negotiations. Some years ago we used to talk about negotiating from strength. Then as we studied the problem more we became aware that if we are dealing with pretty much a man of equal strength we must accept parity or, as President Nixon put it, sufficiency. Now I find a turning around of the cycle. I was curious if it is semantic or if there is some thought we must retain the old idea of nuclear superiority, a position second to none, because you in your own testimony earlier referred to negotiating from strength and the preamble of the agreement before us talks about a position second to none.

This is counter to President Nixon's views of 2 years ago when it was sufficiency. Is there more in this than meets the eye or is it all the same ball of wax?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I think it is important to point out that when we use the word sufficiency we mean a strong national defense capability second to none.

Now, there have been some tendencies on the part of some to give the word sufficiency the meaning that somehow we are prepared to be a little bit inferior or considerably inferior because we will show our good faith. We want to make it quite clear when we use the word sufficiency we mean a strong national security second to none. We don't claim it has to be anything except that, second to none, and it should be sufficient for purposes of our national defense and we think that that kind of a posture, one of sufficiency, second to none, strong, will give us the best negotiating position in the second round of the SALT talks.

Senator PELL. But the possibility of retaliation and with devastating results on the second round would not be considered sufficiency in itself?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

NO CONFLICT WITH SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY

Senator PELL. On another subject, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, which Mr. Smith and Mr. Leonard and his agency negotiated, also very successfully, is there any inhibition or conflict between the terms of the Seabed Arms Control Treaty prohibiting ABM's and weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and this treaty?

Secretary ROGERS. No, there are not, but I would be glad to have Ambassador Smith comment on this.

Mr. SMITH. I agree with the Secretary; there is no conflict at all. This treaty does not permit the deployment of an ABM system except on the continental territory of both countries and one cannot have sea-based ABM systems under this treaty.

ABM DEPLOYMENT IN CLIENT STATES NOT PERMISSIBLE

Senator PELL. Under the treaty, if either side had a client state that was willing to have an ABM system planted in it, would that be permissible?

Secretary ROGERS. No, you cannot deploy ABM systems abroad and you cannot transfer an ABM system to third countries.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

POSSIBILITY OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN DURING PHASE TWO

Is there any further thought to moving ahead with the idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty as part of phase two?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, as you know, over a long period of time the hang up has been verification. At the moment we think that still is an obstacle. I don't think we exclude it totally as a possibility, but we think in view of that obstacle it is possibly not realistic at the moment.

Senator PELL. I would imagine that the Senate will certainly give its assent to this treaty. I as one member looked forward to congratulating you on negotiating them.

SENATE PARTICIPATION IN NEXT ROUND

In connection with the advise portion of the advise and consent phrase in the Constitution, as you move into phase two, and I am not talking about the extra briefing Mr. Farley gave us and you gave us, is there any thought being given to Senate participation in the advising of the delegation in the next round?

Mr. SMITH. I would think, Senator, I believe, as was the case, we certainly will be consulting with appropriate congressional committees before we start actually negotiating in the second round; yes, sir.

Secretary ROGERS. I think in the process of consultations we get a good deal of advice.

Senator PELL. Was there thought given to representatives of the Senate being part of the delegation in the next round?

Secretary ROGERS. I don't think so. I think this has worked out so well we ought to continue the process that we have followed up to now.

I think it is worth pointing out that in my experience there never have been such extensive consultations with congressional committees as in SALT. I think that the figures show that we have briefed congressional committees 30 times during the course of the negotiations.

Mr. SMITH. I think in addition to the considerations the Secretary mentioned one should keep in mind that a comprehensive test ban presumably will be a multilateral negotiation because it is much broader than just Soviet-American relations. We think of the next round of SALT as limited to Soviet-American strategic relations and I wouldn't think of them in the same negotiating forum.

Secretary ROGERS. I also think I should add we have consulted very actively with our allies and there is great satisfaction on the part of our allies all over the world about the consultation process and we expect to continue that.

IMPLICATIONS OF EXPANSION TO LIMITS OF AGREEMENTS

Senator PELL. I think probably Ambassador Smith would best be able to answer this question. If the Soviets do what is allowed in land and submarine based forward movement on their side, what are the implications for us? If the Kremlin or Pentagon move ahead on the same basis and expand as much as they can within the framework of the agreement, would that put us in the very inferior position after a few years?

Mr. SMITH. I think one of the keys to the answer to your question is your last few words, "after a few years." Now, one cannot tell how long this interim freeze will last. People shorthandedly say this is a 5-year agreement. I hope it won't be. It may be a 1-year agreement; it may be a 2-year agreement, depending on when we succeed in the follow-on negotiations.

Now, it is our calculation that nothing that the Soviets can do even if it went the full term of five years could upset the strategic balance. We will be going ahead, as you know, with substantial programs in the Poseidon and Minuteman field and in other strategic areas, so that it is our confident calculation that the strategic balance will remain firm during that period.

ARE BOTH SIDES GOING FULL STEAM AHEAD?

Senator PELL. Basically what you are saying is that both sides really told each other we are going to go full steam ahead within the terms of the agreement. Would that be correct?

Mr. SMITH. I think "full steam ahead" is much too strong a term. Certainly as far as any programs I know of, if we wanted, we could go much further and much faster. For instance, in such programs as the MIRV programs, you could step that up if you wanted to. There are a number of ways that the United States could produce more launchers rather quickly if it wanted to. So I don't see this as a full steam ahead situation, but it is our understanding that the Soviets are not going to be hesitating and reducing their programs because of the fact that a preliminary SALT offensive agreement has been reached. It is by no means a completed agreement.

MOVING AHEAD TO EXTENT INDICATED QUESTIONED

Senator PELL. In conclusion, as one individual member of the body, I would share the doubts of my chairman and Senator Symington that we should move ahead to the extent Secretary Laird indicates he would like us to move. I would think that it would behoove us to see if we really feel if moving ahead in one or two of those weapons systems would not be enough to meet your bargaining purposes and by the same token would perhaps give us some effect to our economy, which is also needed at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

COMMENDATION OF THOSE WHO WORKED ON NEGOTIATION

Senator COOPER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to the Secretary and to the negotiators and Ambassador Smith, Mr. Nitze, General Allison, Dr. Brown, Mr. Gartoff and all of the staff, Mr. Farley and his staff who worked on these negotiations, I believe you deserve the greatest thanks from the country for the painstaking work that you have done throughout these years.

I want to say I had the good fortune to attend as an observer to three of these meetings, two in Vienna and one in Helsinki and have a good idea of what a difficult painstaking process you had to go through. I say that as to what I believe and also to ask this question.

DECISIONS MADE IN LAST 48 HOURS IN MOSCOW

Some publicity has been given to the view held by some that agreement was largely determined in Moscow in the last 48 hours through quick decisions, and some of them to the disadvantage of the United States, particularly on the submarine launched missiles. Again based upon my experience at the SALT negotiations and from your briefings in Washington, I believe that it is not possible to make sudden changes at the last minute. A constant interchange of proposals and ideas was made during the last 2½ years and the treaty and agreement reflect that background. But is there any truth that the decisions made in the last 48 hours were harmful and disadvantageous to the United States of America?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, I can answer——

Senator PELL. What essential agreement was made there that had not been agreed upon in your prior negotiations——

Secretary ROGERS. Let me say that when you are dealing with agreements that are as complicated as these agreements are it requires a coordinated effort on the part of many, many, people, and in order to complete the agreements that effort has to be a long one and it has to be carefully planned. In the final analysis when there are differences of views that prevent the agreement from being consummated, they have to be decided at the highest level. Now that was done in this instance. I think this was as well coordinated and well prepared a negotiation as possibly our country has ever engaged in and it required teamwork of the highest order and we had that teamwork.

There were major agreements worked out in Helsinki and Vienna over a course of two and a half years, each one of them difficult in itself, and combined extremely difficult, because each related to the other.

At the end of that process, just before the agreements were signed, there were still some problems, which is not unusual in negotiations. That is why negotiations haven't been completed, because there are problems. These problems were ones that we had more or less anticipated, they were the ones that remained as a result of long discussions that Ambassador Smith and his team engaged in, and it was understood they would be discussed at Moscow.

As you say, they were well thought through and we knew where the areas of disagreement were and there had to be a decision taken by the President himself about what he would finally be willing to do or not do. That was done. And I don't believe it was a disadvantage

at all. I think if it had not been done we wouldn't have these agreements today and I submit Gerry Smith and all his team agree those final decisions of the President, too, were extremely important, were vital in fact to the success of these negotiations and were not harmful in any degree.

Now, each side had to give a little in order to reach the result we reached but, as the chairman said, and I think the sentiment and the general view of what he said is shared; these are very good agreements and no one has been taken advantage of. I don't think the Russians are at a disadvantage, we are not at a disadvantage. I think these agreements reflect the maturity of national interest. They are going to benefit both the Soviet Union and the United States and the people of the whole world and I don't believe anybody lost or won. I think that the world was the winner, and I think it will improve the relations between our two countries to a great extent.

I am not sure that any useful purpose is served by talking about what the disagreements were and how they were resolved. Everything that has been agreed to is before the Congress. We are going to have another series of negotiations that we have to undertake soon. I can only say I am absolutely convinced myself that nothing that happened at Moscow, no decision that was made by the President, in any way disadvantaged this country. On the contrary, I think it was essential to the successful completion of these agreements, which I think serve our national interest.

WITHOUT AGREEMENT OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE AND ABM WOULD CONTINUE

Senator Cooper. What I am saying is indisputable; it is a fact, but for an agreement, the offensive arms race and the ABM, defensive missiles, would continue with no essential additional protection to the United States or either country, and certainly greater danger to both sides. All this futile, dangerous weaponry could be at tremendous cost to both countries. Isn't that correct?

Secretary Rogers. That is correct.

OTHER UNSUBMITTED DOCUMENTS

Senator Cooper. The President submitted the treaty, the interim agreement and protocol, and also understandings agreed to by both the Soviet Union and the United States, unilateral statements by both countries. In those papers, particularly those dealing with understandings, unilateral statements of both the Soviet Union and the United States, references were made to some other documents which were not included in the papers that were sent up. You already have said there were no secret understandings. Is there anything in the papers to which reference was made in the unilateral statements of both countries and the agreed understandings which are of such significance that they should be sent to the Senate also?

Secretary Rogers. Well, I would like to ask Ambassador Smith to elaborate.

Senator Cooper. The question has arisen many times recently but also in past history, particularly in the early days of this Republic the Executive was asked if the negotiators' papers and instructions

were sent to the Senate on various treaties. Should not these papers—the full papers, the complete record—be given to us now?

Secretary ROGERS. I would like to have Ambassador Smith answer that, but let me before he does say that we very carefully considered everything that may be thought of as an agreement or understanding of any significance and everything that is agreed to of any significance we think has been fully reflected in the treaty, in the agreed understandings that are included in this document. In the interim agreement and protocol. Nevertheless, everything that has been agreed to has been submitted to the Congress for its consideration and perusal. I don't believe there is anything else that is of any consequence.

EXPECTED SOVIET PROGRAMS

Now, there was not any complete transcript maintained of the plenary sessions; so I think the Congress has everything that reflects in any way on what the treaty and agreements involve.

Senator COOPER. Reference has been made to the President's statement that the Soviet Union intends to build up its offensive missiles strength. Agreement has been reached upon the number of land based missiles, submarine launched missiles, protection against upgrading of SAM to the anti-ballistic area. What are the things that you expect the Soviet Union to continue to do, Ambassador Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Well, I think, Senator Cooper, the Soviet Union throughout this negotiation made it very clear that their modernization process should not be interfered with in connection with this first agreement and we, in general, agreed with that proposition. This is to a considerable extent a numerical limitation although there are some qualitative limitations in these arrangements. I think that what the Soviets had in mind is that they want to keep their missile systems up to date. Their missiles are not as efficient as ours. They want to have the opportunity too of having more modern missiles. A lot of their missiles are liquid fueled. They want to probably make them solid fueled. They want to have them more efficient and that is why we had a good deal of discussion about what could be done within the numerical restraints. For instance, one of the questions was, could you increase the size of launchers for an ICBM, and it was agreed that you could not increase the dimensions "significantly." It was subsequently agreed that "significantly increased" meant more than ten or 15 percent. So I would expect that the Soviets will be engaged in programs which would involve some increase in the dimensions of their silo launchers.

In addition to that, the whole submarine program I look on as a modernization program. They apparently are willing to modernize their strategic forces by building more submarines at the price of phasing out ICBM's. I would anticipate we will see that modernization phenomena continue in their forces just as we continue to modernize our forces by improving the warhead situation in our MIRV program, by hardening our silos and otherwise.

Senator COOPER. Then what you are speaking of is the modernization of their ABM system, and their land based missiles systems, and submarine launched missiles systems, which is permitted under the treaty and agreement?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. Do you anticipate they will continue to work upon MIRV, deployment of MIRV which is not prohibited by the agreement?

Secretary ROGERS. I wouldn't be at all surprised if the Soviets follow a MIRV approach.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIETS INCREASING SS–9'S

Senator COOPER. You have spoken of the enlargement of their silos. Does that offer a danger that by enlarging their silos the Soviets could somehow increase their SS–9's? There is a fixed limit on SS–9's; is there not?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir, they have agreed that they will not construct any new ICBM silos and that means that they are frozen not only at their present level of ICBM silos, but at their present level of what we call heavy ICBM silos, which are SS–9's and any subsequent class of that sort.

They presently have something on the order of 300 operational and under construction and under this agreement they will be limited to that.

Senator COOPER. Could they by increasing the diameter of the silos, which you say is permitted up to 15 percent, would that permit the deployment of heavy missiles comparable to the SS–9?

Secretary ROGERS. We believe not.

SUBJECTS FOR NEXT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS

Senator COOPER. What is there then to negotiate in the next phase? There are bombers. What else?

Secretary ROGERS. The first thing——

Senator COOPER. Is reduction of launchers agreed upon in phase one?

Secretary ROGERS. There are not reductions agreed upon in the present situation, except in connection with the SLBM inclusion where the Soviets will have to go in for a substantial reduction program if they want to build up to the levels of submarines and SLBM launchers permitted. I would think that a reduction program would be an important component of any follow-on negotiations but, firstly, what I think we need to get an agreement on is what weapons systems. Strategic offensive weapons systems, must be included in a treaty to match the defensive treaty, and that means including bombers.

Now, the Soviets, as you know, made a strong point in the past of saying it also should include some other aircraft that we do not consider as strategic. These forward based systems——

Senator COOPER. In addition to placing the interim agreement in the form of a treaty, achieving launcher number reductions, you might go into subjects such as bombers, forward based aircraft, the aircraft on carriers, that type of thing?

Secretary ROGERS. Our position is that aircraft on carriers and systems based on the Far East and in Europe are not correctly characterized as strategic.

PERIOD OF RESTRAINT BEFORE WEAPONS BUILDING PROGRAM

Senator COOPER. Now, some discussions have been had about the pushing forward of larger offensive weapons development programs. I know you have stated that you were talking about modernization, but would it be good to have a period of restraint for a year or two before we engage in such a building program to determine whether or not the Soviet Union also has shown some restraints?

Some scientists connected with the SALT talks of great ability, knowledge and integrity told me restraint could be very helpful to the agreements and could perhaps help in reaching a more favorable outcome in phase two. It is their view that if the Soviets do not show similar restraint there would be plenty of time in the 3 years remaining of the interim agreement to take such steps as would be necessary to protect the security of this country.

It seems to me a very reasonable position and it conflicts somewhat with the position of going forward full speed with the weapons building program.

Secretary ROGERS. I want to emphasize——

CHANGE IN BUDGET PRIORITIES

Senator COOPER. Let me say I am glad you brought out the point, which I don't think has been very thoroughly gone into, that while the defense budget has increased without question, it is also true, to anyone who studies it, that the relative priorities have changed wholely.

Secretary ROGERS. There has been a total shift.

Senator COOPER. It has been reversed. We now spend 45% on social needs and about 30% on defense.

QUESTION OF RESTRAINT

I want to ask further about the question of restraint.

Secretary ROGERS. I think Ambassador Smith has pointed out something we should emphasize constantly and that is there a lot of things we could do within the limitations of these agreements that we are not doing. So when we use expressions like full speed ahead and so forth, I think it is misleading. What we are talking about now is continuing with the programs that we had earlier included in our budget submissions and I think that we should continue those programs. I think the Soviet Union would wonder what was happening in this country if under these circumstances, when the President has been so successful in concluding these agreements, that he was not supported in his requests. If we change our budgetary requests now and had unilateral action, I think first it would cause a good deal of concern here in this country and I think the Soviet Union would wonder why the Congress didn't support the President at this time.

Second, I think it would weaken the negotiating position very measureably because the Soviet Union would ask itself why should it bother to negotiate reciprocal limitations if in fact, the Congress of the United States is not going to support the President. I think that would be very harmful, not only to our security interests, but to our foreign policy. So I strongly urge the Congress to support the Presi-

dent and I do not think it is appropriate to indicate that we are not acting with restraint. The programs that we have asked for, we think, are very reasonable programs that are necessary unless we can work out some kind of a further limitation in the permanent arrangement. And to me at a time when the country is very supportive to the President, and I think the committee is, and we all agree these are very significant agreements particularly the ABM agreement which I think has great importance may be not fully understood in this country, that is not the time to fail to support the President. The things that he has suggested in the past that were necessary, programs such as ABM, it has turned out right. There is no doubt in my mind that those programs, that ABM program, contributed very substantially to the success of these negotiations and I think we should, I think the Congress should, support the President in the request he has made. I don't necessarily mean everything; I don't think Secretary Laird said everything we want, but he said forward movement on these programs and I think that is essential.

ARTICLE CONCERNING ARMS ACCORDS AND QUESTIONS FOR RECORD

Senator COOPER. My time has run out. However, I would like to offer for inclusion in the record an article from the Washington Post, dated June 4, 1972, entitled "The Arms Accords: Everyone Gains."

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, June 4, 1972]

THE ARMS ACCORD: EVERYONE GAINS

(By Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman)

The authors are members of the defense analysis staff at the Brookings Institution. Their views should not be attributed to Brookings.

The strategic arms limitation agreements signed in Moscow a week ago are landmark accords, symbolizing a marked reduction of U.S.-Soviet rivalry in strategic armaments and formalizing the mutual acceptance of overall nuclear parity. While the specific limits on weapons systems incorporated in the agreements are important in their own right and will result in greater security and substantial economies for both nations, the significance of the agreements, as stated by Henry Kissinger, "transcends the importance of individual restrictions." Most importantly, by explicitly agreeing to forego nationwide population defenses, the signatories have removed the greatest threat to each other's deterrent. In themselves, therefore, these accords are major steps toward stabilizing the strategic relationship.

Two agreements have been concluded: One, a formal treaty of unlimited duration, limits the development of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM); the second, a five-year executive agreement, limits offensive missiles.

It is unfortunate that in the domestic debate over the advisability of these agreements, the overall sufficiency of U.S. strategic forces and our technological superiority will be largely ignored. The fact is that we have sufficient forces to deter potential enemies, singly or in combination. The large number of U.S. nuclear weapons carried by diverse delivery systems assures that even in retaliation to a preemptive first strike, enough weapons would survive to destroy the attacker's population and industrial base. Our technology lead insures that this will be the case for the indefinite future.

Critics of the agreement will argue, based on simple comparisons of numbers of launchers, that the United States is frozen into a position of inferiority. In fact, however, the United States is better off, by any measure, with the agreements than without them.

The table appearing on page B4 projects the strategic balance for mid-1977, both with and without an agreement. If the momentum of the Soviet missile building program had not been stopped, the U.S.S.R. by that time would have almost twice as many missiles as would the United States. To counter this buildup, the United States could have chosen to launch a new building program of its own, at great expense and with no assurance of great security. The Moscow accords offer a much more favorable outcome.

Although the Soviets will still have 2,300 launchers compared to 1,700 for the United States, the ongoing U.S. MIRV program will ensure a substantial margin of missile-deliverable warheads in favor of the United States. Number of warheads together with equivalent megatons (EMT, an index of nuclear weapon destructive potential) provide much better measures of deterrent capability than number of missiles alone. The restraints provided by the agreements on projected Soviet capabilities are particularly apparent in the projected EMT index.

There is no possibility that the Soviets can reverse the U.S. advantage in number of warheads over the course of this decade. Although the Moscow agreements do not prevent the Soviets from replacing their present warheads with MIRVs, both their submarine-launched missiles and SS–11 land-based missiles are too small for effective conversions. Any Soviet MIRV program is likely to be restricted to the approximately 300 large SS–9 missiles, the unidentified missile for some new silos under construction, or a follow-on to current sea-based systems. In any case, U.S. defense officials indicate the U.S.S.R. is unlikely to achieve the requisite technology before 1980, long after the duration of the present agreement.

Furthermore, the United States has a larger, more modern and more survivable bomber force than do the Soviets. These forces are not limited by the Moscow agreements. Soviet strategic bombers, which entered service in 1956, are comparable to aircraft that were phased out by the United States many years ago. In addition, the late model U.S. B–52 strategic bombers are now being equipped with up to 20 short-range attack missiles (SRAM). The Soviets have not demonstrated any comparable capability.

MOSCOW'S TRADEOFF

In a more general context, the agreements provide substantial benefits for both countries.

From the Soviet perspective, the accords establish the U.S.S.R. as a great power second to none, and the strategic equal of the United States. The agreements and other documents issued during the summit represent formal recognition of this status by the United States, and our acceptance of nuclear parity. Such recognition has long been an important objective in Soviet foreign policy.

Second, the agreement terminates the U.S. deployment of the Safeguard ABM, a system which the Soviets may see as potentially negating the advantages of their offensive missile buildup. Third, the agreements give the Soviets numerical superiority in both land and sea-based offensive missile launchers, an advantage which they may believe will yield political dividends.

To obtain these advantages the U.S.S.R. has made considerable concessions. The Soviets had to accept the United States technological lead; our advantage in warheads, for example, will continue to grow. It has not been able to restrict our great advantage in strategic bombers, nor limit our deployment of forward-based systems (land- and sea-based tactical aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union due to their deployment in Europe and elsewhere). The latter, especially, provided considerable delay in the negotiations, reflecting its importance to the U.S.S.R.

The advantages of the agreements from the United States' perspective stem from two sources. First, they will result in considerable dollar savings. Much more importantly, however, the agreements effectively constrain the momentum of the strategic arms buildup which has been underway in the Soviet Union since 1965. Since that year, the U.S.S.R. has deployed more than 1,200 ICBMs and 25 modern strategic submarines (Yankee class). An additional 17–18 Yankee subs are under construction.

The buildup had reached such alarming proportions that some were beginning to fear the Soviets' quantitative superiority would overwhelm the United States' technological advantages and gain for Moscow substantial political, if not military, advantages. Even though the agreements permit the Soviets to deploy up to 62 missile-firing submarines, they terminate this buildup below potential uncontrolled levels, and are a more effective counter than similar deployments by this

nation. This is particularly true since new U.S. strategic systems such as Trident and B–1 would not be deployed before the late 1970s, even under the accelerated schedules announced by the administration this past winter.

More importantly, both nations benefit by the change in attitudes reflected in the agreement. The superpowers have clearly indicated their determination to reduce the risk of nuclear war and, as stated in the joint communique issued at the end of the President's visit, "to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states. . . ."

NEW OPTIONS FOR U.S.

The Moscow accords directly curtail the Safeguard system to two sites, one at a Minuteman site (now under construction at Grand Forks AFB, N.D.), the other around Washington. Beyond that, the achievement of these agreements should cause reconsideration of some of the major strategic programs presently planned.

On the one hand, we will want to continue certain programs in order to hedge against the unexpected and to modernize or replace existing systems. The Minuteman II and Poseidon MIRV programs are likely to fall into this group. Additionally, there probably will be increased spending on basic research for strategic systems as well as for increased strategic reconnaissance.

On the other hand, because of new explicit constraints on Soviet deployments and because of our improved understanding of Soviet intentions, it may be desirable to modify or redirect other major programs. Some possibilities are:

Since it is no longer necessary to accelerate the development of Trident (a new submarine system incorporating a longer-range missile) as a bargaining chip, or to match the Soviets in sea-based missile, should the program revert to its earlier slower schedule? Furthermore, should we reconsider the characteristics of the new submarine?

Is it necessary or desirable to plan to defend Washington with ABMs, even though it is permitted under the agreement? The survivability of our national leadership now depends on airborne command posts together with an extensive and redundant communications net.

Since both sides now have agreed to forego nationwide defenses of their population against missiles, there is little point in trying to protect cities against Soviet bombers. Should we reduce our objectives for air defenses to a surveillance role against unauthorized penetration of U.S. air space and defense against light attacks?

While answers to these questions are only partly dependent upon the agreements, a new element has been introduced into the strategic calculation which requires careful evaluation. Potential savings realizable from these measures are estimated in the table below, expressed in terms of average annual savings from fiscal 1973 to fiscal 1979, in billions of fiscal 1973 dollars:

Direct result: Limit ABM deployments to two sites	$1.4
Other possible actions:	
Do not deploy ABM defense for District of Columbia	0.2
Slow down Trident development	1.0
Limit air defense to surveillance rule	2.2
Gross potential annual savings	4.8
Incremental spending for additional surveillance and research	0.5
Net potential annual savings	4.3

AGENDA FOR SALT II

Negotiations on further arms limitations are likely to be prolonged and difficult. The prominent issues remaining are complicated and involve forces and concepts that are hard to define and isolate.

Topics likely to be discussed at future SALT meetings include possible limits on forward-based systems, bombers, land-mobile ICBM's, air defenses, anti-submarine warfare forces, and intermediate range missiles. Additionally, one would expect that the two sides will eventually discuss mutual force reductions in strategic systems already limited.

One of the problems most likely to be resolved in the follow-on negotiations concerns the mutual vulnerability of both sides' land-based missiles. Conceivably,

improvements in missile accuracy and warhead proliferation could still lead to the attainment of a counterforce capability against the land-based component in either the U.S. or Soviet strategic force. Such a development could be destabilizing.

Two forms of limitations would ameliorate these problems: reductions in the number of deployed warheads, and mutual agreement to shift land-based missiles to sea, or simply to phase them out altogether. In this sense, the provision in the present agreement permitting the shift of older land-based missiles to sea is an important precedent.

While these subjects are made difficult by problems of definition, verification and the interrelationship of strategic and general purpose forces, the atmosphere of cooperation engendered by the Moscow agreements and the summit in general should help ease these difficulties. In any case, independent of any future agreements, the measures agreed upon in Moscow are major steps in assuring the security of this nation.

The following table estimates the projected strategic balance in mid-1977, at the expiration of the new 5-year agreement on offensive weapons, based on administration statements about present U.S. planning and on observed deployment rates for Soviet systems:

	Without Moscow Agreement		Under Moscow Agreement	
	U.S.S.R.	United States	U.S.S.R.	United States
Land-based missiles	1,900	1,054	1,330	1,000
Sea-based missiles	1,200	656	950	710
Heavy bombers	140	500	140	500
Deployed strategic warheads	3,400	11,000	2,600	11,000
Equivalent megatonnage	5,500	4,550	4,000	4,450

Note: Weapons characteristics based on the International Institute for Strategic Studies' "The Military Balance, 1971–72."

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McGee.

CHARACTERIZING BUILDUP AS FULL STEAM AHEAD QUESTIONED

Senator MCGEE. I would not begin without reference to the phrase already used, Mr. Secretary, as to whether we were going to proceed full steam ahead. If we do, we will end up back in the 1930's. It went out of style a couple of years ago to characterize the arrangement of our buildup that way.

AGREEMENT ON TERM "HEAVY MISSILE"

But I wanted to phrase this particular question now in the wake of the questioning of the Senator from Kentucky. Was there agreement on the meaning of the term "heavy missile" or did the United States simply file its interpretation of what it meant to us?

Mr. SMITH. Senator McGee, there is good agreement. This was reflected in the exchanges, going back quite a bit, as to what is a heavy missile and what is a light missile at the present time.

There is no doubt that the SS–7's and the SS–8's and the SS–9's are heavy missiles, and the SS–11's and the SS–13's are light missiles, and that the Titan on the American side is a heavy missile and the Minuteman is a light missile. The question came up as to the future. Supposing some sort of a missile is developed that is in between? There we tried to get a specific definition of future missiles that would qualify for that term "heavy" and the Soviets were loath to get pinned down to a specific number.

One of the arguments was, if you have a specific number and you are just over that in volume by one cubic meter, there would be a violation, and how can one be so precise about the future as to know exactly what technology would require?

The best that we were able to do was to make a unilateral statement that if the Soviets deployed a missile significantly larger than the SS–11, we would consider that a heavy missile and we expected the Soviets to take our point of view into consideration.

They replied, saying that the record showed we had been unable to reach a specific agreement on the definition of heavy and that the executive agreement should stand as it was written.

I think that there is no doubt about the state of consensus as to the present. There is some possibility that in the future there may be a discussion between us as to whether a new class of missiles would be light or heavy and we have a Standing Consultative Commission that we will set up and it is that sort of problem, I believe, that will be referred to that commission.

Senator McGee. Is there no uncertainty or equivocation in your judgment as it affects the SS–9? I single that out because that is a straightforward statement. One of our very distinguished colleagues in the Senate on this matter said that the ambiguity led to no agreement and thus it leaves the SS–9 and its status in sort of quiet limbo.

Mr. Smith. I think the record is clear that the SS–9 is accepted by both sides as a heavy missile.

DOES AGREEMENT GIVE SOVIETS MORE OF EVERYTHING?

Senator McGee. A second statement has been made by one of our colleagues, and I read this because it was lifted out of a printed record. News Day I think. He says that the agreement gives the Soviets more of everything, more light ICBM, more heavy ICBM's, more submarines, more submarine launched missiles, more payloads, even more ABM radar.

In no area covered by the agreement "is the United States permitted to maintain parity with the Soviet Union."

Mr. Smith. Well, I think that this is a straight, simple statement on the numbers of launchers. The present situation is that the Soviets have more ICBM's and they have more SLBM's under construction and operational. The recitation of the present numerical situation does not affect the value of these agreements.

It is our position, which is supported by our military authorities, that we have a position of sufficiency, that we have advantages in a number of other respects. We have a very substantial advantage in the number of warheads; we have doubled the number of warheads in our arsenal in the last three years. They are programed to be again doubled in the next two or three years.

The quality of our forces is substantially better than the Soviets. We have a bomber force that is something like three times the size of theirs and there is no comparison between the efficiency of our bomber forces.

We have a capability to add new armaments to our bomber force and we have them programed. So I think that there is no question that this agreement does not result in any inequality for the United States.

Senator McGee. In other words, the statement which I read from the Senator is not untrue? It is partly true?

Mr. Smith. Well, the statement about radar, for instance, is based, I take it, on the assumption that the Soviets are permitted to retain some quite obsolescent radars that are not phased-array radars. They are mechanical dish radars that have been around Moscow for some years. And under the agreement, in one of the interpretative statements, we have agreed that they don't have to scrap those. But in all other respects the radar situation is precisely the same and these old radars give them no advantage at all. I would expect they would scrap them pretty soon and go to the modern technology.

Senator McGee. What it leaves out is the number of warheads, for example, where we have distinct advantage, the aircraft that are committed to the strategic balance system and the sophistication of some of the weaponry that is involved. Is that correct?

Mr. Smith. That is correct. In addition to that we have a number of advantages that are given to us by geography.

In the case of our submarine deployments, I believe Dr. Kissinger pointed out the other day that in order to keep the same number of submarines on station as the United States does, the Soviet Union at present would have to have a larger number of submarines than the United States has.

AVOIDING WARPED VIEW OF AGREEMENTS

Senator McGee. Statements like the two that I have just read are going to have to be explained, I think, very carefully, if the public is to avoid a warped view of to what the agreements agree and to what they did not agree.

It is easy to lift something out of context. I suspect we are all guilty of it at one time or another. But I can't stress strongly enough how urgent it is we try to make sure the full story gets out, not just a part of it. The moment there are any gaps, it is going to complicate it for a good——

Mr. Smith. I agree completely and I take it that is the purpose of your line of questioning right now. I think that has been very useful.

Secretary Rogers. I think it is well to keep in mind we have another negotiation coming and we want to be somewhat careful about how we state some of these things.

For example, forward basing, and geographical advantages, it is important for us to take those factors into consideration, too.

We have taken the position that they are not to be negotiated in the next round. But there is no doubt, as Ambassador Smith said, that the areas where we are away ahead are not included in the limitations, MIRV's and airplanes, and so forth.

IS MOVING AHEAD AS DESCRIBED VIOLATION?

Senator McGee. Let me ask again, for the record, if we move ahead, not at full steam, full whatever it takes in the nuclear age, in the terms that have been described, the B–1 the Trident submarine, and the like, does that in any way violate the understanding or the treaty with Moscow?

Secretary ROGERS. No, not at all. In fact, it is quite consistent with what Mr. Brezhnev said they were going to do. He explained they were going to go ahead with their ongoing programs within the limitation permitted in the interim agreement, and our position is we should do the same thing until we negotiate further.

Senator MCGEE. That is why I think it is important again that this be kept very sharply in front of us so that the innuendos that somehow we may be doing violence to a negotiating stance and an agreement with Moscow do not enter the picture.

It is for us to decide up here as a separate issue whether that is a wise policy in terms of the next round. We should not have no choice but to nod our heads and say, I favor the treaty. So I have to go along with the full arms program as outlined by the Secretary of Defense.

Secretary ROGERS. No, we certainly have not taken that position. But our position is both of these things should be considered on the merits and we hope Congress would support President Nixon on both of them.

COST OF ITEMS AND COST OF UNBALANCED STRATEGIC CAPABILITY

Senator MCGEE. We are going to likewise hear a great deal more than we have heard this morning about how horribly costly these items may be in the non-treaty field, the B–1, the Trident submarines, and the like.

The issue, it seems to me, ought to be, at least for the moment, whether or not it complicates or enhances the chance for success in stage two. I think that is the basic question involved. Cost is also a frightening thing. But there are some things I think we have learned in our history even worse than an unbalanced budget. We found that in World War II. I suspect an unbalanced strategic capability could be even more costly than the frightening cost of these items.

BENEFIT OF DOUBT RESIDES WITH CONTINUING LEGAL BUILDUPS

But we should consider those, in my judgment, separately. I must say at this stage I lean toward gambling on the request for these defense articles while we prepare for the next stage. I didn't always think thus, but I think the record is rather impressive, as we remember that only when the Russians acquired a capability in the nuclear areas with us was it even possible to open feelers for discussion ultimately culminating in the SALT talks. And only as we maintained an equivalent balance was it possible to bring those talks to fruition.

I think that the burden of proof lies with those who think otherwise as to what our chances would be if we sat tight here in the steam age and waited placidly for the next stage to get underway.

I think really the benefit of the doubt now has to reside with the request for continuation of the legal buildups, the treaty permissive buildups in capabilities, if we are to preserve the chance for still more progress in disarmament agreements.

Secretary ROGERS. That is the view of the Administration.

Senator MCGEE. I think it is very risky, Mr. Secretary, as we do that, but I think it is well we remember that it is risky if we don't.

If we are going to get two-thirds of the Senate to agree on something, there is going to have to be a bit of give, a bit of reservation from both directions, those who think we can stabilize the world by fortressing America, and those on the other hand who think we can do it by rolling over. I think the balance of capability may hold the key to a new breakthrough.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Senator SCOTT. First of all, Senator Percy regrets he has an engagement which has made him leave early and he expresses the hope there will be an afternoon or later session with the opportunity to question the Secretary and Ambassador Smith. If not, he would like permission to submit certain questions to them and include their answers in the record. (See p. 51.)

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, without objection.

DESIRE FOR PROMPT ACTION

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Secretary, first of all, the Majority Leader and I have had a colloquy this morning in which we have indicated that if, after full opportunity for the purpose of hearings, the treaty could be reported expeditiously, it would be our joint desire to bring it up before the July recess. If that cannot be done, then we would wish to have the Senate debate and act on the treaty following the first of the two conventions.

I put this in the record as indicative of the desire, which I am sure is shared by this committee, for prompt action, as consistent with the importance of the matter before the committee.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DIET AND FAST

There is much controversy on the use of the word "unilateral" disarmament. It seems to me that the difference between following the treaty and refusing to go along with the buildup is somewhat the difference between a diet and a fast. Both of these countries have agreed upon a certain diet which would still leave them quite strong. But if the United States, urged on by unilateral disarmers and neo-isolationists is to engage in not a diet but a fast, while Russia is not engaging in a fast, we will end up much the weaker for it.

I have sat here in this room for 30 years off and on and I heard the same arguments when we were discussing lend-lease, when Wendell Willkie was testifying in favor of it 30 years ago in this room. I have heard these arguments by each new brand of isolationists as they come on and they have always been wrong and they always have had the arguments before them that indicated the worst disasters could occur to this country.

I don't know how much we need, but I know that if we do without the treaty, then we break the backs of both our peoples in supporting an impossible spiraling arms race. But if we do less than the treaty or we do less than the forward movement indicated in the treaty, we will reduce the chances for future limitation.

So I speak for the diet rather than the fast concept.

UNILATERAL OBSOLESCENCE

Moreover, there are those who do not like to be called unilateral disarmers. I would suggest what certainly will clearly define the issue. If we are not to proceed with Trident, if we are to let the Russians build beyond us in submarines, if we are not to proceed with the new bomber, and allow the old ones to be withdrawn, if we are not to proceed with those things, with which the Russians, themselves, admit they will proceed, then those who advocate this withdrawal into a shell of presumed security are advocating unilateral obsolescence.

To my mind unilateral obsolescence is even more dangerous than unilateral disarmament, because on unilateral disarmament you can make political adjustments and prepare to be a second-class power, but on unilateral obsolescence you don't know whether your weapons are any good until you suddenly find you need to use them and it is too appalling and too apparent.

APPROVAL OF APPROPRIATIONS BY CONGRESS

I might point out, too, that we have had discussions here on how heavy our appropriations are, how much these things cost, what we have been spending, how heavy the national debt is. Every appropriation has been approved by Congress. That is the only place they are approved.

REORDERING PRIORITIES

We have, indeed, reordered our priorities from 31 percent on the general welfare and 45 percent on the defense, as you pointed out, to 31 percent on defense and 45 percent on general welfare.

So those who call for reordering priorities have already seen them reordered. That is why it is so difficult in this three-year period to further reorder the priorities for well known and admitted domestic needs.

ADEQUACY OF NATIONAL MEANS OF INSPECTION

The question I had is this: Will the national means of inspection be enough? Is there adequate certainty that cheating can be avoided?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; we are fully convinced that that is the fact, Senator. This is a matter that was very carefully considered by our negotiators and all who worked in the field and there is no doubt in my mind that they will be adequate.

I am sure that subsequently you will have witnesses who will testify to this and maybe Ambassador Smith would like to add to that.

Senator SCOTT. Each nation now admits it will not undertake to interfere with or to prevent the other's national means of inspection; is that correct?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Senator SCOTT. Senator Cooper reminds me this is almost exactly the open skies proposal of President Eisenhower. We are getting toward that; are we not?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, I think that is one way to put it. I think national means of verification are fully adequate for the purposes of these agreements.

CONGRATULATIONS FOR ACHIEVEMENT

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Ambassador. I do congratulate all of you upon your achievement here.

I had so many people say while you were working at it that you would never get it done. Now the usual reaction is that it won't work or we won't cooperate with you.

I think the thing to do is to congratulate you for having done what we all know was difficult, and to help make it work.

VERIFICATION OF SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD MOBILE ICBMS

There is no agreement on mobile ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles); is there? Could we verify any movement on the Soviets' part towards mobile ICBM's?

Mr. SMITH. Senator Scott, you are quite correct in saying the agreement does not cover mobile ICBM's. There are no mobile ICBM's in existence.

It is far from clear that the Soviets have any aim to deploy such a system. I think that their reluctance to include them in this initial agreement was to avoid prejudicing their subsequent position about mobiles in the second negotiation.

We made a very strong unilateral statement saying that if we saw any mobiles being deployed we would consider that as inconsistent with this interim agreement.

On the question of verification, while verification of a ban on mobiles would be somewhat more difficult than a ban on fixed ICBM's, we believe that we have adequate capability even on mobiles. You might not pick up the first one in the world, but before any significant number of mobile missiles were deployed, one would be aware of it and if there were a ban, that would be a clear violation.

WORLD REACTION TO AGREEMENTS

Senator SCOTT. Finally, when I last saw you in Helsinki, as you know, I went on to Russia and in Moscow had the privilege of a long discussion with Mr. Vladimir Semenov. I have made the statement before that I said to him I thought that the overriding reason for a treaty of this kind was in addition to the obligations we owed our own Nation, the obligation we owed the rest of the world, so that they would stop being so frightened of both of us. Do you think this really does represent some movement toward reducing the fear that other nations have of the growth of both super powers?

Mr. SMITH. I think clearly the answer is yes, to that, Senator Scott.

In addition, I think these agreements represent very solid earnest of the seriousness of the American and Soviet intentions to fulfill their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Senator SCOTT. That has been the world reaction; has it not?

Mr. SMITH. I haven't seen any specific commentary, but I am sure, having talked to people from all over the world about this Article VI problem, that it will be taken as quite responsive to those obligations.

Of course, there will always be claims that we are not moving fast enough to implement that article, but I think this will be taken as very serious evidence that we are moving.

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, the answer to your question is yes. I think, without exception, the nations of the world have reacted favorably to these agreements, and have concluded that they may very well mean a reduction of tensions.

Now, as you know, I went to the NATO meeting right after the Moscow Summit and without exception all of our NATO allies made exactly that statement, that they not only thought these were significant agreements in a bilateral sense, but they were confident that they would have the effect of reducing tensions in the world. That certainly is true among our Asian friends and allies.

I had a study made of the world reaction. In fact, I will give you a copy of it. Without exception, the reaction has been tremendously favorable, favorable for the reason that I think you mention. There is a feeling that this will result in reduction of tensions and thereby contribute to the security of the world.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Spong?

Senator SPONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EXCLUSION OF U.S. FORWARD BASED AIRCRAFT

Mr. Secretary, you have touched on this matter in answers to Senator McGee and Senator Scott, but I would like to pursue it.

It has been said that the United States secured an advantage in the negotiations by obtaining the exclusion of our forward-based aircraft. Does this really represent an overall advantage or is it more realistically a recognition of, for lack of a better phrase, "spheres of influence" and the fact that our European alliance would be thrown into turmoil if there were a limitation on our bombers and forward-based systems without some comparable agreement on the estimated 600-plus Soviet medium range missiles presently targeted on Western Europe?

Secretary ROGERS. We certainly don't think it was an advantage in this sense and we have attempted to avoid the use of the word "advantage," who won or who lost.

We felt in the beginning we were not in a position to talk about forward basing and we stated that to our allies, we insisted on it, and Ambassador Smith made two statements to that effect in May, we are not in a position to negotiate on that basis.

So I don't believe that it is accurate to say that we have claimed an advantage. This is one of the things that we were able to exclude from the agreement.

Senator SPONG. I don't know that I said you claimed it as an advantage. I think it is among the observations that I have seen with regard to the——

Secretary ROGERS. Yes.

Senator SPONG. With regard to the negotiations.

HOW SALT FITS INTO OVERALL U.S. POLICY PLANS

On June 15, in a Congressional briefing, Dr. Kissinger noted, and I quote:

* * * Early in 1971, with the stalemate threatening, the President took a major new initiative by opening direct contact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the

SALT discussions and for that matter, the Berlin negotiations, and providing progress could be achieved on these two issues, to explore the feasibility of a summit meeting.

That statement, which refers to SALT, the Berlin accords, and the summit, suggests that SALT is only part of a broader strategy.

Could you address yourself to how SALT fits into our overall policy plans for Europe and the Soviet Union?

Secretary ROGERS. The SALT talks, of course, were considered by the United States as a great significance in and of themselves. The Berlin agreement, which has now been concluded, was also a very important agreement.

The President felt from the beginning, and I think he said the other day in his introductory remarks that it was important before the summit meeting to have assurances that there were going to be concrete results from such a meeting.

Consequently, we worked very diligently to be certain that there were concrete results that would occur in Moscow. So to that extent they were related and we have talked very fully and constantly with our allies in Europe to be sure that they could understand our attitude about the Berlin agreement, about a European security conference, about the SALT talks, about the other specific agreements that we have made with the Soviet Union at the Moscow meeting.

So they do understand, I think, that this is our policy, that inasmuch as we possibly can, we want to work out concrete agreements with the Soviet Union which will reduce tensions. We want to do it realistically on a mutual basis, taking fully into account the interests of our allies, that we have to do it from a position of strength, that if the Soviet Union should decide that we are going to become isolationists, none of these things would have been possible.

Therefore, we have resisted any attempt to reduce our troop strength in Europe on a unilateral basis and I think we have convinced our allies that we are engaging actively in an era of negotiations, as the President said, to reduce the prospect of a confrontation, but not at their expense, and not in a way that is unrealistic.

That is why we have agreed to the European security conference sometime in 1973. That is why we have said we want to have that conference well prepared and we are willing to engage in discussions in Helsinki sometime at the end of this year to be sure that the preparations go forward and that the European security conference would result in some concrete results.

We have also indicated we would like to engage in mutual and balanced force reduction in Europe, for the same reason.

So all of these things fit together in a consistent policy which I think has reassured our allies and also has resulted in reduction of tensions and will continue that way.

FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN ARMS SITUATION

Senator SPONG. Do you anticipate the talks later this year will include discussion of the European arms situation, or do you believe that will be left to the European security conference when that is held?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, no—you mean in the SALT talks?

Senator SPONG. Yes.

Secretary ROGERS. The SALT talks would not. We would not consider that, but we have indicated a willingness, in fact we would like very much to engage in mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, separate negotiations, but those will be mutual negotiations, including all of the nations involved, but that will not be involved in the second phase of the SALT talks.

Senator SPONG. Then the mutual and balanced force reduction will not be part of the second phase of the SALT talks and, as I understand it, they are not to be part of any agenda at the European security conference; is that true?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator SPONG. The Soviets have resisted that?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator SPONG. You are hopeful that these will be on the agenda of some other conference in the future?

Secretary ROGERS. Senator, we expect the SALT talks to continue in the second phase. We expect the European security conference to be convened in 1973. It might in some minor way discuss mutual restraints of a military nature, but any serious discussions of mutual and balanced force reduction, we think, would take place in a separate forum.

We have indicated a willingness to engage in those discussions on a parallel basis. By that I mean at about the same time as the European security conference is taking place.

So if things go well, as we hope they will, we would anticipate a continuation of the SALT talks, the European security conference sometime in 1973, and mutual and balance force negotiations, including those nations involved—I am speaking about the nations that have either their territories involved or their forces involved—which would be parallel to the European security conference. This is all reflected in the communique at Moscow.

Senator SPONG. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I don't believe anybody has mentioned this. I have a few odds and ends.

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Article XIII provides for the establishment, in the first paragraph, of a standing consultative commission "to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this treaty, the parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will . . ." and there are several things.

Would you say a word about that Commission, either you or Mr. Smith, about what you anticipate its setup will be and how it will function?

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, we have in mind as a priority item in the follow-on SALT negotiations, to draw up a charter for this organization. This is unprecedented in Soviet-American relations; so I can only speculate and say that personally I see, at least in the early days and the early years, a rather simple structure, perhaps four or five individuals only, both sides, meeting periodically, perhaps three or four times a year, largely dependent. It will have no decisional au-

thority. It will be a straight consultative body to look into the questions that are recited in the subparagraphs of Article XIII.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you anticipate it being purely military or will it be civilian?

Mr. SMITH. I think it will be both. I would think that it will be headed up by the civilian side certainly for the United States and I think there will be high level military and technical advisers.

The CHAIRMAN. Potentially it could be very important, as you say. It says, "provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed."

That, I would think, if it can be made effective, could be very important. That is the whole basis of at least finally working out to our mutual advantage, and I would hope it would be made effective.

I want you to say whatever you can for the record about it. If that is done, and done properly, it could be very important.

Secretary ROGERS. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. No one has mentioned the general principles that were stated in the obligations to proceed to other mutual undertakings in the fields of health, space, and culture. All of this is not directly involved in this. There were statements of principle. All of these will be greatly influenced by the effectiveness and the good faith with which we live up to the central treaty which is now before us.

Secretary ROGERS. No doubt about that.

The CHAIRMAN. If we go forward with this in the proper spirit, all these matters in the long run could be perhaps more important than just the treaty itself. If we go forward, that commission could be very important in that connection.

Mr. SMITH. We look on it as a very serious piece of machinery that recognizes that in this field you cannot for the indefinite future foresee how the evolution of the strategic relationship is going to go, and this is a good piece of machinery, we think, to oversee the operations of this new relationship.

TREATY'S RELATIONSHIP TO U.N. OBLIGATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to make a comment about the relationship of this treaty with our mutual obligations under the United Nations?

No one has said anything about the United Nations. Did it come into the discussions, at all, or how would you regard that?

Mr. SMITH. In Article XVI there is the procedural provision to register this treaty, pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

I think that it is perfectly clear that strategic arms limitations correspond with the purposes of the United Nations. There was no specific discussion of any obligation under the United Nations Charter during the negotiations, but I think that we all felt that what we were trying to do was completely consistent with the spirit and the letter of the charter.

Secretary ROGERS. In fact, some of the language is quite consistent. In fact, sometimes verbatim with the charter.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not intimate it was inconsistent. I was hoping this would be considered, at least, supportive of our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

Neither of these big countries has shown great confidence in the United Nations. Maybe this will instill a little, if they can develop any confidence in one another.

There are one or two other questions:

AGREEMENT'S RELATION TO CHINA

No one has mentioned China so far in the hearings, the discussions or the considerations. Could you say anything about the relation of this agreement to China?

Will it in any way——

Secretary ROGERS. No, sir, I don't think so. I don't think there is really much to say about it. China is not involved in these agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. The thing that occurred to me was the ABM. When you first presented the program, I believe it was called Safeguard. It has had several names, the Sentinel. Maybe in the early stages it was defended or justified on the basis that this would give us a defense against the Chinese threat. Much was made of that until it was demolished and they changed it to a different threat.

You don't regard the ABM as being significant versus China any longer?

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me there are two aspects of an answer to that question.

One, the Administration considers obtaining the Soviet commitment not to go for a nationwide AMB system as of such importance that another consideration such as the possibility of a defense against a light Chinese attack took lesser precedence. In other words, we did not want to give up the opportunity to get this greater prize to protect against the lesser risk and since the statement in March 1969 about the purposes of Safeguard I think it is quite clear that there has been improvement in our general relations with China. I believe that the possibility of an attack by the Chinese is given a lower value at the present time than back in——

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to hear you say that. You are not deeply concerned about a Chinese attack at this time?

Secretary ROGERS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is progress, anyway. Part of the obsession seems to be receding from our minds.

DICTATED NOTES CONCERNING MEETINGS

It was reported in the press, I believe, that during the meetings the President dictated notes on some of the meetings he had with the Soviet Chairman.

Secretary ROGERS. He is the General Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. The General Secretary or Chairman.

QUESTION OF GENERAL SECRETARY OR CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

That reminds me. Someone raised the question, and I don't know. He is not the Chairman of the Council of Ministers; he is the General

Secretary of the Party, and it properly and legally and constitutionally should have been the Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Secretary ROGERS. We didn't raise that question.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't raise it, either. I am raising it now to give you an opportunity to comment on it.

Secretary ROGERS. I am going to resist the opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Being an old Attorney General, I thought you would be the proper one to give the interpretation of this.

Secretary ROGERS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the constitutional question.

Secretary ROGERS. I prefer to be called a former Attorney General rather than old.

The CHAIRMAN. I saw somewhere the other day, and it hadn't occurred to me. Wasn't Khrushchev both the General Secretary and the Chairman?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a little interesting for the academics to ponder. I thought maybe you should set the matter at rest.

Secretary ROGERS. There was a discussion about his title and General Secretary was his correct title and we refer to him as General Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not for me to question their system. It was an interesting question raised.

NOTES AND ITEMS RELATIVE TO TREATY

This was called to my attention in Jefferson's Manual concerning treaties, and I am not trying to inject any politics in this.

I assume you have some regard for Jefferson now, even though he was identified with the other party.

It reads as follows:

> It has been the usage for the Executive, when it communicates a treaty to the Senate for their ratification, to communicate also the correspondence of the negotiators. This having been omitted in the case of the Prussian Treaty, was asked by a vote of the House of February 12, 1800, and was obtained. And in December, 1800, the Convention of that year between the United States and France, with the report of the negotiations by the envoys, but not their instructions, being laid before the Senate, the instructions were asked for and communicated by the President.

I wondered if there are such notes and items relative to the treaty, and would it be agreeable to the Administration to submit them on a confidential basis, if you would like, to the committee.

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is anything that exists that affects the agreements in any way that hasn't been submitted to the Congress.

Now, there may be, you know, if there are questions of interpretation that arise in the future, we certainly will go back and look at the memoranda because there wasn't a complete transcript kept of the plenary sessions, and because there are so many documents, but we think we have selected everything that could possibly affect the agreements between the two nations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying there aren't such minutes relevant to the treaty that haven't been made available?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

CONSULTATION WITH ALLIES

The CHAIRMAN. You referred a couple times to consultation with allies. Did you consult with allies before the negotiations were completed, or did you inform them only after they were completed?

Secretary ROGERS. Both.

The CHAIRMAN. Primarily, I assume, the NATO allies?

Secretary ROGERS. The NATO allies.

The CHAIRMAN. Not everybody?

Secretary ROGERS. No; but we did consult with others, too.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was in depth with all of them?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

QUESTION OF ADVANTAGE TO SOVIETS AND DISPARITY IN MEGATONNAGE

The CHAIRMAN. There was one other thing raised, and maybe this is the proper time to raise the question, especially with Mr. Smith.

As you know, some members of the Senate, and maybe others, have raised the question that this treaty will result in a great advantage to the Soviets. They also mentioned the disparity in the megatonnage.

There is an interesting piece in the Times, and, Mr. Smith, I think it is a good opportunity for you to clarify this. I will read it for you for your comment:

> But the number and size of missiles is less important than the destruction they can inflict. One large nuclear weapon cannot destroy as large an area as several small weapons. Two one-megaton bombs can destroy an area as large as one four-megaton bomb. The measuring rod used by the Pentagon in its secret studies to obtain a single figure for the total destructive capability of nuclear weapons of varied sizes is known as "equivalent megatonnage." A Soviet sixteen-megaton bomb would seem to give Russia a four-fold advantage over four one-megaton American bombs. But in floor area of destruction both amount to four "equivalent megatons" or parity.

This argument, especially, I think Senator Jackson, has raised. He thinks and believes the Russians have 16 or 20 or 56-megaton bombs. I think this would be a good opportunity for you to clarify this.

Is that statement approximately accurate?

Mr. SMITH. Well, I would like to have an opportunity to study the statement carefully, Mr. Chairman. But as a general matter, it is correct that the amount of destruction does not go up as you go up in numbers in megatonnage.

To put it very simply, if you have a bomb that can destroy New York City, a bomb that is twice the size and yield is not a very valuable instrument, as far as we can see, and it won't destroy twice as much as a bomb that has half the megatonnage.

Now, we long ago made a decision that just to increase megatonnage was not the best way to approach an efficient strategic weapons system. A number of Secretaries of Defense considered this question, I think at least three, and they decided against going to weapons that had higher megatonnage.

I think this process of understanding started as early as 1952 or 1953. It was certainly clearly understood after the first thermonuclear weapons were tested in 1954, and we concluded long ago that it was much more appropriate to have a number of accurate and smaller yield weapons rather than to have very large yield weapons. One of the rea-

sons, I think, you see an apparent or numerical discrepancy now is that the Soviets went in for the opposite philosophy. They for some reason or another—perhaps because they like the Tsar Cannon, which was the biggest cannon in the history of the world, and the Tsar Bell, which was the biggest bell that ever was built—have gone in for very large yield weapons.

One of the advantages that has been overlooked in talking about this submarine arrangement, for instance, is that, if the Soviets go up to their permitted levels in submarines, they will have to destroy, scrap these SS–7 and SS–8's, which are very high yield weapons in terms of this megatonnage question. If they convert those into submarines, their total megatonnage will be substantially reduced.

We don't think that megatonnage differentials are useful ways of determining whether one side or the other has an advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is important for you to state that.

I think I recall recently one of the principal complaints about this treaty is that it allows them to retain over 300 SS–9's. These are described as the weapons that could destroy practically everything, and I think you explained that.

I think it would be useful to put this article in the record.

EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE

I should have read this, I guess, in the beginning. It says:

Two members of the defense analysis staff of the Brookings Institution, Colonel Alton Quanbeck and Barry Blechman, who are both former Pentagon officials, have calculated the "equivalent megatonnage" of Russia's supposed threefold advantage. They have found that the five-year SALT I agreement on offensive weapons would leave the Russians in mid-1977 with 4,000 "equivalent megatons" compared with 4,450 for the United States.

It goes on and refutes the idea. It is consistent with your general statement, but I think that is useful for the people to understand. It is not easy for a layman to understand these complicated questions of equivalence of megatonnage.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the New York Times, June 19, 1972]

MISSILE NUMBERS GAME

President Nixon was right to urge the Congress to speed approval of the missile curb pacts with Moscow. There was no winner-loser outcome in the SALT I negotiations; as the President emphasized, "Both sides won and the whole world won." Moreover, the central argument being made by critics of the agreements has now been refuted in a study made by former Pentagon officials.

Critics of SALT I, such as Senator Henry Jackson, argue that the edge permitted the Soviet Union in numbers and size of offensive missiles will ultimately give Russia a dangerous degree of strategic superiority over the United States. The edge includes 40 per cent more intercontinental ballistic missiles and missile-launching submarines, one-third more submarine-launched ballistic missiles and an alleged threefold Soviet advantage in megatonnage of total missile payload.

But the number and size of missiles is less important than the destruction they can inflict. One large nuclear weapon cannot destroy as large an area as several small weapons. Two one-megaton bombs can destroy an area as large as one four-megaton bomb. The measuring rod used by the Pentagon in its secret studies to obtain a single figure for the total destructive capability of nuclear weapons of varied sizes is known as "equivalent megatonnage." A Soviet sixteen-megaton bomb would seem to give Russia a fourfold advantage over four one-

megaton American bombs. But in floor area of destruction both amount to four "equivalent megatons," or parity.

Two members of the defense analysis staff of the Brookings Institution, Col. Alton Quanbeck and Barry Blechman, who are both former Pentagon officials, have calculated the "equivalent megatonnage" of Russia's supposed threefold advantage. They have found that the five-year SALT I agreement on offensive weapons would leave the Russians in mid-1977 with 4,000 "equivalent megatons" compared with 4,450 for the United States.

Refutation of Russia's "megatonnage advantage" over the United States brings into question the argument made by the Administration for pressing ahead with deployment of the MIRVed missiles, Minutemen III and Poseidon, and accelerated development of the B–1 bomber and the long-range Trident missile submarine. Deployment already underway of MIRV multiple warheads gives the United States more than a two-to-one advantage in deliverable warheads. There is no reason to press ahead to achieve a four-to-one advantage by 1977 if there is any chance that American restraint would encourage similar Soviet restraint and a permanent offensive weapons agreement at a lower level.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

ABM SITE CHANGES AND PROBLEMS OF WASHINGTON SITE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador, I would ask. When the Sentinel system was originally proposed, before it became Safeguard, the system designed to defend us from a Chinese light attack, it all looked pretty silly to me, but we had quite a problem here on the Hill, especially from those who constantly warned us there could be no agreement with the evil Communist nations because of the monolithic Communist conspiracy.

Re the ABM of that day, Boston said you may put them in some places, but you are not going to put them around here; Chicago said don't put them around here, and so did Seattle.

Then a decision was made to change it from area defense to a point defense. Whether or not those cities had anything to do with that decision I don't know, but I do think it makes more sense, at least in theory, to have us defending the missiles instead of the cities.

There was quite a little discussion about whether we would have a choice, keep Grand Forks and Malmstrom and they keeping Moscow. Now, however, the final decision, which I shall support, is to keep Grand Forks, let Malmstrom and the other two go, build one around Washington. The latter I do not support at this time.

Why did we shift from consideration of keeping both Malmstrom and Grand Forks and what do you think the problems will be in building up such a unit in this high density populated area of Washington. What do you think the chances will be of getting it against such objections as those of the three previous cities I mentioned?

Mr. SMITH. Senator Symington, in regard to the abandonment of the option to go for the second ICBM defense and the election to go for defense for the national command authority, when we reached the general area of agreement with the Soviets that we would both have two sites, both have the option of two sites, it was the clear military judgment on our side that it would be more useful militarily to have protection of our national command authority in lieu of having a second site to defend ICBM's. In view of that we negotiated it out that way.

On the question of the problems and chances, I think, on the question of chances, this is an intangible judgment involving congressional opinion that you are much more expert on than I.

In connection with problems, I think they are fewer than were existent back when you are talking about defending Boston or Seattle.

I think that when the country comes to understand that we are not talking here about protecting population, we are not talking even about protecting bureaucrats or Congressmen or population, we are talking about protecting a few persons and a few pieces of hardware, and in general our national command and control system. That is the sole purpose of protecting the national command authority, and to my mind it is a useful purpose and I hope that the Congress will support it.

I think that there are, as I say, fewer problems. One of the reasons is that the real estate acquisition problems, as I remember, were difficult in connection with other cities. I understand that here the real estate acquisition problem is perhaps already solved because the military do have a number of areas in the Washington vicinity that could be used.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. Again I congratulate you and your staff.

CONSIDERATION OF RELINQUISHING ABM SITES

The CHAIRMAN. To follow up on that, was a proposal ever made to have no ABM? Was it ever considered that both sides would relinquish any ABM sites?

Mr. SMITH. There were exchanges about that. We proposed the possibility of a complete ban on ABM in connection with a comprehensive agreement whereby there would be a treaty that would cover all strategic offensive weapons as well as defensive.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee has had, during the last several years, testimony that the large system around Moscow was very questionable. They started it out, I think, to be 120 and stopped around 50 or 60 and didn't proceed. We got the impression it was because they had serious doubts about its effectiveness. Now, they are not proceeding, as far as you know, with the alternative sites comparable to Grand Forks; are they?

Mr. SMITH. We do not see any comparable site. We do understand that they are developing ABM systems for the purpose of defending ICBM.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they are doing research and trying to improve the one they have?

Mr. SMITH. More than research. I think that——

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be feasible to consider, at least in the ongoing negotiations, if the Russians would agree to give up theirs around Moscow if we give up ours around Grand Forks and neither one have to go through the rather futile extravagance? Is that clear out of the ballpark, or is there something that could be considered in your new negotiations that may take place this fall?

Mr. SMITH. Well, as I say, we don't have any guidance on specifics.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you haven't.

Mr. SMITH. I think if you ask us is it feasible, is it in the ballpark, I would think the answer would be yes.

On the other hand, the Administration has faced up to this question about possible deferral and has concluded it would be in our interest not to do so and to proceed with the second option permitted under the treaty. Both the Soviets and ourselves understand that we are free to proceed.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the present situation. You can tell from what has been said by several members that there is certainly no unanimity among the Congress about putting one around Washington. They are all elected people. What are we going to say to our constituents when they hear we are spending $20 million to protect Congress where we sit and not protect them? They are under the illusion these things are effective. I don't think they are. I would have to explain it.

We are not going to protect ourselves and leave everybody else helpless, assuming they have validity. You are going to have a difficult time, I think for various reasons, getting the money for the Washintgon site.

Wouldn't we be better off if the Russians were persuaded to abandon all of theirs? It seems we would be ahead of the game if they would agree to give up theirs at Moscow. I am sure they love Moscow just as much as we do Washington.

Secretary ROGERS. I think that, in answer to your question, Ambassador Smith says he thinks it is feasible. Of course it is feasible to propose it. I do not think it is feasible to expect it will be successful.

The CHAIRMAN. What if you are faced with the situation that Congress won't appropriate the money for one around Washington? Wouldn't you be better off to go back and say, why don't we get rid of all of them?

If we did that would you be content to allow them to have Moscow protected and we have Grand Forks protected? Would you be content with that?

Secretary ROGERS. I think we ought to stand on the treaty as it has been completed, and——

The CHAIRMAN. You have already said it doesn't force us to do it. You said we have the option to do it. You said that a moment ago. I am trying to explore it a little.

Mr. Smith says a proposal was made by someone, whether the U.S. or Russia, to consider no ABM at all.

Secretary ROGERS. That was part of a comprehensive agreement, though.

POSSIBILITY OF RELINQUISHING ABM SITES

The CHAIRMAN. But at that time it wasn't utterly unthinkable both countries would relinquish. Is that not true?

Secretary ROGERS. It is not unthinkable, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You may be faced with the situation that the Congress is not willing to spend that kind of money on a very questionable system around Washington, because I expect there will be a lot of people, not only in Congress, but others, who will object to it, as they certainly did in Seattle and Boston and several other places.

I am just exploring the possibilities. I personally would not vote to pay for the ABM around Washington for various reasons I won't go into now. I detect a number of my colleagues feel the same way about it.

Would you be content with Grand Forks and let them have Moscow, and that is all?

Secretary ROGERS. No; I think the treaty provides what we can reasonably expect at the moment and I think we would hope that Congress will give the President the support that he needs.

NO VIOLATION IN NOT GOING FORWARD WITH WASHINGTON ABM

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you do. But we would not be failing to support the treaty, as I understand it, if we do not go forward with ABM around Washington. That isn't a serious defection from the treaty. Russia wouldn't regard it as a violation of the treaty; would they?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. So no member could be accused of running out on the treaty or not supporting the treaty if he didn't support an ABM around Washington. Is that not correct?

Secretary ROGERS. It is not accurate. What the treaty does is limit the number of ABM deployments that can be——

The CHAIRMAN. If we chose to do it?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We don't undertake to do it. We don't undertake to create deployments?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to make it clear.

Secretary ROGERS. You have made it clear.

APPARENT VALUE TO SOVIETS OF CAPITAL DEFENSE

Mr. SMITH. I think, Mr. Chairman, if I may throw in a thought, when you consider the value or lack of value of a capital defense, you should keep in mind that the Soviets apparently put a very high value on having such a defense. That is to me some evidence of its importance.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know. You have said they put a high value on big megatons. We think that is foolish. You don't think they are infallible. They make foolish mistakes, as we do, and thank goodness. If they hadn't been that way, we would have been in bad shape. They have matched pretty near every mistake of ours with one of their own.

SUPPORT FOR TREATY BUT NOT ABM FOR WASHINGTON

We have a vote coming up, but I want to make it very clear I am very much for the treaty and I don't regard being against the ABM for Washington in any way being inconsistent with the treaty. I shall vote certainly for the treaty and do everything I can, as soon as I can, to get it approved.

PROTECTION BY ABM AND GALOSH SYSTEM QUESTIONED

But I go back: We have had testimony in other hearings, endless testimony, that the ABM and the Galosh system could easily be overcome by a concentrated barrage of ICBM's. Both of them could be easily overcome and there is really no protection despite a sop that has been thrown out to make people feel satisfied. I don't blame them too much for it, under the circumstances, because on the whole we got a good result. But you don't have any doubt and you wouldn't say indeed these 200 launchers—Is it 200 launchers provided for?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Couldn't be easily overcome with 300 missiles.
Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. What protection is it?

PURPOSE OF NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY DEFENSE

Mr. SMITH. The purpose of the national command authority defense is different from what you have been thinking about for defending a country or defending ICBM's. The purpose is to protect against, for instance, an unauthorized launch, and if you could avoid total nuclear war because you are able to knock down four or five unauthorized missiles, that investment, in my judgment, would be a tremendously successful one.

The CHAIRMAN. It sounds an awful lot like the defense against the Chinese. That was the sort of thing we did on the accidental thing and you have abandoned almost all of that.

Mr. SMITH. We have entered into an agreement with the Russians to try to control nuclear accidents. This would be an implementation of that agreement and a recognition that nuclear accidents and unauthorized attacks can take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, that amendment you spoke about, Mr. Secretary, on Bahrain and the Azores is now being voted on; so I think my duty calls on me.

ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS HARDLY CONTINUATION

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, one point should be brought out and that is that while defensive forces are being reduced, it is hardly a continuation of the offensive proposals of Secretary Laird and the Administration to increase by 168 millions of dollars over and beyond continuing programs. I think that point should be made clear.

WEAPONS TO BE CONSIDERED IN PHASE II

Second is a specific question on Phase II. Will there be any other weapons, the strategic weapons in development, that would be considered in Phase II?

Mr. SMITH. I think not. I think we have our hands full with strategic delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

Senator PELL. I thank you very much.

In the absence of the Chairman, the committee on Foreign Relations is now adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, when we will meet in executive session with Mr. Helms.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m. the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair).

(Questions by Senator Percy and responses of Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Smith follow:)

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR PERCY AND RESPONSES OF SECRETARY ROGERS

1. Question. Could you describe the situation we would face in the absence of these agreements?

Answer. The Soviet Union has been building new ICBM and SLBM launchers at the rate of over 300 per year. In the absence of an agreement, they would have been capable of sustaining this program indefinitely. The U.S. was not in a

position to deploy new strategic offensive systems within the five year period of the Interim Agreement.

In the absence of the ABM Treaty, we would have expected the Soviets to go far beyond the 200 ABM launchers and interceptors at two sites permitted by the Treaty. The U.S., for its part, would have continued with its Safeguard ABM deployments.

2. Question. It has taken more than three years of concerted effort to produce the two agreements before us. Could the terms have been substantially improved, or the coverage broadened, if we had kept at the negotiating table longer? What real disadvantages could have resulted from continuing negotiations?

Answer. After 1½ years of attempting to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement, both sides decided on May 20, 1971, to conclude initially an ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement covering certain strategic offensive weapons. Prolonging the first phase of SALT would not have been useful, particularly in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. was constructing new ICBM aand SLBM launchers at the rate of over 300 per year. The sides have pledged to attempt to work out more complete limitations on strategic arms in a follow-on phase of SALT, which we hope will begin in October.

3. Question. How important was the President's visit to Moscow in terms of actually producing the final arrangements? Could they have been accomplished without his presence there?

Answer. The President's visit to Moscow was clearly of importance in producing the final SALT agreements. As the President noted in his Congressional briefing on June 15, one of the reasons for this has to do with the system of Government in the Soviet Union. He said "We have found, in dealing with the system of government in the Soviet Union, that where decisions are made that affect the vital security and in fact, the very survival of a nation, decisions and discussions in those cases are made only at the highest level. Consequently, it is necessary for us to have discussions and decisions at the highest level if we are going to have the breakthroughs that we have had to make in order to come to this point of a successful negotiation." In this case, such breakthroughs occurred at the Summit on several issues that were still unsettled when the Summit began.

4. Question. What is the relationship between the SALT agreements and the Joint Declaration of Principles? Is the latter the symbol of the intent to carry out the agreements in good faith?

Answer. The "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" signed at he Moscow Summit expresses important objectives and attitudes shared by the two sides. The SALT Agreements are concrete measures reflecting such common objectives and attitudes. It is fair to say that one effect of the former document is to symbolize the intent of both parties to carryout the SALT agreements in good faith. Thus, the fourth of the basic principles expresses the intention of the parties "to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded . . . are faithfully implemented."

5. Question. Article XIII of the ABM treaty, which provides for the Standing Consultative Commission, may consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the treaty. Could this be interpreted as providing methods of consultation to deal with changes in the strategic situation brought about by China and that the Chinese may read any US–USSR anti-China purpose in this commission?

Answer. No anti-Chinese purposes is involved in the provisions for establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission, or in any other provision. As stated in the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed at the Moscow Summit on May 29, 1972, "The development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests." In his news briefing on this document on the day it was signed, Dr. Kissinger stated that ". . . we have made clear throughout that our policies toward either of these countries [the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union] is not directed against the other. We did not discuss the Soviet Union in Peking and we did not discuss the People's Republic in Moscow."

6. Question. Did Chinese concerns as to the possible impact on their own security of a US–Soviet SALT agreement in any way inhibit our negotiation procedures or presentation of proposals?

Answer. No. There would be no basis for such concerns.

7. Question. Did we keep Japan as equally well informed as our NATO partners?

Answer. We have kept our Japanese allies well informed on SALT. Since the conclusion of the SALT I agreements, Mr. Smith and I have personally briefed the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Ushiba. In addition, there have been extensive discussions with officers from the Japanese Embassy throughout the SALT negotiations.

8. Question. What has been the reaction of our major allies to the Agreements?

Answer. We have consulted with our allies closely and regularly during the entire course of SALT. There has been great satisfaction on the part of our allies all over the world about this consultation process. For example, at the latest consultations with NAC on June 16 our NATO allies explicitly welcomed both SALT agreements and expressed their appreciation to the US for safeguarding allied interests during the negotiations.

9. Question. One area of disagreement within the press and among some public figures has been the impact of the so-called "secret clauses" to the SALT agreements; those understandings, interpretations and unilateral statements and safeguards, made available to this Committee by the Administration when it forwarded the treaty for consideration. What will prevent differing interpretations of these "clauses" from causing a major misunderstanding and hinder the successful implementation of the agreements?

Answer. These materials were intended to *avoid* misunderstanding of the underlying agreements and to facilitate successful implementation of such agreements. The clarification provided by these interpretations and statements is believed to far outweigh whatever risk there may be that they, in turn, might become subject to differing interpretations.

10. Question. Would it be safe to say that these clauses are really another form of safeguard particularly since they deal with such crucial areas as concealment, ABM technology advances, and missile modernization?

Answer. Yes, they do constitute a form of safeguard against misunderstandings in these crucial areas.

11. Question. Will these clauses, other than the unilateral statements, have exactly the same force as if they were included in the text of the agreements?

Answer. The agreed interpretations will clearly be binding on both parties.

12. Question. Why were they not included in the texts?

Answer. I do not think any single answer I could give would apply to all of the cases involved, except that both parties concluded that these matters could be adequately dealt with by agreed interpretations. In some cases, such as statements made on the last day of the negotiations, timing and convenience were factors. In other cases, such as the statements on standstill arrangements, inclusion in the agreements would have been anomalous, in that they dealt with the period before the agreement entered into force. To take one other example, the statement on the Standing Consultative Commission was designed to apply only pending the working out of more definitive arrangements.

13. What kind of impetus do you see these agreements giving to other arms control negotiations, such as test ban, CBW and conventional weapons, particularly in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva?

Answer. While I cannot give you any precise answer, the conclusion of these agreements should certainly be helpful in giving impetus to other arms control negotiations, particularly at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. It has been our experience that each major post-war accomplishment in arms control has made further progress in this field more readily attainable. This should be particularly true in the case of the SALT agreements, not only because of their inherent significance but also because they should help meet demands often expressed at Geneva and elsewhere that measures constraining non-nuclear-weapon states be balanced by measures placing constraints on nuclear-weapon states.

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR PERCY AND RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR SMITH

1. Question. Since we both now have one ABM site, why in strategic terms should either side build a second?

Answer. The purpose of the two ABM sites is quite different. The ICBM defense will provide a light defense for a portion of the ICBM force. ABM defense of Washington and Moscow will reduce the possibility that a light accidental or unauthorized attack could destroy the National Command Authority and,

in the resulting confusion and disorder, lead to a precipitate response that could mean a full-scale nuclear war. It will provide defense of our National Command Authority and could give the President additional time to make a considered response should an attack occur.

2. Question. Even if the Soviets went ahead and constructed a second ABM site, why would we have to build a second site around Washington?

Answer. Neither side is obligated by the terms of the treaty to construct a second ABM site. However, we believe that an ABM defense of the National Command Authority, which the Soviets already have, could make an important contribution to stability and to our security.

3. Question. On ABMs, is there any possibility that potential difficulties in identifying just what the specific purpose of a radar may be, by national means, could prohibit the construction of space activity or air defense related radars?

Answer. We believe that national means of verification will be adequate to distinguish between ABM radars and air defense and space tracking radars. There are a number of parameters, such as location, orientation, size, power and signal characteristics, which taken together, should provide sufficient information to make this distinction. If an ambiguous situation regarding radars should nevertheless arise, the situation could be clarified through discussions in the Standing Consultative Commission.

4. Question. What was the rationale behind agreeing to Article VI of the treaty which prohibits the future deployment in third countries of early warning radars?

Answer. Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. believed that it is necessary to deploy future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack in third countries in order to obtain sufficient warning of such an attack. Therefore, consistent with the goal of placing tight constraints on systems which could contribute to ABM capabilities beyond those envisioned in Article III of the treaty, the sides agreed to prohibit such deployments. Article VI does not affect existing ballistic missile early warning radars.

5. Question. In view of our own acknowledgment as to the total number of ICBMs that we possess, why did we not insist on obtaining a similar public acknowledgment from the Soviets?

Answer. The specific commitment in the Interim Agreement is not to build even one more ICBM launcher for operational purposes, and we are satisfied that we can monitor whether one more launcher is constructed just as well without having a number specified as with having a number specified. We have the highest degree of confidence that we can detect violations of this commitment.

The Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant to declare current force levels which were not actually necessary to the agreement. They have only declared force levels where absolutely necessary, as in the case of SLBMs, where we are projecting future ceilings. We believe that 1618 Soviet ICBM launchers are currently operational and under construction, and we have made clear to the Soviets that if our intelligence should in the future reveal numbers which significantly exceed that number, a basic premise of the agreement would be in question.

6. Question. Did the Soviets indicate during the course of negotiations just what their estimated ICBM strength would be as of July 1, 1972, or are we relying completely on intelligence estimates?

Answer. The Soviets did not indicate what number of ICBM launchers they would have operational and under construction as of July 1, 1972. We are using the number of 1618, which is derived from our own national means of verification. The Soviet Delegation was made aware of our estimate, and did not challenge it. We are confident that we can detect any attempt to deploy additional ICBMs.

7. Question. Article XII, which deals with verification, and the non-interference therewith, also allows the continuation of current construction, assembly conversion and overhaul practices. Are there any such practices going on now within the Soviet Union, immune from our spy satellites? If there are, don't these constitute an obvious and potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty?

Answer. I must refer you to Mr. Helms for any discussion of current Soviet practices.

8. Question. The Offensive Agreement does not cover forward-based aircraft or heavy bombers, areas where we have a major advantage. In order to counter this advantage is it not likely that the Soviets will continue to develop even

more formidable SAM systems, which because of their own complexity and advance technology could be a potential enlargement of the Soviet ABM systems and which we might not be able to identify as such?

Answer. With regard to Soviet plans regarding future SAM systems, you should consult the intelligence community. In view of the concern of U.S. defense planners that Soviet SAM systems might be developed or converted to perform an ABM role, we insisted that the ABM Treaty contain a clear obligation not to make such conversion and not to test non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars in an ABM mode. With the aid of this provision of Article VI, we are confident that our national means of verification will be able to distinguish between ABM and SAM systems.

9. Question. How important a consideration was the ability to use foreign submarine bases to us when we agreed to a numerically inferior relationship on SLBMs and modern nuclear subs?

Answer. In evaluating these agreements, it is misleading to consider only one element, such as SLBMs. We agreed to accept a temporary Soviet advantage in numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers because the U.S. has offsetting advantages in other areas. The use of submarine bases in other countries is one of these, but we also have advantages in aircraft, in numbers of warheads, and in other respects. The consequences of all of these asymmetries were carefully considered within the U.S. government.

10. Question. The unilateral statement made by both sides and their reception by both sides could raise an interesting problem. Doesn't the Soviet statement referring to their right to increase the number of their SLBM submarines if our NATO allies increase their present deployment of such submarines in effect make the continuation of a bilateral agreement dependent on third party actions?

Answer. No. The Soviets did not indicate that third party actions would affect continuance of our bilateral agreement. They attempted to assert a "right" to take action inconsistent with the terms of the agreement if the stated circumstances should occur. We clearly rejected this claim. The SALT agreements do not cover activities by third parties, and no such "right" exists.

11. Question. Further, doesn't this statement attempt to get us to restrain our allies in this area or commit us to the restriction on the transfer of offensive technology to them?

Answer. Whatever it may have attempted to accomplish, we rejected it; and it does not bind or commit us or our allies in any way. Moreover, it contains no reference to the transfer of offensive technology.

12. Question. The SALT agreements appear to be a formal acceptance of a "stop where you are" position on launchers, radars, ABMs, etc. Neither we nor the Russians are going to dismantle any system other than the second ABM site we started at Malmstrom. Given this situation in the Interim Agreement, do you think that there is any possibility of negotiating rollbacks in the SALT II negotiations?

Answer. In the preamble to the ABM Treaty, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. declared their intention "to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms." It is possible that we will be able to work out some reductions or rollbacks in the next phase of SALT. The U.S. position for this next phase is now under consideration.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice at 10:00 a.m. in Room S–116, the Capitol Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Pell, McGee, Spong, Aiken, Case, Cooper, Scott, Pearson and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. We might as well start. It's 10 o'clock.

We are very pleased to have this morning the Director of Intelligence, Mr. Helms, to give us your advice about verification of the new interim agreements in Moscow.

[Deleted.]

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the Committee adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.)

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 318, Old Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Symington, Pell, Spong, Cooper, Javits and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer. We are very pleased to have both of you gentlemen. Our hearings with you have always been interesting and I am very glad to say you have been candid with the committee, not that we have always agreed, but at least I think you have presented your views most forcefully and clearly.

In this instance, your views about the current business before the Senate, the treaty and the agreements, have been well publicized in the press for the last several days. I confess that I am very puzzled that what is called an arms limitation agreement is to be used as an excuse enormously to increase the arms race. You usually say, Mr. Secretary, as you have on numerous previous occasions, that since you have assumed your position as Secretary of Defense you have a very special responsibility for the security of the country, the implication being that as a Congressman you didn't have quite the same responsibility or the Senators don't have that same responsibility.

Secretary LAIRD. I was able to share it at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. I can assure you that we on the committee are also very deeply concerned about the security of this country. Some of us believe, including myself, that the security of the country consists of more than enormous stores of arms, that there are other elements in our society these days that are equally, if not more, important. In fact, some of us believe that your policies are seriously undermining the strength of this Nation and, therefore, you are endangering our security. We believe that the exorbitant expenditures for military affairs since World War II are the basic reasons for the disarray of our economy, both domestic and foreign, and that they have contributed enormously to the alienation of so many of our citizens, and the con-

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cern with which all the affairs—economic, political and social—are viewed in this country today.

So I think the issue is fairly clear: It is whether or not priority is always to be given to military expenditures or whether or not we should take this effort at arms control seriously and that it be used in a way that can actually bring about some control and some even decrease in the future on military expenditures. I think that is really the issue. There are many subsidiary questions which we no doubt can cover, but, as I see it, that is the main issue.

It has been a great shock to me to read that this agreement, which we have favored, on the ABM in particular, is now to be used as an excuse for a vast increase in military expenditures. This is the dilemma which I hope you will clarify to our satisfaction.

We are very pleased to have you and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY PAUL H. NITZE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SALT

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I certainly will clarify the issues which you have raised, and I think that the short statement which I have addresses the issues that have been raised by you in your opening statement.

PERSONS ACCOMPANYING WITNESS

I have with me today the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Tom Moorer, and Paul Nitze, who is the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, former Secretary of the Navy, and who has served as my special assistant in the SALT area. He was a member of the delegation at Helsinki and Vienna. General Allison, who serves as the special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is also accompanying us as we appear before the Foreign Relations Committee this morning.

I am pleased to have this opportunity to be here today to discuss with you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee matters related to the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weapons and to pursue the consultative process with the Congress and with this committee which the President emphasized in his meeting with you this last week.

TRIPLE PLAY FOR PEACE

It is my view that what we are considering is a triple play for peace. We must take into account at the same time all three elements of this triple play: first, the ABM treaty; second, the interim agreement on offensive weapons; and, third, the President's national security budget as presented to this Congress.

The specifics of the agreement and the other considerations relating to them are, of course, being treated by other officials of the Administration, such as the Secretary of State, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The President has asked me to concentrate on the relationship of the agreements to the security of the United States with appropriate emphasis on the critical importance of proposed U.S. strategic programs to the viability of the agreements already reached, and those we hope to reach in the follow-on talks that could begin this October.

I believe the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weapons now before the Congress are in the interest of America and the world. They enhance our security. They permit us to maintain needed strength. They help us to maintain confidence in the effectiveness and realism of our strategic deterrent. I am confident they can be verified by national means. But by themselves they do not automatically guarantee these national security gains.

In my view, the national security requirements of the United States make it equally urgent that (1) the Senate ratify the ABM treaty; (2) the Congress approve the interim agreement on offensive weapons; and (3) the House and the Senate reinforce these initiatives for arms limitation with strong support for the President's budget requests for the Department of Defense.

As the President has made clear, the merits of each case—the agreements and our pending strategic programs—require affirmative congressional action in both cases.

NECESSITY OF CONTINUED STRONG SUPPORT FOR ADEQUATE DEFENSE BUDGET

Security, the basis of a peace, cannot be bought cheaply. The opportunities for enhanced security embodied in the SALT agreements would be nullified and our national security jeopardized unless there is continued strong support for an adequate defense budget. The success of SALT and prospects for ultimate peace depend on sustained strength.

If we do not maintain this strength by going forward with the strategic programs we are recommending, we will face the problems similar to those we had to face in SALT I: an onrushing and unchecked Soviet momentum in development and deployment reflected by the addition of ballistic missiles at the rate of some 250 per year for the past five years; a reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to accept limitations on certain ongoing programs and other developmental programs; and, with the the exception of Safeguard, no major U.S. deployment programs, but rather qualitative improvements in existing systems.

Only by intense negotiations were we successful in achieving the limitations contained in the interim agreement. Wishful thinking about what we might want the other side to do has no place in successful negotiations; nor does it have a place in planning our national security. As you know from your briefings on the agreements, limitations advocated by some were the subject of discussion and negotiation, but we could not reach agreement in all areas. I am, of course, referring to MIRV limitations, among other things.

In short, the agreements reached were dictated by the strategic balance and ongoing programs. They reflect what could be obtained through negotiations, not what some might have advocated as more desirable.

The programs that we are recommending are designed not to jockey for some unilateral advantage within the bounds of these agreements but in full recognition of the fact that they are necessary for our national security. The President reported last week that Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues in Moscow had made it absolutely clear that they intended to go forward with defense programs in the offensive area not limited by these agreements. It should be no surprise when I report to you that this is precisely what they are doing.

Both as a Member of Congress and when I became Secretary of Defense, I thought it was essential to apply the brakes to the onrushing Soviet strategic weapons momentum. With ratification of these agreements, we will have accomplished this objective.

As a legislator and as a member of the executive branch, I have always felt that it is essential for us to maintain technological superiority. With approval of the President's budget request, this objective also will be sustained.

The defense programs that are before the Congress are needed to preserve the effectiveness of our deterrent, both with and without SALT. Without the current agreements before you, we would be taking further measures to protect our deterrent capability. With the agreements, we can continue our programs in prudent fashion as we move into follow-on negotiations, hopefully in October.

Let me briefly summarize the major programs we have proposed in the 1973 budget and the 1973 defense report, which was submitted to this Congress in February:

TRIDENT PROGRAM

We need Trident, formerly called the Underseas Long-Range Missile System, at the earliest possible date. Last year we made the decision to accelerate Trident as the most appropriate new strategic initiative to preserve the sufficiency of our deterrent for the future. We should move forward to be in a position to deploy the first submarine on schedule.

It should be noted that our program will not get the first Trident submarine into operation until after the scheduled expiration date of this interim agreement. Even though an increase from the present 41 to 44 boats is permitted, the U.S. total number of operational ballistic missile submarines will not increase during the period of this agreement. As you know, Trident is also presently planned as a replacement system. This request is contained in our 1973 budget estimate, which is currently being considered by the Congress.

The House Armed Services Committee has already marked up the procurement bill and has included the funding requested by the President in the 1973 budget submission to the Congress for the Trident program.

B–1 BOMBER DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Similarly, the B–1 bomber development program must be kept on schedule. It is designed to provide us an option to deploy the first aircraft in the late 1970's.

NCA DEFENSE

With regard to the NCA, defense contemplated in the ABM treaty, we can fund the NCA defense in fiscal year 1973 and still reduce, as a result of this treaty, the ABM budget request for fiscal year 1973 by $650 million from the amounts included in the 1973 budget submitted by the President.

As I have reported to you, system components originally slated for defense of Minuteman sites will be continued with the objective of using these components at Washington. During fiscal year 1973 we propose to continue studies of NCA defense, continue advanced site preparation and keep open options for specific national capital authority defense configuration.

There is $28.7 million included in the President's 1973 budget request for this advanced preparation. But the ABM reduction in the 1973 budget as a result of this particular treaty currently before the Congress amounts to $650 million.

SITE DEFENSE PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The site defense prototype development program, which is permitted by the treaty, preserves the option to deploy a terminal defense of U.S. ICBM's should that ever become necessary. The pending site defense program will provide for earlier availability of developmental hardware, earlier development of software and earlier test and demonstration.

REVISED SATELLITE BASING PROGRAM

The revised satellite basing program will provide more rapid movement of our strategic bomber force to inland United States bases and, in addition, makes provision for reducing the time required to get them airborne.

DEVELOPMENT OF SLCM SYSTEM

The development of the Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile—SLCM—system is necessary to assure availability of future U.S. options for additional U.S. strength, if needed. This particular research and development program was included in the 1972 supplemental request submitted by the Administration earlier this year. A decision was made by the Armed Services Committee to consider this supplemental request in conjunction with the 1973 budget and, as you know, the House will be considering this request with the approval and with the recommendation of the House Armed Services Committee next week.

The funding we are proposing will allow accelerated study of the SLCM system and initiate development of critical technology components such as propulsion and guidance.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Soviets, as you know, now have significant numbers of submarine-launched cruise missiles deployed on nuclear boats, and they have on-going an active production program in this area.

IMPORTANCE OF EFFECTIVE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

The SALT agreements, in my view, underscore the importance of effective Command, Control and Communications—C³. That is why we are recommending additional funding in the 1973 budget to improve secure communication with the airborne command post, advance our satellite technology, improve survivability of future computer data systems and conduct system engineering studies of the world-wide military command and control system.

IMPROVED REENTRY VEHICLE FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES

We are also requesting in the 1973 Department of Defense budget request moderate increases in funding to move forward with work on improved reentry vehicles for our ballistic missiles.

VERIFICATION CAPABILITIES

Clearly, adequate and effective verification capabilities are necessary. We have such capabilities now and are proposing moderate increases in funding to assure that verification of these agreements by national means will remain adequate in the future.

We must continue to preserve our security and to negotiate from a position of strength.

INTERDEPENDENT CONVICTIONS WITH WHICH AGREEMENTS ARE ENTERED

I want to repeat what I told the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday: We enter these agreements with the following interdependent strong convictions:

Our security will be enhanced.

We have applied brakes to the momentum of Soviet strategic missile deployments.

We have adequate means of verification.

Congress will support the strategic programs we have proposed in the 1973 budget.

We have taken the initial steps and have laid a solid foundation for further arms limitation and potential arms reductions in the future.

SUMMARY

In summary, Mr. Chairman and members of the Foreign Relations Committee, the agreements are good, but we should not overlook the fact that the negotiations will continue, since we have only an interim agreement on offensive limitations.

We will realize significant savings in strategic expenditures through these agreements that could be about $5 billion over the next five years even with approval of our on-going program and proposed programs contained in the 1973 budget request as submitted by the President.

We can and must take those further steps to insure continued security while at the same time enhancing prospects for successful follow-on negotiations. This is the way to move toward future benefits with respect both to our security and to our defense expenditures. But we are not in this position yet.

SUPPORT OF AGREEMENTS AND PROGRAMS URGED

We can and we will move ahead with your support. I urge your support of these agreements and continued support of the programs necessary for the future sufficiency of our deterrent forces.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has a statement to present to you.

HEARING PROCEDURE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have the chairman. I have just been handed a note that you have an engagement and must leave early. I wonder if, that being the case, we shouldn't question you and allow you to leave. Is that correct? I was told you had to leave early.

Secretary LAIRD. There should be no surprise on that. I think you were informed that I had a 12:30 luncheon.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to have an opportunity to question you, but it is perfectly all right with me.

Secretary LAIRD. But that was communicated, I am sure, Mr. Chairman, to you some days ago.

The CHAIRMAN. It isn't important. I only wondered whether or not we should proceed with your questions so you could leave. It is perfectly all right with me if you say—

All right, Admiral Moorer, you may proceed.

Secretary LAIRD. I am concerned that that surprised you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We had other meetings. I am not current with all the details of all meetings.

Secretary LAIRD. But I do have a 12:30 luncheon.

The CHAIRMAN. I wouldn't want to interfere with your luncheon.

Admiral Moorer, do you wish to add something to the statement?

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. ROYAL S. ALLISON, U.S. AIR FORCE, ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN FOR STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, AND COL. ROBERT M. LUCY, U.S. MARINE CORPS, LEGAL ADVISER, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JCS

Admiral MOORER. I have a statement that I would be happy to present, Mr. Chairman, if you would like.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you summarize it and put the entire statement in the record? I assume you are in agreement with the Secretary; that is customary. [Laughter.]

If you are going to take issue with him, why you can read it all.

Admiral MOORER. Well, most of the time I am in agreement with him, but not always.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; proceed.

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you today the SALT agreements and their inter-relationship to our strategic force posture.

The Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and our strategic forces have been designed to serve a common purpose—to preserve peace.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff share with all the people of the United States a sincere desire to relieve mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons. On 23 October 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President Truman that they "regard it as of great military importance that further steps . . . be promptly and vigorously pressed . . . in an effort to forestall a possible race in atomic weapons . . ." At that time, they further suggested, as a matter of immediate importance, measures for "restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons and for encouraging the full development of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recognized in 1945 and still maintain today that a credible strategic deterrent is indispensable to peace. For that reason, no task is more important, from a military standpoint, than that of maintaining and protecting such a force. Our strategic nuclear weapons have but one essential purpose—to deter conflict. The real objective is that these weapons never be used. Arms control agreements, to be either enduring or effective, must mutually enhance the security of both parties. We must, in order to survive as a nation, retain the power needed to deter aggression; not as a symbol of national aggrandizement, but as an essential shield for the preservation of our security. It is in this context that the treaty, the agreement, and the United States strategic posture must be viewed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were officially represented on the SALT Delegation and were consulted prior to signature. If we press forward vigorously with our programs designed to protect against a degradation in national security posture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the deterrent capability of our strategic forces will not be impaired, that the peace of the world may be enhanced, and that the undertakings will be in the best interests of the United States.

There are two essential ingredients in any analysis of the strategic consequences of these undertakings: first, the relative balance between the U.S.S.R. and U.S. projected over the life of the Agreement; and second, drawing upon that analysis, a discussion of the essential continuing steps we must take to preserve U.S. security and the stability of international order as we move into the future.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

It is necessary that we examine a little of the past in order to understand the present and to put the future in perspective. In discussing the FY 1971 budget with the Congress, Mr. Laird and I both said that the United States no longer had clear superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. In the course of considering our relative military posture during the FY 1972 budget hearings, I reported that the "balance is tenuous." This year my report to the Congress reflected that the balance is turning us in quantitative terms and that short of an effective agreement on strategic arms limitations, the momentum of the Soviet strategic force buildup would likely carry Soviet forces well beyond the level planned for our forces in the mid or late 1970's. This momen-

tum resulted from the fact that the USSR has had an active ICBM and SLBM construction and deployment program since the mid-sixties, while in a quantitative sense, the United States remained static—concentrating instead on qualitative improvements. We, therefore, must examine the impact of these agreements on the basis not only of what they freeze, but also upon what they forestall.

I would like now to briefly analyze the strategic military balance and project it into the future in order to describe how the Strategic Arms Limitations (SAL) undertakings affect that balance. I will address specifically those forces affected by the undertakings: ICBM's, SLBM's, and ABM's. In addition, the three general quantitative measures which have been used to summarize the overall strategic military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union—numbers of delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads—will be discussed.

ICBM LAUNCHERS

Turning now to the numbers of U.S. and Soviet ICBM launchers, the USSR is expected to have approximately 1,550 ICBM's on launchers by 1 July of this year. They have been deploying ICBM's at the rate of about 250 per year. Thus, if unconstrained, they could have had by mid-year 1977 well over 2,000 such missiles on launchers. The number of ICBM launchers projected for the Soviets under SAL is between 1,600 and 1,400, depending on how many they choose to convert to SLBM's. In the SAL environment, we actually consider the lower number of ICBM launchers to be the more severe threat. The reason for this apparent anomaly is that a lower number of ICBM launchers reflects the phaseout and replacement of older missiles with modern SLBM's. It should be noted, however, that the maximum numbers of ICBM's and SLBM's that the Soviets could have had without the constraints of the undertakings were much in excess of those permitted by the agreement. U.S. ICBM's as projected in our five-year defense program would not have increased beyond the current level of 1,054.

SLBM LAUNCHERS

SLBM launchers are the next item of interest. The USSR is estimated to have about 580 operational SLBM's and is building at the rate of about 128 per year. They were, therefore, capable of operating about 1200 SLBM's by 1977. A Soviet maximum of 950 modern launchers is all they are permitted by the undertakings. The U.S. SLBM launcher level will remain constant through 1977 at 656. Although under the agreement we are permitted to build up to 710 SLBM launchers by converting our 54 Titans to SLBM launchers, we cannot deploy our first new Trident submarine until 1978 and, thus, add to our SLBM launcher force.

INTERCONTINENTAL DELIVERY VEHICLES

The total number of intercontinental delivery vehicles projected for the United States and the Soviet Union should now be considered. The 140 USSR and 457 U.S. bombers must now be added to the numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles previously discussed. They are unaffected by the agreement. Approximately 2100 deploy-

able vehicles are now available to each party. The Soviet Union was expected to overtake us in this measure by mid-1972 and to have over 3000 delivery vehicles operational by 1977. Under the terms of the undertaking, our best estimates reflect a level of 2167 U.S. and 2499 USSR delivery vehicles. This factor, more than any other, points out the significance of interrupting Soviet momentum. Granted, we have a freeze at a ratio of about 2499 to 2167 in favor of the Soviet Union, but we have forestalled a 1977 ratio of about three to two in their favor.

INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE MEGATONNAGE AND WARHEADS

The USSR was already far superior to us in total intercontinental strategic offensive megatonnage. Only in the numbers of strategic offensive warheads was the United States projected to maintain a lead over the Soviet Union during the next five years. Even here, the USSR has the potential to overtake us. Given the technology which we have every reason to believe the Soviet Union either has or is acquiring, it is anticipated that they will move vigorously into MIRV's, both in their ICBM's and SLBM's. The considerably greater "throw weight" or payload capacity of the Soviet missile force, particularly the SS–9 type missile, is especially adaptable to this task. It is still anticipated that they will considerably narrow our lead in terms of numbers of warheads by the late 1970's. However, the restraint on their deploying more than the 313 SS–9 type missiles now operational or under construction will impact upon this growth. Here we benefit from both what we freeze and what we forestall.

SUMMARY OF OFFENSIVE BALANCE

As I have noted on several prior occasions, an objective evaluation of the overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union requires consideration of all the factors in the strategic equation—delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads—in an appropriate combination, together with pre-launch survivability, reliability accuracy, range, and penetrability of enemy defensive systems.

To summarize the offensive balance:

The agreement stops Soviet ICBM deployment at some 1600 missiles, and, if the USSR elects to exercise the option of replacing SS–7 and SS–8 ICBM's with SLBM launchers, it would result in a net decrease of ICBM's to around 1400. It also limits their modern large ballistic missiles to the 313 SS–9 types now operational or under construction. The agreement also limits SLBM's to 950 modern launchers. Additionally, there is a limit of 62 modern nuclear-powered submarines. The number 740 was used as a base figure for Soviet SLBM's. To reach the 950 limit, the Soviet Union must dismantle and remove from the inventory either older ICBM or SLBM launchers or a selected combination thereof. The United States will be limited to the current levels of ICBM's and SLBM's (1054 and 656, respectively), but has the option to modernize the 54 Titan launchers or replace them with light ICBM's or SLBM's.

The agreement thus permits the Soviet Union more strategic offensive launchers than the United States, but prevents them from having the strategically significant lead previously projected. We had no

plans to construct additional strategic launchers in the five-year time frame of the agreement. We thus reduced the growth of the Soviet lead through negotiations rather than by adding to our force structure.

ABM TREATY: STRATEGIC DEFENSE BALANCE

Now, I would like to discuss the strategic defensive balance with regard to the ABM Treaty. Both sides are limited to a maximum of two sites, with 100 launchers at each site. The USSR currently has one site deployed around Moscow, with a total of 64 launchers. We have one site under construction at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which is about 90 percent complete at this time. The Soviet Union is limited to one additional site at an ICBM field, and we are limited to an additional 100-launcher site around Washington, D.C., for defense of our national command and control mechanism. As far as ABM launchers are concerned, therefore, both sides can have a comparable defense. This defense will protect our decision-making process and command and control facilities and provide additional time to implement appropriate retaliatory measures. The perception of assured response by those who would be our adversaries reduces the potential for attack. Further, the undertakings are structured to provide a degree of strategic equality and balance. Our failure to construct the Washington site to balance off the Soviet capability would leave an undesirable asymmetrical relationship which could be destabilizing and weaken our overall deterrent posture.

ACTIONS REQUIRED NOW

No discussion of these undertakings would be complete without consideration of the future. We must look beyond the five-year period of the interim agreement and consider the actions required now to preserve an appropriate strategic equilibrium should follow-on negotiations fail. The relaxation of tensions evidenced by the mutual determination to agree, reflected by these undertakings, reduces the probability of war. There is, however, no guarantee that successive arms-limiting steps can be taken so that a more permanent solution will be reached. The present undertakings, if properly pursued, should assist us in achieving a substantial diminution in tension and lead to peaceful progress. In the meantime, however, we must continue taking those essential military steps designed to maintain our deterrent. If we fail to follow the legitimate dictates of our own security, the leadership of the USSR will chalk it up, not to goodwill, but to a failure of will; not to our confidence, but to our weakness. They, thus, might be encouraged to engage in acts which could threaten the peace and security of the world. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, believe that action to achieve the following assurances must be taken now if the United States is to guard against a degradation of its national security posture:

Assurance I.—"A Broad Range of Intelligence Capabilities and Operations to Verify Soviet Compliance in a Strategic Arms Limitation Environment."

Provide high confidence monitoring of Soviet compliance with the terms of the ABM treaty and the interim offensive agreement.

Provide information on Soviet strategic activity, capabilities, and achievements as insurance against both technological and strategic surprise and for use in follow-on arms limitation negotiations.

Assurance II.—"Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs."

Maximize strategic capabilities within the constraints established by the ABM treaty and the interim offensive agreement.

Plan for rapid augmentation of strategic forces beyond the constraints of the treaty and agreement to be made in the event of abrogation, withdrawal, or collapse of negotiations.

Assurance III.—"Vigorous Research and Development Programs."

Maintain weapons systems technological superiority.

Continue testing to insure the effectiveness of new and existing nuclear weapons systems.

WHAT PROGRAMS WILL DO

The Secretary of Defense has already outlined, in his statement, the major programs designed to provide the assurances that I have enumerated above. It is the conviction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that these programs are essential in order not to jeopardize the future security of the United States. Furthermore, these programs will:

Firstly, place the United States in a position to negotiate further acceptable limitations on offensive systems,

Secondly, prevent the United States from being placed in a position of strategic inferiority in the years ahead, and

Finally, provide positive evidence to our allies of our intention to maintain our strategic deterrent power, so necessary to their security within the SAL environment.

When the discussions leading to these undertakings began on 17 November 1969, President Nixon advised the delegation:

> You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations ever entrusted to an American delegation . . . .
>
> I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task . . . I am nevertheless hopeful that your negotiations . . . will serve to increase mutual security.
>
> I have stated that, for our part, we will be guided by the concept of maintaining "sufficiency" in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities. I believe it is possible, however, that we can carry out our respective responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals.

JCS ACCORD WITH PROPERLY SAFEGUARDED UNDERTAKINGS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accord with the undertakings that are before you today, provided they are properly safeguarded, as discussed earlier. They may well constitute the essential first step toward an era of negotiation and a generation of peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

WITNESS'S POSITION ON WEAPON REQUEST AND TREATY

Mr. Secretary, is it your position that unless Congress authorizes your request for new weapons that you will oppose the treaty?

Secretary LAIRD. My position has been, and continues to be, that all three—the ABM Treaty, the agreement on offensive weapons systems, and the requests contained in the President's 1973 budget—should be approved by the Congress, and I have so recommended.

DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN WITNESS AND PRESIDENT SUGGESTED

The CHAIRMAN. In the public briefing at the White House when Mr. Kissinger was authorized to speak for the President, he stated that the treaty should stand on its own feet, its own merits, and that the weapon systems should be considered on their merits. He did not tie them together. I asked him specifically. It seems to me there is same difference of view between you and the President as described by Mr. Kissinger.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not think there is any difference of opinion, but, as a witness before this committee, I believe that you would want me to state my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. You state, Mr. Secretary, "an adequate defense budget." Of course, that is exactly the question before us. Incidentally, I think we should proceed under the ten minute rule in order for everybody to get an opportunity. You keep time, Mr. Marcy, so that everyone can have an opportunity to question the witnesses, because we have such limited time this morning.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, in further response to your question, I do believe that our defense budget should stand on its own merits, and I have tried to present it in that way to each of the congressional committees. I have made certain recommendations. I realize that the Congress is a co-equal branch of the Government; as I have said on many occasions. The Congress has the right to make different decisions, but as a witness, I would assume that this committee would want my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

ADEQUATE DEFENSE BUDGET WITH REGARD TO ABM TREATY

You refer to an adequate defense budget, which is really the question. What is adequate is the question with regard to the ABM Treaty.

If the treaty is lived up to, if both sides take it seriously—you have stated and other witnesses have stated that we have adequate means of verification, that there could be no serious cheating on this agreement. Helms is very positive about it and, I take it, from your testimony you feel we have adequate means of verification. If that is so and if each side has given up the idea of an effective defense against strategic weapons, it seems to me this has a very important bearing on what is adequate because it is acknowledged, I think, by everyone that the existing weapons now in being are quite adequate to destroy effectively each country. We have sufficient weapons, if their delivery is not thwarted, to destroy them, and the same on the other side. Therefore, it strikes me this has a very important bearing upon what is adequate. If you insist upon these enormously increased weapons with enormous costs, you will force them to respond in kind. All you are doing is continuing the arms race. The whole purpose of the ABM treaty, we thought, was to stop the arms race. There is, to me, an inherent inconsistency in these two positions.

I wish you would clarify that. If they do not have an effective defense against our present capacity to destroy, I don't quite see why it is necessary to continue these enormous increases because, obviously, they will respond in kind if they are capable of it, and they have proved to be fairly capable in the past.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the numbers that are contained in the offensive agreement, which is a first step toward follow-on negotiations in the offensive field, do give a numerical advantage to the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, numerically——

Secretary LAIRD. I do not feel that this is a difficulty. It does not present a problem for the realism of our deterrent because we have technology which is, I believe, from 18 to 24 months ahead of the Soviet Union.

I believe that our friends and allies, as well as the Soviet Union and our adversaries in the world, recognize the fact that we will maintain this technological superiority during this period. So that does not concern me, the fact that there is this imbalance as far as numbers are concerned.

But I am aware of the fact that the Soviet Union has stated that it is going forward with programs permitted under the agreement. And not only have they stated this, but they are also going forward with very effective test programs. I believe that they have the MIRV technology. They have done tests in this particular area and they will, I believe, flight-test this MIRV technology within the next six to nine months.

QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY

The question of sufficiency is one that involves a judgment factor. I personally believe that we have a realistic deterrent today. I believe that our friends and allies—as well as the Soviet Union and the world—understand that. But I do not believe that we can take action today that does not permit us to carry forward with these programs for maintaining our technology and maintaining our replacement capabilities until we have achieved an adequate follow-on agreement. I believe we are moving from arms competition to arms limitation, but I would remind this committee and you, Mr. Chairman, that this particular interim offensive agreement applies primarily to numbers. Each time that we tried to get qualitative limitations included in the negotiations and the agreement, these efforts were unsuccessful.

I would be hopeful that in the follow-on negotiations such forward movement would be possible between the Soviet Union and the United States, but I do not believe that we should take unilateral action without the benefit of these negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary LAIRD. As far as the ABM Treaty is concerned, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I testified before this committee in 1969 in favor of a 12-site ABM program. I pointed out at that time why we wanted to change the concept of the Sentinel system which was announced in 1967 and approved in principle by the Congress in 1968, which was for a deployment of 17 sites. I supported that program and the Congress, in its wisdom, has gone along by approving the follow-on Safeguard program on a phased basis. Presently we have four sites that are approved

for either deployment or advanced site preparation. Contracts have been let and we were going forward on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are all aware of that.

Secretary LAIRD. Now, with this particular treaty we are abandoning that momentum which was started with the approval of the Congress in the defensive area. The Soviet Union is abandoning the extreme momentum which they had going in the offensive area. This was a mutually acceptable course of action for both countries at this time. I do not believe that we should read into the interim offensive agreement considerations which you read into that agreement, and you use as the premise of your question—

The CHAIRMAN. Every time we have a ten-minute limitation you take up the whole ten minutes and you leave no opportunity for questions. We are familiar with that. I will remind you that was approved by a 50–50 vote on the ABM. It was not unanimous in the Senate by any means.

Secretary LAIRD. I am sorry if I implied it was unanimous.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not very significant.

Secretary LAIRD. I have been in politics a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a close question.

Secretary LAIRD. One vote is just as good as two, three, or four; so I don't want to argue how it was approved.

EFFECT OF WITNESS' PROGRAM ON PARITY

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think you have answered or even responded to the questions. We have a sufficiency. The President himself has stated in no uncertain terms that one reason why there has been a favorable response is that these agreements cannot last unless each side feels that it has security. He reiterated as did Mr. Kissinger that you should not describe these agreements as either party having an advantage. that either won the game. He is trying to promote, if I understand him, that each has a degree of parity.

Secretary LAIRD. That is what I am promoting, too.

The CHAIRMAN. What your program is doing is to upset that. You continually refer to superiority as you go along.

Secretary LAIRD. I have referred to it in the area of technology and, Mr. Chairman, we do have a superior position as far as technology is concerned. That is the reason why I am confident that the disparity in numbers that exists in the offensive agreement does not prevent us from maintaining sufficiency as far as our deterrent is concerned.

I would quote the President to you and perhaps we could put this in the record at this particular point. The President did cover this in his briefing to the members of the committee last week at the White House, and it might be well to restate his position.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like for us to give as many members of the committee as possible some opportunity to make observations.

Secretary LAIRD. Could I put that in the record without reading it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you can put anything you would like into the record.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you. I appreciate that. (See appendix.)

EFFECT OF SEEKING ADVANTAGE ON SPIRIT OF AGREEMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. The point comes back to this. It will destroy the whole spirit of these agreements if you persist or if our government persists in seeking an advantage, and a clear advantage, in any of these fields. The basis of the agreements is a high degree of parity. The numbers are not so significant if there is no defense against them. If the weapons are more than adequate and they can't defend against them, the fact that you have 100 or 500 more missiles doesn't make any appreciable difference. In addition, you have already stated you believe, we have superiority in technology. Our own government made a decision to develop Minuteman, which is smaller than the SS–9, because it is a more efficient way to use your material. A 16-megaton weapon or a 25-megaton weapon is not an efficient way to proceed. We made that decision ourselves; so there is a degree of parity. In fact, there are some very good authorities who believe that we have on balance various very much stronger systems today.

If we go forward with your proposals we will upset that balance and I think we are likely to destroy the effectiveness of the treaty itself and that is what we wish to protect.

ADEQUATE DEFENSE ISSUE IN VIEW OF ABM AGREEMENT

I think the issue about the adequate defense in view of the ABM agreement is the very crux of the matter and I don't quite think you have addressed yourself directly to that question.

We have had some very interesting hearings with other members of the government and some who have recently left, particularly the Navy. Information has been supplied the committee from the Center for Defense Information which, as you know, is headed by an admiral who just retired and who is thoroughly aware of the relative strength of the American government versus the Russians. He says, for example, "The Center for Defense Information has made its own study of the naval balance and has reached the following conclusions: The balance is heavily in favor of the United States. The Soviet Union is doing little which would significantly change the balance in the next few years. There is little evidence to support the request for a large increase in money for ships designed to project U.S. power overseas and to greatly expand U.S. strategic weapons capability."

(The document referred to follows:)

THE DEFENSE
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THE SOVIET NAVAL THREAT: REALITY AND ILLUSION

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has told Congress that "a major shift in the naval balance between the United States and the Soviet Union" is taking place.

"Unless we accelerate the modernization of our fleet," he told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 15, 1972, "the Soviets will increasingly challenge our control of the seas in those maritime regions essential to the success of our forward defense strategy, as well as in ocean areas closer to our shores."

On the basis of these arguments, the Defense Department has asked Congress for $9.7 billion in new Navy procurement funds for fiscal 1973, about $1 billion more than in 1972, which was in turn about $1 billion more than in 1971. These funds are part of a Navy "modernization" program: 42 major combat ships and 21 submarines now under construction or authorized by Congress and more than 60 major surface ships and a new fleet of ballistic missile submarines contemplated (see tables 4 and 5).

The Center for Defense Information has made its own study of the naval balance and has reached the following conclusions:

- The balance is heavily in favor of the United States.
- The Soviet Union is doing little which would significantly change the balance in the next few years.
- There is little evidence to support the request for a large increase in money for ships designed to project US power overseas and to greatly expand US strategic weapons capability.

A Look at the Balance

Defense Department testimony to Congress on the Soviet naval threat stresses such trends as an increase in the number of Soviet major combat surface ships in the last five years (from 185 to 215, including two new helicopter carriers, seven new missile cruisers, 18 new missile destroyers and 36 new escorts). It stresses Russia's numerical advantage in submarines (about 343 Soviet to 138 US), new Soviet anti-ship missiles, and increases in Soviet naval operations in the world's oceans.

But these presentations fail to give a fair picture of the relative strengths of these two navies. The diagrams and data on the following pages give a fair picture. They show that:

1. The Soviet Union has no nuclear-powered combat surface ships and is not reported to be building any. The United States has four and is building seven more.

2. The United States has 14 attack aircraft carriers which carry from 40 to 90 jet aircraft each, used for striking land or sea targets. Two nuclear carriers are under construction. The Soviet Union has no attack carriers and no sea-based fixed-wing aircraft. The Defense Department has asked for funds in 1973 to start building the power plant for a fourth nuclear attack carrier. It also has asked for funds to design a new fleet of at least eight smaller follow-on carriers to be called Sea Control Ships.

3. The United States has two anti-submarine carriers which carry helicopters and fixed-wing anti-submarine aircraft. The Soviets have two anti-submarine carriers which are actually cruisers with large helicopter landing decks. One 35,000-ton ship is under construction in the Soviet Union which may be a carrier or some other type of ship.

4. The United States has seven "assault" helicopter carriers designed to move marines ashore. Five more, twice the size of the existing ones, are under construction. The Soviet Union has no comparable ships.

5. The United States has nine cruisers. The Soviets have 25. But four of the Soviet cruisers are pre-World War Two and are probably being retired. Ten of the Soviet cruisers are smaller than many US destroyers. The US Navy wants to build two 2200-ton prototypes of what would eventually be a cruiser-size hovercraft called a "surface effects ship."

6. Soviet missile-firing destroyers are fewer and smaller than their US counterparts. Congress has already authorized 30 new destroyers (DD963 Spruance Class), which are larger than any destroyers of the Soviet Union. The US Navy is asking for funds for 50 new "patrol frigates" which will be larger than most Soviet destroyers. By the late 1970s all US destroyers and patrol frigates are to be equipped with the new Harpoon surface-to-surface missile.

7. The present US fleet of 41 strategic ballistic missile submarines has 2800 separately targetable warheads.[1] Russia's ballistic missile submarines have about 500 warheads (see Table 1). Also, a greater percentage of the US ballistic missile submarines are on station at a given time than is the case with the Soviet submarines. By 1976, the

Continued on Page 2

[1] To put in context with overall US strategic capability, Secretary Laird gave these comparative figures for nuclear weapons for mid 1972:

Total offensive strategic nuclear weapons (warheads)

US	*USSR*
5700	2500

80-942 O—72——6

REALITY Continued from Page 1

number of separately targetable US submarine-launched warheads will increase to almost 7000. This figure does not reflect the proposed new ULMS ballistic missile submarine system which will be the subject of a subsequent edition of *The Defense Monitor*.

8. The Soviets have a fleet of 68 submarines armed with anti-shipping "cruise" missiles. The United States decided in the 1950s not to develop a capability in this area and abandoned its Regulus missile program. Recently, the Pentagon decided to go ahead with development of a new cruise missile for a new attack submarine.

9. The US has more than twice the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines as the Soviet Union. The Russians have 190 diesel attack submarines as compared to 41 for the US, but these are being phased out of both navies. The total number of Soviet attack submarines has decreased from 430 in 1960 to 283 in 1972, and Admiral Moorer states that he expects this number will continue to decline as newer submarines are introduced at a slower rate than older units are withdrawn. The US is building a new class of nuclear attack submarines (SSN 688 Los Angeles Class).

Construction

Admiral Moorer told Congress: "The rate of modernization in the Soviet surface fleet is expected to accelerate during the next few years."

The Russians are building mainly light cruisers and destroyers. These include Kresta II cruisers, and Krivak and Kashin destroyers. Recently these have been built at a rate of about one per year in each class. Defense Department reports have suggested another "possible" cruiser construction program and a "possible" carrier.

But in view of the US construction program already in progress, Soviet "acceleration" would have to be enormous to make a significant difference in the overall balance.

Regional Balances

When talking about a shifting balance, Defense Department witnesses limit themselves to comparing the US and Soviet navies. Yet, many NATO allies have modern effective navies that must be taken into account. When NATO and Warsaw Pact forces are compared the balance clearly favors NATO (see Table 2).

The balance is even more striking when naval forces in the Mediterranean, for example, are examined alone (see Table 3). (Not shown in the table are the more than 50 small patrol boats armed with anti-ship missiles which the Soviet Union has given many of her allies in the area. These boats normally operate relatively near shore.)

Other Factors

The map on page seven shows that Soviet fleets suffer geographic and climatic handicaps—limitations not faced by the US Navy. Some fleets are partially iced-in during winter. Others can be bottled up in home waters because of narrow passages through which they must travel. These "choke points" also facilitate NATO's monitoring of Soviet fleet movements.

In discussing the US-USSR naval balance, Defense Department witnesses neglect to consider the US Coast Guard—a force which possesses over 50 ocean-going cutters of naval destroyer size, armed with guns and anti-submarine weapons.

Conclusions

The overall naval balance favors the United States. The Soviet Union is not likely to change this status in the near future.

The naval "balance" argument does not, therefore, justify, by itself, the kind of naval buildup which the Defense Department has under way now or plans in the future. However, Defense Department testimony makes clear that the Navy has other purposes in mind. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, told Congress that the Navy's four "capabilities" are:

- "Assured second strike"
  (This refers to the Polaris-Poseidon fleet retaliating with strategic missiles after a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States.)
- "Control of sealines and areas"
- "Projection of power ashore"
- "Overseas presence"

The first "capability" is defensive. In view of the overwhelming second strike capability which the US possesses, the new ULMS program is not needed at this time. The American public deserves a much clearer definition of the other Navy "capabilities": What kind and degree of "control of the seas" has the US decided to pursue? Under what conditions and in what areas of the world will it "project power ashore"? What portion of the present Navy and what portion of the "modernization" program is designed for overseas presence? These are questions which must be publicly asked and answered before additional programs are approved by Congress.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

"Every addition to defense expenditure does not automatically increase military security. Because security is based upon moral and economic, as well as purely military strength, a point can be reached at which additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken it."

President Eisenhower

★ ★ ★ ★ ★

TABLE ONE

CURRENT BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE COMPARISON

	Type	Number of Submarines	Missile Type	Missile Range	Number of Launchers per Submarine	Total Number of Launchers	Number of Independent Warheads per Submarine	Total Number of Warheads
US [1]	Poseidon	12	Poseidon	2500 nm	16	192	192	2304
	Polaris	21	A-3	2500 nm	16	336	16	336
	Polaris	8	A-2	1500 nm	16	128	16	128
	Totals	41				656		2768
USSR [2]	Yankee	26	SS-N-6 (Sawfly)	1300 nm	16	416	16	416
	Hotel II	9	SS-N-5 (Serb)	650 nm	3	27	3	27
	Golf II	25	SS-N-5 (Serb)	650 nm	3	75	3	75
	Totals	60				518		518

[1] Figures as of June 1972
[2] Figures as of February 1972

TABLE TWO

MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT COMPARISON
(Figures as of February 1972)

NATO	Totals	United States	United Kingdom	France	Canada	Denmark	Netherlands	Italy	Norway	Portugal	Greece	Turkey	West Germany
Attack and ASW Carriers	20	16	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Helicopter Carriers	12	7	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cruisers	16	9	3	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Destroyers and Escorts	460	214	76	48	20	2	18	24	5	11	12	10	20
Submarines	259	138	34	20	4	6	5	10	15	4	2	10	11
Totals	767	384	118	74	24	8	25	34	20	15	14	20	31

WARSAW PACT	Totals	USSR	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	East Germany	Hungary	Poland	Rumania
Attack and ASW Carriers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Helicopter Carriers	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cruisers	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
Destroyers and Escorts	206	195	2	4	3	0	2	0
Submarines	350	343	2	0	0	0	5	0
Totals	583	565	4	4	3	0	7	0

TABLE THREE

MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS IN MEDITERRANEAN AREA

NATO AND US ALLIES	Totals	NATO [1]	Spain [2]	Israel	Morocco
Attack and ASW Carriers	5	4	1	0	0
Helicopter Carriers	3	3	0	0	0
Cruisers	3	2	1	0	0
Destroyers and Escorts	106	86	17	2	1
Attack Submarines	47	41	3	3	0
Totals	164	136	22	5	1

[1] NATO includes US 6th Fleet; United Kingdom forces normally in the area; one half of the French navy; and the naval forces of Italy, Greece, and Turkey.
[2] One half of the Spanish navy.

WARSAW PACT AND USSR ALLIES	Totals	W.P. (USSR) [1]	Egypt	Yugoslavia [2]	Albania [2]	Others [3]
Attack and ASW Carriers	0-0	0-0	0	0	0	0
Helicopter Carriers	0-1	0-1	0	0	0	0
Cruisers	2-4	2-4	0	0	0	0
Destroyers and Escorts	14-17	5-8	7	2	0	0
Attack Submarines	27-32	7-12	12	5	3	0
Totals	43-54	14-25	19	7	3	0

[1] USSR totals are normal and highest observed.
[2] Yugoslavia and Albania are included though the political situation with the USSR may be strained at the moment.
[3] Others include Syria, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon.

TABLE FOUR

SUMMARY OF MAJOR US COMBATANT SHIPS AUTHORIZED OR PRESENTLY UNDER CONSTRUCTION

2—Nuclear Attack Carriers
5—Large Amphibious Helicopter Assault Carriers
5—Large Nuclear Guided Missile Destroyer Leaders
16—Large All-Purpose Destroyers (DD963 Spruance Class)
14—Large Escorts (DE1052 Knox Class)
12—Large Nuclear Attack Submarines (SSN688 Los Angeles Class)
9—Medium Nuclear Attack Sumberines (SSN637 Sturgeon Class)

TABLE FIVE

SUMMARY OF MAJOR US COMBATANT SHIPS FISCAL YEAR 1973 REQUESTED

$299 million for long lead items for one additional nuclear attack carrier (CVN-70). (Eventual total program will cost an estimated $951 million.)

$10 million for contract design for a "first buy" of eight new follow-on carriers called Sea Control Ships (SCS). (Eventual total program will cost an estimated $1 billion.)

$50 million for two 2200-ton prototypes of a new major surface combatant called Surface Effect Ship (SES), which will be a large hovercraft. (Eventual total program cost is not available.)

$945 million for advanced development of a new strategic-missile nuclear submarine called Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS). (Eventual total program will cost an estimated $11.2 billion as "presently constituted.")

$612 million for procurement of seven additional all-purpose destroyers of the DD963 Spruance Class. (Eventual total program will cost an estimated $2.7 billion.)

$192 million for the lead ship of a new fifty ship class called Patrol Frigate (PF). (Eventual total program cost is estimated at $2.4 billion.)

$1.05 billion for procurement of six additional nuclear attack submarines of the SSN688 Los Angeles Class. (Eventual total program will cost an estimated $6.8 billion.)

(All total program cost estimates are based on Department of Defense figures.)

TABLE SIX

US AND USSR MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS (Figures as of February 1972)

	US	*USSR*
SURFACE		
Aircraft Carriers	16	0
Helicopter Carriers	7	2
Cruisers (with missiles)	8	11
Cruisers (without missiles)	1	14
Destroyers and Escorts (with missiles)	65	40
Destroyers and Escorts (without missiles)	149	155
SURFACE TOTALS	246	222
SUBMARINES		
Nuclear Submarines (with ballistic missiles)	41	35 (est.)
Diesel Submarines (with ballistic missiles)	0	25
Nuclear Attack Submarines (with cruise missiles)	0	40 (est.)
Diesel Attack Submarines (with cruise missiles)	0	28
Nuclear Attack Submarines (without missiles)	56	25
Diesel Attack Submarines (without missiles)	41	190
SUBMARINE TOTAL	138	343
MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANT TOTALS	384	565

TABLE SEVEN

US AND USSR MAJOR NAVAL COMBATANTS
(Figures as of February 1972)

US

No. of Ships	Class or Type	Tonnage	Status	Operational Dates
	NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS			
1	Enterprise	75,000	Active	1961
2	Nimitz	81,000	Under construction	1974-6
1	Nimitz	81,000	Requested FY1973 $299 million for long lead items (Est. total cost—$951 million)	
	CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS			
4	Kitty Hawk	60,100	Active	1961-8
4	Forrestal	59,650	Active	1955-9
3	Midway	51,000	Active	1945-7
2	Hancock	32,800	Active	1944-50
2	Essex	32,800	Active	1943-5
8	Sea Control Ship	17,000 (est.)	Requested FY1973 $10 million for contract design (Est. total cost—$1 billion)	late 1970s
	HELICOPTER CARRIERS			
7	Iwo Jima	17,000	Active	1961-70
5	Amphibious Assault Ship	35,000 (est.)	Under construction	1973-6
	NUCLEAR CRUISERS			
1	Long Beach	14,200	Active	1961
	CONVENTIONAL CRUISERS			
1	Salem	17,000	Active	1949
3	Albany	13,700	Active	1945-6
4	Cleveland	10,670	Active	1944-5
?	Surface Effect Ship (Hovercraft)	10,000 (est.)	Requested FY1973 $50 million for two 2200 ton prototypes (Est. total cost—not available)	late 1970s
	NUCLEAR DESTROYERS			
5	California	9,000 (est.)	Under construction	1972-5
1	Truxton	8,200	Active	1967
1	Bainbridge	7,600	Active	1962
	CONVENTIONAL DESTROYERS AND ESCORTS			
63	Missile Destroyers	3,370-6,570	Active	1953-67
30	Spruance [1]	6,000 (est.)	Under construction	late 1970s
50	Patrol Frigate [1]	3,400 (est.)	Requested FY1973 $192 million for lead ship	late 1970s
46	Knox [1]	3,011	Active (14 still under construction)	1971-2
	(The US has about 115 additional older destroyers and escorts.)			
	NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES			
41	Polaris/Poseidon	5,900-7,320	Active	1959-67
?	ULMS	16,000 (est.)	Requested FY1973 $945 million for advanced development (Est. total cost—$11.2 billion)	late 1970s
	DIESEL SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES			
None				
	NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES			
None				
	(The US decided not to pursue this weapon system in the late 1950s, but a cruise missile weapon system is presently under development.)			
	DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES			
None				
	NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES			
56	Sturgeon and others	2,317-3,860	Active (Nine more under construction)	1954-?
12	6,000 (est.)	Los Angeles	Under construction (Six more requested in FY1973 budget)	1967-?
	DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES			
41	Guppy and others	1,850-2,145	Active (But being deactivated)	1943-59

(All total program cost estimates are based on Department of Defense figures.)

[1] The surface-to-surface missile (Harpoon) will be put on these units and almost all other destroyers by the late 1970s. These units are shown because of this fact and their large size.

USSR

No. of Ships	Class or Type	Tonnage	Status	Operational Dates
	NUCLEAR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS			
None				
	CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS			
None				
	HELICOPTER CARRIERS			
2	Moskva [1]	15,000	Active	1967-8
1	(Possible carrier or merchant ship)	35,000 (est.)	Under construction	late 1970s
	NUCLEAR CRUISERS			
None				
	CONVENTIONAL CRUISERS			
10	Sverdlov	15,450	Active	1951-60
1	Dzerzhinski	15,450	Active	1962
2	Chapaev	11,500	"Probably" being deactivated (old)	1948-50 [2]
1	Missile Cruiser	9,000 (est.)	Under construction	late 1970s
2	Kirov	8,500	"Probably" being deactivated (old)	1938-44
	(The following Soviet cruisers are smaller in size than US destroyers.)			
2	Kresta II	6,000	Active	1968-?
4	Kresta I	5,140	Active	1967-8
4	Kynda	4,800	Active	1962-5
	NUCLEAR DESTROYERS			
None				
	CONVENTIONAL DESTROYERS AND ESCORTS			
40	Missile Destroyers	2,850-5,200	Active	1964-?
	(The USSR has about 155 additional older non-missile destroyers and escorts. Some are being converted to missile ships.)			
	NUCLEAR SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES			
35	Yankee	7,300	Active	1969-?
	Hotel II	3,700	Active	1961-?
	DIESEL SUBMARINES WITH BALLISTIC MISSILES			
25	Golf II	2,300	Active	1950-65
	NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES			
40	Echo I+II	5,000	Active	1961-8
	Charlie	4,000	Active	1969-?
	DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES WITH CRUISE MISSILES			
28	Juliett	2,200	Active	1962-7
	Whiskey	1,200	Active	1950-?
	NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES			
25	Victor	3,600	Active	1969-?
	November	3,500	Active	1959-65
	DIESEL ATTACK SUBMARINES			
190	Fox Trot and others	650-2,000	Active (Most being deactivated)	1950-67

(Question marks denote continuing construction.)

[1] Cruiser forward with large ASW helicopter deck aft

[2] Construction began in 1938

In addition to the over-all numerical superiority of the US major naval combatant force and its preponderance of strength in ballistic missile capability, the US Navy also enjoys fewer climatic and geographic limitations in its normal fleet operations. The Soviet North and Pacific Fleets are restricted by severe winter weather. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets can easily be blocked if necessary to prevent them from exiting their home waters into international seas. Also, due to geographic factors, it is easier for NATO to keep the Soviet fleets under surveillance than it is for the Soviets to maintain continuous surveillance of NATO naval operations.

TABLE EIGHT

US AND USSR FLEET OPERATIONAL COMPARISONS

US

Normal Operations	*Estimated No. of Major Units*	*Major Facilities*	*Climatic or Geographic Limitations*
FIRST FLEET: Extensive training operations in eastern Pacific year-round.	125	San Diego, Long Beach, San Francisco	None
SEVENTH FLEET: Extensive training operations in Western Pacific year-round. Frequent operations in Sea of Japan and South China Sea. War operations in Gulf of Tonkin and Philippines Sea. Infrequent operations in Indian Ocean. Patrols US Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.	61	Pearl Harbor, Guam, Midway, Japan, Philippines, Formosa, Vietnam	None
SECOND FLEET: Extensive training operations in western Atlantic, Norwegian and North Seas, and in the Caribbean Sea year-round. Annual operations around South America. Deploys to Mediterranean Sea and to the Indian Ocean.	179	Norfolk, Newport, Charleston, Mayport, Key West, New London, Spain, Scotland, Iceland, Cuba, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Azores	None
SIXTH FLEET: Extensive training operations throughout the Mediterranean Sea year-round. Quarterly deployment of 2-3 destroyers into the Black Sea.	23[1]	Ports in Italy, Greece, France, Spain, Turkey, Malta	Narrow exit via Strait of Gibraltar
MIDDLE-EAST FORCE: Normal training operations in Persian Gulf.	2	Bahrein, Diego Garcia (Indian Ocean)	Narrow exit from Persian Gulf via Strait of Hormuz

[1] Includes two attack carriers and amphibious landing ships with embarked Marine Battalion Landing Team.

USSR

Normal Operations	*Estimated No. of Major Units*	*Major Facilities*	*Climatic or Geographic Limitations*
BLACK SEA FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in Black Sea year-round. Extensive deployments to Mediterranean Sea. Infrequent operations in Atlantic or Caribbean Sea.	123	Batumi, Sevastopol, Novorossik (USSR)	Narrow exit via Turkish Straits
MEDITERRANEAN FLEET: Normal operations in Eastern and Central Mediterranean Sea. Extensive time spent at anchorages or in ports. Submarines deploy from North or Baltic Fleets. Most surface combatants deploy from Black Sea Fleet.	21	Egypt	Narrow entrance via Strait of Gibraltar and Turkish Straits
BALTIC FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in Baltic Sea year-round. Out-of-area operations in North Sea. Infrequent operations in the North Atlantic or Caribbean Sea.	74	Riga, Kaliningrad (USSR)	Partial winter freeze in both ports/Narrow exit via The Sound
NORTH FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in White and Barents Seas during summer months. Out-of-area exercises in Norwegian Sea. Infrequent operations in North Atlantic and Caribbean Sea.	197	Kola, Murmansk Severodvinsk (USSR)	Partial winter freeze in all ports
PACIFIC FLEET: Normal in-area training operations in Seas of Japan and Okhotsk. Infrequent out-of-area operations in North and Central Pacific during summer months only. Deployments to the Indian Ocean.	161	Vladivostok, Nakhodka, Petropavlovsk (USSR)	Partial winter freeze in all ports/Narrow exits via Kuril Islands and Korea and Tsugaru Straits
INDIAN OCEAN DETACHMENT: Extensive time spent at anchor in the Socotra Island area, or in Seychelles and Maldive Islands. Minor training operations in Arabian Sea.	5	None. Use friendly ports for support	Narrow entrance via Strait of of Malacca/Long distance from Pacific and North Fleets
GUINEA PATROL: Off west coast of Africa.	3	None. Use Conakry, Guinea for support	None


USSR FLEET OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS
USSR
MAJOR FACILITY

THE CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

The enormous size and complexity of the military effort in this country has outrun the institutions established for citizen understanding and control of public policy. An informed public opinion on national defense and foreign commitments is lacking in our society.

For these reasons the Center for Defense Information has been established. The Fund for Peace has encouraged and made possible the initiation of this Center. Further funding will be provided by private foundations and interested individuals. The Center will be under absolutely no financial or other obligation to any government, military, industrial or individual special interest.

The Center will concentrate exclusively on analyzing and circulating public information on matters of national defense and overseas commitments, as well as scrutinizing our national defense program on a day-to-day basis. Its appraisals will challenge existing assumptions about national defense and provide the basis for rational alternative policies and budgets, to be measured against those of the Department of Defense.

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The Center and its rapidly developing inventory of information will be a reliable and non-partisan resource for all individuals and groups insisting upon a military that will genuinely defend and strengthen American society, not weaken it by overcommitments and waste of resources.

Real Admiral Gene R. La Rocque retired from the United States Navy on April 1st 1972 to become Director of the Center for Defense Information.

He commanded destroyers in the Pacific in World War Two and holds the Bronze Star and Navy Commendation Medal. He commanded a fast carrier task group with the Sixth Fleet, a division of destroyers, a cruise and Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla. He served on the staff of the Naval War College, and more recently, in the Strategic Plans Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral La Rocque recently received the Legion of Merit and left his position as Director of the Inter-American Defense College to direct the Center for Defense Information.

THE STAFF

Rear Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, US Navy (Ret.)
Director

Lindsay Mattison
Assistant Director
Donald May
Assistant Director
Sally Anderson

Robert Berman
David Johnson
William Ronsaville
Dean Rudoy
Judith Weiss

Center for Defense Information
201 Massachusetts Avenue NE
Washington DC 20002
202 543 0400

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The CHAIRMAN. I submit he is a very good authority and, as I say, he retired recently, within the last, I think, 60 days, from the Defense Department. So there is room for honest difference of opinion.

QUESTION OF LIVING UP TO SPIRIT OF TREATY AND AGREEMENT

It comes down to this question, as I see it, of our living up to the spirit of the ABM treaty and the agreement and to give them a chance to operate. I must say I was greatly surprised that before we even had an opportunity to consider the ABM treaty you gave the impression that unless we went forward with these three new programs the treaty would not be in our interest. It gives me the feeling——

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. One last comment and my time is over.

It gives me the feeling in order to get your support, the President had to agree to these weapon systems whether he liked it or not. We know this goes on in all governments. I suppose that in Russia Marshal Grechko said if they didn't do this he wouldn't support it. It has happened before. I remember on such minor matters as the Antarctic Treaty and other treaties we ran into this jockeying. It is not unknown and it is not necessarily an illegitimate matter, but it is up to this committee and the Congress, it seems to me, to exercise its own judgment, viewing both of these matters, as the President said through Mr. Kissinger, on their own merits. That is about the way I look at them.

My time is up.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I feel that I should respond.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I hope it won't take up all the time.

Secretary LAIRD. If I could have 30 seconds to respond.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly; you have taken an hour to begin with. Go ahead.

Secretary LAIRD. All right. I won't respond.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Out of my time I would like the Secretary to respond. Leave me, if you would, a few minutes in my time.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, thank you, Senator Pell.

REQUESTED PROGRAMS AND PROJECTED SAVINGS

I would merely state that all we are asking for is congressional approval of these programs that are in our 1973 budget. We have a ship construction program to which you refer and on which you quote an authority from whom you have certain information.

The CHAIRMAN. It is Admiral La Rocque. You know Admiral La Rocque.

Secretary LAIRD. And I would certainly feel that the military advice that I have from the Chiefs of Naval Operations as far as our ship construction programs are concerned is very good military advice. I have consulted with the best authorities that I can on our submarine programs, all the way from Admiral Rickover and Admiral Smith to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Chief of Naval Operations, and I do support the ship construction program that is in our 1973 budget.

As for the B–1 and the Trident, which are in the strategic area, the Congress last year supported the Department of Defense as we went forward with these two programs. We are merely asking for a continuation in the 1973 budget of these programs which were approved last year.

We are coming to Congress with a reduction in the 1973 budget as a result of the ABM treaty of some $650 million. We are projecting a five-year savings as a result of the ABM treaty of up to $5 billion. We are projecting a saving through 1981 as far as the ABM treaty is concerned over the period of some $8.6 billion. I think that these things should be pointed out and an amendment is coming forward to the 1973 budget, which in part reflects the impact of these particular agreements, although it does not affect the B–1 or the Trident requests which we have before the Congress. There were some people, it seems to me, who were reading into these agreements the assumption that a reduction could be made in these on-going offensive weapon programs which we have asked the Congress to continue. That is a point that I think is sometimes overlooked.

DECREASED DEFENSIVE AND INCREASED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BUDGETS

Senator PELL. I think the record should also show that while there is a decrease, as you justly say, Mr. Secretary, in the defensive weapon budget, there is an increase, although not as great, in the offensive weapon budget.

I have two questions.

Secretary LAIRD. But that is not true to any great extent for fiscal 1973 expenditures in the offensive area. That, of course, is not the case. Our expenditure level for 1973 is projected in the budget at $76.5 billion. When you get into the large ship construction and other procurement and R & D items in our budget, our increases in expenditures are much less than the increase in budget authority for 1973. The ship construction is on a full funding basis; those expenditures do not show up much until 1974, 1975 and beyond.

Senator PELL. Correct, but I think that to simplify, and I realize how confusing it is for the American public, the fact remains from the viewpoint of strategic nuclear weapons, the budget is being reduced in defensive weapons, but it is being increased in offensive ones. Is that not correct?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct because of the ship construction that is involved; that increase will not show up in expenditures however until about the 1975 period, but we are asking for full funding on the authorization.

Senator PELL. I have two questions. I hope we can get through in my time. If not I will wait around and I hope I will be able to bring up the rear guard on it.

EFFECTIVENESS AND PURPOSE OF NCA INSTALLATION

First, in connection with the National Capital ABM, I am a little concerned here because a quick look at the charts shows that a Soviet submarine could be within 125 miles of this Caucus Room and be in

international waters. Is there any ABM systems in the world that is so effective that in the 30 seconds it would take for a missile to go that distance it could protect the center from that missile with no warning?

Secretary LAIRD. With no warning?

Senator PELL. Right.

Secretary LAIRD. The NCA ABM defense will be able to defend against a ballistic missile fired at the NCA from a distance of 125 miles. The ballistic missile flight times are much longer than the 30 second figure you have mentioned, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. But I think, again, from the viewpoint of all of us who are not too informed in this field, we should bear in mind that the Capital ABM center is really a bargaining chip and not much else from the viewpoint of military effectiveness. I am not sure——

Secretary LAIRD. No, I don't think——

Senator PELL. It is not a bad idea that we should take our risk because, gosh knows, we are expendable with the rest of the country.

Secretary LAIRD. I don't agree with your military assessment. I would like the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to comment on your military assessment.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Pell, the purpose of the NCA installation is to protect the decision-making process in the government. We look on the decision-making process as a very important component of the overall deterrent package; and if a would-be attacker feels that he can destroy the decision-making process without too much effort with full assurance, that weakens the deterrent.

We have confidence in our operating forces that they can execute the task assigned provided they get timely instructions; consequently, the whole purpose of the NCA installation is to provide more time for decision, and to ensure that the proper instructions do, in fact, reach the executing forces. It is not related to the protection of industry or population over all.

Senator PELL. I thank you very much, but the fact remains that for the time being until these new devices are developed, this is basically a bargaining chip, not a protective device.

Secretary LAIRD. I would disagree with that. I have not used that term and I would not use that term in connection with the NCA defense. The question of the construction of an NCA defense, of course, will be covered in the fiscal 1974 budget submission. There is no construction money in the 1973 budget for an NCA defense except for a small amount for advanced preparation. I would only add one point, and it is that I have confidence in the ASW (anti-submarine warfare) capabilities and I believe that we would have warning on any submarine that was within 150 miles of our coasts.

Senator PELL. We would certainly have warning, but I think there is a certain inconsistency in your statement because we both agree that as of now——

Secretary LAIRD. Your question was no warning.

Senator PELL. No warning in the sense—exactly, but if there is no legal reason——

Secretary LAIRD. I was answering your question, not one I proposed.

Senator PELL. I understood, but there is no legal reason why a submarine should not be 125 miles away.

Secretary LAIRD. No legal reason, but I can assure you we have an ASW capability such that I do not believe a question of no warning would be a viable question at this time. I would be glad to get into the ASW capabilities at this time, but I have confidence that we would have some warning of a submarine located that close to our shores.

TIME NEEDED FOR ABM SYSTEM TO BE EFFECTIVE

Senator PELL. Would it be possible to say in an open meeting of this sort how much time is needed for an ABM system to be effective?

Secretary LAIRD. I will supply that for the record.

Senator PELL. On the record, or classified?

Secretary LAIRD. I hestitate—classified.

Senator PELL. There is no way of giving a public statement in that regard?

Secretary LAIRD. I do not believe it would serve a useful purpose to get into those times in public testimony, but I will be glad to supply it for you, Senator Pell.

(The information referred to follows:)

TIME NEEDED FOR ABM SYSTEM TO BE EFFECTIVE

(Supplied by Department of Defense)

SAFEGUARD interceptors can be warmed up and launched within [deleted] after threatening objects are detected. As you know, nuclear release must be granted in order to launch these interceptors. At all times the SAFEGUARD radars are actively performing their search functions, and incoming SLBMs will be detected and tracked as soon as they break the radar horizon. For a submarine launching ballistic missiles from 100 NM offshore, there is ample time for the interceptors to be warmed up and launched during the time it takes the radar to track the incoming SLBMs. Even for SLBMs launched from such close range, ample flyout time is available after radar track and missile launch for the SPRINTs to intercept the incoming RVs in time to protect NCA facilities.

Senator PELL. All right. I think my time is up. I will come back later.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?

ATTENTION GIVEN TO DOMESTIC PRIORITIES AND DEFENSE

Senator COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will first make a general remark to get into the subject to which the chairman alluded and that is the attention we give to the domestic priorities and defense. I certainly would agree, we are taking care of the domestic needs the best we can. I only want to repeat what Secretary Rogers said the other day: In the last three and a half years the United States has changed its priorities. The ratio was 45 percent for defense and 31 percent for domestic priorities; it is now 31 percent of our budget for defense and 45 percent for domestic priorities.

I want an adequate defense. I was the first one to offer an amendment to strike ABM's. We lost on that on a tie vote of 50 to 50. You have been very straightforward, Mr. Secretary, and Admiral Moorer has given us a thorough statement of the outer limits of the numbers of launchers that each side could have under this treaty, very clear.

U.S. SECURITY NEEDS FOR NEXT FIVE YEARS

The question I want to address myself to is what are our security needs for the next five years.

Now, it has been admitted that the Soviets could, under this treaty, interim agreement, have superiority in numbers of launchers and megatonnage. They could, if we do nothing and they go all out, have superiority in warheads if they deployed MIRV on all their systems, ICBM's and SLBM's. Is that correct?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. Do you anticipate in the next five years or have any reason to believe that they would try to achieve superiority in warheads or could achieve superiority in warheads?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Cooper, it is very difficult——

Senator COOPER. We have now superiority of 2 to 1 in deliverable warheads; don't we?

Secretary LAIRD. It is very difficult for me to give you a projection on Soviet intentions. I believe they have the technology and the capability to move forward in this area because of the tremendous throw weight that they have with their systems.

Now, when you asked me to interpret their intentions, I know they are going forward with test programs. Since the President left Moscow, very important tests have been conducted with their ICBMs and with other offensive systems.

I cannot project the intentions of the Soviet Union other than to say they stated quite categorically that they would be going forward during the five-year period with all of the programs permitted in the offensive area.

Senator COOPER. Well, at present, though, the United States has over a 2 to 1 superiority in the number of deliverable warheads.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, and we have supplied to this committee a breakdown of all of those figures. I have no question about the adequacy and the realism of our deterrent at this time.

Senator COOPER. With regard to the SLBM system you stated they could have a numerical superiority within a five-year period, if they go ahead with it. But I would like to ask you, Admiral Moorer, isn't it correct that the U.S. Poseidon-Polaris fleet, with its launchers, with its MIRV's, is superior in present capabilities and effectiveness to the Russian marine missile fleet?

Secretary LAIRD. There is no question about that. At the present time we not only have more modern operational submarines in the Polaris and Poseidon area, we have a greater number operational. They, however, have operational and under construction a greater number than the United States, and they are building at the rate of 8 to 9 a year. We do not have a capability of bringing any new ballistic missile submarines to operational status during the period of this agreement. They, without the agreement, could have gone up to 90 if they had continued their current momentum. At the end of five years they could have had up to 90 and we would still have been at 41.

Senator COOPER. Now, considering the fact of this superiority not only in numbers of launchers, deliverable warheads, but also the range of our missiles and the ability to stay on station close to the Soviet Union, would you say there is any possibility of the Soviet Union attaining superiority over our SLBM fleet in two years?

Secretary LAIRD. In a period of two years, I would say no. I would like Admiral Moorer to comment on that question as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I think if you limit it to two years the answer would be no. Of course, for us to build a submarine would take at least five years from the time that we went forward, but I would like the chairman to comment on that question.

Admiral MOORER. Senator Cooper, Secretary Laird and I have repeatedly said that we are confident we have adequate deterrence for today. What we are really talking about in proposing these programs is the future. I don't think that the people at large, the American public as a whole, recognize the very long lead time involved in developing any modern weapon systems. We are concerned about slipping back into a state of obsolescence and, consequently, we must move ahead now in order to maintain modern systems and maintain this deterrence that we are talking about.

Senator COOPER. I understand your argument. Secretary Laird said just a few minutes ago that he couldn't state that within five years that the Soviet Union would be superior to us in warheads.

QUESTION OF RESTRAINT OR NEW WEAPONS PROGRAM

My question now goes to the question whether we should exercise restraint for two years and see what we can do to achieve nuclear offensive missile system reductions or move into a big new weapons program. You said flatly that you don't think that for two years we would be in danger. Admiral Moorer said that unequivocally.

Now, I will ask you this: The history of the arms race with the Soviet Union is that we first got the atomic bomb; they wouldn't agree to any restraint until later when they came up with it. We obtained superiority in numbers of ICBM's; they wouldn't agree to restraints until they deployed over 1,000 ICBM's.

They agreed to restraints on ABM's, ICBM's and SLBM's only when they deployed them in similar numbers.

Are the Soviets really bargaining from strength or are they just saying, "You have this system of weapons; so we will not agree to any limitations until we come up on a level with you."? The fundamental question is, if it is correct that for almost 30 years every deployment we have made has been matched by an equivalent deployment and the only agreements we have reached have been on the basis of parity, why shouldn't we show restraint for two years instead of this demonstrably futile "bargaining from strength" so they will not do what they have done, it seems to me, in the past 30 years, "to not agree on any limitations until we get up to you." If we build up in two years, they will undoubtedly do the same and the arms race will go on.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, and Senator Cooper, I think we have shown that restraint. When you talk about the position we will be in in two years, what I am really talking about and what the President has submited to this Congress for the B–1 and the Trident system are programs that will place us in a position where we can have this sufficiency, this parity of systems, during the period of the 1980's.

Now, the Soviet Union, if we were to stop research and development on a unilateral basis in these offensive areas, if we were to stop building a capability to go forward with these systems—and there

we are talking about the period of 1978 and beyond—if we were to do that for a period of two years, I believe the safety and the security of our country would be jeopardized.

SIGNIFICANCE

Senator COOPER. Well, I respect your opinions.

Secretary LAIRD. And I am sure that is——

Senator COOPER. I don't think our security would be jeopardized if we had rejected your assumptions about Soviet intentions of three or four years ago, but we will never know for sure about that. But my time is up.

I would like to say here that I think that it is significant that the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approve this unprecedented agreement and should receive credit for their participation in achieving the treaty and interim agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Spong?

TECHNICAL SUPERIORITY

Senator SPONG. Mr. Secretary, yesterday in the Armed Services Committee hearing—and here this morning—you said that the United States retained a technical superiority under the treaty and under the agreements. In response to Senator Cooper you have compared submarine weaponry capabilities. Would you further elaborate on what you consider technical superiority?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I believe that the disadvantage that shows up in the numbers in the offensive agreement is offset by the 18 to 24 month lead that we have because of our technology in the MIRV area—M-I-R-V area. That is perhaps the best example of what I am talking about.

Senator SPONG. Do you expect the Soviets to reach a MIRV capability within the next two years?

Secretary LAIRD. I do. In the defense report and statement which Admiral Moorer and I submitted to this Congress in February, we projected in that that such a capability could be acquired and deployed but not for 18 to 24 months, and I stand behind those reports. I think that that generally has complete and total agreement within our government.

Senator SPONG. Then your assessment of technical superiority may not go beyond 18 to 24 months in the future?

Secretary LAIRD. If we were to stand still and not support the programs that are in the 1973 budget, I think that assessment that you make is correct.

SENATOR JACKSON'S WORKING PAPER

Senator SPONG. Yesterday Senator Jackson submitted a working paper on provisions of the SALT agreement. Admiral Moorer, in his very thorough statement on the numerical limitations, gave us figures this morning. I wonder, Admiral Moorer, if you would care to comment in any way on Senator Jackson's paper.

(Senator Jackson's paper follows:)

WORKING PAPER ON PROVISIONS OF SALT AGREEMENTS

Weapon system	Soviet Union	United States	In absence of SALT agreements, Soviet Union
Heavy ICBM	313 [1]	0	
Light ICBM	1,305 [1]	1,054	
Submarine launched ICBM	Up to 950 [2]	Up to 710 [3]	
Submarines, Y-class	Up to 62	Up to 44	
Submarines, diesel equipped with nuclear missiles	22	0	
ABM radars, NCA	10	6	
Total force payload capability (throw weight ratio)	4	1	
Size of light ICBM permitted under modernization	—— cubic meters	—— cubic meters	
Size of heavy ICBM permitted under modernization	—— cubic meters	0 (no heavy ICBM permitted).	
ICBM test launchers			
MIRV	Unlimited	Unlimited	

[1] U.S. intelligence estimate. The Soviets refuse to state the number of ICBM's to which the executive agreement limits them.
[2] Requires the Soviets to trade in old submarine launch tubes and/or old missile silos to achieve a number in excess of 740.
[3] Requires the United States to trade in Titan ICBM's to achieve a number in excess of 656.

Note: This working paper presents those weapon systems covered by the SALT agreement in which the United States and the Soviet Union are permitted different deployment levels.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

The figures that he had, as I recall, with respect to ICBM's and SLBM's, in general, were correct.

AGREEMENTS' EFFECT ON U.S. NEED FOR NAVAL FACILITIES ABROAD

Senator SPONG. I would like to ask both of you gentlemen if, in your opinion, the treaty and agreement either increase or diminish the United States need for naval facilities abroad?

Secretary LAIRD. I do not see anything in these agreements, in the treaty or in the offensive agreement, that diminishes the need for the current requests we have pending here in the Congress. A large part of the requests that we have pending here in the Congress are dealing with manpower requirements which we have, and the personnel problems which particularly the Navy faces because of the long separations that their sailors have as far as their families are concerned.

As for the follow-on programs that we are advocating, such as the Trident, this system would diminish the need for forward basing—although it will not come into being during the existence of this agreement—because the Trident submarine would be based within the United States. But during the period of the agreement the answer to your question is no.

I would like to point out that the Trident system does have home basing within the United States.

AGREEMENTS' EFFECT ON NEED FOR AIR FACILITIES ABROAD

Senator SPONG. Would you comment on whether the treaty and the agreement would increase or diminish our need for air facilities abroad?

Secretary LAIRD. No, they would not affect that area. The mutual and balanced force reduction discussions, which could start within the next 12 months, may impact on that particular question. But as for

this treaty that we are testifying on today, and the offensive agreement which we are supporting before this committee today, they do not have an impact.

ATTITUDE OF EUROPEAN ALLIES

Senator SPONG. Now, Secretary Rogers touched on this in his testimony before the committee on Monday, but you may also want to comment upon it. What has been the attitude of our European allies since the announcement of the treaty and agreement?

Secretary LAIRD. We have carried on very close and continuing consultations in the spirit that the President outlined in his first meeting with the NATO council in 1969; and I believe that there is general support and understanding for the agreement and for the treaty among our NATO allies. We have also stressed in our briefings of our NATO allies that we are going forward with the various programs that are contained in the 1973 budget.

Senator SPONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator Javits has agreed to allow Senator Symington to have his time at this time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that and express regret at not being here all the time, but we had the privilege of hearing the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs yesterday in the Senate Armed Services Committee. I would make a couple of observations and then have the comments of the Secretary.

CLARITY CONCERNING ABM'S AND SUBMARINES

To me, the treaty agreement is clear so far as the ABM's are concerned. It is reasonably clear also so far as the submarines are concerned, although I worry a great deal about the cost of the submarines. If the costs stay firm, I would oppose the rapid development of these new ships, ten of them, especially as you could put the new missile in the Poseidons.

FUZZY ASPECT OF ICBM

What worries most is the fuzzy aspect of the ICBM. The more I listen to the questions and answers from Senator Jackson, like the capacity to MIRV in heavy quantities, perhaps 20 each, the SS–9's, of which they have 313, it worries me.

U.S. ECONOMY

As mentioned yesterday, when I was at the White House, Dr. Kissinger talked for an hour and the President for 15 minutes, then he took questions for an hour, but not one word was brought up about the economy. In fact, Secretary Rogers, day before yesterday, before this committee, said he thought the economy was in very good shape and getting better. Perhaps he doesn't think the growing size of the gigantic Federal debt is important. Today it is the third largest cost to the American taxpayer—interest on that debt.

INCREASED SPENDING RESULTING FROM SALT AGREEMENT SUGGESTED

It would seem the SALT arrangement has been designed to create a heavy increase in arms costs, and this at a time when the taxpayer is already heavily burdened with those costs. Those of us who had hoped any agreement comparable to the SALT agreement would mean less arms costs, less of a burden on the taxpayers' shoulders, at least to the point where we could put more money in our domestic problems, now realize we are faced with the fact that the result of the SALT agreement means you believe we must spend many billions of dollars more in arms.

Secretary LAIRD. I don't think that is the case, Senator Symington. I have already presented——

Senator SYMINGTON. Please let me finish.

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). A reduction in our 1973 budget.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have talked about a new Soviet test of a new missile. We are always getting to the "scare" aspect as we approach these military budget problems.

So, to me, SALT in some ways is now becoming exactly the opposite of what we had hoped for.

I have finished my statement, and before going back to the markup, would appreciate your comments.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Senator Symington, I believe that we can move into arms limitations and arms reductions but I think that it has to be done through the negotiating process. These are the first steps in that process—the treaty and the interim offensive agreement.

We are submitting a reduction in our 1973 budget as a result of this agreement in the strategic area. We will reduce, and an amendment is coming to your committee which will cover net reductions in the strategic area of over $500 million. The projected reductions are $5 billion during the five-year period; the projected reductions through 1981 are over $8.5 billion; these reductions are in the strategic area of our budget.

I believe, Senator Symington, that we are moving in the right direction as far as defense spending is concerned.

When I became Secretary of Defense, we were up over 9 percent of our gross national product that was devoted to defense spending. As Senator Cooper remarked, close to 45 percent of our budget was in defense. Now 30 percent of our budget is devoted to defense.

We have been able to reduce the size of our military forces from over 3.5 million men and women down to less than 2.4 million men and women and we are making further reductions in the 1973 budget. We have reduced defense-related employment in industry by over 1.3 million. We have reduced Civil Service employment within the Department of Defense by 250,000; so we are moving in that direction.

My concern is that we should not go too far unilaterally in these reductions before the negotiations are completed in these various areas.

We have made the first step in these negotiations with these two agreements that we have before you today. There will be further agreements in the strategic area, I am confident. There will be, I believe, negotiations within the next 12 months on mutual and balanced force reductions. I believe we can have negotiations in the field of military assistance to limit the military assistance programs in places

like the Middle East, the Far East, and other areas of the world. So I believe that we are moving from this confrontation of the past to an era of negotiations and I believe we can be successful.

These negotiations will make possible further reductions, but the reductions as far as costs in defense should be made on a negotiated basis and not on a unilateral basis by the executive branch of this government or by the legislative branch of this government.

NET RESULT OF REDUCTIONS QUESTIONED

Senator SYMINGTON. I remember one time when we were discussing the aid program, I said we hear all about your reductions, but when we add all the reductions up there turns out to be a large addition. As you make the point about various things we have reduced, but net what you are asking for is a great deal more, especially when you carry—

Secretary LAIRD. Senator——

Senator SYMINGTON. Just let me finish now—when you carry the programs out. That is the first point I want to make.

The second, inasmuch as we did not put in our FBA's, forward-based aircraft, and they unilaterally refused to put in mobile ICBM's, it looks as if before we get any mutual reduction of troops in Europe it is going to be a long, long time. In the meantime, the billions continue down the drain.

I am not saying there was anything political in all this, but it is very clever. That is why I am so glad we are having these hearings and you are being frank. Those who think we are spending too much and want to see peace and disarmament look to the SALT agreement. They are happy; they want to sign. Those who are not too keen about peace because it might affect their ideologies or their business, and so forth, are happy because they know they are going to get billions of dollars more for military production orders. Looking at it that way, everybody is happy today.

If events don't proceed the way you hope and plan, most assuredly you are going to end up with a much larger military budget than ever before, especially if these ten new ships are going to cost over $13 billion. These are thoughts that run though my mind.

Secretary LAIRD. But that is not because of SALT, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. I beg your pardon.

Secretary LAIRD. That is not because of SALT, Senator Symington. The programs, such as our ship construction, whether they be in the strategic field or the conventional field, are programs that are not related to the SALT agreement.

INCREASE IN PEOPLE-RELATED COSTS

I would only like to state that I know you are marking up the authorization bill for the Department of Defense and you are familiar with the fact that the greatest increase in our budget is not in weapon systems; our greatest increase is in people-related costs and I think that we have made the right decision, in cooperation with the legislative branch of our government, to carry our labor costs and our costs of manpower in the defense budget, but we have increased those costs

by some $20 billion since 1964. Yet we have over 300,000 less men than we had in 1964. We have gone from personnel costs in our budget which were $22 billion in 1964 up to $43 billion in this particular budget, but I believe we should be paying these young people on the basis of the current, going rate for labor. We do not have to have every young man in America in military service. Those who are in military service should be paid adequately and fairly, and I believe that it was long overdue for these labor costs to show up in the defense budget.

Senator SYMINGTON. You made that point before and I think it a good point. I would say this. I don't remember what my salary was, and I really didn't care, when I was a private in the Army, and I doubt if you remember what your salary was when you were in the Navy. We both wanted to defend our country.

Today you have this problem—these young people don't want to go into the Army or Navy or Air Force as they used to; so you have to pay them a lot more to get them. My time is up.

Secretary LAIRD. When you only need one out of seven young people in the military service today, Senator Symington, there is no reason why that one should be levied with a most regressive type of indirect taxation.

Senator SYMINGTON. You are a very able witness and I want to thank the able Senator from New York for yielding to me. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits?

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, first let me welcome you here and join my colleagues in appreciation for your frankness. I have to ask you some questions about your frankness.

QUESTION OF LINKAGE OF AGREEMENTS WITH WEAPONS SYSTEMS

I was at the White House on the occasion of the presentation of this matter by the President and Dr. Kissinger. From what they said and from what you are quoted as saying yesterday, the question of the linkage of the approval of these agreements with the authorization for the new weapon systems is rapidly, in my judgment, overshadowing the matter of ratifying the treaty and approving the agreement—which, I am confident, both houses will do overwhelmingly.

I refer to the following. You are said to have answered a question on linkage as follows: "I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system, on the B–1 bomber and on the other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five-year period."

On the other hand, Dr. Kissinger said, and I quote from the published statement of his briefing: "Therefore, our position is that we are presenting both of these programs on their merits. We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs and we—mind you, the use of the word "we"—"hope the Congress will approve both of these programs as it examines each of them on its merits."

Question: What is the President's policy? Does he link the approval of the weapon systems to the approval of the agreements or does he not?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I think that the President would want the Congress to consider each of these three items on a separate basis. I would want the Congress to consider them on a separate basis. It so happens that the Congress is now moving on the defense authorization bill, which will be debated in the House, I believe, next week, and has been reported out of the House Armed Services Committee. There is not attempt in anything that I have said to indicate that these should not be considered by the Congress on a separate basis.

In answer to a question as to my support for the treaty and my support for the interim agreement on offensive weapons, my support for these particular agreements does anticipate that we will go forward with the requests of the President in the 1973 budget which he has submitted to the Congress.

I would only add that the President has stated that these are all equally essential and I would like to put quotes around the President's words "equally essential." I think that that answers your question as adequately as I can.

I am sure, Senator Javits, that you would want me to give my opinion as long as I serve in this position as Secretary of Defense. When I am asked questions by committees, I will be as frank and candid as I can with you because I sat on that side of the table for a good many years, and I did not like witnesses coming from the executive branch who did not treat the Congress frankly, openly and fairly. I have always done that and I will continue to do just that.

Senator JAVITS. So, linking the approval of the weapon systems to the approval of the agreements is your opinion; it is not the President's?

Secretary LAIRD. The President has stated that they were "equally essential."

Senator JAVITS. He has not tied them together?

Secretary LAIRD. I have never used the word "linkage" that I can recall. I think that has been used by others. I have said that all three are equally essential.

WITNESS'S POSITION CONCERNING WEAPON SYSTEMS AND AGREEMENTS

Senator JAVITS. You say you stand by your statement that if we fail to approve the weapon systems then you could not support the agreements?

Secretary LAIRD. If we failed to move forward during this particular period, I think that other recommendations would have to be made by me as Secretary of Defense in order to give you the best judgment that I can make as far as the security requirements of our country during this period are concerned. I am sure that you would want me to make those recommendations. Those recommendations, of course, would be reviewed not only in the executive branch of our government; they would also be reviewed, I would hope, by the legislative branch of our government.

VOTE FOR AGREEMENTS NOT COMMITMENT TO WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Senator JAVITS. Right. When I am considering the conscience of every Senator who has to vote yea or nay, when I vote yea on these

agreements and upon the treaty I am not thereby committed to every one of the weapon systems; am I?

Secretary LAIRD. Certainly you are not. I don't want to get into the political science ramifications of this, but the legislative branch is a co-equal branch of the government. I am giving you my recommendations. Those recommendations can be rejected by any member of the House or Senate.

WHAT DOES ADMINISTRATION ASK CONGRESS TO DO?

Senator JAVITS. But I am going with the President. He is not giving me a package; he is giving me two separate packages, right?

Secretary LAIRD. No, the President has stated, and I can quote from the President: "It is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program."

This sound, strategic modernization program is in the President's 1973 budget request to this Congress.

Senator JAVITS. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. And I support that request.

Senator JAVITS. Yes, but Dr. Kissinger has said, "We are presenting both of these programs on their merits. We are not making them conditional. We are also saying that the requirements of national security impel us in the direction of these strategic programs and we hope that the Congress will approve both"—et cetera.

The thing I am trying to get at is are we being presented with a package or are we being presented by the President with two separate packages? Now, he says—

Secretary LAIRD. I think there are three packages involved here.

Senator JAVITS. If I may just finish, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary LAIRD. I think I stated——

Seantor JAVITS. As I understand Dr. Kissinger, speaking for the President, he says: We believe both are essential, but they are not necessarily to be approved or rejected together.

This is very important to all of us. Many of us want to have freedom of action on the weapon systems but are very pleased with the agreements. I may vote for some; I may vote against others. I want to know what the Administration asks us to do.

Secretary LAIRD. The Administration asks you to approve all three—the 1973 budget, the treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weapons.

Senator JAVITS. I am sorry; that is not responsive to my question.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, that is as responsive as I will be, Senator.

Senator JAVITS. That is as responsive as you will be. That is all I need to know.

NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS RELATED TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT

Mr. Secretary, one other point: Are all of these new weapon systems related to the American nuclear capability? Do they have anything to do with conventional weaponry or conventional capability?

Secretary LAIRD. The B–1 and the Trident—

Senator JAVITS. All of them—Trident, B–1, NCA Defense and so on.

Secretary LAIRD. These are systems, related to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the United States.

Senator JAVITS. Very well.

WHAT IS THERE TO ADD TO DETERRENT?

Now, do you or do you not subscribe to the following proposition, again what we understand to be stated as Administration doctrine, and I quote again from the briefing which we had: "As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces have in effect a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive."

Now, if missiles have a free ride to their targets and if, as we understand it, the United States has enough offensive missiles to obliterate the Soviet Union and they have enough offensive missiles to obliterate us, what else is there to add to the deterrent? Why do we need all these missiles?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Javits, I earlier today discussed the question of the difference within the agreement as worked out—the fact that the Soviet Union is given a greater number of missile launchers, the fact that we are not concerned about that greater number because of the position that the United States has as far as technology is concerned, and the fact that we will continue these programs. The question of deterrence is a question of what the potential adversaries or our allies think is a sufficient deterrent. I believe we have that sufficient deterrent today, and I believe our allies and our adversaries recognize that fact.

The important thing about deterrence is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons at any time and that is what these programs are all about. We would hope that the money spent on these programs would be completely wasted in the sense the weapons would never be used; then deterrence has been completely successful. But as far as the numbers are concerned in this agreement that I am testifying on today, I believe, because of the technological lead that we have in this area, that we have a sufficient deterrent and it will prevent the use of nuclear weapons. That is the important thing for us to be considering.

I would like the chairman to comment on that because I think it does get into the military aspects as well as the political aspects of what deterrence is all about.

WHAT ELSE DO WE NEED AND WHY?

Senator JAVITS. May I sharpen my question, Admiral Moorer, because although I am a lawyer, and I speak in terms of adequacy, I assure you that I don't feel that way. I really want to be instructed and I am perfectly ready, as I have been throughout my career, completely compatible with my liberal reputation, to vote for arms if I consider them needed. I have always done that; it is important.

My question is this: If the deterrent consists of our ability to obliterate them and their ability to obliterate us, what else makes any difference? I mean, whether you have a bomber or you have a Trident or anything else, how many times do we have to eliminate them? How many times do they have to eliminate us? What is really the purpose of these terribly expensive weapons? If the deterrent is the mutual capability of obliteration and we have that and it isn't going to be changed, says Dr. Kissinger, says Secretary Rogers, for the measurable period of time, what else do we need and why?

Admiral MOORER. Well, Senator Javits, as I explained to Senator Cooper, we all agree that as of today we have adequate forces to provide a stable deterrent for the United States. However, if we simply stop now and do nothing to improve our system for the future, bearing in mind the fact that it takes many, many years to build any of these systems, we will simply slip back first to a state of obsolescene and then into a position where we will not have adequate deterrence in the minds of the other side. Consequently, they may be tempted to try some kind of offensive action. I just don't think you can stop at this point and never make any improvements and never move forward with new systems.

Now, we look on the Trident submarine, for instance, as a replacement for the well-known Polaris system. The Polaris, by the time that the Trident is operational, will be around 20 years old, which is the generally accepted life of a submarine. We will have to replace it. We must move forward to modernize these systems.

As ASW capabilities become more developed, it is going to take quieter submarines to insure the survivability of the Trident systems.

If we have these survivability systems which can do as you suggest—inflict unacceptable damage on the other side—then we will be in a position where we have, in our view, a viable and valid deterrent posture.

Senator JAVITS. Gentlemen, my time is up but I would just like to say this: If you will be good enough to confirm or whatever you choose on that—so as I understand it, a proper standard of judgment as to the new weapon systems is that they must be judged by the ability to maintain the present situation. If I or any other legislator feels that to maintain the present situation he needs new weapon systems, he must vote aye; if he feels that to maintain the present situation he does not, then he may in conscience vote no?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I agree, sir. The objective of the new systems is to maintain the current deterrent posture.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask one question?

NOTICE OF SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE BY RUSSIANS

Under our intelligence system as of now, if there were any substantial change by the Russians, we would have notice of it; would we not?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct and that is one of the difficulties that we have had. You get notice, but then it takes 3 to 7 years in order for action to be taken on the part of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes them 7 years, too; I mean, it takes equally the same time.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Fulbright, when I first came up to testify as Secretary of Defense and used some of the construction figures on the Soviet submarine construction program, there were editorials all over this country and there were people condemning those figures. Now the production rate for the Soviet submarine systems, particularly in the strategic area, has gone far beyond even the figures that I projected in 1969.

The CHAIRMAN. We have known about it. I know that, but I want to yield to the Senator.

Secretary LAIRD. For us to go forward——

The CHAIRMAN. The point is, we knew they were doing that. It wasn't any great surprise.

Secretary LAIRD. You don't know until they move well down the road. I can tell you by the time we have our first Trident, if they were depending upon the same means that we have to depend on, the Soviets would have known about it for five years and that is an important thing. That is the difference between a closed society and an open society and that is what causes some concern to me as a defense planner and as Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Percy?

COMMENDATION OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE ADMINISTRATION

Senator PERCY. Mr. Secretary, I would like to say that when we vote on this issue we will be the best informed Congress on such a complex problem, and I think that is due to the great care and cooperation of the administration in providing full information about the agreements.

We have all had a chance to be briefed by what I consider to be the finest American negotiating team I have known. I have been briefed in Helsinki, as have other members of Congress, and in Washington, and the cooperation of the administration, the executive branch, as offered in this regard, has been very good.

The President said to us last week that he did not want to give us a pep talk on these agreements; he wanted us to be well informed and he considered these hearings vital, not to just inform us but the country, to have the country behind these agreements. So our questions are not antagonistic; they are searching questions as we try to carry out the intent of the President and our chairman in clarifying all aspects of the agreements.

RELIABILITY OF FIGURES CONCERNING RUSSIAN MISSILES

I was on two national television programs with Senator Jackson and he has raised many very searching questions. One that has not been totally, satisfactorily answer to date is why the Russians are unwilling to certify the exact figures as to their number of missiles, the 1,618, we presume, and 313 SS–9's, while we acknowledge 1,054 of our own ICBM's.

In your judgment, having available all the intelligence you have, are you as certain as you can be that we are dealing with known figures and that there is no hidden deterrent they may have that we are not aware of, and that we can rely on these figures as reasonably accurate?

Secretary LAIRD. For those particular items covered by this agreement, that is correct.

RUSSIAN NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN SUBMARINES

Senator PERCY. On the question of why they should have 3 submarines for our 2, are you convinced, that this numerical advantage really leaves us at parity, considering the basing and the fueling for

submarines, and the geography involved, and that they will have no advantage in having a larger number of submarines than we have?

Secretary LAIRD. No, I would not look at one system at a time like that. So I would answer your question no, that I would not be satisfied on the basis of the premise of your question.

Senator PERCY. You feel that they have an advantage then as it relates to submarines in the allowable number that they are permitted to have in terms of the agreement?

Secretary LAIRD. They have an advantage in the allowable number and right on its face they have that advantage, but the problem during this five-year period is that we couldn't build new SSBN's if we wanted to.

We are trying to prevent an even greater numerical advantage and that is why I support the agreement.

Senator PERCY. In other words, they were in construction and we were not in construction and we had no program for going into construction?

Secretary LAIRD. That's right.

Senator PERCY. So we can at least put a limit on that?

Secretary LAIRD. We have had no new program since 1958 to go into construction on this kind of submarine. In 1958 the Polaris program was approved by the Congress, and it was limited to 41 boats; and since 1958 there has been no change in that basic program.

U.S. ADVANCE IN MIRVING AND ACCURACY

Senator PERCY. Would you feel that with our advance in MIRVing and with our accuracy that even in this field we do have at least parity then during the term of this agreement?

Secretary LAIRD. We have; we are in a superior position as of today in this area because they have approximately 25 of their Y-class submarines operational and we have 41 of our submarines operational at this particular time. But I thought your original question involved the figures in the agreement?

POSSIBILITY OF LIMITING PRESENTED SYSTEMS IN SALT II

Senator PERCY. In Admiral Moorer's fine statement, he said "A sincere desire"—the Joint Chiefs have a sincere desire—"to relieve mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons" and repeated the statement the Joint Chiefs had stood on since 1945, that they wished—"restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons." Would it be your hope, Mr. Secretary, that in SALT II, the next phase of negotiating, that we might find a way to negotiate a limitation on the very systems that are now being presented to Congress for the B–1 bomber, the Trident and other systems?

Secretary LAIRD. I think that is quite possible, and I think that that is the direction in which we want to move. That is what these negotiations are all about, but you cannot take unilateral action now in that direction before we have some indication of success along that line.

Senator PERCY. In other words, it is your feeling that continuing these programs not now covered by our agreements will strengthen the hand of our negotiating team in SALT II?

Secretary LAIRD. I firmly believe that.

SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF MIRV CAPABILITY NOT PROHIBITED

Senator PERCY. If the Soviets test MIRV on a large ICBM, would we consider that an extraordinary event which jeopardizes our supreme interests and provides a basis, for, say, withdrawal from the agreement?

Secretary LAIRD. No; we would not. We expect the Soviets to develop a MIRV capability and the defense report which I presented to this Congress in February pointed out that such a program was within the technical capability of the Soviet Union. It would not be prohibited under this agreement.

DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MOBILE MISSILES WITH ICBM RANGE

Senator PERCY. What would be our reaction if we observed deployment of Soviet mobile missiles with ICBM range?

Secretary LAIRD. There is an interpretation in which we have stated unilaterally that we would—and I can quote that provision to you and I would like to put the full provision in the record—this is not agreed to by the Soviet Union; however——

Senator PERCY. I wonder if this wouldn't be a good opportunity to explain to the American people and Congress why it was necessary to make certain unilateral assertions and not have an absolute, verified and certified response back from them as to what they would understand as being in violation of the spirit of the agreement?

Secretary LAIRD. I would like——

Senator PERCY. If you would like to put the statement in the record, go ahead.

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). Secretary Nitze, who was part of the negotiating team, to comment on that question, but I would also like at this point to put in the record——

Senator PERCY. Yes; of course.

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). The U.S. unilateral statement. I will just insert it in the record here. Secretary Nitze will also provide a comment for the record. This particular position is not agreed to by the Soviet Union.

(The information referred to follows:)

UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY U.S. DELEGATION TO SALT

(May 20, 1972) and Comment By Secretary Nitze

(Supplied by Department of Defense)

In connection with the important subject of land mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the interim agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the interim agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that agreement.

MR. NITZE'S COMMENT FOR THE RECORD

The agreement does not cover mobile ICBMs. At present, neither side has deployed such systems. [Deleted.]

CRUISE MISSILE SITUATION

Senator PERCY. What would be our reaction if the Soviets started building submarines equipped with long-range strategic cruise missiles?

Secretary LAIRD. They are deploying submarines with cruise missiles now that have a range in the area of a few hundred miles. I am not sure what you mean by a long-range cruise missile. That is a long range—

Senator PERCY. In excess of 3,000 miles.

Secretary LAIRD. A cruise missile in excess of 3,000 miles?

Senator PERCY. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. It would not be limited by this agreement, but I would doubt that such a deployment would be made in any substantial number during this period. They have already deployed a few hundred.

Senator PERCY. What if 2 years from now we had evidence they were——

Secretary LAIRD. This cruise missile is not covered by this agreement. They have already deployed cruise missiles, as you know, Senator Percy. They are not covered in this agreement.

Senator PERCY. What do you think the Soviets' reaction would be if we start to deploy and undertake such a program?

Secretary LAIRD. They would expect it.

Senator PERCY. In other words, they would not respond. What we are trying to prevent, of course, is one escalation counteracted by another escalation.

Secretary LAIRD. No, they already have the cruise missile deployed and I believe they will be deploying more than the few hundred they have deployed at the present time. I would not anticipate any reaction as far as the Soviets are concerned. I think they will go forward with this program and I would expect them to.

Now, it is hard to read their intentions on all of these programs but when MIRV was brought up for discussion, they did not want to go forward with limitations on testing in this first step agreement.

The cruise missile situation is something that is entirely outside of this agreement, and although I hate to make projections or forecasts, I would anticipate that they would increase the number they presently have deployed in that particular area—that they would continue that program. They have that system in production and I would assume that they would go forward with their production and would not shut down their production facilities.

RELIEVING MANKIND OF BURDEN OF MODERN WEAPONS

Senator PERCY. I would like to come back later, Mr. Chairman, to try to pin down how close we are getting to starting a process of relieving mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons or whether we are just controlling one phase, but going to go hell-bent for election with another phase.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, you are talking about the giant step—this is the first step; this is a small step, but it is an important step. The agreement and the treaty that we are testifying on today represent that important first step toward that giant leap that you are talking about.

Senator PERCY. SALT II is then crucial to see how far we are going to go?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, and SALT II may not be the ultimate, but certainly we would hope to move in the direction that was outlined in the statement of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

WHAT CRUISE MISSILE IS

The CHAIRMAN. I think for the record, a cruise missile is not generally considered a strategic weapon. It is for surface ships. It has a limited range from 30 miles to 300, about; hasn't it?

Secretary LAIRD. No, the cruise missile can be used at a longer range than that, and it is effective against both sea and land targets.

The CHAIRMAN. It is designed primarily——

Secretary LAIRD. It comes in at a very—I can go into it briefly—it comes in very low.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not comparable to the Minuteman and the ICBM. It is not that kind of a missile?

Secretary LAIRD. No; it is not a ballistic missile and that is why it is outside of this agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not. That is one reason it is not there. I didn't want the record to be misunderstood that this was comparable to the ICBM's.

Secretary LAIRD. No; it is not covered in the agreement on offensive weapons. I am sorry if I gave that impression.

The CHAIRMAN. No, you didn't. Nobody said what a cruise missile is, but it is a relatively short-range missile and primarily designed for destruction of ships on the surface and that type of thing?

Secretary LAIRD. Ships and land targets.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, limited range.

Secretary LAIRD. It could be coastal target type of weapon.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. I will supply the different ranges of it for the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

DIFFERENT RANGES OF THE STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE

(Supplied by Department of Defense)

The cruise missile I was discussing was the newly-proposed submarine-launched cruise missile. This is conceived as a submarine-launched, air-breathing, subsonic missile, flying at low altitude [deleted]. We currently are studying two versions—one capable of launch from a torpedo tube, and the other from a Polaris type launch tube. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago that since the President——

UNITED STATES DOES NOT HAVE CRUISE MISSILES

Secretary LAIRD. We do not have them, by the way, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. We don't need them; I guess.

Secretary LAIRD. We are hopeful we can do some research and development on that particular system.

The CHAIRMAN. I can't think of anything that you are not hopeful of examining——

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). All the way from witchcraft of the Congo on up to ICBM's. [Laughter.]

ARE SOVIETS TESTING MIRV?

The CHAIRMAN. You said a moment ago, sort of incidentally, that since the President was in Moscow the Soviets have made a new and, you think, very significant test. I think it could leave the impression that you believe they are testing MIRV.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I do not believe they will test—flight-test—MIRV, and I think I made that clear, for from 6 to 9 months. They are going forward with the development and testing of MIRV technology but not flight-tests, and I do not expect a flight-test for from 6 to 9 months. There is some disagreement on the MIRV testing—MRV testing—of 1970 as to whether that had any MIRV capability, with an "I" in it. I never get into that discussion because I don't believe it serves any useful purpose. Their system that was used in those tests does give the capability of changing the impact pattern, but it is in no way comparable to the MIRV system which we have developed.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted to make that clear. There is a disagreement as we found over the years between the intelligence community and the Defense Department.

Secretary LAIRD. There is no disagreement that I know of in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been in the past, but the intelligence community does not believe that they have tested MIRV and that they have anything other than the MRV. That is what they believe.

Secretary LAIRD. And I never have gotten into that discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. We have gotten into it with them and that is what they tell us. I am just telling you. I don't want this scare psychology to arise from this meeting because I don't think you intended to say that they have had a MIRV test and that they have arrived at that technology.

Secretary LAIRD. I will be glad to supply for the record, your classified record, the number of tests conducted since the President——

The CHAIRMAN. We already have had it, at least from the intelligence community.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, we develop that material, as you know, and we will supply it to this committee if requested.

SECRETARY M'NAMARA'S STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES AND SOVIET BUILDUP

The CHAIRMAN. It is interesting, particularly growing out of Senator Javits' and Senator Cooper's questions about the effect of our

moving forward in the face of this agreement. It reminds me of one of your predecessors, Secretary McNamara, in discussing this interaction between what we do and what the Russians do. I think it is interesting for the record to recall it. You can comment on it if you like.

In 1967 he was discussing circumstances which led to our vast increase in our arsenal of strategic weapons which did, I think, unbalance the situation, and did create great superiority on the part of the United States. I want to read this, which is a quote from his statement at that time:

> Thus, in the course of hedging against what was then only a theoretically possible Soviet buildup, we—the United States—took decisions which have resulted in our current superiority in numbers of warheads and deliverable megatons. But the blunt fact remains that if we had had more accurate information about planned Soviet strategic forces, we simply would not have needed to build as large a nuclear arsenal as we have today.
>
> Now let me be absolutely clear. I am not saying that our decision in 1961 was unjustified. I am simply saying that it was necessitated by a lack of accurate information. Furthermore that decision, in itself—as justified as it was—in the end, could not possibly have left unaffected the Soviet Union's future nuclear plans. What is essential to understand here is that the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's strategic plans. Whatever be their intentions, whatever be our intentions, actions—or even realistically potential actions—on either side relating to the buildup of nuclear forces, be they either offensive weapons or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger reactions on the other side. It is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race.
>
> Now, in strategic nuclear weaponry, the arms race involves a particular irony. Unlike any other era in military history, today a substantial numerical superiority of weapons does not effectively translate into political control or diplomatic leverage.
>
> Now, I have pointed out that in strategic, nuclear matters the Soviet Union and the United States mutually influence one another's plans. In recent years the Soviets have substantially increased their offensive forces. We have, of course, been watching and evaluating this very carefully. Clearly the Soviet buildup is in part a reaction to our own buildup since the beginning of this decade. Soviet strategic planners undoubtedly reasoned that if our buildup were to continue at its accelerated pace, we might conceivably reach, in time, a credible firststrike capability against the Soviet Union.

What would be your comment on Mr. McNamara's statement?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I have no disagreement on the period of time with which Secretary McNamara is dealing. I think the statement is a very good statement dealing with that period.

The question of the missile gap in the 1960 period and the effect of that during the 1960 campaign—I know that Senator Percy, who was chairman of the platform committee for his party in that particular year, remembers the amendments that were debated at that time. The fact is that during that period of time we did not have the open skies. President Eisenhower had talked about the open sky policy; we did not have the means of verification that we do have today. I can assure you the figures I have given in the defense report and the figures that the chairman has given in his briefing on the capabilities of the Soviet Union as compared with the United States are reasonably correct assessment because of the improvement that we have had in the verification area.

Secretary McNamara and the Congress during that period of time—political leaders during that particular period of time—we did not have the same kind of information available to us.

PROCEEDING WITH BUILDUP QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. I agree; I think that is one of the principal reasons why both sides felt they could enter into this agreement. It is acknowledged that both sides have this very capable, what they call national means of verification. This, I think, was a critical consideration in allowing this agreement to be made.

Secretary LAIRD. You know, Mr. Chairman, in 1960 Senator Percy was promoting an amendment to his party's platform to add five billion dollars to the defense budget and I was opposing that amendment in 1960 because I had served on the Defense Appropriations Committee and I felt that we had an adequate defense budget in the year 1960.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you won't divert me. I am trying to make this point: With this verification being as reliable as our government believes it is, and certainly the intelligence community believes it is, and you apparently believe it is, if we proceed with this very substantial buildup, they will certainly know all about it. Even without the verification, it seems to me, as Secretary McNamara said, inevitably what you are doing is triggering a comparable buildup by them and, therefore,——

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish. Therefore, the end result is we are both resuming the arms race and there is no particular advantage to either. There is a very great disadvantage in that both are thereby obligated to spend an enormously increased amount for weapons which both of them need for much more urgent requirements to their national security.

DIFFERENCE IN CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

I come back to my first statement: I think that the great difference between the Defense Department and the Congress is how one conceives of national security. I suppose it is natural, being in the defense business, that military arms are your principal reliance for security, whereas, I believe and I think a number of other believe that is only one element. If you have a sufficiency, the strength of your economy and especially the spirit of your people and the unity of your people is as important or more important.

If a country is afflicted with tremendous disunity and dissatisfaction among its people, it will rot at the center, and it will be weakened. This is what I think has been the great tragedy of the Vietnam war. It has undermined the security of this country.

Those who profess to be fighting communism in Vietnam are playing the communist game. They are undermining the strength of the United States and its allies. I mean, there is nothing that could have increased the prestige and the influence of the communist world as effectively as our pursuit of the Vietnam war.

ENHANCEMENT OF SECURITY BY MORE WEAPONS QUESTIONED

So we come back here. Does this really enhance our security? In view of Mr. McNamara's statement, and your agreement with it, I can't see

how it increases it at all. At best, it is a standoff at great expense because they will react. You don't deny they have the technology to do it.

So if it is action-reaction, then the net result is we just have a much higher level of nuclear weapons. Mr. McNamara at least had the excuse he didn't know what they were doing and he took a guess and resolved everything in favor of more weapons because they did not have the kind of surveillance and information gathering that we now have.

There is no excuse for us now to proceed down that line because we know what they have. We would have notice, if they began to violate the spirit of the agreements. I understand our surveillance, we would know it, in a relatively short time, and we could then take whatever measures are necessary. I don't believe they will since they know we will know that they are doing it.

Secretary LAIRD. Could I have one minute?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

DIFFERENCES IN CONDITIONS SINCE 1961

Secretary LAIRD. I would just like to say that there are two very important differences since 1960.

The CHAIRMAN. This was '67 he made the statement.

Senator PERCY. Incidentally, what was the defense budget then?

Secretary LAIRD. He was referring to 1963.

The CHAIRMAN. He was referring to decisions taken in 1961.

Secretary LAIRD. Then I will answer your question. There are two very important differences: One of them is the question of verification. We can verify and we can react from verification; the reaction time on weapon systems, of course, is from four to seven years, but we do have that verification capability and we are basically—

The CHAIRMAN. They have agreed not to—

Secretary LAIRD. Could I finish? Let me make the second point, then, and I would appreciate it if I could finish this one brief statement, that verification is important.

Secondly, and this is also very important, we know what the Russians plan to do as a result of these discussions. We know that they plan to go to 62 modern submarines.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Secretary LAIRD. We know that now even though we can't verify the construction of those submarines at this time. But we know that for us to be in a position even to go to the 44 that are permitted by this agreement it would take us the complete five-year period before we could build the 42nd one to add to our strategic deterrent force. So the conditions with which we are dealing in this year 1972 are completely different from the conditions that the decision-makers faced in 1960, and I think that is an important difference.

SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBERS IF NO DEFENSE QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it isn't all that important because of the denial of our right to interfere with these weapons. That is the relinquishment of the ABM. You think it is effective—you did. I never did think it was very effective, but in any case we have officially given up the right to that defense.

Secretary LAIRD. We have abandoned the 12-site ABM program with this treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. This in itself makes all these numbers much less significant because you have to treat these two together. If we go through with the ABM relinquishment then the fact that we have 42 against their 62, is not significant. No one maintains that 42 or 62, whatever they may have, constitutes a first-strike capability, in other words, that they could completely overwhelm the United States. No one that I have heard of has said that. I don't know what that number would be, but, you see, you keep coming back to these numbers games which are not really significant if there is no defense against the weapons.

Secretary LAIRD. But our programs are not aimed at numbers. Our programs that are in this budget which I have presented to the Congress for its consideration and decision are aimed at survivability, modernization and replacement, which I believe are absolutely essential. But we do make these decisions on the basis of being able to verify what the Soviets are doing and what they tell us they plan to do; and we do know what their capabilities are.

SOVIET AND U.S. SUBMARINE SYSTEMS

The CHAIRMAN. Did they tell you they are planning to build a Trident?

Secretary LAIRD. We know they are building a Trident. We have verified the fact that they are going forward with a modernized missile submarine, of the Y class.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. —which has longer range. Our particular Trident submarine will be worth two of their modified Y-class submarines in numbers of missiles and we are doing that for a purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. But how do you say they are going forward with a Trident when in the next sentence you say——

Secretary LAIRD. It is almost the same range as far as the missile is concerned. It is approximately in that range area of the Trident system. Now, the Trident system that we are asking the Congress to go forward with in research and development in the 1973 budget, is a system that has 24 missiles. Their follow-on or improved Y-class submarine has 12. We have made that conscious decision to go with twice as many missile launchers, and not only on a cost effectiveness basis. We have done it on the basis that our manpower problems in the 1980's are important problems for us to consider and with the long deployments at sea we can get a greater deployment ratio with fewer men in the United States Navy with the larger launch platform.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you saying that the extended Y-class submarine is going to be that superior to our existing Poseidon in range?

Secretary LAIRD. What I am saying is that it will have a longer range and a larger missile; it will have a missile system that has an inertial guidance system which we do not have. It will have certain improvements.

Now, I am not raising this question as a question that concerns me because I believe we do have in our budget the follow-on programs that are needed and necessary, not only to assure survivability but also to ensure modernization in the period of the 1980's and beyond.

The CHAIRMAN. I can see that, of course, if you wish to go with the Trident it is twice as big as the existing submarine. It is not planned to be——

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. —twice as big?

Secretary LAIRD. At the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. And I expect twice as vulnerable, but anyway obviously it would be a much bigger target than a smaller one?

Secretary LAIRD. I would like to say, Senator Fulbright, that I will be glad to see that a classified briefing is given you on the survivability and on the capabilities, the breakthroughs we made in submarine construction. I think it would be a mistake not to use this new technology as far as the new submarine is concerned. I do not believe that we should build carbon copies of old submarines that were designed in the 1950s. I believe that we should use this modern technology that we have developed and it will give us a greater capability to deal with the ASW.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that is the same argument Mr. Teller used to make in his opposition to the test ban treaty. Because we are capable of doing it, he believed we ought to do it. I mean, it is the pursuit of knowledge and technological superiority has that purpose all its own——

Secretary LAIRD. I know, Seantor——

The CHAIRMAN. —— from a scientific point of view.

GOING FORWARD WITH ABM

Secretary LAIRD. —— you did not support my position on the ABM. I believe that going forward with the ABM was most important and I think that it has contributed considerably to the success we have had in SALT.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think there is any way you can prove that at all. You do not know what would have happened if we had done it. The Russians have never had any confidence in their own Galosh system.

Secretary LAIRD. They are going forward in building new ABM sites around Moscow and they are going forward and developing and deploying new technology in the ABM field.

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The CHAIRMAN. This is again the difference between the way you testify and the way the intelligence community testifies, but, of course, unfortunately, it is secret.

Secretary LAIRD. There is no difference, I can assure you, of that, because the information is developed in the Department of Defense, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Your information is, but not all of it.

Secretary LAIRD. Their information is, too, in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. Unfortunately, it doesn't seem to jibe because we had a long session yesterday, but it is classified.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, Senator Fulbright, that comment of yours is not correct——

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is correct.

Secretary LAIRD. —— and I do not believe——

The CHAIRMAN. We had, years ago—this is not new, Mr. Secretary——

Secretary LAIRD. It is not fair to put out that kind of information because it is not correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Years ago, at least four or five years ago, we had this testimony. We examined the intelligence community representative in detail about the Galosh system during the ABM debate. They described it; they had pictures of it and all of this. It was planned to be about 120, 125. They had installed 64. They had abandoned going forward with it. Now after all these years it is approximately in the same state and the only reasonable explanation of why they didn't go forward with it is because they didn't believe it was effective and they didn't want to spend the money on it. Are you saying today they have completed it?

Secretary LAIRD. We have notified your committee at all times of this information; and there has been no disagreement within the intelligence community at any time. To give the American people the impression that the verification figures which we are using here and which are used by the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Department of Defense, are at variance is doing a disservice, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We went all over this.

Secretary LAIRD. They are not at variance and the information——

The CHAIRMAN. When you first came before this committee——

Secretary LAIRD. The information we have supplied this committee has been correct in all cases and we have used the intelligence estimates that have been verified by all groups. This goes to the very heart of this agreement. If we cannot accept these verification figures, then truly we are in difficulty. I believe we can accept these verification figures which have been agreed upon by the entire intelligence community.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we went through this when you first came into office. You made statements about the first-strike capability of the Soviet Union and you aroused a great deal of fear and consternation. We had the testimony of Mr. Helms and then you yourself requested that you and Mr. Helms come before the committee——

Secretary LAIRD. And there was no difference between our figures at all.

The CHAIRMAN.——in executive session. You are stating your own opinion.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I can guarantee you that and I don't believe that it is fair to attribute anything else to Director Helms.

The CHAIRMAN. I was greatly concerned at the time that I might cause Mr. Helms to be relieved of his responsibilities, and in my own view——

Secretary LAIRD. I am sure you were reading into it something that——

The CHAIRMAN. ——my own view—listen——

Secretary LAIRD. ——was not in any way of concern to Mr. Helms.

DIFFERENCE IN VIEWS OF WITNESS AND MR. HELMS

The CHAIRMAN. I allowed you to speak without interruption for a minute. Now you might allow me to speak for a minute.

The fact of the matter was there was a difference in your views.

Secretary LAIRD. There were no differences as far as the projection of the figures was concerned, and you know that full well.

The CHAIRMAN. I know full well—

Secretary LAIRD. There was a difference of opinion as far as future intentions were concerned, and that is an entirely different question.

The CHAIRMAN. I know full well that you sought to give the impression to the public and this committee in public session that the Soviets were probably going for a first-strike capability. It scared everybody to death and you got your appropriations. But I know that the intelligence community at that time, after detailed examination, said they had never found, never made an opinion, in any effect that they believed the Soviet Union was going for a first-strike capability; and you remember this went on for a long time.

Secretary LAIRD. Would you want the facts on that? The statement that I made was, of course, that the SS–9 was a weapon system that had, I believe, a first-strike, counterforce, capability. If that particular system were developed and went forward at the rate it was then being deployed, the Soviet Union could possess a first-strike capability against our land-based ICBM's. I stated at that time that I was discussing capabilities and not intentions. The intentions are something different, and the record is crystal clear. I do not believe that it is fair to interpret it in the manner in which you currently are interpreting it, and I cannot sit here as a witness and allow that to go on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you are entitled to your opinion. I interpreted it that way at that time and I think the record will show you were wrong in your estimate or your opinion.

(The statement referred to follows:)

(Excerpt from "Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of the ABM Systems," Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Part I, March 6, 11, 13, 21, 26 and 28, 1969, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1969.)

Secretary LAIRD. Well, we were and still are going for a second strike capability, as you know. With the large tonnage the Soviets have they are going for our missiles and they are going for a first strike capability. There is no question about that.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I have not—

The CHAIRMAN. They have not gone for a first-strike capability; the very fact we have an ABM treaty is evidence of that and your hunch or whatever you want to call it was not correct. That was 3 years ago.

Secretary LAIRD. I was talking about capabilities and I told you I would not read the Soviets' intentions. I still believe if you went forward on the basis of the present deployment at that time, you would be in a position where that could come about.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you are a genius at semantic confusion.

(Laughter.)

You invent such terms as "protective reaction strikes." The stories which have now come out about General Lavelle, completely demolish your semantic ingenuity. They were not protective reaction strikes. They were plain only bombing strikes.

Why do you do this sort of thing? You are a genius at it.

Secretary LAIRD. I appreciate your compliment.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a genius at it. I never have seen anybody who could think of these semantic terms that confuse the public. You know, you were trying to give the impression, whatever the words you used, that the Soviets represented an enormous danger. We had to react and we did. We gave you the ABM, but, in any case, I will come back to this question of the submarines.

EQUIVALENCY OF Y-CLASS SUBMARINE TO TRIDENT QUESTIONED

As I say, I don't think that what information we have received confirms the view I think you have left that the new USSR sub which is an extended Y class, a little larger—there are no secrets about it—is the equivalent of the Trident. If I have understood the Trident, it intends to have a much longer range missile; it is a much larger ship; I think it is 15,000 tons; isn't it? It has all been in public.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I am talking about something that the Soviets have in being today and something that the United States may have in being five or six years from now.

The CHAIRMAN. But the point about it—

Secretary LAIRD. The point I was making—and you completely missed the point—is that they currently have such a submarine launched missile and the United States does not.

TRIGGERING ANOTHER ARMS SPIRAL WITH TRIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. But the point is you want to get this and my point is that if we give it to you—

Secretary LAIRD. I recommend it, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If we give it to you, all you are going to do, in the words of McNamara, is trigger another arms spiral in which they will go all out and spend all their money, which they need for other things for an equivalent of Trident. Then neither of us will have any advantage, except we will be at a great disadvantage by spending so much money on weapons that neither of us need. This is the whole point I am trying to make.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, that is your opinion. It is not mine.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Secretary LAIRD. And I respect your opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

SIGNIFICANCE OF SENATE VOTE

What is significant is not your opinion or mine but how many votes we can get in the Senate. That is why I am trying to clarify the record. Hopefully, they will vote without being scared to death by some misinformation that you have been capable of spreading in these hearings. That is all I am trying to do.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I appreciate your very nice interpretation of my testimony, and if you believe it is misinformation——

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is because you are testifying from a different point of view. It is the duty of this committee and the Senate to weigh all of these matters, both the military and the others.

IDENTITY OF RESPONSIBILITY QUESTIONED

If I were a military man and in your job, no doubt I would take your position. But what I want to make plain is there is not this identity of responsibility between the Secretary of Defense and a Member of the Congress because it is not your responsibility to have concern for the budget, for the deplorable state of our domestic economy. It is not your responsibility to be concerned about the conditions in New York and Chicago and San Francisco.

Secretary LAIRD. I think it is, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not your primary responsibility.

Secretary LAIRD. I believe I would be willing to stack up my record in health, education, and welfare and other domestic areas against yours any day.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about when you were a Congressman. You deserted us and went over to the other side.

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS

Secretary LAIRD. I will stake my record and stack it up against yours any time, and I resent the fact that you refer to any of my testimony as misinformation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well——

Secretary LAIRD. I think you have gone far beyond the reasonable position for a Member of Congress to take on testimony which I have given to you on the best information which is available to me as the Secretary of Defense. I believe you cannot dispute it with the kind of allegations that you make.

The CHAIRMAN. I gave you examples here. I think your information about the little first-strike-capability incident is an example of that. I think today you leave the impression that the present sub the USSR is building is equivalent; therefore we have to have a Trident. That is the impression you left.

Secretary LAIRD. I did not leave that impression and you are trying to create that impression. I am letting you run because I think it is just fine. If you want to create that impression that is up to you.

PROTECTIVE REACTION STRIKES

The CHAIRMAN. How do you explain the protective reaction strikes. How do you explain that?

Why did you impose upon the American people the idea that you only responded to attacks upon our planes when now, with General Lavalle's revelations, it is perfectly obvious it is not so? How do you explain that?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that those were the orders.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't deny what happened, do you, that Lavalle did attack the north without any provocation from the north? You don't deny the facts as being——

Secretary LAIRD. As soon as that was determined and as soon as the investigation was made, and there were some 28 instances——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. —action was taken.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. But I just want you to understand as best I can——

The CHAIRMAN. So far as I know you invented that term.

Secretary LAIRD. Pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. You invented the term "protective reaction strike."

Secretary LAIRD. I also approved the authority under which the strikes were being carried out, and the orders were not followed.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a brief comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

INTERPRETATION OF ATTEMPT TO SELL SYSTEM BY OTHER SIDE

Senator PERCY. Secretary Laird, I think that the chairman is making an excellent point. Many times what is said in an attempt to sell a system is interpreted by the other side in an entirely different way that could be detrimental to our interests. We well know that the attempt to sell the ABM several years ago alarmed the Soviet Union to the point where it was difficult to even get the talks underway. There was a breakdown of communications.

I am hopeful that as a result of these talks that we can have sufficient on-going communication that neither side will misinterpret the other's intentions and I hope as we go into this next phase that there is intimate communication with them so that they do not interpret what we are doing as just an attempt to work around the agreements. In principle, we are saying let's put a ceiling on things. We are concerned about the interpretation that could be made if we escalate in one area of technology and armament as we put a ceiling in another area. This is our concern. I think the country is concerned that we are once again on another spiral; at the very time we see some hope on one hand, the other hand is carrying us forward.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have a number of other questions and I ask permission to submit those for the record so they can be answered. (See p. 130.) Because I did have some more questions for Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Smith, I ask unanimous consent that my questions be inserted in the record for answering by the Department of State. (See p. 51.)

The CHAIRMAN. I would also like to submit a few, if the Secretary will be able to supply for the record some answers to other questions. (See p. 124.)

The Secretary is going to have to leave. Admiral Moorer, can you stay for a few minutes?

Senator PELL. I have one very brief question, if I could.

PROMOTION OF GENERAL ABRAMS

This concerns the sanctity of the civilian chain of command, which I think is a little removed, but you brought it up yourself in that protective reaction strikes were enlarged beyond your authority. I think this gets to the heart that worries many of us, as civilians, because we want to see men like yourself, the civilian side, retain control of the direction of our armed forces. When we have so many raids that

were not protective reaction raids but were called protective reaction raids carried on with very little action taken, it upsets us. I noticed today in the press that the commanding general there, who presumably was the direct superior of General Lavelle, General Abrams, was named Chief of Staff.

Could you explain to us so we could understand it the line of reasoning that permits a commanding general, who must have been aware of what was going on because otherwise he couldn't have been a commanding general, being promoted, having permitted this violation of the civilian directives?

Secretary LAIRD. I would only state that we will be going into this matter—and have—before the House Armed Services Committee, and we will be going into it at a later time before the Senate Armed Services Committee; but I can assure you that General Abrams was not involved in any way with the abuse of authority exercised by General Lavalle.

Senator PELL. He must have been aware of it, sir, if he was an effective, immediate boss.

Secretary LAIRD. I have been satisfied that General Abrams, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Forces, General Ryan, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not aware of this.

Senator PELL. I see.

INFORMING CIVILIAN SECRETARIATS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

There is one further point along this line which surprised me from the viewpoint of the civilian control. I realize the civilian secretaries are not in the direct line of command, but Secretary Seamans, I think, said on a Today Show that the first he knew about the increase in raids in North Vietnam was when he saw it mentioned on the show. The former Secretary of the Navy, my own opponent for reelection, mentioned that he would have opposed the Hanoi and Haiphong minings, and had no inkling of it. He said this a very few days after it occurred.

I am wondering if the civilian secretariats are not informed of military operations?

Secretary LAIRD. They are informed of military operations. Secretary Seamans happened to be on leave at the time, but the Under Secretary of the Air Force was completely informed. As you know, the National Security Act as revised in 1958 does not include the services secretaries in the operational chain of command; it is the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and runs in that line and in that order. The service secretaries, under the National Security Act, are not in the operational chain of command, but I do see that they are informed about these particular operations. It is true that Secretary Seamans made the statement that you referred to, but he was on leave at the time.

Senator PELL. The former Secretary of the Navy said he would have opposed the mining of Hanoi-Haiphong if he had been asked, but had "no inkling." He was not on leave. Why would he not know?

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chaffee left office a few days before the President's announcement.

Senator PELL. I see, because he said afterward he had no inkling, but we will let that stand. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, it has been a very interesting hearing. I think you have been very frank and candid and you always make a good record; you never fail to make a good record.

TESTIMONY OF WITNESS

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I hope the misinformation of this morning does not concern you as much as you seemed to let it concern you a few minutes ago, because I can assure you that the testimony I have given you is the best information I can as Secretary of Defense and I will continue to be frank, open and honest with you in any subsequent testimony, and I hope you will respect that as I respect you.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the word "misinformation" might be a wrong word.

Secretary LAIRD. I did not use it.

The CHAIRMAN. I did. If it is offensive to you, I think maybe I can state it differently than misinformation. I recognize you have a different responsibility. The first meeting you came before the committee you emphasized that you felt a very special responsibility for the security of the United States, the implication being that none of us do. I think that simply is a way of stating that you feel that you have a responsibility for a particular part of our government, whereas, I think the Congress has responsibility for all of it and has the responsibility of weighing one against another. It is a misinterpretation of the fact, I guess. I don't mean to say that you had lied about anything or deliberately misinformed on factual matters. I think you look at them from a different point of view and this leads to a misinformation on the part of the public. That is, they misunderstand it as they did in the case of the first-strike capability and as we have misunderstood the protective reaction strikes.

This was always considered to be a defensive move, that we were not taking offensive action. This, in a sense, is misinformation to the public.

Secretary LAIRD. I can assure you——

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever you mean about it——

Secretary LAIRD. (continuing). Any protective reaction strike conducted under the authority and directive granted by me as Secretary of Defense was a defensive activity. The authorities were quite clear and should not have been capable of misinterpretation by any military official of our government.

The CHAIRMAN. But we have had——

RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE UNDER NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

Secretary LAIRD. I would like to add, Senator Fulbright, that it was the Congress, and I was a part of that Congress, in 1958, that rewrote the National Security Act. Perhaps the Congress did not mean what it said in the National Security Act Amendments of 1958, but the Congress in all of its wisdom did charge the Secretary of Defense with certain responsibilities. It spelled out in that National Security Act what those responsibilities would be as the principal assistant to the President in this particular field and I believe that the Congress meant what it said. Evidently there are some who do not believe that

when the Congress passes a statute it means what it says, but I believe that it did mean exactly what it said.

The CHAIRMAN. What did that statute mean?

Secretary LAIRD. In the National Security Act, and I would like to put it into the record at this point——

(The information referred to follows:)

SELECTED PORTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

(Supplied by Department of Defense)

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

That this Act may be cited as the "National Security Act of 1947". [This statement of the short title is part of the first section of the Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343. 61 Stat. 495. The remainder of that section is the table of contents, which is omitted as covered by the table of contents set forth at the beginning of this committee print.]

DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military Departments of the Army, Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own Secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, and a clear and direct line of command to such commands; to eliminate unnecessary duplication in the Department of Defense, and particularly in the field of research and engineering by vesting its overall direction and control in the Secretary of Defense; to provide more effective, efficient, and economical administration in the Department of Defense to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces but not to establish a single Chief of Staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff. [Section 2, Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 496, as amended by section 2, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 514; 50 U.S.C. 401.]

TITLE I—COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SEC. 1. (a) There is hereby established a council to be known as the National Security Council (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "Council". [The National Security Council was incorporated into the Executive Office of the President by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1949, 63 Stat. 1067.]

The President of the United States shall preside over meetings of the Council: *Provided*, That in his absence he may designate a member of the Council to preside in his place.

The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

The Council shall be composed of—

(1) the President;

(2) the Vice President;

(3) the Secretary of State;

(4) the Secretary of Defense;

(5) [Formerly the Director for Mutual Security. All the functions of the Director for Mutual Security, including his functions as a member of the National Security Council, were transferred to the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration by section 2(a), Reorganization Plan No. 7 of 1953, 67 Stat. 640. The office of Director of the Foreign Operations Administration and the functions of the Director in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council were abolished by section 303, Executive Order No. 10610, May 9, 1955, implementing section 525, Mutual Security Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 856.]

(6) [Formerly the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Most functions of the Chairman, including his functions as a member of the National Security Council, were transferred to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization by section 2(a), Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953, 67 Stat. 634. The functions of the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as a member of the National Security Council were transferred to the Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization by section 4, Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, 72 Stat. 1800. The title of this office became Director of the Office of Emergency Planning by the first section of the Act of September 22, 1961, Public Law 87-296, 75 Stat. 630.]; and

(7) The Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and of the military departments, when appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to serve at his pleasure. [The former memberships of the Chairman of the Munitions Board and of the Chairman of the Research and Development Board terminated when those offices were abolished by section 2(b), Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953, 67 Stat. 638.]

(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the direction of the President, be the duty of the Council—

(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose

* * * * * * *

TITLE II—THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SEC. 201. (a) [Repealed and restated in sections 131 and 133 of title 10, United States Code. The language of section 133 appears under section 202, below.

[§ 131. Executive department.

[The Department of Defense is an executive department of the United States.]

(b) [Repealed by section 307, Act of September 7, 1962, Public Law 87-652, 76 Stat. 526.]

(c) Section 158 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 158. The provisions of this title shall apply to the following Executive Departments:

"First. The Department of State.

"Second. The Department of Defense.

"Third. The Department of the Treasury.

"Fourth. The Department of Justice.

"Fifth. The Post Office Department.

"Sixth. The Department of the Interior.

"Seventh. The Department of Agriculture.

"Eighth. The Department of Commerce.

"Ninth. The Department of Labor." [Section 201(c), Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, as added by section 4, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, 63 Stat. 579.]

(d) Except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the provisions of title IV of the Revised Statutes as now or hereafter amended shall be applicable to the Department of Defense. [Section 201(d), Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, as added by section 4, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, 63 Stat. 579.]

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SEC. 202. (a) [Repealed and restated, along with subsections (b), (d), and (f), in section 133 of title 10, United States Code.

[§ 133. Secretary of Defense: appointment; powers and duties; delegation by

[(a) There is a Secretary of Defense, who is the head of the Department of Defense, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within 10 years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.

[(b) The Secretary is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President and to this title and section 401 of title 50, he has authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.

[(c) The Secretary shall report annually in writing to the President and the Congress on the expenditures, work, and accomplishments of the Department of Defense during the period covered by the report, together with—

[(1) a report from each military department on the expenditures, work, and accomplishments of that department;

[(2) itemized statements showing the savings of public funds, and the eliminations of unnecessary duplications, made under section 125 of this title;

[(3) a report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on the reserve programs of the Department of Defense, including a review of the effectiveness of chapters 51, 337, 361, 363, 549, 573, 837, 861, and 863 of this title, as far as they apply to reserve officers; and

[(4) such recommendations as he considers appropriate.

[(d) Unless specifically prohibited by law, the Secretary may, without being relieved of his responsibility, perform any of his functions or duties, or exercise any of his powers through, or with the aid of, such persons in, or organizations of, the Department of Defense as he may designate.]

(b) [Repealed and restated in section 133 of title 10, United States Code. See subsection (a), above.]

(c)(1) [Repealed and restated, along with clauses (2), (4), (5), and (6), in section 125 of title 10, United States Code.

[§ 125. Functions, powers, and duties; transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition

[(a) Subject to section 401 of title 50, the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate action (including the transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition of any function, power, or duty) to provide a war more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation, and to eliminate duplication, in the Department of Defense. However, except as provided by subsections (b) and (c), a function, power, or duty vested in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official, or agency thereof, by law may not be substantially transferred, reassigned, consolidated, or abolished unless the Secretary reports the details of the proposed transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives. The transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition concerned takes effect on the first day after the expiration of the first 30 days that Congress is in continuous session after the Secretary so reports, unless either of those Committees, within that period, reports a resolution recommending that the proposed transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition be rejected by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, because it—

[(1) proposes to transfer, reassign, consolidate, or abolish a major combatant function, power, or duty assigned to the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps by section 3062(b), 5012, 5013, or 8062(c) of this title; and

[(2) would, in its judgment, tend to impair the defense of the United States.

If either of those Committees, within that period, reports such a resolution and it is not adopted by the Senate or the House of Representatitves, as the case may be, within the first 40 days that Congress is in continuous session after that that resolution is so reported, the transfer, reassignment, consolidation, or abolition concerned takes effect on the first day after the expiration of that forty-day period. For the purposes of this subsection, a session may be considered as not

continuous only if broken by an adjournment of Congress sine die. However, in computing the period that Congress is in continuous session, days that the Senate or the House of Representatives is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain are not counted. [Clause (3) of section 202(c) was repealed and restated in section 303, Act of September 7, 1962, Public Law 87–652, 76 Stat. 525.]

[SEC. 303. (a) For the purposes of this section, any resolution reported to the Senate or the House of Representatives pursuant to the provisions of section 125 of title 10, United States Code, shall be treated for the purpose of consideration by either House, in the same manner as a resolution with respect to a reorganization plan reported by a committee within the meaning of the Reorganization Act of 1949 as in effect on July 1, 1958 (5 U.S.C. 133z and the following), and shall be governed by the provisions applicable to the consideration of any such resolution by either House of the Congress as provided by sections 205 and 206 of that Act.

[(b) The provisions of this section are enacted by the Congress—

[(1) as an exercise of the rule-making power of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively and as such they shall be considered as part of the rules of each House, respectively, and supersede other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and

[(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (as far as relating to the procedure in that House) at any time, in the same manner and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.)

[(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if the President determines it to be necessary because of hostilities or an imminent threat of hostilities, any function, power, or duty, including one assigned to tht Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps by section 3062(b), 5012, 5013, or 8062(c) of this title, may be transferred, reassigned, or consolidated. The transfer, reassignment, or consolidation remains in effect until the President determines that hostilities have terminated or that there is no longer an imminent threat of hostilities, as the case may be.

[(c) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense may assign or reassign the development and operational use of new weapons or weapons systems to one or more of the military departments or one or more of the armed forces. However, notwithstanding any other provision of this title or any other law, the Secretary of Defense shall not direct or approve a plan to initiate or effect a substantial reduction or elimination of a major weapons system until the Secretary of Defense has reported all the pertinent details of the proposed action to the Congress of the United States while the Congress is in session.

[(d) In subsection (a)(1), "major combatant function, power, or duty" does not include a supply or service activity common to more than one military department. The Secretary of Defense shall whenever he determines it will be more effective, economical, or efficient, provide for the performance of such an activity by one agency or such other organizations as he considers appropriate.]

(2) [Repealed and restated in section 125 of title 10, United States Code. See clause (1), above.]

(3) [Repealed and restated in section 303, Act of September 7, 1962, Public Law 87–652, 76 Stat. 525. See clause (1), above.]

(4) [Repealed and restated in section 125 of title 10, United States Code. See clause (1), above.]

(5) [Repealed and restated in section 125 of title 10, United States Code, See clause (1), above.]

(6) [Repealed and restated in section 125 of title 10, United States Code. See clause (1), above.]

(7) [Repealed and restated in sections 136 (c)and (d), 3010, 3012(b) (third sentence), 6011 (first two sentences), 5031(a) (third sentence), 8010, and 8012 (b) (third sentence) of title 10, United States Code.

[Section 3010, title 10, United States Code:

[§ 3010. Organization

[The Department of the Army is separately organized under the Secretary of the Army. It operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

[Section 3012(b) (third sentence), title 10, United States Code:

[The Secretary [of the Army] is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department.

[Section 5011 (first two sentences), title 10, United States Code:

[The Department of the Navy is separately organized under the Secretary of the Navy. It operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

[Section 5031(a) (third sentence), title 10, United States Code:

[The Secretary [of the Navy] is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department.

[Section 8010, title 10, United States Code:

[§ 8010. Organization

[The Department of the Air Force is separately organized under the Secretary of the Air Force. It operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

[Section 8012(b) (third sentence), title 10, United States Code:

[The Secretary [of the Air Force] is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the operation and efficiency of the Department.

[Section 136 (c) and (d), title 10, United States Code:

[(c) Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, an Assistant Secretary may not issue an order to a military department unless—

[(1) the Secretary of Defense has specifically delegated that authority to him in writing; and

[(2) the order is issued through the Secretary of the military department concerned, or his designee.

[(d) In carrying out subsection (c) and sections 3010, 3012(b) (last two sentences), 5011 (first two sentences), 5013(a) (last two sentences), 8010, and 8012(b) (last two sentences) of this title, the Secretary of each military department, his civilian assistants, and members of the armed forces under the jurisdiction of his department shall cooperate fully with personnel of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to achieve efficient administration of the Department of Defense and to carry out effectively the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.]

(8) [Repealed and restated in sections 141(e), 3012(b) (last sentence), 5031(a) (last sentence), and 8012(b) (last sentence) of title 10, United States Code.

[Section 3012(b) (last sentence), title 10, United States Code:

[After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary [of the Army] may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

[Section 5031(a) (last sentence), title 10, United States Code:

[After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary [of the Navy] may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

[Section 8012(b) (last sentence), title 10, United States Code:

[After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary [of the Air Force] may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.

[Section 141(e), title 10, United States Code:

[(e) After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he may consider appropriate.]

(d) [Repealed and restated in section 133 of title 10, United States Code. See subsection (a), above.]

(e) [Repealed and restated in section 132 of title 10, United States Code.

[§ 132. Seal

[The Secretary of Defense shall have a seal for the Department of Defense. The design of the seal is subject to approval by the President. Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal.]

(f) [Repealed and restated in section 133 of title 10, United States Code. See subsection (a), above.]

(g) Under such regulations as he shall prescribe, the Secretary of Defense with the approval of the President is authorized to transfer between the armed services, within the authorized commissioned strength of the respective services, officers holding commissions in the medical services or corps including the reserve components thereof. No officer shall be so transferred without (1) his consent,

(2) the consent of the service from which the transfer is to be made, and (3) the consent of the service to which the transfer is to be made. [Section 202(g), Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, as added by section 3, Act of September 9, 1950, ch. 939, 64 Stat. 828. This provision is temporary law and will expire on July 1, 1967, unless otherwise extended. See (1) section 7, Act of September 9, 1950, ch. 939, 64 Stat. 828, as amended by section 8, Act of June 27, 1957, Public Law 85–62, 71 Stat. 208, and (2) section 9, Act of June 27, 1957, Public Law 85–62, 71 Stat. 208, as amended by section 4, Act of March 23, 1959, Public Law 86–4, 73 Stat. 13, and section 4, Act of March 28, 1963, Public Law 88–2, 77 Stat. 4.]

(h) Officers transferred hereunder shall be appointed by the President alone to such commissioned grade, permanent and temporary, in the armed service to which transferred and be given such place on the applicable promotion list of such service as he shall determine. Federal service previously rendered by any such officer shall be credited for promotion, seniority, and retirement purposes as if served in the armed service to which transferred according to the provisions of law governing promotion, seniority, and retirement therein. No officer upon a transfer to any service from which previously transferred shall be given a higher grade, or place on the applicable promotion list, than that which he could have attained had he remained continuously in the service to which retransferred. [Section 202(h), Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, as added by section 3, Act of September 9, 1950, ch. 939, 64 Stat. 828. This provision is temporary law and will expire on July 1, 1967, unless otherwise extended. See note following subsection (g), above.]

(i) Any officer transferred hereunder shall be credited with the unused leave to which he was entitled at the time of transfer. [Section 202(i), Act of July 26, 1947, ch. 343, as added by section 3, Act of September 9, 1950, ch. 939, 64 Stat. 828. This provision is temporary law and will expire on July 1, 1967, unless otherwise extended. See note following subsection (g), above.]

(j) [Repealed and restated in section 124 of title 10, United States Code.

[§ 124. Combatant commands: establishment, composition; functions; administration and support

[(a) With the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, shall—

[(1) establish unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands to perform military missions; and

[(2) shall prescribe the force structure of those commands.

[(b) The military departments shall assign forces to combatant commands established under this section to perform the missions of those commands. A force so assigned is under the full operational command of the commander of the command to which it is assigned only by authority of the Secretary and under procedures prescribed by the Secretary with the approval of the President. A force not so assigned, remains, for all purposes, in the military department concerned.

[(c) Combatant commands established under this section are responsible to the President and to the Secretary for such military missions as may be assigned to them by the Secretary with the approval of the President.

[(d) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary, each military department is responsible for the administration of forces assigned by that department to combatant commands established under this section. The Secretary shall assign the responsibility for the support of forces assigned to those commands to one or more of the military departments.]

RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND CONGRESS

The CHAIRMAN. What is the relevance to this? What does it mean?

Secretary LAIRD. —— because it charges the Secretary of Defense with this responsibility in the national security field and it is very clear and very precise.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the Constitution of the United States which gives the Congress the responsibility of providing for the defense of the United States? Do you just ignore that? It is no longer

relevant at all? The Congress has the responsibility for providing for the defense?

Secretary LAIRD. No, I do not disregard that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't say the Secretary of Defense.

Secretary LAIRD. I believe the Congress exercised its constitutional authority in passing the National Security Act, and the National Security Act is based upon the constitutional rights given to the Congress of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think we have delegated all our responsibility for the defense of the United States?

Secretary LAIRD. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think Congress can.

Secretary LAIRD. And that is why I respect this committee and this Congress as a co-equal branch of this government.

NECESSITY OF WEIGHING ALL ASPECTS

The CHAIRMAN. Here we are dealing with a treaty that is also under the constitutional responsibility of this committee and of the Senate. The military aspects are only one aspect of this whole matter. There is also the effect of this upon our economy and the arms race.

I don't blame you for making the best case you can for your particular department, but I think in order for the other members of the Congress and of the public to judge whether or not you are correct, you have to weigh these other matters, which are such things as McNamara mentioned. Here you are getting ready to take action which will simply stimulate the Soviet Union to take similar action. You don't deny that, I think; you just said you agreed with that statement. That is what Mr. McNamara is saying and this is a very important consideration.

KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT SOVIET UNION IS DOING

Secretary LAIRD. I would like to point out that the conditions under which Secretary McNamara made those decisions are much different from the conditions under which I operate as Secretary of Defense. We are in a position today where we know what the Soviet Union is doing. We know essentially where they will be in 1977 at the close of the interim agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know that; nobody can possibly know that. You can influence them to do that. You can take actions that make them do it.

Secretary LAIRD. We know on the basis of conversations with them what they expect to do, and we know what they have in being at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nobody that can possibly know that. You can't know it even about our own because it is dependent upon so many other actions, such as in this case the vote of the Congress. They don't know nor do you know whether or not we are going to have Trident unless we pass on it; do you? You are just hoping.

Secretary LAIRD. You supported it last year, Senator, and I hope you will support it in 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't support it; I didn't support it. I voted against it.

Secretary LAIRD. I thought you voted for it?

The CHAIRMAN. I voted against the appropriations.

Secretary LAIRD. You voted for the authorization bill? Perhaps I am wrong and I apologize if I am wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't knowingly support it. As you know, I didn't knowingly support the ABM. Now there has been——

Secretary LAIRD. I know you voted against the ABM, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. You know that we had hearings at great length. These are legitimate differences of judgment as to what is in our interests and you are quite right about the dangers——

Secretary LAIRD. It is not fair to say that merely voting for the authorization bill is necessarily a vote in favor of every program.

The CHAIRMAN. Every item in it.

Secretary LAIRD. Of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. But you talk about the differences. I thought Mr. McNamara had a better explanation to go blindly forward with excess weapons than you do because he did not have the information you had. You have stated, and others have, that we do not know what they are doing now. We have much better information-gathering facilities than we had then. There is less excuse for us going down this road than he had. So there are those differences, important differences.

PREVIOUS U.S. RESTRAINT ON SLBM'S AND ICBM'S

Secretary LAIRD. Our previous restraint on submarine-launched ballistic missiles and on ICBMs since 1965 has certainly not been reciprocated by the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. But on the restraint everyone has testified, and I thought you agreed, that because they have made some progress and reached some degree of parity is the only reason why we have the treaty before us. As Senator Percy made very clear, they would not make any kind of an agreement until they had reached at least what they considered to be reasonable parity. So that restraint has paid off. I mean, we wouldn't have any hesitation even in the arms race had it not been for that restraint; that is much more significant, I think, and meaningful than saying because we built the ABM you have it. I don't think there is much validity to that argument.

I apologize for detaining you, although it has been a very lively discussion. I thank you very much.

Secretary LAIRD. I am delighted to have been with you this morning, but I was disappointed that you did not know of my commitment this morning. I notified you earlier about that and I agreed to come at 8:00 this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right. I am sorry we have kept you beyond the proper time.

(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.)

(Questions by Senators Fulbright and Percy and responses of Secretary Laird follow:)

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR FULBRIGHT AND RESPONSES BY SECRETARY LAIRD

Question 1. Has the Soviet Union made any major improvements in ASW techniques that would measurably increase the threat to our Polaris/Poseidon fleet? Are any such specific threats on the immediate horizon?

Answer. There has not been, in recent years, any marked improvement in Soviet ASW, [deleted] the Soviets are actively pursuing an intensive research and development program on ASW related sensors. [Deleted.]

The Soviets presently possess a limited capability to localize US/NATO submarines, both diesel and nuclear powered, once initially detected. [Deleted.]

Question 2. What precise reasons have you for desiring an accelerated TRIDENT submarine program at this precise point? If there is leeway, might it not be better to continue research and development for a while to achieve a better TRIDENT?

Answer. Secretary Laird: The basic objective of our strategic policy is to preserve the sufficiency of our deterrent, to make nuclear attack unattractive. That sufficiency is placed in serious doubt by Soviet momentum in building up their already powerful strategic forces, particularly their sea-based forces. We believe it is imperative that this country have a credible and logical means of insuring that the Soviets do not gain a position of clear nuclear superiority. The TRIDENT program is part of that credible and logical means.

We accelerated the TRIDENT program initially as a step to preserve nuclear sufficiency in the face of such a significant Soviet construction program for ballistic missile submarines. The on-going Soviet SSBN building program—without an agreement—would have given them an even greater numerical superiority advantage than they will have under the Agreement. At the expiration date of the Interim Agreement the Soviets still will have an active production base for these submarines. Unless we maintain the accelerated schedule, we will be in a distinctly unfavorable strategic situation should the Soviets decide not to continue the Agreement. Alternatively, we would not have the negotiating leverage to help reduce the present imbalance.

The proposed acceleration of the ULMS submarine program would commence design, development and construction of the ULMS submarine now rather than waiting another year or two and would provide the first operational ULMS submarine in late CY 1978, approximately three years earlier than in the previous development schedule. This acceleration does not compress the overall program into a "crash" basis, but simply provides for commencement, earlier than originally planned, of a logical, orderly phase of the program (the submarine development).

Thus we believe that a delay of a few years would not necessarily produce a better TRIDENT. The technology base upon which the TRIDENT program is being structured is well in hand. We believe that the presently planned TRIDENT will have the capability to adjust to Soviet ASW characteristics as well as would one delayed by several years.

Question 3. Compare in terms of (a) numbers of launchers, (b) potential numbers of warheads, (c) missile range, and (d) boat dimensions and size, the U.S. Poseidon, the U.S. Poseidon with the ULMS–I missile and the U.S. Trident with the ULMS–II missile with the Soviet Y-class 16-missile submarine and the Soviet extended Y-class 12-missile submarine. Be as open as possible for the record and provide, if necessary, for further clarity a classified response for the Committee files.

Answer.

	Number of launchers per boat	Potential number of warheads		Approximate missile range (NM)	Submarine length (feet)	Size, displacement (tons)
		Per missile	Per boat			
SSBN/Poseidon	16	(1)	(1)	2,500	425	825
SSBN/Trident I [2]	16	(1)	(1)	[deleted]	425	830
Trident/Trident II [3]	24	(1)	(1)	[deleted]		
Y-Class/SSN6	16	(1)	(1)	1,300	426	900
Mod Y-Class/SS–N–8	12	(4)	(4)	(5)	(4)	(4)

[1] Potential number of warheads is not releasable. [Deleted.]
[2] Trident I missile not operational until late 1970's.
[3] Trident II missile not firmly programed or defined, not estimated in inventory until mid-1980's at earliest.
[4] Information not releasable at this classification level.
[5] Over 3,000.

	Number of launchers per boat	Number of warheads: Per missile	Number of warheads: Per boat	Missile range (NM)	Submarine length (feet)	Size, displacement (tons)
SSBN/Poseidon	16	[deleted]	[deleted]	[deleted]	425	8, 250
SSBN/Trident I [1]	16	[deleted]	[deleted]	[deleted]	425	[deleted]
Trident/Trident II [2]	24	[deleted]	[deleted]	[deleted]	[deleted]	[deleted]
Y-Class/SSN6	16	(3)	(3)	1, 300	425	[deleted]
Mod Y-Class/SSN8 [4]	12	(3)	(3)	[deleted]	(5)	(5)

[1] Trident I missile not operational until late 1970's.
[2] Trident II missile not firmly programed or defined, not estimated in inventory until mid-1980's at earliest.
[3] Currently 1 warhead per missile. With appropriate development could be MIRV with potential payload similar to Poseidon.
[4] SSN8 not yet operational—Estimated in inventory in [deleted].
[5] Information not releasable at this classification level.

Question 4. "It is generally assumed that the new extended Y-class 12-missile submarine of the Soviet Union uses a larger missile to achieve longer range. What would be the advantages to the Soviet Union of this achievement, and would they be worth the obvious extra costs, expenses and smaller number of launchers? Is it possible that the larger missiles are being deployed for purposes of warhead yield or application of multiple-warhead techniques? If so, could you analyze fully the implications of that prospect? Estimate the new missiles' throw weight."

Answer. The new class nuclear powered ballistic-missile submarine (follow-on to the Y-class unit) currently under construction in the Soviet Union is apparently designed to carry 12 of the new 3000+ NM range (SS–NX–8) ballistic-missiles (SLBMs). When operational, probably in early 1973, this new submarine will appreciably enhance the flexibility of the Soviet navy's primary SLBM strike force. The new missile, [deleted] more than the missile presently carried on Y-class submarines. Its 3000+ NM range more than doubles that of the SS–N–6 on the Y-class units, and is primarily achieved as a result of its larger propellant capacity.

[Deleted.] Presently, the Y-class submarines are required, because of missile range constraints, to patrol relatively close to the US East and West coasts, [deleted]. Since the patrol areas of the new class submarine will be expanded, and could include coverage on some US targets, while operating in the vicinity of Soviet submarine bases, the US/NATO ASW problem will be aggravated. Should the new class submarines exhibit improved sound quieting, as estimated, the problem of initial detection and subsequent tracking will be further complicated. [Deleted.] Therefore in terms of cost, the Soviets undoubtedly view the slight additional price tag as worth the advantage gained.

While within Soviet technological capabilities, there is no evidence or indication that multiple warhead techniques are currently associated with the new or any other SLBM. The advantage gained by employing multiple warheads is an increase in retaliatory threat (more warheads per missile), an increase in target coverage, and improved ABM penetration capability. If testing of an SLBM multiple warhead commenced immediately, it is not likely that the Soviets could attain operational status of such a system before the mid-1970s. Throw weight of the new missile is assessed at about [deleted].

Question 5. What specific reasons have led the Joint Chiefs to favor a Washington ABM defense? Would not a single ABM site or no ABM sites at all be better on both sides? What was the position of the Chiefs on that?

Answer. The deployment of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense for Washington, D.C. is considered essential by the JCS. An ABM defense will:

Protect the decision-making process against small attacks and unauthorized or accidental launches.

Provides a high assurance that unauthorized or accidental launches would not destroy the command and control mechanism. Only a deliberate mass attack would saturate the defense.

Such a defense would protect against an irrational attack and reduce the credibility of nuclear blackmail.

Would provide the additional critical time in which to perform the command and control functions of assessing the threat, making decisions, and issuing appropriate execution orders.

For an SLBM attack, a relatively large force of submarines would be required to saturate the defense. A force of this size would significantly increase the probability of detection and should provide strategic warning.

One of the major considerations in developing an ABM defense of the Washington area is the amount of time that can reasonably be gained against a surprise attack before defense exhaustion or penetration occurs. This added decision time permits additional flexibility in strategic forces management. This increased time would provide a higher assurance that appropriate responses could be executed.

Would enhance the credibility of our deterrent.

This defense will protect our decision-making process and command and control facilities and provide additional time to implement appropriate retaliatory measures. The perception of assured response by those who would be our adversaries reduces the potential for attack.

The protection of our decision-making process will serve to convince others, including our allies and potential foes that we have the will to resist aggression anywhere in defense of U.S. interests.

Would provide additional benefits including:

The necessary assurance that the nuclear decision is made by the President or his civilian statutory successor.

Provide a base for rapid expansion of the defense in the event of treaty withdrawal. Additional interceptors could be expeditiously added to the authorized defense thereby increasing its overall effectiveness.

Indicate our resolve to abide by the treaty limitations and to send a signal for subsequent negotiations that the United States intends to provide the measures necessary to insure the security of the United States and its allies within the established SAL constraints.

Question 6. If all options were exercised, how many warheads could the U.S. have in its arsenal at the end of five years? What are the options that could be exercised to yield the varying warhead totals?

Answer. Options available to the U.S. to increase the number of warheads in the U.S. strategic inventory and the number currently planned for 1977, include the following:

Convert all 1000 Minuteman missiles to MM III [deleted].

Buy up to 20 SRAMs per B–52 [deleted].

Refit Poseidon with [deleted] RVs per launch tube [deleted].

These deployments would be additions to the presently planned [deleted] strategic weapon warheads for 1977.

Question 7. Senator Fulbright. The proposed agreement would limit Soviet strategic land-based launchers to the present level or less. In March, your Director of Defense, Research and Engineering, Dr. John Foster, said, "In cases where small Soviet growth is assumed, Minuteman forces do not appear threatened until the early 1980s or beyond." Has that estimate changed? If so, for what precise reasons?

Answer. Secretary Laird. The quoted material was taken from page 8 of Dr. Foster's statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 March 1972 in which the Soviet ICBM threat was being discussed. The excerpt is not a threat estimate, but rather part of a section which describes possible Soviet actions. To fully understand this statement, it must be read in context, as follows:

"Analysis of the latest projections concerning Soviet missile growth rates and accuracy improvements indicate considerable variation in the time period in which our Minuteman forces would be seriously threatened. In cases where small Soviet growth is assumed, Minuteman forces do not appear threatened until the early 1980's or beyond. For middle range assumptions, Minuteman could have less survivors in 1980 or before. If the most severe of the postulated SS–9 and SS–11 type missile forces were directed at Minuteman, the Minuteman force (assuming that the silos are undefended, but are upgraded in hardness) could be drawn down as early as the mid-70's. Prudence requires that we take the more pessimistic projections seriously."

Question 8. Senator Fulbright. Project the total number of warheads the United States will have in its arsenal under existing programs five years from now, at the end of the span of the SALT agreement, and contrast that with the best official estimates of the Soviet warhead totals five years from now.

Answer. Secretary Laird. The U.S. presently plans to have [deleted] strategic nuclear warheads in 1977. The present U.S. "best estimate" of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads in being at that time is [deleted]. I would point out that such an estimate requires very specific assumptions regarding Soviet deployment programs for their warheads, assumptions about which there will always be uncertainties.

It is certainly true that the Soviets could decide to do nothing to upgrade their ICBM force. In this situation, even with the numbers allowed by the Interim Offensive Agreement, Minuteman survivabilty would not be in serious question. However, the Soviet R&D program in this area is vigorous and it is not prudent in the light of recent statements made by the Soviet leadership to assume a sudden termination of the ongoing Soviet ICBM programs. Finally the agreements do not prohibit qualitative improvements and our ICBM defenses, with the number of interceptors limited to low levels, are such that future accuracy improvement of Soviet single warhead systems could, by itself, reduce Minuteman survivability to an inadequate level.

Question 9. Do we not assume that the Soviet Union needs more submarines to have the same number on station in strike position? Would you give that ratio? Would the ratio change importantly during the next five years under the proposed SALT agreements?

Answer. We do not assume that the Soviets would necessarily require more submarines than the U.S. to have the same number in strike position.

Present Soviet deployment practices, if retained, would require more submarines than the U.S. to maintain the same number on station. Factors which apply here are the long transit distances required for Soviet submarines to reach their patrol stations, the limited range of the currently deployed Soviet SLBMs, and the single crew manning practices employed.

The Soviets can change any rigid ratio of total submarines to on station submarines which we might assign to them at the present time. These actions are not constrained by the SAL agreement. For example, continuing deployment of the SS–N–8 missile will, for constant target coverage, substantially decrease transit time thereby increasing on-station rates. While it is not possible to predict which other changes the Soviets will implement in the future, they could reduce this ratio during the five year interim period.

Question 10. Looking ahead to the end of the five years covered under the Interim Offensive Agreement, could you project the strength of the U.S. and USSR in relative terms measured by equivalent megatonnage in the arsenals of each side?

Answer. The U.S. currently plans to have [deleted] equivalent megatons in strategic weaponry in 1977. The presently projected corresponding value for the Soviet Union in 1977 is [deleted] equivalent megatons. Soviet equivalent megatonnage is only illustrative or a "best estimate", since any number of MIRVing options is open to them, and we have no way of knowing exactly how the Soviets will shape their forces with the constraints of the interim agreement.

Question 11. What specific ASW technique would the TRIDENT be better at countering than POLARIS/POSEIDON and estimate the time available before these techniques might be applied?

Answer. The TRIDENT system is expected to be able to counter any open ocean ASW technique which we can foresee. A good part of the gain will be realized through use of the long range TRIDENT I missile, which provides significant additional operating area over Poseidon. Greater safety can be added by an even longer range TRIDENT II missile which can be deployed only in TRIDENT submarines. The TRIDENT submarine will be capable of fully exploiting this greatly increased operating area by transiting at high speeds while remaining quiet.

In addition to the benefits derived from the much greater ocean patrol areas, survivability of the TRIDENT submarine is also enhanced through efforts to reduce acoustic observables and non-acoustic observables such as [deleted] magnetic anomaly and mast and antenna exposure. Noise goals, as well as goals for non-acoustic observables, are more stringent for the TRIDENT submarine than for any previous class of nuclear submarine.

If detected the TRIDENT submarine would be more capable of evading by use of speed while operating in a quiet mode, by use of countermeasures devices and/or defensive weapons.

A further enhancement of survivability is the capability to deploy from CONUS bases, and not require overseas bases. This would permit greater security in port exit, including the use of auxiliary U.S. forces to aid therein.

Question 12. Why does either side need 20 radars at each missile complex with only 100 launchers allowed?

Answer. According to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, a Party may have no more than twenty ABM radars at the ICBM defense site, with eighteen of these radars having a potential less than that of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars, (the SAFEGUARD Missile Site Radar). These specified limitations on radars evolved during the course of extended negotiations.

At present, the Army is continuing its construction of the two large radars (PAR and MSR) at Grand Forks, North Dakota. For the reasons discussed below, additional radars may be desirable at the ICBM site and the Army is investigating this possibility.

The Interim Offensive Agreement limits the quantity, but not the quality of the Soviet strategic missile forces. With feasible technological improvements to these forces (such as improved accuracy), the U.S. ICBM force could be threatened. Additionally, if the Interim Offensive Agreement is not replaced by an effective permanent agreement prior to its expiration in five years, the Soviet threat to our ICBM force could be further increased. Radars are the long lead time deployment component in providing defense of the U.S. ICBM force. By deploying additional radars at the ICBM field, the U.S. would be able to respond in minimum time to a threat to our ICBM's [deleted].

Question 13. Given the general assumption of strategists that any ABM of present technology can be overwhelmed, estimate the time saving for Washington before destruction between a situation with no ABM system and a situation with the system designed and deployed as allowed. Assume full-scale attack.

Answer. With no ABM defense against an SLBM attack, the NCA could have as little as [deleted] minutes prior to arrival of the attack in which to learn that an attack had been launched and to attempt to take appropriate action. With an active ABM defense, this time would be increased by about [deleted] or more minutes. The range in added time varies depending primarily on the size, type and sophistication of attack. For those cases where the attacker attempts to rapidly overwhelm the ABM with a large SLBM force located close to the US shore line and to which the smaller added times apply, there may be an increased probability that the element of surprise would be degraded due to ASW detection of the large number of submarines close to US shores.

I would add that, while the NCA defense would not provide a large increase in the time between warning and saturation of the defense in a full-scale attack by a large missile force, that is not the major reason for deploying the NCA defense. Such a defense will provide additional time that is critical for the functioning of the command and control system, which is an essential aspect of strategic deterrence. In addition, the NCA defense would provide protection against unauthorized or accidental launches, and reduce the credibility of nuclear blackmail.

Question 14. Please provide the total projected system costs of the following programs: B–1 Bomber, the Short-Range Attack Missile, the TRIDENT submarine system, National Command Authority ABM defense, site defense of Minuteman, accelerated basing of strategic bombers and the submarine-launched cruise missile.

Answer. The following table provides the information requested:

TOTAL PROJECTED ACQUISITION COSTS FOR SELECTED STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

[In billions of dollars]

	Fiscal year 1972 and prior	Fiscal year 1973	To complete	Total
B–1	0.7	0.4	10.0	11.1
SRAM	.8	.2	.3	1.3
Trident [1]	.2	1.0	[deleted]	[deleted]
Safeguard NCA site [2]	.2	.2	1.8	2.2
Site defense development	.1	.2	1.3	1.6
Bomber rebasing (Milcon only)	.02	.05	.3	.4
SLCM development		.02	[deleted]	[deleted]

[1] Decision on eventual Trident force level has not been made at this time. Acquisition costs shown here are for illustrative 10-boat program and are still being refined.

[2] Decision on NCA configuration has not been made at this time. Acquisition costs shown here are for least costly NCA configuration now under consideration.

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR PERCY AND RESPONSES OF SECRETARY LAIRD

Question 1. What would we do if the Soviets wish to exercise their stated right to exceed their submarine ceiling when our NATO allies deploy a seventh submarine which, together with our allowed 44 would be beyond 50? Would we cut our limit below 44 to keep the total at 50?

Answer. [Deleted.] The US would object through the Standard Consultative Commission should the Soviets for any reason exceed their submarine ceiling. With regard to specific actions that we would take, I believe that it serves no purpose to speculate on this hypothetical question.

Question 2. Why do we need TRIDENT when the Soviets have a ceiling on SLBMs and when there is no ASW threat for the foreseeable future?

Answer. The basic objective of our strategic policy is to preserve the sufficiency of our deterrent, to make nuclear attack unattractive. That sufficiency is placed in serious doubt by Soviet momentum in building up their already powerful strategic forces, particularly their sea-based forces. We believe it is imperative that this country have a credible and logical means of insuring that the Soviets do not gain a position of clear nuclear superiority. The TRIDENT program is part of that credible and logical means.

We accelerated the TRIDENT program initially as a step to preserve nuclear sufficiency in the face of such a significant Soviet construction program for ballistic missile submarines. The on-going Soviet SSBN building program—without an agreement—would have given them an even greater numerical superiority advantage than they will have under the Agreement. At the expiration date of the Interim Agreement the Soviets still will have an active production base for these submarines. Unless we maintain the accelerated schedule, we will be in a distinctly unfavorable strategic situation should the Soviets decide not to continue the Agreement. Alternatively, we would not have the negotiating leverage to help reduce the present imbalance.

The presence or absence of a ceiling on Soviet SLBMs does not affect the requirement for Trident. We do not concur that there is no possibility of an ASW threat for the foreseeable future. Although our confidence in the pre-launch survivability of the SSBN force is currently very high, our confidence in continued high SSBN survivability decline with time simply because of our uncertainty about the future course and rate of progress in Soviet-ASW technology. Intelligence lead times in this area are short compared to the time required to design, develop, and deploy a new submarine. Consequently, it is essential that we hedge against unforeseen developments in the threat with an orderly well-planned Trident program which will be able to counter potential open-ocean ASW techniques.

In addition to its decreased vulnerability to ASW developments, Trident can be operated from U.S. ports, thereby reducing our dependency on foreign bases.

Question 3. An advantage that some see in the offensive agreement is that it allows the United States time to proceed with further development of our key srategic programs such as the Trident and B–1 bomber as well as improving our already superior technology. Doesn't allowing for such potential advances in weapons technology and system quality just replace one area of instability with another, in effect convert the arms race to an equally expensive technological race?

Answer. A more complete statement of the advantage of the Interim Offensive Agreement is that it places some limits on the Soviet threat while allowing the U.S. to proceed with those programs necessary to counter the remaining portions of the Soviet threat that are not foreclosed by the Agreement. We are also allowed the right to maintain the technological lead necessary to offset the numerical advanage retained by the Soviets.

The increased confidence of both sides in the effectiveness of their strategic retaliatory forces, as a result of the SAL agreements, should be a major brake to the offense-defense arms race.

Although the initial agreements did not prohibit technological improvements, we believe that the numerical limitations will reduce arms costs to less than they would have been if both quantitative increases and qualitative improvements were unrestrained.

Question 4. During the SALT talks was any consideration given to dealing with the problem of medium-range ballistic missiles, such as those in Eastern Europe, which have the range necessary to knock out our forward-based systems? Why was no progress made in this area? Will they be on the agenda of SALT II?

Answer. [Deleted.] In the May 20, 1971, understanding we agreed to limit the offense agreement to ICBMs and SLBMs. [Deleted.]

Question 5. If parity is important in ABMs where we supposedly have a large qualitative edge, why is it not important in offensive missiles where we have a qualitative edge but numerical inferiority?

Answer. Numerical parity has importance in both ABMs and offensive missiles. Because the Safeguard program was being deployed, the U.S. was able to obtain numerical parity in the ABM Treaty in spite of the present Soviet lead in numbers of deployed launchers and radars. By contrast, in the offensive missiles area, the Soviets had numerical superiority as well as an active program to construct additional launchers and the U.S. had no program in readiness to construct additional launchers. Because we do not have numerical parity in offensive launchers, it is important that we maintain our technological lead to offset the numerical imbalance. We believe that we can continue to maintain an acceptable strategic balance under the provisions of the Interim Agreement by keeping our technological capabilities updated and by pursuing the other programs we have recommended to the Congress.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

MONDAY, JUNE 26, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright and Case.

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We are very pleased to have this morning Dr. Robert C. Tucker, director of the Russian Studies Program at Princeton University, Dr. Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, and Professor Roman Kolkowicz, Department of Political Science at UCLA.

As you all know, this is the third open session in the hearings the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is holding on the proposed treaty on anti-ballistic missiles and the proposed agreement limiting offensive weapons. Last week the committee heard Administration witnesses in public and closed sessions. This week we will be hearing witnesses dealing with various matters of concern to the committee as it prepares to come to its judgments on the treaty and agreement.

Today, we will be paying particular attention to the Soviet Union. The experts before us will address historic, political, military and strategic aspects.

It is, of course, extremely important that we understand what the proposed treaty and agreement might mean to the Soviet Union and its leadership. A certain amount of trust is necessary on both sides if the agreements are to be meaningful and productive in the long range. That trust can best be based on knowledge on both sides. It is quite clear that we now understand the Soviet Union imperfectly. This is partially due to the fact that much of what happens in the Soviet Union is closed to Western eyes, but also we sometimes fail ourselves to take the time to understand what is available to us. It is in this context that the gentlemen before us here today can be very useful.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Tucker, would you wish to begin?

STATEMENT OF PROF. ROBERT C. TUCKER, DIRECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN STUDIES PROGRAM AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Dr. TUCKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very pleased you gentlemen could come here this morning.

Dr. TUCKER. Thank you very much.

You have invited me to testify on the two strategic arms limitation agreements concluded in Moscow. In responding, I must first mention that I have no technical expertise in matters of arms control. In these remarks I shall try to assess the broad political significance of the SALT agreements in their context.

CONTEXT OF SALT AGREEMENTS

The context was a meeting of the heads of state on fundamental problems of Soviet-American relations and the current international situation. In addition to the two treaties requiring Senate approval, the parties adopted a statement on "Basic Principles of Relations" between the two states and concluded agreements on preventing incidents at sea, on exchanges in science, technology, education and culture, and on cooperation in science, space, health and on environmental problems.

Taken together, these accords represent something of a landmark in the development of Soviet-American relations. In this regard President Nixon has moved a considerable further distance down a path that was taken, although with hesitations and interruptions, by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, on our side, and by Premier Khrushchev on theirs. I believe it to be the right path. I would like to see us go farther along it, however, than either of the two governments has so far given indication of doing.

IMPORTANCE SOVIET GOVERNMENT ATTACHES TO AGREEMENTS

The large importance which the Soviet Government attaches to the new agreements is perhaps best shown by the fact that it went through with the summit meeting despite our government's decision, shortly beforehand, to respond to an offensive in Vietnam with a greatly intensified air war and blockade that challenge the Soviet Union's capacity to supply its North Vietnamese ally. Further testimonial has come in post-conference Soviet press commentaries. As they see it, the new agreements mark the abandonment, in theory and practice, of the one-time American claim to be a world-dominant power capable of coercing even the Soviet Union in event of need. The commentaries stress that according to the "Basic Principles" now adopted, each of the two superpowers is to treat the other as an equal. Great stress is placed on the word "equal," with whom coexistence is necessary, whose vital security interests must be respected, and whose positions on international questions must be taken into account. The two arms limitation agreements derive part of their significance, in the Soviet view, from the very fact that they illustrate and embody this fundamental principle.

The achievement of such politico-military parity with the United States has been a long-range Soviet goal, necessitating a costly effort in strategic weapons development. But that alone does not exhaust the significance of the new accords from Russia's point of view. The placing of Soviet-American relations on a new plateau is part of a larger

trend in Soviet foreign policy which has gained momentum in the early 1970's and was given authoritative sanction at the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress in March of last year. It is a movement toward stabilizing and improving Soviet relations with the West on the basis of the European status quo. In this context the U.S.-Soviet agreements take their place alongside the recently concluded Soviet and Polish treaties with the German Federal Republic, the important new four-power agreement on West Berlin, under which the access routes are guaranteed and the Berlin situation normalized, the Soviet-French talks and accord on "Principles of Cooperation" in October of last year, and the Soviet Government's promotion of a European Security Conference, with U.S. and Canadian participation, for the near future.

MOTIVATIONS BEHIND SOVIET POLICY

A number of motivations are discernible behind this policy of détente and stabilization of relations with the West:

1. The Soviet desire to consolidate the present arrangements in Eastern and East-Central Europe, including the existence of two Germanies, by gaining formal Western recognition and acceptance of them.

2. The Soviet concern to improve Russia's position under conditions of continuing deep tension and rivalry with China by reducing tensions on the Western diplomatic front. This concern has doubtless been accentuated by the recent developments in U.S.-Chinese relations, which may have raised the specter of Soviet isolation from the other main centers of power.

3. The desire of the Government of the Soviet Union to obtain substantially increased trade, credits and technological aid from the main Western countries as means on overcoming its continuing internal economic problems. At the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress, Mr. Brezhnev proclaimed an ambitious new effort, somewhat reminiscent of Premier Malenkov's 1953 "new course," to raise Soviet living standards sharply and soon. Mr. Brezhnev's is, however, a conservative Soviet regime which means to operate the economy, like the rest of the society, in essentially the long established way; and so far the advance of the civilian economy has at best been slow. Expanded trade with and technological assistance from the West are possible sources of improvement in the situation. Furthermore, depressed Soviet living standards may more easily be raised if the SALT agreements and subsequent Soviet-American progress in arms limitation should seriously reduce the burden of investment and effort in Soviet strategic arms development.

IMPLICATIONS OF LACK OF UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR DÉTENTE POLICY

We should take into account that Mr. Brezhnev's détente policy does not enjoy unanimous support in his own country.

There exists in Russia a heavy industry—defense lobby which bears comparison with our own "military-industrial complex." There are there, as there are here, those who perceive more danger than promise in the stabilization and improvement of Soviet-Western relations, and who regard great and growing military might as the only really reli-

able means of promoting the state's vital interests. These facts have serious implications as I see it for American policy. If the United States now rushes pell-mell into an all-out new effort in the field of strategic weapons systems, which is not ruled out by the new agreements, we may be sure that this will intensify internal pressures on the Soviet Government to do likewise. It is to be hoped that both governments will take advantage of opportunities that the SALT agreements provide to gain a certain respite in the strategic arms race while they continue joint efforts for further agreements on limitation and control.

FULL SIGNIFICANCE CANNOT YET BE MEASURED

Although the very fact of the Moscow summit meeting and its accords is cause for satisfaction, the full significance of this event cannot yet be measured. Very much depends upon the manner in which the two governments act in the future. A Soviet-American permanent standing commission has been created by the ABM Treaty, and the SALT talks will go on. A Soviet-U.S. joint commercial commission is to be set up as well as a Soviet-U.S. joint commission on scientific and technical cooperation. The institutional machinery of Soviet-American cooperation is being expanded now in an unprecedented manner. But how it operates, and with what results, will depend very much upon the presence or absence of a will on both sides to make it work and upon concrete policies that still remain to be decided. Will there emerge, gradually, a Soviet-American "community of fate" in face of the ecological crisis, the oncoming population crisis, all the grave and increasing dangers to the survival and well being of civilization on this planet? Will mutual understanding and trust evolve along with habits of working jointly? And will the planned Soviet-American docking in space in 1975 be accompanied by a freer mingling of people and ideas down here?

U.S.-SOVIET WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Among the reasons for being less than sure that the answers to these questions will be affirmative, one deserves special mention. For a long time now the United States and Soviet Russia have been engaged in a world-wide competitive struggle for political influence, a struggle that in the past two decades has increasingly centered in large parts of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. As has often been noted, this contest is costly in resources that could be used cooperatively to better effect. Also, it periodically aggravates tensions between the contestants and thereby makes it difficult for them to outgrow their old posture of mutual antagonism. Recent events on the Indian subcontinent provide one melancholy example. The Middle Eastern situation, with particular reference to Soviet policies there, provides another. So, finally, does the recent history of Indochina, where events have now come to the pass that the United States Government is waging an intense air war with a toll of civilian lives and destruction that fills the hearts of many American citizens like myself with anguish, shame and dismay—a form of war that brings dishonor upon our country and threatens to grow genocidal.

Some degree of competitiveness is probably inherent in Soviet-American relations, given human nature and the division of cultures. Nevertheless, cooperation, like peace itself, is in a certain sense indivisible or must become so. We cannot stably collaborate in certain selected spheres of mutual interest while placing no limits and curbs upon our competition in others. So long as the United States and Soviet Russia continue to view the Third World as an arena of political competition for influence, their attempts to cooperate in arms control, trade, science and technology will be in perpetual jeopardy. The whole structure of Soviet-American cooperation will remain fragile.

CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES DEMANDED FOR INTERNAL PROBLEMS

In concluding, I should like to refer to a memorandum by the eminent Soviet nuclear physicist, Andrei Sakharov. It was completed in March 1971 and sent to Mr. Brezhnev, who did not reply. Some days ago Academician Sakharov released it and excerpts have appeared in our press. Unfortunately, they will not be printed in the Soviet press. The memorandum estimates that military expenditures take up to forty percent of the Soviet national income, and declares: "Only a concentration of resources on internal problems will make it possible to overcome difficulties in the areas of the economy and the welfare of the population."

It is a well known fact that our gross national product is larger than Russia's, and the share taken by military expenditures is lower. Still, our much wealthier society now faces a situation which is in some ways comparable to the one of which Academician Sakharov speaks in reference to his own country. We are confronted with an accumulation of increasingly urgent internal problems—of health, education, care for the aged, crime control, prison reform, population, ecology, urban redevelopment, rail transportation and the like. They, too, demand a national concentration of resources, an effort of large scope over a period of time. In the final analysis, the treaty and the interim agreement, as well as SALT agreements still to be reached, may take on meaning in this context as well as that of our security. They merit the Senate's strong support.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Dr. Tucker. That is a very fine statement, lucid and succinct. I congratulate you on it.

The next statement is by Dr. Marshall Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.

Dr. Shulman.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARSHALL SHULMAN, DIRECTOR OF THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Dr. SHULMAN. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my testimony is to put before the Committee some considerations regarding the treaty and interim agreement, against the background of the larger question of how best to improve our security in our relations with the Soviet Union.

The strategic arms limitation treaty and interim agreement, taken together with the other arrangements discussed during the recent Moscow summit meeting, raise the question whether the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union may now be put onto a less tense and dangerous footing than they have been over the past twenty-five years. No one would argue that the Soviet system has become more liberal or less interested in expanding its influence than it has been. Nevertheless, we now have before us the possibility of a more reasonable and more differentiated relationship: while the political and ideological competition continues to run its course, some restraints in the conduct of that competition appear to be recognized as mutually advantageous and even necessary, including some restraint in the military competition. Also, the possibility of some cooperation between the two countries in trade, technology, space, health and environment may over time help to moderate the hostility with which these two countries have regarded each other.

The move in this direction was not a simple matter for the Soviet leadership. In the period prior to the XXIV Communist Party Congress a little over a year ago, there were signs of a debate in the Soviet Union whether to proceed toward a "normalization" of relations with the U.S. and the SALT agreement. One of the questions raised in that debate concerned the intentions of the U.S. Government and the present Administration: was it seriously interested in a long-term improvement of relations, and did this represent a real option for Soviet policy? In the end, despite the forebodings of the ideologues and the pressures of military interests, the Soviet leadership committed its prestige to the course of action which led to the summit. In doing so, it gave controlling weight to the arguments that the modernization of the Soviet economy, the consolidation of Soviet relations with China and with Eastern Europe, and the advancement of the Soviet position in the world could best be carried forward in a climate of reduced tension.

The course of the discussions in Moscow with the President and his entourage appeared to have reassured the Soviet leadership as to the serious intentions of the Administration, despite some disappointment that the negotiations on trade matters have not yet been productive.

In the month that has elapsed since that time, however, the sounds that have been coming out of Washington have included the Administration's insistence that the treaty and interim agreement, while preventing the Russians from building as many missiles and submarines as they have been and might otherwise continue to build, did not prevent the U.S. from doing anything it would wish to do, except for one additional ABM site in Montana; further, Administration representatives have argued that the treaty and interim agreement not only permit but require the commitment of an additional twenty-five billion dollars for new generations of submarines, bombers, and other advanced weapons systems. In Moscow, those who have been arguing that the U.S. Administration's purpose has been to use SALT as a device to strengthen U.S. military-technological superiority rather

than to level off the arms race, can hardly have asked for more explicit confirmation of their predictions.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO STRENGTHENING SECURITY

It is not surprising and not unreasonable that those who have military responsibility should advocate a continuing increase in our military capabilities. It is, however, the responsibility of the political authorities, both in the executive and legislative branches of the government, to make an overarching judgment as to how much is enough. In making that determination, the political authorities are faced with a choice between alternative approaches to the strengthening of our security.

One approach rests upon a commitment to a continuing effort to achieve and maintain technological if not numerical strategic superiority. This commitment has led us to force the pace of the strategic arms race, and it inescapably leads to an uncontrolled military competition with the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet economic base is substantially less than ours, its system of control enables the Soviet Union to mount whatever level of effort is required to keep pace with us. The net effect of an uncontrolled military competition produces no advantages for either side and results in less rather than greater security, for it increases tensions, risks and costs.

The alternative approach seeks a stable military balance at moderate deterrent levels, as a first step to security. It recognizes that the quest for superiority above these levels is an archaic carry over from the pre-nuclear age; it confers no military or political advantage in fact, and it serves no rational purpose other than to satisfy the pressures of the military interests on both sides.

Moreover, this approach recognizes that security involves other dimensions of power than military. We can have, and have had, an unprecedented capacity for destruction and still experience a decline in our political influence in the world. In the competition with the Soviet Union for political influence the effective resolution of our critical domestic and foreign policy problems through the wise use of our resources will be more decisive than a vain quest for military supremacy.

The chief difficulty in the way of getting public acceptance for a policy of strengthening our security through a stable and moderate deterrent balance is that in both the Soviet Union and the United States fears are aroused by some who point with alarm, not to what the other side has done, or is doing, but what it might do. This manipulation of fear makes the meshing of a rational security policy of the two countries as delicate an operation as the docking of two space ships.

In the recent period, the political leadership of the Soviet Union, against the demurrers of some of its military officers, has given increasing emphasis to the strengthening of its economic base as the main priority and the main guarantee of its future power position. Having overcome a condition of strategic inferiority by concentrated effort over the past seven years, the Soviet leadership has expressed a readiness to seek security "on the basis of the principle of equality." This principle was a significant element in the Statement of Basic Principles

signed in Moscow on May 29 by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev. The question we now face is whether this common acceptance of the principle of security on the basis of equality is to remain empty rhetoric, or can be implemented in reality. If the U.S. now opts for an accelerated effort to strength its technological superiority, the internal debates in the Soviet Union cannot remain unaffected. The Soviet political leadership cannot be expected to deny its military the resources required in the continuing effort to catch up with our projected improved weapons systems, unless they prove to be more sensible than we.

BARGAINING CHIP TACTIC

It is generally agreed that the present treaty and interim agreement will be useful only to the extent that they prepare the way for more substantial arms limitation agreements in the near future. The question is: which course of action by the U.S. is most likely to lead to more substantial arms limitation agreements? The Administration has argued that the bargaining chip tactic has been proven by the Moscow agreements; had we not begun the Safeguard and the MIRV deployments, it is argued, the Russians would not have had an incentive to enter into the present agreements. Therefore we are urged to press forward with advanced bomber and submarine systems, with carriers and cruise missiles, new fighters and other programs in order to strengthen the U.S. negotiating hand at the forthcoming round of SALT.

The difficulty with the bargaining chip tactic is that it deflects attention from the merits of the argument as to whether we genuinely need the weapons systems advocated, and instead of intimidating the Russians, requires them to follow our lead. Had we not begun to deploy a Safeguard system, there would have been no need for the present treaty, and the number of ABM launchers would have been considerably less than the two hundred for each side provided under the treaty. Had the Russians nevertheless persisted in modernizing their Galosh system around Moscow, we could have decided what if any action on our part this required; it is unlikely that we would have been saddled with the kind of a system which the bargaining chip logic has bequeathed us. Similarly, our MIRV deployment, rather than encouraging a positive attitude toward arms limitation on the Russian side, compels them to match our MIRV technology sooner or later. And when they do, we will both be worse off than if we had been able to avert the MIRV competition.

What made the present agreements possible was not that the Russians were intimidated by our bargaining chips, but that they came close enough to eliminating their previous strategic inferiority so that they no longer needed to fear that a freeze would leave them at a permanent disadvantage. If now we continue to follow the logic of the bargaining chip tactic and tried to widen our technological advantage, we shall in fact be undermining the basis of present and future SALT agreements. Bargaining chips is a game that two can play, and two can lose.

ENCOURAGING MOVEMENT TOWARD MORE SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENTS

The course of action most likely to encourage a movement toward more substantial arms limitation agreements would be to hold steady to our present strategic levels for a long enough period to give SALT II a fair chance. This is not, and should not be caricatured as, unilateral disarmament. By any reasonable definition of "sufficiency," we have several times more than is required to maintain an effective deterrent for the time required for a wholehearted effort in this direction. The incentive best calculated to encourage a positive Soviet response to arms limitation is not intimidation, but a clear indication that they can safely deflect resources from weapons to the industrial and consumer sectors without danger or disadvantage.

The present treaty and interim agreement are not based upon trust except in the sense that each side relies upon the other to recognize its own enlightened self-interest in holding the strategic competition within moderate bounds. If we set an example of modernization and restraint, we cannot be certain that the Russians will follow that example, but we can be certain that if we let our defense levels be determined by pressures from the military, no matter what the rationalization, we will eviscerate the agreements that have been reached, and lose whatever opportunity the present moment affords of bringing the arms race under control.

There are no grounds for complacency in the present state of the arms race. The nations of the world are spending more than $180 billion in weapons each year; new and more destructive weapons systems are making their appearance, and the prospect of easy availability of fissionable material brings nearer the day when more nations will have nuclear weapons at their disposal. Although the United States and the Soviet Union have shown increasing sobriety at the scale of destructiveness under which our peoples live in hostage, this gives little assurance that war may not result from miscalculations or from the possibility that military officers may substitute their judgment for that of their civilian superiors.

By itself, the ratification of the treaty and the approval of the interim agreement would be useful only if they reflect a decision on the part of our political leadership to accept a commitment in all seriousness to an agenda of arms limitation. The first step on that agenda is to seek a stable and moderate deterrent balance with the Soviet Union. This means to work in SALT II toward reductions of present stockpiles, to bring bombers and MIRVs under control, and to slow down the technological race by a comprehensive test ban and a limit on flight testing of missiles. Further steps on the agenda require efforts to bring France and China into the system of agreements and to reduce conventional weapons and the traffic in arms.

Finally, although a stable and moderate deterrent balance is perhaps the best realistic hope for the immediate period, we cannot rest content with a system which continues to hold the people of the world in hostage to the risk of wholesale destruction. Only if we find a way to go beyond deterrence to a system of international security not based upon the threat of mass destruction can we begin to breathe more easily.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It therefore follows that the ratification of the present treaty and the approval of the interim agreement by themselves would be without meaning unless this government is prepared to declare its commitment to moderation and restraint in its military programs while it returns to the effort to damp down and reduce the strategic competition with the Soviet Union.

2. If, however, this commitment is not forthcoming from the President and the Congress, and if we give free rein to the military demands for an acceleration of programs for more and more advanced weapons systems, would it not be more honest to recognize that the treaty and interim agreement are a hoax, a deceptive use of these negotiations to cloak an intention to continue the drive for strategic superiority and thereby to guarantee the continuation of the irrational and self-defeating military competition?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Shulman. That is a very persuasive statement.

Our third witness is Professor Roman Kolkowicz, University of California.

STATEMENT OF PROF. ROMAN KOLKOWICZ, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT UCLA

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad to have this opportunity today to discuss Soviet interests and objectives in SALT. I shall address several problems relevant to this broader issue: What is the nature of Soviet interests in SALT? What kinds of Soviet objectives are served by SALT? How is SALT perceived by important Soviet elites?

SOVIET CONCERNS WITH NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE

It is a known historical fact that concerns with national security and defense have invariably been among the very highest priorities of Soviet leaders. Stalin launched radical social and economic reforms of industrialization and collectivization in order to create a powerful, modern defense establishment. Khrushchev came to power in the 1950's largely as a supporter of a strong and dominant defense establishment. The current leadership of Brezhnev has continued this tradition of primacy of defense over other social and national concerns. Moreover, any opponent of this primary objective has in the past suffered the consequences of political demise. Thus, when Malenkov opposed the military and the defense establishment in 1953–54, he quickly found himself ousted from the top positions in the government and party. Similarly, when Khrushchev began to oppose the military and defense interests in the 1960's, he was unceremoniously ousted from power.

This Soviet preoccupation with defense and military interests can be explained in several ways. Lenin had taught his disciples that "everything is a phantom, except power". Soon after the revolutionary momentum abated in Europe after World War I, Soviet leaders found

themselves surrounded by a hostile international environment. Moreover, Soviet leaders succumbed to a kind of paranoia engendered by hostile gestures and acts of the West. Several generations of Soviet leaders grew up in an environment of "*cordons sanitaire*", "capitalist encirclements", anti-communist pacts, etc. And since the end of World War II, they were exposed to Western policies of containment, roll-back, massive retaliation and Western strategic superiority.

If Soviet leaders learned nothing else from their past experience, they certainly learned that they must rely on their force of arms for survival and political viability, and that nothing will assure their security and political interests but the achievement of great power, a power at least equal to that of the United States.

REASONS FOR SOVIET INTERESTS IN SALT

The Soviet Union has now achieved this long-sought objective—strategic parity with the United States. Having climbed this plateau, the Soviet leaders began to pursue policies aimed at strategic arms limitation talks, SALT. I submit, therefore, that an indispensable precondition for SALT was the Soviet achievement of at least strategic parity, so that they could enter into the negotiations from a position of strength and political equality.

Another reason for recent Soviet interests in SALT derives from changes in Soviet foreign policy, changes in objectives, commitments and constraints. For two decades since the end of World War II, Soviet foreign and military policy focused largely on the West, that is NATO and the United States. The Third World remained essentially an area of marginal interest despite some ill-advised gambles by Khrushchev; and the Far East and South East Asia similarly remained an area of limited Soviet interest and concern. This Western-focused foreign and military policy underwent a profound change in the 1960's and a new policy seems to have emerged in the interval. Briefly, the objectives of this policy is to:

Hold, stabilize and normalize Soviet relations with the West, in order to gain greater freedom to deal with their China problem in the East, and to be able to explore the "soft" areas south of Russia for policy opportunities.

A vital pre-requisite of this new policy line, for dealing with the Chinese challenge and for the penetration and exploration of the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas, is the normalization and stabilization of relations with the West. Thus, several major recent Soviet policy initiatives seem to support this assumption: Soviet interests in European Security Conferences; Soviet interest in treaties and agreements with West Germany; Soviet interest in SALT; recent Soviet low-key reactions to militant American actions in Vietnam, etc. These and others seem to support the assumption of a keen Soviet interest in the stabilization and normalization of Soviet relations with the West. Within this context, one may assume that SALT serves Soviet leadership as an important tactical adjustment of their new policy direction, rather than as a major shift in Soviet military and foreign policy.

A further reason for Soviet interest in SALT derives from certain domestic pressures on Soviet policy makers, pressures to allocate a

larger share of available resources to consumer and domestic interests. Now, this is a favorite theory of many Western analysts and scholars. They maintain that a stabilization of the arms race will enable Soviet leaders to finally come to grips with their domestic problems, long neglected, and that resources saved from the arms programs will find their way to the consumer. I am afraid that I do not share this view for the following reasons: Two previous leaders of the Soviet Union, Malenkov and Khrushchev, had at different times proposed such a consumer-oriented policy at the expense of defense interests. Both had encountered stiff resistance from entrenched military-industrial-party bureaucracies and found themselves ousted from power.

WHAT SALT WILL AND WILL NOT DO

More importantly, SALT does not really hold out the promise of either halting the arms race, nor of enabling leaders to drastically curtail defense expenditures in the interest of the consumer. We ought to consider here what SALT promises to achieve and what it will likely fail to achieve:

(1) What SALT will do:

SALT will stabilize and formalize the rules of the game of the now equal superpowers, who have vested interests in maintaining a nuclear-strategic bipolarity.

SALT will stabilize the quantitative arms race, specifying the numbers of tolerable ratios, launchers, sites, et cetera.

SALT may create a useful psychological-political climate for further negotiations.

(2) What SALT will not do:

SALT is not disarmament, it does not promise, "peace in our time."

SALT does not really stop the arms race, it merely moves it into a different direction, into a qualitative arms race of a subterranean nature, which may actually increase the numbers of deliverable warheads, warheads with a greater target-precision and greater devastation potential.

SALT will likely increase allocations in the Soviet Union and the United States to the R. & D. sectors, in order to keep abreast with technological developments in military hardware and in order to remain vigilant and capable of balancing or outdistancing the adversary within the limitations of the treaty provisions.

SALT is not likely to change some important Soviet perceptions of new policy opportunities in the 1970's. For the international arena looks very promising indeed from Moscow; the Soviet Union is stronger militarily than ever before; the Soviet Union has established some sort of order in the bloc; the Soviet Union has extended its political and military influence into many parts of the world; the Soviet Government has even raised the standard of living of its citizens and introduced a modicum of relaxation in its international affairs.

At the time, the United States, which had dominated the international arena for the past two decades, is showing signs of fatigue with its global role. This fatigue is in part the result of: waning support of the American people for foreign interventions; the result of urban disorders and demands for domestic priorities in policy decisions; the result of the "no more Vietnam" syndrome.

These developments are carefully analyzed in Moscow and are interpreted there as signs of American disenchantment with global roles and responsibilities and as signs of waning American resolve to check every kind of Soviet initiative or Communist aggression.

I suggest therefore, that before we succumb to the glittering promises of summitry, and before we fall victim to our illusions and wishful thinking, that we ought to remain realistic about Soviet intentions, perceptions and designs focusing on SALT.

SALT AND THE SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

The recent agreements in Moscow have not affected Soviet military capabilities in any significant way. They merely formalized certain Soviet and U.S. preferences and established numerical ceilings and ratios for strategic forces which are higher than the presently existing Soviet military capabilities. Yet, I would not be surprised to find out that the Soviet military establishment found these largely symbolic gestures objectionable. For the Soviet defense establishment is a powerful institution in the scheme of Soviet politics, a veritable state within a state, a description that usually evokes loud and angry Soviet disavowals. What is the basis of the Soviet military's power?

The Soviet Union is a state without any provisions for the regular and predictable transfer of state power. Thus, each succession to power is a kind of crisis. Under Stalin, the several powerful institutions in the state existed in a condition of balances, or divide-and-conquer, with the security organs, the military, the state bureaucracies and the Party apparatus balancing each other, while Stalin served as the linchpin of the whole system.

Since the death of Stalin one of the vital balancers, the security organs, were removed from the political arena and the governmental bureaucracies were reduced in their political group, while the military remains as the main source of coercive power. The military has in recent years grown in institutional strength and their voice in affairs of the state has grown commensurably. We must ask therefore, what does the military want? What are their preferences and objectives?

Like elsewhere, the Soviet military want large and growing budgetary allocations to their institution; the military demands the primacy of defense and security interests over any other social objectives; they prefer an international environment which is less than stable, one which contains various levels of tension useful for the rationalization of military demands, functions and interests; they have little regard for their political leaders' ability to properly manage the strategic and security affairs of the state.

More concretely, the Soviet defense establishment continues to see high political and military utility of great military power, and they seem eager to project that power into targets of opportunity outside Soviet borders. Soviet military spokesmen continue to view international politics as a "zero-sum-game" and they tend to plan on the basis of the "worst possible case" approach. They argue therefore, that the West must never be trusted; that a deterrence-only policy may have fatal consequences; and that strategic-technological superiority is a plausible and desirable Soviet objective.

It is possible that these Soviet military views are nothing more than the usual saber-rattling of generals who must persuade their political masters of the military's viligence and toughness. It is also possible that the Party leadership is able to exercise full control over their marshals and generals. At the same time, it would be naive to dismiss the Soviet defense establishment's militancy and internal political influence as a Western exaggeration. For the Soviet military is in many important ways different from others, including our own.

In any event, the Soviet defense establishment views SALT with reservations; these reservations would become much more powerful if and when SALT moves into more realistic and consequential negotiations on the limitations of offensive strategic weapons. In such an event, the defense establishment would likely offer strong resistance to their political leaders.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is argued here that Soviet interests in SALT are limited, instrumental and essentially political. They are limited to the extent that SALT does not imply any reduction in Soviet military capabilities or in their arms programs. SALT merely formalizes certain current and future strategic ratios between the Soviet Union and the United States.

They are instrumental to the extent that SALT serves other important Soviet objectives as a *peredishka*, a necessary breathing pause, in stabilizing one traditional area of confrontation, as the Soviet Union assumes new responsibilities and commitments in the Far East, Asia and south of Russia.

They are essentially political, to the extent that SALT formalizes superpower political equality and symbolically binds the United States to the Soviet Union, while excluding China and others from this compact.

Another argument made here is that SALT does not significantly change the adversary relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union. Any expectations of dramatic departures in Soviet foreign policy are bound to be disappointed. If anything, one would expect a heightened Soviet foreign policy activism in areas of presumed vulnerability, opportunity and low U.S. interest. Such policy activism is likely to proceed at a slow, uneventful pace, in an unobstructive, aggressive manner, in areas of strong Soviet interest. For example, the Middle East would appear to be such a target of opportunity and is likely to become an area of continuing Soviet penetration.

A further argument advanced here is that while American globalism and interventionism is waning, Soviet globalism and imperialism is gaining momentum. The Soviet Union had been denied a global role by Western policies of containment and by U.S. strategic superiority. Having broken out of containment, and having finally achieved strategic parity, the Soviet military and political elites face an adversary who is assumed to be "fatigued" and moving into a neoisolationist position. Thus, Soviet elites find themselves in the possession of enormous power, a power that is looking for a purpose. And that purpose will be shaped by the resolve of their traditional adversary, by probes

into vulnerable targets of opportunity and by the internal politics in the Soviet Union.

Thank you.

(Biographic sketch of Dr. Kolkowicz follows:)

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH OF ROMAN KOLKOWICZ

Born 1929, US citizen, married, three children.

Education: M.A. and Ph.D. degrees received at the University of Chicago.

Areas of Specialization: Comparative politics; International relations; Soviet Foreign and Strategic Policy.

Professional Activities: Professor of Political Science, University of California Los Angeles, 1970–. Senior Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1966–70. Visiting Professor, George Washington University, 1968–69; University of Virginia, 1967–68; and CUNY, 1966–67. Research Staff Member, The RAND Corporation, 1961–66.

Related Activities: Delivered papers, lectures at international conferences at Evian, France (1966); West Berlin (1967); Moscow (1968); Garmisch, Germany (1969); Washington (1967); Tel Aviv (1971). Also at Harvard, Columbia, War College, Berkeley, etc. Directed two research projects: Research Project on the Warsaw Pact for the Department of Defense, (ISA), at the Institute for Defense Analyses, 1967–69; and Research Project on Arms Control for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at IDA 1968–1969.

Languages: Proficient in Russian, German and Polish.

Publications: Books—"The Soviet Military and the Communist Party," Princeton University Press, 1967. "The Soviet Union and Arms Control," (editor and co-author), Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics" (contributor), Princeton University Press, 1970. "Armed Forces and Society" (contributor) Mouton, The Hague, 1968. "The Soviet Union: A Half-Century of Communism" (contributor) Johns Hopkins, 1968. "The Prospects for Arms Control" (contributor), MacFadden, 1965.

Articles and Monographs: Numerous monographs completed at the RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analyses; also published in World Politics, Journal of International Affairs, Orbis, Comparative Politics, Aussenpolitik, Osteuropa, Survey, Problems of Communism, Interplay, Estudios Internacionales, Military Review, etc.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Kolkowicz.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

Those are very provocative statements, all three of them. I regret that there are not more members of the committee here to hear these very thoughtful statements. I can assure that all of the committee expressed a desire to hold these hearings, but when the hearings are held for some reason or other they have other matters that seem to take precedence. But I think that all of your statements are extremely well thought out.

IS AGREEMENT A HOAX?

Dr. Kolkowicz, do I gather from your statement that you feel, as I believe Mr. Shulman put it, that this agreement is a hoax? Do you think it should not be ratified?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Not at all. I believe the agreement is not a hoax. I am suggesting that we should be aware about what the agreement implies in concrete political and military terms; at the same time, we ought to be aware that the agreement is not likely to bring about major changes in United States-Soviet relations.

The CHAIRMAN. I get the feeling that you don't think it promises anything.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. No; I was simply trying to introduce an element of caution in terms of the expectation of regarding these treaties, and how they might possibly affect Soviet Foreign policy. I am not persuaded there will be a substantial change in their foreign policy.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is used as an excuse for a vastly accelerated arms race than it is a hoax; isn't it?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, not necessarily. I see SALT I as a sort of first step of a long journey that might possibly lead to an improved psychological political climate in which further negotiations, more concrete negotiations, may take place. Thus, SALT I seems to be largely symbolic, an arrangement in which neither side gave away anything they didn't want to. It appears to be a formalization of their own preferences at a superpower level.

ZERO-SUM-GAME

The CHAIRMAN. What does the term "zero-sum-game" mean? I have never seen that used before.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, I am afraid this is sort of a hangover of my past, I used to work for the Rand Corporation and at that time we used to resort to these kind of things, rather than speak simple English.

Zero-sum-game merely suggests a conflict relationship in which one side can only gain if the other loses. The two sides cannot both gain or lose.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no such thing as a mutual advantageous agreement then?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes. I was saying therefore that the Soviet military seems to view international relations today in the zero-sum-game form, from a zero-sum-game premise.

QUESTION OF AGREEMENT AS OPPOSED TO RECOGNITION OF FACTS

Senator CASE. You have made a very interesting point, Mr. Chairman. The question reflected is fundamental: can there be a useful agreement as opposed to a useful recognition of status or of existing facts? Forgive me for the interruption—

The CHAIRMAN. I will always welcome your interruptions.

Senator CASE. I have been intrigued by this for sometime. It seems to me possible to state this in a way that doesn't downgrade an agreement entirely but rather looks at it as a recognition of existing facts. Negotiations for an agreement therefore are useful chiefly for the explorations that both sides are obliged to undertake into these facts and the relative strengths of each side. I think this is an extremely important consideration and one that the chairman has touched upon frequently. It is especially vital in its bearing upon the question of what we do in connection with the weapons now being requested and the arms race generally.

The CHAIRMAN. I am so pleased to have a colleague. I will yield to you now. You may proceed. I think it is very comforting to have at least one member who is sufficiently interested to come to this meeting.

Senator CASE. In defense of the other members of the Committee,

and I speak not for myself, it should be noted that other duties, including those involving other committees, sometimes makes attendance difficult.

The CHAIRMAN. I can assure you I didn't set this meeting at my convenience. It is customary to have them at 10 o'clock on week days.

It wasn't for my convenience that it was set at 10 o'clock. It is the only time traditionally we have a meeting. Do you wish to proceed?

DIFFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AGREEMENTS

Senator CASE. In connection with the point I was making earlier it does not seem to me that an agreement in international affairs is made in the same fashion as one in the business world.

An agreement in international affairs differs in that it involves a recognition of balances and existing conditions—and this, I believe, downgrades the argument that "bargaining chips" are so necessary—they aren't, really. The only "bargaining chips" are those reflected in the other sides recognition of your willingness to defend your national integrity. If you are so willing, then the other side likely will agree to a reasonable deal based upon existing relative strengths. If the preservation of these respective conditions is in the interests of both sides, then a lasting deal will be made. If not, then one side is dissembling in order to get some advantage and the deal will be worthless.

I don't think these agreements are worthless. I think they are useful as far as they go, although they are limited in nature.

Dr. SHULMAN. Could I respond to this point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

ATTITUDE OF SOVIET MILITARY

Dr. SHULMAN. In the passage you refer to, what Mr. Kolkowicz is doing is to characterize the attitude of the Soviet military, as he understands it, and he is saying that from their point of view the agreements represent a zero-sum-game in the sense that it is a situation in which one side wins and the other loses, but it is not possible to have both sides win. I take it he is not saying that, this is his view of the SALT agreements, and I hope there is no misunderstanding of that point and I would want to underline that.

ISSUE TO SECURITY THEORY UNDERLYING PROGRAM

It seems to me this characteristic of our strategic military competition with the Soviet Union is in a somewhat different category than the kind of political competition that he speaks of elsewhere. This is one area where agreements to dampen down the competition can be advantageous to both sides in which neither side necessarily loses by the agreement. I feel strongly that the effort to play the numbers game closely figuring the number of missiles is grossly misleading and in fact that the effort to use these agreements for the purpose of getting support for additional military programs has a certain "catch 22" quality about it. That is to say, what is at issue here is what theory of security really underlies the program. Do we really accept the principle that by dampening down the strategic competition we are both

better off—without any illusions that the rest of our competition is going to continue, but at least it may be safer and less costly? That is the issue as I see it. Or are we simply using these negotiations for the deceptive purpose of cloaking an effort to force the pace of the technological arms race? If that is so I think that then it would be a hoax.

Dr. TUCKER. May I respond?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

REGISTRATION OF FACTS AND INTENTIONS IN AGREEMENTS BETWEEN STATES

Dr. TUCKER. On the matter of agreements, it seems to me that agreements between states do register facts but along with the facts they also may register intentions, and I think both of them have to be involved in any agreement, and because they do represent both facts and intentions they may be significant landmarks in a change in a relationship between two states involved in the agreements. But as I think both Professor Shulman and I wanted to emphasize very strongly, very much depends on how we both go from here, the Soviet Union and the United States. On this point I do find myself in one rather significant, I won't say disagreement, but difference of emphasis with my colleague, Professor Kolkowicz, and that is over the role of the Soviet military in the Soviet state.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOVIET UNION

If I understand his position correctly, the Soviet government the Soviet state at the present time is viewed almost as a state controlled by its military establishment. He gave us a picture of Premier Malenkov having been ousted when he went against the military wishes and later of Khrushchev being ousted when he went against the military wishes, and of projection is that Brezhnev will go the same way if he goes against the military.

I think I would consider this somewhat of an oversimplication of the realities of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union. I think it would be partly true of the Malenkov case, but I think in the case of the fall of Khrushchev many other issues than the displeasure of the military were involved. I also think we can't project past incidents into the future. In some ways the pressure from below upon the government to improve the standard of living of the Soviet people is greater now than it ever has been in the past and I believe that is one factor that might counter-balance these military advisers.

WAYS IN WHICH SOVIET MILITARY DIFFERS FROM OURS

The CHAIRMAN. Could I return to that passage, Mr. Kolkowicz, after discussing the zero-sum-game you say, "For the Soviet military is in many important ways different from others, including our own."

What are some of the important ways in which it differs from our own.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, first, I would suggest that during the last four or five decades of Soviet history the military has been treated preferentially by the Party. Most of Soviet social and economic planning was built around the military's interests; massive social and polit-

ical reforms were undertaken in the interest of the defense establishment.

The CHAIRMAN. How does that differ from the influence of the American military establishment?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. One could explain it further. The Soviet military, while it has been controlled by the civilian leaders all these years, is perceived by the leadership as a constant source of potential challenge to the Party. There is an enormous system of political controls in the military; I don't know of any other military establishment in the world that is subject to such complex 4–5 layers of controls. All of this is to make sure that the military remains at all times politically reliable and pliable.

The CHAIRMAN. And what?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Politically reliable and manageable, controlled. I don't know of any other military establishment that is in a similar position.

Senator CASE. I wonder if we could illustrate——

The CHAIRMAN. One little question, please, and then I will yield.

You are intimating that the military in Russia is effectively controlled by the political leadership. They do not have instances of a General like General LaVelle and others going off the reservation following their own view. Is that what you are saying?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I am not saying that.

The CHAIRMAN. You are saying they control it?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that this is a difference between them and us.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, this is one of the differences. We don't know about the General LaVelles in the Soviet Union because they keep these things secret; they don't have a public press. But there are certain reliable sources that give reliable information on instances of military intervention and——

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think, outside of the LaVelle case and others, we have civilian control of the military? I thought you used this as a difference.

You said there are many important differences from ours and you immediately say they are controlled by the political leadership, as if this was a difference.

Dr. KOLOKOWICZ. I am suggesting that there is an enormous control apparatus which doesn't exist any place else. At the very least it tells us the sense of concern by Soviet political leaders with their military. That control is not very effective, but it exists and it is very complicated.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think we are concerned about our military.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I am not saying that.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get precisely what you are saying.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Our concerns with our military and the Soviet concerns with their military seem to differ in intensity and concretely. The Soviet military has been at the center of their political preoccupation for many decades. The Soviet military is the most controlled institution in the state. The military establishment is at the same time the most preferentially treated institution in terms of social and economic planning and budgetary allocation policies.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET ATTENTION TO MILITARY AFFAIRS

The CHAIRMAN. But do you see any real distinction between the relative devotion of our resources and attention to military affairs in this country and in Russia. I would have thought looking at the last ten years, at least, that the military operations and expenditures occupy even greater attention and resources in other countries than they do in the Soviet Union.

Do you disagree with that?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I agree that this was the case in the last decade or so; I would certainly agree with that. But I am talking about the whole span of Soviet history, from the late 1920's until the 1970's.

The CHAIRMAN. I think all countries that have been invaded as often as they have, for example, by Germans twice, and exposed to invasions, have all been more conscious of the military threat than we have because we have been more isolated. We have not been invaded or bombed; we have only bombed others during these past 25 years. In that sense they are more conscious of their defense. Is that not so? Isn't it true of France? Hasn't she had the same feeling of exposure and other countries that are surrounded by people who have invaded them?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, this is possibly true.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not peculiar to the Soviets. There are good reasons for them to be preoccupied about, for example, Germany; aren't there?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Concrete reasons?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I am trying to get the significance of this and how different it is.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. It may be a matter of emphasis or degree of emphasis. I would also stress the peculiar role of the military as a source of constant potential instability within its system. This is an important difference between our two political systems.

The CHAIRMAN. I may have misunderstood the thrust of your statement, which is a very good statement. In a sense is this a rather futile operation because no matter what you do the Russian military is so strong they will do as they please and they will override the others and the political leadership are so afraid of being ousted by them that if they don't give them everything they want there is not much hope in any kind of restrictions upon the military in Russia? Is that true or not?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. No; that is not true.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just giving you an opportunity to make it clear to the uninitiated. That is what these hearings are for.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I am not suggesting that the Party leadership is at all times scared or threatened by takeover; this is not the case. We are talking about massive institutional pressure, of what we call the military industrial complex, upon the party leadership, not in terms of a military coup but in terms of affecting policy choices. This is something not unlike what has been taking place in other countries in the West.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not unlike here, is my impression.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. When you said it was very different, I immediately thought how is it different. It seems to me it is very similar.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. It is different.

The CHAIRMAN. The apparatus may be different. The final effect is that the military gets anything they want out to the Congress; don't you agree? They have to now. I can't think of an important issue in which the military have been interested in the last ten years that they didn't get what they wanted, almost to the nickel. Is that not true?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. That is true, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. How does it differ than other than merely a mechanical arrangement for the exercise of power?

POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENT BY RESTRICTING ACCELERATION

I am not trying to put words in your mouth. The final effect of this is whether or not this agreement has significance. I agree with other statements that have been made that unless we accept this in good faith and unless we implement it by restricting this acceleration, it is a hoax and it is a facade. But if we implement it by showing restraint, genuine restraint, it can be made the beginning of an effective program of deescalation of the Soviet military affairs. That is all I am trying to say. And I want to get your views.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I certainly agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. You left me with the impression you didn't think there was much hope of that.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I am afraid I may have given the wrong impression.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would clarify it. It isn't easy to communicate with me, I suppose, because there are too many other things that distract us. I am only trying to give you an opportunity to clarify, not to argue with me.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Shall I do it now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Let me briefly repeat what I said. I said that SALT I is essentially a symbolic gesture, in which both sides agreed to give away very little. It is not disarmament; it doesn't really change the levels of their respective military capabilities.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I further stated that the Soviet Union has in the past 20 years been exposed to a variety of coercive western policies, policies of containment, massive retaliation, strategic superiority, and that only very recently have the Soviet military and political leaders obtained this long sought advantage of political equality and strategic parity. I am suggesting therefore, that it doesn't seem very realistic that the Soviet Union which has labored for 25 years to obtain that dearly sought objective, would be willing to trade it away in such a way, that it would bind them to agreements which may affect their security or their freedom of policy, their freedom to press for political advantage based on military strength. Thus, I prefer to look at SALT as a two-level problem. One aspect of SALT will lead to certain arms control agreement, which have their own utility, depending on how

they are followed up. The other aspect of SALT, its implications to Soviet foreign policy, is separate from the arms control agreement. Thus, traditional Soviet foreign policy is very likely to remain very active and possibly militant.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. I think it will remain active. But does that lessen the necessity of going forward with the arms control?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are in favor of that?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I certainly am in favor.

EFFECT OF AGREEMENTS AND ARMS REQUESTS

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be in favor also of our proceeding to implement the requests of Secretary Laird? What effect would it have upon the agreements if the Congress both agreed to the treaty and the agreement and at the same time authorized these vast new technologically superior systems? Do you think that we should or should not do both?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, I must agree here with my colleague, Professor Shulman, or was it Professor Tucker, who suggested that arguing from numbers is not always the best way to deal with this complicated problem. If we insist on the need for some sort of bargaining chips in order to persuade the Russians to give up some of their bargaining chips then this is likely to set in motion a new action-reaction momentum of a new arms race. We would have two parallel developments, one in which we negotiate a dampening of the arms race and another which would lead to increased arms production programs on both sides. I am not sure that this is the best way to go about arms control.

SHOULD WE SHOW RESTRAINT?

The CHAIRMAN. Can I conclude from that you feel we should show restraint in going forward with these proposed weapons systems that are very expensive?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Restraint in what sense?

The CHAIRMAN. By not proceeding with them at the present time, giving at least a reasonable time to see what the intentions of the people in the Russian government are. To put it another way, you said the numbers are not very significant. I think you all agree with that. What is significant is the underlying intention of the two countries; whether they accept the principle of parity, whether they accept the principle of restraint in further arms races or whether they don't. This is what I meant by the restraint.

If we proceed immediately with the vast escalation of highly sophisticated weapons, it seems to me it does undermine. It shows something about our intentions, which are simply to transfer from numbers to quality, and that we can with our alleged superior technology—When I look at what happened to the country in the last two weeks, I am not so sure about this technology being very superior except in the arms race and going to the moon. Other than that I don't see that we have such great technological superiority. Maybe there are good reasons for that.

What are your feelings about the question how it bears upon the intentions, really, of what do these people mean by this. Have we arrived at the point where we are willing to accept parity or are we only transferring the struggle into an area where we think we can gain superiority? The word superiority is used quite often and has been used in these hearings.

STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY

Mr. Laird made no bones, I believe I am right, in his testimony. We must have superiority in the technological field and maintain our superiority is the way I think he put it in the hearing last week.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Mr. Chairman, I am not quite sure what superiority means in the context of contemporary nuclear deterrence.

The CHAIRMAN. The way he was using it it means we can throw a weapon from a Trident twice as far as they can throw one from their existing Y-class submarine. That is what he means by it; isn't it?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I suppose, yes, but one wants to follow this up.

It seems to me that the notion of strategic superiority doesn't have much currency. What we see presently is the burden of past ideas on both sides. Russian strategists are now thinking of strategy the way we have been doing for the past 10–15 years. At that time we thought in terms of strategic superiority, four to one or five to one, etc. But in the present context of massive weapons, and MIRV's etc. I fail to see utility in concepts of superiority except as a numerical ratio which has no significant military implications or consequences.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't either. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I yield to you. I am finished.

MAINTENANCE OF SOVIET CIVILIAN AUTHORITY OVER MILITARY

Senator CASE. Earlier you were talking about several ways in which the Soviet civilians maintain authority over the military, I would like to ask you to name two of the ways in which this is done—as an illustration.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, sir. There is an organization called MPA, a part of the Central Committee Secretariat. This is a very critical control organ whose agents and operatives parallel every level of the military hierarchy.

Senator CASE. At the highest level?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. From the very top.

Senator CASE. These are members appointed by the Party apparatus?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. And responsible only to the Party and having access to all of the information.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. What is the relationship between an MPA member of the General Staff and a military member?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. At the highest levels, they have military councils rather than direct control organs. A military council typically consists of a commander, a ranking military leader, his deputy, the representative of the Party unit there, and an MPA functionary. This is to

make sure that whatever takes place at the highest military levels is open to constant scrutiny and control of the Party. The Party has also always been concerned with military closure and has always tried to open it up, to see what goes on in the military units, from the very top to the bottom. The MPA represents only one layer of control and it parallels the whole military structure. There are three–four others, including the regular Party organization in each military unit which reports upward to the Party Central Committee.

Senator CASE. How does that work in the case of a platoon, for example?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Let's take a regiment or battalion—all the Communist Party members of this particular unit belong to a Party committee or Party organization. In this particular Party unit all are assumed to be equal, the colonel and the lieutenants are considered to be equal by the Party.

Senator CASE. Does this cell consist only of commissioned officers?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. No, this applies to enlisted personnel, too, but I was referring to the officers. They are also encouraged by the Party to participate in a process which they call Criticism/Self-Criticism, which is a unique sort of innovation where everybody is expected to confess their sins against the Party; they are asked to point their finger at anyone who has transgressed against the Party, and all of this is taken down and recorded. This serves to open up the closure-prone military units and keep the military less than secure.

Senator CASE. How is discipline maintained in such circumstances?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. During the regular military activities they have traditional discipline. But I was talking about extra-military activities, like party meetings, MPA meetings, indoctrination, propaganda activities. It is through these activities that the party asserts its own prerogatives and authority.

During some periods of stress in the late 1950's and early 1960's, this led to severe erosion of morale, but they have since dealt with it.

RUSSIAN MILITARY'S VOICE IN DETERMINING POLICY

Senator CASE. But then your point was that in spite of the various ways in which civilians maintain control over the military, nevertheless the military in Russia has a strong voice in determining policy, as they have here.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I think I really should make something clear. I do not want to imply that the Soviet military is constantly threatening the regime——

Senator CASE. But it does determine policy.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. By exerting a strong influence on policy, that is right.

Senator CASE. In effect, what the situation is here.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes.

POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING STATUS QUO

Senator CASE. I wish you would address yourself, if you are interested, to the question of whether it is really possible to have agreements between old and settled countries and those that are "on the make."

I think one of the great concerns of people who are concerned about this country's giving away too much, is not that those who wish to go further are unpatriotic. Rather, they seem to fear that since we are a "stand pat" country, we had better be as tough as we can in trying to maintain the status quo—which happens at the moment to be satisfactory with us. Is it ever possible to maintain a status quo?

Dr. SHULMAN. May I comment?

Senator CASE. Yes. This interests me very much and I believe it is quite basic to the political side of the matter in the United States.

Dr. SHULMAN. I agree, Senator, I think this is a crucial question, but the question to which it leads is what kind of power is important in terms of our related political influence.

This is a period, as you suggest, in which the Soviet Union is developing as a nation, is increasing its role in international affairs, is seeking to increase its influence in the world.

Now, I suppose that the question that is raised by the recent debates is whether the superiority that we have had in the past is a vital factor in projecting American influence in the world or not, or whether other forms of power may not be more important.

As I suggested in my statement, we have had an extraordinary capacity for destruction and yet in spite of that we have had a decline of American influence. My own judgment is that that is not because the world has reached a condition of parity in strategic competition between the Soviet Union and the United States, I think it has to do with other forms of power with our political skill, with our use of our economic resources, with the condition of our society at home, the confidence of our allies in the United States, the confidence of our people here in our own society.

These strike me as more relevant to the competition for political influence than it would if we had, say, twice as many intercontinental missiles as the Soviet Union.

Senator CASE. Does anyone else wish to comment?

RUSSIA IS OLD ESTABLISHED STATUS POWER IN CERTAIN SENSE

Dr. TUCKER. Senator, I might say a word. I think it might be added to what has just been said that the Soviet Union, too, in a certain sense is an old established status power, to use your words. Sometimes in the heat of discussions we tend to take it too much at its own, so to speak, ideological face value as a country committed to revolutions. We must remember that this revolution is 55 years old and that at 55 most revolutions are middle aged. And that is in many ways true of the Russian revolution. It is a country which, while in certain respects it is still actively involved in increasing its influence in the world, and we have all talked about that, we are all very much aware of that, but in certain other ways has a status quo to protect, particularly the status quo in Europe. In certain ways it is a conservative state and we have to learn to think in those terms. In certain ways the major problems that the Soviet government faces today are due to its conservatism, its unwillingness to liberalize its present laws, to abolish the censorship, to democratize areas of society, and to restructure the long standing established single party system. Consequently, I don't think the image of the old established static United

States confronted with activistic dynamic Soviet Union is a very accurate reflection of the reality of our interrelationship.

Senator CASE. I think you are right. I recognize now that the way in which I put the question made it sound as if it is a contest between "aggressive" Russia versus "old established" United States. Although the Russian government isn't as old in the modern sense, one could draw a parallel between Russia and Rome. Some have said that Rome was trying to conquer the world because she was afraid of being defeated—and there is something in this, although in both cases I think a certain degree of crusading spirit was involved.

IMPORTANCE OF UNDERLYING ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FORCES

What I am trying to say is that it is not so much agreements that are important—rather it is the underlying economic and cultural forces, certainly including nationalism.

NO UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF U.S. MILITARY POSITION

I am trying to arrive at an orderly picture of this. What does it lead to so far as the United States is concerned? It isn't in the mind of any of you, I take it, that we should unilaterally and substantially reduce our relative military position vis-a-vis Russia.

Dr. SHULMAN. No.

SLOWING DOWN U.S. BUILDUP

Senator CASE. I also take it that you think it possible that the United States could take a chance on slowing down our military build-up a bit and seeing whether a similar response was forthcoming from the other side. Broadly, are you in agreement on these issues?

Dr. SHULMAN. Yes, sir. Could I rephrase it a bit, Senator.

Senator CASE. Yes.

Dr. SHULMAN. I take it the issue about the new defense programs that are proposed is not one of the extremes, that is of unilateral disarmament on one side or preparations for a massive program on the other, but that it comes down to a question of degree—how much is needed and how soon. My own feeling, which I gather is shared by my colleagues here, is that in the present context of the agreements and our hope for follow on agreements, what seems to be suggested is a steady program holding our defenses at something like the present level. Our feeling is that we are not in a situation so far as we can judge where our deterrent is jeopardized by developments that are likely to take place in the next few years during which a SALT II may be negotiated. Our feeling is that holding steady means not particularly accelerating new programs of advanced systems in the present period.

It does not seem to me at least that the case for doing so is persuasive. It seems to me the case against doing so is quite strong in that it would tend to undermine the possibilities for further agreements, as I think all three of us have said in one way or another. The basis of the present SALT agreement and indeed the range of agreements reached at the summit meeting is essentially that at this moment there has been achieved a condition of something like parity, whatever parity means;

for all practical purposes it means the two countries have something like an adequate defense which they feel comfortable with.

I would argue that instead of trying to upset that condition, whether in the name of a bargaining chip tactic or whatever rationalization, our interests are better served by maintaining that condition and trying to damp it down, than to move to higher levels. This would be the argument.

What follows from this, I think, is not only the ratification of the treaty and the approval of the interim agreement but attention to the political context, attention to our intentions as expressed in our current military programs.

Now, the arguments that have been made in this country have been based largely on what the Soviet Union might do or what they could do. Some of the military have argued that they are presenting a case based not on Soviet intentions but on Soviet capabilities. But consider what the reaction would be in this country if it were Marshal Grechko who had been saying the things that have been said by the United States military lately. Then there would be real alarm raised, but can we not expect a comparable reaction on the Soviet side?

Dr. TUCKER. I would like to simply restate what my colleague has just said in slightly different words because we are in complete agreement.

What I think is so deeply concerning us is a sense of the kind of predicament in which these two great powers each feel compelled, under pressure of assumptions about what the other is going to do, to act as though what the other is going to do in the next phase presents it with the need to do the most itself.

We are concerned about the fact that certain pressures in both societies on the governments of the two societies seem to cooperate in bringing about this constant spiral of competitive effort in the armament field, and in a sense the agreement could be a very very significant first step toward a more rational way of relating, of Russia and America relating to one another so that we don't have to operate on the worst-possible-case assumption.

So in answer to our question, where does this leave us, or where does it lead us, I think my feeling is it leaves us with an opportunity, a possibility in the course of the coming months, maybe even over a longer period, to take advantage of this agreement in order to get the dynamic competitive arms development under control. I think it follows from the arguments that were being presented in these papers that both the Soviet Union and the United States presently have an enormous interest in some kind of control over the allocations of their resources, this represents an opportunity to work in this direction.

QUESTION OF HOW TO PROCEED IN DAMPENING MILITARY COMPETITION

Senator CASE. I think no one could disagree with that as a general proposition. But the question remains of how you then proceed, how you get a handle on the course of action to follow. Absent a resolution of this program, all that can be done is to consider each individual weapon, for example, on its own individual merits. In this connection we expect the military to be resourceful and ingenious and to keep ahead, at least conceptually, of the potential of any possible aggres-

sor. We would be very uncomfortable if we didn't think this was being done.

If you were Admiral Zumwalt, for example, you would have very specific ideas about what is necessary in the Mediterranean.

Do you have any thoughts about this?

Dr. SHULMAN. Yes, I do, Senator.

If we have as an objective the dampening down of the military competition I think we have to take it in a series of stages. The first stage relates to the strategic balance and that is what we are dealing with now in the present SALT agreements, the prospect for future agreements.

I do think, as you suggested, that we need to look beyond this in several ways. Firstly, on the strategic side. We have to work not only for a balance as we are doing now but to get to the point of reductions and eventually to get out from under what is essentially the hideous present reality which is that we see our security based upon a deterrent balance. Deterrence is just another way of saying two civilian populations are held in hostage against the risk of destruction. That is not a very satisfactory condition, though it maybe the best one we can have at the moment. So I think our perspective in regard to strategic weapons is to work first toward a balance, secondly toward a reduction and bringing the new technology advances at least to a slower pace, and then, thirdly, to work beyond that toward some strengthening of international institutions so we aren't dependent upon the hostage system. Then there are the other aspects of the arms race that have to do with the conventional weapons. And it is true, as you suggest, that perhaps the condition of parity in the strategic field may raise more sharply the question of the balance of conventional weapons of fleets, men under arms, mobility, fire power of the conventional forces. In fact from the point of view of our defense budget, the highest proportion of our budget does go into general purpose forces, and if we want to bring out resources into balance we have to pay attention to reductions in the general purpose forces as well as in the strategic side.

Moreover, it is the potentiality of sparks that may be struck by the fleets or the mobile forces of the two sides in troubled spots in the world, whether in the Middle East or South East Asia, that do contain the risk of conflict in the world that could get out of control.

So I think it has to be on our agenda to move beyond this stage of negotiations to an effort to dampen down the competitions in navies and in conventional forces.

Now there, too, some of the same problems that have bedeviled us in the strategic field have also operated in the field of conventional weapons. We have also had the sound of alarm about what the Russians have been doing. It is true that they have built up their Navy, fairly substantially, although it is, I think, still by a substantial margin less powerful than our own. The alarm is raised not so much about what the Russians have done but what they might do in the future. This is essentially a subjunctive condition. It is based on extrapolations from present rates of building vessels and submarines, what their position may be generally and in particular parts of the world, in the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and so on.

GEOGRAPHICAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

Senator CASE. —Taking into account the fact that we are an island nation and Russia acts from a heart land large enough to support itself.

Dr. SHULMAN. That has advantages and disadvantages.

Senator CASE. I know, but it also bears on the question.

Dr. SHULMAN. There are serious disadvantages for the Soviet Union in operating as a maritime power. Their access to the oceans of the world is more difficult than ours and in a way, as the Administration has said, one of the reasons for justifying the proposed submarine balance is that the Soviet Union is operating at a geographical disadvantage. It needs to have a larger submarine fleet than ours in order to maintain the same number of submarines on station. So the geographical factor is a complex one which confers some advantage on one side and some on the other, but at any rate I do think it is necessary, as you imply, for us to look beyond present agreements toward an effort to stabilize and to damp down both the strategic and the conventional competition.

APPLICATION OF DETERRENT BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL FIELD SUGGESTED

As a matter of fact, it seems to me we might well apply in this conventional field the same notion of a deterrent balance as we have done in the strategic field. That is, the purpose of our conventional forces of our fleets and of our men under arms is essentially a negative one, to prevent the other side from using its forces in order to affect the political outcome in conflicted areas of the world. That means that if we can achieve that kind of a general balance it will not confer upon us the capability of intervention, which I trust we do not wish, but we hope it will dissuade others from intervention. Having stabilized the military competition it may be possible to move toward some system of international security.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EDITORIAL ENTITLED: "THE ARMS RACE: WHAT'S THE HURRY?"

Could I suggest this editorial might go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes indeed. Without objection the editorial from the morning Post will be inserted into the record.

(The information referred to follows:)

[From the Washington Post, Monday, June 26, 1972]

THE ARMS RACE: WHAT'S THE HURRY?

Senator Fulbright is right to say that Defense Secretary Laird abuses the spirit and purpose of the SALT accords by threatening to withdraw his "support" unless Congress moves ahead on new arms. The threat is meaningless in the sense that, even if implemented, it would not block Congressional approval of the accords. Its danger is that it may scare some Congressmen into voting for questionable weapons programs that, on their merits, might fail.

The most questionable is the Trident missile-submarine project, justified by the administration on grounds that its greater speed, size and quietness (over the Polaris-Poseidon force) would extend its patrol area and its invulnerability to enemy discovery and attack. Last year Mr. Nixon planned to deploy Trident in

the 1980s. This year the date was moved up to 1978, the year after expiration of the interim agreement limiting offensive weapons. The speedup indicates that the administration wants Trident chiefly as a "bargaining chip" in SALT Two. It is asking almost $1 billion, including large sums for the long-lead time nuclear reactors that would allow actual boat construction to begin next year.

But what's the hurry? Not even the Pentagon claims the Polaris-Poseidon fleet is wearing out or becoming easier for the Russians to find and destroy. Pentagon estimates, which no reasonable man can credit, put the Trident fleet's cost at $11 billion; the administration's speedup doubtless would push the figure higher still. The boat as designed is so sophisticated in technology as to make some experts question whether the extras are necessary and will work. One alternative would be to appropriate the money for the Trident missile, which could go on the Poseidons (thus extending their patrol areas), and meanwhile to hold back on the boat.

The $500 million the Pentagon seeks for the new B–1 bomber, for development of a prototype, would not take that project so close to construction and therefore is less objectionable. Nonetheless, the administration has yet to demonstrate that the B–1 has any rationale more compelling than Air Force service pride. Would a sensible man hard pinched for money buy a new third car when he already had three good cars in the garage? Strategic bombers are the "third car" of the American deterrent, after the land-and-sea-based missiles. The B–1 would cost, again by Pentagon estimate, $11 billion.

We are aware that on Thursday Mr. Nixon confirmed that Mr. Brezhnev had told him the Russians were "going ahead" on arms programs not limited by SALT One. Unless Congress approves his arms requests, the President went on, American security will be "seriously jeopardized" and SALT Two will have "no chance." One could perhaps question the value of a SALT Two agreement that would permit arms building on the scale Mr. Nixon seems to envisage. He should know that the relevant issue now is not whether the Russians are "going ahead" but on what projects and at what pace and to what particular ascertainable effect on American security and credibility. The further relevant issue is the extent to which Soviet programs are pushed or slowed in response to American programs. Crude assertions that the Kremlin is "going ahead" are no help. What else could Mr. Brezhnev have said?

President Nixon did say that the SALT agreements and the arms programs should be weighed on their separate merits. We entirely agree. To ensure so, the Senate should vote first and soon on the ABM treaty, and the Congress as a whole on the offensive-weapons agreement. There will be time enough later to make decisions on new weapons. A delay past the conventions would be fine. The expected nomination of Senator McGovern by the Democrats would give the arms sceptics a strong champion, just as the administration's contrary viewpoint has such a champion in President Nixon: That is to say, the issue of the arms race likely will extend beyond the SALT ratification process into the Presidential campaign. And why not? The issue is no more complex than others that will be debated, and no less urgent. We surmise that neither Mr. Nixon nor Mr. McGovern, assuming he is the Democratic nominee, would shrink from it.

RUSSIAN PERCEPTION OF U.S. NOT BUYING NEW PROGRAMS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shulman, last week Admiral Moorer in justifying the increased arms expenditure stated that unless we buy new submarines and bombers, among other things, and I quote, "The leadership of the USSR would mark it up not to goodwill, but to a failure of will, not to our confidence but to our weakness."

How would you comment on such a statement?

Dr. SHULMAN. Well, I am not sure where that kind of reasoning can lead. It seems to me that no one is arguing that the United States ought to abstain from acquiring what it feels it needs in the strategic field out of goodwill, but what is at issue is whether we make a judgment on the military procurements on the basis of what we think is necessary or whether we do it on the basis of a bargaining chip logic.

As I suggested in my statement, I feel the bargaining chip logic is fallacious; what it does is to saddle us with systems in the expectation this is going to intimidate the Russians and then in the end we are left with the systems whether we in fact needed them or not. I think this is what happened in the ABM field. The judgment that we make on whether we should build now the Trident, the submarine and the two missiles that are contemplated under the Trident program, or the B–1 or cruise missiles or the other programs advanced, should be on the basis whether there is in fact a military need for these under the present circumstances, and I would rather see the Admiral make the argument on the basis of the need for these programs at the present time rather than on the basis of the argument that this will intimidate the Russians, this is necessary in order to strengthen our bargaining hand.

Dr. TUCKER. May I add something?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. TUCKER. I don't quite see the logic of the Admiral's reasoning. It seems to me that if we proceed circumspectively, they would not perceive that as weakness on our side. They know we are very well capable of providing these weapons systems; the whole history of our past development testifies to that. They couldn't be in any doubt about our capability. I don't see the reasoning that this would be perceived as weakness. It could be perceived as a willingness, a desire to keep open the option of not making certain investments depending upon what they do, and in a sense it seems to me the negotiating goes on all the time between us even when our SALT delegations aren't talking because we are both in interrelations, we are talking in various ways, the representatives of our governments are communicating to one another and we both see what the other is doing, and that is a form of talking and a form of negotiating. I believe Professor Shulman was pointing out that none of us is really saying that the United States should stop all activities in this field of strategic arms development or unilaterally divest ourselves of these possibilities. We know that planning will go on and a certain amount of work will go on in these fields. We take this into account. It is a question of degree, of how much and how fast.

U.S. SUPERIORITY IN NAVAL OPERATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. There have been some recent studies put out by the Center for Defense Information, particularly with regard to the naval forces. They point out that we have, I think, 14 or 15 aircraft carriers. We have four or five times as many intercontinental bombers. We have three, I believe, forward bases, as they call them, one in Scotland and the others I forget.

Dr. SHULMAN. Guam, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. This points out the difference in size of many of our destroyers, which are larger than the largest Soviet cruisers and so on. There is a good deal of technical information.

Admiral La Roque, who is just out of the Navy only a month ago, I think, should be qualified to know what these relative strengths are. It would seem to me that while in strategic weapons there is a parity, in the field of naval operations we are vastly superior at the present

time. They have really no very large naval vessels other than their submarines.

POSSIBILITY OF U.S. DISADVANTAGE IN NEAR FUTURE QUESTIONED

It didn't seem to me there is any possibility in the near future of our being at a great disadvantage. I don't understand that that is the thrust of it. That is going to be obviously the approach. I agree with what you said about the effect upon the spirit with which these agreements have been accepted, whether we really mean it or not.

With regard to the military balance, if it is a balance, or parity, in many respects there is a superior capacity to deliver nuclear weapons abroad on Russia than the Russians have in reserves, other than the big missiles. Of course, our people in another context have often said ours are more accurate and more efficient than theirs.

WHY DOES U.S. THINK SECURITY ALMOST WHOLLY MILITARY POWER?

All three of you gentlemen are scholars, not only in this field. Why do you think it is that our country seems to think of security almost wholly as military power. That may have been appropriate a hundred years ago or so, but the development of nuclear weapons, it seemed to me, negatived to a great extent the concept of security as being composed primarily of military power. Because we don't really want to use it, other activities which you suggested have become more significant now in enhancing our prestige and influence abroad than the military power. It isn't nearly as important in this whole complex of a country's influence as it was before invention of nuclear power. Would you agree with that?

Dr. SHULMAN. Yes, Senator, I agree completely. I think that one of the unfortunate aspects of the debates in recent weeks is that they misdirect our attention to the numbers of strategic weapons and imply that the security of the country and the political influence of the country is dependent upon the relative strategic arsenals of the two countries, whereas in fact it seems to me if we were to study those instances in which the United States has been declining in influence in the world, in Europe, and in Japan, and in Latin America and elsewhere, I think the answer would be that it has not been because there has been a change in the strategic balance but it would have to do with other forms of power, the way in which we have managed ourselves, say, in the subcontinent, or in the way in which the people of Western Europe look to us now, to the way in which we handle our economic monetary relations with the Europeans, the way in which we have shown a sensitivity to the interests of our allies, the extent to which we have articulated values and purposes which attract the people of other countries.

It seems to me that even if we were to do everything that the military is asking for and to pile on the new systems, the full something like $25 billion——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is just the beginning.

Dr. SHULMAN. Yes. And surely our experience is that it would be much more than that. I think the prospect is if we had all that this would be a disadvantage in terms of the kinds of power that are likely

to affect the political competition with the Soviet Union. That it is somewhat the Neanderthal approach to security.

EFFECT OF VIETNAM ACTIVITIES ON U.S. PRESTIGE AND INFLUENCE

The CHAIRMAN. One of you mentioned, and I have forgotten whether it was Dr. Tucker or Dr. Shulman, your reactions to our present activities in Vietnam. I think you said you were ashamed of the unlimited, unrestricted destruction of everything.

How do you think that affects our influence and prestige around the world?

Dr. TUCKER. I don't think that there is a simple thing in the past 10 years, in the past 7 years particularly, since February, 1965, which has so hurt the United States all over the world as our conduct of the war in Vietnam. I am talking about Europe particularly, which we like to think of as that sphere of the external world which is in many ways most important to us. That is a sphere of the world in which many of us have friends. We travel there; we talk to our colleagues, other scholars; we have a finger on the pulse of European thought.

I really believe that our war in Vietnam, our methods of conducting the war from the air, our intransigence in the approach to the political settlement of the war has harmed us and depleted our influence more than any other single thing in the minds of those people who are so important to us.

I can't speak with similar confidence of people in vast parts of the world that I am not familiar with, but I am speaking particularly of Europe.

POSSIBILITY OF U.S. DESTRUCTION MOTIVATING SOVIET DÉTENTE

The CHAIRMAN. I sometimes wonder whether or not this unlimited, unrestricted destruction has not, however, raised a question in the minds of people like the Soviets and others that they are dealing with such a dangerous country that they might better try to reach some détente because it is a very dangerous power that can be let lose at any place; can it not?

Do you think it has any psychological effects upon the Russians deciding that this is such a dangerous country they had better try to seek a détente?

Dr. TUCKER. Senator, I don't see the motivation behind the present Soviet détente policy with the West as being substantially inspired by that kind of a worry. After all, the worry would have been in the Soviet mind at all times from February 1965 on, or at least at most times, and yet the détente policy has been pursued in a vigorous and effective way only in these last three or four years. And while I wouldn't discount the possibility that you speak of, I am not really sure that that is a major factor in——

The CHAIRMAN. I agree it is a very speculative question. It sometimes occurred to me that people capable of doing what we are doing to a small defenseless country might be capable of nearly anything.

Dr. SHULMAN. Could I add a word on that, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. SHULMAN. My impression is there have been several stages in the Soviet response to what we have done in Vietnam. In the first period, immediately after the intensification of our involvement in late 1964 and early 1965, I think there was a period in which there was some alarm in the Soviet Union about what this indicated about American policy, whether it indicated a general increase in bellicosity and a willingness to intervene. Then there followed, I think, toward the latter part of 1965 a somewhat different emphasis, a realization that our present policy in Vietnam was reducing American influence in the world, as Professor Tucker suggests, and this was creating a new situation, new opportunities in the world.

So indirectly it may be so, but not for the reason you suggest. I think it may be largely because this is a period in which from the Soviet point of view there are opportunities for expansion of their influence, not so much because of their own wisdom but because of the disadvantages on our side. They see a decline in American prestige and influence and this does create what they call an objective factor in the world situation which is potentially advantageous.

EFFECT OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON RUSSIAN ATTITUDES

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. I was reminded a moment ago, when you were suggesting that Russia is a new country and we are an old and settled country, that their experience, even going back to Genghis Khan and on up through the Russian invasion and may have contributed something to their national attitudes. That is, there is something left in the traditions and the history of a country which influences its attitudes. It never occurred to me they were a young and new country without experience. I thought they were in many respects burdened with old experiences that make it very difficult for them to have confidence in anybody and especially neighbors. I would have thought so. The last two world wars I would have thought contributed to an attitude which makes it difficult to accept even new good faith on the part of any neighboring country or any other country. Would you not think so?

Dr. SHULMAN. Yes, sir; I do think so. One would have to take account of a whole long historical background that goes back before the revolution in judging some of the Soviet attitudes. This certainly has to do with the tradition of secrecy for example, which is an ancient one; it has to do also with the apprehensions of the Soviet Union about China. These have deep historical roots and it would be a mistake, as you suggest, to think of the Soviet Union as only beginning its history in 1917.

Dr. TUCKER. I would like to add to that, Senator. If you look to the Russian history you will find that at certain periods that in the more distant past, partly owing to the Mongolian conquest, back in the 12th and the 13th centuries, Russia was really detached from Europe and in certain ways felt itself more of an eastern country, but that in the modern period, particularly from the late 17th and early 18th century under Peter the First through the modernization, the building of Petersburg and the whole cultural Europeanization that Russia underwent, the country had come by the early 20th century to regard

itself, at least the elite society, and to be regarded, as a European power. It was part of the whole cultural and political world of Europe.

In a sense the early Soviet period saw a break in this modern line of development and a reestablishment, a recreation of that old status of isolation. One of the reasons why I think many of us who study Russia feel that it is worthwhile to encourage a trend toward better relations and stabilization with the West, such as we see, is that we feel that it may foster a return in a way, or a completion of that earlier process of rapprochement between Russia and European civilization, which we think would be a desirable and a healthy thing. Many Russians of our generation like to think of themselves as belonging to Europe and I think that needs to be encouraged.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brezhnev seems to have a weakness for Cadillacs and Rolls Royces. Maybe that is a sign of his attachment for the West.

CONSTRAINT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY BY SALT NOT LIKELY

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I wonder if I could move to the more contemporary history of Russia and suggest something that seems of interest here. We are concerned here with strategic weapons and balances of strategic weapons. As we look at the past 20–25 years of U.S.-Soviet relations we note a very interesting development. Even when we had nuclear monopoly or strategic superiority this did not prevent the Russians from undertaking aggressive action, say, in Korea, Berlin, or even Cuba. Thus, one might say that most instances of hostility, tension, or war have taken place regardless of strategic equality or parity, but during periods of Soviet strategic inferiority. Therefore, I am suggesting that while SALT is desirable largely for the establishment of the rules of the game between two super powers in the 1970's, it is not likely to constrain Soviet freedom to pursue a foreign policy which they have pursued for the past 25 years.

SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD GLOBAL FOREIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICY

I would like to refer to another interesting recent Soviet historical development. Soviet foreign policy has since World War II, been closely related to their military capabilities. Stalin's foreign policy had been essentially continental and regional; his military capabilities were also continental and regional. As we move into the 1950's and early 1960's, we see Soviet military capabilities under Khrushchev becoming partially global and Soviet foreign policy also moves in a global direction. In the 1970's Soviet capabilities became truly global and Soviet foreign policy, assumes global scope and direction. This is to suggest what I have mentioned before, that Soviet foreign policy and strategic policy are now of global dimensions, and that any constraint created by SALT is not likely to influence Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless, the SALT agreements, which I support, will likely balance two enormous arsenals of strategic weapons, whose military utility is considered questionable by many knowledgable people.

The CHAIRMAN. Since we are on that subject, I have a question. I think you covered it. I was trying to rephrase it a bit. You emphasized the control of politburo, we will call it, the government of Mr. Brezhnev over the military, keeping it very strong. Consider the power of our military establishment now, political power, not military power, in that such a large percentage of the major corporations in this country have an economic interest in the arms race business. Hundreds of thousands of employees, as you know, all of whom vote, are employed by the great corporations. This is the example of the Lockheed loan. That wasn't disassociated from the fact they have a great many employees in some very important States. This is, I think, primarily politics. This is what they call the military-industrial complex. There isn't anything more sophisticated or esoteric than the fact that these peoples' livings depend upon their jobs and they are unusually good jobs and there are hundreds of thousands of them. I mean a company like Boeing, I suppose, had a hundred thousand employees. McDonald Douglas has, I think, 50 or 60 thousand in the State of Missouri alone. I don't know how many Lockheed, A. T. & T. and General Electric have, but all of the major companies are interested. You see in all of the magazines what they call institutional advertising, demonstrating our technological superiority, sometimes relating to a missile directly and sometimes going to the moon. You put that together with their capacity to get appropriations and I wonder if our military in the final analysis on the question of the distribution of a country's resources is not more powerful here than it is in Russia. Would you comment on that?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, Mr. Chairman, my so-called expertise is largely in the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. You have observed what goes on here; haven't you?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I think it would be probably fair, Mr. Chairman, to put this particular question in a broader context.

The CHAIRMAN. In what?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. In a historical context. During the 1940's and 1950's, and possibly the early 1960's, it was generally assumed that while this was an expensive proposition and drain on resources, it was nevertheless very necessary. As we became more sophisticated, and we got to know our adversary much better, and realized that the Communist Bloc is far from being a unified, dangerous, monolith—and after we became involved in the miserable war in Vietnam, we began to reconsider the nature of the external threat and the utility of this vast expense and the terrible consequences of the military-industrial complex to our society. I believe, however, that in the long run, the stability of our institutions and of democracy will prevail and that the excesses of the military industrial complex will be contained. I think that we realize at last that big power doesn't bring commensurate political influence, and that secondly, that we have much more important business at hand, than creating more military hardware.

BRIEFING BY PRESIDENT AND MR. KISSINGER AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. I am only trying to bring out the actual situation here. The President briefed one hundred and twenty members of Congress, as did Mr. Kissinger. I thought he did an extremely effective job of presenting the case. The President along with Mr. Kissinger, who spent over two hours together in briefing them, emphasized that this is an agreement in which neither party can be said to have an advantage, that it shouldn't be considered that way, that no one won this at this summit, and that the agreement was in our mutual interest. I was impressed by this. Then to have this spokesman for the military in effect say that this is the reason why we must go forward with these enormous new projects, which I agree with what has been said by some of you, undermines at least the spirit, the intentions, the sincerity of our agreement. I would have thought it would be almost impossible in the Soviet Union for Marshall Grechko, even if he thought so, to make a public statement, in effect, I thought, undermining the very agreement the President has just presented in a very appealing way. I thought this was rather remarkable boldness on the part of the military. I wondered if that told us anything about the control of the civilian and government in Russia versus our own.

I was amazed really that the Secretary of Defense would make such a statement, which seems to me to be contradictory to what the President and his spokesmen were saying. It is true the President says he supports these programs. The Secretary of Defense linked them together. He wouldn't support the agreements unless he got the weapons. Mr. Kissinger said that they are not linked together, that they are separate and each must be judged upon its own merits separate from the others. It is difficult for me to reconcile these. The point here is the boldness of the military to take this position in which they do link the two together, and if you can't give us the weapons we can't support SALT. I thought this was rather unusual. Do you see nothing unusual?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, I would say it is rather unusual. However military professionals traditionally do see the somber aspect of international relations.

The CHAIRMAN. And are willing to talk about it in public in opposition or in contradiction to the civilian leaders.

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. That remains to be seen.

WITNESS' FAITH IN ULTIMATE CIVILIAN CONTROL

The CHAIRMAN. This is why when you mentioned your faith in this, I raised the question. What is your faith, that ultimately the civilians will control?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes, I may be naive. One might possibly speculate even further, on the fact that civilian leaders of military establishments can at times be more bellicose than so-called professional military people.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that faith can be transmitted into votes on the floor of the Senate when we come to the proposals?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. I wouldn't presume to comment on that.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about it?

POLITICAL STRENGTH OF U.S. AND SOVIET MILITARY

Dr. TUCKER. Well, sir, in response to your question, I don't know which of the two military is the stronger. As to the political strength of the Soviet military concerning which there may be some difference of opinion here on the panel. As you know from our earlier remarks, it is interesting that whereas our Secretary of Defense is a member of the President's cabinet, and a very influential one it seems, the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, is not a member of the Politburo. There is no Soviet military officer in the highest policy-making body, the Politburo. In the Central Committee, which is a much larger policymaking body, there is a contingent of military representatives, but it is a small contingent in terms of numbers. I don't know how much all this means but it is an interesting circumstance to take into consideration.

I think we also have to realize that probably there and probably here too there is no monolithic military mind. I presume, though I can't speak from direct knowledge, that military men also may disagree and differ as to the answers to some of these questions that we have been discussing. But it seems to me, to return to your question, that the strength of the military influence on politics in the Soviet Union and in the United States is only partly to be measured in terms of the internal situations in those two countries and their government and the organization of civil-military relations. An essential margin of the strength of the military in each of these two countries is what the other country does.

That is to say, the military pressures on policy are very effective in part because the other country is, or is presumed to be, doing or planning to do something along the line of its security which necessarily implies for our security that we follow the recommendations being made by our military. And exactly the same thing is happening on the other side. So you could say that even without being aware of it, the two military establishments are cooperating with each other.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. TUCKER. And consequently the real question that arises is whether the two civilian leaderships could learn to cooperate with each other in curbing this other cooperation, and one of the ways of doing that is through agreements of this kind.

JOB CONSTITUENCY FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

The CHAIRMAN. I was suggesting that in our country, in our system, very often votes in the Congress on proposals may not be primarily inspired by the leadership in the White House. You have this enormous constituency whose jobs and whose economic situation is dependent upon it. The Lockheed loan was a fairly good example. This was sold entirely on the ground of jobs. No one could defend their performance on the C5A. It is a complete disaster. Here they have spent five or six billion dollars on a white elephant. You have seen the reports that they hardly dare even take it on trial flights for fear the wings will fall off. It is a complete waste of money.

But to give people jobs, we give them a $250 million loan and really most of the arguments centered around defense. You have seen

recently some of our candidates go to California and they feel they have to modify their proposals because they are afraid they will alienate the workers. I don't know any Admiral or General who has intervened on this. You have here a tremendous built-in political influence.

I have had members of the Congress say they can't afford to vote against something because there are 50–80 thousand of their people who have jobs in that area and that they would have to bow out if they should vote against that. This applies to space not quite the same, but in a similar way to a lesser extent. So you get a rather initial influence. Apparently operating directly on the Congress through constituents is not so potent in the Soviet Union. No elected officials can ignore this. They can't survive very long if they ignore the personal economy interests of their constituents. This is said as no reflection on the members. They wouldn't be here if they were not responsive to these influences. It grew up as you say because of the obsession with communists going back to Stalin's days. That is what you are confronted with. I personally think the arguments you have made about this are very persuasive, but I am not at all sure and I wouldn't want to bet today that when the showdown comes—are we or are we not going to put up the money for the Trident, the B–1, the F–14, the cruise missile—that you won't end up about 53 or 54 votes for it and it will be close, like the old ABM. It was 50–50 and if there ever was a case of a ridiculous instrument that was authorized that was it. This is what we face. Logic has very little to do with it really.

NECESSITY OF NATIONAL PLANNING FOR CONVERSION OF RESOURCES

Dr. SHULMAN. Senator, could I make two comments on what you have said. The first is that it seems to me that the force of your analysis, with which I agree, suggests that a necessary component of our arms control effort is national planning for the conversion of resources so that these jobs are not called into question, so that there are other useful and profit activities to which these resources can be directed. This requires, I think, planning on a national scale and it has to be side by side with the steps that we propose to follow in the arms limitations field.

PRICE OF JCS SUPPORT FOR SALT AGREEMENT

The second comment I would make relates to your early suggestion about the point of a difference between the position taken by the President and by the Secretary of Defense. What seemed to me significant there was not so much the nuances of difference in the President's presentation but that basically the agreement that had been reached between the White House and the Joint Chiefs and Secretary of Defense for the terms on which the Joint Chiefs would support the SALT agreement, seemed to me to be too high a price. What was at issue there was not the ambiguity of the remarks—whether they were or were not linked—in fact what does link them, is the price that was exacted for the Joint Chiefs support of the present agreement, and it is this that seems to me to give this "catch 22" quality to the SALT agreement. The price exacted was such that in fact it cuts the heart out of the agreement itself.

The CHAIRMAN. It almost negatives it, I would say.

DEBATE AMONG SOVIET LEADERSHIP

A moment ago, Dr. Shulman, you referred to a debate among the Soviet leadership. What did you have in mind? What is the debate?

Dr. SHULMAN. In the period before the Party Congress, from perhaps 1969 on, there were a number of varying views expressed about foreign policy about whether the Soviet Union should move toward the treaties with Germany, and also whether it should move toward a policy of easement of tension with the United States, whether it should move toward substantial SALT agreement and so on. That discussion came to an end rather sharply in about February 1971, just a month or so before the Party Congress opened, and it was clear that the political leadership made a decision about the direction in which the Party Congress was going to go and the main line of foreign policy that was to be established. This was related at that time to the decisions that were being made about economic resources in the ninth 5-year plan which was then being drawn up. So what I was referring to were the ranges of differing views that were expressed during that period. It included for example, disagreements about whether the treaties with Germany were a good idea and those disagreements continued to be expressed right up to the time of the signatures of the treaties and even for a month or so after.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Pyotr Shelest connected with this? Was he a dissident on this policy? I have seen in the press some references to that?

Dr. SHULMAN. One can only guess at this, Senator. I want to make it clear that this study of the Soviet Union we are engaged in is not exactly a science but it is partly a matter of finger-type feel and guesses. All the signs would indicate from what he had been saying in public that his emphasis had been on the side of a rather more militant policy and that he had been expressing reservations about policy of easement of tension and also about the treaty with Germany. So it is quite possible that the fact that he was relieved of his position as party secretary in the Ukraine may be significant.

Now, it is not yet known that he was relieved from his position in the Politburo, so final judgment really waits to see whether that next step is also taken.

BAHRAIN AGREEMENT'S EFFECT ON RUSSIAN INDIAN OCEAN PRESENCE

The CHAIRMAN. One or two questions. It is getting late. I hate to detain you too long, but you are here and you have all studied Russia. We don't have many people that are qualified to comment on these matters. I and others have made the point that on the Bahrain agreement what we are doing there is simply inspiring the Russians to go much further in their presence in the Indian Ocean and that area than they have so far. Would any of you comment. I and some of my colleagues were objecting to taking this step formalizing a naval base in Bahrain. Senator Case was instrumental, and I think he is the principal one, in suggesting that these executive agreements be submitted as treaties in order to at least submit them to a discussion. In the course of that, which I approve of, of course, and a number of us did, we thought that the Russians so far have not actually placed a

naval base there. They simply can send their ships where they like, of course. If we put one in they will feel compelled to put one in. Would you comment on that?

Dr. SHULMAN. I would not pass on the question of whether these should be executive agreements or not, although it does seem to me it is a good idea to have a discussion of the issues involved and that the submission of these treaties to the Senate would serve a useful purpose in airing the issues. The problem that the Bahrain agreement is addressed to is that in that part of the world, in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, there is a long-term issue raised for our security and also the security of our friends in Western Europe and in Japan in that their dependence for their energy needs upon the oil of that area is substantial. This is really going to create a difficult problem in the future. The question is how best to insure that this remains generally accessible, does not become subject to Soviet control in view of the contraction of British influence in the area.

Now, I can see a number of different ways in which we could move in that direction. It obviously would be desirable from our point of view if we did not get into a race in the area, if we did not get into competition in which both we and the Soviet Union were trying to establish bases and increase our military presence in the area. The most desirable way in my judgment of insuring the security of access to the oil resources of the area would be if there were an understanding, albeit a tacit understanding, that we would both operate at very moderate low levels.

The CHAIRMAN. That neither would have bases?

Dr. SHULMAN. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. That seems to me the argument we made. If we put one in, they will feel compelled to put one in. If we stay out and they stay out, it will not upset.

Dr. SHULMAN. Precisely. I would hope that at least the exploration of that possibility may have been on the agenda for the Moscow conversation. I don't know whether it was or not.

The CHAIRMAN. I get the impression our people don't think that is a matter for negotiation; we have already executed it in an executive agreement.

RUSSIAN REACTION TO U.S. NAVAL BASE

Do either of you have any feeling about that? How do you think the Russians will react if we put an actual naval base there? Will they feel that they should have one too or am I wrong?

Dr. TUCKER. I don't know about that situation but every one of our international acts is precedent creating and, therefore, if we have taken a step that creates a somewhat new situation and it is possible to duplicate or parallel this step, we obviously have to expect greater pressure on the other side to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you agree with that?

Dr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that in the spirit of parity and political quality that is now descending upon the international arena I would not be surprised to see the Russians actually demand something of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Like building Tridents, it simply will inspire them to imitate us. Many places where we have exerted this great presence they seem to follow. They used to imitate us in the field of aid, even though we had some disasterous experiences. So did they. They followed along and went into Guinea and got much the same reaction we got. The net result was both of us spent a lot of money rather uselessly. It seems to me that will be going on around all over the world.

MEANING OF SOVIETS PROVING TO BE MORE SENSIBLE THAN WE

You made one comment, I believe it was Dr. Shulman, which intrigued me. I wondered what you meant by it.

Soviet political leadership cannot be expected to deny its military the resources required in the continuing effort to catch up with our projected improved weapons steps, unless they prove to be more sensible than we.

What do you mean by unless they prove to be more sensible than we?

Dr. SHULMAN. Well, my point was this, Senator. It does not really buy us any great political advantage to be pushing the strategic arms race. It represents in my judgment a deflection of resources from other forms of national power which are more important for our domestic society and our foreign policy and the question is whether in the Soviet Union judgment, the final judgment will be made on the basis of the relative pressures from the military or whether it will be based on some sort of rational calculations of what kind of power is most effective and most useful for them. In my judgment these programs do not confer the political advantages that are advertised for them, neither for the Russians nor ourselves. If they are sensible and if they have a sense of proportion about the allocation of the resources, they will not follow our lead.

U.S. AND SOVIET WISDOM QUESTIONED

The CHAIRMAN. You remind me of an argument I used to make years ago that the only thing that has really saved us has been the equal stupidity of the Russian government to our own. If they had taken a different turn and really made a much greater success of their economy in dealing with the internal problems and set an example which the so-called united Third World would admire more than our military power, we would have been in much worse condition. I think Japan is a sort of example. Everybody admires Japan's great economic advances. When you contrast the regard of the world for Japan now and what it was 25 years ago, it is right remarkable. It also reminds me of a comment that Mr. Kissinger made not too long ago in discussing the Presidents trip to China. He said if you do open up communications with China, this opens up an unknown area in which the challenge from communications, that is becoming acquainted with the capacity of the Chinese, might confront us with a much greater threat in the so-called expansionism, or whatever it was, that inspired our going into Vietnam. It gives us food for thought. Because they are extremely able people and the contrast in the way they devote their resources, the way they train their people to do various things, and certain accomplishments in the field of social activities, crime, pollution, clean-

liness in the city, even in the field of medicine, people have to recognize we don't know all of the answers to all of the problems. And the discipline of their society. All of this raises very serious questions as to our own wisdom; doesn't it?

Dr. SHULMAN. I would echo what Dr. Kolkowicz was saying awhile ago; I do have faith that in the end we will show more common sense. It is true that a lot of our problems come because these diverse views do get expressed. It is possible in this country for our military leadership to speak out, say what they have to say. We don't know altogether what the pressures are on the Soviet side. It may be that there are views that are not expressed but that may nevertheless be important, and it is the case also that although both in the Soviet case and Chinese case there are some things that we may wish to emulate, on the whole it seems to me no one would really want to trade even the disadvantage of and the inefficiencies of a free society for the kind of discipline that you have spoken of. The cost of achieving unified social purpose in that way is simply too great.

IMPORTANCE OF EXAMPLE ONE SETS

The CHAIRMAN. I am not suggesting that I or any of us prefer the Soviet or Chinese system. I wasn't talking about faith either. You said a sensible reaction and one of the major things we have been talking about is our influence, the power, in one sense the military power. I thought we had agreed that there is more to influencing other peoples and in general the directions which the world as a whole moves. To me the example one sets is more powerful than the military in the long run except in the critical positions of taking a piece of real estate or doing what we are doing in Vietnam. If we look upon this as a period which we are approaching and in which we do compete peacefully rather than with military arms, then if they are more sensible than we are, it could be more dangerous than if they followed our example.

Dr. SHULMAN. I agree with you completely.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't this something for our people to consider?

Dr. SHULMAN. I hope the effect of our hearing will be to call this to public attention.

DIFFICULTY OF COMMUNICATION

The CHAIRMAN. I am not very hopeful this hearing is going to be effective, as interesting as I find it. You see how difficult it is to communicate with our own country. We say it is free and open, but how much communication do you expect this hearing to have with the people of this country?

But if someone gets up and makes a speech that we are threatened by military might of Russia, it will be on the front pages of every paper in the world.

This is another difficulty I find simply of communicating your statements. I think all three of your statements are extremely interesting, but I don't know how to get that beyond the chairman of this committee and I am afraid he is already committed to your view; so you haven't made many converts this morning. You didn't have to convert me to the view that this arms race is a disaster, but I don't

know who else you have converted. And I feel very sad about it. I think it is a great problem with us. With two hundred million people, how in the world do you expect them to think about what you gentlemen have offered this morning as food for thought. I think you have done extremely well. I can't imagine how you could make more thoughtful statements than you have this morning. All of them are extremely well thought out.

About the only thing that carries these hearings at all is the public television and about the most sensible thing I have seen us do lately, as far as the Senate is concerned, is to sustain the public broadcasting, and that is about all. I dare say I saw no one from any of the other networks this morning. So if there is any at all, it will be on public broadcasting and I think all of it very worthwhile for the whole public to know about. I regret very much that we do not have a greater exposure of thoughtful people such as yourselves, but we are a distracted nation all the way from floods to the war in Vietnam.

Do you have anything else you would like to add? I think it has been extremely interesting. Would any of you like to make any further comments?

Dr. SHULMAN. Thank you, no.

Dr. TUCKER. Thank you very much for the invitation.

The CHAIRMAN. You were very kind to give us your time for these hearings.

The Committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon at 12:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator John Sparkman, presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Symington, Cooper, Javits and Percy.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

I would like to welcome Mr. Paul Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; Dr. Donald Brennan, Senior Member of the Professional Staff of the Hudson Institute; Dr. Stanley Hoffmann of the Department of Government at Harvard University; Mr. Jerome Kahan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; and Dr. Edward Teller, Associate Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory.

I understand that Mr. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary Warnke, has not arrived yet, but I assume he will be in.

This is the fifth of the committee sessions on the proposed treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems and the proposed interim agreement on offensive weaponry.

Today we will look into the strategic implications of the proposed treaty and agreement and look ahead to future steps in arms control. Beyond that, our witnesses will explore possible directions in national defense.

For many of us, the proposals offer a prospect that the arms race that has continued for more than two decades may be on the verge of a slowdown and, hopefully, a halt.

The subject at hand now is SALT I; but the Administration has already indicated that it plans to proceed in the fall with SALT II. There is also the prospect of further movement toward a comprehensive test ban. Undoubtedly, before all the talks are done, limitations discussions will move into the area of conventional armaments as well.

It has been argued that the proposed treaty and agreement should not be accepted with euphoria. Similarly, however, the proposed understandings should not be viewed with fear, for they represent an honest attempt on the part of many persons to arrive at some preliminary steps that will move this nation and the Soviet Union onto the path of sound arms control.

The agreements were achieved in an atmosphere of parity. Consequently, we must ask ourselves not only whether they are good agree-

ments for the United States, but also whether we should strive for a bargaining position other than relative parity in which each side has what is known as sufficiency.

Is there a real military need for these programs or are they primarily expensive bargaining chips? If we insist upon bargaining from a position of strength, we must ask whether we can expect the Soviet Union to do less.

I think we must ask ourselves how we can justifiably seek to bargain only from the position of advantage. How can the Soviet Union accept the obvious choice, should that course be pursued, of either accepting a position of weakness or of trying for its own position of strength?

The whole issue of arms limitation is an extremely difficult one to comprehend. Except for close students of the issues involved, many do not have an opportunity to come to grips with the implications of the move so far and future steps.

A major purpose of these hearings is the shedding of light upon the issues so that more people can understand what the United States and the Soviet Union are attempting now that the first round has been concluded.

Mr. Warnke has come in. We are very glad to have you, sir, and we will be glad to hear from you at this time.

By the way, I say to all of you we have your prepared statements and they will be printed in full in the record. You can present them as you choose.

STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. WARNKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you suggest, sir, I will count on my statement being printed in the record and I will endeavor now to highlight some of the points that I endeavored to make.

First of all, I would like to say that I think very highly of the agreements that were reached with SALT. As a matter of fact, sometimes I think that perhaps I think more highly of these than do the administration spokesmen; but, in my opinion, the Moscow agreements can constitute a very large step toward effective control over strategic nuclear weapons.

ABM TREATY IS PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLISHMENT

The principal accomplishment, in my view, is the ABM treaty. That, to me, constitutes realistic recognition of the fact that no physical defense on any known or foreseeable technology is available against a nuclear attack of any significant size.

Accordingly, both sides have accepted the principle that safety resides not in physical defense but in the certainty that the attacker would be destroyed by the retaliatory strike that the other side would be able to mount.

LOOPHOLES IN INTERIM AGREEMENT

Now, in addition to the ABM treaty, the interim agreement does provide some control over offensive systems. I find the coverage at the

present time disappointingly small; and what troubles me, as I point out in my statement, is the possibility that the loopholes that exist in the interim agreement may make that agreement a brake on the offensive arms race, but instead a spur to that race.

So construed, the interim agreement would be at least slightly worse than no agreement at all.

But, entirely apart from the restriction on offensive systems, the ABM Treaty is a major accomplishment; it should serve to put the end to the inordinate expense and the very high risks of the nuclear arms race.

LOGIC INHERENT IN ABM LIMITATION

The question, however, is whether both sides will accept the logic that I find to be inherent in the ABM limitation. In all logic the ABM Treaty should eliminate any fear that the other side can achieve a first-strike capability. Because of the narrow limitations on the ABM system that either side can deploy, each is, in fact, open to nuclear attack even in a second strike. The surviving forces would be far more than sufficient totally to devastate the attackers' side.

NO PURPOSE IN ACHIEVING NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY

Under those circumstances, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cooper, that the continuation of the missile numbers game is in fact a mindless exercise, that there is no purpose in either side's achieving a numerical superiority, which is not translatable into either any sort of military capability or any sort of political potential. That is why, in my opinion, the ceilings that are placed in the interim agreement on both land-based and sea-based missiles should not be the cause for any concern on our part. They do give the Soviets an apparently large mathematical edge. They are permitted, as I read it, some 2,350 missile launchers to our 1,710, but either figure is a flagrant example of military redundancy. In the light of the abandonment of any forlorn hope of an ABM defense, either number affords more missiles than the other side affords in the way of targets.

So, accordingly, we should not be concerned about the existing mathematical edge nor should we be concerned about any attempts that the Soviet Union might make to add additional, useless numbers to their already far more than adequate supply.

I suggest in my statement that were the Soviet Union to do this, we might perhaps feel some relief that they have not expended their funds for militarily more meaningful and potentially more mischievous purposes.

INTERIM AGREEMENT PROVIDES SOME CONTROL

Now, I believe that sensibly construed, the Interim Agreement does provide some measure of control which is useful in assuring the survivability of our land-based missile systems for the indefinite future. It does limit, in a qualitative way, the numbers of large missiles that the Soviet Union can construct. It confines them to some 313 instead of the magic number of 500 which at times has been suggested as the figure that would give the Soviets a counterforce capability against our land-based missiles.

With this limitation, it seems to me apparent that even with the Minuteman part of our offensive triad alone, enough Minuteman missiles would survive to inflict unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union. But I believe that a sensible construction of the Interim Agreement requires that we recognize that acceptance of the numerical imbalance is possible because, in fact, numbers are totally irrelevant to our security in the strategic nuclear arms field.

If missile numbers were a valid measure of national strength, then the Interim Agreement would be improvident; but since they are without significance, there is nothing for which we need compensate.

Accordingly, I feel that we should focus on the fact that arms control must not be allowed to become the new medium for fueling the arms race and this, in my opinion, could be the result if the Congress were to accept any one of three arguments which, as I read them, are currently being presented as justification for new strategic weapon systems.

LINKING APPROVAL TO FUNDING OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS

The first and, I think, the most flagrant of these is the argument that approval of the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty should be linked to the funding of new strategic weapon systems. It has been suggested by Secretary Laird that the price for Pentagon support of the Moscow accords will be the agreement by Congress to fund the new programs for a manned, strategic bomber and for an underwater-launched missile system which includes a submarine which is more expensive than our nuclear carriers and approximately the same size as the largest Soviet surface ship.

There has also been a suggestion that a submarine-borne cruise missile should now be perfected because of the fact that this is not forbidden by the Interim Agreement.

In my view, if the SALT agreements mean that we must now spend more money to build more strategic weapon systems and continue the offensive arms race, then the SALT agreements should not be approved by the Congress. Instead, they should be sent back to the drawing board with directions that the job be done again and that it be done better this time.

I was gratified to see that President Nixon has asserted that the arms control agreements—the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement—should be approved on their merits. He stated in his news conference on June 22 that he would not have signed them unless he believed that standing alone they were in the interest of the United States; but, at the same time, and I feel somewhat inconsistently, he has contended that failure to approve the new offensive weapon programs would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States and jeopardize the cause of world peace.

As I understand his position, it appears to be based on two arguments that differ somewhat from Secretary Laird's contention that the agreements and the new funding for additional weapon systems must be linked.

ACCUMULATION OF ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE WEAPONS BY SOVIET UNION

The first of these is an argument which I believe is based more on military cosmetics than it is on military capability. President Nixon

has emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union proposes to go ahead with programs in areas from which they are not foreclosed under the Interim Agreement. But since both countries are confined to what I regard as token ABM defenses, these new offensive systems add nothing to the Soviet ability to deter or in any way to utilize blackmail against the United States.

In my view, the Soviets have always lagged behind the United States in their appreciation of the realities of nuclear logic. Since I feel that way and since they have now begun to move in a direction which I regard as being the desirable direction, I don't think that we should substitute their judgment for our common sense when it comes to the further accumulation of offensive nuclear weapons.

We should accept, in fact, the reality that the ABM Treaty assures our deterrent for the years to come. We should not yield to the temptation to get back into a numbers race and, as far as any political disadvantage is concerned stemming from the appearance of mathematical superiority, this can be prevented by a sound, rational explanation of our views to our own people, to our allies and to those who might be disposed to be hostile to us.

Since the accumulation of additional offensive weapons by the Soviet Union will give them nothing that they do not now have and will challenge nothing that is important to our national security, it seems to me that we should not, by apparently attributing some military significance to any such gesture, put ourselves at a political disadvantage. This will occur if, and only if, we bad mouth our own strength.

BARGAINING CHIP ARGUMENT

The third argument that has been presented is the so-called bargaining chip argument and that to me poses perhaps the direst potential for continued arms escalation.

We were told for almost three years that we had to deploy an ABM in order to assure success at the first SALT, but as I understand the developments, the delay in reaching an ABM treaty stemmed less from Soviet reluctance to enter into an agreement on defensive systems than it did from our own insistence that a defensive treaty be linked to some measure of control over offensive weapons.

President Nixon noted in his State of the World Message last February that: The Soviet Union wished to work toward an initial agreement limited solely to antiballistic missiles. We considered that so narrow a solution would risk upsetting the strategic balance and might put a premium on the further development of offensive weapons.

Now, if that was the risk then that is what the Interim Agreement should prevent. The Interim Agreement is good if it diminishes that risk. If, in fact, it spurs the arms race, then it is indefensible and it will spur the arms race if we continue during arms control negotiations to take the position that we must escalate the arms race in order to accumulate further bargaining chips.

I think the experience with the ABM Treaty documents justifies this apprehension. Our decision to go ahead with the ABM deployment, while the impasse continued at Helsinki and Vienna, has just meant more expense and less control. We have continued with deployment of an unneeded ICBM antiballistic missile defense centered in

North Dakota. The Soviet Union has gone ahead with its Galosh system which could not possibly defend Moscow and now, in a curious twist, both sides seem to be in a position in which they may end up with an additional ABM system that they never seemed to want before.

The treaty permits us to deploy a command and control ABM around Washington and the Soviets are entitled to build east of the Urals a defense of ICBM missiles. But whether or not they go ahead, it seems to me, sir, that the Congres should reject any further ABM expenditures.

With the completion of the treaty it seems obvious that not even a bargain-chip argument can be advanced as a reason for deploying a system that can provide no effective defense.

In my view, the reason that the Soviet Union and the United States have been able to negotiate and have been able to reach an agreement is because each side has had to recognize the other side's technical potential. Each side must recognize that it is not capable of achieving any sort of meaningful advantage in the strategic weapons field unless the other side is willing to concede that advantage, and nothing in the history of the arms race indicates any such concession or any such prospect of one dropping out of the competition if the competition continues. Neither side need let the other one gain an appreciable advantage and neither side will.

So, if the bargaining-chip argument is valid, and if it is going to be used, what it means is that the continuation of strategic arms limitation talks will lead to agreements to arm rather than agreements on arms control.

SALT AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON THEIR OWN MERITS

As President Nixon has suggested, the SALT agreements should be considered by Congress on their own considerable merits. I think that decisions on new nuclear weapon systems that are not now forbidden should be made entirely separate from the consideration of these agreements and should be made with primary emphasis on their implications for effective arms control in the future.

Any program that threatens the retaliatory capability of either side should be rejected. I refer, of course, specially to such things as antisubmarine warfare programs or anything else that might have the same impact as an antiballistic missile defense in appearing to challenge the retaliatory capability of either side.

AGREEMENTS ASSURE TIME FOR SENSIBLE SELF-RESTRAINT

In my view, the major accomplishment of the agreements signed at Moscow is to assure time for sensible self-restraint. No action that the Soviet Union can take, at least for the duration of the Interim Agreement, can threaten our deterrent or in any respect endanger our security.

Accordingly, I would recommend that we announce now that we are withholding any further deployment of nuclear weapons pending further negotiations. The ABM Treaty does not require that, just because it is permitted, we must go ahead and spend further billions on

a useless ABM site. What the ABM Treaty does provide is that we need no more MIRVs, no new bombers, no larger submarines to enable us to penetrate a nonexistent Soviet defense.

Instead of bargaining chips, I think our restraint can create the best climate for further progress in arms limitations. Our example can be well publicized and can, and I believe would put great pressure on the Soviet Union to respond in kind.

The agreements reached at Moscow can do much to move the world toward nuclear sanity and I would suggest that any arguments that diminish this bright promise should be taken with at least a grain of salt.

Thank you, sir.

(Mr. Warnke's prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE SALT AGREEMENTS AS ARMS CONTROL

On their own merits, the Moscow agreements can constitute a giant step toward effective control over strategic nuclear weapons. The ABM treaty is realistic recognition that no physical defense is possible against a nuclear attack of significant size. By its terms, both of the nuclear superpowers accept the proposition that security against nuclear devastation depends instead on the certainty that an attacker would himself be destroyed by a retaliatory second strike.

The accompanying Interim Agreement provides some measure of control over offensive missile systems. Though disappointingly permissive, it nonetheless can be a useful beginning toward comprehensive restriction of offensive nuclear weapons. But its utility in real arms control depends upon its explication and acceptance as a means facilitating further restraint. If, instead, its support is linked to Congressional adoption of crash programs in many of the offensive weapons areas which it does not cover, this Interim Agreement could prove to be slightly worse than no offensive agreement at all.

Whether or not offensive weapons are restricted, the ABM treaty by itself would constitute the single greatest major accomplishment in controlling the nuclear arms race, with its inordinate expense and incalculabe risks, by its adoption, each side will accept the policy that a strategic nuclear exchange, in light of the modern technology of death, spells out only the assured destruction of both. Soviet strategic planners, as quoted by advocates of an American nuclear war-fighting capability, have in the past characterized the concept of mutual assured destruction by its acronym—a "MAD policy." Now, however, the SALT ABM treaty attests that, in the nightmare nuclear world, "though this be madness, yet there is method in it."

In all logic, the restriction on ABM defenses should eliminate any fear that either side may acquire a first strike capability. Thus it should ensure stability and forestall the accumulation of additional offensive weapons. Since each has abandoned any real attempt to defend itself from nuclear attack, the number of warheads that would survive even an all-out first strike would be sufficient totally to devastate the attacker's society. For example, if the Soviet Union, by striking first, could destroy all of our ICBMs and all our bombers, and even if the attack could catch and destroy most of our submarines in port, 10 surviving Poseidon submarines could aim 1,600 warheads at the Soviet Union. They would run out of targets before they ran out of missiles. In thus assuring retaliatory capability, the ABM treaty makes continuation of the missile numbers game a mindless exercise.

To the extent that the Interim Agreement actually leads toward the limitation of offensive weapons, it can be a desirable complement to the ABM treaty. But to the extent that it is used as an argument for accelerated construction and deployment of new offensive systems, it can only nullify the gains the treaty has achieved and thus disserve the cause of genuine arms limitation. It becomes an agreement to arm—not arms control.

The ceilings put on ICBMs and SLBMs give a mathematical edge to the Soviets in both land-based and sea-based missiles. In aggregates, they are per-

mitted about 2,350 missile launchers that can reach United States territory while we are restricted to some 1,710 that can be aimed at the Soviet Union from our ICBM silos and missile submarines. But this nuclear edge gives the Soviet Union no practical military capability that we do not have, and that we would not have with far fewer missiles entirely apart from our commanding lead in strategic bombers and deliverable warheads. Elimination of any forlorn hope of ABM defense of populations and facilities makes either ceiling figure a flagrant example of military redundancy. And even if our potential adversary should elect to pour additional resources into additional warheads, we need have no concern. Instead, we might properly feel some gratification that he has not used these funds for more meaningful and more mischievous purposes.

Sensibly construed, the Interim Agreement is of some value in assuring the survival of our land-based missile deterrent for the indefinite future. Limited to no more than 313 large missiles of SS–9 size or greater, and with no testing yet of true MIRV technology, a Soviet counterforce strike would leave enough Minutemen to obliterate the Soviet Union, even without resort to our submarine-launched missiles and our nuclear bombers. It thus lengthens the lead time during which, if we are really serious about nuclear arms control, we can exercise restraint and look for reciprocal action from the Soviet Union. But pursuit of this sound policy requires an explanation of the Interim Agreement which focuses on the fact that we can accept the numerical imbalance because it is in fact totally irrelevant to our security. To suggest instead that this missile surplusage must be offset by the expenditure of additional billions on strategic offensive systems that are outside the parameters of the agreement is inconsistent and self-defeating. If missile numbers were a valid measure of national strength, the Interim Agreement would be improvident. Since they are militarily meaningless, there is nothing for which we need compensate.

We must not let arms control be converted into a new reason for escalating the arms race. This will be the ironic and tragic result if the Congress accepts any of the three current arguments used to justify new strategic weapons programs.

The first of these fallacies is that approval of the treaty and Interim Agreement must be linked with new funding of strategic weapons programs to preserve our security. Secretary Laird has told this Committee that the price for Pentagon support of the SALT accords is Congressional approval of proposed programs for a new manned strategic bomber and a new underwater-launched missile system carried by a submarine about the size of the largest Soviet surface ship and more expensive than our most modern attack carrier. Suggested also is a submarine-borne cruise missile. This has little more merit than a nuclear arrowhead shot from a cross-bow. If the SALT agreements mean that we must spend more money and buy more weapons for our security, they should not be approved by Congress. Instead they should be sent back to the drawing board with the request that the job be done again and be done better.

President Nixon has now asserted, however, that the arms limitation agreements should be approved on their merits. He assures us that he would not have signed them unless he believed that "standing alone, they were in the interest of the United States." But at the same time, in his news conference of June 22nd, he has contended that failure to approve the new offensive weapons programs "would seriously jeopardize the security of the United States and jeopardize the cause of world peace." His position seems to rest on two further arguments that differ somewhat from Secretary Laird's contention that the agreements and new funding must be linked.

One of these arguments appears to be based on military cosmetics rather than military capability. It is emphasized that the Soviet Union has indicated its intention to go ahead with programs in areas not controlled by the Interim Agreement .With both countries confined to token ABM systems that can defend neither populations nor industrial plants, the only mission for more warheads would be, as Winston Churchill put it, to "make the rubble bounce." The Soviets have always lagged behind us in strategic doctrine. We should not now substitute their judgment for our own common sense. Rather we should accept the fact that the ABM treaty assures our retaliatory deterrent for years to come and we should see that this fact is appreciated by our own people, by our friends, and by those who might feel disposed to be unfriendly.

Strategic nuclear forces can serve no purpose except to deter an enemy from using his. By this single sensible criterion we have more than enough and cannot fall into an inferior position unless this deterrent is threatened. With the ABM limitation, nothing that can threaten it is remotely in prospect. Whatever

else the Soviet Union may do in the offensive nuclear missile area is without military meaning. It can give them a political advantage if, and only if, we appear to concede it to them by depreciating our own strength.

The "bargaining chips" argument is the third risk that arms control may be converted into arms escalation. We were told for almost three years that we had to deploy an ABM in order to assure success at SALT. But the delay in reaching an ABM agreement seems to have stemmed less from Soviet recalcitrance than from our own insistence that an ABM limitation be accompanied by limitations on offensive weapons. As noted in President Nixon's State of the World message of February 9, 1972: "The Soviet Union wished to work toward an initial agreement limited solely to antiballistic missiles. We considered that so narrow a solution would risk upsetting the strategic balance, and might put a premium on the further development of offensive weapons." The Interim Agreement can be defended only if in fact it diminishes that risk. If it spurs the arms race, then it is indefensible. It will do so if new offensive nuclear weapons systems are supported as bargaining chips for further negotiations.

Our decision to deploy an ABM, while the impasse continued, has meant just more expense and less control. Experience shows that nations hoard obsolete weapons just as some wealthy mean save string. We now seem condemned to continue with our unneeded ABM defense of some Minuteman missiles in North Dakota. The Soviets will probably retain their "Galosh" system that can't defend Moscow. Indeed, we may both end up with an additional mirror image ABM we never seemed to want before. The treaty permits us to deploy a "command and control" ABM around Washington. They are entitled to build, east of the Urals, and away from Soviet populated areas, an ABM defense for some of their missiles. Whether or not they engage in profligate futility, Congress should reject any further ABM expenditures. Not even a "bargaing chip" argument can be advanced now that an effective ABM limitation has been achieved.

What has led both nations to the bargaining table and what can lead to lasting and comprehensive limitations on offensive weapons is each side's recognition of the other's technical potential. The agreements, presumably, were designed to avoid the costs of converting that potential into weapons that would then be countered and nullified. Neither need—and neither will—let the other achieve a position of appreciable bargaining advantage. To continue to build additional nuclear weapons systems in order to bargain from strength will mean only that the final bargain will be the poorer. In the interim, the existence of negotiations will have been used to spur the arms race. If the "bargaining chip" argument is to prevail, it is questionable that we can continue to afford arms control negotiations.

As President Nixon has suggested, the SALT agreements should be considered by Congress on their own considerable merits. Decisions on new nuclear weapons systems not now forbidden should be made separately and with primary emphasis on their arms control implications. Those that may threaten the Soviet retaliatory capability should be rejected as inconsistent with the SALT accords. Measures that serve, like the ABM limitation, to protect the mutual deterrent should be favorably considered. Among them are restrictions on further testing and on developments in ASW. They should have top priority in the negotiations that are to follow.

The major accomplishment of the agreements signed at Moscow is to assure time for the sensible self-restraint that can bring an end to the nuclear arms race. No action the Soviet Union can take at least for the duration of the Interim Agreement can threaten our deterrent or endanger our security. We therefore should announce now that we are wtihholding any further deployment of nuclear weapons pending further negotiations. The ABM treaty does not mean that, because it is not forbidden, we must spend further billions on useless ABM sites. The treaty does mean that we need no more MIRVs, no new bombers, no larger submarines to penetrate a non-existent Soviet defense.

Our restraint can, moreover, create the best climate for further progress in arms limitations. This example—which can and should be well publicized—would put pressure on the Soviets to respond in kind and would turn the negotiations themselves into a medium for arms control.

The agreements reached at Moscow can do much to move the world toward nuclear sanity. Any arguments that diminish their promise should be taken with at least a grain of salt.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Warnke.

I wonder if the members of the committee would feel that perhaps the best way to proceed is to hear from each one of these people first and then propound questions across the board; otherwise, I am afraid we would never get through today.

Our next witness is Mr. Donald G. Brennan, senior member, professional staff, of the Hudson Institute.

Mr. Brennan, we will be very glad to hear from you, sir.

STATEMENT OF DONALD G. BRENNAN, SENIOR FELLOW, PROFESSIONAL STAFF, HUDSON INSTITUTE

Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure and a privilege for me to appear before you once again. As some of you know, the subject of arms control and disarmament has been a major field of my study for perhaps a dozen years and I am grateful for your invitation to testify on the historic proposed agreements now before you.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

A detailed biographical sketch is attached at the end of my statement. Let me mention here that I organized and edited the volume "Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security," often called the bible of arms control, which was endorsed by Senator Fulbright, among others, and I have collaborated with or consulted or testified for many congressional groups and agencies of the executive branch on matters concerning arms control, including at least four prior occasions on which I have presented testimony to this committee. There were the hearings on the establishment of ACDA, on the Partial Nuclear Test Ban, on ABM in the spring of 1969 and on the ratification of the Geneva Protocol on Chemical and Biological Warfare in the spring of last year.

I have supported, in one way or another, every arms control agreement that has been established since World War II. I have also been an active advocate for a dozen years or more of a suitable Soviet-American agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons; such an agreement was a particular focus of my work in the mid-1960s. It is therefore a matter of particular disappointment to me that the proposed agreements now before you are such that I cannot support them.

DIFFICULTIES WITH AGREEMENTS

The difficulties with the two agreements are quite different; the proposed ABM Treaty does the wrong thing well and the Interim Agreement does the right things badly.

To begin with the ABM Treaty: We and the Soviets have agreed not to defend ourselves, not only against each other but, interestingly, against anyone else, either. I believe that at least on the American side this agreement stems purely from a sophomoric ideology and fashion. Let me elaborate on this point.

MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION POSTURE

The idea has taken hold in the United States that the best route to nuclear peace and security resides in a strategic posture in which we

and the Soviets maintain a capability to destroy a large fraction, say, one-quarter to one-half, of each other's population and cities and in which no attempt is made by either side to interfere with the assured destruction capability of the other. Such a posture is often called a "mutual assured destruction posture." It has the property that the obvious acronym for it—MAD—provides at once the appropriate description for it, that is, a "mutual assured destruction" posture as a goal is almost literally mad.

If technology and international politics provided absolutely no alternative, one might reluctantly accept a MAD posture. But to think of it as desirable, for instance, as a clearly preferred goal of our arms control negotiations, as the proposed ABM Treaty automatically assumes, is bizarre.

As some of you probably know, I have often suggested a reduction-to-absurdity proof of the madness of MAD. If a MAD posture were genuinely desirable, we and the Soviets could have an arms control agreement to mine each other's cities. The Soviets could plant large thermonuclear explosives under, say, the first 100 American cities, and we could do the same there. This arrangement would save most of the present troubles and costs of ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers and so on and, of course, would make any and all active defense systems, such as ABM and air defense, completely irrelevant, at least as far as Soviet-American confrontations were concerned. And yet despite the obvious technical effectiveness of a mined-city posture for implementing MAD, I suspect that few of you would care to sell such a program to your constituents.

Your constituents would have the right reaction. Some would describe the reaction as naive or unsophisticated; however, it would in fact represent the wisdom of rejecting a wholly unproved theory when it leads to absurd consequences.

The main theory involved is that a MAD posture is the best way to protect against nuclear war altogether. This theory is reflected in the preamble to the proposed ABM Treaty and in the Letter of Submittal of June 10, 1972, from Secretary of State Rogers: "Effective limits on antiballistic missile systems . . . will decrease the risk of outbreak of nuclear war . . ."

There is, of course, not the slightest shred of evidence in support of this idea. Many nuclear strategists, including those who have achieved the greatest prominence in the field, do not believe it is true. The prevalent popularity of this theory can only be described as a fashion. Yet the government is apparently prepared to gamble that the theory is true and thereby commit us to a MAD posture indefinitely.

The treaty itself contains evidence that the theory is little more than a fashion. If, as is usually argued in support of the theory, stability resides in high hostage levels and the interposition of ABM on both sides would be destabilizing because of reducing those levels, it should be similarly destabilizing if the hostage levels were reduced by direct cuts in offensive force levels. But the same treaty preamble which extols limits on ABM systems, without regard to their technical characteristics, including effectiveness, also has the parties "Declaring their intention . . . to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament . . ." This is something less than consistency.

It is possible to make a technical case—I personally do not believe it—that it would be unwise to use currently available ABM technology in conjunction with cuts in offensive forces to begin to move away from a MAD posture. However, there is no such technical argument to be made about all possible future systems of missile defense, of whatever effectiveness and other characteristics, yet all future systems are prohibited by the treaty.

In consequence of both my work with Hudson Institute and my occasional consulting work for the government, I have been close enough to the analyses of American positions for the SALT to know what major alternatives and avenues have been considered and examined within the government. I should like to state flatly for the record that no serious consideration has been given to possible alternatives to a MAD posture.

INTERIM AGREEMENT ALLOWS SOVIETS GREATER CAPABILITY THAN U.S.

Passing now to the Interim Agreement, the basic intention of this is to establish the beginning of a freeze on strategic offensive forces. The trouble is simply that it is a bad beginning, not that the objective itself is unwise. On many occasions in the past, both in published articles and in lectures, I have urged a freeze of some kind for offensive forces. However, I never supposed that the United States would formally accept ceilings that, in every particular controlled by the agreement, allowed the Soviets substantially greater capability than that permitted the United States.

The Interim Agreement does exactly that. It may be that, in some particulars not controlled by the agreement, such as numbers of warheads, the United States still retains some kind of lead; however, under the terms of the agreement it is open to the Soviets to close the leads that we have, and then some, while it is not open to us to close the Soviet leads.

The payload capacity, or throw weight as it is ofted called, permitted the Soviets in their ICBM and SLBM forces is perhaps four times ours. The throw weight of a strategic force is unquestionably the most important single parameter for characterizing the potential of that force, even though other parameters—notably the number, yield and accuracy of warheads that can be delivered—are of more immediate importance. If the Soviets choose to do so, they can deploy as many warheads per ton of throw weight as we can and since they are permitted roughly four times as many tons, they can ultimately deploy roughly four times as many warheads as we. They may not choose to do so; they may choose some other way of using their payload, but the important fact is we have signed an agreement that says, in effect, that we have not only become but are willing to remain the second nuclear power.

The real Administration argument for the Interim Agreement is that it will limit the extent to which the Soviets will achieve strategic-force lead more reliably than any other approach in sight. But that Soviet advantage, by any reasonable assessment, is already real, and may well become greater as the Soviets deploy MIRVs and otherwise upgrade their permitted force in the coming years. The political consequences of this superiority, or more precisely of the general public recognition of it, are several, and all bad.

First, it will reinforce and confirm previously established Soviet images and expectations of a declining American role in world affairs. Within the past two years Soviet commentators on the American scene have exhibited increasing contempt for the United States, its power and its role in international affairs. For instance, Soviet analysts often made such remarks as "The United States must be adjusting itself, in the manner of the United Kingdom at the end of World War II, to its loss of power and influence in the world." The Soviets, correspondingly, think of themselves as very much as the ascendant. These Soviet attitudes and expectations will be reflected in their peacetime bargaining and will increase their aggressiveness in possible crisis confrontations.

Second, the Agreement and the Soviet lead it establishes will do much to establish an image of American inferiority in American governmental circles. The effects of this, of course, will be the obverse of those to be expected from the attitudes in the Soviet bureaucracy, though probably less marked in degree.

Third, the new imbalance of power will become established in the minds of our allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives. To use the current jargon, the Interim Agreement will contribute to "Finlandizing" tendencies in the policies of our allies.

Fourth, enshrining this degree of Soviet superiority as a substantially permanent thing will almost certainly have adverse consequences in any serious crisis that may develop. For instance, we could not reasonably expect as favorable an outcome in a replay of the Cuban missile crisis. I might remark parenthetically, the success of that outcome did not reside so much in the immediate outcome in Cuba as that the Soviets were deterred from counterescalating in Turkey or, especially, in Berlin, a fact that apostles of parity find convenient to ignore.

It is in a certain sense true that different degrees of superiority can in the last analysis translated only into different degrees of victory that would in any event be Pyrrhic. However, this often repeated observation conveniently ignores the fact that most political leaders and many military leaders are not academic strategists; these leaders not only count weapons, they tend to think in terms of who will come out ahead and their perhaps simplistic attitudes about these matters will influence their expectations, demands and flexibility in a crisis, other things, such as the guts and the political support of the leaders on the scene, being equal. Therefore, a commitment to a position of strategic disadvantage is, at least in some statistical sense, an invitation to be pushed around in the next crisis. The Soviets understand this very well.

In a press conference in Moscow on the occasion of the signing of these agreements, Henry Kissinger repeatedly made the point that the terms of the Interim Agreement were influenced by the fact that the Soviets had ongoing ICBM and SLBM construction programs while we did not. As he put it on one occasion, it was not the most brilliant bargaining position he would recommend people to find themselves in. He could not reasonably have made the point in that setting that if the American government found itself in that uncom-

fortable position, the responsibility must rest with the American government; but I can, and do, make that point here: There has been a collective failure.

REJECTION OF AGREEMENTS RECOMMENDED

This brings me to the final point of whether to recommend acceptance or rejection of these agreements.

The argument can reasonably be made that although both agreements represent important failures, the best course of action in view of current political realities is simply to accept them.

I am sympathetic to this argument. I also doubt very much whether any recommendation of mine will alter the expected acceptance of these agreements. But it seems appropriate that someone should say, unambiguously and on the record, that both of these agreements are wrong, that the United States ought not to be in the position these agreements will leave us in, and that the country would ultimately be best off by rejecting them both and then doing what is right. I hereby take this position.

I shall be pleased to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brennan. We will withhold questions until we have completed the direct statements.

(Biographical sketch of Dr. Donald G. Brennan follows:)

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF DONALD G. BRENNAN

Donald G. Brennan is a mathematician and student of national security problems. His special interests are in advanced military policy, alliance relationships in Europe, and selected areas of arms control, such as policy issues relating to ballistic missile defense.

Prior to joining Hudson Institute, of which he was President from July, 1962 until May, 1964 and where he now conducts research studies. Dr. Brennan worked for nine years as a research mathematician and communication theorist at Lincoln Laboratory of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a research laboratory engaged in technical studies for the Government. In addition to his technical research there, he devoted substantial time to studies of arms control and national security problems.

Dr. Brennan's serious interest in arms control began in 1957, when he was organizer of a group that led to the 1958 Summer Study on Arms Control held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, under the auspices of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He was an organizer and co-director of the 1960 Summer Study on Arms Control, again held in Cambridge under American Academy auspices. He was a member of the Academy's Committee on International Studies of Arms Control in 1961–66, serving as its chairman in 1961–62, and has been a frequent participant in international conferences relating to arms control.

Dr. Brennan has served as a consultant to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Executive Office of the President, and to several research organizations. He is editor of the well-known anthology, *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security* (New York, George Braziller, 1961), sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and guest editor of its predecessor, the special (Fall 1960) issue of *Daedalus* on "Arms Control." He has edited studies of future military technology and several publications on arms control. He has contributed articles on arms control to a number of journals and books, and has lectured on national security subjects at many universities, the U.S. National, Air, and Naval War Colleges, The Canadian National Defense College, and defense study centers in London, Bonn, Paris, and Oslo, among others, and has given seminars on arms control in Moscow. He is a frequent witness at Congressional hearings concerned with national security affairs.

Born in 1926 in Waterbury, Connecticut, Dr. Brennan received the B.S. (1955) and Ph.D. (1959) degrees in mathematics from Massachusetts Institute of Tech-

nology, where he was a Gerard Swope Fellow and received other graduate and undergraduate prizes and awards. Prior to entering M.I.T., he was engaged in radio engineering as a registered professional engineer in the State of Connecticut. He is a Senior Member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers and a member of Sigma Xi, the American Mathematical Society, The Council on Foreign Relations, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He was a member of the President's National Citizens' Commission on International Cooperation Year in 1965.

Senator SPARKMAN. Next, Dr. Stanley Hoffmann, Professor of Government at Harvard University. Mr. Hoffmann, we shall be very glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF STANLEY HOFFMANN, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT; CHAIRMAN, WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES; FACULTY MEMBER OF THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. HOFFMANN. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am happy to be here and to be able to testify on this subject.

For many years both national security and global peace have been assured by what has been called the "balance of terror" between the superpowers. This balance has depended and still depends on two certainties: the certainty of not being able to destroy in a first strike the enemy's retaliatory force, and the certainty—which does not appear so mad to me—of being able to inflict intolerable destruction on the enemy in a second strike if he chooses to unleash nuclear war.

SAL AGREEMENTS CONTRIBUTION TO STABILITY OF DETERRENCE

Examined in and for themselves, the SAL agreements must be hailed as an important contribution to the stability of deterrence. The curbing of ABM systems insures that one's population will remain the enemy's hostage and removes any incentive to a first strike. As for the limitation on offensive systems, a ceiling is placed on the development and modernization of land-based missiles, that is, those which are now most vulnerable to a first strike; and while the ceiling on the total number of nuclear submarines and SLBM launchers acknowledges the wastefulness of unlimited expansion, the fact that the interim agreement on offensive arms does not affect bombers and allows both for the modernization and replacement of existing submarines and for the replacement of older ICBMs by SLBM launchers, guarantees the survival of the retaliatory force.

To be sure, the Soviet Union, under those agreements, is entitled to a higher number of launchers than the United States, but we must take into account—and I am pretty sure that our allies are—first, our current superiority in MIRV and bombers, unregulated by these accords and, secondly, the fact that at so high a level of overkill, and as long as the survival of one's retaliatory force is assured, even a smaller number of ICBM and SLBM launchers fully protects national security and preserves the credibility of one's alliances.

FUTURE OF STRATEGIC BALANCE

We must, however, take a dynamic look at these agreements and discuss not only their merits but also the future. It is here that the

Senate can and should have a considerable impact in orienting American policy.

There are two ways of looking at the future of the strategic balance: One can envisage a stable balance achieved through a combination of escalating arms races and joint superpower regulation limiting the quantitative and qualitative expansion whenever a degree of sufficiency or abundance is reached with respect to a given weapons system. In this way, stability would be safeguarded and the most delirious excesses would be curbed. But the strategic arms race would, in effect, go on; its costs would increase and the capacity to overkill would reach even more ludicrous proportions. Deterring the unthinkable and accumulating the unusable would continue to be almost as senseless as the holocaust itself.

The alternative is to try to stabilize deterrence in such a way as to make unnecessary the breathless race that we have known for more than a quarter of a century and which merely condemns the two racers to keep running faster just in order to remain in place, with temporary pauses when the strain becomes too high. It always leaves the two runners at the end of each phase in the same mutual relation but on a higher plateau of financial depletion and human absurdity. In effect, each side is a hostage of the other's calculations; both are driven by their interacting fears and their competing programs. I would like to see the alternative to such a mad momentum become the policy of the United States. It raises two sets of questions:

SUBSTANCE OF LIMITATIONS

The first concerns the substance of limitations. Obviously, the main objective should be a much more complete limitation of offensive systems. This means, on the one hand, quantitative curbs—on the numbers and types of bombers, whose vulnerability to a first strike is real, and whose effectiveness in a first strike is dubious; on the states' right to modernize and replace submarines; and one should also envisage a gradual reduction and ultimate dismantling of fixed ICBM systems.

On the other hand, the qualitative arms race must be brought under control. This means limiting the deployment of MIRV, which, as Mr. Warnke has already pointed out, is much less necessary now that ABM is being curbed, and also limiting the development of antisubmarine warfare devices.

There are serious problems here. Concerning MIRV, we may soon be so far head that a freeze would be unacceptable to the USSR; whereas, if we wait until their technology has caught up with ours, they may then achieve a superiority in overall deliverable warheads that might be, politically if not strategically, intolerable to us; and there is the vexed question of inspection. But these obstacles should also be incentives. Limits on the number of missile test firings and a comprehensive test ban treaty could be important steps.

As for defensive systems, a question can already be raised about the need to build an ABM network to protect Washington; Moscow may want to be defended against a Chinese attack, but we do not face a comparable theat.

QUESTION OF TACTICS

The second question is one of tactics. It has been raised in different terms but in the same spirit by Secretary Laird and by President Nixon. Both have clearly chosen what I have called the first alternatives and have asked the Congress to approve new offensive weapons programs concerning bombers and submarines. They argue that without these programs the USSR "will within a matter of a very limited time be substantially ahead of the U.S. over all", which assumes that the Soviets will catch up with us in MIRV. They also argue that without these programs the USSR will have no incentive to accept desirable limitations, quantitative and qualitative, on offensive weapons. How impressive are these arguments?

In my opinion, they are highly debatable.

PREEMPTIVE ESCALATION

The whole history of the postwar arms race is one of, so to speak, preemptive escalation based on a worst-case hypothesis which assumes the adversary's capacity and will to go ahead full spead. This escalation then turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy, for it serves as an incentive to the adversary's own escalation and provides him with the pre-assumed will, which he may not have had at the start.

Our massive nuclear expansion in ICBM and nuclear submarines, following the myth of the missile gap, may have pushed Khrushchev into the gamble of the Cuban missiles adventure. Both our drive and his debacle led to the formidable Soviet effort which started in the mid-60's and resulted in their exceeding our arsenal in numbers of launchers and in payloads. This Soviet effort, in turn, was used as an argument for the Safeguard system, while both the widely exaggerated development of Soviet ABMs to protect major cities and the expansion of the Soviet ICBM force were used as arguments for our proceeding full speed ahead with the deployment of MIRV.

Today, the Trident is described as a hedge against Soviet eventual success in antisubmarine warfare, and the B–1 bomber, no longer presentable as a resource against an effective extensive Soviet ABM network, is hailed as a hedge in case of enemy destruction of our ICBMs, or of insufficient accuracy of our SLBMs. In the past, when it became apparent that each new program only raised the balance of terror to a higher plateau, it also became fashionable to describe the program as a bargaining chip toward an agreement to stabilize the race. Today, the first major agreement is, in effect, presented as an incentive to climb higher, with the new climb hailed as a bargaining chip toward a no doubt temporary halt at an even more dizzying altitude.

BARGAINING TACTICS

If we examine more closely the President's present arguments, we find that the prospect of overall Soviet superiority is, to say the least premature. While Russia's determination to go ahead in the areas not controlled by the SALT accords poses a problem, it does not impose our own escalation as the only possible answer. The problem is precisely how to curb the race which SALT merely channels, not how to continue

it. Thus, the decisive issue is that of bargaining tactics. Here, the Administration's arguments are not persuasive.

An agreement on ABM was reached, less because we met Russia's challenge and launched our own program, than because both sides recognized that the costs were out of proportion with the value of these systems.

The Interim Agreement on offensive weapons was reached even though we had no on-going ICBM program, and the Soviets, who resisted for a long time the inclusion of nuclear submarines and SLBM into the agreement, gave in even though we have not launched Trident yet. To be sure, incentives to agreements are necessary, but the threat of launching a major program if no agreement is reached, coming from a nation that is in so many respects still ahead in sophisticated technology and qualitative performance, can be just as powerful, and far more effective, in getting results at a lower level of absurdity than actual escalation. Otherwise, we shall never break out of the vicious circle which consists of launching a dubious program in order later to be able to claim as a political breakthrough and as a victory of common sense an agreement that merely restricts the further waste of resources on such a program.

AREAS CURBED IN SALT

The President has correctly pointed out that the new offensive weapon programs were recommended prior to SALT. This throws a rather intriguing light on SALT. We have obtained from the Russians curbs in areas, including the SS–9, where they, not we, have ongoing programs and where had they refused limitations, we could not have caught up with them during the next five years. But we have avoided curbs in the areas where we wanted to expand anyhow, so as to stay ahead of them. This is quite a competitive achievement, but it suggests not so much the triumph of the bargaining-chip theory—after all, our biggest chip is the MIRV, which remains unregulated—as the certainty that the Soviets will indeed feel that they have to catch up with us in all the areas, including MIRV, that are left open in the race.

ARMS RACE DECISIONS POLITICAL

The arms race raises, of course, purely military questions; but the process of mutual reactions does not account for the entire story. The decisions are also political in two senses: (1) they are based on an overall political conception of the international system; and (2) they correspond to specific political interests and objectives.

The logic of the stratetgic arms race correponds to a view according to which, in the realm of nuclear weapons as in foreign policy, the best that can be hoped for between the superpowers is regulated competition. Through regulation, explicit or tacit, direct confrontations as well as strategic unilateral breakthroughs would be avoided, but the contest for influence and the spirit of rivalry would go on. I have no doubt that in the realm of diplomacy this is indeed correct. But I do not think that we are doomed to this bleak future in the strategic arms race, which has a life of its own. These weapons are not usable for political purposes; they are deterrents, that is, they insure

that the rivalry in the field will both persist and be relatively safe for global peace. This means on the one hand that unless one side achieves so decisive a breakthrough as to destroy one or both of the bases of stable deterrence described above, a relative overall superiority in numbers of launchers or warheads, or the inevitable asymmetries between two different nuclear arsenals cannot, as the President claims, "be an open invitation . . . for more potential aggression in the world." A margin of nuclear superiority is not convertible into political gains at lower, that is, nonnuclear, that is, daily, levels of conflict.

This means, on the other hand, that a separation between levels could be firmly sought and established so that, at the nuclear level, regulated contest could be turned into actual cooperation, channeled escalation into gradual deescalation and the race toward qualitative progress into a beginning of disarmament. Not an inch of additional security is gained by pursuing the contest here, and enormous resources are wasted.

To be sure, it takes two to achieve such a change; but it seems to me impossible to expect the Soviets to initiate it as long as we are ahead in the race. It is the leading power's responsibility to make the shift through its acts and in its planning. Thus, if we want to curb the deployment of MIRV, we probably ought to slow down or suspend ours so as to incite the Soviets to an agreement on terms acceptable to them.

One may legitimately ask, what if the Soviets spurn such offers, and use our good will as a springboard? My reply is that it is precisely our margin of superiority and our skills in research and development which allow us to gamble in the way I have advocated. Should the gamble get us nowhere, we will still be able to return to the policy of competitive escalation without any loss in security, and with a better perspective from which to decide whether the new weapons systems we need are those the President recommends today and which assume that bigger is better.

PROBLEMS WHICH SALT HAS BARELY AFFECTED

Insofar as specific political interests and goals in various parts of the world are concerned, a look at the future shows a variety of problems which SALT has barely affected.

One is that vexing perennial, nuclear proliferation. While it would be wrong to argue that there is a direct connection between superpower agreements curbing the strategic race and some lesser powers' inclination to "go nuclear," there is no doubt that the very stability of the strategic balance between the U.S and the USSR, with or without SALT, raises questions among America's allies about U.S. willingness to suffer nuclear devastation for their protection. The nuclear stalemate may also serve as an excuse and incentive for other nations, involved or uninvolved in the superpowers' contest, to go nuclear in order to gain prestige or to establish their regional preponderance; but this problem can only be solved case by case, and in some instances, such as Japan, the solution may lie in making profitable alternatives to rearmament available to the country in question. In other instances, the solution may lie in U.S.-Soviet cooperation, taking the form of joint

guarantees. Such cooperation, in turn, depends on the shift of policy which I have suggested before.

Another problem of particular interest to me is that of European security. SALT, which excluded from its scope America's forward-based system in Western Europe and Soviet MCBMs aimed at Western Europe, has not disturbed our European allies whom we have kept well informed. But a SALT II that would deal with these two sets of weapon systems above our allies' heads would be politically diastrous, even if it left the overall strategic balance in Europe intact. Indeed, these systems should be discussed in a different arena—the MBFR negotiation that was called for by the Moscow summit communique.

A few points can be made, which are of general validity. What is at stake here is not the capacity of the U.S. to deter a most improbable Soviet attack in Europe, but its will to keep on playing a deterring role. What matters ultimately in this respect is not the number of U.S. troops but the maintenance of a more than token U.S. presence and the conviction of our allies about our will and intentions. What is important is not a perfect equilibrium of conventional and tactical nuclear forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. What the West Europeans fear is not Soviet military occupation but the political influence of the USSR based on Russia's military might.

What matters in this respect is that Western Europe, which is not yet a coherent entity, should not feel left alone facing Moscow, and be in no way deprived, at the coming European Security Conference and in the MBFR forum, of the right to transform the EEC into a political and military community in the future. In other words, political self-confidence and economic strength are the best recipes against the so-called Finlandization or Austrianization of Western Europe, and these, in turn, depend on U.S. diplomatic skill and sense of purpose as much as on wise military policies.

RELATION OF MILITARY POWER TO POLITICAL EFFECTIVENESS

A final remark of general importance:

Insofar as the major powers of the world are concerned, the political contest between them will be one for influence rather than of arms. While weapons shall remain essential both as a deterrent and as an ingredient of influence abroad, we are now in a world in which the relation of military power to political effectiveness is far more complex and twisted than ever before, and I have a feeling that political leaders understand this even better than some strategic experts. It is Western Europe's continuing identity crisis, its lack of a collective political purpose, not military weakness, which limits its influence in international affairs, despite huge economic strength. Japan's relatively small impact on world politics has resulted from a deliberate political choice, not from military atrophy; indeed, Japan's huge economic impact was largely made possible by the limitation of defense costs. Militarily, small powers can be highly effective if they have the necessary will, cohesion and outside support, as Israel or North Vietnam have shown. Almost unlimited might can fail to bring either victory or compromise, as the U.S. is still demonstrating in Vietnam, the area which requires the most drastic change in U.S. policy, along with the strategic realm we have discussed here.

Stable deterrence provides both the framework within which disputes between nations will persist, and the reason why conflicts are not only unlikely to lead to global war but also likely to result in an increasing political fragmentation of the globe. This means, on the one hand, that disputes will have to be dealt with on their merits, and that great powers, acting together or balancing one another, do not have any more the power to impose their solutions.

But, on the other hand, the leading states still have a double capacity to make matters worse and it is to that formidable power for evil that we should address ourselves. One is the capacity to feed and escalate local conflicts through competitive supplies of arms; the other is the capacity to perpetuate an overall climate of competitive absurdity, in full contradiction with any effort to bring about a moderate international system through the strategic arms race. Thank you.

(Mr. Hoffmann's prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STANLEY HOFFMANN, PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, CHAIRMAN OF WEST EUROPEAN STUDIES, AND FACULTY MEMBER OF THE CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

1. For many years, both national security and global peace have been assured by what has been called either the "balance of terror" or, "stable deterrence" between the two superpowers. This balance depends on two certainties: the certainty of not being able to destroy, in a first strike, the enemy's retaliatory force; the certainty of being able to inflict intolerable destruction on the enemy in a second strike, if he chooses to unleash nuclear war.

In recent years, the stability of this balance appeared endangered, on the one hand by the development of offensive missiles with greater accuracy and bigger payloads, as well as by the deployment of the MIRV, on the other by the construction of ABM systems. The threat to the second certainty, due to the ABM, was greater than the threat to the first, for even though MIRV and new missiles may raise doubts about the capacity of land-based missiles to survive a first strike, they have not affected the capacity of the two other components of the strategic nuclear force: submarines and (to a lesser extent) bombers, to survive one. But the balance of terror requires both the absence of a first strike disarming capability, and the exposure of populations to attack.

Examined in and for themselves, the SALT agreements must be hailed as an important contribution to the stability of deterrence. The curbing of ABM systems insures that one's population will remain the enemy's hostage and removes any incentive to a first strike. As for the limitation on offensive systems, a ceiling is placed on the development and modernization of land-based missiles, i.e., those which are now most vulnerable to a first strike; and while the ceiling on the total number of nuclear submarines and SLBM launchers acknowledges the wastefulness of unlimited expansion, the fact that the interim agreement on offensive arms does not affect bombers and allows both for the modernization and replacement of existing submarines, and for the replacement of older ICBM by SLBM launchers, guarantees the survival of the retaliatory force.

To be sure, the Soviet Union, under those agreements, is entitled to a higher number of launchers than the United States. But we must take into account, first our current superiority in MIRV and bombers, unregulated by these accords, and, secondly, the fact that at so high a level of overkill, and as long as the survival of one's retaliatory force is assured, even a smaller number of ICBM and SLBM launchers fully protects national security and preserves the credibility of one's alliances.

2. We must, however, take a dynamic look at these agreements, and discuss not only their merits, but the future. It is here that the Senate can and should have a considerable impact in orienting American policy.

There are two ways of looking at the future of the strategic balance. One can envisage a stable balance achieved through a combination of escalating arms races, and joint superpower regulation limiting the quantitative and qualitative expansion whenever a degree of "sufficiency" or abundance is reached with respect to a given weapons system. In this way, stability, as defined above, would be safeguarded, and the most delirious excesses would be curbed. But the

strategic arms race would, in effect, go on, its costs would increase, and the capacity to overkill would reach even more ludicrous proportions. Deterring the unthinkable and accumulating the unusable would continue to be almost as senseless as the holocaust itself. The alternative is to try to stabilize deterrence in such a way as to make unnecessary the breathless race that we have known for more than a quarter of a century. It condemns the two racers to keep running faster just in order to remain in place, with temporary pauses when the strain becomes too high. It always leaves the two runners, at the end of each phase, in the same mutual relation, but on a higher plateau of financial depletion and human absurdity. In effect, each side is a hostage of the other's calculations; both are driven by their interacting fears and their competing programs. I would like to see the alternative to such a "mad momentum" become the policy of the United States. It raises two sets of questions.

(a) The first concerns the substance of limitations. Obviously, the main objective should be a much more complete limitation of offensive systems. This means, on the one hand, quantitative curbs: on the numbers and types of bombers (whose vulnerability ot a first strike is real, and whose effectiveness in a first strike is dubious), on the states' right to modernize and replace submarines. A gradual reduction and ultimate dismantling of fixed ICBM systems should also be envisaged, given the growing vulnerability of these systems. On the other hand, the qualitative arms race must be brought under control. This means limiting the deployment of MIRV and the development of antisubmarine warfare devices. Serious problems exist here: concerning MIRV, we may soon be so far ahead that a freeze would be unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., whereas if we wait until their technology has caught up with ours, they may then achieve a superiority in overall deliverable warheads that might be—politically, if not strategically—intolerable to us; and there is the vexed question of inspection. But these obstacles are also incentives. Limits on the number of missile test firings and a comprehensive test ban treaty could be important steps. As for defensive systems, a question can already be raised about the need to build an ABM network ot protect Washington; Moscow may want to be defended against a Chinese attack, but we do not face a comparable threat.

(b) The second question is one of tactics. It has been raised, in different terms but in the same spirit, by Secretary Laird and by President Nixon. Both have clearly chosen what I have called the first alternative, and have asked the Congress to approve new offensive weapons programs concerning bombers and submarines. They argue that without these programs the U.S.S.R. "will within a matter of a very limited time be substantially ahead of the U.S. overall"—which assumes that the Soviets will catch up with us in MIRV. They also argue that without these programs the U.S.S.R. will have no incentive to accept desirable limitations, quantitative and qualitative, on offensive weapons. How impressive are these arguments?

3. In my opinion, they are highly debatable.

(a) The whole history of the postwar arms race is one of, so to speak, preemptive escalation, based on a "worst case" hypothesis which assumes the adversary's capacity and will to go ahead full speed. This escalation then turns into a self-fulfilling prophecy, for it serves as an incentive to the adversary's own escalation and provides him with the pre-assumed will, which he may not have had at the start. Our massive nuclear expansion in ICBM and nuclear submarines, following the myth of the missile gap, may have pushed Khrushchev into the gamble of the Cuban missiles adventure. Both our drive and his debacle led to the formidable Soviet effort which started in the mid sixties and resulted in their exceeding our arsenal in numbers of launchers and in payloads. This Soviet effort in turn was used as an argument for the Safeguard system, while both the (widely exaggerated) development of Soviet ABMs to protect major cities and the expansion of the Soviet ICBM force were used as arguments for our proceeding full speed ahead with the deployment of MIRV. Today, the Trident—a reply to a Soviet submarine expansion that was a reaction to ours—is described as a "hedge" against Soviet eventual success in antisubmarine warfare, and the B1 bomber—no longer presentable as a recourse against an effective, extensive Soviet ABM network—is hailed as a hedge in case of enemy destruction of our ICBMs, or of insufficient accuracy of our SLBMs. In the past, when it became apparent that each new program only raised the balance of terror to a higher plateau, it also became fashionable to describe the program as a "bargaining chip" toward an agreement to stabilize the race. Today, the first major agreement is, in effect, presented as an incentive to climb higher,

with the new climb hailed as a "bargaining chip" toward a no doubt temporary halt at an even more dizzying altitude.

(b) If we examine more closely the President's present arguments, we find that the prospect of overall Soviet superiority is, to say the least, premature. While Russia's determination to go ahead in the areas not controlled by the SALT accords poses a problem, it does not impose our own escalation as the only possible answer. The problem is precisely how to curb the race which SALT merely channels, not how to continue it. Thus, the decisive issue is that of bargaining tactics. Here, the Administration's arguments are not persuasive. An agreement on ABM was reached, less because we met Russia's challenge and launched our own program, than because both sides recognized that the costs were out of proportion with the value of these systems. The interim agreement on offensive weapons was reached even though we had no on-going ICBM program; and the Soviets, who resisted for a long time the inclusion of nuclear submarines and SLBM into the agreement, gave in even though we have not launched Trident yet. To be sure, incentives to agreements are necessary, but the threat of launching a major program if no agreement is reached, coming from a nation that is in so many respects still ahead in sophisticated technology and qualitative performance, can be just as powerful, and far more effective in getting results at a lower level of absurdity, than actual escalation. Otherwise, we shall never break out of the vicious circle which consists of launching a program of dubious utility, in order later to be able to claim as a political breakthrough and as a victory of common sense an agreement that merely restricts the further waste of resources on such a program. While we negotiate a limitation of the "bargaining chips", with all their formidable complexity, we fail to concentrate on all the other aspects of the arms race that could be limited also.

(c) The President has correctly pointed out that the new offensive weapons programs were recommended prior to SALT. This throws a rather intriguing light on SALT. We have obtained from the Russians curbs in areas where they, not we, have on-going programs (ICBMs, submarines)—and where, had they refused limitations, we could not have caught up with them during the next five years. But we have avoided curbs in the areas where we wanted to expand anyhow so as to stay ahead of them (MIRV, bombers, Trident). This is quite a competitive achievement; but it suggests, not so much the triumph of the "bargaining chip" theory (after all, our biggest "chip" is the MIRV, which remains unregulated), as the certainty that the Soviets will indeed feel that they have to catch up with us in all the areas, including MIRV, that are left open in the race.

4. The arms race raises, of course, purely military questions. As I have indicated, each side's decisions on strategic programs have been largely shaped by the acts, and by the (rightly or wrongly) anticipated acts or assumed intentions of the other side. But this process of mutual reactions does not account for the entire story. The decisions are also political, in two senses: they are based on an overall political conception of the international system, and they correspond to specific political interests and objectives.

The logic of the strategic arms race corresponds to a view according to which, in the realm of nuclear weapons as in foreign policy, the best that can be hoped for between the superpowers is regulated competition. Through regulation (explicit or tacit), direct confrontations as well as strategic unilateral breakthroughs would be avoided, but the contest for influence and the spirit of rivalry would go on. I have no doubt that in the realm of diplomacy this is indeed correct (see my article, "Weighing the Balance of Power", in Foreign Affairs, July 1972). But I do not think that we are doomed to this bleak future in the strategic arms race, which has a life of its own. These weapons are not usable for political purposes; they are deterrents, i.e., they insure that the rivalry in the field will both persist and be relatively safe for global peace. This means, on the one hand, that unless one side achieves so decisive a breakthrough as to destroy one or both of the bases of stable deterrence described above, a relative "overall" superiority in numbers of launchers or warheads, or the inevitable asymmetries between two different nuclear arsenals cannot, as the President claims, "be an open invitation . . . for more potential aggression in the world". A margin of nuclear superiority is not convertible into political gains at lower, i.e., non-nuclear, i.e., daily, levels of conflict. This means, on the other hand, that a separation between levels could be firmly sought and established so that, at the nuclear level, regulated contest could be turned into actual cooperation, channeled escalation into gradual deescalation, and the race toward qualitative

"progress" into a beginning of disarmament. Not an inch of additional security is gained by pursuing the contest here, and enormous resources are wasted.

To be sure, it takes two to achieve such a change. But it seems to me impossible to expect the Soviets to initiate it, as long as we are ahead in the race. It is the leading power's responsibility to make the shift, through its acts and in its planning. (Thus, if we want to curb the deployment of MIRV, we probably ought to slow down or suspend ours so as to incite the Soviets to an agreement on terms acceptable to them). One may legitimately ask: what if the Soviets spurn such offers, and use our good will as a springboard? My reply is that it is precisely our margin of superiority and our skills in research and development which allow us to gamble in the way I have advocated. Should the gamble get us nowhere, we will still be able to return to the policy of competitive escalation without any loss in security—and with a better perspective from which to decide whether the new weapons system we need are those the President recommends today, and which assume that bigger is better.

5. Insofar as specific political interests and goals in various parts of the world are concerned, a look at the future shows a variety of problems which SALT has barely affected.

(a) One is the vexing perennial, nuclear proliferation. While it would be wrong to argue that there is a direct connection between superpower agreements curbing the strategic race, and some lesser powers' inclination to "go nuclear", there is no doubt that the very stability of the strategic balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (with or without SALT) raises questions among America's allies about U.S. willingness to suffer nuclear devastation for their protection. The nuclear statement may also serve as an excuse and incentive for other nations, involved or uninvolved in the superpowers' contest, to go nuclear in order to gain prestige or to establish their regional preponderance. This problem will have to be solved case by case. In some instances (such as Japan), the solution may lie in making profitable alternatives to rearmament available to the country in question. In other instances, the solution may lie in U.S.-Soviet cooperation, taking the form of joint guarantees either to the states on the threshold of nuclear power or to the potential victims of these states. Such cooperation in turn depends on the shift of policy advocated above.

(b) Another problem, of particular interest to this witness, is that of European security. SALT, which excluded from its scope America's forward-based systems in Western Europe and Soviet MCBMs aimed at Western Europe, has not disturbed our European allies, whom we have kept well-informed. But a "SALT II" that would deal with these two sets of weapons systems above our allies' heads would be politically disastrous, even if it left the overall strategic balance in Europe intact. Indeed, these systems should be discussed in a different arena: the MBFR negotiation that was called for by the Moscow summit communiqué. This is not the time and place to discuss the numerous problems of MBFR, but a few points can be made, which are of general validity. What is at stake here is not the capacity of the U.S. to deter a most improbable Soviet attack in Europe, but its will to keep on playing a deterring role; what matters ultimately in this respect is not the number of U.S. troops, but the maintenance of a more-than-token U.S. presence, and the conviction of our allies about our will and intentions. What is important is not a perfect equilibrium of conventional and tactical nuclear forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. What the West Europeans fear is not Soviet military occupation, but the political influence of the U.S.S.R., based on Russia's military might. What matters in this respect is that Western Europe, which is not yet a coherent entity, should not feel left alone facing Moscow, and be in no way deprived, at the coming European Security Conference and in the MBFR forum, of the right to transform the E.E.C. into a political and military community in the future. In other words, political self-confidence and economic strength are the best recipes against the so-called "finlandization" (or austrianization) of Western Europe, and these in turn depend on U.S. diplomatic skill and sense of purpose as much as on wise military policies.

6. Insofar as the major powers of the world are concerned, the political contest between them will be one for influence, rather than of arms. While weapons shall remain essential both as a deterrent, and as an ingredient of influence abroad, we are now in a world in which the relation of military power to politi-

cal effectiveness is far more complex and twisted than ever before. It is Western Europe's continuing identity crisis, its lack of a collective political purposes, not military weakness which limits its influence in international affairs, despite huge economic strength. Japan's relatively small impact on world politics has resulted from a deliberate political choice, not from military atrophy: indeed, Japan's huge economic impact was largely made possible by the limitation of defense costs. Militarily, small powers can be highly effective, if they have the necessary will, cohesion and outside supports, as Israel or North Vietnam have shown. Almost unlimited might can fail to bring either victory or compromise, as the U.S. is still demonstrating in Vietnam—the area which requires the most drastic change in U.S. policy, along with the strategic realm discussed here. Stable deterrence provides both the framework within which disputes between nations will persist, and the reason why conflicts are not only unlikely to lead to global war, but likely to result in an increasing political fragmentation of the globe. This means, on the one hand, that disputes will have to be dealt with on their merits, and that great powers, acting together or balancing one another, do not have any more the power to impose their solutions. But on the other hand, the leading states still have a double capacity to make matters worse, and it is to that formidable power for evil that we should address ourselves. One is the capacity to feed and escalate local conflicts through competitive supplies of arms, the other is the capacity to perpetuate an overall climate of competitive absurdity—in full contradiction with any effort to bring about a moderate international system—through the strategic arms race.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

Next we will have Mr. Jerome H. Kahan, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Before you start, let me say there is coming up very shortly a vote on the Interior Appropriations bill. When that vote comes, we can either recess or, if one of you gentlemen would be willing to do it, leave immediately and vote and come back and the others of us leave on the Interior Appropriations bill. When that vote comes, we can recess; whichever you desire.

All right, Mr. Kahan.

STATEMENT OF JEROME H. KAHAN, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. KAHAN. Senator Sparkman and Members of the Committee, I am privileged to appear before you to testify on the subject of strategic arms limitations.

In the interest of time, I will summarize the more important points of my testimony and request that the full statement be entered in the record.

Senator SPARKMAN. That will be done.

ARTICLE: "LIMITED AGREEMENTS AND LONG-TERM STABILITY"

Mr. KAHAN. Many of the ideas and analyses I will present are based upon an article of mine entitled "Limited Agreements and Long-term Stability," appearing in the Spring, 1972 issue of the Stanford Journal of International Studies. I request permission for this article to appear in the appendix of the published record of these hearings.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very well, it will be included in the appendix. (See appendix.)

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Mr. KAHAN. For the information of the committee, before joining the Foreign Policy Division at Brookings, I served on the staff of

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the International Security Affairs Division of the Department of Defense. The views I will express today, of course, are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Brookings Institution or organizations supporting its research.

SENATE SUPPORT OF TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT URGED

The signing of the Moscow strategic arms limitation accords represents a major milestone in bringing the nuclear competition under control. The agreements will enhance both sides' security primarily by placing low limits on ABM systems and also by setting ceilings on offensive missile forces. But apart from the specific details of the accords, the mere fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were able to negotiate agreements affecting weapon systems so central to their security is itself an unprecedented political event with positive significance for U.S.-Soviet relations and benefits for all nations. For these reasons, I would urge Senate support of both the Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

QUESTIONS ADDRESSED BY WITNESS

In outlining my views on the SALT accords, I will address three related but relatively distinct questions:

First, why are the Moscow agreements in the net interest of the United States. Second, how might both sides maintain long-term stability through further negotiations and discussions? Third, what guidelines should the United States follow in managing its strategic policies under the initial SALT accords while working toward further limitations?

ABM LIMITATIONS MOST IMPORTANT BENEFIT OF AGREEMENTS

Without doubt, the single most important benefit of the Moscow agreements can be found in the ABM limitations. More than any other strategic weapon, defensive systems capable of protecting populations against missile attacks have the potential of stimulating an increase in the level of offensive armaments and, beyond that, of creating serious instabilities.

With stringent limits placed on ABMs by the SALT Treaty, the requirements for the United States and the Soviet Union to improve or enlarge their offensive forces should diminish. The prospect of large ABM deployments by the other side would no longer dominate each nation's defense planning, and variations in offensive force levels and uncertainties over qualitative improvements should have less significance.

In a remarkable doctrinal shift, the Soviet Union, in the context of SALT, adopted the view that ABMs are, in fact, destabilizing and should be limited to very low levels. The USSR's implicit acceptance of the principle of deterrence through the threat of reprisal should make U.S. leaders feel more certain that a secure nuclear relationship with the Kremlin can be maintained.

REASONS FOR NEGOTIATING OFFENSIVE MISSILE LIMITATIONS

There are also important reasons for negotiating offensive missile limitations. From the U.S. viewpoint, it would be useful to limit for number of Soviet strategic missiles, even though MIRVs are not banned under the Interim Agreement. Forestalling further deployment of large ICBMs of the SS–9 type could delay the date by which the Soviet Union might develop a counterforce MIRV capacity, thereby increasing the life expectancy of our Minuteman force. And limiting the number of Soviet SLBMs could diminish the threat to U.S. air bases and, over the long term, enable American planners to take more effective countermeasures to preserve our bomber deterrent.

Moving beyond strict military calculations, however, the offensive limitations negotiated at SALT can have considerable value.

Administration officials have justified acceptance of the USSR's 50 percent advantage in numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs under the Interim Agreement by pointing to our undisputed lead in long-range bomber capabilities, numbers of warheads, and overall force quality. This line of reasoning is valid.

Of crucial significance is our advantage in MIRV technology which will enable us to retain an overwhelming superiority in deterrent power through the 1970s. Even if the Soviets managed to deploy MIRVs on their large ICBMs within the next five years they could not match our lead in the far more important area of MIRVed sea-based missiles of the Poseidon type. Indeed, from the perspective of a Soviet "conservative planner," the Interim Agreement, which permits the U.S. to exploit its technological edge, does not limit U.S. long-range bomber capabilities or forward-based nuclear systems, which could be as placing the USSR in an extremely disadvantageous strategic position.

On the other hand, if no constraints were placed on Soviet offensive forces, the USSR might well continue to deploy ICBMs and SLBMs at the current rate for the next five years. During this period, U.S. leaders would undoubtedly feel increasingly uncomfortable if the Soviets showed signs of building toward a level of perhaps 2,000 ICBMs and over 1,200 SLBMs deployed on 80 modern nuclear-powered submarines. U.S. officials in any Administration would feel the pressure to build additional strategic offensive forces in order to counter the Soviets' overriding numerical missile advantage—even if such actions were not necessitated by strict military calculations.

Faced with expanding Soviet programs, the U.S. would almost surely react by producing a substantial number of new generation offensive systems and constructing ABM defenses. The Soviet Union, in turn, would probably increase its offensive missile forces still further and enlarge its ABM network. In this environment, U.S. planners could not be certain of the ability of our strategic offensive forces to inflict retaliatory damage on the Soviet Union.

DETERRENT WOULD REMAIN RELIABLE IN CONTEXT OF SALT

In the context of SALT, on the other hand, our deterrent would remain highly reliable throughout the decade. The Interim Agreement would not eliminate the potential danger to our landbased missiles but, with Soviet ABMs severely constrained U.S. sea-based missile forces

alone could be assured of inflicting at least 25 percent retaliatory damage upon the Soviet Union's population. Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) threats are not imminent and a variety of countermeasures could be taken by the U.S. to maintain a survivable sea-based force in the future.

Without the SALT Treaty, the U.S. would, of course, be free to deploy additional ABMs around its ICBM sites. But it is highly unlikely that such hard-point defenses could guarantee the invulnerability of our Minuteman force against a Soviet MIRV threat. At best, any increased retaliatory capacity which might be obtained through this costly countermeasure could be offset by the attritive characteristics of an enlarged Soviet ABM network.

Senator SPARKMAN. This is the five-minute signal. I must go. We will stand in recess. I may not be able to come back myself because I am managing the Foreign Assistance Act which I think will be called up immediately, but someone else will take over.

Dr. Teller, I am sorry I didn't get to hear you, but I will read carefully your statement and wish I might be here for the questioning.

The committee will stand in recess until further notice.

(Recess.)

Senator COOPER (presiding). The committee will come to order. I regret very much that Senator Sparkman is unable to come back. He has an amendment pending on the floor.

I think we vote on it at 12:30.

I am very sorry that we are hearing you in the last few days of the Senate before the recess. Many committees are in session and votes are on the floor all the time. so it has not been possible to have all members of the committee present. Having heard the testimony thus far and having read the testimony of Dr. Kahan and Dr. Teller; I know how important it is. I think this is the first time in this hearing we have had before us experts who have worked in this field for so many, many years that your testimony is of tremendous importance. Mr. Kahan, will you proceed.

STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH/WITHOUT AGREED LIMITATIONS

Mr. KAHAN. Thank you, Senator.

In political as well as military terms the SALT accords can be expected to improve our strategic position when constrasted with the future situation which would be expected to arise in the absence of mutual limitations—that is, on a "relative risk" basis.

Although the initial agreement would codify the Soviet Union's position of nuclear parity, American deterrent forces should be sufficient to dissuade the Soviet Union from attempting to exploit its strategic power for purposes of blackmail or coercion. Nonetheless, having overcome its past position of strategic inferiority, there is still the possibility that the Soviet Union might see the changed nuclear balance as enabling it to pursue an aggressive foreign policy.

However, the strategic relationship without agreed limitations would probably be less desirable. Even with a major increase in expenditures, the United States could not regain strategic superiority and an uncontrolled arms race might work to our disadvantage.

It is possible, of course, that without any SALT controls the Soviet Union might not build a strategic missile force larger than the levels permitted under the Interim Agreement. And it is also possible that the U.S., through congressional action or executive branch policy, would not move forward with its major strategic programs. In theory, both nations ought to exercise unilateral restraint and pursue purely stabilizing strategic policies. But experience shows that neither nation has taken such initiatives. In this sense, bilateral agreements, defensive as well as offensive, have the unique effect of forcing both sides to do together what they are not likely to do separately.

COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE MORE COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES IN PHASE TWO

The value of the SALT accords extends beyond the initial agreements negotiated at Moscow, to the commitment on the part of both nations to negotiate more comprehensive measures in phase-two. This is an important goal, since an uncontrolled continuation of the arms competition within the bounds of the agreement could make it difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union substantially to ease tensions. Over the long term, failure to minimize potential instabilities could preclude renewal of the Interim Agreement and possibly jeopardize the ABM Treaty.

At the outset, both sides should, of course, ensure that the initial SALT agreements will operate effectively and enhance mutual confidence. But the United States and the Soviet Union should immediately begin to explore ways of modifying the terms of the Interim Agreement and expanding its scope.

The SALT experience to date demonstrates that the two nations are capable of holding serious discussions of strategic arms control questions and striking a bargain acceptable to both sides. Equally significant is the fact that the Moscow accords do not merely place numerical ceiling on deployed forces but impose technical and qualitative restrictions as well. Thus, the initial agreements contain many substantive as well as procedural precedents which make comprehensive offensive controls seem feasible.

TWO OBJECTIVES PROPOSED FOR PHASE TWO

It might be useful to attempt to address the issue of future SALT prospects by proposing two objectives which might be followed in formulating additional agreements and identifying certain limitation options which flow from each of these guidelines.

MAINTAINING HIGH DEGREE OF STRATEGIC STABILITY

The first objective of phase-two should be to maintain a high degree of strategic stability.

Consistent with this objective, an obvious issue for further negotiation concerns future ICBM vulnerability. As noted earlier, the initial accords will not eliminate this problem, since MIRVs are permitted and missile-site ABM deployments are severely limited.

There are three possible arms control approaches to this problem:

(1) Modify the Interim Agreement to permit both sides to deploy extensive missile site ABM defenses which would not appear as a first step toward an area ABM. Although a theoretical possibility, this approach would involve modifying the ABM Treaty and would raise a host of technical and verification issues.

(2) Minimize the threat by imposing deployment or testing limitations on MIRVs. At this stage, however, such measures would probably prove difficult to negotiate and verify.

(3) Diminish the danger by removing the targets threatened by MIRVs, notably, fixed ICBM sites. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could first agree to reduce their ICBM forces by 50 percent. At the same time, the freedom-to-mix formula of the Interim Agreement could be extended to provide both sides the option of replacing substantial numbers of ICBMs with SLBMs, but perhaps on a less than 1-for-1 basis. This approach might prove to be the most feasible and desirable. If initial progress is made, both sides might eventually move toward exclusive reliance on sea-based missile systems and bombers—a strategic configuration which would eliminate the instabilities associated with accurate MIRVs.

The survivability of sea-based deterrent forces, on the other hand, seems relatively well assured. While there seems to be no immediate prospect of ASW breakthroughs, however, negotiated restrictions would reduce fears over the possibility that missile-firing submarine systems might become increasingly vulnerable within the next decade. Perhaps joint technical working group could be established within the SALT framework to grapple with the complex, long-range problem of ASW limitations.

CONTAINING ARMS COMPETITION IN WAYS REDUCING TENSIONS, COSTS

A second objective which should govern future negotiations stems from the need to contain the arms competition in ways which could reduce political tensions and the costs associated with strategic arms.

Measures flowing from this concern could include agreed limitations on weapons not covered by the Interim Agreement, such as long-range bombers and forward-based systems; restrictions on weapons which could create uncertainties in estimating relative U.S.-Soviet nuclear power, such as a formal ban on land mobile ICBMs; and developing guidelines to restrict both nations from modernizing their strategic arsenal when not justified on grounds of security or efficiency.

In addition, constraints could be placed on active air-defense systems without detracting from warning or command and control capabilities. With ABMs limited to low levels, it would make little sense for either side to retain large and costly air-defense establishments.

QUESTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS POLICIES UNDER SALT

At this point, I would like to turn to the question of strategic arms policies under SALT—an issue which has become more important than the agreements themselves during the current debate.

There will remain considerable room for U.S. strategic weapons decisions within the bounds of the Moscow SALT accords. But the

precise implications of SALT for our unilateral strategic weapons decisions are neither obvious nor simple to assess.

To begin with, it should be recognized that the accords do not remove all the potential threats to our strategic forces which many ongoing programs are designed to meet. For example, the lack of ASW limitations makes it imperative that the U.S. ensure that its sea-based deterrent remains highly secure, and the prospect that our ICBM forces might become vulnerable makes more important the goal of preserving reliable bomber as well as submarine systems.

The USSR will probably continue quantitative and qualitative strategic programs permitted by the SALT accords, not only in anticipation of our future efforts but as a means of further improving its present position. Thus, until and unless Soviet restraint or follow-on SALT agreements eliminate or significantly alleviate these dangers, the U.S. must pursue programs needed to maintain an assured deterrent capability—keeping current forces effective and modernizing them when necessary.

It would also be necessary for the U.S. to place greater emphasis on national verification efforts needed to monitor Soviet compliance with the accords. And it might be necessary to institute programs which could provide additional hedges against uncertainties which could arise in our verification capabilities as well as a standby capacity to deploy systems in the event the agreements are abrogated for any reason. Apart from their prudential value, these programs can help the Administration and the Congress develop a sense of confidence in the new environment of SALT, lower the likelihood that uncertainties or false alarms might generate tension, and reduce to a minimum the possibility that U.S. officials might consider withdrawing from the accords.

On the other hand, as a consequence of the Moscow accords, it is clear that the U.S. can and should modify and possibly curtail many of its strategic programs.

Important U.S. strategic deployment efforts, notably the Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRV programs, were planned primarily as responses to anticipated Soviet ABM expansion. With ABMs limited and MIRVs permitted, these programs will provide the U.S. with a strategic posture under SALT far more adequate than originally contemplated. Therefore, in developing new systems, such as TRIDENT and the B–1, U.S. defense planners can be less conservative in calculating our future deterrent requirements.

The U.S. should also restructure its strategic programs to avoid endangering the stability of the initial agreements or foreclosing future SALT options. In particular, the U.S. should seek to minimize the "action-reaction" cycle within the constraints of SALT by attempting to maintain the viability of its deterrent without posing a threat to the Soviets' deterrent. Thus, programs designed to improve the counterforce capabilities of MIRV's on other offensive weapons should not be pursued.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S. should shape its strategic programs to support its negotiating objectives and facilitate meaningful progress in phase two of SALT.

BARGAINING TACTICS

To this end, there is a legitimate need to maintain momentum in our strategic programs. In many bargaining circumstances, putting this form of visible pressure on the other side to accept restrictions on his activities can represent a sound and sensible negotiating strategy.

The Soviets bargained hard throughout the first phase of SALT. In Phase-two, the USSR will almost surely propose measures which the U.S. would find difficult to accept and oppose measures put forth by Washington. Therefore, leverage should be available to strengthen the hand of U.S. negotiators during the difficult discussions which lie ahead.

At the time, there are serious disadvantages in pressing the so-called bargaining-chip argument too far. Negotiating from strength can reduce prospects for agreement by stimulating the nuclear competition in uncontrolled areas as each side seeks to acquire more "chips" in response to the other side's move. If weapon systems are deployed for bargaining purposes, it becomes virtually impossible to reverse the process. As a consequence, the effectiveness of agreements are often degraded and resources wasted on marginally useful systems. Alternative bargaining tactics which exploit the potential for deployment, such as placing construction funds "in escrow," can be equally effective in supporting a strong negotiating posture without detracting from the ultimate value of the agreements being sought.

RELATING FUTURE U.S. STRATEGIC WEAPON DECISIONS TO SALT

As a means of striking a realistic balance between deterrence requirements and negotiating needs, the U.S. might be guided by four criteria in deciding how to relate its future strategic weapon decisions to SALT:

First, prevent the bargaining-chip rationale from becoming the major motive for programs which cannot be credibly justified as necessary to support our deterrent objectives and which would otherwise be halted or restricted for cost-effectiveness reasons.

Second, maintain momentum on developmental programs designed to offset potential threats to our retaliatory capability, but seek to avoid moving these systems into the full flight test or procurement stages unless actions are judged essential for maintaining a confident deterrent posture.

Third, pay particular attention to exercising restraint on programs which might seriously threaten the stability of the initial SALT agreements or foreclosure options for future agreements which could increase our own longer-term security.

Finally, indicate to the USSR that continued restraint on our part in a particular area would require some form of Soviet reciprocity—not simply a symmetrical response, but a response which reduced the threat our program was designed to meet.

Such broad policy considerations can be used as guidelines for evaluating specific aspects of the U.S. strategic forces program. However, detailed analyses and legislative actions concerning our unilateral strategic options should take place in the context of reviewing the

Administration's proposed fiscal year '73 defense budget. During this process, the implications of SALT for U.S. strategic forces and policies should be taken into account as one of the many factors to be considered in assessing the U.S. defense program. It would be neither appropriate nor advisable to delay or imperil implementation of the SALT accords by making congressional support for the agreements conditioned in any way on the outcome of the defense budget debate.

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING U.S. FY 1973 STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

My major recommendations regarding U.S. fiscal year '73 strategic programs can be briefly summarized as follows:

(1) Complete the Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRV programs as scheduled as a means of maintaining a highly-reliable U.S. posture under SALT and diminishing pressures for new systems.

(2) Continue the Trident program at a reduced funding level of $350 million and retain the option to deploy this system as an eventual replacement for Polaris/Poseidon or an alternative to land-based ICBMs.

(3) Cut the B–1 program to $100 million but allocate $50 million to develop a follow-on bomber for the 1980s which would be less costly and more efficient in terms of satisfying a retaliatory deterrent mission.

(4) Reduce the AWACS program to approximately $150 million in developmental efforts, with a view toward introducing this system as a replacement for expensive and inefficient ground-based warning and control systems, and refrain from modernizing our fighter-interceptor or SAM squadrons.

(5) Complete the one Safeguard site currently being deployed at our ICBM installations in North Dakota, but do not construct the second ABM site around Washington, D.C., as permitted under the Treaty.

These recommendations would reduce the fiscal year '73 strategic forces' budget by some $1.2 billion over the approximately $600 million in direct savings tied to curtailment of those Safeguard sites banned under the treaty. However, it should be recognized that the economic savings from the initial SALT agreements would tend to flow from future expenditures foregone, rather than from appreciable cuts in current or near-term levels of spending. But this should not call the accords into question, since the primary value of these agreements is to increase strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Over the long term, through phase-two agreements and a movement away from "worst-case" planning, more meaningful savings might arise.

MAINTAINING SECURE NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP

In sum, the initial SALT agreements will contain the nuclear competition, help both sides maintain credible deterrent forces and offer the United States and the Soviet Union the continuing opportunity of managing their strategic policies within a bilateral framework. But the Moscow accords represent only the beginning of the search for stability. Sustained efforts will be needed to maintain a mutually secure nuclear relationship during the coming decade, and both superpowers must commit themselves to this task.

(Dr. Kahn's prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. JEROME H. KAHAN

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee: The signing of the Moscow strategic arms limitation accords represents a major milestone in bringing the nuclear competition under control. In transmitting the agreements to Congress, President Nixon stated that they "provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked." The agreements will enhance both sides' security primarily by placing low limits on ABM systems and also by setting ceilings on offensive missile forces. But apart from the specific details of the accords, the mere fact that the United States and the Soviet Union were able to negotiate agreements affecting weapons systems so central to their security is itself an unprecedented political event with positive significance for U.S.-Soviet relations and benefits for all nations. For these reasons, I urge Senate support of both the Treaty and the Interim Agreement.

Yet domestic reactions to the strategic arms limitation agreements have not been uniformly favorable. Some doubt that the measures will in fact strengthen U.S. security and argue that acceptance of the accords could freeze the U.S. in a potentially dangerous position of inferiority. Others suggest that the offensive agreement is too limited to have any real utility and claim that both nations will simply channel their energies into the many areas of the arms race left uncontrolled. Still others see considerable value in the agreements and praise the President's efforts but fear that SALT will be used to justify excessive expansion of U.S. strategic programs.

In presenting my views on the SALT accords, I will address three related but relatively distinct questions:

First, why are the Moscow agreements in the net interest of the United States?

Second, how might both sides maintain long-term stability through further negotiations and discussions?

Third, what guidelines should the United States follow in managing its strategic policies under the initial SALT accords while working toward further limitations?

I. BENEFITS OF THE INITIAL SALT ACCORDS

Without doubt, the single most important benefit of the Moscow agreements can be found in the ABM limitations. The Treaty limits ABM deployments on both sides to two separated sites of 100 launchers each, places constraints on ABM radars, and imposes restrictions on ABM-related testing and development. But of perhaps greater significance than the limitations themselves is the statement of intent by both nations not to deploy nationwide ABM defenses or provide a base for such a system.

More than any other strategic weapon, defensive systems capable of protecting populations against missile attacks have the potential of stimulating an increase in the level of offensive armaments and beyond that of creating serious instabilities. One country's ABM poses a direct threat to the other country's retaliatory missile forces. In contrast to offensive counter-force threats which might endanger the survivability of a nation's land-based systems. The ABM threat is far more serious since it can potentially negate both land- and sea-based missiles. Moreover, if ABMs were extensively deployed, the risk of nuclear war could rise. In a time of tension, one side might come to believe that it had sufficient confidence in its offensive forces to launch a first-strike while relying on its defensive network to reduce damage from weapons launched in retaliation.

U.S. strategic force decisions have been substantially influenced by the fear that Soviet ABM deployments would endanger our "assured destruction" deterrent capability. Indeed, the mere prospect that the Soviets might deploy an ABM tended to trigger anticipatory countermeasures. Until recently, the USSR did not appear to share this U.S. attitude toward deterrence. However, in a remarkable doctrinal shift, it now seems that the Soviets have reversed their longstanding belief in the desirability of ABMs, and, in the context of SALT, have adopted the view that ABMs are destabilizing and should be limited to very low levels.

With stringent limits placed on ABMs by the SALT Treaty, the requirements for the United States and the Soviet Union to improve or enlarge their offensive forces should diminish. The prospect of large ABM deployments by the other side would no longer dominate each nation's defense planning, and variations in offensive force levels and uncertainties over qualitative improvements should have less significance. Each nation should thus become more con-

fident of its retaliatory force and both sides would benefit from a stable strategic situation based upon mutual deterrence. The USSR's implicit acceptance of the principle of deterrence through the threat of reprisal should make U.S. leaders feel more certain that a secure nuclear relationship with the Kremlin can be maintained.

The foregoing discussion seems to suggest that limits on ABMs alone might be sufficient to dampen the offensive nuclear arms competition and enhance strategic stability. However, there are practical military as well as political reasons for negotiating offensive missile limitations.

From the U.S. viewpoint, it would be useful to limit the number of Soviet ICBMs, even though MIRVs are not banned under the Interim Agreement. The Soviet Union has tested simple multiple warheads, but has not yet demonstrated a MIRV capability and could not acquire an advanced MIRV system before the late 1970's. A Soviet SS–9 force of approximately 500 missiles outfitted with a MIRV package of three multi-megaton warheads could pose a threat to the survivability of our land-based Minuteman force. However, to acquire a comparable capability with some 300 SS–9 ICBMs as limited by the agreement, the Soviets would have to develop a more sophisticated package containing five or six single-megaton warheads of even greater accuracy. These additional technological demands could delay the date by which the Soviet Union might develop a counterforce MIRV capacity and increase the life expectancy of our Minuteman force.

Strategic policy experts consider sea-based missiles to be stabilizing, since these systems are highly survivable and best suited for retaliatory rather than first-strike missions. Nonetheless, U.S. officials have been concerned that the growing Soviet Polaris-type submarine fleet will pose an increased threat to the survivability of our bombers. Pentagon planners fear that Soviet SLBMs launched from close range can reduce the warning time needed to permit our B–52 forces to become airborne before they are destroyed on their bases. Limiting the number of Soviet SLBM's could diminish this threat and, over the long term, enable American planners to take more effective countermeasures to preserve our bomber deterrent.

Admittedly, the value of the Interim Agreement may not be great on strict military grounds. On a broader level, however, the offensive limitations can have considerable utility for the United States.

Administration officials have justified acceptance of the USSR's 50% advantage in numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs under the Interim Agreement by pointing to our undisputed lead in long-range bomber capabilities, numbers of warheads, and overall force quality. This line of reasoning is valid. Of crucial significance is our advantage in MIRV technology which will enable us to retain an overwhelming superiority in deterrent power through the 1970's. Even if the Soviets managed to deploy MIRVs on their large ICBMs within the next five years, they could not match our lead in the far more important area of MIRVed sealbased missiles of the Poseidon type. Indeed, from the perspective of a Soviet "conservative planner," the Interim Agreement—which permits the U.S. to exploit its technological edge, does not reduce the American long-range bomber force, and leaves U.S. forward-based nuclear systems uncontrolled—could be seen as placing the USSR in an extremely disadvantageous strategic position.

On the other hand, if no constraints were placed on Soviet offensive forces, the USSR might well continue to deploy ICBMs and SLBMs at the current rate for the next five years. During this period, U.S. leaders would undoubtedly feel increasingly uncomfortable if the Soviets showed signs of building toward a level of perhaps 2,000 ICBMs and over 1200 SLBMs deployed on 80 modern nuclear-powered submarines. With the prospect of a Soviet missile force twice as large as ours, the U.S. might decide to procure additional offensive systems simply to prevent the numerical balance from shifting too dramatically against it—even if such actions were not necessitated by military calculations. While acknowledging that small changes in the strategic relationship are not significant and that neither side could obtain a first-strike capability, President Nixon has emphasized that the United States would respond to any substantial Soviet effort to alter the balance. U.S. officials in any Administration would feel the pressure to build additional strategic offensive forces in order to counter the Soviets' overriding numerical missile advantage.

In short, when evaluated by comparison against the future situation which would be expected to arise in the absence of mutual limitations—that is, on a "relative risk" basis—the SALT accords will improve our strategic posture. With-

out the agreements, it is likely that both nations would continue to enlarge and improve their strategic forces. Faced with expanding Soviet programs, the U.S. would almost surely react by producing a substantial number of new-generation offensive systems and constructing ABM defenses. The Soviet Union, in turn, would probably increase its offensive missile forces still further and enlarge its ABM network. In this environment, U.S. planners could not be certain of the ability of our strategic offensive forces to inflict retaliatory damage on the Soviet Union.

In the context of SALT, on the other hand, our deterrent would remain highly reliable throughout the decade. The Interim Agreement would not eliminate the potential danger to our land-based missiles, but, with Soviet ABMs severely constrained, U.S. sea-based missile forces alone could be assured of inflicting at least 25 percent retaliatory damage upon the Soviet Union's population. Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) threats are not imminent, and signs of Soviet progress could be countered by qualitative improvements in the Polaris submarine fleet, extending the range of the Poseidon SLBM, or, if necessary, eventually building Trident as a replacement for present sea-based forces. Bomber capabilities, which would not be controlled, would provide diversity and thereby increase confidence in our deterrent. Without the SALT Treaty, to be sure, the U.S. would be free to deploy ABMs around its ICBM sites. But it is highly unlikely that such "hard-point" defenses could guarantee the invulnerability of our Minuteman forces against a Soviet MIRV threat. At best, any increased retaliatory capacity which might be obtained through this costly countermeasure would be offset by the attritive characteristics of an enlarged Soviet ABM system. Put another way, a strategic situation in which a reliable dual deterrent of American SLBMs and bombers faced only a token ABM capacity is to be preferred over a situation in which the U.S. might be able to maintain a marginal "triad" deterrent—but at the price of permitting the Soviets to deploy large numbers of ABMs.

Although the initial agreement would codify the Soviet Union's position of nuclear parity, American deterrent forces should be sufficient to dissuade the Soviet Union from attemping to exploit its strategic power for purposes of blackmail or coercion. Not only would our strategic forces retain the clear capacity to inflict catastrophic damage, but, on an overall basis, our strategic posture would remain numerically comparable to that of the Soviets. This makes it improbable that Kremlin leaders would underestimate either the capabilities of our forces or the willingness of the United States to protect its interests.

Nonetheless, having overcome its past position of strategic inferiority, there is still the possibility that the Soviet Union might see the changed nuclear balance as enabling it to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. However, the strategic relationship in the absence of agreed limitations would not necessarily be more desirable. Even with a major increase in expenditures, the United States could not regain strategic superiority, and an uncontrolled arms race might work to our disadvantage. At best, we would remain equal and be confronted with whatever problems parity may bring.

A SALT agreement would, of course, introduce a new uncertainty into the strategic equation—the possibility that the Soviets might violate its terms or abrogate the accord and mount a massive buildup in an attempt to gain advantage. But these dangers must be put into perspective in evaluating relative risks. The U.S. would be able to verify the agreed restrictions with a high degree of confidence through national means. The Soviets could attempt to disguise their deployment activities, but this would involve considerable technical difficulties as well as a high risk of discovery with its attendant political costs. In addition, there would be little payoff for the Soviets in undertaking an evasion program unless they could be reasonably certain of gaining a meaningful advantage. This is a most unlikely prospect, for, even with a delay in our capacity to detect, we could be certain of identifying Soviet violations before they became significant enough to pose a threat to our deterrent or to dramatically alter the numerical balance. With our current strategic force levels and continued qualitative improvement, we would have a cushion against uncertainties and could tolerate delay and ambiguity in detecting possible Soviet violations. Consequently, the Soviets would not be able to rapidly deploy defensive or offensive systems after a sudden abrogation on such a scale that our security would be threatened before we could take appropriate counteractions.

It is possible, of course, that without any SALT controls, the Soviet Union might not build a strategic missile force larger than the levels permitted under the Interim Agreement. And it is also possible that the U.S., through Congressional

action or Executive Branch policy, would not move forward with its major strategic programs. In theory, both nations ought to exercise unilateral restraint and pursue purely stabilizing strategic policies. But experience shows that neither nation has taken such initiatives. In this sense, bilateral agreements—defensive as well as offensive—have the unique effect of forcing both sides to do together what they are not likely to do separately. The certainty gained through SALT may well be its most important benefit.

In sum, the foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that the SALT accords are in the net security interest of the United States. Strategic superiority is no longer within our grasp. Under the terms of the agreements, the U.S. would be able to maintain a strong nuclear posture and would not be placed in an inferior position. Indeed, our strategic deterrent could be preserved with greater confidence and at less cost than would otherwise be the case.

II. POSSIBILITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE AGREEMENT

The value of SALT extends beyond the initial agreements to the commitment on the part of Washington and Moscow to negotiate more comprehensive measures. The Interim Agreement places only limited costraints on offensive forces. Although many new weapons programs and improvements can be stabilizing—for example, more secure sea-based systems and hardened ICBM silos—an uncontrolled continuation of the arms competition within the bounds of the agreement could make it difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union substantially to ease tensions. More importantly, failure to minimze potential instabilities could preclude renewal of the Interim Agreement and possibly jeopardize the ABM Treaty.

While negotiating additional agreements, both sides should ensure that the initial SALT accords will operate effectively and enhance mutual confidence. A significant step in this direction is the formal agreement between Washington and Moscow acknowledging the use of "national technical means" for verification, prohibiting interference with such systems, and precluding "deliberate concealment measures" which could impede verification. The Treaty also calls for a Standing Commission to be formed for the purpose of monitoring and managing the agreements. Through this mechanism, the parties would discuss the precise interpretations of restrictions and clarify actions by either side which might otherwise generate false alarms regarding compliance. The Commission would, in addition, be responsible for overseeing the various replacement procedures associated with the Interim Agreement.

Within the framework of the SALT Commission, systematic attempts could be made to minimize uncertainty and maximize stability as both nations continue to pursue unilateral strategic weapons activities which are not prohibited by the initial agreements. For example, one side could notify the other in advance of its future development programs and procurement plans. Perhaps mutually-agreed guidelines could be established to assist both nations in making unilateral strategic force decisions which would not be viewed by the other side as threatening.

But continuing discussions and attempts to arrange tacit rules of restraint cannot, in themselves, be relied upon to contain the future strategic competition. Explicit agreements need to be reached in order to achieve meaningful results. Thus, the U.S. and the USSR should immediately begin to explore ways of modifying the terms of the Interim Agreement and expanding its scope, with the goal of securing a more permanent and stable offensive agreement. Again, the SALT Commission would be the most natural vehicle for such negotiations.

It is important to recognize that the Moscow accords provide a firm foundation for U.S. and Soviet negotiators to work out additional limitations. Most fundamentally, the SALT experience demonstrates that the two nations are capable of holding serious discussions of strategic arms control questions and striking a bargain acceptable to both sides. In addition, the agreements do not merely place numerical ceilings on deployed forces. There are detailed technical restrictions (e.g., power-limitations for ABM radars); limits on testing and development (e.g., the various ABM-related prohibitions); qualitative constraints on offensive weapons (e.g., silo and missile size limitations); and procedures for dismantling and replacing forces (e.g., "cashing-in" older ICBMs for SLBMs). Thus, the initial agreements contain many substantive as well as procedural precedents which make comprehensive offensive controls seem feasible.

At this stage, it is difficult to predict the precise course of subsequent negotiations. Nevertheless, it might be useful to attempt to address this issue of future SALT prospects by proposing two objectives which might be followed in formulating additional agreements and identifying certain limitation options which flow from each of these guidelines.

The first objective of phase-two should be to maintain a high degree of strategic stability. This was emphasized in an official U.S. Unilateral Statement which declared that a goal of the follow-on negotiations should be "to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective retaliatory forces." The USSR did not subscribe to this particular statement, but expressed strong interest in "more complete" limitations.

Consistent with the first objective of stability, an obvious issue for further negotiation concerns future ICBM vulnerability. As noted earlier, the initial accords will not eliminate this problem, since MIRVs are permitted and missile-site ABM deployments are severely limited. By the end of the decade, therefore, ICBMs on both sides could become endangered. Many analysts do not express concern over this prospect as long as both sides retain sea-based deterrents. But other strategic experts, as well as high American officials, claim that the existence of vulnerable ICBMs could create instabilities which might lead to a breakdown of deterrence in a time of tension. In any case, the subject should be discussed at SALT with a view toward acquiring a common understanding of the issue and finding mutually acceptable solutions to potential problems.

There are three possible arms control approaches to the problem of ICBM vulnerability:

(1) Design an agreement permitting both sides to deploy extensive missile-site ABM defense which would not appear as a first step towards an area ABM. However, this would involve modifying the ABM Treaty and would raise a host of difficult technical and vertification issues. Moreover, it is unlikely that ABM defenses could provide cost-effective protection against MIRVs. While the possibility of such an arrangement should not be dismissed, serious pursuit of this option would not appear to be fruitful at this time and such efforts could jeopardize the stability of the initial SALT agreements.

(2) Minimize the threat by imposing mutual limitations on MIRVs. A ban on MIRV deployments would involve intrusive on-site inspection, and, apart from this stumbling block, would probably be unacceptable to both sides on strategic policy grounds. It might be possible to alleviate the adverse implications of MIRVs by placing agreed restraints on missile testing to prevent each side from developing highly-accurate warheads with a counterforce capability. But this would probably prove difficult to formulate and negotiate. The U.S. would raise verification concerns while the Soviets would see the measure as freezing them in an inferior position.

(3) Diminish the danger by removing the targets threatened by MIRVs—notably, fixed ICBM sites. Under this approach, the U.S. and the USSR could first agree to reduce their ICBM forces by 50%. At the same time, the "freedom-to-mix" formula of the Interim Agreement could be extended to provide both sides the option of replacing substantial numbers of ICBMs, but perhaps on a less than one-for-one basis. The U.S. would probably view this plan with considerably more interest than the USSR, although it might be acceptable to the Soviets since they could increase their sea-based strength by shifting substantial forces from land to sea without seriously compromising their ICBM power. Such a reduction plan could enhance mutual stability by leading both sides to rely more heavily on sea-based missiles. Over the longer term, both sides might move towards exclusive reliance on sea-based missile systems and bombers—a strategic configuration which would eliminate the instabilities associated with accurate MIRVs.

Even if agreed solutions to the problem of ICBM vulnerability cannot be found, bilateral discussions of this issue could be beneficial in reducing risks. The U.S. would, of course, always retain the option of reducing its ICBM forces unilaterally if this action is judged to be necessary for the maintenance of a stable deterrence posture.

The survivability of sea-based deterrent forces, on the other hand, seems relatively well assured. There seems to be no immediate cause for concern over ASW breakthroughs. Nevertheless, negotiated restrictions would reduce fears over the possibility that missile-firing submarine systems might become increasingly vulnerable within the next decade. For example, an agreement could be reached whereby neither side's nuclear-powered attack submarines are permitted to cross an agreed and monitored sonar barrier. In principle, this measure would permit

both sides to maintain a reliable deterrent force with their offensive ballistic missile submarines while preventing attack submarines from crossing into areas behind the barrier. As a complementary measure, a limit could be placed on the number of hunter-killer submarines each side might deploy. Perhaps a joint technical working group could be established within the SALT framework to grapple with the complex long-range problem of ASW limitations.

A second objective which should govern future negotiations stems from the need to contain the arms competition in ways which would reduce political tensions and the costs associated with strategic arms. Measures flowing from this concern could include agreed limitations on weapons not covered by the Interim Agreement, imposing restrictions on systems which could create uncertainties in estimating relative U.S.-Soviet nuclear power, and eliminating expensive systems which each nation might otherwise retain in order to match the other.

As an initial step, numerical limits could be placed on strategic bombers. Soviet inferiority in this area suggests that such a measure might not be negotiable. However, the United States might be prepared to accept a bomber limit of 250—the approximate number of B–1 aircraft which might eventually replace our present 500-unit heavy bomber force—in return for a Soviet agreement not to increase their present force of 200 long-range bombers. Both sides would remain free to deploy air-to-surface missiles on their bombers to improve penetration, but such actions would not be destabilizing.

In addition, constraints could be placed on active air-defense systems, without detracting from warning or command and control capabilities. These could include prohibitions against modernizing bomber defense networks as well as agreed reductions of interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, and associated radars. With ABMs limited to low levels, it would make little sense for either side to retain large and costly air-defense establishments. Reducing such defenses would also contribute to stability by further alleviating concerns on each side that the other side might upgrade its air-defense system and acquire a clandestine ABM capability in violation of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, lowering the level of air-defenses would help insure the reliability of both sides' bomber deterrent forces—an objective which could become increasingly desirable as ICBMs become less survivable.

An attempt could also be made to set a ceiling on Soviet intermediate- and medium-range missiles and medium-range bombers in return for the United States accepting some limits on numbers of forward-based tactical aircraft (FBS) reployed in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers. This issue is extremely complicated because of the variety of weapons involved, the problem of dual-purpose systems, and the significance of these systems for NATO defense. Moscow's position that all weapons capable of reaching the homeland of the U.S. and the USSR should be classified as "strategic" created a deadlock earlier in SALT. However, after gaining the experience and confidence of a working SALT agreement, some accommodation might be found. FBS limitation options could also be discussed in the context of European force reduction negotiations (MBFR).

As a specific item in phase-two of SALT, the U.S. should seek to persuade the USSR to accept a formal ban on land-mobile ICBMs. Deployments of these systems by either side would tend to create undesirable uncertainties, since it would be difficult to estimate the other side's force level. For this reason, sea-based missiles are to be preferred over land-mobile missiles as an alternative to fixed ICBMs. The unilateral U.S. statement regarding land-mobile deployments as inconsistent with SALT should be made more meaningful through mutual agreement.

As a broader measure, it might be possible for the U.S. and the USSR to negotiate arms control guidelines for strategic force modernization programs. Land-based and sea-based systems on both sides will eventually need replacement if they are to continue to serve as reliable deterrents. Through SALT, the two sides might reach an understanding to replace systems only when justified for reasons of cost or efficiency and to work towards postures which contained fewer forces of greater survivability designed primarily for retaliatory rather than "war-fighting" purposes. Mutual force levels could be set and replacement systems and schedule could be made subject to agreement.

Finally, success at SALT can provide impetus for negotiating a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. With progress made towards stabilizing the strategic relationship as a result of the initial accords and efforts under way to reach more complete offensive limitations, the U.S. and the USSR should find continued nuclear weapons testing less essential. At the same time, constraints on underground test-

ing—whether a total ban or a threshold arrangement—would reduce fears of possible destabilizing weapons developments and thus support the goals of SALT. The CTB could be explored by the SALT Commission, but the multilateral negotiations at Geneva would probably become the primary forum.

III. STRATEGIC ARMS POLICIES UNDER SALT

Not surprisingly, there will remain considerable room for unilateral U.S. strategic weapons decisions within the bounds of the Moscow SALT accords. Indeed, no one argued that the limited agreements likely to be negotiated as the first step towards controlling the strategic competition would remove the need for continuing defense programs. Nevertheless, in the course of considering the SALT accords, the question of U.S. strategic defense options has become a dominant domestic issue, often overshadowing the agreements themselves.

The debate over the connection between SALT and U.S. strategic programs shows signs of becoming polarized. It seems safe to observe, however, that the signing of the SALT agreements does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the U.S. should halt all its new and ongoing strategic programs or to the conclusion that we should sustain and accelerate all our strategic efforts. But between these extremes, the precise implications of SALT for our unilateral strategic posture decisions are neither obvious nor simple to assess.

To begin with, there are many reasons why the U.S. should continue certain strategic programs within the framework of the SALT agreements. The accords do not remove all the potential threats to our strategic forces which many ongoing programs are designed to meet. For example, the lack of ASW limitations makes it imperative that the U.S. ensure that its sea-based deterrent remains highly secure, and the prospect that our ICBM forces might become vulnerable makes more important the goal of preserving reliable bomber as well as submarine systems. The USSR will probably continue quantitative and qualitative strategic programs permitted by the SALT accords, not only in anticipation of our future efforts but as a means of further improving its present position. Thus, until and unless Soviet restraint or follow-on SALT agreements eliminate or significantly alleviate these dangers, the U.S. must pursue programs needed to maintain an assured deterrent capability, keeping current forces effective and modernizing them when necessary.

In addition, there are factors introduced by the SALT agreements which can create new program requirements. It would be advisable for the U.S. to place greater emphasis on national verification efforts needed to monitor Soviet compliance with the accords. Furthermore, it might be necessary to institute programs which could provide additional hedges against uncertainties which could arise in our verification capabilities and a standby capacity to deploy systems in the event the agreements are abrogated for any reason. Apart from their prudential value, these programs can help the Administration and Congress develop a sense of confidence in the new environment of SALT, lower the likelihood that uncertainties or "false alarms" might generate tension, and reduce to a minimum the possibility that U.S. officials might consider withdrawing from the accords.

On the other hand, as a consequence of the Moscow accords, it is clear that the U.S. can and should modify and possibly curtail many of its strategic programs. The single most important justification for moving in this direction are the severe limitations placed on Soviet ABMs by the Treaty. Important ongoing U.S. strategic deployment efforts, notably the Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRV programs, were planned primarily as responses to anticipated Soviet ABM expansion. With ABMs limited and MIRVs permitted, these programs will provide the U.S. with a strategic posture under SALT far more adequate than originally contemplated. Therefore, in developing new systems, such as Trident and the B–1, U.S. defense planners can be less conservative in calculating our future deterrent requirements. Rather than using "worst case" analyses based upon the so-called greater-than-expected threat, it would be safe and sufficient to design our forces using less pessimistic assumptions which recognized that SALT places constraints on the Soviet threat.

At the same time, the U.S. should restructure its strategic programs to avoid endangering the stability of the initial agreements or foreclosing future SALT options. Such an approach makes sense in strict defense terms, since SALT has already led to a negotiated situation which contributes to the achievement of our basic strategic objectives far more effectively than could have been achieved

through unilateral policies alone. Accordingly, the U.S. should seek to minimize the "action-reaction" cycle within the constraints of SALT by attempting to maintain the viability of its deterrent without posing a threat to the Soviets' deterrent. This would argue against programs designed to improve U.S. counterforce capabilities. More generally, in planning our future strategic posture, the short-term gains of strengthening our deterrent through rapid modernization or qualitative improvements should be balanced against the possible long-term adverse consequences of these actions for stability and arms control. If procurement decisions on particular new systems are deferred because of SALT, we might have to mount a costly crash program if further agreements do not materialize. On the other hand, if such decisions lead to successful phase-two SALT arrangements, we may not find it necessary to procure certain expensive systems at all.

The U.S. should also modify its strategic programs to support its negotiating objectives and facilitate meaningful progress in phase-two of SALT. To this end, there is a legitimate need to maintain momentum in our strategic programs. In many bargaining circumstances, putting this form of visible pressure on the other side to accept restrictions on his activities can represent a sound and sensible negotiating strategy. Without accepting all the Administration's claims of success for its "bargaining chip" tactic, it is possible that a unilateral halt in the Safeguard construction program might have reduced the USSR's incentive to accept limitations which serve U.S. security interests, such as the sub-ceiling on SS–9 missiles. The Soviets bargained hard throughout the first-phase of SALT; in phase-two, the USSR will almost surely propose measures which the U.S. would find difficult to accept (such as limitations on forward-based systems and the elimination of overseas submarine bases), and tend to oppose proposals which the U.S. might favor (such as an agreed ban on land-mobile missiles and reductions in ICBM forces). Therefore, leverage should be available to strengthen the hand of U.S. negotiators during the difficult discussions which lie ahead.

On the other hand, there are serious disadvantages in pressing the bargaining chip argument too far. Negotiating from strength can reduce prospects for agreement by stimulating the nuclear competition in uncontrolled areas as each side seeks to acquire more "chips" in response to the other side's moves. If weapons systems are deployed for bargaining purposes, it becomes virtually impossible to reverse the process. As a consequence, the effectiveness of agreements are often degraded and resources wasted on marginally useful weapons. Thus, if the Administration had followed a restrained negotiating strategy, it might have been possible to reach a more comprehensive set of initial SALT limitations at lower force levels. Alternative bargaining tactics which exploit the potential for deployment, such as placing construction funds "in escrow", can be equally effective in supporting a strong negotiating posture without detracting from the ultimate value of the agreements being sought.

In an attempt to strike a realistic balance between deterrence requirements and negotiating needs, the United States might be guided by four criteria in deciding how to relate its future strategic weapons decisions to SALT:

Prevent the bargaining chip rationale from becoming the major motive for programs which cannot be credibly justified as necessary to support our deterrent objectives and which would otherwise be halted or restricted for cost-effectiveness reasons.

Maintain momentum on developmental programs designed to offset potential threats to our retaliatory capability but seek to avoid moving these systems into the full flight test or procurement stages unless such actions are judged essential for maintaining a confident deterrent posture.

Pay particular attention to exercising restraint on programs which might seriously threaten the stability of the initial SALT agreements or foreclose options for future agreements which could increase our own longer-term security.

Indicate to the Soviet Union that continued restraint on our part in a particular area would require some form of reciprocity—not simply a symmetrical Soviet response, but a response which reduced the threat our program was designed to meet.

The broad policy considerations outlined above can be used as guidelines for evaluating specific aspects of the U.S. strategic forces program. However, detailed analyses and legislative actions concerning our unilateral strategic options should take place in the context of reviewing the Administration's proposed FY 73 defense budget. During this process, the implications of SALT for U.S. strategic forces and policies should be taken into account as one of the many factors to

be considered in assessing the U.S. defense program. It would be neither appropriate nor advisable to delay or imperil implementation of the SALT accords by making Congressional support for the agreements conditioned in any way on the outcome of the defense budget debate.

My major recommendations regarding U.S. FY 73 strategic programs can be summarized as follows:

1. Complete the Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRV programs as scheduled. Deployment of these systems will ensure that the U.S. can retain a highly reliable deterrent under the SALT accords and preserve our advantage in numbers of warheads. Military requirements and political pressures for new offensive systems would thus be diminished.

2. Continue the Trident program at a reduced funding level of $350 million and retain the option to deploy this system as an eventual replacement for Polaris/Poseidon or an alternative to land-based ICBMs. Emphasize the ULMS–1 missile as a potential replacement for the Poseidon SLBM, but do not commit the Trident submarine to production until substantially more development efforts have been successfully completed. Redesign Trident to carry 16 rather than 24 missiles in order to maintain the maximum number of nuclear submarines permitted under the Interim SALT Agreement.

3. Cut the B–1 program to $100 million and allocate $50 million to develop a follow-on bomber for the 1980's which is less costly and more efficient in terms of satisfying a retaliatory deterrent mission. Deploy the SRAM and SCAD air-to-surface missiles to enhance the penetration capabilities of the present B–52 force. Pursue the base dispersal, warning, and rapid-alert programs designed to improve the survivability of our bombers.

4. Refrain from modernizing our fighter-interceptor or SAM squadrons, and reduce the AWACS program to approximately $150 million in development efforts. With nationwide U.S. missile defense deployments banned by SALT, there is little justification for modernizing active air-defense systems or maintaining extensive bomber defense capabilities. However, a prudential level of defense should be maintained with AWACS eventually introduced as a replacement for expensive and inefficient ground-based warning and control systems.

5. Complete the Safeguard site deployed at our ICBM sites in North Dakota, but do not construct the second ABM site around Washington, D.C. as permitted under the SALT Treaty. There are no strong security requirements for such a defense and there is no need to match the Moscow ABM. In any case, the possible marginal benefits of a Washington ABM site are not worth the projected expenditures of over $3 billion. However, research efforts in the field of missile-site defenses should be continued.

These recommendations would reduce the FY 73 strategic forces budget by some $1.2 billion over the approximately $600 million in direct savings tied to curtailment of those Safeguard sites banned under the Treaty. However, it should be recognized that economic savings from the initial SALT agreements would tend to flow from future expenditures foregone, rather than from appreciable cuts in current or near-term levels of spending. By constraining the Soviet offensive missile threat and by restricting ABMs on both sides, the agreements should prevent a major increase in United States strategic expenditures over the coming decade. On the other hand, continuation of programs not affected, replacements of obsolescent systems, and greater emphasis on readiness and monitoring programs make it unlikely that the United States could substantially reduce its annual strategic arms budget. This should not call the SALT accords into question, since the primary value of these agreements is to increase strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war. Over the long-term, through phase-two agreements and a movement away from worst-case planning, more meaningful savings might arise.

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The initial SALT agreements will contain the nuclear competition, help both sides maintain credible deterrent forces, and offer the United States and the Soviet Union the continuing opportunity of managing their strategic policies within a bilateral framework. But the Moscow accords represent only the beginning of the search for stability. Sustained efforts will be needed to maintain a mutually secure nuclear relationship during the coming decade, and both superpowers must commit themselves to this task. Whatever the specific evolution of SALT, there will continue to be a need for intelligent unilateral strategic policies on both sides—policies which recognize the interlocking nature of Ameri-

can and Soviet strategic postures and leave open options for further enhancing security through negotiations.

Senator COOPER. I thank you, Dr. Kahan.

I may say again that you who testified this morning have given the committee insight and facts that we have not received from other witnesses.

I believe that—I know that Dr. Teller has been one of those associated with the development of nuclear systems and I know that I wouldn't expect Mr. Warnke to have been, although I know he is experienced in other fields, but the others—the others who have testified—have you been—were you associated in any way with the development of these systems?

Mr. BRENNAN. To a modest extent.

Senator COOPER. You have been.

DR. BRENNAN'S POSITION ON AGREEMENTS

From the testimony, I assume that all, with the possible exception of Dr. Brennan, favor the ratification of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty; am I correct on that?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. I don't think you are very clear on that, Dr. Brennan. Do you favor the ratification of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty?

Mr. BRENNAN. May I simply reread the final paragraph of my statement, sir? I said: "But it seemed appropriate that someone should say, unambiguously and on the record, that both of these agreements are wrong, that the U.S. ought not to be in the position these agreements will leave us in, and that the country would ultimately be best off by rejecting them both and then doing what is right. I hereby take this position."

Senator COOPER. The purpose of this hearing is to receive the testimony of those who favor the ratification of the treaty, and their reasons for it, and also those who oppose it.

Now, you have said it is a bad treaty and a bad agreement, Would you express specifically what your reasons are for saying that it is a bad treaty, a bad agreement? First limit it to the ABM Treaty.

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to respond to that before you hear Dr. Teller's statement?

Senator COOPER. Excuse me. I am sorry, Dr. Teller——

Mr. BRENNAN. I should be delighted to come back to that again.

Senator COOPER. Dr. Teller, please go ahead. I beg your pardon. I have been waiting to hear your testimony so will you speak, Dr. Teller?

Mr. TELLER. Thank you.

Senator COOPER. May I say I welcome you here. We have heard you many times before this committee.

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE RADIATION LABORATORY, LIVERMORE, CALIF.

Mr. TELLER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Percy, in direct answer to the last question raised, I favor ratification of the treaty but—and I have to ask you to listen to some of my qualifications of the statement—this

treaty freezes the United States in a position of decisive disadvantage. It has been stated repeatedly that there is enough—there is more than enough to kill and to overkill. This statement, precisely because it is so widely accepted, must be discussed, and I will do so in a few words (which will be insufficient).

U.S. LEAD IN NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES IS ESTIMATE, NOT FACT

It is claimed we are ahead of the Russians today in an important respect; we have more nuclear explosives, more warheads, by a ratio of 2 to 1.

First of all, please realize that this is not a fact; it is an estimate, an estimate with which I agree though I am not sure of it.

TREATY DOES NOT LIMIT NUMBER OF WARHEADS

Secondly, the treaty does not limit the number of warheads. Putting many warheads on the same missile, using MIRV, is open and should be open because it can't be policed. There have been estimates how long it will take the Russians to catch up with us. I tend to agree with that of Secretary Laird, that the Russians will have the full capability of putting many warheads on their missiles in two years. By that time they also can acquire high accuracy; they can destroy our land-based missiles; they can destroy most of our bombers before the bombers take off.

U.S. LOSING TECHNOLOGICAL ARMS RACE

Our security hangs by the single thread of the sea-based deterrents, Let me mention here the main theme of what I have to say. We are not in a quantitative arms race. The quantitative restrictions imposed by the treaty, while significant, are not the most basic. What is most basic is the qualitative development, the new ideas.

We are in a scientific—we are in a technological arms race, in a race of technology.

In sharp contrast to one of the earlier speakers, I want to say (and I want to return to this all important question) that this race we are losing. This race, the race of ideas, cannot be regulated by any treaty. If we lose this race, indeed we are lost.

This is the most ominous part of the present situation and in the conclusions of my remarks I will come back to it.

DANGER TO U.S. SEA-BASED DETERRENT

Now I only want to say that a single, big discovery in oceanography, in the detection of submarines, can wipe out our last deterrent, and we don't know whether and when it will happen. Secrecy (I am against secrecy, which excludes the American people, which excludes even the Senate from knowing the full facts about preparedness) will not allow us even to know it when our danger has arrived. This secrecy prevents me from discussing in detail what I would like to discuss, how our sea-based deterrent might be endangered.

Senator COOPER. Would you repeat that, Doctor? I am sure what?

Mr. TELLER. The Russians know the various ways of how submarines can be detected. We here cannot openly discuss what I think can be and should be common knowledge.

RUSSIAN ADVANTAGE IN AMOUNT OF EXPLOSIVES DELIVERED BY ROCKETS

Now, the treaty, by giving the Russians a 4 to 1 advantage in the amount of explosives that they can deliver by rockets, is a great increase in our danger. I am for ratifying this treaty because in doing so you will not do more than to ratify a fact that is not going to change whether you ratify or not.

"GOOD EXAMPLE" HAS NOT DETERRED RUSSIANS IN PAST

In many years in which we tried to give the Russians good example by not deploying missiles, the Russians increased their rate of deployment. Our good example has not "deterred" them in the past. It is for you to say whether it will deter them in the future.

POTENTIAL GRAVE DANGER OF TREATY

Now, the treaty has a potential grave danger, that is, if people stand up and say, "We can reduce our budget; now we can save dollars because we are safe." Actually we have not been as unsafe ever. We are now as unsafe as Britain was at the time of Munich; but this is not Munich. Our government has not agreed to anything, has not given away anything of real value. It has put down on paper for everyone to see what the position is.

One of the greatest advantages of this treaty is that by spelling out our danger we might at least do something about getting ourselves into a position where we can defend ourselves and the free world.

I am for the treaty because it is realistic and because it raises a signal of danger which signal will remain on the mast long after ratification.

ARTICLES ESTABLISHING COMMISSION ON VERIFICATION OF TREATY

Now, I want to say something very positive for the treaty and for the agreement.

There is a novel, imaginative proposed article in both treaties, Article XIII in the ABM Treaty, and Article VI in the Agreement. These articles establish a Commission on Verification of the Treaty. This is done because verification cannot be accomplished by rigid and agreed means; it can be done only by good will, by asking questions and by volunteering not only answers but also additional information as is foreseen in Article XIII.

One of the main points on which I think the Senate should insist is that this Article XIII should receive careful scrutiny. The way how it is implemented should be watched. The Commission should contain men highly capable in a technical respect, imaginative men and men who are properly worried about the safety of the United States and of the free world.

If the Russians should volunteer the evidence that indeed the treaty is adhereed to, then we face a better future. I hope this will be the case.

A number of questions have to be raised. For instance, relocatable ABMs are ruled out. This is very hard to check and very important to check.

Can parts of ABM equipment be stockpiled? Could the Russians repeat their performance of 1961 when they abrogated the test mora-

torium and went ahead with the most impressive test series that they had prepared for a long period; this has put them ahead in nuclear weapons, in megatonnage and in the study of the effects of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere; it put them on the road toward constructing a realistic missile defense. We were caught unprepared. Can they now, stockpile ABM parts, put them together in a hurry?

This time, if we are unprepared there may be no future.

Can they convert their SAM missiles, SAM–5s, into ABMs? Can they do it in a hurry?

The treaty says they should not do it. How can we be assured that they won't? The commission, under Article XIII, should find assurances.

Can they upgrade their missiles? What is the number of Russian missiles? We talk about the ratio of numbers, 3 to 2; we talk on the basis of knowledge of our missiles, but on the basis of guesses concerning the Russians'. We talk about this on the basis of intelligence which is imperfect.

There are these questions and a lot more that under Article XIII have to be clarified. If they are, then we are on the road to peace. If they are not, then we have evidence on the basis of which we shall have to act.

This unique provision in the treaty is the one which distinguishes it from every one of its predecessors and this new beginning should be fully exploited.

But even apart from that, even if one adheres to the treaty, considering the coming Russian multiple warheads, considering Russian research, we face great danger.

U.S. HAS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH ALLIES

What can we do? We can do two things: One is not in my field and I will mention it. The other is in my field and I will discuss it.

I believe that the United States cannot retain its leading position in defense. I think actions in the past 12 years have made that unavoidable, and we are facing a very dangerous world. The united free world still could be number one. We have to work closely with our allies, and in this respect I completely agree with Professor Hoffman. How this should be done is up to you, very specifically, up to this committee.

NATIONAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

I raise only one little point that worries me. There is the question of the so-called national means of verification which undoubtedly we shall discuss with the Russians. These national means of verification are secret. Reliance on the treaty depends on acts carried out in secrecy. We shall discuss these secrets with the Russians. We are not going to discuss them as it now appear with our allies, with the American people or even with the Senate. This is highly improper.

Since the national means of verification are the basis of reliance on the treaty, these national means of verification should be opened up, displayed, at least to our allies, at least to the Congress; I hope also to the people of the United States.

UNITY BETWEEN FREE DEMOCRACIES

Other than that, I don't want to make detailed recommendations except for saying that the survival and the maintenance of freedom in every advanced democracy is the same issue and it is only unity between these free democracies that can save us. It is only such unity which can persuade any reasonable person in Russia to sign meaningful treaties. Because if we are not united they cannot talk with all of us at the same time. For the sake of safety, for survival and also for the possibility of a real structure for world peace, including the Russians, we must first come to complete agreement with our allies.

ROLE OF RESEARCH

Now, let me come to the last point and that is the role of research. It is research, it is technology, it is excellence in these fields which made of the United States the strongest country in the world. Today research on defense subjects is considered a dirty word on our university campuses. Research on any technical subject is looked down upon. Even respect for pure science is declining in our institutions of higher learning.

By contrast, the Russians have established a splendid institution, in Siberia, in Novosibersk, Academegorodok, the academic city which has been written up in Newsweek in the last issue. It is a place where people of privilege live in Russia, and this privilege includes an unheard of privilege, for Russians, some free speech. It is the greatest research and educational institution in the world. But it is only one of the tips of the Russian research iceberg whose mass is somewhere between the outskirts of Moscow and the Altai mountains. Again it is secrecy, the keeping of Russian secrets, which happens to be imposed upon me by the United States Government, which prevents me from describing to you this tremendous Russian research effort which outstrips us and which is apt to insure Russian domination or at best a "Russian peace" for the world.

I would like to become a little more specific about research because unless I do so I do not think you will fully understand what I am talking about. At the same time, secrecy unfortunately prohibits me from giving you real details.

One example is space exploration. That it is connected with knowledge about what is going on everywhere in the world is not hard to imagine. I welcome cooperation with the Russians in space as in every other respect. I worry that our open space effort should be coupled with the Russians' secret one, lest we acquire the disease of secrecy even in that field.

I also worry that the increasing Russian effort is not matched by us. Rather we are cutting our space budget. This effort is needed to find out what is going on everywhere, to detect hurricanes and save 50,000 lives in Texas as happened two years ago, to know of other dangers that may be impending. The space effort is important.

Then, instead of looking up we may look down into the ocean. Oceanography, with its very many fruits for the civilian economy, with its ultimate capability of detecting and destroying submarines, may be the one field in which our safety, our survival; may be decided.

FIELD OF FUTURE: LASERS

Finally, I would like to mention a brand new field. It is ten years old. I speak of lasers—exceedingly intensive, very sharply defined beams of light. They can be used to measure the distance of the moon, to an accuracy better than an inch. It has already been measured to the accuracy of one foot, and I could give you reasons why this is important.

It can be used to check whether pollution regulations are obeyed. Lasers can also be used for defense.

The Nobel prize for the basic ideas has been given to three people: one American, my good friend, Charlie Townes, who works in Berkeley where I work, and two Russians, Basow and Prokoroff.

Charlie Townes is no longer working on lasers. He is working on astrophysics. His interest is many light years away. Baslow and Prokoroff have stuck to lasers and to all their applications.

In this field, in the field of the future, there is no question but that the Russians are ahead of us. I believe that this lag in research or our unwillingness to apply research to better our every day life, and the criticisms leveled against the research to be applied to the defense of our country and of the free world—these are our real weaknesses.

RATIFICATION OF TREATY RECOMMENDED

If this treaty will deflect us from looking too closely on the quantity, if it deflects us from paying too much attention to the size of our weapons, if it directs our attention to finding new approaches, if it stimulates us to work with our allies for the common defense of the free world and for the ultimate establishment of a really peaceful world, then I can be happy about the treaty. At any rate, at the present moment we cannot do anything but ratify it because if we wouldn't do so this will not lead to the desperately needed improvements.

On this basis, and with deep worry about the safety of freedom everywhere, I recommend ratification of the treaty.

(The prepared statement of Mr. Teller follows:)

COMMENTS ON THE MOSCOW AGREEMENT

(By Edward Teller, University of California)

Though the SALT agreements signed in Moscow put us at a dangerous disadvantage, I recommend ratification by the Senate and general agreement by Congress. It would take many billions of dollars in the next five years to close the missile gap that becomes apparent in these agreements. In the absence of treaties, the Russian advantage would grow faster.

These agreements freeze our present disadvantage, but leave the door open for the Russians to catch up with us and surpass us in any field where we are still ahead.

It is claimed that we have a two-to-one lead in numbers of nuclear explosive missile warheads. This claim is probably correct but this advantage will not last. Mr. Laird's specific estimate that the Russians can develop MIRVs in two years is plausible.

The ABM Treaty has a valuable and novel provision; Article XIII. It establishes a standing commission with the purpose to strengthen the credibility of the treaty. It should be staffed by experts who possess vision and are dedicated to the defense of our country.

The greatest immediate danger of the agreements is unjustified euphoria. The great potential advantage is that the agreements spell out American inferiorities in vital fields; thus, needed preparation of our defenses may be spurred.

One phase of such preparation is research directed toward means of defense. Today such an activity is unpopular. If this does not change, our future is dark.

In the understandings which accompany the treaty, a most doubtful point is a limitation placed under implementation of novel ABM ideas, should they develop in the future. It is indeed a mistake to limit the use of systems which do not exist as yet and may not even be imagined at present.

Another needed step of preparation is to work more closely with our allies for the common defense of freedom. American advantage, if it still exists, is vanishing. A united, free world could insure safety, peace and democracy. Nothing in the treaty or in its interpretation should stand in the way of the effort to build a better world based on the ideas of human dignity and safeguarded by proper measures to defend the citizens of a free society.

Hence, I recommend a careful and detailed scrutiny, resulting in a statement of understandings designed to safeguard the beneficial aspects of the agreements. Once this is done, I recommend wholeheartedly, the endorsements of the treaty and interim agreement, including particularly the planned cooperation in several fields which our President has called "building blocks of peace."

Senator COOPER. I appreciate very much your statement, Dr. Teller. You have made a great contribution and your testimony is very valuable.

U.S. ARMS DEVELOPMENT IN 5-YEAR PERIOD

As I understand, you are for the agreements and this treaty—one, because you think they lay our danger out before the world and the people, and because otherwise there would be no restrictions upon the continued arms race. You have said that you fear that we are falling behind in research. Of course, there is nothing in these agreements, either the treaty or the agreement, which prevents research, so it is a question not so much dealing with the treaty or the agreement but what the attitude of the Congress is, what the attitude of the American people may be toward research and technology. At some point the others might want to comment on your statement that we are falling so far behind in research. It is my judgment and, I think, the judgment of the committee that the treaty will be approved with very few votes against it and the agreement also. All of you have stated, as the Administration does, that numerically the Soviets will be superior under this agreement in launchers, and in megatonnage. I assume that we are superior in warheads.

One question which all of you have raised and which might be the most useful for you to comment upon is, what we should do about the development of arms during the next five-year period.

As you know, in both treaty and agreement, there is nothing to prevent the modernization of the weapons which are the subject of the agreement and the treaty.

I have noticed that all of you suggest—I don't know what Dr. Brennan's views are—that we should show restraint in the development of new weapons and the modernization of the existing systems. But Dr. Hoffmann said, if I recall, on page 3 of his testimony, that the Soviet Union could overtake us in MIRVing its offensive weapons, as we are doing, and that if we wait until their technology has caught up with ours, they may then achieve a numerical superiority in overall deliverable warheads that could be politically if not strategically intolerable to us.

What is the judgment of the panel on this issue? If we show restraint, if we do not begin the development of additional strategic weapons, if we do not undertake complete modernization, but the Soviet Union does, what would be the position of the United States, if the political question is a correct one as Dr. Hoffmann has pointed out?

Would you comment, Dr. Hoffmann?

Mr. HOFFMANN. I think, Mr. Chairman, that the answer depends very much on what kind of weapons one is talking about. What I was trying to suggest in my testimony is that the new weapons programs which have been submitted by the President do not seem to me to be able to meet that particular problem. There is indeed a problem, which Dr. Teller has very forcefully described, of the Soviet Union catching up with us or doing better than we are doing in the qualitative realm; but I am not at all convinced that the programs which have been submitted to Congress address themselves to this question or that their adoption would do anything to fill the gap, if indeed it exists, which Dr. Teller has been talking about and which concerns such things as lasers, in particular, and general attitudes toward science and military research.

What those programs do is essentially continue the quantitative race in those areas which have not been restricted by SALT I, without, it seems to me, any advantage for us.

SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES

There is indeed one very serious question, on which I would like myself to hear some opinions from our military experts: what one does about the competitive deployment and testing of MIRV; but that is a very different problem from new submarine and new bomber programs.

Senator COOPER. Let's forego the bomber program. For myself, at least, I don't see any necessity of starting on that program. But what about SLBM's? I thought I gathered from what all of you said that submarine-launched missiles are now our best deterrent; is that correct? Would you agree?

Mr. TELLER. Excuse me. Let me answer this question explicitly.

Senator COOPER. What would be the effect of our failure to improve the SLBM and failure to commence Trident? Would that in any way endanger the United States? I will ask each one of you to speak upon it, and then I will yield to Senator Percy.

Mr. TELLER. Mr. Chairman, I did not say, and I don't want to be understood as saying, that our submarines today are safe.

Senator COOPER. You implied it.

Mr. TELLER. I implied it. I implied it; I hope so. I don't know the opposite. A surprise is a surprise, and it has happened before. This safety on which we count may have vanished already.

At this point I would like to make another reply to your remarks.

If you asked what will happen if the Russians get ahead of us in MIRVing, in other improvements of this kind, my answer is not only that the situation will be grave, but when it happens we may not even know it.

Senator COOPER. I understand.

Mr. TELLER. We may find it out only when the Russians feel that they are sufficiently strong to put before us their non-negotiable demands. We may be faced at that time with overwhelming irresistible force. It is for this reason that I say we have to do what we can do and we must fight the danger of euphoria which could follow from this treaty.

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO GO AHEAD WITH TRIDENT

Senator COOPER. I want to ask each one of the others because we have now to consider after the agreements and treaty are agreed to, what we will do about the modernization of the weapon systems. Do you believe that the failure to go ahead with the accelerated Trident program, for example, would in any way imperil the ultimate deterrent which I thought you all agreed on was the SLBM? What would you say, Mr. Warnke? You were the first witness.

Mr. WARNKE. As I have stated, Senator Cooper, in my written statement, I feel that going ahead with the Trident program at the present time is not only unnecessary, I regard it as a calamitous waste of funds. I think that the logic of the ABM Treaty is such that our deterrent is unchallenged and unchallengable for the foreseeable future, certainly for the period of the Interim Agreement. I think that the context has been established in which we can exercise restraint and look for reciprocal restraint on the part of the Soviet Union.

I would disagree very respectfully with those who suggest that we have tried that restraint before and have not ended up with any sort of reciprocity. Neither side has tried restraint. We have frozen the numbers of missile launchers but we have proceeded with a program which now give us 5,700 warheads to their 2,500. Now, that is not much restraint.

I am suggesting that the arms race has not been stopped by anything that has been done up to the present time. It has not been stopped by one side trying to scare the other side into submission. I think we ought to try restraint and I think there is a good chance it will work.

Senator COOPER. Dr. Brennan?

Mr. BRENNAN. May I begin with a side question and ask if these microphones that we keep wrestling with are of real or imaginary importance; is there any importance—I see. All right. They are real.

U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE BUDGET

If I may answer the question with a prefactory remark: We have for the past several years operated with a strategic-force budget that is apparently roughly half of the Soviet strategic-force budget. This has left us in a posture from which, as Mr. Kissinger noted in his Moscow press conference, we had a very poor bargaining position for attempting to persuade the Soviets to agree to equal limitations on their offensive forces and ours.

ATTEMPTING TO REDRESS IMBALANCE AND LIVE WITHIN AGREEMENT'S SPIRIT

I believe that ultimately an appropriate objective of offensive-force limitations should be to establish some kind of symmetry in the forces

so that the United States is not in a position of declaring to the world that we have accepted a secondary position in at least the forces controlled by the agreement.

How we are to get to that position, if ever, is problematical. I believe it will probably be of some importance that the United States not seem to be suffering from euphoria with regard to strategic matters. I also believe that it is important not to violate the spirit of this Interim Agreement if, as expected, it is approved and, therefore, I should be reluctant to say at this point that we should attempt to redress in the span of a few years the strategic-force imbalance that has developed between the Soviet Union and the United States.

These conflicting requirements, one, of attempting to redress an imbalance that has developed and, two, of attempting to live within the spirit of this agreement if we accept it, are going to present a difficult and delicate problem of balance, to which I have no immediate and ready answer.

PROCEEDING WITH TRIDENT APPROPRIATE

In regard to the particular question of ULMS or Trident, whichever you wish to call it, my immediate belief would be that it is highly appropriate to proceed at least with the development of the Trident system, although whether it will ultimately prove necessary to deploy it in large numbers is a decision that can easily be deferred.

DANGER IF RESTRAINT IS SHOWN?

Senator COOPER. I must defer to my associates here. It has been suggested by some that the United States should show retraint for a year or two at least, to determine whether or not the Soviets were proceeding with a strategic arms buildup. I will defer to my associates but I hope you will respond as to whether there would be any danger, in the military or political fields, to which you have referred if we showed restraint for a year or two.

I yield now to Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I have not been here but I would greatly appreciate it if, on my time, we simply continued down the line. We have heard from two of the expert witnesses and we have heard from Dr. Teller.

Could we have a word from you in answer to Senator Cooper's question, Professor Hoffmann?

Mr. HOFFMANN. Yes, I would entirely support Mr. Warnke's position, that to go ahead fullspeed now with the Trident program would be at least a waste of opportunities for further limitations, especially in the qualitative arms race for offensive weapons.

In the two areas which strike me as the most sensitive and the most dangerous, and which are ASW and MIRV, I do think, for the reasons that both Mr. Warnke and I have both indicated in our testimony earlier, that we can afford this restraint for a while.

U.S. IN POOR BARGAINING POSITION IN MOSCOW

I do believe that if we were indeed in a poor bargaining position in Moscow, that then the results we have achieved are nothing short

of miraculous. After all, we have got the Soviets to accept limitations in areas where we had no ongoing programs and where, if they had wanted to hold out, they could have pushed ahead far beyond the 3 to 2 position which they have now; and, frankly—and I do some reading about foreign relations—I see nowhere any indication that our allies now believe that we have accepted a second-rate position in defense. They may believe it if we tell them often enough, but so far they do not.

Of course, there are the dangers that Dr. Teller has mentioned; but I still do not believe that in the daily universe of politics the scenario by which suddenly the Soviet Union would feel that it is capable of knocking out pretty much all of the U.S. retaliatory force in a first strike without suffering an unbearable and unacceptable damage in return, is a very likely one. It may be a scientist's nightmare, but I must say that it seems to me as imaginary as science fiction.

PLEA FOR MORE RESTRAINT

What I do know is that if after 25 years of this arms race we are in a position in which we can be told that never has our security been more threatened, never has the danger been greater, then there is indeed something very grievously wrong with the logic of the momentum; even on that basis, I would plead for more restraint. And I do not like the overuse of the Munich analogy. It is Munich which, to a large extent, sent us into Vietnam and if there is disaffection in universities toward research which seems connected with war, it is very largely to that that we owe it.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

Professor Kahan?

RESTRAINT

Mr. KAHAN. In answer to Senator Cooper's question, I believe that as a practical matter it is simply too late to get an effective ban on MIRVs. I begin with that premise, unfortunate as it may be. However, even though this would free the Soviet Union to build MIRVs, the U.S. will not fall behind in the vital area of MIRV technology for at least the next eight years. We are already deploying these systems in Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles. I suggest that we should complete these programs simply because it will provide a lead which will then take away the requirements for pursuing full speed ahead with additional modern weapon systems, such as the Trident and the B–1. By giving a little on MIRVs, perhaps we can exercise greater restraint on expensive future.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SHOULD CONTINUE ON TRIDENT

Therefore, on the Trident program, I would disagree that there is a need to begin to produce and prepare to deploy such a system. But I share Dr. Brennan's view that we should continue research and development efforts in that area because of the importance of keeping our submarine systems viable.

SOVIET POINT OF VIEW

I might add that from the Soviet Union's point of view the agreement, as I suggested in my testimony, can appear to be disadvantageous: Imagine the Soviet analog of some of our "worst case" Pentagon analysts looking at the emerging U.S. threat under the SALT agreement: at least 10,000 U.S. warheads being deployed in our missiles and on our aircraft over the next five years; an advantage in U.S. qualitative technology across the board which can be exploited under the agreement; from no controls of the U.S. long-range B–52 bombers and no controls over U.S. forward-based systems in Europe and on carriers which can hit the Soviet Union. Were I sitting in the Kremlin examining the agreements I might indeed be nervous about signing it.

Clearly, this is a distorted analysis. However, when you can construct these arguments from the Soviet point of view, it begins to make our deterrent look a lot better than a lot of people have suggested.

EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC BALANCE

Finally, whatever the evolution of the strategic balance might be within the confines of SALT, I believe that we cannot do any better in the absence of any agreement. If parity is here, it is here to stay. We should cement it at the levels agreed to under the SALT accords rather than continue to add new weapons at a rapid rate.

CHOICES UNDER SALT

But the choices under SALT are not complete restraint or full deployment and procurement. The current debate has become polarized, in my view, between these two alternatives which are really not practical. The realistic questions concern what R&D efforts we should pursue and at what pace, and what criteria should we use for moving those programs into deployment and procurement as necessary improvements or replacements for existing systems.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, Professor.

Dr. Teller, would you wish to make any comment?

U.S. RETALIATORY FORCE

Mr. TELLER. It is extremely hard to argue against a point of view that has been established by repetition and that is supported by the enormous size of nuclear explosives. The idea that we have enough retaliatory force is indeed very generally accepted, according to the simple facts of human psychology impossible to change this idea in a few words.

I have given some reasons how our retaliatory forces could be knocked out. I have not completed my argument. I am now forced to go a little farther in what has been called science fiction. I only can say I wish it were mere fiction. I lived with these problems for very many years and unfortunately it is not science fiction.

We have, for instance, a presumed superiority in bombers. The Russians have an incredible air defense system, at least five times stronger than ours. Not many of our bombers will get off in a surprise attack. Those that get off probably will not reach their targets.

CIVIL DEFENSE

One further thought: We have no civil defense, practically none. The Russians have an evacuation plan which they have published. The last publication, a little more than a year old, has been distributed in 500,000 copies. The English translation is available. It has been estimated what would happen if the Russians execute this evacuation plan, and then give us an ultimatum, and if they attack us and we retaliate. If our retaliation is successful, if all my other worries are mistaken, then our retaliation against the Russians will give rise to a casualty rate of 3 or 4 percent of the Russian population; while the same exchange much more than 50 percent of our people will die.

The Russian cities may be in ruins but Russia will then have a way to tell everybody what to do, and their recovery will be fast and their domination of the world will be complete.

DANGERS SEEN IN FIELDS OF RESEARCH AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I have been asked to respond so I tried to do so. The relations of this to the treaty is simply connected with the proposal: we have now a treaty; we are safe; let's cut the budget. I say let's ratify the treaty; let's put up a defense system around our capital and get more experience about ABM since the Russians already have more experience than we do. Let us go ahead with every reasonable expenditure and look at each of them carefully. I think that generally what is being proposed by the Department of Defense is reasonable but I don't want to talk about objects like a Trident or the B–1, about which I am not an expert. There seem to be nothing but experts here. I am an expert in research. I am an expert in nuclear weapons. In those two fields I see enormous dangers.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Dr. Teller.

Mr. Chairman, we have a vote on the floor. Thank you very much. I am through so far as I am concerned.

Senator COOPER. I do not want to impose on you but Senator Percy has not had a chance to ask a question. Do you mind waiting until he returns?

Mr. TELLER. Of course not.

Senator JAVITS. It shouldn't be more than five minutes.

NEW SYSTEMS OR MODERNIZATION OF PRESENT SYSTEMS?

Senator COOPER. Five minutes. I don't want to over-simplify these matters and, of course, it seems like oversimplification when I am talking to a group of men who have great knowledge in this field, but I think we know that both countries have the capability of destroying each other over and over and over at present, and if the arms race goes on, of course, that capacity will be increased in magnitude. What I would like to know and I think what most of us would like to know, in this situation—hoping that in Phase II of negotiations, there will be further agreements on limitations or reductions of arms—are your recommendations when we are now called upon to determine whether we should support new systems or modernization of present systems. When Senator Percy returns will you say what you recommend that we do?

BARGAINING CHIPS

I ask one further question before I leave on the question of bargaining chips: Isn't it really a question that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are both, not so much bargaining but both have recognized what the other side in fact has? I will try to come back and Senator Percy won't keep you long. Thank you very much.

[Recess.]

Senator PERCY (presiding). To conserve the time of our guests, and we are sorry for these interruptions, Senator Cooper suggested that I go right ahead.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES

I would first like to say how very helpful the testimony has been this morning, and I see that you have as much unanimity of opinion as we have in the Senate on most issues.

IMPORTANCE OF PROPOSED SECOND (WASHINGTON) ABM SITE

First, I would like your judgment as to the importance of the proposed second ABM site in terms of the stability of the SALT agreements, the security of the United States, and the need to present a strong negotiating position for SALT II.

Mr. BRENNAN. By the second site you mean the importance of the Washington site?

Senator PERCY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRENNAN. I believe that is more important than the Grand Forks site for the protection of Minuteman, and in this I differ quite sharply with both Mr. Warnke and Professor Hoffmann in their remarks on that point.

I believe there is a very considerable substantive importance to the Washington defense site. This does not have to do with protecting the country as a whole against large-scale Soviet attacks but with a number of technical but important considerations for protecting the command and control capability of the country against possible light attacks, which might be Soviet attacks or they might be from some other source. Let me mention only one possible consideratiton.

You might have a situation in a tense crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union where some possible third country, the favorite candidate of these scenarios is China but other possibilities may occur in the future, in which this third country would like to provoke a large-scale war between the Soviet Union and the United States. An active defense system of Washington would be one of the ways to assure that an attempt of that kind would be quite likely to fail, and this reason alone would justify the Washington defense even if there were no others.

I don't think the Washington defense is of great importance for bargaining-chip purposes but it is, in my judgment, of very great strategic significance.

Senator PERCY. May I ask who agrees with that position of Dr. Brennan?

Mr. TELLER. I agree with the position but I want to add that the Russians had much more experience with missile defense. Our experience has been limited and I think to acquire this experience in a second

missile site where we are not hampered by hardware already committed is an additional valuable asset.

Senator PERCY. Is there any further agreement with the position? Those who disagree, then. Mr. Kahan?

Mr. KAHAN. At the outset I might observe that the Russian experience with their ABM has probably been all bad and a waste of money. The realization that ABMs do not have much value undoubtedly influenced the Soviets to take the initiative in advocating ABM limitations at SALT.

Beyond that, I believe that there is no security requirement or negotiating need to build the Washington ABM site at a cost of over $3 billion. Unlike certain offensive programs which should sustain some momentum, I see no necessity for the site.

Senator PERCY. Professor Hoffmann?

Mr. HOFFMANN. I agree entirely and concur in that position.

Senator PERCY. Yes. Mr. Warnke?

Mr. WARNKE. I agree with Mr. Kahan. I would say the national capital ABM defense is of no importance whatsoever; it can't defend against a Soviet attack; it has only 100 intercepter missiles; it is not needed against the attack of a third country because that which deters the Soviet Union is certainly more than adequate to deter any third country. If a third country were insane enough to want to attack, a defense around Washington still leaves them with sufficient targets to provoke the kind of crisis to which Dr. Brennan referred; and, finally, as far as the bargaining-chip argument is concerned, we have the ABM Treaty. We have played our bargaining chips. We don't need them anymore for a treaty; it has already been signed.

ACCOMPLISHMENT OF OBJECTIVE AT KWAJALEIN

Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, can I ask you why you can't accomplish your objective better at Kwajalein where you can really test?

Mr. TELLER. I would be glad to see the objective accomplished in Kwajalein. The system is a very complex one and needs a pilot plant type of operation which is more than we ever are likely to invest in Kwajalein.

RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE WITH ABM

I also would like to make one point which I think is more important in a general sense than it is in a specific sense. I have stated, and I think I can prove it, that the Russians have a much longer experience with ABM than we have. It has been stated on the other side that all the experience of the Russians was bad. Let me please reply to that, that it may be correct, maybe not. The other witness did not know; I don't know. We are talking about the uncertain future where research and development are very important, and to jump to the conclusion that Russian experience was all bad, to settle such an important question in such a manner, I think that is improper.

I happened to look into all the intelligence available and I can tell you, without violating security but perhaps violating some feelings in the CIA, as well as outside of the CIA, that everything we know is inconclusive.

SOVIET RESPONSE IF NO SECOND ABM SITE

Senator PERCY. Dr. Brennan, I know you want to comment on this, but would you also comment on what you think the Soviet position might be if we did not go ahead with the second ABM site? What sort of a response or reaction do you think that would elicit from them?

Mr. BRENNAN. To take the specific question you just put first, I have not thought about it and have no immediate idea of what, if anything, the Soviets might specifically do as a consequence of our not doing the Washington defense site.

CATALYTIC ATTACK

I did wish to comment on part of Mr. Warnke's remarks just preceding. I believe he misunderstood the role I had in mind for a third power. His remark that what would deter the major power would also deter the minor one suggests he must have been thinking of a situation in which the minor power I was speaking of was identifiable. I was speaking about what is sometimes called a catalytic attack in which some secondary power attempts to provoke a Soviet-American war by disguising its own attack to appear as a Soviet attack directed at us. If in a tense Soviet-American crisis Washington were suddenly to disappear, along with a few other targets, from submarine-launched missiles from some unidentified submarine which could not be discriminated from a Soviet submarine, the likelihood of triggering an all-out Soviet-American war would be much greater if Washington were among the cities destroyed in such an attack, and it is insurance against that kind of eventuality that makes me think that the Washington defense site would be valuable. There are other considerations of like kind.

POSSIBILITY OF SOVIETS NOT GOING AHEAD WITH SECOND SITE

Senator PERCY. Would you respond to the possibility, however, that the Soviets who—who did not have the protection of ICBMs in their original ABM defensive plan anyway—might not go ahead with their second site if we did no go ahead with ours? They have not selected the location yet.

Mr. BRENNAN. I should think the likelihood that they will go ahead or not go ahead with their second site is likely to be substantially independent of whether or not we build a Washington defense. They may not have very great motivation to go ahead with their allowed ICBM defense site, apart from the one Dr. Teller mentions of acquiring experience with systems of this kind. I myself believe that our motivation for the Grand Forks site is very much lower than our motivation for the Washington defense site, given the nature of the Interim Agreement and given the amount of protection that that Grand Forks site will provide to the Minuteman force.

EFFECT OF NOT GOING AHEAD WITH SECOND SITES

Senator PERCY. Would you feel that we would be at a strategic disadvantage if we did not go ahead with the Washington site and they did not go ahead with their second site protecting ICBMs?

Mr. BRENNAN. I should judge that we would be at a strategic disadvantage from some important perspectives if we did not build the Washington defense site whether or not they build their second site allowed them.

Senator PERCY. Mr. Warnke, did you want to comment on either one of those points?

Mr. WARNKE. I did want to comment, Senator Percy, on the reply that Dr. Brennan made to me.

SCENARIO WHERE THIRD COUNTRY PRETENDS TO BE SOVIET UNION

My feeling with regard to the scenario where a third country pretends to be the Soviet Union is again that it is science fiction in large part. But assuming this horrendous thing would take place, I would suggest that even the destruction of Chicago or possibly Winnetka would be sufficient to increase the crisis atmosphere. There are a plethora of targets that would be available. The defense of Washington does not contribute in any respect to decreasing the likelihood of this highly implausible scenario.

Mr. BRENNAN. No, sir. If I may respond further to that point, the decision makers of the U.S. are not in Winnetka, or in Chicago either. It is a very important asymmetry.

Mr. WARNKE. If they disappeared, they could not make the mistake that the attack was from the Soviet Union instead of China.

Mr. BRENNAN. You might get a different set of decision makers who might be less cautious.

Mr. TELLER. I want to associate myself with Don by stating that our decision makers who are here are the best possible ones.

PROTECTION WASHINGTON ABM SITE WOULD AFFORD NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY

Senator PERCY. Dr. Kahan, I wonder if you would comment as to what protection a second ABM site around Washington would afford the national command authority in real terms, especially if the threat came from SLBMs or cruise missiles launched, let's say, 300 to 1,000 miles offshore?

Mr. KAHAN. I think you have given part of my answer in your question, Senator Percy. I think that because there are ways of getting through a very thin 100-launcher ABM defense of Washington, if a nation wished to do so——

Mr. BRENNAN. If the Soviets wish to do so.

Mr. KAHAN. I would argue if any nation wished to do so. I am thinking five to eight years ahead—since we not even build the ABM site for three or four years—and by the time it is constructed, technology would be available to the Chinese which would make it possible for them to exhaust, by-pass, or penetrate a 100-launcher system. Even if the U.S. could "buy" some time—under one of the scenarios conjured up, where our 100 ABMs are launched against single missiles coming at Washington—I question how much additional time we could actually buy and what our leaders might do with in those additional few minutes that would require a defense.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Finally, I would say from the standpoint of U.S. policy toward China—a dimension which has not been introduced—the ABM treaty has significant benefits. It prevented the U.S. from deploying a nationwide ABM system against the Chinese which in my judgment, would have harmed U.S.-Chinese relations.

If we build a Washington ABM site, however, Peking could begin to believe that we really are worried about the so-called "irrational Chinese ICBM threat." We would then be moving in the direction of destabilizing U.S.-Chinese relations. Yet Henry Kissinger returned from a recent visit in Peking and indicated that we can easily give up an ABM defense against China because the Chinese are peaceful and we are establishing relations with them. I would therefore, reject the Washington area site for reasons of improving relations with China, in addition to the other reasons prevented.

SKEPTICISM ABOUT ABM DEPLOYMENTS

Senator PERCY. My own skepticism about ABM deployments has been expressed in televised discussions with Senator Jackson, and we have come closer together as he has taken a position against the proposed Washington site. Soviet officials have indicated that they have no doubt about U.S. ability to penetrate the Moscow ABM defense and about our inability to create an impenetrable U.S. ABM defense. And a crew on one of our nuclear submarines told me they would have no problem in penetrating the Moscow ABM defense.

Now, it is still a subject of debate and I think your comments today have been helpful for the forthcoming debate on the floor of the Senate.

B–1 BOMBER

I would like to get some insight into your feeling on the B–1 bomber and, Mr. Warnke, perhaps with your background you can comment on that for us.

Do we or do we not, in your judgment, need the B–1? Do you believe the Soviets assume we are going to build it?

Mr. WARNKE. Senator Percy, I have never been able to guess what the Soviets assume or what they don't assume. I have difficulty enough dealing with our own decision makers. As far as my view is concerned, I think that the B–1 is not a needed improvement at the present time. I am not sure that it is really an improvement. I think that it has been made clear by the people in the Pentagon that the B–52 properly modernized can serve the purpose of the bomber part of our deterrent well into the 1980s. I think that the B–1 gives you less in the way of payload. I think that the B–52, particularly with SCAD and SRAM, gives you the capability of mounting a very serious threat to Soviet targets in a standoff capacity. All that the B–1 really does is to give you a low-level, supersonic capability. That is very expensive and relatively useless in the light of the development of SRAM; therefore, I think that the program is inordinately expensive and it probably gives us less for more money than we would have by modernizing the B–52.

IMPROVEMENT OF POSEIDON AS AGAINST NEW TRIDENT PROGRAM

Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, on the Poseidon-class submarine and missiles, why can't the present class be improved as against the necessity of going into a whole new $12 billion program for the Trident? Is there room for improvement, and do we think that the Poseidon technology will become obsolete in the next five years?

Mr. TELLER. Senator Percy, I have already disqualified myself from making a detailed argument on any of these specific subjects. I want to point out, however, that in the Trident program there is included a missile modification that can be used on the Trident or on another submarine which gives our submarines much more sea space, which even allows us to keep them close to home, where countermeasures against Trident or any other submarine will become more difficult because we can do something about those countermeasures. This portion of the program looks to me completely justified.

When you go beyond that I know that the program has been carefully considered. If you ask me to say yes or no to Trident, I will say yes but I am not basing it on my own expert knowledge, and cannot go further than this.

FRUITFUL AREAS FOR NEGOTIATING SALT II

Senator PERCY. I wonder if, Dr. Kahan, you could comment on what you feel would be the most fruitful areas for negotiating in SALT II?

Mr. KAHAN. In my testimony I tried to introduce a logical framework for considering a question such as this. However, I must admit that nations often strike bargains which seem illogical. The ABM Treaty, in particular, seems to reflect a compromise which did not represent both sides' optimum negotiating positions but which each side was prepared to accept.

Nevertheless, the two of SALT II ought to be: first, maintaining stability in the strategic balance, and second, preventing the arms race from continuing to increase tensions and wasting money—even though those efforts may not directly threaten the stability of the balance. I view it first as a military goal and the second as perhaps political goal.

Under the first objective, I believe that both sides ought to begin working immediately on two stability problems: ASW limitations and ICBM vulnerability.

I agree, in this sense, with Dr. Teller, that there is a need to ensure that both sides' submarine deterrent remain survivable. I view SALT as providing a framework to discuss this problem bilaterally and to try to work out arrangements, such as agreed sonar barriers and other zonal arrangements, which can make each side feel secure that its submarine forces cannot be threatened by possible antisubmarine progress on the other side. I do not suggest that the problem needs to be solved tomorrow. But I do think that a technical negotiating group at SALT should begin to discuss this issue. Four or five years hence, when the problem begins to be thought of as more serious, we might have found some possible solutions.

Similarly, the problem of ICBM vulnerability will inevitably be upon us, if not in five years in eight years, because SALT permits

MIRVs and accuracy improvement, but does not permit either side to protect its ICBM sites with ICBMs. Solutions to this problem, such as ICBM reductions, should be considered by the U.S. and Soviet negotiators.

In terms of the second objective, I would broaden the scope of the agreement and try to put a lid on expenditures. I would suggest limits on long-range bombers, forward-based systems and other strategic weapons which have not been limited in phase I.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Senator PERCY. Is it realistic for us to seek a comprehensive test ban now and can we enforce such a ban with our present detection methods? Would any of you care to comment on that?

Mr. TELLER. Senator Percy, may I have permission to answer your previous question as well as this one?

Senator PERCY. Of course.

Mr. TELLER. I think that in this particular treaty, in SALT I, there is one innovation which I emphasized; I don't remember whether you were here or not when I did so. Article XIII——

Senator PERCY. Yes, I was.

Mr. TELLER (continuing). Gives us a way to communicate?

Senator PERCY. Right.

PROPOSAL FOR SALT II: DECREASE SECRECY

Mr. TELLER. I have one proposal for SALT II, which I think has overriding importance. Decrease secrecy on both sides. Unless we do so, unless secrecy disapears, these negotiations look to me like an honest poker game with each side having several wild cards up its sleeve produced by research. Only we are beginning to run short of wild cards and the Russians are not. Openness, to my mind, is the condition for any agreement that can be controlled. Any step that will bring about more than one sided openness will be highly welcome.

I would not bargain for openness by saying if you open up we do so too. I argue that here we should proceed unilaterally, but then we should exert every possible pressure, use every possible inducement so that they will open up as well.

POLICING OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NOT POSSIBLE

Now, as to the second point: No, the policing of a comprehensive test ban is not possible. A great deal has been said about it. But nuclear explosives can be decoupled, exploded in cavities. They can be exploded in earthquake-prone areas. It will be exceedingly hard to distinguish them from bona fide earthquakes.

Furthermore, by giving up a possibility of testing we are giving up one very important active field of research where further improvements can be made. For instance, we may produce nuclear explosives for very specific purposes, small and accurate ones that can be used in the battlefield. We have to develop these. We cannot check whether the Russians will continue to do so.

Furthermore, the comprehensive ban would close another door on research. For that reason I am definitely opposed to it as well as for the reason that it cannot be checked.

Senator PERCY. Does anyone else wish to comment on that particular point?

Mr. WARNKE. I find myself in great disagreement in that respect. I think the seismological detection has been improved to the point where you could have quite adequate certainty that the ban was not being circumvented by the Soviet Union. I think our national means of observation would be sufficient also so that we could detect any attempts to cheat on that.

BENEFITS OF CONTINUED TESTING

As far as the vaunted benefits of continuing testing are concerned, I take quite a jaundiced view of it. I think for us to try to continue testing for the purpose of developing small tactical nuclear weapons for the battlefield would be self-defeating and eventually destructive of the entire human race and I think if we ever did develop small tactical nuclear weapons you would have to be sure the other side had an equivalent supply, otherwise when you started with one of your small clean ones they would come back and hit you with a great big dirty one.

Senator PERCY. I appreciate your comment. I did not want to assume then that by silence everyone concurred with Dr. Teller.

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, sir.

DR. TELLER'S CONTACTS WITH ACDA

Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, have you kept up your contacts with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and advised them of your judgment in this, because a very crucial point is that we shouldn't enter into any agreement the integrity of which we can't insure, and if this next step is possible we want to be certain that it can be effectively enforced.

Mr. TELLER. Sir, I have kept up carefully my contacts with the detection capabilities. I did not intend to reply to Mr. Warnke because he is so wrong that there is no point in replying. However, as far as ACDA is concerned, I shall be happy to discuss this with them if and when they invite me to do so.

Senator PERCY. Fine.

TECHNOLOGICALLY FEASIBLE TO CONDUCT CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

Mr. BRENNAN. It so happens that the subject of a comprehensive nuclear test ban had been one of my main areas of study for the past year and a little bit more, so I happen to be very familiar with most of these issues.

Mr. Warnke in his remarks used an important qualifying word; I am not sure exactly what it was, but I think he said it can be quite adequately detected. Well, what is adequate may depend on your judgment about some very complex issues and I wouldn't attempt to discuss those issues here in any detail. I should say that as a matter of technological feasibility it is probably technologically feasible to con-

duct a number of clandestine nuclear explosions, that the Soviets could conduct a number of clandestine nuclear explosions about which we would have little knowledge or very uncertain knowledge at best.

Whether or not those would be sufficiently significant in order to justify the cost, the potential cost, to the Soviets of carrying out those tests is a much more complex issue, and I believe Mr. Warnke's position was reflecting a judgment about this evaluation which transcends the simple technological question of whether or not there are means available to the Soviets to conduct a number of covert tests.

It is possible to argue that the significance of further nuclear developments, if tests are otherwise mainly limited, is rather small in terms of what can be done with a surreptitious test series. As I say, this is a much more complex evaluation than the question of detection and identification.

Senator PERCY. Professor Hoffmann and Dr. Kahan, would you want to associate yourselves with either of the two positions?

DR. TELLER'S LOGIC

Mr. HOFFMANN. I am slightly ovewhelmed, which has happened before, by the contradictory evidence presented by experts. My own reaction is essentially a political scientist's reaction. What worries me about the logic of Dr. Teller's position is that it is the logic of an absolutely unlimited continuation of the arms race because otherwise one takes risks which might be fatal in certain circumstances, which I consider to be extreme and unlikely.

DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL, NUCLEAR WEAPONS

On the other hand, if there is a very grave risk that a very important unilateral breakthrough can be made by undetected testing, then obviously one has to be very cautious. But from the little I know on the subject I would certainly prefer to associate myself with Mr. Warnke's comment, in particular when it comes to the small, tactical weapons. It seems to me that to a large extent the kind of world order we have tried to establish has rested on a very sharp distinction between nuclear weapons and all others, and I am not convinced that efforts to erode that distinction by making nuclear weapons more like other weapons is wise.

It seems to me what can be accomplished by the small tactical weapons can very well, if that is the word, be accomplished by conventional weapons, and that in that way one would not run the risk which Mr. Warnke mentioned, of somewhat inadvertently or unintentionally starting the kind of nuclear escalation that we have so very carefully avoided since 1945.

Mr. KAHAN. I would begin. Senator, by associating myself strongly with that last point. I view it as an advantage if a comprehensive test ban would deny the U.S. the option of developing small nuclear weapons which might then serve as alternatives for sustaining adequate levels of conventional defense around the world. I fear that the U.S. might conceivably find itself in a return to a form of a "massive retaliation" defense policy if we are not selective in the way in which we seek to reduce the defense budget. One of the specific fears I have is a

reduction in conventional defense leading willy-nilly to a return to increased reliance on nuclear defense as battlefield weapons in Europe and Asia so we can bring the boys home. More "bang for the buck" made little sense 15 years ago and it certainly does not make any sense under the present situation of nuclear parity. If a CTB can help prevent such possible defense policies from emerging, I am for it.

VERIFICATION OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

In terms of verification of the CTB, I tend to align myself with Mr. Warnke's position, although I am not an expert in that particular area. The key question is how much confidence you ask for under an arms control agreement. One should not expect 100 percent certainty. We do not have that in the absence of arms control. We could, of course, always attempt to negotiate the so-called "threshold" test ban by banning underground nuclear testing above the level at which we are highly confident of detection but below the level which might have sufficient uncertainty to bother some people. Such a two-step approach to a CTB might be bureaucratically effective within the U.S. and the Soviet Union in terms of satisfying those who argue that we must continue testing and it could pave the way for a total test ban without on-site inspection.

NUCLEAR TESTS COULD BE DETECTED AS EARTHQUAKES

Senator PERCY. Dr. Teller, we would appreciate your comments on this point, that if earthquakes can be detected as possible nuclear tests, is the reverse likely, tests that can pass possibly as earthquakes on detection equipment?

Mr. TELLER. I am sorry, sir, I have not understood the question.

Senator PERCY. The question is, if earthquakes can be detected as possible nuclear tests, then is the reverse also true or likely, that is, tests that can pass as possible earthquakes on detection equipment? If you have a nuclear test could it show up as an earthquake?

Mr. TELLER. That was one of my main points, that a nuclear test can be made to look like an earthquake. I also should say that I would be very interested in hearing from Mr. Warnke, a quantitative statement of how small nuclear explosions does he think can be safely detected? What has gone on here, is a confusion of issues, and a confusion of words. That to me is appalling. Respectfully, Professor Hoffmann you said you were confused by the evidence. No evidence was shown here, only words, and those words in toto made no sense.

OBLITERATING DISTINCTION BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Mr. BRENNAN. May I make one brief point? I would just not like to leave the possible impression on the record I was sympathetic to obliterating the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, in case any of our colleagues had the impression I supported that position. I never have and I do not now.

Senator PERCY. Thank you.

DEFENSE RELATED RESEARCH ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES

Dr. Teller, you made some very disturbing comments about research and research attitudes on universities, and I can assure you that even those of us who did hope that we would not go ahead with ABM deployment always supported continued research in that area, and we tried to overcome the feeling on campuses that defense-related research should not be pursued. I am thankful that we are doing it at campuses rather than just in Government laboratories, and that we have the competence available on campuses.

DETECTION OF SUBMARINES

I would sometime like very much to pursue with you in private or in executive session the subject you raised of detection of submarines. It would be very crucial to us to know if our submarine fleet is in danger of detection and if we are falling behind in that area of research, and certainly in the national means of verification. I just want to clarify that I understood your point there; as I recall, you indicated that we are making available information to the Soviet Union on our national verification system that is not available to the public or to Congress. I just wanted to be sure I understood what you meant there because, as I understand it, we do not share intelligence data with the Soviet Union. It is not made public, but Congress does have access to such material.

Having spent many years in the photographic field, I have had a deep interest in it and it is my impression we can detect railroad ties at 100 miles and even count the railroad ties. A steady pattern of photography over a given area, all four seasons of the year, enables us to verify with considerable accuracy what is going on in that area in the deployment of offensive or defensive systems. Were you saying that we don't have such detection information or that whatever we have should be shared with the public more than it is, or implying that we in Congress are not getting access to information that we should have?

Mr. TELLER. I meant the second and third.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator PERCY. Thank you very much. I appreciate your brevity, and I want to thank you very much again on behalf of the committee for your patience. I am certain committee members will study your testimony very carefully. Senator Cooper and Senator Javits wanted me to express particularly their deep disappointment at not being able to return because of their schedules. But your contribution today will be shared with all committee members and is very valuable indeed. We much appreciate it.

The hearings are recessed.

(Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 1:30 p.m., the committee to reconvene at 10 o'clock a.m., Thursday, June 29, 1972.)

(The following material was subsequently supplied:)

LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY,
June 30, 1972.

MR. BILL ASHWORTH,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. ASHWORTH: Please find enclosed a supplementary statement that I hope you can add to the record of the testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations on June 28. I think this statement is quite important. It explains the basis on which testimony was given concerning an exceedingly important question, namely, the comprehensive test ban.

A copy of the attached statement is being sent to Mr. Warnke in case he has anything to say in the way of a refutation or comment.

Thanking you for your courtesy,

Sincerely,

EDWARD TELLER.

Attachment.

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT BY DR. EDWARD TELLER

Immediately following the question period conducted by Senator Charles H. Percy of Illinois, I (Edward Teller) addressed Mr. Paul Warnke in order to clarify an important question that came up in connection with a possible comprehensive test ban (CTB). I asked Mr. Warnke how small a nuclear explosion needs to be in order to escape detection. Mr. Warnke's answer was, "small enough." I thereupon inquired just how small is "small enough?" Is it one ton? 10 tons? 100 tons? One kilton? 10 kilotons?

Mr. Warnke gave an answer to the effect, "I do not care how small it is."

I thereupon asked Mr. Warnke, who is of course respected by the Committee as a former head of ISA, to make a statement to the same effect in order to clarify the basis of his testimony. Mr. Warnke refused. Then I told him that in that case I felt that it is my duty to do so myself. He answered that he does not care wheher or not I do so.

For the information of the Committee, I wish to add that to the best of my knowledge a nuclear explosion will be effectively undetectable (even as a mere seismic event) if it is smaller than one kiloton and is fired in a reasonably low coupling medium such as dry alluvium. However, no serious evader would consider himself limited by this number. Such an evader would be concerned with the question of how large an explosion can be and still be unidentified (as a nuclear explosion). The following chart was presented as testimony to hte JCAE.[1]

CHART 22.—EVASION TECHNIQUES

Technique	Conservative yield limit to avoid seismic detection or identification (kilotons)	Constraints on tester
Tamped shot in low-coupling media	1–2	Low yields; relatively few areas of low-coupling media; most in undeveloped regions; evader should test in seismic region.
Decoupling cavity	50	Large volume of rock or salt to hide; long time to prepare; expensive.
Detonate following nearby earthquake	50	Device may have to be emplaced for many months; local earthquakes must be at least 1 seismic magnitude larger than explosion. 10 to 20 events per year > mb 5.5 in U.S.S.R.
Detonate following large earthquake	100	Most efficient way to conduct clandestine tests; evader should probably test in seismic regions. 1 event every 1 to 2 years.
Multiple shot simulation of earthquake	100	Requires multiple emplacement holes; evader should test in seismic regions.

[1] "Status of Current Technology to Identify Seismic Events as Natural or Man Made," Hearings of The Subcommittee on Research Development and Radiation of The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, October 27–28, 1971. Chart 22, page 53, testimony by Dr. Lukasik, Director of Advanced Research Projects Agency.

This indicates that an evader can fire up to the order of 100 kilotons, depending on the effort he is willing to exert. In view of the fact that most important work on tactical weapons need be performed under one kiloton and in further view of the fact that the greatest portion of our important shots were fired under 100 kilotons, Mr. Warnke's statement that undetectable explosions are "small enough" is completely unjustified. On the basis of present information we have to accept the fact that a CTB cannot be policed in an effective manner. It should also be noticed that Dr. Lukasik's testimony on which the above chart is based has been given less than a year ago. What this amounts to is the fact that advances in capabilities of detection and identification have been offset by advances in a better understanding of evasion.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m., in Room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Cooper and Percy.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT

This is the fifth open committee session on the proposed treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems and the proposed Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons.

At this point I would like to specifically recognize members of the media who have diligently covered these hearings and, in particular, I would like to express my appreciation to the National Public Radio Network which has broadcasted all of these sessions live, enabling many interested in these issues to follow them closely.

This morning I would like to welcome Senator Kennedy as our first witness. We will also be hearing from Senator Buckley, Senator Joseph Clark of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy; Mr. Roy Bennett of the Americans for Democratic Action; Dr. George Rathjens of the Council for a Livable World; Dr. James Dornan, Liberty Lobby; Mr. Sanford Gottlieb of SANE; Mrs. Phyllis Schafly of the National Association of Pro America; and Mr. Cordell Burch of the Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism.

Senator Kennedy, we are very pleased to have you this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee this morning regarding the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement presented to the Senate by the President.

I am pleased to be part of the continuing inquiries by this committee and by the other committees of the Senate, for I believe that the tenor of much of the testimony from Administration witnesses requires some response.

Stated as simply as possible, it seems clear that the Administration is using an important and impressive treaty to limit arms in order to whipsaw the Congress into stamping its approval on new, outrageously expensive and unnecessary weapon systems.

The SALT agreements essential include a treaty limiting ABMs and a five-year interim agreement which places numerical limits on certain offensive weapons systems. But beyond those agreements there is an equally impressive achievement, one which Dr. Kissinger captured in these words: ". . . the stakes were larger than the simple technical issues; . . . what was at stake was a major step toward international stability, confidence among nations and a turn in the pattern of postwar relationships."

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S PURSUIT OF ADDITIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS

It would be tragic were the accomplishments of diplomacy to be tossed away to satisfy those within the President's constituency who were so evidently uneasy with his Peking and Moscow visits. Yet within a few days of the President's return the Secretary of Defense was calling for a new cruise missile for our submarines, for a tenfold increase in outlays this year for ULMS, for full speed ahead on the B–1 bomber and for construction of a National Capital Area ABM system—a total package of at least $25 billion.

Instead of the restraint called for by the President, the Defense Department is engaged in a headlong pursuit after additional weapon systems that are irrelevant to our strategic deterrence at this time and irresponsible in their appetite for resources when our domestic needs are being short changed.

It would be tragic if a treaty limiting the quantitative arms race were to become the excuse for a new qualitative arms race. Yet Defense Department witnesses appear determined to exact these new weapon systems as their pound of flesh for SALT ratification. In so doing they have painted a distorted picture of the relative strategic postures of the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the SALT accord; and so as I testify today in favor of ratifying the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, I believe it is vital to ask ourselves, first, what is the principle underlying our strategic force structure, second, how would SALT affect that structure and, finally, what should be our policy after SALT I.

PRINCIPLE OF ASSURED DESTRUCTION

The policy that has guided recent administrations in their definition of strategic force requirements has been one of deterrence, the ability of our offensive strategic forces to not only survive an effectively launched surprise attack but to do so in such condition that the United States would have a credible ability to respond with such devastating power as to rule out any rational decision by an opponent to attempt that first strike.

This principle has been defined as assured destruction, the ability to destroy a substantial portion of the Soviet Union in a retaliatory blow.

President Nixon went further in his foreign policy report to the Congress, arguing that, "Our forces must also be capable of flexible application." He said, "A simple 'assured destruction' doctrine does not meet our present requirements for a flexible range of strategic options."

CONCEPT OF FLEXIBLE OR LIMITED NUCLEAR RESPONSE

I would argue, Mr. Chairman, that even with the President's expanded definition of what is the underlying rationale behind our strategic force structure, the SALT agreement enhances our deterrent, not only for assured destruction but also for any so-called flexible response. But I would also challenge the concept of a flexible or limited nuclear response as being a contradiction in terms. There is no limited nuclear response. It is irrational to talk of a flexible nuclear response targeted only on the military potential of an opponent when that attack will inevitable encompass the deaths of millions of civilians, millions of Tanyas.

SALT AGREEMENT ENHANCES DETERRENT

Even accepting the President's view of the parameters of deterrence, I believe the SALT agreement enhances that deterrent and leaves us not only with an unquestioned assured destruction capability today but with improved confidence in that deterrence for the future.

ABM PROVISIONS

First, the ABM Treaty prohibits not only a nationwide antiballistic missile system but also the upgrading of an air defense system to perform an ABM role.

Second, the treaty also prohibits the development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea based, air based, space based and mobile land based.

The only exceptions are made for a National Capital Site and for the protection of a single ICBM site. Total launchers for these two sites are limited to 200 interceptors; the sites must be separated by at least 1,300 kilometers, and the deployment of ABM radars is strictly controlled to avoid any dual use for an areawide purpose.

I have cited these ABM provisions because they comprise the strongest commitment yet made to stem the nuclear arms race—a commitment that both the U.S. and USSR pledge not to defend their populations from attack.

This treaty which the President, Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Laird, Admiral Moorer, Secretary Rogers and Ambassador Smith have stated can be adequately verified through national means alone, removes any threat to our capacity to penetrate Soviet defense in a second-strike situation.

In the debates over MIRVing our land-based ICBMs and our Polaris submarines, the Pentagon argument was based almost entirely on the possibility that the Soviet Union was developing an areawide ABM system. It was that threat that prompted many senators to accept the $13 billion cost of placing multiple warheads on our missiles, for a nationwide Soviet ABM system might have prompted their

military planners to question our second-strike capability. That possibility prompted the Congress to underwrite a long-term program to place multiple warheads on 550 of our ICBMs and on the missiles carried on 31 of our Polaris submarines.

Nor was there any hard evidence, despite the annual cries of "wolf" by the Defense Department that such a system was within the near-time competence of the Soviet Union. Now the issue is settled.

An areawide ABM has not been constructed. Under this treaty, it is prohibited and, thus, barring abrogation of the treaty, the USSR is stripped forever of a shield against the 2,760 warheads on our submarines and against the 1,300 warheads on our land-based ICBMs; and even were our ICBMs destroyed, the SLBMs still could lay waste to the USSR.

Without considering the additional nuclear bombs carried in our strategic bomber force, we are assured a multiple level of overkill, a level far beyond the needs of assured destruction; and the statements of the defense spokesmen of a year ago must now be recalled.

Dr. John Foster, DOD head of research and development, testified a year ago: ". . . if a ban were placed on the ABM in the sense of banning a capability to intercept a ballistic missile attack, then as I see it at the moment there would be no need for the United States to deploy a MIRV . . ."

It seems clear that the fear that a Soviet ABM could threaten the penetration of our deterrent is laid to rest by the treaty; and if that fear is gone, then why do we need to go forward today with the production or development of a single new strategic weapon system?

CURRENT STRATEGIC FORCE STRUCTURE OF U.S.

Let us examine the current strategic force structure of the United States, where we are today at the conclusion of a SALT agreement prohibiting a Soviet ABM system: the ICBM and the bomber force are each capable of destroying in a second strike at least 30 to 35 percent of the Soviet Union's population. The Polaris-Poseidon is even more potent. Our arsenal consists of 1,054 ICBMs, 656 ballistic missiles carried on submarines and 457 heavy, long-range bombers. The combined force packs a nuclear punch of some 5,700 warheads, the smallest of which is three times the power of the 15 kiloton bomb that destroyed Hiroshima and the largest of which contains the power of several million tons of TNT, hundreds of times the Hiroshima bomb; and those figures do not even take into account the 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe, a substantial number of which could be delivered on targets in the Soviet Union. That power is not in the planning stage or in the research and development stage: it exists at this instant on the Strategic Air Command runways, in ICBM silos and beneath the seas on Polaris submarines. Its capacity, without going forward with MIRVing the remainder of the Minuteman III's, is beyond the limits of assured destruction.

The long accepted level of assured destruction—25 percent of population and 50 percent of industry—could be achieved by destroying 100 of the Soviet Union's largest cities; and this could be accomplished by two on-station Polaris-Poseidon submarines which would have 12 missiles and 120 warheads left over.

The missiles from a single Poseidon submarine could destroy one-quarter of the Soviet Union's industry, not to mention a substantial percentage of the Soviet Union's population.

Fifty Minuteman III missile could destroy nearly half of the Soviet industry, and ten B–52 bombers, approximately 2 percent of our strategic bomber force, could destroy nearly 40 percent of Soviet industry. These are the realities that a Soviet military planner would confront in his consideration of a first-strike attempt after SALT.

Our deterrent is awesome in its power and the surplus overkill capacity is ample evidence that political decisionmakers in this Nation have failed miserably to find a way to answer the question how much is enough.

Under no circumstances which can even faintly be termed rational can our deterrent be endangered now or in the near future and under no circumstances can any nation, including the Soviet Union, estimate that a first strike will succeed in destroying our ability to massively destroy them in return.

CONDITIONS IN 5 YEARS UNDER PROVISIONS LIMITING OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS

That is the present situation. What will be the condition in five years under the provisions of the executive agreement limiting offensive armaments? First, we have a specific numerical limitation on submarines and a freeze on additional construction of ICBMs by either side; and we have the assurance from Mr. Kissinger at the White House on June 15: ". . . we are confident that the national means of verification are sufficient to give us the highest degree of confidence that this agreement will be lived up to, or that we will know it almost immediately if it is not lived up to."

Although the agreement did not limit qualitative changes, it had the effect of halting the quantitative momentum of the Soviet Union in the two categories in which they were embarked on major construction programs, no additional land-based ICBMs particularly the potent SS–9s, and a ceiling on Y-class nuclear submarines.

In examining the results of the agreement, the only relevant question appears to be the one posed by Dr. Kissinger in Moscow on May 26: ". . . the question is to ask in assessing the freeze is not what situation it perpetuates but what situation it prevents. The question is, where we would be without the freeze."

Members of the defense analysis staff at the Brookings Institution estimated that the USSR could have 1,900 land-based ICBMs by 1977, against a U.S. total of 1,054. Under the Moscow agreement, they project Soviet strength at 1,330 missiles—a drop of 600—against a U.S. total of 1,000—a drop of 54.

They estimate that the Soviet Union would have had some 1,200 sea-based missiles at the level they were previously building, compared to barely half that total, 656 missiles, for the U.S.

Under the treaty, the Soviet Union is limited to 950 sea-based missiles, a decrease of 250, and the U.S. a total of 710 missiles, an increase of 54.

Also, where the U.S. has substantial leads in strategic bombers and in the technology of the MIRV, the agreement was silent. The

result is that our MIRV program will produce a proliferation of U.S. warheads from the present level of 5,700 to a level of 11,000. Relative to the U.S., the Soviet Union will continue to have a fraction of the number of our warheads since they have not yet tested a single MIRV. On that basis alone, the executive agreement would appear to be of substantial benefit to the U.S., but if the ABM treaty and the executive treaty are ratified and approved, as I believe they should be, what is to be our future policy?

COURSE CHOSEN BY ADMINISTRATION

The Administration has chosen one course, a course that I would described as pockmarked with danger for the Nation; for it views the SALT accords as a corporation views the tax laws—as a compendium of loopholes. Instead of acting as if the SALT agreement were an incentive for mutual restraint, this Administration is telling the nation that wherever SALT permits an opening, it intends to drive a new nuclear weapon system through the loophole.

The basic and compelling argument which should convince the Congress to reject this approach is the argument I have stated previously.

ADDITIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS NOT NEEDED

Our policy is one of deterrence. With the ABM Treaty, we have that deterrence, not only today but well into the future. We do not need these additional weapon systems today.

ULMS

With our Polaris-Poseidon invulnerable today, and with no one, not the President, not Dr. Kissinger, not Secretary Laird able to tell the Congress what the threat against those submarines will be five years from now or ten years from now, it makes little sense to lock ourselves into a program whose minimal costs are in the neighborhood of $13.4 billion.

If we do not know the threat, it is a foolish and ultimately a dangerous practice to become committed to a larger submarine which may not be the proper response to an as yet undefined ASW menace. It makes far more sense to move forward only with the development of the ULMS–I missile at this time. Nor is the modernization argument compelling since none of the present submarines are anticipated to reach the end of their 25 to 30 year lives until the 1985–1990 timeframe.

Admiral Moorer, testifying last year before the Armed Services Committee, stated: ". . . If the Soviets continue this momentum . . . then we will have to go forward with these new programs such as the ULMS . . . and accelerate the development of production of these systems. If some progress could be made in SALT . . . then the expansion and the augmentation of our current capabilities would not be so vital. If we can succeed in reaching agreement which would limit the overall capabilities on both sides and set an established level, then we could afford to hold back on the weapon development and production . . ."

Admiral Moorer's reasoning of a year ago should be adhered to. SALT has been concluded. There is a limitation halting the Soviet momentum. There is an ABM ban. Therefore, we should not go forward with the accelerated ULMS schedule at this time.

B–1

Admiral Moorer also referred specifically to the B–1 in stating that a SALT agreement would remove the incentive for deploying new systems. The modern B–52 is not wearing out. Its current effectiveness against Soviet-type air-defense systems has been shown in the Haiphong-Hanoi area.

There is no reason to go forward now with $11 billion B–1 program. If there is rationale for maintaining a strategic bomber force in a no ABM environment, we would be wiser to save our money and invest it in further research and in consideration of ways to preserve the life of the B–52s through the addition of standoff missiles.

NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA ABM

The National Capital Area proposal is an expensive and unnecessary example of converting the option contained in SALT into an obligation. For any scenario that one can imagine, whether massive attack, accidental launch, or limited attack, the NCA ABM would be unjustified and of highly questionable value. In a massive attack, its 100 interceptors could be overwhelmed without difficulty. In a limited attack by a third country, the NCA would be of little deterrent use since the rest of the nation would be vulnerable and it would bear the brunt of the attack; and it is a matter of extreme improbability for an accidental launch to head for Washington.

CRUISE MISSILE

The proposal for $20 million this year alone for a cruise missile to be placed on our submarines is best described as nonsense. We have a treaty that prohibits an ABM; therefore, there is no challenge at all to ballistic missiles on our submarines. Yet, instead, we see the proposal to develop a cruise missile that must be fired at close range and a missile which will be vulnerable to the air-defense system of the Soviet Union. It makes little sense if our concern is deterrence and not the satisfaction of devising an exotic new weapon system.

ADMINISTRATION'S ARGUMENT: BARGAINING CHIPS

If these weapons systems cannot be justified on their own merits, as I believe they cannot, then it leaves only the peripheral argument that the Administration has used so successfully in the past to obtain more arms: bargaining chips.

We are being told that failure to approve these weapon systems constitutes unilateral disarmament. Despite our ability to destroy the Soviet Union thousands of times over, we will be told that failure to approve ULMS or B–1 constitutes unilateral disarmament.

In similar terms, this argument says that any weapon system that can be built must be built and that the failure to build constitutes

unilateral disarmament. I reject that logic. If Lewis Carroll were here today, I suspect he would tell this committee that Alice in Wonderland is loose in the Pentagon.

I also reject the argument that failure to build the weapon systems deprives us of a bargaining chip and therefore removes the incentive of the Soviet Union to negotiate. Our past experience should not be forgotten. The Administration argued that without moving forward with an ABM, there would have been no SALT agreement. I question that assertion.

Two years ago, the Soviet Union was ready to accept a limitation to a single national capital site; but because we were already going ahead with the ABM, we rejected that proposal. Using ABM as a bargaining chip has produced a treaty in which the Soviet Union can wind up with a bigger ABM system than they had before the negotiations started.

With regard to MIRVs, the insistence on deploying them virtually assured the failure of any serious negotiations on that subject at SALT. Our defense planners wanted to go forward with the full deployment of this bargaining chip and theirs refused to bargain from a position of such blatant inferiority. The result is that the most potentially destabilizing strategic offensive system is not covered in the agreement.

We have consistently failed to recognize that a bargaining chip is good so long as it is not played. Once played, its only effect is to raise the stakes, and that has been the effect of our use of nuclear bargaining chips, each time the stakes have been raised and each time the security of all nations have been endangered.

If there is any bargaining chip, it is our overall nuclear deterrent, its size, its diversity, its clear dominance in the number of warheads; and beyond these factors our bargaining chip is our technological capacity, the capacity shown in the Apollo program, the capacity for almost unlimited technological innovation.

Instead of raising the ante of nuclear stockpiling, I would urge the Congress to put a check on this round of proposed military escalation.

POLICY OF COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIATE ARMS REDUCTION URGED

Instead of the course of nuclear escalation to bloat an already sufficient deterrent or to construct a new bargaining chip, I would urge that we adopt a policy of restraint, a policy of commitment to negotiate arms reduction.

MORATORIUM ON UNDERGROUND TESTING

First, I believe we must offer a new initiative by announcing a moratorium on underground testing to remain in effect so long as the Soviet Union abstains. I introduced a resolution to that effect which also called for prompt negotiations by the President. I think it is instructive to note the criticism today by the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, of France's plans for a nuclear test. Yet most nations would see that statement as hypocritical since we continue to test underground while criticizing other nations which are unable to test underground, when they test in the atmosphere.

I would hope that following SALT this committee would find itself able to consider that resolution as a means of stimulating action toward placing qualitative limits on the arms race.

LIMITING ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE DEVELOPMENT

Secondly, I would urge that SALT II consider limiting anti-submarine warfare deployment. While there is no immediate threat to our Polaris-Poseidon force, nor any which can be easily imagined, an important stabilizing influence in the strategic dialogue would result from agreements in this area. I see no reason why there could not be an effort to achieve ASW-free zones as a first step toward elimination of this threat. This is a far more productive course of action for preserving our deterrent than seeking to develop Trident.

MIRV LIMITATION

Third, I believe we must do more to obtain a MIRV limitation. We no longer have adequate reasons to continue MIRV deployment, particularly on the Minuteman, since the ABM has vanished. At the very least we should make every effort to achieve limitations on MIRV testing.

MOVE FROM ARMS LIMITATION TO ARMS REDUCTION

Fourth, I believe it is time to move from arms limitations to arms reduction. A proportional reduction in the number of land-based ICBMs would seem to be a desirable and feasible goal.

These are among the kinds of efforts that we should make in the post-SALT environment and they are far more in keeping with our national interest and with the stability of our deterrent than the Administration's strategy of escalating armaments.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. I think that is an extremely well thought out and complete response to this problem of an ongoing missile program.

SENATE RESOLUTION ON MIRV PASSED

You have raised many problems. The moratorium which you suggest on underground testing has been raised, and I think a number of the members of the committee are in favor of it. It reminds me that the Senate as a whole passed a resolution recommending a moratorium on deployment of MIRV, as you will recall, but it did not influence the Administration. I think your colleague from Massachusetts introduced that resolution and a number of others, of course, supported it. In fact, it was a very large vote in the Senate.

I find myself very much in agreement with your reasoning on both counts, that is, the approval of the ABM and essentially restraint in going forward with the further weapon systems.

Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. I enjoyed the statement very much, too. However, I couldn't help but have this thought, that we are dealing with a treaty and with the two agreements. This committee will not be the one to consider ABMs, MIRVs, and so forth. I know your position, but I would like to get it very clear.

You do not tie your endorsement of the treaty and your endorsement of the agreements to the other matters? In other words, you are for them regardless of the other, aren't you?

Senator KENNEDY. I am for the treaty and have been opposed to the rationale and the justification that has been suggested by the Administration for expanded weapons, strategic weapon systems; so I am for the treaty but not for the new weapons systems.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, I understand it.

Senator KENNEDY. I don't tie them together.

Senator SPARKMAN. You don't tie them together?

Senator KENNEDY. The Administration does.

Senator SPARKMAN. This committee does not handle the other.

Senator KENNEDY. As I say, I support the treaty and I was trying to address myself to the particular argument of the Secretary of Defense in justification for the treaty, only if there were new weapons. I accept completely the observation that those issues and questions should be decided in the authorizing—appropriating committees, but, obviously, they are very much relevant to the considerations of this committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I am thinking—I have heard some say that they could not support the treaty unless these other things were done. I am trying to separate the two. I don't think that we ought to condition one upon the other.

Senator KENNEDY. I support that logic and that presentation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very well; that is what I wanted. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?

FURTHER MIRVING OF MINUTEMAN OPPOSED

Senator COOPER. I think it is a very good statement, Senator Kennedy. I would like to ask a question regarding the ongoing programs.

The Minuteman is being MIRVed and Poseidon is as well—do you support the continued MIRVing or are you opposed?

Senator KENNEDY. No, I would oppose any further MIRVing of the Minuteman weapon system. Obviously those submarines in the process of conversion would have to be completed. As I tried to suggest as a fundamental theme in the statement, the question at issue is the deterrent capacity of the United States. I think that that deterrent capacity is preserved with the living up to this treaty by the Soviet Union and by the United States, and so I see no further reasons for such a program. I also would have very serious reservations as well about the building of an ABM system around the capital or around the single missile site in Grand Forks. I think they can both be easily overcome and I think the argument of accidental launch is extremely remote. I fail to feel that there is a necessity for those or for the other weapon systems which I have outlined here.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Senator COOPER. I think the treaty itself is testimony to the fact that both countries know they can easily overcome an ABM system. As I understand it, ULMS or Trident could not be deployed until, I

think, '78 if accelerated and not until 1982 on its regular schedule. Would you favor research and development?

Senator KENNEDY. Research and development was well——

Senator COOPER. Research.

Senator KENNEDY.—on the Trident as well as on the missile. But I think, first of all, accepting the statements that were made to the Armed Services Committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the virtual invulnerability of the Poseidon last year; I think we can rely effectively on them as a deterrent. I know there are those in the Defense Department who think that because of the development of antisubmarine warfare by the Soviet Union we ought to move into production of the Trident submarine; but we can't tell exactly the nature of the antisubmarine warfare mechanisms being developed by the Soviet Union.

It is hoped by the Defense Department that because the Trident might be faster, and might be quieter, that it would be able to overcome any antisubmarine warfare, but we don't know whether the antisubmarine warfare might be more effective in identifying a larger target and therefore be counterproductive. Perhaps we would be better off in building the smaller submarines rather than the large ones and I would like to defer action on the Trident now given the fact that the Poseidon weapon submarine system will not be outdated until the mid-1980s. I think we could afford to defer action on that. And that at the particular time, and I would hope, while we were deferring action, that we would consider the possibility of ASW-free zones in order to protect the deterrent of the United States as well as of the Soviet Union. I think that would make a great deal more sense and I think our efforts ought to be in those directions before moving on to a multibillion dollar new weapon system.

Senator COOPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, one or two points:

PRESIDENT DOES NOT LINK TREATY AND WEAPONS SYSTEMS

It is my understanding that the President himself, and certainly Dr. Kissinger in his briefing in the White House to members of the Congress, does not link these two together. He does not make approval of the ABM Treaty dependent upon an obligation to go forward with all the weapon systems. It was Secretary Laird who asserted that.

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And Secretary Laird did assert it before this committee, as I understood it, and in the press; I am not sure about Secretary Rogers. But I think the position of the President, at least, is that each of these should be considered upon its merits; that is, independent of the other. He proposes them, but he does not make them dependent and does not insist on linkage, so in that regard you are in agreement with him.

MILITARY POWER NOT ONLY SIGNIFICANT CONSTITUENT TO NATION'S SECURITY

One other thought that strikes me. We have become so fascinated with these great technological weapon systems that the impression is

given in many of these hearings that the only significant constituent to a nation's security is its military power. When you consider the difficulties we are having with our economy, both internationally and domestically, and with social problems, it strikes me that in balancing the relative importance of more powerful weapon systems we are neglecting or overlooking the fact that there are these other elements to our security. If the two ventures of the President in China and Russia are not to be taken as simply an exercise in futility, then we should consider them vis-a-vis the other aspects of our internal stability as a major element in our security. I think we see in the hearings everything is centered around the military as if the military power was the whole problem, the whole question of security.

I think it is only a part of it, that much of our security depends on what we do in other areas. Would you agree with that?

Senator KENNEDY. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that the security interests of the people of my city of Boston are more threatened by violence in the streets of Boston than they are by 17 million peasants in North Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. But to get this perspective seems to be very difficult. For some reason or other, the military aspects are so much more newsworthy and attract the attention of everyone. There are so many things we need to do here that relate to our security that I think we must reexamine the relative importance of these programs, and the only place this could be expected to be done is in the Congress.

I do not criticize the military for asking for everything they can think of. That is their responsibility. What I try to emphasize is that it is essentially and uniquely the responsibility of this body, the Senate and the House, to make a decision as to what is most important in the near future to our security.

Would you not agree?

Senator KENNEDY. I would certainly agree with everything that you have commented on and stated there.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a tendency to always put this responsibility on the administration. When we seem to be criticizing a proposal by the Joint Chiefs, it isn't a criticism, really; I don't think we are justified in saying they shouldn't ask for these things. The criticism is on Congress for not going to the trouble to exercise its independent judgment on which of these various things should be given emphasis.

Nobody is advocating unilateral disarmament or abandonment of all arms. This is the position of those who criticize the point that the Congress must make this decision.

Thank you very much.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Our next witness is the distinguished Senator Buckley of New York. Senator Buckley?

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES L. BUCKLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would say that I have a rather lengthy statement, but I will spare you large chunks of it, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. We can put it all in the record and you can read what you want.

Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to express my views on the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords. I suspect you will find the thrust of my remarks somewhat at variance with those of Senator Kennedy.

I have followed these developments with intense interest and not only because of their effect on our national security but also on our role in international affairs as well.

AGREEMENTS COULD INCREASE ULTIMATE RISK OF WAR

Throughout the course of the negotiations it had been my hope that agreements could be concluded that would fulfill the traditional objectives of arms control—namely, to reduce the risk of war, or if war should occur, to mitigate its consequences. Having had an opportunity to study the agreements in some detail, I have reluctantly concluded that unless appropriate measures are taken, they will achieve neither goal; in fact, they could well increase the ultimate risk of war by undermining our alliances while encouraging Soviet intransigence in any future confrontations. If we have learned anything from the great conflicts of this century, it should be that weakness invites attack and that aggressor nations seem inevitably to overestimate the willingness of free men to retreat.

We are dealing, of course, with two separate agreements: the Treaty on the Limitations of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement placing limitations on certain categories of strategic offensive arms. I will discuss, in brief, the risks which I believe to be inherent in each before recommending to your committee certain safeguards which can be adopted by the Congress in order to minimize these risks.

ABM TREATY OPPOSED

I will say at the outset that I will vote against ratification of the ABM Treaty for the reason that I have strong misgivings as to both the prudence and the ultimate morality of denying ourselves for all time, or denying the Russians, for that matter, the right to protect our civilian populations from nuclear devastation. I am not suggesting that we have the technical means to do so at the present time, but I challenge the morality of precluding the possibility of developing at some future date new approaches to antiballistic missile defenses which could offer protection to substantial numbers of our people. I question, in short, the basic doctrine which requires us to dismantle our defenses before agreement is reached on dismantling the weapons of mass destruction.

The immediate effect of the treaty, of course, is to limit antiballistic missile systems to nominal levels, where each side agrees to defend its national capital and one strategic missile site with not more than 100 antiballistic missile interceptors per site. I would argue that this agreement is inappropriate on its face.

For some years American defense policy has been dominated by theories such as "assured destruction" or a contemporary variant of assured destruction known as "strategic sufficiency." It has been a car-

dinal objective of these theories that U.S. security is best maintained by establishing a system whereby active defense is severely constrained on the theory that strategic stability will be assured by the mutual vulnerability of the citizens of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

This is the doctrine that the ABM Treaty signed in Moscow seeks to perpetuate. Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, test or deployment of sea, air or space-based ballistic missile defense systems. This clause, in Article V of the ABM Treaty, would have the effect, for example of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser-type system based in space which could at least in principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formally excluded by this agreement.

There is no law of nature that I know of that makes it impossible to create defense systems that would make the prevailing theories obsolete. Why, then, should we by treaty deny ourselves the kind of development that could possibly create a reliable technique for the defense of civilians against ballistic missile attack? Why should we not at least be in a position to deploy such a system with the least possible delay in the event that we should find it necessary to terminate the agreement under the conditions allowed in Article XV or should we fail to negotiate a satisfactory successor agreement to SALT I?

There are many other defects inherent in the treaty. For example, it is technically possible for the Russians to net or tie in their Moscow ABM defense system into the system which they are allowed for the defense of a strategic missile site. For some unknown reason, the Soviet Union is permitted to deploy its site for the protection of an ICBM base as close as 800 miles from Moscow, while the United States may not deploy one closer than 1,400 miles from Washington.

These relative proximities would enable the Soviet Union, with appropriate radar and data-processing equipment, to have the more effective type of radar coverage for its two ABM systems which comes from the capability to tie them together electronically. This disparity in the effect of the ABM Treaty on the United States and Russia becomes even more significant when it is considered that the disposition of the Moscow defense system would permit them to defend about 350 of their ICBMs or the equivalent of about two U.S. ICBM bases.

PROBLEMS REGARDING CAPABILITY OF U.S. SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

There are also two problems which have to do with the capability of our existing surveillance system to detect violations of the treaty by the Soviet Union.

The treaty contains language which prohibits the deployment of a "rapid reload capability" for ABM missiles. But the nature of the Soviet ABM missile launcher makes it relatively simple for the Soviet Union to covertly develop for later deployment a rapid reload capability. There must be a more realistic means of insuring compliance with the rapid reload prohibition of the treaty than is possible with satellite surveillance. Otherwise, it would be a rather simple matter to develop the necessary mechanical devices and to store them in ware-

houses from which they could be deployed at launch sites in a matter of days.

The other possibility relates to the upgrading of existing or new antiaircraft systems to an ABM role. There are those who believe, for example, that the existing SA–5 missiles, with their effective altitude of 100,000 feet, could be given an ABM capability and connected with the necessary radar installations without detection.

In the Interim Agreement, the United States has accepted a position of significant quantitative inferiority in every area of offensive strength which is subject to its control.

Mr. Chairman, I won't detail the facts supporting this proposition. I know they are well familiar to you and they will be in my text. I would only say that I agree—I substantially agree with the conclusion expressed by Dr. Donald Brennan of the Hudson Institute who testified here yesterday. These conclusions also suggest that the Soviet Union have the technical capability of developing a MIRV technology for their ICBMs well in advance of the termination of the five-year period of the Interim Agreement.

Suffice it to say that there is nothing in the SALT Accords to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining significant quantitative advantage. On the other hand, the SALT Accords will prevent the United States from catching up to the Soviet Union in those areas where the Soviet Union is guaranteed a substantial quantitative advantage.

There are additional hazards in the Interim Agreement which result from ambiguities in its text or from the inadequacy of its provisions for verification. For example, (1) the agreement places a ceiling on intercontinental ballistic missiles based on the number of light and heavy missile launchers in place or under construction as of July 1, 1972. Yet the United States has no definite information as to the size, number and approximate location of land-based Soviet strategic missile forces.

At the present time the United States is relying entirely on its own intelligence estimates. It should be noted that the general area in which Soviet ICBMs are deployed is in North-Central Asia, where the normal cloud cover is among the heaviest of any region in the Northern Hemisphere. It is entirely possible that at some time subsequent to July 1, 1972, scores of additional ICBMs could be discovered by our reconnaissance satellites. As the agreement only prohibits starts on new construction after that date, we would face the practical difficulty of not being able to establish whether or not newly discovered missile sites had been constructed in violation of the agreement.

(2) It is not at all clear that the so-called "national technical means of verification" available to the United States will suffice to provide conclusive evidence as to whether or not Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles—M/IRBM—Will be upgraded to an intercontinental capability through the replacement of obsolescent SS–4 and SS–5 missiles with variable-range SS–11 missiles. We do know that some replacement is now taking effect but we have no evidence as to the capability of those new missiles.

RESERVATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO TREATY RECOMMENDED

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am quite prepared to accept the proposition that given the rate at which the Soviet Union has been overtaking us

in its deployment of ICBMs and nuclear-powered submarines, the risks which we are most assuredly assuming under the Interim Agreement are nonetheless far smaller than those we would be assuming if current trends were allowed to continue. I do feel, however, that it is most important that the Congress recognize that we are, in fact, assuming substantial risks so that we may take appropriate measures to minimize them during the term of the agreement and to place ourselves in an optimum position to negotiate a satisfactory SALT II Agreement within the next five years; or should this fail, to move swiftly to recapture a posture of nuclear parity. I believe that these protections can be secured by attaching appropriate reservations to the ABM treaty.

Specifically, I recommend that the Senate attach the following reservations and instructions to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missile Systems:

(1) A reservation which will result in the automatic termination of the Treaty at the expiration of the five-year term of the Interim Agreement unless the parties shall have earlier concluded an agreement for the limitation of offensive weapons which shall establish approximate parity in the payload capacity of their respective strategic offensive forces, such agreement to avoid the ambiguities contained in the Interim Agreement and to provide a mechanism for the reliable verification of compliance.

(2) Instructions to the American representatives on the Standing Consultative Commission providing for in Article XIII of the Treaty requiring them to establish procedures at the earliest possible date which will provide the United States with reliable evidence that (a) the Moscow ABM system will not be tied into the other ABM system permitted the Soviet Union under the Treaty; (b) existing or future air-defense systems will not be upgraded to an ABM capability; and (c) the Soviets will not develop a standby rapid-reload capability for their ABMs. The instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure such assurances will constitute an extraordinary event jeopardizing the supreme interests of the United States within the meaning of Article XV of the Treaty.

With respect to the Interim Agreement limiting certain strategic offensive arms, I recommend that the Congress incorporate the following provisos in its Joint Resolution approving the Agreement:

(1) An acknowledgment that the United States cannot prudently enter into the Interim Agreement except with the understanding that it must immediately intensify its investment in military research, development and procurement so as to (a) preserve those areas of strategic superiority which it currently enjoys, and (b) achieve the maximum qualitative improvement possible during the term of the Interim Agreement in those weapons systems in which it will be frozen into a position of quantitative inferiority.

(2) The issuance of instructions to the American representatives on the Standing Consultative Commission to secure the earliest possible agreement as to the following: (a) verification by the Soviet Union as to the exact number, size and approximate location of all land-based Soviet strategic missile launchers in existence or under construction as of July 1, 1972; (b) a reliable mechanism for verifying that the SS–11 variable-range missiles which replace the obsolescent SS–4

and SS–5 medium and intermediate-range missiles do not have an intercontinental capability; and (c) a definition as to what constitutes a "heavy missile" within the meaning of the Interim Agreement.

These instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure such agreement shall constitute an extraordinary event jeopardizing the supreme interests of the United States within the meaning of Paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement.

WHY CONGRESS SHOULD CONDITION APPROVAL OF SALT ACCORDS

I believe that if the Senate and the Congress will condition their ratification and approval of the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords in such a manner, and if the Congress will give further evidence that it understands these inherent risks by launching a serious and sustained program to upgrade our strategic and military capabilities within the limits imposed by the two agreements, then we will not only minimize those risks as they affect our physical security but will also at the same time avoid a critical dilution of our influence in world affairs.

If we do anything less, if it appears that we are willing to retreat to a position of permanent strategic inferiority, then we will see subtle but corrosive forces at work in the world arena which will have the most serious implications for the United States and for the cause of peace.

We can expect, for example, to see the Soviet leadership intensify their diplomatic pressures around the globe; and in any future confrontations with the West, to assume more confident and intransigent attitudes. By the same token, to the extent that the relative strategic position of the United States declines, so will the options which are available to an American President in any such future political crisis with the inevitable erosion of his ability to support vital U.S. foreign policy objectives. And it is not only our own diplomatic options which would be affected by an understanding that the Soviet Union has achieved a position of strategic supremacy.

As Dr. Brennan of the Hudson Institute pointed out to this committee in testimony yesterday, and I quote:

> The new imbalance of power will become established in the minds of our allies which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives.

How can we expect the Japanese to accept with equanimity so dramatic a change in the relative strength of the superpowers. Japan will be left with little choice but to either seek an accommodation with the Communist powers or, in the alternative, to develop an independent military and strategic capability which will guarantee her own security. What I am suggesting, in short, is that unless we couple the SALT Accords with a clear indication that we will settle for nothing less than nuclear parity, unless we launch credible programs for the modernization of our strategic capabilities within the limits set by these Accords, these agreements will prove not only dangerous to the security of the United States but to the stability of the world.

G. K. Chesterton once said: "I do not believe in fate that falls on men however they act. I do believe in a fate that falls on men unless they act."

I believe that Chesterton's point is relevant to the facts of international life which we face today. I trust that we will not, for the first time in our history, entrust our fate to others. Only we can make sure that our own security and that of the free world is not placed in jeopardy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Senator Buckley's prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES L. BUCKLEY

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee to express my views on the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords signed by President Nixon in Moscow on May 26th. I have followed these developments with intense interest not only because of their effect on our national security, but on our role in international affairs as well.

Throughout the course of the negotiations, it had been my hope that agreements could be concluded that would fulfill the traditional objectives of arms control; namely, to reduce the risk of war, or if war should occur, to mitigate its consequences. Having had an opportunity to study the agreements in some detail, I have reluctantly concluded that unless appropriate measures are taken, they will achieve neither goal. In fact, they could well increase the ultimate risk of war by undermining our alliances while encouraging Soviet intransigence in any future confrontations. If we have learned anything from the great conflicts of this century, it should be that weakness invites attack, and that aggressor nations seem inevitably to overestimate the willingness of free men to retreat.

We are dealing, of course, with two separate agreements: the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Systems and the Interim Agreement placing limitations on certain categories of strategic offensive arms. I will discuss, in brief, the risks which I believe to be inherent in each before recommending to your Committee certain safeguards which can be adopted by the Congress in order to minimize these risks.

I will say at the outset that I will vote against ratification of the ABM treaty for the reason that I have strong misgivings as to both the prudence and the ultimate morality of denying ourselves for all time—or denying the Russians, for that matter—the right to protect our civilian populations from nuclear devastation. I am not suggesting that we have the technical means to do so at the present time, but I challenge the morality of precluding the possibility of developing at some future date new approaches to anti-ballistic missile defenses which could offer protection to substantial numbers of our people. I question, in short, the basic doctrine on which the SALT Accords have been constructed; a doctrine which requires us to dismantle our defenses before agreement is reached on dismantling the weapons of mass destruction.

The immediate effect of the Treaty, of course, is to limit anti-ballistic missile systems to nominal levels, where each side agrees to defend its national capital and one strategic missile site with not more than 100 anti-ballistic missile interceptors per site. I would argue that this agreement is inappropriate on its face.

For some years, American defense policy has been dominated by theories such as "assured destruction" or a contemporary variant of assured destruction known as "strategic sufficiency". It has been a cardinal objective of these theories that U.S. security is best maintained by establishing a system whereby active defense is severely constrained on the theory that strategic stability will be assured by the mutual vulnerability of the citizens of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

This is the doctrine that the ABM Treaty signed in Moscow seeks to perpetuate. Thus the agreement goes so far as to prohibit the development, test or deployment of sea, air or space base ballistic missile defense systems. This clause, in Article V of the ABM Treaty, would have the effect, for example, of prohibiting the development and testing of a laser type system based in space which could at least in principle provide an extremely reliable and effective system of defenses against ballistic missiles. The technological possibility has been formally excluded by this agreement.

There is no law of nature that makes impossible the creation of defense systems that would make the prevailing theories obsolete. Why then should we by

treaty deny ourselves the kind of development that could possibly create a reliable technique for the defense of civilians against ballistic missile attack? Why should we not at least be in a position to deploy such a system with the least possible delay in the event that we should find it necessary to terminate the agreement under the conditions allowed in Article XV.

There are other defects inherent in the Treaty. For example, it is technically possible for the Russians to "net" or tie in their Moscow ABM defense system into the system which they are allowed for the defense of a strategic missile site. For some unknown reason, the Soviet Union may deploy its site for the protection of an ICBM base as close as 800 miles from Moscow, while the United States may not deploy one closer than 1400 miles from Washington. These relative proximities would enable the Soviet Union, with appropriate radar and data processing equipment, to have the more effective type of radar coverage for its two ABM systems which comes from the capability to tie them together electronically. This disparity in the effect of the ABM Treaty on the United States and Russia becomes even more significant when it is considered that the disposition of the Moscow defense system would permit them to defend about 350 of their ICBMs or the equivalent of about two U.S. ICBM bases.

There are also two problems which have to do with the capability of our existing surveillance system to detect violations of the treaty by the Soviet Union.

The Treaty contains language which prohibits the deployment of a "rapid reload capability" for ABM missiles. But the nature of the Soviet ABM missile launcher makes it relatively simple for the Soviet Union to covertly develop for later deployment, a rapid reload capability. There must be a more realistic means of insuring compliance with the rapid reload prohibition of the treaty than is possible with satellite surveillance. Otherwise, it would be a rather simple matter to develop the necessary mechanical devices and to store them in warehouses from which they could be deployed at launch sites in a matter of days.

The other possibility relates to the upgrading of existing or new anti-aircraft systems to an ABM role. There are those who believe, for example, that the existing SA–5 missiles, with their effective altitude of 100,000 feet, could be given an ABM capability and connected with the necessary radar installations without detection.

In the Interim Agreement, the United States has accepted a position of significant quantitative inferiority in every area of offensive strength which is subject to its control. Depending on how the parties choose to exercise their options under the agreement, the Soviet Union will be able to deploy, in round figures, between 1400 and 1600 intercontinental ballistic missiles to our 1,000, and up to 1,000 submarine launched ballistic missiles to our 700. She will be able to expand her fleet of modern "Y-Class" nuclear powered submarines to 62 while retaining 22 diesel-powered "G–Class" submarines, for a total force of 84 missile launching submarines in comparison with the fleet of 44 which we will be allowed to maintain.

Most significantly, because of the enormous size of Russia's heavy missiles, the ceilings placed on intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles will provide the Soviets with a more than four times advantage over the United States in the payload capacity or "throw-weight" of these weapons systems. This means that the Russians will be guaranteed the *capability*, during the term of the agreement, to deploy with these weapons more than four times as many warheads as the United States should they achieve parity with us in warhead design.

Because such parity has not yet been achieved, it is argued that the United States is likely to retain its existing two-to-one advantage in deliverable warheads during the life of the agreement. This argument is based on U.S. superiority in manned heavy bombers, in multiple warhead technology, and in forward based systems. I believe, however, that it is important to emphasize the fragile and transitory character of this "advantage."

First, with regard to the U.S. superiority in manned bombers, this advantage quickly disappears when one includes the medium bomber forces available to both sides. While the United States has about 75 medium range FB–111 bombers in the Strategic Air Command which can operate from forward bases as part of our retaliatory force, the Soviets have approximately 550 TU–16 BADGERS and approximately 150 TU–22 BLINDER medium bombers which are refuelable and quite capable of reaching the United States and then landing in airfields in Cuba or Mexico.

Second, while a combination of skillful warhead miniaturization and relatively accurate guidance systems provides the United States with a formidable present

advantage in multiple warhead technology, we have little reason to be complacent. It should be noted that the United States developed its multiple warhead hardware in approximately three years, from 1966 through 1969. Discussions of the engineering characteristics of our multiple warhead missiles have been widely disseminated in trade journals and Congressional hearings. It would be imprudent, at best, to presume that the Soviets are so technologically retarded that they would be incapable of developing and deploying significant numbers of multiple warheads within the five year term of the Interim Agreement.

It has been argued that our intelligence estimates give the Soviet Union only a limited capability to develop multiple warhead technology. I would point out that these intelligence analysis are the ones who have consistently underestimated Soviet nuclear force objectives. It is these same intelligence analysts who advised Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara in the mid-1960's that the Soviet Union had permanently accepted the status of strategic inferiority.

It is with these same intelligence analysts who concluded in 1964 that the Chinese Communists would detonate a primitive nuclear device made of plutonium rather than the uranium device actually detonated which required a huge gaseous diffusion plant for the manufacture of nuclear material.

With respect to these and other advantages which the United States may currently possess in non-controlled strategic offensive weapons, it should be noted that there is nothing in the SALT Accords to prevent the Soviet Union from overtaking us in every category while these accords prohibit us from overtaking the Soviet Union in those areas where they have been assured substantial margins of superiority.

There are additional hazards in the Interim Agreement which result from ambiguities in its text or from the inadequacy of its provisions for verification. For example:

1. The agreement places a ceiling on intercontinental ballistic missiles based on the number of light and heavy missile launchers in place or under construction as of July 1, 1972. Yet the United States has no definitive information as to the size, number and approximate location of land-based Soviet strategic missile forces. At the present time, the United States is relying entirely on its own intelligence estimates. It should be noted that the general area in which Soviet ICBMs are deployed is in North-Central Asia, where the normal cloud cover is among the heaviest of any region in the northern hemisphere. It is entirely possible that at some time subsequent to July 1, 1972, scores of additional ICBMs could be discovered by our reconnaissance satellites. As the agreement only prohibits "starts" on new construction after that date, we would face the practical difficulty of not being able to establish whether or not newly discovered missile sites had been constructed in violation of the agreement.

2. It is not at all clear that the so-called "national technical means of verification" available to the United States will suffice to provide conclusive evidence as to whether or not Soviet medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles (M/IRBM) will be upgraded to an intercontinental capability through the replacement of obsolescent SS–4 and SS–5 missiles with "variable range" SS–11 missiles. It has already been noted in the press and elsewhere that the Soviet Union has begun to place SS–11 missiles in her M/IRBM fields in the western part of the Soviet Union. If the United States does not obtain ironclad proof that an upgrading to an intercontinental capability is not taking place, the Soviet Union could add an additional 700 ICBMs to its arsenal without detection.

3. While it is agreed that missiles and launchers may be modernized and replaced so long as the respective ceilings on light and heavy missiles are not exceeded, nowhere is there an unambiguous definition of what is meant by a "heavy missile". The United States has issued a unilateral definition, but this is somewhat less than satisfactory. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to exchange its existing SS–9s for new missiles having twice their payload capacity—and this may well be possible even within our own definition of what constitutes a heavy missile—the resulting threat to our land based forces could be so formidable as to allow us no prudent alternative but to develop and deploy a mobile ICBM system on an urgent basis.

I am quite prepared to accept the proposition that given the rate at which the Soviet Union has been overtaking us in its deployment of ICBMs and nuclear powered submarines, the risks which we are most assuredly assuming under the Interim Agreement are nonetheless far smaller than those we would be assuming if current trends were allowed to continue. I do feel, however, that it is most im-

portant that the Congress recognize that we are in fact assuming substantial risks so that we may take appropriate measures to minimize them during the term of the agreement and to place ourselves in an optimum position to negotiate a satisfactory SALT II Agreement within the next five years; or should this fail, to move swiftly to recapture a posture of nuclear parity. I believe that these protections can be secured by attaching appropriate reservations to the ABM treaty.

Specifically, I recommend that the Senate attach the following reservations and instructions to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems:

1. A reservation which will result in the automatic termination of the Treaty at the expiration of the five-year term of the Interim Agreement unless the parties shall have earlier concluded an agreement for the limitation of offensive weapons which shall establish approximate parity in the payload capacity of their respective strategic offensive forces; such agreement to avoid the ambiguities contained in the Interim Agreement, and to provide a mechanism for the fool-proof verification of compliance.

2. Instructions to the American representatives on the Standing Consultive Commission provided for in Article XIII of the Treaty requiring them to establish procedures at the earliest possible date which will provide the United States with absolute, fool-proof assurances that—

(*a*) The Moscow ABM system will not be tied into the other ABM system permitted the Soviet Union under the Treaty;

(*b*) Existing or future air defense systems will not be upgraded to an ABM capability; and

(*c*) The Soviets will not develop a stand-by "rapid reload" capability for their ABMs.

The instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure such assurances will constitute an "extraordinary event" jeopardizing the "supreme interests" of the United States within the meaning of Article XV of the Treaty.

With respect to the Interim Agreement limiting certain strategic offensive arms, I recommend that the Congress incorporate the following provisos in its Joint Resolution approving the Agreement:

1. An acknowledgement that the United States cannot prudently enter into the Interim Agreement except with the understanding that it must immediately intensify its investment in military research, development and procurement so as to:

(*a*) preserve those areas of strategic superiority which it currently enjoys, and

(*b*) achieve the maximum qualitative improvement possible during the term of the Interim Agreement in those weapons systems in which it will be frozen into a position of quantitative inferiority.

2. The issuance of instructions to the American representatives on the Standing Consultive Commission to secure the earliest possible agreement as to the following:

(*a*) Verification by the Soviet Union as to the exact number, size, and approximate location of all land-based Soviet strategic missile launchers in existence or under construction as of July 1, 1972.

(*b*) A fool-proof mechanism for verifying that the SS–11 variable range missiles which replace the obsolescent SS–4 and SS–5 medium and intermediate range missiles do not have an intercontinental capability.

(*c*) A definition as to what constitutes a "heavy missile" within the meaning of the Interim Agreement.

These instructions should stipulate that a failure to secure such agreement shall constitute an "extraordinary event" jeopardizing the "supreme interests" of the United States within the meaning of Paragraph 3 of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement.

I believe that if the Senate and the Congress will condition their ratification and approval of the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords in such a manner, and if the Congress will give further evidence that it understands these inherent risks by launching a serious and sustained program to upgrade our strategic and military capabilities within the limits imposed by the two agreements, then we will not only minimize those risks as they affect our physical security, but will at the same time avoid a critical dilution of our influence in world affairs.

If we do anything less, if it appears that we are willing to retreat to a position of permanent strategic inferiority then we will see subtle but corrosive forces

at work in the world arena which will have the most serious implications for the United States and for the cause of peace.

We can expect, for example, to see the Soviet leadership intensify their diplomatic pressures around the globe; and in any future confrontations with the West, to assume more confident and intransigent attitudes. By the same token, to the extent that the relative strategic position of the United States declines, so will the options which are available to an American President in any such future political crisis with the inevitable erosion of his ability to support vital U.S. foreign policy objectives. And it is not only our own diplomatic options which would be affected by an understanding that the Soviet Union has achieved a position of strategic supremacy. In testifying before this Committee yesterday, Dr. Donald G. Brennan, of the Hudson Institute, pointed to the following adverse political consequences:

> "The new imbalance of power will become established in the minds of our allies, which will ultimately lead them to be more responsive, perhaps unduly responsive, to Soviet diplomatic pressures and initiatives."

Nor can we expect the Japanese to accept with equanimity so dramatic a change in the relative strength of the super powers. Japan will be left little choice but to either seek an accommodation with the Communist powers or, in the alternative, to develop an independent military and strategic capability which will guarantee her a degree of independence in matters affecting her own security.

What I am suggesting, in short, is that unless we couple the SALT Accords with a clear indication that we will settle for nothing less than nuclear parity, unless we launch credible programs for the modernization of our strategic capabilities within the limits set by these Accords, these agreements will prove not only dangerous to the security of the United States but to the stability of the world.

G. K. Chesterton once said: "I do not believe in fate that falls on men however they act. I do believe in a fate that falls on men unless they act". I believe that Chesterton's point is relevant to the facts of international life which we face today. I trust that we will not, for the first time in our history, entrust our fate to others. Only we can make sure that our own security, and that of the Free World, are not placed in jeopardy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Buckley.

IS THERE APPROXIMATE NUCLEAR PARITY BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UNITED STATES?

Do I understand your position is that there is or is not approximate strategic parity, nuclear parity, in nuclear power between Russia and the United States today?

Senator BUCKLEY. Well, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that as of this moment we have a superiority of deliverable warheads; but the consequences of the Interim Agreement and the fact that we must anticipate that the Soviet Union will strive to be able to exploit the enormous throw weight advantage which it will be guaranteed by that agreement in its ICBM and SLBM weapons will place us in the very positive position of facing the world five years hence in a position where we are not only—do not have parity but have something substantially less.

IS SOVIET UNION DETERMINED TO DESTROY UNITED STATES BY MILITARY MEANS?

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your position that the Soviet Union is determined to destroy the United States by military means?

Senator BUCKLEY. No; I believe that military power has an influence on diplomatic events, on world politics, and that the possession of

power can enable the possessor of the power to force events to follow his own wishes.

I hope and believe that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will ever launch a nuclear attack on the other; by the same token, as I tried to point out at the close of my testimony, if the perceptions of the parties involved in any confrontation is that one or the other would be undertaking a substantially greater risk, then that perception will inevitably influence the degree of determination of the parties facing up to that confrontation.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AS POSSIBLE OBJECTIVE

The CHAIRMAN. I assume the President's moves recently in this area were based upon an assumption that—this phrase, and I suppose everyone interprets it in a different way, but anyway it is overused—peaceful coexistence is a possible objective. Do you agree that it is a possible objective?

Senator BUCKLEY. I am afraid I didn't catch the earlier part of your question.

The CHAIRMAN. We often have heard, you know, the phrase "peaceful coexistence." I think Khrushchev used it and it has been used generally; it may be rather vague, but in any case, it means in my view some kind of normal relationships in which you have competition for the respect and allegiance of other peoples, but not with military means. It is the same type of relations that we have with many countries that are not allies, but at least our relations with them are reasonably normal. I assume the President based his move to both China and Russia on the assumption that such relations might be established. Do you accept that premise?

Senator BUCKLEY. I believe this is possible, Mr. Chairman, but only if we also follow the President's strongest recommendations that we couple these agreements with a determination to, in effect, catch up in certain critical areas so that during the negotiation of SALT II we have an effective parity.

Now, I believe, if and when the Soviet Union is satisfied that we have the spine and determination to match their extraordinary expansion in every aspect of their military might, that at such time will they be most willing to do what makes sense for both of us and that is, to start cutting back on the deployment of arms. I pray that the time will come when we don't set ceilings but start peeling back on this enormous inventory of nuclear warheads. But as I indicated earlier, I think that this is where we should be focusing our attention and not in dismantling the military protection to protect ourselves against the remote but nevertheless eventual possibility of a catastrophe.

The CHAIRMAN. I had thought these two agreements were a first step, rather tentative, toward achieving that goal. That is the way I interpreted the way the President and his spokesman, Dr. Kissinger, explained it. While it couldn't be expected to do all of this at once, this was a step in that direction. You do not think this is a step in that direction?

Senator BUCKLEY. We have—first of all, I have a fundamental disagreement, of course, as to the ABM limitations on humanitarian

grounds, on moral grounds, but I think that both Dr. Kissinger and the President have made it reasonably clear that, whereas, in fact, the Interim Agreement will allow the Soviet Union to achieve a very significant advantage, quantitative advantage, in the weapon systems it controls, it is their feeling that this agreement is nevertheless necessary because otherwise they would get even further ahead of us.

This is risk-taking in my judgment, and it is risk-taking which may be necessary under the cold realities we face today, but it is risk-taking which can be minimized if we will exploit such technological advantages as we are capable of, within the ceiling that has been imposed on us.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Buckley, I think you make your position clear. Now, as I understand it, you do not agree with the President in his viewpoint on this, nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

PHILOSOPHY OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE

Senator BUCKLEY. I don't—let me put it this way: Where I am in disagreement, where I have explicitly said I am in disagreement, is the philosophy of a mutual deterrence; this is a philosophy that says we will not protect ourselves. It seems to me the first duty of a nation is to protect the lives of its civilians, if it has that capability. We have allowed a doctrine to develop over the years, and this is not new; this has been the doctrine for the last decade or so, a doctrine which maintains that we will deliberately be naked, hopefully in the expectation that the Soviets will oblige us by undertaking to be naked themselves, and that in this matter we have our best chances of avoiding a strike, the mutual terror argument.

MORALITY OF PRECLUDING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW CONCEPTS QUESTIONED

Now, on the basis of existing technology, I can see the reasoning for this, although there is question about the effectiveness of available ABM technology; but I do question the morality of deciding now for all time that we will preclude ourselves from developing new concepts which at a later date could mean that the city of Washington or New York or San Francisco or Detroit could not be meaningfully protected either from attack by the Soviet Union or from an attack from some other nation which has the capability of launching a weapon.

INTERIM AGREEMENTS

Now, with respect to the Interim Agreement, I said that I am willing to accept the fact that given the corner in which we found ourselves with the Russians rapidly overtaking us in their land-based and submarine-based missile capabilities, that perhaps this is the best we could do, and then I specifically support the President and Secretary Laird and Mr. Kissinger in saying that furthermore we will be totally imprudent if we adopt these agreements, the Interim Agreements, without at the same time making sure that we do not develop a euphoria and sit on our hands to the end that most assuredly at the end of 5 years we find ourselves in a position of decisive inferiority.

They are not recommending that; they are recommending that we develop the ULMS, the B–1, that we increase the technical sophistication of our warhead guidance systems and so on and so forth.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was going to ask you if you would go along with Secretary Laird who has indicated that his support of the treaty would come only if we were allowed to proceed in the development of these new systems, new weapons, new technology.

Senator BUCKLEY. This, of course, poses the dilemma that if the Congress is not willing to go forward with even these programs, how likely is it that the Congress will make that larger effort which will be required to try to catch up with the Soviet capabilities in ICBM's and submarine construction at the rate they are presently going. It is a prudential judgment.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator COOPER. I would like to say I think that Senator Buckley has performed a useful service here today. You have raised practically every question I think that might have been considered by the negotiators. Your paper shows the very thorough knowledge you have of the negotiations and of the systems. Your questions are very valuable because the questions you raised, in their technical application at least are correct.

Your paper points out as clearly as any I have seen and read that these negotiations were very difficult. Agreement didn't occur in the last 24 hours in Moscow, and our negotiators were not just shadowboxing. These questions you have raised and others had to be worked out over a period of years very carefully.

NOT ALL ISSUES SETTLED

You are correct that not all the issues are settled. It is a fact that the question of the heavy missile is not settled; the mobile ICBM's are not settled. The question of whether we could check the launching, the repeat loading of an ICBM raise—I don't know whether it can be detected or not. I don't suppose anybody knows; the question of whether you can detect with full certainty ICBM's in the mountainous section of the Soviet Union which is under clouds most of the year—you raise very important questions.

DANGER OF ABM SYSTEM

I do want to question you on the ABM, though. You oppose it on the ground of morality, whether or not we should be denied the authority to protect our people. But as I have understood the reasoning about the futility of an ABM system and also its danger throughout these years of the debate over the ABM, the central factor is this that if one country deployed an areawide ABM system and gave the impression it was trying to protect its population and might be able to do so, then it would cause such an instability that one nation might launch a first strike in the belief that it could protect its population

and, in fact, achieve the destruction of the other country, by a first strike.

How do you answer that?

Senator BUCKLEY. Well, I think the concept is fine so long as we can be assured that both sides are playing by the same concepts, the same rules; but I would suggest that the Soviet Union does not believe in the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. They have long since passed the point in the development of their capabilities which is sufficient to satisfy that doctrine; whereas, we have deliberately avoided achieving a counterforce capability, which is part and parcel of this doctrine of assured mutual destruction; they have gone on to deploy huge missiles which have the capability of zeroing in and destroying our land-based deterrent forces.

STATEMENTS OF EDITORS OF JANES MILITARY ANALYSES

Now, I am sure, Senator Cooper, that you have seen some scenarios—I know I have—and I know there is argument about them. But, nevertheless, we find some foreign observers such as the editors of the Janes Military Analyses who state that by 1975, if current trends are allowed to continue, the Soviet Union will have achieved the capability of destroying 90 to 95 percent of our ICBM's, half or more of our B–52's, a third or more of our Polaris-Poseidon submarine forces, which would then face the United States with this dilemma. Very few people would be killed and when we are talking in the nuclear contest, with such a first strike to be aimed at the sites of weapons, not cities, at that point deterence might very well work entirely against the United States in that one can ask whether a President of the United States would really press the button to destroy tens of millions of Russians in an act of revenge when he would know that the immediate response, because the Soviets would have sufficient weapons left over, after their first strike, if the immediate response, would be to destroy 40 or 50 or 60 percent of our population.

Now, as I suggested earlier, I don't believe anyone is going to push buttons, but if the two parties in a confrontation should sense that the Soviet Union has this capacity, and could conceivably launch, and that we would find ourselves in that position and this could very definitely and dramatically influence diplomatic developments—very important developments—which ultimately affect the security of the free world.

SERIOUS PROBLEMS EXIST: CONCERNING MIRV

Senator COOPER. You have raised a question which has been raised by other witnesses, both those who think the agreements are good and those who think they are bad. For example, we had witnesses yesterday—Dr. Brennan, who wouldn't quite say whether he approved or disapproved these agreements, but he voiced doubts about them; we also had a very fine witness, Dr. Stanley Hoffmann, who approves them—both the ABM and the agreements, but who raised the question which also you raised and I don't think it ought to be glossed over . . . He said this, about MIRV:

Serious problems exist here: concerning MIRV, we may soon be so far ahead that a freeze would be unacceptable to the U.S.S.R., whereas, if we wait until

their technology has caught up with ours, they may then achieve a superiority in overall deliverable warheads that might be—politically, if not strategically—intolerable to us.

EFFECTS OF ACTION OF SOVIET UNION IN PHASE II

My question is this: Would you think that phase II and the action the Soviet Union may take in phase II and that we take may tell more accurately the story of whether these agreements are a step toward control of these weapons or their proliferation?

Senator BUCKLEY. I think, Senator Cooper, it may depend entirely or to a very significant extent on our relative postures toward the end of the five-year period envisaged in the Interim Agreement. If we have failed to move ahead, as the President has recommended, we may find ourselves in a position of actual or almost immediate inferiority from which we cannot catch up, at which time we might find the Soviet Union very intransigent, the Soviet Union working not to achieve what I believe is necessary in SALT II, namely, beginning with assured parity on a payload capacity and then peeling back the weapons, so we reduce, constantly reduce, this awful threat to humanity. They might, in the alternative, use their existing strength and their continuing capacity to tool up and start building still more submarines and still deploying still added numbers of missiles to cause us to agree to a position where they would have a permanent superiority as the price for not—for both sides not continuing to spend still more money, at which point the political implications would be most serious.

Senator COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

I want to repeat again, I think your statement, while I don't agree with your position on ABM, nevertheless I think it is a very intelligent, thoughtful statement and one in which you raised, as I look back through these years, practically every question of what must have been considered in these negotiations.

Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator COOPER. And the questions that lie ahead.

Senator BUCKLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Buckley.

The next witness is our former colleague, Senator Joseph Clark. We are very pleased to have you, Senator Clark.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH CLARK, FORMER U.S. SENATOR, CHAIRMAN OF THE COALITION ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND MILITARY POLICY

Mr. CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful to you and the members of the committee for giving the Coalition this opportunity to testify and I believe I can save the committee some time if my statement is placed in full in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. Then I will ad lib from it.

The CHAIRMAN. Put the entire statement in and you can emphasize those points you wish to make.

Mr. CLARK. Thank you, sir.

APPROVAL OF ABM TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT RECOMMENDED

The Coalition believes both the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons should be approved by this committee and we make this recommendation despite the belief that in many ways both agreements are frauds on the American and Russian people perpetrated by the military leaders of both countries.

ABM UNLIKELY TO WORK UNDER BATTLE CONDITIONS

The ABM Agreement is a fraud because the military leaders of both countries know that the ABM will in all likelihood not work under battle conditions. The billions the Russians have spent on their ABM around Moscow have been wasted; so have the billions we have spent in Montana and in North Dakota.

The basic inadequacy of the ABM was first called to the attention of the American public in 1967 in a series of papers written by outstanding scholars and scientists under the title "Debate to ABM" brought together by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. This was followed by a volume which received even greater attention when published in 1969, under the title, "ABM—an Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System", in which 17 knowledgeable scientists, former Defense Department executives and public figures, including Senator Edward Kennedy, who testified this morning, came to the conclusion stated above: That is, the ABM would not work; and more than that, it will not turn the arms race downward.

It is not too much to say that every prominent American scientist not directly or indirectly in the pay of the Pentagon shares this view.

It is devoutly to be hoped that the Congress will not permit the Defense Department to squander more billions in the building of a useless ABM ring around Washington. The fact of the matter is that the ABM was obsolete before the first one was deployed.

INTERIM AGREEMENT DOES NOT TURN ARMS RACE DOWNWARD

Similarly, the Interim Agreement respecting Strategic Offensive Arms does not turn the arms race downward. In fact, if one is to believe President Nixon and Secretary Laird, the Russians intend to go full speed ahead with further massive research, development, testing, and deployment of even more lethal nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

We are told that in the interests of national security we must follow suit, so under these agreements the arms race will accelerate, not cool off.

SALT AGREEMENTS COULD USHER IN ERA OF GOOD FEELING

Why, then, you will naturally ask does the Coalition recommend approval of these exceptionally ridiculous agreements?

The answer lies in our hope that the very real public relations triumph which the President achieved in Moscow could conceivably be turned into a solid start to a wide-ranging détente with the Soviet Union; and on such a détente the peace of the world may well depend. If we can only keep our Cold Warriors quiet in the Congress and the Pentagon, the SALT agreements could usher in an era of good feeling which could bring the arms race to an end within the foreseeable future.

So the years of shadowboxing at SALT can be turned to good advantage if this committee recommends the ratification of these two agreements without exploring too deeply their essential unimportance in and of themselves.

IMPACT OF RATIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS ON FY 1973 DOD BUDGET

Two main questions remain: First, what impact should ratification of the agreements have on the 1973 fiscal year Department of Defense budget; and, second, where should the United States go from here in terms of further arms control and disarmament negotiations, not only with the Russians but also with all other nations having significant armed forces.

The answer to the first question, in our opinion, is easy: Under no circumstances should Mr. Laird be permitted to use his requested increases in the budget for new or improved nuclear weapon systems or warheads as a "bargaining chip" in the congressional debate on ratification of the SALT agreements. There is no legitimate excuse for increased expenditures on nuclear weaponry; in fact, our strategic nuclear arsenal should be cut, not expanded.

In the debate on this treaty, one sees very little reference to the overkill that each side has. There is no reason to increase it. It would be folly to do so.

President Nixon says that Chairman Brezhnev told him the Russians are going full speed ahead with further nuclear research, development, testing, and deployment within the limits set by the treaty. If this should turn out to be true, the answer should be, "Well, let him." If the Russians want to waste billions on this kind of folly, that is their business. It is no reason for our following suit. As long as we have at least 800 nuclear warheads on our invulnerable submarines, we have no occasion to provide more. At present we have 5,700 warheads overall compared to their 2,500; that is many times more than enough. If a nuclear strike were required, the 800 warheads could destroy civilization in the Soviet Union many times over.

I call to the attention of the committee the June 30 issue of the Defense Monitor published by the Center for Defense Information of which Rear Adm. Gene La Rocque is the director. I would like your permission to place it in the record. Parenthetically, the Center for Defense Information clings wisely to its tax exemption as a research and educational group and, therefore, they can't lobby by appearing before you. However, we are pleased to call your attention to the excellent work being done by Admiral La Rocque and his staff of defense experts.

(The information referred to follows:)

THE DEFENSE MONITOR

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SALT AND AFTERWARD

The SALT accords, signed May 26th in Moscow and now before the US Congress for approval, were written in the face of a rapidly moving nuclear arms race.

At the time of the signing the United States was installing multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV) on its land and sea-based missiles. It was going forward with a

SALT AT A GLANCE

ICBM LAUNCHERS



US	
Deployed	1054
Recent construction rate	None
Planned for 1977 without SALT	1054
SALT ceiling	1000-1054*



USSR	
Deployed	1550
Recent construction rate	250 per year
Possible 1977 projection without SALT	2000
SALT ceiling	1408-1618*

SLBM LAUNCH TUBES



Present	656
Recent construction rate	None
Planned for 1977 without SALT	656
SALT ceiling	710**



Present	580
Recent construction rate	128 per year
Possible 1977 projection without SALT	1200
SALT ceiling	950**

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES



Deployed and under conversion	41
Recent construction rate	None
Planned for 1977 without SALT	41
SALT ceiling	44**



Deployed and under construction	53 (approx.)
Recent construction rate	7-9 per year
Possible 1977 projection without SALT	80-100
SALT ceiling	62**

ABMs



SALT ceiling	2 sites (100 missiles each)



SALT ceiling	2 sites (100 missiles each)

NOT COVERED BY SALT AGREEMENTS
(CDI Estimates)

STRATEGIC BOMBERS



Present strategically targeted	321



Present strategically targeted	140

WARHEADS



Present	5746
Probable under SALT by 1977	10,557



Present	2491
Probable under SALT by 1977	3869

*Depending on whether old ICBMs are dismantled and replaced by SLBMs.

** To reach these levels US would have to dismantle 54 old Titan ICBMs; USSR would have to dismantle 210 old SS 7 and SS 8 ICBMs.

program to greatly expand the destructive power of its strategic bombers by equipping them with short range attack missiles (SRAM). Together these steps would increase the US strategic nuclear warhead and bomb total from about 5700 in 1972 to more than 10,000 in 1976. On top of this the United States was developing a new strategic submarine called Trident, with new missiles to go with it, and a new strategic bomber, the B-1.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was building new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers at a rate of 250 per year. These included silos for the huge SS9 missile, capable of carrying 25 megatons (a US Minuteman II carries about 1 to 2 megatons). The Soviets had dug 25 silos possibly for a new missile even larger than the SS9. They were building new nuclear-powered strategic ballistic missile submarines at a rate of 7 to 9 per year, and could at this rate have twice as many such submarines as the United States in five years. The Russians were, however, years behind in MIRV. They were working on MIRV technology but had yet to test what US technicians considered to be a MIRV system.

Thus, the two superpowers were running their nuclear race in different ways. The United States was concentrating on MIRV, while holding its missile totals constant and reducing megatons. The Soviet Union was increasing numbers of missile launchers and deploying larger vehicles to carry fewer warheads but with greater megatonnage. Both sides were developing anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

For the question "Who's ahead?" there were as many answers as there were ways to measure the strategic arms balance.

In numbers of ICBM launchers, the Soviet Union had come from behind and passed the United States.

In numbers of submarine missile launch tubes the Soviets were catching up, and would in a few years pass the United States.

In numbers of heavy bombers the United States had a 3 to 1 lead.

In numbers of separately targetable nuclear weapons, the United States had a 2 to 1 lead, and because of this country's head start in MIRV, this lead was rapidly widening in favor of the United States.

In total megatons the Soviets had about a 2 or 3 to 1 lead.

When all these measures were considered together the Soviet Union clearly had come from a position of nuclear inferiority at the time of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to a position which many weapons experts saw as parity, and which some viewed with alarm as indicating future Soviet superiority unless the United States speeded up its weapons programs.

THE ACCORDS

The SALT accords consist of a treaty limiting ABMs, a five-year Interim Agreement which puts certain partial limits on offensive weapons development pending further arms talks, a protocol to this Interim Agreement, and a number of statements of "interpretation" some agreed and some unilateral. Based on all these documents, the following is a summary of the main provisions of the accords:

ABM Treaty

Each country agrees not to build an ABM system for defense of its entire territory or major region. This amounts to a pledge that neither will try to upset the present deterrent balance by deploying ABMs to protect its general population and industry.

Each will limit ABM systems to two sites—one in defense of its national capital, the other in defense of an ICBM field. These must be at least 1300 kilometers (800 miles) apart, which means the Soviet ICBM field to be protected must be east of the Ural Mountains, away from the major western USSR population centers.

No more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 intercepter missiles may be deployed at each site.

Restrictions are set on numbers, types and placement of ABM radars to foreclose a radar capability for nationwide defense of either country.

In addition to these basic provisions, the two countries agree to ban sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABMs; not to deploy ABM systems of new kinds without prior discussion; not to convert air-defense or other systems to an ABM role; not to build radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missiles except along the edges of the country facing out; not to transfer ABM systems to other states or deploy them overseas.

There is no on-site inspection. Each side will use its own technical means of verification and each pledges not to interfere with these means or resort to deliberate concealment.

A Standing Consultative Commission will be established to implement the treaty and consider questions involving it.

The ABM treaty is of unlimited duration but either side can withdraw for supreme interest.

The treaty would require the United States to cut back its 12-site ABM program (of which four sites have been approved by Congress) to a maximum of 2. The Administration plans to complete the ABM site on which construction is farthest ahead—at the ICBM field at Grand Forks, N.D. It will halt work on three other sites at ICBM fields and has asked Congress to approve an ABM site at Washington, D.C. The treaty permits Russia to continue its ABM site already under construction at Moscow and to start a second site at an ICBM field.

Interim Agreement and Protocol

These deal with offensive nuclear weapons. In general they limit the numbers of ICBMs, ballistic missile sub-

marines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to levels which each side agrees are presently deployed or under construction. These limitations are for five years, pending further SALT talks. With agreed "interpretations" the limitations are as follows:

No additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers may be started during the freeze above the numbers deployed and "under active construction" at the time of signing—1054 for the United States, and about 1618 for the Soviet Union.

Launchers for so-called "light" ICBMs (the US Minuteman and Soviet SS11 and 13) and "older" ICBMs (the US Titan and Soviet SS7 and 8) may not be replaced by "modern heavy ICBMs" (the Soviet SS9). The SS9 class missiles may, however, be made heavier. Russia has 288 SS9s now and 25 apparently larger silos dug. It could therefore end up with 313 "modern heavy" ICBMs of SS9 size or larger. The United States has no "modern heavy" ICBMs and plans none.

Within these restrictions, ICBMs may be replaced with more modern ones—for example with MIRV. But in the process of modernization, launchers may not be increased in size more than 10-15%.

The number of launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) each side presently has deployed or under construction was stipulated to be 656 US and 740 USSR. These numbers can be increased subject to two provisions:

> Additional SLBM launchers may become operational only as replacements for an equal number of "older" ICBM launchers (first deployed prior to 1964) or for launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines or for modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarines.
>
> During the five year freeze the US is limited to 44 modern ballistic missile submarines and 710 SLBM launchers. The Soviet Union is limited to 62 modern ballistic missile submarines and 950 SLBM launchers.

As in the case of ICBMs, submarine missile systems can be modernized. Single-warhead missiles can be replaced by MIRVed missiles. New submarines can be substituted for old.

Destruction or dismantling of old ICBMs or submarine missiles must begin by the start of sea trials of a replacement ballistic missile submarine.

Each side agrees not to significantly increase its number of test and training launchers for ICBMs or SLBMs.

There were several unresolved points of *disagreement* in the accords:

> The Soviet Union stated unilaterally that if US allies in NATO should increase their numbers of ballistic missile submarines beyond those presently in operation or under construction the Soviet Union would have the right to make a corresponding increase in its number of submarines.
>
> The United States was unable to get agreement on a common definition of "heavy" ICBMs. The US considers it to be any missile bigger than the largest existing "light" ICBM which is the Soviet SS11.
>
> The United States was unable to get agreement to include mobile ICBMs in the freeze. (Mobile ABMs are banned.) The United States declared unilaterally that deployment of mobile ICBMs during the freeze would be considered "inconsistent with the objectives" of the agreement.

WHAT THE ACCORDS MEAN

From an Arms Control View

The SALT accords can be examined from several viewpoints. One of these is the viewpoint of international arms control—that is, in terms of what effect the accords will have on the arms race.

Among the achievements in this regard:

The SALT accords represent the first—even though partial—limitations by the United States and Soviet Union dealing with the fundamentals of their arms race. Previously, the two countries had agreed to bar nuclear weapons from the Antarctic, from outer space, and from the sea bed. They had agreed not to test them in the atmosphere, underwater or in space and not to give them to other countries. But never had the two superpowers reached agreement on the nuclear weapons targeted at each other.

The ABM treaty bans the kind of ABM system which could be most de-stabilizing—a nation-wide or major regional defense of population and industry. Such a system, undertaken by either country, could threaten the other's deterrent and cause it to respond with additional offensive buildup. The complex restrictions on ABM sites should convince each side the other is not developing an ABM for defense of large areas. The treaty rules out a US ABM for population defense against China, which this country once planned but later abandoned.

Freezing ICBMs, SLBMs, and ballistic missile submarines at levels deployed and under construction is a first step in limiting offensive nuclear weapons, a step on which future SALT talks can build. Broadly speaking, the accords accommodate themselves to the different kinds of offensive weapons buildup which each side now has underway—Soviet construction of more and bigger missiles and US MIRV. They allow each side to substantially complete the round it now has in progress. The new levels become the starting point for attempting to freeze the arms race.

Among the debits from an arms control viewpoint:

Except for ABMs the accords do not stop any of the major weapons programs now in progress. This is because numerical limits are set high, qualitative improvements are

allowed, and many weapons systems—including bombers, air-defense, anti-submarine warfare, air-breathing strategic missiles and tactical nuclear weapons—are not covered. Under SALT the United States can continue conversion of Minuteman and Polaris to MIRV, development of Trident submarines with new missiles, the B-1 bomber, research on "site defense" for ICBMs, submarine launched cruise (air breathing) missiles and new submarines in which to carry them. The Soviet Union can continue, up to a point, building additional land and sea-based missile launchers, and could develop and deploy MIRV.

Because all these programs are allowed, and because numerical limits are set so high, military planners on each side will still point to future possibilities rather than existing or likely forces to justify their own building programs.

From a US Security View

The accords can also be looked at from a much narrower view of US military security:

Advantages:

Since only the Soviet Union is presently building up its numbers of offensive weapons launchers, it is to the advantage of the United States to put ceilings on these numbers. Within the totals the number of "heavy" ICBMs Russia can have is limited to 313. Without SALT, the Soviet Union could, at present rates of construction, exceed the freeze ceiling. Instead of 62 modern ballistic missile submarines it could have 80 or 90. The US has had no plans to add to its numbers of ICBMs or build "heavy" ones. It could, under the freeze, build 13 Trident submarines. Defense Secretary Laird has said only ten are planned. Actually the first Tridents would not become operational until after the 5-year freeze, and are therefore more related to future rounds of SALT than the first.

Freezing the number of ICBM launchers, especially "heavy" ones will leave only one route for the Soviet Union to develop increased "counterforce" capability to knock out US ICBMs—qualitative improvements such as increased accuracy, MIRVing, and throw weight.

The ABM limit plus the limits on ICBM numbers lessen the chance that the Soviet Union could develop the capability for a successful "first strike"—that is, the ability to knock out enough US missiles to suffer no or substantially less damage in return.

Criticisms:

A number of criticisms have been made against the treaty on US security grounds:

> The accords allow the Soviet Union to have more ICBM launchers, SLBMs and ballistic missile submarines than the United States.
>
> Only the Soviet Union can have "modern heavy" ICBMs, with capacity to carry more megatons or more MIRVs than US missiles.
>
> The Soviet Union will retain advantage in total megatonnage and throw weight.
>
> Though ICBM numbers are frozen at levels deployed and under active construction, the Russians did not specify exactly how many they have under construction. The United States considers the freeze level to be 1618 for the Soviet Union.

In reply to these criticisms, Administration officials have said that without the SALT ceilings, assuming recent Soviet construction rates were to continue, the Russians could have, in 1977, more than 2000 ICBMs instead of the 1618 permitted; 1200 SLBMs instead of the 950 permitted and 80 to 100 modern ballistic missile submarines instead of the 62 permitted. As to Russia's refusal to specify its ICBM total, US officials said that if the Russians were to significantly add to the number 1618, the United States would quickly know about it and would have the right to withdraw from the treaty.

An important factor in the security controversy is MIRV. If the Soviet Union does not develop MIRV, it will still have little more than 2500 warheads five years from now when the United States will, under presently planned programs, have more than 10,000.

If the Soviets do develop MIRV, two key questions will be: How fast? And how much?

The Soviet Union appears to be years behind this country in MIRV. The United States began MIRV tests in August, 1968. The first squadron of Minuteman III missiles became operational Jan. 8, 1971; the first wing of 150, on Dec. 13, 1971. The Soviet Union has also been working on multiple warhead technology since about August, 1968, but according to U.S. officials it has yet to test a MIRV system as the United States knows the term. The Russians tested a triple-warhead system in which the warheads may or may not have been independently targetable. (U.S. analysts differed on this point.) But these tests stopped in late 1970, suggesting that the Russians might have decided to start over on a new tack.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said June 5 that Russia "could have a MIRV capability in 24 months." But he did not say how many they might have by then.

Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) has said that when the Soviets achieve MIRV "...the combination of their vastly superior payload and modern MIRV technology will give them superiority in warheads." There have been published reports that Soviet missiles larger than SS9s could hold up to 20 MIRVs each. (A US Minuteman holds up to 3; a Poseidon, 10 to 14). But other defense analysts believe this overstates what Russia could realistically achieve in MIRV during the next five years.

Table V shows the Center for Defense Information's calculation of what the Soviet Union probably could achieve in MIRV during the five years of the Interim Agreement, if it develops MIRV. At the end of five years it would have

some 3800 warheads compared to more than 10,000 for the United States.

Assuming Russia could MIRV its missiles to the maximum figures indicated in public print, it could have more than 14,000 warheads. It is doubtful Russia could achieve this level in five years. The United States could also have 14,000 warheads by MIRVing all its Minutemen and building the B-1 and Trident. This would be permitted by the SALT Interim Agreement.

However, such calculations of marginal advantages for the United States or Soviet Union—whether they be in warheads, launchers or megatons—overlook one important point: Both countries have the power to destroy each other several times over, and this will remain the case during the five years of the Interim Agreement.

Gerard Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, when asked during hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 19 whether Russia would get ahead of the United States during the five year agreement, replied: "Nothing the Soviets can do within the five year agreement will offset the present strategic balance between the US and USSR."

COST

The immediate cost impact of the SALT accords on the fiscal 1973 defense budget has been listed by the Defense Department as follows:

Reducing ABM program to two sites	$-711 million
Increases in other strategic programs:	
Accelerate and complete development of Site Defense	+ 60
Develop submarine-based cruise missile	+ 20
Accelerate bomber rebasing	+ 45
Augment verification capabilities	+ 13
Develop improved reentry vehicles for ICBMs and SLBMs	+ 20
Improved command, control and communications	+ 10
Net change	$-543 million

Secretary Laird has testified that the total ABM saving through 1981 as a result of SALT would be $9.9 billion, figured in 1968 prices. (The 1968 estimate for a 12-site ABM was $18.4 billion, of which $13.4 billion remains to be spent. The 1968 estimate for a two-site program was $8.5 billion, of which $3.5 billion remains to be spent. The SALT saving is $13.4 billion minus $3.5 billion.)

Further savings could come from the first round of SALT if the United States decided that, as a result of the recent accords, it could safely stop or slow down some of its other major nuclear weapons programs, such as Trident, the B-1, or air defense. The Administration wants to go ahead with these programs. The question of what this country's pace in nuclear weapons building should be following the first round of SALT has become a major issue.

POLICY FOLLOWING SALT

Secretary Laird told newsmen June 6: "I could not support the (SALT) agreements if Congress fails to act on the movement forward of the Trident system, on the B-1 bomber, and the other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five year period." Admiral Moorer said the Joint Chiefs were in accord with the SALT agreements provided the other programs went ahead.

In a briefing for Senators and Congressmen June 15, Dr. Henry Kissinger, assistant to the President for national security, considerably moderated this stand. He said the Administration wants Congressional approval of both SALT and the new weapons programs but: "We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs..."

Laird told the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations June 5 that "Just as the Moscow agreements were made possible by our successful action in such programs as Safeguard, Poseidon and Minuteman III, these future negotiations to which we are pledged can only succeed if we are equally successful in implementing such programs as the Trident system, the B-1 bomber, NCA defense, Site Defense, SLCM, and accelerated satellite basing of strategic bombers. We must also initiate certain other measures in areas such as intelligence, verification, and command, control, and communications."

Transmitting the SALT agreements to Congress, President Nixon said: "Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached."

The Administration's argument is that if the United States had not been deploying MIRVs and going forward with other programs it would have lacked the bargaining power to obtain a ceiling on Soviet building of SS9s and other systems.

Others have challenged this "bargaining chip" approach. Sen. George McGovern told the Priorities Subcommittee of

the Joint Economic Committee June 16 that if the United States had followed a policy of restraint in weapons building, both American and Soviet MIRVs could have been stopped. He said building weapons for bargaining purposes "can only push up the terms of ultimate arms control agreements."

The Arms Control Association said: "The US should review its unilateral weapons programs and pursue only those that have a security need in light of the new strategic situation."

Thus, a fundamental issue has been raised—whether the way to ultimately curb the nuclear arms race is to build more weapons for "negotiating strength" or whether it is to exercise more restraint in weapons building.

It is an issue which, no doubt, both the United States and Russia face as they contemplate the next round of SALT in October.

CONCLUSIONS

Arms Control

The ABM treaty bans the kind of ABM systems which would be most de-stabilizing and is therefore a significant step in limiting the arms race.

The five-year agreement on offensive weapons allows the United States and Soviet Union each to continue its present round of nuclear buildup, and then establishes a partial, quantitative freeze at the resulting new levels. This is a start which can be followed up in future SALT negotiations.

US Security

The accords place ceilings on numbers of offensive weapon launchers at a time when only the Soviet Union is increasing these numbers. Without the accords, Soviet construction could be greater. The offensive freeze plus the ABM limitation lessen the chances of Russia ever becoming able to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against this country without being destroyed in return.

While Russia will continue to lead the United States in numbers of launchers and total megatonnage under the accords, the United States is expected to retain its lead in numbers of warheads. These differences, however, are less important than the fact that each country has the power to destroy the other several times over.

Weapons Policy

The Administration should reconsider its present policy which says that the way to limit nuclear weapons is to build more of them. Both the United States and Russia appear to have approached the recent round of SALT determined to "negotiate through strength." Each had nuclear buildups in progress. But somehow these bargaining chips didn't get bargained. They are being built. The initial round of SALT has made the US deterrent more secure. The United States now does not need to build Trident submarines and B-1 bombers and submarine cruise missiles to convince the Soviet Union that both countries have good reason to bring their arms race under control and eventually reduce nuclear arms. Each side already has more than sufficient nuclear power to bargain toward this end.

TABLE I

Estimated Strategic Force Levels of the US At the Time of the SALT Agreement—May 1972

Type	Launch Vehicle	Number (X)	Missiles/Bombs per Launch Vehicle (=)	Missile/Bomb Total	Warheads per Missile/Bomb (X) (MRV/MIRV)	Deliverable Warhead Total (=)
ICBM						
"Light"						
	Minuteman I	320[1]	1	320	1	320
	Minuteman II	500[1]	1	500	1	500
	Minuteman III	180[1]	1	180	2.5[2]	450
"Older-Heavy"						
	Titan II	54[1]	1	54	1	54
"Modern-Heavy"						
	None	0		0		0
	Sub-totals	1,054[1]		1,054[1]		1,324
SLBM	Polaris (A-3)	21[1]	16	336	2.5[2]	840
	Poseidon	10[1]	16	160	12[3]	1,920
	Polaris under conversion to Poseidon	10[1]	16	160	12[3]	1,920
	Sub-totals	41[1]		656[1]		2,760 (Not including those under conversion.)
Strategic Bombers	B-52G&H	255[4]	6[5]	1,530	1	1,530
	FB-111	66[6]	2	132	1	132
	Sub-totals	321[7]		1,662		1,662
	TOTALS	1,416		3,372		**5,746[8]**

[1] DOD figures. May 22, 1972; *Washington Post.*

[2] A total of three warheads per missile (MIRV) is possible. A multiple of 2.5 is used to take into account an assumed percentage of less than 20% for decoys used in the overall system warhead loading.

[3] This figure varies from 10 to 14. Twelve is used as an average.

[4] 255 is the Unit Equipped (UE) figure. The total number of B-52 Gs and Hs is 282. The additional units are in training and testing programs.

[5] This figure includes 2 Hound-Dog air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and 4 nuclear gravity bombs.

[6] 66 is the UE figure. The total number of FB-111s is 72. The additional units are in training and testing programs.

[7] DOD gives 531 as a total for US long-range bombers. 321 represents only those UE bombers probably strategically targeted. About 200 other B-52s are currently assigned to conventional bombing missions in South East Asia (SEA).

[8] DOD figures of May 27, 1972 give 5700 as the US warhead total.

TABLE II

Estimated Composition of U.S. Strategic Forces by the Expiration of the SALT Agreement in 1977. Table Shows Only Those Programs Approved by Congress and Does Not Include the Trident Submarine or the B-1 Bomber Programs.

Type	Launch Vehicle	Number	(X) Missiles/Bombs per Launch Vehicle	(=) Missile/Bomb Total	(X) Warheads per Missile/Bomb (MRV/MIRV)	(=) Deliverable Warhead Total
ICBM	Minuteman II	450[1]	1	450	1	450
	Minuteman III	550	1	550	2.5	1,375
	Titan II	54[1]	1	54	1	54
	Sub-total	1,054		1,054		1,879
SLBM	Polaris (A-3)	10[2]	16	160	2.5	400
	Poseidon	31[2]	16	496	12	5,952
	Sub-total	41		656		6,352
Bombers	B-52G&H (Hound-Dog Missiles and Bombs)	163[3]	6	978	1	978
	B-52G&H (SRAM)	92[4]	20	1,840	.60[5]	1,104
	FB-111	66	6	369	.66[6]	244
	Sub-total	321		3,187		2,326
	TOTALS	1,416		4,897		**10,557**[7]

[1] DOD figures from Laird's Annual Defense Department Report for FY1973, page 67.

[2] DOD figures from Admiral Moorer's US Military Posture for FY1973, page 10.

[3] This figure represents those B-52 Gs and Hs not currently scheduled for conversion to carry the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM). See Laird, *op. cit.*, page 71.

[4] Laird, *op. cit.*, page 71.

[5] This multiple assumes that out of the possible weapons load of 20 SRAMs per B-52, only about 12 (or 60%) will be actual warheads while the remaining weapons will be decoys. See J. I. Coffey, "Strategic Power and National Security," University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971, page 13.

[6] This multiple assumes that out of the possible weapons load of 6 SRAMs per FB-111, only about 4 (or 66%) will be actual warheads while the remaining weapons will be decoys. See Coffey, *Ibid.*, page 13.

[7] Staff analysis by the members of the Brookings Institution projected this figure to about 11,000 in an article which appeared in the *Washington Post* on June 11, 1972. A figure of 14,082 was used by the Center for Defense Information in an earlier issue of the Defense Monitor entitled "ULMS: TOO MUCH TOO SOON." The present figure of 10,557 is a revised Center estimate adjusting for decoys and assuming only 92 bombers equipped with SRAM instead of 255.

TABLE III

Estimated U.S. Strategic Force Levels Including the Trident Submarine and the B-1 Bomber by Early to Mid 1980's

Type	Launch Vehicle	Number (X)	Missiles/Bombs per Launch Vehicle (=)	Missile/Bomb Total	Warheads per Missile/Bomb (X)	(MRV/MIRV) (=)	Deliverable Warhead Total
ICBM	Minuteman III	1,000	1	1,000	2.5		2,500
	Sub-total	1,000[1]		1,000			2,500
SLBM	Poseidon	31	16	496	12		5,952
	Trident	13[2]	16[3]	208	12		2,496
	New Strategic Cruise Missile[4]	?		?			?
	Sub-total	44		704[5]			8,448
Bombers	FB-111 (SRAM)	66	6	396	.66		261
	B-1 (SRAM)	241[6]	24[7]	5,784	.58[8]		3,355
	Sub-total	307		6,180			3,616
	TOTALS	1,351		7,884			**14,564**

[1] This figure assumes the replacement of 54 Titan II ICBMs by additional SLBMs, and converting the Minuteman IIs to IIIs.

[2] This figure is more than the ten Tridents discussed by Laird, but is the number needed to replace the ten older Polaris submarines and add three additional ones to reach the allowed SALT total of 44. Keeping the 31 Poseidon SSBNs is assumed.

[3] This figure is required in order to build the assumed thirteen Trident submarines and keep within the maximum allowed number of SLBMs even though Laird has suggested that 24 would be the number of missile launchers on the new Trident submarines.

[4] The number of new strategic cruise missiles planned and new submarines required to launch them is unknown.

[5] A total of 710 is allowed by the SALT agreements.

[6] *Air Force Magazine*, February 1972, page 64.

[7] *Air Force Magazine*, February 1972, page 29.

[8] This multiple assumes that out of the possible weapons load of 24 SRAMs per B-1, only about 14 (or 58%) will be actual warheads while the remaining weapons will be decoys.

TABLE IV

Estimated Strategic Force Levels of the Soviet Union at the Time of the SALT Agreement—May 1972

Type	Launch Vehicle	Number	(X)	Missiles/Bombs per Launch Vehicle	(=)	Missile and Deliverable Warhead Total
ICBM						
"Light"						
	SS-13	60[1]		1		60
	SS-11	970[2]		1		970
	New ICBMs (Silos under construction)	66[3]		?		?
"Older-Heavy"						
	SS-7 & 8	210[4]		1		210
"Modern-Heavy"						
	SS-9	288[5]		1		288[6]
	New ICBMs (Silos under construction)	25[3]		?		?
	Sub-totals	1,618[4]				1,528
SLBM	Y-Class	25[5]		16		400
	Ys and "Stretch" Y-Class (under construction)	18[4]		14(ave.)[7]		252
	H-Class	10[4]		3		30
	Sub-totals	53[8]		3		682[8]
Bombers	TU-95 Bear (Kangaroo ASM)	66[9]		1		66
	TU-95 Bear (Bombs)	34[9]		4[10]		136
	M-4 Bison	40[11]		2[10]		80
	Sub-totals	140[5]				282
	TOTALS	1,811				**2,492**[12]

[1] *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1971-72*, page 5.

[2] *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, "The Growing Threat-2," October 11, 1971.

[3] *Washington Post*, May 27, 1972. Only silo holes have been detected without missiles implaced. See Admiral Moorer's Military Posture for FY 1973, page 6.

[4] Kissinger press conference in Moscow, May 26 and 27, 1972.

[5] DOD Figures, May 27, 1972; *Washington Post*.

[6] The actual total of SS-9 warheads is difficult to define. Four SS-9 missile modifications exist. A possible 3-warhead MRV capability may have been tested and deployed for the SS-9 MOD 4. A MIRV capability has not yet been demonstrated.

[7] The new "Stretch" Y-Class has 12 missile launchers versus 16 for the Y Class and carries the longer-range (3,400 nm) SS-N-8 SLBM. Since it is not publicly known how many of each type submarine is under construction an average of 14 missiles per submarine is used in this chart. See Kissinger's Moscow press conference, May 26 and 27, 1972.

[8] These figures do not include the 22 Soviet G-Class diesel-powered submarines or the 66 SLBMs carried by them. The SALT agreements only mention "modern" submarines which means "nuclear-powered." The 66 G-Class SLBMs are the same as those carried by the nuclear-powered H-Class, but were considered similar in nature to US forward deployed forces in Europe and the Mediterranean Sea. See Kissinger's Moscow press conference, May 26 and 27, 1972.

[9] This number is taken from "The Military Balance 1970-71," IISS, page 9, which estimates that about two-thirds of the 100 TU-95 Bears carry a single Kangaroo air-to-surface missile (ASM). The remaining one-third carry gravity bombs.

[10] This is an estimated bomb load and is based on the Bear and Bison lift capacity as related to the US B-52.

[11] "The Military Balance 1971-72." About 90 M-4 Bisons exist of which 50 serve as tankers.

[12] DOD figures of May 27, 1972 give 2,500 as the Soviet warhead total.

TABLE V

Estimated Composition of Soviet Strategic Forces by the Expiration of the SALT Agreement in 1977. Table Assumes Only a Limited MIRV Capability by That Time.

Type	Launch Vehicle	Number	(X) Missiles/Bombs per Launch Vehicle	(=) Missile/Bomb Total	(X) Warheads per Missile/Bomb (MRV/MIRV)	(=) Deliverable Warhead Total
ICBM	SS-13	60	1	60	1	60
	SS-11	970	1	970	1	970
	New ICBMs	66	1	66	1	66
	SS-9 and larger	313[1]	1	313	3[2]	939
	Mobile ICBMs[3]	?		?		?
	Sub-total	1,408[4]		1,408		2,035
SLBM	Y-Class	34[5]	16	544	1	544
	"Stretch" Y-Class	28[6]	12	336	3[7]	1,008
	Sub-total	62		880[8]		1,552
Bombers	TU-95 Bear (Kangaroo ASM)	66	1	66	1	66
	TU-95 Bear (Bombs)	34	4	136	1	136
	M-4 Bison	40	2	80	1	80
	Backfire[9] (under development)	?		?		?
	Sub-total	140		282		282
	TOTALS	1,610		2,570		**3,869**[10]

[1] This figure includes the current 25 "Modern-Heavy" ICBM silos under construction.

[2] This assumes at least a three-warhead (MRV/MIRV) capability deployed in all missiles.

[3] Mobile ICBMs are not covered by the present SALT agreements.

[4] This assumes that the "Older-Heavy" SS-7s and 8s will be replaced by additional SLBMs as provided for by the SALT agreements.

[5] This figure is obtained by assuming half (or 9) of the 18 missile submarines presently under construction are Y-Class, and this is added to the 25 presently operational.

[6] This figure is obtained by assuming that all the remaining allowed submarines, including the replacement of the 10 H-Class submarines, will be of the newer "Stretch" Y-class presently under construction.

[7] It is not publicly known if the new SS-N-8 SLBM has a multiple warhead capability. It is assumed here that it is a logical possibility that they will develop a MRV/MIRV capability on this weapon if they have not already done so.

[8] This SLBM total could be increased by 66 more missiles if the Soviets convert those older missiles on the 22 diesel-powered G-class submarines to the newer and longer range SS-N-6 or SS-N-8 SLBM.

[9] This new bomber is under development but it is not known whether it is designed for use against the United States homeland or for use in Europe and Asia.

[10] Accurate longer-range projections of Soviet warhead development are very difficult if not impossible to achieve. Some analysts have assumed a Soviet MIRV capability greater than projected here. By allowing 20 warheads on each missile for the SS-9 force, 12 warheads on each missile of the new "Stretch" Y-class for the SS-N-8 SLBM, and 3 warheads each for the other ICBMs and SLBMs, one can project a Soviet warhead total of over 14,000 by some unknown future date.

Mr. CLARK. The New York Times expressed the points I make in this statement very well in an editorial last Sunday, June 25, entitled "Mr. Laird's Nonsense." I quote from that editorial in my testimony and I will not read it again.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

But the second question is where do wo go from here?

The statements from Moscow in both the Declaration of Principles and the Joint Communique relating to disarmament have been largely ignored by a cynical press, which has not taken the subject seriously since the assassination of President Kennedy. In fact, as far as I know, the word "disarmament" has never passed the lips of either President Johnson or President Nixon.

Article 6 of the Moscow declaration reads:

> The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Or, as the communique stated under the heading, "Disarmament Issues":

> The ultimate purpose is general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament under strict international control. A world disarmament conference could play a role in this process at an appropriate time.

I haven't seen that mentioned anywhere in the press. I suspect, but I do not know, that that was inserted at the insistence of the Russians, possibly over the timid objection of some of our negotiators, but I don't think it should be ignored. I would hope that this committee in its future deliberations will not ignore it.

The United States was committed to this principle by Secretary of State Herter, a Republican, in 1960. President Kennedy, in cooperation with then Chairman Khrushchev, caused separate treaties on GCD to be prepared, filed and debated at the then 18 nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, where they still lie on the table gathering dust.

The Russians have been advocating GCD ever since the days of Czar Nicholas at the turn of the century; but the goal has not been mentioned by any American President since the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963.

Since that date the Russians have freqeuntly advocated reviving the scheme either bilaterally or at a conference of the nuclear powers. In November 1970 the People's Republic of China suggested the very world disarmament conference now accepted in the joint communique.

IMPLEMENTING BILATERAL COMMITMENT TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

Let us now move from the splendid rhetoric issued from Moscow to see what concrete steps can soon be taken to implement the bilateral commitment to general and complete disarmament.

Assuming such disarmament is not just around the corner, there are arms control measures which might turn the arms race downward. One of them is a comprehensive test ban which by prohibiting all

nuclear weapons would crimp the plans of the research and development boys in both the Pentagon and in the Kremlin. Mr. Chairman, I point out that there are presently pending before this committee two Senate resolutions S. Res. 230 and S. Res. 273 on which you held one day of hearings. These resolutions indicate that the Senate believes a comprehensive test ban without on-site inspection should be negotiated. Senator Kennedy's resolution calls for a moratorium pending the negotiations. I would hope the committee would find time to consider and report out a resolution on this subject before you adjourn.

Another possibility would be to destroy all nuclear weapons and build no more; and I call to your attention Principle No. 26 in the Stockholm Conference on the Environment which calls for the elimination and destruction of all nuclear weapons.

This statement represented world opinion on a very wide scale, and I hope this committee will take it into consideration.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SALT II

Then, at SALT II, which we hope will come soon—the only reason why we are supporting the SALT Accords is because we think they may lead to SALT II—we recommend elimination of all nuclear weapons and, until this can be agreed on, the destruction of all existing nuclear weapons over and above those necessary to create a credible deterrent, say, 800 warheads on each side.

The second point, at SALT II, only civilians should be named as members of the two delegations. They should be accompanied, of course, by qualified military and naval advisers but without the power to vote, only the power to advise. The military has a vested interest opposed to arms control and even more so to disarmament. Consider that, if a comprehensive test armament agreement could be negotiated, we could tear down the Pentagon, and the admirals and the generals would have to look elsewhere for useful employment. They have a vested interest opposed to serious arms control and disarmament negotiations, and, therefore, they should have no part as voting members of the SALT II delegation.

Our third suggestion is that prompt steps should be taken at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and at the talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations regarding mutual balanced force reductions this summer and fall to reduce drastically all conventional weapons and manpower in Europe.

ACDA URGED TO START STUDY ON 1962–63 PROPOSED TREATIES

I would hope that this committee would call upon the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to bring up to date the two proposed treaties on general and complete disarmament filed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962–63 with a view to promptly starting negotiations looking to the achievement of that "ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under strict international control and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations" which the Declaration of Priniciples and the Joint Communique issued in Moscow promised the people of the world.

We have urged the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to start such a study. They wouldn't do it. They don't even want to discuss the subject. We in the Coalition have arranged for private funding for such a study which is going forward now. The financial support is being provided by the Arms Control Association and the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. We hope to have a good report on the options confronting the United States and what can be done with those treaties by the next President of the United States. I would hope that this committee, which used to have a subcommittee on disarmament chaired by Senator Humphrey, would take the initiative in urging the ACDA, which, of course, has far more capability for funding this kind of a study than do we in the private sector, to get after it.

SUGGESTED OBJECTIVES FOR SALT II

Now, Mr. Chairman, after this testimony was filed with you we came to the conclusion there were two or three other items we should suggest to you as objectives for SALT II. They are: (1) limit flight-testing of missiles and warheads; (2) limit antisubmarine warfare measures to preserve the invulnerability of sea-based strategic missiles; and (3) conclude agreements to limit chemical weapons, particularly herbicides and riot agents. The chairman will remember that his efforts in connection with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 were unsuccessful in terms of getting cooperation from the Administration which has insisted on excluding tear gas and herbicides. I hope the committee will not give up on that issue and will in due course bring that Geneva Protocol before the Senate for ratification. Maybe you can't do it until next year after the new elections. At least we can be the leaders and not the laggards in getting rid of these dreadful and lethal methods of warfare.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your consideration.

(Mr. Clark's prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH S. CLARK, CHAIRMAN OF THE COALITION ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND MILITARY POLICY

The Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy consists of 39 business, labor, religious, educational, scientific and peace oriented activist civic groups which have joined together to reverse the militarization of America's policies and resources, to support arms control and disarmament agreements and to redirect resources to meet human needs at home and abroad.

We have organized a Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament.

The Coalition believes both the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weapons should be approved by this committee and we make this recommendation despite the belief that in many ways both agreements are frauds on the American and Russian people perpetrated by the military leaders of both countries.

The ABM agreement is a fraud because the military leaders of both countries know that the ABM will in all likelihood not work under battle conditions. The billions the Russians have spent on their ABM around Moscow have been wasted. So have the billions we have spent in Montana and North Dakota.

The basic inadequacy of the ABM was first called to the attention of the American public in 1967 in a series of papers written by outstanding scholars and scientists under the title Debate to ABM brought together by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. This was followed by a volume which received even greater attention when published in 1969 under the title ABM—an Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System in which seventeen knowledgeable scientists, former defense department executives and public

figures including Senator Edward Kennedy came to the conclusion stated above; i.e. the ABM won't work. And more than that it will not turn the arms race downward.

It is not too much to say that every prominent American scientist not directly or indirectly in the pay of the Pentagon shares this view.

It is devoutly to be hoped that the Congress will not permit the Defense Department to squander more billions in the building of a useless ABM ring around Washington. The fact of the matter is that the ABM was obsolete before the first one was deployed.

Similarly the interim agreement respecting offensive nuclear armaments does not turn the arms race downward. In fact if one is to believe President Nixon and Secretary Laird the Russians intend to go full speed ahead with further massive research, development testing and deployment of even more lethal nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

We are told that in the interests of national security we must follow suit. So the arms race will accelerate not cool off as a result of the SALT agreements.

Why, then, you will naturally ask does the Coalition recommend approval of these essentially ridiculous agreements.

The answer lies in our hope that the very real public relations triumph which the President achieved in Moscow could conceivably be turned into a solid start to a wide ranging detente with the Soviet Union. And on such a detente the peace of the world may well depend. If we can only keep our "cold warriors" quiet in Congress and the Pentagon the SALT agreements could usher in an "era of good feeling" which could bring the arms race to an end within the foreseeable future.

So the years of shadow-boxing at SALT can be turned to good advantage if this committee recommends the ratification of these agreements without exploring too deeply their essential unimportance in and of themselves.

Two main questions remain. First, what impact should ratification of the agreements have on the 1973 fiscal year Department of Defense Budget; and second, where should the United States go from here in terms of further arms control and disarmament negotiations not only with the Russians but with all other nations having significant armed forces.

The answer to the first question is easy. Under *no* circumstances should Mr. Laird be permitted to use his requested increases in the budget for new or improved nuclear weapons systems or war heads as a "bargaining chip" in the Congressional debate on ratification of the SALT agreements. There is no legitimate excuse for increased expenditures on nuclear weaponry. In fact our strategic nuclear arsenal should be cut not expanded.

Both sides have presently so much *overkill* that for either side to increase it is folly. President Nixon says Chairman Breshnev told him the Russians are going full speed ahead with further nuclear research, development, testing and deployment within the limits set by the treaty. If this should turn out to be true the answer should be, "Well, let him." If the Russians want to waste billions on this kind of folly that's their business. It is no reason for our following suit. As long as we have at least 800 nuclear war-heads on our invulnerable submarines we have no occasion to provide more. At present we have 5700 war-heads over all compared to their 2500. That is many times more than enough. If a nuclear strike were required, the 800 war-heads could destroy civilization in the Soviet Union many times over.

The New York Times put it well in its editorial of last Sunday, June 25th entitled: "Mr. Laird's Nonsense":

"The issue, however, is not whether the United States should have an ongoing program but what kind and at what pace. Ultimately, the Polaris-Poseidon will have to be replaced, but replacement does not have to begin in 1978. It is much too early to freeze on the Trident design and start on advance procurement as this year's crash-program budget proposes. Research and development work on a replacement could well continue with deployment planned for the late nineteen-eighties.

"A replacement for the B–52 strategic bomber may be needed sooner. But there is plenty of time to study a better solution than the B–1, which will only be marginally better at penetrating Soviet airspace and will cost vastly more. Many experts believe a low-cost stand-off bomber carrying large numbers of air-ground missiles could provide a greater capability at a fraction of the price.

"Soviet development and deployment of MIRV multiple warheads in large numbers, which is unlikely before 1980, will not endanger the American bomber

or missile submarine forces even if it ultimately does threaten much of the Minuteman force. Panic action, therefore, is uncalled for.

"President Nixon argues that accelerated development of Trident and B–1 would provide a 'bargaining chip' for SALT II of such importance that, without it, a comprehensive limitation of offensive weapons could not be negotiated. The United States already has more than twice as many separately targetable warheads as the Soviet Union. With Soviet antimissile deployment now to be limited, that is far more than enough. American restraint now might make it possible for the SALT II negotiations to achieve ceiling at much lower levels than if the arms race is pressed ahead."

The second question is where do we go from here? The statements from Moscow in both the Declaration of Principles and the Joint Communique relating to Disarmament have been largely ignored by a cynical press, which has not taken the subject seriously since the assassination of President Kennedy. Article Six of the Declaration reads:

"The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts and the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purpose and principles of the United Nations."

Or as the Communique stated under the heading "Disarmament Issues":

"The ultimate purpose is general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament under strict international control. A world disarmament conference play a role in this process at an appropriate time."

The United States was committed to the principle of general and complete disarmament by Secretary of State Christian Herter in 1960. President Kennedy in cooperation with then Chairman Khrushchev caused separate treaties of GCD to be prepared, filed and debated at the then 18 Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The Russians have been advocating GCD ever since the days of Czar Nicholas at the turn of the century. But the goal has not been mentioned by any American President since the assassination of President Kennedy in November of 1963.

Since that date the Russians have frequently advocated reviving the scheme either bilateraly or at a conference of the nuclear powers. In November of 1970 the People's Republic of China suggested the very world disarmament conference now accepted in the Joint Communique

Let us now move from the splendid rhetoric issued from Moscow to see what concrete steps can soon be taken to implement the bilateral commitment to GCD.

Assuming that GCD is not just around the corner, there are arms control measures which might turn the arms race downward. One of them is a comprehensive test ban which by prohibiting all nuclear weapons would put a crimp in the plans of the Research and Development boys. Another would be to destroy all nuclear weapons and build no more. A third would be a drastic cut in military manpower and various kinds of conventional military, naval and air hardware. But these matters appear not to have been seriously discussed either at Moscow or SALT or at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. They should be raised at SALT II. We recommend:

1. Prompt resumption of the SALT talks with the purpose of eliminating all nuclear weapons and, until this can be agreed on, the destruction of all existing nuclear weapons over and above those necessary to create a credible deterrent—say 800 on each side.

2. Naming of civilians only to the two delegations, accompanied of course by qualified military and naval advisors. The military has a vested interest opposed to arms control and even more so to disarmament. For a comprehensive disarmament agreement would enable us to tear down the Pentagon and force the Generals and Admirals to seek other employment.

3. Prompt steps at the Geneva Disarmament Conference and at the talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Nations on Mutually Balanced Force Reductions this summer and fall to drastically reduce all conventional weapons and manpower.

4. The bringing up to date of the two treaties of General and Complete Disarmament filed by the USA and the USSR at Geneva in 1962–63 with a view to promptly starting negotiations looking to "the achievement of that ultimate goal of General and Complete Disarmament under strict international control and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations which the Declaration of Principles and the Joint Communique promised the peoples of the World.

This committee can render an important public service by dealing with these matters in its report to the Senate on ratification of the SALT agreements.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Clark.

They have just called a vote. Of course, all day we are going to be confronted with having to recess for votes.

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

I am very glad that you called attention to the statement of principles. It is true that, in the Moscow declaration, it is true they are often overlooked; however, they were discussed rather fully at the meeting at the White House. They have not been overlooked altogether, but they are not as fascinating to the press as the military.

Mr. CLARK. I would suggest there was not too much zeal in support of that declaration in the present executive branch. Again, I am guessing.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I don't know. I am very pleased they accepted them in any case.

PROCEDURAL ANNOUNCEMENT

For the information of some of the other witnesses, I am obviously going to have to recess for a few minutes, but Senator Sparkman, who preceded me, will come back and we will proceed as rapidly as we can with the rest of the witnesses. It is very probable we cannot finish all of them; and we will have to adjourn through lunch and come back later this afternoon in order to complete our schedule. Those witnesses who are on near the end may, if they wish to do so, be excused unless they wish to stay, of course. I think it is fairly sure we could not get to them until this afternoon because we have a vote now and I think three are three votes. We have the debt limit and OEO extension and one of them is controversial; well, they are both controversial; we have some amendmetns on them. What we will have to do is just proceed as we can.

I think I will recess for approximately 7 or 8 minutes to give me time to go vote and come back and proceed.

Mr. CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness will be Mr. Roy Bennett and we will proceed up until about a quarter of one and get as far as we can. I doubt that we can complete them all and we will probably have to come back around 3:30 because there is a vote scheduled, final passage of OEO, around 3:30.

(Recess.)

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please. Sorry that we had this little break, but we don't control the rollcalls.

Let's see, Senator Clark has completed; next, Mr. Roy Bennett, Americans for Democratic Action.

Mr. Bennett, we are very glad to have you here, sir.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). If you will identify the gentleman who accompanies you, we would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF ROY BENNETT, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN ISAACS, LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. John Isaacs who is Legislative Representative of Americans for Democratic Action.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very well.

May I say this for the benefit of all of you: We are going to have a series of roll calls most certainly so if we move right along it will be helpful.

Mr. BENNETT. I will try.

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of Americans for Democratic Action I wish to express my thanks for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement and associated protocol which your committee has under consideration.

I do not intend to scrutinize the details of the weapons balance worked out by the specialists of the two countries. It seems to me that the committee has already been saturated with complicated, comparative weapons capabilities. Since both the Soviet Union and the United States possess overkill nuclear capacity estimated at up to ten times or 1,000 percent of presumed need, a discrepancy of 1, 2 or even 10 percent can have no discernible effect, regardless of which side is the final beneficiary. I am more concerned with the historical background of this treaty, its political meaning, and the consequences of it.

Mr. Chairman, I believe a serious examination of this treaty's impact requires that it be considered in the totality of all related agreements and understandings. I mean by this that the treaty and the agreements become even more significant when one considers them together with the treaties recently concluded between the Soviet Union and West Germany, the agreement on questions between West Germany and Poland on borders, between Germany and the German Democratic Republic on formalization of relations, and the very important treaty finalizing the status of West Berlin.

To these one must add the wide spectrum of additional Soviet-U.S. accords reached in Moscow on science and technology, education and culture, health and medicine, maritime matters, cooperation in space, environmental cooperation, commercial and economic relations, along with guidelines for future bilateral relations in Europe, India, China and the Middle East.

ACCORDS CONSTRUCT BASIS FOR BROADER MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS

The significance of the signing, confirmation and implementation of these accords resides in the fact that they construct a stable basis for much broader multilateral settlements involving all of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the United States, a prospect which goes beyond détente and the ending of the cold war.

After 25 years of political conflict, it is no exaggeration to say that in my judgment, the two superpowers have taken a first step toward a legal codification of coexistence, the first attempt to institutionalize a relationship between differing social systems, following reciprocal acceptance of the concept that, as a political option, war between the nuclear powers is eliminated.

WANING OF COLD WAR SUMMED UP IN 3 MAJOR CONTEXTS

I believe that the long waning of the Cold War might be summed up in three major contexts:

(1) The intensity of conflict which once threatened world conflagration has mitigated as the bipolar nuclear powers have reached a stable balance and, in consequence, nuclear victory no longer can be a rational goal of either country.

(2) The superpowers found that the earlier, apparently profound clashes of perceived vital interests have diminished in significance, that a reciprocal reevaluation of interest has taken place, and that the original perception of each other's aims has undergone change. All this has removed or markedly altered the original basis of conflict.

(3) As a result of an initially tenuous collaboration between the superpowers to contain and suppress violent conflict in many areas around the world, there developed a growing awareness of a wider mutuality of interest that, in most cases, was stronger than the originally perceived conflict of interest. Many serious issues originally deemed unresolvable gave way to de facto resolution, a reluctant acceptance of an unchangeable status quo or, in some cases, formal agreement.

BACKGROUND

The roots of the current Moscow agreements go back a long way. After the most acute stage of the Cold War, the period from 1947 to 1953, a cluster of agreements was reached, in part through Soviet initiative. These were the Korean armistice of 1953, the first Indochina settlement in 1954, and the Austrian Neutrality Treaty in 1955, all finally culminating in the Big Four summit meeting in Geneva in 1955.

At that first meeting of heads of state since Potsdam, the agenda, interestingly, was almost identical to that of the Moscow meeting 17 years later; and, most significantly, the unsolved problems of 1955 gave way to resolution in 1972. It took ten years, 1945 to 1955, to state the issues and 17 years more to resolve them.

At the 1955 Geneva Conference the major subjects were disarmament, the German question, European security and contacts between East and West. Proposals such as President Eisenhower's "open skies" were on the agenda along with a Soviet proposal which was the equivalent of a European security conference a proposal for a nonaggression agreement to be concluded between NATO and the Warsaw Pact member states.

While each step forward toward a lessening of tensions seemed to be matched by a setback which followed it, the pattern which actually emerged found the forces for detente stronger than the forces for conflict. Each step forward was just enough stronger than the countervailing setback to achieve, over the long run, measurable progress.

One could list innumerable initiatives and setbacks through the long period after 1955. The Soviet change in foreign policy at their 20th Party Congress in 1956 ignited counteraction within their own bloc, first in Poland and Hungary and later in China. This upheaval and conflict, together with the eruption of the British, French, Israeli, Egyptian crisis in the same year served to dim whatever positive

values seemed to emerge from de-Stalinization. In 1959, movement forward was resumed on President Eisenhower's initiative which culminated in the Camp David meeting with Premier Khrushchev. This promising, informal rapprochement was scheduled to be followed by a formal summit in 1960. Once again, an unscheduled event, the U–2 incident, torpedoed the meeting.

The 1963 breakthrough represented by the Test Ban Treaty, following the Cuban, Congo, and Berlin crises, once again put the superpowers on the détente road. But when in January, 1965, President Johnson accepted a Moscow invitation for an early spring visit, he found it canceled one month later when the war in Vietnam was escalated by the United States.

Détente, battered and staggering, got its most serious test during the years of the Vietnam war and the Middle East crisis.

However, notwithstanding the divisive confrontation character of these twin crises, the superpowers, forced into collaboration to prevent both conflicts from spreading, achieved an interlocking balance of power which prevented international war.

The years of protracted stalemate did, however, see a number of agreements, such as the nonproliferation, outer space and sea-bed treaties. Agreements were also achieved, as mentioned before, between West Germany and Poland, and West Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and a nonaggression pact was signed between the Soviet Union and West Germany. Together with final ratification of the Berlin Treaty, settling the status of West Berlin, the main East-West conflict in Central Europe for over 25 years was resolved.

Simultaneously, long, arduous and patient meetings on arms negotiations began to bear fruit. The most significant of these meetings was on September 20, 1961. Valerian Zorin for the Soviet Union and John J. McCloy for the United States reached an unusual agreement which was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. Called a joint statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiation, it said that "all measures of . . . disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of implementation . . . could any state or group of states gain military advantage . . ." Today this does not seem as important as it did then, but it did establish the principle of balance of power for all future arms agreements.

The fundamental principle that balance of power shall be maintained in any arms reduction agreement, stated in 1961, guided and shaped the carefully balanced Treaty and Interim Agreement which this committee is considering today. Thus, to complete this very brief history, the world did move slowly and with great difficulty in the 25 years of post-World War II struggles from Cold War to détente to entente.

UNDERSTANDING HISTORY GIVES US

We have set out some of the background better to understand two facts about this historic understanding: (1) Its roots are deep in the history of the Cold War. President Nixon is, in fact, the fortuitously appointed historical agent for this great accomplishment and not the mastermind some would have us believe.

Secondly, it is true creators are those forces and groups who in the ebb and flow of history—I have tried to explain—were the catalyst of

change, tirelessly fighting against the hysteria of the Cold War, the arms race and, in the last few years, the war in Vietnam. Its true creators are those forces and groups who, in the ebbard flow of history, were the catalysts of change, tirelessly fighting against the hysteria of the Cold War, the arms race, and, in the last years, the war in Vietnam.

Without this understanding, which history gives to us, that there was no straight line to detente, one would be at a loss to explain the mystifying paradox we are witnessing today.

MILITARY BUDGET INCREASES REQUESTED BY ADMINISTRATION

The Secretary of Defense's and the President's request for huge increases in the military budget, while simultaneously presenting an arms agreement, raises some question whether it is arms limitation or unlimited arms that they seek.

The extraordinary Joint Communique and the Declaration which came out of Moscow makes the terms and the aims of the agreement explicitly clear: "These agreements," says the Declaration, "constitute a major step forward, curbing and ultimately ending the arms race. The United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regard as the ultimate objective of their effort the achievement of general and complete disarmament."

In light of this, the Administration's request for a massive increase in the arms budget is inexplicable. Taken at its best, it appears that the extraordinary achievement in Moscow is to be used to increase an already swollen arms appropriation.

At its worst, one must conclude that the Secretary of Defense, at least, in his attempt to hold the treaty and agreements as ransom to his blackmail for larger defense appropriations, is engaged in the same kind of political counterrevolution which I have described dotted the road to ending of the Cold War and which has impeded us on the road out of it. Further, there is every likelihood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military establishment extracted a promise from the Administration that in return for their support of the treaty, they would get the expensive and unnecessary hardware they desired. This has been met by forces that set back, delayed or deterred movement forward, and that is what I believe is happening today with these proposals for huge arms escalations.

OPPOSITION TO NEGOTIATIONS IN SOVIET UNION

The United States is not alone in facing this problem. The Soviet Union, in recent *Pravda* and *New Times* magazine articles, attacked those forces inside the Soviet Union who opposed these agreements. They charged there are individuals and groups who wish "to warm their hands in the flames of the Cold War." Indeed, on the eve of the summit meeting itself, in a dramatic move, Pyotr Shelest, reputed hardliner and spokesman for the Soviet Pentagon, was removed from the highest ruling body—the Political Bureau of the Communist Party—because of his opposition to the negotiations: *New York Times*, June 9, 1972, page 4.

ASSAULT IN U.S. AGAINST PURPOSES OF TREATY EXPLAINED

In the United States the assault against the larger purposes of the treaty can be explained in two ways (1) The President, in the face of a military/conservative establishment attack, is fearful of the consequences of his own handiwork. Under pressure he is permitting a watering down of the spirit, if not the letter, of his own bilateral understanding. (2) The Defense Secretary, leading the opposition more directly, aims to gut the treaty itself. In effect, he calls for a new arms race which, if conceded, is calculated to destroy the agreement altogether.

The President's contention that we must engage in such arms escalation as is not explicitly prohibited by the agreement, because we anticipate the Soviet Union will, is a classical self-enforcing prediction. Quite obviously, the Soviets will match whatever increase in arms we approve, permitting us to charge them with the responsibility for a new arms race.

The frank opposition of the Defense Secretary is not unusual. What is unusual is the timidity of the President in dealing with it.

Despite the President, the Secretary of State and presidential adviser Kissinger's attempt to draw a distinction between their views and those of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary is still a member of their own administration.

It is humiliating for an American to consider that the Soviet leadership, faced with a parallel problem, without hesitation removed the representative of their military-conservative establishment who had attempted to sabotage the majoring view. Perhaps we should do no less with the American Pyotr Shelest.

President Nixon, if he sincerely wishes to advance the purpose of the agreement bearing his signature, must have a Secretary of Defense who both agrees in disarmament and is able to control the military.

SUMMING UP CONCLUSIONS

Just briefly, summing up our conclusions: (1) we believe the treaty and the interim agreements are among the most significant achievements for peace and rapprochement in the 15 years of the Cold War. We see it climaxing a slow decline of the costliest, most counterproductive and politically immoral period in the history of both countries. (2) Although these agreements are only a step on a larger road to a fully codified multilateral form of coexistence, they define the future with much more specificity than any previous agreements. (3) The history of the Cold War demonstrates that there is no straight line to detente. Past struggles were not only between the super powers themselves, they were paralleled by a struggle within each of the countries, between two main lines of approach—one which sought the dismantling of the Cold War as inimical to the real interests of the nation and the other which identified the existence of the nation with a continued existence of the Cold War. This struggle continues and will continue until the last residual vestiges of the Cold War are buried. (4) This treaty and agreements, their human purposes, and the promise they hold for the world will have to be defended by the popular forces in both political parties.

The massive turn in the U.S. policy which these agreements represent cannot rely on an Administration whose hesitancy is reflected in the concessions it is prepared to make to the military-conservative establishment. Without taking away any credit, to which President Nixon is entitled, the destiny of this achievement must be accomplished by the majority of Americans who have rallied so strongly behind the summit effort.

ADA STANDS FOR APPROVAL OF TREATY AND AGREEMENT

There is no ambiguity in ADA's policy. We stand for the approval of the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the Associated Protocol. We consider them only a first step to a general and complete disarmament and a foundation for a codified rule of co-existence.

Toward this end we urge the Senate to confirm this treaty and arms limitation agreement.

The CHAIRMAN (presiding). Thank you very much, Mr. Bennett. I am sorry I missed the first part of your statement.

Senator Sparkman, do you have some questions?

ARMS ESCALATION WILL COME UP SEPARATELY, BEFORE OTHER COMMITTEES

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, just this comment: I think Mr. Bennett has given a very interesting review of the various steps leading up to the present detente. Again, Mr. Bennett, I will say this, as I did to Senator Kennedy, that these matters of arms escalation will come up separately and before other committees.

Mr. BENNETT. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not this committee. I think we ought to make the point very clear, and I believe you do, that you support the treaty and the Interim Agreement regardless of what happens.

Mr. BENNETT. Without reservation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?

GIVING CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE

Senator COOPER. I was not here when Mr. Bennett was making his statement. I may say I have read it, and it is a good historical record of what has happened since World War II. I don't agree with you on your statements about the President; I must say that that I have noted that, and I do not say this a partisan way because I am for the ABM agreements and joined in initiating the fight against it several years ago, but I have noted there is a grudging note in the testimony of some witnesses—I think there is a partisan note, a grudging reluctance to say that the President has done what he has done.

Mr. BENNETT. That may be true but I think for ADA to say as much as we have said that is favorable to the President is itself quite an accomplishment. I don't want to say this was not a good achievement and he had nothing to do with it. I simply want to say there were larger forces involved over a very long period to make this possible. I think I said somewhere I don't want to take credit away where it is due and there is credit due.

The CHAIRMAN. I could join in that feeling; I think there is credit due. I think the President, in both his trips to Peking and to Moscow, and in the negotiations of these agreements, does deserve credit. I also would comment that the establishment of the almost overwhelming power of the military establishment isn't solely the creation and responsibility of this President; it has been growing for 25 years and unfortunately the Congress has gone along with it and has declined to take the responsibility in most cases for doing anything about it. I am not sure they will here.

A curious thing about the Congress: It asserts in general terms that it desires to participate in decisions involving foreign policy, but when the actual decisions are put before it, it often declines to take action. We don't really like to take responsibility for this type of thing. Congress prefers the responsibility for increasing Social Security, but when it comes to anything as controversial as the military establishment with all its power and its employees all across the country, it doesn't like to take the responsibility. I think the President shouldn't be held responsible for many of the difficulties. I am not sure he has the power to discharge our Pyotr Shelests.

Thank you very much, Mr. Bennett.

Mr. BENNETT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Mr. George Rathjens.

Mr. Rathjens, we are very glad to have you. We welcome you again. This is an old story with you, particularly on the ABM part.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. RATHJENS, COUNCIL FOR A LIVABLE WORLD

Mr. RATHJENS. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you again, this time on the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and Agreements and I do so as a director of the Council for a Livable World this time.

MIXED VERDICT ON NEGOTIATIONS, AGREEMENTS REACHED, SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATION COMMENTS

Considering the conduct of the negotiations, the agreements reached, and the subsequent comments by Administration spokesmen, a mixed verdict is in order. The ABM Treaty, although not the best that could have been negotiated, is a notable agreement of perhaps lasting importance which should be supported without reservation.

The executive agreement relating to offensive systems is decidedly less important; and the proposals for new strategic programs which Secretary Laird has sought to link inextricably with the SAL agreements, and which the President links, but less strongly, are clearly undesirable.

The ABM Treaty can be faulted in that it has been more delayed than it need have been and because it permits too much. Almost certainly we could have had a simple ABM freeze over a year ago had we not insisted on something like parity in ABM deployment and on linking the ABM agreement with limitations on offensive systems. We would have saved substantial sums. Valuing the agreement on offensive weapons lightly, as I do, and heavily discounting the military

utility of the ABM deployments permitted by the treaty, I believe we would have been better off.

But the delay and the wasted dollars pale into insignificance when measured against the importance of the treaty. It should allay concerns that either the Soviet Union or the United States may in the foreseeable future find it advantageous to attack the other; it codifies the legitimacy of verification by national means; and it can, and should, be interpreted as weakening the case that is being made for developing and expanding strategic offensive forces.

It should, for example, greatly diminish incentives for continuing with MIRV deployment, an issue not addressed in the offensive forces agreement but one of far greater moment than the issues with which that agreement deals.

In fact, the executive agreement will accomplish little and I believe is of marginal value.

In the interest of conserving time, I will skip over the next four or five paragraphs detailing my reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole statement will be put in the record.

Mr. RATHJENS. Thank you.

I would like to go on then and comment on some of the issues surrounding the agreements and particularly the requests for moneys for continuing additional strategic weapon programs and the question of our approach to further efforts at strategic arms limitation.

AGREEMENTS EXCUSE TO TURN DOWN ARMS RACE

I want to emphasize strongly that the SALT agreements, and particularly the ABM treaty, should be construed not as an excuse to accelerate the arms race but as an opportunity to turn it down with less concern than would otherwise have been possible.

With ABM deployment limited to militarily meaningless levels and the primary rationale for MIRV deployment thereby eliminated, we should bring the Minuteman III program to an immediate halt and limit further work on Poseidon to modification to those submarines on which conversion is already well underway.

The Congress should reject the Administration's request for an ABM defense of Washington. At the levels permitted by the treaty, such a defense could buy at most a few minutes' time for decisionmaking by the President; it would not make much difference in the likelihood that he or anyone else in the area would survive attack; and most significantly, it is almost unimaginable that the deployment would make an attack less likely. If ever there was a case for unilateral restraint, this is it.

With the negotiation of the ABM Treaty behind us and with the Washington defense serving no meaningful purpose, not even the most committed proponent of the bargaining-chip argument can claim it is needed to strengthen our hand in future negotiations.

STRATEGIC ARMS QUESTIONS BEFORE CONGRESS

Probably the two strategic arms questions before the Congress that are the most serious, in terms of cost if not otherwise, are the B–1 bomber and the Trident submarine, each of which program is likely

to cost in the range of $15 billion. There are strong arguments against moving ahead rapidly with either.

With significant ABM defense proscribed, there can be little doubt that the number of weapons that could be delivered by a very small number, indeed a single one of our presently deployed submarines would constitute an effective deterrent; and there is nothing on the horizon to suggest that the Soviet Union could somehow destroy the whole force simultaneously. To do so would require dramatic breakthroughs in antisubmarine warfare technology; and while one cannot completely discount such possibilities, there is no reason to believe that if such breakthroughs should occur, Trident will prove to have been an effective response. Exploitation of any breakthroughs by the Soviet Union would require the deployment of new systems based on them on a worldwide scale and with vigilance and a reasonable research program, we would have adequate warning time to react.

Thus, commitment to production of Trident at this time is grossly premature. Somewhat similar arguments apply in the case of the B–1. It will provide a marginal improvement over existing capabilities at a time when marginal improvements are unnecessary in the absence of breakthroughs and likely to be inadequate in the event they occur.

I would remark parenthetically that I am both appalled and depressed whenever I hear claims that we must make decisions now to buy strategic weapon systems that will see their major services in the late '80s, the '90s and even into the next century. Surely we must be optimistic enough to apply very high discount rates to such decisions, putting them off as long as we prudently can in the hope that they will never be needed.

Probably the most dubious of the new proposals is the submarine-launched cruise missile program which, more than any other, a strategic SLCM program epitomizes the worst possible construction to put on the SALT outcome, that is, a determination to go ahead with work in strategic areas not specifically proscribed even if the weapons are neither required nor likely to be as effective as existing weapons.

Imagine our reaction should the Soviet Union now initiate a similar program, particularly if it were not obvious whether the new submarines would carry cruise missiles as permitted by the executive agreement; or ballistic missiles, in which case they would be proscribed; or whether they might be ostensibly designed to carry the former but convertible to carry the latter.

PRESSURE TO GO AHEAD WITH PROGRAMS IS DISTURBING

The pressure to go ahead with all of these programs in the light of SALT is profoundly disturbing. There is the enormous waste of resources; there is the likelihood that such moves will strengthen the hands of those in the USSR who are disposed to use SALT as a basis for greater weapon programs; there is the disillusioning effect on our own people; and, finally, in such pressures there is evidence of a lack of balance if not of something approaching morbidity in our view of the role of strategic nuclear arms in world affairs. Since this view so conditions our unilateral decisions regarding these weapons and what we will do with respect to SALT II, I should like to elaborate briefly using Dr. Kissinger's recent White House presentation to you and other members of Congress as a vehicle.

POINTS MADE BY DR. KISSINGER IN WHITE HOUSE PRESENTATION

Early in his remarks he referred to the strategic weapon systems as those "which guarantee each side's security." The phrase was a parenthetical one to which I doubt he gave much thought. I single it out, however, because I see in it a manifestation of the belief that the major thing we have to fear is a deliberate attack based on rational calculation by the Soviet leadership; and because I am personally persuaded that initiation of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation or irrational behavior in a crisis is a more realistic possibility.

Events of recent weeks suggest that failure of command and control is another possibility that should not be lightly dismissed or discounted. I would suggest that one would come closer to the mark if one observed that strategic weapons guarantee not our security but rather our insecurity for if they are retained in large numbers, in time one or more of them is likely to be launched. To me, this means that the national interest would be better served by less concern about bargaining and about relative advantage, with more attention being given to diminishing those risks of war that have their basis in numbers of weapons, their design, nuclear proliferation, and communications and command and control arrangements.

In this same vein, I find some of the other points made by Dr. Kissinger troublesome. He observed that "Devising an equitable agreement on ABMs proved extremely difficult." Perhaps so, but might not the emphasis on equity have been misplaced? I have suggested earlier that a nonequitable agreement would have saved us billions and could have been achieved earlier, with little difficulty, and with our having to be no more concerned than with the treaty we negotiated.

Later, in discussing possible deferral of construction of a second ABM site by the U.S., Dr. Kissinger decried the possibility that the Soviet Union might have had two sites to our one, as if it would make a difference. He made the point that "if the agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field."

It is by no means obvious to me, although we might want to take compensatory steps or we might want to denounce the agreement, depending on the nature of the violations.

NEED TO VIEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS DIFFERENTLY THAN CONVENTIONAL ARMS

What I am getting at is the need, really, to view strategic weapons differently than conventional arms and to weigh each decision we make with regard to them against a multiplicity of objectives, not just in terms of the two concerns which seem to have dominated our approach in recent years—the nightmare of a deliberate Soviet first strike and the possibility that the numerical or qualitative balance might be shifted in some way that can be exploited politically. There is here a difficult task in education and reorientation of policy to which this committee can make an important contribution. With the ABM treaty serving to help exercise the apparition of a first strike, the time is right.

NOT TOO EARLY TO LOOK AHEAD TO SALT II

Let me close by suggesting it is not too early to look ahead to SALT II. We will be in for a difficult time of it if, as I fear, the negotiations are carried out largely within the philosophical framework that has characterized SALT I. To a large extent, the agenda will be dominated by issues already surfaced in Vienna and Helsinki but which have proved intractable—restraints on qualitative improvements, reductions and the problems of forward-based systems. Thus, unless there is a change in approach, progress is likely to be slow.

I raise this particularly because of the Administration's addition to the bargaining-chip agreement. There would be nothing particularly pernicious about such an approach if the negotiations could move rapidly, but if they are protracted, the adverse effects of buying bargaining chips during the negotiating process could well outweigh the advantages inherent in any final agreement.

ABM TREATY SUPPORTED

In summary, I argue that the ABM Treaty should be supported enthusiastically, that the executive agreement relating to offensive systems hardly matters one way or the other, that there are strong reasons for not going ahead with the major weapons programs Secretary Laird demands, and that if those programs are the price for SALT II negotiations, the negotiations probably are not worth entering into.

Thank you very much.

(Mr. Rathjens' statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE W. RATHJENS

I welcome the opportunity to comment on the strategic arms limitation talks and agreements as a director of the Council for a Livable World.

Considering the conduct of the negotiations, the agreements reached, and subsequent comments by Administration spokesmen, a mixed verdict is in order. The ABM treaty, although not the best that could have been negotiated, is a notable agreement of perhaps lasting importance which should be supported without reservation. The executive agreement relating to offensive systems is decidedly less important; and the proposals for new strategic programs which Secretary Laird has sought to link inextricably with the SALT agreements, and which the President links, but less strongly, are clearly undesirable.

The ABM treaty can be faulted in that it has been more delayed than it need have been and because it permits too much. Almost certainly we could have had a simple ABM freeze over a year ago had we not insisted on something like parity in ABM deployment and on linking the ABM agreement with limitations on offensive systems. We would have saved substantial sums. Valuing the agreement on offensive weapons lightly, as I do, and heavily discounting the military utility of the ABM deployments permitted by the treaty, I believe we would have been better off.

But the delay and the wasted dollars pale into insignificance when measured against the importance of the treaty. It should allay concerns that either the Soviet Union or the United States may in the foreseeable future find it advantageous to attack the other; it codifies the legitimacy of verification by national means; and it can, and should, be interpreted as weakening the case that is being made for developing and expanding strategic offensive forces.

It should, for example, greatly diminish incentives for continuing with MIRV deployment, an issue not addressed in the offensive forces agreement, but one of far greater moment than the issues with which that agreement deals.

In fact, the executive agreement will accomplish little.

If some draw comfort from the fact that five years hence Soviet force levels might be lower with the agreement than without it, that must be counted a plus

but a small one considering that the military balance would not be shifted decisively even if the Administration's speculation about Soviet build-ups in the absence of agreement were to be correct. Those speculations may of course be wrong. It would not be surprising if those in the Kremlin defend the agreement on grounds almost identical to those used here, i.e. that it will not prevent their doing anything that would be done in its absence.

Should the interim agreement prove to be the basis for a lasting treaty the effect could well be simply a continuation of the strategic arms race with greater emphasis on qualitative improvements—not necessarily a desirable direction in terms of either permitting the diversion of resources to constructive purposes nor in reducing the risks of war.

Finally, it must be recognized that there are those who are disturbed by the fact that the agreement permits the Soviet Union numerical superiority in ICBMs and SLBMs; others who are concerned not about the immediate effect but about the possible precedent in the figures; and still others, myself included, who are unconcerned about the military significance of the disparity but who cannot discount completely the political significance of other's concerns. One must, then, in evaluating the agreement, count the numerical disparity as something of a negative factor.

On balance whether the agreement limiting offensive arms is worth having is marginal.

Let me turn now to the issues surrounding the agreements, particularly the requests for monies for continuing and additional strategic weapons programs, and the question of our approach to further efforts at strategic arms limitation.

I want to emphasize strongly that the SALT agreements, and particularly the ABM treaty, should be construed not as an excuse to accelerate the arms race but as an opportunity to turn it down with less concern than would otherwise have been possible.

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Probably the two strategic arms questions before the Congress that are the most serious, in terms of cost if not otherwise, are the B–1 bomber and the Trident submarine, each of which program is likely to cost in the range of $15 billion. There are strong arguments against moving ahead rapidly with either.

With significant ABM defense proscribed there can be little doubt that the number of weapons that could be delivered by a very small number, indeed a single one, of our presently deployed submarines would constitute an effective deterrent; and there is nothing on the horizon to suggest that the Soviet Union could somehow destroy the whole force simultaneously. To do so would require dramatic breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare technology; and while one cannot completely discount such possibilities, there is no reason to believe that if such breakthroughs should occur Trident will prove to have been an effective response. Exploitation of any breakthroughs by the Soviet Union would require the deployment of new systems based on them on a world-wide scale, and with vigilance and a reasonable research program, we would have adequate warning time to react. Thus, commitment to production of Trident at this time is grossly premature.

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systems that will see their major services in the late 80's, the 90's and even into next century. Surely we must be optimistic enough to apply very high discount rates to such decisions, putting them off as long as we prudently can in the hope that they will never be needed.

Probably the most dubious of the new proposals is the submarine-launched cruise missile program, an approach we rejected years ago, which combines greater vulnerability than has the SLBM force to anti-submarine warfare with the vulnerability that bombers have to defenses, the latter vulnerability being greater than that of ballistic missiles, particularly since Soviet air defenses will not soon be restricted by treaty and are already large compared to ABM defenses. More than any other, a strategic SLCM program epitomizes the worst possible construction to put on the SALT outcome, i.e. a determination to go ahead with work in strategic areas not specifically proscribed even if the weapons are neither required nor likely to be as effective as existing weapons. Imagine our reaction should the Soviet Union now initiate a similar program, particularly if it were not obvious whether the new submarines would carry cruise missiles as permitted by the executive agreement; or ballistic missiles in which case they would be proscribed; or whether they might be ostensibly designed to carry the former but convertible to carry the latter.

The pressure to go ahead with all of these programs in the light of SALT is profoundly disturbing. There is the enormous waste of resources; there is the likelihood that such moves will strengthen the hands of those in the U.S.S.R. who are disposed to use SALT as a basis for greater weapons programs; there is the disillusioning effect on our own people; and finally, in such pressures there is evidence of a lack of balance if not of something approaching morbidity in our view of the role of strategic nuclear arms in world affairs. Since this view so conditions our unilateral decisions regarding these weapons and what we will do with respect to SALT II, I should like to elaborate briefly, using Dr. Kissinger's recent White House presentation to you and other members of Congress as a vehicle.

Early in his remarks he referred to the strategic weapons systems as those "which guarantee each side's security." The phrase was a parenthetical one to which I doubt he gave much thought. I single it out, however, because I see in it a manifestation of the belief that the major thing we have to fear is a deliberate attack based on rational calculation by the Soviet leadership; and because I am personally persuaded that initiation of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation or irrational behavior in a crisis is a more realistic possibility. Events of recent weeks suggest that failure of command and control is another possibility that should not be lightly discounted. I suggest that one would come closer to the mark if one observed that strategic weapons guarantee not our security but rather our insecurity for, if they are retained in large numbers, in time one or more of them is likely to be launched. To me this means that the national interest would be better served by less concern about bargaining and about relative advantage, with more attention being given to diminishing those risks of war that have their basis in numbers of weapons, their design, nuclear proliferation, and communications and command and control arrangements.

In this same vein I find some of the other points made by Dr. Kissinger troublesome. He observed that "Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's proved extremely difficult." Perhaps so, but might not the emphasis on equity have been misplaced? I have suggested earlier that a non-equitable agreement would have saved us billions and could have been achieved earlier, with little difficulty, and with our having to be no more concerned than with the treaty we negotiated. Later, in discussing possible deferral of construction of a second ABM site by the U.S., Dr. Kissinger decried the possibility that the Soviet Union might have had two sites to our one—as if it would make a difference. He made the point that "if the agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field." It is by no means "obvious" to me, although we *might* want to take compensatory steps or we *might* want to denounce the agreement, depending on the nature of the violations.

What I am getting at is the need really to view strategic weapons differently than conventional arms and to weigh each decision we make with regard to them against a multiplicity of objectives—not just in terms of the two concerns which seem to have dominated our approach in recent years—the nightmare of a deliberate Soviet "first strike" and the possibility that the numerical or qualitative balance might be shifted in some way that can be exploited politically.

There is here a difficult task in education and reorientation of policy to which this committee can make an important contribution. With the ABM treaty serving to help exercise the apparition of a "first strike," the time is right.

Let me close by suggesting it is not too early to look ahead to SALT II. We will be in for a difficult time of it if, as I fear, the negotiations are carried out largely within the philosophical framework that has characterized SALT I. To a large extent the agenda will be dominated by issues already surfaced in Vienna and Helsinki but which have proved intractable: restraints on qualitative improvements, reductions, and the problem of forward based system. Thus, unless there is a change in approach, progress is likely to be slow.

I raise this particularly because of the Administration's addiction to the bargaining chip argument. There would be nothing particularly pernicious about such an approach if the negotiations could move rapidly, but if they are protracted, the adverse effects of buying bargaining chips during the negotiating process could well outweigh the advantages inherent in any final agreement.

In summary, I argue that the ABM treaty should be supported enthusiastically; that the executive agreement relating to offensive systems hardly matters one way or the other; that there are strong reasons for not going head with the major weapons programs Secretary Laird demands; and that if those programs are the price for SALT II negotiations, the negotiations probably are not worth entering into.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Rathjens.

There is a vote in process, but I was told it was noncontroversial and there was no particular urgency for me to go, so I am going to skip it in the interest of moving along. Perhaps I am not as sensitive to the record of voting on every unanimous vote we have over there.

Your statement is a very good restatement, I think, of the position of those who favor the SAL agreement, and with the reservations about the increased military program.

SINCERITY OF U.S. IN MAKING AGREEMENTS

The first thought I had when I saw in Secretary Laird's statement that his support was dependent upon authorization and appropriation for the Trident, B–1 and so on, raised a very serious question as to our sincerity in making these agreements.

Do we really mean it? Do we really mean it as a first step in the slowdown or stopping of the arms race? If I were a Russian and read that statement, and also if it were implemented, my reaction would be that the Americans don't mean it. The agreement is used as an excuse to go forward with some very expensive weapons that they might not otherwise be able to persuade the Congress to appropriate for.

What is your comment on that?

Mr. RATHJENS. Well, I feel exactly the same way. It seems to me we have made this mistake before in the case of the test ban treaty, where we agreed to go ahead with all sorts of nuclear tests which, in retrospect, turned out to be wasteful and far more of them than we needed, and doing such things, to me, I would think, would send a very bad signal to people on the other side and I am concerned that it would support those in the Soviet Union who would make similar arguments.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is right. I can imagine their military saying, "Look, these people are not serious about this; we can't trust them. Look what they are getting ready to do, which is to vastly increase their nuclear power and by qualitative means. They don't really mean that they are serious."

CONGRESS DECIDES QUESTION OF PRIORITIES

I want to say further though in defense of the Administration, and it is not my primary responsibility in life to do so, but in trying to balance the play of forces within our country as brought to bear in the Congress, I have a great sympathy with them. There is no doubt we have had test after test in which real efforts were made. The classic one to me was the ABM struggle in which you know this committee played a big part. We had long hearings and got the best people we could get, but when it came down to the vote and the great power of the corporate interests in the country together with the ideological obsession which has afflicted us for 25 years were brought to bear, they prevailed. Any government of negotiation has to take that into account, and way I like to view it—and maybe this is being overly optimistic and overly generous, I don't know which—but now they are saying, "Here it is; it's up to the Congress to make this stick."

We had these forces bearing on us; we have it in the Administration; we have to present a kind of a collective judgment. I am not saying I would have presented the same one, but I do think this is essentially a question that the Congress has to decide—this question of priorities, of where you are going to put your money.

Are you going to put $30 billion you save into these things when we have all these demands from every other source? So I am more inclined to say that it is up to Congress. The SAL agreements have made a start; however limited it may be, it is a start. It is a first start in a direction which you approve, and I think the country approves, and now it is up to Congress to make a decision: on the one hand, to accept these agreements and, on the other, to give them validity by not proceeding with those other inconsistent programs.

That is the way it comes down to me. Do you feel too much offended by that?

Mr. RATHJENS. I would agree with everything you say and I think it is a great opportunity for the Congress; the Congress has a great responsibility to condition the environment in which the SALT II negotiations will take place——

The CHAIRMAN. That's right.

Mr. RATHJENS. By doing exactly that, by approving these two agreements and then by insisting on some restraints with respect to all of these new programs.

SHOWING RESTRAINT WOULD BE STEP FORWARD

The CHAIRMAN. If we can show restraint even for two years to test out what the attitude is and what happened, it would be a tremendous step forward. If we immediately go the other way, I can easily see where Marshal Grechko would say, "Well, there is nothing to this; there is no point in taking it seriously." I can't see how by any stretch of the imagination it would be any threat to us if we showed restraint for two years to give SALT II an opportunity to be negotiated. Then I think there might be real hope.

Thank you very much.

Do you have anything?

Senator SPARKMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Rathjens.

Mr. RATHJENS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness is Dr. James Dornan of the Liberty Lobby. Dr. Dornan?

STATEMENT OF JAMES DORNAN, MEMBER, BOARD OF POLICY, LIBERTY LOBBY, AND ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY; ACCOMPANIED BY L. A. HOOSER, LEGISLATIVE AIDE, LIBERTY LOBBY

Mr. HOOSER. I am L. A. Hooser, Legislative Aide of Liberty Lobby.

Liberty Lobby is a political institution composed of 100,000 American citizens who have no special interest except our own conception of national security to guide us in our expressions of policy. For 13 years this institution has expressed to the Senate and the House its views on foreign policy as conceived from what we believe to be a pro-American viewpoint.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Today I would like to present to the committee Dr. James Dornan, who is a member of our board of policy and a special consultant and who also is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at Catholic University and also an Assistant Professor at Johns Hopkins University as well as a consultant for the Center for International Business at Pepperdine University, Los Angeles. He has written articles on American foreign policy and national security affairs for a number of professional journals and at present is completing a book called "Founding Fathers and World Politics," to be published by Johns Hopkins Press.

Dr. Dornan?

Mr. DORNAN. It is a great privilege, Senator, for me to appear before this committee this morning on this topic. No one will doubt that the SALT Accords constitute one of the more important international phenomena of our time. I would like to begin by noting that in my view the accords themselves are not nearly as important as the situation which gave rise to them, which gave the accords their particular form and shape; I am referring here to the ten year strategic buildup of the USSR which has enabled the Soviet Union to equal or surpass the U.S. in many categories of military power and to achieve overall strategic parity with the United States.

It is in this context, I think, the context of rapidly expanding Soviet power, that the recently negotiated SALT accords must be evaluated; and the questions to be asked, I think, about them in this context are many and difficult.

HOW AND WHY FUNDAMENTAL ALTERATION IN STRATEGIC BALANCE OCCURRED

First of all, it would seem to me to be immediately relevant for the committee to ask how and why this fundamental alteration in the strategic balance between the superpowers occurred. In particular, it

would be useful to know both the operating assumptions of American policymakers and their estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions during the five years of the Soviet weapons buildup. An assessment of Soviet motives, it seems to me, would be particularly beneficial because of its relevance for possible Soviet decisions on weapons acquisitions in the post-SALT era. Some students of Soviet behavior have asserted, for example, that the fundamental decisions leading to the 1967–1972 buildup were made well before the Cuban crisis of 1962, which may indicate that the buildup cannot be explained solely as a defensive reaction to the Soviet retreat under fire during the Khrushchev-Kennedy confrontation.

Recent Soviet diplomatic and military activities in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean, when analyzed in conjunction with the weapons buildup, may indicate that Soviet foreign policy has entered a new, dynamic phase which could pose serious threats to the security of her neighbors and to U.S. security as well.

EFFECT OF U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF NIXON-BREZHNEV AGREEMENTS

The question is, then, whether American acceptance of the Nixon-Brezhnev agreements would constitute an at least partially adequate response to such international developments as these and whether, more generally, the SALT accords would enhance or detract from the capacity of the U.S. to protect her interests and her security in the years ahead.

It seems to me, from this perspective, that the most immediate problems arise from the Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The agreement has been widely hailed as establishing a freeze on the acquisition of offensive weapons by the major powers; in fact, however, the only power even partically frozen is the U.S. Both the U.S. and the USSR are permitted to modernize and replace land-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles as new technological developments warrant; warhead capability and accuracy will thus become key areas of competition in an altered arms race.

It seems to me that in this case Senator Buckley was correct this morning when he said the agreement has transformed the arms race from a quantitative to a qualitative one. I won't burden you with further specifics, since you know the details of weapon systems—

The CHAIRMAN. We will put the whole statement in the record, if it is agreeable to you.

Mr. DORNAN. I want to skip to a couple of points——

The CHAIRMAN. You emphasize those.

Mr. DORNAN. Points not emphasized by other witnesses this morning. So I will go now to page six, page four, I guess in the copy you have.

SOVIET THROW WEIGHT ADVANTAGE

The advantage which the Soviets have in weapons systems generally and in delivery vehicles are supposedly counter balanced by the allegedly superior accuracy of U.S. weapons, and the flexibility afforded by our overseas bases; but for a variety of reasons it seems to me the

significance of these U.S. advantages are exaggerated and here I refer especially to the Soviet throw weight advantage. By throw weight, of course, we simply mean the number of thousands of pounds of warheads which a missile can deliver.

This larger Soviet payload capacity is embodied principally in the SS–9 missile system and the new, larger missile now apparently under construction. I think the significance here derives not only from the fact that the Soviet missiles carries larger warheads than our own, but also the fact the weight advantage gives them the possibility of developing a highly potent MIRV capability which may be the most strategic significant fact of the coming five years.

No one denies that within the very near future the Soviets will develop an operational MIRV capability; when that capability is harnessed to the giant new missile, there arises the possibility of a Soviet heavy missile force of 313 launchers, each carrying 20 warheads of 500 kilotons each or 40 warheads of 200 kilotons each. The totals are 6,260 and 12,520, respectively. In the first instance the heavy missiles alone will carry more warheads than the entire present day American total; in the second, a total as large as the most optimistic projections of our own warhead total by 1977. And when one goes further and calculates the potential MIRV capability for up to 950 Soviet SLBMs and 1,100 SS–11 and SS–13 ICBMs of no greater potential than that possession by U.S. Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles, this means a maximum Soviet warhead total of more than 25,000. In turn, this might well constitute a first strike capability for the USSR, depending on the nature of U.S. strategic forces in existence at the time.

SALT ACCORDS DON'T RESTRICT WARHEAD DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT

Now these figures represent, to be sure, the worst of all possible worlds, and the likelihood that the Soviets would choose to deploy warheads on such a scale will doubtless be questioned. Nevertheless, the discussion at the very least serves to emphasize the fact that the SALT accords place no restrictions on warhead development and deployment, and there are thus absolutely no controls over one of the most significance aspects of the arms race. Moreover, any realistic American deterrence strategy for the future must take Soviet capabilities as well as intentions into account now, in making the decisions that will select our strategic posture a decade hence.

U.S. MISSILES' SUPERIOR ACCURACY NOT DECISIVE FACTOR

Next, I would like to emphasize that I don't think the superior accuracy of American missiles is or will be as decisive a factor in the strategic equation as often is assumed

I have already pointed out that warhead size can at least partially compensate for missile inaccuracy; and the Soviets have already achieved a substantial improvement in accuracy in the SS–9 series. Ian Smart, assistant director of London's Institute of Strategic Studies, believes that the SS–9 is accurate to within one-half to eight-tenths of a mile. If that is correct, a five-megaton warhead such as the SS–9 with a MRV configuration would have a 67-percent probability of destroying a Minuteman missile in its silo; and if they im-

prove that accuracy the kill probability will rise even further. So I think it would be unwise in the extreme to allow American security to rest on facile assumptions concerning Soviet technological inferiority. Certainly there is nothing in the record of events of the last 25 years to indicate that they will stay behind us in these key areas for very long.

SENATOR BUCKLEY'S CONCERN ENDORSED

Now, there are a number of other difficulties with the Interim Agreement and most of these were raised by Dr. Brennan yesterday and Senator Buckley this morning—the difficulties involving heavy versus light missiles and mobile systems and the rest.

I would like to say I simply endorse Senator Buckley's concern on all of those issues; and I think the basic difficulty with the Interim Agreement is that it freezes U.S. force levels in areas where the Soviets have achieved superiority, and leaves the Soviets free to seek parity or preponderance in areas where we possess superiority.

One or two final points and these are addressed to comments raised by the two previous witnesses.

U.S. SHOULD RETAIN SURE SECOND STRIKE CAPABILITY

It is argued often that concern with numbers of weapons or warheads under contemporary conditions is misguided. Both sides, so this argument runs, possess the power to destroy each other many times over; this so-called overkill capability is not subject to destruction by a preemptive first strike. Soviet decisions to procure more launchers or warheads, therefore, need not influence U.S. weapons decisions except in the most extreme of eventualities. The fact is, however, that whether our kill capability is "over" or "under" depends on what our enemy could do to that capability in a preemptive attack. That, in turn, clearly depends at least partially on the numbers of missiles and warheads in his arsenal. Given a sufficiently large numerical margin in his favor, the pressures upon him to strike first could grow substantially. While it is sometimes argued that any gross future enemy superiority in numbers of deliverable weapons could be overcome by U.S. adoption of a rapid fire or launch-on-warning strategic posture and contingency plan, most observers reject this solution as highly dangerous and destabilizing, given the unsolved problems in determining quickly enough precisely what constitutes the kind of enemy attack requiring instantaneous launch, et cetera.

Such calculations are not made any easier by the growing sophistication in the use of penetration aids, decoys, and the rest, so for this reason most responsible observers, I think, believe we should continue to retain a sure second-strike capability.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AGREEMENT

Finally, I think attention should be given to the political implications of the agreement. Even if it is conceded that the superiority in numbers of land- and sea-based missiles which it guarantees to the

Soviet Union does not in itself adversely affect American security, it is worth inquiring about the possible impact of the fact upon our image abroad, as perceived by both friend and foe, and its effect on our political influence and power. Appearances are realities in international politics, as John Kennedy once reminded us, and a nation's influence and effective power often exist in direct proportion to its reputation for military preeminence.

If other nations become persuaded that a new and permanent imbalance of power in the Soviets' favor is now a fact of international life, the consequences could be profound indeed. This would be even more true if the Soviets were to achieve parity or superiority in numbers of warheads, as distinguished from superiority in numbers of launchers or in amount of megatonnage five years ahead.

Taken in conjunction with the new U.S. low profile and apparent withdrawal from some areas of the globe, wise as that action may be in several cases, the apparent abandoning of a policy of parity may well arouse fears among our allies, and perhaps hopes among our enemies, of a reversion to isolationism on the part of the U.S. Once again, prudence appears to dictate careful attention to this area in the post-SALT era . . . I think again in that connection that it is useful to reflect upon the significance of the two arguments defending the SALT accords, offered by the President and Mr. Kissinger.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S ARGUMENT DEFENDING ACCORDS

The first argument, and I refer here now to Mr. Nixon's statement transmitting the treaties to the Senate, the first argument defends the accords on grounds that without the agreement the U.S. would five years from now be in an even weaker position vis-a-vis the USSR than is now the case. In noting that the U.S. has no ongoing program in land- or sea-based missile systems, while the Soviets have been increasing their totals by several hundred each year, and that this did not constitute the best of all bargaining positions, Mr. Kissinger conceded that the U.S. was negotiating from a position of weakness and essentially took what it could get. One must ask what we might feel compelled to accept should the Soviets have achieved numerical superiority in warheads by 1977.

It has often been suggested in testimony before this committee and by the chairman himself in his various publications that should the U.S. continue with present plans to improve its strategic position relative to that of the USSR, the Soviet military would have sufficient excuse to demand further additions to the Soviet arsenal, and the continuation of the arms spiral would thereby be ensured. Conversely, if the U.S. forbears to add to its strategic power, the forces of moderations in the USSR might be encouraged and the arms race fade away.

THESIS THAT ARMS RACES ARE SELF-GENERATING UNPROVED

The debate over whether strength or goodwill is the proper foundation for an effective foreign policy or an effective disarmament is as old as international relations itself and certainly will not be solved here. It is worth noting that even Mr. Nixon has, on occasion of late, flirted with the goodwill position. It can only be suggested here that Soviet foreign

policy, like our own, is determined by a highly complex series of interacting factors, both domestic and international, and that the capacity of the U.S. to influence decisively Soviet decision making by unilateral initiatives does not appear to be great.

The thesis that arms races are self-generating phenomena remains in any event unproved.

I might point out, finally, that the U.S. decision in the 1960s to halt acquisition of new offensive system clearly did not inspire a comparable Soviet decision. Incidentally, I am not surprised to note that most of the individuals who five years ago were insisting that the USSR would be satisfied with strategic parity with the U.S. once parity had been achieved, have not had their optimism dampened by their previous errors in judgment and analysis.

Man's capacity to draw the relevant lessons from history has always appeared to be limited.

MORAL PROBLEM WITH ABM TREATY

I have a few remarks in my statement about the ABM Treaty and again I would be repeating much of what Senator Buckley said. I simply endorse his remarks about the moral problem that he finds with that treaty, particularly the implications that we will forbear in the future to construct a defensive system should the technology become available to protect the population of the U.S.

If I were in the Senate I doubt whether I would vote for that treaty myself on those precise grounds.

DOUBTS ABOUT TREATY

Just to conclude now, Mr. Nixon, in his transmittal message expressed the view that "besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past."

The above remarks indicate my doubts about the treaty on several grounds. I fear, on the contrary, that the agreements do little to slow down the arms race or ensure global strategic stability, that they will not have a substantial impact on Soviet-American relations, and that they may create serious potential dangers for American security in the future. If the accords do indeed represent the best possible solution to the current strategic problem faced by the U.S., it is imperative that we substantially improve our military posture without delay.

(Dr. Dornan's prepared statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF: DR. JAMES S. DORNAN, JR., SPECIAL CONSULTANT, LIBERTY LOBBY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am Dr. James E. Dornan, Jr., assistant professor in the Department of Politics, Catholic University, and also assistant professor at Johns Hopkins University, as well a consultant to the Center for International Business at Pepperdine University, Los Angeles. I have written articles on American foreign policy and national security affairs for a number of professional journals, and am completing a book, *Founding Fathers and World Politics*, to be published by Johns Hopkins Press.

I am also a special consultant for LIBERTY LOBBY, and appreciate this opportunity to present the views of LIBERTY LOBBY's 20,000-member Board of Policy, and also to appear on behalf of the 110,000 other subscribers to its monthly legislative report, *Liberty Letter*.

Historians of the future will almost certainly judge the massive development of the Soviet strategic arsenal from 1967 to 1972 to be the most crucial fact of the present historical era. A few years ago—and during the preceding 15 years as well—the U.S.S.R. was substantially inferior to the U.S. in virtually every category of strategic power: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), number and accuracy of warheads, total weapons megatonnage, and long-range strategic aircraft, *inter alia*. The U.S. thus possessed the maximum degree of security possible in the nuclear age—a security resting on the certain knowledge that any nation choosing to attack the American homeland, even a nation utilizing its full strategic potential, could be utterly destroyed by an American retaliatory blow.

There is, of course, no way of measuring the precise impact of American strategic preponderance upon Soviet and Chinese behavior in world affairs during the first 20 years of the cold war, although few would deny the existence of a direct relationship between Russian and Chinese prudence and American power during that period. In any event, after 1967 the U.S. added no new missiles to its strategic arsenal, and as a consequence in 1972 the strategic balance between the two superpowers is vastly different, as the two charts below clearly indicate:

TABLE I.—GROWTH OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET ICBM/SLBM STRENGTH, 1962–72 [1]

	1962	1967	1972
U.S.S.R.:			
ICBM	75	460	1,510
SLBM		130	520
United States:			
ICBM	294	1,054	1,054
SLBM	144	656	656

[1] Institute of Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance for 1971–72," printed in Air Force Magazine, vol. 54, No. 12 (December 1971), p. 99; also Department of Defense information appearing in the Washington Post, May 27, 1972.

TABLE II.—COMPARATIVE STRATEGIC STRENGTH, UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R.[2]

Category	United States		Soviet Union	
	Type	Number	Type	Number
Land-based missiles:				
ICBM	Titan 2	54	SS–7 Saddler	220
	Minuteman 1	900	SS–8 Sasin	
	Minuteman 2		SS–9 Scarp	288
	Minuteman 3	100	SS–11	950
			SS–13 Savage	60
IRBM			SS–5 Skean	100
MRBM			SS–4 Scandal	600
Cruise missiles			SSC–1 Shaddock	100
Sea-based missiles:				
SLBM (nuclear submarines)	Polaris A2	160	SS–N–5 Serb	30
	Polaris A3	432	SS–N–6	400
	Poseidon	64		
SLBM (diesel submarines)			SS–N–4 Sark	42
			SS–N–5 Serb	48
Cruise missiles (submarines)			Shaddock	310
Cruise missiles (surface vessels)			Shaddock	48
Aircraft:				
Long-range bombers	B–52 C–F	150	Mya–4 Bison	40
	B–52 G/H	210	Tu–20 Bear	100
Medium-range bombers	FB–111	70	Tu–16 Badger	500

[2] Ibid.

The Soviet Union has now far surpassed the U.S. in total weapons metatonnage and number of ICBM's, and will soon possess a numerical margin in SLBM's as well. No responsible observer doubts that the Soviets possess the scientific and technological competence to eradicate, within the near future, remaining U.S. margins of superiority in warhead design and accuracy.

It is in this context that the recently negotiated SALT accords must be evaluated. First, it would seem immediately relevant for the Committee on Foreign Relations to ask how and why this fundamental alteration in the strategic balance between the superpowers occurred. In particular, it would be useful to

know both the operating assumptions of American policy-makers and their estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions during the five years of the Soviet weapons build-up. It has been suggested, for example, that Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and President Johnson were persuaded that the Soviet Union would halt major acquisition of offensive weapons systems once strategic parity with the U.S. had been achieved. It would be useful to know whether the Johnson administration's decisions on weapons systems were based on estimates of Soviet intentions or whether they simply represented the adoption of a new deterrence strategy for the U.S. In either case it is a fact that during the Johnson years the U.S. made the strategic decision to terminate its building program in offensive systems and to concentrate on qualitative improvements. So too with the Nixon administration, during whose tenure in office—and while the SALT negotiations were in process—the Soviets also registered striking gains in the strategic weapons field.

An assessment of the motives for the Soviet weapons build-up in the past decade would be particularly beneficial because of its relevance for possible Soviet decisions on weapons acquisitions in the post-SALT era. Some students of Soviet behavior have asserted, for example, that the fundamental decisions leading to the 1967–1972 build-up were made well before the Cuban crisis of 1962, which may indicate that the build-up cannot be explained solely as a defensive reaction to the Soviet retreat under fire during the Khrushchev-Kennedy confrontation. Recent Soviet diplomatic and military activities in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean, when analyzed in conjunction with the weapons build-up, may indicate that Soviet foreign policy has entered a new, dynamic phase which could pose serious threats to the security of her neighbors and to U.S. security as well.

The question is, then, whether American acceptance of the Nixon-Brezhnev agreements would constitute an at least partially adequate response to such international developments as these, and whether, more generally, the SALT accords would enhance or detract from the capacity of the U.S. to protect her interests and her security in the years ahead. I am hard-pressed to answer affirmatively to either question; and I believe that the agreements contain serious limitations, both as a contribution toward meaningful arms control and as an aid to American security.

From this perspective, the most immediate problems arise from the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The Agreement has been widely hailed as establishing a "freeze" on the acquisition of offensive weapons by the major powers; in fact, however, the only power even partially "frozen" is the U.S. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are permitted to modernize and replace land-based and sea-launched ballistic missiles as new technological developments warrant; warhead capibility and accuracy will thus become key areas of competition in an altered arms race. The U.S., for example, will be able to replace approximately 10 of the older A–3 Polaris-type submarines with the new Trident system vessels, and eventually may also replace the Poseidon system with a more advanced ULMS. The Soviets, on their part, have tested a 3,500-mile SLBM and are believed to be building a new, larger class of ballistic missile submarine, probably to replace the older G and H classes which have only 3 and 4 missile launchers. In fact, in this sense the Agreement has merely transformed the arms race from a quantitative competition to a qualitative one. No controls whatever are placed on such key elements of military power as strategic aircraft, naval forces beyond submarines, or forward land bases for the development of nuclear-armed tactical aircraft. Thus, U.S. plans for a substantial B–1 bomber force and possible Russian acquisition of a new variable geometry bomber are not affected by the Agreement.

Indeed, since the fundamental conditions which led to the arms race originally—the conflicting ideologies and ambitions as well as clashes of interests which have characterized relations between the two powers since at least the end of World War II—have not been essentially altered, pressures on the powers to escalate the arms race in areas not subject to restriction under the Agreement are likely to prove overwhelming. The need for power and the appearance of power in a competitive world, as well as the mutual fears which are the inevitable accompaniment of competition at the great-power level, remain, and may even be exacerbated. Pressures to continue arms build-ups, as exemplified by the recent statements emanating from Secretary Laird, will be at least as great within the Soviet Union as in the U.S. And, rightly, neither nation feels

that it can afford to make strategic decisions on mutual protestations of sincerity and love for peace.

The Soviet Union, moreover, is permitted under the Agreement to proceed with all land-based and sea-launched missiles now under construction. When the on-going programs are completed, therefore, the Soviet arsenal will consist of somewhere between 1400 and 1600 ICBM's and 740 to 950 SLBM's; the exact total is contingent upon Soviet decisions concerning the "cashing in" of her 220 older SS–7 and SS–8 weapons and other replacement by more modern land-based or sea-based launchers. The U.S. remains frozen at her 1967 level of 1,054 ICBM's and 656 SLBM's. Since strategic bombers are not controlled by the Agreement the U.S. will most probably retain her margin here; while published figures on the available number of U.S. bombers vary somewhat, we possess approximately 390 more strategic aircraft than the U.S.S.R. (see Table II above).[3] The Soviet Union will thus possess, within the lifetime of the agreement, a 3 to 2 margin in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

The Soviet advantage is allegedly counterbalanced by the American preponderance in total numbers of warheads, the result of our earlier mastery of MIRV technology, which is believed at present to constitute a 5,700 to 2,500 margin. Present plans call for the U.S. to MIRV 550 Minuteman missiles with three 200 kiloton weapons, and 496 missiles of the Poseidon type with ten 50 kiloton weapons. It is also allegedly counterbalanced by such factors as the superior accuracy of U.S. weapons and the flexibility afforded by our overseas bases.[4] For a variety of reasons, however, the significance of these U.S. advantages seems exaggerated. Since Soviet nuclear weapons are generally much larger than ours, the U.S.S.R. has a huge lead in total megatonnage, usually estimated to be 4 to 1. Larger weapons, of course, can compensate for deficiencies in accuracy; a 20-megaton weapon will have an 80% chance of destroying a 300 psi silo at an impact point 4000 feet from the target, while a 50-kiloton weapon (the size warhead with which the U.S. Poseidon missile is armed) must hit within 750 feet to achieve the same probability of destruction. Even more significant is the greater "throw-weight" of Soviet missiles. "Throw-weight," of course, is simply the number of thousands of pounds of warhead which a missile can deliver. Soviet payload capacity has increased enormously since 1966, and it has been variously estimated that it now stands at three or four times that of the American strategic forces.[5] This larger Soviet payload capacity is embodied principally in the SS–9 missile, now designed to carry either one 25-megaton weapon or three 5-megaton MRV warheads. The Soviets reportedly have at least 288 SS–9 missiles either deployed or under construction.[6]

In addition, the U.S.S.R. is building silos (at least 25) for an even larger missile, with a diameter at least 30% larger than the SS–9, and thus with an even more substantial throw-weight. Administration sources have reported that the Russians have developed a method, through new launching techniques, of fitting these new missiles into SS–9 silos. Since the Interim Agreement forbids only the substitution of heavy ICBM's for light missiles, there is nothing to prevent the Soviet Union from eventually deploying the new heavy missile as a replacement for all SS–9's; this would apparently involve a total of 313 such missiles.[7] The significance of these figures is obvious. In five years—and perhaps much sooner—the Soviets will surely develop an operational MIRV capability; when that capability is harnessed to the giant new missile, there arises the possibility of a Soviet heavy-missile force of 313 launchers, each carrying 20 warheads of 500 kilotons each or 40 warheads of 200 kilotons each. The totals are

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[3] *U.S. News & World Report*, June 12, 1972, described the U.S. bomber force as consisting of 440 B–52's and 76 FB–111's. In news dispatches printed in Washington *Post* of June 15 and June 21, 1972, dealing with recent groundings of American aircraft for repair and structural defects, the Associated Press listed the totals as 67 FB–111's and 455 B–52's. The Institute of Strategic Studies has reported that 90 B–52's are in "active storage," *op. cit.*, p. 52. It should also be noted that the Soviets possess 200 TU–22 "Blinder" medium-range bombers which, with refueling, could reach North American targets, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[4] See, for example, New York *Times*, May 27, 1972. It is also argued that U.S. tactical aircraft based in Europe, many of which are said to be armed with nuclear weapons, add to the potency of the American deterrent. But the Soviets also possess large numbers of Europe-based tactical aircraft, as well as IRBM's and MRBM's appropriately targeted, and given the NATO role of the American forces in Europe, their net additive to U.S. deterrent strength would appear to be small.

[5] See, for example, the estimates of Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute in "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review*, June 23, 1972, p. 686.

[6] See, e.g., New York *Times*, May 25, 1972, and Los Angeles *Times*, May 11, 1972.

[7] See New York *Times*, May 25, 1972.

6,260 and 12,520, respectively: in the first instance, the heavy missiles alone will carry more warheads than the entire present-day American total; in the second, a total as large as the most optimistic projections of our own warhead total by 1977. Calculating a potential MIRV capacity for up to 950 Soviet SLBM's and 1100 SS–11 and SS–13 ICBM's of no greater potential than that possessed by U.S. Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles,[8] this means a maximum Soviet warhead total of more than 25,000. In turn, this might well constitute a first strike capability for the U.S.S.R., depending on the nature of U.S. strategic forces in existence at the time.

Now these figures represent, to be sure, the worst of all possible worlds, and the likelihood that the Soviets would choose to deploy warheads on such a scale will doubtless be questioned. Nevertheless, the discussion at the very least seems to emphasize the fact that the SALT accords place no restrictions on warhead development and deployment, and there are thus absolutely no controls over one of the most significant aspects of the arms race. Moreover, any realistic American deterrence strategy must take Soviet capabilities as well as intentions into account now, in making the decisions that will select our strategic posture a decade hence. Since the time span between design and actual deployment of advanced weapons systems has reached a decade or more, and since the Agreement prevents the U.S. from adding heavy land-based missiles to our deterrent force, hard choices on alternative weapons systems lie just ahead, if we are to keep pace with Soviet warhead deployment.

Moreover, there is no reason to assume that the U.S.S.R. will be permanently barred from acquiring overseas bases comparable to our own, perhaps in Latin America and elsewhere, thus cancelling another existing American advantage.

Neither is it clear that the superior accuracy of American missiles is or will be as decisive a factor in the strategic equation as often is assumed. I have already pointed out that warhead size can at least partially compensate for missile inaccuracy; and the Soviets have already achieved a substantial improvement in accuracy in the SS–9 series. Ian Smart, assistant director of London's Institute of Strategic Studies, believes that the SS–9 is accurate to within one-half to eight-tenths of a mile. If that is correct, a five-megaton warhead such as the SS–9 with a MRV configuration would have a 67% probability of destroying a Minuteman missile in its silo. If the target accuracy could be reduced to a quarter of a mile, the kill probability would rise to 99%.[9] In any event, it would be unwise in the extreme to allow American security to rest on facile assumptions concerning Soviet technological inferiority.

Finally, serious questions must be asked about the future role of the B–52 strategic link in the U.S. deterrent force. References to the "aging B–52" have already achieved the status of an Air Force cliche, a fact which is not surprising in view of the fact that the last models came off the assembly line more than a decade ago. B–52 repair crews fight a continuing struggle against corrosion, and maintenance problems continue to worsen; evidence that major structural defects exist in the D and F series, totaling 172 aircraft, was reported by the Air Force to the Hoover Defense Appropriations Subcommittee as recently as last March.[10] In addition, questions continue to arise concerning the reliability of the F–111; the entire fleet of the tactical fighter version of this aircraft was once again grounded on June 20, after another series of unexplained crashes.[11] Moreover, although the B–52 was designed for high-altitude bombing, the proved effectiveness of Soviet air defenses has forced the U.S. to adopt a strategy of low-altitude penetration. Serious reservations exist about the ability of the B–52's to take the pounding suffered on low-altitude bomb runs.[12] While the development of the Short Range Attack Missile could enhance the strategic value of the B–52's during the next five years, their useful life is clearly nearing an end.[13]

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[8] The Poseidon missiles each carry 10 MIRV's in the 50-kiloton range, while the Minuteman III's carry 3 MIRV's in the 200-kiloton range. The older Polaris A–3's are configured for 3 MRV in the 200-kiloton range, or a single 1-megaton warhead. When the 31 newer ballistic-missile submarines have been equipped to carry the Poseidon missile, the U.S. submarine force will carry 5,440 warheads capable of hitting 5,120 targets. See Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Missile Submarines and National Security," *Scientific American*, June, 1972, printed in *Congressional Record*, June 21, 1972, p. S9845.

[9] See Los Angeles *Times*, May 11, 1972.

[10] Washington *Post*, June 15, 1972.

[11] *Ibid.*, June 21, 1972.

[12] See, e.g., Los Angeles *Times*, May 11, 1972.

[13] The B–52 can be equipped to carry 24 SRAM missiles, which reportedly will have a range of up to 85 miles. The planned B–1 will be able to carry 32 SRAM's.

There are other difficulties with the Interim Agreement, most of which have been raised by Senator Jackson in speeches on the Senate floor. For example, serious consideration ought to be given to possible Soviet motives in refusing to agree to include in the Agreement a ban on the deployment of mobile land-based missile systems, in rejecting a precise definition of "light" and "heavy" ICBM's, and in maintaining official secrecy about the exact number of ICBM's currently deployed and under construction in the U.S.S.R. As Senator Jackson has noted, it is possible to conceal land-based missile emplacements, at least for a time; intelligence sources indicate that in the past whole ICBM fields not previously known have suddenly been uncovered by our detection systems. We thus remain to some degree uncertain of the exact number of missiles in the Soviet arsenal. These could prove to be significant ambiguities, and the refusal of the Soviets to resolve them could indicate an intention to seek further improvement in the size of their strategic forces at our expense.

Fundamentally, then, the difficulty with the Interim Agreement is that *it freezes U.S. force levels in areas where the Soviets have achieved superiority, and leaves the Soviets free to seek parity or preponderance in areas where we possess superiority.* Not only does the Agreement not call a halt to the arms race, therefore, but it also contains clear dangers to U.S. security for the future.

To be sure, it is often argued that concern with numbers of weapons or warheads under contemporary conditions is misguided. Both sides, so this argument runs, possess the power to destroy each other many times over; this "overkill" capability is not subject to destruction by a preemptive first strike. Soviet decisions to procure more launchers or warheads, therefore, need not influence U.S. weapons decisions except in the most extreme of eventualities. The fact is, however, that whether our "kill" capability is "over" or "under" depends on what our enemy could do to that capability in a preemptive attack. That, in turn, clearly depends at least partially on the numbers of missiles and warheads in his arsenal; given a sufficiently large numerical margin in his favor, the pressures upon him to strike first could grow substantially. While it is sometimes argued that any gross future enemy superiority in numbers of deliverable weapons could be overcome by U.S. adoption of a "rapid fire" or "launch on warning" strategic posture and contingency plan, most observers reject this solution as highly dangerous and destabilizing, given the unsolved problems in determining quickly enough precisely what constitutes the kind of enemy attack requiring instantaneous launch, etc.; such calculations are not made any easier by the growing sophistication in the use of penetration aids, decoys, and MIRVed missiles. The moral pitfalls in making a quick decision based on available evidence in such a confusing situation have led many to argue that we have an obligation to ensure retention of an ensured second-strike capability. The U.S. military has traditionally argued that the best solution to these potential difficulties is the maintenance of a "triad" of weapons systems in our deterrent force (i.e., ICBM's, SLBM's, and strategic bombers) so as to complicate inordinately the problems of an attacker who seeks to destroy our second-strike capability; if this argument is sound, we should give top priority to the acquisition of the planned B–1 bomber force of 227 aircraft.

Finally, attention should be given to the political implications of the Agreement. Even if it is conceded that the superiority in numbers of land- and sea-based missiles which it guarantees to the Soviet Union does not in itself adversely affect American security, it is worth inquiring about the possible import of that fact upon our image abroad, as perceived by both friends and foe, and its effect on our political influence and power. Appearances are realities in international politics, as John Kennedy once reminded us, and a nation's influence and effective power often exists in direct proportion to its reputation for military preeminence. If other nations become persuaded that a new and permanent imbalance of power in the Soviets' favor is now a fact of international life, the consequence could be profound indeed. This would be even more true if the Soviets were to achieve parity or superiority in numbers of warheads (as distinguished from superiority in numbers of launchers or in amount of megatonnage). Taken in conjunction with the new U.S. "low profile" and apparent withdrawal from some areas of the globe, wise as that action may be in several cases, the apparent abandoning of a policy of parity may well arouse fears among our allies (and perhaps hopes among our enemies) of a reversion to isolationism on the part of the U.S. Once again, prudence appears to dictate careful attention to this area in the post-SALT era.

With regard to this topic, it is useful to reflect upon the significance of the two arguments defending the SALT accords, offered by the President and Mr. Kissinger. On the one hand, they defend it on grounds that without the Agreement the U.S. would five years from now be in an even weaker position vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. than is now the case.[14] In noting that the U.S. has no on-going program in land- or sea-based missile systems while the Soviets have been increasing their totals by several hundred each year, and that this did not constitute the best of all bargaining positions, Mr. Kissinger concluded that the U.S. was negotiating from a position of weakness, and essentially took what it could get. One must ask what we might feel compelled to accept should the Soviets have achieved numerical superiority in warheads by 1977.

It has been suggested in testimony before this Committee that should the U.S. continue with present plans to improve its strategic position relative to that of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet military would have sufficient excuse to demand further additions to the Soviet arsenal, and the continuation of the arms spiral would thereby be ensured; conversely, if the U.S. forbears to add to its strategic power, the forces of moderation in the U.S.S.R. might be encouraged and the arms race fade away. There is no way to prove or disprove that proposition. The debate over whether strength or good-will is the proper foundation for an effective foreign policy or an effective disarmament is as old as international relations itself, and will not be solved here; it is worth noting that even Mr. Nixon has, on occasion of late, flirted with the good-will position. It can only be suggested here that Soviet foreign policy, like our own, is determined by a highly complex series of interacting factors, both domestic and international, and that the capacity of the U.S. to influence decisively Soviet decision-making by unilateral initiatives does not appear to be great. The thesis that arms races are self-generating phenomena remains in any event unproved. Lastly, the U.S. decision in the 1960's to halt acquisition of a new launching system clearly did not inspire a comparable Soviet decision. Incidentally, I am not surprised to note that most of the individuals who five years ago were insisting that the U.S.S.R. would be satisfied with strategic parity have not had their optimism dampened by previous errors in judgment, and argue today in a similar fashion about likely Soviet progress in warhead acquisition. Man's capacity to draw the relevant lessons from history has always appeared to be limited.

It remains only to remark briefly on the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Most commentary on the Treaty has applauded it as a long step toward acceptance by both sides of a deterrence strategy of mutually assured destruction. If both powers eschew defensive systems, the argument runs, they will thereby decrease the likelihood that a second-strike attack could be contained sufficiently to avoid unacceptable destruction. A high degree of strategic equilibrium will thus have been achieved, and the danger of nuclear war will correspondingly be reduced. I have already dealt with overly-facile assumptions about the maintenance of "plateaus" in strategic relationships during my discussion of possible warhead developments under the Interim Agreement. Here I suggest only that the whole theory of "mutual assured destruction" deserves a careful reexamination: it appears to postulate an excessive degree of rationality on the part of decision-makers and decision-making systems, an assumption for which there is little supporting evidence. In the words of Donald Brennan, advocates of mutual assured destruction seem to "have been bemused by theoretical models of strategic interactions, models which seem sophisticated and intellectually appealing but which are in fact much over-simplified descriptions of reality."[15] There are moral questions involved as well; if deterrence fails under conditions of MAD, utter devastation of both countries is the inevitable result. While the technology to avoid such destruction may not yet be available, a treaty which points to permanent renunciation by the U.S. of the right to defend its populace should not yet be ratified without a careful consideration of its implications.

In his message announced while transmitting the SALT accords to Congress, Mr. Nixon expressed the view that "besides enhancing our national security,

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[14] "The Interim Agreement," Mr. Kissinger told the Congressional leadership on June 15, "perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which could only have gotten worse without an agreement." *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 8, No. 25 (June 19, 1972), p. 1050.

[15] Brennan, *loc. cit.*, p. 689.

these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past." The above remarks indicate my doubts about the treaty on several grounds. I fear, on the contrary, that the agreements do little to slow down the arms race or ensure global strategic stability, that they will not have a substantial impact on Soviet-American relations, and that they may create serious potential dangers for American security in the future. If the accords to indeed represent the best possible solution to the current strategic problem faced by the U.S., it is imperative that we substantially improve our military posture without delay.

Thank you again for the opportunity to present our views today.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much, Dr. Dornan.

You have certainly raised some questions, answers to which we all need.

OPPOSITION TO RATIFICATION OF TREATY

Tell me this, just as things are before us, do you oppose the ratification of the treaty?

Mr. DORNAN. The ABM Treaty troubles me for the reasons given.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know you bring that out but I never do find any definite word as to whether or not you think we should refuse to ratify.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me put it this way: Certainly the technology for an effective missile defense does not presently exist, so the kind of objections raised by Senator Buckley this morning are moot or contingent on future developments. I would be opposed to the treaty, would vote against it were I a U.S. Senator, unless it contained an escape hatch, one much more clear than it presently contains, an escape hatch that would enable us to withdraw from the treaty should at some future point in time technology be available to protect our population.

SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF U.S. DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE ABM CAPABILITY

I would like to address myself to a question Senator Cooper addressed somewhat earlier: If we developed an effective ABM defense, wouldn't that be destabilizing, possibly leading the Soviets to believe we were perfecting a first-strike capability on our own?

I think there is a great deal of misunderstanding on this question, not with you people but with the American people. The U.S. lacks a first strike capability because it lacks appropriate weapons. It is not only a case of our not possessing sufficient numbers of missiles. In fact, we don't have a first-strike capability because of the size of our warheads which are not apparently accurate enough to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos in a preemptive strike, so I don't think that destabilizing factor exists.

I don't think, therefore, that the Soviets could possibly interpret U.S. development of an effective ABM capability as a prelude to an effective preemptive first-strike capability of the U.S. So without that escape hatch I would——

ESCAPE HATCH RECOMMENDATION

Senator SPARKMAN. Let's get through with the treaty. The treaty does not at the present time contain that escape hatch that you recommend?

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Senator SPARKMAN. And, of course, the treaty comes before us as it is. We can't amend it.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, the Senate can certainly attach reservations.

Senator SPARKMAN. We can have reservations, but a reservation does not put something into the treaty that is not there already.

Mr. DORNAN. Right. Well, I think then——

Senator SPARKMAN. So I just wanted to get it definitely, as the treaty stands now, you would be opposed to it?

Mr. DORNAN. Yes, with the additional reservations I think it would be acceptable given the technological problem I referred to earlier.

DANGERS IN WARHEAD DEVELOPMENT AND MIRV CAPABILITY

Senator SPARKMAN. But now go ahead with the agreement.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, on the agreement, I think the President and Mr. Kissinger both have raised a relevant point. In the absence of those agreements, we are quite likely to be even worse off than we are at the end of five years than would be the case under the treaty. So I think Mr. Nixon is correct when he argues that the treaty can be separated or can be evaluated on its own merits and the agreement can be approved on its own merits and probably should be for that reason; but I certainly believe that there are dangers that exist in the area of warhead development and MIRV capability and the rest, dangers that the Soviets will surpass us in the one remaining area we presently have preeminence; all of that implies it is imperative we go full speed ahead in this area.

The proposals of Senator Kennedy, Mr. Bennett and Dr. Rathjens, that we abandon some of our existing MIRV capability, I find, I must confess, truly incredible.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

Senator Cooper?

Senator COOPER. I am sorry I was not here when you made your statement. I was on the floor to vote but I will read it carefully.

I think I can get from what you just said some of the problems——

Mr. DORNAN. Yes, quite similar to many raised by Senator Buckley this morning and by Dr. Brennan yesterday.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). Next we will hear from Mr. Sanford Gottlieb, representing SANE, A Citizens' Organization for a Sane World.

Glad to have you.

STATEMENT OF SANFORD GOTTLIEB, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SANE, CITIZENS' ORGANIZATION FOR A SANE WORLD

Mr. GOTTLIEB. I am an executive director for SANE. I would like to submit my full statement and just make a few points.

Senator SPARKMAN. That will be done.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. I hope these will be simple points in a discussion which I think becomes unnecessarily complicated.

SECRETARY M'NAMARA'S CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE

Number one, as Secretary of Defense McNamara said in 1967, the number of nuclear warheads deliverable on target was the most meaningful measure of nuclear capability. Secretary McNamara was talking about deterrence, and his concept was based on the notion that if you had enough nuclear warheads each one of which could destroy a city, you would deter the other side. He then went on to say that between 200 and 400 megaton size warheads would be sufficient. Of course, when he said that we already had far surpassed the number that he was talking about.

We are now up to 5,700 warheads on the American side, and 2,500 on the Soviet side, which, by Mr. McNamara's definition, can only be considered overkill.

ACCORDS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS PERMITS ARMS RACE CONTINUANCE

Secondly, the accords on the strategic offensive weapons permits the continuation of the arms race; it really does not restrict it. One group, the Center for Defense Information, has estimated that even under these accords the United States could go up to 14,000 warheads by the end of the five-year period. Until such time as the Soviet Union develops MIRV technology, the best they can do is 3,000, so this agreement, not the ABM agreement but the Strategic Offensive Arms Agreement, does nothing to end the arms race.

DISCUSSION OF REALITY NEEDED

Third, there has been a great deal of unnecessary mystification that has surrounded the public dialogue on this issue. Even the arms controllers use the term qualitative improvements when they are talking about MIRVs, the very weapon which continues to propel the United States into an ever-increasing lead in the number of warheads over the Soviet Union.

I think we should describe what is actually happening. MIRVs mean thousands more nuclear warheads; each capable of annihilating a city, will be deployed during the term of this Interim Agreement, yet the Soviet Union has only 219 cities of 100,000 population and more.

We get concerned, and rightly concerned, when we see the effects of the recent floods in this country on several American states. We see hundreds of thousands of people who are now struggling to restore the semblance of a natural life and perhaps this should bring us back to some kind of discussion of reality of what we are talking about here when we talk about one warhead that is capable in one instance of annihilating several hundred thousand or perhaps millions of people.

EFFECTS OF AGREEMENTS ON ARMS RACE

Number four: If I were in the Senate, I would vote for the ABM Treaty as a modest, tiny step in the direction of general and complete disarmament; but in terms of the Interim Agreement on strategic

weapons, we would have to express serious reservations about that because it does very little if anything to end the arms race.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN ARMS FIELD

Finally, we believe it is much more important at this stage of history to turn to the unfinished business in the arms field. We think that two parallel courses of action are necessary; one is to refrain from developing and deploying additional weapon systems such as Trident and the B–1 bomber which would further increase the overkill in the heavy Asian-American arsenal, and the other is to seek much more vigorously than in the past other agreements on arms control and disarmament and disengagement.

Among these should be a comprehensive nuclear test ban, limitations on strategic bombers and on antisubmarine warfare, a reduction in the number of offensive missile launchers, mutual force reductions in Central Europe which we believe can be encouraged by some unilateral reductions and limitations on military aid to other nations.

It is not enough, Mr. Chairman, to take tiny steps which permit a major part of the nuclear arms race to continue. This is the time to end the arms race. The resources thus saved are urgently needed to restore our society which has fallen into neglect as we concentrated for an entire generation on building the ramparts against foreign threats.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Mr. Gottlieb's prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SANFORD GOTTLIEB, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF SANE, A CITIZENS' ORGANIZATION FOR A SANE WORLD

The best we can say about the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms is that the situation would be worse without them.

An unrestricted nuclear arms race has been replaced by a nuclear arms race with a small measure of mutual restraint. However, the agreements announced in Moscow represent only the tiniest step toward ending the nuclear arms race. Because they permit the continued deployment of thousands more warheads on individual launchers, these agreements also reflect a lost opportunity to clamp a lid on offensive weapons.

To assess the significance of the accords it is necessary to recall former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's statement to the UPI Editors and Publishers on September 18, 1967: "For the most meaningful and realistic measure of nuclear capability is neither gross megatonnage, nor the numbers of available missile launchers; but rather the number of separate warheads that are capable of being *delivered* with accuracy on individual high-priority targets with sufficient power to destroy them."

In February, 1968, Secretary McNamara testified that 200-400 megaton-size nuclear weapons would constitute "an effective nuclear deterrent".

In short, one megaton-size warhead can destroy a city. Since the Soviet Union has 219 major cities, 200-400 warheads should suffice as a deterrent even if half the warheads failed to reach their targets.

Yet, by 1968 the United States already possessed 4,200 strategic nuclear weapons, against the Soviet Union's 1,200—vast overkill on both sides. According to the Defense Department's latest "Posture Statement", the balance at mid-1972 will be 5,700 to 2,500, respectively. Thus, between the time former President Johnson tried to begin the SALT negotiations and the accords announced in Moscow on May 26, the United States deployed 1,500 additional warheads while the U.S.S.R. deployed 1,300. In the past year alone the United States added 1,100 warheads, the Soviet Union, 500. The greater American momentum is a reflection of its three- or four-year lead in deploying multiple warheads (MIRVs).

It is precisely in their failure to prevent the expansion of MIRV's that the Moscow accords lost a major opportunity to halt the nuclear arms race. If the power of destruction can be compared to the illumination of a house, *these agreements limited the total number of sockets but did not prevent the residents from using multiple sockets to which many light bulbs can be attached.*

Depending on which options it chooses under the interim accord on offensive weapons, *the United States could double its strike force in warheads* and perhaps go as high as 14,000 during the next five years. Until the Soviet Union develops MIRV's, it will be unable to deploy much more than 3,000 warheads under the terms of the agreement. When it perfects multiple warheads, the U.S.S.R. will be able to double its strike force. Both nations are free under these agreements to add overkill to overkill.

The concept of a freeze on the number of launchers, which formed the basis of the interim Soviet-American agreement, was first advanced by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1964. The Johnson Administration as a whole did not embrace the concept until 1968. When the Nixon Administration came to office in 1969, it took nine months to agree upon a negotiating position. By that time the deployment of MIRV's was beginning, and the Administration did not want it stopped by negotiation.

Yet, a leading Pentagon planner is on record as admitting that there is no rationale for MIRV's if a limit is placed on ABM's. On April 19, 1971, Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, had this dialogue with Senator Stuart Symington before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

Senator Symington: "Dr. Foster, in that one of the major arguments for MIRV's is the penetration of ABM defenses, what would be the requirement for MIRV's if a ban were placed on ABM's?"

Dr. Foster: "Senator Symington, if a ban were placed on the ABM in the sense of banning a capability to intercept a ballistic missile attack, then, as I see it at the moment, there would be no need for the United Staates to deploy MIRV."

Thus, the Moscow accords are more important for what they failed to do than for what they did do:

1. They failed to halt the deployment of MIRV's, the single most important cause of the expansion in offensive weapons.
2. They failed to limit strategic bombers in any way.
3. They failed to limit anti-submarine warfare, a pursuit which creates insecurity for those nations seeking a seaborne deterrent.
4. They failed to scrap any existing weapons.

On the other hand, the accords did:

1. Place a limit on the expansion of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) saving badly-needed funds and removing one of the rationales for deploying MIRV's. (The limit on ABM's will permit both nations to increase the number of defensive missiles above the current levels.)
2. Place at least a numerical limit on the launchers of both sides.
3. Establish the principle of inspection by each nation's spy satellites rather than the more politically sensitive system of on-site inspection.

There are two parallel courses of action which can help overcome the shortcomings of these agreements. One is to refrain from developing and deploying additional weapons systems, such as Trident and the B–1 bomber, which would further increase the overkill in the leviathan American arsenal. The other is to seek, much more vigorously than in the past, other agreements on arms control, disarmament and disengagement.

Among these agreements should be a comprehensive nuclear test ban, limitations on strategic bombers and on anti-submarine warfare, a reduction in the number of offensive missile-launchers, mutual force reductions in Central Europe (which we believe can be encouraged by some unilateral reductions), and limitations on military aid to other nations.

It is not enough to take tiny steps which permit a major part of the nuclear arms race to continue. This is the time to *end* the arms race. The resources thus saved are urgently needed to restore our society, which has fallen into neglect as we concentrated for an entire generation on building the ramparts against "foreign threats".

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Cooper?

AGREEMENT REPRESENTS SOME PROGRESS

Senator COOPER. You do concede, don't you, that this agreement, from your viewpoint, and the viewpoint of the people you speak for, represents some progress?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. I think the ABM Treaty represents some small advantage. It is not, I think, a weapon system that either side is particularly interested in, except perhaps for negotiating purposes.

The real ballgame is in offensive missiles and the Interim Agreement does very little to restrict the deployment of, as I say, as I said earlier, thousands of additional warheads through MIRVing; so if we had to——

Senator COOPER. I don't believe enough significance is given to the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States could come into such an agreement, that they could negotiate for three years——

Mr. GOTTLIEB. We would have been a lot happier——

Senator COOPER. In a rather dispassionate atmosphere without the polemics that we associated with the Soviet Union in the past.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. On the one hand, Senator Cooper——

Senator COOPER. And we were able to reach an agreement.

Why do you think it is so easy?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Considering the history of the Cold War, one can only celebrate any agreement that is reached. On the other hand, I think we have to admit that the agreement comes very late in terms of the development of the new technology which has brought the arms race to a higher level of danger.

Senator COOPER. What did you say about technology?

Mr. GOTTLIEB. I say that on the one hand we can only celebrate any agreement that has been achieved between the two superpowers, but, on the other, we have to admit this agreement comes very late because of the development of a new technology—the MIRV technology.

Senator COOPER. I don't know how you could or should stop people from thinking who are working in research and development of technology. I think one can disagree or agree with the treaty and with the agreement; we have had witnesses who presented very good reasons on both sides, but I think the idea that to reach any agreement is something quite simple is absolutely incorrect. You know, just go in and sit down and reach an agreement, I was not here when Senator Clark testified but I read his statement, and I think he said they were engaged in shadowboxing. I had the opportunity to attend three of the meetings and spaced over periods of, six months apart; and you could see the hard work of negotiating the difficult issues that were settled. I think the idea that it is easy to go over there and reach an agreement is very superficial.

AGREEMENT SHOWS LITTLE RESTRAINT

Mr. GOTTLIEB. If I may say so, Senator, I am not trying to take away from the hard work of the negotiators that they engaged in; all I am saying, if at the end of a 5-year period you come out with 14,000 warheads on one side that started out with 5,700, and on the other perhaps 3,000 or perhaps 6,000 warheads when the Soviet Union started out with 2,500 at the beginning of that 5-year period, that you have reached an agreement that shows very little restraint, very

little restraint. That is the point I am trying to make; therefore, if I had to rate this agreement on the basis of three cheers, I could perhaps muster one.

Senator COOPER. That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate your presentation.

Mr. GOTTLIEB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Next, Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly of the National Association of Pro America.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Mr. Chairman——

Senator SPARKMAN. I guess that means you represent all of us.

STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY, MEMBER, NATIONAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PRO AMERICA

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I will try to save the time of the committee by skipping paragraphs if you will be kind enough to take the whole statement.

Senator SPARKMAN. The whole paper will be placed in the record.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you.

My name is Phyllis Schlafly and I represent the National Association of Pro America, a women's volunteer educational organization dedicated to the protection of our American constitutional republic. I am also the co-author of three books on nuclear strategy, written in 1964, 1965 and 1968, which accurately predicted that the Soviet Union had a program to overtake and surpass the United States in nuclear weapons.

CONGRESS URGED TO REJECT AGREEMENTS

We urge the Congress to reject the SALT Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the Protocol. This SAL pact is the most dangerous, disadvantageous and devious document the United States has ever signed. No more unequal, craven and degrading agreement has ever been signed by any nation, except by a nation which was defeated in war or about to be defeated in war.

The contradictor pro-SAL arguments: The national debate on the SALT Pact is unique because U.S. officials urging ratification use two entirely different and mutually-contradictory lines of argument, one line to persuade the general public and a completely different line to convince the well-informed. Such a dichotomy is possible only because of widespread misinformation and misunderstanding on the part of the general public about the power and purpose of nuclear weapons.

LINE OF ARGUMENT USED FOR GENERAL PUBLIC

Here is the line of argument used for the general public: (1) The strategic arms limitation pact is a great achievement because it stops the spiraling arms race; (2) Don't worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets in ICBMs, SS–9s, Polaris-type submarines, submarine-launched missiles, et cetera, because this is balanced by U.S. superiority in numbers of warheads: (3) Don't worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets because this is balanced by U.S.

superiority in MIRVs; and (4) Don't worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets because, if the Soviets attack us, we have enough nuclear weapons to strike back and destroy them. Our retaliatory power is variously described as "sufficiency," "assured destruction" or "overkill."

Let us examine these arguments:

(1) The strategic arms limitation pact does not stop the spiraling arms race. This one-sided pact freezes the United States but gives the Soviets written authorization to continue their nuclear building program for the next five years. The SAL pact gives the Soviets the go-ahead to complete the 90 to 100 giant new ICBMs on which they have started construction, and there is no restriction on how much megatonnage the Soviets can put in these missiles. We are forbidden to build any ICBMs because we have none under construction.

The SAL pact authorizes the Soviets to continue building their Polaris submarines until they reach 62, while we are frozen at 44. The SAL pact does nothing to stop the Soviets from continuing to build other strategic systems, including mobile ICBMs, reload capability, bombers and space weapons.

(2) To understand the joker in the argument that the U.S. has a 5,700 to 2,500 "warhead superiority" over the Soviets, consider this scenario: You are discussing entering business with a potential partner. He proposes that you each make an investment in the business and share the profits equally. You ask, "What investment do you have in mind?" He replies, "I'll put up $50,000 and you invest $25 million." You demur, suggesting that this isn't equal. He replies, "Both sides are making an investment and an investment is an investment."

If you allow yourself to be conned into that kind of unequal business deal, you won't stay in business very long. But the enormous inequality concealed under the word "investment" in this scenario is exactly the same ratio of inequality concealed under the word "warhead."

Anyone who cites the figures of 5,700 warheads for the U.S. and 2,500 for the USSR is equating our one-twentieth of a megaton with a Soviet 25-megaton warhead. This means asking the American people to equate 50,000 tons of TNT explosive equivalent—in a MIRVed U.S. Poseidon—with 25 million tons of TNT explosive equivalent in a Soviet SS–9. In other words, one Soviet warhead has 24 million 950 thousand tons of TNT explosive equivalent more than one U.S. warhead.

President Nixon's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel supplemental statement released March 12, 1971, written largely by now Justice Lewis Powell, severely criticized what it called the "numbers game . . ." This Blue Ribbon statement specifically exposed the falsehood of a warhead tabulation by which "a single bomb or one air-to-ground missile on a B–52 was equated with a Soviet 25-megaton ICBM."

The Blue Ribbon statement concluded: "This simplistic type of comparison creates the illusion of abundant security, if not U.S. overkill capability. It would be difficult to conceive of a better way to mislead the public than to present, without precides definition or analysis, comparative figures of this kind. Those who present such distortions contribute to the confusion rather than enlightenment of our people."

(3) To understand the joke in the claim that U.S. superiority in MIRVs compensates for USSR superiority in ICBMs, SS–9s, Polaris-

type submarines and SLBMs, consider this comparison: One suburban developer has a plot for subdividing which has a total area of one acre. A second developer has a plot for subdividing with a total area of 25 acres. Which one will get the larger number of useful lots out of the subdivision?

The answer is obvious, and it ought to be just as obvious that the Soviet ability to MIRV is 25 times greater than ours. We are MIRVing our one-megaton Minuteman missiles; the Soviet SS–9s are 25 megatons each.

The reason why we are MIRVing our Minuteman and Polaris missiles is that the Soviets have 64 ABM launchers already deployed around Moscow, and we adopted the MIRV program in extremis as a countermeasure to preserve some credibility that some warheads would get through the Soviets ABMs.

Since we have no deployed ABM, the Soviets have no need to run a MIRV race. They can just hit our undefended country with their un-MIRVed weapons carrying the full megatonnage. But if the Soviets choose to run a MIRV race, look how they can outpower us, by a factor of 20 to 1.

EXAMINATION OF ARGUMENT USED FOR GENERAL PUBLIC

(4) The myth that the Soviets are deterred from attacking us by the knowledge that our sufficiency or assured destruction or overkill will destroy them is widely believed by the American public, but cannot persuade anyone who understands the power and the use of nuclear weapons. For example, in a speech on April 13, 1972, Dr. Edward Teller, one of the greatest living nuclear scientists, was asked the question, "If the Soviets launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States, what would be the result?"

Senator COOPER. May I interrupt just a moment?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes, Senator.

Senator COOPER. I have an amendment and I must go to the floor. I apologize to you because I know you have been waiting a long time.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Shall I continue?

Senator COOPER. I just wanted to tell you why I was leaving, but I shall read your statement.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator COOPER. Is that all right?

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine; go right ahead.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. This is a quotation from Dr. Edward Teller:

> The question is when. Right now they could do terrible damage. In a few years, if present trends continue, it is practically certain that it will be the end of the United States. The United States will not exist, not as a state, not as a power, not as an idea. I think that more than 50 percent of our people would be killed.
>
> I believe that the Soviets could so behave that there would be very few casualties in Russia because we would not have forces enough left to retaliate. They have excellent defenses—air defenses, missile defenses, civil defenses. It is possible that in a few years we shall be at the mercy of the Soviet Union unless present trends change.

The real test of U.S. survival is not how many missiles we have in a peacetime inventory but how many we will have left after a surprise attack. Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research, told U.S.

News and World Report that the Soviets "would require a little over 400 SS–9s to knock out all but a small fraction of our Minuteman's missiles." The Soviets have 313 now.

The Mutually Assured Destruction myth has been aptly described by its acronym as a MAD strategy. Who cares how many Russians we can kill after the Soviets have killed more than half our population and destroyed everything we know and love? Retaliation under such circumstances is irrational.

As Nobel prizewinner Dr. Eugene P. Wigner stated on June 10, 1972, "It would have been better if each nation was assured that the other could not destroy it."

ARGUMENT USED TO INTELLECTUAL AUDIENCES

No way to catch up? These four arguments used on the general public simply cannot be used on informed people who understand the power and purpose of nuclear weapons; so an entirely different and contradictory argument is used confidentially and off the record to intellectual audiences. Here is the line spelled out in select briefings:

We are lucky to get the strategic arms limitation pact, even though it guarantees the Soviets superiority in all strategic nuclear weapons, because without it in the next five years the Soviets would be able to go so much farther ahead of us, and there is no way we can possibly catch up because the Soviets have on-going weapon programs and we have none.

Let us examine this clever, sophisticated tangle of truth and untruth: (1) It is true that the Soviets have nuclear weapons superiority now and are increasing their lead rapidly. Note, however, that in this line of argument to informed audiences that U.S. officials admit Soviet superiority while concealing it or sidestepping the point when addressing uninformed audiences. (2) It is true that the Soviets have an ongoing weapon program and are determined to continue building nuclear weapons. The Soviets have been building more than 150 giant ICBMs per year. They have doubled the size of their shipyards to build 8 to 10 Polaris-type submarines a year. On June 15 President Nixon said, "Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive areas which are not limited by these agreements." (3) It is true that the United States has no ongoing nuclear weapon production. We have been in a strategic nuclear weapon freeze ordered by Robert McNamara in 1967 and still in effect. We have not built a single ICBM, SLBM, Polaris submarine, strategic bomber, or space weapon since that time. (4) What is emphatically not true is the claim that the United States is not capable of catching up with the Soviets. There is no logical or factual basis for such defeatism and despair. America is the greatest industrial power in the world and our gross national product is double that of the Soviet Union. During World War II we proved that we could produce armaments not only to equip the great American forces on two sides of the world but also that we could arm and equip the British and Russian forces at the same time.

PERCENT OF GNP SPENT ON DEFENSE

At the present time we are spending less than 8 percent of our gross national product on defense, and only a tiny fraction of that on strategic weapons.

During World War II we spent 35 percent of our gross national product on defense, proving that we can do it if we want to. Meanwhile, the Soviets are spending 33 percent of their gross national product on defense in their determination to achieve overwhelming nuclear superiority and rule the world.

Any notion that we can't afford the strategic weapons to stay ahead of the Soviets is simply not true. We could have kept our former superiority for the price we have paid to put a man on the moon, or for the price we have paid to keep troops in Europe so the West Europeans don't have to provide their own troops, or for the price we have paid in foreign giveaways.

Those who say we can't afford to spend money on nuclear weapons to defend America are like people who claim they can't afford to carry fire insurance on their homes. The truth is, we can't afford not to carry this insurance. Most people are glad to pay fire insurance premiums and never collect on them, knowing that they have this protection in case a disaster strikes. That is what nuclear weapons are—protection of our lives, families and property against the unexpected disaster of attack.

SALT TREATY DANGEROUS, DISADVANTAGEOUS, DEVIOUS

Dangerous, disadvantageous and devious: (1) the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty is dangerous because it signs away our right to defend 205 million Americans, except for the Washington politicians, against nuclear attack. Why should we give up our right to protect our lives, our families and our property against attack? Why are the Washington politicians any more worthy of protection than the men, women and children in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Atlanta, Miami, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, New Orleans, Dallas, Houston, Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, et cetera?

The SALT pact is disadvantageous because it freezes the United States as a poor second in the nuclear weapons which will control the world. We will soon have to accept any ultimatum the Kremlin bosses deliver because we will have no power to defend even our own vital interests.

IDEA THAT RELIANCE ON TREATY WILL PREVENT WAR

I think that the idea that reliance on a treaty will prevent war is not new. In 1928 an American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, persuaded 62 nations to sign the Kellogg Pact which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. Neither Germany, nor Japan nor the Soviet Union paid any attention to this treaty.

In the 1930's, a British Prime Minister adopted a policy similar to that of the SALT agreements. Neville Chamberlain relied on weapons restraint and a treaty he signed with Hitler at Munich in 1938 which promised to bring "peace in our time." The majority of the English people supported him because disarmament meant more money for social welfare.

Today, there are no monuments to Prime Minister Chamberlain, and history books condemn his tragic mistake. The monuments are all erected to Winston Churchill who warned that Britain must stay ahead in weapons and rely on her own strength instead of on a treaty.

HISTORY PROVES WEAKNESS INVITES AGGRESSION

History proves that weakness invites aggression. World War II is only one of many lessons that tyrants strike when they think they can win cheap, easy victories by surprise attacks against weak or poorly prepared nations. The now officially proclaimed military inferiority of the United States to the Soviet Union is a dire threat to the lives and freedom of all Americans. We should head the ominous warning of Winston Churchill:

Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent, there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever.

(Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY

My name is Phyllis Schlafly and I represent the National Association of Pro America, of which I am a member of the National Board of Directors. Pro America is a woman's volunteer educational organization dedicated to the protection of our American Constitutional Republic. Founded in 1933, the first two honorary presidents were Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt and Mrs. Calvin Coolidge, and the present president is Mrs. Williard Hendrick of Houston, Texas. I am the co-author of three books on nuclear strategy, written in 1964, 1965 and 1968, which accurately predicted that the Soviet Union had a program to overtake and surpass the United States in nuclear weapons. These books also accurately warned of the danger from the Robert McNamara policy of freezing U.S. production and permitting this to happen.

We urge the Congress to reject the SALT *Treaty*, *Interim Agreement*, and *Protocol*. This SALT Pact is the most dangerous, disadvantageous, and devious document the United States has ever signed. No more unequal, craven, and degrading agreement has ever been signed by any nation—except by a nation which was defeated in war, or about to be defeated in war.

THE CONTRADICTORY PRO-SALT ARGUMENTS

The national debate on the SALT Pact is unique because U.S. officials urging ratification use two entirely different and mutually-contradictory lines of argument: one line to persuade the general public, and a completely different line to convince the well-informed. Such a dichotomy is possible only because of widespread misinformation and misunderstanding on the part of the general public about the power and purpose of nuclear weapons.

Here is the line of argument used for the general public:

(1) The SALT Pact is a great achievement because it stops the spiraling arms race.

(2) Don't worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets in ICBMs, SS–9s, Polaris-type submarines, submarine-launched missiles, etc., because this is balanced by U.S. superiority in numbers of warheads.

(3) Don't worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets because this is balanced by U.S. superiority in MIRVs.

(4) Don't worry about SALT giving superiority to the Soviets because, if the Soviets atack us, we have enough nuclear weapons to strike back and destroy them. Our retaliatory power is variously described as "sufficiency," "assured destruction," or "overkill."

Let us examine these arguments:

(1) The SALT Pact does *not* stop the spiraling arms race. This one-sided Pact freezes the United States, but gives the Soviets written authorization to *continue* their nuclear building program for the next 5 years. The SALT Pact gives the Soviets the go-ahead to complete the 90 to 100 giant new ICBMs on which they have started construction—and there is no restriction on how much megatonnage the Soviets can put in these missiles. We are forbidden to build any ICBMs because we have none under construction. The SALT Pact authorizes the Soviets to continue building their Polaris-submarines until they reach 62, while we are

frozen at 44. The SALT Pact does nothing to stop the Soviets from continuing to build other strategic systems, including mobile ICBMs, reload capability, bombers, and space weapons.

(2) To understand the joker in the argument that the U.S. has a 5,700 to 2,500 "warhead superiority" over the Soviets, consider this scenario. You are discussing entering business with a potential partner. He proposes that you each make an investment in the business and share the profits equally. You ask, "What investment do you have in mind?" He replies, "I'll put up $50,000 and you invest $25,000,000." You demur, suggesting that this isn't equal. He replies, "Both sides are making an investment—and an investment is an investment." If you allow yourself to be conned into that kind of unequal business deal, you won't stay in business very long. But the enormous inequality concealed under the word "investment" in this scenario is *exactly* the same ratio of inequality concealed under the word "warhead."

Anyone who cites the figures of 5,700 warheads for the U.S. and 2,500 for the U.S.S.R. is equating our 1/20th of a megaton with a Soviet 25-megaton warhead. This means asking the American people to equate 50 thousand tons of TNT-explosive-equivalent (in a MIRVed U.S. Poseidon) with 25 million tons of TNT-explosive-equivalent (in a Soviet SS–9). In other words, one Soviet warhead has 24 million 950 thousand tons of TNT-explosive-equivalent more than one U.S. warhead.

Would you really go into partnership with someone who started out by deliberately attempting to deceive you this way? Would you trust a friend who tried to persuade you to go along with such a lopsided agreement?

President Nixon's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Supplemental Statement released March 12, 1971 (written largely by now-Justice Lewis Powell) severely criticized what it called the "numbers game, namely, the mere counting of warheads without analysis of megatonnage" and other factors. This Blue Ribbon Statement specifically exposed the falsehood of a warhead tabulation by which "a single bomb or one air-to-ground missile on a B–52 was equated with a Soviet 25-megaton ICBM." The Blue Ribbon Statement concluded:

This simplistic type of comparison creates the illusion of abundant security, if not U.S. overkill capability. It would be difficult to conceive of a better way to mislead the public than to present—without precise definition or analysis—comparative figures of this kind. Those who present such distortions contribute to the confusion rather than enlightenment of our people."

(3) To understand the joker in the claim that U.S. superiority in MIRVs compensates for U.S.S.R. superiority in ICBMs, SS–9s, Polaris-type submarines, and SLBMs, consider this comaprison. One suburban developer has a plot for subdividing which has a total area of one acre. A second developer has a plot for subdividing with a total area of 25 acres. Which one will get the larger number of useful lots out of the subdivision? The answer is obvious. And it ought to be just as obvious that the Soviet ability to MIRV is 25 times greater than ours. We are MIRVing our one-megaton Minuteman missiles. The Soviet SS–9s are 25 megatons each.

The reason why we are MIRVing our Minuteman and Polaris missiles is that the Soviets have 64 ABM launchers already deployed around Moscow, and we adopted the MIRV program in extremis as a counter measure to preserve some credibility that some warheads would get through the Soviet ABMs. Since we have no deployed ABM, the Soviets have no need to run a MIRV races. They can just hit our undefended country with their un-MIRVed weapons carrying the full megatonnage.

But if the Soviets chose to run a MIRV race, look how they can outpower us. Take our most powerful missile against their most powerful one (that we know about). Our Poseidon could deliver a single 4-megaton warhead; but we are splitting it into ten 50-kiloton warheads, making a total of 500 kilotons or ½ megaton for the Poseidon missile. The Soviet SS–9 with a single warhead of 25 megatons can be split into ten one-megaton warheads with a total of 10 megatons per SS–9. Thus, in a MIRV race, the Soviets will have a superiority of 20 times the power of ours.

(4) The myth that the Soviets are deterred from attacking us by the knowledge that our "sufficiency" or "assured destruction" or "overkill" will destroy them is widely believed by the American public, but cannot persuade anyone who understands the power and use of nuclear weapons. For example, in a speech on April 13, 1972, Dr. Edward Teller, one of the greatest living nuclear scientists, was asked the question: "If the Soviets launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States, what would be the result?" He replied:

"The question is when. Right now, they could do terrible damage. In a few years, if present trends continue, it is practically certain that it will be the end of the United States. The United States will not exist—not as a state, not as a power, not as an idea. I think that more than 50 per cent of our people would be killed. I believe that the Soviets could so behave that there would be very few casualties in Russia because we would not have forces enough left to retaliate. They have excellent defenses: air defenses, missile defenses, civil defenses. It is possible that, in a few years, we shall be at the mercy of the Soviet Union, unless present trends change."

The real test of U.S. survival is not how many missiles we have in a peacetime inventory, but how many we will have left after a surprise attack. Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research, told U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT that the Soviets "would require a little over 400 SS–9s to knock out all but a small fraction of our Minuteman" missiles. The Soviets have 313 now.

The stark fact that we have no "assured destruction" or "over-kill" or "sufficiency" was confirmed by Dr. Donald Brennan, a consultant on weapons to the Departments of Defense and State. He recently wrote that in a nuclear war we could kill only 6 perecnt of the Russian poeple, while "current Soviet forces could probably destroy 60 percent of the American population."

The "mutual assured destruction" myth has been aptly described by its acronym as a MAD strategy. Who cares how many Russian we can kill *after* the Soviets have killed more than half our population, and destroyed everything we know and love? Retaliation under such circumstances is irrational. As Nobel-prize winner Dr. Eugene P. Wigner stated on June 10, 1972: "It would have been better if each nation was assured that the other could *not* destroy it."

NO WAY TO CATCH UP?

These four arguments used on the general public simply cannot be used on informed people who understand the power and purpose of nuclear weapons. So an entirely different—and contradictory—argument is used confidentially and off-the-record to intellectual audiences. Here is the line spelled out in select briefings:

We are lucky to get the SALT PACT (even though it guarantees the Soviet superiority in all strategic nuclear weapons) because, without it, in the next five years the Soviets would be able to go *so much farther ahead of us*, and there is no way we can possibly catch up because the Soviets have "on-going" weapons programs and we have none.

Let us examine this clever, sophisticated tangle of truth and untruth.

(1) It is true that the Soviets have nuclear weapons superiority now and are increasing their lead rapidly. Note, however, that, in this line of argument to informed audiences, U.S. officials *admit* Soviet superiority, while concealing it or sidestepping the point when addressing uninformed audiences.

(2) It is true that the Soviets have an "on-going" weapons program, and are determined to continue building nuclear weapons. The Soviets have been building more than 150 giant ICBMs per year. They have doubled the size of their shipyards to build 8 to 10 Polaris-type submarines a year. On June 15, President Nixon said, "Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements." On June 22, PRAVDA announced that the Soviets plan to push ahead with offensive weapons development.

(3) It is true that the United States has *no* "on-going" nuclear weapons production. We have been in a strategic nuclear weapons freeze ordered by Robert McNamara in 1967 and still in effect. We have not built a single ICBM, SLBM, Polaris submarine, strategic bomber, or space weapon since that time.

(4) What is emphatically *not* true is the claim that the United States is not capable of catching up with the Soviets. There is no logical or factual basis for such defeatism and despair. America is the greatest industrial power in the world, and our Gross National Product is double that of the Soviet Union. During World War II, we proved that we could produce armaments not only to equip the great American forces on two sides of the world, but also that we could arm and equip the British and the Russian forces at the same time.

At the present time we are spending less than 8 percent of our Gross National Product on defense—and only a tiny fraction of that on strategic weapons. During World War II, we spent 35 percent of our Gross National Product on

defense, proving that we *can* do it, if we want to. Meanwhile, the Soviets *are* spending 33 percent of their Gross National Product on defense in their determination to achieve overwhelming nuclear superiority and rule the world.

Any notion that we can't afford the strategic weapons to stay ahead of the Soviets is simply not true. We could have kept our former superiority for the price we have paid to put a man on the moon—or for the price we have paid to keep troops in Europe so the West Europeans don't have to provide their own troops—or for the price we have paid in foreign giveaways.

Those who say we can't afford to spend money on nuclear weapons to defend America are like people who claim they can't afford to carry fire insurance on their homes. The truth is we can't afford *not* to carry this insurance. Most people are glad to pay fire insurance premiums and never collect on them—knowing that they have this protection in case a disaster strikes. That is what nuclear weapons are—protection of our lives, families and property against the unexpected disaster of attack.

DANGEROUS, DISADVANTAGEOUS AND DEVIOUS

(1) The Salt *Treaty* is dangerous because it signs away our right to defend 205,000,000 Americans (except for the Washington politicians) against nuclear attack. Why should we give up our right to protect our lives, our families and our property against attack? Why are the Washington politicians any more worthy of protection than the men, women and children in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Atlanta, Miami, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, New Orleans, Dallas, Houston, Denver, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, etc.?

It is no answer to say that both sides are limited to the same number of ABMs. The Soviets have a long record of sneak, surprise attacks on defenseless countries, whereas the United States has never committed such an attack and no rational person believes it is in the realm of possibility. The Soviets do not need any defense against U.S. attack; but we do need a defense so we will not suffer the fate of Poland and Finland in 1939, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia in 1940, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The ABM SALT *Treaty* is just as one-sided as though Tiffany's made a pact with the head of the jewel thief syndicate, agreeing that neither side would have a burglar alarm system. Such an agreement is obviously for the benefit of the only side which engages in burglary. It would be highly dangerous for Tiffany's.

Most important, the Soviets don't need any ABMs to protect themselves against a first strike because we have no first-strike weapons. We have only retaliatory weapons.

(2) The SALT Pact is disadvantageous because it freezes the United States as a poor second in the nuclear weapons which will control the world. We will soon have to accept any ultimatum the Kremlin bosses deliver because we will have no power to defend even our own vital interests.

The SALT Pact guarantees the Soviets a more than 3 to 2 superiority in intercontinental ballistic missile launchers. We are frozen at 1,054, but the Soviets are allowed at least 1,618, and it's anybody's guess how many more than that because the Soviets refuse to say how many they have now, or have under construction, or how many ICBMs they are limited to by the SALT Pact.

The SALT Pact guarantees the Soviets almost a 3 to 2 superiority in Polaris-type submarines (62 to 44), and a similar superiority in submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers (950 to 710). Up until a few months ago, we were told that the Polaris submarine was our last best hope for the defense of the United States. Now we are told we are lucky to get the SALT Pact which permits the Soviets "to go on turning out submarines like sausages" until they have overwhelming superiority over us. In addition, having Cuba as a base is equivalent to doubling the size of the Soviet submarine fleet.

(3) The SALT Pact is devious bceause its language and loopholes are cleverly and deviously designed to help the Soviets and hurt the United States. Look at a few examples:

(*a*) The cutoff date for permitting new construction of ICBM launchers, July 1, 1972, is a date which rewards the Soviets for having engaged in a rapid missile-building program during the 2½-year period of the SALT Talks—and punshes the U.S. for exercising restraint and remaining in a missile freeze. Why wasn't the date of the beginning of the SALT Talks, November 17, 1969, selected? It was *after* that date that the Soviets achieved their decisive superiority.

(*b*) The date "1964" specified in Article II of the *Interim Agreement* was obviously designed specifically to guarantee the Soviets an overwhelming and increasing lead in missile megatonnage. This section says: "The parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time."

This Article clearly prohibits the U.S. from increasing the megatonnage of our ICBMs (because our Minutemen are "light" and our Titans are "older types deployed prior to 1964"), while at the same time it *does* permit the Soviets to increase the megatonnage of their SS–9s, and maybe of other models, too, because they were deployed after 1964. The Soviets already have a megatonnage superiority over the U.S. of at least 5 to 1—and Article II permits them to increase this lead as much as they want in order to destroy or blackmail us.

(*c*) Both the *Interim Agreement* and the *Agreed Interpretations* make clear that the Soviets can go ahead full-speed with their huge mobile ICBM program. They can keep their production line for the manufacture of missiles, their technology and their momentum, simply by making their new ICBMs mobile by putting them on railroad cars or trucks. Our U.S. negotiators specifically "agreed to *defer* the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers." But, while agreeing that the Soviets could go ahead in mobile ICBMs, our negotiators in effect bound the U.S. *not* to do likewise by stating that "the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the *Interim Agreement* as inconsistent with the objectives of that *Agreement*."

(*d*) At least 140 Soviet ICBMs have on-site reload capability, and there is nothing in the SALT Pact to prevent the Soviets from adding an on-site reload capability to 1,000 more missile launchers, including their SS–11s and SS–13s. This loophole allows the Soviets to tremendously increase their first-strike capability against us. While theoretically we could also develop a reload capability, in practice we cannot, because our reload missiles would be useless unless they were "hardened" like our Minutemen—because the Soviets have SS–9s to knock them out (whereas we have no comparable missiles to knock out Soviet missiles).

CURRENT SOVIET WAR PLANES

There is one question which Congress owes it to the American people to get the answer to before voting on the SALT Pact, and that is: *Why* are the Soviets building all these nuclear weapons of mass destruction? The Soviet Union's hugely-expensive, decade-long buildup of weapons of war is without parallel in all recorded history. *Why* are they building them?

My study has convinced me that the answer to this question is contained in a certain group of documents which are classified Top Secret by the Defense Department and called the Oleg Penkovskiy "Special Collection." Colonel Penkovskiy was a high Soviet missile expert and intelligence officer who defected to the West in 1961 and delivered into our hands thousands of secret Kremlin documents which set forth in detail the Soviet military doctrine. Penkovskiy summarized this doctrine in his diaries published by Doubleday in 1965 in these words:

"A future war will begin with a sudden nuclear strike against the enemy. There will be no declaration of war. Quite to the contrary, an effort will be made to avoid a declaration of war. When conditions are favorable for delivering the first nuclear strike, the Soviet Union will deliver this strike under the pretense of defending itself from an aggressor. . . . About 100 nuclear charges, exploded in a brief period of time in a highly industrialized country . . . will suffice to transform all of its industrial areas and administrative-political centers into a heap of ruins, and the territory into a lifeless desert. Contaminated with deadly radioactive substances. . . . This plan has been worked out in every detail and is on file in the General Staff. . . . I know the extent of their preparations. I know the poison of the new military doctrine, as outlined in the top-secret 'Special Collection'—the plan to strike first, at any costs. . . . Imagine the horror of a 50-megaton bomb. . . ."

The Penkovskiy documents came into possession of the Defense Department in 1961 and 1962 and have been kept secret from the American public ever since, although they do not involve *any* American secrets at all. In refusing to make them public, the Defense Department wrote on February 1, 1972: "The 'Special Collection' contains material of the highest classification, much of which is *still extremely relevant to current Soviet strategic doctrine and war plans.*"

On March 8, 1972, a suit was filed in Federal Court (Case 72–40) against Melvin Laird and the Defense Department under the Freedom of Information Act (Public Law 89–487) to force declassification of these 10-year old Soviet documents. The date on these documents, 1961 and 1962, coincides perfectly with the years that the Soviets must have adopted the "strategic doctrine and war plans" for the decade-long weapons buildup and the nuclear hardware we know they now possess.

Before voting on the SALT Pact, Congress has a right to know what are the "Soviet war plans"—and how the Soviets plan to make use of the nuclear weapons they now possess. This is why Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act—and there is no better time to make use of it than now.

NO SECOND CHANCE

The idea that reliance on a treaty will prevent war is not new. In 1928, an American Secretary of State, Frank Kellogg, persuaded 62 nations to sign the Kellogg Pact which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy. Neither Germany, nor Japan, nor the Soviet Union paid any attention to this treaty.

In the 1930s, a British Prime Minister adopted a policy similar to that of the SALT agreements. Neville Chamberlain relied on weapons restraint and a treaty he signed with Hitler at Munich in 1938 which promised to bring "peace in our time." The majority of the English people supported him because disarmament meant more money for social welfare.

Today, there are no monuments to Prime Minister Chamberlain, and history books condemn his tragic mistake. The monuments are all erected to Winston Churchill who warned that Britain must stay ahead in weapons and rely on her own strength instead of on a treaty.

History proves that weakness invites aggression. World War II is only one of many lessons that tyrants strike when they think they can win cheap, easy victories by surprise attacks against weak or poorly prepared nations. The now-officially proclaimed military inferiority of the United States to the Soviet Union is a dire threat to the lives and freedom of all Americans. We should heed the ominous warning of Winston Church : "Sometimes in the past we have committed the folly of throwing away our arms. Under the mercy of Providence, and at great cost and sacrifice, we have been able to recreate them when the need arose. But if we abandon our nuclear deterrent, there will be no second chance. To abandon it now would be to abandon it forever."

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly. It is a very interesting presentation and you certainly make our position clear.

UNITED STATES-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

Would you—do you believe that anything can come from negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union looking toward the limitation of armaments?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. I believe that the last two and a half years of the SALT negotiations going on in Helsinki and Vienna proved that the Soviets used that period as a stall to build up their own weapons, while we remained in a weapons freeze. In other words, they made use of that time to achieve the superiority over us and when they got the superiority that they felt they needed, then they were willing to sign some kind of an agreement which would preserve that superiority.

We operated in good faith in not building anything during that period and I think one of the jokers in the SALT "pact" is the selection of the date July 1st, 1972, as the cut-off date. Now, that is a date which rewards the Soviet for making use of the negotiating period to build the weapons of mass destruction which can destroy us. Why didn't they pick the date of the beginning of the SALT, of November, 1969? Obviously because the Soviets used that period for their own advantage.

Senator SPARKMAN. I recognize the force of the argument you make, but I just ask the general question: Is it possible or is it going to be possible for the two great powers to negotiate any worthwhile settlement, in your opinion, or is it something that we should give up hope for?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. I wish it were; I wish we felt that the Soviets were negotiating with a feeling of fellowship and humanitarianism and a desire to have peace; but I think it is important for the Senate to consider the question before you vote as to why the Soviets have been building these weapons of mass destruction. It is the most gigantic arms buildup in the history of the world. There is no parallel for it. Why have they been building it?

Now, I think that the answer to that question is contained in some papers which are classified top secret over at the Defense Department and which they will not release. These are the thousands of documents which were given to this country in 1961 and 1962 by a very important Soviet defector named Colonel Eleg Penkovsky. Colonel Penkovsky sent these documents over and they have been classified top secret ever since. When a statement was made earlier this year to get the Defense Department to declassify these papers and remember, they concern only Soviet secrets not American secrets, the Pentagon replied saying, "That these Pentkovsky papers contained material of the highest classification, much of which is still extremely relevant to current Soviet strategic doctrine and war plans." That is a direct quote.

Now, I think we are entitled to know the answer to the question what are the Soviet war plans. The Pentkovsky papers which we know because the diaries summarized the Soviet war plan as a strategy of a surprise nuclear strike on the United States, and under the Freedom of Information Act, which Congress passed a couple of years ago, I would hope that the senators would take steps to bring about the declassification of these documents; and the dates on those documents are precisely the dates which, under which, the Soviets had to have established for their master plan under which they have had the ten-year buildup of weapons of mass destruction.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, thank you very much. It has been an interesting presentation and I think you make it very clear that we have no easy job ahead of us.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SPARKMAN. Next, Mr. Cordell Burch, Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism.

Mr. Burch, we are very glad to have you, sir.

STATEMENT OF CORDELL BURCH, NORTHERN VIRGINIA COMMITTEE FOR VICTORY OVER COMMUNISM

Mr. BURCH. My name is Cordell Burch, Mr. Chairman, and I represent the Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism, and I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify.

SAL AGREEMENTS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT OPPOSED

The Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism opposes the strategic arms limitation agreements, including the treaty

limiting ABM sites, and the executive agreements limiting offensive nuclear capability, because we are opposed to world government.

The Moscow agreements are part of a long-standing plan for world government which was made the official policy of the United States Government in 1961 and has been its policy ever since. This plan, Department of State Publication 7277, envisages three stages: First, the United States and Russia would limit their armaments; second, a United Nations peace force would be established; third, the UN peace force would be strengthened until it was more powerful than any nation, including the United States.

Now, I quote from this plan as published by the Department of State in September, 1961: Under Stage I, Part B is entitled, "To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments" and under Part B, paragraph (b) states in part: "Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps."

Again under Stage I, Part D is entitled, "To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles" and under Part D, paragraph (a) states in part: "Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps."

The Moscow agreements are designed specifically to implement these provisions of Stage I of this world government plan.

I quote now from Stage II, Part E, paragraph (b): "The UN Peace Force shall be established and progressively strengthened."

And, finally, I quote from Stage III: ". . . progressively controlled disarmament and continuously developing principles and procedures of international law would proceed to a point where no state would have the military power to challenge the progressively strengthened UN Peace Force . . ."

With the implementation of this stage, world government would be a reality. I think that is quite obvious.

I would like to emphasize that this is the official policy of the United States Government, that is, to progressively transfer our military armaments to the United Nations until the United Nations is stronger than we are.

You are aware, of course, that the UN official in charge of all United Nations military forces, the Under Secretary General for Political and Security Council Affairs, is always a Communist, under an agreement made between the United States and Russia at the founding of the UN. At present he is Leonid Kutakov of Russia.

The Northern Virginia Committee for Victory over Communism unhesitatingly and, we think, with apparent justification, characterizes the Moscow agreements as the first stage in the plan to abolish the United States as we know it today and make us a part of a Communist world government.

ROLE OF COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS IN U.S. GOVERNMENT

To learn how the United States got into this precarious position, almost on the point of submitting to a world government, you must look into the role of the Council on Foreign Relations in our government. The Council on Foreign Relations—CFR—was founded in 1919

by Colonel E. M. House, the Henry Kissinger of his day, and some of his associates. It had become apparent to them by that time that the United States would not join the League of Nations, which was to have been their vehicle for establishing a world government, and that they would have to lay a much stronger groundwork and basis for getting the United States into a world government.

The CFR was set up to get the United States into a world government. With strong support from the huge tax-exempt foundations, the CFR grew in influence and during the 1920s and 1930s infiltrated the executive branch of government until at the onset of World War II it effectively controlled our State Department and has controlled it ever since.

The CFR completely dominated the Committee on Postwar Problems, later changed to the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policies, which is the group that designed the United Nations.

The CFR did its job so well that when the UN Charter came before the Senate for ratification, only two votes were cast against it.

Since that time the CFR has worked unceasingly to implement the world government plan I have outlined. In 1961 the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was established under CFR member William C. Foster and the State Department published the plan as official government policy.

Today, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is headed by CFR member Gerard Smith, the man who negotiated the SALT agreements, and the CFR is about to see the United States enter into the first stage of its world government plan.

The Northern Virginia Committee for Victory Over Communism vigorously opposes United States participation in this plan and urges the Senate to reject the treaty that is before it and to condemn all the other executive agreements associated with it.

TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS OPPOSED

We view these treaties and agreements as exceedingly dangerous to the security of the United States, not only in and of themselves, as many witnesses have brought out before the committee today, but also, more importantly, as a precedent, as a first step, in submerging the United States in a world government. They lead inevitably to more treaties and then more treaties until ultimately the whole scheme for world government will be completed. We maintain and urge that it must be stopped now before it ever gets started.

ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF ACTION FOR U.S. PROPOSED

In closing, we would like to propose an alternative course of action for the United States to follow:

First, the United States must get out of the United Nations and get the United Nations out of the United States. This is of the utmost importance if we are not to find ourselves very soon in a Communist United Nations world government.

Second, the United States must completely stop all trade with and aid to the entire Communist bloc of nations, who are the major promoters of war in the world today. Within six months the whole Communist empire would collapse without our support, we believe.

Professor Antony Sutton's three-volume study, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which provides mountains of evidence to show how the Soviet Union has been built up by the West, and leads me to believe that the above prediction is no exaggeration.

Third, we must stop all trade and aid to any nation that will not join us in the first two steps. This will ensure the rapid accomplishment of the first two steps. This course of action would soon result in a world of free, independent, peace-loving nations, whereas the course on which our nation is now about to embark will result with absolute certainty in a one-world, totalitarian government.

We ask the Senate to reject this latter course by rejecting the Moscow agreements and to adopt instead the course of action we have outlined.

I would like to say in addition that I want to express my appreciation to Senator Spong for arranging for our appearance before the committee.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

I suppose you know Senator Spong had an amendment coming up on the floor of the Senate which he was greatly interested in and therefore could not be here. He is a member of this committee and I am sure he would have been here if he could have.

We have all been working under considerable difficulty today, as you know, but we appreciate your presentation.

TREATY ALLOWS SOVIETS TO BUILD ONLY 25 NEW SILOS

Mrs. Schlafly, there was just one think I wanted to call to your attention. In your statement you referred to the Soviet Union building without limit, apparently, additional ICBMs. I believe under the treaty they are allowed to build only 25 new silos to hold heavy missiles which would bring the number from the present 288 to 313.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Is this on——

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you recall that?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Senator, the Soviets have never said how many they have. The figures that have been used on Soviet ICBMs are strictly U.S. intelligence figures on what we have seen but they have refused to be bound to any figures as to the numbers they now have or have under construction or feel they have to respect under the terms of the treaty, so while I didn't use the term "unlimited," nobody knows exactly how many they can still build. They can certainly continue with the 90 to 100 holes that we have already spotted, and they can put SS–9s in those and they can even put their 50-megaton weapon in it.

U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

Senator SPARKMAN. Don't you believe that we have a pretty good system of detection on these things?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. No, I don't believe we have a good system. Satellite surveillance is good but it is no substitute for on-site inspection which the Soviets have resisted very greatly. There is no way that satellite reconnaissance can tell how many warheads they have. There are many ways that they can conceal their weapons and, of course, Brezhnev has

made it perfectly clear and our negotiators made it clear that they can go ahead full speed in mobile missiles which are practically impossible to detect through satellite reconnaissance.

Senator SPARKMAN. You know, our people who handle those things claim that our present detection system is superior to on-site inspection?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes, these are the same people who didn't find the missiles that went into Cuba in 1962; these are the same people who didn't find a movement of 650,000 troops when they went into Czechoslovakia in 1968; these are the same people who didn't detect the 6 months of preparation that the Soviets went into when they set off their giant series of nuclear tests in 1961.

Our intelligence has had such abysmal failures in detecting what the enemy is doing that I would suggest that it is very unsafe for us to rely on that source.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would you include the CIA in that?

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Well, we have many sources of intelligence supposedly; but the net result is we have been surprised with every major move on the part of the Soviet Union and that is why I pointed out at the beginning of my statement that my books, beginning in 1964, accurately forecast the deployment of the SS–9 and the determination of the Soviet Union to pass parity and to go on to overwhelming superiority, which they subsequently proceeded to do, while all the people with access to all this giant information assured us solemnly that the Soviets were going to stop when they got to parity.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with you that we have been severely disappointed in the past on different occasions by the lack of proper detection, but I am convinced that our methods of detection have been vastly improved just within the last few years.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Well, they can't detect the mobile ICBM's and they can't detect the numbers of warheads, and they can't detect the submarines through the satellite reconnaissance, and that is the only thing we are limited to. Meanwhile, of course, you know the Soviets have successfully tested satellite interceptors and we do not have that capability. So they have the capability to blind us if they decide to move and knock our spies in the sky out of existence.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, all those thing have to be taken into consideration. That is one of the things that may be necessary for us to delve into this just as thoroughly as we possibly can and that is what we are trying to do.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Well, I hope you do, and particularly on this question of why are the Soviets building these weapons of mass destruction. They have poured such gigantic resources, at least twice, into defense of what we have put into defense; they are determined to acquire superiority in every strategic weapon.

SOVIET ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES FOR WEAPONS

Why are they doing it? Do you think they like spending money on weapons instead of consumer goods to improve their standard of living? They must have a reason. I don't think these things just accidently happen. There must have been some brain which decided, yes, we are going to allocate this gigantic amount of resources into weapons which only have one utility and that is to defeat the United States.

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, we could discuss this all day back and forth, banter back and forth. I have my ideas as to why they did it. I think it all started at the time of the missile crisis in Cuba, and I think it has been going on ever since.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. That's right. It has.

Senator SPARKMAN. And you and I both know that they have had some difficulty over there in the quarrel between sides as to whether or not they were spending too much on armaments and not enough for consumers. Of course they probably do not have the ease of expression that people in this country have; but we have been having our own problems here on that, as you know.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes, but Mr. Brezhnev who is the space czar has won out and they have spent the money on the weapons; and when you point out that the decision was made about the time of the Cuban missile crisis 10 years ago, again——

Senator SPARKMAN. I would say it started—

DECLASSIFICATION OF PENTAKOVSKIY DOCUMENTS

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. It started then; then that ties in with the date of these Pentakovskiy documents and I hope that in your position as Senator on the Foreign Relations Committee you will perhaps do what you can to secure the declassification of these papers which reveal the Soviet war doctrine and the Soviet strategic doctrine at that time; and, personally, I see no reason why our Defense Department should keep Soviet secrets away from the American people. The Soviets already know about them; why can't the American people know what the Soviets are planning? So, under the Freedom of Information Act, Senator, I hope you will request declassification of those documents.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sure you know we have been working on the general subject of over-liberal classification of documents and working in an effort to get declassification as early as it may be practicable. I am not speaking of these documents particularly, but in the general field of classifying documents. You know this committee has expressed itself rather strongly on that subject.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes, and I agree with you and while some case can be made or a good case can be made for keeping certain American secrets quiet and not available to the public, what argument can you make for keeping Soviet secrets away from the American people?

Senator SPARKMAN. That is not our problem. That is something they have to settle within their own country.

NON-INTERFERENCE WITH DETECTION SYSTEMS PART OF AGREEMENT

By the way, in connection with this treaty, the Soviet Union did promise us in turn, in fact, both sides promised that they would not interfere with the detection systems of the other side. The question is whether or not that will be faithfully observed, but that is a part of the agreement itself.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Yes, that applies only, however, to the satellite reconnaissance; we are not allowed any other type of surveillance.

Senator SPARKMAN. No, no; the on-site is not a part of it.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Is not a part of it.

Senator SPARKMAN. But any detection system that we may have, they promised not to interfere with; of course, they know we have got these spy satellites; I suppose the whole world knows it now.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. But so far as the Soviets promising not to interfere, I think we ought to remember back in 1968 when they made a treaty with the Czechs for peace and friendship, 17 days before they marched in with 650,000 troops.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have no argument with you on that basis. In fact, I am not arguing at all. I am just trying to point out some things that I think are essential for us to remember.

Anyhow, thank you very much, all of you.

Mrs. SCHLAFLY. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the committee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS

THURSDAY, JULY 20, 1972

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4221, New Senate Office Building, Senator John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Symington, Spong, Case, Cooper and Percy.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

OPENING STATEMENT

I would like to welcome Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, Director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center at Stanford University; Dr. Marvin L. Goldberger, Chairman of the Department of Physics at Princeton University; and Dr. Richard Garwin of the IBM Watson Laboratory at Yorkton Heights, California.

This is the sixth and final public session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the proposed interim agreement limiting strategic weapons and the proposed treaty limiting antiballistic missile deployments. To date we have heard Administration witnesses presenting the arguments in favor of both the treaty and the agreement and we have received testimony from experts in several fields who have addressed points of concern as the committee and the Congress prepare for consideration of these two extremely important accords.

Today our distinguished panelists will address important issues relating to the agreements who have before us and will look ahead to SALT II and further discussions with the Soviet Union.

The testimony we will receive will be particularly important in light of the various weapons proposals made by the Administration and related by the Administration to the treaty and the agreement. The committee must address itself to these very important related issues of the weapons proposals and how they will influence both this government and the government of the Soviet Union, now and in the future, as it endeavors to reach conclusions on the two accords.

I am informed there is to be a roll call vote in the Senate at about 11:00 o'clock and there may be other interruptions, but we will move along as well and as fast as we can.

Senator Cooper, do you have any statement to make preliminarily?

COMMENDATION OF WITNESSES AND OTHER SCIENTISTS

Senator COOPER. Thank you, Senator Sparkman. I would like to say I think the committee is fortunate to have the opportunity to hear the witnesses we have before us—Dr. Garwin, Dr. Goldberger and Dr. Panofsky. I am sure their testimony will be of the utmost importance.

I would like to say also that I believe these witnesses and other scientists have contributed more to the effort toward arms control than any other group. At the beginning of the debate on strategic arms policy and arms control several years ago their testimony opened up not only the debate on nuclear strategic systems but also it cleared the way for informed debate on all arms. They have educated the committees and they have educated the country. We are all greatly indebted to them.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Percy?

Senator PERCY. Senator Sparkman, Mr. Chairman, I came up primarily to say exactly the same thing. We are very indebted to our witnesses this morning. It is in a way very unfortunate that on this final day when they are the anchormen and important witnesses we do have these roll call votes. I also must get down to the floor and speak on the issue we are voting on at 11:00 o'clock, and also participate in an executive meeting of the Government Operations Committee, of which I am the ranking Republican, to mark up legislation we have been working on for three years.

I find it very interesting that some of the chief proponents before of the ABM system are now saying exactly the same things against the extension of an ABM system around the control center here in Washington. This certainly is a turn of events that sometime ought to be completely written up. But it also seems to me an absolute and total and complete vindication of the position that our three witnesses took at a time when it almost looked like they were against the national interest in so testifying. What they said at that time was so wise and so right that I think it has been a great service to the country.

I want to express my deep appreciation to these three men who, I think, are very, very unique in the role that, they have played through the past several years and in the services they have contributed to their country and to the United States Senate.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Senator Percy.

By the way, you mentioned having to go to an executive session. It happens my committee is having an executive session and I am going to have to slip out at least long enough to make a quorum up there, but I hope to be right back.

Senator COOPER. I will be here throughout the entire hearing.

COMMUNICATION OF SENATOR HART

I would like to say one more thing. Senator Philip Hart has been asked to testify, but in view of his modesty said he probably would submit a statement. I would like to say for the record that I believe his work on arms control throughout the last three or four years has been of the utmost importance and he deserves the immense credit of

the United States Senate in the work he has done toward the limitation of nuclear systems.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right. Our first witness will be Mr. Goldberger.

Senator Spong, we are just getting started. We have had some preliminary statements. Would you care to make one?

Senator SPONG. No, I have none.

Senator SPARKMAN. Then, Mr. Goldberger, if you will come forward we would appreciate it. You have a statement. I will say this to all of you. Each one of you has a statement. Your statements will be printed in full in the record and you may present them as you see fit—either read it, summarize it, discuss it or however you want to proceed. We are very glad to have you.

STATEMENT OF MARVIN L. GOLDBERGER, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Mr. GOLDBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to be here today to discuss the strategic arms limitation treaty and the related interim agreement on offensive weapons. I have been concerned for many years with arms control issues related to strategic weapons and it is particularly gratifying to appear before you at a time when an important step has been taken to limit the strategic arms race, namely, the signing in Moscow of the SALT agreement. I strongly support this treaty and urge speedy ratification of it by the Senate.

While supporting the treaty without reservation, I think it worthwhile to draw attention to certain issues that naturally arise in connection with it, which might have bearing on future actions taken by both sides and on the direction which future arms control agreements might take.

ABM SYSTEMS AND TREATY

In connection with the ABM treaty, it has long been clear that ABM systems have been one of the most destabilizing elements in the arms race; they can create unwarranted confidence in their effectiveness for those who build such systems, which might promote reckless foreign policies and at the same time cause the other side to react violently to produce offensive weapons in quantities more than sufficient to compensate for the conjectured effectiveness of the defense. Although it would have been preferable in my opinion if the treaty had banned ABMs completely or limited them to the existing single site in each country, I feel that the two-site provision in the treaty is still quite satisfactory since it clearly precludes the acquisition of a nationwide defense by either side. The treaty, together with the supplementary understandings, contains sufficient technical details so that not only are large ABMs banned but also bears that air defenses could be upgraded to ABMs no longer can have any substance. The negotiators have successfully attacked the problem of ABM radars, the most critical element in an ABM system which must be controlled. While upgrading was always of very questionable technical feasibility, it was nevertheless used as an excuse by the U.S. for procuring additional offensive weapons such as MIRVs. This red herring can now be buried.

FUTURE U.S. ABM PROGRAMS IN LIGHT OF TREATY

Before leaving the subject of ABMs, I should like to express my views on the future U.S. ABM program in light of this treaty. Should we proceed to deploy the Washington ABM which is specifically allowed? My answer to this question is clearly no. Just because we have this option is no justification for proceeding to exercise it. Admiral Moorer stated on February 15, 1972, that the "Moscow (ABM) system even with improved radars and more and better interceptors, could still be saturated by a very small part of our total missile force." Why, then, should we proceed to deploy a Washington defense similar to such an ineffective Moscow system?

Neither Secretary Laird nor Admiral Moorer in testimony before this committee have satisfactorily justified the need to proceed. They have argued that it might buy time for our command-and-control system, but they have so far avoided being specific on this score, probably because the time bought is extremely short even under optimum circumstances. Since the allowed system would permit only 100 defensive missiles, even if it were 100 percent effective, it could be penetrated by 101 incoming warheads. What time is then bought by the defensive system? Our current command-and-control system has been built to respond to the normal 30-minute warning of an ICBM launch or the somewhat smaller period for the submarine-launched ballistic missile. Any small increment provided by a defense which could be measured only in seconds or at most minutes is clearly irrelevant.

Furthermore, the Washington ABM makes no sense for the secondary objectives originally put forth to justify the Safeguard system, that is, defense against a Chinese attack or accidental launches. Since by treaty the remaining population and industrial centers of the U.S. outside of Washington must remain vulnerable, the Washington system cannot have any practical value against even a limited Chinese ICBM threat. Similarly, only a small proportion of the Soviet missiles would be targeted against Washington so that the probability that it could provide useful protection against an accidental Soviet launch is very small. Thus the Washington ABM has virtually no value against accidents, the Chinese threat, or a Soviet attack. I would submit that we are carrying the concept of parity too far if we seek equality in Soviet mistakes.

The question of proceeding with the missile site defense at Grand Forks is more debatable since it has been announced that the system is already more than 80 percent completed. As I have stated previously before this committee, I do not believe that the Safeguard ICBM defense was either needed or effective since it could be overcome by a very small increase in the offensive forces needed to destroy Minuteman. This conclusion still holds good today; in fact, the requirement for ICBM defenses has been significantly reduced by the ABM treaty and by the ceiling on large ICBMs included in the interim agreement. The ABM treaty would allow the construction of 18 additional radars as a part of the missile site defense and this does remove the most obvious Achilles heel in the Safeguard system, that is, the vulnerability of the single missile site radar. However, with the limit of 100 interceptors, the system can still be easily overpowered. The addition

at great expense of 18 radars to the system at this time is probably unwarranted. I recommend, however, that vigorous research be carried out on the so-called hard-site system as a hedge in the event that the treaty and the interim agreement are abrogated.

MORE LIMITED VALUE OF INTERIM AGREEMENT

I consider that the interim agreement on offensive weapons is of more limited value than the ABM treaty since both nations already have large numbers of strategic missiles and since it includes few restraints on qualitative improvements. Two years ago when SALT was in its early stages, Dr. Herbert Scoville pointed out that a simple numerical limitation on missiles with few if any restrictions on replacement of existing weapons by new and different models could be a sham of arms control. Fortunately, the interim agreement does go beyond a simple numerical ceiling although only to a limited extent. It does prevent the replacement of small ICBMs by large ones and significantly increasing the size—10 to 15 percent—of the land-based launchers. Thus the Soviets are now frozen at 313 large SS–9 ICBMs, significantly less than the 500 which Secretary Laird predicted the Soviets would have by 1975 when justifying the Safeguard ABM and MIRV deployments. The interim agreement, therefore, should reduce fears on this score although in fact the Soviets had only started 25 new large ICBM launchers since August, 1969. If Secretary Laird's original arguments were sound, then we should have reduced requirement for new strategic weapons now.

Apart from this restriction on large ICBMs, the numerical ceiling is of marginal value and indeed by specifically endorsing the concept of replacement of old models by new ones, it can provide an excuse for accelerating the qualitative arms race. I am not concerned by the fact that the Soviets are allowed a larger number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles than the U.S. This disparity has no security significance since the U.S. has a tremendous qualitative and geographical advantage. Dr. Kissinger has pointed out that the Russians would require about 60 submarines to have the same capability as 40 U.S. ones because of the much longer time that their ships would have to take to reach operational stations. President Nixon pointed out in his State of the World Message this year that both our SLBMs and our Polaris submarines were superior to the Soviet systems. Secretary Laird in testimony before this committee attempted to give the impression that the Soviet Y-class submarines together with the newly developed longer-range SLBM were already equivalent to our proposed TRIDENT, but I know of no facts which would justify such a comparison. The Polaris-Poseidon system is, in my view, still superior to anything that the Soviets are deploying today.

PROPOSED U.S. STRATEGIC ARMS PROGRAM

Since the interim agreement places so few restrictions on qualitative improvements, its true value and indeed that of the ABM treaty as well will depend on the unilateral actions which the two nations now take in light of the present guaranteed state of mutual deterrence and on the vigor with which additional negotiations are

prosecuted to secure restrictions on qualitative improvements and to reduce existing weapons. Our proposed strategic arms program should now be carefully reexamined in light of the new situation and only those items which have a real security need should be carried forward. There is no reason for accelerating any offensive weapon programs at this time. Instead, if the agreements are to have any real value, then many proposed programs should be cut back. There is no security requirement for rushing ahead with the Trident submarine; in fact, prematurely freezing on the design of a large and hopefully quieter vessel at this time could eventually lead to a reduction in our security when one is attempting to design to an unknown antisubmarine technology and against a threat which has not yet developed. Further deployment of MIRVs on either the Poseidon or the Minuteman III is no longer warranted since the requirement for overwhelming a large Soviet ABM does not now exist and since the continuation of such programs can only make more difficult the achievement of a MIRV ban. The proposal to move ahead with a submarine-launched strategic cruise missile at this time seems so absurd as to almost not warrant comment since the ABM treaty has guaranteed that our submarine-launched ballistic missiles can reach their target within the USSR. I would recommend that the Congress look at these and in fact at all other strategic weapon programs in light of the Moscow agreements and fund only those which have a clearly justifiable security need.

BARGAINING CHIP ARGUMENT

The argument that weapons must be bought as bargaining chips for arms control negotiations is not very convincing. It is difficult, if not impossible, to assess the role played by Safeguard as a bargaining chip in the SALT treaty.

Perhaps the Russians were influenced or at least mystified by our insistence on deploying an ABM system with such obvious technical deficiencies. At any rate, in practice the Safeguard ABM bargaining chip only produced a treaty which allowed the Russians to enlarge an ABM system which they were showing no signs of extending.

The MIRV bargaining chip has made more difficult the achievement of any limitation on MIRVs which in the long run can be a significant security loss to the U.S. The Trident submarine program request designed to demonstrate to the Soviets our intention to match their submarine construction program may have resulted in an agreement which allowed the Soviets to build 50 percent more submarines than they already had under construction. This is not an impressive record for bargaining chips. We can no longer afford to let arms control negotiations be used as a cloak to procure unnecessary weapons.

VERIFICATION ASPECTS OF AGREEMENTS

Finally, I should like to make one further point relative to the verification aspects of the two agreements. I fully subscribe to the thesis that national means of verification are satisfactory to verify that significant violations of these two agreements are not occurring. The clandestine deployment of an ABM system or upgrading of air defenses to provide a significant ABM capability would have a very high

probability of being detected by our national means. In this connection, the provisions of the treaty relative to radars are particularly helpful since these are the most easily detectable and longest lead-time items in an ABM system. The precedent established by these agreements in legalizing such national technical means of verification is excellent and is useful not only in connection with the present agreements but also for future ones as well. It is particularly satisfying to note the provisions which make it illegal to interfere with such national technical means and to use deliberate concealment measures which impede such verification. This is a major accomplishment in the field of arms control.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, if the two governments act with restraint in their unilateral programs and if they move forward rapidly to attempt to reach agreement on qualitative restrictions, then the Moscow agreements can be truly looked on as milestones toward the goal of limiting nuclear arms. With good will and restraining on both sides, there will be many opportunities for further restrictions, not all of which need to be carried out in the context of bilateral SALT negotiations. A comprehensive test ban which could be negotiated at the CCD in Geneva would be a useful step in applying qualitative restraints and in reducing the risks of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Mutual force reductions negotiated by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries would be an important step in reducing the burdens of conventional arms. There is little question that there will be widespread support for efforts by the United States to ensure that the limitations on strategic arms now undertaken are followed up in a manner which ends the fruitless and expensive arms competition.

Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Goldberger.

In view of the fact that we are going to have a roll call a little later, Senator Cooper has made a suggestion, which I think is very good, that we have all three witnesses present their statements and leave the questioning until later. If that is agreeable, we will hear from Mr. Garwin next.

Mr. Garwin, we are very glad to have you with us. You may proceed with your statement as you see fit.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. GARWIN, IBM WATSON LABORATORY, YORKTON HEIGHTS, CALIF.

Mr. GARWIN. Thank you. I am honored by the committee's request for my testimony in regard to the strategic arms limitation agreements now before the Senate, and I am pleased to have this opportunity to comment. The committee surely recognizes that I can add very little to the excellent factual presentations which have been made by Ambassador Smith and others and to the highly informative White House briefing by President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger on June 15, 1972. Furthermore, it must be recognized that I speak for myself alone in making these remarks. I hope that my views may be of some help to you.

BACKGROUND OF WITNESS

Since 1950 I have been involved extensively in technical contributions to offensive and defensive strategic arms. Since that year a substantial part of my time has been spent in helping to understand and to provide the background for policy decisions in the national security area. In particular, I have contributed extensively to the design of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, to the command and control of such weapons, to the strategic air defense of the United States, to the formulation of various possible systems for antiballistic missile defense, to studies of arms control agreement such as the Limited Nuclear Weapons Test Ban, and to agreements such as those which are now before the Congress.

My recent involvement with the government has included membership in the President's Science Advisory Committee from 1962 to 1965 and again from 1969 to the present time; membership in the Defense Science Board—advisory to the Secretary of Defense—1966 to 1969; membership and chairmanship of several military panels of the President's Science Advisory Committee over these years; and the chairing of panels for the Defense Department and for other agencies in the national security area. In particular, it has been reported to the Congress by responsible officials that I chaired the Military Aircraft Panel and the Antisubmarine Warfare Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee. Over the years I have had deep and intimate contact with both strategic and tactical weapon programs, with the responsibility of assessing our technology in these specific areas in view of the potential and the capabilities of our possible adversaries. Another aspect of my task at various times was to assess the current military capability of certain of our forces I have recommended at times that certain development or production programs be initiated or expedited and I have judged at times that certain programs should be canceled or redirected.

AGREEMENTS BEFORE SENATE COMMENDED

The Senate has before it for its action the ABM treaty, the interim agreement on offensive weapons and the associated protocol, signed May 26, 1972. These were transmitted to the Senate June 13, together with twelve agreed interpretations initiated by the heads of the delegations on May 26, 1972, six common understandings and eight unilateral statements. These supplementary statements amplify and in most cases extend the coverage of the agreements. The formal documents are models of brevity.

I regard these agreements as an historical achievement. They are indeed a step toward more complete limitation of strategic arms, but the limitations which they impose are of enormous significance in themselves. I do not suggest that the agreements coincide in every respect with those I would have advocated but I believe they result in greater overall progress than I thought possible in arms limitation by this date.

POSTURE OF MUTUAL DETERRENCE

For more than a decade the destruction of the U.S. by the Soviet Union, or vice versa, has been prevented not by the traditional aspects

of defense—that is, a shield against the striking force, but by the certainty that each side possessed a thermonuclear force sufficiently numerous and survivable that it could be used in return to destroy the initiator of strategic warfare. During the decade, measures were taken on both sides to render the offensive forces more survivable and more controllable, so that this posture of mutual deterrence, apparently acceptable, even unavoidable, at any given time, could not be stolen or destabilized by sudden unilateral action on the other side. The technical possibility most destabilizing would have been a deployed defense against ballistic missiles—ABM—which it was felt by some could be developed and proliferated to ward off and hence to negate the reentry vehicles and warheads of the land-based ICBM force and of the submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Of course, deterrence would still exist if the bombers could survive to take off and to penetrate to their targets. Although costly and heavy air defenses were deployed on both sides, it is clear that the present bombers on either side can penetrate. Furthermore, any ABM system which has thus far been proposed in detail has had no capability to prevent the overwhelming penetration by the ballistic missile forces of the other side. Still the uncertainty as to the future possibility of ABM of some unknown type was an impetus for proliferation and improvement programs of the offensive forces, such as multiple reentry vehicles—MRV, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles—MIRV, retention of bomber-delivered weapons, et cetera.

The other perceived threat to the stable deterrent was the possibility of destruction before launch. The public and even official circles often confused some eventual possibility of prelaunch vulnerability of the land-based ICBM with an overall destruction before launch of the offensive forces, although no combination of enemy ICBM warhead yield and accuracy can threaten the survivability of the bombers or of the submarine-launched missiles. The first are protected by their ability to be launched on detection of ICBM firing, and the second by the other side's ignorance of the specific location of the submarines. This confusion was exploited by various individuals and groups for their own reasons.

Furthermore, many wished for a world in which the shield-like defense could replace the deterrent and in which their own nation could wield the threat of ultimate destruction of the adversary. In fact, no proposal has ever been advanced which could seriously promise to repeal the technical facts. Between the reality and grudged acceptability of deterrence on the one hand, and the will-o-the-wisp of the permanent defensive shield against all possible types of weapons on the other, the responsibility national leaders have chosen the reality of deterrence.

PROMISED PERMANENT ABSENCE OF EFFECTIVE ABM CAPABILITY

Thus the ABM treaty promises the permanent absence of effective ABM capability, either locally or nationwide. To enforce such an important promise, it has provisions to limit systems which act like ABMs or look like ABMs. Most importantly, it recognizes the use of national technical means of verification, and it includes the undertaking not to use deliberate concealment measures nor to interfere with

the national technical means of vertification of the other party. Finally, it establishes a standing consultative commission to consider various questions, including details of compliance, et cetera. Furthermore, the agreed interpretations further limit ABM systems and specify, among other things, that specific limitations on ABM systems based on other physical principles and on their components, would be subject to discussion and agreement. Among the articles of the treaty, Article V is an undertaking "not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea based, air based, space based, or mobile land based." It is my judgment that this treaty and the auxiliary documents provide a firm, safeguarded an verifiable elimination of the ABM as a threat to the effectiveness of our ICBM and SLBM force.

INSURANCE AGAINST DESTRUCTION BY PREEMPTIVE STRIKE

The interim agreement on the limitation of offensive missiles, together with the protocol and the agreed interpretations, attempts to do for a period of five years what the ABM treaty does for an unlimited duration. They attack the other possible threat to stable deterrence, that is, the fear of destruction of the ICBM force before launch. Remember that the SLBM force is not threatened by accuracy or numbers of the opposing offensive warheads, and the bombers can be based and managed so that they can take off before being destroyed. Thus the offensive limitations constitute a further insurance to the certainty that our entire strategic offensive force cannot be destroyed in a preemptive strike. As has been previously stated many times in these hearings, the interim agreement and the protocol freeze the number of ICBMs at the number presently operational or under construction, and the number of SLBMs at the number presently operational or under construction, the protocol spelling out the precise numbers. The U.S. may trade 54 of its ICBMs for new construction SLBMs on not more than three submarines, and the Soviet Union can destroy 210 ICBMs and replace them with SLBMs. I can respond to questions regarding the details of these numerical limits, but I don't want to give them undue significance.

DISCREPANCY BETWEEN NUMBERS OF MISSILES ALLOWED

Various individuals have made much of the discrepancy between the number of missiles allowed the two sides:

	United States		U.S.S.R.	
ICBM	1,054	(1,000)	1,618	(1,408)
SLBM	656	(710)	740	(950)

For each nation the numbers in parenthesis give the maximum permitted number of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines and modern SLBM launchers on any submarine. To reach this number, a nation must destroy ICBMs to the level indicated by the parentheses.

ARGUMENTS CONCERNING SOVIET STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE QUESTIONED

Critics have argued that the Soviet Union, by virtue of these greater numbers, has some kind of strategic advantage. These arguments ignore the realities of deterrence, the fact that an ABM treaty effectively increases the number of our missiles five or ten years hence by some unknown but large factor in comparison with what we regarded as satisfactory in the absence of such a treaty. It ignores the strategic advantage contained in the unilateral "statement of the Soviet side" submitted to you regarding the "strategic imbalance"—their words—in the deployment of the nuclear-powered submarines of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Finally, it ignores the enormous growth potential permitted us under the terms of the agreements, which would allow us to replace each Minuteman missile in its existing silo by a new missile with at least three times as many warheads as the MIRVed Minuteman III. Of course, there is no necessity to do any such thing; in the absence of an ABM agreement we felt no compulsion and had no program to increase our ICBM offensive force at all, let alone by that amount; but this offensive agreement, which in any case is limited to a duration of five years, allows us this enormous growth.

It is difficult to recollect that early in May 1972, we had no guarantee that these SALT agreements would be signed. Admiral Moorer testified to this committee on June 21, 1972, that the Soviet Union was deploying annually 250 ICBMs and 128 SLBMs. Considering the expiration date of the interim agreement—1977, during this five-year period the Soviet Union, without such an agreement, and without any acceleration in their programs, could have had 1,250 more ICBMs and 640 more SLBMs, all of the most modern types. Even if the interim offensive agreement were not to be followed by further advances in arms limitation, I would regard it as a very major benefit to the United States to be facing a Soviet force in 1977 little different from that which they have now, rather than one which could be far more than twice as large. I must admit that there is one way in which the Soviet Union benefits from these agreements more than the U.S.—by having agreed to the termination of the enormous on-going programs to which Admiral Moorer alluded, they will save tens of billions of rubles.

We should be very clear that had the SALT agreements not been reached, there was no program underway in the Defense Department to provide a larger offensive force by 1977. The ABM agreement has now quaranteed our ICBMs and SLBMs a free ride to their targets. Compared with conservative projections of Soviet ABM capability, our penetrating missile forces are enormously increased in capability in the late 1970s. Furthermore, the ABM treaty, which eliminates effective ABM, does not limit air defense. Thus, for the indefinite future missiles are assured of penetration, whereas, our bombers face an already heavy and potentially unlimited air defense. There is no doubt that the SALT agreements make a major change in the relative values and priorities of our existing strategic forces, in the needs for development, and in the relative balance between strategic forces and others.

APPROVAL OF AGREEMENTS AND VOTE ON WEAPONS PROGRAMS

The benefits of the agreements will become a reality only when the treaty has been ratified by the Senate and the Congress has approved the executive agreements; therefore, I believe that it is urgent, as the President stated on June 23:

> First, the arms limitation agreements should be approved on their merits—after the Congress moves—in approving the ABM Treaty and also the limited, temporary, offensive limitations curb—all Congressmen and Senators—and this would, of course, concern them all—who are concerned about the security of the United States should then vote for those programs that will provide adequate offensive weapons in the areas that have been recommended by the Secretary of Defense and by the administration.

FISCAL YEAR 1973 STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

I would like to give you my views on some of these fiscal year 1973 strategic programs:

It is important to recognize that the fiscal year 1973 programs must take into account the great impact of the ABM treaty and the offensive limitations which the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have signed and which the Congress will soon affirm. Proposed programs, and on-going programs should then be evaluated in terms of their contribution to our overall stable deterrent, their cost and hence their impact on other military and nonmilitary needs, and their impact on future arms limitations agreements.

TRIDENT AND TRIDENT I MISSILE PROGRAM

The largest and the least sensible innovation in strategic weapon programs is ULMS or Trident. It must be clearly recognized that Trident is an uneasy marriage of a useful, sensible program and a premature, almost purposeless program. The Trident I missile, that is, the Poseidon C–4 is a new development missile which fit into the existing Polaris-Poseidon submarine and which, even if deployed in small numbers, would allow these submarines to contribute to deterrence soon after they left home port. Furthermore, these new missiles would greatly increase the submarine operating area from which Polaris-Poseidon could strike deterrent targets in the Soviet Union. I believe that the Trident I missile is a good program and should proceed at a measured pace.

The Trident submarine, on the other hand, seemed to me unjustified even in the absence of any SALT agreements. There is no threat known or on the horizon which threatens the prelaunch survivability of our submarine deterrent. In particular, a proper response to some future unexpected development in antisubmarine warfare could almost certainly be met at lower cost by new construction, slightly modified Poseidon boats carrying the Poseidon C–4 missile. In the presence of the ABM treaty and the interim offensive agreement, continuation and even acceleration of the Trident submarine programs seems to me to compound folly. The ABM treaty ensures the penetration of warheads launched from Polaris or Poseidon boats. There is no need to expand our force. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the ICBM's will in fact become vulnerable, since it would be illogical for

the Soviet Union to build an expensive capability to threaten Minuteman when it has no way of effectively threatening Poseidon, and when it will now have no ABM system to ward off those missiles which may be launched.

In regard to the Trident submarine, you will remember that the Secretary of Defense testified before the Armed Services Committee, February 15, 1972, that:

> The continuing Soviet strategic offensive force buildup, with its long-term implications, convinced us that we need to undertake a major new strategic initiative. This step must signal to the Soviets and our allies that we have the will and the resources to maintain sufficient strategic forces in the face of a growing Soviet threat. It would be diplomatically and politically unacceptable for the U.S. to allow the Soviets to achieve a large numerical superiority in both land-based and sea-based strategic missiles . . .

I am at a loss to understand how an ULMS or Trident program which was needed in the face of a Soviet rate buildup of 250 ICBMs and 128 SLBM's per year continue to be needed while this rate of buildup has been reduced to zero. I believe that the Trident submarine program ought to be redirected to be an exploratory submarine survivability program, at a level of about $50 million annually.

B–1 BOMBER AND SCAD PROGRAM

The B–1 bomber, in view of SALT, is considerably less valuable relative to missiles than had been the case. The ABM treaty guarantees penetration to their targets for both ICBMs and SLBMs. It does nothing for the bomber. I believe that the B–1 must be justified, if at all, for its tactical uses. For the strategic force, if one believes that bombers are indeed a necessary component, and I remain unconvinced, one could better use the SCAD—subsonic cruise armed decoy—now planned for the B–52, launched from outside the borders of the Soviet Union by cargo-type aircraft—for example, C–141, et cetera. There is no hurry to replace the B–52 and the B–1 could well proceed, if at all, at a slower pace. On the other hand, the SCAD program, in its armed version—not solely a decoy—could provide additional deterrent capability from many available vehicles, and here I should add that it could provide this capability at reduced cost.

CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAM

The Department of Defense has included in its strategic programs the development of a new cruise missile to be launched from submarines. It notes that the Soviet Union has cruise missiles which can be launched from their submarines. I have long argued that such nuclear armed Soviet cruise missiles could, in fact, vitiate any coastal ABM system, but I believe that the Soviet submarine-launched cruise missile is generally regarded as an anti-shipping weapon. Surely the Defense Department cannot seriously propose the substitution of cruise missiles on a one-for-one basis for SLBM's, which later encounter no defenses, while the cruise missile will be subject to the general air-defense system of the Soviet Union. If the Department of Defense is proposing to build large numbers of cruise missiles, simply because they are not limited by the precise text of the interim offensive agree-

ment, it could better consider the payload enhancement of the Minuteman missile, too, on the order of 10 of the present type MIRVs, to which I have referred before. This cruise missile program makes no sense.

SAFEGUARD ABM SYSTEM

The Safeguard ABM system is strictly limited by the treaty to the one ICBM defense site at Grand Forks and to a possible site at Washington, D.C. I believe that the site at Washington, D.C., was never worth the money and is far less desirable now. If the Soviet Union wished to deny us the small additional decision time which one might imagine to be provided by a 100-interceptor Safeguard site, it could well do that by targeting on Washington a very small fraction of their total stable of warheads. They could do it with far less expenditure by the use of decoys. They could deny us all warning in the case of this attack on the national capital—not in the case of an attack on the strategic offensive force—by the use of other means. Simply because I am permitted by law to shred or burn my money does not impel me to do so. Similarly, although the U.S. is authorized under the ABM treaty to deploy an ABM for Washington, D.C., there is no reason for us to proceed with this system of 100 interceptors together with radars at no more than 6 aim points unless we believe it is in our interest to do so.

ASSURANCES REQUESTED BY JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are quoted by their chairman in his testimony of June 21, 1972, as requesting three assurances in connection with their support of the arms limitation agreements. These are: Assurance (1) "A broad range of intelligence capabilities and operations to verify Soviet compliance in a strategic arms limitation environment." Assurance (2) "Aggressive improvements and modernization programs." Assurance (3) "Vigorous research and development programs."

I agree with his statement of Assurance 1. I believe that the JCS statement of Assurance 2 is unrealistic and illogical—"maximize strategic capabilities within the constraints established by the ABM Treaty and the interim offensive agreements." This says to me that because we have arms limitation agreements, the normal budetary controls no longer apply. It means that strategic capabilities must be maximized independently of their impact on tactical programs, or for that matter independent of their budgetary impact on Assurance 1 and Assurance 3. Furthermore, the second part of Assurance 2, "plan for rapid augmentation of strategic forces beyond the constraints of the treaty and agreement . . . to be made in the event of abrogation, withdrawal, or collapse of negotiations," unless qualified, is a prescription for an arms race, for the development and creation of production capacity for systems which are unneeded now and which would be unneeded even in the event of collapse of negotiations.

Assurance 3, "continued testing to ensure the effectiveness of new and existing nuclear weapons systems," really begs the question as to whether nuclear testing is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons systems. This is a point which deserves a good deal of discussion in its own right, rather than being stated as a condition for support of the arms limitation agreements.

PRESIDENT'S TWO STEPS TOWARD FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT

In his remarks at a briefing for five congressional committees June 15, 1972, President Nixon said:

> It is for that reason, without getting into the specifics as to what the level of defense spending should be, as to what the offensive programs should be, I am simply saying that if we want a follow-on agreement, we have to have two steps: We need first, of course, to approve these agreements; and second we need a credible defensive position so that the Soviet Union will have an incentive to negotiate a permanent offensive freeze. That is what we all want.

That is what I want, too. The Congress should act favorably on these agreements and should then look closely at what is required for a strong and credible defense program. I do not believe that the program proposed by the Department of Defense would lead to a credible and strong defense. I have no objection to spending the money requested, but I believe that far better uses for it can be found in the Defense Department than in the development of the Trident submarine, in the construction of the Washington, D.C., Safeguard site, or in the development of the submarine-launched strategic cruise missile. I think that the historic achievement represented by the strategic arms limitation agreements, when endorsed by the Congress, should force a thorough review of the detailed programs for improving and maintaining our defense capabilities. I do not believe that hasty action on the defense budget is in the best interests of our national security or of our military capability.

Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. (presiding). Thank you, Dr. Garwin.

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Panofsky, do you have a statement?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you read it, please?

STATEMENT OF WOLFGANG K. H. PANOFSKY, DIRECTOR, STANFORD LINEAR ACCELERATOR CENTER, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA

Mr. PANOFSKY. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity of testifying before this committee in support of ratification of the treaty signed May 26, 1972, at Moscow on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems and in support of approval of the interim agreement signed at the same time dealing with limitations of strategic offensive arms.

I am testifying as a private citizen who in the past and at present has served in various consultative capacities to branches of the U.S. Government and who has a continuing interest in strategic matters in general, and in arms control in particular.

The Moscow agreements can constitute the largest advance in the control of arms which the world has as yet seen; it is essential that actions subsequent to the treaty and its ratification shall make fullest use of the unique opportunities these agreements could bring to reverse the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. This race is dangerous, is wasteful of our resources and, in my view, is one of the real tragedies of the postwar era.

PRECEDENT-SETTING TERMS IN MOSCOW AGREEMENTS

There are many terms in the Moscow agreements which are precedent setting. Let me enumerate a few of these. Obviously time does not permit here a complete analysis of the agreements.

(1) The treaty is equivalent to a joint declaration that mutual deterrance is the strategic policy of both the U.S. and the USSR and implicitly denies the usefulness of a nuclear war-fighting strategy. It is explicitly stated in Article I that the parties will not deploy an ABM system for the "defense of the territory" of each country. This means that both nations agree not to adopt a "damage-limiting" strategy which would attempt to reduce the impact of nuclear war to each country. Once a nuclear war-fighting strategy at various levels of intensity is given up as realistic objective of national policy, there should be no need for either side to develop and deploy any nuclear strategic offensive weapons beyond those needed for deterring the other side from a first-strike attack or from a preemptive strike in case of crisis.

(2) The agreed prohibition of effective ABM defenses implies that each offensive strategic missile in the U.S. arsenal has now a larger deterrent value. The overall deterrent value of the U.S. arsenal is enhanced above that before signature of the Moscow treaty; therefore, signature of the SALT treaty implies a reduction in the required level of armaments relative to that justifiable before the SALT agreement was signed.

(3) We have agreed with the Soviets not to interfere with legal "national means of verification" presumably including data collection from satellite platforms. This is an important agreement which attests to the fact that technology in general and satellites in particular have made this a more open world.

(4) The SALT treaty enters into technical matters of considerable detail. It would have been considered impossible until a relatively short time ago to negotiate with our ideological opponents in as much technical detail as has been possible at SALT. As a result, some of the restraints agreed upon, such as limitations on the product of permitted radiated power and aperture for a radar, are quite detailed.

(5) The Moscow treaty contains many important restraints on the growth of military technology. The treaty not only forbids deployment of ABM systems in excess of the numbers of interceptors and the numbers and sizes of radar specified, but it also precludes such items as testing of air-defense systems in an ABM mode, and prevents deployment of ABM systems using physical principles different from those now employed. Thus the treaty begins to demonstrate to the world man's willingness to control the growth of technology in directions which are considered undesirable to the overriding interests of humanity.

Technical products evolve through a long chain starting from new results in basic research—that is, research not motivated by applications but by man's fundamental curiosity about the functioning of nature—and leading on through development, test and, finally, production and deployment. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a table which is also contained in your written presentation which indicates the chain of technological evolution from basic research, research applied to

identified technologies, development, test, production, deployment and then possible transfer of the technology worldwide. Now, the ABM treaty has provided highly meaningful controls deep into the technological chain all the way through. For instance, it prohibits the development of an ABM multiple-warhead and prohibits adaptation of non-ABM systems to ABM use. These are similar provisions as to testing and broader provisions as to deployment. The treaty also prohibits transfer of ABM technology to other countries. You will note however, from the table that the interim agreement on offensive missiles lags notably in terms of any constraints on qualitative evolution of military offensive strategic hardware; this is a defect which I hope will be remedied in the negotiations to follow.

PROS AND CONS OF TREATY AND INTERIM AGREEMENT

The previous paragraphs describe what I believe to be the most important policy precedents achieved by the Moscow agreements, quite apart from their specific content. In place of a more complete analysis of the agreements themselves, I have tried to summarize in Tables II and III of the agreement the pros and cons of the treaty and interim agreement. Now, I have divided the pros and cons in these charts into three categories: (1) those items clearly enhancing the security of both nations; (2) those items in which the Soviets apparently enjoy an advantage; and (3) those items in which the U.S. apparently has benefited.

It is clear from these tables that the items agreed to which enhance the security of both countries and which should do so at lower cost to each, greatly dominate this summary, and I have here Table II which enumerates those items in that category, namely, the ABM limits increase the deterrent value of each offensive missile on both sides, and thus both nations can obtain more deterrence at less costs. This benefits both sides.

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me, Doctor. Mr. Chairman, I have to go vote and I would hope the hearings will continue. There are some questions I would like to ask.

Senator SPARKMAN (presiding). Yes. I will wait here. Senator Cooper went on over and he will come right back and I will continue until he gets back.

USE OF AGREEMENTS TO ACCELERATE U.S. ARMS PRODUCTION

Senator SYMINGTON. The purpose of the questions is to be sure that Dr. Garwin, especially, and Dr. Panofsky understand that the SALT agreements are obviously being used as a method of heavily accelerating our arms production. That to me is very disappointing. I had hoped that the agreement would have something to do with reducing our arms because of the financial situation in which the federal governernment now finds itself, as evidenced by stories in the paper this morning. So I would like to ask you and your colleagues some questions along those lines when I return. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. We deferred questioning until they could present their papers.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understood.

Senator SPARKMAN. Go ahead, Doctor.

ITEMS FAVORING U.S., SOVIET UNION AND BOTH

Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe, Mr. Chairman, much of this material relates directly to the point just raised by Senator Symington. So here are the items which enhance the security of both nations and I will not go into them further.

Then, the next chart, Table III, indicates those items which apparently favor the Soviet Union and those which apparently favor the United States.

It is clear from these tables that the items agreed to and which enhance the security of both countries and which should do so at lower cost to each, greatly dominate this summary. This is as it should be, since an arms control agreement can only achieve a durable objective if both parties believe they have gained in security. This observation contrasts with much of the debate which has been carried out before this committee and in the press, which has focused largely on the question as to which side has gained from the Moscow agreements at the expense of the other. The truth of the matter is that the Moscow agreements have increased the security of both parties, and that a debate which tries to represent an arms control accord as a tug-of-war between opposing parties grossly misrepresents the situation. Table III contains items which appear to favor, and may, indeed, favor either the USA or the USSR, but these items are reasonably well balanced against each other. A principal achievement of the SALT agreements has been stabilization on a very broad front of the strategic balance between the two countries; therefore, small shifts in favor of either side should not obscure the basic truth of the strategic situation of the U.S. vis-a-vis the USSR; neither side can have the least hope of delivering a first strike against the other that would be sufficiently devastating to escape destruction of its own society in retaliation.

On the surface, the much publicized numbers which constitute the interim freeze on the number of offensive missile launchers provided for by the interim agreement appear to be in favor of the USSR. However, it should be recognized that there are many items not covered by the interim agreement—in particular, the fact that the U.S. is in a position of leadership in the number of deliverable warheads and in numbers of strategic aircraft. Such leadership cannot reasonably be erased during the period in which a follow-on agreement must be negotiated under the treaty. In addition, the interim agreement on offensive missiles has achieved one goal that strongly favors the USA: The agreement halts those items of Soviet offensive deployment—construction of land-based missile silos and of missile-carrying submarines—in which the Soviets currently have a very vigorous ongoing program, but it places no constraints on those programs with which the United States is actively proceeding: deployment of MIRVs and other upgrading measures of the U.S. strategic forces. Therefore, within its limited scope the interim agreement is a well-balanced measure.

EACH NATION VASTLY OVERARMED TO DETER ATTACK BY OTHER

I consider the counting of missiles and warheads and the weighing of megatonnage to be a very naive means of assessing strategic stand-

ing. There are many other important factors such as differences in geography and qualitative performance and sophistication of the strategic forces which contribute to the overall balance. However, the singlemost important fact is that in the absence of meaningful ABM defenses of their territories, as is now guaranteed under the treaty, each nation is now vastly overarmed for its primary mission of deterring an attack by the other.

INEXPERIENCED WITH USE OF WEAPONS

No precise figures can be given as to what the minimum level of armament must be to deter the other side from a first-strike attack. Deterrence, after all, is not a measurable physical condition but is a state of mind based on many factors other than sheer level of armaments. Many of those who talk about deterrence tend to lose sight of the enormity of the forces now at the command of the two superpowers and of the literally unimaginable destruction that these existing weapons can wreak. Debates about sufficiency of nuclear armament tend to become a political game of numbers rather than a consideration of the physical violence that these tools of mass destruction imply. Since, happily, nuclear weapons have not been used in anger since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, few of the current decisionmakers of either the United States or the Soviet Union have any first-hand experience with the use of these weapons; it is just this inexperience which tends to lend an unjustified abstractness to the debate. Let me remind this committee again about the incredible lethality of the threat to the future of civilization which the world's nuclear arsenal implies.

Senator SPARKMAN. Doctor, that is the warning bell. I barely have time to get there, so I will ask you to hold up. Senator Cooper ought to be here within a couple of minutes.

Mr. PANOFSKY. Very good. Thank you.

(Recess.)

Senator SYMINGTON. (presiding). The committee will come to order. Dr. Panofsky, will you continue?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Shall I continue? I can also in a few words briefly summarize all these things if that is not necessary.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many pages have you?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I have altogether 11 pages.

Senator SYMINGTON. Inasmuch as the SALT agreement apparently is being used as justification for a heavy increase in armament, I would hope you would not skip anything in your statement that has to do with the matters as, for example, the Trident submarine.

We were told by this Administration several years ago that the new plan was fly before you buy. To the best of our knowledge the hundreds of millions of dollars that are being asked for the production of the ULMS submarine are being asked for the production of something for which there are not yet even complete blueprints.

Mr. PANOFSKY. All right, sir. The most relevant item which has bearing on that is what I consider to be a salient result of the SALT agreement. It increases the worth as a deterrent of every missile now in the United States arsenal.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Case is with us and Senator Cooper. Why don't you go ahead and read your statement?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Very good.

I said since happily nuclear weapons have not been used in anger since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, few of the current decisionmakers of either the United States or the Soviet Union have any firsthand experience with the use of these weapons; it is just this inexperience which tends to lend an unjustified abstractness to the debate.

INCREDIBLE LETHALITY IMPLIED BY WORLD'S NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Let me remind this committee again about the incredible lethality of the threat to the future of civilization which the world's nuclear arsenal implies.

I have here a picture posted here and also in the transcript, Mr. Chairman, of the devastation brought to Nagasaki by a single weapon of approximately 20 kiloton TNT equivalent explosive power. Today, the captain of a single Poseidon submarine has at his command roughly 150 nuclear weapons, each independently targetable and each exceeding in explosive power that of the bomb delivered to Nagasaki. Multiply this by the number of submarines and add in the additional striking power available through land-based missiles and strategic bombers and the result is a degree of devastation beyond any human comprehension.

It is all too easy for military strategists to ignore these horrors in their preoccupation with the numbers of casualties and weapons needed for deterrence. Moreover, all strategic calculations tend to estimate casualties only through what is known as prompt effects, that is, the death and injury caused by the blast of a nuclear weapon and its immediate radiation effects; usually not even fallout is included in the damage prediction. What is totally ignored is the aftermath of a nuclear exchange—fire, disease, lack of medical care, destruction or inaccessibility of food supplies, disorganization, unbalance of ecological chains, et cetera. Therefore chances are that eventual casualties resulting from nuclear war are very much higher than those generally used by executive-branch decisionmakers or presented by strategic analysts to legislative committees. I therefore tend to agree with the opinion expressed by McGeorge Bundy in 1969, that any policy leading to the delivery of only a single nuclear weapon would be considered to be a catastrophe blunder and that the delivery of even a small number of nuclear devices would be a disaster of the first magnitude in the history of the world. In contrast, those who plead for additional nuclear armament demand potential deaths in the many tens of millions, calculated naively as prompt fatalities, as a basis of sufficiency of our deterrent forces.

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question for clarification?

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Dr. Panofsky, when you say a single nuclear weapon, do you mean of any strategic sort or any——

Mr. PANOFSKY. I mean any nuclear weapon of this yield or larger.

RELATIONSHIP OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES TO MILITARY EXPENDITURES LEVEL

This brings me to the last part of my testimony which is the relationship of arms control measures in general, and the Moscow agreement in particular, to the level of military expenditures in those areas affected by the arms control agreement. Let me flag again three items which represent the cardinal achievements of the Moscow agreements:

(1) Each missile in the U.S. arsenal has a higher deterrent value as a result of the Moscow agreements than it had before as a result of the treaty constraints on ABM.

(2) The declaration in Article I of the Moscow treaty that each nation will forego defense of its territory is equivalent to accepting a policy of mutual deterrence as the primary mission for its strategic forces; both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are now vastly overarmed for that mission.

(3) The balance of terror implied by the strategy of mutual deterrence is very insensitive to even considerable changes in the current strategic armaments of both sides.

Considering these circumstances, it is contrary to all reason to use the Moscow agreements as an argument for more and not less strategic weaponry. The conclusion that the SALT agreements have decreased the need for offensive weaponry is clearly substantiated on technical grounds. The only question that remains is whether one can justify further escalation of strategic weapons expenditures on a political basis, that is, by the so-called bargaining chip argument applied to the forthcoming round of SALT.

It is indeed true that in spite of the far-reaching achievements of the Moscow agreements of May 26 a great deal remains to be done. Table IV lists some of the elements of the strategic arms race which remain unconstrained by SALT I and which, unless controlled, might well in time negate much of what has been accomplished.

ITEMS UNCONSTRAINED BY INTERIM AGREEMENT

I am listing here, Mr. Chairman, on Table IV, those items which are unconstrained by the interim agreement.

The first is strategic bombers. There are no constraints on qualitative improvements through one-for-one replacement by better models. There are no—there are hardly any constraints on strategic military research and test, no constraints on MIRVs, no constraint on nuclear weapon improvements, no constraint whatever on production and stockpiling, which can lead to future deployment of hardware for strategic military offensive systems and no constraints on antisubmarine warfare.

In particular, qualitative improvements of strategic missiles, be they through further additions of MIRV, through improvements in accu-

racy or through other measures, could in time erode the significance of the limitation on offensive arms imposed by the interim agreement. However, I would like to point out that the limitations of the ABM treaty will continue to stabilize the strategic balance and thus reduce the requirements for offensive strategic armament, irrespective of the success of a follow-on agreement.

AGENDA FOR NEXT ROUND OF SALT

Control of some, if not all, of the items listed in Table IV constitutes an ambitious agenda for the next round of SALT. Priority should be given to converting the interim agreement to a comprehensive limit on offensive strategic weapons, including both numerical and qualitative constraints. Moreover, in view of the vast excess of present armament, considering the openness of the population guaranteed by SALT–I, both nations should be able to negotiate reductions of strategic arms and so demonstrate to the rest of the world their commitment toward a saner policy.

ARMS EXPENDITURES POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The argument has been put forth that in order to lend urgency to these future negotiations the U.S. must accelerate its arms expenditures. To put it bluntly, the existence of these follow-on negotiations is being proclaimed by Department of Defense spokesmen as a justification for strategic arms expenditures which under the ordinary budgetary process and congressional review could not be justified.

I believe that this kind of argument is a mockery of the basic purpose of arms control, which is to achieve higher security for both nations at lower cost. Whether arms control negotiations are in progress or not, each country has to make decisions on its military expenditures taking into account both its internal priorities and its external security problems. What are the alternatives? One possibility would be for our nation to proceed with a policy of restraint, that is, by cutting back military expenditures, taking into account the arms control agreement reached in the past, and demonstrating faith that arms control discussion of the future will achieve further constraints on the arms race. A second alternative might be to proceed on the basis of business as usual, ignoring the possibility of future arms control by making the prudent assumption that the discussions may fail. A third alternative is the bargaining-chip or the negotiating-from-strength approach which means to buy more military strength in order to be able to give some of it away in the negotiations. Yet the result may be the opposite; the negotiating opponent may not propose that the bargaining chip be given up; rather, he may demand an equal augmenta-

tion in armament and thus the bargaining-chip argument in itself contributes to an escalation of the arms race.

LESSONS OF HISTORY OF U.S. AND SOVIET ABM DEPLOYMENTS

Let me consider the lessons which can be learned from the history of United States and Soviet ABM deployments that culminated in the Moscow treaty. The Soviets have deployed an ABM system around Moscow containing 64 Galosh-type ABM interceptors. This system was built after several false starts and it is now agreed that it offers negligible resistance to the penetration of U.S. missiles targeted against Moscow.

I believe a previous witness has quoted Admiral Moorer's testimony to that effect.

The United States Administration proposed the multiple purpose Safeguard ABM system for authorization to the Congress. This system was designed both to support an area-defense mission and to provide for the defense of the Minuteman and strategic bomber deterrent forces. After receiving severe technical criticism of the system, the Congress denied authorization for the area-defense component of Safeguard, which is now also prohibited by the Moscow treaty, but in successive years it authorized deployment around three Minuteman sites. When the technical critics testified pursuasively as to the exceedingly low effectiveness of the resulting Minuteman defense in relation to its cost, the Administration used the bargaining-chip argument in support of authorization. I cannot conclusively testify as to Soviet reaction to this deploying decision. Although they must have been fully aware of the low effectiveness of the system, they may well have been concerned about the future growth of Safeguard into a more comprehensive system. At any rate, as a consequence of the Moscow deployment and of the 80 percent completion of the Safeguard installation at Grand Forks, North Dakota, the SALT negotiations converged on an agreement which, to reflect the strategic parity between the two powers, permitted each side to copy the wasteful mistake made by the other. The agreement permits the U.S. to match the admittedly ineffective defense of Moscow as a defense of Washington, D.C., and it also permits the Soviets to imitate the Grand Forks Safeguard installation by protecting an equivalent force of missile silos east of the Ural Mountains. Thus our bargaining chip has resulted in an arms control agreement permitting, but not requiring, some very ineffective but at the same time very expensive ABM installation on both sides.

OPPORTUNITY TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

The achievements of SALT–I have created an unparalleled opportunity to exercise some restraint in military expenditures and still

meet the needs of national security. Contrary to some public statements, I am aware of no evidence that in response to the Moscow agreements the Soviets are accelerating their strategic military activity in order to divert and intensify their preparations into those directions not as yet constrained by the agreements. SALT I gives us some time to watch what the Soviets will in fact do subsequent to the agreements and then to respond ourselves. Because of the very broad range of strategic stability reached by the elimination of meaningful ABM defenses, there is no necessity for as high a rate of expenditure in anticipation of unseen threats as we sustained in the past. We must not confuse the weapons permitted under the Moscow agreement with a mandate to proceed toward their procurement and deployment.

This testimony deals primarily with the merits of the Moscow strategic agreements, not with a detailed analysis of the strategic weapons authorization request of the Department of Defense. I would, however, suggest that in view of the foregoing the Senate recognize that technically the agreements must necessarily lead to lessened strategic requirements and that the prospects for negotiation of a follow-on agreement to replace the interim accords should not justify military expenditures which are otherwise not needed. On the contrary, the increased strategic stability achieved by the accords provides a safe opportunity for restraint in strategic military spending. For all these reasons I recommend that the Congress examine most critically the technical justification for such items as the accelerated programs for the Trident submarine and the B–1 strategic bomber, as well as the need for the ABM defense of Washington. I hope that the Congress will not support further escalation of the strategic arms race justified by proposed negotiating tactics rather than by fully demonstrated strategic need.

I consider the Moscow strategic accords to be a precedent-setting event which enhances the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union and thus of the world. At the same time it enhances the opportunity for both countries to shift their priorities from oppressive military expenditures to urgent civilian needs. I recommend that the Senate speedily ratify the treaty and that the Congress approve the interim agreement. I also hope that the Congress will be able to use the strategic agreements as a basis for increased dedication to the solution of the many pressing civilian problems at home and abroad.

(Tables and photograph follow:)

TABLE 1.—CONSTRAINTS ON ABM TECHNOLOGY, DEPLOYMENT, AND TRANSFER IMPOSED BY THE MAY 26, 1972, TREATY AND IMPOSED ON OFFENSIVE MISSILES BY THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

	Basic research	Research applied to identified technologies	Development	Test	Production	Deployment	Transfer
ABM treaty			No ABM multiple warheads. No ABM reload or refiring. No adaptation of non-ABM systems to ABM use. No development of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile ABM.	Agreed test ranges, limits on launchers at test ranges. No test of ABM multiple warheads, or reload capable launchers. No testing of the non-ABM systems in an ABM role. No test of sea-, air-, or space-based ABM or mobile ABM systems.		ABM launchers limited in numbers and locations. Radar constraints. No ABM capabilities to be given to non-ABM systems. No ABM reload-capable launchers. No ABM multiple warheads. ABM system based on new physical principles not to be deployed. No deployment of sea-, air-, or space-based ABM or mobile ABM system.	No transfer of ABM systems or components to other states.
Interim agreement						No new starts of specified categories of land-based missiles and numerical limits on sea-based missile launchers. Limits on certain physical dimensions.	

TABLE II.—SOME ITEMS IN THE AGREEMENTS OF MAY 26, 1972 OF SECURITY BENEFIT TO BOTH THE USA AND USSR.

(*a*) ABM limits increase deterrent value of each offensive missile. Thus both nations can attain more deterrence at less cost.

(*b*) Agreement on "no defense of the territory of each country" signals that mutual deterrence of attack is an agreed strategic policy and that the populations of *both* countries are "hostages for peace." Under these conditions peaceful coexistence is a necessity.

(*c*) The momentum of the *offensive* arms race is reduced (but not halted!); an obligation is assumed to seek a halt and a reversal to the race through future agreements.

(*d*) "New technology" ABM is prevented from deployment.

(*e*) The world is a more open place since surveillance of satellites (national legal technical means of verification) is protected.

(*f*) Future reduction of offensive weapons can be undertaken without impairing strategic stability.

(*g*) A consultative commission to monitor compliance is established.

TABLE III.—SOME ITEMS IN THE AGREEMENTS OF MAY 26, 1972 WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO FAVOR EITHER THE USA OR THE USSR

IN FAVOR OF USA

Momentum of that program in which the USA is active (MIRV's) is continuing, while momentum of that program in which USSR is active (Missile and Submarine Building) is arrested.

U.S. has *technical* superiority in many aspects of strategic submarines and has better access to ocean areas.

U.S. has numerical superiority in strategic bombers and numbers of warheads.

IN FAVOR OF USSR

Freeze occurs at a larger number and size of USSR ICBM's and greater total megatonnage of all offensive systems combined.

Freeze occurs at a somewhat larger number of Soviet launch tubes on submarines.



General panoramic view taken from the Nagasaki Medical School and Hospital, looking southeast. In the foreground, at the foot of the hill on which the Medical School is located, the double-track street railway loop to the hospital buildings will be noticed. There was practically no damage to the tracks themselves, but the trolley wires were knocked down and the tracks covered with debris. The whole area shown in this picture was covered with industrial buildings and small residences almost as close together as it was possible to build them. In the background, the skeleton remains of the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works can be seen. Note that the reinforced concrete office buildings still stand amid the wreckage of steel frame buildings. In the reinforced concrete school buildings at the foot of the hills in the background, the doors, windows, ceiling, and building contents were damaged by the blast.

TABLE IV.—ITEMS OF IMPORTANCE TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE NOT CONTROLLED BY THE MOSCOW TREATY OR INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972

(*a*) Strategic bombers.
(*b*) *Qualitative* improvements through one-for-one replacement by better models.
(*c*) Almost all strategic military Research, Development and Test.
(*d*) MIRV.
(*e*) Nuclear weapons improvements.
(*f*) Production (in contrast to deployment) of hardware for strategic military offensive systems.
(*g*) Anti-submarine warfare.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Dr. Panofsky.

There is a vote and we have to go to that vote. If it is all right with you, we will go to that vote and come back and ask you some questions. We will recess until that time.

(Recess.)

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Panofsky, are you ready?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. And your colleagues, Dr. Garwin and Dr. Goldberger?

SALT AGREEMENT SHOULD NOT RESULT IN ACCELERATED ARMS RACE

You three gentlemen are unanimous in feeling quite strongly that this SALT agreement should not result in acceleration of what could be called the arms race. Is that correct?

Mr. Panofsky?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Yes, sir. I believe that would be a real contradiction to the basic purpose of the agreement which, I believe, is to obtain more security for both countries at lesser cost to each.

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Garwin, would you comment?

Mr. GARWIN. Yes, I quite agree. I think that the programs which were advocated by the administration before SALT in response to, in many cases, exaggerated claims of the rate of Soviet progress, certainly are not required after SALT, and what the precise post-SALT program should be will require much more study, certainly will be very much slower and less expensive than what has been proposed by the administration.

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Goldberger?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. If it was in fact correct, as the President emphasized, that we had a posture of nuclear sufficiency before the SALT, with which I do agree, then it is even more true after the SALT agreements. As Dr. Panofsky emphasized, the value of every single one of

our offensive systems and our missiles has been enhanced by this agreement.

PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Senator SYMINGTON. Yesterday I put in the record an article by Mr. Andrew Wilson of the London Observer, which was reprinted over here, entitled, "Nuclear Capability Spreads." The article states that by the end of the 1970s about one-third of the countries in the world will have significant programs for the production of nuclear energy and hence the potential for making nuclear weapons. It does not mention France and China who have signed no agreement, but it does mention India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Australia, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Switzerland and West Germany as potential developers. The last paragraph reads:

> By 1980 about one-third of this plutonium will be owned by countries which do not now possess nuclear weapons, an amount of plutonium that would in theory make possible the production of 100 nuclear weapons of Hiroshima size per week.

What are your thoughts about the proliferation and its relationship to the SALT agreements?

Mr. GARWIN. The preamble to the treaty has a sentence, "Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons." That refers to our obligation as a nuclear power to do something toward disarmament in order that the other nations of the world should renounce nuclear weapons, and these agreements are a start. But if they are used as the basis for an expansion of the arms race, expansion of nuclear weapons programs, they will not fulfill this purpose. They will have, in my opinion, a bad impact on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

I think that we must move; we must reduce the forces to slow proliferation and we must take new initiatives in that area as well.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Dr. Goldberger?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. The possibility of very many nations acquiring nuclear weapons has always been a nightmare and would clearly lead the world into a seriously more unstable situation than we now find ourselves with a relatively small number of nations having nuclear weapons.

It seems to me intuitively clear that if the United States and the Soviet Union, as a start, deemphasize armaments in general and, in particular, their strategic forces in agreements which we hope will follow the current SALT treaty, this might serve as a spur, an incentive, for other nations to become less concerned with a feeling that they must themselves acquire nuclear weapons. It is surely no guarantee that they won't continue to strive for them, but since it is our policy to pursue the nonproliferation treaty, I think this is again a good time to take that up with great vigor.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Panofsky?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Yes, I agree with what was said. I might read here from the preamble of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons which entered into force on March 5, 1970, after ratification

by the Senate. It says: "Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,"—and then later on there is more. These obligations are spelled out in greater detail in Article VIII. So it means, therefore, that the U.S. Government has an obligation under the treaty to slow the arms race. Therefore, using arms control to accelerate the arms race, which is very much what the bargaining chip implies, would be against the spirit if not the letter of the treaty and, therefore, would be an impediment, in my opinion, to adherence by the other nations to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Yesterday and the day before in the Armed Services Committee, Senator Jackson asked some very constructive questions of the members of the United States SALT delegation and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an effort to obtain the opinion of outside experts on these same issues, and with his agreement that it would be in order, I would go to a quarter of 1:00 and ask some of these questions and then yield to my colleagues. I don't want to take all of the time, but I thought these questions were very pertinent.

SOVIET REFUSAL TO INCLUDE NUMBER "1618" IN AGREEMENT

The first question was, why, in your view, did the Soviets refuse to include the number 1618 in the agreement, thereby stating precisely the number of fixed, land-based ICBMs they are permitted to deploy? Mr. Panofsky?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe that the reason why the Soviets insisted on phrasing the treaty in terms of general terminology relating to their state of construction rather than specific numbers is that they did not wish to get into a dialogue with us as to the precise validity of our intelligence assessments. So it is fundamentally, I believe, a political point, that they did not wish to acknowledge toward their own people as to how precise our assessment of their capability really was; so, therefore, they preferred to put it in terms of an operational rather than a numerical description.

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Garwin, do you want to add anything to that?

Mr. GARWIN. Well, I generally agree. I think also there is some degree of embarrassment in admitting that their society is really so open to other nations and that these numbers are then embodied in an agreement when they have been kept so secret from their Soviet citizens and probably even from some high level officials.

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Goldberger?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. I have nothing to add.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

LIMITATION OF NUMBER OF INTERCEPTORS AT GRAND FORKS

The next question: Why, in your view, did the Soviet Union insist on limiting the number of interceptors in the U.S. ABM system at Grand Forks to only 100?

To that I would add, do you believe these 100 missiles provide sufficient defense to warrant the expenditure of additional billions to complete that site?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Let me answer the first question.

This number 100 arose from negotiations. It was not a unilateral insistence by the Soviet Union which defined that particular number and I believe the negotiating record indicates that several other numbers had been discussed. So I think the question as phrased does not state quite the exact situation.

Clearly, in my view, it is in the United States' interest to have that number be as small as possible because any number in that general magnitude of 100 interceptors constitutes a very ineffective defense.

At the same time, the very fact that the Soviets have it gives an incentive to our defense planners to escalate offensive weaponry; therefore, I believe that the most important achievement of the SALT from the point of view of the United States' security and the United States' ability to lessen expenditures is to have that number low. I would have preferred it even lower.

Now, to answer the second question. Is a number as low as 100 interceptors a sufficient number to constitute an ABM defense worth the money, either for defense of the capital or for defense of the deterrent? I would answer no, but I might add that that number is not significantly different from what it always had been in our proposed ABM system.

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Garwin?

Mr. GARWIN. Well, our purpose at SALT was to keep the Soviets from having a substantial ABM. We would have been unhappy with a large number of interceptors around Moscow; we could therefore not insist on a very large number of interceptors at our ICBM site. Given the number 100, the answer is clearly no; we do not have an effective defense of the ICBM site.

On the other hand, because of the offensive limitations and because especially of the absence of ABM on the Soviet side, we don't need any defense of the ICBM sites. For these two reasons, there is no military justification for continuing with the Grand Forks system. I think that there is a good deal of political face invested in this system and that it might be difficult to terminate it.

On the other hand, the very great investment to come in a defense of Washington, D.C., has no military justification and no political face invested, and I think it ought to be stopped now.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Doctor.

Senator Case?

Senator CASE. I think after Dr. Goldberger.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thought you had a question.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. I have nothing to add to the question of how the number was arrived at in the agreements with the Soviet Union. I agree with my colleagues that it is a very comfortably small number and that from the general standpoint of our deterrence posture the number is essentially negligible and the same observation applies, as I referred to in my testimony, and on previous applies, as I referred to in my testimony, and on previous occasions, to the Safeguard defense of Minuteman, which was never adequate or reasonable or logically sensible. So that if pure logic were to prevail, we should stop

spending any money at all on it. But I agree with Dr. Garwin that there may be a variety of political reasons that would make such a totally cartesian course, untenable.

BUILDING OF SECOND ABM DEFENSE

Senator CASE. I don't know whether this had better be left to later, but I was going to ask about the question of the building of the second ABM, either in Washington here or the Russian one that is permitted by the agreement. It is my understanding, for at least I have been told that the Defense Department was the one, that insisted we should have a defense of Washington instead of another defense of Minuteman site and they chose that Washington be defended.

Have you any knowledge of this or understanding of the reason for their thinking about it or any comment on it?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I could not testify as to the formulation of our position in that respect, Senator Case.

I can give you my opinion on it, but I do not know through what decisionmaking process this particular apparently symmetric arrangement was arrived at.

Fundamentally, in my testimony I certified that this history of events where we ended up permitting the Soviets to build what we have built and where we are permitted to build what the Soviets have built is, I believe, a very poor example of arms control because it is an arrangement of arms control by adding the totality of deployment on the one side which are in one case not identical, rather than determining equivalent. Therefore, I would have preferred an arrangement where the number would have been lower rather than the sum of the two. I believe this whole history demonstrates the real danger of the bargaining-chip concept. Once you have established a bargaining chip rather than negotiating your way in the negotiations, the negotiations end up with the other side wanting it too. I believe, therefore, that the fact that we deployed Safeguard gave an incentive to the Soviets to take that same defense of their deterrent as a serious strategic objective. There has been no history before the SALT negotiations that the Soviets ever had any interest whatsoever in active defense of their deterrent.

I have no knowledge whether as a result of these agreements the Soviets will in fact deploy an active defense around the number of silos permitted east of the Urals. They may simply decide to forego this opportunity after evaluating the costs vis-a-vis the benefits.

Similarly, I would like to urge the Senate not to consider the fact that it is permitted under the treaty to deploy an ABM around Washington as a mandate to do so because I believe that the military justification for doing so is exceedingly low.

I agree with Dr. Garwin's testimony that the educational time in terms of responding to an attack against Washington such a defense would provide is negligible under any circumstances and that anyway what delay time there would be would be under the control of the attacker. If the attacker decides to attack with 101 missiles simultaneously, there is no delay time because you have 100 interceptors; so it is at his discretion. So the only marginal military use of a defense of Washington would be as a defense against a very sophisti-

cated kind of accident which happens to launch a missile against Washington and against nowhere else in the U.S. and where then the hot lines makes it possible to alert the National Command Authority of the United States.

That very narrow and remote contingency is, I believe, the only technically viable justification for an NCA defense and I consider that particular contingency to be so remote that the very large investment which would be required for an NCA defense is clearly not justified.

Senator CASE. You have already talked about this in a sense in your statement. Again, Stu, I don't want to break in and interrupt your thinking.

Senator SYMINGTON. No.

Senator CASE. But there was a piece by Dr. Hoffman of Harvard, I think, in Foreign Affairs discussing the whole general question of balance of power. He made several statements and I wanted to check them with you.

FUTURE POSSIBILITY OF OTHER COUNTRY HAVING EFFECTIVE DETERRENT

One of the points that he made was that it will be not within the foreseeable future that any other country besides Russia and the United States will have the capacity that they have in nuclear weapons. That is to say, will not be able to have an effective deterrent. Is this, in the judgment of any of you, a fairly sound hypothesis? That is, France will have the capacity to do damage to us and to Russia, and the Chinese the same, but no foreseeable nuclear power will have the capacity to wipe us out. Is this correct?

He goes on and uses this to knock down the idea that we will have a five point power system, for instance.

Mr. GARWIN. Frankly speaking, other countries can have the capacity to do tremendous damage—nuclear weapons are extremely powerful—but they will not have the capacity to survive, to have their forces survive a strike and then do this kind of damage. So other countries in general will walk more cautiously for different reasons than will the Soviet Union and the United States.

They could do damage. It would be national suicide on their part. They can be treated somewhat differently than we treat the Soviet Union. We have other ways of urging them not to build large forces, not to use those forces if they build them.

Senator CASE. What good does it do to build them if you don't have the capacity to survive?

Mr. GARWIN. Well, it feeds some innate need of human nature, I suppose, and it is better to have arms control agreements.

Senator CASE. I am serious.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. I think that what Dr. Garwin is referring to is perhaps reflected both in the development of a strategic nuclear force by France and by China. I think there is definitely a prestige element involved that can't be ignored.

One, I suppose, can imagine circumstances where those countries in desperation might feel that they had to inflict damage on the United States, although it is very hard to construct such a scenario. Certainly from a technical standpoint, as you put it, in the foreseeable future,

it is hard to imagine any country achieving a nuclear striking power comparable to that of the United States or the Soviet Union.

Senator COOPER. Can I ask a question?

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Cooper?

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Senator COOPER. I have a list of questions which I don't believe we will have time to ask and have answered now. I would like to submit them for the record so that the witnesses can comment on them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield? I was told the debate on the military procurement bill will start Monday and I have some more questions, too. We have a meeting at 2:30. Could you gentlemen work it out so that the questions and your answers could be part of the hearing record?

Mine are not long and as long as we are having these hearings we ought to have all the facts we can.

Senator COOPER. I have some comments. I think this testimony is of the utmost value. I want to ask one question because Senator Case referred to the testimony of Dr. Hoffmann.

SITUATION IN WHICH SOVIET UNION COULD EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE ON UNITED STATES

Dr. Hoffmann argued, and so have other witnesses, that suppose the Soviet Union does go ahead with qualitatively improving its offensive weapons, and the United States does not. A situation could arise which might be impossible for the United States in which the Soviet Union could exert great political pressure at some critical point. He didn't expand the point.

With your knowledge of these weapons, having participated in their development, can you comment on that and describe, if you can, how such a situation could arise? It is a theoretical question.

Senator CASE. I am very glad you asked that because that point is also made in this article.

Mr. GARWIN. I think Dr. Kissinger has pointed out——

Senator COOPER. It is a point that will be made. It is a political issue.

Mr. GARWIN. I think Dr. Kissinger has pointed out the lack of utility of these weapons once one has achieved a deterrent force, a sufficiency.

Now, the political importance depends on the degree of understanding of the person who is influenced. When Admiral Moorer or somebody in his position says that we need these new programs solely to provide positive evidence to our allies of our intentions to maintain our strategic deterrent power so necessary to their security within the strategic arms limitation environment, I don't think he does justice to the resources of the Defense Department and to the degree of understanding which we have in this country of the utility and lack of utility of strategic forces.

Yes, people who are sufficiently ignorant can be impressed by numbers, true or not true, as to which country has more weapons, more

warheads, more megatons or is just plain meaner than the other country.

The facts though are different from the numbers which have been stated. For instance, I quoted Admiral Moorer as saying that the Soviet Union has been deploying an average of 250 ICBMs per year and 128 SLBMs per year. In fact, there appear to have been no new starts on ICBMs for almost the last year and the previous year only 80 or thereabouts.

So if we insist through our leaders and the management of the Defense Department that the Soviet Union is making qualitative strides, and they are important, surely we can persuade our allies of the fact although some of them, like me, may remain skeptical.

If, on the other hand, we point out there are many ways of spending money without any technical or political return, and I can point to the Safeguard weapon system on our side, the Moscow system on the other side, too many useless systems, then we can emphasize what I think is absolutely correct, that investments, even achievement in qualitative improvements, are not politically useful.

We tend always to minimize what we have accomplished—the MIRV programs, the number of deliverable warheads, the fact our submarines are not operational or under construction; they are operational and they are at sea much more than the Soviet submarines—we tend to minimize that in looking for new weapons programs, new authorizations from the Congress, and thereby persuade our allies that we are weaker than in fact we are.

Senator COOPER. Senator Symington announced we won't come back because we will have other votes. You all have been here such a long time and we will have to go, but we will submit some other questions to you.

EFFECT IF U.S. FELT IN INFERIOR POSITION

But I wish all of you would apply yourselves to that question, that first, if such a situation as Dr. Hoffman suggested should arise, and you have been speaking of the way it might affect countries which did not have knowledge of our resources—you said ignorant—but how it would affect this country if it felt it was in a much inferior position.

Our scientists said to me it is much more subtle than that, if one country, the USSR, thought it had such a superior position it might feel that it would have to show that superiority. These are subtleties. We have to go, but would you discuss those in your answers?

Senator CASE. Just answer all those questions.

DECLINE IN U.S. BASIC RESEARCH

Senator COOPER. There is one other thing I would like to ask you. Dr. Teller suggested that the United States is falling so far behind in basic research at its universities and colleges, not just applied research but basic research, that it was possible that we could find ourselves in the position where we could be overwhelmed by new discoveries, new applications, new weapons, a situation to which we would not be able to respond. He spoke of the paucity in basic research and resources for research, money and people in this country today. He said it had greatly declined. I don't want to exaggerate what he said, but I think that was the thrust.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. I would like to assert, Senator, that is unmitigated nonsense.

Senator COOPER. I must leave now. We just have about three minutes to get there to vote.

COMMENDATION OF FITNESSES

Again I would like to express our great thanks to you. I think your testimony is of the highest quality. It will be historical, too. So I wish, if you have not done so, you would all submit a statement of your background, education, scientific work, all of your scholarly work and your work in connection with these systems. We thank you very much.

(Committee Staff Note: The remainder of the hearing was conducted by Mr. George W. Ashworth of the Committee staff, using questions submitted by the Committee members. Each Senator's name appears before his questions as it would have had he asked it himself.)

ABSENCE OF NUMBERS OF LAND-BASED ICBM'S

Senator PERCY. Professor Panofsky, what is your reaction to the absence both of specific figures as to the number of land-based ICBMs covered by the interim offensive agreement or of a public declaration by the Soviets as to the number of ICBMs they have deployed? Numbers were, after all, included in the protocol covering SLBMs.

Mr. PANOFSKY. The Soviets have maintained, historically, a posture before their own population of maintaining high security in privacy of their country; therefore, admitting precisely to the numbers of land-based ICBMs which they now possess would cause them some embarrassment. For this reason since all uncertainty about the number of ICBMs they possess or which are under construction is in fact very small, we agreed to adopt an operational definition rather than a numerical definition. By doing this we do not lose any degree of precision while at the same time preserving the Soviets' sensitivity on this particular point.

The situation in regard to SLBMs is somewhat different because there seems to be some substantial degree of numerical disagreement and, therefore, it was found necessary in the auxiliary protocol to document our understanding as to numbers.

However, even in that case in the interest of the Soviet sensitivity on this point, the negotiators evidently decided not to press for having these numbers included in the primary agreement.

U.S. BARGAINING POSITION FOR SALT II

Senator PERCY. Dr. Panofsky, how would you characterize our bargaining position for the forthcoming SALT II talks? What are our principal areas of strength and weakness?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Well, I would characterize our bargaining position for SALT II that we are proceeding from a situation of approximate numerical strategic parity and from a position of more advanced technological strength. I believe our main strength is that we have an assured destruction capability which will surely be preserved for the next decade without the addition of any major programs and both

sides are proceeding from a position of being vastly overarmed for the maintenance of a deterrent capability.

I am sorry; what was the second part of the question?

Senator PERCY. What are our principal areas of weakness?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe that a great deal of the SALT II negotiations will depend on our ability of achieving qualitative constraints as deep as possible in the technological chain. Our greatest weakness in regard to verification of any agreement is the much larger effectiveness of secrecy in the Soviet Union. For this reason, compliance with prohibitions on production are much more difficult to verify than in the United States and therefore to avoid suffering from this weakness we should urge restraints further down the line in the area of development and testing.

IMPORTANCE OF B–1 AND TRIDENT SYSTEMS TO U.S. BARGAINING POSITION

Senator PERCY. How important are the B–1 and the Trident programs to a strong, effective bargaining position for SALT II? Dr. Panofsky?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I do not consider that initiation of these programs on a developmental basis, even an accelerated developmental basis, will improve our bargaining position in SALT II. On the contrary, the very existence of these programs, in particular, if they were accelerated, would tend to force—I am sorry—would tend to persuade the Soviets, to urge for higher levels of armaments themselves and, therefore, the constraints which can be imposed by SALT II would become less severe and the arms control objectives would be weakened.

I believe that the momentum of our on-going programs, combined with the high rate of expenditures which corresponding to those program forces on the Soviet Union, are entirely adequate to lend a real sense of urgency to the Soviet negotiators to proceed with SALT II. I therefore conclude that the merit of these new strategic programs should be judged on their own value and not in reference to alleged negotiating positions on SALT II.

POSSIBILITY AND IMPACT OF SOVIET MIRV DEPLOYMENT

Senator PERCY. Everyone is prepared to admit that the Soviets will achieve a MIRV capability within the life of the interim agreement. What, Dr. Panofsky, is your estimate on this question and on the impact that Soviet deployment of MIRVs will have on maintaining the balance achieved in SALT I in Salt II?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I am not persuaded by the current state of Soviet MIRV deployment that they will achieve an effective deployed MIRV capability during the life of the Interim Agreement. By effective MIRV capability I mean a MIRV which constitutes an effective counterforce threat against U.S. landbased missiles. It is technically possible for them to achieve such a capability, but I am not persuaded by the available intelligence information that they are certain to do so.

PROTECTION AFFORDED NCA BY WASHINGTON ABM SITE

Senator PERCY. Dr. Goldberger, what protection would a second ABM site around Washington afford the National Command Author-

ity in real terms, especially if the threat came from SLBMs or cruise missiles launched 300 to 1,000 miles off the coast?

Dr. GOLDBERGER. Upon the assumption that the radar arrangements were such that these missiles would be picked up or that by tying into the Washington ABM system information coming from other systems giving information about launches of SLBMs, one could imagine that a Washington ABM system could cope with a relatively light attack from such missiles.

There is no assurance that any time for a command and control would be bought by such an arrangement because the missiles could be launched in such a way that they would arrive simultaneously so that the total time for decision would simply be that of the basic warning period.

AUTHORITY TO LAUNCH ABM'S AND ICBM'S

Senator PERCY. Dr. Goldberger, if it seems doubtful there will be much time for a Washington ABM system to respond to an incoming missile attack originating from anywhere other than the Soviet Union proper. What does this imply for the workings of our command and control system; specifically how much authority to authorize the launching of either the ABM missiles or our retaliatory ICBMs would the President have to surrender to various military commands?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. If the Washington ABM system is to have any utility whatsoever, it obviously has to have a response time that is consistent with the warning that would be available from a submarine-launched missile. It must have a rapid response. It is hard to imagine an ABM system in which the authority to launch ABM missiles would not, in general, lie with the military. I don't know in detail what the current arrangements are for responding to an attack in connection with the ICBM complex defense, but it would be my assumption that launching defensive missiles would be a military decision.

With regard to the question of the launching of retaliatory missiles, that depends, for example, on whether you assume that the President would be killed in an attack on Washington, in which case there is aready a well laid down plan for the way the chain of command passes; and, secondly, if the President were assumed to survive, he may or may not want to decide at that moment whether to launch retaliatory missiles and there would be no obvious reason to couple the attack on Washington with the launch of retaliatory missiles; so the question of passing such responsibility over to the military seems to me would not necessarily arise.

ROLE OF EXTREMELY LARGE PAYLOAD SS–9 MISSILE

Senator PERCY. Dr. Panofsky, what do you believe the role to be of the extremely large payload SS–9 missile? Is it first strike, one designed primarily to take out our Minuteman force?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I do not know the precise rationale which the Soviets followed in designing the SS–9. Soviet technology in general had a tradition of building things large and unsophisticated compared with the miniaturization and compactness and more advanced packaging in electronics which is prevalent in the Western world. To some

extent the dissimilarity in the design approach to the SS–9 vis-a-vis, for instance, Minuteman follows this general pattern of Soviet technology, but one need not necessarily assume a specific motive as to strategic missions.

Nevertheless, I suspect that the Soviet planners had several missions in mind and were willing to let future evolution of United States response and general strategic situation determine which of these missions to give higher weight. Clearly, a general deterrent mission by, as an example, using a high altitude, high yield detonation could well be a significant mission. In order to engage in counterforce anti-Minuteman mission, as we all know, the SS–9 force would either have to be MIRVed with high accuracy missiles or would have had to be proliferated to very large numbers.

Now, the Soviets have done neither up to this particular time; so therefore I have no way to tell whether the anti-Minuteman mission was or was not a primary consideration.

ACCURACY OF SOVIET MISSILES

Senator PERCY. The SS–9's effectiveness as an anti-Minuteman weapon would seem to depend a great deal on its accuracy and not on its admittedly large payload. Just how accurate are Soviet missiles, the SS–9 in particular? How much of a lead in this crucial technological area do we have and how long can we maintain it?

Mr. PANOFSKY. The effectiveness of the SS–9 as a silo-killer depends both on accuracy and yield. The more yield you have, the less accuracy you need to be an effective anti-Minuteman missile.

Now, at present it is indeed true that the Soviet accuracies which have been demonstrated lag behind those of U.S. weapons and it is also true, as has been stated in public testimony, that neither the Soviet weapons nor the U.S. weapons have the combination of yield and accuracy at present to make them very effective silo-killers.

I am not in a position in open hearing to give specific numbers on Soviet accuracies which have been obtained and prospects for improvement.

SIGNIFICANCE OF CLOUD COVER

Senator PERCY. Dr. Garwin, verification of adherence to the SALT agreements appears to be largely dependent upon the use of spy satellites. The role of cloud cover has recently entered the debate on verification ability, especially in view of the claim that much of the Soviet Union is under perpetual cloud cover. Would you discuss this question for the committee and give your views as to whether or not cloud cover is a significant obstacle to U.S. verification efforts?

Mr. GARWIN. Well, I think the best answer to that concern is that the Joint Chiefs had their representative on the SALT delegation and that the Joint Chiefs are assured that the verification capabilities built into the treaty are adequate to the job.

I can go further and point out that the construction of an ICBM silo is a long task which requires the moving of much earth. We are familiar with the procedures which are involved and the elements which are limited by the treaty and the agreement can be adequately verified.

Furthermore, in the case of large radars, there are other means than those which would be impeded by cloud cover and we are quite confident that we can continue to monitor radars which could be capable of being used in ABM roles. So I don't think that this is a serious concern.

ARE SOVIETS WORKING ON SYSTEM SIMILIAR TO TRIDENT?

Senator PERCY. I have three ASW questions here, submarine questions.

First, is there any indication that the Soviets are working on a system similar or equivalent to the Trident program?

Mr. GARWIN. We don't know much about their early research. Certainly there is no submarine being deployed or under construction which has capabilities remotely comparable with those that are talked about for Trident. In fact, none of their submarines or missiles have a capability comparable with that of the Poseidon system.

The standard SSN–6 missile is more nearly comparable with the Polaris than with the Poseidon. The SSN–8, which is apparently beginning to be deployed on some of their boats, has a capability comparable with that of the Poseidon launcher, but has no MIRVs such as we have in Poseidon.

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. ASW PROGRAM AGAINST SOVIET SLBMS

Senator PERCY. How effective is our own antisubmarine warfare program against the threat of Soviet SLBMs?

Mr. GARWIN. Well, this is a question to which I alluded in an article I published in the July, 1972, *Scientific American*. Our Navy does not have the mission to pursue and be ready to destroy Soviet SLBM boats; it wouldn't make any sense to use our Navy in this role while we have no capability against the Soviet land-based ICBMs.

By the time we could develop a capability to destroy ICBMs, Soviet ICBMs and an ABM system on our side, the Soviet SLBM force would be large enough and sophisticated enough to cause us a great deal of difficulty if we were to try to pursue and to destroy it in connection with a first strike.

Certainly under the agreements which we have undertaken to have no ABM and to limit the offensive forces, it makes no sense at all to ask that question since the capability of the Soviet Union to destroy this country in a deterrent role is not dependent upon their submarine force.

ADVANTAGES OF POSEIDON OVER SOVIET SLBMS AND SUBMARINES

Senator PERCY. What advantages does our Poseidon system have over the modern Soviet SLBM and submarines? What is the likelihood that we can maintain this lead in SLBM system technology for the next five years?

Mr. GARWIN. Well, we have any number of advantages, starting with the fact that all 41 of our boats have been built and become operational, whereas, only about 25 of the Soviet SLBM boats are operational. Furthermore, we have a big advantage in geography; we have easy access to the sea from home ports, warm water ports on both

coasts of the U.S.; we have forward bases at Holy Loch and Rota and I believe one other. We do not have to go through narrow straits to reach positions from which we could fire at the Soviet Union. Furthermore, we have a great deal more experience in the operation of our boats since each boat has two crews. Our submarine-launched missiles are at sea some 60 percent of the time. The Soviet boats are at sea very substantially less than that; so in operating tempo and on-station time we are far superior. Our boats are quieter than the Soviet boats and, of course, we now have multiple warheads on ten Polaris boats and MIRVs in the Poseidon on about eight, I believe, is the number, Poseidon boats, with 31 of them to be converted during the next couple of years.

We have a very substantial range advantage in the missiles over the deployed Soviet boats as well.

Now, of course, some of these advantages will gradually go away but not for several years as the Soviets develop more experience with their boats and if they put the effort and the money into developing and deploying MIRVs.

The whole idea of the strategic arms limitations agreements, though, is that these minor changes, even major changes, really don't matter in the strategic balance, because the strategic balance consists of the capability on one side to destroy the other and vice versa and not in a comparison between the numbers or quality of the offensive force.

VULNERABILITY OF POSEIDON/POLARIS FORCES

Senator PERCY. Dr. Garwin, Dr. Teller, in recent testimony before this committee, implied that our Poseidon/Polaris forces are not as secure from Soviet ASW capabilities as we would care to think. What are your views on their vulnerability? If there is a threat, where does it come from?

Mr. GARWIN. Well, Dr. Teller is an old colleague of mine and a tremendously creative and ingenious person. But I cannot imagine a source of information about Soviet ASW capabilities against our fleet to which Dr. Teller has access that I do not. Certainly there is no existing Soviet system and no necessary behavior on the part of our submarine fleet which would put our fleet into any jeopardy in its deterrent role.

Now, it is clear that our boats could be struck by the Soviet Union while they are in port. It is clear that they return to port every 60 days or so. It is clear that if they stood on the surface at all times ready to launch a first strike, they could acquire some vulnerability to Soviet ASW efforts.

In the national policy which is endorsed by the arms limitations agreemeents; namely, that of deterrence, our boats need not surface, need not communicate, need not be close to the Soviet shores and need survive only for a period of minutes or hours in order to receive the message to fire and to execute their missions.

In the deterrent role which is all that we are concerned with in connection with these arms limitations agreements, there is no significant vulnerability to Soviet ASW.

Now, a Polaris or Poseidon boat may die of old age, but that is 20 years or more away. It may suffer an accident or it might by chance

run into or be run into by a Soviet ship or submarine. In no way can this be imagined to constitute a vulnerability of the SLBM fleet in its deterrent role.

POTENTIAL OF MOBILE ICBM FORCE

Senator PERCY. A great deal has been said over the potential of a mobile ICBM force, a concept we discarded some time ago but which the Soviets have shown some interest in. What is your view of the possible effectiveness of such a system and your estimate of the probability that the Soviets will go ahead and develop it to the point of deployment during the course of the SALT II negotiations?

Mr. GARWIN. There is a reference to mobile ICBM in the second unilateral statement submitted to the Senate with the treaty and the agreement. This reference says that the U.S. delegation now withdraws its proposal that the agreements explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. It goes on to say unilaterally that "the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational land mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the interim agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that agreement."

Now, the problem with mobile ICBMs is not that they are more dangerous than fixed missiles but that they are not easy to count and if we insist on a precise knowledge of the numbers of ICBMs on the other side, we might make an error of some magnitude if the other side had a deployed mobile system.

On the other hand, we did not reject the concept ourselves very long ago; it was last year that the Defense Department was considering a garage-based Minuteman, which is a kind of mobile system. It encountered the same difficulty of demonstrating to the other side that we had only one Minuteman for a garage complex rather than that all garages were full.

It may be that follow-on SALT agreements may permit mobile ICBMs and that would not necessarily be a bad thing. It would give survivability to ICBMs which cannot be obtained by hardening or in other ways.

On the other hand, with limitations of the offensive forces and considering especially the ABM treaty which enhances the deterrent value of any remaining number of ICBMs or SLBMs, there is less reason to search for ways to protect the ICBM force.

So I believe this is a detail which can very well be settled over the years and in the SALT II discussions.

PRESIDENT'S OPTION IF U.S. LAND-BASED DETERRENT DESTROYED

Senator SYMINGTON. Should the President be left with the single option of striking Soviet cities with submarine-launched missiles in the event that the U.S. land-based deterrent is destroyed in a Soviet first strike?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. Well, let me say one thing about that: We also have a bomber force.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am assuming Minuteman decimation and bombers.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. All right.

Mr. GARWIN. The purpose of the deterrent is to prevent such an onslaught which would result in tens of millions of fatalities among U.S. citizens. It makes very little sense to ask about the details of the response to such a massive strike. The Soviet Union must recognize that it will be destroyed in response and any other flexibility is a bonus, not a substitute.

Mr. PANOFSKY. I would like to add to that: I believe that the Soviet Union will not possess in the foreseeable future the means to destroy both the bomber and the land-based missile components of the deterrent simultaneously, considering the means of warning available to the United States. So, quite apart from the fact that the destruction by the sea-launched missile should be a formidable deterrent, I question the validity of the basic assumption.

I should also like to add that as a result of the SALT I agreement even the survival of 10 or 20 sea-based missiles should constitute a major deterrent factor, considering the multiplicity of their warheads.

SOVIET INCREASES IN ABSENCE OF SALT AGREEMENTS

Senator SYMINGTON. Administration spokesmen have maintained that in the absence of a SALT agreement the Soviets would have pursued a vigorous increase in their strategic forces. Do you agree with this general view? That was agreed to a certain extent earlier.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. The evidence from the past few years of the Soviet missile deployment and submarine construction gives very little support to this idea.

The President is quoted as saying that in five years they would have 1,000 additional ICBMs, 1,000 ABMs, and 90 submarines. In particular, in connection with the submarines, if you take their current rate of construction and the fact that they presently have 25 submarines, in five years it would come to a number no greater than 75. It is not technically impossible for them to build at the rate of 200 ICBMs per year, but in fact there have been no new starts on ICBM launchers for about nine months, and in the preceding year there were only 80 launchers constructed or begun. There is no evidence for any widespread deployment of ABMs so that it is simply impossible to project what numbers they might have in five years.

Mr. GARWIN. I would just like to say I know of no evidence available to the government which indicates that the Soviet Union has had such a plan.

Mr. PANOFSKY. No comment.

Senator SYMINGTON. What objectives would such a Soviet build-up support?

Mr. GARVIN. Since there is no evidence for such a build-up, I don't believe it is useful to ascribe motives to it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does everybody agree?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. We agree.

PREVENTION OF SOVIET MOVEMENT TOWARD FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there anything in the present agreements that would prevent the Soviets from moving toward the development of a first strike capability during the five-year period of their application?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. There is one very clear thing that would prevent them from moving to a first-strike capability and that is the absence of an ABM system of their own. Unless they want to commit national suicide, and if they adhere to the provisions of the SALT ABM treaty, there is no way that they could expect to escape destruction if they were to attack us and wipe out our land-based forces, and we have great confidence in the continued invulnerability of our sea-based forces.

Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe it is technically impossible with the framework of the SALT I agreement for the Soviets to acquire a first-strike capability, if by that you mean that all three arms of the U.S. retaliatory forces were destroyed with only a negligible retaliatory capability. I even believe that it is exceedingly unlikely, although not totally impossible, that the land-based missiles might become endangered during the five-year period.

Mr. GARVIN. I agree that it is quite impossible for the Soviet Union to obtain a disarming capability against our offensive forces within this period. Furthermore, the ICBMs could always be launched if they were threatened by the Soviet strike.

USEFULNESS OF INTERIM AGREEMENT AS PERMANENT AGREEMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Would the present interim agreement be acceptable as a permanent agreement? In this connection, I would like to ask if not acceptable, what specific items do you believe should be considered for negotiation?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe the present interim agreement would not be a useful arms control permanent accord. I believe at a minimum qualitative constraints should be added to the interim agreement and the other offensive strategic systems and particularly bombers should be covered by the agreement. I consider this to be the highest priority objective of SALT II with the possibility of negotiated force reductions the second objective.

Mr. GARWIN. The interim agreement should take on some of the aspects of the ABM treaty which limits systems which are not precisely described. If one were to abide only by the precise text of the interim agreement, the future would hold so many loopholes that no ceiling on offensive forces would, in fact, have been set.

On the other hand, if the interim agreement should become permanent and all other offensive systems be limited severely, then I could recognize that as some type of arms limitation.

Mr. PANOFSKY. This matter is dealt with in some further detail in the text and in Table IV of my statement.

GENEROSITY OF SOVIETS IN SALT II

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you believe that the Soviets will be more generous in SALT II than they were in SALT I?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. I am not competent to answer that because I do not know how generous they were in SALT I.

Mr. PANOFSKY. I don't know how to answer that.

Mr. GARWIN. I don't look for generosity on the part of the Soviets.

Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe the Soviets will agree to those terms which they believe enhance their security and since there will be a large number of items which enhance the security of both countries, it will be those items which should properly dominate the SALT II agreements.

INTERIM AGREEMENT'S EFFECT ON SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM'S MOMENTUM

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you agree with the claim that the interim agreements halts the momentum of the Soviet ICBM program over the next five years?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I agree with the statement that under the interim agreement the numerical momentum must be stopped. I, of course, do not know how rapidly the Soviets would have increased their force in the absence of an agreement.

Mr. GARWIN. I think that the interim agreement sets a significant ceiling on the Soviet ICBM force. On the other hand, the word "momentum" implies that they had a large ongoing program which happens not to have been the case for the last couple of years.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. The interim agreement certainly puts constraints on things that they might have had on the back burner prepared to resume activities on, but certainly their program to significantly increase their stock of large missiles is halted in an important way.

SOVIET REFUSAL TO BAN DEPLOYMENT OF LAND MOBILE ICBMS

Senator SYMINGTON. Why, in your view, did the Soviets refuse to agree to a ban on the deployment of land mobile ICBMs?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I do not have any specific reply to that, other than that they were unable to complete the internal staff work to restore differences among the various parts of their decision-making apparatus.

Mr. GARWIN. I don't have a good basis for judgment.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. I have no opinion.

RADAR DEPLOYMENT PERMITTED AT MOSCOW

Senator SYMINGTON. Is the radar deployment permitted at Moscow an adequate base for the eventual development of a thick defense of European Russia? Of the Moscow region?

Mr. GARWIN. The whole purpose of the limitation on radars is to prevent the construction of an adequate base for an area defense. Therefore we can be sure that all members of the delegation and their parent bodies agree that the radars, which are permitted, cannot form such a base. My own investigations persuaded me that the permitted radars are either sufficiently vulnerable by reason of their limitation to six sites or are insufficiently powerful to provide such a base.

Mr. PANOFSKY. In essence, the radar limitations provide six aim points which would totally negate any ABM capability and I consider it to be impossible for the Soviets to defend those six points adequately in order to have that constitute a defense of European Russia.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. I concur.

DOES ICBM FREEZE PLACE U.S. IN INFERIOR POSITION?

Senator COOPER. A number of the critics of the SALT ABM treaty and interim offensive weapons agreement have stated that the large

throw weight missiles possessed by the USSR place the United States in a position of inferiority. Does the freeze on ICBMs contained in the interim agreement place the United States in a position of inferiority particularly when the Sovet large throw weight missiles like the SS–9 are taken into consideration?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I don't believe that the meaning of inferiority and superiority can be measured by a single index. The Soviets are ahead in terms of throw weight and total number of ICBMs. We are ahead in the total numbers of reentry vehicles and strategic bombers. There is no question that neither side possesses or can reasonably be expected to gain a first-strike capability and therefore strategic stability maintained in the foreseeable future. Therefore, I think this question of superiority is not one which should be measured through a single index.

Mr. GARWIN. We have as many missiles as we need and we have under the interim offensive agreement the possibility of multiplying by an additional three times the number of warheads deliverable by our Minuteman force. I would not call this inferiority.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. The argument about the disadvantage the U.S. finds itself in because of the larger throw weight in individual missiles possessed by the Soviet Union has always been a very inaccurate way to view our strategic position. It is worth remembering that we made a very deliberate decision not to go in that direction that was strongly backed by the military, by the Department of Defense in all branches, and by and large by the entire scientific community. We believe that we made the right strategic decision to maximize the effectiveness of our force.

ASSURING FULLY ADEQUATE DEFENSE UNDER AGREEMENTS

Senator COOPER. Given the ABM treaty and interim agreement and given the present deployments of weapons on both sides, what is needed to assure a fully adequate defense? Could you describe how the Senate can be confident that our R&D and deployment programs are sufficient to our security needs?

Mr. PANOFSKY. Let me respond to one part of this question.

I am personally acquainted in very considerable detail with the basic research program of the Soviet Union in many areas including my own specialty, high energy physics and low temperature work and solid state physics and several other areas, and there is no question whatsoever that in terms of originality and creativity as well as total number of results of basic significance, that the U.S. program has done considerably better in the past than has the Soviet Union and there is no evidence that the gap here is being narrowed. Similarly, in the important area of data analysis and computer development a similar statement applies. So I see no basis that provided U.S. support of basic research continues or if possible is improved somewhat, there is no question that this will not be a current problem.

ASSURING U.S. SECURITY IN EVENT OF SALT AGREEMENTS BREAKDOWN

Senator COOPER. Dr. Teller in his testimony raised the question of not placing ourselves in a position as a result of SALT where we would be in danger should the SALT agreements break down. Would you please outline for the committee a reasonable R&D and deployment program that would assure U.S. security in the event of a breakdown of SALT? In other words, what hedges are necessary?

Mr. PANOFSKY. The question of the stability of the strategic balance in case of abrogation of the treaty was clearly very carefully considered in formulating the U.S. position and it is believed—and I believe—that the range of stability is broad enough that even if the Soviets should abrogate the treaty, after clandestine preparations, we would have time to take the necessary measures to preserve strategic stability.

Mr. GARWIN. The question of the defense R&D program is a very broad one which I covered in testimony on February 2, 1972, to the Armed Services Committee. The question of breakdown of SALT negotiations was an important consideration in the decision process on our side. If one imagines that the Soviet Union does not abide by the agreements at any time, then clearly one should not enter into such an agreement. I believe that the program which we have with the modifications which I advocate in my testimony are completely adequate so long as we keep our eyes open to guard against any consequences of a breakdown of negotiations or an abrogation of the treaty.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. Our strategic forces were built up over the past few years to cope with what was a projected massive Soviet ABM deployment. The number of warheads was so large as to be conjectured to overpower anything that they might rationally be expected to develop. For this reason there is a great deal of leeway in our security, and there is no reason to believe that our own on-going R&D programs together with the tremendous size of our offensive forces would enable us to fall into a dangerous position even if the Soviets were to abrogate the treaty.

CHANGE IN U.S. SECURITY NEEDS SINCE SALT

Senator COOPER. How have our security needs changed since the SALT agreements of May 26? Had SALT not been signed and had the Soviets continued their deployments, what would the situation have been?

Mr. GARWIN. I believe our needs were more than adequately covered by the defense budget request of February, 1972; in fact, I would emphasize in that sentence the word "more." Certainly faced now with the prospect of no ABM and of strong limits on Soviet offensive forces over the next five years, our defense programs can be reoriented and in many cases cut back as I have indicated in my testimony.

Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe the matter is dealt with in some detail in my testimony in my prepared statement.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. We have alluded to this in our prepared statements.

SUGGESTED MORATORIUM ON FURTHER WEAPONS DEPLOYMENT

Senator COOPER. There have been some suggestions that there should be a moratorium on further weapons deployment for a reasonable period so the Phase II negotiations would not be adversely affected by deployments. (a) What is a reasonable period for a moratorium? (b) What deployments could we defer during that moratorium?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I personally would not be in favor of an explicit moratorium preparatory to Phase II. I would rather advocate a policy of restraint based on a realistic examination of our true security needs which have been lessened as a result of SALT I.

Mr. GARWIN. I think that the effort required to negotiate and to agree to a moratorium is as much as to achieve a more permanent arms control limitation, so I do not think a moratorium would be useful at this time. I think a good guide at all time is not to build useless systems and not to spend more money than is necessary.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. There is no simple thing on which one could have a moratorium because we are not, both of us, planning to deploy identical objects. Therefore, you would get into the question of trying to decide our moratorium on MIRVs would have to be equivalent to a Soviet moratorium on something quite different and therefore I agree that it is not a feasible thing to contemplate at this time.

WEAPONS SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BE CONTROLLED IN PHASE II

Senator COOPER. Maybe a simple list would suffice here.

Specifically, what weapons systems do you think would be possible to bring under effective control in Phase II?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I believe my table IV in my prepared statement dealt with this question in general terms, although, as I said in my statement, that this constitutes a very ambitious agenda and it may not be possible to have Phase II be as comprehensive as indicated in Table IV.

Mr. GOLDBERGER. I have no comment.

Mr. GARWIN. I think we have—I think some options have been presented here, but what can be brought under control depends very much on the views of the two sides as will be developed in the negotiations.

RAPIDITY WITH WHICH SOVIETS COULD ENDANGER MINUTEMAN WITH MIRV

Senator COOPER. How rapidly could the Soviets achieve a sufficient MIRV force consistent with the SALT I agreement which would endanger the Minuteman force as a significant part of the U.S. deterrent?

Mr. GOLDBERGER. Didn't you address that question before?

Mr. PANOFSKY. I gave some reply to that question.

Senator COOPER. All right. You consider that one answered.

Mr. PANOFSKY. I consider that one answered, but I believe it would be difficult to achieve such a capability in five years.

SUBMARINE AGREEMENT

Senator COOPER. Dr. Garwin, could you explain how it can be argued that the submarine agreement which gives the Soviets a large number of submarines than the United States but freezes them at those levels, in fact, gives the U.S. an advantage? Could you describe the factors that went into the identification of respective strength of submarine forces?

Mr. GARWIN. I think I covered that in relation to an earlier question. On the other hand, I don't think that anybody claims that the submarine agreement gives the U.S. a specific advantage over the Soviet Union. We wanted to limit the Soviet submarine program. We accomplished our aim as to whether they contribute to the overall national security and I believe very strongly that the package is in the interest of our national security.

(Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIX

[From the office of the White House Press Secretary, June 15, 1972]

THE WHITE HOUSE—REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT A CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON THE ARMS LIMITATION TREATY AND AGREEMENT, THE STATE DINING ROOM

Ladies and gentlemen, we are beginning a little late because I understand traffic is quite heavy around the White House this morning due to the arrival of the President of Mexico. We must go forward with the schedule, because there is a Joint Session, as you know, today and we do want the members of the committees present here today to be able to attend that session. We will have to adjourn this meeting at approximately 12:00 o'clock, or at best, five mintues after 12:00, to give you plenty of time for questions.

A word about the format of this meeting. I will make a statement, and then I will have to depart in order to prepare for the arrival of the President of Mexico. Dr. Kissinger will then make a statement, and then it will be open to questions to members of the committees who are present here.

In order to facilitate recognition of Members, someone who knows all of the Members who are here, Clark MacGregor, will moderate the question and answer period, but we will try to be just as fair as possible among the members of the committees and between the House and the Senate, and Clark will, of course, be responsible in the event it isn't fair.

In any event, let me come directly now to my own remarks, which will not be too extended, because Dr. Kissinger today will be presenting the Presidential views. He will be telling you what the President's participation has been in these negotiations. The views he will express I have gone over with him in great detail, and I will stand by them.

I noted in the press that it was suggested that I was calling down the members of these committees for the purpose of giving you a pep talk on these two agreements. Let me lay that to rest right at the outset. This is not a pep talk and Dr. Kissinger is not going to make you a pep talk either.

When I came back from the Soviet Union, you will recall in the Joint Session I said that I wanted a very searching inquiry of these agreements. I want to leave no doubt about my own attitude.

I have studied this situation of arms control over the past 3½ years. I am totally convinced that both of these agreements are in the interest of the security of the United States and in the interest of arms control and world peace.

I am convinced of that, based on my study. However, I want the members of the House and the members of the Senate also to be convinced of that. I want the Nation to be convinced of that.

I think that the hearings that you will conduct must be searching because only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and only in that way will the Nation also be convinced.

In other words, this is not one of those cases where the President of the United States is asking the Congress and the Nation to take on a blind faith a decision that he has made and in which he deeply believes.

I believe in the decision, but your questions should be directed to Dr. Kissinger and others in the Administration for the purpose of finding any weaknesses that you think in the negotiations or in the final agreements that we have made.

As far as the procedures are concerned, as you know, you will be hearing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and of course, Ambassador Smith, in the sessions of your various committees.

I know that a number have suggested that Dr. Kissinger should appear before the committees as a witness. I have had to decline that particular invitation on his part, due to the fact that Executive privilege had to prevail.

On the other hand, since this is really an unprecedented situation, it seemed to me that it was important that he appear before the members of the committee in this format. This is on the record.

All of you will be given total transcripts of what he says. All of you will have the opportunity to ask these questions and in the event that all of the questions are not asked on this occasion, he, of course, will be available to answer other questions in his office from members of the committee as time goes on, during the course of the hearings.

What we are asking for here, in other words, is cooperation and not just rubberstamping by the House and the Senate. That is essential because there must be follow-through on this and the members of the House and Senate, it seems to me, must be convinced that they played a role as they have up to this point, and will continue to play a role in this very, very important field of arms control.

Now, let me go to the agreements, themselves, and express briefly some of my own views that I think are probably quite familiar to you, but which I think need to be underlined.

I have noted a great deal of speculation about who won and who lost in these nogetiations. I have said that neither side won and neither side lost. As a matter of fact, if we were to really look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the whole world won.

Let me tell you why I think that is important. Where negotiations between great powers are involved, if one side wins, and the other loses clearly, then you have a built-in tendency or incentive for the side that loses to break the agreement and to do everything that it can to regain the advantage.

This is an agreement which was very toughly negotiated on both sides. There are advantages in it for both sides. For that reason, each side has a vested interest we believe, in keeping the agreement rather than breaking it.

I would like you to examine Dr. Kissinger, and the other witnesses, before the committee on that point. I think you also will be convinced that this was one of those cases where it is to the mutual advantage of each side, each looking to its national security.

Another point that I would like to make is Presidential intervention in this particular matter, Presidential coordination, due to the fact that what we have here is not one of those cases where one department could take a lead role.

This cut across the functions of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, it cut across, also, the AEC, and, of course, the Arms Control Agency.

Under these circumstances, there is only one place where it could be brought together, and that was in the White House, in the National Security Council, in which all of these various groups participated.

There is another reason, which has to do with the system of government in the Soviet Union. We have found that in dealing with the system of government in the Soviet Union, that where decisions are made, that affect the vital security and in fact, the very survival of a nation, decisions and discussions in those cases are made only at the highest level. Consequently, it is necessary for us to have discussions and decisions at the highest level if we are going to have the breakthroughs that we have had to make in order to come to this point of a successful negotiation.

The other point that I would make has to do with what follows on. The agreement that we have here, as you know, is in two sages: One, the treaty with regard to ABM defensive weapons; and second, the offensive limitation, the Executive Agreement, which is indicated as being, as you know, not a permanent agreement—it is for five years—and not total. It covers only certain categories of weapons.

Now we are hoping to go forward with the second round of negotiations. That second round will begin, we trust, in October. That means that we can begin in October, provided action is taken on the treaty and on the offensive agreement that we have before you at this time, sometime in the summer months; we would trust before the 1st of September. I don't mean that it should take that long, but I hope you can finish by the 1st of September so we can go forward with the negotiation in October.

The other point that should be made with regard to the follow-on agreements is not related to your approval of these agreements. It is related to the actions of the Congress on defense. I know there is disagreement among various Mem-

bers of Congress with regard to what our defense levels ought to be. I think, however, I owe it to you and to the Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements.

Under those circumstances, since they will be going forward with their programs, for the United States not to go forward with its programs—and I am not suggesting which ones at this point; you can go into that later—but for the United States not to go forward with its offensive programs, or worse, for the United States unilaterally to reduce its offensive programs would mean that any incentive that the Soviets had to negotiate the follow-on agreement would be removed.

It is for that reason, without getting into the specifics as to what the level of defense spending should be, as to what the offensive programs should be, I am simply saying that if we want the follow-on agreement, we have to take two steps: First to approve these agreements; and second, we need a credible defensive position so that the Soviet Union will have an incentive to negotiate a permanent offensive freeze. That is what we all want.

These are just some random thoughts that I had on this matter. I will simply close by saying that as one stands in this room in this house, one always has a tendency to think of some of the tragedies of history of the past. As many of you know. I have always been, and am, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson. As all of you know, the great tragedy of his life was that after he came back with the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, due to ineffective consultation, the Senate rejected the treaty and rejected the League.

We, of course, do not want that to happen. We do not think that it will happen. We have appreciated the consultation we have had up to this point, and we are now going forward with this meeting at this time.

I will only say that in looking at what Wilson said during that debate when he was traveling the country, he made a very, it seemed to me, moving and eloquent statement. He said: "My clients are the children. My clients are the future generation."

This is an election year, and I realize that in an election year it is difficult to move as objectively as we ordinarily would move on any issue, but I would respectfully request the Members of the House and Senate, Republican and Democratic, to approach this in the spirit that Wilson explained in that period when they were debating whether they should go forward with the League of Nations, remembering that our clients are the next generation, that approval of these agreements, the treaty limiting defensive weapons, the agreement limiting offensive weapons in certain categories, and also the continuation of a credible defense posture, will mean that we will have done our duty by our clients, which are the next generation.

Thank you.

[From the office of the White House Press Secretary, June 15, 1972]

THE WHITE HOUSE—CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING BY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, THE STATE DINING ROOM

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, the President has asked me to present to you the White House perspective on these agreements, and the general background with the technical information and some more of the details to be supplied by the formal witnesses before your various committees.

I will read a statement to you which we will distribute. It is still in the process of being typed.

In considering the two agreements before the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems and the interim agreement on the limitation of offensive arms, the overriding questions are these: Do these agreements permit the United States to maintain a defense posture that guarantees our security and protects our vital interests? Second, will they lead to a more enduring structure of peace?

In the course of the formal hearings over the coming days and weeks, the Administration will demonstrate conclusively that they serve both of these ends. I will begin that process this morning by offering some general remarks on the agreement, after which I will be happy to take your questions.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S

The first part of my remarks will deal with U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these agreements. The agreement which was signed 46 minutes before midnight in Moscow on the evening of May 26th by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev is without precedent in the nuclear age; indeed, in all relevant modern history.

Never before have the world's two most powerful nations, divided by ideology, history and conflicting interests, placed their central armaments under formally agreed limitation and restraint. It is fair to ask: What new conditions now prevail to have made this step commend itself to the calculated self-interests of both of the so-called superpowers, as it so clearly must have done for both willingly to undertake it?

Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of the broad design of what the President has been trying to achieve in this country's relations with the Soviet Union, since at each important turning point in the SALT negotiations we were guided not so much by the tactical solution that seemed most equitable or prudent, important as it was, but by an underlying philosophy and a specific perception of international reality.

The international situation has been undergoing a profound structural change since at least the mid-1960s. The post-World War II pattern of relations among the great powers had been altered to the point that when this Administration took office, a major reassessment was clearly in order.

The nations that had been prostrate in 1945 had regained their economic strength and their political vitality. The Communist bloc was divided into contending factions, and nationalistic forces and social and economic pressures were reasserting themselves within the individual Communist states.

Perhaps most important for the United States, our undisputed strategic predominance was declining just at a time when there was rising domestic resistance to military programs, and impatience for redistribution of resources from national defense to social demands.

Amidst all of this profound change, however, there was one important constant—the continuing dependence of most of the world's hopes for stability and peace upon the ability to reduce the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The factors which perpetuated that rivalry remain real and deep.

We are ideological adversaries, and we will in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable future.

We are political and military competitors, and neither can be indifferent to advances by the other in either of these fields.

We each have allies whose association we value and whose interests and activities of each impinge on those of the other at numerous points.

We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet the threat implicit in the other's strength and aims.

Each of us has thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdependence for survival between the two of us.

Although we compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to coexist. We have an inescapable obligation to build jointly a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality is the beginning of wisdom for a sane and effective foreign policy today.

President Nixon has made it the starting point of the United States policy since 1969. This Administration's policy is occasionally characterized as being based on the principles of the classical balance of power. To the extent that that term implies a belief that security requires a measure of equilibrium, it has a certain validity. No national leader has the right to mortgage the survival of his people to the good will of another state. We must seek firmer restraints on the actions of potentially hostile states than a sanguine appeal to their good nature.

But to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that the determination of national power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the primary concern of most national leaders has been to accumulate geopolitical and military power. It would have seemed inconceivable even a generation ago that such power once gained could not be translated directly

into advantage over one's opponent. But now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength.

With modern weapons, a potentially decisive advantage requires a change of such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs of a decade ago is in danger of being overtaken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological advance, which opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage.

A premium is put on striking first and on creating a defense to blunt the other side's retaliatory capability. In other words, marginal additions of power cannot be decisive. Potentially decisive additions are extremely dangerous, and the quest for them are destabilizing. The argument that arms races produce war has often been exaggerated. The nuclear age is overshadowed by its peril.

All of this was in the President's mind as he mapped the new directions of American policy at the outset of this Administration. There was reason to believe that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the repeated failure of their attempts to gain marginal advantage in local crises or in military competition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches.

The President, therefore, decided that the United States should work to create a set of circumstances which would offer the Soviet leaders an opportunity to move away from confrontation through carefully prepared negotiations. From the first, we rejected the notion that what was lacking was a cordial climate for conducting negotiations.

Past experience has amply shown that much heralded changes in atmospherics, but not buttressed by concrete progress, will revert to previous patterns at the first subsequent clash of interests.

We have, instead, sought to move forward across a broad range of issues so that progress in one area would add momentum to the progress of other areas.

We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested interest in mutual restraint.

At the same time, we were acutely conscious of the contradictory tendencies at work in Soviet policy. Some factors—such as the fear of nuclear war; the emerging consumer economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, administrative society—have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable relationship with the United States. Other factors—such as ideology, bureaucratic inertia, and the catalytic effect of turmoil in peripheral areas—have prompted pressures for tactical gains.

The President has met each of these manifestations on its own terms, demonstrating receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives and firmness in the face of provocations or adventurism. He has kept open a private channel through which the two sides could communicate candidly and settle matters rapidly. The President was convinced that agreements dealing with questions of armaments in isolation do not, in fact, produce lasting inhibitions on military competition because they contribute little to the kind of stability that makes crises less likely. In recent months, major progress was achieved in moving toward a broadly-based accommodation of interests with the USSR, in which an arms limitation agreement could be a central element.

This approach was called linkage, not by the Administration, and became the object of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three years later, the SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically, to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age.

The agreements on the limitation of strategic arms is, thus, not merely a technical accomplishment, although it is that in part, but it must be seen as a political event of some magnitude. This is relevant to the question of whether the agreements will be easily breached or circumvented. Given the past, no one can answer that question with certainty, but it can be said with some assurance that any country which contemplates a rupture of the agreement or a circumvention of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy not only a limited arms control agreement, but a broad political relationship.

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PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARMS TALKS

Let me turn now to the more specific decisions we had to make about what the agreement should do and how it could be achieved.

We knew that any negotiations on arms control, especially ones involving those central weapons systems which guarantee each side's security, were found to be sensitive and complicated, requiring frequent high-level decisions.

The possibility of a deadlock would be ever present, and the repercussions of a deadlock could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet relations across the board. We had to begin, therefore, by assessing what the situation was in terms of armaments in place and under construction; what realistic alternatives we had at the negotiating table; and how a tentative or partial agreement would compare with no agreement at all.

For various reasons during the 1960s, the United States had, as you know, made the strategic decision to terminate its building programs in major offensive systems and to rely instead on qualitative improvements. By 1969, therefore, we had no active or planned programs for deploying additional ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had dynamic and accelerated deployment programs in both land-based and sea-based missiles. You know, too, that the interval between conception and deployment of strategic weapons systems is generally five to ten years.

At the same time, both sides were in the initial stage of strategic defense programs, each approaching the antimissile problem from a different standpoint. The Soviets wanted to protect their capital. The United States' program concentrated on protecting our retaliatory forces. Both sides also possessed weapons which, although not central to the strategic balance, were nevertheless relevant to it. We have aircraft deployed at forward bases and on carriers. The Soviet Union has a sizable arsenal of intermediate-range missiles able to attack our forward bases and devastate the territory of our allies.

A further complication was that the composition of forces on the two sides was not symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given priority to systems controlled within its own territory while the United States had turned increasingly to sea-based systems.

The result was that they had a panoply of different ICBM's while we essentially had one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, together with a more effective and modern submarine force operating from bases overseas and equipped with longer-range missiles.

All of this meant that even arriving at a basic definition of strategic equivalency would be technically demanding and politically intricate.

Looking beyond to the desired limitations, it appeared that neither side was going to make major unilateral concessions. When the national survival is at stake, such a step could not contribute to stability. The final outcome would have to be equitable and to offer a more reliable prospect for maintaining security than could be achieved without the agreements.

With these facts in view, the President, in the spring of 1969, established a group of senior officials responsible for preparing and conducting the SALT negotiations.

I acted as Chairman, and the other members included the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This group, called the Verification Panel, has the task of analyzing the issues and factors and submitting for the President's decisions those options which commanded support in the various departments and agencies.

The Verification Panel analyzed each of the weapons systems which could conceivably be involved in an agreement. It compared the effect of different limitations on our program and on the Soviet programs, and weighed the resulting balance. It analyzed the possibilities of verification, and the precise risk of evasion, seeking to determine at what point evasion could be detected and what measures would be available for a response. This was done in various combinations so that if one piece of the equation changed, say the ABM level, the Government would be able to determine the effect of that change upon the other components of a particular negotiating package.

Our aim was to be in a position to give the negotiations a momentum. We wanted to be sure that when stalemates developed, the point at issue would not be largely tactical, and that the alternative solutions would be analysed ahead of time and ready for immediate decision by the President.

SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

In the first round of the talks, which began in November of 1969, the two sides established a work program and reached some tentative understanding of strategic principles.

For example, both sides more or less agreed at the outset that a very heavy ABM system could be a destabilizing factor, but that the precise level of ABM limitations would have to be set according to our success in agreeing on offensive limitations.

In the spring and summer of 1970, each country put forward more concrete proposals, translating some of the agreed principles into negotiating packages. During this period, we, on the American side, had hopes of reaching a comprehensive limitation. However, the initial search for a comprehensive solution gradually broke down over the question of defining the scope of the forces to be included.

The Soviets believed that strategic meant any weapons system capable of reaching the Soviet Union or the United States. This would have included our forward-based aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet intermediate range rockets aimed at Europe and other areas.

We opposed this approach, since it would have prejudiced our alliance commitments and raised a distinction between our own security and that of our European allies.

We offered a verifiable ban on the deployment and testing of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles. The Soviets countered by offering a totally unverifiable production ban, while insisting on the freedom to test, thus placing the control of MIRV's effectively out of reach.

At this juncture, early in 1971, with the stalemate threatening, the President took a major new initiative by opening direct contact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the SALT discussions and for that matter, the Berlin negotiations, and providing progress could be achieved on these two issues, to explore the feasibility of a summit meeting.

The Soviet leaders' first response was to insist that only the ABM's should be limited, and that offensive systems should be left aside. But as far as we were concerned, the still incipient ABM systems on both sides were far from the most dynamic or dangerous factors in the strategic equation. It was the Soviet offensive programs, moving ahead at the average rate of over 200 land-based and 100 sea-based missiles a year, which we felt constituted the most urgent issue. To limit our option of developing the ABM system without at the same time checking the growth of the Soviet offensive threat was unacceptable.

Exchanges between the President and the Soviet leaders embodying these views produced the understanding of May 20, 1971. As any workable compromise in the field must do, that understanding met each side's essential concerns. Since the offensive systems were complex and since agreement with respect to all of them had proved impossible, it was agreed that the initial offensive settlement would be an interim agreement and not a permanent treaty, and that it would freeze only selected categories at agreed levels.

On the defensive side, the understanding called for negotiations towards a permanent ABM solution with talks on both issues to proceed simultaneously to a common conclusion.

This left two major issues for the negotiators, the precise level of the allowed ABM's, and the scope of the interim agreement, specifically what weapons would be included in the freeze.

Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's proved extremely difficult. The United States had virtually completed its ABM site at Grand Forks, and we were working on the second site at Malmstrom. Hence, we proposed freezing deployments at levels operational or under construction, that is to say, two ICBM sites on our side, and the Moscow defense on the other.

The Soviets objected this would deny them the right to have any protection for their ICBM's, a new formula was then devised allowing each side to choose two sites, one each for national capital and ICBM defense or both for ICBM defense. The resolution of the ABM issue was completed after our Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Secretary of Defense, decided that a site in Washington to defend the National Command Authority was to be preferred over the second ICBM-protective site at Malmstrom. They reasoned that while a limited defense would not assure the ultimate survival of the National Command Authority, it would buy time against a major attack while the radars in both the NCA defense and

the defense of ICBM's would provide valuable warning. Moreover, an NCA defense would protect the National Command Authority in the event of a small attack by some third country or even an accidental or unauthorized launch of a weapon toward the United States.

The President accepted their recommendation.

What about the offensive weapons freeze? Early in the discussions about the implementation of this portion of the May 20 understanding between the President and the Soviet leaders, it was decided to exclude from the freeze bombers and so-called forward-based systems. To exclude, that is, the weapons in which this country holds an advantage.

We urged the congress to keep this fact in mind, when assessing the numerical ratios of weapons which are subject to the offensive freeze.

There was also relatively rapid agreement following the May 20 breakthrough that intercontinental ballistic missiles would be covered. This left the issue of the inclusion of submarines.

With respect to ICBM's in submarines, the situation was as follows: The Soviet Union had been deploying at the average annual rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 100 sea-based ballistic missiles a year. The U.S. had completed deployments of Minuteman and the 41 Polaris submarines in 1967. Of course, as you know, we are engaged in increasing the number of warheads on both our ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles. We were, and are, developing a new submarine system, although it cannot be deployed until 1978 or until after the end of the freeze. In other words, as a result of decisions made in the 1960's, and not reversible with the time-frame of the protected agreement, there would be a numerical gap against us in the two categories of land- and sea-based missile systems whether or not there was an agreement. Without an agreement, the gap would steadily widen.

The agreement would not create the gap. It would prevent its enlargement to our disadvantage. In short, a freeze of ICBMs and sea-based systems would be overwhelmingly in the United States' interest.

These basic considerations undoubtedly impelled the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any freeze which was to command their support must include the submarine-based system. The only possible alternative was a crash program for building additional missile-launching submarines. The President explored this idea with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operatitons. Their firm judgment was that such a program was undesirable. It could not produce results before 1976—that is, toward the very end of a projected freeze—and only by building a type of submarine similar to our current fleet, and without many of the features most needed for the 1980s and beyond.

The President once again used his direct channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to urge the inclusion of missile-launching submarines in the offensive agreement.

After a long period of hesitation, the Soviet leaders agreed in principle at the end of April. Final details were worked out in Moscow between the President and the Soviet leaders.

My purpose in dwelling at such length upon the details of our internal deliberations and negotiations has been to make one crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBMs nor the freeze of submarine-launched missiles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not an American concession. On the contrary, in both cases it was the Soviet Union which reluctantly acceded to American proposals after long and painful deliberation.

PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

I will not spend this group's time in further review of the frequently arduous negotiations in Vienna, Helsinki, and during the summit in Moscow leading to the final agreement. I do want to pay tribute on behalf of the President to Ambassador Smith and his delegation, whose dedication, negotiating skill and patience contributed decisively to the outcome.

Let me summarize the principal provisions of the documents as signed. The ABM treaty allows each side to have one ABM site for the defense of its national command authority and another site for defense of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers, or 800 miles apart in order to prevent the development of a territorial defense. Each ABM site can have 100 ABM interceptors.

The treaty contains additional provisions which effectively prohibit either the establishment of a radar base for the defense of populated areas or the attainment of capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles by conversion of air defense missiles to anti-ballistic missiles.

It provides for withdrawal by either party on six months' notice, if supreme national interests are judged to have been jeopardized by extraordinary events. By setting a limit to ABM defenses the treaty not only eliminates one area of potentially dangerous defensive competition, but it reduces the incentive for continuing deployment of offensive systems.

As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive.

The interim agreement on offensive arms is to run for five years, unless replaced by a more comprehensive permanent agreement which will be the subject of further negotiations, or unless terminated by notification similar to that for the treaty.

In essence this agreement will freeze the numbers of strategic offensive missiles on both sides at approximately the levels currently operational and under construction. For ICBM's, this is 1054 for the United States and 1618 for the Soviet Union. Within this overall limitation, the Soviet Union has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, the weapons most threatening to our strategic forces.

There is also a prohibition on conversion of light ICBM's into heavy missiles. These provisions are buttressed by verifiable provisions and criteria, specifically the prohibition against any significant enlargement of missile silos.

The submarine limitations are more complicated. In biref, the Soviets are frozen to their claimed current level, operational and under construction, of about 740 missiles, some of them on an older type nuclear submarine. They are permitted to build to a ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but only if they dismantle older ICBM's or submarine-based missile to offset the new construction.

This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and some 30 missiles on some nine older nuclear submarines. Bombers and other aircraft are not included in this agreement.

In sum, the interim offensive agreement will keep the overall number of strategic ballistic missile launchers both on land and at sea within an agreed ceiling which is essentially the current level, operational or under construction. It will not prohibit the United States from continuing current and planned strategic offensive programs, since neither the multiple-warhead conversion, nor the B–1 is within the purview of the freeze and since the ULMS submarine system is not, or never was planned for deployment until after 1977. The agreement will stop the Soviet Union from increasing the existing numerical gap in missile launchers.

Finally, there are a number of interpretative statements which were provided to the Congress along with the agreements. These interpretations are in several forms: Agreed statements initiated by the delegations, agreed interpretations or common understandings which were not set down formally and initialed, unilateral interpretations to make our position clear in instances where we could not get total agreement.

In any negotiations of this complexity, there will inevitably be details upon which the parties cannot agree. We made certain unilateral statements in order to insure that our positions on these details was included in the negotiating record and understood by the other side.

The agreed interpretations and common understandings for the most part deal with detailed technical aspects of limitations on ABM systems and offensive weapons. For example, it was agreed that the size of missile silos could not be significantly increased and that "significantly" meant not more than 10 to 15 percent.

In the more important unilateral declarations we made clear to the Soviets that the introduction of land mobile ICBM's would be inconsistent with the agreement. Since the publication of the various unilateral interpretative statements, suggestions have been heard that the language of the treaty and agreement in fact hide deep-seated disagreements. But it must be recognized that in any limited agreements, which are between old time adversaries, there are bound to be certain gaps.

In this case the gaps relate not so much to the terms themselves, but rather to what it was impossible to include. The interpretations do not vitiate these agreements, but they expand and add to the agreements.

WHAT DO THE AGREEMENTS MEAN?

Taking the longer perspective, what can we say has been accomplished?

First, it is clear that the agreement will enhance the security of both sides. No agreement which fails to do so could have been signed in the first place or stood any chance of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to gain a unilateral advantage in the strategic field must be self-defeating.

The President has given the most careful consideration to the final terms. He has asked me to reiterate most emphatically this morning his conviction that the agreements fully protect our national security and our vital interests.

Secondly, the President is determined that our security and vital interests shall remain fully protected. If the Senate consents to ratification of the treaty and if the Congress approves the interim agreement, the Administration will, therefore, pursue two parallel courses.

On the one hand, we shall push the next phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the same energy and conviction that have produced these initial agreements.

On the other hand, until further Arms limits are negotiated, we shall push research and development and the production capacity to remain in a fully protected strategic posture should follow-on agreements prove unattainable and so as to avoid giving the other side a temptation to break out of the agreement.

Third, the President believes that these agreements, embedded as they are in the fabric of an emerging new relationship, can hold tremendous political and historical significance in the coming decades. For the first time, two great powers, deeply divided by their divergent values, philosophies, and social systems, have agreed to restrain the very armaments on which their national survival depends. No decision of this magnitude could have been taken unless it had been part of a larger decision to place relations on a new foundation of restraint, cooperation and steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of agreements on joint efforts with regard to the environment, space, health, and promising negotiations on economic relations provides a prospect for avoiding the failure of the Washington Naval Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war which collapsed in part for lack of an adequate political foundation.

The final verdict must wait on events, but there is at least reason to hope that these accords represent a major break in the pattern of suspicion, hostility, and confrontation which has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for a generation. The two great nuclear powers must not let this opportunity slip away by jockeying for marginal advantages.

Inevitably an agreement of such consequence raises serious questions on the part of concerned individuals of quite different persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of them here. Let me deal with some of the most frequently asked since the agreements were signed three weeks ago.

Who won?

The President has already answered this question. He has stressed that it is inappropriate to pose the question in terms of victory or defeat. In an agreement of this kind, either both sides win or both sides lose. This will either be a serious attempt to turn the world away from time-worn practices of jockeying for power, or there will be endless, wasteful and purposeless competition in the acquisition of armaments.

Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. strategic disadvantage?

We reject the premise of that question on two grounds. First, the present situation is on balance advantageous to the United States. Second, the Interim Agreement perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which could only have gotten worse without an agreement.

Our present strategic military situation is sound. Much of the criticism has focused on the imbalance in number of missiles between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, this only examines one aspect of the problem. To assess the overall balance it is necessary to consider those forces not in the agreement: our bomber force which is substantially larger and more effective than the Soviet bomber force, and our forward base systems.

The quality of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have a major advantage in nuclear weapons technology and in warhead accuracy.

Also, with our MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of their own.

Then there are such factors as deployment characteristics. For example, because of the difference in geography and basing, it has been estimated that the Soviet Union requires three submarines for two of ours to be able to keep an equal number on station.

When the total picture is viewed, our strategic forces are seen to be completely sufficient.

The Soviets have more missile launchers, but when other relevant systems such as bombers are counted there are roughly the same number of launchers on each side. We have a big advantage on warheads. The Soviets have an advantage on megatonnage.

What is disadvantageous to us, though, is the trend of new wepons deployment by the Soviet Union and the projected imbalance five years hence based on that trend. The relevant question to ask, therefore, is what the freeze prevents; where would we be by 1977 without a freeze? Considering the current momentum by the Soviet Union, in both ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the ceiling set in the Interim Agreement can only be interpreted as a sound arrangement that makes a major contribution to our national security.

Does the agreement jeopardize our security in the future?

The current arms race compounds numbers by technology. The Soviet Union has proved that it can best compete in sheer numbers. This is the area which is limited by the agreement.

Thus the agreement confines the competition with the Soviets to the area of technology? And, heretofore, we have had a significant advantage.

The follow-on negotiations will attempt to bring the technological race under control. Until these negotiations succeed, we must take care not to anticipate their outcome by unilateral decisions.

Can we trust the Soviets?

The possibility always exists that the Soviets will treat the Moscow agreements as they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted conflict. If this happens, the United States will have to respond. This we shall plan to prepare to do psychologically and strategically and provided the Congress accepts the strategic programs on which the acceptance of the agreements was predicated.

I have said enough to indicate we advocate these agreements not on the basis of trust, but on the basis of the enlightened self-interests of both sides. This self-interest is reinforced by the carefully drafted verification provisions in the agreement. Beyond the legal obligations, both sides have a stake in all of the agreements that have been signed, and a large stake in the broad process of improvement in relations that has begun. The Soviet leaders are serious men, and we are confident that they will not lightly abandon the course that has led to the summit meeting and to these initial agreements. For our own part, we will not abandon this course without major provocation, because it is in the interest of this country and in the interest of mankind to pursue it.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, the President and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a Declaration of Principles to govern the future relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These principles state that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear ago. They commit both sides to avoid direct armed confrontation, to use restraint in local conflicts, to assert no special claims in derogation of the sovereign equality of all nations, to stress cooperation and negotiation at all points of our relationship.

At this point, these principles reflect an aspiration and an attitude. This Administration will spare no effort to translate the aspiration into reality. We shall strive with determination to overcome further the miasma of suspicion and self-confirming preemptive actions which have characterized the Cold War.

Of course the temptation is to continue along well worn paths. The status quo has the advantage of reality, but history is strewn with the wreckage of nations which sought their future in their past. Catastrophe has resulted far less often from conscious decisions than from the fear of breaking loose from established patterns through the inexorable march towards cataclysm because nobody knew what else to do. The paralysis of policy which destroyed Europe in

1914 would surely destroy the world if we let it happen again in the nuclear age.

Thus the deepest question we ask is not whether we can trust the Soviets, but whether we can trust ourselves. Some have expressed concern about the agreements not because they object to their terms, but because they are afraid of the euphoria that these agreements might produce.

But surely we cannot be asked to maintain unavoidable tension just to carry out programs which our national survival should dictate in any event. We must not develop a national psychology by which we can act only on the basis of what we are against and not on what we are for.

Or challenges then are: Can we chart a new course with hope but without illusion, with large purposes but without sentimentality? Can we be both generous and strong? It is not often that a country has the opportunity to answer such questions meaningfully. We are now at such a juncture where peace and progress depend on our faith and our fortitude.

It is in this spirit that the President has negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit that he asks the approval of the treaty and the Interim Agreement and that I now stand ready to answer your questions.

[From the office of the White House Press Secretary, June 15, 1972]

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION AFTER A BRIEFING BY DR. HENRY KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, IN THE STATE DINING ROOM OF THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. MACGREGOR. Gentleman, as the President indicated in his report to the Joint Session of Congress two weeks ago tonight, he places the highest importance on executive-legislative partnership in the further carrying forward of the constitutional process with respect to the treaty and the agreement.

This session this morning is designed to further that commitment on the President's part and to give to you and through you the American people, an opportunity for the fullest possible debate and the fullest range of questions.

The President has asked me, and I would like to do so, to recognize the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

Dr. Kissinger, first, may I say I think that was an extraordinarily thorough and enlightening statement. The only regret I have is that he didn't make it public so all the country could have heard it, because I think it is a very great description, I think, of what these agreements mean.

I am thoroughly in accord with the spirit with which you have given them and the way the President has presented this agreement for our country. I have only one serious question about it.

There does appear to me to be an inherent inconsistency in the attitude as expressed by the Secretary of Defense the other day. For background, I will read one sentence. This is a quote from his testimony before the Armed Services Committee: "I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on movement forward of the Trident system, the B–1 bombers or other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five-year period."

Now, the explanation that Mr. Kissinger has made about maintaining our security during the five-year period I accept as a general statement, but in view of the fact that we know the Soviets have no aircraft carriers whatever, they have a very small and not very modern bomber force, they have no forward bases similar to ours, unless you consider Cuba perhaps a forward base.

But so far, we have no evidence that it is being so prepared. They are not planning a Trident system that I know of. Their system of submarines is traditional and similar to the ones they already have.

In view of all this, it seems to me to couple the approval of the ABM and the interim agreement with Congressional approval of these vastly expensive programs raises a serious question about our determination to accept this agreement in the spirit in which I think it was negotiated and the spirit which you have stated. That is a gradual relaxation of the tensions, and not to use these agreements as an excuse for a greatly enlarged arms system of our own.

This is the only thing that has bothered me about them. I, of course, am personally extremely pleased with the overall agreements with the sole exception, do we mean it, as I have said, and you yourself so offer, put yourself in the place of the Russians, if we proceed immediately to a very large expansion of our

weapons systems, would this not leave in the mind of General Grechko and his colleagues a question about our sincerity in really moving toward a reduction in the arms race.

This is the only question I have and it is the one which bothers me and I wish you would enlarge upon the necessity of proceeding at once and tying these agreements with the approval of programs about which there were serious questions even before this agreement was made, there were very serious questions about the A–14 and B–1 before these negotiations were agreed on.

Now, we seem to be put in the position of being pressured into that in order to get an agreement with which I am thoroughly in accord.

Dr. KISSINGER. As the President pointed out, and as I also said in my statement, Mr. Chairman, we intend to move on two tracks: One, we hope to start the second round of SALT negotiations as soon as the Senate ratifies the treaty and the Congress approves the interim agreement.

If the schedule that was tentatively suggested to you by the President were met, that is to say, approval by the end of August, we would hope to have the first session of the second round of SALT sometime during October and then to begin the process again. We will pursue those negotiations with the attitude towards bringing about a change in the international climate that I have described.

At the same time, the question arises of what we should do in our national defense posture while we engage in these negotiations. It has been the judgment of this Administration that we must continue those programs which preserve our strategic position. I do not, in this setting, want to go into each individual weapon system because I believe that the appropriate committees will examine the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to them.

Our view, however, is that we must continue those strategic programs which are permitted by the agreement and those research and development efforts in areas that are covered by the agreement in case the follow-on agreement cannot be negotiated.

Our experience has been that an on-going program is no obstacle to an agreement and, on the contrary may accelerate it. That was certainly the case with respect to Safeguard. We are in the position with respect to various categories of weapons that the Soviet Union has an accelerated program, and we have none. Therefore, our position is that we are presenting both of these programs on their merits. We are not making them conditional. We are saying that the treaty is justified on its merits, but we are also saying that the requirements of national security impel us in the direction of the strategic programs, and we hope that the Congress will approve both of these programs as it examines each of them on its merits.

Mr. MACGREGOR. I am sure if the President were here, he would like to have recognized the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman Morgan.

Congressman MORGAN. Thank you, Clark, and I want to thank Dr. Kissinger in inviting us to brief us on it.

When the President appeared here in the short appearance he made before this group, he spelled out the reason why this had to be done in Moscow at such a high level, because it crossed over so many agencies and because of the form of government of the Soviet Union.

He also ended up by saying that you would not be available for testimony on Capitol Hill, in which I agree. But I just wondered, with the five committees who are represented here today, who are going to consider over in the Senate side the Treaty of the ABM's and over on the House side this, the limitation that has been set by you and the President, of September 1, whether you would be available by these committees for consultation as we go along.

Dr. KISSINGER. I would be delighted to meet with members of these committees in groups, on an individual basis, or in the kind of setting that we have worked out before, in which I will meet with the committees at the invitation of the Chairman in some setting that maintains the position of Executive privilege.

But I will be fully available to answer any questions and we are prepared to go as far as is humanly possible with respect to Executive privilege.

Certainly, to make available to the Congress any answers that we can.

Congressman MORGAN. I want to assure you that the Committee on Foreign Affairs will go to work on this as soon as we get back from the Democratic Convention.

Mr. MacGregor. I am sure we would like to hear from the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Honorable John Stennis.

Senator Stennis. Well, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues I certainly didn't come here to make a statement. I came to listen and to learn. I did respond when I walked in, to a request that I would say just a word.

Gentlemen and ladies here in the Congress, I have been on the Armed Services Committee since before we had ICBM's and I have thought many times the growing realization I had of what these could mean and now what they do mean in our hands and then this same weapon in the hands of our adversaries.

So, I have been driven into a corner of wanting very much to have some kind of an agreement that would be the germ, perhaps, of something that would relieve the tensions and assure our safety.

I do have one major reservation about this situation I am going to mention, but I do believe if we can approve it, it is a start, maybe not much of a start, but it is a start. That is the biggest thing I see about it.

May I just respond one moment to the very major point that the Senator from Arkansas made, about if we get these agreements, why go on with the ULM's. I remember so well the ABM debate that we had in the Senate. The most outstanding point in my mind, I was convinced that the great probability was that by putting in the ABM for whatever it was worth, it might increase the chances of getting some kind of a start on agreements.

Not that I have any perception, but as I have understood, from the President at other briefings. they thought that was a major point in getting this.

This same reasoning applies, I think. I am going to support the B–1 and the ULM's and frankly, I am going all of the way on ULM's now, even though I had in mind supporting it only for a limited amount this year, and not on an all-out program.

I have in mind now, the statement you made, Dr. Kissinger, but I am not under its impact exactly, and I have said these things because they were old thoughts. But it is quite helpful.

By the way, is this an open meeting, is the press here? Anyway, the reservation I have is on this surveillance, our power to detect any cheating. That hadn't been gone into here and it hasn't been gone into in other briefings that I have been to, and I don't insist on any question being answered on it, but I raise that point.

If you want to comment on it, you may. I want to make this observation. I think that we are more than doers out there in the Congress. We are not going to say just Yes or No. We have to actively make up our mind on this, and take a position for future generations.

I believe that will help us approach it. Do you want to comment on that detection and surveillance?

Dr. Kissinger. Well, I am sure that when Mr. Helms testifies in executive sessions, that he can go into more detail than I can. In fact, all I can do is to make the statement that we are confident that national means of verification are sufficient to monitor the numerical limitations of this agreement.

We studied this problem in great detail before we entered negotiations, and determined for each category of weapon the margin of error that we thought our collection systems had and what we could do to react once we found out that there had been a violation.

In each of these cases, we found that the margin was well within tolerable limits. In this case, however, where we are dealing with numbers, we are confident that the national means of verification are sufficient to give us the highest degree of confidence that this agreement will be lived up to, or that we will know it almost immediately if it is not lived up to.

Mr. MacGregor. The President is aware that the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have developed a tremendous expertise which applies directly to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to the interim agreement and we are delighted to see the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Honorable John Pastore, from Rhode Island.

Senator Pastore, do you have a question?

Senator Pastore. Not exactly a question for the moment because I have asked it before and I think it has been answered. I think the one dominant question here is whether or not in these agreements we have reserved to ourselves the military potential that will constitute a deterrent against an attack upon us,

and also whether or not in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff they are all unanimous that this is a good agreement.

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, we would not have entered into this agreement if we thought it impaired our capacity for deterrence. As was pointed out in my statement, we believe that it maintains the capacity of deterrence and at the same time, enables the world to start toward turning away from the arms race as well as improving the whole international climate.

Secondly, at every stage of this agreement we consulted in the greatest detail with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been pointed out, both in my statement, but it was done throughout the work of the Verification Panel in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is represented and at every decision that the President made, the International Security Council.

I do not know of any significant decision—I don't know of any decision with respect to this agreement that was made which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not unanimously supported.

During the final stages of the negotiation in Moscow, we were in direct touch with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the various proposals unfolded, and, of course, you will be calling Admiral Moorer yourself, but I am certain that he will confirm the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this agreement.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Yes, Congressman.

Congressman NEDZI. Dr. Kissinger, on March 14, the President gave as a rationale for the broad safeguard system, part of his rationale, was the defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which the People's Republic of China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.

Has anything happened to that threat, and in that connection, are you able to tell us anything about your forthcoming visit to China?

Dr. KISSINGER. Our estimate of the Chinese nuclear capability is still approximately what it was at the time that Safeguard was developed. Our estimate of the likelihood of our being involved in any nuclear conflict with the People's Republic of China is considerably less than it was at the time that the Safeguard program was submitted to the Congress, because of the political developments that have happened since then, specifically the opening toward China.

Therefore, we accept now that in the overall context of the contribution that this agreement could make toward world peace and toward improving general relationships, and in the light, also, of improvement of relations with the People's Republic of China, that we could pay this price of foregoing the additional protection that the President requested in his original statement.

We could do this all the more so because if our estimates turn out to be incorrect, we have such an overwhelming retaliatory capability vis-a-vis any other country other than the Soviet Union, that the idea of a third nuclear country attacking the United States is a rather remote possibility.

Congressman NEDZI. Didn't we have it three months ago?

Dr. KISSINGER. I was talking about the justification which the President gave when he started the Safeguard Program. I don't know what March 14th statement you are talking about. It must have been March 14, 1969.

Congressman NEDZI. My apologies.

Dr. KISSINGER. It was not March 14th of this year.

Congressman NEDZI. I stand corrected.

Dr. KISSINGER. That was 1969. Then with respect to my visit to the Peoples Republic of China, it was foreseen in the Shanghai Communique. It was tentatively agreed to at the time of the President's visit to Peking that sometime during the course of the summer we would send a senior representative to the Peoples Republic. We intend to review the whole range of international problems as they affect American-Chinese relationships.

Mr. MACGREGOR. When I recognized Congressman Nedzi, I was looking unsuccessfully for the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Congressman Hébert of Louisiana. I don't see Eddie, but I do see the ranking majority Member of the Committee, and the Vice Chairman of the Committee on Atomic Energy. I would like to recognize Congressman Mel Price.

Congressman PRICE. Mr. MacGregor, Mr. Hebert has important business in Louisiana today and could not be here. But I would like to advise the group that the committee will mark up the Procurement Bill and all the items in there are going to be approved this afternoon.

Senator BENNETT. My question is partly a request for additional clarification. Do I understand that Mr. Kissinger's statement will be available to us as well as that of the President?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct.

Congressman HANSON. Dr. Kissinger, as I understand the ABM Treaty, it anticipates the construction of an ABM site at the capital of each of the two countries, plus one other site.

Dr. KISSINGER. That is correct.

Congressman HANSON. With respect to an ABM system to protect our Nation's Capital, is it the intention of the Administration to push forward for authorization and construction of this system around Washington and how important it is to the credible defense to which reference was made that we do proceed to authorize and construct this protection for the Nation's Capital? Will our position be significantly weakened in terms of future negotiations if we fail to take this step?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, we will request this authorization. Secondly, it was the judgment of our senior military leaders that a second site in the Capital area would be more useful than a second site in Malstrom. It would give additional warning time in case of major attack and it would give protection against an attack by a third country. It is for this reason that we are recommending to the Congress and requesting the Congress to authorize its construction.

Senator JACKSON. Dr. Kissinger, first I want to compliment you on a very fine statement. I think we all want to see an end to the arms race, but I think we all should agree that if you are going to have an agreement it should be one that will stabilize and not destabilize. When you have a number of ambiguities such as we have in the present arrangement, I think it is fraught with some trouble.

For example, I just want to illustrate a couple: There are a lot of them. But we do have, for example, a bilateral understanding on the number of advanced strategic type submarines, the Y Class, Polaris. That is defined specifically. But there is no specific limitation other than our unilateral statement as to the number of land-based missiles, intercontinental, that are permitted.

Would you comment? The same is true of "What is a heavy missile?"

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the numbers of missiles actually being deployed, the Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant to specify precise numbers, that is true. We have operated with a number of 1618. There is absolutely no question that if our intelligence should reveal that the Soviet numbers significantly exceed that figure that the whole premise of the agreement will be in question.

Now, what will maintain this agreement is not the fact that we can waive these provisions and take it to court at any particular moment, but what will maintain this agreement is the consequences the other side will face if it turns out that it has turned into a scrap of paper and that it is being circumvented.

If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field. But beyond that, as is pointed out in my statement, the two countries have a unique opportunity right now to move into an entirely different relationship of building additional trust.

If it turns out that through legalistic interpretations of provisions of the agreement of through failing to specify numbers about which we have left absolutely no doubt as to our interpretation and where are hereby reaffirmed, if it should turn out that those numbers are being challenged in any significant way at all, then this would cast a doubt. It would not only threaten disagreement, but it would threaten the whole basis of this new relationship which I have described.

We are very confident that our national means of detection give us the highest degree of confidence that these numbers cannot be exceeded without our knowing and that if they are exceeded that the consequences I described will follow.

Now, with respect to the definition of heavy missiles, this was the subject of extensive discussions at Vienna and Helsinki, and finally Moscow. No doubt, one of the reasons for the Soviet reluctance to specify a precise characteristic is because undoubtedly they are planning to modernize within the existing framework some of the weapons they now possess.

The agreement specifically permits the modernization of weapons. There are, however, a number of safeguards. First there is the safeguard that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted.

Secondly, there is the provision that the silo configuration cannot be changed in a significant way and then the agreed interpretive statement which we made, which the other side stated reflected its views also, that this meant that it could not be increased by more than 10 to 15 percent.

We believe that these two statements, taken in conjunction, give us an adequate safeguard against a substantial substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles. So, we think we have adequate safeguards with respect to that issue.

It is, however, true, Senator Jackson, that within these limitations, improvements, qualitative improvements, are possible which will increase the capabilities of each of these missiles and this is one of the reasons why we have advocated qualitative improvements in our strategic forces. But as far as the break between the light and the heavy missiles is concerned, we believe that we have assurances through the two safeguards that I have mentioned to you.

Congressman STRATTON. Dr. Kissinger, I have one question with regard to one of the unilateral statements that was published the other day. Under the agreement, as I understand it, we have 41 Polaris submarines and we could go to 44 if we turned in our old Titans. But the Soviets say that they are considering the British and the French Polaris submarines to be part of our force and that if the total goes over 50 they will consider the agreement breached. The British have four. The French have one and three others in construction, which means that if the French ones are completed, then we could only have 42 without putting it over the total of 50.

Could you comment on how we can hold down the British and French as part of this agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, the Soviet Union has not said that they would consider the agreement breached. The Soviet Union has said that they would then reserve the right to ask for additional compensation.

Secondly, we have emphatically rejected that interpretative recitation and have written our rejection of that into the record. So, we do not consider that we have agreed to this Soviet interpretation. You have to remember the interpretative statements are in a number of categories. There are those that are agreed and initialled. There are those orally agreed. There are those that are unilateral and not challenged and then there are those that are unilateral and challenged.

I would think that a unilateral statement that was challenged at the time it was made would not be the most determining feature in our own policy with respect to this.

But, finally, the provisions that permit the trading in of one type of missile for another do not have to be implemented. We have the right, but we don't have the obligation, to trade in the Titans for additional submarines and given our construction program at this moment, with no additional submarines of the Polaris type being built, we may well decide not to exercise this option and keep the Titans, in which case your question would be moot.

But in any event, we have not accepted this Soviet interpretation.

Congressman PIKE. Dr. Kissinger, if I understand the philosophy whereby one of these agreements requires a treaty and the other is an executive agreement, it has to do with the fact that the executive agreement is limited to a term of years. As we look ahead to SALT II, I would like to ask this question: For how long a period of years could an executive agreement be made which was not required to be a treaty? Could it be for 25 years, for example?

I would also like to ask a question in this regard: The tentative agreement was fairly well leaked or publicized in some manner before the President went to Moscow. I would simply like to ask whether there were any substantive changes made at Moscow.

Dr. KISSINGER. The first question is an important Constitutional question: At what point does an executive agreement achieve character of such permanence that it should really more properly be in the form of a treaty?

There were two reasons why the exectuive agreement was put into that form. One was because of its limited duration and secondly because of its limited scope. That is to say, here we had an agreement, the major categories of which were going to be included again in a more comprehensive negotiation leading to a more permanent arrangement.

For example, the disparity which is involved for a limited period of time might not prove acceptable for a more permanent arrangement.

For this reason, that is to say, the limited duration and the limited scope it was decided that an Executive Agreement which, however, is submitted to the entire Congress, was more appropriate.

If you got to the point where you made a 25-year agreement, I don't want to prejudge that issue, but, as a political scientist and not as a presidential assistant, it would look more like a treaty to me. But I don't want to get into that.

Now, with respect to the second question, the general outlines of the agreement were shaped, really, in three ways. One was by negotiations in Helsinki and

Vienna, which did most of the detail. But the policy decisions that were brought about through direct contact between the President and the Soviet leaders which led to the May 20, 1971 breakthrough and then, again, to the formula which led to the inclusion of the submarines—when we were in Moscow there were four major issues that had not been resolved in Helsinki, which were known as issues, but the solution of which could not have been leaked because it hadn't been achieved. Those were the subjects that were most intensively discussed between the President and the General Secretary, primarily the issue of how you calculate the submarine limits, and at what point the replacement of submarines has to start, and which submarines had to be counted for replacement purposes, and questions of this type.

There were subsidiary issues having to do with the silos, I mentioned interpretative statements, and matters of this kind, none of which had been settled in Helsinki, and had to be settled in very extensive conversations between the President and the General Secretary and between members of our delegation in Moscow and their Soviet colleagues.

Mr. MacGregor. Senator Javits?

Senator Javits. I would like to revert to the question asked by Senator Fulbright and Senator Stennis, because they raise some, to my mind, very serious points.

On the assumption that the treaty can be denounced in six months, but the agreement cannot be denounced at all, if it is breached, either party can treat it as an end. What do you advise us to do about the September 1 date the President names, if by then we have not determined that we wish to authorize any additional weapons systems in view of the fact that the President has made it clear that he made this agreement on the assumption that we, too, would press forward with our weapons plans as the Russians are?

And the second part of that question is: Is this the total bill or are there more weapons systems to come within the next five years that we are going to have to authorize because we have made this deal?

Dr. Kissinger. First, I think it is not correct to say that you have been asked to authorize weapons because we have made this deal. All of the weapons that you are being asked to authorize had been requested prior to the deal and were judged to be necessary before the deal. The question is not whether the deal impels them, but whether the deal makes them dispensable.

This is the shape of the debate.

Secondly, I am frankly not sure about the withdrawal provisions of the defensive agreement. I thought it had the same withdrawal provisions.

It is my impression that the offensive agreement has exactly the same withdrawal provisions of the defensive treaty, so that we are protected.

Thirdly, as I have said, we are requesting both of these programs on their own merit, and, therefore, it is up to the Congress to decide how to deal with them.

Senator Percy. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to first express that in dealing with our two major adversaries, you will always be as skillful and successful as you have in skirting around the Executive privilege question.

I think in the case of the treaty and the agreements, you have been, and the President has been, and Secretary Rogers.

My question pertains to the second allowable site that each party can have. Neither one of us has even begun the preparation of those two sites. Neither one of us have either site in our original defense strategy plans. Is it possible that we could reach an agreement that neither one of us go ahead with those two sites and would we take the initiative in suggesting that might be a possibility?

Dr. Kissinger. The question of the deferral of the second site had been considered and had been rejected by both sides. The Soviet Union had taken the position that it could not agree to an ABM limitation that did not give it the right as long as we were in a position to defend ICBM's in which they could not also defend some ICBM's of their own.

So, therefore, our failure to go ahead with our second site would, in effect, give them two sites to our one. The only possibility for us would have been to scrap the site we had and build an entirely new one in Washington, and it seemed to us not a good policy to begin a disarmament agreement by which we had to scrap everything that we had done in order to build something entirely different from what we started out to do.

Mr. MacGregor. If you have any complaint about this process, I am the one to complain to, but I have not identified to date the following hands, and I

would like to recognize you in this order, if I may. Senator Ervin, Congressman Gubser, Congressman Fascell, Congressman Leggett, and Congressman Frelinghuysen, and then we will go on from there.

Senator ERVIN. I would like to ask this question. I think we had the wisest of all Americans in Benjamin Franklin, and he said, "Beware of being lulled into dangerous security." My question is this: Wouldn't a ratification of the treaty and the approval of the Limited Arms Agreement make it all the more imperative for us to go forward with the Trident and with the B–1 bomber, and other programs, to keep from being lulled into a dangerous sense of security?

Dr. KISSINGER. That is the position of the Administration.

Congress GUBSER. I seem to get from your remarks that we do, under the treaty, have the option of going ahead with Malmstrom instead of the protection of the National Capital. Is that correct or was that possible at one time?

Dr. KISSINGER. This was considered at one time, and then when we reached a point where we were talking about two sites, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that if there were to be two sites, they would rather have the second site around the National Command Authority than in Malmstrom. Whether we could have obtained Soviet acquiscence in two ICBM sites rather than having the second site in Washington, we cannot judge today, because we accepted the recommendations of our military leaders that if there were to be a second site, that second site should be in Washington.

Congressman FASCELL. Dr. Kissinger, what does the protocol address itself to, and what were the circumstances which brought it about; and, secondly, we know what is excluded from the Interim Agreement and we know what we can proceed with in terms of qualitative improvements because they won't be deployed until 1975. What is it that the Russians have excluded from the Interim Agreement and what is it that the Russians can proceed with in terms of qualitative improvement that might not be deployed until after 1975?

Dr. KISSINGER. The protocol came about because the submarine question could have been an extraordinarily complicated one, and the complications arose from this fact. We do not have a program for building missile-carrying submarines until 1978 at the earliest. The Soviet Union had been producing over the last few years at the rate of eight missile-carrying submarines a year. It has built additional facilities which would enable it nearly to double this production rate, although up to now they have used it mostly for the conversion of older submarines into more modern types. But they do have a very substantial production capability.

Therefore, a freeze on submarine construction was bound to stop a very dynamic Soviet program, and it was not affecting any on-going American program. Therefore, a formula had to be found which at one and the same time met our needs for some equivalent, and took account of the reality that the Soviet Union without this agreement could have produced at the rate at least of eight to nine a year, so that over the period of the freeze, the Soviet Union could have built up to eighty to ninety submarines, that is an additional 40 to 45 to something like 43 to 44 they now have under construction.

This was the situation we faced. So we developed a formula which enabled the Soviet Union, if it wished, to go beyond their present level up to 62, which is well short of their capacity, but only at the price of trading in some of the older ICBMs and some of the older missiles on earlier nuclear submarines, so that the Soviet Union has to trade in 240 missiles in order to be able to build up to this agreed level.

So the submarine agreement has the dual advantage of stopping the Soviet program on construction well short of its capacity; and secondly, retiring for the first time by international agreement a substantial number of other missiles that we, in our annual statements, had been carrying as part of the Soviet missile force.

So we needed a protocol to determine those things.

Then there was the second question of at what level does the process of trading-in start? That is to say, at what point do you determine that the Soviet Union must trade in these ICBMs and older submarine missiles for newer ones. The ambiguity here arose from the fact that while our intelligence is adequate to tell us when they are putting submarines at sea, and how many submarines are under construction in the sheds at any given moment, there is some difficulty in defining the term "under construction."

If you start the process of "under construction" when the hull sections are being built, before they are moved into the sheds, you get a different figure than

if you get the figure in the sheds. Therefore, this was a subject of some complicated negotiation to determine the level at which the trade-in would start, which is, as expressed in the communique, at the level of 740 ballistic missiles on submarines, which includes 30 older ones, which is to say, therefore, at the level of 704 to 710 of the newer submarines.

This is the explanation for this rather complex calculation of the protocol.

Now as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, their bombers are outside of this system and theoretically they could start building up their bomber force without being limited by this agreement.

Historically, the Soviet Union has not put the emphasis on its bomber force that we have. Its operating procedures and experience is far below the level of our Air Force. We do not consider it probable that they will make a major effort in that field, but this is one field in which they could make progress.

The field in which it is most likely that they will make progress is in the modernization of the missiles that are permitted under the agreement. That is, they will not violate the numbers of the agreement, but they will improve the quality, accuracy, number of warheads and this is what will represent a threat to our strategic forces.

Congressman LEGGETT. Doctor, I want to commend you and the Administration on the negotiation of what I think is an extremely remarkable agreement. I have my reservations that perhaps the Department of Defense is stampeding in the opposite direction, though, of the spirit of the negotiations.

I am concerned that in the bill that we marked up yesterday in the Armed Services Committee we increased the hard site Sprint nuclear program clearly outlawed as far as deployment 100 percent.

We accepted the budget figures which had a 900 percent increase in the ULMS or Trident program. Of course, the answer you originally gave was that we needed this as a bargaining chip perhaps for Phase 2 or 3, however, it seems to me we have successfully negotiated the limitation on the number of land-based missiles without an accelerated program, limited the submarine tubes without an accelerated program.

We perhaps have wasted several million dollars in the ABM program in making that a bargaining chip and aren't we perhaps doing the same thing in developing the big bargaining things which obviously will never be deployed if you are successful in your negotiating program?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me say two things: One, it is not easy to prove the motivations of the other side in making an agreement. I would think it probable however that we could not have negotiated the limitations on offensive weapons if it had not been linked to the limitations on defensive weapons and to their desire of stopping the deployment of the ABM system.

So, what drove these negotiations for the first year was their desire to limit our ABM deployment. And it was not until we insisted that we could not agree to an ABM treaty without offensive limitations that they reluctantly included the offensive limitations.

Secondly, I think we will deploy, even if we are successful in the negotiations that it is very likely we will deploy ULMS and Trident and then retire a similar number of the older submarines, use them for replacement purposes rather than additions to the current submarine fleet.

So, I cannot fully accept the assumption that they will not be deployed. What would almost certainly happen though if an agreement were successful is a substantial replacement of the older Polaris boats.

Congressman LEGGETT. Of course, those older Polaris are a quarter billion dollars a piece, zero defects and a third of a mile CPI. It is hard to conceive that they are obsolete or will be.

Dr. KISSINGER. I don't want to go into the technical weapons characteristics. I think you will get more competent witnesses than me on that subject.

Congressman FREYLINGHUYSEN. I am sure we all appreciate both your presentation and the question and answer period which you have given us. I would like to congratulate you on a masterful presentation. I think Clark is to be congratulated on the music that he has provided to supplement the high points.

My question gets back to this level of defense spending. The President and you both said you hoped for an earlier resumption of the SALT talks. Assuming ratification of the treaty, you didn't really answer Senator Fulbright's question as to whether the Soviets might not consider defense spending an indication of our sincerity or insincerity. Do you think that there is any chance that there is not

an expectation on the part of the Soviets with respect to defense spending that might jeopardize successful talks following the ratification of the treaty?

In other words, does the other side hook our spending and our attitude towards defense to further talks?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, this last round of talks took nearly 2½ years. So, even if the talks start again this fall, they are likely to be prolonged. We would expect that the first session will deal with general principles rather than with detailed negotiating packages.

All the more so in the next round, we are getting into the more complicated issues of how to control technological change where national means of inspection are not as reliable as they are with respect to sheer numbers.

Now, there is no question that the Soviet Union will judge our intentions in part by the level of our defense spending, for good or evil, and that we cannot take the position that our defense spending is irrelevant to our general political relationship.

The question is: If we spend too little on defense, if we create such a unilateral weakness then we destroy their incentive to negotiate seriously. If we spend too much and give them the idea that we are gearing up simply for getting a tremendous spurt to get ahead of them, then we create the other problem.

So our problem is to get our defense expenditures at a level that does not create a unilateral weakness and give them pressure for agreement but does not get us into an area where it had the counter-productive tendency of generating a new round on their side.

We believe that we are navigating that course. But it is a serious question and it is a serious problem and we have to be alert to both of these dangers.

Mr. MACGREGOR. John Hunt wishes to make a statement in explanation for the departure of a number of members of Congress.

Congressman HUNT. Let me thank you for the clear and concise explanation of your mission this morning. On behalf of the Armed Services Committee, you will notice some of us are leaving. It is not because of any discourtesy to you, sir, or because we are not interested.

The fact is we have a conflicting schedule of subcommittees that are getting ready for an important mark-up of the legislation this afternoon in the absence of Mr. Hebert.

So, if you permit me for a moment to explain, that is the reason they are leaving.

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you. I thought they were like my Harvard students. [Laughter.]

Congressman HARRINGTON. At the risk of being repetitive, to follow on Congressman Freylinghusen's question and Senator Fulbright's question, I am puzzled that this year and last year we saw a $6 billion increase in defense spending requested and if the estimates given us by the Assistant Secretary of Defense Moot are correct, we can expect a $5 billion increase in Southeast Asia.

I have seen before the tide was even out, before our committee, hundreds of millions of dollars sought for additional spending in the procurement bill for the betterment of systems that were not part of your agreement in Russia.

On three levels I am puzzled, one, sound economic policy which appeared to be both centered in the White House as a concern prior to the present occupancy in the White House looking toward the era of 1964 and 1968, public confidence that has been led to believe that somehow out of this whole business will come a reduction, not an increase, in the overall spending in the defense area and in general, whether or not in going to these talks you didn't have enough of an outline of questions in coming before Congressional committee and members of the Executive Branch did to be able to live this year with the procurement and appropriations bill as they were without adding to them in the way and with the timing I think has been chosen to do it.

I would like to have you address yourself to some of those considerations, particularly as a constituent might say to me, "What do you mean it is going to cost more for defense? I thought you fellows were negotiating for reductions in tensions and costs." I think that is the problem most of us have.

Dr. KISSINGER. It is our intention and conviction that as these talks proceed into other areas that we will be able to bring about a substantial reduction in defense expenditures as a result of these talks.

There are, of course, certain savings in the ABM program. What we are finding out is that the combination of certain trends has produced requirements which are not themselves the cause of the agreement, but which have come to a head at about the same time by accident as the agreement.

One of these problems is that for a number of years we had significantly slowed down the modernization of our strategic programs so that our strategic weapons now were essentially designed in the early 60s, while those of the Soviet Union were designed in the late 60s and this has created a certain technological requirement.

This is the reason for this additional expenditure. This other figure for Southeast Asia that you mentioned is a projection forward of current rates and may or may not be necessary, depending on how long current rates are being sustained.

Congressman HARRINGTON. I am quoting Assistant Secretary Moot.

Dr. KISSINGER. I know and he projected them forward over a period of months which may or may not be necessary because he was being proper with the Congress by giving his best estimate, but he was projecting current expenditure rates.

If there were negotiations, for example, if the offensive slows down, there are many factors that could affect this. I am just trying to give you an idea.

Thirdly, the increase in the defense spending has been caused to a considerable extent also by military pay increases which now consume about 54 percent of our defense budget. I have seen a chart—I think the Secretary of Defense can do it much better than I—that shows what the present defense establishment would cost if the pay scales were still those of eight or 10 years ago.

So, it is a combination of these factors that have produced the increase of defense costs while forces have actually be shrinking.

Senator COOPER. I would like to join with others in thanking you and showing appreciation for your very fine statement.

The first question I will ask is not one that I suggest myself, but it was asked the day the agreement was announced. I am sorry Senator Jackson is not here, but he wouldn't mind my saying he asked the question.

Are there any other understandings, secret understandings, which have not been made public or will be made public? I think we will be asked, and it is just as well to ask it now.

Dr. KISSINGER. There are no secret understandings. We have submitted to the Congress the list of all the significant agreements and interpretive statements, and so forth. What we have not done is to go through the record to see whether Ambassador Smith might have said something that they interpreted in a certain way, and this is why we put on the qualification "significant", because otherwise we would have to submit the entire record.

According to the best of our judgment, there are no secret understandings, and all the significant interpretive statements have been submitted to the Congress.

Senator COOPER. May I ask one more question? I notice in your explanation, it is said that the United States asked for a prohibition on mobile land-based missiles. You later withdrew that. But you did say that if the Soviet Union went ahead with deployment, you would consider it serious enough to break the agreement. Is the Soviet Union going ahead with mobile land-based missiles?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me make one other comment with respect to the first thing about secret understandings.

There are, of course, in the discussions, general statements of intentions. For example, we have conveyed to the Soviets what I have also said here publicly on the record: that the option of converting the Titans into submarines, given our present construction program, was not something we would necessarily carry out. But we do not consider that as a secret agreement, that sort of thing. This was simply a statement of general unilateral intentions.

Now, with respect to the land-based mobile missiles, we have made an interpretive statement according to which the deployment of land-based mobile missiles would be inconsistent with the purposes of the agreement. Then this raises the question of whether our national means of verification are adequate to monitor this.

The national means of verification are adequate to monitor over a period of time whether a land-based mobile missile is being deployed. The margin of error with respect to total numbers would be great, if you have a margin of error of five percent, and I am giving you a fictitious figure; it might be 15 percent with respect to mobile missiles.

But the fact of the matter is, what we have to monitor is not total numbers of land mobile missiles; what we have to monitor is the fact that they are deploying any of them. We are quite confident that within a reasonable period of time after the initial deployment, and maybe not in the first month, but over a three- to four-month period, and well before they can develop a substantial capability,

we will be able to tell whether they have deployed a land mobile missile and we can draw the appropriate conclusions.

So as to the fact of deploying a land mobile missile, we are confident that we will discover it well before they could deploy enough to have any effect.

Congressman MONAGAN. Dr. Kissinger, you have said that these agreements, our confidence in them, is not based on trust, but enlightened self-interest, and yet I think you would agree with any bilateral arrangements, with the credibility of the other party to the contract, where that is very important, you have also said that there is reason to believe that the area of distrust and suspicion may be at an end.

I just wonder, in view of that question of credibility, is there any specific reason that you have for coming to this conclusion?

Dr. KISSINGER. We are not basing this agreement on trust, and we believe that this agreement can be verified; and secondly, that it has adequate safeguards to prevent its being violated. We also believe that we have started a process by which we can move international relations into a new era, and we base this on the fact that we agreed with the Soviet Union over the past two years on the issue of Berlin, which has removed one of the primary causes of tension in the world for the foreseeable future, and a whole spectrum of agreements on health, space, environment, rules of navigation, that we are on the verge of making progress with them in other fields such as commercial agreements, and finally, we have signed a Declaration of Common Principles which it would have been no point to sign unless we meant to move in a major effort in that direction.

So, for all of these reasons, we believe that there is a basis, that we have an opportunity both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, to move into a new era. Whether both sides have the wisdom to do it, and even if they have the wisdom they are not caught by events in areas in which they cannot control their decision, this remains to be seen. But I think we have the opportunity to turn a significant page in history, and as far as this Administration is concerned, we are going to make a major effort in that direction.

Senator PELL. It is an excellent presentation. I have three short questions.

First, if the Soviet expenditures for arms remains static, or should decline, or ours go up, wouldn't that have a reverse effect on their willingness to move into SALT II?

Secondly, are any of the provisions of the seabed disarmament treaty in conflict with our own treaty which you have negotiated, in view of the fact that we apparently still consider the possibility of weapons of mass destruction stored on the seabed floor, and they are prohibited by the seabed disarmament treaty?

Third, why, in this set of negotiations, was the constitutionality normal course of Congressional consultation, advise as well as consent, not engaged in?

Mr. MACGREGOR. When did you stop beating your wife?

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the seabed, I am not aware that we have any intention of deploying weapons on the seabed, and we have no intention of violating the seabed agreement, so unless you know of some weapon that I am not aware of, I would have to say that this is not planned.

We believe that the defense expenditures will stay roughly in balance and that the Soviet incentive to come to an agreement will not be reduced by our being stronger. On the contrary. So the judgment has been that our strength, if anything, gives them an additional incentive to make a negotiatiton, if we do not carry it to a point where they are convinced that this is just a subterfuge for a massive effort to get ahead of them. If that should become their conviction, then, in fact, we have a problem.

I have to repeat: We have to navigate between that, on the one hand, weakening ourselves unilaterally, and on the other hand between having them see these negotiations simply as a stage by which we try to achieve superiority. Either of these things would be self-defeating.

As for the process of consultation with the Senate, as Senator Fulbright knows, this is not my specialty, but it has been my understanding that Mr. Smith and the appropriate Secretaries have been in close consultation, and we have tried from here to be on a personal basis in contact with key Senators.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Might I add in that respect, Senator Pell, that at least since have been here, that is, January 4, 1971 to date, it has been Ambassador Gerard Smith's intention, following the directions of the President, to make himself readily available to the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, here in Washington as well as in Helsinki and Vienna. I would be delighted

to talk to you further about that, but I had thought that was worked out to the reasonable satisfaction of the Members of the Congress.

Congressman FRASER. Dr. Kissinger, let me say first that I have thought that the consultations with Ambasador Smith have been good, both here in Washington and in Vienna.

I listened with some care to the answer you gave to Senator Percy's question on the ABM sites. I can appreciate the Soviets would want to have a symmetrical arrangement with ours, but I was not quite clear from your answer whether in fact you have evidence that the Soviets intend to go ahead with their option to protect an offensive missile site.

The reasons I ask that is that since building the National Capital Defense is not a bargaining chip clearly because we have now put a cap on ABM and since we have a two to three times lead over the Soviet Union building a site over the Capital is not going to give us any significant benefit from the possibility of attack. It will not even give us more time.

Unless we already know the Soviets are going to build a second ABM, why couldn't we wait on ours and save the taxpayers several billions of dollars?

Dr. KISSINGER. It depends on how you define "how do we know." We have no evidence that they have started construction. We have the impression that they have the firm intention of proceeding. I have no evidence whatever to the contrary that they do not intend to proceed.

All the conversations the Presidential party had with them left the impression that they have the firm intention of proceeding with their second site. As for the argument of how much time you gain, the effort to overwhelm, in itself, is apt to give some additional time but I would not insist that this will add a huge span of time to the warning.

Congressman ZABLOCKI. Dr. Kissinger, the President and you have made it quite clear that it would be desirable to have the treaty ratified and the Executive Agreements approved by Congress in order that Phase II could begin in October.

We fully understand the system of the Soviets and there is no ratification on their part as we have it here, and I am sure the Soviets understand that this is an election year and we have political conventions and there may be an opportunity not to meet, that is a ratification and approval of the Executive Agreements.

Is it absolutely necessary that the treaty be ratified and Executive Agreements approved by Congress before Phase II can begin, sometime in October? Indeed, cannot Ambassador Smith meet with his counterparts, even though the Senate and the Congress have not finished their work as far as the treaty and Executive Agreement are concerned?

If I may ask just a second question, I think it is in the support, but what problems were there, or why didn't we pursue with greater determination the inclusion of MIRV's in the Executive Agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to the first question, actually, the Soviets do go through a ratification procedure. They have their Supreme Soviet approve it but with all respect, it is a little more tractable than our Congress.

The reason why, really, we can have some exploratory informal talks and we probably will at various levels, but the reason it would be difficult to start formal sessions is because we have to know from what base we are operating. It is rather an embarrassing position to have a senior negotiator operate on the basis of the assumption of a ratification.

Also, it would be somewhat presumptuous towards the Congress to assume a ratification that has not in fact taken place. Yet, on the other hand, unless you make some assumptions, you really have not got a fixed base from which you can operate.

Therefore, the beginning of the second phase of SALT really has to follow congressional ratification. We understand the pressures of this year and this is simply a fact.

Now, with respect to MIRV, MIRV is a complex issue for this reason: You can count numbers with national means of verification, but it is much more difficult to determine how many warheads are confined in the master warhead.

Now, you have some indications but it is not very easy. Therefore, with respect to the deployment of MIRV, the inspection requirements have to be a little bit more rigid than would be otherwise the case.

Now, we have made two proposals, two linked proposals, one is a ban on the testing of MIRV, this we are prepared to monitor by national means of

inspection, and second, a ban on the deployment of MIRV for which we asked for spot-checks on on-site inspection. Now we considered the test ban absolutely crucial because we could have been somewhat more lenient on the frequency of on-site inspection if there had been a test ban on MIRV's because without testing, by definition, it is not easy to deploy them. It is, in fact, impossible to deploy them.

The Soviet Union, for not ununderstandable reasons, because they are behind in MIRV technology, refused a test ban. They also refused a deployment ban as such. What they proposed was a production ban but without inspection. A ban on production is totally unverifiable in the Soviet Union while they could verify ours through our budget and other methods through which our industrial production generally becomes known.

So, the Soviet counter-proposal for a production ban without a test ban was generally unacceptable to us and when we reached that stalemate, we could not proceed any further. This was the obstacle to proceeding on the MIRV's.

Congressman ZABLOCKI. What encouragement do you see, or optimism that this may be an area that in Phase II we may find some common ground on?

Dr. KISSINGER. Phase II, Mr. Congressman, will be very much more difficult than Phase I, because there, we will deal with technological problems and there we will require even more ingenuity with respect to Phase II than was shown in Phase I.

If one can have optimism with respect to it, it is because now the Soviet technology has gone somewhat further probably so that they may be more willing to accept a test ban which will at least put a limit on further deployments, and secondly, you will remember when we started these negotiations in 1969, we were going through a crisis in the Middle East and the Berlin Crisis. We were emerging out of this whole miasma of suspicion and it was the first time we engaged with the Soviets in any major negotiation, so the climate was different.

Now, we have established a pattern in which the Chief of State on our side, the President and their political leaders, can be in constant contact with each other and I believe we can perhaps move a little more creatively in the early stages of SALT I.

I must also say that the subject is more difficult. Certainly, we had conversations of the breadth and precision in Moscow that would have been unimaginable three or four years ago with respect to strategic questions, but this gives us some hope that at least we can talk about the gut issues.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Can I ask you to comment on one aspect, on the significance of ABM, so much more has been said about the agreement.

How do you evaluate what appears to me to be a renunciation of the effort to create a defense? What you have left in the ABM is surely nothing more than a token. Hasn't each country, in effect, said, "We recognize, we have no defense to almost total devastation in view of the capacities for destruction, or within the existing weapons," and if that is true, isn't this the experience, and I don't know why you would say it would be much more difficult.

If they live up to that and we give them no reason to believe we haven't accepted in good faith that our population is hostile to their weapons, and vice versa, and it seems to me it ought not to be more difficult if you believe in that.

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is a very good point. The limit on ABM's or effective ABM's of both sides, really creates a situation, as I said in my statement, in one sentence, in which the offensive weapons of both sides really have a free ride into the country of the other.

So that therefore, the difference in numbers is somewhat less significant than you would assess otherwise. There is still a danger that one side will get such an enormous numerical advantage in warheads that it can completely obliterate the force of the other.

But in the absence of significant defenses, even relatively small forces can do an enormous amount of damage.

Therefore, too, if we can move into the second phase of SALT, into an explicit recognition that both sides will try to stay away from counter-force strategies, from the one danger that now exists, or the overwhelming danger, that they will try to destroy each other, then perhaps the premium on MIRV's will be reduced, because, as you remember very well, Mr. Chairman, MIRV's were developed at first as a hedge against ABM.

So I think we will find, in perhaps unexcepted ways, that the new strategic relationship that is created by this treaty will create realizations on both sides as to the significance of usable strategic power that over a period of the next negotiations could have quite dramatic impacts.

I am very glad that you asked that.

Mr. MACGREGOR. It is very close to 12 noon. We appreciate your participation and your presence and your patience, and we thank you for launching what the President has called an effective Legislative-Executive partnership.

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LIMITED AGREEMENTS AND LONG-TERM STABILITY: A POSITIVE VIEW TOWARD SALT*

(By Jerome H. Kahan†)

The United States-Soviet Union Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have been under way for over two years. Thus far, the two nations have reached agreements to modernize the Washington-Moscow "hot line" and reduce the danger of an accidental missile launch.[1] But the negotiations have not yet yielded an agreement which limits the strategic forces deployed on each side. Indeed, the pattern of a continued arms buildup on both sides which has paralleled the talks to date has not been reversed.

However, there are grounds for optimism. On May 20, 1971, President Nixon announced that the deadlock at SALT had been broken and stated that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to ". . . . concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABM's)" and to seek "certain measures" to control strategic offensive systems.[2] Recent reports suggest that an initial accord might be reached in mid-1972—about the time of the President's planned visit to Moscow.[3] This agreement would restrict ABM systems to low levels and probably limit the number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM's) on each side.

Admittedly, an agreement along these lines would leave substantial areas of the arms race uncontrolled. In principle, a more effective agreement could be reached—for example, a comprehensive measure which banned multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) or a quantitative arrangement which limited submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) or set forces at lower levels. Nevertheless, the real choice at this point seems to be a limited agreement, hopefully representing a first step toward more comprehensive measures, or no agreement at all.

The preceding discussion raises three questions which will be explored in this article:

(1) Why would the achievement of a limited SALT agreement be in the net interest of the United States?

(2) How might this initial agreement be managed and modified to maintain long-term stability?

(3) What guidelines should the United States follow in designing its unilateral policies within the framework of a SALT agreement?

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†B.S., Queens College, 1960; M.S.E.E., Columbia University, 1961. Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution. Lecturer in International Relations, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. Member of Policy Planning and Arms Control Staff, Department of Defense, 1968–69; Physical Science Officer, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1964–68.

[1] T. Smith, *U.S. and Soviet Union Sign Two Nuclear Controls Accords*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1971, at 1, col. 6.

[2] N.Y. Times, May 21, 1971, at 2, col. 7. A simultaneous announcement was made in the Soviet Union.

[3] An initial SALT agreement will almost surely be reached before or during the President's visit to Moscow in May of 1972. *See* Getler, *Packard Is Optimistic About SALT Chances*, Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 4; Gwertzman, *U.S. Aides Expect No '71 Arms Pact*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1971, at 7, col. 1; Marder, *Arms Talks Recess*, Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1971, § A, at 8, col. 1. In his third Foreign Policy Message, President Nixon listed on his proposed agenda for his visit to Moscow the consummation of an accord on an initial strategic arms limitation agreement or, if the details of an agreement had been worked out before that time, discussion of the issues to be addressed in a second stage of the SALT negotiations. Gwertzman, *Nixon Says Soviet and U.S. Define Pact on Missiles*, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1971, at 1, col. 1; Getler, *Nixon Says Initial Limits Near*, Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1972, § A, at 12, col. 1.

II. UTILITY OF THE INITIAL AGREEMENT

The particular parameters of the agreement likely to be negotiated can be estimated with reasonable certainty from available public evidence.[4] On the defensive side, the agreement would limit the Soviet Union to approximately 100 ABM launchers around Moscow and restrict the United States to 100–200 ABM launchers deployed at Minuteman sites in Montana and North Dakota. In terms of land-based missiles, the agreement would "freeze" the United States at its present level of 1,054 ICBM's and limit Soviet forces to 1,550–1,600 ICBM's, possibly with a subceiling of 300 placed on the large SS–9 ICBM's. Since Soviet negotiators have strongly opposed sea-based missile controls, it is unlikely that SLBM limits would be part of the initial SALT package.[5]

Clearly, many details of the actual agreement cannot be predicted with confidence. For example, since the Soviet Union is in the midst of a missile buildup, the exact figure for the Soviet ICBM level would be determined both by the "cut off" date agreed upon and by whether Moscow will be permitted to complete partially constructed systems. Perhaps SLBM limitations *will* be included in the first-stage agreement. At any rate, the implications for American security and the United States-Soviet Union strategic balance would not be significantly affected by these or other variations in the actual accord as long as its essential features remained unchanged.

A. Potential Benefits

The main value of the agreement outlined above would flow from the severe limits placed on both sides' ABM systems. More than any other strategic weapon, defensive systems capable of protecting populations against missile attacks have the potential of stimulating an increase in the level of offensive armaments and creating serious instabilities. The reason for this is that one side's ABM poses a direct threat to the other side's retaliatory missile forces which in turn represent the foundation of both the United States' and the Soviet Union's deterrent posture. In contrast to counterforce threats which might endanger the survivability of one side's land-based systems, the ABM threat is far more serious since it can potentially negate both land- and sea-based missiles. With ABM's extensively deployed, the risk of nuclear war could rise—particularly in a time of tension—if one side came to believe that the other had sufficient confidence to contemplate a first-strike with its offensive weapons while relying on its defensive network to reduce damage from surviving missiles and bombers launched in retaliation.

Past United States strategic force decisions have been substantially influenced by the fear that Soviet ABM deployments would endanger our "assured destruction" deterrent capability. Indeed, the mere prospect that the Soviets *might* deploy an ABM has tended to trigger anticipatory countermeasures—witness the premature United States MIRV response in the mid-1960's to the possibility that the Soviets might deploy a large-scale ABM or convert the Tallinn air defense system into an effective ABM.[6] The United States is continuing to install MIRV's in its offensive missiles primarily for prudential reasons out of concern that the Soviets might enlarge their ABM network. During the 1960's, the Soviet Union did not share this attitude toward deterrence and ABM's, but it now appears that the Soviets have reversed their longstanding belief in the desir-

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[4] The basic elements of a potential SALT agreement can be readily predicted from the press reports of some highly credible newspaper correspondents. *See, e.g.*, Beecher, *U.S. Urges Soviets to Join in a Missiles Moratorium*, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1971, at 1, col. 6; Roberts, *A SALT Agreement Near at Hand?*, Washington Post, Oct. 6, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 4; Marder, *supra* note 3, at 8, col. 1. Estimates of Soviet land-based and sea-based missile strength are reported in Beecher, *Laird Warns of Soviet Missile Buildup Far Exceeding His Earlier Estimates*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1971, at 5, col. 3; Beecher, *Satellites Spot a Soviet Buildup for Atomic Arms*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1971, at 1, col. 8; Getler, *Sub Goals of Russia Puzzle U.S.*, Washington Post, Nov. 23, 1971, § A, at 2, col. 8.

[5] The United States and the Soviet Union appear to have agreed to postpone placing limitations on SLBM's at this time. Gwertzman, *Nixon Says Soviet and U.S. Define Pact on Missiles*, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1972, at 1, col. 1. This negative position on submarine restrictions has undoubtedly been influenced by the Soviet Union's inferiority in sea-based deterrent capabilities. *See* T. Smith, *Submarine Missile Impasse Said to Persist in Vienna*, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1972, at 6, col. 5. The possibility of SLBM limits as a second step in SALT is discussed in the text accompanying notes 28–29 *infra*.

[6] A description of the factors leading to the American MIRV decision can be found in C. ROBERTS, THE NUCLEAR YEARS; THE ARMS RACE AND ARMS CONTROL, 1945–1970, at 79–94 (1970).

ability of ABM's, and, in the context of SALT, have adopted the view that ABM's are destabilizing and should be limited to a low level.[7]

In principle, it would be possible to design a SALT agreement which banned large-scale ABM's but permitted each side to deploy thin ABM systems comparable to the United States Sentinel or full Safeguard configurations. Such systems would have nationwide coverage, contain perhaps 1,000 defensive launchers, and involve a widespread network of ABM radars. In practice, however, the presence of such negotiated ABM's would undercut most of the benefits of a SALT agreement. The uncertain effectiveness of the opponent's thin system, coupled with the fear that such a system could be rapidly expanded into a more extensive ABM, would tend to stimulate offensive countermeasures on each side. Even with the most careful attempts to formulate equitable and vertifiable ABM limits, the resultant relationship would be unstable because of each nation's desire to maintain a high degree of confidence in its relatiatory capability. Primarily for these reasons, both the United States and the Soviet Union have decided within the scope of the SALT negotiations to work toward more stringent ABM limits of the kind de scribed above.

With nationwide ABM defenses prohibited, both sides will have to rely on their offensive forces to deter China. However, the case for anti-Chinese missile defenses is highly questionable on both military and political grounds, and there is little reason to doubt the reliability of applying a retaliatory deterrent policy against China.[8] Both sides would retain sufficient weapons under the limited SALT agreement to deter China without detracting from their capabilities to deter each other, since the Chinese missile force will remain small and relatively vulnerable for the next decade. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union have little to lose and much to gain in permanently agreeing to forgo thin ABM's in order to stabilize the bilateral balance.[9]

The common interest in imposing strict controls over ABM's has been reflected in both nations' reluctance to permit deployment under a SALT agreement of extensive ABM defenses around *missile sites*. Even though such defense systems may theoretically be designed to protect ICBM's and enhance stability, there appears to be a common concern that these deployments would nonetheless provide population protection and could be seen as the first step toward a nationwide ABM system. More specifically, the Soviets may fear that the United States Safeguard system will afford population coverage because its components were originally designed for city defense and the second phase of the President's original program called for nationwide expansion. The United States may be concerned that the proximity of many Soviet ICBM sites to population centers would create an appreciable "overlap" if the Soviets were to deploy ABM's at missile sites.

With stringent limits placed on ABM's, therefore, the requirements for the United States and the Soviet Union to improve or enlarge their offensive forces would diminish. Limits on ABM's *alone* could thus dampen the competition as each side gained assurance that the prospect of large ABM deployments on the other side need no longer dominate unilateral strategic planning. At the same time, with ABM's limited through agreement, both sides would be more willing to consider moving toward mutual offensive limitations. With the premise that

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[7] The Soviet announcement of December, 1969, following the first phase of SALT in Helsinki, was interpreted to mean that the Soviets had accepted the idea of mutual deterrence. *See* Roberts, *U.S., Russia Agree on Full SALT Talks*, Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1969, § A, at 1, col. 3. In December of 1970, the Soviets proposed that ABM's be limited to the protection of Washington and Moscow only. *See* Roberts, *Soviets Propose ABM Limit*, Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1971, § A, at 1, col. 2. In July of 1971, the Soviets demonstrated not only that they were opposed to large-scale ABM deployments, but also that they appreciated the validity of the action-reaction phenomenon as it pertains to the ABM. *See* Viktorov, *Some Results and Prospects—On the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks*, Pravda, July 7, 1971, at 4. This attitude was officially confirmed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in a policy statement before the United Nations General Assembly on September 28, 1971. *See* N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1971, at 2, col. 4.

[8] Most China scholars share this view. *See, e.g.*, A. BARNETT, A NEW U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA ch. 7 (1971).

[9] Defense Secretary Laird has stated that "[t]he U.S. has indicated a willingness to modify the long-range plans for full safeguard area defense . . . if an acceptable arms control agreement with the Soviet Union can be reached." *Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972–76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget Before the House Armed Services Committee*, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 73 (1971) [hereinafter cited as *Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird*]. This position is consistent not only with recent United States proposals at SALT, but also with the *original* United States proposal which included ABM limits of fewer than 100 launchers. *See* T. Smith, *U.S. Offers Soviet Package Accord to Curb Missiles*, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1970, at 7, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Smith]. The Soviets, it might be noted, have never publicly advocated an "anti-Chinese" ABM.

ABM's will in fact be restricted, let us now explore the significance of ICBM limitations at SALT.

From the American viewpoint, it would be militarily useful to limit the number of Soviet ICBM's, even though MIRV's were not banned. The Soviet Union has tested multiple or "clustered" warheads, but has not yet demonstrated a MIRV capability and could not acquire an advanced MIR system before the late 1970's.[10] Estimates show that a Soviet SS–9 force of approximately 500 missiles outfitted with a MIRV package of three multi-megaton warheads could pose a serious threat to the survivability of our land-based Minuteman force.[11] However, to acquire a comparable capability with some 300 SS–9 ICBM's as limited by agreement, the Soviets would have to develop a more sophisticated package containing five or six single-megaton warheads of even greater accuracy. These additional technological demands could delay the date by which the Soviet Union might develop a counterforce MIRV capacity and increase the life expectancy of our Minuteman force.[12] This would give United States planners more time to develop effective countermeasures to protect our ICBM's or, in the likely event that such measures were not forthcoming, find ways of coping with this problem within the framework of future SALT discussions—a point which will be treated more fully below.

On broader political grounds, strategic offensive limitations can have considerable utility. The President has already expressed concern over the possible adverse foreign policy consequences of nuclear parity.[13] Thus, United States leaders would feel increasingly uncomfortable if the Soviets continued to deploy ICBM's at the current rate and showed signs of building toward a level of perhaps 2,000 ICBM's. In such a circumstance, the United States might be forced into the procurement of additional offensive systems to prevent the "apparent balance" from shifting too dramatically against it—even if such actions were not necessitated by military calculations. While acknowledging that small changes in the strategic relationship are not significant and that neither side could easily obtain a first-strike capability, President Nixon, it should be recalled, has emphasized that the United States *would* respond to any substantial Soviet effort to alter the balance.[14] However, pressures for new United States systems might be contained if the Soviets agreed to halt their ICBM constructions as called for

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[10] Defense Secretary Laird estimated that the accuracy of the SS–9 multiple warhead system ". . . could be substantially improved by 1975/76." *Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird*, *supra* note 9, at 46. Technical studies sponsored by the Pentagon and the CIA in the spring of 1971 reportedly concluded that "[i]t would take the Soviets two or three more years to perfect and begin deployment of a more accurate MIRV . . . and several more years to equip the entire force of SS–9s [with these systems]." Getler, *Russian Missile Faulted*, Washington Post, June 17, 1971, § A, at 15, col. 1. More recently, in early 1972 Dr. John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, testified that the Soviets might not be able to deploy an effective MIRV system until 1980. *See* Beecher, *Soviet Missile Peril*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1972, at 1, col. 4.

[11] For example, Dr. Foster, in a UPI interview, estimated that such a Soviet force, if launched against our Minuteman sites, would leave very few ICBM's surviving, probably fewer than 100. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1969, at 15, col. 1. The more widely known figure of 420 Soviet ICBM's has also been presented by Dr. Foster and Defense Secretary Laird as potentially endangering the survivability of our Minuteman force.

[12] It is difficult to be more precise in offering such a judgment. Indeed, as indicated by Dr. Foster, there is substantial disagreement within the United States government over the details of the future Soviet MIRV threat and its effect on Minuteman ICBM survivability. *See* Beecher, *supra* note 10. Nongovernmental experts question the Administration's analyses, and scientists differ among themselves. Survivability calculations are extremely dependent upon assumptions regarding the reliability and accuracy of Soviet warheads, the number of warheads permissible, and the number of SS–9's available. Alternative assumptions can lead to wide variations in calculating Minuteman survivability for a given Soviet threat—anywhere from 50 to 300 ICBM's remaining, for example. Nonetheless, one cannot escape the conclusion that the USSR could acquire the capacity severely to endanger our Minuteman force before the end of the decade. For an informative report showing in detail how analyses of the MIRV threat can differ, see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., PLANNING-PROGRAMMING-BUDGETING, DEFENSE ANALYSIS : 2 EXAMPLES (Comm. Print 1969).

[13] In his second Foreign Policy Message, President Nixon acknowledged that the Soviet Union had reached a strategic position "comparable" to that of the United States and expressed concern that this growth of power ". . . could tempt Soviet leaders into bolder challenges. It could lead them to underestimate the risks of certain policies." R. NIXON, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, FOR THE 1970's : BUILDING FOR PEACE, H.R. Doc. No. 53, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 159 (1971) [hereinafter cited as NIXON].

[14] In a press conference on October 12, 1971, President Nixon observed that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would be able to get such a decisive advantage over the other as would enable it to launch a preemptive strike or engage in international blackmail. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1971, at 18, col. 6. But in his second Foreign Policy address, the President warned that the Soviet Union ". . . should be under no illusion that we will not respond to major quantitative and qualitative improvements which threaten to upset the strategic balance." NIXON, *supra* note 13, at 171.

under SALT. American officials could justify acceptance of a Soviet edge of 500–600 ICBM's by pointing to our undisputed lead in long-range bombers, numbers of warheads, and overall force quality. Of crucial signifiance is our advantage in MIRV technology which will enable us to retain an overwhelming superiority in sea-based missile deterrent power through the 1970's, even if the Soviets gain a numerical lead in SLBM's.[15]

The Soviet Union would also derive benefits from ICBM limitations at SALT. Although the United States is already installing MIRV's on Poseidon and Minuteman missiles, the accuracy of these small-yield weapons would have to be substantially improved to pose a counterforce threat to Soviet hardened ICBM's. Moreover, the United States has officially cancelled its "hard-target kill" program and forsworn efforts to develop such a capability.[16] But Soviet planners would be understandably reluctant to rely on pledges and might nonetheless assume that we will acquire a counterforce MIRV potential within the next five years. In particular, the Soviet Union might fear that the United States will build additional, more powerful offensive missile systems in the 1970's designed for counterforce purposes. Soviet leaders could thus conclude that placing numerical limits on American land-based missiles would at least prevent the United States from pursuing this course.

More importantly, on a policy level, Soviet leaders might find a freeze at 1972 ICBM levels an effective way of maximizing their nuclear position at minimum cost without risking a massive United States counterresponse which could negate ther strategic gains. Under such an agreement, the Soviet Union's ICBM advantage would remain, and, as a result of its rapid progress in submarine construction, the Soviets could be assured of attaining at least a level of parity in SLBM's by the mid-1970's. This would provide Moscow with a sufficient military deterrent, as well as a force signifying political power.[17]

B. Relative Risks

The preceding discussion underscores the fact that an initial SALT agreement would not be without defects and difficulties. The agreement would leave large areas of the strategic offensive arms competition unconstrained. No controls would be placed over research and development programs, and qualitative improvement of existing systems would be permitted. Thus, both sides would be free to install MIRV's with improved accuracies. Moreover, the number of strategic bombers would not be restricted, and, in all probability, new offensive missile systems would be deployed on a one-for-one basis to replace existing systems. Perhaps the most serious strategic defect of the agreement is the fact that, with MIRV's permitted and defense of missile sites prohibited, fixed ICBM forces on both sides will become increasingly vulnerable. More generally, codification of the strategic balance through SALT could pose potential problems to the United States and the West if the Soviets mistakenly perceive this relationship as a foundation for taking greater diplomatic and military risks.

Despite its imperfections, however, the limited SALT agreement—indeed *any* arms control agreement—should be evaluated by comparison against the future situation which would be expected to arise in the absence of mutual limitation measures. Such a "relative risk" analysis attempts to answer the question of whether the United States strategic posture will, on balance, be improved or degraded as a result of the SALT agreement.

Let us consider the strategic environment which is likely to emerge in the late 1970's if SALT fails. Without *mutual* limits placed on ABM's, it is likely that both the United States and the Soviet Union will, at a minimum, deploy thin

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[15] The Soviets have difficulty maintaining a sea-based deterrent comparable to ours because of their geographic position vis-à-vis the United States and the fact that they are almost a generation behind us in missile-firing submarine technology. The Soviet Union's "Y-class" submarine missile, it should be recalled, resembles the American Polaris A–1 missile of the early 1960's, while the United States is presently deploying the MIRVed Poseidon missile and developing ULMS—a new underwater long-range missile system. The new Soviet SLBM under development has a range comparable to Poseidon but is *not* MIRVed, reported William Beecher in *Soviet May Have New Missile in '72*, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1971, at 7, col. 1.

[16] In response to Congressional pressure, the Pentagon cancelled a $12 million program to improve missile accuracies, and in a letter to Senator Brooke, President Nixon stated: "There is no current U.S. program to develop a hard-target MIRV capability." Washington Post, April 24, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 2.

[17] For a thoughtful and balanced discussion of Moscow's motives in entering the SALT negotiations and the possible effects of an agreement on Soviet behavior, see T. WOLFE SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE: 1945–1970 ch. 18 (1970).

nationwide defensive systems.[18] Faced with the likelihood of expanded Soviet ABM deployments and evidence of Soviet movements in this direction, the United States would almost surely take actions to increase the survivable power of its deterrent force by deploying new generation offensive systems, such as the underwater long-range missile system (ULMS), and protecting its ICBM's with "hard point" ABM systems. The level of United States strategic spending could rise by as much as $3 to 5 billion annually.[19] The Soviet Union, in turn, would probably increase its offensive missile deployments well beyond the present levels and emphasize advanced MIRV's.

The presence of a nationwide Soviet ABM network of uncertain effectiveness, and its potential for growth, would introduce uncertainties in estimates of the ability of our strategic offensive forces to inflict retaliatory damage on the Soviet Union. It would be particularly difficult for United States planners to perform reliable calculations which demonstrated that our forces could survive and impose a specified level of Soviet population fatalities, given a variety of assumptions regarding Soviet force levels, weapons performance, and attack strategies. Perhaps most significantly the deployment of Soviet ABM's could cause American leaders to fear that the credibility of our sea-based deterrent had been substantially weakened. The existence of a large Soviet offensive force would compound the problem. While free to take countermeasures without arms control constraints, the United States could not ensure that its ICBM force would remain invulnerable through the decade ahead, for there may be no reliable, cost-effective way of protecting American ICBM's against a Soviet MIRV threat.[20] At best, any increased surviving ICBM capacity which might be obtained through protective countermeasures would be offset by the attritive characteristics of an enlarged Soviet nationwide ABM system.

In the context of SALT, on the other hand, our deterrent posture would remain highly reliable throughout the decade. Although an initial agreement would not elminate the threat to our ICBM's, with Soviet ABM's severely constrained, United States sea-based forces *alone* could be assured of inflicting at least 25 percent retaliatory damage upon the Soviet Union's population. Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) threats are not imminent, and signs of Soviet progress could be countered by qualitative improvements in the Polaris submarine fleet, extending the range of the Poseidon SLBM, or, if necessary, building ULMS as a replacement for present sea-based forces.[21] Bomber capabilities, which would not be controlled, would provide diversity and thereby increase confidence in our deterrent. Put another way, a strategic situation in which a dual deterrent of American SLBM's and bombers faced only a token Soviet ABM capacity is to be preferred over a situation in which we might be able to maintain a marginal triple deterrent—but at the price of permitting the Soviets to deploy large numbers of ABM's.

Economic savings from the limited type of agreement we might expect to arise out of SALT would tend to flow from future expenditures forgone, rather than from appreciable cuts in current levels of spending. By constraining the Soviet offensive missile threat and by restricting ABM's on both sides, an agreement which placed quantitative limits on American and Soviet forces would prevent a major increase in United States strategic expenditures. On the other hand, con-

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[18] Many factors would move both sides in this direction, including the perceived need to counter Nth country missile threats and the desire to match or surpass the other side's defenses. Pressures for the ABM within the United States and the Soviet Union would be difficult to counteract if the other side's strategic forces were unrestrained.

[19] For a discussion of strategic weapons and budget issues and an analysis of possible future United States strategic expenditures, see C. SCHULTZE, A. RIVLIN, E. FRIED, & N. TEETERS, SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 1972 BUDGET chs. 3–4 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SCHULTZE].

[20] Even Defense Secretary Laird acknowledged that the planned Safeguard deployment might not provide adequate protection for our ICBM's and indicated that the United States is investigating alternative ways of preventing these missiles from becoming vulnerable—including improved "hard site" ABM's, "super-hardening" of ICBM sites, and land-mobile systems. *See Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird, supra* note 9, at 71. However, many experts argue that none of these alternatives can provide effective protection for our ICBM's. *See, e.g.*, York, *Military Technology and National Security*, 221 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 17 (Aug. 1969).

[21] In early 1971 Defense Secretary Laird acknowledged that there was "no immediate concern" over the survivability of our Polaris and Poseidon submarines, but observed that the Soviets are working on new ASW techniques. *Statement of Defense Secretary Laird, supra* note 9, at 68. Scientific opinion supports the view that "breakthroughs" in ASW are extremely unlikely to occur during the next decade, given the complexity of the problem and the availability of offensive countermeasures. For a summary of antisubmarine warfare, see INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, STRATEGIC SURVEY: 1970, at 12–17 (1971).

tinuation of programs which were not affected by the agreement, permissible replacements of obsolescent systems, and increased emphasis on readiness and monitoring programs would make it unlikely that the United States could substantially reduce the annual strategic arms budget.

A SALT agreement would, of course, introduce a new uncertainty into the strategic equation—the possibility that the Soviets might violate its terms or abrogate the accord and mount a massive buildup in an attempt to gain advantage. But these dangers must be put into perspective in evaluating relative risks.

To begin with, the United States would be able to verify the agreed restrictions with a high degree of confidence through national means. The number of deployed ICBM's, SLBM's, and ABM's can be estimated quite accurately, without onsite inspection; indeed this is done as a matter of course by the Department of Defense in planning our strategic forces. The Soviets could attempt to conceal their deployment activities, but this would involve considerable technical difficulties and cost as well as a high risk of discovery.[22] In addition, it is not clear why the Soviets would necessarily be driven to attempt to conceal their missile deployments under an arms control agreement and not try to do so in the *absence* of arms control constraints. On the contrary, a case can be made that the Soviets would have *less* incentive to do so in the context of a mutual agreement which explicitly commits them to certain arrangements. And there would be little payoff for the Soviets in undertaking an evasion program unless they could be reasonably certain of gaining a meaningful advantage—a most unlikely prospect.

Even with a delay in our capacity to detect, we could be certain of identifying Soviet violations before they became significant enough to pose a threat to our deterrent or to dramatically alter the numerical balance. The most worrisome prospect for Soviet cheating lies in the area of ABM's, since successful clandestine efforts to upgrade missile defenses could pose a serious threat to our retaliatory deterrent capacity. With stringent limitations placed on ABM's and associated radars, however, it is highly improbable that the Soviets could successfully conceal deployments of substantial numbers of ABM launchers leading to a meaningful defensive capacity or convert air defense systems into substantial missile defense functions without early detection by the United States. In general, with our MIRV's fully deployed and continued qualitative improvement of all systems, we would have a cushion against uncertainties and could tolerate delay and ambiguity in detecting possible Soviet violations. Consequently, the Soviets would not be able to rapidly deploy defensive or offensive systems after a sudden abrogation on such a scale that our security would be threatened before we could take appropriate counteractions.

Finally, "relative risk" analyses can be performed on a political as well as military level. Although the initial agreement would codify the Soviet Union's position of nuclear parity, American deterrent forces should be sufficient to dissuade the Soviet Union from attempting to exploit its strategic power for purposes of blackmail or coercion. Not only would our strategic forces retain the clear capacity to inflict catastrophic damage, but, on an overall basis, our strategic posture would remain numercially comparable to that of the Soviets. This makes it improbable that Kremlin leaders would underestimate either the capabilities of our forces or the willingness of the United States to protect its interests. Nonetheless, having overcome its past position of strategic inferiority, there is still the possibility that the Soviet Union might see the changed nuclear balance as enabling it to pursue an aggressive foreign policy. However, the strategic relationship in the *absence* of agreed limitations would not necessarily be more desirable from the American viewpoint. Even with a major increase in expenditures, the United States could not regain strategic superiority, and an uncontrolled arms race might work to our disadvantage. At best, we would remain equal and be confronted with whatever problems parity may bring.

In sum, measured against military and political criteria, a limited SALT agreement appears to be in the net United States interest. Undoubtedly, the United States would always be able to retain an adequate nuclear posture. But our strategic deterrent could be maintained under a SALT agreement with greater confidence and at less cost than would otherwise be the case. This conclusion is further strengthened by the realization that the initial agreement can be im-

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[22] An excellent analysis of United States verification capabilities as applied to a SALT agreement can be found in Scoville, *Verification of Nuclear Arms Limitations*, 26 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 6 (Oct. 1970). It might be noted that the relative difficulty of verifying a MIRV ban in contrast to launcher limitations is perhaps the major factor responsible for the probable exclusion of MIRV's from the initial SALT accord.

proved through further mutual United States-Soviet efforts—an issue treated in the following section.

III. IMPROVING THE AGREEMENT

The foregoing discussion highlighted the fact that only minimal constraints would be placed on American and Soviet strategic offensive systems under the terms of the initial agreement. Although many new weapons programs and improvements can be stabilizing—for example, more secure sea-based systems and "hardening" of ICBM's—an uncontrolled continuation of the arms competition within the bounds of agreement could make it difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union substantially to ease tensions, and, even more worrisome, could call into question the strategic value of the initial agreement. How can the benefits of SALT be assured in light of these problems?

A. Basic Approaches

The modalities of the initial agreement can be designed to provide flexibility and facilitate change. For example, the United States and the Soviet Union might set a limit of perhaps three years on the agreement, at which time this "interim" arrangement would lapse unless renewed and possibly modified by both parties. Moreover, the agreement itself could take a variety of forms, ranging from an informal understanding to a formal accord. A combined arrangement could be reached, with ABM's limited by treaty and offensive weapons constrained through a less formal measure, such as an exchange of letters, which could be more easily modified.[23]

Whatever the form of the initial agreement—and whether it is structured in one or two parts—it will undoubtedly contain a clause enabling either side to withdraw from the arrangement at any time if its supreme national interests are jeopardized. The overarching objective of both sides, however, should be to ensure that neither side exercises the withdrawal option. This, in turn, requires mutual efforts to maintain and modify the initial measure as necessary.

Once an initial agreement is effected, therefore, it would be advisable for the United States and the Soviet Union immediately to organize a mechanism for continuous meetings, perhaps forming a standing Joint Commission. Through this mechanism, the parties could monitor the agreement by discussing the precise interpretations of restrictions and clarifying actions by either side which might otherwise generate false alarms regarding compliance.[24] Equally important, the Commission could be used as a basis for substantive discussions of future stability problems and an examination of specific way of improving the agreement—much like the exploratory phase of SALT.[25]

Within the framework of the SALT Commission, systematic attempts should be made to minimize uncertainty and maximize stability as both sides continue to pursue strategic weapons activities which are not prohibited by the basic agreement. For example, one side could notify the other in advance of developmental testing programs and future force procurement plans as permitted by the agreement. Perhaps mutually agreed guidelines could be established to assist both sides in making unilateral strategic force decisions which would not be viewed by the other side as threatening. Both parties might also reach an understanding not to replace existing systems on a one-to-one basis, but to work toward postures which contained fewer offensive forces of greater survivability. Agreed procedures could be followed in implementing such a "mutual modernization" program, with prior notification and approval of planned replacements.

Going beyond a strategic dialogue and tacit rules of restraint, specific weapons control measures could be formally negotiated. It may, in fact, prove necessary to reach explicit agreements in order to achieve results.[26] A variety of measures could be considered.

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[23] Reports now indicate that the first-stage SALT accord will probably take this form. *See* Doder, *U.S. Seeks Arms Pact Financing*, Washington Post, Mar. 10, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 8. For a comprehensive treatment of precedents for informal agreements, as well as an analysis of the alternative forms a SALT agreement might take and the role Congress might play, see Bunn, *Missile Limitation: By Treaty or Otherwise*, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1970).

[24] It would be desirable for both sides to reach an "anti-jamming" understanding wherein each would agree not to interfere with the unilateral verification capabilities of the other—notably reconnaissance satellites and externally based radars.

[25] It would be preferable to initiate these discussions on a working level immediately, and not wait until the agreement is about to lapse or until one side threatens to abrogate. Indeed, it would be advantageous if both sides could agree to establish such a commission in the context of negotiating the *initial* agreement. This would more firmly commit the parties to the agreement to the task of preserving the stability of SALT.

[26] For a discussion of the inherent difficulties in holding a productive American-Soviet strategic dialogue, the need for explicit agreement, and a description of an informal "reciprocal action" procedure, see Kahan, *Strategies for SALT*, 23 WORLD POLITICS 171 (1971).

To begin with, there could be an agreement simply to reduce obsolescent systems. Such a mutual "bonfire" could be more politically acceptable than unilateral moves to phase out obsolete programs. Under such an arrangement, for example, the United States could eliminate its 54 Titan ICBM's while the Soviet Union phased out a fraction of its force of 220 older-generation land-based missiles.

Of more strategic significance, the United States and the Soviet Union could agree to extend the limits of the initial SALT agreement to cover categories of offensive systems not originally included. The first order of business might be the issue of placing limits on numbers of SLBM's as well as ICBM's.

Strategic policy experts consider sea-based missiles to be stabilizing, since these systems are highly survivable and best suited for retaliatory rather than first-strike missions. From this perspective, the Soviet Union's SLBM buildup should not alarm American defense analysts. Nonetheless, American officials are concerned that the growing Soviet Polaris-type submarine fleet will pose an increased threat to the survivability of our bombers. Pentagon planners fear that Soviet SLBM's launched from close range can reduce the warning time needed to permit our B–52 forces to become airborne before they are destroyed on their bases. Limiting the number of Soviet SLBM's would diminish this threat and enable American planners to take more effective countermeasures to preserve our bomber deterrent.[27]

On the all-important political level, if the Soviets acquired a submarine force substantially larger than ours, surpassing us in numbers of SLBM's *and* ICBM's, American leaders might *not* view our advantage in warheads and bombers as adequate offsetting factor. Indeed, the Secretary of Defense recently stated that the United States would be placed at a "very great political disadvantage" if the Soviet Union gained superiority in missile-firing submarines,[28] he thus requested, for fiscal year 1973, funds of almost $1 billion to accelerate the ULMS program, primarily as a means of forestalling such an imbalance.[29] Thus, even if Soviet ICBM's were limited, the United States might be motivated to build additional strategic offensive forces in order to counter the Soviets' overriding numerical missile advantage. For example, the United States might move even more rapidly to deploy the ULMS sea-based system than military reasons alone would dictate, introducing this weapon as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, the existing Polaris fleet. But, if the Soviet submarine deployments were constrained by a SALT agreement, United States policy concerns would be alleviated and the procurement of strategic systems for purely political purposes would be less likely to arise.

Although opposed to initial limitations on sea-based missiles, Soviet negotiators might accept an agreement at a later date which permitted them to complete all units under construction and led to a numerically superior Soviet SLBM force. Such a measure would seem to be in the Soviet Union's interest for two reasons. First, it would provide the Soviet Union with a sea-based deterrent of sufficient size to offset its geographic and technical inferiorities, and Soviet leaders would have the option of eventually installing MIRVed missles in their submarines. Second, it would prevent the United States from adding to its sea-based strength by introducing ULMS as a *supplement* to the present fleet of 41 Polaris submarines. This would not only minimize the military threat from the United States, but cement Soviet superiority in overall numbers of missiles.

As a further step, numerical limits could then be placed on strategic bombers. Soviet inferiority in this area suggests that such a measure would not be negotiable, but the United States might be prepared to accept a bomber limit of 250—the number of B–1 aircraft which might eventually replace our present 500-unit B–52 force—in return for a Soviet agreement not to increase their present force of 200 long-range bombers. An attempt could also be made to set a ceiling on Soviet intermediate- and medium-range missiles and medium-range

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[27] In his Fiscal Year 1972 Defense Report, Secretary Laird outlined a number of measures to be taken to increase the survivability of our bombers, notably dispersal of bases, introducing a rapid-start capability for the B–52's, and deploying a radar warning system against Soviet SLBM's. *See Statement of Secretary of Defense Laird, supra* note 9, at 66, 70.

[28] Getler, *Laird Says Soviet Rushes Sub Fleet*, Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1971, § A, at 13, col. 1.

[29] Getler & Wilson, *Laird to Press Rise in Spending*, Washington Post, Feb. 16, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 1.

bombers in return for the United States accepting some limits on numbers of forward-based tactical aircraft deployed in Western Europe and on aircraft carriers. This issue created a deadlock earlier in SALT, but after gaining the experience and confidence of a working agreement, some accommodation might be found.

Specific constraints could also be placed on air-defense systems, including prohibitions against modernizing existing bomber defense networks, as well as agreed reductions of surface-to-air missiles (SAM's) and associated radars. Such measures would contribute to stability by alleviating concerns on each side that the other side might "upgrade" its air-defense system and acquire a clandestine ABM capability in violation of the basic agreement. Moreover, they would help ensure the reliability of both sides' bomber deterrent forces—an objective which could become increasingly desirable as ICBM's become less survivable.

Looking further ahead, although there seems to be no cause for concern over ASW "breakthroughs," selected restrictions might be added to the basic agreement as a means of reducing mutual fears over the possibility that sea-based systems might become increasingly vulnerable toward the end of the decade. For example, an agreement could be reached whereby neither side's nuclear-powered attack submarines are permitted to cross an agreed and monitored sonar barrier. In principle, this measure would permit both sides to maintain a reliable deterrent force with their offensive ballistic missile submarines while preventing attack submarines from crossing into areas behind the barrier and posing an immediate threat to the other side's offense. As a complementary measure, a limit could be placed on the number of hunter-killer submarines each side might deploy.

B. ICBM Vulnerability: A Specific Case

Perhaps the most obvious issue for bilateral attempts to improve the initial SALT agreement concerns the problem of future ICBM vulnerability. American officials have raised the possibility that the existence of vulnerable ICBM's could create instabilities which might lead to a breakdown of deterrence in a time of tension. Even if our sea-based forces and bombers remained secure and capable of inflicting high levels of damage, it is argued, there might be some incentive for the Soviets to launch a first-strike against our land-based missiles. In a severe crisis, for example, Kremlin leaders, fearing that the United States was about to fire its ICBM's, might decide on such an action in an attempt to limit damage to their country. By withholding their sea-based systems and bombers as a direct threat to our population, the Soviets might believe that we woud be inhibited from mounting a retaliatory response. Furthermore, the United States is apparently reluctant to adopt a "launch on warning" doctrine as a way of preventing our ICBM's from being destroyed in a surprise attack, since this would tend to increase the risk of inadvertent missile launchings. For these reasons, the United States has adopted "crisis stability" as a criterion for deterrence, and has already taken actions to enhance the survivability of its ICBM's through silo hardening and ABM defenses.[30]

The initial SALT agreement, as pointed out earlier, would prohibit meaningful Safeguard ABM protection of our Minuteman force. Consistent with its "crisis stability" objective, however, the United States might seek to modify the agreement to permit additional protective measures for Minuteman, possibly including deployment of "hard point" defenses specifically designed to defend missile silos. If faced with no other choice, rather than retain vulnerable systems, the United States might decide to reduce and possibly eliminate its ICBM force, but might hesitate to do so unilaterally since this would leave the Soviets with a massive monopoly in land-based missiles, thereby shifting the numerical missile balance against this nation. Moreover, because deterrence must operate on a bilateral

[30] As stated by Defense Secretary Laird, one of the Administration's four official "criteria for sufficiency" is to provide ". . . no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis." *Statement of Defense Secretary Laird, supra* note 9, at 62. The President and senior United States officials apparently interpret this objective to mean that the United States must not permit its ICBM force to become vulnerable and have specifically rejected the possibility of a "launch-on-warning" doctrine as indicated by the President's second Foreign Policy Message. NIXON, *supra* note 13, at 170–73. *See also* Beecher, *Nixon Questions Atomic Strategy*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1970, at 6, col. 1. Nongovernmental experts have further questioned the logic of the "crisis stability" criterion, arguing that the Administration's scenarios for Soviet attacks against our ICBM's are implausible, and concluding that we need not protect our ICBM's because our sea-based missile forces provide sufficient deterrence. A discussion of these issues can be found in SCHULTZE, *supra* note 19, at 40–43.

basis, stability could be similarly endangered if the Soviet Union's ICBM force became vulnerable. Thus, the United States would find it useful—if not essential—to obtain Soviet cooperation and reciprocity in seeking solutions to the ICBM problem.

However, the Soviet Union may not share these American objectives or concerns, and may be reluctant to accept American proposals for ICBM reductions or protective arrangements. Kremlin leaders put far greater stock in ICBM's than do their counterparts in the United States, and this may help explain their decision to build a force of over 1,600 ICBM's—possibly at the expense of other military systems. The Soviets apparently see ICBM's as a sign of political power, and may view their advantage in ICBM's as a counterweight to our advantage in sea-based SLBM effectiveness as well as our substantial edge in strategic bomber capabilities. Soviet planners may also be constructing a large land-based missile capacity as a means of acquiring a counterforce capability against the American Minuteman force—if not part of a first-strike doctrine, then simply out of the prudential desire to be in a superior "warfighting" position. Furthermore, Soviet planners may not fear our counterforce threat as much as we fear theirs, and, in any event, may favor different countermeasures. For example, the Soviets seem to consider land-mobile ICBM's a feasible alternative to fixed land-based missiles, but the United States has tended to dismiss this option for a variety of technical and domestic political reasons. And the "superhardening" of Soviet ICBM's—which may already be under way—could be quite effective against small American missile warheads, while strengthening the hardness of American missile silos will not bring long-term protective benefits against a Soviet MIRVed force of high yield, accurate warheads.

Even if both sides could agree on the problem and the solutions, practical technical and verification problems would arise in formulating mutual arrangements for ICBM protection. Consider, for example, attempts to design an agreement permitting both sides to deploy equivalent "hard-point" ABM systems to defend their ICBM's which, at the same time, would not appear as a first step to an area ABM. Among the ideas generated for satisfying these objectives are schemes wherein the United States would deploy a newly developed short-range defense system at a designated number of Minuteman sites in the Midwest while the Soviets would deploy their ABM system east of the Ural Mountains, removed from the highly dense population centers of Western Russia. Such an arrangement might be negotiable in principle, but it would surely take substantial time and effort to consummate compared to the simpler agreements contained in an initial SALT measure.

Because of the many asymmetries in American and Soviet strategic forces and attitudes, it will undoubtedly be difficult to negotiate a formal solution to the problem of ICBM vulnerability. However, it might be possible to apply the less formal procedure of influencing unilateral actions through SALT.

In addressing the ICBM issue, for example, both sides could attempt to identify a set of mutually acceptable measures which were designed to improve the survivability of each side's land-based missiles but which would not be viewed by the other side as endangering its deterrent. In conjunction with formulating rules for protective measures, the United States could introduce "freedom to mix" provisions which would permit each side to vary its proportion of land- and sea-based missiles within an agreed overall limit—a level no greater, and preferably lower, than the sum total of each side's existing land- and sea-based forces.[31] We could then reduce our ICBM force while retaining the option to construct additional sea-based missiles if needed to satisfy our deterrent objectives and maintain a stable strategic relationship. This formula might be acceptable to the Soviets, since they could increase their sea-based strength by shifting substantial forces from land to sea without seriously compromising their ICBM power. If sucessful, "freedom to mix" could enhance mutual stability by leading both sides to rely more heavily on sea-based missiles, thus making it at once more feasible and less imperative to protect the remaining land-based missile forces. Over the longer term, both sides might move toward exclusive reliance on sea-based systems, since this strategic configuration would eliminate the instabilities associated with accurate MIRV's.

As a consequence of implementing these arrangements for coping with the ICBM problem, it may prove practicable to negotiate explicit measures. But, even if this outcome cannot be obtained, the informal approach can maintain and enhance mutual stability through coordinated unilateral weapons decisions.

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[31] The proposal at SALT put forth by the United States in July, 1970, contained such a "freedom to mix" provision, but bombers as well as land- and sea-based missiles were included in the overall quota. T. Smith, *supra* note 9, at 1, col. 8.

IV. UNILATERAL PLANNING AND ARMS CONTROL

The foregoing sections have demonstrated how SALT can help the United States achieve its strategic objectives through agreed limitations and continuing bilateral contacts. Nonetheless, there will be considerable room for unilateral strategic force and policy decisions within the bounds of a SALT agreement, and it is therefore important to consider the question of how our unilateral planning can maximize the benefits of SALT.

The United States would undoubtedly abide by the agreed limitations. If certain prohibitions have an unclear interpretation, the SALT Commission should be used for clarification. If, at some future time, the agreement is judged to be disadvantageous to American security and appropriate modifications cannot be implemented, the withdrawal option can always be exercised.

In areas unaffected by the agreement, the United States should structure its force decisions to create a political climate and weapons conditions conducive to improving the basic measure. The guiding rule should be to maintain the viability of our deterrent without posing a threat to the Soviet deterrent, endangering the stability of the initial agreement, or foreclosing future SALT options. This would not only argue against programs which are specifically designed to provide the United States with a first-strike capacity against the Soviets' strategic force, but would counsel against deploying systems which are ambiguous in terms of their first or second strike potential. Furthermore, it would also suggest that the United States be sensitive to the possibility that the Soviets might react politically as well as militarily to our decisions. We should recognize that the Soviets might be motivated to "match" our weapons systems to preserve an overall balance of forces even if such reactions made little sense in strategic terms.

Difficult as it might be to assess Soviet reactions or to apply arms control criteria precisely, a deliberate effort should be made to apply these guidelines not only to deployment decisions but to the research and development, flight test, and procurement phases of weapons programs. Throughout this spectrum of decisions, the type, timing, and scope of each American program should be evaluated in terms of its potential effect on Soviet reactions and prospects for further limitations. Short-term gains for improving our deterrent through rapid modernization or qualitative improvements should be balanced against the possible long-term adverse consequences of these actions for stability and arms control. "Relative risk" calculations should be systematically included as part of the Pentagon's force planning procedures.

Such a policy would require the United States to loosen somewhat the degree of conservatism applied to strategic planning and to place self-imposed constraints on the amount of effort devoted to "readiness programs" which would undoubtedly be instituted under a SALT agreement for security reasons and to facilitate Senate ratification of an agreement. Premature force decisions taken to hedge against future Soviet threats of low probability should be avoided, and, in many instances, reliance on "high confidence" measures to ensure survivability and penetrability might have to be forgone in favor of measures which are less reliable but also less provocative. To be sure, if procurement decisions on new systems are deferred because of SALT, we might have to mount a costly crash program if an agreement does not materialize. On the other hand, if unilateral restraint leads to an appropriate phase-two SALT arrangement, we may not find it necessary to procure certain expensive systems at all. More generally, as noted above, policies of unilateral restraint could bring the ultimately greater benefits of an improved SALT agreement.

As an example of American strategic planning under arms control, a major new program such as ULMS should be held in the advanced development stage until and unless clear signs of Soviet ABM or ASW improvements are seen. Such restraint would be feasible under an agreement which limited ABM's, even if no explicit restrictions were placed on ASW. As a hedge, against Soviet ASW progress, greater emphasis should be given to anti-ASW measures for our existing Polaris fleet, and, if necessary, Poseidon could be replaced with a longer-range SLBM. In addition, more effective penetration aids should be placed on our missile and bomber forces. These moves would increase our deterrent without threatening the Soviets—in contrast to decisions to increase the number of offensive delivery vehicles or the number of MIRV's on each American system.

As another element of its unilateral policy under SALT, the United States would have to adopt an appropriate attitude toward the relationship between

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weapons decisions and SALT negotiations. On the one hand, SALT seems to have induced some restraint and inhibited the United States from taking destabilizing actions—witness the reluctance to move ahead with large-scale ABM deployments and the rejection of counterforce MIRV capabilities. On the other hand, the United States has followed a strategy of "negotiating from strength," under which weapons programs tend to be thought of as bargaining chips to be used at the SALT table. Our MIRV program would probably have continued if SALT did not exist. But it can be credibly argued that SALT saved the Administration's ABM program from Congressional defeat, since the "bargaining-chip" argument proved strong enough to override opposition to Safeguard on cost and effectiveness grounds.[32] Although the Soviets' continued ICBM buildup may well be motivated by the same reasoning, Moscow's tactics might, in part, be a response to ours.

In certain circumstances, putting pressure on the other side to accept restrictions on his activities can represent a sound and sensible negotiating strategy. Indeed, it is quite possible that unilateral American restraint in areas of interest to the Soviet Union might reduce its incentive to accept limitations on important programs. If a SALT agreement does emerge, perhaps the Administration's tactic could be considered a success. On the other hand, "negotiating from strength" tends to work directly against arms control goals, as one side seeks to acquire more "chips" in response to the other side's moves. Thus, in all probability, the Administration's strategy degraded the effectiveness of any resultant agreement, since it might have been possible to reach a more comprehensive agreement at lower force levels if both sides had exercised unilateral restraint earlier in the SALT process and not entered into an additional arms competition for negotiating purposes.

In an attempt to strike a balance between negotiating needs and realistic restraint, the United States might be guided by four criteria in deciding how to relate its future strategic weapons decisions to SALT once an initial agreement has been reached.

First, the United States should maintain momentum on developmental programs designed to offset potential threats to our retaliatory capability, but avoid moving these systems into the flight test and procurement stage unless such actions are judged essential for maintaining a deterrent worthy of confidence.

Second, the United States should pay particular attention to exercising unilateral restraint on programs which might seriously threaten the stability of the initial agreement or foreclose options for future mutual agreements which could increase our own longer-term security.

Third, the United States should not permit the need for bargaining chips to become the major motive for continuing programs which would otherwise be halted on grounds of security, cost, or effectiveness.

Finally, in pursuing a particular policy of weapons restraint, the United States should indicate to the Soviet Union that continued restraint on our part would require reciprocity—not simply a symmetrical Soviet response, but a response which removed the threat our program was designed to meet.

It may not be possible to fully apply all these criteria simultaneously in every case, but they should all play a role in unilateral program decisions. At the same time, the practical difficulties associated with unilateral restraint should not be underestimated. Therefore, while attempting to follow a stabilizing policy on its own, the United States should not lose sight of SALT.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Nuclear parity will not automatically ensure strategic stability in the face of changing weapons technology and the mutual misperceptions which characterize

[32] During the spring and summer of 1970, the Nixon Administration argued that continuation of the Safeguard ABM program provided the United States with leverage for achieving agreement. For example, Henry Kissinger reportedly told senators that the Safeguard system was vital in terms of providing a "bargaining chip" with which to persuade the Soviets that a ceiling should be placed on SS–9's. *Id.* The Administration's basic negotiating strategy was confirmed and defended by other officials such as Deputy Defense Secretary Packard. *See Hearings on the Arms Control Implications of the Current Defense Budget Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.*, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 169–70 (1971). This strategy was partly responsible for the decision in early 1972 to accelerate sea-based missile programs as suggested by R. Levine in *New Pentagon Budget to Combine Needs with Politics, Calls for $1 Billion Spending Increase*, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 1972, at 30, col. 1. SALT may also have had the ironic effect of inhibiting the United States from phasing out obsolete weapons, such as Titan II or older model B–52's, in hopes of being able to negotiate a *quid pro quo* with the Soviets.

the nuclear competition. Yet unilateral policies have been only marginally successful in achieving stability in the past, and sole reliance on this approach will become increasingly inadequate in the future. SALT, on the other hand, offers the United States and the Soviet Union the opportunity to find ways of managing their strategic posture within a bilateral framework.

The limited initial agreement likely to be negotiated at SALT would contain the competition and help both sides maintain credible deterrent forces in the 1970's. However, such an arrangement would represent only the beginning of the search for stability; sustained bilateral efforts will be needed to maintain a mutually secure nuclear relationship during the coming decade, and both superpowers must commit themselves to this task. But whatever the evolution of SALT, there will continue to be a need for intelligent unilateral strategic policies on both sides—policies which recognize the interlocking nature of American and Soviet strategic postures and leave open options for further enhancing stability through negotiations.

Statement of Edward F. Snyder on Behalf of Friends Committee on National Legislation

As a Committee which is widely representative of Friends' groups in the United States, but which does not attempt to speak for all Friends, we appreciate this opportunity to comment on the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement and associated Protocol signed in Moscow May 26, 1972.

The signing of international agreements in general, and especially agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., on complex and controversial subjects, should be the cause of great rejoicing. We are therefore glad that nearly four years of negotiations have borne fruit in the Treaty agreement and protocol now submitted to the Congress.

We welcome this evidence that these two great powers recognize their mutual interest on matters of national security. But we also wish to make the following brief comments which suggest the ambivalence we feel toward these agreements.

These are positive aspects, in our opinion:

1. The concept of nuclear parity as an acceptable state of affairs between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is confirmed. Hopefully this may encourage an end to the illusory search for superiority in nuclear arms.
2. Each side recognizes there may be a point beyond which it does not gain more security with more weapons.
3. Each side recognizes its own vulnerability and the devastating futility of nuclear war as an instrument of national policy.
4. Specifically, the limitation to two ABM sites in each country is a positive factor. The limitation on the construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers and additional submarine-based ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines except as replacements is also constructive.

These are important and significant, though small, steps and we applaud them. If they stood alone, we would have no difficulty in supporting the agreements wholeheartedly.

But there are other aspects and implications from these agreements which are not so positive.

1. Secretary of Defense Laird has indicated that the approval of the ABM Treaty is linked to a huge increase in military spending. We ask the Foreign Relations Committee to look at this proposition very, very carefully. If the Committee accepts this "bargaining chip" theory, it will be buying an expanding military budget on into the indefinite future.

[Press deadlines have made it impossible for the text of this article to be updated beyond April 1, 1972. Newspaper reports since that date strongly suggest that (1) SLBM limitations *will* be included in the first stage agreement; (2) ABM's will be limited to two installations for each country, placed "symmetrically," with the United States deploying ABM's around Washington to match the Soviet installation protecting Moscow, and the Soviet Union deploying ABM's around one ICBM complex to match the United States ABM installation protecting the Minuteman site at Grand Forks, N.D.; and (3) freedom-to-mix provision will be included, applicable to missiles only but permitting shifting between land-based and sea-based missiles. Washington Post, May 3, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 4. *See also* Washington Post, May 2, 1972, § A, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, May 3, 1972, at 3, col. 5; *id.*, May 2, 1972, at 1, col. 4. Despite these changes in the expected contours of the final agreement, the concepts presented and the evaluative criteria discussed in this article will remain relevant to consideration of that agreement, if and when it appears.—Ed.]

For many years the very expensive national military program was sold to Congress on the basis of a military threat to the United States from the U.S.S.R. and China. Now, fortunately, that fear is fading under the impact of time and events, and is confirmed by President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow this year.

How, then, can Congress be persuaded to spend even larger sums annually for military purposes? The Administration suggests a "Catch-22" solution: by agreeing to arms control arrangements. Instead of arms control argreements reducing military spending, it is necessary to spend *more* so we will have more bargaining chips and more weapons to agree not to produce or deploy in the next round of negotiations.

If the Congress accepts the ABM Treaty as a part of a package which includes increased military spending, it will be increasingly difficult to cut the military budget in the future, and much of the positive value of the SALT agreements will be vitiated. New military spending will lead to increased research, development and deployment to continue the spiralling arms race. Again next year and the year after, Congress will be asked to spend more money to step up the arms race in the hope there will be a later agreement to step it down. This is an expensive and dangerous road to take.

2. The agreements encourage more research on ABM systems and Secretary Laird has promised that "we will vigorously pursue a comprehensive ABM technology program."

Even more military research and development will go for offensive weapons. The limitation on launchers puts a premium on development and refinement of programs to build bigger and better submarines like Trident, to put more nuclear weapons on each launcher, and to make them more accurate.

3. The ABM Treaty authorizes the construction of up to 100 ABM launchers and interceptor missiles around Washington, D.C. We oppose construction of such an ABM system because it would be a waste of funds which are badly needed elsewhere, because it would be ineffective and unreliable, and because it has already been rejected by Congress and is not wanted by the people of the area.

4. The ABM Treaty by preventing construction of ABM sites around major population centers makes clear beyond doubt that millions of Soviet and American citizens would die in a nuclear exchange. This confirms the fact that there is no place to hide and no hope for survival in ABM and civil defense systems. "Deterrence" is formally recognized as the keystone of national security. By some curious alchemy of the arms race, we are told we are more secure because we are less secure.

These agreements enshrine the balance of terror as national policy. The Congress and the Administration must move quickly forward from this position. We are glad to note that the preamble to the ABM Treaty states the parties' "intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament."

The most effective way to assure that these will be more than mere words on paper is to cut the military budget, not increase it. Some progress toward world disarmament can come by agreement, but, in our opinion, more rapid progress will come by example, interlaced with occasional agreements on key points.

In summary, we urge the Foreign Relations Committee and the Congress to approve these agreements *if* it is understood such approval does not require increased military spending and, in fact, permits significant reductions, and *if* it is understood that an ABM system for Washington is not required and need not be built.

If the price for approving these agreements is a $6.3 billion increase in new military funding as requested by the Administration and the construction of a multi-billion dollar ABM system around Washington, the cost is too high. The precedents which would be set are too dangerous. In these circumstances, it would be better to allow the agreements to remain as they are now, signed by the two heads of state on the premise and with the hope that they represent what each nation conceives to be in its own best interest in any event, and are thus self-executing. Hopefully negotiations for SALT II would result in an arms control agreement which would reduce military spending rather than increase it.

Hopefully, also, the Congress and the public can have a larger role in future negotiations. This would help avoid the current situation in which the President reaches an agreement in secret sessions and then presents it to Congress

and the public on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The public has been greatly handicapped during this entire negotiation by lack of information as to the precise goals which are being sought.

We suggest these goals for the next round of discussions which might occur in more than one forum simultaneously:

(1) Dismantle even those ABMs which are now being constructed or are in place.

(2) Establish a permanent limitation on launchers, prevent construction of mobile land-based launchers, and commence a phased reduction of the total number of permitted launchers.

(3) Initiate a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapons testing.

(4) Withdraw nuclear weapons from bases outside national boundaries of the nuclear powers. This action should be coupled with a non-first-use agreement.

ROOSEVELT, N.Y., *July 11, 1972.*

Senator J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: In connection with the hearings conducted by your Committee relative to the Moscow agreements on the control of strategic arms, I am submitting below my statement on this subject. I respectfully request that this statement and the accompanying copy of my letter addressed to the *Christian Science Monitor* dated 6/14/72 be included as part of the record of those hearings.

STATEMENT ON THE MOSCOW AGREEMENTS

The testimony and views of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H. Moorer with regard to the Moscow agreements on the control of strategic weapons have brought to the surface one of the most portentous forces in contemporary America. Should this powerful current continue unchecked, it will profoundly subvert Constitutional authority and thereby deprive the American people of any meaningful voice in the shaping of basic policies affecting their very lives and fortunes. That ominous force of subversion is *Militarism.*

What is the essence of *Militarism?* Comte de Mirabeau defined it succinctly in 1788 following a mission to Berlin: "La Prusse n'est pas un pays qui a une armee, c'est une armee qui a un pays." Mirabeau then noted: "La guerre est l'industrie nationale de la Prusse."

Across the Atlantic at that time where tyranny had been vanquished, Alexander Hamilton pointedly warned of the pitfalls leading to *Militarism.* He wrote that the institutions "which have a tendency to destroy their (the peoples') civil and political rights" were chiefly "standing armies and the correspondent appendages of military establishments." Continual resort to military means, Hamilton further admonished his countrymen, "enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil." (*The Federalist,* No. 8.)

In his classic work *Imperial Germany* (1915), Thorstein Veblen analyzed the impact of *Militarism* as it affected German society under the Kaiser: "Chief of the agencies that have kept the submissive allegiance of the German people to the State intact is, of course, successful warfare, seconded by the disciplinary effects of warlike preparation and indoctrination with warlike arrogance . . . The experience of war induces a warlike frame of mind; and the pursuit of war, being an exercise in the following of one's leader and execution of arbitrary orders, induces an animus of enthusiastic subservience and unquestioning obedience to authority." Military organization, Veblen continued, "reaches its best efficiency in either case, war or peace, only when the habit of arbitrary authority and unquestioning obedience has been so thoroughly ingrained that subservience has become a passionate aspiration with the subject population, where the habit of allegiance has attained that degree of automatism that the subject's ideal of liberty has come to be permission to obey orders . . ." (pp. 81–2)

The conditioning process in imperial Germany yielded its fruit in terms of political values. "The German ideal of statesmanship", Veblen observed, was "to make all the resources of the nation converge on military strength . . ." (p. 162)

The material and historical conditions surrounding the growth of the United States militated against the emergence of rampant *Militarism*, and it became a virtual article of faith that the German experience, which was also present in varying degrees in other major states, could not happen here. This estimate is no longer valid precisely because conditions have changed, thus altering the relationship between the military and other sectors of American society.

In his remarkably perceptive address on the dangers of the military-industrial complex, the late President Dwight D. Eisenhower delineated the main hazards to civilian authority described by Veblen in greater detail with respect to the German scene. President Eisenhower said: "Now this conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the Federal Government." Continuing in this vein, President Eisenhower declared that the American people must not "fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society."

By the time President Eisenhower yielded his responsibilities as Chief Executive, the curve growth of *Militarism* in the United States had risen sharply. It continues to move upwards at an accelerated rate. Discerning observers, who have had close contact with the military power, have publicly described its pervasive influence.

For example, General David M. Shoup, former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps asserted that America's expanding role in world affairs subsequent to World War II "hinged upon military power." He then declared: "The voice and views of the professional military people became increasingly prominent." Military leaders, according to General Shoup began to fill top government posts and became "respected opinion-makers."

Expanding on this theme, General Shoup wrote: "It was a time of international readjustment; military minds offered the benefits of firm views and problem-solving experience to the management of the nation's affairs. Military procedures—including the general staff system, briefings, estimates of the situation, and the organizational and operational techniques of the highly schooled, confident military professionals—spread throughout American culture."

Commenting on the results of the steady increase in the influence of the military power, General Shoup wrote: "The American people have also become more and more accustomed to militarism, to uniforms, to the cult of the gun, and to the violence of combat. Whole generations have been brought up on war news and wartime propaganda. . . . Soldiering loses appeal for some of the relatively few who experience the blood, terror and filth of battle; for many, however, including far too many senior professional officers, war and combat are an exciting adventure, a competitive game, and an escape from the dull routines of peacetime. It is this influential nucleus of aggressive, ambitious professional military leaders who are the root of America's evolving militarism." (*The Atlantic Monthly*, April 1969.) In the light of General Shoup's analysis, one must conclude that the forces of *Militarism* have spread like a contagion through the entire fabric of American society.

The economic base of the military power has been bolstered by the interpenetration of key military and civilian personnel in the structure of the military-industrial complex. According to Senator William Proxmire, the number of high-ranking retired military officers employed by leading companies in 1959 was 721 (88 of 100 companies reporting). In 1969, Senator Proxmire declared, 95 out of the 100 largest defense contractors reported the employment of 2,072 officers, or an average of almost 22 per company. (Cong. Record, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. Mar. 24, 1969, Vol. 115, No. 50, pp. S3072–S3081). At the same time, it must be borne in mind that many individuals with private corporate connections have been employed in key posts in the Pentagon.

Consequently, therefore, a reciprocal relationship has been consolidated between the military power and certain sectors of private industry. In turn, this relationship thrives on the enormous sums of the country's wealth which have been mortgaged to the military power. It is this wealth, above all, which provides the military power with economic and political leverage unprecedented in the annals of American history. From 1946 to 1970–71, U.S. military expenditures amounted to approximately $1,200,000,000,000. Over this same period, the average percentage devoted to military expenditures represented approximately 8–10% of the Gross National Product. Needless to say, the statistics on "purely" military expenditures cannot indicate all of the ramifications of *Militarism* in the United States and the grip which it exercises on the lives of the people.

It is to be noted that the tremendous funds poured into the military establishment have become secured through institutional arrangements. As early as January 1944, Charles E. Wilson of General Electric proposed a "permanent war economy" based on a planned cooperative relationship between the military power and Big Business. The administration of this enterprise would be the responsibility of the President acting as Commander-in-Chief. As for the role of Congress, Mr. Wilson suggested that its function be "limited to voting the needed funds."

Even if one were to assume that the raison d'etre for these vast outlays for the military was aimed at enhancing the security of the United States, it is pertinent to ask whether that goal has been reached. A few years ago (February 1968), another top executive of General Electric, J. B. McKitterick stated publicly: "Yet armed to the teeth with weapons too terrible to use, we never have been more insecure." Nor has the situation appreciably improved today, if we ponder the implications of the views of Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer. Is it not true that the gist of their argument for more funds rests on the allegation that American security requirements have not as yet been achieved?

Yet the real irony of the continued "insecurity" of the country derives exactly from the fact that the military power has become the determinant influence in the shaping of foreign and domestic policy. On the domestic front, the military power has become the final arbiter in terms of deciding what portion of the country's resources shall be devoted to productive purposes. As early as September 1967, William McChesney Martin, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, informed Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman of the House Banking Committee that the country could *not* have equally guns and butter. (*N.Y. Times*, 9/13/67) Mr. Martin reaffirmed this view in March 1968. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 3/25/68)

Martin's assessment of the economics of war and peace has proven to be correct. President Nixon himself described the blight of *Militarism* on the domestic economy when he said: "One of the cruelest legacies of the artificial prosperity produced by war is inflation. Inflation robs every American, every one of you. The 20 million who are retired and living on fixed incomes—they are particularly hard hit. Homemakers find it harder than ever to balance the family budget. And 80 million American wage earners have been on a treadmill. For example, in the four war years between 1965 and 1969, your wage increases were completely eaten up by price increases. Your paychecks were higher, but you were no better off." (*N.Y. Times*, 8/16/71)

In terms of foreign policy, the military power has been a decisive factor in the development of policies and their implementation. The notion that military power plays a prime role in diplomacy appears to have been accepted by top Government leaders as a matter of course. Speaking to a meeting of the Veterans of Foreign Wars last August, President Nixon stressed the point that the military might of the United Sates "is the *only* foundation on which peace among nations can ever be built." (My underscore. UPI, 8/19/71) The next month, Admiral Moorer told a correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* that diplomatic credibility in negotiations must be based on military power. "In other words", he said, "the way to have peace is to have strength." (9/9/71) Secretary Laird echoed this principle of the primacy of military power in foreign relations when he told a House sub-Committee on Appropriations in early June 1972 that, "We have consistently advocated negotiations from a position of strength. We must not forget this principle in our deliberations on charting our future course."

The steady erosion of the civilian authority as it is subjected to the mounting demands of the military power has been a fundamental factor in the deterioration of America's world position. Our growing isolation does not stem from the pressures of so-called isolationists, but rather from the spreading mistrust among many important countries as to our real intentions. Indeed, the anxieties of these countries have been markedly aroused precisely because of the special influence enjoyed by the military power in policy-making in Washington. Addressing a meeting of the Natioal Industrial Conference Board prior to his election to the Presidency, Mr. Nixon said: "Seldom has a nation been so mistrusted in its purposes or so frustrated in its efforts." (*N.Y. Times*, 9/13/67).

During the very first days of the Truman administration, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt threatened to resign from her post as a delegate to the U.N. because of the growing influence of the military power on foreign policy. (*N.Y. Times* 6/25/72). In concrete terms the massive influence of the military power on the conduct of foreign affairs has resulted in consequences aptly described by Senator Mike Mansfield: In the past, he noted, "we have not always been very prompt to recog-

nize national self-interest as a basis for a policy of peace." Senator Mansfield continued: "The pursuit of ideological struggle has not led us to any victories. Rather, it has projected us into a hodgepodge of foreign aid, military alliances and into overseas propaganda and other dubious manipulative operations. The warm human concern of Americans for other people has been distorted by ideological warfare and we have plunged, without warrant, into the internal political and social affairs of other nations everywhere in the world." (N.Y. Times, 6/11/72).

The gains made by *Militarism* in the United States have escaped widespread detection because the elements fostering it have managed to contain it within the general framework of the Constitutional structure. However, the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and its counterpart in the House reveal with stark clarity that the military power will not tolerate any significant diminution of its prior claims on the resources of the country. This unmitigated challenge to Constitutional authority does not bode well for American democracy. In the last analysis, the positive remedy to this most dangerous situation depends upon an alert and active citizenry determined to curb the excesses of the military power by the reassertion of the Constitutional prerogatives of Congress.

JUNE 14, 1972.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR,
The Christian Science Monitor,
Boston, Mass.

DEAR SIR: Secretary of the Defense Melvin R. Laird and Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned Congress that they would not support President Nixon's agreements with Moscow on strategic arms unless billions of dollars were appropriated to enhance the quality of American weaponry. That is to say, policies and pacts which are exclusively the constitutional province of the President and the Congress are subject to the veto of the Pentagon. The Pentagon has now openly declared that the powers of governing as stipulated in the U.S. Constitution are no longer definitive. There is now a "higher authority" which possesses the ultimate voice in policy-making without benefit of the peoples' will as expressed in the electoral process.

We are witnessing, in other words, a profound transformation in our political system. The "logic" of this change in the nature of political governance points to the emergence of some sort of authoritarian structure sanctioned by the Pentagon and the forces it represents. In other countries, the establishment of military dictatorships is usually dramatized by a coup d'etat, but here, the moves against constitutional authority have been more subtle and hence undiscerning to the average American. Nevertheless, the drive goes on relentlessly buttressed by a budget of tens of billions which supplies the Pentagon with unprecedented economic and political leverage.

It is indeed ironical that the enormous largess enjoyed by the Pentagon comes from the Congress of the United States, the very institution whose constitutional powers are being emasculated. While historical analogies can be tricky, one cannot help but think of the period leading to Julius Caesar's rise to power in Rome. That the power of the Pentagon has become pervasive in the crucial areas of the government, may be seen by its predominant influence in the shaping of foreign policy. This is reflected in Washington's approach to Southeast Asia which is viewed through the "spectacles" of the Pentagon's strategists.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT KRIEDMAN,
Professor of History.

BOARD OF CHRISTIAN SOCIAL CONCERNS
OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
Washington, D.C., June 21, 1972.

HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Once again we wish to call to your attention actions of The United Methodist Church in its continuing efforts for disarmament and an end to the arms race. We do this at a time when the Foreign Relations

Committee is reviewing the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms agreements brought back by the President from Moscow and the requests of the Department of Defense for a new missile-submarine project, a new bomber program, and a new ABM ring around Washington.

In 1968 the General Conference of The United Methodist Church adopted a statement on peace that still remains the official position of the Church. In the section on disarmament it includes these paragraphs:

The use or threat of use of weapons which by their very nature are indiscriminate and difficult to control cannot be morally justified. The nations of the world should halt the immoral, futile, and suicidal quest for military supremacy.

Anti-ballistic missile systems threaten to accelerate arm spending and heighten tensions dangerously without adding to the security of the nations. We emphasize that there is no real substitute for world-wide safeguarded disarmament under agreements that provide for adequate verification and enforcement.

In 1971 the Board of Christian Social Concerns, an official national agency of The United Methodist Church, approved the following resolution as part of a larger statement on peace:

If the human race is to move forward out of this period of futility and constant peril, the search for new weapons systems must be halted through comprehensive international agreements. International negotiations, such as SALT, should include all nations with substantial armaments systems. The vast stockpiles of nuclear bombs and conventional weapons must be progressively dismantled, and the resources they represent must be diverted to programs designed to enhance life rather than destroy it.

In 1972 the General Conference of The United Methodist Church adopted with overwhelming support the "Bishops' Call for Peace and the Self-Development of Peoples." This document, now an official declaration of that delegated assembly, further supports strong moves to end the arms race. Quoted here is a portion of the action of that body:

"There must be eventual *disarmament*. We cannot be certain of the causes of a particular war. "Causes" may be simply pretexts. In the final analysis, it is the presence of military institutions in the nations of the world that make wars possible and arms races probable. The tide must be turned. Recognizng the strategic dangers of unilateral disarmament, nations can begin processes of military disengagement and move toward bilateral and multilateral disarmament agreements within the framework of the United Nations. Our suicidal confidence in arms and military systems must give way to a radical reordering of priorities and an awareness of overriding human values."

We wish to assure you, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, that The United Methodist Church with a membership of nearly eleven million stands in support of those policies that will lead to peace through a complete and safeguarded disarmament through international agreements. We commend you for questioning the need of new military programs and budget at the very time the United States and the Soviet Union have initiated SALT agreements.

Sincerely yours,

HERMAN WILL, Jr.,
Associate General Secretary.

P.S.—If it is possible to include this letter in the record of the hearings now being held it would be greatly appreciated.

(Material submitted by Mr. Kilsoo Haan of Aptos, California, is available in the committee files.)

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