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Pt. 3 **PART III: NORTH VIETNAM**

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BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 16 AND 17, 1972



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
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CONTENTS

Statement of—	Page
Hon. Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the United States..	3
Mr. John A. Sullivan, associate executive secretary, American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia, Pa.....	29
Rev. Robert S. Lecky, codirector, Clergy and Layman Concerned, accompanied by Dr. William Zimmerman.....	50
Appendices:	
I. Chairman's letter to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, August 19, 1972.....	65
II. Chairman's letters to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, May 3, June 26, and August 9, 1972.....	69
III. Chairman's statements on war victims in Indochina, Senate floor, June 29, August 3, 1972.....	73
IV. Background materials on the question of American bombings of dikes and dams in North Vietnam.....	79
V. Firsthand reports on conditions in North Vietnam.....	147
VI. Selected press reports on bombing of North Vietnam.....	159
VII. Excerpts from the Kissinger memorandum on U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, 1965-69.....	177



PROBLEMS OF WAR VICTIMS IN INDOCHINA

Part III: North Vietnam

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room 2228, New Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy (presiding), Hart, and Fong.

Also present: Dale S. de Haan, counsel and Jerry M. Tinker, staff consultant; Patrica Carney, secretary to the subcommittee, and Marc Ginsberg, assistant.

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee will come to order.

The hearing this morning continues the subcommittee's public inquiry into the problem of war victims in Indochina.

On May 8 and 9, the subcommittee held its 34th hearing since 1965, on the problems of refugees and civilian casualties in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Today we seek to better understand the impact of this war on the civilian population of North Vietnam. As this subcommittee has done regularly in the past, this morning we are seeking the observations and impressions of private Americans who have recently returned from the field, and tomorrow we anticipate hearing from representatives in the Departments of State and Defense.

Our concern here is to provide accurate information on humanitarian problems that exist among the people of North Vietnam. Just as this subcommittee is concerned over the escalating violence from both sides, and just as we condemn all those who continue this violence from both sides, so, too, are we concerned over the humanitarian problems that affect war victims on both sides. No border should ever separate or diminish our country's concern over the needs of an orphaned child or the suffering of a wounded mother.

There can be little doubt today that we are witnessing a human disaster of historic proportions in Indochina. The plight of civilians is worse today than at any time since the war began, including the Tet experience in 1968.

As we meet this morning Indochina's regional crisis of people escalates. Each day of war brings another day of needless human suffering. More civilians become casualties or die; more refugees flee devastated villages and towns in North and South Vietnam, and in Laos and Cambodia.

As of June 30, our country has dropped 6,857,858 tons of bombs over Indochina. This is over three times the tonnage dropped during all of World War II. It is over 10 times the tonnage dropped during the Korean war. In 1972, the tonnage of bombs dropped over Indochina has risen sharply from nearly 56,800 tons in January to nearly 112,500 tons in June. The total for just the first 6 months of 1972 is 504,185 tons. With added tonnage over the last 6 weeks, the total bombs dropped over Indochina since January of this year alone exceeds the tonnage for the entire Korean war. The bulk of this tonnage was dropped over North Vietnam. For anyone to suggest these bombs have little impact on civilians or in the creation of war victims, defies understanding and common sense.

Until this tragic war finally ends, this subcommittee will regretfully, but with determination, continue to make the case that the civilian population and the plight of war victims throughout the area must be a matter of vital concern to the American people and their Government.

If we can try to suggest what we have to do at this point in time, the first need is to stop the violence and extricate ourselves from the war through appropriate decisions at the highest levels of our Government. In the meantime, we should be planning a program for what our great Nation can do in concert with other nations to insure a rebuilding process for the people who have suffered so much, in so many ways, throughout Indochina.

So we welcome here this morning some Americans who have had the opportunity of seeing firsthand what the air war is bringing to the people of North Vietnam.

Senator HART?

Senator HART. No, I came, as you suspect, Mr. Chairman, to welcome Ramsey Clark back and to tell him I think, as he knows, that he was indeed a great Attorney General, and I think he is about the only man I know to persuade my wife to pay her taxes at the moment and I feel just the same way about him.

Mr. CLARK. Thank you, Senator Hart; it is good to be back.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Fong?

Senator FONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In view of the very short time we have available for this witness and to hear the other witnesses scheduled for appearance today, I will reserve my opening statement for a time later. For now I just want to welcome Mr. Clark and want to hear what he has to say about his visit to North Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. Thank you, Senator Fong.

Senator KENNEDY. We want to extend a warm welcome to you, Mr. Clark. Your visit to North Vietnam follows in the tradition of other Americans who have visited the north, going back to Harrison Salisbury in 1967; Tony Lewis of the New York Times; Joe Kraft; George Wald, a Nobel Prize winner; and a number of other distinguished labor leaders and clergymen who have visited the north and have taken the opportunity to inform the Congress about their impressions. We want to extend a warm word of welcome to you.

This subcommittee is a part of the Committee of the Judiciary, so most of us have had an opportunity as members of the Judiciary Committee to have heard testimony from you as Attorney General, and we

always benefited from your appearances and we want to extend a cordial welcome to you this morning. We appreciate very much your being with us.

**STATEMENT OF RAMSEY CLARK, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES**

MR. CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is good to be in this room again. I have been here many times and testified before all of you and I respect this institution.

Let me describe briefly in an outline where I went and what I did, and mention a few specific things; but I think perhaps it will be more efficient if you elicit what you want to know through questions.

I arrived in Hanoi on Saturday afternoon July 29. It was about 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The airport is quite close to the city itself and there were two air alerts before we got to the city. I don't think it is 3 or 4 miles, but it took probably 3 or 4 hours. I was ready to get to the hotel because we had been flying for 26 hours, but it didn't happen that way.

I spent the next several days in Hanoi. I visited bomb-damaged sites there, including schools, one hospital, several housing areas, a tile factory—such things as that. I had conferences with many leaders. I will outline generally the types of conferences and not go into the details.

I met with several Ministers, including the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister who is also the Vice Prime Minister, and the Minister for Culture and his Deputy, also the Minister for Foreign Trade, as well as probably five provincial presidents—who are roughly analogous to our Governors—and mayors, village leaders, and a good many others.

The process of asking permission and getting to do what you want to do is quite difficult and quite time consuming. I had a list of things I wanted to do that expanded constantly. I wanted a helicopter and to go see Laos; I wanted to see Vinh Linh by the DMZ; I wanted to go to the Chinese border and, of course, these things just could not be done within 2 weeks. I was, however, provided with automotive transportation—it was a jeep. We clocked, by my measurement, over 1,200 kilometers between cities and many more than that within cities and villages.

I was in about six provinces. I went down to Thai Binh and saw damage to the dikes and sluices and schools and a leprosy hospital that had been bombed 3 days before I got there. I saw three churches in one little village of Vu Van—why they built the churches so close together, I don't know—but there they were, and all three were severely damaged.

I might talk a minute about churches, as long as I am on that point. At 5:30 p.m. on the second Sunday I was there, there was a Mass in the Catholic Cathedral in which not fewer than 1,000 and perhaps as many as 2,000 people participated. They knew the liturgy; I don't think they had been coached for my purposes; I don't know where they all came from, but there were children, women, and men—the service was wide open. On the Friday before I left—and I have a few still

pictures of this—I went to another quite beautiful little church in Hanoi. I don't know what you would call little Catholic churches, but it wasn't a cathedral. They had a Mass for Fathers Philip and Daniel Berrigan, and, as they said, other Americans who have tried to save their children; a couple of hundred people were there. It was barely daylight. The church was situated within 500 yards of the building in which I met with the Prime Minister; it is on the same main street; the doors open right onto the street. Everybody was singing the hymns, if that is what they are. I have tape recordings; I couldn't understand the language, but I had some translation.

I also went to Haiphong and saw bomb damage to dikes and other things in villages in between Haiphong and Thai Binh. I went to Phuc Loc and some of the areas around Haiphong which had been described by Tony Lewis and others, then back to Hanoi and then out again down south to Thanh Hoa. It is quite a drive to Thanh Hoa; it took us 15 hours. We left as soon as it was dark and we didn't make it while it was still dark. We had to race in the morning hours to get in. They drive at night because it is a little safer.

There are bomb shelters all over the place. I never imagined there were as many bomb shelters as there were. If half the energy that had been put into bomb shelters had been put into homes and things, why, the place would look like Camelot; and they are really serious about those bomb shelters. They get into them fast and stay long. There is a lot of discipline and patience about that sort of thing—more than I would have and more than I think the average American would have.

The cities like Ninh Binh and others are severely damaged; the urban damage is easily understood. You see Haiphong and it reminds you of World War II. Right after World War II I went through every country in Western Europe, except Bulgaria, and as far out as Moscow, and I saw what had happened to cities like Warsaw, Frankfurt, Schweinfurt. I lived in London for a while and remember the ruins around there. This trip took me back 27, 28 years, to things I would like to forget and had hoped would never happen again.

Those cities had been bombed to the earth; a lot of people were killed. They had statistics that they gave me on their claim as to the numbers of hospitals hit and numbers of schools hit. I obviously was not able to see all that they say have been hit, but I was able to see a good many schools and hospitals, a number of dikes and two sluices and other places that were obviously the object of extensive bombing.

I should say that there was not a day that I didn't walk by myself in any direction that I chose, wherever I might be, and see whatever I could find and I would say I averaged a couple of hours a day like that. There was never an occasion on which anybody said, "No, you can't go there. Who are you? What are you doing here?" I was looked at with great curiosity as you will see from some of the movies I took. The kids are first shy and then they start running toward you and laughing and then look through your camera and you are lucky if you ever get away because they will look through it all day.

I don't know if the people thought I was a Russian or what they thought—that hurts a little bit, too—but they treated me uniformly with curiosity but with respect and dignity.

I spent almost 24 hours in a little village called Thieu Minh where 2,900 people live. That village goes back 500 years, to their knowledge,

when three hamlets were combined. Most of the people had lived there all their lives and never had been out of shouting distance from the village. They told me a foreigner had never been there, and I believe that.

I saw another village three kilometers away, called Thieu Hoa—which means flowers, I was told Thieu is just a surname. If I were they and in the propaganda business, I wouldn't have given anyone that name because it reminds you of somebody who lives down South. It was in the wrong place though. It got hit by B-52's on April 13 and it didn't look pretty when I saw it, and a lot of people were killed there. The survivors were still stunned; they didn't want to look at me. That was after I spent 24 hours in the other village where I was treated to as generous, kindly, curious, and friendly a reception as I have ever had among people who had never seen a white man before.

I left North Vietnam on August 12, which was a Saturday, and by coincidence I read in the papers later that it was the greatest air bombing of the war. I saw planes; I have tape recordings of anti-aircraft; you could hear the bombs every day in the distance. During 2 weeks, I averaged about six air raid alerts a day. I didn't happen to be in close proximity to where the bombs fell, but I saw planes within 1,000 yards and you could see the markings very clearly.

I think questioning would be more efficient now.

Senator KENNEDY. Can you tell us about the impact of this war on the civilian population; what kind of impressions did you get about the burden to civilians caused by the bombing?

Mr. CLARK. Well, the war has changed their lives rather drastically, especially in the cities. In the villages it is different. In the villages, unless you are unlucky, the war passes you by. It takes your sons, your brothers, maybe your father—and they may not come back—but unless the bombs happen to hit you—and there are a thousand of these villages—the violence passes you by.

But the cities are, to a very considerable degree, evacuated. Even high governmental officials will tell you that they miss their wives who have been gone since April. The wife is out north here, 25 kilometers away in a village. The three children are not with her; the 3-year-old is out—down here, and the 9-year-old is down there, and the 11-year-old is in another village.

Senator KENNEDY. Why is that?

Mr. CLARK. They separate them because they say it is terribly sad to lose a wife or a child, but to lose a whole family is unbearable, and, therefore, they have separated the wives and the children; only the workers remain.

Senator KENNEDY. How long has that been their policy to divide up the family?

Mr. CLARK. I think that it began in April, although it is hard to say for sure. Probably it was May before it was extensive. A number of women told me they had never been separated from their children before. You know this was something that was hard for them.

In the cities life is disrupted daily a number of times. I think in the 24 hours I was in Haiphong there were 11 air alerts. They get you up in the night—or, at least they try to—and get you down in a bomb shelter. Whatever you happen to be doing in the middle of the day is liable to be interrupted at any time by an air alert. So the war affects

daily movements in the life of the people. Even in the villages, the air alerts are constant; they have a network; if you are out on the highway you hear the gongs—in the city they use sirens. I have got tape recordings of all these noises from little villages, and every so often on the highway there is kind of a homemade air alarm. The variety seems infinite. There would be a brake drum, or piece of scrap metal, and somebody will hit it with a hammer. They make a lot of noise and you can hear the noise, moving from place to place across the paddies, and they seem to transmit the alert that way.

Most of these areas in the outlying districts don't have electricity but they have battery powered transistor radios and they have got music and other broadcasts that almost permeate the countryside. I never saw anything quite like it. In that sense, you could say the nation is a captive audience, and it is from these radios and music that begins at 5 o'clock in the morning, and there is talking, too.

Senator KENNEDY. What is the nature of the weapons that have affected the civilian population? Do people get hit sort of incidentally because they are living in an area which is proximate to a military target? Also, what can you tell us of your impressions about how civilians have been affected, say, by the kinds of bombs that are being used in heavily populated areas?

Mr. CLARK. I am not a military expert and I can't elaborate at length on that. When I got there I said, "Look, I don't want to see military operations or guns or things like that because that is not my line." But in all the walks and travel around the cities, I didn't see military activity. Every once in a while you see a SAM missile that is on a portable carriage, but I didn't see military installations. You don't see many police; you don't see guns at all like you do in the United States where officers stand around with guns on their belts or anything like that. I really don't know that there are significant military concentrations around these cities. I doubt it.

They are big on railroads and they are quick at repairs. Driving south from Hanoi one night I came by a place where a bomb had fallen near the railroad just a few hours before and the cars were blown off on the side. One big oil tank car was ripped open and laid on its side; they had already repaired the track and they had trains running up and down, so we are hitting that sort of target.

The people themselves, a lot of them, have been killed, especially in an area like the Ha Ly area of Haiphong. They told us there was a raid on July 31. I went there August 3 and August 4, and there were simply acres of debris and waste. I have some pretty good movies and I hope some still shots of that area and they claim the raid just killed a score of people. I don't see how it could have killed so few. They also claim that there were both perforating and antipersonnel or fragmentary bombs.

I am no military ordnanceman, but perhaps there is somebody in these United States who could tell us whether these things [illustrating] were, in fact, built here and, in fact, dropped on the cities and the civilian populations of North Vietnam.

This is what, as a guy who doesn't know any more than a former marine corporal, I would call a fragmentation bomb—it is a lot better instrument of death than the hand grenade we practiced with down at Parris Island when I was there in 1945. Those would have 60 or 80

pieces of metal that would fly out. These have several hundred. These are called bomblets by the people in North Vietnam and hundreds of them are contained in what is called a mother bomb. There are casings of mother bombs all over the place and they are great big, long metal cylinders. After the mother bomb falls from the planes, they open and they scatter these bomblets—and there are several hundred of these, depending on the type of the bomb, and when they hit they throw shrapnel all over the place.

Now, they have one purpose and that is to kill people. They don't do much damage to property because it is just little pieces of shrapnel; they are not going to tear a house down although they may puncture a locomotive tank or something like that. But these are antipersonnel weapons.

Now, the mayor of Hanoi gave me that and he said that it was dropped in a highly populated area of the city of Hanoi. It didn't go off. As I understand, 2 percent are duds, as we might call them; they don't go off, and this was one of those.

If that is true, then I know of no justification in law or morality for the use of that kind of weapon against civilian personnel. I was given this by—

Senator KENNEDY. Did you in your visits to the hospitals, either in Hanoi or any of the other places, see civilians who had been wounded by antipersonnel bombs?

Mr. CLARK. I went to a number of hospitals and I saw a number of what they called were victims of antipersonnel bombings, but, you know, I am a professional person, I have some discipline, but when I see a person in the hospital and they show me he is hit here, here, here, and here, I don't know how it happened so I can't really judge that. I can only tell you what they told me; they told me these people were hit by fragmentary bombs; they told me that plastic casing on these bombs are not detectable by an X-ray and, therefore, if you happen to get hit by that, the movement of your body is going to cause it to cut and cause pain but it is very difficult for a doctor to locate it. Maybe the Department of Defense can explain that in a different way; I don't know, but that is what they say and I am not trying to make their case here, heaven knows.

I think that there are, you know, many, many civilians killed; I don't think there is any doubt that there are little babies and old men and women killed. There is no way that you could destroy the buildings that I saw destroyed in Hanoi and Haiphong and not kill a lot of people because those buildings were homes and some were apartment units and some were schools.

Take villages like Thieu Hoa or Phuc Loc—what could be there? I just don't know what could be there to justify hitting it. Phuc Loc is near Haiphong; it would be a pretty big miss since it is a number of kilometers away, but it is conceivable in the rain or something like that, that you could just miss. But Thieu Hoa, that is nowhere.

I must say, too, that Vietnam is a foreign country to me; I don't know it; I have to ask directions and have to get explanations of what things are. But the hospitals that I saw—and this does not include the medical dispensaries that you can see going along the street—the hospitals I saw were all damaged. There was one particularly, in Thanh Hoa, a provincial hospital, that was opened in 1969, they told me. It

had been a tuberculosis rest place before that. The old provincial hospital had been at the provincial capital which is a number of miles—kilometers as they measure distance—away. It had been so badly damaged in 1968 they decided to relocate it and they built this new large hospital complex with many buildings spread over 6 to 8 acres, and it was bombed into the ground; six buildings were totally demolished. Walking through there, you could see radiology equipment; you could pull out patient records; the place has been abandoned.

Getting up on some of the ruins, you can see forever, and there is no habitation within a couple of kilometers from that hospital; it is standing out in the middle of rice paddies and fields and nowhere. It may be that there were troops bivouacked there the morning it was bombed; I don't know; I was not there that night. It was, I think, 8:15 in the morning. But there was nothing in the debris that indicated that there was any military activity there. The debris indicated, as did the gate through which you entered, that this place had been a hospital and nothing more. The people you talk to, including the head of the medical team, said it was a hospital, and you could see hospital beds and you could see everything else that told you it was a hospital. There might have been racks of SAM missiles standing there on that day; I don't know, because I wasn't there. But I don't know what in the world they would be doing out there, and even if they were there I don't know why you have to fly over them.

Senator KENNEDY. What was the condition of this hospital?

Mr. CLARK. It was demolished. I have got some extensive movies of it. I would like to give the committee copies of all the films I have. They are Eastman Kodak film and I carried them into the country and I put them into the camera and I pressed the button and I carried them out.

Unfortunately, I am not a mechanically oriented person. Originally, I had a man going with me who speaks Vietnamese and who knows how to take pictures but he was not allowed in, so I had to carry these cameras and take the pictures myself. I have 800 or 900 feet that came out, 200 or 300 feet of pictures of prisoners of war. To me, I am awfully pleased with them because the families will get copies of them so the families can see how their husband or son looks.

I have a lot of tapes I would like to give you, including close to an hour and a half of tape of free interchange with 10 prisoners of war—during which there were no holds barred. I negotiated for about 30 minutes with the commandant of the prison camp. I was the first person, I am told, to visit a prison camp since December 1970, shortly after Son Tay, except for a Canadian newspaperman. I was permitted to see every room, see every man in the room, and I was able to have this discussion and I have tapes; I spent a couple of hours there. I was also permitted to take a letter from each man and to have each man send a private message to whomever he chose on the tape recorder and the tape recorder remained in my possession throughout. They may have some technique of getting something out of that recorder—I don't know what it would be, but I would like for you to have a copy of that tape.

I think the tape is awfully important.

Senator KENNEDY. How recent were these prisoners? Are these the prisoners recently captured, or are they old ones?

Mr. CLARK. Well, they varied. I was as unreasonable as I know how to be—which most people will tell you is pretty unreasonable—and I wanted to see the oldest prisoner, a man named Alvarez, and I wanted to see the most recent prisoner.

I arrived in Vietnam on Saturday and the very next day four pilots were captured. Some of the people in the hotel—and there were people from the Netherlands and Sweden and Denmark and France and a number of other countries staying in the hotel—went out to one of the sites where the plane fell, but I just wanted to see the pilots who were prisoners.

Anyway, they didn't let me see those four. They had these 10 men in this one wing and they said, "This is the way we want to do it."

These men told me how long they had been in the wing, told me where else they had been and told me about four or five other prison camps they had been in. They told me about other prisoners in this camp to some degree, but I didn't want to get them into trouble and since the prison authority didn't want to tell me how many men were in this camp I didn't ask the men because they would be there after I left and I didn't want to get them in trouble.

The oldest prisoner of war in terms of captivity, went back to 1967 and the most recent was captured in May of this year, so they spanned that period pretty generally.

There were two pairs, back seat or front seat in the same plane, and I asked the men how many of them knew each other before that. Two had known each other before somehow; I think maybe it was in pilot training school or something, but the rest had all been strangers to each other.

Senator KENNEDY. What can you tell us about their condition?

Mr. CLARK. I can tell you what I saw and what they said. I think their greatest anxiety, disregarding for the moment their enormous desire to come home, was that their families should believe that they are well. Some of them were injured and they are not well, because getting shot down in a plane is not an easy experience. One man has severe damage to an eye. He said he could see light and shadows. One man has a pretty bad hearing loss. One man thought he was going to lose his arm; it still hurts him some, but with his jacket on I couldn't tell until he told me. I think I may have noticed if I had been able to watch longer—that he was favoring it a little bit. But he was recovering well.

They get all they want to eat. They don't get to choose their menu and the kind of food that they would like most which they just don't have over there, but they say they eat a lot of rice, a lot of fish and a lot of pork and chicken. They eat a lot more than the Vietnamese people because, as they pointed out, they need a lot more because they are a lot bigger.

They get exercise; they had an exercise yard right outside their rooms that I could see, and I could see a basketball backstop outside. I wanted very badly to get there in the daylight; I wanted to have a meal with them. That didn't work out.

They had a little garden area that they did some gardening in. One man said he put on 15 pounds; most of them lost a little. They seemed to me to be strongminded, tough, good American men, regular guys. One was a black, born in Tampa. I talked to his wife; she was from

New Orleans and he had gone to Morehouse College in Atlanta and I said, "That is not a bad school but I am a Clark College man myself." He said, "Wrong, man, wrong." He knew what he was talking about—for Morehouse and Clark are rivals. I don't think he had been brainwashed.

There was a guy from Oklahoma there and I had a lot of fun kidding him about his being born on the wrong side of the Red River.

Of course, they want out, they want to come home, and I respect them.

Senator KENNEDY. What can you tell us, Mr. Clark—and then I will yield to Senator Hart and Senator Fong—about the damage to the dikes and the dams? How extensive is it?

Mr. CLARK. There are a number of people who are studying that carefully and some are experts, demographers, geographers, and engineers, and they will be able to tell you—I don't know when, because, as you know, it takes these guys a long time to study anything—but they will be able to tell us some day in some detail what they have seen.

The Government of North Vietnam itself claims that there has been a clear and purposeful attack on critical points in the dikes, the sluices, the canals, and the gates. They will tell you that they are bombed on the concave side so that the current will erode them out. They will tell you they are bombed near the coast because that is where the villagers are in the greatest jeopardy. In the province of Thai Binh, they told me the highest point is less than 2 meters above the mean high tide of the South China Sea.

On the coastal plain of the Tonkin Delta, the villagers are below the highwater within the levees and the river so, if there is a breach of those levees you have a major risk of mass drowning. If you breach it so seawater comes in, they have lost six or eight crops. They have three or four crops a year so you are talking about a couple of years and millions of people starve.

I saw the Lan sluice which is famous—they have written about it in books. They told me it was a multipurpose water-control facility that affects 48,000 acres of land where 600,000 people live, and I can tell you that somebody has made big holes all around that thing on the land side, and that levee—it is a low, fairly long concrete structure which looks like a low dam—is all pockmarked up. There were superstructures that had been there, heavy steel I-beams and gates and lifts, and they were all demolished and twisted and snarled around.

They gave me a half dozen dates that they said it had been attacked and I noted in their reports in Hanoi that it was alleged to have been attacked the day after I left.

I saw another place, just a bare dike in Thai Binh, where there must have been 50 craters, right up by the dike. These were earthen dikes and this is alluvial land; it is very fine; it won't compact when it is wet. This is the rainy season and therefore they make emergency repairs and every place I saw I would say out of a half dozen where dikes had been hit there were people swarming all over trying to repair it but they say these are emergency repairs; they can only last hopefully through the highwater. There will have to be a complete restoration where they cut out huge segments of the dike during the dry season when they can get the compaction they need.

It is hard for us to understand the meaning of the dike system. To me a dike was always only a pile of dirt. I didn't know what they were for except to hold water back. But you get the sense there that they believe their civilization depends on those dikes; they see the hand-print of their ancient ancestors on the dikes; they go back as far as recorded history, and they are essential for the control of water that keeps people from drowning and keeps crops from drowning and dying.

All the farming I saw was wet farming and that means you have to have efficient water control and the water control is just incredible. You can look out in an area and you can see 20 different levels of water which may be 6, 8 inches different here and 10 feet over here where there is a canal coming through; and if they can't control that water, they are either going to starve or drown.

Senator KENNEDY. Given the fact that there are some 2,700 miles of dikes in North Vietnam, and some 300 air sorties a day, whether the hitting of the dikes is accidental or deliberate may be uncertain, but it is certainly predictable. Do you think it is also reasonable to predict that there will be more extensive damage to the dikes with a continuation of the bombing?

Mr. CLARK. I think I can say not in the way of predicting, but in terms of personal observations, there is extensive damage to the dikes now.

Senator KENNEDY. Now?

Mr. CLARK. Right now; yes. That doesn't mean that we have flattened out 2,700 miles of dikes; that just means that every so often you find a place where there are big cracks and holes where people are trying to fill them up and I saw a couple of sluices, concrete, where things had been chipped up and smashed up.

They had a bunch of statistics they gave me, and maps, and I don't know what to make of them. Some of the experts that were there in Hanoi with whom I talked, and I can't vouch for their objectivity, although they seemed objective to me, said that from what they had seen about 80 percent of the damage was in what they would call the coastal plain—and that is the vulnerable part—and the places they had seen were places that, in their judgment, would be critical points on the dikes.

You don't need to level a whole dike. If you hit a critical place and the water starts coming through, it will take care of the rest because it will wash it all out, as the people in the Northeastern part of the United States will recall from our recent experience here this last spring.

Just bombing the dikes may not do the job; there has to be some coordination with nature and if the water isn't high this year, if the runoff isn't great, then, in spite of the damage to the dikes, there might not be a great loss of life or a great loss of crops. But the two experts with whom I talked on the plane flying out—a man named Yves Lacoste from Paris and a man named Daniel Mandelbaum, who is an engineer while Lacoste is a geographer—they had all these books and materials they were still studying, and they said their estimate was that the chances were 50-50 that there would be severe flooding and loss of life and crops because of the bombing damage.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Hart?

Senator HART. Mr. Clark, I was called to the phone just as you began your testimony, so if you have already answered this tell me so and I will read it in the record. Otherwise, I would like you to state for the record the answer to the question as to why you went to North Vietnam? Did you state that?

Mr. CLARK. No; I didn't. Of course, I have been asked that a number of times, as you can imagine.

I went for many reasons. I am not sure I could name them all. I had sought to go—and I haven't really gotten back to figure out the exact date—but sometime in the winter of 1969-70, I tried to go to do something about the prisoners. A friend went to Paris and worked with me and called me every once in a while and said, "I think we are going to make it." We didn't make it and I dropped it.

Earlier, I had worked for 2 years to go to the Republic of South Africa and I finally got in. But I have worked since 1970 to get into Russia to study Soviet Jewry and I haven't made that yet.

Well, coincidence, while I was working on a trip to Moscow to see about what I was concerned were new persecutions of Soviet Jews. I had called on the State Department and had arranged to visit them the next day on that subject when I got home that night and had a telegram from Stockholm inviting me to go to North Vietnam with a commission. It is a commission headed by Gunnar Myrdal, whom we all know is a famous Swedish sociologist, the author of "An American Dilemma," and who contributed so much to the recognition of racism in America.

I wired back and said I wanted to go; I could not go as a member of the commission or in connection with it; I could only go as an independent, private citizen of America; and, after awhile, they got back in touch with me on the phone and said it had been cleared and that I could go; and I went.

From the moment I got that telegram I knew I had to go. A man has to live with himself and what would I think at breakfast the next morning if I don't go when I could have gone and when it might have made a difference; when I might have helped a prisoner; when I might have learned something or seen something to help tell the American people what we are doing to them and to ourselves.

So I went—and I will never be able to question that decision. I would go again in a minute.

Senator HART. Unless my question suggests that I have a different point of view, I don't. But let's not kid ourselves; I think the general public's reaction to a private individual, especially a prominent one going to Hanoi, is that they might be mucking around when the President is trying to make an arrangement with our adversary.

I think that is a regrettable assumption. At least your answer would suggest, to those who automatically criticize, that you didn't go over there to try to put yourself between Hanoi and Washington in negotiations, but rather to inspect the situation. I am correct in that, am I not?

Mr. CLARK. You are quite correct.

As you may know, I highly disapprove of personal diplomacy within or without government. I just don't think that you can put the fate of billions of people on this planet into the hands of some globetrotter. I think you have to work through institutional processes and I am not about to get into personal diplomacy, whether I am a Presidential

assistant or an Attorney General or just John Q. Public—which is what I am.

But I believe the citizens of a free country have a responsibility, and they have to face the truth, and it is very difficult to get the truth today in America. I think we can barely see it and I think the distortions are enormous. I would urge every American who cares about his children, and the children of this world, to go over there and see for himself.

I urged the North Vietnamese Government—I said, “Let them in.” Bring people who have talked bad about you and people who have talked good about you; try to bring objective people, but don’t try to bring people who are only “friendly,” but get them in here and let them see, because the truth is the most powerful problem solver that the Lord has given man on earth.

Senator HART. So you are suggesting that there is a citizen’s right, and perhaps a moral obligation, if the opportunity presents itself, to check on your Government, to audit your Government—particularly when, either with justification, or just from appearance, some conduct of your Government seems to offend your moral standards?

Mr. CLARK. Well, I think it is more than a citizen right. I think it is a citizen duty—and not just in a hackneyed sense that “eternal vigilance is the price of liberty,” but in the sense of the complexities of a mass, technologically advanced, urban society. If we give the impression to our leaders that we think they can or have solved our problems, we will have done an injustice to the people because the American people are going to have to search hard as individuals for the truth and, if they don’t, they are not going to make it, in my opinion.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, let me thank Mr. Clark for going to North Vietnam and for the report he has made. I join him in his wish that others of us could go and see, and have them see us. The identification of truth is difficult enough even when you have all the facts. It is folly to think that you know for sure if you don’t have all the facts.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Fong?

Senator FONG. Mr. Clark, prior to going to North Vietnam, did you get a briefing from the State Department or the Department of Defense to get our side of the story before you went there?

Mr. CLARK. I received that telegram at home, which is a bad place for me to receive telegrams because I don’t get home that often. The next day I was at the State Department. I had already made an appointment by coincidence; I had had an appointment in the Office of European Affairs to discuss Soviet Jewry and I asked that they arrange an appointment with the Bureau on the Far East. I talked to Ambassador Sullivan, who, as you know, is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East and who has testified before your committee, and I talked with Frank Sieverts, who, I assume you know, is the American official in the Department of State who has the greatest responsibility and most knowledge about the prisoner-of-war, missing-in-action individuals.

Senator FONG. You did not see anyone in the Department of Defense?

Mr. CLARK. No. I am not a military man. It is just not my line.

Senator FONG. But they would have been able to give you some idea as to what is going on over there—so that you at least would have an open mind.

Mr. CLARK. Senator, I love this country and I believe in the goodness of our people—but I am not happy with the Department of Defense. You know when I read the “Pentagon papers,” I just wonder. I know that they have their problems, but I wanted to make an individual judgment. I have been anxious about this war for a good many years, as have you, and I have read everything I could get my hands on and I have listened to everybody I could listen to and I have studied it as hard as I could and I saw no reason to go by the Department of Defense.

I said when I got back that I was happy to talk to Mel Laird or anybody else over there who wanted to talk to me and I would be happy to talk to anybody in State and I intend, of course, sometime today, hopefully, to talk to the people in State that I talked to before, and report back to them.

For instance, Mr. Sieverts—I guess it was him—was the intermediary who gave me 102 letters that he had gathered to take to prisoners held by the PRG, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and they were quite anxious about these because these are letters to prisoners that are not in North Vietnamese prisons so far as we know. These were men who disappeared in the south and I said, of course, I would take them and do everything I could to get them delivered.

I met with the PRG people four or five times in Hanoi and they called me Friday night before I left and said they they were going to do everything they could to get the 102 letters delivered. They didn't know whether they had the men, they said; they didn't know where they were but they would do everything they could to deliver them; and I asked them also to get me any letters they could possibly get to bring back, because, you know. I know the enormous anguish and suffering of these families. They gave me a handful of letters from the south to bring back. I have not checked, but I will do it immediately, to see how to get these letters to members of the families. I took over 400 letters altogether and brought back a big batch; I have not counted them.

Senator FONG. How can they justify their reluctance to have the International Committee of the Red Cross visit these prison camps?

Mr. CLARK. Well, as you know, that argument has been batted back and forth for years and years. They didn't have to justify anything to me and they didn't spend a lot of time trying to justify it. They just said they don't have confidence in it.

Senator FONG. Did you ask them about it?

Mr. CLARK. Of course I asked them about it. I don't know why people are making a big issue out of it here because we all know that it has been hammered and hammered into the ground and I didn't know how, after all the effort that had been made, I would be able to make much headway with it, but I tried, yes.

Senator FONG. Did they say they just didn't have any confidence in the International Committee of the Red Cross?

Mr. CLARK. That was the conclusion I drew from what they said.

Senator FONG. When you visited these prisoners, were you all alone with them?

Mr. CLARK. When I walked into their rooms, there were two in each room and the three of us would be there, but only for several minutes.

They had cameramen, cameramen who came in and they would take some pictures there and leave and then we walked down to the dining room, or what they call the dining room, 10 of us—the 10 of them and me—11 sat in the dining room and people came in and out. I would say there was a man there who sat by me and said nothing all the time, who had driven out with me, whom I had met several times after I got there, named Tran Trong Quat. I guess they were press people who came in with cameras and tape recorders from time to time. I tried to record everything and, as I indicated, I have several hours of recording.

Senator FONG. You always had other people present with you?

Mr. CLARK. There were other people with us all the time; the room may have been bugged for all I know.

I had worked out with the commander of the prison camp an agreement—whether he would live by it or not, I didn't know, but he did—that each man could take a tape recorder and send a private message. The way we worked that was that 10 of us at a time would be standing over by the door and we would continue talking because it seemed like time was very precious—and I can tell you those guys could talk for a month.

One at a time, one man would take the machine—this little tape recorder, you know, that you talk into—and he would go over into the corner, the far corner; there was nothing between us and him, and he would stand over in the corner and talk into the tape recorder. These were private messages. I only asked him to say to whom he wanted it sent and told him only one person would listen to it, although one person would have to listen to it beforehand to cut the tape and send it to whom they wanted it sent to. Of course, I don't know what they said on those tapes and I have not yet been able to send the tapes physically to the wives or parents, although I promised them when I saw them this Friday night. I arrived at San Francisco early Monday morning and I promised the men I would call the person that they indicated that day and I got nine out of the 10 on Monday and I only got the 10th on Tuesday. She was the mother of a captain who lives here in the District, by coincidence.

Senator FONG. Was there anyone with you when you asked them questions?

Mr. CLARK. Well, as I said, there were people in or around all the time; yes.

Senator FONG. So, they never were alone with you?

Mr. CLARK. We were alone only to the extent that I have already indicated. There is no question that certainly I was sensitive to their predicament.

Senator FONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Prisoners.

Senator FONG. You didn't ask them questions which were really sensitive; did you?

Mr. CLARK. No; as I said at the beginning—and I don't know what you mean by sensitive—I said “I do not want to talk about anything military because I just don't think we should; I won't talk about politics or anything like that; I want to find out what you are thinking, what you are doing, what I can do to help you, what anybody in America can do to help you and what you want.” And each one talked for a

little while into the microphone on those subjects. Nobody was listening to that, really; there was no way anybody could listen because there would be two guys talking over here and this guy talking into the machine over there. I will say this: My privacy with them far exceeds the privacy I had in San Quentin about 2 months ago talking to a man there, and it far, far exceeds any privacy I have ever been able to have with Father Philip Berrigan in the U.S. Federal penitentiary, and I once headed those institutions. There is no comparison.

When I walked in there in North Vietnam, I had three big bags because I didn't have anybody to help me carry the cameras, and I had a movie camera; I had to have lights, didn't know how to work them exactly; had to have batteries, and a still camera and tape recorder, and, you know, the guard didn't even look in those bags.

But you listen to the tapes. I hope you will listen to the tapes.

Senator FONG. I will.

Mr. CLARK. I hope you listen carefully and I think you will be impressed by the self-confidence, the humor—by the way, those men interrelate to each other—and by their deep concern about their families, about their lonesomeness.

Senator FONG. Is it true that these are the same men who have been paraded time and again?

Mr. CLARK. Well, I don't know why you say "paraded." I think that belittles those men. I respect those men.

Senator FONG. Maybe "paraded" was not appropriate; perhaps I should have said "seen."

Mr. CLARK. I don't think they are puppets. I think they are good, strong Americans. I don't know why you say "paraded." I think when we say those men are "brainwashed," and they don't know what they are doing, we do a terrible disservice to them.

Senator FONG. I haven't said they are brainwashed.

Mr. CLARK. Well, they are going to come home and people will say they have been brainwashed. How do we know?

Senator FONG. We have been told these men, who you saw, are the same men who have appeared in pictures time after time; is that correct?

Mr. CLARK. Well, how many times have you seen pictures?

Senator FONG. I haven't seen many.

Mr. CLARK. How many times have they been interviewed? Do you know of one man who has been to a prison camp in the last 2 years?

Senator FONG. This is what they have said.

Mr. CLARK. Do you know one man who has seen 10 prisoners?

Senator FONG. And you have seen—

Mr. CLARK. I haven't been there all these other times. How do I know?

Senator FONG. You have only seen one wing of a prison; haven't you?

Mr. CLARK. No. I saw other parts there. I went through their auditorium that seats 150 people, where they showed movies. There was nobody in there.

Senator FONG. Where was this?

Mr. CLARK. The prison was in the Hanoi area. They took me in the dark and drove me a good 30 minutes. When I asked to go there I said, "I know you have problems. Lock me in the trunk of the car and take

me out later. I don't care. I want to see those men; I don't care to know where they are."

But I think that the Son Tay raid was insane. It was the same mentality that caused the Bay of Pigs because it was the best way to get those men killed, to get paratroopers to go in there and try to rescue them. What is going to happen to other camps? That's a cowboys and Indians thing that will never work.

Senator FONG. Going back to the sluices and dikes, did you feel after seeing the damage to the sluices and gates and dikes that it was done deliberately by our planes?

Mr. CLARK. I am a lawyer, as you are. I know how hard it is to determine intention. You can only determine intention from the intention and from the circumstances. That is the only way.

God knows I don't want to think it was deliberate; but I don't know how all those bombs happened to hit on those dikes. I don't know how there could have been so much damage to the Lan sluice. You can say maybe they had a bunch of SAM missiles there; I don't know—but why would they have them there? What would be the point of that?

Senator FONG. How about oil drums and other materials; did you see any storage of such materials beside the dikes?

Mr. CLARK. No.

Senator FONG. I have here with me three pictures taken on July 24 and 29 in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, showing oil drums and other things stored within the dikes. Let me show them to you.

Mr. CLARK. I would like to see them.

Senator FONG. I ask you if you saw anything like that on your trip?

Mr. CLARK. I have quite a few hundred pictures that I hope you will take the time to look at—although I have my thumb in most of them.

Senator FONG. Each of these three pictures shows the sluice gate; each shows the dike areas. [See following photographs supplied by the Department of Defense.]

Mr. CLARK. I assume that we have all these photographs—that the Pentagon has tens of thousands of them. I think the F-1's are just flying over there and taking pictures of everything that happens. Rather than have the Department of Defense select three pictures they want to show us, I would like them to show us any pictures they took of Thanh Hoa Provincial Hospital area the day before, the day of and the day after the bombing and see what is in those pictures. That would be pretty interesting; wouldn't it? That is a big country over there. I assume around some dikes they have some things.

Senator FONG. Did you see anything like what is depicted in these pictures?

Senator KENNEDY. Let me say, Mr. Clark, that I can sympathize with your desire to see the aerial reconnaissance photos of some of the other parts of North Vietnam because I have written to the Secretary of Defense now for the past several months and we can't get any pictures at all from him indicating the impact of the air war on the civilian areas of North Vietnam.

So, it is interesting that we are getting these pictures here this morning, yet we can't get them on my request.

Mr. CLARK. You know, I can't look at that picture and identify anything that I have seen with my own eyes; I couldn't be positive if these are in Indochina and not in Hawaii for that matter.

Senator FONG. They tell me it is Route 11 between Haiphong and Hanoi.

Mr. CLARK. Yes, Senator; they tell you——

[Laughter.]

Mr. CLARK. I can say——

Senator KENNEDY. Let's be in order.

Mr. CLARK. I can say, though, sir, that I have seen places where there is a railroad line near a dike. I think it would be impossible to build all dikes and railroads in that country where there wasn't a railroad line near a dike. I have seen places where it looked like what I would call light manufacturing near a dike. I wouldn't have any doubt that you are going to have to carry oil drums and things like that past dikes. You couldn't get around the country if you didn't carry them around dikes from time to time.

But I can say that I did not see a gun mounted on a dike at any time; I did not see a SAM missile mounted on a dike at any time. They may have removed them when they saw me coming, but it doesn't make a lot of sense to me that they could or would ever put them up there. Most of the dikes I saw were away from the cities because when I was in the city I looked at the city. I saw miles and miles of countryside and paddies and the dikes and there wasn't anything near the dikes except people working in the fields.


One of the first things I did when I visited any site that had been damaged, whether it was a hospital or anything else, was to try to get some sense of the whole surrounding area. Around the Lan sluice I didn't see anything that could look like a military target. We had to walk in there; you couldn't truck anything in.

Senator FONG. Mr. Chairman, I ask these three photos be received as part of the record.


Senator KENNEDY. They will be made a part of the record.

Senator FONG. These photographs were taken in the Hanoi-Haiphong area on July 24 and July 29, 1972, and show the positioning of supplies close to the dikes.


(The following aerial reconnaissance photographs were submitted to Senator Fong by the Department of Defense):



Supplies positioned along a dike (Route 11A) in North Vietnam.



Pol Drums along a dike (Route 5) in North Vietnam.



Pol Drums along Route 5 in North Vietnam.

Senator FONG. Mr. Clark, in your talk with the Prime Minister and other high officials here, did you get to ask them why was it that they had mounted this tremendous invasion of the south, especially at a time when we were withdrawing our troops and deescalating?

Why did they go into the south and hit them with such massive force as to create approximately a million refugees, to destroy almost the entire city of Quang Tri; why did they start shooting missiles into Hue? Why did they do that, especially when we were getting out?

Mr. CLARK. Well, I asked them—and as you can imagine, it wasn't a smart thing to do, was it, because I got a long speech just as I would have gotten a long speech if I had asked you a question like that. Basically, what they said was, "As Ho Chi Minh said, nothing is more precious than freedom and independence." Well, that is what they said. I had some problems, too. When I would go to a village—a little village—and the man who had lost most of his family would look at me and ask: "Why did you bomb us?"

Senator FONG. Did you ask them, "Why did you mount this invasion in the first place?"

Mr. CLARK. Of this man in the little village who had lost all of his family? No, I didn't ask him.

Senator FONG. In your talk with the Prime Minister, didn't that come up as one of the subjects—why they mounted this very massive invasion of the south?

Mr. CLARK. You know, you said a number of things that I don't know we can demonstrate. I don't know what caused a million refugees in the south; I don't know whether it is entirely their invasion or our bombing.

I know that many people in the north feel that this is in considerable part a civil war. One editor in a very sensitive way said, "This isn't the most important war in history but it is the most suffering," and I said, "Well, I think it has to be the most important war because it has to teach us that we can't do this anymore," and he said, "Well, you know, we would hope that, but I know it is the most suffering war, and the greatest suffering by far has been in the south," he said.

Senator FONG. And did he add that this was the most devastating of all battles?

Mr. CLARK. No question; they always said the greatest damage was in the south. They say that while the American bombing in the south has driven the people from the villages into the cities, in the north American bombing has driven the people from the cities into the villages.

I don't know why if we say we are withdrawing why we are increasing the bombing. I don't know why we do that. To punish? What is the purpose? If we are getting out, why don't we get out? How do you possibly justify increasing the bombing? And never doubt that they believe that this is an accelerated war and the Prime Minister said—or at least the interpreter said he said—"Of course, this is a war of genocide; of course the bombing of the dikes and dams and sluices is deliberate." Now I just tell you that is what he said. What he believed, I don't know.

Senator FONG. But my question to you was, Why is it when you are decelerating the war that they mounted this massive invasion of the south? Didn't they have any answer to that question?

Mr. CLARK. They had—you know they have—and the answers that they give all the time I just got through telling you; they say they are fighting—I don't know whether they believe it—they say they are fighting for freedom and independence. They say there is a repressive government in the south; you know they say that. You hear it more often than I have, I imagine, and that is essentially it.

Senator FONG. I think we told them, "Let's have a general election." They refused to have one.

Mr. CLARK. Well, you are telling me that; I don't know. They told me they wanted a tripartite government of national concord, whatever that is. But they told me they do not want a Communist government there; that was not their objective. The PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam]—I asked the PRG, a man named Soai, I said, "Do you want, when the war is over, an immediate unification with the north?" He said, "That is not what we are talking about at all." He said, "We want freedom and independence and then we will let nature take its course."

Whether he was putting me on or not, I don't know.

Senator FONG. Mr. Chairman, I have two more questions and I will be through.

In your discussion with the Ministers and Prime Minister, did you go over the peace terms again as to what they would accept for a negotiated peace? Do they still cling to or hang on to what they said they wanted—the overthrow of Thieu, our getting out completely? Did they reiterate that?

Mr. CLARK. As I said earlier, I don't believe in personal diplomacy and all I was trying to do was listen, really. They said they believed

that the Nixon administration was more interested in the Thieu government than in the American prisoners of war. That is what this was really all about. They said that it is impossible to have a military settlement without a political settlement; that the war had been fought for political motivations and that the two have to go together and they said they wanted this "tripartite government of national concord" and they thought the PRG should be one-third of it and, you know, it gets a little complicated when you get much beyond that.

Senator FONG. Do you feel that they will not release our prisoners of war as long as there is fighting going on between us?

Mr. CLARK. Well, this is obviously a matter of judgment. I am not sure they know what they will do, and perhaps chance is still in control of a man's destiny to a considerable degree. But my impression is that the chances of their releasing American pilots while there is American bombing of the north is nil, except as a symbolic gesture; they may release one or two or three. I urged them to as hard as I knew how. They said, "How do we explain it to our people?"

Senator FONG. I think you stated that if Senator McGovern were elected President, they would release the prisoners immediately?

Mr. CLARK. No; I didn't say that. I wish people would be more careful because I was quite precise. I said I had a long meeting with the editor of the largest newspaper in Hanoi. Editors are usually informed people and usually interesting people, and this man was quite interesting. One of the main things that I wanted some sense of confidence about was that if there was a total settlement the prisoners would be released and I pressed him on that as I pressed every official that I met. And I must say they all looked at me like it was a silly question because what they seemed to say was, "Why not? Why would we not release them? Who is telling you we would not release them? Of course we would release them. Why would we want to keep them?" Anyway, this editor said he thought that if Senator McGovern was elected that some prisoners would be released the day he took office, and all would be released within 90 days; that is what he said; that is just an editor talking and I have seen a few editors wrong.

Senator FONG. You didn't get that from the Prime Minister?

Mr. CLARK. No, no. The Prime Minister said, as did everyone, "Of course, the prisoners would be released." The Foreign Minister gave me a letter in which he said that had the seven points and the two settlements been accepted, the prisoners would have all been returned long ago. He also said in private conversation he would guarantee it, but how can he? When I was Attorney General I couldn't guarantee something—I could only do my best.

Senator FONG. You went there at the instigation of a Swedish commission?

Mr. CLARK. That is not my impression. I heard from them that I had an invitation to go with them, but my impression is the people in control were the people in the Government of Vietnam.

Senator FONG. You went there at the invitation, did you say, or at the expense of the people of North Vietnam?

Mr. CLARK. At the expense?

Senator FONG. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. I don't know what you mean, "expense."

Senator FONG. Did you go at the expense of the North Vietnamese government?

Mr. CLARK. Money?

Senator FONG. Yes.

Mr. CLARK. We ask every question, don't we? No, I didn't.

Senator FONG. I say did you pay your own way?

Mr. CLARK. Yes, I paid my own way. But I am going to get my money back, my expenses back. I am going to write and tell the people of America what I saw and if there is any money left it is going to go to the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, a group of men I respect, and other groups. [Applause.]

Senator KENNEDY. Let's have order.

Just a couple of final questions of Mr. Clark. We have to recess; there is a call for a full Judiciary Committee meeting at 10:30, so we are not permitted to meet after that time.

You have been a practicing lawyer, Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General as well as Attorney General, and under the laws of the United States what are the kinds of limits on a citizen visiting places such as North Vietnam, speaking there and speaking on his return?

In your own opinion, does this kind of visit, the kind of comments that you make, would any American citizen come close to violating a law of the United States?

Mr. CLARK. Well, I guess this is kind of self-serving. You know the old saw that a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client.

I care about the law, and I love the law, but I love life more and I think that this is what we have to work for. I think the law has to serve life.

My impression of the cases is that in spite of the policy of the administrations, and I say that in the plural, we are a free people; that is what the Constitution says and that is what the Supreme Court has said. You have a right to travel and if the passport says you can't go someplace, you can go there because we believe in freedom and we believe that truth is found from experience and not from the inside of a building where people have got stacks of papers lying around; so I believe that there is a right—and I am quite confident there is an established right—to travel, and I think it is imperative that there be a right for all of the members of a free society to travel anywhere. I don't know of anybody complaining about that from a legal standpoint.

As to talking I think the first amendment follows the American citizen. I believe in the first amendment and I believe it is the way we find the truth and it is the way we come to understand. Long before I got back from North Vietnam, people started accusing me of talking over Radio Hanoi. I didn't talk over Radio Hanoi.

Senator KENNEDY. Would you tell us about that?

Mr. CLARK. Yes. I was asked whether I would speak over Radio Hanoi to the people of North Vietnam and to American servicemen in the area. Now, frankly, I think that that is something that an American citizen should feel free to do and perhaps should do in terms of dialog and communication, particularly speaking to the people there, but I wasn't built that way, so I told them no, and I gave them reasons

and the reasons were essentially these: I don't speak Vietnamese, therefore, I really can't speak to the people over their radio; I didn't think I wanted to speak to American servicemen over their radio, because I can speak to them Stateside or shipside, I told them.

Now while I was there, there were press people in North Vietnam from most countries, not ours—although I had one fellow say he was from the Paris Herald Tribune. There were reporters from most of the countries in Western Europe, and I guess they are like the press everywhere. They bother you; they stick microphones in your face; they are taking pictures of you all the time. Thomas Jefferson said at the height of the Revolutionary War that human nature is the same on both sides of the Atlantic and nearly got run out of the country for that; and I think, among the press people, human nature is the same on both sides of the Pacific and both sides of the DMZ, and while I was there I made observations and said what I thought from time to time. When I say something publicly it is public property so far as I am concerned. I am a free man; I can state my opinion; and if that is played on Radio Hanoi, that is their responsibility. If they distort it, that is their responsibility. They could take what I am saying now, what you are saying now, what President Nixon is saying in a radio address and they could put it on or put somebody else's voice and say that is President Nixon and he says such and such. What are we supposed to do about that? I think it is absurd to think if they are going to be devious about those things, that you are going to have to tape your mouth the whole time you are there and not say anything.

Besides that, I don't know how you go to a little secondary school that was bombed 3 days before you get there and stand in front of six of the teachers, even if there are some press present and not say, "I believe in schools; I believe in those signs on the wall. You tell me that one says 'Honor thy teacher.' You tell me that one says 'Teach well; learn well.' And I hope this isn't the lesson America teaches or the lesson that North Vietnamese children learn. I hope they can understand the American people are essentially good, and I want to tell you I am awfully glad the children were not in that school when the bombs hit."

Now, if anybody wants to play that anyplace in the world, so far as I am concerned, they can.

Senator KENNEDY. I want to thank you very much for appearing here, Mr. Clark. I don't think over the period of the last 11 or 12 years of this war have we had a more vivid or eloquent comment about the conditions in the north, the impact of our policy on the people of North Vietnam. It is not a pretty picture; it is perhaps one of the ugliest chapters in our history; and it doesn't do us very much good just to condemn the other side. So much of what you have presented here is being done in the name of the United States that I can't help but believe many millions of Americans are deeply distressed by that.

Senator FONG. Mr. Clark, do you intend to visit Hue and Quang Tri and see the damage in the south?

Mr. CLARK. I would like to, but I don't imagine I will. One of the men I met was the vice mayor of Hanoi, an interesting man, 73 years old, very distinguished looking; he had been a mandarin leader; he had lived many years in Paris; he was born and raised in Hue; he is an ardent anti-Communist and a lawyer.

He told me that he wonders if anything is left of the city of his youth.

Senator FONG. It would be good if you could visit Hue and Quang Tri and such places in South Vietnam.

Mr. CLARK. It would be, yes; I would like to.

Senator FONG. I trust you will then give a report to the people of the United States of what you find there.

Mr. CLARK. I would like to go to Vinh Linh and other places, too, and I will be interested in seeing what sort of reception I can get there. I would be interested in seeing whether I could walk the streets as safely in Saigon as I can in the north. I wonder if there is the unity of purpose there and security of life there. I wonder if I can walk off military bases without being concerned about someone shooting me or stepping on a mine or something. It would be interesting to see and I am ready to go.

Senator FONG. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. We want to thank you, Mr. Clark.

We had intended to hear this morning Mr. John Sullivan, who is the director of the American Friends Service Committee. But we have run out of time, so we hope he can appear tomorrow morning.

I think you have been enormously helpful to us, Mr. Clark, and I believe you performed a very important public service by this trip, as you have in the past. Thank you very much.

Mr. CLARK. Thank you very much.

Senator KENNEDY. We will adjourn until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, the subcommittee to reconvene at 9 o'clock a.m., Thursday, August 17, 1972.)

PROBLEMS OF WAR VICTIMS IN INDOCHINA

Part III: North Vietnam

THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:05 a.m., in room 2228, New Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy and Fong.

Also present: Dale S. de Haan, counsel, and Jerry M. Tinker, staff consultant.

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee will come to order.

We resume this morning the subcommittee's inquiry into the problems of war victims in Indochina, seeking additional information on the impact of the war on the civilian population of North Vietnam.

Previous hearings of the subcommittee since 1965 have served to document the problems of war victims in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, but very little information has been available on conditions in North Vietnam. Until recently, few American observers have visited this area of Indochina.

Yesterday we heard from former Attorney General Ramsey Clark, and today we will hear from additional visitors to North Vietnam.

The people of Indochina, particularly both Vietnams, are taking a ferocious beating, the worst since the war began. There is escalating violence from both sides, from enemy rockets and American bombs. Each day brings more refugees and civilian casualties and war victims of all kinds.

It is easy for our national leadership to express public concern for the plight of civilians. It is easy for them to blame civilian suffering on the other side. But common sense alone tells us that we are also part of the bloodbath. So does the record of our involvement in Indochina. And whatever our military planners are saying today about the precision of the new strategies and weaponry on civilian targets, and whatever they are doing to drum up a public euphoria for winning the war, instead of negotiating the peace, the fact remains that the human cost of the war to the people of Indochina is appalling and our rising contribution to this cost should outrage the conscience of all Americans.

Before we move on to hear our scheduled witnesses, let me just say that the subcommittee deeply regrets that spokesmen for the Administration have not taken the opportunity to appear before the committee

this morning. We had hoped to create as broad a record as possible regarding civilian problems in North Vietnam during these 2 days of hearings and for that reason we had invited representatives from the Departments of State and Defense.

The Department of Defense has declined to send a representative, suggesting that the issues before this subcommittee are outside the Department's jurisdiction. Apparently the Department can supervise an air war over North Vietnam but it does not feel free to discuss the impact of our bombing on the civilian population.

The Department of State has also declined to send a representative, suggesting that it needs more time to prepare.

It distresses me that the administration finds it so easy to issue press statements critical of American visitors to North Vietnam but refuses to discuss the troubling issues raised by these visitors. It distresses me even more that the administration through the release of a few selected reconnaissance photos can dismiss these issues and pretend there is no serious discrepancy between officially stated military policy and practice, and the actual performance in the field. The Department cannot hide behind the five selected photos released yesterday.

In the light of the growing evidence of civilian casualties and extensive bomb damage to civilian installations in North Vietnam, I am writing again to Secretary Laird requesting additional photos of areas of North Vietnam allegedly hit by American bombs. [For the text of this letter, see appendix I.]

The "people problems" of North Vietnam are part of Indochina's regional crisis of people; and as I suggested yesterday, no border should ever separate or diminish our Nation's compassion or concern over the needs of innocent civilians caught in the crunch of war.

Senator FONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is no question but that the bombing in North Vietnam is hurting the North Vietnamese. There is no question but that there has been much havoc and much destruction of North Vietnamese property—both civilian and military—all the very, very destructive things that have happened to North Vietnam because of U.S. bombing. One must also take into consideration that there has been much missile firing, with the military hitting the civilians in Quang Tri, Binh Dinh, Hue and other places in South Vietnam.

This bombing can be stopped very easily. It was North Vietnam that started this escalation of the war. It was North Vietnam that started this massive infiltration of the south. It was North Vietnam that re-escalated the war and hit the cities of South Vietnam which forced the United States to mine the harbor of Haiphong and to bomb North Vietnam.

Now these bombings can easily stop if North Vietnam would only agree to a cease-fire and negotiate. There is no reason why North Vietnam shouldn't agree to a cease-fire and negotiate unless their desire, sole desire, is to topple the Government of South Vietnam and to take over South Vietnam.

As I said, we could easily stop this bombing and all of the havoc and destruction being wrought on the people of North Vietnam as well as on the people of South Vietnam can cease.

I do regret that the State Department and the Defense Department have not seen fit to have witnesses here today. I do hope that before this hearing ends that they will send witnesses here to tell us what the

policy of the United States is in relation to the bombing of civilians and the bombing of dikes and sluices and gates in North Vietnam.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KENNEDY. Our first witness this morning will be Mr. John A. Sullivan, associate executive secretary of the American Friends Service Committee of Philadelphia, who visited North Vietnam this past July.

We regret very much we couldn't hear your testimony yesterday, Mr. Sullivan. I think you recognized our particular time problem with the meeting of the full committee which excluded our continuing the hearing during the course of the morning, but we appreciate very much your rearranging your schedule to be with us today. We are very interested in your comments.

**STATEMENT OF JOHN A. SULLIVAN, ASSOCIATE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE**

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am very glad to come down.

Senator KENNEDY. You have a written testimony which we will include in the record, but before you begin, perhaps you could tell us just a little bit, as Mr. Clark did yesterday, about the circumstances which took you to North Vietnam.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Very well, Senator.

The American Friends Service Committee, of which I am a staff member, has had a program of medical assistance and relief to the people of Vietnam, to civilian war victims, over a number of years and this is carried on both in South Vietnam, where we have a physical rehabilitation center for amputees, and in North Vietnam, where we have delivered over a period of time several shipments of open heart surgical equipment which is a kind of equipment that is not getting into North Vietnam otherwise, and which we are satisfied is principally useful for civilian purposes, people with heart disease, heart defects, and so forth. As a matter of fact, when Dr. George A. Perera, who is a Quaker doctor and who accompanied me on the visit to Hanoi July 15 to 22, when he and I brought the equipment to Hanoi, we were very gratified to receive within a few days a photograph and then subsequently to examine a premature baby whose life had been saved by one of the pieces of equipment we had brought in just a few days earlier.

We undertook this voyage with passports validated by the State Department for such travel and the equipment that we brought was taken to North Vietnam under export licenses of the U.S. Government.

As I say, we were there from July 15 to 22. Our principal purpose was to bring in this equipment, to see it delivered, to talk to the doctors who use it, to see some of the patients who are benefiting from it and to discuss with the North Vietnamese future medical equipment deliveries.

While we were there we had the opportunity to do two or three other things of some importance. One, of course, was simply to see Hanoi during a period of air bombardment and air alerts and the other was to travel, necessarily briefly, since our stay was only for a week, to another portion of the country which had been extensively damaged.

I would like to describe very briefly those two things, if I may.

During the time we were there we went through 44 air alerts, most of them in Hanoi. These occur morning, noon, and night. If you follow the rules, you are forced to get up out of your bed in the middle of the night, sometimes three or four or five times, because of the air alerts and, of course, everyone in the city who experiences this is going through the same kind of process.

Our conversations during the day with hospital officials, with Red Cross officials, and with governmental representatives, were on many occasions interrupted by air alerts and we had to descend into air raid shelters and continue our conversations there.

My observation of the people of Hanoi was that they are taking this thing in stride. I saw no evidence of panic; there was one very bad air raid that occurred while we were in Hanoi on the day we were leaving, July 22, and I had, really, ample opportunity to observe the way the population is responding to that sort of thing.

I might add that Hanoi is said to be about 50 percent evacuated. There are still plenty of men, women, and children there. In fact, Dr. Perera and I were very surprised at the number of children still in the city.

The people, when these air alerts occur, go about their business as usual, riding bikes, walking the streets, doing their work. When the planes come closer to Hanoi and the air raid sirens go off, traffic stops, work stops, people get off their bicycles and they go to shelters. They don't necessarily go into them. That was interesting to observe; in fact, I still have a mental image of the shelters across the street from the hotel where we stayed where people would ride up on their bikes, stop and get off and sit outside the shelters and some of them were reading newspapers.

When the actual gunfire begins, or when planes are seen overhead, then people really get into them; but otherwise it seemed to me that despite the obvious interruption of the normal course of life that these air raids cause, the people have found a way to live with this situation.

I would also observe that in all our conversations with North Vietnamese officials and with neutrals who are in Hanoi, whether they are press people or diplomats, we got the same kind of verbal comment about the conduct of the population: they are tolerating the punishment that is coming from the air and the punishment that is coming in the form of the interruption of their lives through the incessant air alerts.

The North Vietnamese officials with whom we talked said such things as "We are at the bottom now; why should we give up? We have lost virtually everything we have to lose but we will fight on." And every visible evidence that we could see with our eyes seemed to confirm that statement.

Because we had a medical purpose to our mission, we were particularly interested in some of the hospitals we visited, both in Hanoi and in the city of Nam Dinh, which is the provincial capital of Nam Ha Province, some 80 to 100 kilometers south of Hanoi.

Two of the hospitals were very badly damaged. Bach Mai, which is said to be the largest in North Vietnam, is located in Hanoi and had been damaged by bombs and rockets from an American Air Force raid. Several sections of the hospital had been knocked out of commission and while the hospital was still functioning and while patients were

still being admitted, it was very evident to me as a nonmedical layman that the work of the hospital was considerably interrupted.

From the city of Nam Dinh, we visited what they called the No. 1 hospital in that city, and it is no longer functioning, the damage has been so severe. We visited several areas, residential areas, where bomb damage had occurred and rendered the places hit completely uninhabitable.

Clearing up work was going on in many of them as we watched.

We visited some dikes in Nam Dinh and saw the bomb damage there and the repair work there.

Because I thought it was important to have something more than oral evidence, I used my camera as much as I could during these trips and I have selected some pictures that I would like to submit to the subcommittee showing some of the damage that is described in my written testimony which you already have. There are inscriptions on the back of the photos so that you can clue them into the written testimony and see just what they are referring to.

These are——

Senator KENNEDY. We will accept them and make them a part of the files.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I beg your pardon?

Senator KENNEDY. We will accept them and make them a part of the subcommittee file.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Very good.

Senator KENNEDY. To the extent that we can use the photos for the record, we will.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would like to stress these are my photos, not North Vietnamese photos; they were taken with my camera and my film and I will pass those up to you when we are through.

I did arrange to have two of the photographs blown up into considerable size so that we could look at them because I suspected that one of the things you might want to talk about would be the dikes.

The top photo on the easel [see following photographs] is of a primary dike on the Red River at Nam Dinh. You will notice that it is a curved area and this was described to us as one of the key points in the dike system since at the curve in the river and the dike, the dike itself is at its weakest and it was just at this point that the bomb damage was said to have been done on July 3, a little over 2 weeks before we, ourselves, walked on it.


You can see in the photograph there are metal pontoon boats floating on the river surface which were used in the construction work and which had not yet been taken away.

The light, shaded area in that photograph is the replaced section of the dike.

Running off that primary dike is a secondary dike and the bottom photo shows that. There were two cuts in that secondary dike similar to the one that is shown in the photograph. In the group standing at the top in the checked shirt is Dr. Perera. I am not in the picture because I was taking it.

Those two cuts in the dike, in the secondary dike, were still there when we visited the place in mid-July.

Senator KENNEDY. This hospital, where had that been damaged? How much time had elapsed before your visit?





A primary dike in the Red River dike system near Nam Dinh that was bombed but recently repaired (dotted lines indicate the new soil used in repairing the bomb damage to the dike).





A bombed-out wing of the Bach Mai hospital in Hanoi.





A bomb crater along a residential street in Hanoi.



A block of housing in Hanoi damaged by bombing.



A scene from a residential area of Nam Dinh.



Ruins of the Nam Dinh cultural center.

Mr. SULLIVAN. The Bach Mai hospital?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, Bach Mai.

Mr. SULLIVAN. It was hit, we were told, on June 27, which was approximately a little over 2 weeks before we got there. It had been hit—my recollection was that it had been hit by three bombs and one rocket. There were two persons, two hospital personnel, who were killed in that raid and you will find in the photographs several interior shots where wards are rendered useless, and various other parts of the hospital are made useless until a great deal of repair work is done.

One of the things we did, Senator, was to go to St. Paul's Hospital in Hanoi. This is a large general hospital in the center of the city. There we were shown patients who had recovered from war injuries. The X-rays of their injuries were shown to us, and Dr. Perera went over them very carefully, as well as physically examining the patients.

The doctor in charge of that hospital told us that he had—he and his staff—had handled many instances of personal injury to civilians resulting from ball and pellet weapons as well as bomb fragments, also burns and shock.

Senator KENNEDY. Dr. Perera, as I understand it, was formerly the associate dean of the College of Surgeons and Physicians at Columbia University?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is correct, so that we were able to verify with our own eyes, and by examination of the patients, and we offer the evidence of these photographs as well, that regardless of whatever the intentions may be, there is a great deal of very serious damage being done to the civilian structure of life in the north and to the people there.

One of the things that I would like to add, if I may, about the dikes: we were concerned and Dr. Perera was especially about what could happen if floods come in this rainy season and any of these dikes are breached. Obviously, and everyone is aware of this, there would be the problem of danger of food shortages and we were concerned about the possibility of epidemics. We talked with the North Vietnamese about that and they assured us that their health services had been alerted and were spread through the countryside so that there would be an opportunity to deal with epidemics if they occur.

However, we did have the opportunity to talk in private with physicians, Vietnamese physicians, and we got a somewhat different story at one or two points. One of the physicians we talked to said he was concerned about the insufficiency of medicines for dealing with amoebic epidemic that might occur as a result of flooding. So if the dikes are breached and if there is flooding and, of course, that remains to be seen, there is a very serious question that arises for us and that is whether there will be further, very damaging effects on the civilian population, both through food shortage, general dislocation, and the possibility of serious epidemic disease.

We talked about this with some of the North Vietnamese officials and they described to us in their words what they are doing in attempting to foresee these possibilities.

They said that they are getting in seeds for short-term crops, for water-grown crops, to deal with the food problem. They are encouraging the peasants to get important possessions to high places where they will be safe from the floods.

They said that every peasant has the ability to go and get material from bamboo and banana trees for making boats. Their health services have been dispersed through the countryside to deal with this and they expressed some confidence officially that they could deal with the situation adequately in their terms if a serious situation does arise; and, of course, that remains to be seen.

(Prepared statement follows:)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN A. SULLIVAN, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMITTEE

My name is John A. Sullivan of Philadelphia, Pa. I am Associate Executive Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee. In responding to the Subcommittee invitation to testify, I speak as an official of the AFSC and as a member of the Religious Society of Friends, but, of course, do not speak in the name of the Society of Friends. I have just returned within the month from Hanoi, where I visited July 15-22 in the company of another Quaker, Dr. George A. Perera, formerly associate dean of the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University. Travelling on passports validated for North Vietnam by the State Department, we brought \$14,000 worth of a \$30,000 shipment of heart surgery equipment for civilian use to Hanoi. This was one in a series of such shipments which we carry out under official export licenses of the U.S. Government. Our civilian aid to North Vietnam is part of our overall relief program for Vietnam which includes the operating and staffing of a physical rehabilitation center situated in Quang Ngai city, Quang Ngai Province, in South Vietnam. As a Quaker organization, we do not restrict our assistance to civilian victims to one side of a battle line but try to aid all regardless of political distinctions or loyalties.

During our stay in North Vietnam, we experienced 44 air alerts in which U.S. aircraft penetrated in a range anywhere from direct attack on Hanoi to flights up to 100 kilometers away. The alerts occurred morning, noon and night and we had to get up out of bed as many as four times during the night. On several occasions when we were conferring with doctors, neutral diplomats and North Vietnamese officials, we had to interrupt our conversations to take shelter for varying lengths of time. On the day we left we witnessed what were described as 10 Phantoms in a flight—and were told that others came overhead while we were underground—and we saw anti-aircraft shells bursting in their vicinity. The planes flew directly over us and wheeled over Hanoi. We took shelter, first in the single-manholes and then in a larger concrete underground shelter together with Vietnamese, Russians and Poles. While in the shelter, we heard anti-aircraft firing and felt the percussion of explosives. We were later told that the planes had bombed a candy factory in Hanoi.

The effect of constant alerts on normal life is disruptive. When planes first approach, there are loudspeaker warnings throughout the city and life and traffic continues uninterrupted. But if the planes come closer, air raid sirens sound, traffic stops, factories and offices stop work and people go to, but not necessarily into the air raid shelters, unless there is immediate evidence of raids and gunfire. Some such alerts lasted an hour or longer.

The population of Hanoi, which is said to be about 50% evacuated to the countryside, appears to be taking the raids in stride. There was no evidence that we saw of panic, although obviously taking shelter and stopping work and traffic interrupts normal life.

It is a strange and unpleasant feeling to be an American on the ground while American planes are flying with hostile intent overhead. One's reactions are very mixed, since one is very aware of the fact that one is risking one's life under American bombs. Because it is difficult to describe in matter-of-fact prose, I have written a free verse poem which the Subcommittee may have if it wishes; it seeks to describe the feelings and thoughts of an American in that situation [see text below].

"Hostile planes knife through cold and silent sky.
Terse loudspeakers signal the approach.

The sirens that I heard in London—
Another land, another time, another pang of history—
I hear again.

Theirs is the raucous call known well to ears that have heard them before.

"Who goes there overhead? Is he
From the plains of Kansas, green slopes of Vermont,
The soft-voiced south, the uproar of New York,
The ever-greening Northwest U.S.A.?"

"Who up there knows what I see here?
Look: There goes the enemy:
A sweet-eyed child chubby-legged on a bike.
A mother caring anxiously for her young.
A slender girl bent over green shoots in a paddy,
A rider off his bicycle and sitting by a hole—
The single-occupancy shelter designed to beat the bomb.

"Men, women, children . . . the enemy is everywhere!
And the targets abound.
The factories, ports, rails, homes, hospitals, dikes
That hold the salted sea from land,
Or coursing rivers that bring green life.
Or death.

"Who sits underground?
I sit in concrete shelter rooms
and talk of war.
With a Vietnamese surgeon whom war has forced
To new techniques of saving lives.
An Indian of supreme dignity who
Presides over the international group
named to control the agreement of men who
Decided 18 years ago to supervise a peace that hasn't come.
An actress who knows the studios of
Paris, London, Hollywood,
Now to find, falling asleep at night,
That her pillow is wet from tears
Brought forth by sights of war and thoughts of men
Her country has sent to ride the skies on tubes of death.

"Oh, Vietnam, Vietnam.
I know your gentle, slow and graceful people in the south,
And now I see here, in Hanoi, the same soft sweetness,
The same deep love of life and land.
The same people, the same clothes, the same words,
As those I know beyond the Ben Hai.

"Oh, Vietnam.
In the enveloping heat of July, another flush comes to my face.
How can it be? When will it stop? Who will say the word?"

—JOHN SULLIVAN.

In the streets of Hanoi during air alerts, we saw both military and civilian people, including men, women and small children from infants to teens. We were told both by North Vietnamese physicians and others that a tragic situation persists, namely, that many young children try to avoid taking shelter in order to witness the excitement of the planes and anti-aircraft fire. A result, they said, is that many of the casualties are children and their mothers who try to protect them, sometimes with their own bodies, when the bombs fall.

On July 20, we visited St. Paul's Hospital in Hanoi and met Dr. Pham Van Phuc, the director of the hospital, and Mrs. Le Thi Linh, a doctor of pediatrics. We were told that since April 16 when the air bombardment of North Vietnam was intensified, the injured included many aged persons, women and children, and that many were treated at St. Paul's. Many with serious wounds were 14 and 15 years old. They said many wounded had not taken shelter in time, or had been in rice fields, or had been hit on Sundays when many people were walking the streets on their day off. They maintained that, thanks to evacuation and other security measures, the casualty raids were not too high. A neutral newspaper correspondent, however, told us that he estimated the casualties in raids on Haiphong, for example, were perhaps double the number officially announced.

At St. Paul's Hospital, with Dr. Perera participating, we examined patients and their x-rays. They included:

Nguyen Van Gia, aged 15, hit while tending a water buffalo in May when a plane rocketed his village. A fragment entered his head but he recovered after an operation. He was also burned on the leg. He could not walk and was paralyzed but is now walking with difficulty. He has memory lapses.

Mrs. Nguyen Thi Leng, 30 year old teacher, hit April 16 while in the street by a rocket fragment. She had a 14 month old child, Dinh Phuong, whom she covered with her own body. Her hands were cut and child's buttocks were pierced. The child fainted and an emergency operation had to be performed on it.

Thien Tien Dat, 14, hit April 16 when a rocket pierced the roof of his house. He suffered internal hemorrhaging and wounds to the skull and temple. When he was operated on, blood was found in his abdominal cavity and there were intestinal cuts.

Le Quoc Khanh, 16, hit April 16, hemorrhaging as a result of damage to an artery. Fragments were found in his stomach and lower intestines and his right arm was fractured.

Le Quoc Tien, 14, hit June 8. His spleen was damaged and there was internal hemorrhaging.

The doctors also described patients and showed x-rays of children who could not be saved, including one where a shell fragment penetrated the skull, then ricocheted back from the other side of the skull to pierce the brain a second time.

Dr. Phuc asserted that the doctors have found both cubic and ball pellet damage to patients hit by anti-personnel weapons and said there were many cases of this in his experience. He also said many were hurt by burns, i.e., whether they were caused by blast or by incendiary contents. He said that Vietnamese doctors are building up extensive new experience in treating burns and noted that, unlike Western physicians, they avoid absolute sterile conditions for treatment, so that patients will have a strong resistance to bacteria and he claimed a very great ratio of success.

During our visit to Hanoi we toured a display of U.S. weapons used in aerial warfare and saw bombs and rockets of varying weights and purposes, incendiary weapons and numerous kinds of anti-personnel weapons used in air bombs or artillery shells. The non-military layman is struck, and may I say, horrified, by the ingenuity with which anti-personnel bomblets have been improved and made more effective, so that a single mother bomb can release scores of thousands of pellets or fragments calculated to go off at the height of a standing person, or to go off by a pre-set delay mechanism either by timing or vibration, and to cover a wide area very intensively.

While in Hanoi we visited the sites of recent bomb damage. This included :

Trung Dinh workers housing flats, hit June 27 by air explosion that flattened or damaged eight apartment blocks with 20 living units each, as well as a primary school. Twenty-eight were reported to have been wounded, 16 killed, mostly aged and young.

Ming Khai Street, hit July 4, houses of 33 families destroyed or damaged, one dead, four injured, as the result of four bombs falling in the residential street.

Textile workers living quarters, hit July 4, when 4 pressure bombs exploded in the air, destroying or damaging several large buildings, killed 4, injuring 15. Signs hand-lettered and posted on the ruins where workers were clearing the rubble read: "These crimes are engraved in our minds"; "despite difficulties and hardships, we are determined to win over the U.S. aggressors"; "for the sake of independence, we are ready to sacrifice"; "we are determined to make the U.S. aggressors pay in blood."

Bach Mai Hospital, hit June 27. This is a 1200-bed hospital, said to be Hanoi's largest, which the director says is functioning though the bomb damage has harmed the hospital's capability. He said there had been three bombs and one rocket that caused the damage. The following hospital sections were damaged: heart-lung-liver section; pharmacy section; obstetrics, eye-ear-throat, lying-in hall, pediatrics, physio-therapy. In addition he said the concussion of the explosion knocked out many doors and windows and damaged equipment. One physician and a laundry worker were killed. They both were in shelters at the time. Patients had been brought downstairs and did not suffer injury. Problems of infection had been increased. A number of patients have been evacuated but there are still others being admitted. As we toured the bomb-damaged hospital, it was evident to us that large sections of it would take a long time to clean up, repair or reconstruct.

We travelled on July 19 to Nam Dinh city, capital of Nam Ha province some 80-100 kilometers south of Hanoi, passing through Phu Ly which was virtually

flattened. While we were in Nam Dinh, an air alert was in progress and the all-day trip through the province which had been scheduled was curtailed out of concern for our safety. We were told Nam Ha province had been raided more than 200 times since April 15 and that thousands of shells had been fired from naval craft. We were told 20 planes had raided Nam Dinh the day before we visited (and we heard there was another attack the day after we visited). Damaged were residential areas, a factory and dikes, with casualties reportedly mostly women and children. We visited and photographed schools, pagodas, residential streets and the Number One Hospital, which was no longer functioning and largely lay in ruins. We were told there had been 40 raids on the Nam Ha province dike system in three months.

We stood on a primary dike at a bend in the Red River and observed where a large section was recently repaired. Pontoon boats used in repair were still floating at the base of the repaired section. There were no military targets visible to our eyes. It was stressed that the curve in the dike was a key point, since it was where the dike was weakest; the Vietnamese were sure the bombing was intentional. They said it took place July 3.

Running off the primary dike was a secondary dike which had been cut through in two places and which had not been repaired. I took photographs of these dikes. There was an air alert in progress and we either carried or wore helmets during this visit.

We cannot say whether the dike bombing was intentional, although a French news correspondent, a Swedish diplomat and a Cambodian diplomat gave us their opinions that it was. We consider the question of intent to be somewhat academic. As far as we are concerned, the bombing is happening and we stood with our own feet on two dikes that had been bombed.

If the dike system is so damaged or weakened through bombing that floods result during the rainy season now underway, we are fully aware of the potential hazard to the civilian population and of the serious risk of food shortage and of epidemic sickness that could result.

The North Vietnamese are also aware of this and we were told that many preparations have been made. Peasants are being encouraged to move possessions to high places and to prepare boats out of bamboo and banana trees. Foodstocks are being stored. Medical services are being spread through the countryside. Preparations for water-grown short-term crops are being made.

So much for what we saw and heard. I would now like to report on comments from North Vietnamese officials and on what we heard from U.S. officials when we visited Washington to report on our experiences. I will then offer my conclusions.

Conversations with Vietnamese officials stressed their anger at the air bombardment and blockade equally as strongly as their determination to survive and continue fighting. They said such things as:

We have nothing left to lose. Why should we give up now?

We have fought for years. We can fight for four more years if we have to.

If your air force and navy flatten Hanoi and Haiphong and destroy the dikes, we will not give in. What can you do then?

They expressed their belief that the air bombardment and naval blockade is prima facie evidence that Vietnamization has failed in the south and that the ARVN forces would be defeated if an American air war was not being carried on. They added grimly: you have an incomparable air force; if we had it, we'd have won. They admitted that they could not break the back of U.S. air and naval strength, but they also said that the U.S. must defeat them in the short run and that it could not be done. They stressed that our PWs can return home when the U.S. withdraws completely and drops its support of President Thieu and one of them said, it seems to us that your President loves Thieu more than the PWs. They expressed their conviction that Mr. Nixon intends to maintain either an actual or what they call a neocolonial presence in Saigon, that it is part of the Nixon Doctrine and of Mr. Nixon's global strategy. But they said they would not give in. When asked what they could say that would be more convincing than mere words, they said that we were religious people and perhaps we could understand that their commitment to freedom and independence and belief in victory is like a religious belief to them, for which they will make any sacrifice.

When we returned to the United States, we made arrangements to visit Washington, D.C. on August 3rd and 4th. We talked with officials of the White House Executive Office and of the State Department, as well as with Senators and Senatorial aides on Capitol Hill, reporting our experiences, showing our photographs and asking questions.

We were told that the North Vietnamese are unwilling to make concessions in Paris and evidently, though hurting, are unwilling to relent in their offensive and their resistance. We reported the North Vietnamese statements that for them a coalition government in the South is not a negotiation ploy, but a historical and objective necessity in the existing conditions. We reported their statement that, though they would like to see a Communist regime in the South, they recognize that the objective conditions for that are absent. They did say that such questions as that are questions for the future, but what is needed now is for Vietnamese of all groupings to work together to establish a neutral, independent, peaceful country. The response of U.S. officials to that was one of disbelief. In fact, it was clear to us that the distrust of the North Vietnamese toward the U.S. Administration was fully matched by the distrust of the U.S. Administration toward the North Vietnamese.

We asked American officials if this were the case, if the gap in agreement over the government of South Vietnam is as wide as it has ever been, what could our government do to cut the Gordian knot and bring some hope of resolution of the problem to despairing and frustrated people on all sides. We were given no answer to our question, only told that the North Vietnamese had brought their plight on their own heads by starting an offensive and thus not allowing for a more complete U.S. withdrawal and that the North Vietnamese were the ones who would make no concessions, while our side had offered many.

It was our observation that these U.S. officials, while committed to their strategy, were frustrated and pessimistic about a resolution of the conflict. We told them of the horror we felt at the death and destruction being rained on civilians, not to mention a militarily and technologically very inferior army and air force and they assured us that they wanted peace, too, but it was clear to me that that was not their first priority.

We said that we could foresee years more of war in which America, while being pictured as withdrawing, was playing a primary military role and causing great death and destruction. They did not offer any hope that such would not be the case.

It is my personal conclusion, which I offer to you, that unless a drastic change in policy takes place, our country has an indefinite commitment to military action in Vietnam, that far from a withdrawal, we have had a substitution of one devastating form of warfare for another, and that until the question of the Saigon Regime of General Thieu is resolved, we will stay in the Vietnam quagmire.

It is long since past due time for a complete U.S. military withdrawal from all of Indochina, for the ending of U.S. guarantees of the survival of autocratic and repressive military regimes which have by any standard inadequate popular support, for the ending of the dishonorable situation in which the mightiest and most technologically advanced nation in the world rains death and destruction on a population whose chief pitiful defense seems to be to tell the story of what is being done to them. The soul of America is exposed in Vietnam and if it is to be saved and if the people of that tragic land are to be allowed to lick their wounds and try to restore some form of more or less normal life, our country must get out of there with the least possible delay.

STATEMENT FROM BRONSON P. CLARK, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE INC.

Two representatives of the American Friends Service Committee have just returned from Hanoi where they delivered a humanitarian shipment of heart surgery equipment. They are Dr. George Perera, former associate dean of the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons and a recognized expert on hypertension, and John A. Sullivan, Associate Executive Secretary of AFSC.

Our representatives brought home personal and photographic evidence of what some of the American bombs are now doing: wrecked hospitals, schools, homes and cultural buildings. They stood on and photographed a primary and a secondary dike at Nam Dinh which had been bombed with no visible military target nearby. Whether the bombing of civilian institutions, the maiming and killing of civilians and the damage and weakening of dikes is intentional or accidental is academic. The critical question is whether these things are happening, and the direct, first-hand evidence of AFSC observers is that they are.

U.S. bombardment and naval shelling of North Vietnam must be terminated. For a technologically superior country like ours to be raining sophisticated destruction on a relatively defenseless, essentially peasant people who are completely without the means of the slightest attack on our country brings dishonor to American ideals. Our representatives found in all their conversations and observations that the North Vietnamese people, far from being driven to defeat, are uniting more strongly under the pressure and putting their ability to adapt and survive to work to outlast and endure the bombing.

In the name of all that is holy, in the name of spiritual values, in the very name of America, this loathsome bombing and shelling must stop.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you for your formal statement. Could I ask you a little bit about evidence of antipersonnel weaponry that you saw; its impact on the civilian population? What can you tell us from your own eyewitness experience?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I can tell you two things, Senator: We were taken to see some of the collection of U.S.-made weapons that have been collected as a result of raids in North Vietnam. We saw numerous examples—I don't have them with me; they were not given to me—numerous examples of antipersonnel weapons that had been gathered. These included the type of bomb that Mr. Clark showed you yesterday, which they call the guava bomb. It included a perforating bomb-let which can pierce a shelter or a roof, and if my memory is correct, this was formerly used as an antitank weapon but it can be used for other purposes—and they say it is being used for other purposes.

We saw a variety of bomblets which had either ball pellets encased in a matrix of plastic, or—I don't know quite how to describe this—a bomblet which contained a metal interior which was scored both vertically and horizontally so that upon impact it would break up and these fragments would then fly out.

We were shown various types of nonmetallic mines which could be dropped in great numbers and which could only be set off by someone stepping on them or tripping wires which fan out from the mines.

We were shown incendiary weapons—

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, but those collected weapons might have all been used outside populated areas; how do you know they weren't used against troops?

What I was interested in was the impact such weapons have had on civilians. Did you have any eyewitness experience on the impact these weapons have had on the civilian population?

Mr. SULLIVAN. The thing that we specifically saw were patients at the St. Paul's Hospital in Hanoi and their X-rays which showed pellets and bomb fragments inside the bodies of the victims; and we examined the victims themselves.

Senator KENNEDY. Were they troops; were they North Vietnamese troops?

Mr. SULLIVAN. They were mostly children from roughly the age of 10 to 16; they were not troops.

Senator KENNEDY. What sort of wounds did they have?

Mr. SULLIVAN. They had wounds in various parts of their bodies. Some that we saw had operation scars on their abdomens where they had been opened up in order to remove these objects where they had gone in. Some of them had had colostomies where the fragments had pierced the intestines. We saw X-rays showing pellets in arms, legs, chests, body and, of course, in some victims who were no longer alive, we saw the X-rays and autopsy reports on people whose heads had been

pierced by the bomb fragments. One particularly gruesome one—that of a young boy who had a bomb fragment pierce his skull, go through the brain and ricochet off the other side of the skull and pass through the brain a second time; obviously, he is no longer alive, but those were the specific things that we saw with our own eyes of injury to civilians.

We saw a number of them; they are described in the written testimony I will submit. We saw the X-rays, the autopsy reports and talked to the doctors who had handled them and they said they had had many instances of anti-personnel-weapon injuries since the major raids started in April.

Senator KENNEDY. I don't have any further questions. I am going to yield to Senator Fong and then after his questions we are going to hear from Reverend Lecky and then I thought you would be available after we see the film, to respond to perhaps some additional questions that might be raised, if you could.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Very well.

Senator FONG. Mr. Sullivan, were you allowed to go anywhere that you pleased?

Mr. SULLIVAN. In Hanoi, Senator, we were perfectly free and we did go from our hotel anywhere we pleased in the city. When we went to Nam Dinh we were escorted and we did say, "Let's go over there" but we were during that period, during that trip, always with people who accompanied us.

Senator FONG. I see.

Now, in Hanoi did you visit many of the dikes there?

Mr. SULLIVAN. No, I did not visit any of the dikes in and around Hanoi. The dikes that I visited were in Nam Dinh.

Senator FONG. Nam Pinh?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Nam Dinh.

Senator FONG. How far away from Hanoi is that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Eighty to one hundred kilometers; I am not sure of that exact distance.

Senator FONG. How many bomb cuts did you see in these dikes?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Just what you see up on those photos, Senator. We saw the replaced section in the primary dike and we saw two cuts of the sort shown in the second picture in a secondary dike.

Senator FONG. Is that all the damage that you saw as far as the dikes are concerned?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Those are the only dikes we visited.

Senator FONG. I see. You visited this dike in Nam Dinh—

Mr. SULLIVAN. Right.

Senator FONG (continuing). And you saw the section there [pointing to photograph] covering approximately how many feet, would you say?

Mr. SULLIVAN. It is in the neighborhood of 100 feet, the replaced section at the top.

Senator FONG. I see the soil there is a little different from the other soil which was the old soil. Is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, as you can see in the picture itself, the shading shows the new soil in the picture.

Senator FONG. Then, in the lower part of the picture, you have a cut there. That cut seems to be very, very nicely done. It could have been done by a bulldozer, couldn't it?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I sort of have a funny feeling, Senator, that they wouldn't have run a bulldozer through there for our purposes.

Senator FONG. What I mean is would that necessarily be a bomb cut?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is what we were told.

Senator FONG. A bomb crater cut so nicely?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes; they sometimes cut very nicely, evidently.

Senator FONG. I see.

Then, as far as you were concerned, and as far as you saw, there were two cuts, one was that filled portion?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Since those are the only places we visited, yes.

Senator FONG. Did you ask to be taken to other spots where you could see damage to the dikes?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, we did. We wanted very much to travel to other places and, in fact, when we visited Nam Ha Province we had been scheduled for a full day of touring throughout the province and we had been told we would see many dikes. When we arrived in Nam Dinh an air alert was in progress, off and on during the whole time we were there. You can see, perhaps on closer examination, that some of the people in that photo are either wearing helmets or carrying helmets. There was an air alert in progress at the time.

After we had been there 3 or 4 hours, our guides came to us and said that because of the fact that there had been air raids the day before and there had been many in the days before that, and because the alerts were now in progress, they felt that for our safety it was necessary to curtail the plans and to return to Hanoi, which we did with much disappointment on our part.

Senator FONG. You don't know whether the cuts were made by our bombs—or were made by, say, antiaircraft fire from North Vietnam's own guns?

Mr. SULLIVAN. We, of course, did not see the bomb damage occur.

Senator FONG. Exactly.

Mr. SULLIVAN. So that it is literally impossible for us to say exactly how the damage occurred. I don't personally see how an antiaircraft gun could create such damage, but certainly what I can tell you is that we were told that these were caused by bombs from American planes.

Senator FONG. Did you hear or see any U.S. planes when the alert was sounded?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes. On July 22 we were on our way to the airport to leave Hanoi and we got to the Red River to take the ferry across; we were—there had been two or three alerts already that morning—we were all on the ferry, all loaded, all the vehicles and all the people jammed in like sardines, and as we stood on the ferry we saw planes directly overhead and antiaircraft fire going off.

Senator FONG. Were the planes dropping bombs?

Mr. SULLIVAN. At that moment it was not dropping bombs. They were flying over; we were told they were Phantoms, directly overhead and they wheeled over us, over the city of Hanoi; at that point we were told to take shelter. We went first into those small, one-man holes and then were taken out of that because they felt it was not safe enough, and brought to an underground shelter of a larger size.

While we were in the shelter we heard the anti-aircraft fire initially; we heard explosions and I can't tell you the nature of the explosions, of course, whether they were bombs or missiles coming down or ground-to-air missiles going up, but there were explosions which shook the shelter. There was percussion which you could feel with your eardrums and it was quite evident that there was military action going on above us, but being underground we couldn't see it.

Senator FONG. Now, in your—

Mr. SULLIVAN. Incidentally, that lasted for something in the neighborhood of an hour to an hour and a half; there was a great deal of activity.

Senator FONG. I see.

You say the people in Hanoi take the alerts in stride; they don't seem to be bothered by it?

Mr. SULLIVAN. They certainly are bothered by it, Senator—I said they were not panicked by it. There was no evidence of panic.

Senator FONG. I understood you to say they would go to the bomb shelters and sit outside and read newspapers or even bicycle until—

Mr. SULLIVAN. Until there was either the sound of gunfire or the sight of planes; this happens so frequently in their lives that they have learned the pattern of the air bombardment and they conduct themselves accordingly.

The officials are constantly urging them and you can hear the loudspeakers, and you can see officials urging people to go into shelters and to protect themselves against the possible effects of bombing; but not all of them do. I was in the air raids in London in the Second World War and I saw exactly the same thing, Senator. I did it myself. There were many, many raids where I didn't take shelter because I had learned what was likely to happen. Of course, this is a little risky and there are people who get hurt because of it and there are people getting hurt because of it in North Vietnam. But I think that is kind of a human thing even when you are under so gross and terrible a thing as is happening there, that you learn how it works and you adjust your life accordingly, and that is what we saw happening.

Senator FONG. Isn't that an indication that the American planes were not bombing indiscriminately? Is it not because of the fact that they were not bombing indiscriminately that these civilians in Hanoi, for example, were just taking the matter in stride?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I would say that if there wasn't evidence that people weren't being injured and killed, but they are.

Senator FONG. Now, are these people who were injured and killed, do you know whether they were injured when they were close to military establishments, supply depots, tanks?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Of course, I don't know that, Senator.

Senator FONG. You don't know that?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Of course I don't; no more than would you if you were there.

Senator FONG. Why would the Americans be releasing antitank bombs against civilians?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Something that was called a perforating bomblet which, as I say, my memory is that I was told that this had been at one time an antitank weapon and perhaps still is, were also being used in air bombardment, and were perforating shelters, roofs and so forth before detonating.

Senator FONG. You saw these victims of American air raids. Would you say they were much different from the victims that you saw in South Vietnam—or have you been to South Vietnam?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, I have been to South Vietnam.

Senator FONG. You visited hospitals there?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; I have.

Senator FONG. You have seen victims in South Vietnam's hospitals?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; I have.

Senator FONG. Victims who were injured by rockets fired by North Vietnamese into South Vietnamese cities?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I have seen victims of all sorts of firing by all sorts of people in South Vietnam—

Senator FONG. Yes.

Mr. SULLIVAN (continuing). Including American and South Vietnamese; yes.

Senator FONG. Were they much different, the victims in South Vietnam, caused by North Vietnamese guns?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, the ones I am most familiar with, Senator, in South Vietnam, are the patients in our physical rehabilitation center in Quang Ngai City and these are people who have lost arms and legs, sometimes two arms and two legs, or who have suffered spinal injuries from shell and bomb fragments. We keep records of those things in the rehabilitation center and the cause of those injuries is identified as far as we are able to do it as to whether it resulted from both North or NLF action, from South Vietnamese action, or from American war action. We submitted this material to the subcommittee during the hearing on May 8. [See Part I.]

Senator FONG. You would say that people suffer just as much in the South as people in the North?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I would say that anybody who is wounded or severely injured from war action is a suffering person, yes, indeed, and that is why we are carrying on a program of humanitarian assistance both in the south and in the north.

Senator FONG. Now, you say you received a license from the American Government validated for North Vietnam so that your shipment of \$30,000 worth of heart surgical equipment was in fact consented to by the U.S. Government?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Oh, yes, we are in full compliance with the U.S. Government law about what we are doing.

Senator FONG. The Government didn't try to stop you from delivering these supplies?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Of course they didn't. We got the export licenses; we have discussed this in advance many times with the Department of State. I have had personal conversations with Frank Sieverts, Ambassador Sullivan and others. I have had conversations with the U.S. Embassy officials in Vientiane just before going into Hanoi and just after coming out of Hanoi.

As far as I am concerned, the American Friends Service Committee acts in a very open and public way and the U.S. Government knows that and I think respects it.

Senator FONG. Would you not say, however, that this official sanctioning of your efforts to bring medical supplies and medical equipment to North Vietnam is inconsistent with the views as stated by

some that we are deliberately killing innocent children and bombing dikes and bombing nonmilitary targets.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, you know, I really don't want to get into the question of intention of what I have seen in North Vietnam. There is no way in the world that I can say that this was intentional, accidental or otherwise. What I can tell you, and I can tell you very flatly, is that it is happening and I think that that is the important question.

To me the question of intent is pretty academic. It may be important to propagandists but to me the important thing is that civilians are being killed and injured in an undeclared war by our arms and our Air Force that shouldn't even be there in the first place.

Senator FONG. Let me ask you, Mr. Sullivan, who started this massive fight?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Are you asking me to review the history of the—

Senator FONG. You are now stating that this is happening. Who started it now? Who invaded the south? Who started the massive invasion of the south?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I don't know how far back you want to go, Senator. Do you want to go back to 1954—

Senator FONG. Everything was decelerating—

Mr. SULLIVAN (continuing). Or 1960 or 1965?

Senator FONG. Everything was decelerating until this massive invasion of the south; is that correct?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Everything was accelerating?

Senator FONG. Decelerating.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Decelerating? By that I suppose you mean we were in the troop withdrawal process?

Senator FONG. We were not bombing the north. We had not mined the harbor.

Mr. SULLIVAN. We were bombing the north; there was something described in the papers—described as preemptive strikes that General Lavelle gave some very interesting testimony that was going on before April.

Senator FONG. But even those were very, very few in comparison to what is happening today. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. SULLIVAN. That is what I am concerned about, what is happening today, Senator.

Senator FONG. Now, if the North Vietnamese had not mounted this tremendous invasion of the south, this present bombing wouldn't be happening, would it?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, and if we hadn't been there in the first place maybe that massive invasion wouldn't have happened; I don't think there would be a war going on there today if our military involvement didn't exist.

Senator FONG. Yes, but who started it?

Senator KENNEDY. Here we go—

Mr. SULLIVAN. I am sorry; I didn't want to get into a long history of the Vietnam war which I am—

Senator FONG. You seem to come here and feel that we are the bad guys in this whole picture. You seem to present a picture that here are victims in a hospital, victims of our bombing. Have you considered that sometimes they may be victims of their own anti-aircraft guns? You say that these are people who are suffering because of what we

have done. We had to do these things because they were mounting this tremendous invasion of the south and they were creating a million refugees; it was they who were sending people to the hospitals in the south. Now these things could easily be stopped if they would just sit down and negotiate and stop firing.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, and they could easily stop if we would stop doing them.

Senator FONG. We told them we would stop, but they refused to negotiate.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, Senator, you may be an expert on the negotiations going on but I certainly am not; all I know is what is happening in the field. All I know is what I saw with my own eyes and all I know is that I am distressed and horrified by what I saw.

Senator FONG. But we must remember that there are also distressing tales of 1 million refugees moving away from their homes in the south because of the massive invasion.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Sir, what has that got to do with my testimony?

Senator FONG. I just want to present a balanced picture here. I want to present a picture that the present situation is the result of the massive invasion of the south by the north.

Mr. SULLIVAN. All right, and I responded that this thing would be over if we would get out of it.

Senator FONG. Yes, if they would start negotiating, we would have a cease-fire. We have asked them to do this but they have not done so.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Senator, when I returned from Hanoi to the United States, one of the first things I did, and Dr. George Perera was with me, was to go to visit officials in the Executive Office of the President, to visit officials of the State Department, to visit U.S. Senators and senatorial aides on Capitol Hill, to give an immediate and direct report of what we had seen and witnessed and heard and learned in the north. We, of course, raised the question in conversation with these officials about the negotiations; we talked with officials of the White House and we said, "Given the fact that North Vietnam is insistent on certain conditions in the negotiations which our side evidently is unwilling to agree to, given the fact that there is terrible destruction going on in both ends of Vietnam, not just in the north, and given the fact that there is almost no one left in the world who wants this war to go on, what is it that our Government, which is an outside party to this, what is it that our Government can do to cut the Gordian knot and, Senator, I have to tell you frankly that I got no answer to that question.

Senator FONG. Well, the answer was stated in the proposals made by the President. These proposals, I think, are pretty generous: stop firing; we negotiate.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I guess we are both entitled to our opinion. I think if we got out there wouldn't be any great need for this thing to go on.

Senator FONG. And if we got out of there, what would happen to the civilians in South Vietnam?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Well, I suppose something would happen to them—

Senator FONG. Then would you be called upon again to go to South Vietnam?

Mr. SULLIVAN. Some good things and some bad things might happen to them in South Vietnam, but all I can tell you is that some mighty bad things are happening to them now.

Senator FONG. Three thousand people were killed, massacred in Hue.

Mr. SULLIVAN. And American bombs have killed many, many more thousands, Senator.

Senator FONG. These were killed and massacred after the North Vietnamese got control of these cities.

Mr. SULLIVAN. There is a great deal of talk of massacres by all sorts of causes and I deplore every one of them, whether they occur as the result of the north or the NLF or the south or the Koreans or the Americans. I deplore every one of them, not just one side of them.

Senator FONG. But not the massive massacre of 3,000 to 4,000 people in Hue?

Mr. SULLIVAN. I will grant you the deliberate, cold-blooded massacre of anyone whether it is by Vietnamese soldiers, by one side or the other, or by American troops, and we have had records of all of those things as you know, that massacres of those sort capture the public attention, capture the attention of the media and they certainly become the center of controversy and propaganda. But for anyone who is concerned about human life, such massacres have to fit into the pattern of what is happening to all the people concerned and there are many, many, many more people being killed by other means than massacres, and I think that we ought to be concerned about all of that, Senator, not just selected aspects of it which have particular propaganda value.

Senator FONG. I hope you don't mean that you are willing to let thousands and perhaps millions of South Vietnamese be massacred if the North Vietnamese came in?

Mr. SULLIVAN. If it was in my power, I wouldn't have anyone massacred—

Senator FONG. I am glad you say that.

Mr. SULLIVAN (continuing). By any side.

Senator KENNEDY. I hope you will remain with us, Mr. Sullivan—

Mr. SULLIVAN. I'd be glad to, Senator.

Senator KENNEDY (continuing). To perhaps respond to some other questions later.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. I suppose—if I could just make this final observation, for we want to move right along because we are going to run out of time—I think the point which I gathered from your testimony is that there has been an escalation in human suffering in Vietnam on both sides.

You can talk about negotiations in Paris, or wherever the President's representatives are going, but there remains massive human suffering affecting innocent civilians in North Vietnam and South Vietnam alike, and this is a story that if the American people fully understood I think they would no longer tolerate. And I think from your eyewitness report, from what you have seen, from what you have heard, and from the pictures that you supplied, you have helped provide a better understanding of this for all Americans. I don't think the American people would tolerate this war for one minute more if they really understood it.

I want to thank you very much for coming this morning.

Mr. SULLIVAN. May I just say, Senator, that if other Americans could have the opportunity to see what I have seen they wouldn't tolerate this war another day indeed.

Senator KENNEDY. We will now call on Reverend Lecky, who is a former associate executive director of the Department of Ministry of the National Council of the Churches of Christ and currently a codirector of Clergy and Laymen Concerned.

Reverend Lecky will present a film and then respond to some questions.

STATEMENT OF REV. ROBERT S. LECKY, CODIRECTOR, CLERGY AND LAYMAN CONCERNED, ACCOMPANIED BY DR. WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN

Reverend LECKY. Sir, I would just like to say just a few words about how the film came to be.

We went into North Vietnam on May 20, and we took this film with 8 millimeter cameras. I had never taken film before and I don't think my other colleagues who were on the trip had, either. We were the first Americans who were allowed to take undeveloped color film out from North Vietnam and we brought it back with us and had it developed here.

We visited three provinces centered around Hanoi, Haiphong and Nam Dinh, and I think the film will speak for itself. I would like to show it now.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you; you may proceed.

(Film presentation.)

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. This is the village of Phuc Loc—

Senator KENNEDY. Would you give your name?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. I am Dr. Bill Zimmerman. I accompanied Reverend Lecky on this trip and took some of the footage.

This village is near Haiphong. We visited it on the morning of May 23, 1972. It has been described in the press by Tony Lewis and yesterday at these hearings by Mr. Clark.


On the morning of April 16, at 2:30 a.m., this area was "carpet bombed" [see following illustration] by B-52 bombers dropping 500-pound demolition bombs. The village is a square kilometer in area. We drove into it from Haiphong and passed only through rice fields in areas of dikes and canals.

The man that you will see standing in the center of one of these craters in a moment is one of the villagers—one of the members of the village; he is 70 years old. There were 17 members in his family before the attack. This is the man here.

During the attack, 10 members of his family were killed; the other seven seriously injured. Of the 10 killed, nine were dismembered beyond recognition by the impact of the 500-pound bombs.

Part of the village was being rebuilt when we were there which was approximately 6 weeks after the attack.

The Vietnamese told us that there were 142 bomb craters and from our observations all of those bomb craters were within the village perimeter. We didn't see a single bomb crater outside this one square kilometer area.



B-52's and diagram of bomb bursts are superimposed on map of Haiphong to indicate area covered by typical rectangular pattern of bombs dropped by three-plane mission. B-52 missions are usually flown by three planes. Bomb pattern is more than mile long.

In the surrounding fields there was only evidence of antipersonnel weapons, very small holes in the ground made where these antipersonnel weapons detonated.

This is a scene of destruction in Haiphong, also shot on May 23. In a moment there will be on the screen an interview with Quang Thao who is the chief administrator of Haiphong, the equivalent of one of our mayors. He is describing the attack on the city that took place on April 16.

The map in front of him is the city plan of Haiphong and the dark symbols on the map, which are a little difficult to see, represent areas where demolition bombs fell on the city on the 16th. The first raid on the 16th was at 2 in the morning, 2 a.m. It hit the harbor and several housing projects—three housing projects, to be exact.

At 9 a.m., 7 hours later, the planes attacked and hit the same housing projects a second time, injuring people who had returned to their homes.

Senator KENNEDY. You will give us later the names of the housing projects, if you know?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. I believe I have them in my briefcase; yes.

The planes attacked, hit the same housing projects the second time in order to wound, the Vietnamese told us, the people who had returned to sift through the wreckage of their homes.

On the 16th they attacked a third time at 4 p.m. and again hit the same housing projects and the harbor.

We visited the harbor and our observations indicated that damage to the harbor was far less extensive than the damage you see before you now, which was to urban residential areas.

During the second attack on April 16 at 9 a.m., there were two additional targets besides the harbor and the housing projects—the Ky Dong Hospital and the Vietnamese-Czechoslovakian Friendship Hospital. Here you see the Czech Hospital; the little pockmarks in the wall there were made by antipersonnel weapons.

These are victims of those raids who were being treated in the hospital.

This is the head of surgery in the hospital who is describing this particular boy who is 10 years old and who was injured in his bed in one of the housing projects at 2 a.m. on the 16th, brought to this hospital, and was on the operating table at 9 a.m., when the second attack occurred, and on that operating table was injured a second time. The planes hit the operating room and the surgical ward of the hospital as well as the staff residences for the nurses and doctors.

Senator KENNEDY. What is this scene?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. This is the Vietnamese-Czechoslovakian Friendship Hospital in the center of Haiphong, about one-half kilometer from the housing project and about a mile or so from the harbor.

The physician told us after describing the case of this young boy that their outrage at the American pilots, who would attack even children, is increased by the happiness they feel after saving this boy's life.

Their medical services in the hospital seem to be excellent.

All of the patients that we saw in the hospital were civilians. The vast majority were children and older people, and we were told that these are the principal victims of the attacks on urban areas because they have the most difficulty in getting to shelters during the attacks. There isn't as much warning before an attack in Haiphong as there is in Hanoi because the Phantoms from the 7th Fleet come directly off the sea and there are no plane spotters out at sea, Vietnamese plane spotters.

We were in one attack in Haiphong on May 23, the day these pictures were taken, and were able to see 10 Phantoms divebombing over the city.

The footage we will see immediately after this shot is from the city of Nam Dinh, also described in Mr. Sullivan's testimony. This city was attacked on May 23, 1972. We were there; we arrived late at night on the 23d and this footage was taken on the morning of the 24th.

The area the film is showing now is an urban residential area in the center of Nam Dinh. This man is standing at the bottom of a very deep crater made by a 500- or 1,000-pound demolition bomb.

Nam Dinh the day before was severely attacked; we saw—

Senator KENNEDY. Did you see any other factories or machines or plants destroyed in these communities?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. Not in this area, Senator. There are many textile factories in Nam Dinh and we saw one that was destroyed on a previous attack and one that was still functioning.

Senator KENNEDY. Is this a church?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. This is a church, yes. This is Our Lady of Peace Church in Nam Dinh.

Most of the damage from the raid depicted here, which occurred the day before, as I said was in urban areas. There seemed to be, to me, about 8 acres of rubble of this sort in the center of town.

Senator KENNEDY. As I understand, the policy is not to drop those 500-pound bombs in any area where there are civilian populations.

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. That is what the Pentagon told us, too.

This is a housing project; it was a complex of four buildings: three were apartment buildings and the fourth was a secondary school and they are all arranged around a campus area. These buildings were in

Haiphong, not in Nam Dinh. The footage is out of order here. All four buildings in that complex, the three apartment buildings and high school, were all wrecked by demolition and antipersonnel bombs.

This is the backyard of our hotel in Nam Dinh; three hours before this footage was taken Rockeye antipersonnel bombs, described in Mr. Sullivan's testimony, were dropped on this hotel in Nam Dinh. This hotel is in the center of town. There is a textile mill adjacent to it and the people in the background are workers on a lunch break. The Vietnamese are in the process of defusing some of the weapons that had not gone off. That—you can't see it clearly—but that is a Rockeye bomb, manufactured by the Honeywell Corp., that that person is holding. It was formerly an antitank device.

These bombs are designed to penetrate underground shelters as they used to penetrate tanks. They have the secondary function, if they don't hit a shelter directly, of driving into the ground, as we are about to see, down to a depth of about 60 centimeters. At that depth they explode and set off an underground shockwave. If there is a shelter nearby, the walls of that shelter might collapse as a result of the shockwave, crushing the people inside.

We saw evidence of these Rockeye bombs in several areas around Nam Dinh, but this particular attack, as I said, occurred just before we got there. We were asked not to walk around this yard because there were a number of undetonated bombs there. There is a fragment from a demolition bomb that was also found in the backyard of that hotel.

During the 24th when we were there, there were three additional raids on Nam Dinh. This is the village of Bao Ngu, about 30 kilometers from Nam Dinh. It has been attacked on May 12, just about noon. In the attack, eight people were killed and 23 injured. Most of the killed and injured were students or teachers who were returning from a lunch break from the village day-care center and were caught outside the center as the planes swooped in on the village. The little holes in the pot being held up are made by the steel pellets from antipersonnel weapons. There was quite extensive damage of that sort in this village, little holes and pockmarks in buildings and furniture, cooking utensils and so forth, all over the village, indicating that a very large number of antipersonnel pellet bombs had been dropped on this village.

Senator KENNEDY. What was the military significance again of this village?

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. It was surrounded by miles and miles of rice paddies. We saw no targets that could be construed in any way to be of military significance.

This man had been injured by an antipersonnel weapon and we could see several small puncture wounds on his legs made by them.

This is a monument of outrage to the American pilots erected by the villagers, and it describes the date and time of the attack, number of people killed and injured.

Here we just walked through the village and you will see against some of these walls evidence of the antipersonnel bombs which are incapable of—the pellets of which are incapable of penetrating the walls. There will be a couple of pockmarks and we are now panning to one of the holes in the wall that was made by a Rockeye bomb itself. These are the penetrating or perforating bombs. The little pockmarks

up there are made by the pellets and you are able to dig the little steel ballbearing pellets out of some of those holes in the buildings.

I might add, since this footage, since this section of the film we are showing you is about to end, that some of this footage was shown on CBS TV on June 18 and on that date an Air Force colonel who was assigned to the Pentagon information office denied that the Air Force or Navy had ever dropped bombs on the village of Phuc Loc which you saw in the opening sequence of the film. They claim to have aerial recon photos from April 17, the day after the attack on Phuc Loc, indicating that there had been no attack.

They also denied to CBS TV on June 18 that they had ever dropped antipersonnel weapons on Nam Dinh, stating it was their policy not to drop such weapons on urban areas.

Reverend LECKY. Senator, I asked Dr. Zimmerman to narrate this film since he had been working closely with the development of the film since we returned and had to cut small sections out from the three or four hours of film; that is why I asked him if he would help.

Senator KENNEDY. Tell me, of the pictures that we saw here of schools, homes, churches, or hospitals; were any of these buildings in any way associated with military targets?

Reverend LECKY. Our invitation—I had applied to go to Hanoi—but the invitation came to inspect civilian targets, and we only saw in a sense one military target and that was the harbor in Haiphong. We saw certain things on the roads and trains but we saw nothing in any of these situations which you saw today which would resemble a military target, and particularly in the villages where the roads to them were very narrow; they tended to be usually many kilometers away from major urban residential areas. It seemed to be totally a kind of peasant society. So we saw nothing of a military nature that would indicate the reason for the ferocity of some of these attacks.

Senator KENNEDY. I suppose they would say that a textile mill might be a military target, and you saw textile mills?

Reverend LECKY. We saw textile mills and, of course, Nam Dinh is the center of the textile industry in North Vietnam, and I guess if that is rated as a military target then that would explain the bombings in and around Nam Dinh and which included residential areas and the hotel in which we stayed.

Senator KENNEDY. Powerplants?

Reverend LECKY. I saw none of those in these areas.

Senator KENNEDY. Cement factories?

Reverend LECKY. No, as I say, most of the places we were shown were so typically residential and so typically related to civilians that there was no indication of military targets and, believe me, we looked. I mean, the obvious question was why, and there was no answer to that.

Senator KENNEDY. Were there any concentrations of troops around any of these areas?

Reverend LECKY. We saw very, very few military people at all, and the only time we saw even the emergence of small arms was when during a raid, people who had been performing civilian tasks would put on helmets and grab a rifle and go out into the street and shepherd people into shelters and so on. But we saw at no stage any contingent of troops at all.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you have accessibility to visit areas or communities that you wanted to?

Reverend LECKY. Within, it seemed to me, within the bounds of personal safety, we did. We roamed the streets of Hanoi, but there was always a question being asked about our personal safety and so there were times, particularly in Nam Dinh and Haiphong, where raids were almost daily, there were restrictions placed on us, but I had the sense they were for our personal safety, and whenever we traveled that seemed to be uppermost in their mind.

I would like, Senator, if I could, to just make two very brief observations: One is when we went in and around Hanoi, we noticed that the major bridge across the Red River had one single span blasted out of it, which is a photo which we have all seen in the press, which was, I thought, a clear indication of the Air Force's or the Navy's ability to hit a very, very small target very accurately. But literally within a few hundred yards of that were housing areas which had been blasted very badly indeed, and I had to say, why is it that we can hit the bridge so accurately and yet at the same time blast very large areas of housing?

The second—

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. May I make a related comment, Senator?

A number of people in commenting on the attack on Phuc Loc, a number of administration spokesmen, have tried to explain the damage to that village in terms of possibly a backfiring SAM missile. Our observations indicated 142 bomb craters within a square kilometer. Unless the North Vietnamese have been given MIRV's by the Russians, it is very difficult to explain the extensive number of craters that the Air Force and Navy spokesmen claim result from a single backfiring missile or a single misplaced Air Force missile, and this was a pattern which we saw in many places.

Reverend LECKY. The other point that I wish to make is that whenever they are firing SAM missiles, this remarkable alert system that they have of using loudspeakers always urges people to go to the shelters, that they are firing missiles and, therefore, that there may be some falling. But the damage we saw, particularly in Phuc Loc, was so concentrated and really confined within the area of the village, that I would say that it almost had to be aimed there for it to have done the damage that it did.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you see any missile sites while you were there?

Reverend LECKY. None at all.

Senator KENNEDY. Did you ask to see any?

Reverend LECKY. I didn't. We asked for certain things, and I think all that we asked to see we were allowed to see, particularly schools, hospitals, captured pilots.

Senator KENNEDY. In an interview in the New York Times recently with some of the pilots, they indicated that during the prestrike briefings, the pilots say they pore over detailed maps, and reconnaissance photographs, dikes, and other "no-noes"—hospitals, churches, clusters of homes, and POW camps, for example—are pointed out, and the paths for approaching and departing the targets are planned so as to minimize collateral damage.

How successful would you say that that procedure has been in relationship to what you have seen?

Reverend LECKY. We didn't see the military targets so I don't know how successful they have been with the military targets; but all we can say is what we saw, and we saw extensive damage to what were only schools, only hospitals, only residential housing—and it was extensive. There is no way even with our film that you can capture the magnitude, particularly in Haiphong and Nam Dinh, of areas which have been leveled, and I mean we are not talking about, you know, a few isolated bombs; we are talking about street blocks.

Dr. ZIMMERMAN. With respect to the pilots, later on in this film there is an interview with the eight pilots that we saw, and they all said that the bombing attacks placed them, and I quote, "in very real, very imminent personal danger."

Senator KENNEDY. Since you have been back, have you had the opportunity of talking with anyone in the Defense Department to ask them about any of these particular villages, their possible military significance, and have you been able to get any response from them?

Reverend LECKY. I was the one who did most of the work with CBS, and they did speak specifically and directly to the Defense Department about some of the claims we make in the film, and Dr. Zimmerman referred to their denial of it; and I guess I want to say it seems to me in terms of the argument about the date of bombing of Phuc Loc that it is absolutely immaterial. For there is no question at all that that village was bombed almost to smithereens, and I don't believe that their own missiles fell so accurately on their own village.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Fong?

Senator FONG. Reverend Lecky, what was your purpose in going to North Vietnam?

Reverend LECKY. My purpose, Senator, was part of my function as a codirector of a group called "Clergy and Laymen Concerned"—I am editor of a weekly newspaper called American Report which deals extensively with issues of religion and power, and so I have written a lot and read a lot and published a lot about the situation in Vietnam and I wanted to go for myself and that was the reason I applied to go.

Senator FONG. You were given permission to go to North Vietnam for what purpose?

Reverend LECKY. I was given permission to inspect and look at civilian bomb damage.

Senator FONG. Just civilian bomb damage?

Reverend LECKY. Yes, sir.

Senator FONG. That was specifically designated?

Reverend LECKY. Yes, sir.

Senator FONG. You were not allowed to see any other damage?

Reverend LECKY. As I said, the only serious military target I thought we saw was the harbor in Haiphong. I did not see missile sites; I did not see, apart from the airport at Hanoi, any airfields or anything like that.

Senator FONG. So, specifically, your guide just took you to civilian targets?

Reverend LECKY. Yes.

Senator FONG. In fact, you were prohibited from seeing military targets except while passing by?

Reverend LECKY. Yes, and I would just like to say, Senator, that we were there in a time of war and, therefore, even our presence there was a certain cost to them because it meant that people had to be taken

away from other tasks, to translate for us, to escort us, and so on. The limitations of the war were always present whether it was for our own personal safety or in the kind of resources they could offer to us.

Senator FONG. How large is the Port of Haiphong?

Reverend LECKY. How large is the Port of Haiphong? Do you mean in terms of—

Senator FONG. Area, square miles.

Reverend LECKY. I don't know; I wouldn't like to hazard a guess.

Senator FONG. Is it a big port?

Reverend LECKY. I would say it was a fairly big port, yes. There are a number of very large ships that were tied up while we were there.

Senator FONG. The apartments that you saw bombed in Haiphong, how far were they from the waterfront?

Reverend LECKY. The major area that we saw bombed in Haiphong was about a mile from the harbor, and that was this complex of a school and workers' quarters which was very, very badly damaged. It was absolutely unusable anymore.

Senator FONG. Approximately a mile from the harbor?

Reverend LECKY. Yes.

Senator FONG. Did you photograph any civilian damage in Haiphong more than a mile from the harbor?

Reverend LECKY. Well, the village of Phuc Loc is 7 kilometers from Haiphong, from the city, and we photographed there.

Senator FONG. I mean in Haiphong?

Reverend LECKY. I would say probably no. We were going to further places, but there was a very bad raid while we were there, and we had to scamper back to what was regarded as a safer shelter.

Senator FONG. So, these civilian targets which were damaged in Haiphong were approximately 1 mile from the waterfront, which was a military target, wasn't it?

Reverend LECKY. I am assuming we are calling the waterfront a military target, and this was about a mile, yes.

Senator FONG. You have no idea whether there were any antiaircraft guns or SAM missile sites which were in back of the waterfront?

Reverend LECKY. Back of the waterfront?

Senator FONG. Conceivably they could have been.

Reverend LECKY. Conceivably they could have been, yes. Let me say I did stray away from our party to go around the back of those buildings because we were in the center of the road and there were buildings to the right and left badly damaged and I went around the side to ask the very question you are asking—whether, behind this very large building, there was an antiaircraft gun or missile site or something like that. There was nothing there that I could see and they started to shout out to me and I thought, "Aha. I am finding something out," and so I kept going and then they continued to shout and then I heard the sirens and saw the planes and that is why they were shouting at me.

Senator FONG. I see. Now, in this village that you talk about, that was 1 kilometer from Haiphong—

Reverend LECKY. Roughly, yes.

Senator FONG (continuing). Which was bombed out, did I not hear you say there were some guns close by?

Reverend LECKY. No, you did not. We never saw any guns close by.
 Senator FONG. Not a single one?

Reverend LECKY. Not a single one, and we saw no villagers with guns. You know in Hanoi we would see, as I said before, we would see when the air raid siren went people don a helmet and grab a rifle, who until then had been a waitress or something else as part of their defense procedures, but certainly not in Phuc Loc.

Senator FONG. Now, apart from Phuc Loc, and apart from Haiphong, these pictures you have shown us, where else were they taken?

Reverend LECKY. Where else were the pictures taken?

Senator FONG. Yes.

Reverend LECKY. We took pictures in and around Hanoi—well, we took pictures everywhere we went and, as I said, in the beginning we went to three sections of North Vietnam centered in Nam Dinh, Haiphong, and Hanoi, which forms a kind of triangle, and we took pictures everywhere we went, and there were very few times when we were not allowed to take pictures.

Senator FONG. So you concentrated in Haiphong, Nam Dinh—

Reverend LECKY. And Hanoi.

Senator FONG (continuing). And Hanoi?

Reverend LECKY. Right.

Senator FONG. In Haiphong you took these pictures which were approximately a mile from the waterfront?

Reverend LECKY. Yes.

Senator FONG. In Nam Dinh I understood you to say there were textile mills there?

Reverend LECKY. Yes; we took pictures in the center of the city, on the edge of the city, and in the villages around it.

Senator FONG. I see. Where are the textile mills located?

Reverend LECKY. I beg pardon?

Senator FONG. Where are the textile mills located in Nam Dinh?

Reverend LECKY. Well, it is a textile city. There was one next to our hotel and then there was a large complex which had been totally flattened several—I guess I would say a half mile away from where we were in the hotel; and around that were workers' quarters, day care centers, schools, and these had all been bombed, too.

Senator FONG. In Hanoi, where were these pictures taken?

Reverend LECKY. We took pictures in the city of Hanoi; we went out to its environs; we went across the Red River to this area that I described which was a few hundred yards away from the bridge, and we went, well, we went literally all around the city; and we took pictures of the medical school which had been bombed on the other side of the city. I could give you street names but I don't have it here sitting in front of me.

Senator FONG. Are there many bridges in Hanoi?

Reverend LECKY. I beg pardon?

Senator FONG. Are there many bridges in Hanoi?

Reverend LECKY. We saw several; yes.

Senator FONG. Were they all hit?

Reverend LECKY. All that I saw were hit; yes. They were now operating on pontoon bridges or ferries.

Senator FONG. Then, it was the area surrounding these bridges that was hit?

Reverend LECKY. In most cases.

Senator FONG. I have no further questions.

Senator KENNEDY. It has been suggested that for reasons of morale, that Hanoi understates the amount of damage to civilian populated areas. Did you form any impression about that?

Reverend LECKY. It is my personal opinion and I asked that question of journalists and diplomats in Hanoi, that this is true, that they do underestimate.

Now, I think that it is not just for questions of morale; I think there are other factors at work. First of all, there was a good deal of local autonomy in regions and so the local groups are responsible for supplying the statistics of how many people were killed, and I really think that just given the energy and effort that is required following a raid, that these statistics have to err on the side of being too few rather than too many. Also, I think that they kind of want to tell Hanoi, the central Government, that things aren't as bad there as they might seem, so as not to worry them. I think there is some of that at work from what they were saying.

Then there is also simply the question of morale, but some of the statistics that were given to us about eight people were killed here, and you could see several blocks flattened—I just personally couldn't believe that either they had such extensive warning and their safety was so immaculate that that was all that were killed.

Senator KENNEDY. It seems that the underestimation of the impact of the war on civilians is really used to serve different interests, whether it is in Hanoi, underestimating because of the impact that it might have on their morale, or in South Vietnam, where we have seen in the course of our hearings of 7 years, and our investigations of various hospitals, that they always underestimate the number of civilian casualties because they don't want to admit Vietnamization is a failure in a given area.

So everyone, on both sides it seems, suppresses the impact of the war on civilians. I think we see that today, in the idea that this war is de-escalating. Even after what we hear from you here, and from Mr. Clark yesterday, and other respected leaders, clergymen, business leaders, public officials, Nobel prize-winners, after these reports of massive damage to civilian areas because of the escalating bombing, we hear Administration spokesmen announce the reduction of combat troops, and they show pictures of the last American combat troops leaving South Vietnam, and the impression is given that the war is winding down. They never mention or show pictures of churches, schools, homes, and villages that are being destroyed. They never mention the number of bombs that are being dropped, which has certainly escalated. In fact, more bombs have been dropped during the first 7 months of this year than during the whole Korean war.

So we are seeing an escalation of civilian casualties on both sides—in the north as well as in the south—and we can argue about who created the million refugees in the south and who is to blame for the casualties. But our review, and the statistics we have seen from the USIS study in Laos, point out that approximately 75 percent of the refugees are created by aerial bombardment. The bombing is driving people out from the countryside and into the cities.

I think what this country has to recognize is rather than condemning those who visit the north and bring back these pictures—like yourself and Mr. Clark and other distinguished citizens who go and visit the north and bring back the evidence of the awful destruction in terms of civilian lives, schools, churches, hospitals—rather than condemning those individuals, what we ought to be doing is condemning the policy that is perpetrating and prolonging this destruction. We ought to recognize and acknowledge that this is the result of our escalation of aerial bombardment in the north.

No matter how many pronouncements and press releases that show we are only bombing military targets, you can't get around the kind of evidence that you have brought here, and other eyewitness reporters have brought to us. If the American people understood this, then they could make a determination whether they want to continue to support this policy or change it. Senator Fong and I each have our own views about that particular question, but you can't get around the kind of evidence that you have made here and the eyewitness presentation that you have made and recorded on film.

It is important, I think, that the American people simply understand what is going on. I take little satisfaction from the fact that because violence and brutality may be a part of the policy of one country that, therefore, we have to duplicate it as a policy of our own. I am certain we like to believe that we have a higher standard of conduct.

So I want to thank you very much for your presentation here, and for the information that you have provided to us, and I am hopeful that we can be helpful in trying to find out why these various civilian areas were targeted and we are going to try. We are hopeful that we will have some response from the administration, and we intend to give them an opportunity to review with us the reasons for it and the justification for it, because I, for one, believe that it is outrageous that we can't get this, if there is any justification. But I think it is going to be extremely hard to be able to justify such extensive bombing of civilian areas.

Senator FONG. Mr. Chairman, may I ask that the press report, "Dike Bombing Denied by U.S. Carrier Pilots," appearing in the New York Times on August 12, and the statement released by the Department of State on July 28, 1972, relating to "North Vietnam: The Dike Bombing Issue," be incorporated into the record?

Senator KENNEDY. It will be made a part of the record.

(The press report and statement follow:)

[From the New York Times, Aug. 12, 1972]

DIKE BOMBING DENIED BY U.S. CARRIER PILOTS

(By Joseph B. Treaster)

Aboard U.S.S. Saratoga in the Gulf of Tonkin, Aug. 8—The pilots aboard this aircraft carrier swear that they have never tried to bomb the dikes of North Vietnam and they say they are hurt and irritated that so many Americans at home do not seem to believe them.

The pilots are troubled, too, they say, that some Americans apparently think they are deliberately bombing other civilian targets like schools and hospitals and residential areas.

"The thing that hurts us," said Comdr. Richard Bardone of Pittsburgh, the stocky, curly-haired leader of the pilots on this ship, "is that we make every effort to avoid the dikes. We do not, absolutely not, go after dikes."

Lieut. Comdr. Lew Dunton's eyes flashed, "There are a lot of prisoners in the Hanoi Hilton," he said, "because they were shot down trying to avoid civilian targets. It really galls me."

The pilots and their senior officers scoff at the foreign visitors to North Vietnam who have been quoted as saying they have seen dikes damaged by bombs and that they believed the United States had "deliberately tried to destroy the dikes."

The airmen argue that only isolated damage has been reported—the kind that might likely result from an accident—and they say none of the visitors so far appears to have been qualified to determine whether the damage was done by bombs or other explosives.

"The absurd part about it," one senior officer said, "is that somebody comes up with a hole in a dike and he translates that as meaning we're going after the dikes."

"If we were hitting the dikes with malice or aforethought," the officer continued, "we could clean all of them out in a week without many bombs."

The dikes, the pilots say, are not in well-defended areas and "they'd be a piece of cake."

It seems important to the pilots that they be believed. They put their lives on the line every day and they stand together under an old-fashioned code of military honor. They see themselves as patriots in the service of their country and their President. They would like to have been respected and appreciated. Now they will settle for being believed.

They insist that the President has proscribed the dikes as targets and that they have sometimes increased the risk to themselves to comply with his orders.

An insight into the minds of the pilots came from one senior air officer who said, "Probably the best reason for not hitting the dikes is the fact that the President of the United States has advertised to the whole world that we're not hitting the dikes, and we don't want to make a liar out of him."

Not only are the pilots under standing orders not to bomb the dikes, they say, but before each mission they are specifically told again to stay away from them.

During prestrike briefings, the pilots say they pore over detailed maps and reconnaissance photographs. Dikes and other "no-no's"—hospitals, churches, clusters of homes and P.O.W. camps, for example—are pointed out and the paths for approaching and departing the targets are planned so as to minimize "collateral" damage.

In some instances, the pilots say, the North Vietnamese have incorporated into the dikes system roads, gun positions and missile sites which the United States generally regard as fair game. But, the pilots say, these targets are "off limits" when they are on a dike.

Still, Bardone concedes, "there can be mistakes, especially in a hot environment"—where there is heavy antiaircraft fire."

"There is a possibility of a dike being hit," he said. "But I think this is very remote. If it did happen it would be purely accidental."

One pilot on the Saratoga is said to have reported that he accidentally bombed a dike, but reconnaissance photographs showed no damage.

Discussing the effect of the bombing on the civilian population of North Vietnam, Commander Bardone said, "most of the targets are isolated, but some are near the civilian population. There is a tremendous amount of secondary explosions and there is debris. There is a lot of overflow and I'm sure this gets over into the populated areas."

"I can't say absolutely that we do not put bombs outside the target area," he continued, "if we put a bomb a couple of hundred feet away from the target it might get into civilian areas. But I'd say 99 percent of the time it's debris overflow that gets into the civilian areas."

The pilots say that the so-called "smart bombs" that are guided by laser beams and television have greatly reduced the margin of error in bombing. But, they add, even the smart bombs sometimes go astray.

It is routine procedure for pilots under attack by enemy planes to jettison their bombs so they can pick-up speed. These bombs are not armed and are not supposed to explode when they land, but since they weigh several hundred pounds they may have damaging impact.

Another danger to the civilian population, the pilots say, is debris and flak from North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns and missiles. "It all has to come down," said Commander Dunton, who is from Melrose, Mass. "and sometimes it comes down on their heads."

At least once foreign diplomats in Hanoi have said that damage attributed by the North Vietnamese to American planes had actually been caused by Communist missiles.

Citing an example of the official concern for civilian casualties, one senior officer said that before the first big raid this year in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the attack plan was routinely reviewed in Washington and "they knocked off some targets—some damn fine targets, because they were too close to civilians."

Lieut. Comdr. Grady Jackson, a bombardier-navigator from Indianapolis, said that he and his pilot turned back from a target in the vicinity of Haiphong a few weeks ago because they felt it was too close to civilians.

The pilots know, though, that no matter how painstaking they are, some civilians are likely to be killed.

"Let's face it," said Commander Duton, who is a boyish-looking 32, "some of the military targets are probably manned by civilians. If you rolled in on the Boston navy shipyard there'd be a lot of civilians hurt. But they are working for the Government war effort. We don't go after those people in their suburban homes and supermarkets."

NORTH VIETNAM: THE DIKE BOMBING ISSUE

[A statement issued by the Department of State]

In recent weeks Hanoi has tried to convince the world that its elaborate dike system is a direct and deliberate target of US attacks. This is not true. Photographic evidence shows conclusively that there has been no intentional bombing of the dikes. A few dikes have been hit by stray bombs directed at military-associated targets nearby. The damage is minor and no major dike has been breached. The damage can be easily repaired—in a matter of a few days—and has not been sufficient to cause any flooding. No damage has been observed in the Hanoi area or against the primary dike system protecting that city. Hanoi no doubt is genuinely concerned about the dike system. North Vietnam's rainy season will soon reach its peak and damage in the dikes caused by last year's very extensive flooding have not yet been fully repaired.

North Vietnam's Water Control System

1. North Vietnam's elaborate network of dike's dams, and locks controls the water of the heavily populated Red River Delta. The delta farmlands depends on irrigation during the dry months and is endangered by flooding in the wet months. The country's major transportation waterways—the Red River, the Thai Binh River, and the connecting Canal des Rapides and Canal des Bambous—link the principal urban centers. Fertilizer, foodstuffs, petroleum, and other commodities are moved, in part, by these waterways, as is the coal mined in the Hon Gai and Cam Pha areas. Southern North Vietnam also contains rivers necessitating a dike and lock system for water control and navigation, but the system is less important than that of the delta.

2. Dikes to control flooding and the course of the waterways are most fully developed along the Red River. The Red River system begins near Viet Tri, only 43 feet above sea level, although about 100 miles inland. The great amount of silt brought down from the mountains and deposited along the river beds in the delta has raised the waterways above the surrounding countryside in many places and requires a constant elevation of the restraining walls. In some areas—particularly around Hanoi—the height of the dikes reaches 40 feet. Some are as broad as 80 feet at the flood line and spread to 200 feet at the base. A secondary system between 4 and 22 feet high running parallel to the main dikes is designed to localize and minimize damage if the primary dikes are breached. A tertiary system of smaller dikes divides the rice-growing plains into compartments, assists irrigation, and controls the level of small streams and local waterways. In addition, small natural or man-made dikes along the coast keep out brackish sea water.

3. Dams and locks play a lesser role. Only a few large dams are constructed of concrete with gates to permit passage of watercraft, and only one major waterway in the Red River Delta has navigation locks to control water levels and facilitate transport.

Recurring Floods

4. The rivers rise to a seasonal peak during July and August, when unusually heavy rains frequently cause breaches in the levees. Extensive floods and destruction to property and agricultural crops result. Although there have been

only a few major breaches since the mid-1940s, minor breaks occur almost every year.

5. The floods of last August rank with the most serious ever recorded. Four major breaches occurred in the primary dikes along the Red River. An estimated 1.1 million acres of riceland—a quarter of the country's rice acreage—were seriously flooded and the entire crop in that area destroyed. Storms took out a half-mile section of a levee outside Hanoi and closed the railroad north to Dong Dang. The area of heavy flooding continued to expand through late September, probably because prolonged soaking and high water pressure had undermined the secondary dike systems.

6. Apart from immediate rice losses, the floods produced extensive longer term physical damage. The enormous force of water unleashed through breaches in the primary dikes caused widespread erosion far beyond obvious scouring effects near the breaks. Long stretches of irrigation canals were cut, and the press reported many washed-out pumping stations. Flood water everywhere deposited silt in drainage ditches. The prolonged inundation during the floods may have caused subtle undermining of the primary dike systems that will not show until late this summer. The possibility that the dike system has been weakened thus adds to this year's flooding threat.

Resiliency of the System to Bombing

7. North Vietnam's water control system includes a large number of widely dispersed individual components which could be substantially affected only by a large-scale, coordinated air offensive. Such attacks would be necessary against specific locks, dams, and dike areas, and bomb damage would have effect only during the relatively short periods of high water. Even then, the North Vietnamese, long accustomed to battling against floods, could be expected to act promptly to mend breaches in the system.

8. Damage to the locks would have little effect on either North Vietnam's transport or its water control systems. Inland craft could be diverted to waterways not dependent on locks, and some cargoes could be sent by the many alternative land routes. Accidental bomb damage during the 1965-68 period made some locks inoperative, but had little effect on water transport or flooding in the area. Similarly, breaching of dams, even during periods of high water, would not cause significant disruption because most are small and easily repaired.

9. Dikes are particularly resistant to bomb damage. Those in the primary system could be breached only by a series of overlapping craters across the entire top of a dike, and the lips of the craters would have to be sufficiently lower than the river surface to initiate the flow and subsequent scouring action of water rushing through the breach. The dikes along the Red River near Hanoi are approximately 80 feet wide at the flood line.

Hanoi's Claims Versus Actual Damage

10. North Vietnam's official press agencies and radio services have repeatedly described alleged US bombing attacks on the dike system. In April and May, the North Vietnamese made more than 40 specific allegations, and on 30 June the official press quoted the Deputy Minister of Hydraulics as saying that 20 bombing attacks had been made on dikes during that month. Foreign diplomats, newsmen, and, most recently, actress Jane Fonda have been escorted to dikes to view damage—most of it around Hai Duong, southeast of Hanoi.

11. A detailed examination has been made of photography of mid-July of the North Vietnamese Red River Delta and bomb craters were detected at 12 locations. None of the damage has been in the Hanoi area, where destruction of the dikes would result in the greatest damage to North Vietnam's economy and logistics effort. Nearly all the damage has been scattered downstream from Hanoi, as well as downstream from the areas of major breaks resulting from the 1971 floods.

12. There are no signs of destruction of vital dike portions stretching to a length of several kilometers—as reported by Hanoi-based newsmen. In comparison to the dikes, the craters are small, and no flooding has occurred as a result of the damage. Although water levels are not yet at their highest, the absence of leakage through the craters indicates that damage was limited.

13. All identified points of dike damage are located within close range of specific targets of military value. Of the 12 locations where damage has occurred, 10 are close to identified individual targets such as petroleum storage facilities, and the other two are adjacent to road and river transport lines. Because a large number of North Vietnamese dikes serve as bases for roadways, the maze they

create throughout the delta makes it almost inevitable that air attacks directed against transportation targets cause scattered damage to dikes.

14. The bomb craters verified by photography can be repaired easily with a minimum of local labor and equipment—a crew of less than 50 men with wheelbarrows and hand tools could repair in a day the largest crater observed. Repairs to all the dikes could be completed within a week, as the necessary equipment is available throughout the delta. Local labor historically mobilizes to strengthen and repair dikes to avoid serious flooding. An occasional bomb falling on a dike does not add significantly to the burden of annual repair work normally required. North Vietnam must, however, complete the repair of damage caused by the 1971 floods before next month when this year's rainy season will reach its peak.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The subcommittee will stand in recess.

(Whereupon, at 10:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned, the subcommittee to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I. CHAIRMAN'S LETTER TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD, AUGUST 19, 1972

(Subsequent to the hearing, and in light of the Defense Department's aerial photographs presented to the subcommittee by Senator Fong, Senator Kennedy addressed a letter to the Secretary of Defense, requesting additional photographs and information on U.S. bombing policy and the rules of engagement governing U.S. military practices in North Vietnam. Senator Kennedy's letter and enclosures follow:)

AUGUST 19, 1972.

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you probably know, the Subcommittee on Refugees resumed last week its public inquiry into war-related civilian problems in Indochina, focusing its attention on conditions within North Vietnam.

In connection with the record of these hearings, and as a follow-up to my letters of May 3, June 26, and August 9, I would like to request the current rules of engagement governing air activities and naval gunfire in North Vietnam, and a series of aerial photographs of civilian populated areas allegedly subject to American air strikes. It would be helpful if these photographs could include shots of specific locations in or near these areas, both before and after the date they have been reportedly hit. It would also be helpful for the Department to identify what military targets were in, or near, these civilian populated areas. Hopefully, materials forwarded to the Subcommittee will include photographs of the sites listed in the testimony submitted to the Subcommittee by the Honorable Ramsey Clark, a copy of which I have attached to this letter, and of the following:

1. Haiphong City—photos taken prior and subsequent to the April 15-16, 1972, bombing raids on Haiphong, particularly the Ngo Quyen district, the central market place (hit on July 31st), and the so-called Vietnamese-Czechoslovak Friendship Hospital. Western observers also report that a housing and school complex consisting of three four-story apartment buildings and one two-story senior high school, located 2½ kilometers east of the harbor area, was struck three times on April 16, 1972: at 2:15 a.m., 9:00 a.m., and 4:00 p.m. Is this information, submitted to the Subcommittee, correct, and what military targets were in the area?

2. *Nam Dinh*—photos prior to May 23rd and subsequent to June 23rd showing the central city area, specifically the hospital, and the Chung Dang Ling secondary school.

3. *Han Gai*—photos before and after June 7th-9th, showing the Ha Long quarter.

4. *Hanoi*—reports to the Subcommittee report heavy bomb damage since April 16th to such civilian installations as the Bach Mai hospital (hit on June 27th); the Truong Dinh workers housing apartments (hit on June 27th); and civilian housing on Ming Khai Street (hit on July 4th).

Your assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

[Signed] EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.

(Attachments follow:)

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Hon. EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: As I testified before your Subcommittee on August 15, I visited North Vietnam between July 29 and August 11, 1972. During this period, I traveled over 1200 kilometers between cities and provinces and many more miles within those places. I visited six provinces, five major cities, and numerous villages, towns and dike sites.

Bomb damage to what appeared to be purely civilian targets was extensive. I personally observed schools, hospitals, churches, residential quarters of cities and whole villages, dike sections and water control facilities which had been damaged or destroyed by bombing. I also visited children and old people in hospitals who stated they had been wounded by bombing, and talked with other civilians who described losing members of their families because of bombing raids.

The bombing of civilian targets in North Vietnam must be a subject of great concern to every American. It is intolerable that a rich, powerful, technologically advanced nation should bomb villages, hospitals and dikes killing women and children in a poor, undeveloped country simply because it has the power. It is incredible that we should do so when we are withdrawing ground troops and say we are "winding down" the war. The implications for the future are ominous.

It is imperative that this controversy over whether we deliberately bomb civilians be resolved in a way which will give the American people the facts and let them judge for themselves.

For this reason, I am attaching a partial list of structures and areas which I personally observed to have been bombed. I include here but a few of the more striking examples of what I saw. Of course, the Department of Defense knows what targets it intends to hit and what targets it does hit. If the Department of Defense will disclose the facts as to these places I list, I can send a full list of what I observed in North Vietnam at a later date. Extensive aerial photo reconnaissance is made of North Vietnam and often planes on bombing missions photograph as they bomb. I hope you will be able to obtain aerial reconnaissance photographs from the Department of Defense of the bombed places listed here. Ideally, every existing photo of each target would be obtained. The most important are those taken on the day of the bombing, then the days before and finally the days after.

The disclosure of such aerial reconnaissance photographs to the American people is clearly an essential step to open, informed consideration of our bombing policy in Vietnam and its effects on the civilian population. Citizens of a free democratic society are entitled to such data. Indeed, our system cannot work without an informed public.

Of this list, the most critical set of targets are the dikes because they sustain the agriculture of the people and retain waters that could drown hundreds of thousands. I am therefore appending a list of dike sections which have reportedly been bombed, some of which I saw and some which I did not see.

In view of the world-wide controversy over the bombing of the dikes, Administration officials should produce aerial reconnaissance photographs of these specific dike sections, taken both before and after they were reportedly struck. Their failure to do so will imply to many a fear of the truth on their part. I include here a United States Army map to aid in identifying these dike sections more precisely.

You will recall I showed two small bombs to your Committee. The bomb I called a penetrating bomb was given to me by the Mayor of Haiphong. He said it was found after an attack on his City on June 26 in Lach Tray Street where much damage was done. The round bomb I described as an anti-personnel bomb was given to me by the Mayor of Hanoi. He said only that it was dropped on the southern part of his city on June 8, 1972. I would be interested in the legal justification by the Department of Defense for dropping such bombs outside of combat zones and military encampments if it concedes these bombs were dropped as described.

I hope you can secure an early response from the Department of Defense. If the American people and the Congress are to have a say in determining this country's policies, they must have the facts.

Thank you for your efforts on behalf of peace and humanity.

Sincerely,

RAMSEY CLARK.

(Enclosures : 3)

Attachment 1

Listed below are specific places which I saw after they were bombed as to which some admission, denial, or explanation is sought. I would be most anxious to see aerial photographs of these areas because no military targets were visible at the time of my visit.

Place	Location	Date reportedly struck	Observations
I. City areas:			
Ha Ly District...	In Haiphong City.....	July 31, 1972.....	Acres of destruction to residences, business area; hundreds allegedly killed.
Truong Chinh workers' quarters and secondary school.	In Hanoi City.....	May (?), 1972.....	Total destruction of large housing development and damage to nearby school.
II. Villages:			
Phuc Loc.....	Approximately 12 kilometers east-southeast of Haiphong City.	Apr. 16, 1972 (03:00)....	Many bomb craters, much destruction, in village.
Thieu Hoa.....	Approximately 25 kilometers from Thanh Hoa City.	Apr. 13, 1972 (02:45)....	Total destruction of Xan Ai; damage to remainder of village; allegedly 23 killed, 33 wounded.
Vu Van.....	Approximately 20 kilometers southwest from Thai Binh.	July 31, 1972.....	Homes, school, dike, hit. 3 churches nearby badly damaged.
III. Hospitals:			
Thanh Hoa Hospital.	Approximately 6 kilometers from Thanh Hoa City.	Apr. 27, 1972 (08:50)....	6 buildings demolished; others extensively damaged. Facility out of operation.
Vinh Phong Leprosarium.	Near Vu Van Village.....	July 31, 1972.....	Administration building and medical treatment facility destroyed; barrackslike housing for patients damaged.
Bach Mai.....	On highway to Ninh Binh, 6 kilometers south of center of Hanoi City.	June 27, 1972 (09:00)....	Large crater in a courtyard; destruction of 1 wing of hospital; damage to other wings and adjacent building.
IV. Dikes:			
Lan sluice and gates.	Approximately 25 kilometers east-southeast of Thai Binh City within several kilometers of sea.	May 19, 24, June 15, July 2, 8, 11, 12, and Aug. 4.	Extensive damage to adjacent diking, concrete base, destruction of lifts, housing, gates, superstructure.
Vu Dong dike...	Approximately 10 kilometers south of Thai Binh City.	July 20, 1972.....	Extensive damage to dike, bomb craters on and near dike, adjacent huts destroyed.
Nam Sach dike.	40 kilometers east of Hanoi.	June (?), 1972.....	Extensive damage visible though largely repaired by Aug. 6. This is the dike location which the French newspaper reporter Jean Thoraval says he saw attacked.
V. Schools:			
Haiphong (3)...	In Haiphong City.....	July 12, 1972.....	Destroyed.
Hanoi (1).....	In Hanoi City.....	May (?), 1972.....	2-story building, extensively damaged, unusable.
Vu Van Secondary School (1).	In Vu Van Village.....	July 31, 1972.....	6 classrooms destroyed; other classrooms damaged.
VI. Churches: 3 churches near Vu Van.			
	Within 2 kilometers of Vu Van Village in Thai Binh Province.do.....	All badly damaged from bombing.

[ATTACHMENT 2]

LIST OF DIKE SECTIONS REPORTEDLY BOMBED

Dike section number (see map—Attachment 3) ¹	Location	Date reportedly struck
1	5.5 miles northeast of Hanoi	May 20.
2	3 miles northeast of Hanoi	Do.
3	9.9 miles north of Haiduong	July 11.
4	8.3 miles north of Haiduong	Do.
5	6.4 miles north-northwest of Haiduong	July 9.
6	2.7 miles west of Haiduong	July 13.
7	2.7 miles northwest of Haiduong	July 9.
8	1.2 miles south-southeast of Haiduong	May 10.
9	6.2 miles northeast of Haiduong	July 23.
10	5.7 miles northeast of Haiduong	May 10.
11	14.4 miles east-northeast of Haiduong	July 18.
12	1.5 miles east-southeast of Haiphong	May 18.
13	6.7 miles south of Haiphong	July 10.
14	14.4 miles northwest of Phuly	July 19.
15	At Phuly	June 2, 12, 21.
16	4.2 miles north-northwest of Hungyen	June 28.
17	2.7 miles east-southeast of Hungyen	July 8.
18	7.3 miles east of Hungyen	May 23.
19	11.6 miles east-northeast of Hungyen	July 7.
20	18.7 miles east-northeast of Hungyen	May 23.
21	20.6 miles northeast of Hungyen	May 24.
22	13.6 miles northeast of Thaibinh	July 2.
23	14.9 miles east-northeast of Thaibinh	May 24.
24	15.6 miles east of Thaibinh	May 19, 24, June 15, 21, July 2, 8, 11, 12, 29, Aug. 4, 8, 9.
25	16.1 miles east-southeast of Thaibinh	May 19, 28.
26	15.3 miles east of Thaibinh	June 7.
27	7.2 miles northeast of Thaibinh	July 1.
28	9.2 miles south-southeast of Thaibinh	Do.
29	5.7 miles northeast of Thaibinh	July 7.
30	5 miles south of Thaibinh	July 31.
31	0.5 miles north of Thaibinh	July 10.
32	1 miles southeast of Thaibinh	July 21.
33	5.7 miles south-southwest of Thaibinh	July 5.
34	5.7 miles west-southwest of Thaibinh	July 14.
35	9.4 miles west-southwest of Thaibinh	May 6.
36	9.4 miles south-southwest of Thaibinh	July 6.
37	11.9 miles south of Thaibinh	June 30.
38	12.9 miles south of Thaibinh	Apr 27.
39	14.1 miles west-southwest of Thaibinh	June 30.
40	14.9 miles south of Thaibinh	June 6.
41	15.4 miles west-southwest of Thaibinh	July 1.
42	11.9 miles southwest of Thaibinh	July 6.
43	17.4 miles south-southwest of Thaibinh	June 18.
44	6.7 miles east-southeast of Ninh Binh	May 17.
45	4 miles east of Ninh Binh	June 8.
46	3.2 miles southeast of Ninh Binh	May 24.
47	2.5 miles east-northeast of Ninh Binh	July 22.
48	1.2 miles southeast of Ninh Binh	June 8.
49	5.4 miles south-southeast of Ninh Binh	June 30.
50	9.7 miles south-southeast of Ninh Binh	June 28.
51	10.4 miles south-southeast of Ninh Binh	June 25.
52	13.6 miles south-southeast of Ninh Binh	June 26.
53	1.49 miles southeast of Ninh Binh	July 7.
54	1.54 miles southeast of Ninh Binh	July 14.
55	2.11 miles southeast of Ninh Binh	July 17.
56	1.86 miles south-southeast of Ninh Binh	July 24.

¹ Attachment 3—a map not printed here.

APPENDIX II. CHAIRMAN'S LETTERS TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
MELVIN R. LAIRD, MAY 3, JUNE 26, AND AUGUST 9, 1972

(The letters that follow request Secretary Laird's comment on a number of items raised during the course of subcommittee hearings and inquiry, including items on North Vietnam. As of mid-September, no responses have been received. The subcommittee can only conclude that there is official reluctance within the Department of Defense to comment on the issues raised in the chairman's letters.)

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C., May 3, 1972.

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I appreciated receiving the Department of Defense's response of November 8, 1971, to my letter of May 10, 1971. However, the Department's response, by Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel, neglects several items raised in my letter. I suggested in this letter, that, as responses are prepared to individual items, they be forwarded to my office. Because nothing has been received since early November, and in the light of the growing congressional and public concern over the kinds of items raised in my letter, I am writing to you again, and would appreciate the Department's comments on the items below.

1. The Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees again requests a complete glossary of terms which have been used, officially and unofficially, to describe various American or American-supported military activities in Indochina. Although it was helpful to receive a copy of MACV Directive 525-13, "Rules of Engagement for the Employment of Firepower in the Republic of Vietnam", the glossary of terms contained therein was minimal. Moreover, Mr. Buzhardt's letter failed to comment on the projected impact upon civilians of the military activities associated with the terms.

2. I would also like to request again, for use by the Subcommittee, a copy of the full text of the "Report of the Department of Army Review of the Preliminary Investigation into the My Lai Incident", commonly referred to as the Peers report.

3. The intensity and the impact on the civilian population of the American-sponsored air war over all of Indochina has evoked much public controversy and concern. The recently increased bombing, especially, raises again the kinds of questions I included in my letter of May 10. What is the history of the air war over Indochina, as measured by annual bomb tonnages and the annual number of aircraft sorties over each of the countries in the area, including North Vietnam? In separate calculations for northern and southern Laos, and for North Vietnam, what is the monthly rate of sorties, identified by the kinds of aircraft employed, since January 1968? What is the monthly tonnage of ordnance for each area, and over the same period of time? How would the Department characterize the kinds of ordnance used? And what are the Department's estimates of civilian casualties, resulting from aerial bombardments, for each country in Indochina? The Subcommittee is particularly interested in available estimates on war damage to the civilian population in North Vietnam.

4. At a hearing on May 7, 1970, the exchange below took place. In the absence of a satisfactory response at that time, or since then, it would be helpful to receive the Department's full comment now, but in the context of all of Indochina and of developments throughout the area subsequent to May 7, 1970. In this connection, my reference to "confidential materials" obviously applies only to open sessions of the Subcommittee, such as those in which Mr. Doolin has participated.

"MR. DOOLIN. In terms of our air attacks, Senator, I believe my statement is as far as I can go in open session; it accurately reflects the operating authorities.

As I indicated, all air strikes, except some, are validated by the Ambassador to Laos and to my knowledge maximum care is taken to avoid the causing of civilian casualties. . . .

"Senator KENNEDY. Well, are these limitations really any different from Vietnam. . . .

"Mr. DOOLIN. I can only say on the basis of the information available, the maximum care is taken to avoid civilian casualties wherever possible.

"Senator KENNEDY. I'm sure maximum care is taken. I want to know what the results are.

"Now, you must know from aerial photography how many villages have actually been destroyed—what the size was of villages where you take pictures one day and then again the next day; you can tell where buildings were, whether they are up or down; and you can make some estimation as to whether there had been people in the village or not. Have you done any kind of work like this?

"Mr. DOOLIN. Mr. Chairman, there is some information available and I will be pleased to prepare a report on the subject and submit it to you and correlate it with the rules of engagement which I will go into in much more detail either in executive session or private correspondence.

"Senator KENNEDY. I don't think any of us are looking for confidential materials here. I think we are trying to find out whether there are procedures used in bombings, and whether you follow those procedures to the best of your ability. We are interested in what the results of these procedures are in terms of civilian casualties and the creation of refugees.

"Mr. DOOLIN. Well, as I indicated in my statement, Mr. Chairman, the air activities are with the approval of the Forward Air Guides. These men are Laotian, English-speaking; they avoid towns and these strikes are validated by the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane.

"Senator KENNEDY. That, of course—

"Mr. DOOLIN. They might put them as close to the scene as possible.

"Senator KENNEDY. Well, now I'm interested in the performance chart as well as what the procedure chart shows. I'm sure we have outlined carefully prescribed procedures to avoid the creation of civilian casualties and refugees. But I'd be interested in what the results of those procedures have been as seen from aerial photography and from other kinds of intelligence activities you have access to and whether you are sufficiently concerned about these problems that you are taking these precautions.

"Mr. DOOLIN. I'll see if I can provide that to you, Senator."

5. There are currently in existence manuals on rules of land warfare and on rules of naval warfare. What is the status of proposals on a similar manual relating to the rules of air warfare? Also, what program of instruction pertaining to the protection of civilians in air warfare is currently in use at the Air Force Academy? Does the Department accept the statement of the Institute of International Law on the nature of military targets (resolutions at Edinburgh, 1969) as an accurate restatement of international law? Does the Department accept the "Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War"—prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—as acceptable standards for the protection of such populations, and, if not, are there specific changes the Department would suggest? Are the classified rules of engagement governing American military activities in Indochina fully compatible with the general rules established by the ICRC and the general standards set by the Institute of International Law? And what is the Department's attitude toward the draft protocol on aerial bombardment and other matters which was submitted on May 3, by the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the Geneva Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts?

6. Finally, on the basis of the Subcommittee's hearings and study over recent years, on April 29, 1971, I recommended that the President create a permanent Military Practices Review Board to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff on standards and procedures designed to keep American military policies and practices within the bounds of simple humanitarian and international legal obligations, and to monitor the implementing of the rules of engagement governing American armed forces in active combat. I further recommended that the Review Board be appointed by the President at an early date in consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress; that it be composed of high level officials in government as well as recognized non-governmental experts on humanitarian problems and international law; and that it be attached to the National Security Council.

The recommendation has generated much positive response among persons in government and elsewhere, and, again, I would appreciate very much learning the Department's views on this matter.

In conclusion, let me say once again that I fully appreciate the lengthy nature of these inquiries. But, in view of the widespread Congressional and public interest in the issues raised by these inquiries, I strongly feel that meaningful responses will contribute to greater understanding and will be beneficial to all concerned. I am extremely hopeful that it will be possible to include a good deal of the responses in the public record. I would also like to suggest that, as responses are prepared to individual items, they be forwarded to my office.

Many thanks for your consideration.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.

JUNE 26, 1972.

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On May 3, a week prior to hearings on war-related civilian problems in Indochina before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, I addressed a letter to you regarding several issues of concern to members of the Subcommittee and others in the Congress. The letter was an effort to continue the exchange of views in previous correspondence between the Department and the Subcommittee.

As of today, I have not received a response to my letter of May 3, and just wanted to inquire as to the status of the comments and information requested at that time. As I suggested in the letter, the Subcommittee is particularly interested in available estimates on war damage to the civilian population in North Vietnam. In view of continuing press reports regarding this matter, including current reports on war damage to the dikes in North Vietnam, I am extremely hopeful of hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C., August 9, 1972.

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Secretary of Defense,
Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.


DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On May 3, I addressed a letter to you regarding several issues on Indochina of concern to members of the Subcommittee on Refugees and others in the Congress. The letter was an effort to continue the exchange of views in my previous correspondence with officials in the Department of Defense.

On June 26, I inquired about the status of the comments and information requested in my letter of May 3. On July 7, my letters were acknowledged by Mr. Rady A. Johnson, your assistant for Legislative Affairs. Because no additional communications have been received from the Department, I am writing again to inquire as to the status of the comments and information which I requested in my letter. As my letter of May 3 suggested, the Subcommittee is particularly interested in estimates on war damage to the civilian population in North Vietnam. In addition to information in this area of concern and the others raised in my letter, I would also like to request a copy of the recently completed study on the conduct of the war, prepared under the auspices of the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

It distresses me that the Department is failing to respond to legitimate inquiries regarding our country's participation in the Indochina war and the humanitarian issues at stake. However, in light of the very active congressional and public concern over this significant area of public policy, I am extremely hopeful of hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.



APPENDIX III. CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENTS ON WAR VICTIMS IN
INDOCHINA, SENATE FLOOR, JUNE 29, AUGUST 3, 1972

[From the Congressional Record]

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, Congress and the American people see the fruits and glamor of summitry—and we hear the rhetoric of peace. But none of this can hide the escalating and senseless war in Southeast Asia—a war the President promised to end—but a war whose end is not in sight. And so today, as on previous Thursdays, the media will report our Government's routine press release on the latest number of military casualties. We will learn of new deaths and new injuries. We will probably learn of new prisoners of war or new missing in action. And we will certainly learn of added numbers of enemy killed. But our Government's press release will tell us nothing of civilian war victims—of the fate of noncombatants who bear the brunt of battle. We will learn nothing of new refugees. We will learn nothing of new civilian casualties. For the flight of civilians is not very important to our Government—except to blame all their suffering on the other side. And this fact reminds us again, that the appalling human tragedy of An Loc and all of Indochina is on the back burner in the councils of government—apparently until we win a smashing military victory, or until great powers sort things out.

But as the violence continues and spreads—from both sides—from enemy mortars and American bombs—thousands of civilians are being injured or maimed or killed; and thousands more are fleeing their homes as refugees from battle.

Over the years nothing has more accurately documented the intensity and spread of the conflict—and the level and nature of military operations—than the number of civilians killed or wounded or made refugees. By this measure, the situation in Vietnam—let alone North Vietnam and the rest of Indochina—is worse today than at any time since the war began—including the Tet offensive in 1968.

The flow of refugees in South Vietnam continues at an alarming rate. The Agency for International Development—AID—informed me yesterday, that since their testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee on May 8—the official figure for new refugees in government-held territory increased by at least 125,000—a daily average approaching 3,000. The cumulative official figure since early April now stands at more than 814,000, with the bulk of these people in military region 1. Based on unreported data including displaced persons in enemy controlled territory, the subcommittee estimated more than 1,200,000 new refugees since April 1. The subcommittee now estimates that the cumulative total of refugees since 1965, approaches nearly 8 million men, women, and children—nearly one-half of South Vietnam's population.

As if this were not enough cause for concern, civilian casualties also continue at an alarming rate. Based on known hospital admissions, AID's official estimate for civilian casualties in April is 8,699—for May it is 5,897. A June 10 cable from Ambassador Bunker to the Department of State notes that these figures are incomplete. The April figure, for example, does not include hospital admissions in Quang Tri and Kontum provinces—where heavy fighting was underway—and it only includes 600 verified casualties in An Loc. In a similar way the May figure is also incomplete.

Needless to say, the full extent of civilian casualties in South Vietnam cannot be measured by hospital admissions alone—even if all the hospitals report their admissions. For the record is clear that the bulk of civilian casualties never see a hospital. They are treated elsewhere, not treated at all, or they die.

And so the Subcommittee on Refugees, as it has done periodically since 1966, has made estimates of civilian casualties since April 1. On May 25, I reported the subcommittee's findings for the month of April and the first week of May. Our estimates put the number of civilian casualties during this period at some 40,000 to 50,000—including some 15,000 deaths. I said at the time that all indicators pointed to a continued high level of civilian casualties—and that if the pace of

battle continued, by early June the civilian casualty figure since April 1, would exceed the total during Tet, 1968. I must report today the accuracy of this projection. During May, another 30,000 to 40,000 civilian casualties probably occurred in South Vietnam—putting the total for April and May at nearly 80,000—including as many as 25,000 deaths. The subcommittee's comparable figure for February and March of 1968, was some 62,000 civilian casualties—including about 20,000 deaths.

Mr. President, civilian casualties in South Vietnam today, confront us with a very grim human tragedy—a tragedy for which our country bears a heavy responsibility. And if the violence continues, so will the tragedy. The Bunker cable of June 10 tells us to expect more of the same. In fact, the cable says that civilian casualties will be a "formidable challenge" in South Vietnam for the rest of the year. And although the cable does not verify the subcommittee's current estimates on civilian casualties—it does confirm the subcommittee's projections about the severity if the current situation, as compared with Tet. The cable tells us that the "only comparable episode" to the current situation is the 1968 Tet experience. The cable goes on to say that during Tet and its aftermath, hospital admission rates on a monthly average, increased by 37.3 percent—from 4,340 per month to 6,925. The cable has this to say about the current situation:

April and May civilian war casualty admissions appear proportionately greater than initial increases following Tet 1968 offensive. It appears reasonable to assume next 6-month period will show monthly average substantially in excess of 37.3 percent, and may reach numerical increases following Tet 1968. Believe 100 percent increases or estimate 5,400 per month civilian war casualty admissions to Ministry of Health hospitals through end of calendar year.

Mr. President, nowhere has the picture of human suffering in South Vietnam been more graphically drawn than in the faces of those civilians who survived the siege of An Loc.

The fate of An Loc was the story of a massacre—from a rain of bullets and mortars and bombs. No one answered the pitiful cries for help from the people holed up in that nightmare of destruction and death. No one seemed to care. And international diplomatic appeals to open a mercy corridor into the area were all but ignored by the combatant leaders on both sides. Several days ago the press reported an official figure of some 2,000 to 3,000 civilian deaths in An Loc. The unofficial figure reported to the Subcommittee on Refugees is up to 10,000.

The subcommittee now estimates that the cumulative total of civilian war casualties in South Vietnam since 1965 is nearly 1,250,000 men, women, and children—including some 380,000 deaths.

The human suffering in South Vietnam staggers the imagination. It is difficult to comprehend the aggregate statistics of war victims in South Vietnam—and all of Indochina. It is even more difficult to comprehend the implication of these statistics—and the continuing war—on the social fabric of nations confronted with massive upheaval and total war. But few will disagree that a human swamp of rootless people and orphans and widows and war victims of all kinds, exists in Indochina.

Mr. President, a question of growing concern, which I share with many Americans, is the impact of our bombing and shelling on the civilian population of North Vietnam. Except for occasional press comment, and public claims by the Hanoi government about civilian casualties and damage, little is really known. However, based in part on the pattern of death and destruction which our military practices have brought to other areas of Indochina, there can be little doubt that civilians have been caught in the crunch of the air war. Thousands of North Vietnamese civilians have suffered immeasurably, as civilians do in all wars.

I am not just referring to the inconveniences of no water or electricity, because our bombs hit utility installations. I am not just referring to the closing of schools and hospitals, because they have also been hit by our bombs. I am not just referring to the growing potential for a shortage of consumer goods, because we have mined the harbors. Nor am I just referring to the fear and anxiety associated with men, women, and children running to bomb shelters. I am not even referring to the hardships imposed on tens of thousands of people who have been evacuated from urban areas to the countryside by the Hanoi government, to escape the threat of bombs. All of this, is bad enough. But I am also referring to the assumption which all of us must make—that thousands of civilians in North Vietnam are becoming casualties of the air war and the

shelling from gunboats off the coast—thousands are being injured, or are losing their lives.

In the earlier stages of the current bombing and shelling of North Vietnam, the administration tried to ignore—or at least to minimize the issue of civilian casualties and damage—apparently on the assumption that whatever civilian suffering our bombing and shelling brought to North Vietnam was inevitable, and justified in the national interest, as defined by the President. Informal inquiries I made to the executive branch in April produced nothing. Finally, on May 3, I wrote to the Secretary of Defense regarding the airwar's impact on civilians in North Vietnam, and related issues—but this letter remains unanswered. On June 26, I wrote another letter to the Secretary inquiring about the status of the comments and information which I requested on May 3. I indicated again, in the latest letter, that the Subcommittee on Refugees was particularly interested in available estimates on civilian casualties and damage in North Vietnam. In light of growing press reports and public concern on this issue, I expressed the hope that the Department of Defense would respond very soon. But if the pattern of responses to earlier subcommittee inquiries at the Department is any measure, my recent letter to the Secretary will not be answered for many months, if at all. And this not only says something about the low priority our national leadership seems to attach to the care and protection of civilians—but, as in some many other cases, it also says something about our leadership's casual attitude toward the Congress and the legitimate concerns of the American people, and about the closed character of the present administration.

On May 9—in a public hearing before the Subcommittee on Refugees—administration witnesses were asked about estimates of civilian casualties as a result of the new air war over North Vietnam. Representatives from the Department of Defense had no comment. Representatives from the Department of State were extremely evasive—but they did say there was internal debate over the number of civilian casualties publicly announced by North Vietnam, but that there is “no solid basis to make an estimate.”

The implication, however, was that some casualties do occur.

More recently, spokesmen for the administration suggest that if casualties do occur, they are minimal. The spokesmen say that only military targets are bombed. They cite the careful preparation of the rules of engagement—whose contents are denied Members of the Senate. They cite the accuracy of guided bombs and “smart bombs”—whose use amounts to a small percentage of the total bombs actually dropped. They insist that every precaution is taken to minimize injury and death to civilians.

That these assurances by the administration's spokesmen are viewed by many Americans with a great deal of skepticism, is easy to understand. For these are some of the same spokesmen who in earlier times, denied that the forced relocation of villagers was among our military practices. They denied that villages in Laos were bombed, that a refugee problem existed in Cambodia, that bombing was an important cause in creating refugees or civilian casualties—anywhere in Indochina.

But the record is clear, Mr. President, including the hearings and findings of the Subcommittee on Refugees, that over the years there has always been, and continues to be, a vast gap between what our leaders say about the war victims problem in Indochina—and the actual conditions in the field. On the occurrence of civilian casualties in North Vietnam, the Pentagon papers disclose that in January of 1967, the Central Intelligence Agency informed the previous administration in a secret report that American air strikes in North Vietnam had caused some 29,000 civilian casualties during 1965 and 1966. Elsewhere in these papers a high level Department of Defense memorandum in 1967 discusses the risks involved in mining Haiphong and in the air war over North Vietnam. At one point the memorandum states:

“The picture of the world's greatest superpower killing or seriously injuring 1,000 noncombatants a week, while trying to pound a tiny backward nation into submission on an issue whose merits are hotly disputed is not a pretty one.”

Whether similar estimates and projections on civilian casualties in North Vietnam are being made today is unclear. The May 9 testimony before the Subcommittee on Refugees suggests that no estimates are made. Other sources within the administration, however, suggests they are. Given the broad congressional and public concern over the impact of our bombing, I feel it is important for the administration to clarify the issue.

This is particularly true in light of the growing number of reports in the press and elsewhere, which run contrary to the official view of the administration. The public comments of the Swedish Ambassador to Hanoi, as reported by Reuters in this morning's Washington Post, are cause for alarm. In part, the story reads as follows:

"Sweden's ambassador to Hanoi today accused the United States of currently pursuing 'a policy of annihilation' in its bombing of North Vietnam.

"The ambassador said it was not true that the Americans were bombing only military targets. They were dropping antipersonnel bombs on housing areas, schools and hospitals.

"The Americans are expending enormous resources on also destroying small workshops, small bridges, small railway stations, everything.

"The biggest worry at the moment is the dams. The Red River has already begun to rise and it reaches its highest point in July and August. The Americans are aiming at the dams and dikes. If the river swells to the same level as last year there will be an immense catastrophe.

"In Hanoi, from which more than 80 percent of the population had been evacuated, energy was supplied by one steam power plant still standing and only one hospital remained in use."

Moreover, Mr. President, one official report which is typical of others available to the Subcommittee on Refugees, summarized the situation in May as follows:

"Attacks on Hanoi have been mainly limited to targets around the city. Attacks on Haiphong have been more general and there is evidence of carpet bombing hitting civilian and other targets indiscriminately. This appears to apply to many other urban centers. Targets appear to include all forms of industry, transport and stockpiles.

"Many civilian areas have been hit. Casualties may not be so heavy because of massive evacuation and effective precautions. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam has, however, mentioned figures of nearly 1,000 casualties for one day in Haiphong alone."

Mr. President, the people of both Vietnams—let alone the people of Laos and Cambodia—are taking a ferocious beating—the worst since the war began. It is easy for our national leadership to express public concern for the plight of civilians. It is easy for them to say that every precaution is taken to protect civilians. It is easy for them to blame civilian suffering on the other side—as the President did in his May 8 address, when he talked about keeping "the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws of North Vietnam," and when he referred to "over 20,000 civilian casualties, including women and children, in the cities which the North Vietnamese have shelled in wanton disregard of human life."

But commonsense alone tells us that we are also part of the bloodbath. So does the record of our involvement in Indochina. And whatever our military planners are saying today about the precision of the new strategies and weaponry—and whatever they are doing to drum up a public euphoria for winning the war, instead of negotiating the peace—the fact remains that the human cost of the war to the people of Indochina is appalling, and our rising contribution to this cost should outrage the conscience of all Americans. For more than our Government cares to admit, American military practices—especially the no-holds-barred airwar—is contributing heavily to the escalating regional crisis of people throughout Indochina.

As of May 31, our country has dropped over Indochina nearly 6,360,000 tons of bombs. This is over 10 times the tonnage dropped during the Korean war, and over 3 times the tonnage dropped during all of World War II. In 1972, the tonnage has risen sharply from nearly 56,800 tons in January to nearly 105,800 tons in May—the bulk of it, presumably, over North Vietnam. For anyone to suggest these bombs have little impact on civilians—on the creation of war victims—defies understanding and commonsense.

Mr. President, the people of this country are tired of the war. They are tired of hearing the stale arguments for the war and against it. They are tired of seeing our men withdraw from Vietnam, only to show up across the border in Thailand or on the decks of our gunboats at sea or in the cockpits of our bombers. They are tired of hearing the promise of peace met with plans for more war.

But most of all, they are tired of seeing pictures of napalmed children flash across their television screens and the pages of our papers. And they ask today more than ever before—how much longer will we be part of the bloodbath in Indochina.

In the end, the answer to this question lies in the hands of the President.

[From the Congressional Record, Aug. 3, 1972]

WAR VICTIMS IN VIETNAM

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, little more than a month ago, I reported to the Senate on the rising number of war victims in South Vietnam, and discussed the growing concern in many quarters over the impact of our shelling and bombing on the civilian population of North Vietnam. I wish to comment briefly on these issues again, today, especially in reporting to Senators the latest compilation of statistics on war victims in South Vietnam.

On June 29, as chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, I reported that the flow of new refugees and civilian casualties was continuing at an alarming rate in South Vietnam. By official count, the numbers of new refugees, in government-held territory since April 1, stood at some 814,000—and the number was increasing at a rate of nearly 3,000 per day. Unofficial estimates put the number of new refugees at well over 1,000,000.

Based on known hospital admissions, official estimates for civilian casualties put the number at nearly 8,700 for April and nearly 5,900 for May—for a total of some 14,600. A June 10 cable from Ambassador Bunker to the Department of State emphasized, however, that these figures were incomplete; for they did not include hospital admissions in areas such as Quang Tri and Kontum where heavy fighting was underway. The Bunker cable also said, that civilian casualties would be a "formidable challenge" for many months to come, and that the developing human tragedy in South Vietnam would probably exceed what occurred during and after the Tet experience in 1968.

I pointed out on June 29, that the full extent of civilian casualties could not be measured by hospital admissions alone—even if all the hospitals were reporting their admissions. For the record is clear that the bulk of civilian casualties never see a hospital. They are treated elsewhere, not treated at all, or they die.

And so, on June 29, I released the subcommittee's estimates on civilian casualties during April and May, which put the number at nearly 80,000—including as many as 25,000 deaths. The subcommittee's comparable figure for the Tet experience in February and March of 1968 was some 62,000 civilian casualties—including about 20,000 deaths.

The television and radio and press remind us every hour of the day that the intensity of the war continues. The bombing goes on. The shelling goes on. The violence spreads—from both sides. There are more military casualties. There are more prisoners of war—more missing in action. More civilians are injured or die. More children are maimed or orphaned. More refugees flee devastated villages and towns.

And despite what our military planners are claiming about victories on the battlefield—despite what they are claiming about having the other side on the run—and despite the President's new promises for peace—the fact remains that a war continues in Southeast Asia. The fact remains that the human cost of continuing this war to the people of Indochina is appalling, and our rising contribution to this cost should outrage the conscience of all Americans.

Since my report of June 29, the number of new refugees—by official count—has increased by more than 50,000—from some 814,000 to more than 866,000. Again, by official count, this is a daily average for the last few weeks of nearly 2,000. The Subcommittee on Refugees now estimates that the cumulative total of refugees since 1965, approaches nearly 8,000,000 men, women, and children—nearly one-half of South Vietnam's population.

Inevitably, the number of civilian casualties has also increased. In fact, Mr. President, the high numbers previously reported for April and May have continued. Based on known hospital admissions, the preliminary official estimate for June is 5,874. As a recent cable from Ambassador Bunker notes, however, this figure does not include civilian casualties treated in Quang Tri, Binh Long, Long An, and Phuoc Long Provinces—where the heaviest fighting has occurred. How many bodies lie in the rubble of Quang Tri City, An Loc and other devastated areas, is unknown. But accounts from all sources, including those within our Government, tell a very grim story of death—and more death.

Based on known hospital admissions, and estimates in all other categories, the Subcommittee on Refugees estimates that another 30,000 or more civilian casualties probably occurred in June—including as many as 10,000 deaths.

Since April 1, the subcommittee now estimates that more than 100,000 civilians have become casualties—including as many as 35,000 deaths. The cumulative total of civilian war casualties in South Vietnam since 1965 now stands at nearly 1,300,000 men, women, and children—including up to 400,000 deaths.

Mr. President, the comments I am making today sound a familiar theme. For they are only the latest chapter in the seemingly endless story of human suffering in South Vietnam. This latest chapter dramatically underscores again, that the war continues—not only in the Northern Provinces of South Vietnam just below the demilitarized zone—but all over the country. In fact nearly half of the reported civilian casualties are occurring in the delta below Saigon—an area the administration claims to have pacified long ago. And so the administration's peace slogans of the past have become the policy failures of the present. Vietnamization was not a plan for bringing peace, but a plan for continuing war.

Although the focus of human suffering in Indochina is currently in South Vietnam, the number of war victims is also rising in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. And for anyone to suggest that our bombing and shelling of North Vietnam is having little impact on civilians—on the creation of war victims—defies understanding and commonsense. Based in part on the pattern of death and destruction which our military practices have brought to other areas of Indochina, there can be little doubt that civilians have been caught in the crunch of the airwar. It is naive of the administration to suggest they can cover up the suffering and death of civilians in North Vietnam. Sooner or later the full truth will come out—as it did after the spokesmen for the administration denied that the forced relocation of villagers was among our military practices, that villages in Laos were being bombed, that a serious refugee problem existed in Cambodia, that bombing was an important cause in creating war victims throughout Indochina.

It is easy for the President to blame all the civilian suffering in Indochina on the other side—as he did again in his press conference just a week ago. But commonsense alone tells us that we are also part of the bloodbath. So does the record of our involvement in Indochina.

Mr. President, the people of this country are tired of the war. They are tired of hearing the stale arguments for the war and against it. They are tired of seeing our men withdraw from Vietnam, only to have others show up in Thailand or on the decks of our gunboats at sea or in the cockpits of our bombers. They are tired of hearing again and again the promises of peace met with plans of more war.

But most of all they are tired of seeing the pictures of refugees and maimed children flash across the television screen and the pages of our papers. And they ask today more than ever before how much longer will our country be part of the bloodbath in Indochina?

In the end, the answer to this question lies in the hands of the President. The Senate's vote yesterday on ending the war is a mandate to our national leadership from the people of America.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a chart summarizing civilian casualties in South Vietnam.

There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SOUTH VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN WAR-RELATED CASUALTIES, 1965-72

Year	Official USAID hospital admissions	Subcommittee casualty estimates	Subcommittee estimates of death
1965	150,000	100,000	25,000
1966	150,000	150,000	50,000
1967	48,734	175,000	60,000
1968	84,492	300,000	100,000
1969	67,767	200,000	60,000
1970	50,882	125,000	30,000
1971	39,395	100,000	25,000
Total	391,300	1,150,000	350,000
1972 (6 month)	130,000	150,000	50,000
Total	421,300	1,300,000	400,000

¹ Estimate.

APPENDIX IV. BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN
BOMBINGS OF DIKES AND DAMS IN NORTH VIETNAM

[Adapted from documentation prepared by the American Friends
Service Committee and recent press reports and comments]

SYNOPSIS

The North Vietnamese reports about dike breaching started soon after a regular bombing campaign was resumed by President Nixon in early April, 1972. They are characterized by detailed information about the location of attacks. On June 24, the DRV delegation in Paris appealed to world opinion to prevent destruction of the dike system.

In late June, western observers—journalists and diplomats—began reporting dike damage caused by U.S. attacks in first person, eye-witness accounts. To date, Jean-Christophe Oeberg, the Swedish ambassador to Hanoi; Jean Thoraval, correspondent of Agence France Presse; Erik Eriksson, Swedish journalist; and the Americans, actress Jane Fonda, columnist Joseph Kraft, and American Friends Service Committee staffer, John Sullivan, have given reports, sometimes accompanied with pictures, of dike damage they saw. Their reports establish that the United States has bombed dikes and areas adjacent to dikes.

With every report of dike bombings, there was a reaction from Washington.

1) The Department of Defense's initial response was a firm denial that the dikes had been bombed with the suggestion that North Vietnamese missiles may have fallen back on dikes, causing damage.

2) Following eyewitness reports from western observers, President Nixon held his first televised press conference in a year, in which he characterized reports of dike bombings as "inaccurate," although the inaccuracy has not yet been specified.

3) Admitting that pilots could have hit the dikes inadvertently while striking anti-aircraft and road systems near or on the dikes, Secretary of Defense Laird on July 6 accused the North Vietnamese of seeking to shift the blame for failure to repair the dikes after last year's floods.

4) Laird thus implicitly predicted flooding this year; State Department officials also flatly predicted flooding, and cited an article appearing in the North Vietnamese press exhorting the citizenry to greater efforts to repair the dikes. (Huge numbers of dike repair workers have been noted for months by western observers.)

5) President Nixon and administration spokesmen claimed they are the victims of a propaganda campaign. They contend there is no *deliberate* bombing campaign to hit the dikes.

Most criticism has been careful to avoid the question of intent. However, Eugene Blake, Secretary General of the World Council of Churches, has indicated he believes there is deliberate bombing of the dikes.

Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations, careful to avoid the question of intent, made a humanitarian appeal to the US on the issue of damage to the dikes. Secretary Rogers and, later, President Nixon, responded indignantly, denying deliberate bombings, and claiming that the statement was part of a "propaganda" campaign. On July 27, Nixon personally accused critics of hypocrisy and double standards. Claiming great restraint, Nixon said, "If it were the policy of the US to bomb dikes, we could take them out in a week." Nixon stressed that there were no reports of dike bombing to the six dams which are what Nixon described as the heart of the dike system.

The Administration brought in a group of pilots who denied bombing dikes in televised interviews, July 26. The bases in Thailand and the aircraft carriers from which aircraft attack North Vietnam are off limits to newsmen. Without greater freedom to ask questions of airmen participating in the attacks on North Vietnam, this testimony is inconclusive.

On July 28, the State Department released an intelligence report on the bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. The report admitted damage to 12 dikes, but minimized the claims of the North Vietnamese. The photographic evidence upon which the report rested has not yet been made public. North Vietnamese charges that attacks adjacent to the dikes would weaken their foundations were not discussed. Ten U.S. Senators, including Sens. Tunney, Harris, and Kennedy, sponsored a resolution forbidding deliberate dike bombing, August 4. Hanoi has invited foreign observers to view the extent of damage to the dikes, and the report of an international group now in North Vietnam will soon be made public.

The following material is in five groupings:

- (I) Eye-witness Western Observers
- (II) North Vietnamese Reports
- (III) U.S. Government Responses
- (IV) Descriptive and Analytical Commentary; Reaction
- (V) Historical Information about Dike Breachings; U.S. Precedents

PART I: EYE-WITNESS WESTERN OBSERVERS

Dagens Nyheter, June 29, 1972:

"What frightened the Swedish Ambassador to Hanoi, Jean-Christophe Oeberg, more than anything else, was the methodical bombing and rocket attacks against dams, dikes and locks. A whole series of attacks, in one region after another, show clearly that the United States is trying to cause a flood catastrophe with everything that it will mean in mass deaths, and famine with more mass death. He has seen dam constructions which have been bombed with precision, with smart bombs. This gives him the impression that American pilots who now have a much greater possibility of hitting targets, and direct destruction against them, do not make mistakes.

"Jean-Christophe Oeberg says he has no doubt whatsoever that these attacks are deliberate and precise. The attacks on the dams, the bombings which could cause a water catastrophe in a few weeks' time when the river rises, for him, are the climax—the ultimate atrocity."

The Swedish Ambassador Oeberg, quoted in *Aftonbladet*, June 28, 1972:

"Practically all industry in North Vietnam has been destroyed. But the greatest danger just now is the bombing of dams and locks. If there are further attacks, there may be an enormous catastrophe, with villages submerged, and famine. The intention seems to be to weaken North Vietnam economically for a long period to come and to transform it into a second or third class nation in Southeast Asia. It is a typical policy of annihilation. The bigger the defeats of the U.S. and Saigon troops in the South, the more the bombing in the North.

"Now, the dams and dikes are the greatest worry for the Vietnamese. The Red River has already started to rise; it reaches its highest level in July and August. If the river rises as high as last year, there may be an enormous catastrophe.

"Everyone, even diplomats, must react as human beings, particularly those of us who have the advantage of being on the spot. Diplomat or not, I have no intention of witnessing passively what is happening. I am free to do this because we have a government which calls things by their correct names."

Ambassador Oeberg addressing a conference of Young Socialists in Sweden:
 "I am not the only one to have seen it. The Americans are now beginning to speak of the inability of the North Vietnamese to maintain their system of dikes. For someone who has seen the work carried out by the North Vietnamese continually to improve and reinforce the dikes, this looks like an attempt to provide an alibi for what may happen if the dikes break, and if the bombings continue at the same level. If a catastrophe occurs in a few months, at the time of the monsoon, we shall know who is responsible. But this must not be allowed to happen. The lives of millions of people are in jeopardy, and an unprecedented famine could occur in the North. This is perhaps just what the Americans want when they talk of bombing North Vietnam back into the stone age.

Erik Eriksson, *Aftonbladet* (Stockholm), June 30, 1972:

"I travel in the Red River delta in North Vietnam. The cameraman Bjorn Henriksson and I collect material for a TV reportage. Before noon that day, we are filming a dike that was destroyed by bombs a few days earlier. It is last Friday.

"On next Monday, we are back in Stockholm. We hear statements from the U.S. government saying North Vietnamese dikes are not being bombed. However, we saw the exact opposite.

"The dike we visit along the Dao river—one arm of the Red River in the delta province of Nam Ha. This is a strong wall—6.7 meters high (about 20 feet). The dike protects people and rice fields from flood when the river rises in July and August. 70,000 people live in the area that is protected by this dike. There are 5,000 hectares (about 12,000 acres) of ricefields.

"On two places, this dike has been bombed. On both places, the dike is cut through by bomb craters. Peasants from the area try to repair the damage when we are there. I can't see any other targets in the vicinity. Around the dike, there are only the rice fields, little hamlets and groups of trees.

"On the most severely damaged place, there are crater close to crater. Fifty bombs were dropped, the Vietnamese who show me the place tell. I can't count the number of craters, but the figure seems likely. It was on June 18th, the US Air Force attacked this dike. The bombs were 500 pounds and 2000 pounds, the Vietnamese tell me. Observing the craters, it seems to me if the attack was directed onto the dike itself. Eight planes performed the attack, I am told.

"The water in the Dao river is low for the moment. But the rain has started to fall in North Vietnam now. Soon the level rises fast. In August, it reaches far up on the side of the dike. If the flood is strong this year, as it was last year, pressure will become strong on the dikes in the Red River delta.

"This could happen:

"The people will not be able to repair bombed dikes. Water will flood the area that the dike is supposed to protect.

"People are able to repair the dikes. But the new soil filled into the craters is looser than the surrounding soil. The repaired place could give away.

"Bombings cause rifts in the dike. Some rifts are not visible, but go deep in the dike. When water rises, the wall might collapse. If it happens, the flood that follows will be sudden.

"If a flood occurs, a double disaster strikes the people. Many will be drowned by the water. Many will starve when the fall crop is destroyed by the water. In the Red River delta, perhaps 12 million people live. It is where most of the grain is produced. This is the economic base area of the country.

"President Nixon has stated that economic targets are being attacked. Now people in North Vietnam fear that the attacks on the dikes is part of the economic warfare. They know that the U.S. includes cities in the economic targets. We saw ourselves cities and parts of cities recently bombed away.

"Such terror bombings are not admitted by the U.S. government, however. Nor is it admitted that dikes and dams are targets.

"But while water is rising in the rivers in North Vietnam, bombs are constantly being dropped in the Red River delta."

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE DISPATCH ON NAM SACH DIKE BOMBING

(By Jean Thoraval)

A group of foreign journalists inspecting bomb damage to North Vietnam's vital dike system, escaped unhurt as a dozen U.S. aircraft made a new and concerted attack on the irrigation system.

The journalists, including this correspondent, all agreed that the American pilots were specifically aiming for the dikes—as far as the eye could see, there was nothing but rice paddies.

The foreigners, accompanied by North Vietnamese journalists, had walked about two kilometers (over a mile) through the paddies to look over the damage caused by three previous attacks, the most recent on Sunday.

It was about 6:00 AM, an hour after dawn, we had just arrived at the edge of a crater made by an earlier attack when we heard the sound of approaching jet aircraft.

About two kilometers away, in the hamlets bordering Nam Sach (about 40 miles (60km) from Hanoi), warning bells announced the advance of U.S. aircraft.

A few seconds later, about a dozen fighter-bombers could be seen flying fairly high above the hamlets.

Then the jets went into a dive and released several bombs and rockets against the dike on which we were standing. In several other attacks and evidently without bothering to aim precisely, the jets dropped more explosives to both sides of us.

Since there was no nearby shelter—not even a tree—the journalists had all the time they needed to study the action, in which the Americans were complete masters. The small nearby town of Nam Sach has no significant anti-aircraft defenses, and only two or three SAM missiles were fired at the attackers.

The Phantoms and A-7 (Intruders) dived toward us again, undisturbed by the missiles.

The journalists, direct witnesses to the attacks, were unanimous about two things: Firstly, the attack was clearly against the dike system. Secondly, during the 10-minute raid, the pilots dropped their bombs at random—and since the area was full of dikes and minor irrigation controls, each bomb had its chance of causing damage.

The Nam Sach region contains 54 kilometers of dikes which have been in existence for generations, and maintained carefully by the local people.

[From the Washington Post, June 29, 1972]

ENVOY SAYS U.S. TRYING TO "ANNIHILATE" N. VIET

STOCKHOLM, June 28.—Sweden's ambassador to Hanoi today accused the United States of currently pursuing "a policy of annihilation" in its bombing of North Vietnam.

In an interview published today in the Stockholm newspaper Aftonbladet, ambassador Jean-Christophe Oeberg, who is home on a brief visit, said American bombing was designed to weaken North Vietnam's economy for a long time to come and make it a second- or third-rank nation in Southeast Asia.

The ambassador said it was not true that the Americans were bombing only military targets. They were dropping antipersonnel bombs on housing areas, schools and hospitals, he said.

He said all industry in the Hanoi area had been knocked out, everything but the harbor had been put out of action in the northeast industrial area of Hanggai, the shipping industry and cement factory in Haiphong had been destroyed and the U.S. mining of ports had effectively blocked sea passages.

"The Americans are expending enormous resources on also destroying small workshops, small bridges, small railway stations, everything," he added.

"The biggest worry at the moment is the dams", Oeberg said. The Red River has already begun to rise and it reaches its highest point in July and August. The Americans are aiming at the dams and dikes. If the river swells to the same level as last year there will be an immense catastrophe."

In Hanoi, from which more than 80 per cent of the population had been evacuated, energy was supplied by one steam power plant still standing and only one hospital remained in use, he added.

"Everyone, diplomats included, must react as human beings," the ambassador said. "Diplomat or not, I do not intend to watch what is happening in silence."

[From the New York Times, June 25, 1971]

NEWSMEN ON A VISIT TO TOWN NEAR HANOI SEE FACTORY RUINS

(By Jean Thoraval of Agence France-Presse)

HANOI, June 24.—This correspondent and a few other members of the foreign press visited the town of Namdinh, a textile center about 60 miles south of Hanoi, today.

The town's commercial district was in total ruin. Utility poles and wires, apparently blasted by American B-52 bombing, littered the streets. Twisted drainpipes and wrought-iron balustrades produced a serpentine effect on the few building facades that remained standing.

The town's main streets were blocked with piles of broken concrete, bricks and other debris.

Half-destroyed and semi-legible signs identified a few shops and factories, one of them the "Weaving Cooperative." It was here that workers in the town produced handkerchiefs and other cotton textile goods.

In the midst of the rubble, townspeople were trying to salvage what remained of their plant. Young women were at work carting cotton, still wringing wet, in wheelbarrows.

CAVE-INS FEARED

The salvage operation was risky because of the danger of cave-ins.

Another district of Namdinh that we visited was in similar condition.

Then, traveling cautiously for fear of further bombings, we made our way to the town's dikes, about 14 miles away. [The Hung, or Red River, North Vietnam's largest stream, flows past Namdinh a short distance to the north.]

One of the embankments was completely cut. Several were gutted, with gaps in the dike itself and hollows, evidently caused by bombs, alongside. Deep cracks were visible everywhere. The landscape was almost what one might have expected to find in the moon.

Village officials feared that the embankments would continue to disintegrate. One man explained that battered, cracked dikes were more difficult to repair than completely demolished ones.

[From the New York Times, July 1, 1972]

VISITOR DESCRIBES NORTH VIETNAMESE DIKE AS BADLY DAMAGED

(By Jean Thoraval)

HANOI, NORTH VIETNAM, June 30.—The dike at Phuly, a town about 40 miles from Hanoi, has been seriously damaged.

I was one of a group of foreign and North Vietnamese journalists who, in a convoy led by Phan My, Deputy Minister of Water Conservation, visited Phuly this morning and saw the damaged dike. According to the minister, the dike was attacked three times this month by American planes.

We approached the town before dawn, headlights out. When we were about 10 miles from our destination, exploding anti-aircraft shells sent flashes into the dark sky at the nearby city of Namdinh. Seconds later there were bright bursts on the horizon. The attack lasted about 15 minutes shortly before daybreak.

Entering Phuly, which normally has a population of 20,000, we crossed a bridge that had been bombed and rebuilt twice. Bomb craters, some of them immense, were on both sides of the road. Telegraph poles were bent in two.

Then we came to the dike, with its system of sluice gates designed to hold back the muddy waters of the Songday, tributary of the Red River, and prevent them from flooding the 10 districts of Namha Province.

Here and there we saw craters that women were patiently filling by hand. Houses near the dike had been blown up by the bombs, while others were without roofs. An old bunker dating from the French fighting in Indochina had been pierced.

SLUICES INOPERATIVE

The system of sluice gates no longer worked, for the six doors could not move up or down. The reinforced-concrete pillars had been destroyed or cracked.

As for the dike itself, apart from craters in it, it was full of cracks, some of them about a foot wide.

Mr. My said that the Americans attacked the dike three times during June. On June 2, he said fighter-bombers paralyzed Sluice Gate No. 3 and 10 days later attacked No. 1. Then, on June 21, he added, the entire system was attacked.

Trees all around had been felled or damaged. I saw one crater big enough to accommodate two trucks.

When we returned to Hanoi we were greeted by the sound of the second air-raid pre-alert in the capital since dawn.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Aug. 16, 1972]

U.S. DELIBERATELY HITTING DIKES, GEOGRAPHER SAYS

(By Scott Sullivan)

PARIS—A left-wing French geography professor offered a new and highly technical argument yesterday in an effort to prove that American bombing of the North Vietnamese dike system is "deliberate."

Yves LaCoste, a professor of geography at the University of Paris, published his contentions yesterday in a front-page article in *Le Monde*.

"PERSONAL" INVESTIGATION

His findings are the result of a "personal" investigation made in North Vietnam under the auspices of the International Commission for Investigation of U.S. War Crimes in Indochina.

Others visiting North Vietnam at the same time included Ramsey Clark, attorney general in the Johnson administration, and Sean McBride, a former foreign minister of Ireland.

Mr. LaCoste backed up statements by Mr. Clark and Mr. McBride who said that the vital dike system had been severely damaged by American bombing.

Mr. LaCoste added that he was in a position to bring "new pieces of evidence" to the dike-bombing discussion after a "geographical analysis" of the points in the dike system that have been struck.

"PREMEDITATED" PLAN

Essentially, Mr. LaCoste argued that the pattern of American bombing betrays a "premeditated" plan to destroy the dikes, provoke severe floodings during the forthcoming rainy season and, "at the least," damage the food supplies of vast segments of the country's population.

Mr. LaCoste's study concentrates on the Red River Delta near Hanoi, where 15 million of the country's 20 million people live and where there has been the heaviest concentration of bombing.

In that region, the geographer charges, the most significant bit of evidence is that all but four of the bombing attacks have occurred in the eastern part of the delta, from Nam Sach district in the north to the provinces of Tai Binh, Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh in the south.

MOST BOMBING IN EAST

American spokesmen agree that the bulk of the bombing has been in the east. And they have cited the fact in arguing that if the idea of the bombing were to provoke massive flooding, the raids should have been concentrated not in the east but in the west—or upstream—parts of the Red River delta.

Mr. LaCoste challenges this argument directly. Not only is the eastern, or lower delta, section by far the more populous, but it includes the largest areas of floodable ground, the French geographer argued.

In a second section of his analysis, Mr. LaCoste examined the southern part of Thai Binh province, which forms a sort of man-made island between a branch of the Red River and the Traly River, an important rice-growing area with a population of 600,000.

The key to the safety of this area is the huge sluice gate at Lan, through which excess rain water is released into the South China Sea.

The Lan sluice gate, Mr. LaCoste charged, has been bombed a dozen times since May 24, the last three raids coming in the first week of August.

As a result, according to the geographer, the water "which cannot flow out to sea, is beginning to accumulate in the rice paddies, where a good part of the harvest can be considered as lost."

Mr. LaCoste also confirmed earlier reports that bombs dropped on the dikes were equipped with delaying devices. Describing a July 14 raid on the Red River dike near the village of Tan Lap, he said, 13 of 14 bombs exploded between 6 hours and 21 days after they landed.

The French geographer concluded his charges with the statement that August 5 American bombers destroyed the Nha May Gho Khi factory, which manufactured material used in repairing sluice gates and other hydraulic installations.

REUTERS DISPATCH (PARTIALLY PRINTED IN WASHINGTON POST, AUG. 17, 1972)

(By Mark Blackburn)

PARIS, August 16, Reuter—A French engineer whose specialty includes dike-building said today that American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam was not only deliberate, but clearly designed to hit the system at its weakest points.

The comment was made by Daniel Mandelbaum, 32, one of two French experts who recently returned from two weeks in North Vietnam with the Swedish-based International Commission of Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes in Indochina.

"The points chosen are the key ones for the destruction of the system," Mandelbaum said.

He told a press conference that, with Paris University geographer Yves Lacoste, he had concentrated during a July 29-Aug. 12 visit on the Red River delta region, which includes Hanoi and Haiphong, speaking with specialists and examining hydraulic works.

"The dikes are built according to the rules of the art. The methods are rudimentary but ingenious and sufficient," Mandelbaum said, noting that he was taking exception to official American statements that the dikes were badly made. Mandelbaum, a specialist in soil mechanics currently doing research for the French Ministry of Public Works, also said it was not true that the dikes were easily repaired, especially since earth used for the repairs at this season was already almost too wet to use.

He said he had seen no roads or anti-aircraft batteries on the dikes that could serve as military targets, and even though he tried to drive on one dike in a jeep, it bogged down. The United States has said that some dikes had been hit by bombs aimed at nearby military targets.

Lacoste, who also attended the conference, explained with the aid of maps and photographs the basis of their conclusion that American air raids were clearly aimed the weakest point of the dike system in North Vietnam.

He cited examples including the Nam Sach dike complex east of Hanoi and the Thai Binh system near the coast south of Haiphong, pointing out key sites where they had been breached.

"The dikes were attacked exactly at the point where it risks submerging the whole thing," he commented.

Lacoste, a professor at Paris University, wrote a front-page article for the influential newspaper *Le Monde* Tuesday in which he said that from April 16 to July 31 a total of 96 sites were seriously hit by 150 air attacks.

He said today he had been told this in North Vietnam during their visit and he had checked its accuracy.

[From *Le Monde*, Aug. 16, 1972]

"THE BOMBING OF DIKES IS DELIBERATE"

(The Testimony of a Frenchman Returned From North Vietnam)

Returning to the United States after a visit to North Vietnam made with a delegation of the International Commission of Inquiry into American War Crimes in Vietnam, Ramsey Clark, former attorney general under President Johnson, has stated that an enormous coastal dike protecting a zone where six hundred thousand people live from flooding "has been hit several times." Another member of the commission, Sean McBride, former Irish minister of foreign affairs, has affirmed that the North Vietnamese dikes were "systematically" attacked, adding: "For example, in one region which I visited, about 70 kilometers (42 miles)

south of Hanoi, a portion of the dike nearly one kilometer long had at least fifty bomb craters; none of the craters was more than 30 meters (30 yards) from the center of the dike."

Another member of that mission of inquiry to North Vietnam was Yves Lacoste, professor of geography at the University of Paris VIII, who has personally made an investigation into the dike bombing, mostly in the flat regions at the base of the Red River delta. Mr. Lacoste makes known his conclusions in the article we publish below:

"By Yves Lacoste

"(Professor of geography of the University of Paris VIII, Member of the International Commission of Inquiry into War Crimes)

"In the controversy where, for the past several weeks, those who denounce the bombings of North Vietnamese dikes oppose the American administration, it is possible to assemble a dossier of a new nature, arising from a geographic analysis of the points where the dike network has been hit with bombs.

"From April 16 to July 31 (the bombings continue as well in August), the water works system of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was made the object of more than one hundred fifty attacks; it has been hit seriously in 96 different places.

"The International Commission of Inquiry into War Crimes, among others, has particularly studied the effects of these bombings of the dikes of the Red River delta. It is really in that region containing the major part of the population where the largest number of bombed location occurs: 58 out of 96. The Commission preferred to concentrate their investigations on that region, the one on which the menace of floods weighs most heavily because of the might of the rivers which cross it.

"The American administration, after first denying the dike bombings, has since admitted that the waterworks could have been hit because of the presence of military objectives 'in their immediate neighborhood.' The American administration has energetically denied that these attacks could have been aimed at the waterworks in a deliberate fashion.

"WHY IN THE EAST?"

"If one examines closely the map which has the bombed dikes marked, a first pattern emerges: with the exception of four cases (two close to Hanoi and two on the sluice at Phu Ly on the River Day), all the bombed locations (54 out of 58) lie in the eastern part of the delta, in the district of Nam Sach in the north, the province of Thai Binh, and the provinces of Nam Dinh and Ninh Binh in the south. The American administration, moreover, recognizes this fact and pretends this puts the argument in their favor, declaring that bombings intended to cause severe floods would aim at the western part of the delta, near the upper reach of the rivers, which is precisely the safe region. The examination of geographic conditions permits one, on the contrary, to reach opposite conclusions (to the American administration).

"Indeed, schematically, the Red River delta can be divided into two parts: in the west, in the high delta, the rivers flowing directly from mountains undergoing a terrific erosion, have built up numerous alluvial deposits: not only those which form the banks of the river, but also those arising from numerous changes in the river course before the dikes were built.

"—In the east, in the low delta, the rivers deposit the major part of the silt. The rivers flow in natural levies, which are lower than the alluvial walls in the high delta. The terrain there is made up of vast low stretches, more or less flat.

"The major flood danger area in the delta lies where the arms of the Red River diverge toward the sea. While in the high delta, most villages are located on the heights of the many old alluvial deposits which rise well above the low areas, in the low delta, on the contrary, most villages are lower than the river, right in the flood danger area if the dikes were to break. It is exactly the eastern part of the delta which has been bombed almost exclusively. If the bombings do not aim at dikes, but at "military objectives", they would have to be distributed within the whole delta. The high delta and the region of Hanoi has been bombed repeatedly. Curiously, the dikes have not been hit there.

"One could conclude that the concentration of the dike bombings in the eastern part of the delta, the region most densely populated and most important agriculturally, betrays the deliberate character of these attacks since they are localized exactly where their effects would be worst.

"On another level of geographic analysis, examining different sectors of the eastern part of the delta in a more detailed manner, the premeditated character of the bombings emerges when one takes into account the organization of the waterworks. One of the most striking examples is furnished by the southern part of the province of Thai Binh, between the Red River to the south and one of its arms, the River Traly to the north. These two rivers, both flowing on alluvial deposits, form the borders of a long drainage system opening toward the east, toward the sea. The improvement of this area, where six hundred thousand people now live, has been made possible by the construction of river dikes and also coastal dikes keeping back sea water. But it is necessary to release excess rain water at the ocean end of that vast drainage system during low tide. This is done by the important sluice gate of Lan.

"The bombings have aimed at the key points of this complex system of waterworks, and, above all, at the Lan sluice. Between May 24 and July 29, it has been attacked 9 times. Despite this damage, three new raids took place in the first week of August on the sluice gate, obviously to make repairs impossible. The sluice gate is far from all other objectives. Thus the waters, unable to flow into the sea, are beginning to accumulate in the rice paddies where a good part of the crop may be considered lost.

"DELAYED-ACTION BOMBS

"Moreover, four bombings have hit the dikes of the river Traly to the north and three on the dikes of the Red River to the south. These bombings were aimed against the concave part of the dike which is subject to the greatest pressure of the current at flood peak. In two places, delayed-action bombs have been used: for example, of the fourteen bombs dropped on July 14 on the dike of the Red River near the village of Tan-Lap, thirteen have exploded at different intervals (some six hours later and others up to 21 days afterwards).

"So the 'operation' on the southern part of Thai Binh province can be summarized as follows: to cause, on the one hand, breaches in the dikes at the weakest points, vulnerable despite repairs to giving way at the time of highest water (it is, in fact, very difficult to properly pack down the earth which already absorbed too much water from the summer rains; hence the dike repairs are very fragile); on the other hand, to block the sluice in order to hamper the flow of water to the sea. Thus, at a minimum, part of the rice paddies are ruined and the subsistence of six hundred thousand people compromised. At the worst, if very strong floods result, there are numerous villages located lower than the alluvial banks which are in danger of being flash-flooded in the case of a sudden breach of the dikes: either those places where the dikes have been repaired imperfectly because of the season, or those where new bombings will take place.

"It is important to underline that, while the dike bombings of the 'Johnson era' halted for the most part before the season of high waters, those of the 'Nixon period' do not seem about to stop. River dikes continue to be attacked, as well as the coastal dikes which are constantly bombarded by the Seventh Fleet. The sluices are particularly valuable objectives since their destruction could produce either the accumulation of too much water in the settled or cultivated areas, or flooding by sea water which makes the soil impossible to cultivate for several years.

"Finally, one will have an idea of the total and systematic nature of the operation taken against the waterworks system of North Vietnam when one learns that the factory Nha May Gho Khi (near Hanoi) which furnishes the material necessary to repair the sluices and other water works was destroyed on August 5 by a bombardment particularly intense (2000 pound bombs) and precise."

PART II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REPORTS

[From the New York Times, June 8, 1972]

HANOI SAYS DIKES ARE BOMBED; 2 TOP PENTAGON AIDES DENY IT

(By John L. Hess)

PARIS, June 8.—North Vietnam charged today that the United States had been intentionally and heavily bombing its dikes, an action that could provoke major floods in its most populous rural areas.

The North Vietnamese mission to the suspended peace talks here listed eight sectors where it alleged that heavy bombs and naval artillery had damaged

dikes, dams and locks in repeated attacks from April 10 to May 24. It also reported nine bombing raids asserted to have struck schools and killed scores of children.

Referring to President Nixon's visit to a cemetery in Leningrad where he met a war orphan named Tanya, a spokesman for Hanoi said, "North Vietnam has many Tanyas."

The spokesman, Nguyen Thanh Le, also indicated at a news conference that Senator George McGovern would be welcome to come to Hanoi, as he offered yesterday to do if elected President.

Asked about such a visit, Mr. Le said that, in the first place, Hanoi wanted President Nixon to reply positively to the Communist peace proposals, and, secondly, was happy at all times to receive Americans who seek peace.

If Mr. Nixon were ready to negotiate, the Paris peace conference could "register important progress in 24 hours," he said. But he told another questioner that there had been no contact with the Americans since they broke off the talks, four weeks ago.

A statement by the North Vietnamese delegation said that American planes had conducted 42 raids and dropped 580 bombs on the dikes and waterworks of the Red River and other streams up to May 24. It added that ships of the Seventh Fleet had fired 500 shells on coastal dikes of Haihau district, about 70 miles southeast of Hanoi.

Yves Lacoste, a geographer at the University of Vincennes, warned in an article in the newspaper, *Le Monde*, this week that the bombings might have so weakened the dikes that a major catastrophe could occur in the flood season, which begins in July.

Mr. Le, who appeared to agree, said that as a result of a major dike-building program, the country could "cope with any natural situation" and was now "doing all it can to bandage the wounds and strengthen the dams and dikes."

"But if Nixon continues," he said, "he must shoulder the responsibility. For our part, we'll continue our resistance, and it is to be foreseen that he'll meet worse defeats than before."

STATEMENT BY THE SPOKESMAN OF THE DRVN MINISTRY OF WATER CONSERVANCY ON US AIR AND NAVAL BOMBARDMENTS AGAINST THE DIKE AND WATER CONSERVANCY SYSTEM OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

In April and May, 1972, the Nixon administration ushered in a new, highly barbaric stage of its war escalation against North Viet Nam. Along with attacks on densely populated areas, including Hai Phong port city and Ha Noi capital, from April 10 to May 24, 1972, the US imperialists on 42 occasions sent flights of planes to dump 580 demolition bombs of different calibres on the dyke networks of the Red River and Thai Binh, Day, Ma, Lam and La rivers belonging to Ha Tinh, Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Ninh Binh, Nam Ha and Hai Hung provinces and Ha Noi city.

Besides the air dropping of high-calibre bombs on dykes of large rivers, day and night, US warships from the sea bombarded the sea-dyke system and violently pounded a number of water-conservancy works of the DRVN.

In Nghe An, from April 10 to 20, on many consecutive days, groups of US aircraft dropped 126 demolition bombs and containers of antipersonnel bombs on a dyke section on the left bank of Lam river belonging to Hung Nguyen district, seriously damaging it and causing many casualties among volunteers who were repairing the dyke there.

In Thanh Hoa, repeatedly on April 19, 20, 24, 26 and 27 and May 13, 17 and 18, 1972, flights of US aircraft, day and night, unloaded 158 high-calibre demolition bombs on the dykes of Ma and Len rivers, belonging to Hoang Hoa, Dong Son, Thieu Hoa, Vinh Loc and Ha Trung districts.

In Ninh Binh, on May 2, 6, 14, 17, 22 and 23, 1972, US aircraft discharged large numbers of demolition bombs on neuralgic dyke sections and lower water conservancy works along the Day river dyke from Gia Vien district to Yen Khanh and Kim Son districts. In particular, on May 22, 1972, 44 sorties of US planes dumped 28 demolition bombs on Ha Phu dyke, Thuan Phu village, Yen Khanh district, breaking or causing to slide down 150 meters of dyke, some place on an uninterrupted length of 25 meters.

In Nam Ha, repeatedly on May 6, 7, 12 and 17, 1972, dozens of high calibre bombs were dropped on the dykes of Nam Dinh canal and Day river in the Red River basin, damaging many dyke sections and lower water conservancy works.

Besides, day and night, US warships from the sea fired 550 shells on the sea-dyke in Hai Hau district, damaging sluices and dyke sections.

The Red River left-bank dyke, on May 10, 1972, was also damaged by US bombs at many places in the section belonging to Yen Tan village, Gia Lam district, Ha Noi suburbs.

Especially, on May 21, a 1-odd km sea dyke section in Thai Loc village, Thai Thuy district, Thai Binh province, received as many as 180 demolition bombs.

Obviously, those crazy war acts of the Nixon administration, those day-and-night air and naval bombardments against the dyke and water-conservancy system of the DRVN aimed at the exterminating en masse men and property in heavily populated areas in North Vietnam, constitute most savage acts prohibited by international law.

The DRVN Ministry of Water Conservancy vehemently denounces to public opinion at home and abroad those crimes of blackest dye of the Nixon administration and resolutely demand that the latter immediately end the bombardments against the DRVN dyke and water-conservancy system as well as all other war acts against the Vietnamese people.

We call on the people of the peace- and justice-loving countries in the world, including the American progressive people, to strongly condemn the Nixon administration's above crimes and take effective and energetic measures to timely stop those barbarous acts of the US imperialists.

No matter how mad, cruel and perfidious are they, the aggressive Nixon clique can in no way shake the Vietnamese people's iron-like determination to defeat the US aggressors. The US imperialists' crazy war acts against the Vietnamese people only show that they are being inflicted heavy setbacks in their scheme of neo-colonialist aggression in South Viet Nam, that they are in a hopeless declining position and will meet with total failure. The more the US imperialists step up their attacks against the dykes and water conservancy works in North Viet Nam, the deeper will grow the Vietnamese people in both zones, who are determined to punish the aggressors five times, ten times more severely to defend the socialist achievements in the North, liberate the South and go forward to a peaceful reunification of the country.

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE SPOKESMAN FOR DRVN MINISTRY OF WATER CONSERVANCY: IN JUNE 1972, THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AIR RAIDS ON THE DRVN DIKE AND WATER CONSERVANCY SYSTEM

Over nearly 3 months, from April 10 to June 29, 1972, US aircraft have conducted 77 bombing and strafing raids on 37 important dike portions of large rivers, 33 hydraulic works and many dike-repairing sites, dropping 764 high-calibre demolition bombs and hundreds of containers of steel-pellet bombs or of other kinds of anti-personnel weapons.

In June, 1972, alone, the US imperialists concentrated 20 violent attacks on a number of dyke portions and irrigation works already hit more than once in April and May. Meanwhile, they extended the scope of attack to other dyke portions. What is most savage is that the US imperialists intensified the use of steel pellet bombs and other antipersonnel bombs, especially perforating bombs, against dike menders.

Following are some typical cases among those utterly criminal raids:

On June 10, 1972, the US imperialists flew 55 sorties of planes for a second intensive attack on Thac Ba hydro-electric station with a view to bringing about sudden flood in the downstream area since the dam is a major flood-preventing work in the entire Red River system. Then, in the morning of June 14, in a bid to prevent the mending and consolidating of dykes, many flights of US aircraft, coming from the sea, rained anti-personnel bombs on civilians who were repairing a dyke portion on the southern bank of Ma river in Dong Son district, bombed in the preceding month, killing or wounding scores of them.

On June 18, many flights of US planes, coming from the sea, dumped dozens of demolition bombs on the dyke and a sluice below it. The dyke got a 200m-breach village, Nghia Hung district, Nam Ha province, belonging to the Red River system. The dyke was damaged on a stretch of 1,000 meters of which 300 meters were heavily battered. The Minh Chau sluice below was also seriously damaged by US bombs and missiles. An eventual breaking of that dike portion on the period of great swellings might cause tens of thousands of hectares of fields in the

2 districts of Nghia Hung and Nam Ninh to be flooded, thus endangering the life and property of hundreds of thousands of people.

In particular, the Kim Bang dyke in the same province was bombed on 3 occasions (June 2, 6 and 21, 1972). On June 21, US aircraft dropped 3 large-size demolition bombs on the dyke and a sluice below it. The dyke got a 200m-breach and the sluice was smashed. The Kim Bang dyke belonging to the Day river system protects from flood the six northern districts and the capital of Nam Ha province and the sluice is designed to ease thousands of hectares of fields in Duy Tien district of excessive water in case of submersion. If this dike collapses, the life and property of about a million peasants in the province will be in great danger and tens of thousands of hectares of cropland will be inundated.

These premeditated and deliberate attacks on dykes and water conservancy works in the preceding months as well as in June 1972, constitute an extremely savage and loathsome crime of the Nixon clique. In the forthcoming rainy season, the consequences of these acts of sabotage will be a serious threat of dyke-breaking and flood.

Evidence is overwhelming that Nixon and Co are the author of the attacks on dykes and other irrigation works in North Viet Nam. Yet the war maniacs in the White House and the Pentagon have advanced extremely impudent and preposterous denials to cover up their crimes. Moreover, despite growing protest and condemnation from the world public, the inhuman war criminals and perpetrators of genocide in Washington are continuing their criminal acts.

The DRVN Ministry of Water Conservancy vehemently denounces and condemns the Nixon's administration's barbarous, perfidious schemes and acts and attacks on the dykes and hydraulic works of North Vietnam. We severely warn the Nixon administration that it must bear full responsibility for all the consequences of its acts in case of dyke-breaking and flood, and resolute demand an immediate end to these felonies. We call on public opinion and the peace- and justice-loving countries all over the world and the progressive public in the US to step up the denunciation and condemnation of these savage acts of genocide taken by Nixon and Co against the Vietnamese people, thus actively contributing to stop their criminal hand.

No matter how frantic and cruel the US imperialists are, the Vietnamese people with the determined-to-overcome-all-difficulties-and-hardships-to-fight-and-to-win spirit, will perseveringly continue and push forward their struggle against US aggression for national salvation till they strongly defeat and duly punish the new Hitlerites of our time.

EXCERPTS OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF VO VAN SUNG, GENERAL DELEGATE TO FRANCE FROM THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, JUNE 22, 1972

Q. What is the exact period during which the water level is at its highest?

A. From June through October, although most critical points are reached during July and August. This is the time when danger of floods is the greatest.

Q. What proportion of the dikes in the DRVN have been touched by the bombing raids? Also, some points in the dikes are more crucial than others; have these been touched?

A. The Americans have already attacked all of the dike networks throughout the DRVN. The Americans attack both dikes and dams; they attack river dikes as well as sea dikes. They employ several different tactics in these attacks. First of all, they strike the dikes directly with bombs of medium or high calibre. Secondly, in order to cover their crimes, the Americans do not always strike the dike itself, but instead unleash bombs of very high calibre in immediate proximity of the dikes. The shock waves of these attacks, traveling through the ground, weaken the foundations and lower the capacity of the dikes to hold back the rivers and seas at high water marks. And finally, the U.S. forces have hit the same areas with anti-personnel bombs, killing the peasants who have come to repair and reinforce the dikes.

We have no information on the vital portions of the dikes. We can say, however, that the recent attack on the Song Ma dam may provoke a catastrophe many times greater than that of Rapid City, South Dakota.

Q. Is there danger of flooding?

A. The breaking of the dikes and dams, in periods of high waters, threatens the lives of millions of people, and might submerge hundreds of thousands of acres.

Q. Is the damage to the dikes as great as that inflicted by the Japanese in 1945?

A. The damage to the dikes in 1945 was extremely grave. There was flooding

throughout seven Provinces. Two million people died, either directly, from the floods, or indirectly from famine.

Q. Was there American bombing of the dikes between 1965 and 1968?

A. During the period called "the first escalation," there were American raids against the dikes, but they were not as concentrated as at present. The earlier strikes were fewer and spread out over several years. In the past two or three months, there have been over one hundred attacks on the dikes.

[From the New York Times, June 23, 1972]

DIKE ATTACKS CHARGED

PARIS, June 22—North Vietnam appealed to world opinion today to halt what it called a "premeditated" effort by the United States to destroy its dike system and flood the country in the coming months.

Vo Van Sung of the Hanoi delegation here read a statement at a news conference charging that from April 10 to June 10 the United States attacked dikes 68 times, dropping 665 bombs along the Red River and other waterways.

The statement asserted that 32 portions of dikes and 31 hydraulic works had been seriously damaged, while a large number of civilians working on repairs and reinforcement of the dikes had been killed or wounded by antipersonnel bombs.

Mr. Sung asserted that the American aim was to spread death and famine among the civilian population and lower its morale. "The possible rupture of the dikes in North Vietnam during the season of cresting rivers would threaten millions of inhabitants and create the danger of submersion of hundreds of thousands of acres of cultivated land," he said.

Mr. Sung indicated that most of the bombs had fallen not directly on the dikes, but close to them. He asserted that this was an effort to weaken the dike structure so that it could not resist the water pressure when the rivers rose in July and August.

"VENGEANCE" IS CHARGED

He linked the air threat in the dike region to what he said was a search for "vengeance" by President Nixon. He said that President Nixon was rankled by what was termed the failure of Vietnamization in South Vietnam.

There has been nothing in the terms employed by North Vietnamese spokesmen recently to suggest any softening of Hanoi's negotiating position as a result of the diplomatic and military pressure they have publicly protested. Today, while expressing obvious worry, Mr. Sung described the Vietnamese people as "persevering in their patriotic struggle for independence and freedom."

[From LeMonde, June 24, 1972]

HANOI CASTS AN APPEAL TO WORLD OPINION TO PREVENT DESTRUCTION OF THE DIKE SYSTEM

It was with pathetic tone that M. Vo Van Sung, general delegate of the DRV (Democratic Republic of VietNam) to France, declared Thursday afternoon to the press: "In the name of the Vietnamese people, the delegation of the DRV to France condemns with force the extremely barbarous acts of genocide of the Nixon administration which consists of systematic attacks against dikes and hydraulical works in North VietNam, denounces them vigourously and alerts French and world opinion to this extremely grave crime not only against the Vietnamese people but against all of humanity that the Nixon administration is in the midst of committing. The Vietnamese people appeal to the people's of the world, to international organizations, to the scientists of the world, to take action now to stop the bloody hand of the American aggressors and to energetically demand that they put a stop to the bombings of the dikes and hydraulical works, as well as to every act of war against the Vietnamese people."

GUAVA BOMBS ON PEASANTS

Each day, in effect, for some time, Hanoi has announced attacks against the hydraulic system. From April 10 to June 10, there were aerial bombardments

totalling 68 and several naval bombardments. 38 important frustums and 31 hydraulic works were heavily damaged. The diverse river basins—that of the Red River and its tributaries, the Clear River and the Black River, the Thay Binh River and the Song-Dao were attacked. The central part of the Thac-Ba Dam was destroyed; a simple fissure in the dam, which took ten years to construct, would provoke a catastrophe, for the lake reserve would spill over on hundreds of thousands of inhabitants. The same would go for the Do-Luong—in the Nghe-An River—which was also attacked.

The North Vietnamese are no longer hiding their fear, at least as great, they emphasize, as the air raids—such as those of the 14th of June, in the south of their country—of guava bombs on peasants and students who fill in the holes provoked by the raids. And now, the rainy season will begin in about two weeks. It will last until October. The months of August and September will be crucial. Perhaps the huge dikes have already been shaken, without the engineers knowing it, by the explosions. If the system were to crack, millions of persons would risk being drowned; the best lands would be under water.

15 million Vietnamese (out of a total of 20 million) live in the river basins. The density in the Delta is from 700 to 800 inhabitants per sq kilometer. Soon, the rivers will exercise a formidable push on the dikes which protect the cities such as Hanoi. This summer, the output of the Clear River at Yen-Bai will be 17,800 cubic meters per second, that of the Black River at Son-Tay will be 33,500 cubic meters per second (the average output of the Seine in Paris is 450 cu. meters; the maximum reached during the floods of 1910 was 2500 cu meters). In 1945, recalled M. Vo Van Sung, there were about 2 million deaths in the North, when the Japanese provoked the rupture of the dikes; for, due to the catastrophe, came a famine. Last year, the North also knew very high waters; there were no doubt victims, but they weren't numerous, he believed. Each year since 1954 the peasants have transported from 2 to 3 million cubic meters of earth to reinforce their some 4,000 kilometers of dikes. M. Sung recalled in his press conference that Seiss-Inquart, Nazi war criminal, was hanged for having destroyed hydraulic installations in Southern France.

Meanwhile, raids against the DRV remain numerous: 270 on Thursday, several B-52's near Dong-Hoi city. The Americans claim to have lost one plane; the Vietnamese affirmed having destroyed four aircraft and declared that two dikes were destroyed in Quang-Ninh province.

[From LeMonde, June 28, 1972]

M. Trang Dang Khoa, Director of the Institute of Hydraulic Sciences, expressed astonishment that humanity was so concerned about atomic testing in the Pacific but scarcely worried about the catastrophe which is threatening his country because of the bombing of the dikes. He asked journalists, technicians, scholars, and jurists around the world to do everything possible to stop "the bloody hands of the bellicose Nixon and to avert catastrophe that no conscience could pardon.

[From the Washington Post, June 29, 1972]

VC RENEWS CHARGES OF BOMBING OF DIKES

PARIS, June 28—Despite Pentagon denials, the Vietcong today renewed charges that the United States was bombing North Vietnamese dikes and flood control systems in order to cause their "systematic destruction."

Waving a photograph allegedly showing a partially destroyed irrigation canal, Vietcong spokesman Ly Van Sau told a news conference that impartial witnesses have seen the destruction of dikes. Official Pentagon denials only "reveal the Nixon administration's cynicism," he said.

"While President Nixon flies over flooded areas of the United States," he added, "he is conducting the most diabolical plan to submerge vast areas of North Vietnam under water."

The spokesman stressed that there was "absolutely no change" in the Vietcong's demands that the United States accept their year-old seven-point peace plan. He again rejected President Nixon's May 8 offer to withdraw all U.S. troops four months after a cease-fire and release of all American POWs.

Sau also took the unusual step of differing with the French government in public. He "regretted" that French entry visas had not been forthcoming for a

North and South Vietnamese delegation of victims of U.S. bombing who had hoped to meet near here with an American group representing Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

Sau said tartly "you'll have to ask the French" why the Vietnamese group had been held up in Moscow awaiting the visas.

[From the Washington Post, July 5, 1972]

U.S. BOMBS DIKE GATES, HANOI SAYS

(By Murrey Marder)

North Vietnam is now accusing the United States of using television and laser-controlled "smart" bombs to knock out sluice gates and repair centers for its dike system.

According to North Vietnam, the United States is now striking its dike maintenance system while denying it is engaging in any attacks on "dikes." Hanoi charges that this is a "mendacious" scheme to so weaken the dike system that when flooding develops during coming weeks it can be blamed on "natural calamity." North Vietnam is warning its farmers to "be ready to overcome the greatest difficulties."

The intensified charges about American bombing attacks on North Vietnam's dike system produced another Defense Department denial that U.S. aircraft are aiming at the dike complex.

Defense Department press spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said yesterday:

"The dike system of the North has not been targeted, as we said a number of times. I wouldn't want to guess about what might have happened to some (dikes), if in fact anything happened to them.

"We're obviously being treated to a kind of worldwide propaganda campaign on this subject in which the enemy may hope to explain the normal monsoon flooding by blaming it on us.

"It always floods during the monsoon in North Vietnam and it probably will again. We have not targeted dikes and we have no intention to do so."

North Vietnam has been intensifying its charges of U.S. attacks on its dike system, and conducting diplomats and newsmen based in Hanoi on tours to examine the claimed damage.

President Nixon said last Thursday that "we have orders out not to hit dikes because the result in terms of civilian casualties would be extraordinary." Nevertheless Hanoi insists the dike complexes are being hit, with new concentration on the dike maintenance equipment, even more than on the dikes themselves.

The rising North Vietnamese criticism, which is receiving increasing world support, is likely to be pursued vigorously when the Paris peace talks on Vietnam resume July 13. The Stockholm Conference on Vietnam on Sunday said it will rally world technicians to aid in reconstructing the dikes allegedly damaged by American bombing.

In a July 1 statement, North Vietnam's Water Conservancy Ministry charged:

"Especially in June, the U.S. imperialists violently struck 20 times (at) sections of dikes and water conservancy projects that had already been repeatedly hit in April and May.

"More barbarous still, the U.S. imperialists stepped up using CBU bombs and smart bombs to strike the dike-repair sites . . . to prevent the people in the localities from repairing and strengthening dikes to prevent flash floods and other flooding."

An Agence France Presse reporter in Hanoi, Jean Thoraval, reported on June 30 that he was taken to Phu Ly, about 40 miles from Hanoi, to inspect bomb damage to a tributary of the Red River. He reported, "The system of sluice gates no longer worked, for the six doors could not move up or down. The reinforced concrete pillars had been destroyed or cracked. As for the dike itself, apart from the craters which demolished it, it was full of cracks, some of them 30 centimeters wide."

North Vietnam last year suffered its worst natural floods in modern history. The condemnatory language used against the Nixon administration is now reaching new depths of bitterness. The Army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan said on June 29:

"In his impasse (in the war), Nixon is repeating the crimes of Hitler by ordering U.S. aircraft to attack dikes in a systematic manner with the intention to cause floods and bring the Vietnamese people to their knees."

[From the New York Times, July 7, 1972]

HANOI REPORTS U.S. RAIDS

HANOI, North Vietnam, July 6 (Agence France-Presse)—The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry said today that American planes attacked inhabited areas of a dozen provinces yesterday, from the southernmost part of the country almost to the Chinese border.

It said that a dike had been damaged in Xuanlam commune of Nghean Province, in the middle of the country, and that a sluice gate in Namha Province, south of Hanoi, had been struck.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE DISPATCH ON SEVERAL DIKE BOMBINGS REPORTED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NEWS AGENCY

HONG KONG, July 9, AFP—American fighter bombers badly damaged the foundation of the forty-year old Bai Thuong dam in North Vietnam after dive bombing it with 8 2,000 pounders on July 6, the North Vietnamese news agency reported today. The bombs dug craters 6-7 meters (yards) in diameter on the left side of the dam on the Chu River in Thanh Hoa province. The agency claimed one of the bombs fell squarely on the surface of the dam, tearing a hole 1½ meters deep and 3 meters wide, causing large cracks in the dam body. U.S. planes bombed the main canal connecting the dam to paddy fields a few hours later when six large bombs severed the canals at many places, claimed the Agency. The VNA charged that during the last three months U.S. aircraft have bombed dikes and dams in Thanh Hoa province for 27 times, killing scores of people busy filling up the craters. From July 1 to July 6 U.S. planes also made night raids against dikes, piers, medical stations and farming establishments in Hai Hung province, damaging many vital dike sections, killing many civilians, the Agency claimed. U.S. planes dropped twelve demolition bombs on a pier at Duyen Yen hamlet in Hgoc Thanh village, Kim Dong district on the night of July 1, blowing up 8 meters of dike, VNA also claimed. A flight of U.S. 6 planes dropped four bombs on a dike section at Thanh Bich village at Thanh Ha district on July 2, destroying 10 meters of dike, VNA added.

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE DISPATCH ON SEVERAL DIKE BOMBINGS REPORTED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTRY

HANOI, July 10, AFP—The North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry today protested against U.S. bombing of Haiphong suburbs, ten North Vietnam provinces and Vin Linh town near the 17th parallel Saturday and Sunday. The Ministry said that the dikes were attacked at three points during the weekend raids by fighter bombers: in Nam Ha province, in the commune at Truc Thanh and in Hai Hung province 60 miles southeast of Hanoi.

[From the Washington Star, July 14, 1972]

FAT ALBERT BOMBS USED, 1ST SIX SCORE SIX HITS

(By George Esper)

SAIGON.—The U.S. Navy announced today the introduction of a new, one-ton video bomb called "Fat Albert" into the air war against North Vietnam and termed it highly effective.

The weapon is an improved version of the "Walleye" television bomb and has been in use for a month, the Navy said.

Capt. Marland W. Townsend, commanding officer of the carrier Kitty Hawk, said the first six Fat Alberts scored direct hits on their targets, while reducing the risk that American pilots would be hit by ground fire.

Townsend said four bridges were downed and two military supply buildings were destroyed by the bombs.

"You can't beat 100 percent," he said.

TWICE AS POWERFUL

The Fat Albert, named by fliers aboard the Kitty Hawk, is twice as powerful as the Walleye and has a television camera in the nose to direct the bomb to the target.

"The primary advantages of the Fat Albert over the earlier Walleye series are increased explosive impact, better reliability and greater standoff range—or the ability to hit targets from higher altitudes, the most popular feature for combat air crews exposed to enemy ground fire," the Navy said.

The Navy said it would continue to use the Walleye, first used against North Vietnam in March 1967, and also the laser-guided bombs.

270 STRIKES MADE

The U.S. Command announced, meanwhile, that U.S. pilots carried out 270 tactical air strikes against targets inside North Vietnam yesterday.

The Navy said its pilots leveled three coastal defense sites, northeast and southeast of the port city of Vinh, with laser guided bombs.

Other Navy planes from the three carriers in the Tonkin Gulf hit hard for the second successive day in the Hanoi-Haiphong region. The pilots reported destroying six buildings in the Chung Hau storage area 28 miles northeast of Hanoi, five buildings at the Mai Thinh vehicle truck park a mile farther northeast, three warehouses 14 miles northeast of Haiphong and a railroad bridge 18 miles northwest of the port city.

Pilots said they sank three barges on a small waterway 19 miles northeast of Haiphong, and in attacks against coastal transshipment points 20 miles northeast of Haiphong triggered six large secondary explosions and two sustained fires.

Radio Hanoi claimed that 14 U.S. warplanes bombed a section of dikes in North Vietnam's Hai Hung Province on Tuesday and that a large number of Western newsmen saw it.

The broadcast said the newsmen had been taken to the area near Hiep Ca and Nan Hung villages to see damage allegedly done to dikes there by U.S. bombs two days earlier.

"While the reporters were inspecting and photographing this damage," Radio Hanoi said, "a wave of 14 U.S. warplanes dropped 28 bombs in a massive, concentrated attack against a portion of the dikes less than 600 meters from where the newsmen were standing."

The North Vietnamese radio said two of the bombs scored direct hits on top of the dike and 23 others hit along the sides, "cratering and cracking a 200-meter long section."

Radio Hanoi said the "more than 50 reporters and newsmen" present included representatives of French, Japanese and Swedish television network, and reporters and photographers from newspapers and magazines in Germany, France, Russia, Japan and China.

[From the Guardian, July 22, 1972]

RICHARD GOTT WITH THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION IN PARIS: BREAKING POINT?

Adamant that Nixon's diplomatic initiatives in Peking and Moscow have met with failure, the Vietnamese also maintain that the bombing will not break their resolve now, any more than it has done in the past. "Can the bombing halt our determination to fight for a just cause?" asks Mr. Vy without rhetoric. "The answer is no." Next month is the flood season, he explains. "Already there is danger of the dikes breaking. It will increase if the bombing continues." He recalls the recent floods in South Dakota. "The losses there were very big, even though they have more advanced technology than us for dealing with the situation."

Some people believe, Mr. Vy continues, "that after several million people have been killed by the dikes breaking, Vietnam will give in. But they should remember that in 1945 there were floods and famine and two million people died—and this was followed by the August revolution."

The Americans have repeatedly denied that they are engaged in specific attacks on the Vietnamese dike system, but the Vietnamese insist that Nixon's phrase including as targets "anything that contributes to the war effort" has been interpreted to mean the dikes. Certainly when a group of foreign journalists—among them Jean Thoraval of Agence France Presse—were inspecting dike damage near Hanoi, they were able to give incontrovertible proof of the existence of these American attacks. Almost as if for the benefit of the journalists, a dozen American fighter-bombers appeared on the horizon, dropped their bombs on the

dikes, and then returned to spray the startled party with machine gun fire. Fortunately they survived to tell the tale.

"What does Mr. Nixon mean when he claims to be using 'restraint'?" asks Mr. Vy. "His air war against North Vietnam is even more atrocious than that of Mr. Johnson. Perhaps by restraint he means not using A bombs or H bombs." Our country, Mr. Vy says, is smaller than Florida, yet it has received a greater tonnage of bombs than that dropped in all of the Second World War in all theatres. "The acts of Mr. Nixon," he concluded, "are a challenge to you all."

[From the New York Times, July 28, 1972]

POLEMICS MARK SESSION IN PARIS—NO PROGRESS IS REPORTED AS DISPUTE ON DIKES FLARES—SECRET TALK LOOKED FOR

(By Clyde H. Farnsworth)

PARIS, June 27—The 152d meeting of the Paris peace talks was held here today and Communist and Western sources said that there had been no change from the positions the United States and North Vietnam took at secret talks eight days ago.

At today's full meeting, American and Communist negotiators traded charges concerning the damage done to dikes in North Vietnam in a reversion to polemics that was another signal of no progress.

The United States yesterday said that any damage done to the North Vietnamese dike system by the American bombing of military installations was accidental and had only "the most incidental and minor impact" on the system.

The American chief delegate, William J. Porter, said to his counterpart from Hanoi, Xuan Thuy, "I note that you make no claim that military equipment or installations were not emplaced near dikes or related structures."

Hanoi repeated its charge that the United States was waging genocidal warfare. Hanoi's spokesman, Nguyen Thanh Le, asserted that attacks against the dikes were deliberate because several specific dikes had been struck many times.

Mr. Porter said that Hanoi had brought its troubles on itself by not repairing damage done to dikes by last year's flood-waters, diverting manpower to building roads across the demilitarized zone to the South in preparation for the spring invasion.

[From the Washington Post, Aug. 4, 1972]

PUBLIC ANGER POINTS TO LITTLE PROGRESS IN PRIVATE VIET TALKS

(By Jonathan C. Randal)

PARIS, Aug. 3—The formal Paris peace conference bogged down in angry exchanges today, adding to the growing impression that the latest private meeting between North Vietnam and the United States failed to narrow fundamental differences.

Symptomatic of the ugly mood at the 153d semipublic session were charges and countercharges arising from Hanoi's claim that the United States is now systematically bombing North Vietnamese dikes as a matter of policy. The United States maintains that only about a dozen bombings of dikes have occurred and that those were accidental or aimed solely at destroying weapons installed on the dikes.

U.S. Ambassador William J. Porter fruitlessly challenged the North Vietnamese to explain the apparent discrepancy between a recent Hanoi newspaper photograph of a weapon mounted on or behind a dike and North Vietnamese claims last week that "we never put a military installation on a dike."

Hanoi negotiator Xuan Thuy refused to answer directly but was quoted as responding that the United States "had no right to attack North Vietnamese territory or any civilian or military targets." His press spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le, who last week denied weapons were installed on dikes, claimed that President Nixon had uttered "a series of lies" about the dikes during his July 27 news conference.

Both Le and Thuy said that U.S. warplanes have attacked dikes and dams 173 times since April.

Le listed 17 such attacks in April, 46 each in May and June and 63 in the first 27 days of July.

In addition, Thuy charged American bombs destroyed the Lan sluice gate in Thai-binh Province which irrigates 120,000 acres of land.

Thuy also charged that American warplanes since April have attacked "100 primary schools, 32 medical installations including 22 hospitals, some 30 pagodas and churches, dozens of farms and forestry installations, many power plants and dozens of enterprises . . . including a flour mill and a candy store."

So angered was Porter by the prepared Hanoi and Vietcong statements to the conference that he lashed out against communist "invective" and "attempts to vilify President Nixon" as well as "continual slanders against the person of (Saigon) President (Nguyen Van) Thieu."

He warned the communist delegates: "You would be well advised to abstain from egregious insult and to concentrate instead on the issues." Porter later expressed the hope that next week the communists would honor "minimal standards of diplomatic interchange."

At no point did any of the head delegates even mention the meeting Tuesday between White House advisor Henry Kissinger and Thuy and Le Duc Tho, the Hanoi Politburo member.

[From the Boston Globe, Aug. 2, 1972]

HANOI MAY EVACUATE DIKE AREA

STOCKHOLM.—Hanoi declared yesterday that the civilian population of North Vietnam will have to be evacuated if American bombings of dikes and dams continue.

The statement was made by Cao Dac Hung, charge d'affaires at the North Vietnamese embassy in Stockholm. He told a press conference that if the bombardment of dikes and dams continued, "it will be necessary to evacuate the population . . . to the Highlands, where they will be exposed to further air attacks."

Cao said US bomber sorties have attacked embankments and dams 173 times from the time US aerial bombings resumed in April until July 25.

"President Nixon alleges that the dams were hit by accident, but so many attacks cannot be judged accidental," he said.

Today from Hong Kong came the report that Hanoi has accused Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik of helping the United States to cover up American bombings of dikes in North Vietnam.

According to the North Vietnamese army paper Nquan Doi Nhan Dan, Malik said in a recent statement that the US air raids had not been carried out with the intention of making the dikes the object of attacks.

The North Vietnam news agency said that Nguyen Viet, acting head of the Third Department for Asia of North Vietnam's Foreign Ministry, told Indonesian charge d'affaires Kasman P. H. Siahaan that Malik's statement "runs counter to the common trend of public opinion in the world, including opinion in the United States, which is . . . demanding that the (US) immediately stop the bombing and shelling of North Vietnam and the blockade of its ports, especially the bombing of its dikes," the agency reported.

PART III: U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

[From the New York Times, May 9, 1972]

U.S. RESPONSE

[The United States command denied that American jets had bombed the dikes, United Press International reported. In Washington, a Pentagon spokesman said it was possible that North Vietnamese missiles fired at the American planes had missed and fallen back on the dikes.]

[From the New York Times, June 8, 1972]

BOMBING OF DIKES DENIED

WASHINGTON, June 8.—Two high-ranking military officials denied today that the North Vietnamese dikes had been targets of the bombing campaign.

Vice Adm. William P. Mack, who commanded the Seventh Fleet until two weeks

ago, told reporters that the dikes were not among the targets struck by Navy and Air Force bombers.

The Seventh Fleet is stationed off Vietnam. Admiral Mack has been designated the new superintendent of the United States Naval Academy.

In an afternoon briefing, Lieut. Gen. George J. Eade of the Air Force also denied that the dikes had been hit.

"We haven't targeted any dikes," General Eade said in a review of the bombing campaign. He also said that he was not aware of any dikes struck by accident.

General Eade is the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.

Regarding the reported attack on Konghring, Defense Department officials said that there would be no comment. A spokesman said that all reports of alleged massacres were routinely investigated by the military.

[From the New York Times, July 1, 1972]

U.S. REITERATES DENIAL

WASHINGTON, June 30.—A Pentagon spokesman said today in response to questions about the reported bombing of the Phuly dike that the Defense Department "will stand on the statements that we have made in the past and that were made yesterday by the President."

In his news conference last night President Nixon said that orders not to hit the dikes of North Vietnam were still in force and that reports of strikes were inaccurate.

The Agence France-Presse dispatch from Hanoi quoted a North Vietnamese official as having said that American planes last bombed the Phuly dike on June 21, but apparently newsmen did not visit the site until today. The dispatch gave no indication whether anything else in the area might have been an intended target.

Ronald L. Ziegler, the President's press secretary, reiterated the President's statement this morning, saying it was based on good information.

Mr. Ziegler was questioned about statements by diplomats in Hanoi that they had witnessed bombing of dikes. Asked if his remarks would leave open the possibility of accidental bombing, he replied: "I do not mean to leave anything open."

The Pentagon spokesman repeated the department's position that the dike system was not "targeted" in the bombing campaign, adding, "That doesn't mean that some of them don't get hit by stray weaponry."

[From the New York Times, July 1, 1972]

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE (EXCERPT)

BOMBING OF HANOI'S DIKES

Q. Mr. President, the background—Thank you, Mr. President, I'll remember you.

The background of this question is your own statement made down in Texas among other places, saying that you had not sanctioned and would not sanction the bombing of the dikes and dams in North Vietnam because you considered it an inhumane act because of what it would do to civilians. Now within the past week there's been reports to eyewitnesses, one of these reports came from French press agency and another, I think, from the Swedish Ambassador in Hanoi; eyewitnesses claiming to have seen American planes hit dikes and dams. Now, the question is: has such bombing occurred; if so, what steps are you taking to see that it doesn't happen again?

A. Mr. Rather, we have checked those reports. They have proved to be inaccurate.

The bombing of dikes is something, as you note from—will recall from the gentleman who asked the question in Texas, was something that some people have advocated.

The United States has used great restraint in its bombing policy; and I think properly so. We have tried to hit only military targets and we have been hitting military targets.

We have had orders out not to hit dikes because the result in terms of civilian casualties would be extraordinary.

As far as any future activities are concerned, those orders still are in force. I do not intend to allow any orders to go out which would involve civilian casualties if they can be avoided. Military targets only will be allowed.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LAIRD'S NEWS CONFERENCE (EXCERPT), JULY 6, 1972
FROM THE PENTAGON TRANSCRIPT

I believe that, at the present time, the North Vietnamese are carrying on a very intensified world-wide campaign, which is accusing us of tampering with the dikes, and with their dam system. Last year, as you know, they had tremendous rains and monsoons and many of the dams and dikes were affected by the severe flooding which took place last year.

We have never targeted a dam or dike on our targeting system as far as North Vietnam is concerned. Some of the dams and the dikes may be roadways that are being used or they may be in a position where anti-aircraft weaponry is placed; and, of course, our pilots are given the opportunity and they should have the capability to take out anti-aircraft wherever it comes, or from wherever it comes.

So there have been times when I assume these pilots have gone off after primary targets which were, of course, the anti-aircraft or logistics supplies. With the road network which they have, many times, and with all the rice paddies and all of the dams, there may have been some damage. The real damage to dikes and dams of North Vietnam is the damage that was suffered weakening these dams and dikes last year during the very, very heavy flooding of North Vietnam.

I believe that the North Vietnamese are carrying on this campaign in order for them to relieve themselves of the responsibility with their own people for their failure to adequately repair this system since the major flooding of last year.

[From the Boston Globe, July 7, 1972]

LAIRD ADMITS NORTH VIETNAM DIKE DAMAGE

WASHINGTON.—Softening previous flat U.S. denials of Hanoi's claims, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird has acknowledged American warplanes may have damaged some flood control dikes in North Vietnam.

Laird charged, however, that most of the claims result from a deliberate effort by Hanoi to duck responsibility for failing to repair the dike system adequately after disastrous monsoon floods a year ago.

North Vietnam's dikes themselves have never been the target of U.S. bombs or rockets, Laird said yesterday. But he said in certain cases dikes may have suffered damage during attacks against anti-aircraft weapons firing from them or supply convoys traveling down roads built on them.

Laird said U.S. pilots are allowed to fight back against anti-aircraft fire "wherever it comes from" emplacement on the dikes. He said he considers this proper, but implied it does not happen often.

In recent weeks, North Vietnam has repeatedly accused the United States of bombing the dikes. A western correspondent based in Hanoi, Jean Thoraval of the Agence France-Presse, reported June 24 he had been taken to see some of the dikes protecting the town of Nam Dinh, 60 miles south of the North Vietnamese capital, and several of the dikes had been cracked or gutted.

Defense Department officials have consistently maintained there is no photographic evidence of U.S. bomb damage to dikes but Laird deliberately backed away from any flat claims of no damage at all, which some U.S. officials have made in the past.

[From the New York Times, July 6, 1972]

ENEMY IS FACING FLOODS, U.S. SAYS, DENYING ROLE

(By Bernard Gwertzman)

WASHINGTON, July 5—State Department officials said today that there was a strong likelihood North Vietnam would be flooded later this summer, but they said North Vietnam's dike system would be responsible rather than American bombing raids.

In separate interviews, responsible State Department officers did not deny that some bombs were falling on the dikes. But they again insisted that there has been no systematic targeting of the dike system, which runs throughout the Red River basin.

In recent weeks, North Vietnam repeatedly accused the United States of intentionally bombing the dikes to cause flooding during the monsoon season, which has just begun.

FLOODS LAST SUMMER

Last summer, when there was no American bombing of the area, North Vietnam suffered its worst flooding in years. Administration experts say the dikes were heavily damaged by those floods, and they back up their views with citations from the Hanoi press.

A State Department senior official showed a translation of an article that appeared in the June 20 issue of a Hanoi newspaper, Hanoi Moi. Written by Tran Duy Hung, chairman of the Hanoi Administrative Committee, the article said: "In some places, the repair of the dike portions that were damaged by torrential rains in 1971 has not yet met technical requirements."

"A number of thin and weakened dikes which are probably full of termite colonies and holes have not been detected for repair," it said.

WARNING TO POPULACE

The article said that each individual and locality must actively take part in the current dike-building operation, because "there is not much time before the torrential rain season."

"Repair methods must be firmly grasped in case the dikes are eroded, eaten away, broken through or washed over by water," it said. "We must organize many dike repair exercises, including cases in which the dikes are attacked by the enemy."

The article also accused what it called "the warlike Nixon clique" as having destroyed parts of the dike system by bombing.

The State Department officials interviewed said that in view of the heavy air campaign against North Vietnam, accidental bombing of the dikes could not be ruled out.

One official said that such bombing could take place under at least three circumstances: the first, when North Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns are situated at or near dikes, and are attacked; the second, when American fighter-bombers, engaged in aerial combat, unload their ordnance to gain speed, and the third, when air-to-ground missiles directed against North Vietnamese radar become "undirected" when the radar is shut off.

PROBABILITY OF FLOODS

Administration experts, studying the over-all situation in North Vietnam, have concluded that there is "a higher than normal probability" that floods similar to last year's may strike next month.

Because North Vietnam has charged repeatedly that the dikes have been bombed deliberately, the Administration has become sensitive to the possibility that world opinion would blame the United States for any flooding that develops.

Therefore, the State Department has been eager to publicize any internal evidence, such as the Hanoi Moi article, that supports, even indirectly, the American contention that flooding may occur for reasons unconnected with the bombing.

President Nixon and Administration spokesmen have regularly denied that the dikes are targets for destruction.

[From the Baltimore Sun, July 9, 1972]

BOMBING VIET DIKES COULD KILL MILLIONS, AUSTRALIANS SAY

(By Edward K. Wu)

HONG KONG—Ten million North Vietnamese could drown if American planes continue to bomb the dikes in the Red River valley of North Vietnam, a group of Australian anti-war movement leaders said here yesterday upon return from a seven-day visit to Hanoi and Haiphong.

The group, speaking at a press conference, reported that a Swedish Embassy official in Hanoi could prove with documentation that the Nixon administration was not telling the truth when it denied bombing river dikes in heavily populated areas.

From their conversations with the Swedish diplomat and North Vietnamese officials, they had the impression that the Hanoi leaders also were worried that the United States might use meteorological warfare in combination with the bombing of the dikes to cause devastating floods.

The monsoon rains have just started in North Vietnam. Any seeding of rain clouds with silver iodide could cause abnormally concentrated rainfall.

In July and August last year, North Vietnam suffered from the worst floods in history as the result of heavy rains and breaking dikes.

The five Australians were Ken McLeod, of the Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament, in Sydney; Leo Lenane, of the Brisbane Waterside Workers Federation; Robert Catley, of the University of Adelaide; Deirdre Hunter, a writer from Canberra, and Harry Van Moorst, a Melbourne student leader.

They were guests of the Vietnam Peace Committee.

In their meeting with Hoang Tung, an alternate member of the Vietnam Workers (Communist) Party Central Committee and editor-in-chief of the official Hanoi daily *Nhan Dan*, it was indicated that Senator George S. McGovern, of South Dakota, would be welcome if he came to Hanoi as President to end the war.

Insisting that the war must be ended on the Communists' terms, Mr. Tung was quoted as saying, "Senator McGovern said he would come to Hanoi within 90 days of being elected President to solve the war, and we would welcome this."

The anti-war leaders also interviewed 14 American prisoners of war in Hanoi June 29. Among the prisoners they talked to were two pilots whose planes were shot down as recently as June 27.

They said the prisoners appeared to be in good health and made statements urging the U.S. to end the war immediately.

Mr. Lenane alleged that the object of American bombing was to terrorize the people. He cited examples of indiscriminate bombing of schools, hospitals, civilian homes and sometimes complete villages.

According to Mrs. Hunter, the group saw whole blocks of houses in a residential area in Haiphong demolished by the bombing. The only structure remaining intact in that area, they said, was a bridge, which might be a military target.

The anti-war visitors did not see panic either in Hanoi or Haiphong. People go to the air raid shelters in an orderly way when the alert siren is sounded and return to their jobs when the raid is over, they said.

The visitors were taken to the air shelters several times during their week-long stay and chatted with the Vietnamese there while the raids were on.

Among the Vietnamese was a woman who only three hours earlier had given birth to a baby.

"People in Haiphong still trim their hedges and prune the trees," Dr. Catley said. Parks and restaurants, he added, were full of people, and life was reasonably normal.

The port of Haiphong, however, appeared to be idle, with only seven ships in the harbor. The ships were registered in the Soviet Union, East Germany and Hong Kong.

[From the New York Times, July 13, 1972]

U.S. DISPUTES FRENCH NEWSMAN ON BOMBING OF DIKES

(By Seymour M. Hersh)

WASHINGTON, July 12—The Defense Department and a French correspondent in North Vietnam were in sharp dispute today over whether United States planes deliberately bombed dikes yesterday near a village 37 miles southeast of Hanoi.

A dispatch filed yesterday by Jean Thoraval, a Hanoi-based correspondent for Agence France-Presse, said that about a dozen United States jets staged an early-morning attack on a dike system outside the village of Namsach, in the fertile and heavily populated Red River Delta area.

Mr. Thoraval reported that he and other foreign journalists had been taken to Namsach to inspect bomb damage that the North Vietnamese said American

planes had previously inflicted. The attack began, he said, soon after the party arrived.

"The jets went into a dive and released several bombs and rockets against the dikes on which we were standing," Mr. Thoraval wrote.

Daniel Z. Henkin, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, confirmed that United States Navy planes repeatedly bombed the Namsach area yesterday morning. But Mr. Henkin, in a statement supplied to The New York Times, denied that any dikes in the area had been assigned as specific targets. He said that the aircraft were attacking three nearby military targets—a surface-to-air missile site, a dispersed oil and petroleum area and an above-ground fuel pipeline.

Although the Agence France-Presse dispatch was received yesterday, The New York Times delayed publication while seeking further clarification from the agency and the Department of Defense. Today Agence France-Presse was unable to clarify questions raised by the original dispatch.

In his dispatch, Mr. Thoraval said that "only two or three SAM missiles were fired at the attackers." He and his fellow journalists, he wrote, unanimously agreed that the attack was clearly against the dike system and that "the pilots dropped their bombs at random" during the 10-minute raid.

The area under attack, Mr. Thoraval said, was full of dikes and irrigation-control facilities. "As far as the eye could see there was nothing but rice paddies," he wrote.

Among the questions left unanswered by the dispatch were whether the attack damaged any of the dikes, how far from the spectators the bombs fell, the locations of the antiaircraft emplacements from which missiles were fired at the planes, and how the newsmen could know that the jets were aiming at the dikes and not at the missile sites.

Mr. Henkin said that his office had made an extended effort to obtain details of the bombing mission. "Normally, I do not discuss special military targets," he said.

"The pilots on top can see 25 to 30 miles and he's got orientation," he said. "He knows what he's going after."

Speaking of Mr. Thoraval, Mr. Henkin said: "You can be sure nobody told him that there was a pipeline or a SAM site there."

Mr. Henkin also suggested that the random bombing mentioned by the French journalist might have been an attempt by the pilots to destroy the oil pipeline. Asked specifically whether any dikes had been attacked inadvertently or otherwise—in conjunction with the bombing raids on the three military targets, Mr. Henkin stated: "We have stated that there is always a possibility that dikes may be hit."

He added that he had not seen any after-action photographs of the targets at Namsach.

Mr. Thoraval's dispatch yesterday was the third within three weeks on bomb damage to the North Vietnamese dike system. On June 24 he wrote that he had visited bombed-out dike sections near the city of Namdinh, and on June 30 he filed a similar account of dike damage around Phuly. Both are south of Hanoi.

Similar reports were made by Jean-Christophe Oberg, Sweden's Ambassador to North Vietnam, during his home leave last month. Mr. Oberg, who is now back in Hanoi, was widely quoted in newspapers as alleging that the United States attacks were deliberate.

In addition, North Vietnam's official press agencies and radio services have repeatedly described alleged United States bombing attacks on the dike system. On June 30, for example, The Phan My, North Vietnam's Deputy Minister of Hydraulics, was quoted in official newspapers as saying 20 bombing attacks were made on dikes during the month. More than 40 specific allegations were made by the North Vietnamese in April and May.

In interviews today, officials in both the State Department and White House expressed concern over the bombing reports. "We're taking a pasting on this thing," one said.

"It's depressing," another official said, "but we know we're doing all we can and we're going to just ride it out."

In what seemed to be an attempt to counter the adverse publicity, State Department officials recently distributed copies of a Hanoi newspaper article in which the citizens were exhorted to take part in dike repair and rebuilding operations. They explained that much work was needed to repair portions of

the dikes that were damaged or destroyed by the 1971 floods, described them as the worst in more than 25 years.

"There is not much time before the torrential rainy season," the article said. That season is expected to reach its peak sometimes between July and late September.

In interviews at the Pentagon, a number of high-ranking military officers heatedly reasserted that dikes were not targets of Air Force or Navy attacks. "If we wanted to go after them, we'd go after them," an officer said.

A senior Navy pilot who recently returned from duty with the Seventh Fleet said that "it has been emphasized and reemphasized to the pilots that dikes are not authorized targets."

Details on the current rules of engagement are highly classified, but military sources agreed that Navy and Air Force pilots could legitimately attack—as so-called "targets of opportunity"—enemy missile sites or antiaircraft batteries on top of dikes.

Similarly, pilots are apparently authorized, without obtaining clearance, to attack supply convoys or equipment stockpiles on roads on top of dikes.

"A military target is targeted and if it happens to be near a dike," a military source said, "then it gets hit."

One high-ranking officer who has access to much of the daily bombing information said: "Given the number of irrigation systems up there, and given all the ordnance being dropped, there's always the possibility of an accident."

[From the Washington Post, July 11, 1972]

HANOI'S RED RIVER DIKES CALLED UNDERPINNING OF NATION'S LIFE

(By George McArthur)

SAIGON, July 10—The bombing of the dikes in North Vietnam—now being claimed by Hanoi and hotly denied by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird—has never been advocated by any of the ranking U.S. officials who have served in Vietnam.

From Gen. William C. Westmoreland to the current commander, Gen. Frederick Weyand, they have all denied any such intention. Privately, the military commanders and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker have recognized that such a campaign would risk enormous civilian casualties and set off justifiable outcries around the world.

While lower ranking officers have sometimes spoken of such bombings, official sources say such proposals have never been given any consideration.

The reluctance to consider bombing the dikes is based on the knowledge that these massive structures are literally the underpinning of life in North Vietnam.

IMPORTANCE IS PARAMOUNT

While most people might conceive of dikes as more or less ordinary construction efforts to control errant rivers, the dikes of North Vietnam are far more important.

They moved historian Joseph Buttinger to write, "They rise above the flat lands of the delta in higher praise of man than the pyramids along the Nile—true ramparts of civilization, if anything ever deserved such a name."

Visitors to North Vietnam are invariably awed by the dikes along the Red River and its tributaries. In recent months, trips along the river have been forbidden to most if not all outsiders, according to those who have visited the North.

In 1954, before the partition of Vietnam, the dikes along the Red River extended more than 1,600 miles. Under the Communist regime they have been extended and enlarged, but there are no official figures. The most important dikes, of course, are those which flank the Red River itself.

Prewar population figures show that some 6 million people live in the Red River Delta. In some areas, the population density is one thousand per square mile.

Since the beginning of Vietnamese history perhaps 2,000 years ago, these people have been dependent on the river and have labored to enlarge and strengthen the very dikes which stand today.

In Vietnamese, the Red River is often called simply the Great River (Song Cai). The reason is clear: Buttinger's history notes that the Red River carries twice the average volume of the Rhone in a bed far narrower.

GREAT FLOW VARIATION

The flow variation between dry and wet season can be as much as 40 times the low of 844 cubic feet per second. During severe floods—as happened last year—almost the entire delta was well below the river's high water mark. Parts of Hanoi are as much as 25 feet below the high water mark.

As Buttinger noted, only a "Promethean reaction against the cruel heavens" could insure survival in the Red River Delta, and this reaction was the building of a system of dikes surpassing that known anywhere else in the world.

"The Red River now flows through the delta between two gigantic dikes, suspended, as it were, above a watchful and apprehensive population."

Some of these dikes measure 80 to 100 feet at their base. The surface is used for major roadways paralleling the river and extending on over only slightly lesser dikes to the north and south. Some of these are defended by antiaircraft guns.

Last Thursday in Washington, Laird said that some of the dikes may have suffered damage from air strikes directed at convoys on the roads or antiaircraft guns positioned on the dikes. But he said that the dikes themselves have never been bombing targets.

Laird raised the possibility that Hanoi radio was engaging in a propaganda campaign "to relieve themselves from the responsibility with their own people for the failure to adequately repair this system since the major flooding last year."

At the time, Hanoi admitted that those floods were the most severe in more than a century. The transportation system of the whole country was disrupted. Hanoi radio carried repeated broadcasts exhorting the river dwellers to greater work on the dikes and Communist Party dignitaries were photographed toiling alongside ordinary peasants to repair the damage.

The floods lasted approximately six weeks and struck in August and September. The flood season is once again approaching, and should the floods approach anything like the level of one year ago, the dikes in many areas might not sustain the pressures of two such successive years.

[From the New York Times, July 18, 1972]

EXCERPT FROM REPORT OF SECRETARY LAIRD'S NEWS CONFERENCE

Mr. Laird said that air force and navy pilots were under instructions not to bomb any of the six or seven major dams and dikes in North Vietnam that control most of the flood waters in the north. He said one or two "minor" dikes or sluice-ways might have been inadvertently struck if they had antiaircraft weapons on them or roads or bridges passing over them carrying military traffic.

"But there are no dams or dikes that are authorized as military targets," he stressed.

[From the Washington Post, July 26, 1972]

HANOI VOICE IS HEARD, U.S. ADMITS

The White House acknowledged yesterday that North Vietnam is achieving "some success" in spreading charges around the world that the United States is deliberately bombing its dikes.

"Without question there is a propaganda effort that they are working very hard on and with some success," said press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler. He again denied that the United States is "purposely undertaking a policy of bombing the dikes," as North Vietnam charges.

"Our bombing policy has been spelled out," said Ziegler: "We have never had a policy of bombing dams and dikes. We have a policy of not hitting dams and dikes."

Ziegler was responding to newsmen's questions about the unusually sharp language used the day before in a statement by Secretary of State William P. Rogers criticizing comments made by United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. The U.N. chief had said he received information through private channels, that American air attacks on North Vietnam are hitting dikes. Rogers replied that all claims that the United States is engaged in "deliberate bombing" of dikes are "false."

At the Defense Department yesterday, spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim also assailed what he called "Hanoi's propaganda campaign." He repeated that U.S. bombing is directed only against "military targets." When reporters asked if American planes fire at targets on dikes, Friedheim replied. "If a U.S. plane is attacked it will respond to protect itself."

On July 17, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said, "There are occasions . . . when a dam or dike could possibly be hit when an anti-aircraft installation is placed on a dam or dike or when there is a roadway or a bridgework that is also tied in with a dam or dike formation." But Laird said there is "no targeting of dikes or dams in North Vietnam."

[From the New York Times, July 21, 1972]

ZIEGLER COMMENT CITED

WASHINGTON, July 20—Gerald Warren, deputy press secretary at the White House, said tonight that the Administration had no immediate comment on Dr. Blake's charge that United States planes were deliberately bombing North Vietnamese dikes.

But he called attention to comments this morning by Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, in response to questions about similar charges made by others.

"It is obvious the North Vietnamese are attempting through their normal propaganda to claim that we are purposefully bombing dams and dikes," Mr. Ziegler said in part. "Every year there is some flooding in Vietnam. We have a policy: There is no targeting of dikes and dams in Vietnam. There will be no such policy."

[From the Washington Post, July 26, 1972]

WALDHEIM MUM ON VIET DIKE ISSUE

Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has nothing more to say for the time being on the question of possible U.S. bombing of dikes in North Vietnam, a spokesman at the United Nations said yesterday.

The spokesman said he was not authorized to comment on a statement made by U.S. Ambassador George Bush Monday night that he was convinced Waldheim, in a news conference yesterday, did not intend to lend credibility to a worldwide Communist charge of deliberate bombing of the dikes, which could trigger flooding.

Waldheim said at the press conference that he had "private and unofficial" information from Hanoi that the United States is bombing the North Vietnamese dikes.

In Washington, White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler reiterated the statement Secretary of State William Rogers made Monday that the reports were part of Hanoi's propaganda campaign, and added that the North Vietnamese are "meeting some degree of success."

[From the Washington Post, July 27, 1972]

VIET DIKE DAMAGE "MINOR," U.S. SAYS

(By Murrey Marder)

A Nixon administration study shows only "the most incidental and minor impact" on North Vietnam's dike system from American bombing, the State Department said yesterday.

This was the first specific U.S. acknowledgement that any bomb damage was caused to North Vietnam's flood control system. The admission, intended to refute Hanoi's charges, also illustrated the administration's dilemma about how to respond to the accusations without focusing greater attention on them.

Until yesterday, U.S. officials publicly have said only that dikes "may have been hit" unintentionally by American bombs aimed at military installations or military traffic on or near the massive earth levees that extend nearly 2,000 miles across North Vietnam.

Some officials have been convinced that the best thing to do about North Vietnam's charges that the United States is engaged in a "systematic" campaign to

destroy the dikes is to reply to them as briefly as possible. But other officials fear that if North Vietnam this year experiences anything similar to the extensive August-September flooding of last year, Hanoi's charges could do great political damage to the Nixon administration in the midst of the presidential election campaign.

The inconclusive outcome yesterday of this divided counsel was fragmentary disclosure of a dam-survey assessment based on aerial reconnaissance and studies of Hanoi's accusation.

In New York, George Bush, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, said in a television interview on NBC's "Today" show that:

"I believe we are being set up by a massive propaganda campaign by the North Vietnamese in the event that there is the same kind of flooding this year—to attribute it to bombs whereas last year it happened just out of lack of maintenance."

Bush added that, "There's been a study made that I hope will be released shortly that will clarify this whole question."

He said this study "would be very helpful because I think it will show what the North Vietnamese are up to in where they place strategic targets . . ."

He was suggesting, in other words, that some North Vietnamese military installations are located on or near the dikes in order to gain immunity from attack by subjecting the United States to charges of "genocide" if bombing results in flooding the countryside.

In North Vietnam that is a clear risk. According to North Vietnamese statistics, more than half of its 20 million people live in areas that would be flooded if the dikes were breached.

A recent Hanoi article said that at flood crest many rivers are as much as "six to seven meters" above the surrounding fields, and "any dike break, especially in the Red River delta, is a disaster with incalculable consequences."

"I think you would have to recognize," Bush told his interviewer yesterday, "that if there was any intention" to attack the dikes, "it would be very, very simple to do exactly what we are accused of—and that is what we are not doing."

State Department officials had contemplated making public yesterday a summary of the study to which Bush referred, with accompanying photographs.

Some officials privately claimed that this would provide "conclusive evidence" that there was no deliberate dike-bombing program because it would show only "minor" bombing of dikes in the area east and southeast of Hanoi, rather than north and northwest of Hanoi, the logical area for deliberate dike-busting strikes.

But other administration officials—who prevailed—were concerned that the resulting world debate would only play into North Vietnam's hands.

As a result, State Department press officer Charles W. Bray attempted to invoke the thrust of the study without getting into any detail.

Bray told newsmen:

"There has been no indication of any but the most incidental and minor impact on the system of levees as a result of our strikes against military installations. That is a fact. The root cause of Hanoi's concern with respect to the dikes, it itself has described in its own Communist newspaper".

[From the New York Times, July 28, 1972]

TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE

WASHINGTON, July 27—The following is a White House transcript of the news conference held today by President Nixon:

The President: We will go ahead with some questions if you like.

1. WORLD OPINION ON DIKES

Q. Mr. President, you have said that it is against U.S. policy to bomb the dikes and dams in North Vietnam. Yesterday, the State Department acknowledged there had been incidental and inadvertent damage from the bombing nearby. My question is, is it worth the risk of possible flooding and having world opinion turned against us as a result of bombing dams?

A. I think your question would be better answered by my discussing the policy toward bombing of civilian installations of North Vietnam generally, and then coming down to the specifics of your question, in giving a general answer.

Some of you who were in Texas with me will recall that that question was raised on the Connally ranch, and it was raised, actually, by an advocate of bombing dikes as to why we did not bomb dikes. I said it had not been United States policy even before the bombing halt of 1968 to bomb the dikes; that it was not our policy now, and it would not be in the future, because it is the policy of the United States in all of its activities in North Vietnam to direct its attacks against military targets only.

This was the policy in the sixties and it is now the policy since we have had to resume the bombing for the reasons that I mentioned in my speech of May 8th.

With regard to the situation on the dikes, let us understand what we are confronted with here. This is approximately a 2,700-mile chain of installations, including perhaps a half-dozen major dams, which are the heart of the system, and then peripheral areas getting down to mounds, which have, of course, the purpose of controlling the floodwaters in that particular area.

If it were the policy of the United States to bomb the dikes, we could take them out, the significant part of them out, in a week. We don't do so for the reasons that I have mentioned, because we are trying to avoid civilian casualties, not cause them.

Now, with regard to the reports that have come from Hanoi that there had been some damage to some parts of the dike system, I think it is important to note two things: One, there has been no report of any flooding and second, there has been no report of any strikes on the major dike areas.

What I am referring to is the big dams, which are the heart of the system. There have been reports of incidental damage to some of the peripheral installations in this 2,700-mile system, which covers the country of North Vietnam.

Now, under these circumstances, I think that it is well to keep in context first what our policy is, and second, what its effect has been. Our policy is not to bomb civilian installations and second, our restraint, it seems to me, rather than being subject to criticisms, should be subject to objective analysis and, it seems to me, a considerable amount of support.

As far as this matter is concerned, I think, too, it is time to strip away the double standard. I noted with interest that the Secretary General of the U.N., just like his predecessor, seized upon this enemy-inspired propaganda, which has taken in many well-intentioned and naive people, to attack the American bombing of civilian installations and risking civilian lives, and yet not raising one word against deliberate bombing of civilian installations in South Vietnam.

Just so the record will be kept straight—and it should be stated at this point—all of you ladies and gentlemen are aware of it, of course; you have printed it, and perhaps you will see fit to again in this context:

I just got a cable from Ambassador Bunker. I had asked him what had happened to civilians in the new offensive. You recall in my speech of May 8th, I said 20,000 civilian casualties, including women and children, have resulted because of the deliberate shelling of the cities and the slaughtering of refugees indiscriminately by the North Vietnamese.

The number is now 45,000, including women and children, of which 5,000 are dead.

I asked him for the number of refugees. It is higher than I had thought. There have been 860,000 made homeless by the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam, this newest invasion to date; 600,000 of them are still in refugee camps, away from their homes.

Looking back over the period of this very difficult war, we find that since 1965, there have been 600,000 civilian casualties in South Vietnam as a result of deliberate policies of the North Vietnamese Communists, not accidental, but deliberate.

In North Vietnam, in the period from 1954 to 1956, in their so-called land reform program, a minimum of 500,000 were murdered, assassinated and, according to the Catholic Bishop of Danang, whom I talked to when I was there in 1956, in South Vietnam, in addition to the 800,000 refugees who came south, there were at least a half-million who died in slave labor camps in North Vietnam.

Now, I did not relate this series of incidents for the purpose of saying, because they did something bad, we can do something bad.

What I am simply saying is, let's not have a hypocritical double standard. The United States has been restrained, greater restraint than any great power has ever shown in handling this war. We will continue to be restrained. We have to bomb military targets in order to accomplish the objectives I have described in my goal, in my speech of May 8th.

On the other hand, as far as this particular matter is concerned, I can only say that if damage did occur that we are making every possible effort to see that it will not occur again, which gets to your question. Military commanders, aircraft commanders and so forth, in terms of where military targets are, are instructed to avoid civilian damage where they can.

That is why some targets in the heart of Hanoi, for example, major power installations, fuel installations, in the heart of Hanoi have not been hit, because I have not wanted to have civilian casualties if we could possibly avoid it.

I will simply close by saying that this is a major propaganda campaign; it is one that does concern us. But let us keep the record straight. In the event that the United States followed the course of action recommended by some of those who have voted for the so-called end-the-war resolution in the Senate of the United States, it would mean that there would be visited upon South Vietnam the same atrocities that were visited upon North Vietnam, with perhaps at least one million marked for assassination because they had fought against the North Vietnamese attempts to conquer South Vietnam.

I will add one other thing. As far as the negotiations are concerned, we are negotiating. We have negotiated in public. We have had one private conference a week ago, lasting approximately six hours. We hope to continue to negotiate.

We have made fair offers on withdrawal, on a cease-fire, on political settlement. We have not made them on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

We made fair offers on exchange of prisoners of war and unaccounted missing in action.

Having done this, there is one thing we have not offered and this is one hang-up in the settlement today. That is the demands of the enemy directly or indirectly to do what they cannot accomplish themselves, impose a Communist government in South Vietnam. That would be the height of immorality to impose on the 17 million people of South Vietnam a Communist government with the blood bath that would follow.

3. MISSILE SITES ON DIKES

Q. Mr. President, to follow up the first question, if I may, there had been reports that SAM sites have been put on top of some of those dikes or dams. Does your policy rule out the bombing of that particular area where there are SAM sites?

A. I have seen those reports, Mr. Lisagor. As you know, the Secretary of Defense has made some indirect comments about it. The situation there is one that we would lean against taking out SAM sites on targets that would result in civilian casualties of a substantial amount.

However, I have not seen in recent days any reports indicating that any such SAM sites will be hit and in view of the present debate, I think we are going to be very careful with regard to hitting them. We would do so only if we had to do so in order to protect American fliers who otherwise would be hit down by the SAM's.

5. BOMBING AS POLITICAL ISSUE

Q. Mr. President, are we to understand that now that stop bombing the dikes has been made a political slogan this year, perhaps those who have gotten behind it have not thoroughly checked the background of those accusations?

A. I did not use the word "naive" unintentionally. The North Vietnamese are very skillful at propaganda. They have, of course, brought those who have been invited into the country to the areas where they have found bomb damage. They have not gone to any great pains to fill those holes, which they would naturally want to do before the possibility of rain and flood again comes to the North.

In my view, this is a deliberate attempt on the part of the North Vietnamese to create an extraneous issue, to divert attention from one of the most barbaric invasions in history, compounded by a violation of all concepts of international law in handling the prisoners of war. For them, with their policy of deliberate murder and assassination, and otherwise attacks on civilians for the purpose of killing civilians, for them to try to seize on this and divert attention from that, first, is a patent propaganda effort, and it is one that I think needs to be answered.

We have to, of course, be responsible for what we do. But it is time that in this terribly difficult war some Americans, or that most of us, should perhaps realize that when we talk about morality that it is never an easy question.

If I can digress for a moment, and then I will come to your follow-up question on the other matter, I remember one of the first conversations I had with Presi-

dent Eisenhower about war. We were riding back from Quantico. You may remember it. Charlie Wilson used to have those meetings in Quantico of the defense establishment people. He asked me to ride back with him. It was very early in the Administration, the first year.

He was talking a little about the decisions he had to make in World War II. One of the questions I raised with him was: Here, on our part, the deliberate bombing of German cities, the tragedy of Dresden, of Essen, of Hamburg, not to mention Berlin. General Eisenhower said that was a terribly difficult decision for us, the strategic bombing of civilians in Germany. But, he said, "On the moral question, we had to answer to ourselves this fundamental problem." He said, "The height of immorality would be to allow Hitler to rule Europe."

Now, in our case we have not gone that far. We are not going to bomb civilian targets in the North. We are not using the great power that could finish off North Vietnam in an afternoon, and we will not. But it would be the height of immorality for the United States at this point to leave Vietnam, and in leaving, to turn over to the North Vietnamese the fate of 17 million South Vietnamese who do not want a Communist government, to turn it over to them.

That is what this is about. That is the only issue that is left. Those who say "end the war" really should name their resolution "prolong the war." They should name it "prolong the war," not because they deliberately want to. They want to end the war just as I do, but we have to face this fact: We have only one President at a time, as I said in 1968. At that time, as you may recall, I was pressed quite often by you ladies and gentlemen, "What do you think we ought to do about negotiation?" I didn't think there was much chance for successful negotiation then.

But I said, correctly, we had only one President, and I didn't want to destroy any chance we might have to end this war. At this point, the chance for a negotiated settlement is better now than it has ever been. It is not sure, and I am not going to raise any false hopes, but the enemy is failing in its military offensive, although there is still some hard fighting to take place in the Quangtrihue area. But the enemy is also, of course, suffering the consequences of mining and cutting the roads and other systems that would bring in supplies to North Vietnam.

Under these circumstances, the enemy because also we have made a very fair offer—has every incentive to negotiate. But when you put yourself in the position of the enemy, and they hear that the Congress of the United States says, in effect, "We will give you what you want regardless of what the President has offered," why not wait?

This is the problem, and I would hope that as Senators and Congressmen consult their consciences, they would realize that we have just three months left before the election. In those three months we hope to do everything we can to bring this war to an end, and they should take no action which would jeopardize those negotiations. I can only say that the resolutions to this point cannot help. They can only confuse the enemy, at best; and at the worst, they will prolong the war.

10. PRESSURE TO BOMB DIKES

Q. Mr. President, on the bombing of the dikes and dams, would you say that you have been resisting pressure from the military to bomb such installations?

A. No. The pressure does not come from the military. I have talked this over with Admiral Moorer and, naturally, General Abrams. As a matter of fact, let me just say one thing about our military because somebody ought to speak up for it now and then.

We get the idea they are a bunch of savage flyboys and they love to get down and machine-gun all the innocent little civilians and all the rest. We can be very proud of our military, not only the men who are flying—they are brave and courageous—but also the men on the ground. We can be very proud of the marines—all of them have gone now—for what they have done—the Marines, the Army and the ground soldiers—for the civilians and refugees there. It is a story of generosity in a country that has never been equaled by American fighting men or anybody else.

As far as our military commanders are concerned, while they do give me their judgment as to what will affect the military outcome in Vietnam, they have never recommended, for example, bombing Hanoi. You have seen some of these signs "Bomb Hanoi." In fact, they were around in '68 even, a few, as well as '64.

Our military doesn't want to do that. They believe it would be counterproductive, and secondly, they believe it is not necessary. It might shorten the war,

but it would leave a legacy of hatred throughout that part of the world from which we might never recover. So our military have not advocated bombing the dikes; they have not advocated bombing civilian centers. They are doing their best in carrying out the policy we want of hitting military targets only.

When, as a result of what will often happen, a bomb is dropped, if it is in an area of injury to civilians, it is not by intent, and there is a very great difference.

[From the Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), July 27, 1972]

U.S. WON'T SHOW FILMS OF 'MINOR' DIKE HITS

(By Ray Moseley)

WASHINGTON—The State Department says U.S. bombing of military targets in North Vietnam has had only "the most incidental and minor impact" on dikes and dams in that country.

But it refuses to release reconnaissance photographs that might show the impact of bombing on these installations, or even to admit that it has such photographs.

Still, the statement by spokesman Charles W. Bray 3d yesterday that the bombing has had some impact represented a small step away from the virtual news blackout the Administration has imposed on the subject.

NO FLAT ADMISSION

It was the closest any official has come to acknowledging that dams or dikes have been hit. But Bray refused to say flatly. "I can't take it any further," he said after repeated questioning at a news conference.

[A State Department official said later, according to the New York Times News Service, that the conclusion that the dikes were not seriously damaged was the consensus of various intelligence agencies on the basis of photos and other unspecified information.]

United Nations Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim rekindled the controversy over U.S. bombing policy on Monday when he asserted that he had received unverified information that dams and dikes had been bombed.

Administration spokesmen retorted that the United States has not "purposely" or "deliberately" bombed dams or dikes.

They have been saying for several weeks that such facilities may have been hit if they were near anti-aircraft guns, radar and roadways.

PROPAGANDA EFFECT

Their refusal to go beyond that apparently is due to reluctance to give Hanoi what officials call "a worldwide propaganda campaign" against U.S. bombing policy.

But the Administration's silence nonetheless gives ammunition to those who suspect that damage to the dikes and dams, accidental or otherwise, may be more extensive than the Administration cares to acknowledge.

The Peking People's Daily joined the attack Tuesday, asserting that there have been more than 100 raids on 58 sections of major dike systems and 46 irrigation works along the Red River and other rivers in North Vietnam.

Bray said he couldn't comment on those figures.

FILMS SHOWN IN PARIS

Actress Jane Fonda, just returned from Hanoi, also kept up her accusations about the bombing. At a Paris news conference, she showed film taken by a French television crew showing cratered dikes at two villages near Hanoi, called Nam Sakh and Nam Dinh.

Bray refused to comment on her report.

Nam Sakh is the same village where French correspondent Jean Thoraval reported seeing bomb damage to dikes on July 11. The Pentagon acknowledged July 12 that military targets around Nam Sakh had been bombed, but it denied that dikes had been "targeted."

Ironically, the Hanoi newspaper Nhan Dan appeared to take some of the steam out of Hanoi's propaganda drive by reporting that "our dikes are now big, high and solid" in preparation for the coming monsoon season.

The newspaper said hundreds of thousands of persons have worked at bolstering the dikes over the last six months so that they could withstand floods and typhoons.

The Nixon Administration has contended all along that Hanoi's accusations about bombing of dikes is intended to blame the United States for damage that will result from the monsoon later this summer.

Last September, North Vietnam reported heavy damage to food crops, roads and communications from severe floods. In May and June it reported work was still underway to repair dikes damaged by floods.

The latest Nhan Dan article suggested the dike system was in relatively good shape and sections damaged by bombing have been repaired. But it said U.S. planes and warships continue to hit the dikes "night and day."

[From the New York Times, July 29, 1972]

U.S. ISSUES REPORT TO REBUT CHARGES ON DIKE BOMBINGS—INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT SAYS HITS WERE UNINTENTIONAL AND DAMAGE WAS MINOR

(By Bernard Gwertzman)

WASHINGTON, July 28—The Administration today released a Government intelligence report finding the American bombing had damaged North Vietnam's dike system at 12 points. But the report concluded that the hits were unintentional, their impact was minor "and no major dike has been breached."

The eight-page report, put together largely by the Central Intelligence Agency, was given newsmen by the State Department to buttress the Administration's contention that North Vietnam was falsely charging the United States with bombing the dikes systematically and deliberately.

Although the report was based on photographer reconnaissance, the State Department refused to show newsmen any of the photographic evidence. A department official said that it was decided today not to issue the photograph because it was felt by the Administration that this would only provoke North Vietnam to issue its own photographs in rebuttal, some of which might be "fabricated."

This report, including the photographs, prepared earlier and presented on Monday to Kurt Waldheim, secretary general of the United Nations, by George Bush, the United States delegate. Mr. Waldheim had said he had unofficial information that the United States was bombing the dikes.

Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was briefed along with other Senators by the C.I.A., a few days ago. He said today that he had no quarrel with the conclusion of the report. He said that the photo evidence he was shown seemed to support the view that the dike damage was near military targets.

[From the New York Times, July 29, 1972]

TEXT OF INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON BOMBING OF DIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM ISSUED BY STATE DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON, July 28.—In recent weeks Hanoi has tried to convince the world that its elaborate dike system is a direct and deliberate target of U.S. attacks. This is not true. Photographic evidence shows conclusively that there has been no intentional bombing of the dikes. A few dikes have been hit by stray bombs directed at military-associated targets nearby. The damage is minor and no major dike has been breached. The damage can be easily repaired—in a matter of a few days—and has not been sufficient to cause any flooding. No damage has been observed in the Hanoi area or against the primary dike system protecting that city. Hanoi no doubt is genuinely concerned about the dike system. North Vietnam's rainy season will soon reach its peak and damage in the dikes caused by last year's very extensive flooding have not yet been fully repaired.

NORTH VIETNAM'S WATER CONTROL SYSTEM

[1]

North Vietnam's elaborate network of dikes, dams and locks controls the water of the heavily populated Red River Delta. The delta farmland depends on irriga-

tion during the dry months and is endangered by floods in the wet months. The country's major transportation waterways—the Red River, the Thai Binh River and the connecting Canal des Rapides and Canal des Bambous—link the principal urban centers. Fertilizer, foodstuffs, petroleum and other commodities are moved, in part, by these waterways, as is the coal mined in the Hongai and Campha areas. Southern North Vietnam also contains rivers necessitating a dike and lock system for water control and navigation, but the system is less important than that of the delta.

[2]

Dikes to control flooding and the course of the waterways are most fully developed along the Red River. The Red River system begins near Viettri, only 43 feet above sea level, although about 100 miles inland. The great amount of silt brought down from the mountains and deposited along the river beds in the delta has raised the waterways above the surrounding countryside in many places and requires a constant elevation of the restraining walls. In some areas—particularly around Hanoi—the height of the dikes reaches 40 feet. Some are as broad as 80 feet at the flood line and spread to 200 feet at the base. A secondary system between 4 and 22 feet high running parallel to the main dikes is designed to localize and minimize damage if the primary dikes are breached. A tertiary system of smaller dikes divides the rice-growing plains into compartments, assists irrigation and controls the level of small and local waterways. In addition, small natural or man-made dikes along the coast keep out brackish sea water.

[3]

Dams and locks play a lesser role. Only a few large dams are constructed of concrete with gates to permit passage of watercraft, and only one major waterway in the Red River Delta has navigation locks to control water levels and facilitate transport.

[4]

The river rise to a seasonal peak during July and August, when unusually heavy rains frequently cause breaches in the levees. Extensive floods and destruction to property and agricultural crops result. Although there have been only a few major breaches since the mid-1940's, minor breaks occur almost every year.

[5]

The floods of last August rank with the most serious ever recorded. Four major breaches occurred in the primary dikes along the Red River. An estimated 1.1 million acres of riceland—a quarter of the country's rice acreage—were seriously flooded and the entire crop in that area destroyed. Storms took out a half-mile section of a levee outside Hanoi and closed the railroad north to Dongdang. The area of heavy flooding continued to expand through late September, probably because prolonged soaking and high water pressure had undermined the secondary dike systems.

[6]

Apart from immediate rice losses, the floods produced extensive longer-term physical damage. The enormous force of water unleashed through breaches in the primary dikes caused widespread erosion far beyond obvious scouring effects near the breaks. Long stretches of irrigation canals were cut, and the press reported many washed-out pumping stations. Flood water everywhere deposited silt in drainage ditches. The prolonged inundation during the floods may have caused subtle undermining of the primary dike systems that will not show until late this summer. The possibility that the dike system has been weakened thus adds to this year's flooding threat.

[7]

North Vietnam's water-control system includes a large number of widely dispersed individual components which could be substantially affected only by a large-scale, coordinated air offensive. Such attacks would be necessary against

specific locks, dams, and dike areas, and bombing would have effect only during the relatively short periods of high water. Even then, the North Vietnamese, long accustomed to battling against floods, could be expected to act promptly to mend breaches in the system.

[8]

Damage to the locks would have little effect on neither North Vietnam's transport or its water control systems. Inland craft could be diverted to waterways not dependent on locks, and some cargoes could be sent by the many alternate land routes. Accidental bomb damage during the 1965-68 period made some locks inoperative, but had little effect on water transport or flooding in the area. Similarly, breaching of dams, even during period of high water, would not cause significant disruption because most are small and easily repaired.

[9]

Dikes are particularly resistant to bomb damage. Those in the primary system could be breached only by a series of overlapping craters across the entire top of a dike, and the lips of the craters would have to be sufficiently lower than the river surface to initiate the flow and subsequent scouring action of water rushing through the breach. The dikes along the Red River near Hanoi are approximately 80 feet wide at the flood line.

[10]

North Vietnam's official press agencies and radio services have repeatedly described alleged U.S. bombing attacks on the dike system. In April and May, the North Vietnamese made more than 40 specific allegations, and 30 June the official press quoted the Deputy Minister of Hydraulics as saying that 20 bombing attacks had been made on dikes during that month. Foreign diplomats, newsmen, and most recently, actress Jane Fonda have been escorted to dikes to view damage—most of it around Haiduong, southeast of Hanoi.

[11]

A detailed examination has been made of photography of mid-July of the North Vietnamese Red River Delta and bomb craters were detected at 12 locations. None of the damage has been in the Hanoi area, where destruction of the dikes would result in the greatest damage to North Vietnam's economy and logistics effort. Nearly all the damage has been scattered downstream from Hanoi, as well as downstream from the areas of major breaks resulting from the 1971 floods.

[12]

There are no signs of destruction of vital dike portions stretching to a length of several kilometers—as reported by Hanoi-based newsmen. In comparison to the dikes, the craters are small, and no flooding has occurred as a result of the damage. Although water levels are not yet at their highest, the absence of leakage through the craters indicates that damage was limited.

[13]

All identified points of dike damage are located within close range of specific targets of military value. Of the 12 locations where damage has occurred, 10 are close to identified individual targets such as petroleum storage facilities, and the other two are adjacent to road and river transport lines. Because a large number of North Vietnamese dikes serve as bases for roadways, the maze they create throughout the delta makes it almost inevitable that air attacks directed against transportation targets cause scattered damage to dikes.

[14]

The bomb craters verified by photography can be repaired easily with a minimum of local labor and equipment—a crew of less than 50 men with wheelbarrows and hand tools could repair in a day the largest crater observed. Repairs to all the dikes could be completed within a week, as the necessary equipment is

available throughout the delta. Local labor historically mobilizes to strengthen and repair dikes to avoid serious flooding. An occasional bomb falling on a dike does not add significantly to the burden of annual repair work normally required. North Vietnam must, however, complete the repair of damage caused by the 1971 floods before next month when this year's rainy season will reach its peak.

[From the New Republic, June 3, 1972]

PART IV. DESCRIPTIVE AND ANALYTICAL COMMENTARY AND REPORTS

BOMBING THE DIKES

(By D. Gareth Porter*)

North Vietnamese society, based on agriculture and a highly motivated and resourceful labor force, has one major vulnerability—the vulnerability of its food supply to destruction by floods. The destruction of that food supply by flooding is Mr. Nixon's only remaining military option. He's bombing the ports, power transformers, rail lines and bridges; next he can bomb the dams and dikes of the Red River Delta.

The possibility arises because of the extreme unevenness of precipitation in the North; about 85 percent of its annual rainfall will come during the coming months, peaking in July, August and September in the most fertile rice-producing area. During the rainy season the Red River becomes swollen, often nearing the top of its dikes. If those dikes are breached or broken, floods will cause paddy fields to become waterlogged and the rice crop to be lost, even if other damage is minimized. And if the Red River overflows, it will probably mean serious floods in the other river valleys of Central North Vietnam as well.

North Vietnam's people have suffered floods during the rainy season—and droughts during the dry season—many times in their history, but the worst of all was in 1944 when 25 sections of the Red River dikes were broken and some 225,000 hectares of riceland, or about one-fourth of the total under cultivation, were ruined. That natural calamity became an atrocity when the Japanese occupation authority requisitioned much of the available paddy for its own purposes, leaving an estimated two million Vietnamese to starve to death.

Last year, flood waters smashed through a 30-mile section of the delta's dikes, wiping out large parts of the 1971 autumn rice crop, which was then being harvested and the 1972 winter crop, which is only now being harvested. Because of the importation of food from Russia and China and relief efforts, there apparently was no starvation. When systematic US bombing of the North began in 1965, a civilian army of 200,000 men and women was formed to patrol the branches of the Red River for any ruptures in the dikes, whose destruction would threaten mass starvation.

Air attacks on the dike system would have to be combined with all-out bombing to prevent the import of sufficient foodstuffs overland from China. The Johnson administration gave serious consideration to just such a plan, based in part on the analysis of the Central Intelligence Agency, which said in January, 1967, "Bombing the levee system which keeps the Red River under control, if timed correctly, could cause large crop losses and force North Vietnam to import large amounts of rice. Depending on the success of the interdiction efforts, such imports might overload the transport system." But the military effects of such a policy, the CIA correctly observed, would be "limited and short-lived." Such proposals were rejected, and Secretary McNamara's memorandum of May 16, 1967 explained why: "There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and most of the world would not permit the United States to go," he wrote.

Although the systematic targeting of the Red River dikes and dams was ruled out, this did not mean that they were never hit. Attacks on dikes surrounding the city of Namdinh in 1966 were reported by *New York Times* correspondent

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Harrison Salisbury during his trip to the North. According to city officials, US planes dropped six bombs on a two-kilometer section of the dike on May 31 and again on July 14. As the water level of the Dao River continued to rise, American planes returned on July 20 and July 31 to hit the dikes repeatedly. The Pentagon responded to Salisbury's report by saying the real target was a transshipment facility in Namdinh, and that, in any case, "repairs would not be difficult and . . . accidental damage inflicted on it would not necessarily show up on later intelligence photography taken subsequent to repairs." Many such "accidents" occurred from 1965 through 1968, seemingly intended to force North Vietnam to divert manpower to repairing the damage. (In the case of Namdinh, the population worked for 20 straight days to repair the dike.)

Nevertheless, US bombing was not intended to cause major flooding in the Red River Delta. As we know from the Pentagon Papers, the joint chiefs were never satisfied with this restriction and pressed for both the removal of restraints on the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, "with the expected increase in civilian casualties to be accepted as militarily justified and necessary," and the systematic targeting of dikes and dams as well.

The precedent for striking flood control systems as "strategic targets" for the purpose of starving the enemy into submission was set near the end of the Korean War, when the US air force was authorized to destroy all North Korean irrigation dams. On May 13, 1953, 20 air force F-4s destroyed the Toksan irrigation dam, causing a flash flood which inundated 27 miles of valley farmlands. Two other dams were bombed for the same purpose; the remainder were scheduled for attack when the armistice intervened.

American memories are short. Only a few years before, the flooding of agricultural land by a Nazi enemy had been considered a heinous crime. The German high commissioner in Holland, Seyss-Inquart, who opened the dikes of that country at the end of 1944 and flooded approximately 500,000 acres of land, was hanged as a war criminal by the Nuremberg Tribunal—despite the fact that he stopped the flooding after being warned by the Allied High Command and agreed to help in relief efforts.

But that was a crime against white Europeans. In North Vietnam, as in North Korea, the distinction between military and civilian targets is barely perceptible. As marine Commandant Wallace M. Greene, Jr., testified before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee on October 23, 1967, "We are at war with North Vietnam right now . . . , and we shouldn't be so much interested in [the North Vietnamese people's] anger as we are in bringing the war home to every one of them up there." Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson was more blunt: "I put 'innocent civilians' in quotation marks," he said.

The joint chiefs, having lost in the previous administration, are now renewing pressures on the President to attack the dams and dikes. With the fear of direct Soviet and Chinese intervention receding, the Nixon administration may not be as constrained as its predecessor. At any rate, Mr. Nixon has publicly kept this option open. In Texas on April 30, he was asked about bombing the dams and dikes of North Vietnam. His answer, carefully phrased, could be interpreted both as a warning to Hanoi and a trial balloon at home. First he called the dikes and dams "strategic targets," indicating his acceptance of the joint chiefs' doctrine that they are legitimate targets. He went on to say that bombing the dikes and dams could cause "an enormous number of civilian casualties" and that this was something which "we need to avoid" and also "something we believe is not needed." But he did not rule out such attacks at some future time.

Twelve days later, after serious reversals had been suffered by the Saigon army, Hanoi radio reported that US bombers had knocked out a section of the dike protecting Hanoi from the waters of the Red River. *Nhan Dan*, the Lao Dong Party's newspaper, reported that flood control dikes in many areas of the country's four southern provinces had been hit. These breaks, which could presumably still be repaired in time to avoid flooding from the coming heavy rains, might have been accidents, but they might also have been intended to remind Hanoi that the dikes could be breached. If the President does choose to use this remaining option, he will move swiftly and secretly. Congress and the public would once again be faced with a *fait accompli*, and left once again, with nothing to do but express regrets. Those in Congress who want to prevent this crime would be well advised to raise the issue now—while there is still time.

[From *Le Monde*, June 7-8, 1972]

FLOODING THE NORTH

(By Yves Lacoste, geographer, professor at the University of Paris-VIII (Vincennes))

In an attempt to stem the total failure of American policy in Indochina, President Nixon has chosen once again to escalate. When it became apparent that bombing the South—and this with unprecedented violence—was not working to halt the collapse of “Vietnamization,” Nixon ordered the resumption of raids on the North and decided simultaneously on a series of actions which surpass anything his predecessors had dared to undertake. While many of these actions, such as the mining of the ports, have already been carried out, others are still “being considered.” And once again, as in 1966-67, The American aggressors are toying with the idea of destroying the Red River dike system.

If in his recent declarations President Nixon has excluded the possibility of recourse to nuclear arms, the risk of genocide by flooding is very much greater and imminent. American aviation can carry it off without Nixon's having to issue an explicit order.

During the coming week the dikes may break without having suffered direct attacks. To realise how this is possible some understanding of the bombing strategy as worked out by the Americans during the summers of 1965-66 is necessary. (These observations are based on hundreds of declarations of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and are compiled in a report which I edited in 1967 for the Russell Tribunal.)

Huge bombs are dropped, not directly on the dikes but at some distance from them on the alluvial crest over which the rivers flow. In this way, enormous hollows are produced which shock and weaken the base of the dike system and could cause the entire river's flow to spill out into the plain. This strategy has the “advantage” of apparently not touching the dikes and of being infinitely more destructive. It is completed by a series of steel pellet bomb attacks on the workers who have come to repair the damage.

To grasp the full horror of this menace, it is necessary to recall the basic geographical context: the Tonkin Plain, where the great majority of the population of the North is concentrated, is bordered by huge mountains which each spring receive enormous amounts of precipitation from the monsoon. Thus, the rivers which flow into the plain are characterized by powerful swellings during the summer months and carry along with them great quantities of alluvial deposits from the erosion of the mountain sides. This alluvial substance tends to settle on the plain, particularly on the river beds, which have thus been progressively built up over the centuries. The Red River flows then on a kind of mud crest, 5 or 6 meters above the level of the plain, which would be regularly submerged if the Vietnamese peasants had not built and constantly reinforced an entire network of dikes since the Middle Ages. Part of the network is erected directly on the alluvial crest, bordering the river bed and thus containing the periodic swellings; other dikes, running more or less perpendicular to those just described, form a rupture at any one point in the protective network. Finally, there are the coastal dikes designed to prevent the invasion of sea waters blown inward by typhoon winds. In other words, the more than 4,000 kilometers of dikes in all must be constantly reinforced to protect the crops and lives of some fifteen million people who live in the plain, which today groups some eight hundred inhabitants per square kilometer.

If the bombing simultaneously opened a series of breaches in this network (it is not necessary to destroy the entire network in order to obtain a nearly total submersion of the plain) during the period of river swellings (from June to October), it is highly likely that this catastrophe would cause more deaths than the explosion of several atomic bombs on the Tonkin Plain.

These sorts of actions were carried out repeatedly against the dikes during the summers of 1965-66-67. It is true that they were not followed by catastrophic floods. The point to these earlier raids was probably to allow American aviation to perfect its strategy against the dikes, as well as to threaten the population, rather than to try to provoke a major catastrophe.

The fact that these bombings were carried out at very specific moments would seem to be proof of their premeditated character: most of these raids took place just before a particularly violent swelling of the rivers—something which meteorologic observations can easily predict. The clearest example of this premeditated

intent is offered by the series of fourteen attacks against the coastal dikes in the Tien Lang and Vinh Bao districts (Haiphong region) from July 27 to 31, 1966. At this time the swelling of the river waters was combined with the pressure of sea waters being pushed towards the land by winds from the typhoon Ora; vast surfaces were submerged as a result of the attacks.

Today the difficulties of the American government in Indochina have become so overwhelming that we must begin to fear the worst. Even before the period of major river swelling American aviation has begun to attack the dike system e.g., the raids of April 24 against the River Ma which crosses the Thanh Hoa plain. Unlike the use of nuclear weapons where the responsibility would be too obvious, flooding the plains in the North can be caused indirectly and then attributed to a series of "natural accidents." Propaganda would then insinuate that the North Vietnamese ought to have attended to their dikes rather than engage in combat.

One cannot wait for another spectacular decision from the White House before beginning to protest. In effect the decision to flood the North has already been taken. In a few weeks time the period of the large swellings will have begun. We must make clear that *if the dikes break this summer in the North, the responsibility for this genocide falls directly on President Nixon, no less directly than if he had ordered a nuclear attack.*

[From the New York Times, June 26, 1972]

BOMBING THE DIKES (By Anthony Lewis)

LONDON, June 25—The Tonkin plain of North Vietnam is hemmed in by mountains to the north and west, the sea to the southeast. In the rainy season every summer vast amounts of water pour out of the mountains and down the rivers that lace the plain. The principal river gives its name to the area: the Red River Delta.

Over thousands of years peasants have made the delta habitable by building and maintaining an enormous system of dikes. There are nearly 2,000 miles of dikes on the plain, and more along the sea. Without them, it would be a desolate land of marsh and flood.

From the beginning of American intervention in the Vietnam war, some strategists have suggested bombing the dikes. Presidents have successively rejected each such proposal, on the ground that it would be an act of terror unworthy of the United States. At least that has been true until now.

Over the last month North Vietnam officials and diplomats have said repeatedly that American planes are bombing dikes. The charges have been extremely specific and detailed.

On May 26, for example, North Vietnam's Ministry of Water Conservancy listed in a statement 42 alleged raids on dikes in the Hanoi area and seven other provinces, giving dates and places. On June 22 in Paris, a North Vietnamese diplomat gave further details of asserted dike bombings, and shelling by American ships, and appealed to world opinion to stop it.

Even with all the details, the statements from North Vietnam could of course be just propaganda. But now, over the last few days, two pieces of evidence have come to hand that make it harder to dismiss the charge that the dikes are being deliberately attacked.

One item is a report from the correspondent of Agence France-Presse in Hanoi, Jean Thoraval. On June 24 he and some other foreign reporters visited Nam Dinh, a town sixty miles south of Hanoi. He found its textile mills and commercial center in ruins from bombing. Then he went to some of the dikes protecting Nam Dinh, about fourteen miles from town. He reported:

"One of the dikes was completely cut. Several were gutted, with gaps in the dike itself and hollows, evidently caused by bombs, alongside. Deep cracks were visible everywhere. The landscape was almost what one might have expected to find on the moon."

The second piece of evidence is a report from a highly reliable, non-Communist diplomatic source of information on North Vietnam. This source has concluded that "without doubt there is now systematic bombing of the dikes."

The rainy season is just under way in North Vietnam; the rivers usually rise toward the top of the dikes between July and September. No one should be in any doubt about what systematic destruction of the dikes at this time might mean. It would bring into play, justifiably for once, that much-abused word genocide.

Fifteen million people live on the Tonkin plain, one of the more densely populated areas of the world. Some would drown in floods if the dikes failed; many more would be in danger of starvation after flooding of the rice paddies.

After dinner at John Connally's ranch in Floresville, Tex., on April 30, President Nixon answered questions from other guests. One asked about the idea of bombing "dams" in North Vietnam. According to the official transcript, the President first rephrased the question to refer to "the dams and dikes." Then he said:

"Now, the problem that is raised with regard to dams or dikes is that, while it is a strategic target, and indirectly a military target, it would result in an enormous number of civilian casualties. That is something that we want to avoid. It is also something we believe is not needed."

That answer seemed at the time to be carefully calculated to alarm the North Vietnamese, to put more pressure on them to negotiate on American terms. While indicating that he wanted to avoid anything that would kill so many civilians, Mr. Nixon listed the dikes as "indirectly a military target." And by saying that bombing was "not needed" then, he logically left that step open if it ever were "needed."

Is the United States now systematically bombing the dikes of North Vietnam? Americans know from experience that such things can happen without a President informing the public—or even without the President knowing. Those American officials or members of Congress who care about the possibility of causing mass civilian deaths in North Vietnam might want to ask.

ABC TELEVISION JUNE 30, 1972

Ted Koppel, ABC News, Washington, D.C.:

"There is also some question about other facts presented by the President last night. He denied reports that U.S. planes have bombed North Vietnamese dikes, dams and other civilian targets. That statement was challenged today by the Swedish Ambassador to Hanoi, who was among a group of foreign diplomats taken on a tour of the Red River area last Sunday.

"Other diplomats on that tour were contacted by ABC news through various embassies here in Washington. We were provided with the following details: two bomb craters at the Phu Ly dike. The main water sluice is jammed in a half-open position by bomb damage; the dike itself has major cracks in three places. Eight direct hits on the Mim Chan water sluice and dike. Four sections of the dike, totally destroyed. Again, according to foreign diplomats, a 2-square-mile area of workers' homes around a textile plant in the provincial capital of Nam Dinh, has been completely flattened by the U.S. bombs.

"Almost by definition, diplomats accredited to Hanoi are less than sympathetic to the U.S. position in Viet Nam; but the similarity in reports from a variety of sources has raised questions that could deserve a more complete answer from the Nixon Administration."

[From the New York Times, July 1, 1972]

MUST CARTHAGE BE DESTROYED?

(By David Marr*)

WASHINGTON.—If there is a cardinal principle among what we loosely call the laws of war, it is that one antagonist does not have the right to wreak Carthaginian peace upon the other. In other words, to try to force the enemy to give in by methodically devastating his land, his crops, his people is now regarded as barbaric and deserving of punishment.

Already a case can be made against those responsible for the systematic bombing, shelling and defoliation of rural South Vietnam. Now, however, we see a series of events developing around the intricate dike system of North Vietnam that is potentially even more sinister and destructive.

Surely it won't happen, we all say with an incredulous gasp. After all, we know from the Pentagon Papers that although the generals in 1966-67 con-

*David Marr, assistant professor of Vietnamese studies at Cornell University and director of the Indochina Resource Center in Washington, is author of "Vietnamese Anti-colonialism." He served as a Marine Corps intelligence officer for five years.

templated full-scale breaching of the North Vietnamese dikes, the idea was eventually rejected by Robert McNamara. And while American aircraft did indeed drop bombs on the dikes during the Johnson period, as confirmed by Western witnesses, such attacks apparently did not aim at initiating a general flood.

The simple fact is that if the right time and right target coordinates are selected, U.S. aircraft can inundate North Vietnam's entire alluvial plain in a matter of 48 hours. The "right" time, of course, is during the heavy monsoon rains of July-September, and sophisticated meteorological intelligence can even establish the precise day when water will be rushing highest and hardest against the dikes. The optimum targets are sluice gates, dams and canal junctures. According to Vietnamese sources, precisely these locations have been the object of regular U.S. photo reconnaissance in recent months. New "smart" bombs would make the operation quite surgical, and no amount of public outcry after the fact would do a bit of good.

How then explain Hanoi's assertion that up to 700 bombs have damaged more than thirty specific segments of dike in the past three months? Some of this may be exaggeration, but not much, since North Vietnam knows that the Pentagon could simply distribute aerial photographs of the same areas to counter any gross misrepresentations. Some hits may have been accidental, and still others due to the macabre whims of individual pilots. But that would still leave hundreds of craters to account for.

President Nixon in his Thursday press conference said that bombing reports of the Swedish Ambassador and others were "inaccurate," but he did not repudiate them entirely. Also, the President's statement that he had not approved orders for bombing dikes needs to be put in the context of a greatly loosened targeting procedure whereby Air Force generals up to now have been given much more operational leeway than was the case in previous years. For example, rather than baldly list "dikes" as a target, it might be more convenient for the moment to subsume them under "interdiction of communications" or "elimination of power supplies."

French and Vietnamese observers have speculated that bombing on or close to the dikes is designed to seriously weaken them. Thus if and when they collapse the Pentagon can picture it to the world as a natural disaster. Somehow, however, this appears too ambivalent for the mood of the Joint Chiefs these days; it probably overrates their interest in world opinion.

I think there are two much simpler explanations. Tactically, the generals are hoping to force Hanoi's leaders to divert tens of thousands of workers, hundreds of trucks and bulldozers away from repairing roads and rail lines and toward frantic patching up of the dikes. Strategically, the Administration is sending a grim diplomatic signal to North Vietnam: either change your ways, or during peak water flow—now only weeks away—we may blast open the dikes once and for all.

Fifteen million people reside within areas vulnerable to such threats. Our recent East Coast floods pale in comparison. The North Vietnamese areas are totally flat and hence liable to total inundation for months after the initial surge. Tens of thousands might be drowned in the Hanoi area alone, where the U.S. Army Handbook on Vietnam ominously points out that even the floor of the river lies above surrounding terrain, and dikes have to be built forty feet high. More serious indirect losses might well occur among the rural people, since the water would have to drain off gradually of its own accord. Meanwhile they would be without homes, their livestock dead, their crops ruined.

Is the President as Commander in Chief really prepared to join his Roman predecessors in invoking such a peace of the dead? Like other Americans these days I hold my breath and say, "I hope not."

[From the New York Times, July 10, 1972]

"THE DIKES ARE BEING HIT"

TO THE EDITOR:

A June 23 dispatch in The Times gives the impression that we at Project Air War do not believe that the United States is frequently bombing locks and dams in North Vietnam. In fact, we are convinced that in all likelihood the North's irrigation system is presently being bombed.

It must be noted that:

Jean Thoraval of the semi-official Agence France-Presse reported on June 24 that he visited dike sectors near the city of Namdinh which had just been bombed, and on June 30 he filed a similar report concerning dikes around Phuly. Erik Erikson, a Swedish journalist, has recently returned from Hanoi with photographs and film of bombed-out dike sections and numerous bomb craters around dams with no other buildings anywhere nearby.

There is well-documented evidence of bombing of the dikes during the 1965-68 period: reports by Times correspondent Harrison Salisbury in 1966 of attacks against dikes around Nam-dinh; an eye-witness report of attacks on Red River Valley dikes in an Associated Press dispatch dated Sept. 8, 1967; the revelation in the Pentagon Papers that eight locks and dams had been targeted, one heavily damaged, as early as January 1966.

The Pentagon Papers reveal that the military favors bombing the dikes, presumably because it is tactically useful in diverting manpower to repair crews and strategically desirable as a means of forcing Hanoi to capitulate because of the threat of flooding and mass starvation. The Pentagon announced on May 24 that it will bomb "any" target it deems relevant to Hanoi's war effort. We are engaged in a massive bombing campaign, including strikes against population centers in the Red River Valley. Military commanders in the field now have a freer hand from Washington than under President Johnson. This all makes it far more likely than not that dams are being struck.

The question of whether or not dikes are deliberately targeted on paper may be somewhat beside the point. Our research has indicated that particularly sensitive targets are often not officially designated as such on paper, perhaps for fear of possible political repercussions if revealed.

North Vietnam's fragile dike system in the Red River Valley protects a population of nearly ten million people. The rains will reach a peak in the next few months. Destruction of part or all of the dike system could mean drowning or starvation for hundreds of thousands of peasants.

Only time will tell whether dikes are being struck due to pilot error, the massive nature of the bombing campaign which makes such strikes inevitable, or deliberate targeting.

In the meantime, however, all indications are that they are being hit and that only the strongest sort of public protest will prevent even greater attacks in the months to come. It took two years and Harrison Salisbury's trip to Hanoi to reveal to the world that the Johnson Administration was bombing far more than purely "military" targets, as it was claiming back in 1966. We cannot afford to wait that long this time.

FRED BRANFMAN,
Director, Project Air War.

WASHINGTON, July 5, 1972.

[From the Washington Post, July 11, 1972]

HANOI'S RED RIVER DIKES CALLED UNDERPINNING OF NATION'S LIFE

(By George McArthur)

SAIGON, July 10—The bombing of the dikes in North Vietnam—now being claimed by Hanoi and hotly denied by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird—has never been advocated by any of the ranking U.S. officials who have served in Vietnam.

From Gen. William C. Westmoreland to the current commander, Gen. Frederick Wey and, they have all denied any such intention. Privately, the military commanders and U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker have recognized that such a campaign would risk enormous civilian casualties and set off justifiable outcries around the world.

While lower ranking officers have sometimes spoken of such bombings, official sources say such proposals have never been given any consideration.

The reluctance to consider bombing the dikes is based on the knowledge that these massive structures are literally the underpinning of life in North Vietnam.

IMPORTANCE IS PARAMOUNT

While most people might conceive of dikes as more or less ordinary construction efforts to control errant rivers, the dikes of North Vietnam are far more important.

They moved historian Joseph Buttinger to write, "They rise above the flat lands of the delta in higher praise of man than the pyramids along the Nile—true ramparts of civilization, if anything ever deserved such a name."

Visitors to North Vietnam are invariably awed by the dikes along the Red River and its tributaries. In recent months, trips along the river have been forbidden to most if not all outsiders, according to those who have visited the North.

In 1954, before the partition of Vietnam, the dikes along the Red River extended more than 1,600 miles. Under the Communist regime they have been extended and enlarged, but there are no official figures. The most important dikes, of course, are those which flank the Red River itself.

Prewar population figures show that some 6 million people live in the Red River Delta. In some areas, the population density is one thousand per square mile.

Since the beginning of Vietnamese history perhaps 2,000 years ago, these people have been dependent on the river and have labored to enlarge and strengthen the very dikes which stand today.

In Vietnamese, the Red River is often called simply the Great River (Song Cai). The reason is clear: Buttinger's history notes that the Red River carries twice the average volume of the Rhone in a bed far narrower.

GREAT FLOW VARIATION

The flow variation between dry and wet season can be as much as 40 times the low of 844 cubic feet per second. During severe floods * * * the entire delta is well below the rivers high water mark. Parts of Hanoi are as much as 25 feet below the high water mark.

As Buttinger noted, only a "Promethean reaction against the cruel heavens" could insure survival in the Red River Delta, and this reaction was the building of a system of dikes surpassing that known anywhere else in the world.

"The Red River now flows through the delta between two gigantic dikes, suspended, as it were, above a watchful and apprehensive population."

Some of these dikes measure 80 to 100 feet at their base. The surface is used for major roadways paralleling the river and extending on over only slightly lesser dikes to the north and south. Some of these are defended by anti-aircraft guns.

Last Thursday in Washington, Laird said that some of the dikes may have suffered damage from air strikes directed at convoys on the roads or anti-aircraft guns positioned on the dikes. But he said that the dikes have never been bombing targets.

Laird raised the possibility that Hanoi radio was engaging in a propaganda campaign "to relieve themselves from the responsibility with their own people for the failure to adequately this system since the major flooding last year."

At the time, Hanoi admitted that those floods were the most severe in more than a century. The transportation system of the whole country was disrupted. Hanoi radio carried repeated broadcasts exhorting the river dwellers to greater work on the dikes and Communist Party dignitaries were photographed toiling alongside ordinary peasants to repair the damage.

The floods lasted approximately six weeks and struck in August and September. The flood season is once again approaching, and should the floods approach anything like the level of one year ago, the dikes in many areas might not sustain the pressures of two such successive years.

[From the New York Times, July 14, 1972]

DIKES IN HANOI AREA REPRESENT 2,000-YEAR EFFORT TO TAME RIVERS

(By Seymour M. Hersh)

WASHINGTON, July 13.—For more than 2,000 years the peasants of northern Vietnam have been locked in unending battle against nature, trying to stem and control the annual high waters of the Red River with an intricate system of dikes.

The river, spawned in the mountains of Yunnan Province in southern China and fed by monsoon rains, races through narrow gorges in its annual summer drive to spill along the vast and fertile plains of the Red River Delta, where more than 15 million Vietnamese live and farm.

The terrain along the 300-mile route from China to the rich farmlands can most simply be described as a huge drainboard, tilted down from northwest to southeast.

To meet the crest of the Red River and its tributaries, which usually peak between July and late September, Vietnamese societies have constructed about 2,500 miles of earthen dikes with sluice-gates and dams. It is this system that the Hanoi Government charges is under United States aerial attack.

MENTIONED IN 11TH CENTURY

The first written mention of the elaborate system is in Chinese chronicles of the early 11th century. Some Vietnamese scholars also have found archeological evidence of dikes as far back as the second century.

The dikes have been expanded in length perhaps 50 percent in the last 20 years and have also grown in width and height, vastly complicating the problems of maintenance and control. The growth is constant because the Red River carries along millions of tons of silt that are deposited in the river bed.

In other areas, particularly in the rice-growing regions near Hanoi, the river flows on its own progressively rising mud bed that is often five or six feet above the level of the fields. A similar situation exists in areas along the Yellow River in China.

Working on the dikes and repairing them is a constant preoccupation of the North Vietnamese. During a visit by this correspondent to Hanoi in mid-March, hundreds of workers—often led by military men—seemed to be constantly hauling earth to reinforce the vast system near Hanoi.

At that point, as in many parts of North Vietnam, there were actually two separate networks of dikes roughly a quarter of a mile apart. The purpose obviously was to provide a back-up system.

The pressure on the dikes at the height of the flood season is immense. Specific data on the flow of the Red River near Hanoi was impossible to obtain, but last month *Le Monde*, the Paris newspaper, published a dispatch predicting that the flow of the Black River, a main tributary, would reach 32,500 cubic meters a second at Sontay, about 25 miles northwest of Hanoi (a cubic meter is about 35 cubic feet). The dispatch also noted that the peak flow of the Seine in Paris during the floods there in 1910 was 2,500 cubic meters a second.

In addition to the river system there are a number of sea dikes to prevent the seepage of brackish water from the Gulf of Tonkin into crop-growing areas. North Vietnam also has charged that these sea dikes have been bombed by United States aircraft.

FLOOD LAST YEAR RECALLED

Many experts believe that the river dike system northwest of Hanoi is highly vulnerable to bombing attacks. Last year flood waters broke through a 30-mile section of the dikes in the delta and destroyed much of the 1971 autumn rice crop.

The flooding, which forced North Vietnam to import food from the Soviet Union and China, was described as the worst since 1944. In that year the dikes along the Red River were breached in 25 areas and thousands of acres of rice were destroyed.

The repeated North Vietnamese charges of bombing of dikes have been buttressed in recent weeks by a number of news dispatches from Hanoi filed by Jean Thoraval, the resident correspondent there for Agence France-Presse.

Until recently most Administration spokesmen in Washington generally denied that dikes had been chosen as targets or inadvertently bombed. An Air Force general, asked in mid-June whether some dikes could have been accidentally struck, said, "Anything is possible, but I think it's highly improbable."

The official United States position was modified by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in a news conference last Thursday.

"Some of the dikes and dams may be on roadways that are being used or they may be in a position where anti-aircraft weaponry is placed and, of course, our pilots are given the opportunity and they should have this capability to attack North Vietnamese gun emplacements."

Mr. Laird went on to say, however, that "the real damage to the dams and dikes of North Vietnam is the damage that was suffered in weakening those dams and dikes last year during the very, very heavy flooding of North Vietnam."

"I believe," he went on, "that the North Vietnamese are carrying on this campaign in order for them to relieve themselves from the responsibility with their

own people for their failure to adequately repair this system since the major flooding of last year."

State Department analysts have said that major flooding is expected again this year and characterize the wave of North Vietnamese complaints as a propaganda war.

For its part, North Vietnam has repeatedly charged that the United States has been bombing the dike systems for the last three months "in a very wicked design—to destroy or weaken dikes and, thereby, to cause floods."

[From the New York Times, July 16, 1972]

VIETNAM: HOW TO BOMB A DIKE BUT NOT TARGET IT

(By Seymour Hersh)

WASHINGTON—Ever since the American air campaign over North Vietnam was resumed early in April, Hanoi had been charging—and Washington had been denying—that the North's highly vulnerable river-dike system was being bombed. By the end of last month the controversy had swelled into an international propaganda war, with some Hanoi-based journalists and diplomats reporting that the dikes were indeed being hit by bombs.

Last week, the United States Government took a new tack. Military and civilian officials acknowledged that targets such as mobile antiaircraft missile units and roads were being bombed even if they were on top of dikes or other parts of the North Vietnamese irrigation system.

"We're not targeting the dikes," one senior Navy officer said. "But if a SAM [surface-to-air missile] is a threat to you, you're certainly entitled to protect yourself." Another military source said, "A military target is targeted, and if it happens to be near a dike, then it gets hit."

The incident that brought the controversy to the fore last week began at about 6 A.M. Tuesday near the city of Namsach, a rice-growing area about 35 miles south of Hanoi in the fertile and heavily populated Red River delta. A flight of Navy aircraft, ignoring two or three SAM missiles fired in defense, began dropping bombs throughout the region.

To Jean Thoraval, a Hanoi-based correspondent of the French news agency, Agence France-Presse, who had been taken on a routine inspection trip to the area, some of the bombs appeared to be deliberately aimed at the dike on which he and other foreign journalists were standing. Other bombs, he reported in a dispatch, appeared to be dropped almost at random.

The Pentagon looked into the matter and reported that the aircraft had three basic targets in the area—a SAM missile site, some dispersed oil barrels and an above-the-ground fuel pipeline. The Pentagon did not rule out the possibility that the dike had, in fact, been hit. But, a senior Defense spokesman said, "You can be sure nobody told him [Mr. Thoraval] that there was a pipeline or a SAM site there."

It is hard to know how many similar incidents take place every day in North Vietnam. One complicating factor, in the military view, is the sheer number of dikes, dams, and other irrigation facilities in the North. The dike system, which is more than 2,000 years old, sprawls across 2,500 miles. Much of it is built to contain the fast-flowing Red River, which, at the height of the summer monsoon between July and September, attains a flow of more than 30,000 cubic feet of water per second. And much of northern-central part of North Vietnam lies below the bed of the Red River. Hence the huge earthen dikes throughout the North.

Last year a portion of the dike system along the Red River broke during the monsoon, and flooding wiped out much of the autumn rice crop. An even worse flood 25 years ago brought death through starvation to an estimated 2 million Vietnamese.

Some experts here believe that serious flooding would force North Vietnam to reduce its war effort. In 1967 the Johnson Administration weighed the possibility of bombing the dam and dike system. The option was rejected by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara. In a memorandum that was part of the published portion of the "Penatgon Papers," Mr. McNamara wrote, "There may be a limit beyond which many Americans and most of the world would not permit the United States to go."

Concern over the bombing of the dikes came up several times during the Democratic National Convention; it could develop into an issue in the Presidential campaign.

[From the New York Times, July 21, 1972]

BLAKE CHARGES DELIBERATE U.S. BOMBING OF DIKES—HEAD OF COUNCIL OF CHURCHES WRITES LETTER TO NIXON; URGES PRESIDENT TO CEASE THE ATTACKS IMMEDIATELY

GENEVA, July 20—The Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, Secretary General of the World Council of Churches, has written President Nixon that he believes that United States planes are deliberately bombing dikes in North Vietnam.

In a letter dated last Monday, the Secretary General of the council of 250 Protestant and Orthodox churches addressed an "urgent appeal" to the President to "use your authority as Commander in Chief of the military forces of the U.S.A. immediately to cease this bombing."

He further requested Mr. Nixon to "stop the bombing in the region of the dikes in order that the people of North Vietnam can make the urgent, necessary repairs to avoid a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions."

COMMENTS ON LETTER

Commenting on the letter in an interview, Dr. Blake, former head of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States, said he had "no other evidence" of the alleged bombings than the report by a French newsman and Swedish television films that he cited in his appeal to the President.

But he added that because of the low credibility that could be accorded the denials of "low-level spokesmen" in the Defense Department in Washington, council officials were alarmed by the growing number of rumors about the bombings that they were hearing in Western Europe.

"The nature of the widespread rumors reminds me of other occasions when reports first denied by the Defense Department were later admitted as true," Dr. Blake said.

Dr. Blake made the letter public today because, he wrote the President, "I feel conscience-bound to publish at the time you receive it since publicity is the only channel left to me."

The churchman noted that last April he requested a meeting with President Nixon on behalf of a group of American church figures to "discuss the moral issues involved in the Vietnam war."

"As of today," he continued, "there is no indication of your willingness to discuss these matters with ecumenical leaders of your own country."

Dr. Blake wrote that he was raising an "issue of supreme urgency and moral import" because of the council's alarm over allegations that the United States military was seeking to destroy the dikes "both by bombing and artificially induced rainfall."

The allegations are difficult to believe, the church leader commented, "since the magnitude of the human suffering which major ruptures in these dikes would provoke is almost unbelievable."

DISCOUNTS NEGLECT

Nevertheless, Dr. Blake said that "in-depth inquiries with Western Europeans who have personally witnessed the situation since late June" had led to the conclusion that "the American explanation that the present weakness of the dikes is due to neglect by the population is untrue" and that "American protests that no intentional bombing has occurred and that only 'accidental' bombs have fallen on or near the dikes must also be untrue."

In rejecting United States denials of deliberate bombing of dikes, Dr. Blake cited the report of Jean Thoraval, a French newsman stationed in Hanoi for Agence France-Presse, that he and other foreign journalists had witnessed direct bombing of dikes by United States planes on July 11.

This report was disputed by Daniel Henkin, United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, in a statement supplied to The New York Times

But Dr. Blake also said that Swedish television films made in late June "show serious bomb damage done to dikes" some five days before the filming.

[From American Report, Aug. 4, 1972]

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

MR. PRESIDENT:

You may recall that on April 26, I requested a meeting with you on behalf of a small group of leading American ecumenical figures to discuss the moral issues involved in the Viet Nam war. Though I stated then that we would be willing to adjust our schedules to meet with you at your convenience during the week beginning May 7, I received a negative reply from your assistant, Mr. Parker, only on May 10.

Subsequent correspondence from Mr. Parker (May 24) and Dr. McLaughlin, your deputy assistant for church affairs (June 29), assured me that you still had such a meeting under "active consideration." As of today there is no indication of your willingness to discuss these matter with ecumenical leaders of your own country.

This obliges me to address you through a letter which I feel conscience-bound to publish at the time you receive it since publicity is the only channel left to me. The private conversation we have sought for three months has not taken place.

I do not now intend to repeat what I stated publicly together with seven American church leaders at St. John's Church, Washington, D.C., on May 11. Here I raise with you only one issue of supreme urgency and moral import.

For some weeks my colleagues in the World Council of Churches and I have been alarmed by the ever more frequent allegations that the U.S. military is pursuing a policy of intentional destruction of dikes in North Viet Nam both by bombing and artificially induced rainfall. The aim, it has been alleged, is so to weaken the North Vietnamese dike system so as to provoke a "natural" disaster.

I admit that it is difficult to give credibility to such allegations, since the magnitude of the human suffering which major ruptures in these dikes would provoke is almost unthinkable. Of the 18,000,000 inhabitants of that country, more than 10,000,000 live in areas protected by the fluvial and maritime dikes.

It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000 lives would be immediately lost if the violent floods which threaten the region each rainy season were not contained. Many millions more would be left homeless, without food, and exposed to the diseases which ravage flood areas with the result of still more thousands of civilian deaths.

In recent days we have made in-depth inquiries with Western Europeans who have personally witnessed the situation since late June, and are forced to conclude that:

The American explanation that the present weakness of the dikes is due to neglect by the population is untrue. Millions of cubic yards of earth have been added to the dikes to reinforce them in past months, work which has taken place under the most difficult war conditions. Some of these dikes have existed for thousands of years, and the Vietnamese are aware that their very existence as a nation depends on the maintenance of this protection.

The American protests that no intentional bombing has occurred, and that only "accidental" bombs have fallen on or near the dikes must also be untrue. Mr. Jean Thoraval, correspondent of Agence France-Presse reported (*Le Monde*, July 12, 1972) that he and other foreign journalists witnessed on July 11, repeated direct bombings by U.S. aircraft of the dikes they were then inspecting. Swedish television films made in late June show serious bomb damage done to dikes some five days prior to their visit.

I am therefore forced to conclude that intentional bombing of dikes must be taking place, and make an urgent appeal to you to use your authority as Commander in Chief of the Military Forces of the U.S.A. immediately to cease this bombing. I further request that you stop the bombing in the region of the dikes in order that the people of North Viet Nam can make the urgent, necessary repairs to avoid a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions.

Respectfully yours,

EUGENE C. BLAKE,
General Secretary, World Council of Churches.

[From the Washington Post, July 20, 1972]

HANOI UNDER SIEGE

(By Joseph Kraft)

HANOI—I was interviewing Tran Lam, the director of radio and television in North Vietnam when American planes bombed this capital city on the morning of July 8. We went down to one of the city's air raid shelters that have been hotter than the black hole of Calcutta, and, since the power had been temporarily turned off at least as black.

In a desperate effort to keep cool, Mr. Lam produced a pocket fan and began waving it in front of his face. "Nixon", "may be able to knock out our power plants, but he can't do anything about our fans".

That bitter-sweet comment summarizes the impact of the bombing of North Vietnam as conducted first by President Johnson and more recently, during my visit, by President Nixon. The central fact is that life in North Vietnam is so much at the level of pocket fans that the country is virtually invulnerable to weapons designed for use against power plants.

To be sure the bombing has done terrible damage to the basic infrastructure of this country which has a bearing on the Communist war effort in South Vietnam. Hundreds of rail and road bridges linking major towns with each other and the southern front have been cut. Factories in any way useful to the war effort—for instance the textile works at Namdinh have been leveled. The port of Haiphong which I visited has been bombed to the point where it resembles a lunar landscape.

But life and the war effort go on, and at a pretty effective clip. I have seen dozens of cases where destroyed bridges have been replaced by ferries or pontoon bridges. "We are probably better at building pontoon bridges than anybody else in the world," a local editor boasted to me.

I have also repeatedly seen steady streams of trucks, buses, cars, and bicycles moving along the roads linking Hanoi with Haiphong and the military front. I have seen several freight trains pulled by steam locomotives moving along tracks leading east from the capital city to Haiphong and south to the front.

Gasoline remains so abundant that it is not rationed. Food and other basic requirements seem plentiful. In one department store I visited there was an oversupply of shoes and the price had been cut from roughly \$5 a pair to \$3. At the markets there seems to be lots of fruit, dried fish, vegetables, noodles and rice. Ducks are in season and I saw several hundred being sold at what I was told was a relatively low price—about 30 cents per pound.

But if the bombing does not cripple the country, it inspires the kind of wrath that knits people together. I have seen with my own eyes the damage done by American bombs to homes, schools, stores and many innocent people.

I have seen bits of burned clothing hanging grotesquely from the remains of what were trees standing near bombed out homes. I have seen pieces of what were human beings, including a charred lower jaw. I have seen an old man standing, in the ruins of his devastated home mourning the loss of his wife, his only son, and his grandson and vowing, as he shook his fist to the heaven that his heart would always be "hardened with hatred" against the Americans.

Then there is the matter of the dikes which are central to flood control at the end of the rainy season next month and to the prevention of drought in the dry season thereafter. There is no doubt that the dikes have been hit by American bombs. I have seen with my own eyes two undoubted examples of such hits. Indeed, given the number of American sorties (about 200 per day recently) and the extent of the dikes (about 2000 miles) it would be remarkable if there were not some hits on the dikes.

The end result of all this is a particularly grim kind of determination. The North Vietnamese have become convinced that fighting for them is a matter of life or death; that they have no alternative. They believe that if they keep fighting they will prevail—no matter what the cost.

As one of them put it: "Nixon has only two cards left to play—wiping out Hanoi and destroying the dikes. After that he is through".

[From the Washington Post, July 23, 1972]

WALDHEIM URGES U.S. TO AVOID DIKES

Moscow—U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim said yesterday he was concerned about reports that U.S. aircraft have been bombing dikes in North Vietnam. He said thousands would die if such bombings were carried out.

"I firmly hope and appeal that this will be avoided," Waldheim told a news conference at the end of a six-day official mission to the Soviet Union.

Waldheim said he did not know whether reports that bombs had hit the dikes were true, and noted that the United States had denied bombing them deliberately.

[From the New York Times, July 23, 1972]

WALDHEIM VOICES WORRY ON DIKES—ENDING SOVIET VISIT, TAKES NOTE OF BOMBING CHARGES

(By Theodore Shabad)

Moscow, July 22—Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations ended a week's visit to the Soviet Union today after having expressed concern over allegations that the United States was bombing dikes in North Vietnam.

In answer to a question at the news conference, held in the press center of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Secretary General said he was concerned about reports that dikes in the densely populated Tonkin delta had been struck in United States bombings.

"If the dikes are bombed, then the plain will be flooded and this will lead to disaster and death," Mr. Waldheim said. "I hope this will be avoided."

United States officials have denied that dikes and dams in North Vietnam have been deliberately bombed, as asserted by Hanoi, although accidental strikes could not be ruled out, the North Vietnamese charges have received wide publicity in the Soviet press.

[From the Washington Post, July 22, 1972]

HANOI HARVEST EFFORTS BLAMED FOR TROUBLES IN SOUTH

(By Lydia Giles)

LONDON—One of the important reasons North Vietnam has failed to resist the present South Vietnamese offensive is the northern harvest—for the past few weeks, all available North Vietnamese labor has been pressed, night and day, into bringing in the spring rice crop and getting the fields ready for the larger second crop, harvested at the end of the year.

Until these jobs are completed, Hanoi may well be reluctant to spare the reinforcements likely to be needed for any new push in the south.

The North Vietnamese press has complained that the harvest is proceeding too slowly. Conditions have been greatly complicated by the bombing and the arrival of large numbers of evacuees in the countryside, even though the refugees are proving to be a valuable source of extra agricultural manpower.

By now the rice must be nearly in. It can be supplemented by stockpiled food from China and the Soviet Union and by rice seized by Communist troops in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

If the crop is reasonably good, it should see both North Vietnam and its army through to the autumn—but not, as the government has emphasized, without stringent economy and rigorous control of grain stocks.

Rarely have the results of a harvest been more important, even in North Vietnam where food supplies are a perpetual problem.

The North Vietnamese are being left in little doubt that harder times may lie ahead. Hanoi has stressed that "Every inch of land where food crops can be cultivated must be fully devoted to food production."

There were similar government pleas between 1965 and 1968. But now the American blockade of North Vietnamese ports and heavier, more accurate air attacks on communications mean that Hanoi can no longer, count on regular shipments of grain from its Communist allies. In spite of immense efforts over the last few years to step up agricultural production, to cultivate new land, to diversify crops and to make more use of high-yield rice strains, North Vietnam has still been forced to import some 50,000 to 65,000 tons of food a month.

These figures shot up at the end of last year. The autumn harvest in 1970 was good and 1971 started promisingly with a spring rice crop claimed to be 500,000 tons above average.

But in the late summer, the worst floods for a century caused widespread damage to livestock, communications and property and what the government described as "serious losses" to the main rice crop of the year. Thousands of acres of transplanted seedlings were lost.

According to American estimates, North Vietnam's food imports went up from 15 per cent to 25 per cent of its total requirements.

Hanoi must hope that the present harvest will be good enough to help North Vietnam recoup some of last autumn's losses.

It has already made extensive efforts to persuade the peasants to break with tradition, plant more land with spring rice and reduce the country's dependence on the second crop which in its turn depends on North Vietnam's freakish weather conditions. Floods in late summer, drought in the autumn are not uncommon.

It is in this context that Hanoi's accusations of American attacks on the country's complex system of dikes should be seen. The volume of water in the Red River, which irrigates the delta ricefields where most of the population is concentrated, can increase by 30 times during the height of the flood season, from June to October.

Hanoi itself is about 20 feet below river level. In the North Vietnamese lowlands, large dikes control the rivers and channel water into irrigation canals, smaller ones protect and retain water in the ricefields and a further system provides sea defenses.

Hanoi maintains—and the U.S. denies—that bombing has already inflicted extensive and deliberate damage on the dikes.

In part, of course, such claims are aimed at world opinion: The North Vietnamese have not failed to point out that the Germans World War II governor general of Holland was tried at Nuremberg for crimes which included the destruction of Holland's sea defenses.

Now that the rains have begun, the threat of bombing is also a way of encouraging the North Vietnamese people to work harder on an irrigation system which needs constant labor and vigilance in any circumstances.

Hanoi cannot rule out the possibility of a calculated attack. Its fears must be reinforced by the U.S. experiment with induced rainfall as a weapon in Vietnam.

Unintentional damage to the irrigation system is also far from unlikely: There are some 2,500 miles of major dikes, while traffic on the waterways is an important U.S. target. However accurate the bombing is, it is inconceivable that North Vietnam's flood defenses can escape completely unscathed.

At the beginning of this year, a three-month campaign to strengthen the dikes was launched.

Newspapers reported that thousands of laborers—15,000 in the Hanoi area alone—were hard at work. Many were students and their teachers. Classes were organized at worksites.

Since the bombing began in earnest, editorials have stressed the need for night-and-day patrols to inspect the dikes and for careful weather watching.

What particularly disturbs the North Vietnamese is that this year, either floods—will be extremely hard to control. Power stations have been high on the U.S. list of targets.

On June 7, an editorial in Nhan Dan, the Communist Party newspaper, summed up Hanoi's message to its agricultural workers: Carry out normal plans, but foresee all circumstances and prepare for the worst.

For its part, the government seems determined to tighten its control over grain supplies and particularly to prevent the crop being harvested from slipping into new hoarders' hands or onto the free market.

Too much of last year's successful spring crop vanished in cooperative celebrations or into illicit rice alcohol. And in spite of raising the prices on rice in 1970, the government has found it hard to persuade the peasants to sell more than the obligatory minimum of grain to the state.

Prime Minister Pham Van Dong has issued strict instructions on grain procurement and ordered party organizations at district level to send cadres out to supervise cooperatives where "Grain management still leaves much to be desired."

The trouble is that unless the government is able to lay hands on a larger share of the country's agricultural produce, North Vietnamese in the cities and away from the main rice-growing areas face far harsher living conditions than the peasants in the cooperatives.

But with North Vietnam's communications disrupted by bombing and its population scattered, the country's leaders are not likely to find the problems of acquiring food and distributing it any more manageable than in the past.

[From the Washington Post, July 25, 1972]

U.N. CHIEF SAYS U.S. HITS DIKES

UNITED NATIONS, July 24—U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim said today that he had "private and unofficial" information from Hanoi that the U.S. was bombing the dikes of North Vietnam—and appealed to Washington to stop it.

Without directly challenging the Nixon administration position that the U.S. is avoiding deliberate targeting intended to damage the dikes, Waldheim cited reports of damage, intentional or not.

He appealed to the U.S. to "avoid this kind of action, which could lead to enormous disaster and enormous human suffering. Thousands and thousands of persons would die. This has to be avoided."

The secretary general's statement, made at a press conference here on the day of his return to work after a three-week trip to Geneva, Vienna, Poland and the Soviet Union, touched a nerve of extreme sensitivity in Washington.

Secretary of State Rogers reacted with a statement that "we cannot consider helpful any public statements giving further currency to these reports."

U.N. Ambassador George Bush, who was in Washington today, flew back on instructions from Rogers to meet Waldheim this evening. Rogers said Bush would point out "again" that "the information Waldheim has received regarding alleged deliberate bombing to damage dikes in North Vietnam is false, as the President said in his June 29 press conference."

The allegations, said Rogers, are "part of a carefully planned campaign by North Vietnam and its supporters to give worldwide circulation to this falsehood."

State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray told reporters that Ambassador Bush had seen Waldheim before his departure for Moscow and told him that it was not U.S. policy to damage the dike system deliberately.

"What we're being subjected to," said Bray, "is a classic and neatly executed propaganda campaign which, interestingly enough, is greatly muted within North Vietnam itself."

Bray said that in North Vietnam the major thrust of information given to the public concerns the need to repair damage done to the dikes during last year's heavy flooding.

Waldheim, in his press conference, was careful to disclaim any information that bomb damage to the dikes was "intentional." Intentional or not, he said, his information from "private channels to Hanoi—and this is Hanoi information—is that dikes were bombed, and also explosions nearby caused cracks in the dams and produced the same results as if the dikes were bombed directly."

Waldheim's statement, even if it is not regarded by Washington as a challenge to Nixon administration credibility, is still viewed as an attack on those actions the United States admits that it is taking—sorties against military targets on or near the North Vietnamese complex of dikes.

As such, it is regarded by diplomats here, including Americans, as sure to damage the already tense relationship between Washington and the United Nations. Referring to the congressional threat to cut U.S. contributions to the U.N. budget to 25 per cent, one Western diplomat suggested that "now the U.N. will be lucky if Washington gives 12.5 per cent."

Waldheim said he had been told of the attacks on the dikes at the end of June, before his trip. The information, he said, came from "private contacts through unofficial channels to Hanoi."

At that time, he said, he privately informed Washington of the charges, and was told, presumably in his meeting with Bush, "that this is not correct, and

that the U.S. did give instructions to avoid bombing of dikes." This was the same position taken by President Nixon at his June 29 press conference.

But in Geneva early this month, Waldheim said, he received additional information from his Hanoi contacts, and from Dr. Eugene Carson Blake head of the World Council of Churches, "confirming" the bombing of dikes.

"If the allegations are correct, and a number of informations have come forth in this respect, I deeply deplore such bombings and I appeal to stop it," Waldheim said.

[From the Washington Post, July 30, 1972]

VIETNAM: PRESIDENTIAL INCONSISTENCIES

Mr. Nixon's complaint that "well-intentioned and naive" people like Kurt Waldheim have been "taken in" by enemy propaganda about bombing North Vietnamese dikes ignores two crucial facts. First, there would be no propaganda if there were no bombing. Second, the President himself is the real author of the "propaganda," for the reason that three months ago, as part of a deliberate campaign to intimidate Hanoi and bring it to negotiate on his terms, he began to hint carefully that under certain conditions the dikes could be bombed. Last Thursday he said that on April 30 at the Connally ranch he had declared he would not bomb the dikes. In fact, his remarks of April 30 were by no means so categorical. He said then:

"... we will continue to make strikes on military targets throughout North Vietnam. Now, the problem that is raised with regards to dams or dikes is that, while it is a strategic target and indirectly a military target, it would result in an enormous number of civilian casualties. That is something that we need to avoid. It is also something we believe is not needed.

"... we are prepared to use our military and naval strength against military targets throughout North Vietnam, and we believe that the North Vietnamese are taking a very great risk if they continue their offensive in the South.

"I will just leave it there, and they can make their own choice."

When Mr. Nixon thought it might serve his own purpose, he dangled ambiguities about bombing dikes. Only now, when three additional months of fierce bombing evidently have not produced a negotiating breakthrough and when eye-witnesses have reported some dike damage (however unintentional) and when a world outcry has broken out, does the administration offer a belated report on 12 instances of "minor" bomb damage to the dikes—while the President perceives "enemy-inspired propaganda."

As for his complaint of a "double standard" leveled against critics of his policy who don't also criticize enemy attacks on South Vietnamese civilian installations, it is almost embarrassing to have to explain that the violence committed by parties in what is essentially a civil war—however deplorable—is of a very different political and moral order from violence committed by a foreign country intervening in that conflict to uncertain purpose and equally uncertain effect. It seems almost superfluous to add that the standard of American conduct in war really ought not to be fixed, or justified, in terms of the conduct of the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Nixon's reminder that the country has only one President at a time—intended to put down congressmen who doubt he can soon end the American part in the war—is no less off the mark. It was, after all, Richard Nixon, who declared on March 10, 1971: "Those who think Vietnam is going to be a good political issue next year are making a grave miscalculation. Now I am applying our policy there not for political reasons, but for reasons of national security. Nevertheless, those who are counting on Vietnam as a political issue in this country next year are going to have the rug jerked from under them."

The President was saying then, as we read him, that he would end the war by election day. If that was a pledge to the American electorate (and a warning to his domestic political opposition), then it was also a notice to Hanoi that he had to have a settlement to run successfully for re-election.

Mr. Nixon protests now that war critics in Congress are undercutting his negotiating position with antiwar speeches and votes. But to the extent that he meant what he said earlier, he was undercutting his own negotiating position—by imposing on his own diplomacy a deadline for American disengagement more rigorous than any that might have been imposed by the various measures that have been debated in Congress. He is in the insupportable position of

claiming that it's acceptable for American diplomacy to be circumscribed by his own definition of his political requirements but not by the political requirements of his opposition and not by the widespread and growing popular sentiment for an early end to our involvement in Vietnam on almost any terms.

[From the New York Times, July 29, 1972]

WALDHEIM AND BUSH MEET AFTER CRITICISM BY NIXON

(By Robert Alden)

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., July 28—Relations between the United States and Secretary General Waldheim grew more strained today as Mr. Waldheim, responding to criticism by President Nixon, called in George Bush, the United States representative.

Their meeting, resulting from the Secretary General's statement that he had learned "through private unofficial channels" that the dikes in North Vietnam "are being bombed," lasted just short of an hour. Mr. Bush emerged and said, "I think the best thing I can do on the subject is to shut up."

Mr. Bush, normally ebullient and forthright, appeared subdued and troubled following the meeting. He characterized the discussion as "frank and full."

Yesterday, President Nixon declared at his news conference that Mr. Waldheim "like his predecessor, seized upon this enemy-inspired propaganda, which has taken in many well-intentioned and naive people."

The Secretary General declined comment both on Mr. Nixon's statement and on his meeting with Mr. Bush.

But spokesman William C. Powell, did refer correspondents to a series of Mr. Waldheim's statements Mr. Waldheim has made on the Vietnam war, including one memorandum to the Security Council in which he said, "I feel strongly that the United Nations can no longer remain a mute spectator of the horror of the war and of the peril which it increasingly poses to international peace."

Mr. Bush said the he hoped that the current strain would not affect United States relations with the United Nations "over the long run." He said it was his belief that, judging by Mr. Nixon's statements, the President was a firm believer in United Nations.

Mr. Waldheim predecessor, U Thant, was subjected to criticism by the United States over his efforts to end the bombing of North Vietnam. Criticism of Mr. Thant, however, came mainly from State Department officials. President Johnson did not involve himself in the criticism personally.

Since he assumed his office at the beginning of this year, Mr. Waldheim has spoken out forcefully on Vietnam.

"The nations may not choose to accept our efforts to use our good offices to bring about peace," Mr. Waldheim said during the course of an interview, "but I don't want the United Nations blamed for doing nothing."

At a news conference in Paris in April, he said that he was always ready to lend his good offices to bring about peace in Vietnam.

In a statement to the press in New York in May, he said that the time had come for the "full machinery" of the United Nations to be used to achieve a cessation of hostilities in Vietnam.

"It is my earnest hope that even at this very late stage the parties to the conflict will agree to use the machinery of the United Nations in their own interest as well as in the interest of world peace," he said.

[From U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 14, 1972]

BEHIND THE FUROR OVER BOMBS ON RED RIVER DIKES

The approach of a potentially devastating flood season in North Vietnam means that the furor over U.S. bombing of Communist dikes is likely to reach new heights in days ahead.

Hanoi is pulling out all stops in determined propaganda campaign to convince the world that American warplanes are deliberately destroying North Vietnam's dikes and threatening hundreds of thousands of persons with drowning or starvation.

The U.S.—with President Nixon leading the way—is denying just as strenuously that there is any calculated plan to wreck North Vietnam's elaborate system of flood control.

Said the President in a White House news conference on July 27: "If it were the policy of the United States to bomb the dikes, we could take them out—the significant part of them out—in a week."

Next day, the State Department, in an unusual move, released a report on aerial-reconnaissance photos of North Vietnam that showed only a dozen bomb craters on dikes. Even the largest crater, it said, could be repaired in a day with "a crew of less than 50 men with wheelbarrows and hand tools." Highlights of the State Department report are on page 20.

The truth is, American officials contend, that Hanoi—looking ahead to heavy rains in August or September—is seeking to cover up its own failure to repair dikes badly damaged in last summer's destructive floods.

Says one ranking military observer: "Rather than divert the men necessary to make the repairs, Hanoi apparently decided to let the floods come and to blame the U.S.—in advance—for any disaster that might occur."

DELTA'S HISTORY

For a full understanding of the exchange of charges and countercharges between Hanoi and Washington, a detailed picture of North Vietnam's dike system is necessary.

North Vietnam is a country of dikes. A network of between 2,700 and 3,000 miles of them protects the nation from the ever-dangerous Red River and insures the country's food supply by regulating the flow of water to the rice fields.

Dikes play a vital role in the Red River Delta, an ancient rice-producing center. Great quantities of water are channeled by the dikes and spread on the paddies through a system of sluices. Rice seedlings then are planted by hand. When the rice matures, the sluices are opened to drain the field. The water is channeled back to the river, and the grain is harvested.

Since centuries before Christ, the North Vietnamese have been at battle with the Red River. Every year, the river rises to flood proportions in August and September, threatening the surrounding countryside where the great majority of the people live and work.

Every year new dikes are added and damaged dikes are repaired in a never-ending process that over the centuries has resulted in a system so complex that no single dike is responsible for holding back flood waters.

Primary dikes—up to 50 feet high, 150 feet thick at the base and 80 feet wide at the top, channel the Red River through Hanoi and the Delta to the ocean. Other primary dikes on the coast prevent salt water from damaging valuable riceland.

Secondary dikes up to 50 feet thick back up the primary system, so that no one break will overwhelm flood defenses. The smallest dikes—the tertiary system—distribute water to individual fields.

DEFENSELESS?

At first glance, North Vietnam's system appears to be defenseless against air attack. And if actually breached in flood stage, the dikes would unleash billions of gallons of water on Hanoi and the surrounding countryside, flooding up to 6,000 square miles.

However, U.S. experts liken the Red River Delta to a warship in which watertight compartments virtually insure against destruction by a hit from a single torpedo.

Despite President Nixon's assertion that major dikes could be destroyed in a week, some military strategists figure that all U.S. fighter-bombers in Southeast Asia would have to fly daily strikes for up to two months to effectively knock out the system.

Lang Chi Dam and a half dozen smaller dams upstream from Hanoi could be destroyed in a day with guided "smart bombs," they say. But it would take repeated hits with 2,000-pound guided bombs to uproot the massive dikes themselves, 15 feet at a time.

Such an operation, U.S. commanders warn, would expose American pilots repeatedly to withering enemy fire, and would divert them from more productive military targets.

"It's just not worth it," explains one general.

ASSIGNED TARGETS

U.S. officials concede that some dikes are being hit during attacks on military targets either on or near the dikes. North Vietnam is so riddled with dikes that it is impossible to do otherwise, they say, even though pilots are told to bomb only assigned targets and to do as little collateral damage as possible.

According to one military man:

"Dikes are an integral part of the country. To put an absolute quarantine on hitting dikes is like telling your kids to stay off the sand at the beach."

Aerial photographs confirm that the tops of dikes are used by the Communist for antiaircraft guns and missile emplacements, pumping stations for oil pipelines, and storage areas for surface-to-air missiles. Many dikes also are topped by roads which are used by trucks and other military traffic—natural targets for U.S. bombers.

GUIDED TOURS

Western visitors to North Vietnam routinely are taken on guided tours of damaged dikes, and journalists in Hanoi report what appears to them to be deliberate U.S. bombing of the system.

Yet American analysts insist that most of the damage to North Vietnam's dikes has been caused by last year's floods, which were among the most severe in the country's history.

American experts report that four major breaches in primary dikes along the Red River flooded an estimated 1.1 million acres of riceland. Much of the primary and secondary systems were silted or undermined, and great stretches of the tertiary were broken.

Radio Hanoi, although it gave no casualty figures, said at the time that the disaster surpassed even the flood and famine of 1945, which killed huge numbers of people.

The North Vietnamese recognize the problem—at home, if not in their international propaganda. Mayor Tran Duy Hung of Hanoi wrote in the publication "New Hanoi" on June 30:

"In some places the repair of the dike portions that were damaged by torrential rains in 1971 has not yet met technical requirements. A number of thin and weakened dikes which are probably full of termite colonies and holes have not yet been detected for repair."

Despite the obvious dangers, the Hanoi leadership has not diverted the 300,000 or more men, women and children needed to repair the damage. Instead, the labor force has been kept at tasks essential to the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam.

U.S. flood-control authorities say this means that even the normal August-September rise in the Red River will cause some overflow in the Delta region. A heavy rainfall could bring severe floods and widespread damage to Hanoi.

"THE STAGE IS SET"

Most American officials are convinced that the U.S. will be blamed for any flooding. Says one Defense Department expert:

"The stage is set. When the floods come, there is nothing we can do to counter the propaganda that we are responsible."

Another military man explains Hanoi's campaign this way:

"The North Vietnamese have lived in the shadow of dikes all their lives. They see bombs cratering a dike, and they know what could happen if there were a concentrated campaign against the dikes. So they are doing some 'preventive propaganda.' They are hollering as loud as they can now in an effort to forestall such a bombing campaign in the future—even before the U.S. thinks seriously about it."

"HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE"

Some military commanders worry that the Nixon Administration, in an effort to counter North Vietnam's propaganda, will so restrict the U.S. bombing campaign that it would be made useless or needlessly endanger the lives of American pilots. Says one officer:

"Hanoi can blame the U.S. for any break in the dike system. At the same time, the enemy would profit from any change in American bombing strategy. It's a kind of 'heads I win, tails you lose' proposition."

"NO MAJOR DIKE HAS BEEN BREACHED"

(The U.S. State Department on July 28 issued a formal statement refuting charges of intentional bombings of dikes in North Vietnam. From the official text:)

In recent weeks Hanoi has tried to convince the world that its elaborate dike system is a direct and deliberate target of U.S. attacks.

This is not true. Photographic evidence shows conclusively that there has been no intentional bombing of the dikes. A few dikes have been hit by stray bombs directed at military-associated targets nearby. The damage is minor and no major dike has been breached. The damage can be easily repaired—in a matter of a few days—and has not been sufficient to cause any flooding. No damage has been observed in the Hanoi area or against the primary dike system protecting that city.

Hanoi no doubt is genuinely concerned about the dike system. North Vietnam's rainy season will soon reach its peak, and damage in the dikes caused by last year's very extensive flooding has not yet been fully repaired. . . .

Dikes are particularly resistant to bomb damage. Those in the primary system could be breached only by a series of overlapping craters across the entire top of a dike, and the lips of the craters would have to be sufficiently lower than the river surface to initiate the flow and subsequent scouring action of water rushing through the breach. . . .

North Vietnam's official press agencies and radio service have repeatedly described alleged U.S. bombing attacks on the dike system. In April and May, the North Vietnamese made more than 40 specific allegations, and on 30 June the official press quoted the Deputy Minister of Hydraulics as saying that 20 bombing attacks had been made on dikes during that month. Foreign diplomats, newsmen, and, most recently, actress Jane Fonda have been escorted to dikes to view damage—most of it around Haiduong, southeast of Hanoi.

A detailed examination has been made of photography of mid-July of the North Vietnamese Red River Delta and bomb craters were detected at 12 locations. None of the damage has been in the Hanoi area, where destruction of the dikes would result in the greatest damage to North Vietnam's economy and logistics effort. Nearly all the damage has been scattered downstream from Hanoi, as well as downstream from the areas of major breaks resulting from the 1971 floods. . . .

All identified points of dike damage are located within close range of specific targets of military value. Of the 12 locations where damage has occurred, 10 are close to identified individual targets such as petroleum-storage facilities, and the other two are adjacent to road and river-transport lines. Because a large number of North Vietnamese dikes serve as bases for roadways, the maze they create throughout the delta makes it almost inevitable that air attacks directed against transportation targets cause scattered damage to dikes.

The bomb craters verified by photography can be repaired easily with a minimum of local labor and equipment. . . .

Repairs to all the dikes could be completed within a week, as the necessary equipment is available throughout the delta.

Local labor historically mobilizes to strengthen and repair dikes to avoid serious flooding. An occasional bomb falling on a dike does not add significantly to the burden of annual repair work normally required. North Vietnam must, however, complete the repair of damage caused by the 1971 floods before next month when this year's rainy season will reach its peak.

PART V: HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON DIKE BREACHINGS AND
U.S. PRECEDENTS

SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

(Memo by John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Jan. 18, 1966; the Senator Gravel Edition of The Pentagon Papers, vol. IV, p. 43)

. . . Destruction of locks and dams, however—if handled right (perhaps after the *next* Pause) offer promise. It should be studied. Such destruction does not

kill or drown people. By shallow-flooding the rice, it leads after time to widespread starvation (more than a million?) unless food is provided—which we could offer to do 'at the conference table.' . . ."

THE ATTACK ON THE IRRIGATION DAMS IN NORTH KOREA

(By Robert F. Futrell of the USAF Historical Division of Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; Brig. Gen. Lawson S. Moseley, USAF, Director, Research Studies Institute; and Albert F. Simpson, Air Force Historian; published in "The United States Air Force in Korea: 1950-1953"; Duell, Sloan and Pearce; New York, 1961)

On May 13, 1953 20 USAF F-84 fighter-bombers swooped down in three successive waves over Toksan irrigation dam in North Korea. From an altitude of 300 feet they skip-bombed their loads of high explosives into the hard-packed earthen walls of the dam. The subsequent flash flood scooped clean 27 miles of valley below, and the plunging flood waters wiped out large segments of a main north-south communication and supply route to the front lines. The Toksan strike and similar attacks on the Chasan, Kuwonga, Kusong, and Toksang dams accounted for five of the more than 20 irrigation dams targeted for possible attack—dams upstream from all the important enemy supply routes and furnishing 75 percent of the controlled water supply for North Korea's rice production.

These strikes, *largely passed over by the press*, the military observers, and news commentators in favor of attention-arresting but less meaningful operations events, constituted one of the most significant air operations of the Korean War. (emphasis our)

. . . to the Communists the smashing of the dams meant primarily the destruction of their chief sustenance—rice. The Westerner can little conceive the awesome meaning which the loss of this staple food commodity has for the Asian—starvation and slow death. Hence the show of rage, the flare of violent tempers, and the avowed threats of reprisals when bombs fell on five irrigation dams. Despite these reactions this same enemy agreed to sign an armistice less than one month later, and on terms which for two years he had adamantly proclaimed he would never accept—a line north of the 38th parallel and voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. The Toksan-Chasan air strikes were an object lesson in air power to all the Communist world and especially to the Communists in North Korea. These strikes significantly pointed up their complete vulnerability to destruction from the air. . . ."

[From Newsweek, Oct. 11, 1965]

THE "ENEMY": 20,000 MISSIONS LATER—THE DAMAGE TO NORTH VIETNAM HAS BEEN HUGE, BUT THE ECONOMY SURVIVES

. . . The fact is that North Vietnam could fight on even without its industry. Woefully short of both raw materials and skilled technicians, North Vietnam's industrial plant is much over-rated in the West, says a Western businessman who visited the country recently. "The real Achilles' heel of the North," he declares, "has always been, and remains, agriculture. The North can survive without pig iron, but it cannot live without food."

There is evidence that the American military planners in Washington are fully aware of this, for in August United States planes—for the first time—struck at dams and waterways in the crucial Red River Delta, touching off howls of pain in Hanoi. For North Vietnam is almost literally kept alive by its complex system of dams and pumping stations, and widespread bombardment of the vital waterworks could bring on unimaginable chaos, including wirespread flooding and famine.

So far, the raids on the dams have been kept carefully 'limited' and apparently are intended only to remind the men who rule North Vietnam of their country's vulnerability and of the desirability of peace. But publicly, at least, they have not budged Ho and his colleagues from their avowed determination to face all the sacrifice necessary to gain victory in South Vietnam, even if it should take 20 years. . . .

[From the Nation magazine, Sept. 5, 1966]

MESSAGES FROM HANOI

(By Bernard B. Fall)

The late scholar Bernard B. Fall was reviewing two books on Indochina for the Nation. In the section of his review mentioning U.S. bombing of dikes in 1944-45 Fall was discussing "Here Is Your Enemy" by James Cameron:

"... As for the net effect of the bombing raids, Cameron, with his British 'blitz' experience, gives what promises to be a correct assessment when he says that North Vietnamese industrialization was not sufficiently advanced to engage more than 5 percent of the population. Its destruction, therefore, would not affect the country as drastically as similar destructions would in the West, but he does not seem to have taken into consideration the possibility of bombing North Vietnam's major dike systems out of existence.

"When this was done in part in 1944-45 by the U.S. Air Force to keep the crop from going to the Japanese, 1 million Vietnamese starved to death in the North in the ensuing floods and the drought which followed.

"On July 11 the pro-American L'Express reported from Paris that between February and June, 1966, close to 500 small dikes allegedly were destroyed by bombings. . . ."

[From Viet-Report, August-September 1966]

THE TARGET NOBODY TALKS ABOUT

(By Nina Schwartz and Carol Brightman)

Since February of 1965, the North Vietnamese press has carried reports of repeated attacks by U.S. planes on water conservation works, dikes, dams, and hydraulic systems. Until June 1966 there was little or no confirmation of these reports in the American press. American reports, of course, have labored under the official position that U.S. planes do not bomb non-military targets. A more practical obstacle to objective reporting has been the simple fact that American correspondents must rely solely on an official version of the bombing, delivered in prepared briefings by the U.S. Military Command in South Vietnam. What they describe, they never see. Moreover, only those authorized missions dispatched from South Vietnam, the China Sea or Gulf of Tonkin, can be announced. One-half of the air attacks on North Vietnam are estimated today to originate in Thailand, yet neither their targets, nor their own losses, are reported. It is not hard to understand how attacks on North Vietnam's water supply might be overlooked. A target such as this, particularly if repeatedly, deliberately chosen, clearly raises a grave question about the ultimate purpose of U.S. bombing in North Vietnam which the United States would be hard-pressed to answer, at this phase of its operations.

In the earliest reports of the bombing of oil depots around Hanoi on June 29, it was noted, almost in passing, that bombs had dropped on the banks of the Red River. Next to photographs of mile-high bursts of burning oil, this fact was generally overlooked. But for those who have been alert to the historical struggle of the people of northern Vietnam to harness their erratic and unruly rivers, this fact takes on ominous significance.

The people of Hanoi, Rene Dumont wrote in *Le Monde*, July 6, 1965, "know they live beneath the waters of the Red River." It was this knowledge which apparently was the major cause of the evacuation of Hanoi during the June 1966 bombings. The July 5, 1966 *Le Monde* reports that evacuation was provoked more by fear of flooding than by direct aerial attacks on the city. These fears are not idle. The same report noted that the river had risen to the high-water level normally reached in mid-August. On July 9, *Le Monde* predicted severe floods by August if the bombing of the Red River dike around Hanoi continued. North Vietnam, it stated has already formed a civilian army of 200,000 men and women—"La Nage Armee"—to patrol the branches of the Red River for ruptures in the dikes.

In a rare report for the American press, the *New York Times* quoted a recent statement by North Vietnam's Minister of Water Conservation, which charged that the bombings had intensified "in the midst of the flood season, with a view to causing floods in the most populated and biggest rice-growing areas" (8/20/66).

The Minister stated that between February and June of 1966 there had been 55 attacks on water works, and in July alone, when the rivers were in spate, 69 attacks took place. He singled out a concentrated bombing of irrigation works in the Red River Valley on August 13 as the most severe to date.

What is the ominous significance of this bombing?

For the North Vietnamese, it may be inferred from the following paragraph drawn from a September 15, 1965 Statement by the Ministry of Water Conservancy:

"The Democratic Republic of Vietnam is a tropical agricultural country. Solving the water conservancy problem is essential if the peasants' living conditions are to be improved. This question was left unsolved by the former colonial regime, precisely out of its desire to keep our people in utter misery. As a result, each year, the laboring people in the North had often to suffer from food shortage for several months. The food problem has now been given a better solution in the North. This is due to the great and continued efforts made by our people in the building of water conservancy works. In many areas, drought, flood and water-logging have ceased to be a threat. Agriculture is being gradually stabilized and developed, and the peasants' living conditions, steadily improved."

Rice, the main staple of North Vietnam's rural economy, is an aquatic plant and unable to live without water. The flat rice fields must be surrounded by small dikes to keep a predetermined amount of water in the field. Because rain falls during a limited season, the dikes must be watertight to irrigate the fields until harvest. A break in the dike means loss of the crop. It may mean widespread famine, flood and drought. In past years North Vietnam has suffered from a constant rice deficit; with her growing population, together with the partial mobilization order issued by Ho Chi Minh on July 17, successive ruptures in the dike system obviously increases the deficit to intolerable proportions.

About four-fifths of the villages in North Vietnam are located close to the main rice-growing areas—the Red River Delta and the Thai Binh River. In his extremely informative survey of North Vietnam's rural economy published last year in *Le Monde*, Rene Dumont (who is himself an agronomist as well as a journalist) emphasized how susceptible the complex dike system was to air attack. "Certainly," he wrote, "a massive mobilization of the population with a super-human effort would be able to repair some of the breaks. But heavy American bombardments hardly allow for reconstruction at a fast enough rate, especially during the rainy season." (7/6/65). Dumont indicated that strikes on water works had not yet taken on a systematic pattern, nor had they exceeded the capacity of the North Vietnamese to contend with them. Yet he saw the general bombing expanding through three phases:

"Bombardments of North Vietnam first had for targets purely military installations, such as radar stations and barracks. Then their focus became bridges, railways and routes used for troop maneuvers, targets which were obviously also part of the economic establishment of the country. The attack last Wednesday [June 30, 1965] on the oil depots was a new blow at North Vietnam . . . all the more important because it was near Hanoi and because the Red River Delta is no longer safe. Certain observers wonder if the next attacks will not be aimed at the dikes which protect the population and the crops."

Reports from *Le Monde* have since confirmed Dumont's prediction. These reports are all the more reliable since Agence France Presse established the first "free world" bureau in Hanoi in the spring of 1966 (unfortunately, Jean Raffaelli, the Bureau Chief, is said to have returned to Paris in mid-August, "for a short time"). The French accounts, of course, in no way match the detail of the Vietnam News Agency (VNA) accounts. Typical of the latter is the report that between July 27-31, following heavy monsoon rains, U.S. planes made 14 attacks on sections of dikes along the Thai Binh River in Tien Lang and Vinh Bao districts in the suburbs of Haiphong. In this case, as in many others over the summer, the isolation of the dikes from any semblance of military or industrial installation is clearly indicated.

It entails a considerable stretch of the imagination to maintain that these attacks are not deliberate. Long experience with the lack of candor in Administration accounts of what it is doing in Vietnam, has taught us to consider its official depositions as politically self-serving and contrary to military fact, until proved otherwise by impartial observers on the spot. In the case of this bombing our suspicion is confirmed by the appalling logic demonstrated in the general escalation of the war over North Vietnam.

An initial rationalization, which maintained that North Vietnamese infiltration into the South was such that it could be cut physically at the source—at

visible supply and training bases, and military-industrial installations—has since been discredited by Secretary McNamara himself, most notably in Honolulu last February and at a White House briefing on August 25. The validity of the second rationalization has proved to be impossible to measure and thus inherently expansionist in military terms. It maintains that by virtue of logistic and political support, North Vietnam is the aggressor in South Vietnam, and that she will relinquish this role south of the parallel only if enough bombs are thrown her way north of the parallel. She has reacted in contrary fashion. Whatever the exact importance of her role in the South has been, whatever moderating pressure the Soviet Union has tried to exert, the mass bombing has helped both to define and stiffen her will to resist the terroristic coercion the United States has introduced into the Vietnamese conflict. She is lent support in her intransigence with each new raid. It is here that the peculiar logic of the general escalation becomes apparent.

When selective bombing is used to display vast potential force, and to persuade the foe that it would be wiser to save skin and "confess" at a conference table, and it fails; what next? The display, then, becomes the force itself—which, of course, it always was. Persuasion turns into punishment. Although the South Vietnamese government rationalization of this process lacks the sophistication of the American version, it shows far more imagination and candor:

"*Punishment.* After the first months of warning, the course of events could change, that is to say, the Vietcong are risking punishment by annihilation. First signs of more extensive industrial and agricultural destruction came with the recent bombing of hydro-electric power plants and dams ("Why Bomb North Vietnam?" Government pamphlet distributed at RVN Mission at the UN; date not given)."¹

We can be sure that the significance of "agricultural destruction" is not lost on the Saigon government. In the South, where it is regularly practiced by U.S. forces, it takes the form of herbicide: the destruction and poisoning of crops by toxic chemical spray in areas not controlled by Saigon. As in the South, so in the North: it is antipopulation warfare. The target bares the hand; the target is food, or, more exactly in the North, ability to produce and harvest rice.

Does the United States believe that if it can destroy North Vietnam by inducing flood and famine, it can destroy the National Liberation Front? It is unlikely that policy-makers are unaware of the discrepancies between the official charge of North Vietnamese aggression, and the flimsy factual evidence assembled in their White Books and White Papers (see pp. 15-19). Then why the concerted escalation in the North? One reply to this question current today concedes that Hanoi does not lead the NLF, or even provide significant support, but argues, nevertheless, that its collapse would so undermine and demoralize the NLF position that southern forces could be easily forced to retreat into sporadic guerrilla action. Another reply suggest that when the United States intensified its bombing of the North, it deliberately began to shift its major strategic interests from the southern battlefield toward an arena where its air power might be more at home. The bull in that arena is said to be China.

Before February of 1965, it was said that China might enter the war if the United States began bombing North Vietnam. Last spring it was said that China would surely enter the war if the United States bombed Haiphong harbour or the oil depots around Haiphong and Hanoi. Today it is said that two moves in North Vietnam will force China to enter the war: a ground invasion by U.S. forces; the destruction of North Vietnam's agricultural economy, through expanded bombing of the dikes, dams and irrigation systems.

At present, the bull appears to be chasing its tail.

The South Vietnamese government pamphlet quoted before concludes with a Vietnamese proverb; it is suitable here if one is careful to get the animals straight: "*The VC is the fly that gets killed when the buffaloes fight.*"

APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM

(Report by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency on the first year of Operation Rolling Thunder (1965)); the Senator Gravel edition of The Pentagon Papers, vol. IV, pp. 55-56)

CIA and DIA, in a joint monthly "Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam" which had been requested by the SecDef in August, attempted to keep a

¹ Lest it should appear that the Saigon government maintains that it is the Vietcong who have infiltrated North Vietnam (its propaganda releases oddly suggest this), we should note that "Vietcong" stands for the enemy, North and South.

running tabulation of the theoretical cost of repairing or reconstructing damaged or destroyed facilities and equipment in NVN . . . in terms of specific target categories, the appraisals reported results like the following:

. . . Locks. Of the 91 known locks and dams in NVN, only 8 targeted as significant to inland waterways, flood control, or irrigation. Only 1 hit, heavily damaged . . .

HANOI FOOD OUTPUT HELD TARGET OF U.S. BOMBERS

(Associated Press, report by Amando Doronila in *Christian Science Monitor*; September 5, 1967; this is an eyewitness report)

. . . Dikes in the fertile Red River delta—North Vietnam's rice basket—have come under increasing air attack lately. The American bombing appears intended not only to demoralize and harass the population in the most densely populated region of the country, but also to destroy the rice crops in the vast alluvial plains with their vulnerable open spaces . . . here in the delta region, whose paddy fields provide the bulk of the rice supply of 17 million North Vietnamese, there have been almost daily attacks on dikes along the numerous small confluences of the Red River. . . . The pattern of the bombing in the delta seems evident—to interdict agricultural production. No military targets are visible in the dikes. The heaviest artillery pieces we saw were antiquated rifles of the peasant militia . . .

[From O'Hara Books, N.Y., 1968]

EXCERPTS FROM "AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE"

REPORT ON THE DESTRUCTION OF DIKES: HOLLAND 1944-45 AND KOREA 1953

(Testimony by Prof. Gabriel Kolko)

During the final months of the Second World War the Nazis exposed the Dutch civilian population to a form of war crime the United States and English Governments especially designated as crimes against humanity. To prevent the advance of Anglo-American troops, the German High Commissioner in Holland, Seyss-Inquart, opened the dikes and by the end of 1944 flooded approximately 500,000 acres of land. The result was a major disorganization of the Dutch economy and the most precipitous decline in food consumption any West European country suffered during the war. By 1945 the caloric intake in occupied Holland, or the large bulk of the country, was less than 900 a day, and in certain areas 500 calories. As the Allied armies advanced, the Germans threatened to extend the destruction of the remaining dikes to block Allied supply lines and movements.

The misery of the Dutch people, the Prime Minister-in Exile, P.S. Gerbrandy, warned SHAEF Commander Eisenhower, threatened ". . . a calamity as has not been seen in Europe for centuries."¹ The Red Cross issued the same warning, and during April 1945 both Eisenhower and Churchill moved to confront the enormous tragedy resulting from the impact of the destruction of the dikes. On April 10th Churchill wrote Roosevelt that "I fear we may soon be in the presence of a tragedy."² To prevent it he proposed the Allies make available necessary food and medical supplies for Red Cross distribution. A warning was to be given to Seyss-Inquart and his subordinates ". . . That by resisting our attempt to bring relief to the civilian population in this area they will brand themselves as murderers before the world, and we shall hold them responsible with their lives for the fate which overtakes the people of Holland."³ Several weeks later Eisenhower made an additional proposal along the same lines: ". . . I propose to send a very strongly worded message to the German Commander . . . that the flooding of large areas of Holland with the resulting destitution, starvation and the enormous loss of life to the population will constitute a blot on his military honor . . . He must be told to cease opening the dikes and to take immediate steps to assist in every way possible the distribu-

¹ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: "Soldiers Become Governors"* ("United States Army in World War Two: Special Studies") (Washington, 1964), 827; also 823ff. and U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Foreign Agriculture Relations, *World Food Situation, 1946-47* (Washington, 1946), 5.

² Winston Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Bantam Book ed.) New York, 1962, 401.

³ *Ibid.*, 402.

tion of food . . . and that if he fails in this respect to meet his clear obligations and his humanitarian duty, he and each responsible member of his command will be considered by me as violaters of the laws of war who must face the certain consequences of their acts."⁴ Confronted by such grave warnings, Seyss-Inquart agreed to stop the destruction of the dikes and cooperate in relief measures.

Nevertheless, the barbarism of Seyss-Inquart in destroying dikes and starving civilians made him appear in the eyes of the Western officers as "one of the worst war criminals," and when General Walter B. Smith met with him on April 30, 1945 to arrange for Dutch relief he also warned the German ". . . you are going to be shot."⁵ Of the 185 Nazis indicted at Nuremberg only 24 were sentenced to death. Seyss-Inquart was one of the 24. His crime was considered to be one of the most monstrous of the Second World War, and prominent among the charges against him at Nuremberg.⁶

On May 13, 1953, while armistice negotiations in Korea were bogged down, 20 U.S. Air Force F-4's attacked and destroyed the Toksan irrigation dam in North Korea. The Americans also bombed the Chasan, Kuwonga, and Toksang dams and scheduled the bulk of the remainder for attack—only the signing of the armistice prevented their destruction. The flash flood resulting from the destruction of the Toksan dam resulted in a deluge of 27 miles of valley farm lands. In May 1953, "The production of food in North Korea was the only major element of North Korea's economy still functioning efficiently after three years of war," states the official U.S. account. The Americans were now prepared to destroy it, and quite properly the Air Force concluded that "These strikes, largely passed over by the press, the military observers and news commentators in favor of attention-arresting but less meaningful operations events, constituted one of the most significant air operations of the Korean War." "To the Communists the smashing of the dams meant primarily the destruction of their chief sustenance—rice. The Westerner can little conceive the awesome meaning which the loss of this staple food commodity has for the Asian—starvation and slow death . . . Hence the show of rage, the flare of violent tempers, and the avowed threats of reprisals when bombs fell on five irrigation dams. . . ."⁷

Briefly, despite an earlier correct definition of the nature of the war crime inherent in flooding of farm land via destruction of dikes and dams, the U.S. Government within a decade followed the precedent of the Nazis, fully aware of the human and political consequences of their action. The United States has already begun the destruction of the dams of Vietnam, but it has also clearly defined the nature of the action for what it is—a war crime of the first magnitude.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF DIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM

(Testimony by Fujio Yamazaki)

North Vietnam is an agrarian country. The main product of agriculture is paddy field rice which is grown on the alluvial flats of the Red River, Chu River, Ma River and Ca River. Of this, the Red River Delta—Tonkin Delta—comprises a major part.

The Tonkin Delta is an immense plain, measuring about 150 km from Viet Tri, at the top of the delta to the mouth of the Red River and covering over 1,100,000 hectares. It is 13 meters above sea level at the highest part and 0.5 meters at the lowest with almost no slope. It is divided into many dike-encircled fields by tributaries and subtributary waters of the Red River. These dike-encircled paddy fields are surrounded by a natural dike made by the overflowing of the rivers and by man-made dikes constructed over many years by the work of the peasants. Generally, the relative humidity is low in these dike-encircled paddy-fields. The height of the Red River dikes in the vicinity of Hanoi is 13 meters while that of lower land in Hanoi city is only 4 meters.

The height of ground near the seashore of the delta is only 0.5 meters, as it is reclaimed land with dikes constructed on a tideland. The high tide level rises two meters in the Tonkin Gulf.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam attached much importance to river dikes and seashore dikes and made great efforts to have them

⁴ Coles and Weinberg, *Soldiers Become Governors*, 831.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 832.

⁶ U.S.: Department of State, *Germany, 1947-49: The Story in Documents* (Washington, 1950), 117.

⁷ Quarterly Review Staff, "The Attack on the Irrigation Dams in North Korea," *Air University Quarterly*, VI (Winter 1953-54), 40-41.

constructed, thereby extending the total length of such dikes to 4,000 kilometers in 10 years.

The low ground of the delta, including the seashore area, cannot be drained naturally and in the rainy season all the land is flooded, so that growing rice in such a season is impossible unless the land is drained mechanically. In contrast, the high ground of the delta suffers from a water shortage in the dry season, and a rice crop without irrigation facilities is impossible in such a season.

During the days of French Indo-China, irrigation facilities had already been constructed over a considerable area. Since the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the facilities have been greatly and rapidly increased, and 90% of cultivated land is now irrigated. The construction of drainage facilities was undertaken for the first time on a full scale by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and was marked by great progress in ten years. As a result of the strengthening of dikes and the completion of water facilities, twice a year cropping has been made possible over a considerable part of paddy fields in the Tonkin delta, remarkably expanding the production of rice. This description of the Tonkin delta can also be applied to the alluvial plain of the Ma River and the Chu River. Destruction of these dikes and water facilities by U.S. shelling and bombing carries the following significance:

(1) *The Case of River Dikes*

No explanation is necessary to imagine what the results would be should dikes be destroyed in the flood-water season when the river level is higher than the cultivated land and the urban area. In relation to food production, not only farm products would be damaged but the cultivated land itself would be put out of use by the accumulation of earth and sand and by water erosion. In regard to living, houses would either be carried away or destroyed. Damage suffered by the people in both aspects of production and living would be very serious.

(2) *The Case of the Destruction of Seashore Dikes*

If tide-water control dikes along the seashore are destroyed, sea water would flood the land and the cultivated land would be put out of production by sea water, and the crops would die. Even if the dikes are repaired again, and sea water removed, the soil would be salted up and the following season's crops badly effected. If the destruction of dikes should happen at the time of high water, the risk to homes and other buildings and facilities would be great, as they would be destroyed by the force of the inrush of sea water.

(3) *The Case of the Destruction of Irrigation Facilities*

Destruction of irrigation facilities—dams, water control gates, incidental construction of flumes, etc.—would either damage or make impossible the rice crop in the October dry season. Planting of young rice-plants in the transplanting season is impossible without water, and rice crops would suffer from drought if there is not sufficient water after transplantation. Where dams are high, their destruction would result in heavy damage to men and stock, buildings, and cultivated land.

(4) *The Case of the Destruction of Drainage Facilities*

Destruction of drainage facilities—drain sites, overflow, etc.—would make rice cropping impossible in the rainy season in May in the rice areas. As is seen above, dikes and water facilities in North Vietnam have a very important meaning in production activity and living of all the people of North Vietnam, because North Vietnam is an agricultural country and rice crops are cultivated mainly in the delta area. The destruction of these facilities by shelling and bombing therefore constitutes an impermissible war crime against the Vietnamese people.

SOME FACTS ON BOMBING OF DIKES

(Testimony by Prof. Makato Kandachi)

... The bombs used for the destruction of dikes were of about 1,500 kg, and combined with the use of ball bombs. If the destruction of dikes alone was intended, then demolition bombs would have sufficed; but ball bombs, the exclusive purpose of which is to kill and wound men and beasts, were used in combination. Further, after destroying dikes by bombing, additional bombing was conducted against people engaged in repair work. The dike at Traly, Thai Binh province, was bombed twice in 1967 while it was under repair; 52 bombs were dropped and

32 people were wounded. In Quang Binh province, the tide water control dike was bombed several times, destroying paddy fields of 1,500 hectares. Of late, bombings, were carried out against the Vinh Linh area. These are major examples of U.S. bombing. The purpose is to bring about economic difficulties by the destruction of rice crops through flood, and at the same time to kill and wound men and beasts.

The results of the investigation made by the Second Japanese Investigation Team are given below:

(1) On August 13, 1966, the Red River dike in the vicinity of Hanoi was bombed with a 1,350 kg. bomb, producing a bomb crater 12 meters in diameter and 9 meters in depth. Although the water level of the Red River was at its highest at this time, it was quickly repaired and almost no damage was done.

(2) From October 2, 1965 to June 30, 1967, the vicinity of Bac Giang city, Ha Bac province, was bombed 77 times; Bac Giang city was devastated. In the meantime, the dike in the Thuond river was attacked and destroyed by 100 bombs. Although the destroyed parts were quickly repaired, large scale bombing were done even while repairs were going on. At about 1 p.m. on September 7, 1966, four "mother" ball bombs were dropped.

(3) Although the Red River dike that runs through the suburbs of Hai Duong city was destroyed for 15 meters, it had already been repaired. The dike is located in the suburbs far away from Hai Duong city, with no military target at all in the vicinity, only a church. This fact leads to the conclusion that the bombing was for the sole purpose of destroying the dike.

(4) On July 13, 1967, the dike of the Lai Vu river that runs by Ha Thach city, Lami Thau prefecture, Phu Tho province, was bombed by 12 planes. Four bombs hit the dike, and as a result 100 meters were destroyed. A bomb crater 12 meters in diameter and 5 meters in depth resulted. On July 18 the same year Ha Mao was bombed. The investigations of the Japanese team on July 21, showed that there were bomb craters about 15 meters in diameter and 5 meters in depth in 22 places. No bombs had directly hit the dike. It was explained that the height of the dike is about 5 meters and that the water level used to be up to the 4 meter mark at high water. From this, it can easily be seen that the destruction of the dike at high water would bring about serious flood damage. It is also evident that even if the dike itself is not destroyed, destruction in the vicinity of the dike would result in the destruction of the dike because of the nature of the soil in this area which is light and weak in cohesion.

(5) The case of Da Mai dam, Quang Binh province, as told by Mr. Nguyen Hoan, Minister for Water Conservation, is as follows: The Second Japanese Investigation Team visited the ruins of this dam; The dam is situated in the upstream portion of the Zinh river, about a few score kilometers from the sea. Construction was begun in 1965 and was completed on July 5. It supplies water to 2,000 hectares in Bo Truch prefecture. As soon as the water began to run in the channel, it was bombed. The bombing is being carried on sometimes even now.

Commenting on the denunciation of the Foreign Ministry and the Water Conservancy Ministry of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that "the U.S. forces are carrying on the planned destruction of dikes, killing and wounding the inhabitants, and are trying to destroy food production and transportation," a U.S. Defense Department spokesman said that "this was done by accident by American pilots and should not in any way be interpreted as intentional" (AP dispatch, July 22). But according to our investigation, the bombing by the U.S. is so accurate that it is inconceivable for places which have no target other than dikes to be bombed by chance. It should therefore be judged that the U.S. forces have carried on bombing purposely to destroy dikes and kill and wound the people repairing them.

BOMBING OF DIKES AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS IN THE DRV

(Testimony by Tsetsure Tsurishima, Member First Japanese Commission of Inquiry)

On our way to Nam Dinh from Hanoi, on the first of January 1967, we, the members of the First Japanese Commission of Inquiry, could see several craters on the dike in Phu Ly, a village of peasants and fishermen, 30 km. from Nam Dinh and 40 km. from Hanoi. The dike was broken up by several craters, each of which was about 7 meters in diameter. Since the water level was so low—during the months of the dry season—that the river bed was visible, the villagers had not filled the craters since the time of the bombardment on October 1, 1966.

On the same day, January 1, 1967, we saw the people repairing the dike in the village of Nam Phong, in the northern part of the province of Nam Dinh. This

dike had been bombed the day before our arrival . . . Since the water level of the river running through this village was high enough to be touching the canal dikes themselves, the dike had to be repaired immediately after it was bombed. One crater was visible on this dike, and there were two in the river.

There are many other cases of bombed dikes witnessed by members of the Tribunal investigating commissions. And I have here eight different pictures taken immediately after the bombing of various parts of the irrigation system. But what I would like to draw your attention to is the systematic method in which the irrigation system has been bombed.

According to the report which we were given in Hanoi by Mr. Phan My, Vice-president of the Water Conservancy Commission, U.S. bombings and strafing of the entire dike network were exceptionally violent and concentrated in the months of July, August and September of 1966, when the water level was very high. He explained that the following numbers of raids against the dike system had taken place: From February to June 1966: 55 air raids—In July 1966: 69 raids—In August and September 1966: 136 raids.

He stated that these raids had attacked many sections of the dikes of the Red River, the Thai Binh River, the Ma River, and the Lam River in the provinces of Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Ha Bac, Hai Duong, Thanh Hoa, Ha Tinh and Nghe An, as well as in Hanoi; many sections of the sea dikes in Quang Ninh province, Haiphong, etc., were also attacked.

The report entitled "Destruction by the U.S. Imperialists of Water Conservancy Projects and Dike Systems in North Vietnam From March 1965 to December 1966," published by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's Ministry of Water Conservancy, describes the air raids against the dike network in Nam Ha province, for example, as follows:

"The big dikes of Nam Ha were raided 34 times between April and September 1966. Nam Ha is one of the most populous provinces and a big rice bowl of North Vietnam. In April and May 1966, it was attacked by U.S. planes 3 times. In July, it was subjected to 7 air raids. In August and September, when the water level rose highest, the number of air strikes was brought to 24. Typical were the raids on August 1 and 3, 1966, against the Kinh Lung dike and flood gate in Nam Dao commune, Nam Truc district, when the water level was high; a section of the dike was so damaged by U.S. bombs that its surface was only 0.80 meters higher than that of the water, and the damaged dike was the only protection of a populous area of Nam Ha province against the flooding of the Red river. On August 3, 1966, the same dike section was again attacked and the danger of the dike breaking was very serious as some bombs had dug 4-meter deep craters in it. In these two days, the local people had to muster a huge labour force to fill up bomb craters with thousands of cubic meters of earth and stave off the danger of flooding. The air raid on this dike section killed and wounded many people and damaged many houses and much property of the local people." (p. 6)

There are many other similar examples described in this document. For example:

(1) *The Water Conservancy System in North Nghe An*

"The water conservancy system in the North of Nghe An province serves 5 districts with hundreds of thousands of people. It consists of a key project, the Do Luong dam, and hundreds of smaller water regulating projects. In June and July 1965, the U.S. imperialists launched raids against 12 projects. In June and July 1965, the U.S. imperialists launched 12 attacks against the Do Luong dam, 10 attacks against the flood gate at one end of the canal and against water regulating projects of the system on June 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 15 and July 8 and 14, 1965. The system including big and small canals, was hit 137 times. In July and August 1966, when the people made great efforts to repair the damaged projects, U.S. aircraft in 18 attacks used hundreds of tons of bombs and thousands of rockets and missiles against the important projects which had just been repaired. In addition, repeated attacks were also carried out. Between March 1965 and September 1966 the water conservancy system of North Nghe An was attacked 178 times in all." (p. 3)

(2) *The Dike of the Ma River in Thanh Hoa*

"The Ma River is a large river flowing through Thanh Hoa province. Important dike sections of the Ma River in Thanh Hoa province were subjected to 24 air strikes between March and September 1966. In September 1966, when there were heavy rains, U.S. aircraft bombed and strafed 17 times important sections of dike on the Northern bank of the Ma River; in two days, September 21 and 22, 1966, they bombed and strafed 8 times, damaging sections of dikes and dams

which were hundreds of meters long, blasting away 25,000 cubic meters of earth. In these two air raids, U.S. pilots savagely dropped steel-pellet bombs on the people, who were filling up the gaps in the dike and dam network after the bombing, and many peasants working on the top of the dike were killed. From July 27 to 31, 1966, due to the torrential rains during the typhoon Ora, the levels of the rivers were mounting. U.S. aircraft then strafed 14 times many important sections of dike in Tien Lang and Vinh Bao districts, in the vicinity of Haiphong city. Almost all the important dikes in other provinces: Thai Binh, Hai Duong, Ha Bac, Phu Tho, Ninh Binh, Nghe An and Ha Tinh were subjected to hundreds of U.S. air raids in the three months: July, August and September 1966." (pp. 6-7)

3) *The Chu River Water Conservancy System*

"This system serves a production area comprising 6 districts with more than half a million people. Bai Thuong dam, the key project of the above network was bombed 13 times; the water regulating projects and big canals, 31 times. Typical were the August 21, 22, and 23, 1965, attacks against the Ban Thach water regulating dam, an important project the purpose of which is to carry water to fields on higher ground. The dam was hit 6 times on August 21 and 22, twice on August 22; 236 bombs fell on the dam and about 100 others on the surrounding rice fields, damaging the dam and flood gates, and drying up thousands of hectares of land." (p. 4)

4) *The Suoi Hai Reservoir of Ha Tay Province*

"The Suoi Hai reservoir is one of the bigger water reservoirs in North Vietnam, with a capacity of tens of millions of cubic meters for watering an area of Ha Tay province which used to be arid. Some days before the attacks, U.S. aircraft had carried out many reconnaissance flights. On September 9, 1965, the main project was bombed 9 times, from 6:45 a.m. to 1:30 p.m., with hundreds of heavy bombs. It was repeatedly bombed on the following days:—September 10: twice;—September 11: 9 times, from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.—September 12: 9 times—September 14: 3 times—September 15: twice—September 16: once.

Thus, the U.S. attacked the Suoi Hai water reservoir 35 times on 7 consecutive days, destroying a part of the dam, nearly breaking it and damaging a floodgate built across the Tich River, causing serious drought while the crops here badly needed water." (p. 4)

5) *The Be Reservoir in Quang Binh Province*

"The Be water reservoir of Quang Binh province is under construction. Between March 25, 1965, and September 1965 it was attacked 55 times with 1,033 bombs of all sizes, a great number of rockets and 20 mm shells. In 1966, between June 26, 1966, and August 14, 1966, the U.S. launched 57 attacks. In some months as in August 1965, they launched day and night attacks on 30 consecutive days." (pp. 4-5)

6) *Thac Ba Dam in Yen Bai Province*

This was the largest dam under construction in North Vietnam; it was first bombed on September 21, 1965. In 1966, on April 23 and June 22, the U.S. imperialists dropped heavy bombs on the place where workers were working. On July 8, 20 and 21, 1966, they repeatedly bombed the center of the construction site of the main dam where there were numerous workers, killing 30 of them and damaging a large quantity of equipment." (p. 5)

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, as you know, Vietnam is a part of the monsoon area, and the rainy season comes in July, August and September. These are the months when the water level is at its highest. For example, the rivers of Sontay province have an average annual rate of water flow of 3,400 cubic meters per second. During the rainy season, this rate increases to 13,400 cubic meters per second.

One who remembers the great disaster which resulted from the breaking of the dike of the Red River in August 1945 which brought death and famine to two million people, and rendered hundreds of thousands of families homeless, can understand just how serious the bombing of the dikes during the rainy season can be.

One other point on the bombing of the dikes, to which I would particularly like to draw your attention, is that the target of these bombings is nothing other than the dike system itself. The map of the dike system of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, prepared by the Water Conservancy Commission dealing with the dikes

bombed and strafed from March to December 31, 1966, demonstrates very clearly that the irrigation system is one of the main targets of the bombings.

An accompanying map, prepared by the same Commission, which we submit in evidence to the Tribunal, makes it clear that the bombing of dikes has been directed against the most important rivers and canals, and these rivers and canals are not to be found in the proximity of railroads or main roads. Therefore, one can conclude that the bombings of the irrigation system are not the result of error or accident, but have been carried out systematically and deliberately.

The purpose of the bombardment of dikes and the irrigation system in general is not only to cause floods, but also to disrupt economic development and to demoralize the population.

The irrigation system is so important to Vietnam that the success of both the land reform program and the co-operative system depended upon the extent to which they made it easier to build the irrigation system after the abolishment of the landlords. One of the contributions of the co-operatives to the improvement of Vietnamese society has been the mobilization of the people for the construction of the irrigation system. A similar assessment of the success of land reform, based on its ability to improve the irrigation system, can be made for many other countries in Asia as well.

The tremendous increase in the production of rice in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been achieved on the basis of the development of the irrigation system since Independence in 1954. The Vietnamese people have moved over 1,200,000,000 cubic meters of earth, and stretched out the network of river and sea dikes over a land surface of 4,000 km during the ten years following Independence (1955-1965). As a result, 90% of the cultivated area was irrigated, and the irrigation of 80% of rice paddies was provided for through hydraulic works. North Vietnam, which had the lowest yield in the productivity of rice of all the Southeast Asian countries before World War II, is now harvesting a yearly average of four tons of rice per hectare. Five tons of rice per hectare per year is its goal, and we know that it is already producing annually more than five tons per hectare in some areas.

The objective of the bombardment of dikes and other components of the irrigation system is to destroy the achievements of the Vietnamese people, to weaken their determination and to prevent them from continuing to develop their economy . . .

[From the New York Times, Sept. 6, 1972]

ABOUT THE DIKES IN NORTH VIETNAM

"THE ISSUE WILL BE EMPLOYED BY HANOI"

(By Nguyen Tien Hung*)

*Nguyen Tien Hung is associate professor of economics at Howard University.

WASHINGTON—Not only is November the month for the U.S. election, but more important to North Vietnam, it is the time for harvesting the most important crop of the year. The dike issue will therefore be employed by Hanoi for dual purposes: to influence public opinion abroad and to justify poor agricultural performance at home.

The people of Vietnam are grouped around the deltas of two great rivers, the Red River in the North and the Mekong River in the South. While the latter is like the Nile in Egypt, flowing through the South as an irrigator of adjoining lands, the former, in Pierre Gourou's words, "crosses the (Tonkinese) delta as a fearful stranger." It is so strange and fearful that for centuries it has never ceased to be a source of greatest anxiety to the peasants and their rulers for while the Red River supplies water for paddy sowing, transplanting and growth, it can also destroy crops by flooding.

The violence and swiftness of the Red River flow is well known. Heavy rains are often accompanied by great winds which turn into typhoons with winds reaching speeds as high as 101 miles per hour. When they come, the Red River may suddenly break loose, threatening man and his entire rice crop since most of the delta is no more than ten feet above sea level, and some of it is three feet above or less.

Under the Communist regime, state expenditures on hydraulic works accounted for over 70 per cent of total annual spending on agriculture. In spite of these efforts the prospect of completely defending the dikes appears to be as remote now as ever before.

The history of the Red River dikes is one of dike breakings. Between 1890 and 1926 the Tonkin delta suffered sixteen major dike breakings. Between 1927 and 1945, in spite of new, more modern works constructed under the French, the dikes broke seven times. Since the 1954 partition, North Vietnam has not had much luck in controlling seasonal floods. Perhaps with the exception of 1956, 1959, 1964, 1965 and 1967, most of the other years have been classified as bad years, during which typhoons, floods and drought dominated. Natural calamities were climaxed by the devastating flood of last year. On Sept. 2, 1971, Premier Pham Van Dong publicly declared: "Flood waters from upstream have caused the water in the entire system of the Red River and Thaibinh River to rise to an unprecedented level, while heavy downpours in the delta caused added difficulties for the defense of the dike system."

The impact of last year's flood is still being felt in North Vietnam. In spite of substantial relief aid from Communist allies, the food shortage situation remains acute. This year, the summer crop was harvested (during May and June) at the time when the whole population was mobilized to support the current military offensive.

It appears probable that North Vietnam will suffer another calamity this year. At least some major portion of the dikes, especially those which were damaged by last year's flood, will be broken when typhoons strike from now through November.

In the past, North Vietnam's population could turn to the South for food relief in times of crisis. In 1945 when floods ravaged the Tonkin delta and the flow of Southern rice was cut off because of war, starvation claimed the lives of over one million persons. Since the 1954 partition, North Vietnam has turned for assistance to the Communist bloc to partially substitute for the traditional Southern rice. Relief for last year's flood was provided by China, Russia, North Korea and East Germany.

North Vietnam must understand, however, that the vulnerability of its economy to the Red River and the dike system will render the prospect for permanently solving the food problem extremely remote. On the other hand, it cannot count on foreign assistance for lasting relief, especially in view of the Sino-Soviet dispute and its effect on the Communist bloc.

Presumably North Vietnam has looked back toward the South for a solution. It is also highly possible that the devastating flood of last September was a determining factor behind Hanoi's decision to go on toward its goal to conquer the South in the spring offensive. In any case, the food crisis of last year certainly helped strengthen the hand of the hawk faction in North Vietnam.

The Red River, the dikes and the vulnerability of North Vietnam's agricultural sector are critically important in explaining Hanoi's determination in the current conflict.

APPENDIX V. FIRST-HAND REPORTS ON CONDITIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

[From the New Yorker, Aug. 12, 1972]

LETTER FROM HANOI

(By Joseph Kraft)

AUGUST 1.

More than any other capital in the world, probably—and maybe in history as well—Hanoi has grown accustomed to living with war. The city takes its lumps less in the heroic style of London during the blitz than in the spirit of New York at rush hour. Life is unpleasant, and there is an evident need to subordinate self to a larger interest. Still, the misery wears a familiar aspect. It comes in short bursts, and people act in the certain conviction that the trouble will somehow be surmounted.

One reason trouble seems routine is that the American bombing is routine. Almost every day around noon, for instance, a pilotless reconnaissance plane flies in to photograph Hanoi. It moves so rapidly that there is no warning of its approach, and there is small chance for hits by either anti-aircraft guns or the surface-to-air missiles, known as SAMs, that the North Vietnamese have received from the Russians. Only the noise of the drone's breaking through the sound barrier announces its advent. It is a startling noise—like a sudden clap of thunder—but after almost four months of bombing hardly anybody in Hanoi bothers to look up. The drone is dismissed with a shrug as "the noon plane."

Even serious air raids—the raids of June 27th, July 4th, and July 22nd—have a regular pattern. Danger is first signalled by a pre-alert, broadcast through loudspeakers all over town, which announces that American planes have been sighted approaching Hanoi, usually from the southwest, at a distance of more than fifty kilometres—about thirty miles. A second pre-alert, soon afterward, announces that the planes are within the fifty-kilometre radius. Then, within a few minutes, the alert itself sounds—a long, wailing siren note that rises, dips, and then rises again. Minutes later, the planes come into sight—fighter-bombers, floating lazily and then diving on targets to drop bombs, which can be heard as they explode though not seen as they fall. As soon as the planes are visible, the racket of the anti-aircraft guns begins. Almost simultaneously, the SAMs can be seen, powered upward by rocket engines that give off a faint red glow. During the raid of July 4th, it was possible to follow the glow of a missile until a plane was struck and sent spinning to earth, trailing a cloud of black smoke. More often, the SAMs miss the planes, enter the upper atmosphere, and explode in a puff of white vapor. Then, suddenly, the planes are gone, and the siren is sounded on a steady note, signalling the all-clear. Several of the embassies here record the raids, both on film and on tape. The diplomats play the films and tapes over and over, and there has developed among them a kind of connoisseurs' taste in raids. One Canadian representative, before playing his recordings of the July 4th raid, remarked to me, "Visually, June 27th was a better raid, but sonically July 4th was superior." Listening to the recording, I had a chance to clock the raid; from first pre-alert to all-clear, it lasted twenty-seven minutes.

Short though the attacks are, they dominate life in Hanoi. A considerable part (some say forty per cent, some say twenty per cent) of the city's population has been removed to places of safety, in the mountains fifty miles northwest of Hanoi and elsewhere. Most of the government leaders seem to have left, apparently for a mountain hideout. Large numbers of young children have been evacuated, and the streets of Hanoi seem, by Asian standards, empty of boys and girls; when I went to change money recently at the state bank (a formidable pile that in French colonial days housed a main office of the Banque de l'Indochine), one of the women tellers had with her her little girl, who had come in from an evacuation camp for a couple of days.

As a further safety measure, virtually all public gatherings have been stopped. No films are being shown. The theatres are shut down, as are all museums.

Boating on the Little Lake, a chief recreation spot in downtown Hanoi, has been suspended. The International Club, which has a pool where diplomats used to seek relief from the terrible hundred-degree heat of summer days, has been closed. Sunday Mass at the Cathedral is now said at four-thirty in the morning. The central markets have regulations to discourage shoppers from dawdling over their purchases, and an effort has been made to put decentralized, travelling markets in all neighborhoods.

The extent of the damage done by the bombing is hard to determine, especially for foreigners. We are restricted in our movements, and since even the driving of cars is forbidden, correspondents and diplomats must rely on government-assigned chauffeurs to get around. The general impression among Western diplomats is that, for reasons of morale, the government understates bombing losses. In trips I took outside Hanoi, I saw evidence of considerable destruction and death. The two main bridges leading east from Hanoi to the port of Haiphong have been bombed out, and the port itself is in ruins. All the major bridges on the road leading south to the Demilitarized Zone and the front lines have also been destroyed. The textile town of Nam Dinh, about forty-five miles southeast of Hanoi, has been badly battered, and presumably all towns farther south have been even more badly battered. South of Hanoi, I saw two spots where American bombs had seriously damaged the network of dikes that prevents the Red River from flooding in the rainy season (from mid-May through September): near Phu Ly, I saw a sluice gate that had been smashed; south of Nam Dinh, I saw a dike badly cracked and pitted by bomb craters. The hits were probably accidental, since both sites were close to more likely targets—roads and a railroad. But they did take place, and, in a sense—given the extent of the dikes (twenty-seven hundred miles), the number of bombing sorties daily over North Vietnam (about three hundred), and the probable error made by the pilots (quite substantial, in my judgement)—they were bound to take place. If the hitting of the dikes was not deliberate, it was surely predictable.

On the morning of July 8th, I visited a town thirty-six miles east of Hanoi—a trading center called Hung Wen, with a population of about twenty thousand—within twenty-four hours after it had been struck by American planes. The bombs had hit an area about a thousand yards long and five hundred yards wide in the middle of town. According to the local authorities, eighteen blast bombs had been dropped, along with four anti-personnel bombs; each of the latter contains 192,500 steel pellets, which are hurled through the air when the bomb explodes. Seventeen persons were killed and twenty-five wounded. Forty-three houses were destroyed, thirty-six by fire and seven by the force of concussion. One of the houses destroyed belonged to Vo Nguyen Dam. He and two of his children were killed; his wife and three other children survived. In the rubble of their home, I met one of the survivors, a married daughter. She had been burned in the attack, and was poking about in a dazed way. Bits of a body—a charred jawbone, a hank of hair, what looked like a leg—were lying around, and she was trying to assemble them. She kept muttering, "My brother and sister were innocent."

Another destroyed home belonged to Nguyen Van Lam, a seventy-two-year-old grandfather. He said that he was a Catholic and that his family had been saying prayers when the attack came. His wife, his only son, and his grandson had all been killed. He stood in the rubble, a toothless old man dressed in brownish-red pajamas, and raised his fists to the heavens. "I feel deep hatred against the Americans!" he shouted. "As long as I live, I will have hatred in my heart!"

All sixteen beds in the emergency ward of the local hospital were filled. As I entered, I saw a five-year-old boy, his body covered with burns. There was a thirteen-year-old girl whose left leg had been severed just above the knee. There were two children whose bodies were full of steel pellets from the anti-personnel bombs. The doctor who took me around said as we emerged from the ward, "You Americans say you do not mean to kill people. Why, then, do you use antipersonnel bombs?"

Some sections of Hanoi proper have been bombed. I was shown three public-housing projects, comprising about five hundred apartments, that had been destroyed in the raids of June 27th and July 4th. The authorities claim that the raid of July 22nd knocked out a water-purifying plant. I was told that hospitals and schools had been hit in raids during the spring. The industrial power plant for the city has been destroyed, and the electric current that emanates from the remaining power plant is feeble and subject to repeated failure. But otherwise Hanoi is remarkably intact. It bears the aspect of a nineteenth-century French provincial capital, very clean and rather drab, with broad, tree-lined avenues and

airy public buildings of reddish or mustard-colored concrete. The working day starts around dawn, breaks at eleven for four hours, and resumes at three in the afternoon for another four hours. At the beginning and end of every break, the streets are filled with men and women going to and from offices, shops, and factories. The men wear sandals, cotton trousers, and short-sleeved sports shirts, usually white and open at the neck. The women are dressed in the traditional *ao dai*, and they all seem to have the lissome beauty made so familiar to Americans by the women of South Vietnam. Compared with Saigon, where the streets are messy with beggars, prostitutes, peddlers, and families cooking on the sidewalks, Hanoi has almost no street life. The police and the military, both highly visible in Saigon, are rarely seen in Hanoi; even their manning of checkpoints at the city gates—by soldiers in little huts, which they rarely leave—is discreet.

Most shopping is done in the early morning, and the closest thing to a crowd in Hanoi is the collection of housewives bustling about the central market just after dawn. By making huge purchases of food, both abroad and from peasants at home, and by rationing such goods as rice and cloth, the government keeps the prices of necessities within the reach of a consuming public whose earnings average ninety dong, or thirty dollars, a month. Rationed rice (under a system that allots thirty-three pounds a month to a worker, nineteen to a child, and thirty to a government minister) costs about six and a half cents a pound. When I visited the market, beef was going for about forty-five cents a pound, fresh carp for thirty-five cents a pound, fish sauce for twenty cents a pound, and fresh eggs for a dollar a dozen. Pineapples cost twenty cents a piece, tomatoes thirty-five cents a pound. Ducks were being sold, live, at thirty cents a pound.

Goods other than food are bought at government-controlled department or specialty stores. At one department store, I priced soap at twenty cents a bar for a Russian-made brand and forty cents a bar for a luxury item from East Germany, conical hats at eighty cents a piece, plastic raincoats at a dollar a piece, and sleeping mats at forty cents. Sandals cost four dollars a pair, and shoes were on special sale, reduced from eight dollars a pair to six dollars. A short-wave radio cost three hundred and fifty dollars, a Russian-made camera five hundred dollars. Next to the department store was a tailor shop, and there I found shirts selling for three dollars and fifteen cents a piece, and trousers for four dollars and seventy-five cents a pair. Next to the tailor shop was a Western restaurant—the Restaurant of European Dishes. Its menu, which was displayed, in the Continental style, outside the entrance, included a beef dish for thirty cents, an omelette for thirty cents, and stuffed crab for sixty cents. I had some of the crab, and it was very good.

The availability of fresh seafood in a Hanoi restaurant bears on one of the never-ending American arguments about Vietnam. Despite the mining of the harbors since mid-May, and the intensive bombing of all internal transportation lines, North Vietnam is plainly not paralyzed. Large quantities of goods move at a fairly rapid clip all the time. Trucks provide the chief means of transport, and downtown Hanoi, where the bombing is relatively sporadic, has become a kind of national parking lot. The railways have been cut at all the major rivers, but at night I saw several trains being pulled by steam locomotives on the lines between bridges. One foreign ambassador told me that on a nighttime trip to Haiphong he had counted seven moving freight trains. I myself have no evidence that a way around the mining has been found, but the Swedish Embassy here recently received a consignment of tonic water sent by sea, and curtains sent by ship to the British mission arrived the other day. Rumors persist that the North Vietnamese are unloading freighter cargoes at sea onto landing craft and other shallow-draft wooden vessels, which pass over the mines without activating them.

Laborious individual effort, systematically organized and repeated over and over again, is required to keep transport moving. Pontoon bridges have been set up to replace most of the bombed-out road bridges. Traffic moves in one-way bursts of half an hour each; at fixed times sections of the pontoon bridges are removed to allow passage of river traffic. To supplement the pontoon bridges, ferries—usually barges pushed by river steamers—have been set up at most major crossings. Sections of the railways are constantly being demolished by bombing and are constantly being replaced. Pontoon bridges cannot replace the destroyed railway bridges, but the North Vietnamese move merchandise by rail between bridges, then load it on trucks for the river crossing, and then back on freight cars. The trucks come from all corners of the Communist world—Russia, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany—and they have been painted brown, numbered, and incorporated into a national fleet. They move mainly by night, with

headlights hooded. During the day, they line the streets of Hanoi, parked in the shadow of buildings or trees and often camouflaged with leafy branches.

Underlying this laborious effort is a furious concentration on the war and its object—reunification with South Vietnam. The foremost official expression of this well-nigh obsessive focus is the last will and testament of President Ho Chi Minh, written in May of 1969 and published at his death, on September 3rd of that year. "Even though our people's struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation, may have to go through more hardships and sacrifices, we are bound to win total victory," the testament begins. A subsequent passage asserts:

"The war of resistance against U.S. aggression may drag on. Our people may have to face new sacrifices of life and property. Whatever happens, we must keep firm our resolve to fight the U.S. aggressors till total victory.

"Our mountains will always be, our rivers will always be, our people will always be;

"The American invaders defeated, we will rebuild our land ten times more beautiful.

"No matter what difficulties and hardships lie ahead, our people are sure of total victory. The U.S. imperialists will certainly have to quit. Our fatherland will certainly be reunified. Our fellow-countrymen in the South and in the North will certainly be reunited under the same roof. We, a small nation, will have earned the signal honor of defeating, through heroic struggle, two big imperialisms—the French and the American—and of making a worthy contribution to the world national-liberation movement."

The six leading officials of North Vietnam—Le Duan, the First Secretary of the Workers', or Communist Party; Truong Chinh, the President of the National Assembly; Vo Nguyen Giap, the Defense Minister; Pham Van Dong, the Prime Minister; Nguyen Duy Trinh, a Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister; and Le Duc Tho, the Politburo member who sits on the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks—have all sworn allegiance to Ho's testament. Parts of the testament are reprinted under pictures of Ho in markets, offices, and other public places. A placard bearing the line "No matter what difficulties and hardships lie ahead, our people are sure of total victory" is situated at a particularly lovely spot on the shore of the Little Lake in Hanoi. When I remarked to my interpreter that that seemed a queer place to put a call to arms, he replied that, on the contrary, it was entirely appropriate. The Little Lake, he told me, was also known as the Lake of the Restored Sword. In the early fifteenth century, at a time when Vietnam was being invaded by the Chinese from the north, the Emperor Le Loi was out boating, and a tortoise surfaced and gave the Emperor a sword. With that sword, the Emperor beat the Chinese. He then went back to the lake and returned the sword to the tortoise. "The lake," my interpreter said, "is the symbol of our will to be a nation."

Another sign of the intense national commitment to the struggle is the Vietnamese radio. The Voice of Vietnam, as the radio is called, is the principal national medium. Among the twenty-one million residents of North Vietnam, there are five hundred thousand private radios and six hundred thousand loudspeaker units to relay broadcasts to the villages and hamlets. "Our main subject is the fight against U.S. aggression," Tran Lam, the director of the Voice of Vietnam, told me. "Our whole program has as its central theme the strength of our people versus U.S. aggression." On one typical morning, broadcasting began at five with a fifteen-minute program for the peasants. The subject, according to Mr. Lam, was "how to achieve high yield in rice cultivation despite the bombing." At five-fifteen, there was a two-part news bulletin. The first part announced "victories achieved in the past twenty-four hours in North and South Vietnam." The second part dealt with "threats to the dikes by U.S. imperialists and the condemnation of their action by the world public." At five-thirty-five, an announcer read the day's lead editorial in *Nhan Dan*, the official newspaper of the Workers' Party; it dealt with an anti-aircraft unit and the techniques used against low-flying American planes. At five-forty-five, there was a children's program on the subject of "how young people in the country should receive city children who are being evacuated." So it went for the rest of the day. The last program at eleven o'clock at night, was a study of "crimes committed by the U.S. and the lackey Thieu [as President Nguyen Van Thieu is always called here] in terrorizing the students of South Vietnam." The sign-off, at eleven-thirty, was an announcement of the number of American planes shot down—with a separate figure for hits on B-52s—since the war began.

This ceaseless concentration on a war waged against heavy odds has caused some Vietnamese, particularly in the leadership circles, to see themselves at the

center of world history—a nation anointed to carry the torch of revolution. In a speech published on February 3rd, which is now deemed important as an expression of Hanoi's decision to launch the March 30th offensive in South Vietnam. Truong Chinh, the Assembly President, called Vietnam "the focus of the basic contradictions of human society." Nguyen Khac Vien, the French-educated editor of the scholarly publication *Vietnamese Studies*, with whom I had one of my rare unsupervised interviews, expounded on the theme without any evident self-consciousness. "Vietnam has become the focus of the three conflicts central to the present age," he said, as though he were stating a known fact apparent to the meanest intelligence. "It is the front line in the fight between colonialists and anti-colonialists. It is the front line in the fight between capitalists and Socialists. It is the front line in the international class struggle between the rich and the people."

Hong Chuong, an editor of the Communist monthly theoretical journal *Hoc Tap*, made the same point with what seemed to me melodramatic self-importance. I met him in the *Hoc Tap* offices, which are in a pleasant tower-shaped building overlooking a pond. The reception room was decorated with cases full of historical mementoes, including a first edition of *Pravda*, some medals depicting Lenin and Ho Chi Minh, and some fragments of American bombs. The ashtrays in the reception room were made from bomb casings. I opened the conversation by asking for a few biographical details, and Mr. Chuong told me, "We don't speak about ourselves, because we consider each individual a drop of water in the ocean of the people. But I can tell you that I am a journalist about fifty years old."

I asked Mr. Chuong whether he was born in North or South Vietnam. He said, "We don't make that distinction. Our President, our Prime Minister, and the First Secretary of our Party were born in the South. Our country is one. The problem of partition is a problem that has been made by you American imperialists."

I asked him to tell me about the Vietnamese approach to Marxism and how it differs from the Russian and Chinese approaches. He said, "Our tradition is one of fighting, and we put it in the framework of Leninism. It is not enough to say that we have been fighting for thirty years. We have been fighting for much longer than that. We have made a contribution to Socialism in military thinking. Let me take as an example our national hero Tran Huong Dao. He rose up against the Mongol invasions two centuries before Columbus. These were the same Mongols who took China and India and Europe. They were defeated in Vietnam. Not once but three times we defeated them. And each time, I may say, we took prisoners and released them—fifty thousand each time. I once read an article by an American comparing Tran Huong Dao with Clausewitz. I think that underestimates Tran Huong Dao. Clausewitz existed in the eighteenth century; Tran Huong Dao was five centuries before him. Moreover, Tran Huong Dao was not only a great military writer, as was Clausewitz. He was also a great general of armies. I think Tran Huong Dao is a head taller than Clausewitz."

"But you asked about the originality of Vietnamese Socialism. Here is an example. In Russia, Lenin replaced Kerensky and the Czar. Lenin represented the proletariat, and Kerensky and the Czar represented the bourgeoisie and the nobles. But they were all Russians. In China, Mao Tse-tung replaced Chiang Kai-shek. Mao represented the peasants, and Chiang was a representative of the warlords. But they were both Chinese. In Vietnam, however, Ho Chi Minh replaced the Japanese Fascists and the French colonialists. President Ho was Vietnamese. They were foreigners. Our contribution to Marxism is not a question of doctrine. We have creative minds, and we are not stuck on any formula."

One mistake that the Americans always make is to think that we will do what the Russians did or the Chinese did. In that sense, you are dogmatists. But we follow our own ways, and that is why you are being defeated. If there is a single piece of advice I would give to Kissinger, the adviser of Nixon, it would be: Abandon dogmatism. For instance, in chess you can imagine a board full of pieces where the right move will win. You can also imagine a board where most of the pieces are gone and where the right move will also win. We have used both tactics against the Americans."

I said that I was not sure I followed his argument, and he said, "A baby of two cannot understand an adult of forty, but an adult of forty can understand a baby of two. The United States will be two hundred years old in four years. Vietnam is now four thousand years old. Vietnam can understand the two-hundred-year-old United States. But the United States cannot understand the four-thousand-year-old Vietnam. Nixon said recently that the war had lasted eleven years and

had been hard and long. For us, it has not been long enough. We have been fighting eleven centuries, not eleven years. We fought eighty years against the French. When we came to understand that we would have to fight against the United States, we were sure it would take longer. We thought it would take a century, and we are ready to fight for a century. But Nixon has only two cards to play now. He can destroy Hanoi. That is one. He can destroy the dikes. That is the other. But we are not afraid. Let him play them. After that, he will be defeated."

After that interview, I told Ngo Dien, the official of the North Vietnamese Foreign Office who had finally approved my application for a visa to Hanoi, that some of his countrymen seemed to me positively fanatical in their single-minded attention to Vietnam and the war. He said, "We are not fanatics. If we were fanatics, we would lynch the pilots when they were shot down, not treat them correctly in prison camps. If we were fanatics, you would not be here." He went on to point out that immoderate boasting was one response of a small and backward country caught up in a war with a great power, and that another response was to show the special modesty personified by Ho Chi Minh. "The example of our President," he said, "has had a great impact on the Vietnamese people."

Perhaps by accident, perhaps by prearrangement, in everything that happened to me thereafter in Hanoi the softer side of the Vietnamese character emerged. A curious instance occurred at a dinner given for me by the Vietnamese press association. Among the guests was Colonel Ha Van Lau, the officer who negotiated the military cease-fire with the French back in 1954, and a former member of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris peace talks—a man whom I had come to know as the toughest of the tough. Colonel Lau is now in charge of the office that investigates what the North Vietnamese call American war crimes. In an earlier encounter during my visit to Hanoi, Colonel Lau had described American depredations against his country in the harshest terms. He had flung out his words contemptuously, the way a Spaniard spits. But at dinner he was another person. We talked about President Nixon's visit to China and his trip to the Great Wall. I said that the President's comments had not been distinguished but that it was hard to know how an American President should respond to the sight of the Great Wall. Someone suggested that he should have written a poem. "Better a song," Colonel Lau put in. He said that songs were particularly suitable to memorable places. He said there was one song that always reminded him of Paris. It was sung by an American, Josephine Baker. Did I know it? And suddenly the severe military man, who sometimes, in the fury of his nationalism, affected not to speak French, began to sing, in a voice that wasn't at all bad: "J'ai deux amours Mon pays et Paris. . . ."

The next day, an interview was arranged with Nguyen Dinh Thi, a writer, whose work ranges from a critique of Aristotle to a song that the national radio uses as its theme. One of his novels, "The Dike That Exploded," was a best-seller. As secretary of the Writers' Union, he has been in touch with literary figures the world over. Yevtushenko had been his guest during a visit to Vietnam. "I liked him very much," Thi said. "But he is an actor. I told him, 'You are the Don Quixote of world literature.'" Thi told me that "by tradition and wisdom and the teachings of Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people have developed a spirit of bitter intransigence in a fight." He went on, "Our people are performing now as the victims of barbarism. I regret that you haven't seen another side of us. We are poor. We are used to a hard life. We have typhoons every year. We do the backbreaking work of cultivating rice. Our tradition is that everybody helps everybody else. We respect literature more than war in our country, and there has never been a military caste here, as there was in Japan. An expression we use all the time is '*Tinh thuong*,' which means a combination of pity, compassion, and love. We know that we live on the edges of the great powers. We see that we have to be prudent and modest. We have a great sense of humanity, a sense of the pity of humanity."

At a reception the day after that, I met Ton That Tung, a distinguished surgeon and a relative of the former emperor Bao Dai. Among other things, Dr. Tung has translated into French the works of To Huu, a leading contemporary poet, who works in the Secretariat of the Workers' Party. I told Dr. Tung that some of his countrymen seemed peculiarly harsh to me—as if fighting were the only way they knew of to achieve things. I asked him if there was anything that he found unique in the Vietnamese personality. He said, "You should notice that when we entertain we never lord it over people—we put them wholly at ease. And we don't have religious disputes; except when foreigners were involved, we had toleration for all religions."

He asked me what other impressions I had of North Vietnam. I said something about the need to end the war. Feeling that to be banal, I added that the two sides seemed so far apart and that there was so little mutual trust that I was pessimistic about a settlement. Dr. Tung was not so pessimistic. He said, "I know your people are tired of the war. Do you think our people want to go on fighting forever?"

I found that leaving Hanoi was almost as hard as getting there. Only four regular planes a week come to Hanoi; two small Chinese planes with chancy connections through Nanking to Canton and Hong Kong; an Ilyushin 18, run by Aeroflot, which goes out through Laos; and a converted Second World War Stratoliner, which is run by the International Control Commission set up at the Geneva Conference of 1954, and which also goes out through Laos. Bad weather forced two cancellations, but finally I left aboard the Russian airliner. My chauffeur, my interpreter, and a woman guide from the Foreign Ministry who had supervised my entire trip all came out to the Gia Lam airport to escort me through customs and wait for the plane to take off. As we sipped beer and lemonade in the departure lounge, a good cross-section of the foreign diplomats and journalists stationed in Hanoi passed in review. They are cut off from normal Vietnamese life by the language barrier and various restrictions, including the prohibition against driving cars. Much as settlers in the West used to arrange their lives around the pony express, the foreign colony in Hanoi orders its life around the planes from the outside world. Among those I saw were an Arab diplomat, who assured me that a particularly tough statement put out the night before by the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry was done for "domestic consumption," and an East European diplomat, who said the statement showed that revisionism was finally taking hold in Hanoi. A military attaché observed that he had recently been counting the number of anti-aircraft guns parked along the road from Hanoi to Gia Lam; it was down from ninety-six a week ago to sixty-two—a probable sign that the guns had been moved south, toward the front. A West European diplomat observed that though the Paris peace negotiations had resumed, they would probably not get anywhere, because the North Vietnamese did not feel for Nixon the kind of trust they felt for Pierre Mendès-France, who negotiated the Geneva settlement back in 1954. I also saw a Russian diplomat, with whom I shared a bomb shelter at the Foreign Ministry during an air-raid alert, and a Soviet journalist—one of two indistinguishable heavies representing *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, who were known to the speakers of English in Hanoi as Mutt and Jeff. As each of these passing acquaintances talked, my guide drew for me on a napkin the ideograms used to denote their countries. I asked her to draw the characters for America, the characters mean 'beautiful country.' I wish you Americans would stop behaving in a way that is—I won't say it. I wish you would start behaving again in a way that is beautiful."

[From the Atlantic Monthly, August 1972]

NORTH VIETNAM: A VISIT TO A HOSPITAL

(By Anthony Lewis)

Dr. Ton That Tung is professor of medicine at the University of Hanoi and director of the Vietnam-German Friendship Hospital, a university hospital for surgery. He is a remarkable man who symbolizes a rather surprising aspect of life in North Vietnam: amid the overwhelming obsessions of war, a tradition of scholarship and respect for Western thought somehow survives.

We met in his hospital office. In the tropical heat and damp of Hanoi, Dr. Tung was wearing a chic white roll-neck sweater. A man of sixty, he bounded in and out of his chair during the conversation to find scientific papers or write medical terms in my notebook. He spoke French and Vietnamese and English. At one point he referred to a letter to the editor in a recent issue of the international *Herald-Tribune*. He had been in Paris last January, to receive the honor of a diploma from the Academy of Surgery, and was going again in June for a medical meeting. He mentioned with pleasure that the Frenchman who trained him in Hanoi in the 1930s, Dr. Jacques May, now an American citizen, had flown to Paris from Boston for the January ceremony.

He waved off an offered cigarette, saying he had read the American Surgeon General's latest report on smoking. "I've made two or three speeches against it here," he said, "but people always stand up in the audience and say they have

smoked for sixty years and are still alive!" Dr. Tung laughed. "Now there are some reports of whiskey and coffee being damaging. That would be too bad."

Dr. Tung is a specialist in liver surgery. He has developed a new operating technique for cancer of the liver: "I use a method of blocking the hepatic artery to starve the carcinoma cells. I know that in the United States they say that's impossible, but we do it. We started the research in 1962, experimenting first on dogs, and published the results for the first time in 1970." He went to his desk and pulled out a reprint of an article in a French medical journal of March, 1972: a Dr. J. M. Krivine had tried the Tung liver operation and reported that it worked.

Then Dr. Tung discussed what he said was a dramatic increase in the incidence of liver cancer. "I used to operate on one case a week. Now it is almost one a day. We have compared figures for two periods, 1955 to 1961 and 1962 to 1969, and hepatoma increased by a factor of five." The first period was before the United States began spraying herbicides in South Vietnam, and Dr. Tung suspected that there was a connection.

One widely used herbicide contained the chemical dioxin, Dr. Tung said. Dioxin has been found to cause chromosome mutations responsible for malformations in infants. Now there was reason to suspect, he said, that dioxin could cause cancer, and that its particular target was the liver. He was working with doctors in France, Britain, and the United States to analyze dioxin and establish whether it was a cause of liver cancer. He mentioned that another recent American visitor had taken a liver section from him for Matthew Meselson, professor of biology at Harvard; he wondered whether it had ever reached Meselson. (It had.)

"This is not a question only for Vietnam," Dr. Tung said. "For example, liver cancer used to be very rare in France. But now, in Paris, for every four cases of cirrhosis there is one hepatoma. If we can prove that this kind of element causes liver cancer, that would mean great progress in the study of cancer—and possibly a key for the whole question of pollution.

"So the war in Vietnam could have a worldwide effect—we could learn from it, because it is serving as a testing ground for many things in the destruction of men and nature. Most people who speak on Vietnam talk of politics, but now doctors are beginning to look at the scientific questions."

WAR INJURIES

The tone of Dr. Tung's conversation was never propagandistic through the long conversation. He is regarded, in North Vietnam and outside, as a nonpolitical figure of a scientific eminence that allows him to be that. But it was quite inevitable, in Hanoi in 1972, that the war would find its way into the conversation often.

He was talking about tropical diseases, intestinal parasites, when the sound of airplanes was heard overhead. It was early in the morning, so Dr. Tung said jokingly that they were not American: "They are bureaucratic—they start at ten. So we start work at six."

When I saw Professor May in Paris, we talked about professional things and about the possibility of cooperation between our countries on science after the war. I said that American scientists should know about what is happening in Vietnam. Then there would be a chance that they would help us, and we shall need the help."

"ALL WARS END"

I asked whether, after all that had happened, North Vietnam would want aid from the United States.

"Some Americans are helping us right now!" Dr. Tung said. "We fought the French, and now our relations are good. It should be the same with the United States. Nixon will not be in power forever.

"All wars must end. The important thing is what happens afterward. We think the American people should see their duty to help. I have found so many fine things in Americans. But I wonder whether people understand the destruction that has happened here. American help is necessary. And those who have destroyed should help to rebuild."

Asked to name the major public-health problems of North Vietnam, Dr. Tung mentioned stomach ulcers and heart disease along with cancer of the liver. "Some say ulcers are related to diet," he remarked, "but I think the high incidence is related to tension—the stress of the war." He said there had been "a war of one kind or another here since 1939; Allied planes from China bombed this hospital in 1942, when the Japanese were here."

Heart surgery has been done at the Vietnam-German Hospital since 1958—perhaps a thousand cases so far, Dr. Tung said. Since 1965 the hospital has done open-heart surgery, but there have been only about fifty of those operations. Dr. Tung explained that doctors could do them only during the cold season, from September to February, because in the heat they perspire profusely and there is too much danger of infection. The hospital has no air conditioning.

It is an old and shabby hospital by American standards. With a smile, Dr. Tung pointed out the only elevator, a massive seventy-year-old model. Most of the furniture and equipment are rather dated, but on a quick tour one could see a new French heart-lung machine, an American pump to go with it, Chinese operating tables, a Czech anesthetic device, a Soviet respirator, East German and Hungarian lights.

The hospital has four hundred beds. It is for surgical cases only, with separate wings for children, orthopedic cases, heart and liver surgery, and so on. The windows are taped in case of bombing, some in flower or snowflake designs. There are emergency operating rooms underground, in air-raid shelters with the look of catacombs. The doctors have a library, jammed into a small room, that includes many American and English medical journals and books.

Dr. Tung joked about the physical conditions but evidently did not consider them too important. He said that things had improved a great deal since he first became director of the hospital, in 1955. (That was after the Geneva Conference and the departure of the French, but he did not mention that.) "We did not even have an anesthetic department in 1955," he said. "I was the professor, and I had four other doctors under me. Now there are eighty assisting doctors." In North Vietnam as a whole, he added, there was one doctor for every 200,000 people in 1955; now there was one for every 4000. The figures were hard to believe of a small, undeveloped country that has been at war most of the time since 1955. But then much that happens in North Vietnam is extraordinary, and in this case there was persuasive evidence in the person of Dr. Tung.

[From the New York Times, May 17, 1972]

HANOI AIDES SAY THEY EXPECT HEAVIER BOMBING

(By Anthony Lewis)

HANOI, North Vietnam, May 16—North Vietnamese officials are telling diplomats and journalists that they expect heavier American bombing and other attacks before long and are prepared to meet them.

"The escalation has just begun," one official said. "Nixon can go on up other rungs of the ladder. Maybe this building will cease to exist."

He was speaking in the Foreign Ministry, an imposing legacy of French colonial rule. The official grinned and added, "But we shall just have to adapt ourselves to circumstances."

MANY LEAVE THE CITY

So far as foreigners can tell, the Government is acting on the assumption that worse is ahead. For example, families whose children have been evacuated from Hanoi have been told to register them for school next September in country areas where they have gone. Most children and old people and many women have left Hanoi—about half the city's normal million population.

Informed sources said that the second phase of the evacuation—the removal of nonessential industry and services—has begun. If necessary, it is said, two more phases will be carried out—the closing of all industry and finally the removal of all civilians.

In Hanoi proper no bombs have fallen in the last three days, though there have been frequent alerts. Government spokesmen say that the bombing continues elsewhere and that the coast is still being shelled, though there is no way to confirm that here.

The small group of non-Communist diplomats here believe that the pause in the bombing of Hanoi is related to President Nixon's scheduled visit to Moscow next week.

Several diplomats today expressed concern that the bombing might be intensified if the Soviet Union canceled the summit meeting at the last minute. Last

week's bombing did some damage to the British commercial mission here and reportedly to the Chinese economic mission.

North Vietnamese say that they will continue fighting and stick to their demand for the ouster of South Vietnam's President, Nguyen Van Thieu, no matter what the United States does. It is, of course, difficult to appraise such statements on a brief visit. But experienced Westerners here uniformly say they believe in North Vietnam's determination.

An incident today may indicate the state of mind of the North Vietnamese.

This correspondent was talking with Col. Ha Van Lau, the former deputy chief of mission to the Paris peace talks who now heads the war crimes commission, a Government agency that reports on the effects of the bombing.

Colonel Lau was showing pictures of death and destruction and torn bodies caused, he said, by American antipersonnel bombs and rockets. Suddenly sirens sounded. We went to a public shelter nearby, a concrete tunnel 11 steps below ground—perhaps eight feet. It was a claustrophobic place. The tunnel was about 20 feet long and less than six feet high at the center. Sixty people crowded onto narrow benches at each side or stood in the middle. The alert lasted half an hour.

Everyone in the shelter except this correspondent was Vietnamese and all laughed and chatted throughout.

"You can see how we are," Colonel Lau remarked after a while. "Nixon cannot understand us."

"This is the seventh year of the war of destruction," he went on. "It could last 10 more years and we are still sure we would be victorious."

Colonel Lau was asked whether attitudes would be the same if the coastal blockade of North Vietnam lasted indefinitely, causing shortages of food and raw materials, or if the bombing became heavier. When the question was translated, a plump man in a pith helmet a few feet away commented, "You must not understand the Vietnamese," Colonel Lau said:

"We have anticipated the worst and have all the means to face it. Ho Chi Minh said that Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities would be destroyed but that we could not be defeated—he predicted it."

Among Western diplomats here the big subject of speculation remains what Soviet leaders will do about the mining of the ports.

Some observers suggest that the mining could make North Vietnam more dependent on China. The Chinese previously supplied a large labor force to repair damaged roads and rail lines and may do so again if land transport becomes Hanoi's only link with the outside world.

[From the New York Times, May 21, 1972]

NORTH VIETNAM—HERE THERE IS NO THRESHOLD OF PAIN

HANOI—When Henry Kissinger briefed the White House press May 9 about the decision to mine North Vietnamese ports, he ended by saying that he still hoped for a negotiated settlement. "Even in Vietnam," he said, "there must be some realities that transcend the parochial concern of the contestants."

The briefest visit to North Vietnam would likely revise Mr. Kissinger's hopes on that score. It must be one of the most parochial countries on earth, seemingly wholly concerned with itself and its war.

Listening to the radio in a language one does not speak, one hears again and again—every few sentences it seems—the words *Mien-nam Vietnam* meaning South Vietnam. The other familiar word is a name newspapers spell *Nich-Xon*. The papers are all about Vietnam; the news from abroad concerns foreign comments on the war.

This singlemindedness is eerie to someone brought up in the casual non-ideological American tradition. But it is plainly a factor that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger must consider as they weigh practical possibilities of ending the war. Along with concentration on the one subject there is an air of supreme self-confidence—at least so expressed and, so far as can be told, quite genuine.

For example, a week ago a young man from Thanhhoa, the most heavily bombed province, spoke about a famous bridge there at Hamrong. During the Johnson years Americans bombed it repeatedly but never cut it. The North Vietnamese claimed they shot down 99 planes at the bridge by 1968 and the young man said, "Nixon added one more last December to round it off."

A few days later the American command announced that Hamrong bridge had been successfully hit. The young man was asked whether he had heard about it.

"Oh, yes," he said cheerily, "I heard it on the B.B.C. But if it is so, they will repair it soon."

The visitor has to rub his eyes and remember that this small country—where carts are still pulled by water buffalo and an overwhelming proportion of the people live the simplest peasant lives—is fighting the United States.

Where does their confidence come from? Most foreign experts on Vietnam cite history as a major factor, and from here that seems convincing. The street that runs in front of the main hotel in Hanoi is named for King Ngo Quyen who expelled the Chinese overlords in the year 938. Another street is named for the Trung sisters who led a revolt against the Han Chinese in the first century A.D.

In an odd way, the country that all this brings to mind is Israel. There, too, history has given the nation determination and self-confidence utterly out of proportion to its size. And there, too, there is the basic conviction—often irritating to allies—that the country cannot rely on outsiders but has to take care of itself.

European Communist newspapermen, like the few non-Communist journalists here, find much in Vietnamese attitudes that go beyond determination to fanaticism. How, for example, should one react to an experience like the following:

The other day I was invited to the house where the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam has its representation in Hanoi—incidentally, the former United States Consulate General. There I met Miss Pham Thi Nguyen, a 22-year-old "freedom fighter" from South Vietnam.

Miss Nguyen, a plump little woman who talked with great animation and smiled shyly, said American soldiers had killed her parents and eight brothers and sister in a village near Danan, South Vietnam, in August, 1965. At the age of 15 she stole explosives, made a mine and killed seven Americans.

She said she was taken prisoner in 1967, tortured by American and South Vietnamese soldiers. Among other things too grisly to relate, she said they nailed both her hands to a wooden table. She was eventually rescued by guerrillas, she said, and joined them. She won designation as an "intrepid fighter" after personally killing 21 Americans. In 1969 she walked to Hanoi—500 miles in three months.

Propaganda? Of course. Could there nevertheless be some truth in it? Judging by Miss Nguyen's demeanor as she told the bloodcurdling story, yes. There are horrors enough on both sides of this war: After Mylai we know anything can be true.

But there may be a different point to make of that conversation. It lies in the very fact that it was considered useful to tell such a chilling story. All wars brutalize, but there can have been few as brutalizing as this.


Even without individual atrocity stories there is reason enough for the average Vietnamese to feel bitterness. I saw Haiphong last week and parts of it—including a hospital, a school and extensive housing—have been flattened like Coventry. The official figure of deaths from daylong raids April 16 is 244, but some Western diplomats think well over 1,000 may have died.

In these circumstances—and other examples of civilian destruction abound—it is remarkable that most Vietnamese continue to make a distinction between "aggressors" and other Americans. Strangers generally are treated with courtesy and kindness.

Another extraordinary fact is that the country is prepared to take more destruction. Or at least many people say so, and convincingly. Officials say they expect a further American escalation in due course. With that in mind, they have ordered most Hanoi residents to evacuate to the countryside. Families have been told to register children in school for next September at the villages where they have gone.

In practical terms for Henry Kissinger, all this means that counting on the North Vietnamese to be "reasonable" and fit into some neat global package is almost certainly misguided. There is simply no Western observer here who thinks Hanoi will give up its basic demand that President Nguyen Van Thieu resign from the Saigon Administration.

One non-Communist observer here put it: "This is the same for them as 1940 for Britain. Or maybe it is something more. I've never met people like this. The threshold-of-pain theory does not work."



APPENDIX VI. SELECTED PRESS REPORTS ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

[From the Washington Post, May 19, 1972]

U.S. CITES HEAVY N. VIET BOMB DAMAGE

(By Lee Lescaze)

SAIGON, May 17 (Wednesday)—American bombers have cut North Vietnam's road and rail network at 71 points, destroyed or damaged scores of boats, warehouses and railroad cars, and damaged the country's main air defense headquarters near Hanoi since President Nixon ordered the interdiction of North Vietnam's supply lines on May 8, the American military Command announced Tuesday.

In a lengthy "preliminary bomb damage assessment," The U.S. Command said the results of the strikes against North Vietnam's surface transportation lines included the destruction of or heavy damage to eight bridges. The report said 1,800 sorties have been carried out over North Vietnam since the interdiction campaign began.

No major new Communist attacks were reported in South Vietnam by government military spokesmen. The battle at Anloc, 60 miles north of Saigon continues with heavy exchanges of artillery and rocket fire and with Communist troops still occupying the northwest portion of the town.

Around Hue and Kontum where large-scale North Vietnamese attacks are still expected, there was little fighting reported.

The first detailed account of the new American bombing campaign against North Vietnam code named "Linebacker" shows that targets have been struck from 50 miles north of Hanoi to the Demilitarized Zone.

More than 128 trucks and 31 field guns have been destroyed or damaged and seven surface-to-air missile sites have been demolished and another damaged, the command said.

Principle targets, however, have been the railways and roads in keeping with President Nixon's order to prevent supplies from reaching North Vietnamese troops fighting in northern South Vietnam.

The six-page catalogue of targets destroyed or damaged includes: 65 boats, 132 railway cars, 40 warehouses and North Vietnam's petroleum pipeline to the south.

The report said several structures at the North Vietnamese air defense headquarters at Bachmai airfield a few miles south of Hanoi were destroyed in a raid by Air Force Phantoms. Soviet technicians have been known in the past to be working at Bachmai. During the height of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the administration of President Johnson, reliable sources said several of the Soviet technicians were killed in U.S. raids.

The impact of the interdiction campaign is not expected to be known for 30 days, a U.S. Command spokesman said. The North Vietnamese are believed to have stockpiled a month's supply of fuel for their tanks and vehicles near the battlefields in the south.

During the bombing of the late 60's, North Vietnam mobilized the peasantry to repair damage throughout the countryside. China sent a 50,000-man work force to maintain the rail system in the northern part of the country. By one way or another, North Vietnam was consistently able to keep much of its transportation functioning.

During the air offensive, which has included strikes at Hanoi and the port of Haiphong, North Vietnam's two major cities, seven U.S. planes have been lost and 11 North Vietnamese Migs have been shot down, the command said.

Each day since the President's speech on national television an average of about 250 sorties have been flown by U.S. Air Force and Navy jets over the North.

U.S. B-52s, which have been credited by South Vietnamese and American military officials as playing the most important role in checking North Vietnam's current offensive, kept flying roughly one mission an hour against targets in South Vietnam as they have done in recent weeks.

All but two of the 25 B-52 missions flown in the 24 hours ending at noon yesterday were around the three major battle areas of the offensive—Anloc, Kontum in the Central Highlands and Hue and Quangtri near the Demilitarized Zone.

The two exceptions were strikes at targets 57 miles southwest of Saigon where the Mekong Delta borders Cambodia in Kientuong Province.

South Vietnam has stripped the Delta of more than one division of troops in order to reinforce its defenders around Anloc, and recently there have been intelligence reports that the North Vietnamese are infiltrating back to some of their strongholds in the Delta.

The Communist offensive has not yet included major efforts in the Delta where more than a third of South Vietnam's people live.

However, military sources believe there is a good chance the Communists will try to take advantage of the reduced government military strength in the Delta before the current offensive is over.

In the Central Highlands, North Vietnamese forces have again cut Highway 19 which connects Pleiku with the coastal city of Quinhon by blowing a culvert.

[Enemy troops blew up the main ammunition dump in Pleiku early Wednesday, rocking the Central Highlands capital with a series of artillery explosions that were still going off five hours after the attack, AP reported. There was no information available on casualties.]

The airfield at Kontum was hit during the night by 15 to 30 rounds of 122-mm rocket fire. One South Vietnamese C-130 transport plane and two U.S. helicopters were destroyed. Six Americans were injured.

South Vietnamese infantrymen who landed at the ruined Firebase Bastogne 12 miles southwest of Hue Monday were reported Tuesday still combing the area looking for Communist units and supply caches.

They reported killing 78 North Vietnamese in two separate actions in the area, according to a South Vietnamese military spokesman.

South Vietnamese commanders have no intention of trying to rebuild Bastogne into a defensive position. It was largely destroyed by air strikes after its garrison pulled out April 29 under Communist pressure.

However, military sources in Saigon said the commanders hope to continue sweeping the area in an effort to keep the North Vietnamese off balance and to provide early warning should the Communist troops begin a major advance toward Hue.

[From the New York Times, July 8, 1972]

BOMBING TERMED HIGHLY EFFECTIVE

PILOTS REPORT MORE DAMAGE TO NORTH SINCE APRIL THAN IN YEAR UNDER JOHNSON

(By Joseph B. Treaster)

SAIGON, South Vietnam, July 6—Senior United States air officers say American pilots have inflicted more damage on North Vietnam since April than they did in a full year of President Johnson's heavy bombing campaign.

Rather than stepping up the air war gradually as President Johnson did, President Nixon has bombed with great force almost from the time he renewed regular air raids on the North in early April. He has tried to cripple North Vietnam's transportation and power systems and to destroy its fuel stores and its capacity to produce steel. He has also mined the seaports for the first time.

Senior officers here say they have been given more operational flexibility than they had from 1965 to 1968, when President Johnson was running the air war against North Vietnam under the code name Rolling Thunder.

"In two months we've destroyed more targets than we did in a whole year of Rolling Thunder," said one high-ranking Air Force officer in an assessment characteristic of those expressed by senior Air Force and Navy officers in a series of interviews here.

Another Air Force officer, referring to Mr. Nixon and the officials in Washington who control the air war, said: "Of course, they give you priorities and indicate things they consider important. You get plenty of guidance but they give you the flexibility so that you can get the job done."

"Back in the old days," the officer continued, "they'd select a couple of targets and say: 'O.K., these are the targets you're going to hit next week. Period. That's all you're permitted to hit.' And if those targets happened to be in an area where the weather was bad, that's too bad. No bombing was done.

"Now," the officer said, "they give us a whole shopping list of targets and let us decide when to hit them."

Senior officers say that with fewer limitations and more advanced equipment and weapons—especially the new "smart" bombs, which are guided to pinpoint accuracy by either laser beams or television—they are subjecting North Vietnam to "a whole new order of magnitude of war."

Fewer American planes are flying over North Vietnam now than at the height of the air war under President Johnson, they say, but more 2,000-pound bombs are being used and the total tonnage is about the same.

DESTRUCTION IS GREATER

Because of the smart bombs, which Air Force efficiency experts say are 100 times more effective than nonguided bombs, the destruction is much greater.

As an illustration, senior officers point to the heavily defended Thanhhoa bridge, which pilots using smart bombs knocked out on their second try in early May.

When conventional bombs were used against the bridge during Operation Rolling Thunder, an Air Force officer recalled, "we put in over 1,000 sorties and never put it out of commission."

"We lost 30 aircraft and never damaged the superstructure," he added.

No aircraft were lost in the strikes on the bridge this time and over-all losses during the current campaign, called Operation Linebacker, have been lower than they were during Rolling Thunder, despite much heavier antiaircraft fire.

The officers attribute this to improvements in the principal attack planes—the Air Force F-4 Phantom and the Navy's A-7 Corsair—to advances in electronic gear that counters radar-controlled automatic weapons and surface-to-air missiles, and to the experience acquired by air commanders during operation Rolling Thunder. Another factor, the officers say, is that the smart bombs can be dropped from higher altitudes, permitting pilots to stay out of range of some of the most effective antiaircraft guns.

Senior military men and some Western diplomats believe that President Nixon has put Hanoi under greater pressure than ever with the intense bombing, the mining of the ports and his visits to China and the Soviet Union.

A diplomat who studies North Vietnam from Saigon said that Hanoi seemed to be experiencing "a significantly higher level of problems" since the resumption of the air war and added: "The North Vietnamese are clearly suspicious and uneasy about the effects of President Nixon's talking to Peking and Moscow."

At a news conference on June 29, Mr. Nixon said that the mining and bombing had caused a complete turnaround on the battlefield in South Vietnam, where in April and May it seemed that Saigon's troops might be overwhelmed.

AIR STRENGTH INCREASED

Senior officers here feel uncomfortable about disagreeing with the President, but they say it is too early for the campaign in the North to have had any significant impact on the battlefields in the South.

The North Vietnamese are still attacking with Soviet-made tanks that require enormous amounts of fuel and are still firing heavy 130-mm. artillery shells.

One development that might diminish the effectiveness of the mining of the ports is the installation of a fuel pipeline from Hanoi to the Chinese border. American intelligence officials in Washington said last week that the North Vietnamese had either completed the pipeline or were completing it.

Many officers in the Army as well as the air services say that the South Vietnamese may have been saved from defeat by the extremely heavy direct air support—bombardment of advancing troops and tanks.

While Mr. Nixon has continued to withdraw American ground forces in South Vietnam during the Communist offensive, he has sharply increased American air strength in Southeast Asia. There are now nearly 900 fighter-bombers at seven bases in Thailand and on aircraft carriers offshore. In addition, there are about 200 B-52 Stratofortresses on Thailand and on Guam.

An average of about 270 American fighter-bombers strike in North Vietnam every day and there are rarely fewer than 300 operating in South Vietnam. On

several days during the heavy fighting in May there were more than 400 strikes in the South.

As the North Vietnamese menaced Hue again last week, the United States mounted attacks on some days with more than 90 B-52's, each carrying up to 30 tons of bombs.

When the commanders feel the B-52's can be spared from duty in the South and when there are targets that call for saturation bombing—a large camp or a sprawling storage complex—the planes are also used in North Vietnam.

None of the officers interviewed said they expected Operation Linebacker to stop the flow of men and supplies to the South completely. But some Army generals said they believed the bombing might cause the North Vietnamese to abandon the conventional war they have been conducting with heavy machinery and revert to guerrilla tactics.

"We've taken out virtually all of their power," said an Air Force officer as he went through a big loose-leaf album of glossy pictures of shattered buildings and bridges.

"We've taken out major warehouse storage areas, particularly those associated with trucking," he continued. "All the trains on the two main lines leading to China are stopped. We've got 15 bridges out on the northwest rail line and 14 out on the northeast line.

"Nothing is moving, starting with the Paul Doumer Bridge right in Hanoi itself. We've destroyed innumerable depots."

The officer, who had closely followed Operation Rolling Thunder, added: "It took us three years to get to the point where they were hurting for power. We were never able to really interdict the railroads. They were rebuilding the bridges faster than we could knock them out. Now it's no problem to stay well ahead of them."

HANOI TELLING DAMAGE

In a statement transmitted by the North Vietnamese news agency on June 30 and monitored in Hong Kong, the Mayor of Hanoi was quoted as saying that bombing in the North Vietnamese capital had destroyed "a large number of hospitals, ships and residential quarters of workers" and killed "hundreds of civilians."

The United States military command here, in keeping with its long-standing policy, refused to comment on the North Vietnamese charges. But senior officers and pilots say they carefully study targets and plan their strikes so as to minimize injury to civilians. They also deny accusations by Hanoi that dikes and dams have been bombed.

At his news conference, Mr. Nixon said that eyewitness reports that the dikes and dams had been damaged had been checked and "proved to be inaccurate."

"I do not intend to allow any orders to go out which would involve civilian casualties if it can be avoided," the President added.

In a discussion with newsmen last week, an Air Force colonel who commands a fighter-bomber wing based in Thailand made clear that in the kind of war the United States is conducting against North Vietnam civilian casualties cannot always be avoided.

A newsman asked about the bombing of the Thainguyn steel mill, 30 miles north of Hanoi, on June 23, saying that he presumed it had been full of civilian workmen.

The Air Force colonel replied, "Well, it would have to be but I think, you know, they were not the target. I mean that's just the unfortunate thing about war."

[From the New York Times, Aug. 12, 1972]

DIKE BOMBING DENIED BY U.S. CARRIER PILOTS

(By Joseph B. Treaster)

Aboard U.S.S. *Saratoga* in the Gulf of Tonkin, Aug. 8—The pilots aboard this aircraft carrier swear that they have never tried to bomb the dikes of North Vietnam and they say they are hurt and irritated that so many Americans at home do not seem to believe them.

The pilots are troubled, too, they say, that some Americans apparently think they are deliberately bombing other civilian targets like schools and hospitals and residential areas.

"The thing that hurts us," said Comdr. Richard Bardone of Pittsburgh, the stocky, curly-haired leader of the pilots on this ship, "is that we make every effort to avoid the dikes. We do not, absolutely not, go after dikes."

Lieut. Comdr. Lew Dunton's eyes flashed, "There are a lot of prisoners in the Hanoi Hilton," he said, "because they were shot down trying to avoid civilian targets. It really galls me."

The pilots and their senior officers scoff at the foreign visitors to North Vietnam who have been quoted as saying they have seen dikes damaged by bombs and that they believed the United States had "deliberately tried to destroy the dikes."

The airmen argue that only isolated damage has been reported—the kind that might likely result from an accident—and they say none of the visitors so far appears to have been qualified to determine whether the damage was done by bombs or other explosives.

"The absurd part about it," one senior officer said, "is that somebody comes up with a hole in a dike and he translates that as meaning we're going after the dikes."

"If we were hitting the dikes with malice aforethought," the officer continued, "we could clean all of them out in a week without many bombs."

The dikes, the pilots say, are not in well-defended areas and "they'd be a piece of cake."

It seems important to the pilots that they be believed. They put their lives on the line every day and they stand together under an old-fashioned code of military honor. They see themselves as patriots in the service of their country and their President. They would like to have been respected and appreciated. Now they will settle for being believed.

They insist that the President has proscribed the dikes as targets and that they have sometimes increased the risk to themselves to comply with his orders.

An insight into the minds of the pilots came from one senior air officer who said, "Probably the best reason for not hitting the dikes is the fact that the President of the United States has advertised to the whole world that we were not hitting the dikes and we don't want to make a liar out of him."

Not only are the pilots under standing orders not to bomb the dikes, they say, but before each mission they are specifically told again to stay away from them.

During prestrike briefings, the pilots say they pore over detailed maps and reconnaissance photographs. Dikes and other "no-no's"—hospitals, churches, clusters of homes and P.O.W. camps, for example—are pointed out and the paths for approaching and departing the targets are planned so as to minimize "collateral" damage.

In some instances, the pilots say, the North Vietnamese have incorporated into the dike system roads, gun positions and missile sites which the United States generally regard as fair game. But, the pilots say, these targets are "off limits" when they are on a dike.

Still, Bardone concedes "there can be mistakes, especially in a hot environment—where there is heavy antiaircraft fire."

"There is a possibility of a dike being hit," he said. "But I think this is very remote. If it did happen it would be purely accidental."

One pilot on the *Saratoga* is said to have reported that he accidentally bombed a dike, but reconnaissance photographs showed no damage.

Discussing the effect of the bombing on the civilian population of North Vietnam, Commander Bardone said, "most of the targets are isolated, but some are near the civilian population. There is a tremendous amount of secondary explosions and there is debris. There is a lot of overflow and I'm sure this gets over into the populated areas."

"I can't say absolutely that we do not put bombs outside the target area," he continued, "if we put a bomb a couple of hundred feet away from the target it might get into civilian areas. But I'd say 99 per cent of the time it's debris overflow that gets into the civilian areas."

The pilots say that the so-called "smart bombs" that are guided by laser beams and television have greatly reduced the margin of error in bombing. But, they add, even the smart bombs sometimes go astray.

It is routine procedure for pilots under attack by enemy planes to jettison their bombs so they can pick-up speed. These bombs are not armed and are not supposed to explode when they land, but since they weigh several hundred pounds they may have damaging impact.

Another danger to the civilian population, the pilots say, is debris and flak from North Vietnamese antiaircraft guns and missiles. "It all has to come down,"

said Commander Dunton, who is from Melrose, Mass. "and sometimes it comes down on their heads."

At least once foreign diplomats in Hanoi have said that damage attributed by the North Vietnamese to American planes had actually been caused by Communist missiles.

Citing an example of the official concern for civilian casualties, one senior officer said that before the first big raid this year in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the attack plan was routinely reviewed in Washington and "they knocked off some targets—some damn fine targets, because they were too close to civilians."

Lieut. Comdr. Grady Jackson, a bombardier-navigator from Indianapolis, said that he and his pilot turned back from a target in the vicinity of Haiphong a few weeks ago because they felt it was too close to civilians.

The pilots know, though, that no matter how painstaking they are, some civilians are likely to be killed.

"Let's face it" said Commander Dutton, who is a boyish-looking 32, "some of the military targets are probably manned by civilians. If you rolled in on the Boston navy shipyard there'd be a lot of civilians hurt. But they are working for the Government war effort. We don't go after those people in their suburban homes and supermarkets."

[From the Boston Globe, July 23, 1972]

US REPORTEDLY CONSIDERS USING DRONES AS BOMBERS

SAIGON—The US Air Force is using unmanned supersonic planes to drop propaganda over North Vietnam and is considering employing the pilotless craft for bombing missions, US sources said yesterday.

The drones have been used in simulated bombing runs on test sites in the United States, but never as bombers in actual warfare.

The automatic planes, radio-controlled from a specially outfitted C130 "mother ship," were originally designed to carry cameras on reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam and China, the sources said. They have been used successfully in this role since the early 1960s.

The "pilots" of the drones sit in front of television and radar equipment in the "mother ship" and guide the planes to their targets.

This plane can guide the drones from 300 miles away and does not have to fly over hostile territory.

The drones being used in the leaflet drops are manufactured by Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical, an aircraft specialty company based in San Diego.

They are capable of speeds of up to 900 miles an hour, can fly as high as 60,000 feet and for distances of more than 700 miles to and from a target.

The drones and their mother ships are based at the US installation in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, near the Laotian border, the sources said.

North Vietnamese and Chinese gunners have downed scores of the drones since they were first used as picture-taking planes in 1962.

The US command has never acknowledged use of the drones, and therefore has not reported the loss of any to Communist ground fire.

[From the New York Times, May 14, 1972]

150 RAIDS MADE ON NORTH, SOME ON 'SPECIAL' TARGETS

SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES ATTACKED—HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUES AT ANLOC AND NORTHWEST OF SAIGON

(By Sidney H. Schanberg)

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Sunday, May 14—American warplanes made 150 bombing raids on North Vietnam yesterday, United States military sources reported.

Most of the raids struck the south of the country, but the sources said "a few" were carried out on "special" targets, which reportedly did not include the immediate areas of either Hanoi or Haiphong Harbor.

The sources said the Air Force reported knocking out the entire petroleum-pumping network that has been supplying the North Vietnamese on their offensive in South Vietnam.

The United States command does not disclose the specific targets in the North, but the pumping stations, bridges, roads and rail lines. [United Press International, quoting military sources in Saigon, reported that United States planes armed with electronically guided bombs.]

ANLOC FIGHTING HEAVY

In South Vietnam, heavy ground fighting continued at Anloc, the besieged provincial capital 60 miles north of Saigon. And in a battle on the northwest approaches to Saigon, within 23 miles of the capital, South Vietnamese forces killed 137 of the enemy, according to a Saigon command spokesman.

This engagement, six miles northwest of Trangbang, began when North Vietnamese troops staged an artillery and ground attack on Government infantry. The Government troops called in artillery fire and air strikes. Government losses, the spokesman said, were four killed and four wounded.

This enemy operation is an extension of the attack on Anloc, where the remnants of eight South Vietnamese battalions have been cut off and under siege for over a month.

Intensified North Vietnamese assaults began on Thursday, with about 10,000 artillery shells falling on the rubber-plantation town, which is the capital of Binhlong province.

TOWN BATTERED

The town is now nearly flattened, not only by enemy artillery but also by thousands of tons of bombs and rockets from American and South Vietnamese planes.

With the help of this air support, the Government troops—who hold only the southern half of the town—were able to resist the renewed infantry and tank attacks, but military sources said today that there were still enemy companies inside the South Vietnamese perimeter. Casualties on both sides were said to be high.

Although about 20 B-52 bombers pounded North Vietnamese positions around Anloc during the 24-hour period that ended at noon, support was hampered by cloudy and rainy weather.

The B-52 strikes at Anloc during the last three days have been some of the most concentrated air raids of the Vietnam war.

The road from Saigon north to Anloc, Route 13, has been cut by the Communists from the beginning of the siege early last month. But military sources reported today that a stalled Government relief force—the 21st Division—had begun to make progress toward Anloc, reaching a point about six miles below the town by nightfall.

[From the New York Times, May 19, 1972]

B-52 IS RELIED ON MORE THAN TROOPS TO BLUNT FOE'S OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM

(By Craig R. Whitney)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, May 18.—Despite four years of Vietnamization, American and South Vietnamese military commanders here have relied less on the Government's ground troops to stem the current North Vietnamese offensive than on an instrument of massive bombing that only the Americans have—the B-52.

B-52's have been credited in recent weeks with helping to hold off determined enemy attacks not only on Anloc, where about 30 B-52 missions were flown on May 11 to repel a North Vietnamese push sixty miles north of Saigon, but in Kontum Province in the Highlands and near Hue as well—on all three fronts.

Last month, they flew on two raids near Haiphong harbor and near Thanhhoa in North Vietnam, the deepest inside the North they have ever gone.

A B-52 strike just this last Tuesday near Anloc killed 300 North Vietnamese soldiers, destroyed a tank, two artillery pieces and two antiaircraft guns, the United States command reported today.

B-52 IN UNPLANNED ROLE

Well over half the enemy casualties reported since the offensive began at the end of March have been credited to American and South Vietnamese air power,

and the B-52 has accounted for a major share of these, according to senior officers here.

The B-52 has been saved from obsolescence by a tactical assignment for which it was not designed.

It was built in the early nineteen-fifties as a strategic bomber, to fly at high altitudes over enemy air defense systems that were then primitive, and it was to be used as a nuclear bomber.

First used in South Vietnam in the tactical nonnuclear role on June 18, 1965, and in North Vietnam on April 12, 1966, the B-52's have been used as heavy-saturation bombing weapons in tactical as well as strategic roles. None has ever been reported shot down by North Vietnamese antiaircraft defenses, although at least two have been damaged by fragments from exploding surface-to-air missiles in the last month.

Between noon yesterday and noon today, according to the United States command, the Air Force flew 24 B-52 missions in South Vietnam, on all three major fronts and against enemy positions in Chuongthien Province in the Mekong Delta.

This means that there were 50 to 75 of the eight-engine bombers flying in South Vietnam—a mission normally includes three planes, sometimes two and less frequently one. Each of the planes now carries 24 tons of bombs, conventional high-explosive 500-pounders and 750-pounders.

Smaller fighter bombers use those bombs, too, but each of the smaller planes can carry only six or eight bombs, and usually drops one at a time.

ALL BOMBS DROPPED AT ONCE

The B-52 drops them all at once, in a rectangle-shaped pattern about half a mile long. When the B-52's fly in groups of three, a typical rectangle is said to be about one and a quarter miles long and six-tenths of a mile wide.

The air crews and officers on the ground call these patterns "boxes," because when a ground commander requests a B-52 raid he plots it on his tactical map as a box, in roughly the same shape in which the bombs fall. The B-52 raid is carried out a day or so after it is requested.

Though the missions are flown at the request of Vietnamese ground commanders and their American advisers, all the B-52's flying to Southeast Asia are under the control of the Air Force's Strategic Air Command, not under that of Gen. Creighton W. Abrams or his subordinates here. No B-52's are based in South Vietnam. About 50 are based in Thailand. Others come from Guam.

Since the B-52's are large, slow-flying and unmaneuverable, they were never used over the most heavily defended parts of North Vietnam at the height of the sustained bombing campaign—called Rolling Thunder—in 1967 and 1968.

Since then, and especially this year, the North Vietnamese have dramatically increased the size and extent of their air defense system, particularly with the Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles. Thus it came as a surprise to many observers here when, on April 16, the United States Command announced that B-52's were among the planes that bombed Haiphong harbor that day.

How could they get through?

"We got to the point where we felt that the defensive system that we could provide for the B-52's would negate the threat of the SAM's," a senior American officer said.

The B-52's use a complicated system involving radar guidance to bring themselves in on their targets. In the South, where they are being used every day, the on-board navigational equipment is augmented by land stations that are used as cross references to make the bomb patterns precise. In the North, that is not possible.

"The probability of error up there is a little higher, than using them down here," a senior commander conceded in discussing the bombing of the North. "But the photography from the strikes shows they did very well."

He described the targets in Haiphong as "all logistical in nature—oil storage areas, some transshipment points, railroad marshaling yards, all large targets and far away from populated areas."

The blast pressure from the B-52 raids, however, is enough to blow down flimsy houses hundreds of yards away from the B-52 targets.

FIGHTER-BOMBERS COMPARED

"There are some targets that B-52's will do better with than tactical air," the officer continued, referring to fighter-bombers. "It would take a tremendous

amount of tactical air to get the same results, and at greater risk to planes and pilots."

A senior officer said a few days ago, "You haven't seen the last of those raids up there."

But in the last few weeks, the B-52's have been more heavily used in the South. "We're using the B-52's now to prevent massing of troops," another senior officer said. "We try to break up the enemy's attacks before they can get started."

To be effective, of course, the B-52 strikes, however heavy, have to hit something.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 11, 1972]

RENEWED BOMBING ADDS \$1.1 BILLION TO WAR'S COST

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10—The extra cost of the Vietnam war, resulting from the renewal of heavy bombing and other United States air and naval activity since the North Vietnamese offensive, will be \$1.1 billion in the current fiscal year, the Defense Department disclosed today. This is less than the Nixon Administration previously estimated.

The disclosure came in a table in a long Pentagon document entitled "The Economics of Defense Spending." It was the first time that the Administration had disclosed in detail the costs of the war.

The basic document sought to explode what it described as widely held "myths" about defense spending—its impact on the economy, its share of the budget, its role in inflation and its rise or fall in recent years.

Indirectly, the document challenged the plan of Senator George McGovern to reduce defense spending by \$30 billion.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird also attacked the Democratic Presidential nominee—although not by name—today. Mr. Laird said in releasing the report that, "when it comes to national security, the American people do not want mythology."

He said the report was "an attempt to explode a lot of myths that have developed." In July before Mr. McGovern was nominated, Mr. Laird released a 71-page Pentagon commentary on Mr. McGovern's proposed \$30-billion cut in defense spending which he characterized as being "tantamount to a white flag of surrender."

The table on the cost of the war estimated the "incremental" cost in the current fiscal year at \$5.8 billion. This is \$1.1-billion higher than the \$4.7-billion cost estimated last January, before the North Vietnamese offensive and the United States response. The incremental cost excludes expenses of ships and aircraft that would have to be paid even if there were no fighting. The total cost of the war was put \$7.1-billion in the current fiscal year, also up \$1.1-billion from the January estimate.

In announcing a proposed supplemental appropriation to cover the extra post-offensive costs of the war, Mr. Laird had left the impression that it could be as much as \$5-billion. Later, when the supplemental request was sent to Congress, the Office of Management and Budget used a figure much closer to the one mentioned today—an estimated \$1.2-billion.

The table in the Pentagon document put the peak incremental cost of the war at \$21.5-billion in the fiscal year 1969. As troop withdrawals began, it dropped to \$17.4-billion in fiscal 1970, \$11.5-billion in fiscal 1971, and \$7.3-billion in fiscal 1972, just ended.

The renewed bombing and other activity raised the 1972 cost by \$200-million from the January estimate of \$7.1-billion.

The long document on defense spending and the economy seemed to be directed not only at Senator McGovern but also at widely held beliefs among members of Congress, academics, economists and the public. Its points included the following:

After removing the effects of inflation, particularly on military pay, defense spending is now the lowest it has been since 1951, and its recent trend has been steadily downward.

Defense now accounts for 20 per cent of all government spending—Federal, state and local—and about 30 per cent of Federal spending.

Weapons procurement is \$300-million more today in current dollars than eight years ago, before the Vietnam war, and is a little more than a quarter of the total defense budget.

Defense now occupies a smaller portion of the nation's manpower—counting military personnel, civilian Defense Department personnel and industrial workers producing defense equipment—than at any time since 1953.

To contend that the nation is on a war footing, or that defense spending supports the economy, is “torturing the English language.”

Even if \$20-billion to \$30-billion could be saved on defense, it would not make a major difference in a total governmental spending on nondefense programs—Federal, state and local—which is expected to exceed \$400-billion five years from now.

“It is rather difficult to maintain,” the Pentagon document said, “that we could achieve wonders with, say, \$500-billion to spend on social and economic programs—wonders which would somehow escape us if we had ‘only’ \$480-billion to spend.”

The attack on Senator McGovern's defense proposals came earlier in statements by Secretary Laird and other officials that concerned force levels, naval strength and the like.

[From the New York Times, July 7, 1972]

WAR IN AIR DECENTRALIZED BY NIXON, BUT THE CONTROLS ARE TERMED STRICT

(By Neil Sheehan)

WASHINGTON, July 6—President Nixon is waging the air war against North Vietnam with a decentralized system of command and control that differs significantly from the highly centralized system employed by his predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson, during the 1965-68 air campaign. In the view of a number of civilian and military officials with experience in Indochina, the decentralization does not imply the unraveling of civilian control over the military or the loosening of the chain of military command.

In effect they reject suggestions of such a deterioration made in the wake of the acknowledgement by Gen. John D. Lavelle that forces under his command made at least 28 unauthorized air raids on the North between last Nov. 8 and March 8. He was dismissed as commander of the Seventh Air Force in Saigon after a secret inquiry that was completed there March 23.

In the 1965-68 air war, lists of proposed targets were forwarded from the war zone through subordinated commands to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, who modified or approved them and sent them to the White House.

At Tuesday luncheon meetings, President Johnson and his senior Vietnam policy aides decided that certain targets could be attacked by a given date. If the attacks were not carried out by then, the authorization lapsed.

Robert S. McNamara, who favored this highly centralized system when he was Secretary of Defense because he felt that it resulted in calculated doses of force carefully applied, informed the Joint Chiefs, who in turn informed the subordinate commands what targets could be attacked by what dates.

LIST OF AUTHORIZED TARGETS

Under the Nixon Administration's system, according to the officials, who were interviewed by The New York Times, a list of authorized targets in the North was transmitted to the subordinate commands by the White House and the Joint Chiefs in the latter part of April.

Targets are then selected by the field commands from those on the authorized list. The field commands tell the Joint Chiefs in advance what they intend to strike and by what date, thus giving the White House prior notice.

Mr. Nixon resumed full-scale air attacks on the southern panhandle of North Vietnam in the first part of April after the North Vietnamese had launched their offensive across the demilitarized zone. The new air war moved into high gear in the latter half of the month, with raids throughout the North.

The civilian and military officials, explaining their view that decentralization has not weakened command and control, say, first, that the President still decides how military force will be applied and to what extent he will delegate authority to apply it.

Second, they asserted, the decentralized system, in the light of the failure of the Johnson Administration's policy to bring the war to a halt, is a better method of applying air power in a coordinated campaign aimed at depriving

North Vietnam of imports, both economic and military, through mining and bombing. If air power is to be effective, the officials added, the commander on the scene must be free to select his targets and to time his attacks.

In the end, regardless of what guidance is issued by the civilian leadership and the Joint Chiefs, the sources asserted, Washington and the various intermediate headquarters have to rely on what they are told by the field commands.

'SLAVE OF REPORTING SYSTEM'

"On the way back you are the slave of the reporting system," an official said. "It would be very difficult to tell whether the report was falsified if it met the required format, especially when you are handling dozens of messages a day. It is highly improbable that you would smell a rat unless somebody tipped you off."

The deciding factor in the system, the officials maintained, is the honesty and discipline of the commanders close enough to the scene to know what is actually happening. They noted that there were no checks—sometimes referred to as fail-safe devices—that would automatically prevent the kind of insubordination and falsification that General Lavelle, acknowledged in testimony before the House June 12.

The officials interviewed contended that there was no way to build checks into the structure to automatically forestall insubordination and falsification without so thoroughly eroding the responsibility and initiative of subordinate commanders as to make the cure worse than even the possibility of the disease.

In the view of the officials interviewed, a case similar to the Lavelle affair could have occurred—although there is no evidence that it did—under the highly centralized system used by the Johnson Administration. They also believe that it could occur under the present system.

CONFORMING TO THE FORMAT

It was pointed out that General Lavelle met the format of the reporting system by describing the unauthorized strikes as "protective reaction."

Similarly, when Air Force jets accidentally strafed a Soviet freighter in the North Vietnamese port of Campha in 1967 while Mr. McNamara's highly centralized system was in force, the pilots and the acting wing commander, in an unsuccessful attempt to cover up the mistake, filed a false report and burned the gun-camera film that had recorded the incident.

In the case of the Mylai massacre in 1968, again while the Johnson Administration was in power, the original report forwarded to headquarters in Saigon said that 128 Vietcong had been killed and three weapons captured. Because the guerrillas are often able to recover most of the weapons from their dead and because dozens of similar reports were received all the time, the senior officer who saw this one ordered the routine message of congratulations from Gen. William C. Westmoreland, then American military commander, sent to the unit that had committed the massacre. General Westmoreland may not even have read the report.

The circumstances of the famous Green Beret murder case the following year indicate that Col. Robert B. Rheault, Special Forces commander in Vietnam at the time, may have inadvertently misled Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, General Westmoreland's successor, about the killing of a Vietnamese agent suspected of spying for the other side because the colonel had in turn been misled by his subordinates.

SUBTERFUGE PROPOSED

Before President Nixon's decision to launch ground attacks on Communist bases in Cambodia in the spring of 1970, Generals Westmoreland and Abrams were repeatedly frustrated in their pleas for permission to assault those sanctuaries.

Staff officers, it is now known, proposed using the so-called rules of engagement—in the way General Lavelle used the rules of "protective reaction"—as a subterfuge to get around the prohibition. The rules of engagement permitted American troops to return fire across the border or to conduct hot pursuit into Cambodia in the midst of battle.

"People suggested getting lost, or saying we were getting shot at and shooting back, but Westmoreland and Abrams refused to chisel," an officer related.

Some officials say that, specific cases aside, actions by recent Administrations in the conduct of foreign policy and war-making have encouraged an atmosphere of deception. They assert, for example, that when the civilian leadership subverts

the Congressional prohibition against employing a third country's troops in Laos by having the Central Intelligence Agency secretly hire Thai mercenaries, this has an impact on the willingness of subordinate officials to abide by restrictive orders that they dislike.

THE POSSIBILITY OF ERROR

It is also noted that even the most carefully devised system of civilian control can prove ineffective because of human error.

Mr. McNamara's rigidly centralized target selection did not prevent the bombing of schools, churches, hospitals and homes in North Vietnam because individual pilots mistook them for designated military targets or dropped their bombs prematurely.

On the other hand, according to the officials, the Nixon Administration's air war against the North, despite the decentralized targeting process, could result in less civilian damage because the pilots now have bombs of far greater accuracy than those used before.

Some officials conclude that neither technology nor the most comprehensive guidance from higher authority can fully control military force once a decision has been made to loose it. As an experienced officer said: "There are no mechanical decisions. There are mechanical tools for helping decisions, but the decisions are in the judgment area."

[From the New York Times, Jan. 2, 1972]

WHY THE BOMBERS THUNDERED

(By Fred Branfman)

WASHINGTON—The Nixon Administration's decision to reactivate the air campaign against North Vietnam could well be the most serious escalation since the Gulf of Tonkin in May, 1964.

The 350 planes that flew 24-hour, multiple sorties conducted raids as heavy as any ever launched against the North. Unless checked by public opinion, the Administration may well be prepared to level Hanoi and Haiphong, mine Haiphong Harbor, and possibly even bomb North Vietnam's system of dikes.

An exaggerated prediction? Consider these facts:

(1) The Administration made unprecedented attempts in the last month to prepare the public for massive strikes against the North. It previously bombed North Vietnam eight times in raids, involving several hundred planes, which lasted several days. Targets said to have been struck during these occasions included troop concentrations, fuel and petroleum dumps and airfields. All of these raids were carried out with minimum publicity, however. The large fanfare accompanying last week's raid suggests that the Administration has more in mind than in the past.

(2) The Administration has gone out of its way to provoke North Vietnam in recent months. North Vietnam has been officially bombed 186 times between Nixon's accession to office and Nov. 1, 1971. Thus there were an average of under six raids monthly during Nixon's first 34 months in office. In November, however, raids shot up to fourteen a month. In December there were over 26. It thus appears that the Administration was hoping to provoke a response from the North that could be used as justification for increased strikes, as with the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident.

(3) Official claims that the present raids are in response to North Vietnamese escalation cannot be taken seriously. Unsubstantiated press reports of North Vietnamese MIG's heavy artillery and tanks in Laos were not used by Secretary Laird to justify the raids. No correspondents saw the fighting for the Plaine des Jarres. Newsmen are not allowed on bombing raids over Laos. Thus there is no independent confirmation of claims of MIG's over Laos. The official report that four jets were shot down Dec. 17-19 over Laos was later admitted to be false; that at least two had been shot down over North Vietnam, one east of Hanoi.

It is, perhaps, for this reason that Secretary Laird did not use such reports to justify the present raids.

(4) Mr. Laird's statement that the 1968 bombing halt agreement was no longer in force prepares the way for full-scale bombing of the North.

The thesis that the Administration will go as far as public opinion allows it is fueled by the fact, documented in the Pentagon Papers, that all official analyses deemed the 1965-68 bombing of the North a failure. A study prepared by the top-

level Jason Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, for example, stated that "as of October, 1967, the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam has had no measurable effect on Hanoi's ability to mount and support military operations in South Vietnam." This conclusion was shared by the C.I.A., International Security Agency of the Department of Defense, and former Defense Secretary McNamara.

If it is planning on observing previous limitations on the bombing, why did the Administration renew strikes against the North that were shown to be ineffective? And, in particular, why did it do so now at a time when it is making every effort elsewhere to show that the war is "winding down"? Could it be that it is prepared to bomb Hanoi, Haiphong, the dikes, if it feels public opinion will permit it?

Only time will tell. One thing is clear, however: the present bombing is serious, dangerous, and is causing heavy civilian casualties in North Vietnam, while not providing security in the south.

Secretary Laird has already threatened to bomb the "MIG airfields." Since those at Quanlang, Vinh, and Donghoi are quite small and have been bombed already, he apparently means two airfields near Hanoi, and another near Haiphong. When this happens, casualties will rise.

Our interviews with pilots who bombed the North indicate that the majority of ordnance dropped back in 1968 were antipersonnel bombs. These are bombs that cannot destroy a truck, bridge or even a tiny shelter erected in the forest; they are only designed for human beings. They include the pineapple bombs, which send 250,000 steel pellets per sortie spewing over an area the size of four football fields; flechette bombs, which consist of tiny barbed pellets that enlarge the wound as they enter the body; and guava bombs, which explode in the air and send their pellets down diagonally to enter holes where their targets may be hiding.

[From the New York Times, Aug. 19, 1972]

A QUESTION OF INTENT

(By Anthony Lewis)

If a man keeps dangerous animals running wild on his estate, and one mauls a guest's child, he cannot escape responsibility by saying that he had no intention of letting children be hurt. That is generally the law now, and common sense. Subjective intent does not have to be proved, because keeping wild animals where people go makes it so likely that someone will be hurt.

The same common-sense view cuts through the argument about whether the United States is "deliberately" bombing dikes and other civilian targets in North Vietnam. When the greatest power on earth pours bombs on a small, backward country, it is a necessary consequence that people and things of an innocent character will be destroyed. In the legal phrase, the great power will not be heard to argue that it meant no harm.

Of course there would be a different degree of moral culpability in any calculated attempt to destroy dikes or houses or hospitals in North Vietnam. The generals and the politicians in this and previous Administrations have concealed so many horrors—massacres and forest fires and crop destruction and the like—that we cannot exclude the possibility of more.

But it is bad enough to deny responsibility for the human costs of a policy of mass destruction. And that is what the United States Government is doing: putting on a show of amazement at the notion that American bombs actually kill people. The piety of the performance drips like treacle.

Consider, for example, an episode well before the present phase of continuous all-out bombing. Last December, when four American Phantoms were shot down in Laos, the U.S. retaliated by 1,000 bombing sorties against North Vietnam in five days. Most of the time the weather was so bad that the pilots could not even see the ground. Yet the official claim remained that only military targets were being hit. President Nixon called the raids "very successful."

Since last May, Mr. Nixon has removed some of the restrictions on American bombing of North Vietnam. The command is now free to hit economic as well as military targets, and to carry on a planned bombing campaign without regular reference back to Washington.

Half the planes in the Strategic Air Command—200 B-52's—are now being used against Vietnam, North and South. Those are our *strategic* planes, designed

for use against aggressive targets in an ultimate conflict with another great power. And the United States is using them against a peasant country.

The propaganda from Washington and Saigon makes it sound as though every American raid is hitting the Ruhr or some mighty military installation. There is talk of destroying "industries" and "naval bases."

Naval bases! For what—sampons? As for industries, there is hardly a factory in North Vietnam that an American businessman would have looked at twice in 1890. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff first tried to pick bombing targets in North Vietnam, they found only eight industrial sites worth listing.

It is on this backward country, with its mud villages and primitive technology, that the United States is dropping thousands of tons of bombs every month. (The total figure for Indochina is running over 100,000 tons a month, but the Pentagon does not give the total separately for the four target countries.)

Necessarily, then, inevitably, bombs in that volume destroy things not remotely related to the North Vietnamese war effort. In Haiphong last May I saw acres of housing smashed flat, a school destroyed, a hospital damaged. More recently Joseph Kraft wrote from Hanoi: "I have seen with my own eyes the damage done by American bombs to homes, schools, stores and many innocent people."

First-hand reports of civilian bomb damage have in fact been available for years, but American officials continued to react to them with an injured innocence, an imperturbable cynicism. It is in the light of this experience that one should now read the denials of any "deliberate" bombing of the dikes.

The explanation given by Washington for the bomb craters that have been seen in the dikes is that the damage was incidental to attacks on nearby military targets such as "road and river transport lines." But in the waterlogged Red River Delta, laced by more than 2,000 miles of dikes, the dikes are often the only place to build an all-weather road. If you bomb roads and "river transport lines" in North Vietnam, you will hit dikes.

The United States has now dropped on Indochina three times the tonnage of bombs that it used in all theaters of World War II. Those bombs have hit, among other things, dikes and hospitals and schools and peasant villages. Washington knows about that destruction: it has the pictures. In those circumstances a judge in the Common Law tradition would not allow the American Government to wash its hands of responsibility for the civilian damage. Or the American people.

[From the New York Times, May 12, 1972]

HOSPITAL IN HANOI BEARS MARKS OF THE AIR WAR

(By Joel Henri)

HANOI, North Vietnam, May 11—The Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Hospital and its grounds had a surrealistic appearance today, with roofs, masonry, trees and vehicles twisted and riddled with shrapnel.

During American air raids on the Hanoi area yesterday, six Shrike missiles and a 500-pound bomb reportedly fell on the hospital site, which extends over several acres in the city center. When the bomb landed, most staff members and patients were in a shelter below, the chief doctor said today as he took foreign newsmen around the establishment.

The only people working, he said, were surgeons and their aides.

A patient being operated on was reported seriously injured in the blast. Mrs. Mau Don, an anesthetist, said a surgeon was struck on the head and "a colleague took over for him."

All the windows in the operating theater were blown out. Cupboards were lying on the floor, and blood was splattered on the walls.

A Shrike fragmentation missile was said to have pierced a wall and exploded in a pharmaceutical room.

Outside, several parked ambulances were riddled with holes. The blast reportedly tossed a jeep on top of them.

United States planes raided the Hanoi area again today, but the attack, which began at 2:30 P.M., appeared to be less intense than yesterday's.

Phantom jets in formations of three wheeled in the clear blue sky over an area apparently stretching about 20 miles around the capital. Surface-to-air missiles could be seen leaving the launch sites and chasing the aircraft, which made steep dives on targets around the city.

I witnessed the attack, which lasted about an hour, with a group of newsmen while on the way to Hatay Province southwest of Hanoi, an area attacked four days ago. We could see anti-aircraft missiles fired a few hundred yards away from where we halted by the roadside. One of the bombs dropped in the raid fell about 500 yards away behind a clump of trees.

[From the Baltimore Sun, July 9, 1972]

REPORTERS SEE BATTERED TOWN IN NORTH

(By Jean Thoraval)

HANOI, North Vietnam, July 8—This correspondent and a group of other foreign newsmen were taken at dawn today to the town of Hungyen, 36 miles east of Hanoi, which was said to have been struck by American bombs yesterday.

Casualties in the town, which has a population of about 20,000, were put by officials at 17 killed and 25 injured. Fifty-six families reportedly lost their homes.

Hungyen is a town of workers and peasant farmers, with long, wide streets. Nowhere in the part of the town we visited could we see a barracks or a fuel dump, or even a warehouse that could be used for storing war supplies.

The most badly damaged thoroughfare was Law Street, inhabited mainly by craftsmen and farm workers. There, the meanest dwellings, straw huts for the most part, had been blasted and burned. Even more solid buildings were often reduced to rubble.

PICKS THROUGH RUBBLE

One 72-year-old man, Nguyen Van Lam, stood amid the ruins of his house, the rubble still glowing with heat, picking out scraps of clothing that had belonged to his wife, his son and two grandchildren.

"All that is left to me is my daughter-in-law," he said. "When the raid began she had already left for her work in the rice field."

None of his belongings had survived the fire that destroyed his home: the cheap wooden furniture was reduced to charred rubble, and not even a rice bowl remained.

One young woman, Vu Tri Trung, 24, limped as she searched the wreckage of her home.

Miss Trung was the eldest of a family of seven. Three of them were said to have been killed by the bombs and the four other injured. Above her torn blouse, she wore a white band around her head as a sign of mourning.

Further on, in front of the half-ruined building that had housed the local bookshop, we were warned that there were several unexploded bombs. There was also a still-intact bomb detonator bearing the words: "US Navyair Syscom. Lot 010. Date 071".

At one point there was a scrawled sign saying: "Road Closed. Time Bomb." Close by, a straw that lay in the mud.

The newsmen were taken later to the local hospital where the injured were being cared for.

[From the New York Times, May 23, 1972]

HANOI SURGICAL CHIEF IS BUSY AND HOPEFUL

HANOI, North Vietnam, May 22—A Soviet stewardess who North Vietnamese sources say was badly wounded when her ship was bombed at Haiphong May 9 left on an Aeroflot commercial flight for Moscow today.

The stewardess, Galina Feodorovna Kamneva, had her left leg amputated below the knee. Doctors here said she was saved from more serious harm or death.

The 27-year-old Miss Kamneva is a slightly built woman with red hair. She was glimpsed briefly today before she left the hospital for the airport.

Her case was described by Dr. Ton That Tung, an internationally known Vietnamese surgeon. He said it was medically significant because it showed the damage that could be done by the tiniest bomb fragments.

Miss Kamneva as a stewardess aboard the Soviet ship Pevek. One of the vessel's sailors was reported killed and others were reported wounded in the bombing.

HOSPITAL FOR SURGERY

Miss Kamneva was treated at the Vietnam-German Friendship Hospital in Hanoi. It has 400 beds and is connected with Hanoi University Medical School. It is for surgery only, with wings for children, orthopedic cases, heart and liver surgery and so on.

Dr. Tung, who is 60, is its director as well as a medical school professor. He has published numerous articles in foreign medical journals and received a diploma from the Academy of Surgery in Paris in January.

Framed on the wall of Dr. Tung's office was a picture of and a letter from Dr. John H. Gibbon Jr. of Media, Pa., who Dr. Tung said invented the heart-lung machine. During the discussion, Dr. Tung spoke freely and perhaps less politically than most Vietnamese that foreigners meet here. He wore a white turtle-neck sweater and often rose in enthusiasm to make some scientific point. He spoke in Vietnamese using French and English phrases occasionally.

Asked what North Vietnam's chief public health problems were, Dr. Tung first mentioned gastric ulcers. He said his hospital performed 500 to 700 gastric and intestinal operations yearly.

"Some say ulcers are related to diet," he said. "But I think the high incidence is due to tension—the stress of the war."

"Even before this long war began," he said, "life was hard under the French—there was plenty of tension. And there has been a war of one kind or another here since 1939. Allied planes from China bombed this hospital in 1942 when the Japanese were here."

The hospital has received aid from East Germany—hence the name. But groups in France, Britain and the United States as well as China and the Soviet bloc have also donated equipment and supplies. An American pump for use with the heart-lung machine was seen today.

By American standards, the hospital building is badly outdated. Its windows are taped in case of bombing. There are emergency operating rooms in catacomb-like shelters below ground.

Dr. Tung said with emphasis that he hoped for American aid after the war. He noted that North Vietnam now had good relations with France a former enemy, and said it should be the same with the United States.

"All wars must end," he said. "The important thing is what happens afterward. We think the American people should see their duty to help. I have found so many fine things in Americans."

"American help is necessary. And those who have destroyed should help to rebuild. If the United States refuses to help, it will be the American soul that is lost."

[From the Washington Post, July 13, 1972]

• NORTH VIETNAM REFUGEES A PROBLEM

(By Stanley Karnow)

North Vietnam is facing a growing refugee problem as a result of intensified American bombings of its major population centers.

Official Hanoi reports of this problem appear to confirm claims by the Nixon administration that the U.S. air war is creating serious social and economic difficulties for the Communists.

An indication of the extent to which the bombings are dislocating North Vietnamese society is reflected in an increasing number of authoritative Hanoi newspaper articles calling for a more efficient evacuation of urban residents to safer rural areas.

Several recent North Vietnamese press and radio statements have also been emphasizing the need for tighter discipline and greater sacrifices to meet the U.S. threat. These statements are monitored by official U.S. services and made available here.

A measure of the intensification of the U.S. bombings is contained in official statistics showing that the tonnage of American bombs dropped in Southeast Asia nearly doubled between January and May.

The tonnage rose in May, the most recent month for which statistics exist, to 105,725 tons. A total of 56,790 tons of bombs were dropped in January. The increase is primarily due to a larger focus on North Vietnam.

In the view of U.S. government analysts here, however, there is little evidence to suggest that the Communists are being compelled by their difficulties to seek a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict.

On the contrary, these analysts point out, Hanoi's admissions of its problems are being paralleled in the Communist media by appeals to the North Vietnamese population to prepare itself for a protracted war.

An insight into the impact being made on North Vietnam by the U.S. bombing was contained last week in an article in Hanoi's official newspaper, Nhan Dan, urging Communist cadres to "accelerate evacuation" of the cities in order to "defend the lives and property of the people."

The article disclosed that cadres are not only helping families to leave populated areas but are also assisting them to resettle in rural villages. It stressed that "competent cadres" should be sent to refugee centers "to discuss and solve all problems arising from evacuation in order to help the evacuees quickly settle in new places, normalize their livelihood and continue to participate in production and other tasks."

The Hanoi newspaper called on food and other bureaus to "improve their work and selling methods" thereby hinting that the population transfer is causing problems in the distribution of supplies. It also emphasized the need for providing education and public hygiene services, particularly for refugee children.

Another problem apparently confronting the Hanoi leadership is the resettlement of urban refugees in peasant villages unprepared to handle city dwellers. Underlining this problem, the Nhan Dan article exhorted refugees from cities to "respect the customs and habits . . . in the evacuation areas," urging them as well to "enthusiastically participate in production and in other tasks" in the countryside.

More than half of the populations of Hanoi and Haiphong reportedly were evacuated from those cities in early May, but afterward began to drift back, presumably because they preferred urban to rural life despite the dangers involved.

The present evacuation campaign appears to be designed to reverse that movement. This suggests that the North Vietnamese leaders anticipate a further intensification of the U.S. air war.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 11, 1972]

THE FOOD WEAPON
(By Anthony Lewis)

An Associated Press dispatch from Saigon Sept. 3 included this passage:

"The Seventh Fleet disclosed that one of its vessels had intercepted and seized two and a half tons of rice that it said the Chinese had tried to float ashore from a freighter [off North Vietnam] in waterproof plastic and burlap sacks."

The sentence was well down in a roundup of military action in Vietnam that day. The United States Navy's seizure of rice being shipped to North Vietnam was evidently regarded as routine. But for some readers it raised significant questions.

When the United States began its blockade of North Vietnam last May, President Nixon spoke of "tanks, artillery and other advanced offensive weapons supplied to Hanoi by the Soviet Union and other Communist nations." He said the "one way to stop the killing" was to "keep the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws of North Vietnam."

The announced seizure of those bags of rice raises the question whether the American blockade is in fact limited to military supplies.

The question was put to a Pentagon expert. In reply he first pointed out that this particular seizure of rice took place near Honla Island, off the southern panhandle of North Vietnam 75 miles above the demilitarized zone. He called it a "conduit area," where food "has to be for troops or for those working the supply system." But this point turned out to be of no significance.

After checking with higher authority, the Pentagon officer stated that the U.S. Navy was under orders to stop food and anything else discovered anywhere off North Vietnam. He said:

"The policy is to interdict all supplies going into North Vietnam by sea."

In short, the United States is carrying out a total naval blockade of North Vietnam, not one limited to military supplies. What makes that highly important is the fact, not widely understood, that only a tiny proportion of North Vietnam's imports by sea is of a military character.

An analysis of North Vietnamese imports was made in the opening weeks of the Nixon Administration. It appears in National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, known as NSSM-1.

About 85 per cent of the aid from her Communist allies reached North Vietnam by sea, NSSM-1 said. And that was almost entirely food and other "economic" aid rather than military. "The military equipment provided by the Soviets and Chinese" came mainly by rail through China, it said.

During the first nine months of 1968, NSSM-1 estimated, the seaborne cargo broke down as follows: "Foodstuffs [chiefly rice and wheat] 38 per cent of total volume, general cargo 33, petroleum 20, fertilizer 8, timber 1." The memorandum added:

"The importance of food imports can hardly be overstated; even with them, North Vietnam has been forced to strictly ration foodstuffs."

There is no reason to think that the import proportions have changed drastically since the NSSM-1 analysis. The hawkish Economist of London estimated recently that in 1971 only about a quarter of North Vietnam's imports were "military-related, much of the rest being raw materials and food."

From all this two things are unarguably clear:

North Vietnam is dependent on imported food to a significant degree to feed her population.

The American blockade, to the extent that it is effective, must have one of its principal impacts on the food supply. And those who made the policy well understood that when they instituted the blockade.

There is of course the view, expressed by a number of military figures, that no distinction should be drawn between Vietnamese military and civilian activity or personnel: They are all helping the war effort, after all, and if they called that off they would have no trouble importing the food they need.

But our moral system does not allow such obliteration of the military-civilian distinction. We all recognize that it is one thing to bar, say, missiles from Cuba and another to cut off food and everything else. One of the Nazis condemned to death at Nuremberg was the wartime governor of Holland who caused a civilian famine by ordering the dikes destroyed.

Considerations of this kind are not likely to move Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger or the other men who believe that American honor requires bombing, mining and shelling Indochina indefinitely to keep Nguyen Van Thieu in office. But the rest of us might have a feeling in the pit of our stomach the next time Mr. Nixon tells the heart-rending story of little Tanya, the 12-year-old Russian girl who saw her family die one by one in the famine during the German siege of Leningrad.

APPENDIX VII

EXCERPTS FROM THE "KISSINGER MEMORANDUM" ON U.S. BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM, 1965-1969

[NOTE.—The following excerpts are taken from National Security Memorandum Number 1, undertaken at the direction of Dr. Henry Kissinger for the National Security Council by the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Printed here are the answers to question number 28, "With regard to the bombing of North Vietnam;" the answers from the Departments were assembled by the National Security Council into its first Memorandum, the text of which was printed in the Congressional Record of May 10 and 11, 1972.]

[From the Congressional Record, May 10-11, 1972, pp. E4999-5001; E5010-5012; E5022; and E5063-5065]

Question 28: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

a. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

There was a good deal more evidence on the nature of the strain produced by the bombing than on their significance. U.S. intelligence indications, including *inter alia* the observations of travelers to North Viet-nam, the opinions of the Hanoi diplomatic community (notably the Canadians and British), North Vietnamese public radio broadcasts, aerial photography, and the testimony of NVA POW's in South Viet-Nam, of fishermen captured off the coast of North Viet-Nam, and of the Spanish repatriates—all underscored the fact that the U.S. bombing was a matter of concern to the North. This evidence indicated that it was clearly having an impact and was generating strains throughout North Viet-Nam. As shown in the attached chart (at end of paper), the bombing is estimated to have caused North Viet-Nam economic and military losses totaling just under \$500 million. In addition, there were many additional losses that could not, in the intelligence community's opinion, be assigned any meaningful values.

Unfortunately, the available intelligence indicators were relatively silent about the significance of these strains, i.e., about their cumulative ability to deter Hanoi from political and military policies unacceptable to the U.S. In theory, there was an upper limit to North Viet-Nam's capacity simultaneously to continue the defense of the North and the big-unit war in the South. The bombing undoubtedly pushed Hanoi closer to that limit, but it was not possible to determine precisely (1) where the limit lay, and (2) how far from it Hanoi was at any given time. Hanoi's decisions to change from protracted war to the Tet offensive and then to negotiations may be seen as indications it was approaching that limit, but it obviously still had considerable reserve capacity at that time.

What did become clear during the course of the bombing was that the North Vietnamese had not been paralyzed. Hanoi found a variety of ways to minimize and adapt to the strains of the bombing. Foreign aid was perhaps the most important single element in this adaptation, but the striking tenacity of the North Vietnamese leadership and the disciplined if fatalistic response of the North Vietnamese people were of nearly equal importance. Despite increasingly heavy bombing, the North continued to function. A high level of imports continued to be received and distributed, permitting North Vietnam to serve as "the great rear" for "the great frontline" in the South. The infiltration of men and supplies continued to increase from 1965 to the present.

Nevertheless, *in retrospect* it appears that by late 1967 and early 1968, the strains caused by the bombing were having a cumulative effect. The Spanish

repatriates (a group of 14 Spaniards and their dependents who were repatriated to Spain in late 1967 after living for 13 to 19 years in North Vietnam) reported that the bombing had made life in the countryside very difficult and had been extremely demoralizing to the population. Some of the Spaniards believed that the North Vietnamese could not hold out longer than another year or two, because after that time the privations, misery, and bomb damage would be too great. One repatriate talked in Hanoi with an NVA lieutenant colonel from the DRV Ministry of Interior, who said in December 1967 that it would be very difficult to continue the fighting because of widespread demoralization and bomb damage.

Other evidence of growing difficulties in North Vietnam can be found in a decree on "the punishment of counterrevolutionary crimes," published by Hanoi in March 1968, which covered a wide range of activities harmful to state security and to the war effort and prescribed a variety of punishments ranging from several years' imprisonment to death. This decree was originally adopted by the DRV National Assembly in October 1967 and promulgated by President Ho the following month; the four-month delay between promulgation and publication has not been explained, but may have been related to Hanoi's expectations of intensified bombing. However, the very need for such a decree, as well as its timing, points to the leadership's concern with internal conditions and morale in the North in late 1967 and early 1968.

In addition, the bombing was having a cumulative impact on the North Vietnamese economy, resulting in the appearance of widespread black market activities which eventually came to involve many low-level DRV officials and cadre, as well as the man in the street. During 1967, the price of black market rice rose to ten times the price of rationed rice; some foods, like meat, could be procured virtually only on the black market. By the end of February 1968, economic damage caused by the bombing was estimated at \$295 million, more than twice the estimated \$135 million in military damage. A large number of reports from observers in Hanoi pointed to growing shortages in consumer goods and foodstuffs, persistent agricultural shortfalls, and increasingly strict rationing. The progressive dilution of the rice ration (by increasing the percentage of substitutes such as wheat, maize, and manioc at the expense of the percentage of rice) was one of the most striking indications of economic difficulties. By June 1968 the rice ration had been reduced to 50 percent rice substitutes, and subsequently it was reduced even further. (It is now about 60 percent rice substitutes.)

These facts, coupled with personal observations, led the Indonesian ambassador to Hanoi, Nugroho, to conclude in June 1968 that the main reason which impelled the DRV to agree to talk with the US was the need for a breather as a result of a deteriorating economic situation. In his opinion, peace negotiations were essential to Hanoi, at least for a "pause of calm," if not a permanent peace settlement.

Manpower shortages presented yet another intractable problem. Despite one school of thought, which held that Hanoi had more than enough manpower to keep the North intact and to fight a big unit war in the South, we came to believe by February 1968 that some of the key theoretical and statistical assumptions upon which these views were based had overlooked both Hanoi's own demographic data as well as the nearly unanimous opinions of on-the-spot observers, who pointed to severe and increasing labor and manpower shortages. Before the March 31 bombing limitation, an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 civilians were engaged in part-time bomb damage repair work, and an additional 100,000 military personnel were assigned full time to air defense. These manpower drains were intensified by high levels of infiltration into South Viet-Nam, and, in our judgment, by labor shortages which predated the bombing. The over-all result, therefore, was that the manpower situation began to weigh more and more heavily on Hanoi, until eased considerably by the March 31 bombing limitation. It should be noted, however, that there is no evidence that manpower shortages in themselves were becoming acute enough to prevent Hanoi from continuing its policies.

Bottlenecks caused by intensive bombing of the bridges and roads near Hai-phong were yet another problem for the Hanoi leadership. These strikes increased through the summer and fall of 1967, and while their impact cannot be quantified, it was clear from observers' reports that imports were piling up in the port due to interdiction of the lines of communication. Increasing use by the US of Mark 36 Destructors in the latter part of 1967 undoubtedly contributed to transportation problems on inland waterways and some road areas. Throughout North Viet Nam as a whole, transportation routes were heavily interdicted; by the time of the

March 31 bombing limitation, possibly 400 bridges had been damaged or destroyed throughout the country. The turn-around time for vessels calling at Haiphong increased from an average of 13 days in 1966 through 18 in 1967 and 25 in 1968, but there were variations within each year which could not be directly attributed to the bombing.

* * * * *

Question 28: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam :

c. To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

The degree of relief provided by Soviet and Chinese aid cannot be quantified, but its importance is suggested by the fact that, whereas the bombing destroyed capital stock, military facilities, and current production in North Viet-Nam worth nearly \$500 million, Soviet and Chinese aid during this period was nearly \$2.9 billion, nearly 6 times as much. This high rate of foreign aid, coupled with the relatively low requirements of North Viet-Nam itself and of NVA/VC forces in the South, goes a long way toward explaining Hanoi's ability to withstand the bombing.

Despite occasional Soviet complaints of Chinese interference with rail shipment, and despite such transportation difficulties as may have been caused in China by the Cultural Revolution or by deliberate Chinese Government policy, the Communist aid moved in sufficient quantities to take care of North Vietnamese needs and enable the regime to continue the war effort.

The trend of Soviet and Chinese aid has been as follows :

[In million U.S. dollars at Soviet foreign trade prices]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	Total
Economic:					
U.S.S.R.-----	85	150	200	240	675
China-----	50	75	80	100	305
Total-----	135	225	280	340	980
Military:					
U.S.S.R.-----	210	360	505	440	1,515
China-----	60	95	145	100	400
Total-----	270	455	650	540	1,915

All in all, the Soviets and the Chinese have supplied North Viet-Nam with a total of nearly \$2.9 billion in economic and military aid since the bombing began.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this aid to Hanoi. More than any other single factor, it has enabled the North Vietnamese to withstand the bombing and to continue the war in the South. In 1968, for example, the Soviets provided economic aid in the form of petroleum, industrial and agricultural equipment, trucks and other vehicles, and construction materials and equipment, as well as such consumer goods as cotton and silk textiles, and vitally needed bulk foodstuffs. Much of the Soviet economic aid served military purposes, either by releasing North Vietnamese production and manpower capacity for war purposes, or because it was used in support of the military effort (e.g., trucks). In the pure military field the Soviets sent surface-to-air missile systems, aircraft, radar, armor, artillery, infantry weapons, and ammunition. The military aid, while higher in value than the economic aid, is much less in volume.

The Chinese, for their part, provided construction materials, trucks, spare parts, pharmaceuticals, and other machinery and equipment, as well as substantial deliveries of rice, grain, and other foodstuffs. Chinese military aid has consisted primarily of light artillery rockets, and small arms and ammunition used by the Viet Cong, although most of the DRV's naval vessels and some token shipments of aircraft and armor have also been supplied by the Chinese in the past. In addition, the Chinese have had between 30,000 and 50,000 support troops (the number is declining) in North Viet-Nam. These troops have engaged in construction, repair, and air defense.

On a volume basis, about 85 percent of Communist aid to the DRV arrives by sea; rail deliveries from China account for the remaining 15 percent, including the military equipment provided by the Soviets and Chinese. During the first nine months of 1968, the composition of seaborne deliveries consisted of bulk foodstuffs (chiefly rice and wheat, 38 percent of total volume), general cargo (33

percent), petroleum (20 percent), fertilizer (8 percent), and timber (1). This was similar to the first nine months of 1967, except that in 1968 shipments of bulk food replaced general cargo as the single largest category of imports. This point to Hanoi's growing dependence on foreign sources for supplies for rice and wheat, reflects continuing shortfalls in domestic agricultural production.

Question 28: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

d. What are the current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

The crux of this question is the definition of "war-essential imports." There is room for considerable disagreement on this subject, but in our judgment, the category of war-essential imports should include most of the economic aid provided by the Soviets and Chinese, as well as nearly all of their purely military aid. The reason for this is that economic aid is equally if not more important than military aid in keeping North Viet-Nam a going concern. (During 1968, economic aid totaled some \$340 million and military aid about \$540 million). In fact, it can probably be assumed that all North Vietnamese imports in the past few years have been directly related to the war effort. The regime would not have used its sparse funds and credits, or burdened its strained transport system, with non-essential goods.

Food imports constitute a growing percentage of total imports, in 1968 replacing general cargo as the single largest category of imports. This reflects the steady decline in crop acreages and yields that began in 1965 and has continued through the present. The importance of food imports can hardly be overstated; even with them, North Viet-Nam has been forced to strictly ration foodstuffs on the official market and progressively to reduce the composition of the rice ration so that at present it consists 60 percent of rice substitutes such as domestic corn and imported wheat. In addition, a thriving black market has grown up, dealing in foodstuffs (and other items as well) and involving large numbers of DRV lower level officials and cadres, as well as average citizens.

Economic aid has been essential in keeping North Viet-Nam afloat; under present conditions it is extremely doubtful that Hanoi could dispense with any substantial portion of this aid.

The question becomes, therefore, "Could North Viet-Nam continue to receive and distribute most of the economic aid and nearly all of the military aid it is now obtaining from foreign suppliers if Haiphong and other key ports were closed and if the road and rail lines from China were heavily bombed?" A second question is: "What would happen if it could not?"

To begin with, it must be noted that in practical terms it would be impossible to deny all imports by sea. Even if the one principal port (Haiphong) and the two secondary ports (Cam Pha and Hon Gai) were closed, there would still be twelve minor ports as well as numerous coastal transshipment points suitable for over-the-beach off-loading. Lightering operations would permit an indeterminate amount of supplies to enter North Viet-Nam from the sea. It is nearly certain, however, that these minor ports and transshipment points could not handle anything like the present volume of imports going into Haiphong. (It is estimated that 85 percent of the total aid to Hanoi arrives by sea, i.e., through Haiphong. Almost all of this is economic aid, since military supplies are generally believed to come overland via China.)

We do not believe that the capacity of the DRV-CPR road and rail network is great enough to permit an adequate flow of supplies in the face of an intense day and night bombing campaign. In our view, earlier analyses which have claimed a virtually unlimited capacity for this network were based primarily on theoretical considerations of transport capacities and did not give adequate weight to the very real difficulties the North Vietnamese have experienced in handling imports even when Haiphong was relatively untouched. It is true that these difficulties were overcome, but to our knowledge there is no evidence that Hanoi would be able to deal as successfully with the closing of Haiphong and heavy attacks on lines of communication from China. We therefore believe that interdiction of Haiphong and heavy attacks on the rail lines from China would over time prevent North Viet-Nam from receiving sufficient economic and military aid to continue the war effort. But it would be difficult to quantify this, since it depends on the type and intensity of interdiction.

On the other hand, one important point should be kept in mind. The North Vietnamese surprised many observers, and confounded many predictions, by

holding the North together and simultaneously sending ever-increasing amounts of supplies and personnel into the South during 3½ years of bombing. It is clear that the bombing campaign, as conducted, did not live up to the expectations of many of its proponents. With this experience in mind, there is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombings failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism and risk of escalation.

This brings us to the second part of the question. "What would happen if Hanoi could not obtain sufficient war-essential imports, as defined earlier?" Here again, there does not seem to be any quantifiable answer; we are reduced to educated estimates. If we arbitrarily assume that nearly all military aid reached North Vietnam (because it is relatively compact and could be transported by a small number of freight cars or a larger number of trucks, and because it has a high priority) but that only half of the economic aid did, we think that by strenuous exertions and considerable belt-tightening the North Vietnamese could continue on their present course for perhaps at most two years more. Beyond that time, barring a cease-fire or protracted lull in the fighting in South Vietnam (either of which would greatly ease Hanoi's burdens), we would estimate that Hanoi would be forced (1) to make concessions to the U.S. in order to get Haiphong reopened, or (2) at least to reduce the scale of the war in the South to manageable proportions, perhaps by reverting to political struggle backed by terrorism and selected guerrilla operations which did not require Northern aid and personnel. Of course, other factors such as manpower shortages would figure in the same time-frame.

It should be noted, in conclusion, that this paper does not address the advisability of closing Haiphong, nor the question of the Soviet and Chinese responses. These matters, clearly the most central problems, lie outside the terms of reference of Question 28 (d).

Question 28: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

e. What action has the DRV taken to reduce the vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g., through population evacuation and economic dispersal)?

Three chief trends were evident during the bombing: (1) civil defense measures, (2) population evacuation, and (3) economic dispersal.

Civil Defense Measures. Even before the bombing began, the DRV leadership was warning the population of trying days ahead. In January 1965 the National Defense Council directed that citizens should "strengthen further defense and security work and get ready to fight," "actively push forward anti-aircraft work," "make all all-out efforts to build a powerful people's armed force," and "actively build and consolidate North Viet-Nam in all fields." After February 7, 1965 (the beginning of the bombing) intensified civil defense measures were undertaken. On February 9, AFP reported that trenches were being dug, air raid shelters constructed, and vehicles and important installations camouflaged in Hanoi.

Thus, beginning in early 1965, an extensive civil defense program was devised, which eventually provided some form of bomb shelter for virtually the entire North Vietnamese population. Shelter programs were begun earliest in Hanoi and other heavily populated urban areas, where large public semi-underground shelters were built in downtown sections. This was supplemented in less densely populated parts of the city by an extensive system of tunnels and by individual shelters—covered cement cylinders buried in the ground. Almost all industrial plants came to have a network of earthwork tunnels leading away from the buildings to provide protection for workers on the job, and even agricultural workers reportedly built trenches near their rice fields.

At the same time, other forms of air defense were improved or were introduced. The SA-2 surface-to-air missile system was introduced in 1965. The DRV air force, air fields, and early-warning radar system were rapidly improved, and anti-aircraft artillery weapons and units were dispersed throughout the country to protect major cities, industrial and defense areas, and lines of communication. Roughly half of the total AAA guns were located in the northeast quadrant of the country, which includes the Red River delta, and, of course, Hanoi.

Population Evacuation. This program got off to a slower start than the civil defense effort. In September 1965, however, a US traveler said that 50,000 persons had already been evacuated from Hanoi. It appears that, initially, the DRV Government gave little or no financial assistance to evacuees, but by early 1966, allowances for them were being made available. In June and July of the same year, the government conducted a ward census in Hanoi and cut off the ration

cards of those deemed superfluous to the functioning of the city; these people were thus forced to evacuate. In July 1966 AFP reported that 10,000 people a day were leaving the city, and at the end of 1966 both Harrison Salisbury and a TASS reported said that one-third of the capital's population had been evacuated.

People reportedly drifted back into Hanoi in early 1967, but evacuation increased sharply in April and May after US strikes on Hanoi. At that time a Swedish reporter was told that the DRV had plans to evacuate the whole city. In the summer of 1967, however, school children were reportedly entering Hanoi again, and this trend continued to the point where in early 1968 the Hanoi city council passed a decree instructing people *not* to return to the city. But after the March 31 bombing limitation, people began to return in considerable numbers, a trend which intensified after the November 1 bombing halt. It appears at this writing that the full population of Hanoi has not yet returned, but that a good portion of the inhabitants have indeed come back. The DRV Government, however, has not yet officially reversed its evacuation policy.

Economic Dispersal. Beginning in 1965, the expansion of centrally controlled, large-scale industry was deemphasized and local small-scale production received official encouragement with a goal of regional self-sufficiency. Long-term five-year economic planning was shelved in favor of a two-year planning period.

Economic activity in the Hanoi area consisted of electric power, machine building, chemicals, barge building, textiles, light industry, and phosphate processing. Some of these enterprises, such as textiles, were relocated and dispersed, but others, such as electric power plants, perforce had to remain in place. Accurate figures on the production of the relocated plants are not available, but we assume that even limited the pre-1965 output must have fallen considerably under the impact of the bombing and of dispersal.

Present Vulnerability and Importance of Hanoi. Hanoi's vulnerability and importance have probably both increased since the bombing halt. The population is returning to its pre-evacuation levels, and the defenses of Hanoi are reportedly being discretely but substantially reduced. It appears that the DRV leadership has decided to continue indefinitely the policy of economic decentralization begun in 1965, probably to hedge against the bombing being resumed and to avoid the production losses which would occur if industry were recentralized. Some permanent rebuilding has begun, but full scale reconstruction throughout the country will probably await an end to the war in the South. In Hanoi itself, the Doumer bridge has been rebuilt, though it needs additional repairs, and the Hanoi thermal power plant is being rebuilt. Primary and secondary schools and universities in Hanoi have not been officially relocated back to the capital, but the kindergarten and nursery schools may reopen soon. However, hospitals and most government agencies remain evacuated. No large-scale construction of urban housing has been reported.

Question VII: To what relative extent do the US/RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact?

The Communists have a surprisingly large amount of flexibility in controlling their rate of casualties in South Vietnam. This flexibility is reflected in 1968 killed-in-action statistics—during February, at the height of the Tet offensive, VC/NVA KIA totaled nearly 40,000, but only five months later during July, the Communists were able to hold their monthly combat deaths to less than 7,000. During the last three months of 1968, average VC/NVA monthly killed-in-action was substantially below 10,000 per month.

The Communists have been able to control their attrition rate by varying both tactics and strategy. Given any current strategic deployment and short term goals, both offensive and defensive tactics may be more or less aggressive. In turn, strategic deployment and degree of offensive or defensive posture will greatly determine loss rates. These variations are obviously not mutually exclusive and tactical aggressiveness largely depends on short and intermediate term strategic goals.

Data on Allied military operations reflect the difficulty of making contact with VC/NVA forces. These data do not indicate which side is able to initiate the contact, only that Allied units were on offensive operations.

Question VIII: What controversies persist on the estimate of VC Order of Battle, in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On VC recruiting, and manpower pool? What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the overall adequacy of evidence?

Strength estimates

Estimates of VC/NVA Order of Battle as well as estimates of various categories of guerillas, irregular forces, and infrastructure have been under thorough review and discussion by members of the intelligence community and CINCPAC/MACV since the summer of 1967. An apparent agreement reached at a conference in Saigon in September 1967 proved to be short-lived. Therefore, the Director of Central Intelligence convened a second conference in Washington in April 1968. This conference included representation from all concerned USIB agencies, CINCPAC, and MACV, and observers from the military services. The Washington conference failed to reach agreement on any of the elements included in the estimates of enemy strength.

Since April 1968, at the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, a CIA/DIA Working Group has worked to reach agreement in Washington and with CINCPAC/MACV. This CIA/DIA group has reached Washington working-level agreement on the strength of those elements composing the military threat (Main and Local Forces, Administrative Services, and Guerrillas) as of the end of August 1968 and for 31 December 1968. In addition, the working group has reached agreement on end-of-the-year estimates for such irregular organizations as Self Defense Forces and Assault Youth, and for the Political Infrastructure.

The agreed CIA/DIA estimates for 31 December 1968 are as follows:

Military threat in thousands

Combat forces:		
NVA	-----	¹ 105-125
VC MF/LF	-----	45- 55
Subtotal	-----	¹ 150-180
Administrative services:		
NVA	-----	10- 20
VC	-----	45- 55
Subtotal	-----	55- 75
Guerrillas	-----	² 60-100
Total military threat	-----	265-355

¹ An estimated 20,000-25,000 of these NVA troops are serving in VC units. This estimate excludes an estimated 28,000 NVA troops deployed north of the DMZ which include but are not limited to the 304th NVA Div., 320th NVA Div., 88th NVA Regt. of the 308th NVA Div., and 102nd NVA Regt. of the 308th NVA Div.

² We believe that the military threat represented by the Guerrilla forces is not on a parity with that of the Main and Local Forces because probably only about one-third of the Guerrillas are well armed, trained, and organized.

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Question XXVIII: With regard to the bombing of North Vietnam:

a. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

The major effects of the bombing of North Vietnam were extensive damage to the transport network, widespread economic disruption, greatly increased manpower requirements, and the problems of maintaining the morale of the people in the face of personal hardships and deprivation. Hanoi was able to cope effectively with each of these strains, so that the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war. Material losses resulting from the bombing were, for the most part, offset by increased imports from Communist countries. Damage and destruction by the bombing of military and economic facilities and equipment, together with measurable losses of output, were valued at about \$500 million. Economic and military aid during 1965-68 is estimated at over \$3 billion.

Despite heavy damage to the transport network throughout the bombing, effective countermeasures kept the system operable. In the northern part of the

country, transport into Hanoi and the port of Haiphong was disrupted by the destruction of a number of key bridges. The Hanoi Railroad/Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the Red River remained out of service between December 1967 and July 1968; the Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge was out much of the time between September 1967 and April 1968. Rail traffic on the Lao Cai line to China was restricted by the destruction of the bridge at Viet Tri that remained un-serviceable from mid-1966 to December 1968. In each of these, as in countless other interdictions, pontoon bridges, ferries, or temporary bridges provided by-passes into the original structures and permitted continued logistic movements. Other measures to counter bomb damage included the prepositioning of materials and the training of local teams to effect repairs quickly; developing of transport schedules to make maximum use of the cover of darkness and of bomb free sanctuary areas; and pressing into service all types of equipment including bicycles and carts.

The bulk of the bombing throughout the air war was carried on in the Panhandle of North Vietnam. Even under the heavy bombing during the time that air attacks were restricted to the area below the 19th Parallel, however, logistic flows into Laos were maintained, as evidenced by the reports of road watch teams and by photography. (See question 28b.)

Throughout the bombing campaign, construction of new rail lines and new highways, along with the dual gauging of the Hanoi-Don Dang line, was continued so that the transport network now has a greater capacity than at any previous time.

Economic disruption, besides that to the transport system, met with varying degrees of response by the Hanoi regime. Repair of damaged electric powerplants was carried out when major reconstruction was not required, and an estimated 20 percent of the country's prebombing capacity was kept operational at the height of the bombing in mid-1967. A large number of diesel electric generators were imported to provide independent power to essential users. Blast walls were constructed around the principal electric powerplants, beginning in early 1968. For the most part, damage to manufacturing facilities was left unrepaired and the reduced domestic output of such items as cement, chemicals, and clothing was replaced either in whole or in part by imported goods. Efforts to restore the output of important export products that were casualties of the bombing—pig iron, coal, apatite, and cement—were not observed until after the bombing north of the 19th Parallel had been halted. The machine building industry was relatively undamaged by the bombing and appears to have been expanded through substantial imports of machinery and equipment over the past three years.

Disruption of agricultural output by the indirect effects of the bombing on distribution and on the management and productivity of labor was offset by greatly increased imports of foodstuffs with little adverse effect on the availability of food. Rice rations, however, were increasingly honored with less palatable substitutes of imported wheat flour, corn, or domestic subsidiary crops.

Extra manpower demands induced by the bombing brought about some tightening of over-all manpower availabilities, but never reached proportions significant enough to limit Hanoi's support of the war. Additional demands for laborers to repair bomb damage, to move goods, and to help in civil defense, were estimated to total between 475,000 and 600,000. Of these, less than 200,000 were occupied full time in war-related activities; the remainder were used as conditions warranted. The bombing required an additional 100,000 military personnel within North Vietnam to man the air defenses.

These extraordinary demands were satisfied primarily from the underemployed in agriculture and the services sectors, and by the increased use of women. The agricultural labor force could be reduced substantially without a proportionate decline in output because of the low marginal productivity of each farmer. Similarly, workers in handicraft industries could be diverted with only slight adverse effects on the economy. Military manpower requirements, that increased each year during the bombing, were satisfied by broadening the draft regulations. The draft age was increased, former servicemen were recalled to service, and physical standards were lowered. As a result, an estimated 600,000 males were added by 1967 to the 800,000 males eligible for military service in 1965.

The bombing imposed severe hardships on the people by the constant threat to life, by the disruption of personal routines, and by the dispersal of industry and evacuation from urban areas. There were some indications in late 1967 and in 1968 that morale was wavering, but not to a degree that influenced the regime's policies on the war. The regime was quite successful, however, in using

the bombing threat as an instrument to mobilize people behind the Communist war effort. There is substantial evidence, for instance, that the general populace found the hardships of the war more tolerable when it faced daily dangers from the bombing than when this threat was removed and many of the same hardships persisted. Concern about maintaining popular morale, and, in particular, discipline and unwavering support for the needs of the war appears to have grown markedly in the past year when most of the country was no longer subjected to bombing. Since the 1 November bombing halt over the entire country, Hanoi has put great stress on countering the widespread tendency of the people to relax their efforts. Concern of this kind is reflected almost daily in North Vietnamese publications and broadcasts as the regime has used exhortation, criticism, and the threat of coercion to sustain support for the needs of the war in South Vietnam.

b. What was the level of logistical throughput through the southern provinces of NVN just to the November bombing halt? To what extent did this level reflect the results of the US bombing campaign?

An average of about 1,000 short tons per day moved south of Thanh Hoa into the southern provinces of North Vietnam during the period April Through October 1968. About one third of the total flow was economic goods; the remainder, military and war-related goods such as petroleum. About 75 percent of the supplies moved into the Panhandle of North Vietnam were used locally (AAA ammunition comprised a major portion of the total), 15 percent were moved into the Panhandle of Laos for use there or in South Vietnam, 5 percent moved to the DMZ, and 5 percent moved into northern Laos.

The North Vietnamese have continually increased the volume of supplies moving into the southern provinces. The total daily volume moved south during the seven-month period before the bombing halt in October was 15 percent higher than that moved in 1967. The volume moved southward in 1967 was more than double that of 1965. The throughput tonnage to southern Laos increased substantially in 1968 compared with 1967 as shown below:

[Average number per day]

	April through October			
	1967	1968	1967	1968
Tons delivered to southern Laos.....	95	165	70	145

The increase in the volume of supplies moved into the Panhandle of North Vietnam and Laos in 1968 consisted almost exclusively of military and war-related goods. It resulted from the step-up in personnel infiltration, the higher levels of combat in South Vietnam, and the increased supplies and equipment needed to maintain through logistic movements in the face of increased air interdiction against lines of communication (LOCs).

During April–October 1968 an average of about 95 tons per day were destroyed as a consequence of air attacks, or roughly 10 percent of the total flow into the southern provinces. In addition to direct losses the bombing complicated the flow of supplies to Laos and South Vietnam. We are convinced, however, that the bombing did not put a relevant ceiling on the volume of supplies that the enemy could move South. The enemy was able to take effective countermeasures that resulted in the maintenance and even an increase in the flow of traffic. During the final months of the air war, traffic movements in the Panhandle of North Vietnam were influenced as much by the weather and logistic needs as they were by the intensity of the air strikes.

One reason why the air interdiction campaign was not more successful is the fact that the capacity of the transportation routes remained well above the requirements for their use. Another reason is that even though large amounts of transportation equipment were destroyed and damaged by air attacks, the North Vietnamese were able to repair and replace motor trucks, watercraft and railroad rolling stock so that no shortages developed.

The estimates of traffic flows into the southern provinces of North Vietnam are based on both indirect and direct evidence, supported by a limited amount of documentary evidence. The estimate for 1965 was based, in part, on a sample of actual traffic and has been increased over time by such indicators of activity as changes in the military order of battle, pilot sightings, aerial photography, the level of imports, and roadwatch reporting. The data, therefore, are subject

to a margin of error, but are of the proper order of magnitude and could have as great a downward bias as an upward one.

The estimate on supplies lost through air strikes contains an unknown amount of redundancy, and is probably too high. It is based on reports by pilots of the number of fires and secondary explosions, and of the amount of transport equipment destroyed and damaged.

The most authoritative part of the throughput estimate is the amount of supplies delivered to southern Laos which is based on reports from roadwatch teams, particularly those on Route 15/12 to the Mu Gia Pass. The tonnage moved to southern Laos via this route is an estimate based on these reports and is considered to be a minimum estimate. Roadwatch reports for Route 15 also serve as a basis for estimating traffic on the other principal access road (Route 137/912) which has not had good coverage by roadwatch teams. Other intelligence confirms that our estimates of the traffic moving on Route 137/912 were essentially accurate. We believe that the data compiled through careful research and analysis over many years are adequate to support our estimates and that objective alternative interpretations of the data would be difficult.

a. To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

Communist military and economic aid to North Vietnam to a large extent offset the physical destruction and the disruptive effects of the US bombing and were instrumental in maintaining the morale of the people. Communist countries provided all of the weapons; enough food, consumer goods and materials to compensate for lost domestic output; and most of the equipment and materials to maintain the transport system. Without Communist aid, most of it from the Soviet Union and China—particularly given the pressures generated by the bombing—the Vietnamese Communists would have been unable to sustain the war in both South and North Vietnam on anything like the levels actually engaged in during the past three years.

The amount of Communist economic aid delivered annually has grown from a yearly average of less than \$100 million through 1964, to \$150 million in 1965, \$275 million in 1966, \$370 million in 1967, and \$460 million in 1968. The value of Communist military aid increased from an average of less than \$15 million a year during 1954-64, to \$270 million in 1965, \$455 million in 1966, and \$650 million in 1967. With the restricted bombing of the heavily defended northern part of the country in 1968, military aid deliveries were reduced. At least 75 percent of total military aid since 1965 has been for air defense.

North Vietnam's air defenses significantly reduced the effectiveness of the US bombing, resulting directly or indirectly in the loss of almost 1,100 US aircraft, and provided a psychological boost to morale. Before 1965, the Soviet Union had provided North Vietnam with only ground forces equipment, transport and trainer aircraft, and small naval patrol craft, while China had provided MIG 15/17 jet fighters, motor gunboats, and ground forces equipment. Since early 1965, the USSR has provided North Vietnam with most of its air defense systems including surface-to-air missiles, jet fighters, a radar network, and antiaircraft artillery. Chinese military aid since 1965, much smaller than that from the USSR, has been important primarily in building up North Vietnam's ground forces, including re-equipping Communist ground forces in South Vietnam with the AK-47 assault rifle, the 107-mm rocket, and other new weapons.

The bombing had been indirectly responsible for part of North Vietnam's reduced agricultural output since 1965 because of diversions of labor and disruptions to the distribution system. Greatly increased imports of foodstuffs in 1967 and 1968 have prevented any serious widespread food shortages. The food supplied by Communist countries during 1968 probably provided at least a sixth of the total calories consumed by the North Vietnamese. A comparison of estimated shortfalls in rice production and of imports of foodstuffs is shown below:

(Thousand metric tons)

	1965	1966	1967	1968
Shortfalls (in rice equivalents).....	0	200	350	500
Imports.....	120	80	460	790

Estimates of the shortfalls are tenuous and the extent of the increase in output of subsidiary foods cannot be measured. Moreover, the annual population increment adds almost 70,000 tons to the country's annual food requirements.

Without Communist assistance in maintaining the logistics network, North Vietnam's capacity to move supplies southward in support of the war in South Vietnam would have been seriously restricted. To offset the considerable damage to the transport system, the Soviet Union and China provided large quantities of construction machinery and materials, trucks, railroad rolling stock, and watercraft. At no time during the bombing was there close to a critical shortage of transport equipment in North Vietnam. In addition, China supplied North Vietnam with about 50,000 engineering and support troops to build, repair, and defend transport facilities in the northern part of the country.

North Vietnam's small modern industry was destroyed or rendered largely inoperative as a result of bomb damage. All the major Communist countries, however, especially the Soviet Union, have supplied North Vietnam with a vast array of industrial machinery, metal products, vehicles, and chemicals that in total value are several times greater than the value of lost domestic industrial output.

d. What are current views on proportion of war-essential imports that could come into NVN over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

All of the war-essential imports could be brought into North Vietnam over rail lines or roads from China in the event that imports by sea were successfully denied. The disruption to imports, if seaborne imports were cut off, would be widespread but temporary. Within two or three months North Vietnam and its allies would be able to implement alternative procedures for maintaining the flow of essential economic and military imports. The uninterrupted capacities of the railroad, highway, and river connections with China are about 16,000 tons per day, more than two and a half times the 6,300 tons per day of total imports overland and by sea in 1968, when the volume reached an all-time high. Experience in North Vietnam has shown that an intensive effort to interdict ground transport routes by air attack alone can be successful for only brief periods because of the redundancy of transport routes, elaborate and effective countermeasures, and unfavorable flying weather.

Almost four years of air war in North Vietnam have shown—as did the Korean War—that, although air strikes will destroy transport facilities, equipment, and supplies, they cannot successfully interdict the flow of supplies because much of the damage can frequently be repaired within hours. Two principal rail lines connect Hanoi with Communist China, with a combined capacity of over 9,000 tons a day. Eight primary highway routes cross the China border, having a combined capacity of about 5,000 tons per day. In addition, the Red River flows out of China and has a capacity averaging 1,500 tons per day.

An intensive and sustained air interdiction program could have a good chance of reducing the northern rail capacity by at least half. However, roads are less vulnerable to interdiction, and waterways even less so. In the June–August 1967 air attacks—a previous high point of U.S. interdiction efforts against targets in the northern part of North Vietnam—the transport system was able to function effectively.¹ Strikes in August 1967 against the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line were effective in stopping through service for a total of only ten days. Strikes during this period against the highways that parallel the Dong Dang line showed no significant or sustained reduction of capacity. The Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line capacity, after destruction of the Viet Tri bridge, was maintained at 700 tons per day by use of a rail ferry. If more capacity had been required, however, there is every reason to believe that additional facilities would have been installed at this location to restore the through capacity of the line.

In addition to the overland capacity, an airlift from Chinese airfields could potentially provide a means for importing a large volume of high-priority goods. Moreover, total interdiction of seaborne imports would be difficult because shallow-draft lighters could be used to unload cargo from ocean-going ships anchored in waters outside the mined major harbor areas. Large numbers of small coastal ships and junks could move cargoes from ships diverted to southern Chinese ports of Fort Bayard, Canton, or Peihai, and could unload imports over the beaches, or move into North Vietnam's network of inland waterways.

¹ Interdiction of the lines of communication between Hanoi and the China border could not be sustained at the level that was achieved in the southern Panhandle of North Vietnam during August through October 1968 for a number of reasons. The multiplicity of modes and transport routes in the North would make it necessary to sustain interdiction at a larger number of points than in the Panhandle. Air defenses in the North—aircraft, missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery—make air attacks less accurate and also more costly in terms of U.S. air losses. We believe it is unlikely that either B-52s or Sea Dragon forces could be brought to bear in an interdiction campaign in the north.

The volume of imports that would be essential to maintain the war cannot be closely estimated. Out of total imports in 1968, less than five percent were military material and ammunition. Other imports essential to the war would include petroleum, food, clothing, transport equipment, and construction materials to maintain the lines of communication. In 1968, the volume of all overland and seaborne imports included the following:

Total	2,300
Military materiel	100
Foodstuffs	790
Petroleum	400
Fertilizer	155
Miscellaneous	860

Within the miscellaneous category was an undetermined amount of goods to maintain the economy, to build factories, and to satisfy, at least in part, civilian needs. Moreover, the level of import of some goods was believed to be more than current consumption, permitting a buildup of reserves. It is possible, therefore, that war-essential imports might be as much as one fourth less than the total, or 4,700 tons per day. Whether war-essential imports are estimated to be 4,700 or 6,300 tons per day, however, the overland import capacity would be from two to three times the required import level, and it is unlikely that air interdiction could reduce transport capacities enough over an extended period to significantly constrict import levels.

e. What action has the DRV taken to reduce vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g. through population evacuation and dispersal)?

During 1965-68, Hanoi's vulnerability has been reduced somewhat by evacuation of the nonessential population and by dispersal of small industries. Despite these measures, however, Hanoi's economic importance has been largely preserved. The city's air defense is manned by experienced crews and probably has been enhanced during 1968 by the installation of new radar equipment. Construction of additional bomb shelters and maintenance of the older shelters apparently continues. Reports indicate a steady return of evacuees to Hanoi since mid-1968, but these probably could be evacuated again on short notice. On balance, the city's defensive posture appears to have improved gradually since the bombing limitation of 31 March 1968.

Evacuation of the population from Hanoi reportedly involved 300,000 people, more than one half the population of the city proper, of which 170,000 were students and children. Although few specific details are available, the second largest group evacuated probably was handicraft workers, followed by non-essential and old people, government workers, and the labor force of a few factories. Most of these people are believed to have been moved to the rural areas just a few miles outside the city, still largely within the boundaries of the Hanoi metropolitan area. Their proximity to the city is attested to by frequent reports of a large influx of people on weekends. Even though the evacuation produced some hardships—crowded living conditions, separation of families, longer commuting distances—the welfare of the population generally was adequately served. Currently, a growing number of evacuated people are reported to be returning to Hanoi, but the regime has warned that conditions are still not safe. Although primary and secondary schools and universities have not been officially relocated to urban areas, some outdoor classes were observed in late 1968 in Hanoi. There were reports in December that some kindergarten and nursery schools would be reopening soon in the Hanoi area. Hospitals and most government agencies officially continue to operate from dispersed sites.

Industrial dispersal primarily involved small enterprises and short-distance relocation within the Hanoi metropolitan area. It apparently has been accomplished without long-term effects on Hanoi's economy. Dispersal of large industrial installations was limited to a few factories that could be broken up into small producing units. For example, parts of the 8th March Textile Plant and the Hanoi Machine Building Plant were dispersed, but certain shops at the original plants remained active throughout the bombing. On the other hand, in the handicraft sector, which supplied about half the total industrial output in Hanoi prior to the bombing, it appears that hundreds of handicraft shops were relocated, probably to the suburbs surrounding the city. Little disruption of output would result from dispersal of these small-scale, labor-intensive enterprises, compared to the inefficiency inherent in dispersing large installations. Furthermore, as handicrafts typically employ more than 65 percent of the industrial labor force

in North Vietnam, the dispersal would be an effective means of evacuating a substantial segment of the population from the city with minimal disruption to the economy.

Hanoi is the land transportation hub to the southern part of the country. Rail connections with the port of Haiphong and with Communist China, as well as the most important highways, converge on Hanoi. Therefore, most of the imports destined for the south pass through Hanoi. When the main bridges into Hanoi were destroyed under the Rolling Thunder campaign, the North Vietnamese built rail and highway bypasses around the city. The original bridges now have been repaired but the ferry or pontoon bypasses are being kept in readiness for emergencies.

Hanoi continued to bolster its defense against air attacks even after the 31 March 1968 bombing limitation. Some 34 million individual shelters have been constructed throughout the country, and the Hanoi area claims an average availability of 3 shelters per person that can be reached in seconds after a warning is sounded. A number of bunker-type shelters were observed under construction in the spring of 1968, and limited construction of these was continuing as recently as December. The population is experienced in first-aid, techniques of designing home shelters, and regularly cleaning and repairing older shelters. The air defense capability probably has been upgraded by the installation of 10 modified Fan Song radars in the surface-to-air missile network around Hanoi in 1968. Revetments to protect a small number of critical installations have been observed, and massive blast walls were erected around the Hanoi Thermal Powerplant and the Hanoi Post, Telephone and Telegraph building to protect against all but direct hits.

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U.S. OBJECTIVES

Question 28-A: With regard to the bombing of North Viet-Nam:

A. What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the DRV (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

Answer:

1. The bombing of NVN created considerable strains in agriculture, but many of the effects were indirect, and because of imports NVN was never faced with starvation. The normal seasonal shortages of manpower were aggravated and many of the male managerial cadres were drafted and replaced by inexperienced females. As a result, the 1967 rice crop was at least 500,000 metric tons less than normal, and NVN imported about 450,000 metric tons of food during the year. This situation continued, perhaps worsened, during 1968, and NVN was forced to import around 700,000 metric tons of food. With the aid of imported food, primarily wheat flour, and the raising of rice-substitutes, NVN was able to meet its food demands.

2. North Vietnamese industry was damaged severely by the bombing. Up to 80 percent of its electric power capacity was knocked out, reducing not only the production of electricity but also production at plants dependent on the power-plants. The country's cement plant and iron and steel plant also were damaged heavily; this entirely eliminated domestically produced cement and pig iron, both traditional export items. Other plants extensively damaged included textile, paper, chemical, fertilizer, and coal processing.

3. NVN, however, took countermeasures to minimize the effects of the bombing. Industrial plants were dispersed to more secure areas, diesel generators were imported to replace to some extent the reduced electric power production, and manufactured good for both industrial and consumer use were imported, primarily from other Communist countries. Thus, the bombing postponed NVN's program for economic development. Nonetheless, the use of imported industrial goods provided an adequate standard of living for the people and allowed construction of a sizable number of small industrial shops to satisfy local needs.

4. The lines of communication (LOC's) were damaged continuously by the bombing; roads were interdicted, boat traffic disrupted, and bridges knocked out. The latter probably caused the greatest disruption. All of the major bridges were damaged; in particular, the bombing of the bridges along the LOC's from China to NVN was significant. The Viet Tri Bridge was damaged early, thus severing the Lao Cai-Hanoi rail line, and other bridges leading into Hanoi were struck, impeding the flow of goods on the Dong Dang rail line from China to Hanoi. Finally, the destruction of the bridges near Haiphong slowed the movement of goods from the port to other parts of NVN.

5. Several measures were taken to counteract the effects of the bombing on the LOC's. Thousands of full- and part-time workers were employed to repair roads and rail lines, often in a matter of days. Rail lines were made dual gauge to facilitate the flow of goods from China. Bridge substitutes were devised, including truck and rail ferries, and pontoon and cable bridges. By such expedients, goods continued to flow from China and to move from Haiphong to other parts of NVU. Of course, they moved more slowly and some were destroyed during the bombing raids, causing some temporary distribution problems and shortages, but there was never any evidence of serious disruption to the flow.

6. The bombing, viewed in Hanoi as an escalation of the war, increased NVN's manpower requirements for the armed forces and for repairing the LOC's. While the bombing diverted manpower from agriculture and industry into the military and war-related activities, NVN never appeared to be suffering from a shortage of manpower in general, only of manpower in particular skills. With an estimated 120,000 physically fit males coming of age each year, and by drafting older men and recalling officers, the necessary manpower for the armed forces was available. To satisfy the demand for managerial cadres, women were used. To insure the rapid repair of the LOC's, agriculture workers supplemented the full-time construction workers. As further testimony to the absence of critical manpower shortages, NVN continued to send thousands of students and technicians abroad for education and training throughout the period of the bombing.

7. There is little evidence that the bombing adversely affected the morale of the people of NVN. An indirect effect of the bombing was to create a lower standard of living, through a change in the composition of the rice ration, a general inability to fulfill the meat ration, and a reduction in the cloth ration. In addition, the programs to disperse industry and evacuate urban population were poorly organized, resulting in temporary unemployment, lack of housing and often inadequate rations. Moreover, both programs resulted in the separation of families, a possible morale-depressant. As the bombing continued, however, these programs were improved and the standard of living always was maintained, at least at subsistence-level.

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Question 29a: What evidence was there on the significance of the principal strains imposed on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (e.g., in economic disruption, extra manpower demands, transportation blockages, population morale)?

ECONOMY

By the time offensive air operations against NVN were stopped on 1 November 1968, most of the heavy industry and more than half of the electrical power generating capacity had been destroyed. Dispersion of industry and redistribution of labor resulted in serious inefficiencies, which were aggravated primarily by the constant disruption of lines of communication. As domestic economic requirements became more difficult to satisfy, NVN became more dependent on external assistance. What NVN was unable to produce itself (guns, missiles, ammunition, trucks, food, etc.) or was destroyed by US air raids (cement, POL, steel, etc.) was imported from abroad. Seaborne imports during 1968 totaled nearly 2 million metric tons, up from 1.4 million metric tons during 1967. Food imports nearly doubled during 1968, and accounted for about one-third of all imports. Likewise, imports of fertilizer and petroleum products increased.

The economic (monetary) impact of the bombing is shown in the following table:

Costs and benefits to NVN (1965-68)

[In millions of dollars]

<i>Costs:</i>	
Destroyed capital stock.....	215
Lost current production.....	1,400
Destroyed facilities.....	153
	768
<i>Benefits:</i>	
Foreign economic aid.....	1,210
Foreign Military aid.....	1,845
	3,055

¹ Estimate based on growth rates prior to 1965.

While air strikes destroyed about \$770 million worth of capital stock, military facilities; and current production, NVN received about \$3,000 million worth of foreign economic and military aid from Communist Bloc countries. Thus, in terms of total economic and military resources available to support the war, NVN is better off today than it was in 1965.

It is generally agreed that the bombing did not significantly raise the cost of the war to NVN. This was because production facilities outside of NVN were not targetable and ample external aid was available from the Communist Bloc nations. The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Eastern European nations provided the bulk of the combat equipment and materiel used by enemy units in South Vietnam. The cost of this support to North Vietnam was negligible.

Another major impact of the bombing of North Vietnam was a shift within the labor force. Workers moved from food production to the repair of bomb-damaged facilities. The resulting food shortage created further disruption at the ports by adding food imports to an already overburdened military goods traffic. The economy of the country was further upset by the relocation of industry and by the move of over 30,000 of their most highly trained workers from the Hanoi area. In addition, it was estimated that over 400,000 people fled from Hanoi and Haiphong during the height of the bombing.

EXTRA MANPOWER DEMANDS

Manpower dislocations were apparent at the height of the air war. Women were assuming a greater proportion of the workload, and 40,000 Chinese Communist construction troops and antiaircraft artillery units were moved into the country. Extra manpower was required for air defense, road and rail repair, logistical movement, industrial relocating, and rebuilding. A labor force of between 475,000 and 600,000 including women and children, was required in these areas to offset the effects of the airstrikes. About 110,000 military personnel were assigned to air defense duties. This drain, plus the increasing number of combat losses, necessitated a lowering of military induction standards with a like effect on the standards within their Armed Forces. Evidence from interrogation of North Vietnamese fishermen along the coast and from recent prisoners of war reflects the enormity of the manpower drain. Fifteen year-old villagers were conscripted for military duty in South Vietnam. Many received no more than a few days training. The apprentice, technical, high school, and college entry classes were reduced sharply.

In spite of these extra demands, it appears that NVN has enough manpower to continue the war at the high casualty rates sustained in 1968.¹ Most of the additional labor requirements have been met through normal population growth and through the use of their large pool of unemployed and underemployed citizens.

TRANSPORTATION

The interdiction of major lines of communication made the flow of material throughout the country more costly and time consuming. The degree to which interdiction was effective in reducing support of military forces in the south is difficult to measure. The difficulties brought on by the bombing were evident, however, in that the North Vietnamese were forced to build over 1,200 miles of alternate highways and bypasses, employ alternate and less efficient modes of transport, restrict movement to nighttime, and import large quantities of trucks and locomotives.

While the transportation blockage heavily taxed the capability of North Vietnam to support the troops in South Vietnam, the flow of supplies continued. The rail transit time from Hanoi to Vinh more than tripled, and rail traffic became almost non-existent from Vinh southward. As a result, truck travel from Hanoi to Laos and the demilitarized zone areas increased 100 percent. But these effects simply increased the time necessary to move supplies; they did not deny supplies to the VC/NVA in South Vietnam.

MORALE

The bombing undoubtedly had adverse effects on the people of NVN. Individual citizens suffered many hardships. While the total supply of goods in NVN

¹ The bombing may have killed up to 5% of the 285,000 infiltrating troops (about 14,200 men in 1968). Although there are considerable uncertainties about this estimate, these losses would represent less than 3% of the 700,000 regular and militia troops remaining in North Vietnam and are relatively small compared to the 180,000 VC/NVA reportedly killed in South Vietnam in 1968. Infiltration losses of this magnitude would not appreciably limit VC/NVA force levels or activity rates in SVN.

increased, individual standards of living declined. Food was rationed and consumer goods were scarce; and air raid warnings disrupted the lives of the populace and forced many to leave their homes. Moreover, it has been estimated that approximately 52,000 civilians were killed in NVN by U.S. air strikes.

Still, there is no evidence to suggest that these hardships reduced to a critical level NVN's willingness or resolve to continue the conflict. On the contrary, the bombing actually may have hardened the attitude of the people and rallied them behind the Government's programs. Firm population controls and a steady flow of propaganda from Hanoi have been credited with helping to maintain popular support for the regime. There is some evidence, however, indicating that morale and support for the war in NVN has declined significantly since the bombing halt. Whatever their feelings about the war, the people of NVN have lacked either the will or the means to make any dissatisfaction evident.

The bombing also impacted heavily on the morale of the North Vietnam soldiers moving to South Vietnam. Bombing made the journey difficult and hazardous, a fact reported by many prisoners after capture.

Question 29b: What was the level of logistical throughput through the southern province of North Vietnam just prior to the November bombing halt? To what extent did this level reflect the results of the U.S. bombing campaign?

Estimates of the flow of supplies from the southern province of NVN to Laos vary widely. This is because we have no reliable means of measuring this flow. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that an average of 65 short tons per day flowed into Laos during the three months prior to the bombing halt. The Seventh Air Force estimated that the flow decreased from 340 tons per day in mid-July to 35 tons per day immediately prior to the bombing halt. The CIA and DIA estimate that an average of 165 short tons per day flowed into Laos during 1968. Some of this variation can be explained by the seasonal variation in truck traffic as indicated by the following table of truck sightings in Route Packages 1, 2, and 3 in NVN.

TRUCK SIGHTINGS IN NVN (ROUTE PACKAGES 1, 2, AND 3)

Month	1967	1968
January.....	383	2,866
February.....	654	1,037
March.....	770	2,142
April.....	1,731	3,346
May.....	2,919	5,140
June.....	3,388	3,723
July.....	4,254	4,868
August.....	5,717	3,337
September.....	2,510	1,958
October.....	1,037	1,488
November.....	1,090
December.....	1,754

Source: DIA.

In 1967, truck sightings dropped by a factor of 5.5 from the peak in August to the low in October as bad weather set in over NVN. The supply flow followed this trend. Thus, one cannot attribute the entire decrease in supply flow that occurred in the months before the bombing halt to bombing effectiveness.

Whether the "Summer-1968 Interdiction Campaign" had a special effect is difficult to assess. The following table compares truck attrition in Route Packages 1, 2, and 3 in NVN for June-October in 1967 and 1968.

TRUCK ATTRITION IN NVN (EVALUATED DESTROYED IN ROUTE PACKAGES 1, 2, AND 3)

Month	1967	1968
June.....	402	565
July.....	577	775
August.....	784	622
September.....	239	295
October.....	77	242
Total.....	2,079	2,499

Source: DIA.

These results show a 20 percent increase in truck attrition in the period June–October 1968 over the same period in 1967.

Rather than look at monthly estimates of truck sightings and attrition and supply flows, a better perspective on the overall effect of the bombing in NVN on the supply flow into Laos is obtained by comparing estimates averaged over a whole year. The table below suggests that, despite our intensive 1968 bombing campaign, NVN was able to infiltrate supplies and equipment into Laos than it required to support military operations in SVN. The excess material was probably stockpiled in Laos and SVN to support future operations.

INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES INTO LAOS

[Short tons per day]

	Delivered to Laos	Consumed and destroyed	Available for SVN	Required in SVN
1967.....	93	57	36	15–20
1968.....	165	99	66	30–50

While the exact magnitude of these supplies flows and requirements are all subject to uncertainty, the basic conclusion seems clear. The bombing failed to reduce support below required levels, even at the increased activity rates of 1968. The external needs of the VC/NVA forces were so small relative to enemy capacity that it is doubtful any interdiction campaign could have constrained their combat operations. Estimates of the NVA daily requirements for ammunition and weapons range from 30 to 50 short tons, the equivalent of about 10 to 15 trucks per day.

In addition to the destruction of supplies and lines of communication, the bombing campaign in NVN forced the enemy to provide additional materiel to compensate for the interdiction losses, this in order to maintain support for his forces in SVN at acceptable levels. Moreover, NVN was denied use of the more efficient means of transportation (i.e., rail and coastal shipping). Use of these modes since the halt has enabled the enemy to move large amounts of materiel into the southern Panhandle. Movement south to Vinh by rail is estimated at 400 short tons per day; by coastal watercraft, nearly 1,500 short tons per day. Truck activity now occurs throughout the day, whereas it was confined to the hours of darkness prior to the bombing halt. Further repairs and improvement to land lines of communication, coupled with continued southward extension of north-south petroleum, oils, and lubricants pipeline (1,100 metric tons daily capacity) will further increase the enemy's logistic capability.

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Question 29c: To what extent did Chinese and Soviet aid relieve pressure on Hanoi?

Soviet and Chinese aid to NVN has provided nearly all of the materiel required to carry on the war against SVN; NVN's contribution has been chiefly the over-all direction of the war and the input of troops to do the fighting. The bulk of this military and economic aid comes from the Soviet Union. Its assistance generally has consisted of a sophisticated air defense system and training for associated personnel, artillery, petroleum products, transportation equipment, and food. Chinese aid has consisted primarily of small arms and ammunition. Without such aid, NVN long since would have been forced to reduce the scope of fighting in SVN to the guerrilla-warfare level.

One consequence of aid from outside countries was a lessening of economic pressures on Hanoi in the conduct of its war effort. On the other hand, dependence on outside countries for economic support may have resulted in an increase in the political leverage which could be exerted on Hanoi's war policies by other Communist states.

Another consequence of foreign aid directly affected the bombing campaign. The provision of a complete air defense system—including MIG aircraft, surface-to-air missile systems, and antiaircraft guns—enabled NVN to mount a vigorous defense against U.S. air attacks. This air defense environment had significant effects on our bombing performance and tactics.

Seaborne imports to North Vietnam during 1968 increased by almost 40 percent over 1967. The increase was caused mostly by a 40 percent rise in food and a 56 percent rise in petroleum shipments over the previous year from both the

USSR and China. Large amounts of flour and rice were delivered last year to supplement the below-average harvests in North Vietnam. The delivery of such items permitted the movement of men and supplies to SVN and the maintenance of a subsistence-level diet in NVN.

Question 29d: What are current views on the proportion of war-essential imports that could come into North Vietnam over the rail or road lines from China, even if all imports by sea were denied and a strong effort even made to interdict ground transport? What is the evidence?

LAND IMPORT CAPACITY

In 1968, NVN imported an average of 6,800 STPD (short tons per day); 6,000 STPD by sea, and 800 STPD by land. Imports by land were higher in 1967, amounting to about 1,100 STPD. However, the land lines of communication from China were not used to capacity. It is estimated that the two rail lines from China have a theoretical uninterdicted capacity of about 8,000 STPD and the road network could provide an additional 7,000 STPD during the dry season (normally June-September) and about 2,000 STPD during the poor weather months. The combined capacity of the land routes (9,000-15,000 STPD) is more than enough to transport North Vietnam's total import requirements of about 7,000 STPD. If all seaborne imports were to come through China, considerable logistic problems would have to be solved by the Chinese regime.

INTERDICTION OF IMPORTS FROM CHINA

If seaborne imports can be denied to NVN, her ability to successfully pursue the war in SVN would be dependent on land imports from China.

A strong effort to interdict road and rail transport from Communist China through North Vietnam would require a concerted and coordinated air interdiction campaign against all transportation: military support; petroleum oil, and lubricants power; industrial; air defense; and communications target systems. The interrelationship of the effects of destruction of targets in one category to the effectiveness of others is such that a cumulative impact is achieved. The air campaign would be conducted in such a manner as to be free of the militarily confining constraints which have characterized the conduct of the war in the north in the past. The concept would preclude attacks on population as a target but would accept high risks of civilian casualties in order to achieve destruction of war-supporting targets.

An interdiction campaign as described above, when employed in conjunction with denial of sea imports, would, in large part, isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the rest of the country. Isolation of Hanoi, the focal point of the road and rail system, would be highly effective in reducing North Vietnam's capability to reinforce aggression in South Vietnam. Importation of war-supporting material would be seriously reduced. Road capacities would be reduced by a factor well in excess of the estimated 50 percent believed to have been accomplished during the summer months of 1966 and 1967. Over time, North Vietnam's capability to cope with the cumulative effects of such an air campaign would be significantly curtailed.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that resumption of an interdiction campaign similar to that carried out in Route Package I between July and 1 November 1968 would assure almost total interdiction of truck and waterborne movement of supplies into the demilitarized zone and Laos. Naval blockade offshore and interdiction of Regional Package II to Thanh Hoa would further enhance this effort.

Commitment of B-52 forces following heavy and unrestricted suppression of defenses by fighters, could reduce the amount of time to accomplish the above. Although the North Vietnamese have established a significant by-pass capability, the transportation nets remain vulnerable at many key points. The locomotive population could be attrited quickly if all buffer restrictions were removed near the Chinese border.

There is not sufficient data available at this time on either the cost or the effectiveness of an air campaign against these land lines to reach a firm conclusion as to the chances of isolating NVN from her neighbors. Past attempts to cut rail, road, and water networks in NVN have met with considerable difficulties. It has been estimated that a minimum of 6,000 attack sorties per month would be required against the two rail lines from China. Even at this level of

effort, the North Vietnamese could continue to use the rail lines to shuttle supplies if they were willing to devote sufficient manpower to repair and transshipment operations. Interdiction of the road system would be still more difficult. Since the bombing halt north of 19° in April 1968, North Vietnam has repaired all major road and railway bridges, constructed additional bypasses and alternative routes and expanded the railroad capacity by converting large segments from meter to dual gauge truck. These improvements would make even more difficult prolonged interdiction of the overland lines of communication.

We currently fly approximately 7,000 sorties per month against two primary roads in Laos without preventing throughput truck traffic; the road network from China has 7-10 principal arteries and numerous bypasses. Finally, the monsoonal weather in NVN would make it difficult to sustain interdiction on the land lines of communication. Poor visibility would prevent air strikes during 25-30% of the time during good weather months and 50-65% of the time during poor weather months. Thus, it is not possible to give a definitive amount to the question of how much war-essential imports could come into NVN if sea imports are denied and a strong air campaign is initiated.

Attention would also have to be given to interdiction of supplies coming into SVN from Cambodia. Over the past 2 years, the enemy's use of Cambodia as a supply base and a place of refuge has become more pronounced. During the period October 1967 to September 1968, 10,000 tons of munitions transited Sihanoukville and are suspected of having been delivered to enemy forces in the Cambodia-Republic of Vietnam border regions. This amount represents more than enough ordnance to satisfy the arms and ammunition requirements for all enemy forces in South Vietnam during the same period. Thus, the act of sealing off the enemy's Cambodian supply lines must be considered as an integral part of any plan to prevent supplies from reaching enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam.

Question 29e: What action has the Democratic Republic of Vietnam taken to reduce the vulnerability and importance of Hanoi as a population and economic center (e.g., through population evacuation and economic dispersal)?

North Vietnam has attempted to reduce the vulnerability of Hanoi and Haiphong to U.S. air strikes. A large segment of the civilian population (estimates range from 40-70% of the total) was evacuated from those two populated areas while U.S. bombing operations were being conducted in the north. Some evacuees have drifted back into the city since the bombing halt, and a few schools reportedly have been reopened; however, the evacuation order has not been rescinded. In addition to personnel evacuation, the North Vietnamese dispersed most small industry, schools, hospitals, and government administration in Hanoi and Haiphong. There is no indication that these facilities have returned. Finally, North Vietnam has constructed an effective and extensive system of air raid shelters for Hanoi residents, and blast walls are under construction around important facilities such as the thermal power plant. Hanoi and its environs are also protected by a well-integrated air-defense system.

Although the North Vietnamese have attempted to reduce the importance and vulnerability of Hanoi and Haiphong, these two cities still remain essential to their war effort. Approximately 80% of the North Vietnamese imports enter through the port of Haiphong, and Hanoi is the logistic center for all rail, road, and water lines of communication from China. Both cities are important storage areas for war-supporting supplies and materiel. It has been reported that some fuel and industrial equipment are being sent directly to new regional sites and rural areas away from Hanoi where new factories will be set up.

The buildup of a major logistics support/trans-shipment complex in the Thanh Hoa and Vinh area since April 1968 has shifted this important war-support function from the Hanoi area. The buildup of Quang Khe and Dong Hoi since the bombing halt has further reduced dependence on Hanoi. However, the success of this dispersal is dependent in large measures upon unrestricted ship movements south from Haiphong. Hanoi continues to be a bottleneck for all land traffic from China.

The first part of the document discusses the general situation of the country and the progress of the revolution. It mentions the establishment of the National People's Army and the National People's Police, and the implementation of the Land Reform Law. The document also discusses the economic situation and the measures taken to improve the living standards of the people.

The second part of the document discusses the political situation and the role of the Communist Party of China. It mentions the implementation of the United Front Policy and the establishment of the National People's Congress. The document also discusses the role of the Communist Party in the construction of the new China.

The third part of the document discusses the cultural and educational situation. It mentions the implementation of the Cultural Revolution and the establishment of the People's Education System. The document also discusses the role of the Communist Party in the cultural and educational reform.

The fourth part of the document discusses the foreign relations of the new China. It mentions the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other countries, and the implementation of the One-China Policy. The document also discusses the role of the Communist Party in the foreign relations.

The fifth part of the document discusses the achievements of the new China. It mentions the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the implementation of the Land Reform Law, and the establishment of the National People's Army and the National People's Police. The document also discusses the role of the Communist Party in the construction of the new China.