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FISCAL YEAR 1973 AUTHORIZATION FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION FOR THE SAFEGUARD ABM, AND ACTIVE DUTY AND SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTHS

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

S. 3108


TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS DURING THE FISCAL YEAR 1973 FOR PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT, MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS, TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, TORPEDOES, AND OTHER WEAPONS, AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION FOR THE ARMED FORCES, AND TO PRESCRIBE THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL STRENGTH FOR EACH ACTIVE DUTY COMPONENT AND OF THE SELECTED RESERVE OF EACH RESERVE COMPONENT OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Part 1 of 6 parts

Manpower

FEBRUARY 8 AND 9, 1972

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services



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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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WASHINGTON : 1972

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(II)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973— MANPOWER AUTHORIZATION

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Symington, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, and Goldwater.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; L. R. Garcia, John A. Goldsmith, C. J. Conneely, Edward B. Kenney, professional staff members; and Ben Gilleas, director of investigations, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. This is a closed hearing, gentlemen. That means you are responsible for everyone in here, Mr. Secretary, except the ones I am responsible for.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. I will assume that responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. I am responsible for the committee staff.

I have a fairly brief statement that I want to read. First, I want to welcome you gentlemen today. I think this is a very important subject matter and I am sure you do and we are going to wrestle with it the best we can.

(S. 3108 follows:)

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 2, 1972

MR. STENNIS (for himself and Mrs. SMITH) (by request) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1973 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 TITLE I—PROCUREMENT

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appro-
priated during the fiscal year 1973 for the use of the Armed

II

1 Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft,
2 missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes,
3 and other weapons as authorized by law, in amounts as
4 follows:

5 AIRCRAFT

6 For aircraft: for the Army, \$134,500,000; for the Navy
7 and the Marine Corps, \$3,101,600,000; for the Air Force,
8 \$2,612,700,000.

9 MISSILES

10 For missiles: for the Army, \$1,153,400,000; for the
11 Navy, \$769,600,000; for the Marine Corps, \$22,100,000;
12 for the Air Force, \$1,772,300,000.

13 NAVAL VESSELS

14 For naval vessels: for the Navy, \$3,564,300,000.

15 TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES

16 For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army, \$189,100,-
17 000; for the Marine Corps, \$62,200,000.

18 TORPEDOES

19 For torpedoes and related support equipment: for the
20 Navy \$194,200,000.

21 OTHER WEAPONS

22 For other weapons: for the Army, \$70,400,000; for the
23 Navy, \$25,700,000; for the Marine Corps \$900,000.

1 TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST,
2 AND EVALUATION

3 SEC. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropri-
4 ated during the fiscal year 1973 for the use of the Armed
5 Forces of the United States for research, development, test,
6 and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

7 For the Army, \$2,051,100,000;

8 For the Navy (including the Marine Corps),
9 \$2,713,900,000;

10 For the Air Force, \$3,178,600,000; and

11 For the Defense Agencies, \$507,200,000.

12 SEC. 202. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated
13 to the Department of Defense during fiscal year 1973 for use
14 as an emergency fund for research, development, test, and
15 evaluation or procurement or production related thereto,
16 \$50,000,000.

17 TITLE III—ACTIVE FORCES

18 SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1972,
19 and ending June 30, 1973, each component of the Armed
20 Forces is authorized an average active duty personnel strength
21 as follows:

22 (1) The Army, 869,932;

23 (2) The Navy, 601,184;

24 (3) The Marine Corps, 198,391;

25 (4) The Air Force, 727,010.

1 Except when the President of the United States determines
2 that the application of these ceilings will seriously jeopardize
3 the national security interests of the United States and in-
4 forms the Congress of the basis for such determination.

5 TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES

6 SEC. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1972,
7 and ending June 30, 1973, the Selected Reserve of each
8 Reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programed
9 to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

10 (1) The Army National Guard of the United States,
11 402,333;

12 (2) The Army Reserve, 261,300;

13 (3) The Naval Reserve, 129,000;

14 (4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 45,016;

15 (5) The Air National Guard of the United States,
16 87,614;

17 (6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,296;

18 (7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,800.

19 SEC. 402. The average strength prescribed by section
20 401 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any Reserve
21 component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the
22 total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units
23 of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on
24 active duty (other than for training) at any time during the
25 fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members

1 not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected
2 Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other
3 than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in train-
4 ing) without their consent at any time during the fiscal
5 year. Whenever such units or such individual members are
6 released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average
7 strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of
8 such Reserve component shall be proportionately increased
9 by the total authorized strength of such units and by the
10 total number of such individual members.

11 TITLE V—GENERAL PROVISIONS

12 SEC. 501. Subsection (a) (1) of section 401 of Public
13 Law 89-367 approved March 15, 1966 (80 Stat. 37), as
14 amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

15 “(a) (1) Not to exceed \$2,500,000,000 of the funds
16 authorized for appropriation for the use of the Armed Forces
17 of the United States under this or any other Act are author-
18 ized to be made available for their stated purposes to sup-
19 port: (A) Vietnamese and other free world forces in sup-
20 port of Vietnamese forces, (B) local forces in Laos; and
21 for related costs, during the fiscal year 1973 on such terms
22 and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine.
23 None of the funds appropriated to or for the use of the
24 Armed Forces of the United States may be used for the

1 purpose of paying any overseas allowance, per diem allow-
2 ance, or any other addition to the regular base pay of any
3 person serving with the free world forces in South Vietnam
4 if the amount of such payment would be greater than the
5 amount of special pay authorized to be paid, for an equiv-
6 alent period of service, to members of the Armed Forces
7 of the United States (under section 310 of title 37, United
8 States Code) serving in Vietnam or in any other hostile fire
9 area, except for continuation of payments of such additions
10 to regular base pay provided in agreements executed prior
11 to July 1, 1970. Nothing in clause (A) of the first sentence
12 of this paragraph shall be construed as authorizing the use
13 of any such funds to support Vietnamese or other free world
14 forces in actions designed to provide military support and
15 assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos: *Pro-*
16 *vided*, That nothing contained in this section shall be con-
17 strued to prohibit support of actions required to insure the
18 safe and orderly withdrawal or disengagement of United
19 States forces from Southeast Asia, or to aid in the release of
20 Americans held as prisoners of war."

OPENING STATEMENT

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have you with us this morning. With us is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Hon. Roger T. Kelley, to testify on the manpower portion of this year's authorization bill. Mr. Kelley is accompanied by Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy of the Army, Rear Adm. John G. Finneran of the Navy, Maj. Gen. William W. Berg of the Air Force, and Maj. Gen. E. B. Wheeler of the U.S. Marine Corps.

I want to say at the outset that we also appreciate the backup and support materials which have been prepared and assembled from a number of sources by Mr. Sullivan and his staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. We received most of this material in a timely fashion. More will be required on specific issues which we will get into later.

I will take just a moment to say that generally my feelings on military manpower are that we must maintain a very high quality of men in our Armed Forces because of the requirements of complex weapon systems and for many other reasons. I do not know of any time in history when we have had a greater demand for dedication than this period we are going through.

I do feel, however, that it will be necessary for us to continue the reductions in the quantity of military manpower. The pressures which are produced by the cost of modern weaponry and by climbing manpower costs due to pay increases mean that we really have no other choice.

In this coming budget year, fiscal year 1973, the Department of Defense has requested authorization for 2,358,000 men as the fiscal year 1973 end strength. This is only 33,000 men below the end strength for fiscal year 1972: 2,391,000.

During the course of these hearings we expect to receive a detailed justification for the military manpower requested by the Department of Defense. It is not enough to state the threat and then a requirement for a certain number of divisions, air wings, or ships. The costs of defense are so high it is essential that the structure be justified in detail—the link must be shown between the threat and the forces which are requested. Military manpower costs are edging toward 60 percent of the defense budget; manpower is not a free resource, it is our most expensive commodity.

We also expect during these hearings to receive detailed material on the manpower policies of our NATO allies, the force improvements which they may have made, and the contributions which they are making to help defray the large costs which we incur in helping to defend them.

I think we will have a rather lively, but very difficult debate on this subject on the Senate floor where amendments are filed. These amendments come very close to passing. We must have all the justifications we can to back up whatever the committee does with reference to manpower.

It is important that, in making reductions, we do not reduce our combat capability unnecessarily. I was extremely interested to see that considerably over 1 million men in uniform—1,116,000 to be exact—are involved in general support. It is not that the tasks performed by

these men are unimportant—far from it—but we must be particularly sure that the large support structure which we have built up for Vietnam does not continue to drift on and on because of inertia. The question of the numbers of men devoted to support, intelligence, and similar missions, has not been dealt with as thoroughly as it might have been in many cases. Our analysis and our attention, both within the executive and legislative branches, is often focused on the big weapon system issues and on questions having great political importance, such as the number of troops in Europe. But the vast numbers of men involved in these supporting missions absolutely requires the careful attention of the Congress. We will carefully analyze other manpower issues as well this year, of course.

I hope that in our discussions here today and in later testimony during the hearings we can establish a tradition of frankness and candor about these matters. We, in the Congress, fully realize that some of the military manpower problems facing the Department of Defense are not of your making. In part, some of them can be attributed to implicit and explicit policy decisions made by the administration, the Congress, and ultimately by the people themselves. We look forward to exploring these issues with you today, and in following days.

I do not want any tone of complaint about what I say, Mr. Secretary, but I have been on this committee a long time and I have been on the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, and I do not remember ever having heard or considered a real in-depth analysis of the actual manpower needs. I do not know who is to blame for that any more than I am. So, I will put myself first. We just have not been into this in depth to my knowledge, but now manpower is getting such a large part of the money each year, billions of dollars, which I do not think is going to be easy to get this year, or next year either.

I think the military itself wants more of a quality product than they have in many ways, not only the uniformed personnel but the civilian employees. Frankly, I do not know what is being done these days to see that civilian employees actually do a day's work. I know I come in contact with the letdown, the slowdown all over this country, for even a minor repair on your automobile. So, I hope all your civilian employees are exceptions to that general trend.

That is really not before us today, but it is a part of the manpower—I mean, the money part of the bill.

As I understand, plans have been worked out for Secretary Kelley, to take 40 minutes to read a portion of his statement, after which the Army will take 30 minutes to talk from the charts in the books, the Navy 20 minutes, the Marine Corps 10 to 15 minutes, and the Air Force 20 minutes. The services have no prepared statements but will speak to the charts in the backup books.

All right. We have these 2 days now; we are not going to rush anyone, but at the same time, we want to get right down to the questions. We have already had a briefing on the threat from the CIA. We are going to have another one from Mr. Laird and then we are going to have the Secretaries of the services in and the Chiefs of Staff. So, we do not have to go to the threat and matters of that kind.

Mr. Secretary, you are recognized. I am not going to limit you the 40 minutes.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE A. DAOUST, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. LEO A. BENADE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY, OASD (M. & R.A.); FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, OASD (SA); CARL DETWYLER, DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); CHARLES BREWER, DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); JONAS M. PLATT, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. W. D. CRITTENBERGER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND POLICY, J-5 (INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS), OJCS; ROBERT E. MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. DE PUY, ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; REAR ADM. JOHN G. FINNERAN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, USN; MAJ. GEN. E. B. WHEELER, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, USMC; AND MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. BERG, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, DCS/P. & R., USAF

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read a portion of my statement, that portion that deals with the size and the composition of our forces, because I think I would not do justice to the subject if I gave you a capsule statement on that subject. The greater length of my statement I would reduce to a capsule summary, the portions dealing with the elements of the manpower cost and some of the major manpower issues we face.

Mr. Chairman, we propose for fiscal 1973 an average military manpower strength of 2,396,500, down 139,500 from the average strength of fiscal year 1972. This marks the fifth consecutive year in which Defense has requested fewer men than the previous year—a net 5-year reduction of 1.1 million men.

The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress have all determined that past reductions could and should be made. We have not recommended, and we will not recommend, reductions which jeopardize national security. I am advised that the increased capabilities of several of our allies, improvements in our weapons systems, and changes in the threat in some parts of the world, have enabled us to make the manpower reductions of recent years without endangering security.

Today, I want to present not only the reasons why we are recommending a further reduction to the level of 2.4 million men in the Armed Services, but also an overview of the major manpower issues confronting us, including significant cost and other trends.

Despite substantial reductions in the size of our military forces, total manpower costs have risen sharply in recent years and now account for more than 50 cents of every Defense dollar spent. There are many reasons for this trend—including pay raises, higher retired pay costs, more technically trained and higher rated people, and high personnel turnover. These cost trends deserve further analysis as they relate to our most expensive and important asset—people.

Our basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent Nation, to safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and to protect its people. In addition, we have vital interests in other parts of the world, interests which relate intimately to our own security as well as that of our allies. Our military power, in partnership with other nations, helps to protect their interests and our mutual security.

The President of the United States, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, establishes basic policy on broad requirements necessary to fulfill our national security objectives. This broad guidance is, in turn, expanded by the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services for use in force and manpower planning, including the development of recommended force structure and manpower requirements necessary to carry out the guidance.

In our force planning, under the total force concept, we take into account the forces of our allies for the purpose of meeting many of the threats with which we and our partners must be prepared to cope. As you know, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Laird has, for 3 years, laid special emphasis upon the concept of total force, giving effect to President Nixon's principle of partnership. Within our own military forces, the total force concept has meant strengthening our Guard and Reserve units so that they will constitute an effective augmenting force for our active forces.

Once given an approved force goal of, for example, "X" aircraft wings and "Y" divisions, the services are charged with meeting that goal through a combination of equipment, manpower, and training. They must answer such questions as: How many crews are needed to properly man the aircraft; how many men are needed to keep a comserviced and flying; how much support does it take to keep a combat division in the field; what headquarters are needed to direct the combat elements; and what sort of training establishment must be maintained? We must insure that the necessary manpower is distributed into forward deployed units, active CONUS units, and reserve units in order to preserve at minimum cost the capability to deter aggression.

It is my job to see that personnel policies serve the best interests of national security and that they are fair to people. Achieving that goal has not been easy during a period which has been one of the most turbulent in our military history. As we emerge from that turbulence we should jointly examine policies and practices to be sure that they will deliver the best manpower performance at the lowest possible cost. Tough issues must be addressed, and we need your help. This report should provide a basis for further review and discussion of personnel policies and the key manpower issues of defense.

We are moving toward an All-Volunteer Force. This fact requires restudy of basic personnel policies which govern such things as length of enlistments, nature and length of training, and services to be pro-

vided (medical care for dependents, commissaries, et cetera). Personnel policies often have substantial impact on the rate of flow of personnel through the defense system and, consequently, affect the cost of training people, the number of people needed to maintain the required manpower levels in the forces, and the cost of maintaining them.

DOD MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE LEVELS

Manpower requirements, Mr. Chairman, derive from analysis of the threat and what is needed to meet it. Table 1 shows our estimate of military manpower needed for fiscal year 1973, as well as the level maintained in the previous 3 years—broken out by major mission areas: Strategic, general purpose, other mission, and general support.

TABLE 1.—ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER SUMMARY
[Manpower end strengths in thousands]

	Fiscal year—			
	1970	1971	1972	1973
Strategic forces.....	143	130	130	127
Offense.....	(90)	(88)	(88)	(89)
Defense.....	(38)	(27)	(26)	(24)
Command and control.....	(15)	(14)	(15)	(14)
General purpose forces.....	1,251	1,082	949	935
Land forces.....	(746)	(638)	(513)	(516)
Tactical air forces.....	(188)	(167)	(166)	(167)
Naval forces.....	(232)	(205)	(206)	(195)
Mobility forces.....	(85)	(72)	(64)	(57)
Other mission.....	214	204	181	180
Intelligence.....	(93)	(91)	(75)	(68)
Communications.....	(59)	(55)	(52)	(50)
Research and development.....	(39)	(37)	(37)	(35)
Support to other nations.....	(23)	(21)	(17)	(27)
General support.....	1,457	1,298	1,132	1,116
Base and industrial support.....	(657)	(580)	(513)	(506)
Training.....	(617)	(550)	(460)	(458)
Command.....	(154)	(138)	(129)	(121)
Logistics.....	(29)	(30)	(30)	(31)
Total.....	3,065	2,713	2,391	2,358

Note: Numbers in parentheses are additive to major area totals; numbers may not add to DOD totals due to rounding.

Mr. KELLEY. Table 2 shows general support apportioned by major mission area.

TABLE 2.—ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER SUMMARY WITH GENERAL SUPPORT MANPOWER ALLOCATED TO MAJOR MISSIONS

[Manpower end strengths in thousands]

	Fiscal year—			
	1970	1971	1972	1973
Strategic forces.....	273	249	245	240
Offense.....	(172)	(168)	(166)	(166)
Defense.....	(73)	(53)	(52)	(49)
Command and control.....	(28)	(28)	(27)	(25)
General purpose forces.....	2,384	2,075	1,803	1,775
Land forces.....	(1,427)	(1,223)	(975)	(980)
Tactical air forces.....	(356)	(319)	(317)	(317)
Naval forces.....	(440)	(396)	(389)	(370)
Mobility forces.....	(161)	(138)	(122)	(108)
Other mission.....	408	391	345	344
Intelligence.....	(178)	(176)	(146)	(133)
Communications.....	(114)	(104)	(98)	(95)
Research and development.....	(74)	(71)	(68)	(66)
Support to other nations.....	(42)	(40)	(33)	(50)
Total.....	3,065	2,713	2,391	2,358

Note: Numbers in parenthesis are additive to major mission totals; numbers may not add to DOD totals due to rounding.

Mr. KELLEY. I would like to comment briefly on each of the force categories, starting with strategic forces.

Strategic forces, as you know, are those whose primary mission it is to deter nuclear attack upon the United States and are the keystone of the free world deterrent to nuclear war. The President has set forth criteria for strategic sufficiency and the strategic offensive and defensive forces are planned to meet these criteria. The amount of military manpower required to man the missiles, submarines, bombers, command and control centers, and related support facilities for the strategic forces is relatively small. Strategic forces account for about 5 percent of military manpower, or about 10 percent with support allocated to it.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Far more defense manpower (40 percent or up to 75 percent with support allocated to it) is assigned to missions associated with U.S. general purpose forces. The major elements of our fiscal 1973 general purpose forces are: 16 divisions consisting of 13 Army and three Marine; tactical air forces consisting of 21 Air Force tactical air wings, three Marine air wings, and 70 Navy squadrons; and 594 naval ships. General purpose forces also include the 34 active airlift squadrons and 72 ships of our mobility forces.

These land, naval, mobility, and tactical air forces are maintained not only for defense of the United States but also for the support of other nations to which we are linked by common interests. The structure of these forces and their location around the world reflect two policy judgments which have been in force for many years. They are: (1) that the security of the United States and protection of our vital interests requires forces for forward deployment and forward defense; and (2) that strategic nuclear forces, by themselves, are not a sufficient deterrent against the entire spectrum of aggression we must be prepared to face.

Our general purpose forces are sized primarily to provide a capability, together with our allies, to conduct an initial defense either in NATO Europe or in Asia against aggression by the Warsaw Pact or the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). In addition to this capability, the U.S. general purpose force structure reflects a planning requirement to be able to cope with a minor contingency elsewhere, and to provide a strategic reserve.

The general characteristics that distinguish conventional from nuclear forces is that conventional forces permit the physical control of territory rather than provide a capability only to destroy enemy targets. In order to accomplish the physical control of territory, manpower is required. Beyond a certain point, we cannot substitute air or artillery support for land force maneuver units.

The level of U.S. general purpose forces deemed necessary to carry out our military strategy depends on the territory involved, the cooperation of the population, the postulated enemy force, the level and effectiveness of our allied forces, the type of control desired, and of course, the assumed effectiveness of our own forces. The bulk of our general purpose forces are maintained because of the judgment that it is in our national interest to help deter attacks on certain other countries and to help defend them if they are attacked, consistent with

our national interests. Only a small part of our force would be currently required for the territorial defense of the United States.

Thus, overall U.S. general purpose force levels and costs depend mainly on what types of crises and wars we decide to prepare for, what countries we decide to assist, and to what degree these countries can defend themselves.

If a war were to start and we were not adequately prepared with conventional forces, the risk of escalation to nuclear war, the loss of life and destruction of property, and the ultimate military forces and casualties would be much greater than if we were prepared initially. Furthermore, being prepared with general purpose forces in peacetime has significant value in deterring war. Peace would be precarious, indeed, if the President of the United States had no option except the threat of a nuclear attack.

In addition, our general purpose forces actually deployed overseas in peacetime take on a significance beyond their purely military function, because they symbolize both to our allies and our enemies the commitment of the United States to the area involved.

The size of our general purpose forces is determined largely by our NATO commitment. U.S. manpower deployed in Asia has been greatly reduced by Vietnamization and by the success of security assistance programs. Currently about 5 percent of our active forces are stationed in South Vietnam and, as the President has announced, those forces are being further reduced.

The level of U.S. forces in NATO reflects both an indication of our intentions toward Europe and a military capability of high credibility. The forces in Europe include over four divisions. [Deleted.] These forces are consistent with our treaty commitment to defend forward in Europe.

Over the past 10 years, the department has undertaken a series of analyses to determine "how much is enough" to defend Europe. These analyses are reflected in the present size, composition, and readiness of our NATO forces.

The total size of our general purpose forces will be cut by another 14,000 spaces during fiscal year 1973, with reductions of one active Army brigade and one support increment. The number of ships in the fleet will also be reduced.

My discussion of national security policy which forms the basis for our strategic and general purpose forces has been brief. Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer will provide a far more detailed description of the threats to free world security and the President's strategy for coping with those threats in their testimony later before this committee.

OTHER MISSION FORCES

These forces include intelligence, communications, research and development, and support to other nations. Together they account for 8 percent of military manpower, and they are divided between support of strategic and general purpose forces roughly proportionally to the relative size of these forces.

Table 3 shows how other mission manpower increased from fiscal year 1964 into the Vietnam war years and then decreased again during our withdrawals from Vietnam and the corresponding reduction in total military manpower.

TABLE 3.—MILITARY PERSONNEL IN OTHER MISSION FORCES

[People in thousands]

	Fiscal years—			
	1964	1971	1972	1973
Intelligence and security.....	86	91	75	68
Communications.....	41	55	52	50
Research and development.....	51	37	37	35
Support to other nations.....	12	21	17	27
Total.....	190	204	181	180

Mr. KELLEY. As you see, Mr. Chairman, the total from 1964 to fiscal 1973 reduces from 190,000 to 180,000.

In fiscal year 1973, reductions are planned in the order of 9 percent in intelligence and security, 4 percent in communications, and 5 percent in research and development. Most of the manpower increase devoted to support to other nations is related to the Vietnamization program and supports our transition from a combat role to an advisory force. As such, this manpower is transferred from general purpose forces to support to other nations.

Other missions forces carry out defensewide programs, under centralized Department of Defense and national control. Since these missions are essential to the accomplishment of national objectives and the support of the combat forces, the associated manpower is segregated in this category to provide visibility and to avoid duplication of effort.

GENERAL SUPPORT

The Defense budget for fiscal year 1973 provides for 7.6 percent fewer military personnel in general support jobs than in fiscal year 1964, as shown in table 4.

TABLE 4.—MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN GENERAL SUPPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1964 AND FISCAL YEAR 1973

[Manpower in thousands]

	1964	1973	Percent change
Military.....	1,208	1,116	-7.6
Civilian.....	941	915	-2.8
Total.....	2,149	2,031	-5.5

Mr. KELLEY. While the total number of military and civilian members in general support has declined, the relative percentage of general support to total service manpower has increased slightly from 56 percent in fiscal year 1964 to 58 percent in fiscal year 1973. In terms of military manpower only, the percentage in general support increased from 45 to 47 percent between fiscal year 1964 to fiscal year 1968. It has remained stable since then.

The ratio of combat to support personnel has been erroneously interpreted as a sign that the Army is losing its teeth and getting a big tail. In combat units, "teeth" is a function of firepower. An infantry regiment today has 40 percent fewer men than it had 20 years ago—but

more firepower. For the same number of combat artillerymen, the firepower potential of artillery has increased 600 percent in the past 20 years. During the past 2 decades, the combat capability of our forces has improved markedly.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, General DePuy in his comments will elaborate on the Army side of that teeth-and-tail relationship.

One cannot use combat-support ratios of the past as the model for today's allocation of defense manpower. There are today more supporters per fighter. This development is consistent with employment trends in the civilian sector between production and service occupations, and also with trends in the armed forces of all modernized nations. Rifles, tanks, and aircraft have replaced spears and horses. Weapons are considerably more potent, but it takes additional people to keep them in service. Sophisticated, accurate, and powerful weaponry requires proportionately more support personnel. And that accounts for a significant element of our forces. One effect of the changed ratio between combat and support troops is fewer casualties, as the table below shows.

TABLE 5.—CASUALTY RATES PER 1,000 MEN

	Civil War	World War I	World War II	Korea	Vietnam
Battle casualties.....	121.4	83.5	30.6	22.7	19.8
Battle deaths.....	42.9	16.1	9.2	6.4	3.6

THE COMPONENTS OF GENERAL SUPPORT

Mr. KELLEY. The components of the general support are base and individual support, training, command, and logistics, and these are broken down numerically in table 6.

TABLE 6.—GENERAL SUPPORT MANPOWER, TOTAL DOD

[Military manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year—		
	1971	1972	1973
Base and individual support.....	580	513	506
Training.....	550	460	458
Command.....	138	129	121
Logistics.....	30	30	31
Total general support.....	1,298	1,132	1,116

BASE AND INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT

Mr. KELLEY. Currently there are 493 bases in the United States and 302 overseas. The Department of Defense maintains a base structure to provide facilities for operating forces in wartime, keeping forces in peacetime, supporting forces and providing services to personnel and dependents.

We have undertaken a substantial number of activity reductions, realignment and closure actions worldwide since January 1969. Ex-

cluding SEA, these actions eliminated more than 191,400 military and 137,000 civilian positions, and will reduce annual defense expenditures for the base structure more than \$2.9 billion when completed. Most of the actions will be completed by the end of fiscal year 1972, but a few will take longer.

Partially offsetting these reductions, we have increased certain elements of individual support since 1969, including actions taken to implement the All-Volunteer Force. For example, recruiting manpower has risen by 8,000 spaces, to the level of 21,000 requested for fiscal year 1973.

TRAINING

There are many different types of training, including the following main categories: Recruit, specialized, flight crew and unit, professional, and officer acquisition.

Their numbers are broken down in table 7.

TABLE 7.—SUMMARY TABLE OF TRAINING ELEMENTS AS OF JUNE 30

[Military manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal years—		
	1971	1972	1973
Recruit.....	198	149	151
Specialized.....	180	152	154
Flight.....	57	47	44
Other.....	115	112	109
Total.....	550	460	458

Mr. KELLEY. A substantial training base reduction occurred in fiscal year 1972. Fiscal year 1973 is a "holding" year. We cannot further reduce in this area until we are closer to ending reliance on the draft which will enable us to replace short-term draftees with volunteers for longer terms of service.

COMMAND

Total military manpower required for command is reduced from 138,000 in fiscal 1971 to 129,000 in 1972, projected to 121,000 in fiscal 1973.

This category provides manpower for headquarters and administrative staffs at and above the level of numbered Army, Air Force Air Division, Navy Ship Division, Navy Air Wing, and Fleet Marine Force.

In the past 2 years, we have reduced command by 12 percent. For fiscal year 1973, as noted, 8,000 fewer spaces are proposed in this category than in fiscal year 1972.

LOGISTICS

The table below shows the logistics manpower needs of the services and the Defense Supply Agency.

LOGISTICS MILITARY MANPOWER

[In thousands]

	Fiscal years—		
	1971	1972	1973
Supply.....	16	16	17
Maintenance.....	9	9	9
Logistics support.....	5	5	5
Total.....	30	30	31

Mr. KELLEY. This is a fairly constant figure as shown in the comparison between fiscals 1971, 1972, and 1973. The summation of the manpower requirements I have reviewed has an average active duty strength of 2,396,517 allocated among the services as follows: the Army, 869,932; Navy, 601,184; Marine Corps, 198,391; and the Air Force, 727,010.

The almost 2.4 million military personnel man-years requested represent:

- 1,068,000 less than in 1969 at the peak of Vietnam buildup;
- 296,000 less than in 1964 before the Vietnam buildup; and
- 1,028,000 less than in 1954 after the Korean War.

The last time, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, we had an average active duty strength lower than this was before the Korean war, some 22 years ago.

Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would like to provide you in a capsule form the highlights of what appears in the remainder of my statement, those sections that deal with some of the manpower costs and some of the major manpower issues.

As you noted in your letter to Secretary Laird of December 8, 1971, there has to be concern over the fact that manpower costs continue to rise despite the substantial reduction in force. You noted in your opening statement that manpower costs are approaching the total budget authority level of 60 percent. The percent of budget authority due to pay and related costs is leveling off in the range of 52 to 53 percent, but I would like to comment briefly on the reasons why pay accounts for such a substantial portion of the budget and a portion which represents substantial increases both in dollars and percent of total.

First, as you know, a considerable investment is being made in the current and the next fiscal year to bring military pay to levels competitive with civilian pay. Starting with the mid-November 1971 pay raise and continuing through this and the following fiscal year, about \$5 billion will be spent in that area. In addition to that, the civilian pay account represents in fiscal 1973 almost \$2½ billion more than it represented in fiscal 1968, despite the fact that the civilian force has been reduced in that period of time from approximately 1.3 million to 1 million.

You are aware that military retired costs have continued to increase from the level of \$2.4 billion in fiscal 1969 to \$4.9 billion projected for fiscal 1973. This \$4.9 billion, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, includes \$300 million of retired pay adjustments that have been recommended by the President. The total cost of military retired pay represents to us a point of considerable concern, but I would like to discuss that in a moment in conjunction with some of the manpower issues.

The Guard and the Reserve budget has doubled, virtually, from the 1968 level to \$4.1 billion in fiscal 1973, and, of that \$4.1 billion, the outlays for pay alone will be \$1.8 billion in fiscal 1973.

The role of the Guard and the Reserve and the increased reliance which we should place upon these components in the Total Force Concept is also an issue I would like to discuss in connection with the major manpower issues.

Finally, the All-Volunteer Force initiatives for fiscal 1973 over and beyond the standard budget elements are \$272 million. They were \$320 million in fiscal 1972. Now, these include, in addition to special initiatives taken by the individual Services, considerable expansion and improvement of the recruiting systems of the Military Services. Going back to when I came into my job 3 years ago, I and others observed that in the years of draft reliance the services had become overly reliant on the draft, and the recruiting organizations of the services were not recruiting people as aggressively as they might have. The recruiting organizations were not composed of the caliber of people needed to do an effective recruiting job, and so considerable investments has been made in that area and it represents a fair share of the All-Volunteer Force initiatives.

Finally, I should comment briefly on the congressional authorization given to increase very considerably the number of scholarships available in the ROTC officer procurement program and also the congressional authorization for increasing from \$50 to \$100 the subsistence available to ROTC cadets and midshipmen and like provisions for the Marine Corps in the Platoon Leader program. Because of these encouragements given by congressional action, we are confident that we can manage the manpower supply side of the officer system in an all-volunteer environment.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address briefly a few of the manpower issues because of their direct relationship to the total cost factor and because they impact so directly upon the effectiveness of our forces.

Briefly, reviewing first the All-Volunteer Force and reduced reliance on the draft, in fiscal 1970, which was the first complete year for which this administration had a responsibility, we drafted 163,000 men. That was down from a level of almost 300,000 the previous year. It was the lowest level drafted since before Vietnam, but in calendar 1971 we reduced that level of 163,000 to 98,000, and, of the 98,000 we drafted last year, all but 10,000 were drafted in the first 6 months of the year.

As you know, during the first quarter of this calendar year there have been no draft calls, contrasted to 64,000 drafted during the corresponding period last year.

I told you when I appeared about a year ago before your committee why we favored an All-Volunteer Force over one that relied upon the draft, and I think our experience in the past year tends to bear out the accuracy of those reasons. We believed then and we believe now that the Armed Forces, like other organizations in a free society, seem to function best when they compete with other organizations for people. We believe that an organization of volunteers, having survived the test of free competition, is more efficient than one that relies on forced entry. Finally, we believe that the so-called pitfalls of the voluntary

force, that it would be dominated by mercenaries who might take over the Nation or might be dominated by blacks or by some other racial or ethnic strain, proved to be false claims as well as gratuitous ones, and they are totally without support in the makeup of that portion of our military organization that is volunteer.

If you isolate out of the total force those people who have chosen to reenlist, given the option of getting out of the service, you find that the racial minority portion of the total force is within about 1 percent of the racial minority percent of the total national population in that age group.

Finally, we believed then and now, Mr. Chairman, that once the transition to an All-Volunteer Force has been accomplished, the military force will be more effective and will consist of many fewer people than would its conscripted counterpart.

There are some rather encouraging signs of progress in addition to the lower draft calls which I cited a moment ago. They include the fact that today 7 out of every 10 enlistees are true volunteers compared with 6 of 10 a year ago and only 5 of 10, 2 years ago. In the last half of calendar 1971, 25,000 more true volunteers enlisted than in the corresponding period of 1970.

I know you are concerned, Mr. Chairman, about quality. The mental skills of enlistees, which is sometimes referred to as the quality mix, measured by the results of Armed Forces Qualification Tests, were better in 1971 than they were in 1970. Also in 1971 we enlisted 12 percent more high school graduates than we had in the previous year.

A year ago when we were here we talked about the special manning problem in the Army combat skills. One of the remarkable responses of the Army management system to the challenge of the All-Volunteer Force lies in the fact that the combat arms enlistments in the Army have increased from a monthly average of 250 in the last half of 1970 to 3,000 monthly average in the last half of 1971, a whopping increase of 1,200 percent.

A further note of great encouragement insofar as the Guard and Reserve supply picture is concerned; in January of 1972 almost 10,000 soldiers who were separating from active duty enlisted in Army Guard and Reserve units. This, gentlemen, was an enlistment program for prior service personnel that was tried in 1971 at two Army posts, Fort Hood and Fort Lewis, and was very successful there. It was, therefore, expanded to 20 posts for calendar 1972. This January's record of almost 10,000 soldiers with trained skills shipping over is the first indication of real success in that expanded program.

We, of course, have special problems with the All-Volunteer Force. Prominent among them are the supply problems in the Guard and Reserve community and the problem of procuring and retaining of a sufficient number of physicians in other health professions. At the end of December 1971 the Guard and Reserve were 45,000 below their congressional mandated strengths, despite great emphasis that has been recently placed upon their recruiting programs.

Now, if these shortages continue certainly congressional support for not only bonuses but other actions that would stimulate enlistment and retention in the Guard and Reserve will be required. We think that is absolutely vital.

The problem of meeting our requirements for physicians and other health professionals is, of course, complicated by the national shortage of professionals in the national health field. Dr. Richard Wilbur, my colleague, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment, has taken the lead in developing a number of solutions, not only to solve the supply problem but to increase the efficiency of our military health care system. It is his judgment, with which I concur, that we are not doing an effective job of utilizing the talents and time of our military doctors.

If I may, gentlemen, I would like to comment briefly on the role of the Guard and Reserve in the Total Force Concept. You are familiar with the fact that during the Vietnam buildup, approximately fiscal 1965 to 1969, equipment that would have been assigned to the Guard and Reserve was diverted to build up the active forces in Vietnam. The result was that the equipment inventories of the Guard and Reserve actually declined by almost \$100 million during this period. That does not begin to indicate how critical the situation was, because much of what was called equipment was in fact obsolete stuff that could not have been used if the units had been mobilized.

The combination of having no equipment and being unable to train people served as a suction which attracted people to the Guard and Reserves for the wrong reasons. There were long lineups of people who perceived the Guard and Reserve as a perfectly safe haven from the draft and the war, and so we had the ideal recipe for disaster in the fact of insufficient equipment, a questionable mission, ill-trained units, and the wrong people.

Much has happened to turn that picture around. These factors that I mentioned are being eliminated. There are highly encouraging signs of revitalization within the Guard and Reserve. Equipment inventories are being replenished at an annual rate in excess of \$500 million. Much of this is equipment rehabilitated upon the redeployment of units from Vietnam. The Guard and Reserve budget increases have continued from \$2.1 billion in fiscal 1969 to a recommended \$4.1 billion in fiscal 1973. And, as I have already noted, the Guard and Reserve enlistments are beginning to respond to these increased recruiting efforts.

The increased readiness of the Guard and Reserve units, coupled with the high cost of manpower that concerns you, Mr. Chairman, certainly should underscore the urgency of increased reliance on the Guard and Reserve in our national defense system. In fiscal 1973, to pay, clothe and feed the active force member will cost the taxpayer an average of \$9,100 a year. That is more than five times the cost of maintaining a Reserve member.

It seems to me the implication of this is clear. If we rely more on the Guard and Reserve, provided we make them into capable, deployable units, we can provide more defense for the dollars invested. In short, we think the Guard and Reserve are potentially the most economical part of our defense system. We think it is a security bargain and we intend to fully exploit this potential.

I would like to comment briefly on military retirement.

Certainly, an essential ingredient of effective force management is a retirement system that encourages the right people to stay in and

provides adequate benefits for retiring members at costs that can be managed.

Currently the interaction that takes place between grade limitations, advancement opportunities, and the military retirement system is indeed troublesome. Unlike most public and private retirement plans, the military system provides no retirement annuity until the member has completed 20 years of service. As a result, there is a tendency for the services to retain people not needed to the 20-year point in order to establish their retirement rights.

Conversely, at the 20-year point people have the opportunity of retiring with incomes that typically are greater than the incomes of their service colleagues who remain in the service. This, as you know, is because the combination of military retired pay and the pay from a civilian job almost always exceeds the active duty pay of the individual who remains. So, we have the curious phenomenon of a system which on the one hand serves to oversupply the services and on the other hand acts as a retention disincentive for the long-service-career members whose retired colleagues leave and have higher incomes than they do.

It was because of these and other considerations that the President convened an interagency committee a year ago to study the military retirement system and to make appropriate recommendations for changes in it. I happen to be chairman of that committee. We have completed our study of nondisability retirement and survivor benefits for both the active and Reserve forces and we will complete the rest of the study soon.

In the meantime, we are reviewing these matters with military departments preliminary to presenting legislative recommendations which reflect not only the best thinking of that committee but the best judgment of DOD and the executive branch.

This is a critical area, not only because of the high cost of military retirement annuities but because of the very substantial interaction it has upon the services' policies on tenure and upon the services' policies for career force management.

I would like to comment briefly on the mix of people in military grades.

During the recent period of force reduction, the proportion of senior officers in the services increased, just as the proportion of senior officers decreased or lagged behind during the earlier periods of rapid force buildup. However, as we approach fiscal 1973, and reach a relatively stabilized baseline force, the picture changes.

If you exclude the health field, physicians, dentists, and nurses, the distribution of senior officers is very similar to that of 1964, when the force was about the same size, with one exception. That exception is the grade of colonel, in which there is in this period of time an increase of about 800, due mainly to the grade relief which was enacted by Congress in 1966 to provide Air Force officers with promotion opportunities comparable to those of the other services.

The comparison between military grade mix and civilian grade mix is interesting. There are dissimilarities between the two which make these comparisons somewhat imprecise but there are two factors which I think should be mentioned in passing.

One is that within DOD the civilian grade escalation or so-called "grade creep" has been less than it has been in the civilian employment governmentwide. The other is that grade escalation in the military community compares at least favorably with grade escalation in the civilian community.

This is not by way of washing away the problem and suggesting that we do not have mixture problems. It is only my way of suggesting that, on a relative scale, military grade mix and tendencies toward escalation do not compare unfavorably with earlier periods like 1964 when our force was about the same size, nor do they compare unfavorably with escalation factors which have occurred in the civilian sector.

I would like to comment now, Mr. Chairman, on the factor of stability and the importance of having a stable force. I believe strongly that the root cause of many of our manpower problems in the Defense Department is turbulence, which I define as the frequent and sometimes excessive moving of people into, inside, and out of the services.

In the rapid buildup of forces related to Vietnam, including the typical short tours and the early-out requirements, our Armed Forces have had the highest degree of turbulence in their history. Especially hit were the Marine Corps, which had more men in uniform during Vietnam than in World War II, and the Army, whose total number of soldiers entering and leaving each year exceeded the total size of the Army.

The cost impact of these things has been tremendous. But in my view, even more important than the cost impact is the effect of turbulence upon the organization's ability to sustain morale and credibility with people. A military unit within a turbulent situation is very likely to be victimized by under-manning or by a failure to fill job slots at the time they are vacated. A unit with a substantial number of vacant slots encounters great trouble in keeping its people busy doing mission-oriented things and in maintaining unit readiness, but these are the typical problems with which squad leaders, petty officers, and unit commanders have had to cope.

I met with a group of business people and professional people in the Midwest yesterday and I said, "How would you like to run a company of 20,000 employees where your annual separations and retirements exceeded the total employment of your company? How would you like to have a production force that turned over every 6 months, foremen who turned over every 3 months and superintendents who turned over every 6 months?" I said, in terms closely approximating these, that these are the problems with which our senior petty officers, our unit commanders, our squad leaders have had to cope in recent years in the services. And this, gentlemen, is the stuff of which drug adventures and racial violence are made—the stalemates which are caused by undermanned units, continuing rotation, new faces, people typically being deprived of the opportunity to remain anywhere long enough to develop a sense of unit identification or proficiency in their jobs or personal security.

I personally regard the regaining of force stability as one of the most important needs of the Armed Forces. We can talk all we want about other problems related to people, but unless and until we stabilize our force, we do not really give the individual who is the leader

or the other individual who is the follower the opportunity to respond effectively and efficiently to the military system.

Finally, let me touch on a couple of other areas, the military versus civilian mix and the so-called "civilianization" objective.

Civilians today account for a higher percent of our total manpower requirement than they did in the average 1964 to 1971 time frame. With our reductions in force having been largely accomplished by the end of fiscal 1973, we must press hard for better answers in this area, if for no other reason than the fact that the civilian employee costs less than the military member does, provided they can both produce the same result. Frankly, I do not know at this point how much further we should go in increasing the civilian portion of our total defense work force. There are, as you know, some jobs that have to be performed by military rather than civilian personnel simply to provide military people the opportunity for rotation from overseas tours and particularly from unaccompanied tours. There are other jobs that have to be performed by military members because their background is essential to the effective performance of the job. But certainly, this is an area that deserves a good deal of additional examination and better answers than we have been able to provide.

Utilization of women is another issue to which we expect to address increased attention. Actually, the mix of women in the Armed Forces has increased more than the mix of women in private industry. Total women in the forces today are about 42,000. 33,000 of them are non-medical and that is an increase of 50 percent in the last 5 or 6 years. The projection of the services would increase that figure by a significant amount in the next few years.

Whatever the picture of male chauvinism, I am sure we will have to give that subject additional consideration.

Let me talk finally to some quality considerations because I know that you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this committee are concerned that we not permit the erosion of quality as we move away from reliance on the draft.

Essentially, our quality objective in terms of people is twofold. First, we want to achieve a balance between the bright people and the mentally taxing jobs, and between those in the lower mental categories and the less difficult jobs. Our objective is not to get all bright people. Our objective is not to get people with all limited capabilities. Our objective is to get people whose abilities are commensurate with the jobs that have to be performed.

It was our judgment in the course of the last calendar year that the Army was being overburdened with people who were over their heads in terms of job assignments, and so we reduced, as the Army requested we should, the proportion of mental Category IV people who were being inducted or enlisted into the Army. We think that presently we have a force whose composition is roughly commensurate with the demands of jobs.

The second thing we seek to do in terms of quality is to select personnel under what I call the whole person concept. This takes into consideration not only how an individual does on a series of tests, because some people perform better than they test and some people test better than they perform, but also takes into consideration the individual's school record, his personal attitude, his motivation and

his record as a citizen. Frankly, we would rather have a Category IV who has a clean police record, who has graduated from high school, who has done the most with his limited capabilities than we would a smarter individual who has represented nothing but trouble to society before he presents himself at the Armed Forces recruiting station.

Considerable emphasis has been placed, and more will be placed, on assigning the responsibility for people selection to the better members of the military organization who understand what it takes to be a good soldier, a good airman, sailor or marine, and who also have the capacity for recognizing these qualities in other people.

There are other areas that contribute to personnel costs and must be carefully managed to insure the effectiveness of the use of money. Certainly, among these are special pay. At the direction of the President, on January 25 I forwarded to you the report of the 1971 Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation which examined a number of areas of special pay including special pay for physicians, dentists, and veterinarians; flight pay; submariners pay; hostile fire pay; and enlisted attraction and retention pay, usually referred to as reenlistment and variable reenlistment bonuses.

I note for the record that there is an error on page 44. It indicates that we forwarded this report of the Quadrennial Review on January 25, 1971. It was forwarded on January 25, 1972.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to speak as long as I have about not just the size and the composition of the force but about some of the cost elements which concern us as they do you and some of the manpower issues that are directly related to force cost and force efficiency.

As you noted, with me here today are general officer representatives of each of the four services. They and I work closely together in the development of our manpower plans and I think the interests of your committee would be well served if you would hear from them individually so that they could tell in the context of their services what I have attempted to tell you in the context of DOD overall.

MANPOWER COSTS

Mr. Chairman, in your letter to Secretary Laird in December 1971, you expressed concern over the fact that manpower costs increased sharply from FY 1968 to FY 1972 in spite of a reduction of over one million men. It is important that we examine that cost trend and the principal elements of manpower cost.

Payroll and related costs for all Defense manpower, including civilians, are shown in the following table:

TOTAL MANPOWER AND PAY AND RELATED COSTS (OUTLAYS)

	Fiscal years—				
	1964	1968	1971	1972	1973
End year strength (in thousands):					
Active.....	2,687	3,547	2,713	2,391	2,358
Guard and Reserve.....	1,048	1,001	1,034	1,027	1,038
Civilian (direct hire).....	1,035	1,287	1,094	1,041	1,036
Outlays for pay and related costs (in billions of dollars):	22	32.8	39	41	43.5
Outlays for pay and related costs as a percent of total DOD outlays.....	43	42	52	54	57

Although the percentage of total outlays for manpower continues to rise in FY 1973, per capita manpower costs do so at a much more moderate rate. When we view manpower costs in terms of budget authority instead of outlays, we see a decline in the share of the Defense budget attributable to manpower.


PERCENT ALLOCATED TO PAY AND RELATED COSTS

	Fiscal year—				
	1964	1968	1971	1972	1973
Percent of outlays.....	43	42	52	54	57
Percent of budget authority.....	43	43	53	53	52

The overall relationship since 1964 between budget authority and outlays is shown below.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET

BUDGET TRENDS



Mr. KELLEY. During a period of buildup such as we had during 1964 to 1968, budget authority exceeds outlays. It does so because goods are ordered for future delivery, thus incurring budget authority obligations before the money is actually spent. Conversely, during a cutback, such as we had in 1968 to 1971, outlays exceed authority because deliveries continue even though we curtail new buying. In 1972, Congress approved an increase in authority over 1971, and we started to develop and acquire new weapons and to modernize forces in being. In 1973, we seek to continue at an accelerated rate to develop and procure new weapons as well as to modernize, and thus we are back to where budget authority exceeds outlays.

The decrease in manpower's share of budget authority in fiscal year 1973 reflects increases in future outlays for other purposes—not a de-

crease in the level of spending for personnel. But we can anticipate that future years will bring greater stability in personnel costs rather than continued sharp increases.

Let me discuss each of the chief elements of manpower costs and the reasons they have increased in recent years.

ACTIVE DUTY PAY AND ALLOWANCES

Pay and allowances for active duty personnel account for over half of the total costs for manpower and about 30 percent of total outlays.

ACTIVE DUTY PAY AND END YEAR STRENGTH

	Fiscal years—		
	1971	1972	1973
Outlays, billions of dollars.....	21.4	21.7	22.7
Percent total outlays.....	28.4	28.6	29.7
End year strength (thousands).....	2,713	2,391	2,358

Mr. KELLEY. To understand why outlays rise while strength is decreasing, we must examine the impact of pay increases. These can best be illustrated by using rates of basic pay for specific grades as shown in the following table:

Monthly rates of basic pay	E-1 recruit less than 1 year of service	E-5 (ser- geant) 10 years of service	Colonel or Navy captain 24 years of service
July 1963 (beginning of fiscal year 1964, last prewar year).....	\$83.20	\$240.00	\$910.00
January 1972.....	\$288.00	\$495.00	\$1,782.60
January 1973 ¹	\$306.60	\$526.80	\$1,896.30
Percent pay increase, July 1963 to January 1973.....	268.5	119.5	108.4
Percent increase in regular military compensation July 1963 to January 1973 ²	138.0	72.6	80.4

¹ Includes the estimated military increase to match the estimated civilian comparability increase assumed for January 1, 1973. Administration or congressional initiatives in the area of pay could affect these rates.

² Regular Military Compensation (RMC) includes basic pay, quarters and subsistence allowances and tax advantage.

Mr. KELLEY. The total cost of pay increases effective in fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973 is \$4.81 billion, as follows:

ANNUALIZED DOD COST OF PAY INCREASES

Pay increase of:	Annualized cost estimate
November 14, 1971.....	\$2,430,000,000
January 1, 1972.....	1,220,000,000
January 1, 1973.....	1,160,000,000
Total.....	4,810,000,000

Mr. KELLEY. The sharp pay raises of recent years are due to three main factors:

1. The comparability pay (government with industry) principle for Federal civilian employees caused unusually large civil service pay raises during this period to catch up with industry.

2. In 1967, military pay was linked by law to the civilian General Schedule, thus providing increases in military pay corresponding to increase received by General Schedule employees.

3. Pay rates were disproportionately low for the lower military pay grades as the result of a policy followed during the years of heavy reliance on the draft. For 13 years before 1964, there were no pay increases at all in those grades. It was not only necessary to change this policy for the period under consideration to provide equitable pay for servicemen at the entry level; it also became necessary to add additional amounts to attract manpower for an All-Volunteer Force.

A great many longstanding bills became due during this period, and our payroll costs in fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973 reflect a huge element of one-time catching up. The payroll trends also reflect the strong support by Congress of the need to pay equitably those citizens serving in the Armed Forces and to establish reasonably competitive military pay rates. The dual objective has been to remove the economic penalty levied on those who serve and to insure that the Armed Forces can compete successfully for the quality personnel needed to provide our national defense.

Looking ahead, it is reasonable to expect much more moderate rates of growth in pay costs. Reasonable pay competitiveness with the private sector has been achieved, and inequities affecting personnel in the lower military pay grades have been corrected. We have passed the point where active duty pay costs consume a constantly growing proportion of the Defense budget.

CIVILIAN PAY

Civilian pay is the next largest component of manpower costs, and it too has risen during a period of civilian force reduction.

CIVILIAN PAY (DIRECT HIRE) AND END YEAR STRENGTH

	Fiscal years—		
	1971	1972	1973
Outlays, in billions of dollars.....	12.1	12.7	12.9
Percent total DoD outlays.....	16.1	16.7	16.8
End year strength (thousands).....	1,094	1,041	1,036

Mr. KELLEY. The Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970 established a continuing system for adjusting salaries of Federal employees paid under statutory pay systems. This policy, adopted by Congress in 1962 for fixing Federal salary rates, and continued in this law, is based upon the principles that: (1) there should be equal pay for equal work, with pay differentials reflecting differences in work and performance; and (2) Federal pay rates should be comparable with private enterprise pay rates for the same kind of work.

Under the Coordinated Federal Wage System, rates of pay for Federal wage employees are established administratively on the basis of wage rates paid by private employers in each local wage area for similar work.

Increases for white-collar workers granted in January 1972 were limited by the 5.5 percent Pay Board guideline, and it is expected that Federal blue-collar rates will be similarly limited.

Stabilization controls aside, it must be recognized that, when private industrial salary and wage rates are continually rising, the comparability principle will result in significantly increased payroll costs, assuming a relatively constant strength base. The following average civilian pay increases have been granted since 1963:

GS		WB	
Month and year	Percent	Year	Percent
January 1964.....	4.1	1963	2.7
July 1964.....	4.2	1964	2.4
October 1965.....	3.6	1965	2.7
July 1966.....	2.9	1966	3.3
October 1967.....	4.6	1967	3.5
July 1968.....	4.9	1968	4.8
July 1969.....	9.1	1969	9.2
January 1970.....	6.0	1970	8.0
January 1971.....	6.0	1971	8.0
January 1972.....	5.5	1972	(¹)

¹ Not available.

Mr. KELLEY. Assuming the continuation of wage controls, it is estimated that payroll costs for general schedule employees will increase by over \$350 million, and for wage employees almost \$200 million in fiscal year 1973.

MILITARY RETIRED COSTS

Military retirement costs are the third largest component of manpower costs.

MILITARY RETIREMENT COSTS

	Fiscal years—		
	1971	1972	1973
Outlays, in billions of dollars.....	3.4	3.9	4.9
Percent of total DoD outlays.....	4.5	5.2	6.4

Mr. KELLEY. These cost increases reflect retirements among the additions to the force in the 1940's, and retirement plan decisions made many years ago. Military members are eligible to retire with a substantial annuity after 20 years of service. Each year, new retirees with higher retired pay are added to this force, and the size of the retirement force continues to increase because the rate of new retirements has exceeded the death rate. Cost-of-living increases also have increased the cost of military retirement. The projected cost for fiscal year 1973, includes a cost-of-living adjustment and the cost, nearly \$300 million, of the retired pay adjustment being recommended by the President.

GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

The fourth largest component of manpower costs is pay for the National Guard and Reserve.

GUARD AND RESERVE PAY AND PAID END STRENGTH

	Fiscal years—		
	1971	1972	1973
Outlays, in billions of dollars.....	1.2	1.5	1.8
Percent total DoD outlays.....	1.6	2.0	2.4
End year strength (thousands).....	1,034	1,027	1,038

Mr. KELLEY. The increases here are due almost entirely to the active force pay increases previously described.

During the same time frame, increases in budget of the total Guard and Reserve reflect the great emphasis which has been placed on improving combat readiness through more modern equipment and better training. In large part, these actions are the key to making the total force concept work.

GUARD AND RESERVE BUDGET AUTHORITY

Fiscal year:	[In billions]	
1971		\$2.7
1972		3.5
1973		4.1

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE INITIATIVES

Mr. KELLEY. As discussed with your committee earlier, it is necessary to invest money in other areas besides pay to eliminate reliance on the draft. These additional requirements include the following:

1. The ordinary requirements of daily living, such as decent housing and medical care, must be available and within the financial reach of military personnel.

2. Military life must be reasonably satisfying and challenging, and must offer opportunities for individual growth and development through education, training, and personal responsibility.

3. Military people and the uniform they wear must be treated with respect.

4. Recruiting services must reach a wider audience and provide reliable and persuasive counseling to young people who are making their initial occupational choices.

The level of effort for programs to support these requirements in the fiscal year 1973 budget from funds specifically earmarked for Project Volunteer is \$272 million; in fiscal year 1972, it was \$320 million. These programs include service initiatives, recruiting improvements, and the scholarships and increased subsistence for ROTC and Marine Platoon Leaders Class students which the Congress authorized in fiscal year 1972.

Effective performance of the recruiting function of the services is a keystone of our effort to end the draft. The Project Volunteer recruiting allocation for fiscal year 1973 is \$121.9 million for Active Forces and \$23.5 million for the Reserves and National Guard—78 percent more than was spent for recruiting in fiscal year 1971. Both the quality and scope of military recruiting have been enhanced considerably, a fact reflected in the very substantial increases in enlistments.

Action by the last Congress in authorizing 2,500 additional ROTC scholarships, doubling subsistence payments for ROTC from \$50 to \$100 a month, and initiation of like payments for the Marine Corps Platoon Leaders Class (PLC) will assist in meeting officer needs in a no-draft environment. There is already increased interest in ROTC

and PLC programs because of these scholarship and subsistence increases. It is believed these improvements will meet the ROTC and PLC portion of our officer supply needs.

One of our most urgent needs is for the additional medical scholarships approved by the House in H.R. 2 and now pending in the Senate. The accession requirement for physicians in fiscal year 1973 is estimated at about 3,300. The present scholarship program is 642. The allocation of Project Volunteer fiscal year 1973 funds for additional medical scholarships is \$40 million, enough to fund about 3,300 more scholarships. Even if the legislation is promptly passed, the earliest product of the increased scholarship program would be 125 medical officers entering active duty in fiscal year 1974.

The fiscal year 1973 Project Volunteer program also includes \$103.4 million for service initiatives to improve the quality of service life and to improve living conditions. This amount includes \$10.6 million for barracks improvement. In addition, the Army has budgeted significant amounts for related programs. The type of actions included in this program are:

Increased educational opportunities.

Provision of constructive facilities and activities for off-duty hours.

Improved medical services for dependents.

Eliminating menial work details for lower grade enlisted personnel.

More convenient commissary hours.

The actions funded for fiscal year 1973 are the result of carefully considering the comments and recommendations of enlisted men, NCO's, junior officers, and commanders in evaluating the fiscal year 1972 program of service initiatives.

Implementation of the fiscal year 1972 Volunteer Force program is generally on schedule, except for barracks improvement programs which have lagged because of delays in the availability of funds. Implementation of the fiscal year 1972 program is illustrated below:

	<i>Percent</i>
Number of new recruiters (in place)-----	70
Number of new recruiting stations (opened)-----	85
Barracks improvement:	
Complete (fiscal year 1971 funds)-----	78
Obligated (fiscal year 1972 funds)-----	10
ROTC scholarships (committed)-----	90
Service initiatives (obligated fiscal year 1972 funds)-----	50

MANPOWER ISSUES

Mr. KELLEY. Thus far we have reviewed the size and basic composition of our military forces, the reasons supporting their need, and their cost. I would like now to briefly discuss some of the key considerations of Defense manpower—the All-Volunteer Force, the vital role of Guard and Reserve components in our total force, military retirement, the military grade mixture, the importance of having a stable and fully-manned force, and certain quality considerations in the personnel makeup of our forces. Policy and basic practices in these areas will determine in large part how effectively our human resources will be utilized in future years, and at what cost.

ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

A year ago, I appeared before your committee for a discussion of the actions needed to end reliance on the draft and move toward an All-

Volunteer Force. That was just after 1970 in which we drafted 163,000 men, the lowest level since before Vietnam. Last year, we drafted 98,000 of whom 84,000 were drafted in the first 6 months. During the first quarter of 1971, 64,000 were drafted and there will be no draft calls during the first quarter of this year.

I told you then why we favored an All-Volunteer Force over one that relies upon forced entry. Our experience of the past years bears out the accuracy of these reasons.

In the adult work world, the Armed Forces (like other organizations) function best in a free environment where they compete with others for people.

An organization composed of volunteers, having survived the test of free competition, tends to be more efficient than one that relies on forced entry.

The alleged pitfalls of the voluntary military organization—that it will be dominated by mercenaries, who will take over our Nation, or be all black—are gratuitous and false claims, totally unsupported by the makeup of that portion of the military organization that is volunteer.

Once the transition to an All-Volunteer Force has been accomplished, the military organization will be totally more effective and will consist of many fewer people than its conscripted counterpart.

Besides ever-declining draft calls, further signs of progress toward an All-Volunteer Force in the past year were:

Seven of 10 enlistees are true volunteers, compared with a ratio of six of 10 a year ago, and five of 10 two years ago.

In the last 6 months of calendar year 1971, 25,000 more true volunteers enlisted than in the same period of 1970.

The mental skills of enlistees (sometimes called the quality mix), measured by the results of Armed Forces qualification tests, were better in 1971 than in 1970. Also 12 percent more high school graduates enlisted than in 1970.

Combat arms enlistments in the Army increased from a monthly average of 250 in the last half of 1970 to 3,000 in the last half of 1971—an increase of 1,200 percent.

In January 1972, almost 10,000 soldiers separating from active duty enlisted in Army Guard and Reserve units. This enlistment program for prior service personnel was tried in 1971 at two Army posts and expanded to 20 posts this year.

These progress signs are most encouraging. They reflect results achieved before the military pay raises were effective, and they were accomplishments of a year whose second half saw very low draft pressure. But there are remaining problems, and as I told this committee a year ago, it was then (and continues to be now) extremely unlikely that we could totally replace the accession power of the draft in fiscal year 1972. Let me briefly mention two problem areas.

As expected, the impact of low draft calls in 1971 was greatest on the Guard and Reserve since more than 75 percent of their new enlistees have been draft motivated. At the end of December 1971, the Guard and Reserve were 45,000 below their congressionally mandated strengths, despite greater emphasis on their recruiting programs. If the shortages continue, we will seek congressional support

for bonuses and other actions to stimulate enlistment and retention in the Guard and Reserve.

The problem of meeting our requirements for physicians and other health professionals in a no-draft environment is complicated by the national shortage of professionals in these categories. Dr. Richard Wilbur, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment), has taken the lead in developing solutions which will address this problem while increasing the efficiency of our military health care system. In coordination with the Surgeons General, Dr. Wilbur has in the final stages of review a series of programs to expand continuing medical education; improve promotion opportunities for outstanding senior clinicians; increase stability of assignments; and make pay of military health professionals competitive with their civilian counterparts.

Programs to increase the efficiency of the military health care system include requiring that all health professionals and facilities within a military department, in a particular geographical area, be under the operational control of a central health authority; establishing better space standards for existing health facilities so that doctors can be used more efficiently; and providing new equipment for existing facilities.

Earlier, reference was made to increased scholarships for health professionals, a proposed bill which has passed the House and is pending in the Senate. Its passage would enable us to take an important step toward solving the doctor supply problem.

Problems remain in achieving the All-Volunteer Force, and their solutions may require additional programs and transitional funds. But I am encouraged by the progress to date and prospects for the future. Before the end of calendar year 1972, we will be able to determine the means necessary to ending reliance on the draft by July 1973, without impairing our national security system.

THE ROLE OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE IN THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT

The problems of the Guard and Reserve forces relate to causes other than pay, and they won't be solved just by increasing pay or by offering bonuses to people.

Before and during the buildup of our active forces in Southeast Asia, the credibility and overall effectiveness of the Guard and Reserve were diminished by the following factors:

A questionable combat mission, since their units were seldom mobilized.

A marginal capability, due in large measure to the lack of equipment needed to be combat-ready and deployable.

Units dominated by people who perceived membership in the Guard and Reserve as a safe haven from the war and the draft.

These factors are being eliminated, and there are highly encouraging signs of revitalization within the Guard and Reserve. Equipment inventories are being replenished at an annual rate in excess of \$500 million, thus facilitating a big step-up in training and deployability. Guard and Reserve budget increases continue, from \$2.1 billion in fiscal year 1969 to \$4.1 in fiscal year 1973. And as already noted,

Guard and Reserve enlistments are responding to increased recruiting efforts.

The increased readiness of Guard and Reserve units, coupled with the high cost of manpower in the active forces, underscore the urgency of increased reliance on the Guard and Reserves in our national defense system.

In fiscal year 1973, it will cost \$9,100 to pay, clothe, and feed the active force military member—which is five times the cost of maintaining his Guard or Reserve counterpart.

The implication is clear. With greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve, we can provide more defense for the dollars invested. In short, the Guard and Reserve is a security bargain, and we intend to fully exploit its potential.

MILITARY RETIREMENT

An essential ingredient of effective force management is a retirement system that encourages the retention of the desired size and quality of force, and provides adequate benefits for retiring members at manageable costs.

Currently, the interaction between grade limitations, advancement opportunities, and the military retirement system is troublesome. Unlike most private and public plans, the military system provides no retirement equity until the member has completed 20 years of service. As a result, the military services tends to retain more people than they need to the 20-year point to establish their retirement rights.

Conversely, those who retire with 20 years service can do so with incomes that typically exceed those of their counterparts remaining in service. This is because the combination of military retired pay and civilian job income in a second career almost always exceeds regular military compensation of the active duty member. Thus, on the one hand the system operates to over-supply the military services, and on the other hand as a retention disincentive for long-service career members whose retired colleagues have higher incomes.

It was because of these and other considerations that the President convened an Interagency Committee a year ago to study the military retirement system and to make appropriate recommendations for changes in it. This committee, of which I am chairman, has completed its study of nondisability retirement and survivor benefits for the active and Reserve forces, and will complete the remainder of its study soon. In the meantime, we are reviewing these matters with the military departments preliminary to presenting legislative recommendations that reflect the best judgment of the Department of Defense and the executive branch, both as to the military retirement plan and its interaction with policies governing tenure and career progression.

MILITARY GRADE MIX

During the recent period of rapid and substantial force reduction, the proportion of senior officers in the Armed Forces increased just as it decreased during the earlier periods of rapid buildup. In fiscal year 1973, however, as we approach our baseline force, the picture changes. Excluding physicians, dentists, and nurses, the distribution

of senior officers is very similar to that of 1964 when the force was about the same size, with one exception. That exception is the grade of colonel in which there is an increase of about 800, due mainly to the grade relief enacted by the Congress in 1966 to provide Air Force officers promotion opportunities comparable to those of officers in the other services.

The following table shows the proportion of senior officers in the fiscal year 1973 and fiscal year 1964 forces:

TOTAL DOD OFFICER FORCE DISTRIBUTION, INCLUDING AND EXCLUDING PHYSICIANS, DENTISTS, AND NURSES

Grade	1964				1973			
	Total officer		Excluding physicians, dentists, and nurses		Total officer		Excluding physicians, dentists, and nurses	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Total	337,502	100.00	312,151	100.00	325,711	100.00	295,894	100.00
General/admiral	1,294	.38	1,237	.40	1,304	.40	1,243	.42
Colonel/captain	15,323	4.54	13,853	4.44	16,739	5.14	14,697	4.96
Lieutenant colonel/commander	36,347	10.77	34,615	11.09	37,349	11.47	34,225	11.57
Major/lieutenant commander	55,081	16.32	50,115	16.05	59,560	18.31	50,334	17.01

Mr. KELLEY. As of June 30, 1973, there will be 10 more flag or general officers than there were in fiscal year 1964.

In addition to the comparison of military grade mix in fiscal year 1973 and fiscal year 1964, it is interesting to compare trends in military grade mix with corresponding trends in DOD and Government-wide civilian jobs. In this connection, it should be noted that DOD civilian "grade creep" has been lower historically than the civilian Government-wide level.

GRADE TRENDS (GENERAL SCHEDULE POSITIONS)

Year	Average grade		Employment (in thousands)	
	DOD	Government-wide	DOD	Government-wide
1963	7.1	7.2	516.8	1083.6
1964	7.2	7.4	525.3	1090.0
1965	7.3	7.4	530.7	1112.5
1966	7.1	7.3	579.0	1188.6
1967	7.1	7.3	621.7	1251.6
1968	7.2	7.4	653.3	1301.5
1969	7.5	7.7	662.9	1299.0
1970	7.7057	7.8653	631.1	1287.0
1971	7.7715	7.9189	608.8	1298.3
1972 ¹	7.7715	7.8189	580.6	1300.0
1973 ¹	7.6291	7.7189	577.9	1322.0

¹ Estimate.

Mr. KELLEY. It is difficult to make valid comparisons between the proportional growth in general and flag officer positions on the one hand, and civilian supergrade positions on the other. The latter have existed for only 2 decades, and given that late start it is to be expected that they would increase at a faster rate. Also, there is significant history, particularly in the research and development community, which accounts for much of the recent growth in supergrade positions.

Notwithstanding these factors, the proportional growth of general and flag officer positions compares favorably with the growth of super-grade positions in recent years. Certainly, there is no basis for concluding from this comparison that there is an excessive number of military members in general officer positions.

THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A STABLE FORCE

The root cause of many of our manpower problems is turbulence—the excessive movement of people into, within, and out of the services.

In the rapid buildup and drawdown of forces related to Vietnam, and its typical short tour and early-out requirements, our Armed Forces have experienced the highest degree of turbulence in its history. The impact was particularly severe on the Marine Corps, which had more men in uniform during the Vietnam era than in World War II; and on the Army, whose numbers of soldiers entering and leaving each year exceeded the total size of the Army.

Of course, the cost impact has been substantial. The military member has made a permanent change of station move on the average of one a year, and the annual cost of travel alone in such moves exceeds \$1 billion.

In fiscal year 1973 the cost of military training, including pay and support of trainers as well as trainees, will be \$6.6 billion—an average of \$2,750 for every person in the service.

While these costs are great, of even greater significance is the effect of turbulence upon the organization's ability to sustain morale and credibility with the troops.

A military unit within a turbulent organization is apt to be victimized by undermanning, or a failure to fill job slots when they are vacated. A unit with a substantial number of vacant slots encounters great difficulty in keeping its members busy in a mission-oriented way and in maintaining unit readiness.

These are the typical problems with which squad leaders, senior petty officers, and unit commanders have had to cope. This is the stuff of which drug adventures and racial turbulence is made—stalemates caused by undermanned units, continuing rotation and new faces with many people being deprived of the opportunity to remain anywhere long enough to develop unit identification, job proficiency, and a sense of personal security.

I regard the regaining of force stability to be one of the most important needs of the Armed Forces in the manpower area. It is our responsibility to size the organization and to adjust its personnel policies and plans so that military members will experience a much greater degree of stability—with the resulting benefits of higher unit readiness, better morale, and lower costs.

MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN

Civilians account for about 34 percent of our total manpower requirements in the fiscal year 1973 budget, and increase from about 30 percent for the 1964–71 period, as shown in the following table:

Civilians as a percent of DOD manpower as of June 10

1964	30.3
1968	28.8
1969	29.6
1970	29.7
1971	31.1
1972	33.9
1973	33.7

Mr. KELLEY. Since the reduction to baseline levels will be largely completed by the end of fiscal year 1973, we plan to press hard for better answers in this area, if for no other reason than the fact that the civilian employee usually costs less than the military member, provided they are both producing the same result. I don't know at this point how much further we should go in increasing the civilian portion of the total Defense work force. Some jobs that could be performed by civilians must be reserved for military personnel to meet their rotation needs and to provide an opportunity to be reunited with their families between unaccompanied tours. Other jobs must be reserved for military members because their background is essential to effective unit performance.

We would welcome the opportunity for further discussions in this area of military-civilian tradeoffs after we have studied the matter further in a more stable force environment.

UTILIZATION OF WOMEN

Still another issue is the extent to which women can be utilized in meeting the manpower needs of the All-Volunteer Force. Although the major role of women in service in the past has been primarily in medical, clerical, and personnel areas, there are many other occupations in which women are now serving effectively. Accordingly, studies are underway to determine the feasibility of increasing the number of women on active duty and of broadening their career opportunities.

SOME QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS

We have a twofold objective in selecting people for military service and in establishing the quality mix of the forces. It is:

1. To achieve a balance between bright people and mentally taxing jobs, and between those in the lower mental categories and the less difficult jobs.
2. To select the whole person—taking into consideration such factors as the individual's school record, personal attitude and motivation, and his record as a citizen.

Experience shows that some who test poorly perform well, and vice versa. Experience also shows that test performance does not necessarily correlate with one's record as a citizen, nor with one's capacity to cause disciplinary and other behavior problems in the services.

Considerable emphasis has been placed, and more will be, upon assigning the responsibility for people selection to superior military members who understand what it takes to be a good soldier, sailor, airman, or marine—and are able to recognize those qualities in others.

One of the great hazards of the draft environment is that it nurtures the attitude "we take what we get." In the environment of the All-Volunteer Force, we will select persons who have the qualities

needed, and we will consider the selection responsibility to be among the most important in the field of personnel management.

SPECIAL PAYS

Over the years, many forms of special pay have come into being where regular military pay alone has been insufficient to meet special manning problems. These special forms include such items as pay for proficiency, sea duty, submarine duty, exposure to hostile fire, flight duty, and enlistment and retention incentives—and totally they cost more than \$2 billion a year.

With the prospect of eliminating reliance on the draft, it is essential to reexamine these special pays in light of experiences with them and special manning problems. On January 25, 1972, at the direction of the President, I forwarded to you the report of the 1971 Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation which examined the following critical special pays and recommended appropriate adjustments:

Special compensation for physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, and continuation pay for physicians;

Flight pay (crewmember) and submarine duty pay;

Hostile fire pay; and

Enlisted attraction and retention incentive pays.

The Quadrennial Review study recommends the restructuring of enlisted attraction and retention incentive pays, and also flight and submarine duty pay. The transitional costs involved in these changes are modest, and it is believed that the payoff will be substantial in terms of increasing the accession and retention rates and lowering training and other costs.

Legislative proposals will be considered after determining the fiscal year 1973 budgetary impact and the relative priority of all Defense programs necessary to bring about zero draft calls. These matters will require further coordination within the Department of Defense and the executive branch.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present our views on the size and composition of the military force, cost trends, and other characteristics of defense manpower, and some of the key issues related to the most effective utilization of people in our national security system. We need your understanding and support, and hope that we may pursue these matters in greater depth with members of your committee and staff.

With me are senior officers representing each of the services: Lieutenant General DePuy of the Army; Rear Admiral Finneran of the Navy; Major General Wheeler of the Marine Corps and Major General Berg of the Air Force. We work closely with one another on the affairs of defense manpower, and I recommended that you let each officer provide the manpower highlights for his service.

I would be happy to respond to your questions now or after you have heard from my military colleagues.

Thank you very much.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Members of the committee, I propose, if it is agreeable to the committee, that we have some questions now for the Secretary before we

hear the other witnesses. We have set aside today and tomorrow to hear these matters fully. I would like for everyone who comes to get to ask their questions.

We have no votes on the floor this morning. The economic opportunity bill is up for consideration, and we heard an amendment is pending. Rollcall votes are expected this afternoon. If it is agreeable to the committee, we will run until 12:15 and then recess until 2:30 and come back for a couple of hours.

I hope, Mr. Kelley that you can be with us this afternoon.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I will be with you both days.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope we can make our questions fairly brief so that each one can ask the main questions they want to ask this morning and then come back this afternoon. We have some time to go with other witnesses and we can be brief to start with.

Let me make this comment. Last year after you testified, Senator Smith and I were talking about the situation. We were impressed with your statement and the work that you are doing over there. Your statement is the best statement I have ever heard on perhaps the most difficult problem in all the military, that is, personnel; manpower and woman power.

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very good and you went into these matters and how they are related.

RESERVES LEVEL

I think we must get down to the nub of things and make some decisions. We are talking about Reserves. If I may make this comment, I am all for the Reserves and National Guard, the civilian soldier concept, but if we are not going to initiate and have a policy of using them, we should not spend \$4 billion a year plus on them. I do not think that we should give them a lot of equipment unless we are going to have a firm policy to use them. Otherwise, certainly we have too many. I think we should abolish them on the interservice plan but it seems to me that this is one of the very hard practical decisions that we have to make.

If we have these Reserves in appreciable numbers we are going to have to give them bonuses or recruit them through draft or something. However, if we are not going to have a policy of using them, then it is just being overdone. I notice you are trying to get into that retirement cost, the mounting costs of it. I look upon retirement as part of the earnings of the man. I do not want to wreck it but it is getting beyond management. Something is going to have to be done.

I hear it is already over \$4 billion a year and it just passed the first billion dollar mark in 1958, I believe.

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE REPORT

In regard to your Interagency Committee, I want to read again what you said, you have been wrestling with this matter. When are you, as the chairman, expecting to report?

Mr. KELLEY. Sir, as chairman of the Interagency Committee, I have reported to the President on this and at the same time staffed the re-

port to the services and gotten initial service reactions. Following receipt of these, I recommended to Secretary Laird, and he directed, a special DOD study which is being made by an interservice and OSD group, which I am chairing, which will complete its analysis by the end of March.

Following that date, we will be in a position to make some legislative recommendations.

As you have recognized, military retirement is not a system that can be examined in a vacuum. It has to be done in a way that makes it modify sensibly the service programs and policies on tenure and force management.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, I do not mean to cut you off, but I have only a little time and we can develop the details. Your committee work is something that cannot be done overnight, or anything that Congress can do, if anything, in the future. So, I am not requesting a quickie, but do you think there will be a further report, say, in 60 days?

Mr. KELLEY. That would be the most optimistic forecast I could make, 60 days. For the hundreds of hours we have spent on that, I am sure we cannot get you a quickie.

ENLISTMENT BONUS PLAN

The CHAIRMAN. No. I understand. On this bonus for enlistment plan, all the services were eligible for it, but you said you were going to use it only on the Army to start with.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you give us a brief statement on that? To what extent has it been used in dollars, do you know?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, I do know. The combat arms enlistment bonus has not been used at all.

The CHAIRMAN. We have not gone into that?

Mr. KELLEY. And the reason it has not been used is because, one, we wanted to test the capability of better recruiting effort in obtaining combat arms enlistees. I noted that from calendar year 1970 to calendar year 1971, the last halves of those years, we increased the result from an average of 250 to 3,000 per month.

The other reason we have not used it is because we want to see what impact the recent pay raises have on enlistments.

The CHAIRMAN. I had understood you had tried it a little.

Mr. KELLEY. No, we have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me express satisfaction that you have not used it. That was one element of the draft bill I supported that I was not happy about. I took it as part of a package, but with greatest caution. I said then that I hoped it would not be expanded rapidly and that they would all have to have it if one did. So, I hope you continue to hold it up. At least, you are giving the other a fair run.

Mr. KELLEY. We are giving the other a fair run now, Mr. Chairman, and I would be less than candid if I did not say to you that I think we would give the combat arms enlistment bonus a go fairly soon because, if we do not, we are going to find ourselves running short on the combat arms enlistment requirements of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you have not had enough time to really test out your volunteer Army and I am supporting the trial run matter. But are you planning to offer this special bonus I am talking about right away?

Mr. KELLEY. Not right away. We have not made that recommendation, but I think I should say to you that I consider it a strong possibility in the next quarter.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some questions here about how many men are in support units but you have been into that quite a bit and I am going to pass those questions over for the moment. If I do not get a chance to ask the questions this afternoon, I will put some of them in the record.

Mr. KELLEY. I think the rationale will be provided in the comments of General DePuy and the charts he will use and in the presentations of the officers for the other services, too.

PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Congress moved into this matter of setting the ceilings and providing some reductions last year and you have exceeded those reductions beyond what we mandated.

As I understood the press reports, you said you did that because of money reductions in the appropriations bill. I ask you the question, why did you do it? As I understand the figures, you were reducing beyond what the Congress required.

Mr. KELLEY. Are you referring to fiscal year 1972 end strengths or man-years, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Man-years. You have reduced the average strength 17,000 men below the other reductions which were made.

How do you account for the fact that you reduced 17,000 men that were authorized? I ask that because until the bill went to the President's desk, I was requested over and over again to change my position on that reduction in manpower. They just said it was necessary. Not by you but by others in the Department of Defense, and now it turns out that you reduced them 17,000 more than the law required.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, that was driven—

The CHAIRMAN. I think you were justified, you understand, but I want to understand this thing.

Mr. KELLEY. It was driven by two things. One, a pressure to reduce our funding requirements, and second, a relatively minor adjustment in the estimate of the number of personnel required.

As to the latter part, I have said as much as I know. I would have to either provide for the record at a later time or rely on one of the service witnesses to explain that factor further.

(The information follows:)

The Congress reduced the average for FY 72 by 56,000 man-years (50,000 Army, 3,000 Air Force and 3,000 Navy). The additional 17,000 man-years reduction effected by the Department of Defense was distributed as follows: 6,200 Navy, 6,600 Marine Corps and 4,600 Air Force. There was no reduction in Army strength beyond the Congressionally direct reduction.

The two major reasons for the additional FY 1972 reduction of 17,000 man-years were:

1. Military strength reductions were necessary to adjust to Congressional reductions in appropriations, particularly those affecting the Military Personnel and Operations and Maintenance accounts. The Military Personnel request was re-

duced by \$265 million, only \$165 million of which was associated with the Congressional reduction of 56,000 in authorized average strength. To absorb the remaining reduction in funding, the Services reduced average strength further as well as to carrying out economies in other functions.

2. Some strength reductions, particularly those in the Marine Corps, were instituted to facilitate a smoother transition to peacetime force levels as our forces were phased out of Vietnam.

FURTHER REDUCTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Although the average strength is reduced significantly for fiscal 1973, you are actually only reducing the Armed Forces by 33,000 during fiscal 1973. That is the difference between the beginning strength and the end strength of next year, and that is only 1½ percent reduction.

Do you think that this should stay stable at that point and not be reduced any more?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. It means that. It is our best translation of our total security commitments worldwide into the number of people and the composition of forces needed to carry out that commitment.

The CHAIRMAN. My question is related to the logic of the matter and we will get into that later whereby you are really planning to have only 13 Army divisions of an average strength of about 20,000. But still you plan to have in your Army at that time 860,000 or 861,000 men, and we will need a good strong explanation on the record for that in debate. However, I first would like to be personally and fully convinced that there is a reasonable relation between the number of men actually in Army companies, battalions, regiments, divisions. If 860,000 or so are required it looks to me like you would have more than 13 divisions.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, there is no question, sir, that you should have that information and it will be provided through General DePuy's charts and comments. Starting with the final figure of 861,000 and the 13 divisions, he will explain support element by support element, division by division, where these people are going to be used. And certainly, that information is vital.

The CHAIRMAN. I know this is a troublesome matter for you.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, did you wish for me to comment on the use of the Guard and Reserves in your—

The CHAIRMAN. You had already brought it up and that was my response—lack of policy. I think my time is up now.

Mr. KELLEY. I did not mention as perhaps I should have the strong policy declaration that Secretary Laird made in August of 1970. He said to the service secretaries that, in your budget and force planning, you must be guided by the principle that in any future buildup of the forces, there will be a reliance first on the Guard and Reserve as the initial and primary augmentation forces for the active forces and not on the draft as in the past.

That would be an empty policy were it not accompanied by a buildup or a replenishing of the Guard and Reserve equipment inventories and improved training and readiness, all of which are occurring.

The CHAIRMAN. That is good. I want to help create a policy if we can, a sentiment for a policy that will mean just what it says, that we are relying on the Reserves and Guard and we are going to call them up. That is my position. I am very doubtful, however, that it is firmed up to that extent.

Senator Smith.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SMITH

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, my questions are more for the record than for discussion and in the interests of time I am going to ask that the first set be submitted now for complete answers in the record, and on the second time around, the second list of questions that I have.

(Questions submitted by Senator Smith. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.)

Question. The staff recently determined that [deleted] men have intelligence assignments for the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group, and Air Force Security Services. Who determines the essential requirement to maintain over [deleted] people in this area? Who reviews this program to determine if it should be 10,000, 16,000, or 30,000? Do you believe a significant reduction can be made in this area in the future?

Answer. The figure of [deleted] represents only a portion of the military personnel in the FY 73 budget for the aforementioned organizations. The total budgeted end strength for cryptologic programs in FY 73 is [deleted] including [deleted] at the National Security Agency.

It has been a long-standing practice for all manpower requirements for cryptologic programs to be determined by the Director, National Security Agency in close coordination with the Army Security Agency, Naval Security Group, and the Air Force Security Service. His basic guidance for developing these requirements is the tasking which he receives from the United States Intelligence Board, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence. Established manning and staffing factors, along with workload requirements, provide the basis for determining operational manpower levels. Support manpower requirements are determined by the respective military Service in accordance with established manpower support factors. All of these manpower requirements are reviewed in greater detail by the Director, National Security Agency in his role as the program manager for the Consolidated Cryptologic and Advanced Program Support Programs.

For FY 73, these requirements were also validated during the annual joint OSD—Office of Management and Budget review of the intelligence budgets submitted by the DOD components. OSD elements participating in this review included the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, and Director of Defense Research and Engineering. Representatives of the Office of Management and Budget were full partners with OSD in this review. A final review was conducted by the Secretary of Defense, both as a part of his normal budget reviews and during his intensive study of the organization for intelligence that led to the creation of the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. In the future, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) will participate in the Intelligence manpower requirements review process. In addition, selected manpower requirements are examined by both the program manager and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) in the course of analyzing specific issues on a periodic basis. [Deleted.]

Question. In addition there are 17,700 U.S. military communications personnel located in Europe, namely [deleted] Army; [deleted] Navy; and [deleted] Air Force. How essential is it to maintain this vast array of communications personnel? What reductions can be made in the future in this area?

Answer. The communications personnel in Europe are essential for support of fleet, ground and air operations; strategic and tactical command and control; intelligence collection and distribution; support of administrative and logistical systems; the installation, operation and maintenance of global, area and base voice and message switching and terminal facilities.

Since 1968, over 4,000 communications personnel have been reduced. Further reductions are planned as a result of reducing size of intermediate communications headquarters and changing from government owned to leased communications systems. Future reductions will be based on:

- (a) Installation of additional automated facilities.
- (b) Major changes in military forces in Europe and elimination of installations.

Question. Is it a fact that U.S. combat units assigned to West Germany are spread extremely thin to conduct an effective forward defense of Western Europe?

Answer. The U.S. Army forces currently located in West Germany are spread thin. They have been assigned a defensive sector approximately [deleted] kilometers in width and there are 4 U.S. divisions and one brigade of the Reforger division on the ground to defend that frontage. However, our plans for Europe include substantial augmentation. That part of the Reforger division which is based on CONUS is part of CINCEUR's M-Day force and, therefore, will be deployed during a period of increased tension. Also, we plan to deploy an additional [deleted] divisions to Europe within [deleted]. These [deleted] divisions are considered the minimum essential for the conduct of an initial conventional defense in the Central Region.

The following table shows the NATO buildup relative to the Warsaw Pact: [Deleted.]

Question. Is it a fact that they presently cover $2\frac{1}{2}$ times or more the normal territory that a combat unit is assigned in combat?

Answer. Yes, U.S. Army doctrine suggests that the sector assigned to a battalion in the defense should be approximately 3-5 kilometers in width. That frontage could vary depending on specific situations. USAREUR has assigned in Germany a total of [deleted] maneuver battalions and a [deleted] kilometer frontage. If each of these battalions were assigned a defensive sector, battalion sectors would average approximately [deleted] kilometers each. Assuming normal Army doctrine of retaining approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of the maneuver battalions in reserve during the defense, there would be only [deleted] battalions for front line defense of the [deleted] kilometers. In this instance, each battalion would have frontage of approximately [deleted] kilometers. It should be emphasized that this is an analytical approach to answering this question. A specific extract from USAREUR's Emergency Defense Plan would necessarily require consideration of tactical aspects of the battle area to include items such as topography, avenues of approach, lines of communication and population centers. Such consideration would dictate extreme variances in the frontages assigned the individual USAREUR battalions.

Question. Is it a fact that our conventional capability is further limited by the fact that [deleted] as of September 1971?

Answer. We are making a strong effort to improve the readiness of U.S. Army forces in Europe. During the past several years, manpower shortages (both strength and skills) and personnel turnover have caused readiness problems in Europe.

Since September 1971, the readiness of Army units in Europe has improved. During the second quarter of FY 72 [deleted] major units (divisions, separate brigades, and armored cavalry regiments) in Europe attained their training readiness goals and are considered [deleted].

Implementation of the early release program beginning at the end of the second quarter of FY 72 to meet the Army-wide manpower ceiling, is resulting in a temporary decline in strength for units in Europe. To minimize the impact in Europe, replacements are being furnished from CONUS, taking account of skill requirements. [Deleted.]

Question. Is it a fact that U.S. Army personnel in Europe have an annual turnover rate between [deleted] percent? Does this not impair their unit combat efficiency?

Answer. During fiscal 1971, major units in U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) experienced a turnover rate of approximately [deleted] percent per quarter or an annual rate of approximately [deleted] percent. This rate steadily declined during the first half of fiscal 1972 to approximately [deleted] percent for the quarter ending 31 December 1971. The average length of tour served by USAREUR departees during that quarter was 17.1 months, an increase of 1.1 months from the previous quarter.

The quarterly turnover rate that USAREUR can sustain without degradation to its training and combat effectiveness has been estimated to be about 16 percent. Higher rates cause units to compress and in some cases repeat training cycles. Thus, our objective is to reduce and maintain turnover to at least this

level and by so doing provide increased stability to the command as a whole. We foresee this objective as achievable in the not too distant future when our force structure begins to level off.

Question. The U.S. Army Europe is authorized [deleted] military personnel and has [deleted] assigned as of September 30, 1971. Who determines what the proper number of Army personnel in Europe should be?

Answer. The President determines the proper number of total military personnel to be in Europe. The Secretary of Defense, after reviewing the recommendations of the JCS and Service Secretaries, establishes the number of military personnel from each Service to be in Europe.

Question. Do you believe that the Army requires 185,000 military personnel in Europe to fight and support $4\frac{1}{2}$ divisions (whose strength approximates 64,000) plus the artillery and combat support troops?

Answer. Yes. In the Army's case, the number depends on the force level of $4\frac{1}{2}$ divisions, special mission forces such as the Berlin Brigade, and supporting forces. While some of the supporting forces are there to provide base overhead functions (about 3,000), most are there to provide support to operating elements of the division and special mission forces. Moreover, some support forces are maintained in the theater to assist in the rapid introduction of combat forces should they be needed in Europe.

Question. How many combat personnel are in Europe?

Answer. There are many ways to define combat personnel. For example, we could restrict our definition to those whose primary duty is to fire at the enemy. However, we know that many who would not fit the definition nevertheless do fight and work closely with the "shooters" in combat. Another way of defining combat personnel is to include those assigned to *units* (such as tank battalions) whose primary mission is to fire at the enemy. This also would be somewhat misleading, as some units in some Services include supply, maintenance, food service and similar functions whereas other units do not. We could use larger aggregations, such as Five Year Defense Programs, counting as combat those personnel in Programs I (Strategic Forces), II (General Purpose Forces), and IV (Airlift, Sealift Forces); however, each of these programs contains the base operations, logistics, and other non-combat support required for the program. Using the Fiscal Guidance Categories, we rearrange program elements to identify these support personnel separately from the combat personnel.

All of these classification schemes, as well as others which could be developed, have limitations. Data from year to year may not be entirely comparable because of accounting changes, fiscal constraints, and competing requirements for manpower. Comparisons among the Services may not be valid because of different missions, unit structures, and accounting systems.

In order to respond to your question, I shall use the Fiscal Guidance Categories, including as combat only these personnel in Europe assigned to Major Mission units. The numbers and percentages by Service are as follows: Army 167,000 (84%); Navy 30,000 (73%); Marine Corps 2,000 (67%); Air Force 30,000 (38%). It is especially important to note here that unit personnel who perform such functions as supply, maintenance, and food service are not included in this category by the Air Force but are included by the other Services; this accounts in large part for the low Air Force figure.

Question. How many combat support troops are in Europe?

Answer. Again, because of the many definitions which could be used, I would like to be consistent and use Other Mission Forces: Army has 12,000 or 6% in Other Mission forces; Navy 6,000 or 15%; Marine Corps none; Air Force 18,000 or 24%.

There is some limitation to the use of the above percentages. Apparent differences in the levels of combat/support ratios between Services are largely due to accounting, structural and organizational differences rather than relative differences in real ratios.

Question. How many combat service support troops are in Europe?

Answer. Using the General Support functions Army has 20,000 or 10%; Navy 5,000 or 12%; Marine Corps 1,000 or 33%; Air Force 29,000 or 38%.

There is some limitation to the use of the above percentages. Apparent differences in the levels of combat/support ratios between Services are largely due to

accounting, structural and organizational differences rather than relative differences in real ratios.

Question. What reductions can and should be made in each of these areas?

Answer. We have reviewed each of these areas very carefully, recently completing a thorough analysis of whether we could reduce any noncombat forces in Europe. As for the combat personnel, their assignment to the mission forces is essential if those forces are to remain a credible deterrent and to be viable in a conflict. Other mission personnel are fairly small in number, yet they provide vital services both to our Allies and in our own direct interests.

We believe, at present, considering the forces deployed and current contingency planning, that the combat/support relationships in Europe are about right. We will continue, however, to review our support levels with the view toward continued improvement.

Question. How do you know there are not too many supply and logistics personnel in Europe?

Answer. The number of supply and other logistics personnel assigned to Europe is computed from workload measures. For example, a 155 millimeter howitzer battalion fighting in Europe for 90 days at intense rates will fire 75½ tons of ammunition per day. One ordnance ammunition company can handle 1680 tons per day. So for every 21 of these howitzer battalions, we need one ordnance ammunition company in the force structure.

I would like to add that our study has shown that reductions in supply and other logistics people in Europe would seriously endanger our currently deployed combat and special mission forces. Also, by maintaining support units in the theater, we are able to introduce additional combat forces rapidly. If we were to reduce our deployed support, this would impair our ability to build up quickly for a contingency.

CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT SYSTEM

Senator SMITH. I do have one question, Mr. Secretary, at this time and that is, has there ever been any study or consideration of a contributory system for retirement?

Mr. KELLEY. As far as I know, Senator Smith, the answer is no. However, there is an imputed contribution made by the military of approximately 7 percent into the retirement system. In any comparisons made between military and civilian pay comparability or relationships, there is a 7-percent credit given for the fact that the military person is the beneficiary of a retirement system to which he is not actually making a cash contribution. But beyond that I know of no study that has been made.

Perhaps General Benade does know it.

General BENADE. Yes. I would like to mention, Senator Smith, that the University of Michigan at the request of this committee did an exhaustive study in the late fifties and reached the conclusion that a noncontributory system was in fact preferable. I would like to summarize very quickly the reasons why that is so.

There is, I think, a misconception that if the military were to be put on a contributory system, the equivalent to the Civil Service System, that this would ultimately meet the costs of the system. It would not, in fact. The reason is that about 11 or 12 out of every 100 new entrants into the service ultimately qualify for retirement. So, for the great bulk of other people who enter the service it would in effect simply be a form of saving which would then have to be returned to them perhaps with interest.

Also, because of the relatively young ages at which military people retire compared to civilian systems, the length of payments into such a system would not compare to that of a civilian system of people

who normally retire at older ages. The so-called normal costs of the military retirement system run about 23 percent of payroll and that of the civil service about 14 percent. That difference is accountable by the young age that military people retire at.

As Mr. Kelley has indicated, in developing what we would consider to be the proper or competitive level of pay, after having determined that level, we do reduce it within the Department of Defense by 7 percent to take account of the fact that a civil servant would require at least that much more in order to have the same take-home pay. We, therefore, recommend to the Congress a level of pay which is 7 percent less than the amounts otherwise calculated in the Pentagon as being the proper pay levels.

Senator SMITH. So, it seems to me that if we are going to have the defense that we need, we should have a smaller regular establishment, with the best pay possible, and in doing that it might be well to think about a contributory system, also less of the fringe benefits. Get them on a pay scale like the rest of the Government in the end and, of course, if we had the regular establishment of that kind we would have to have it backed up by a very, very strong reserve, an active reserve, which would be on the same basis.

Thank you very much for your expansion for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you yield to me just 1 minute on that?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

RETIREMENT FUND PAYMENT

The CHAIRMAN. General, are you prepared to recommend the military pay 7 percent into this retirement fund if there would be a corresponding adjustment some way as to the present salaries?

General BENADE. Originally, sir, this had been a concept. A great deal of attention has been given to the desirability of a salary concept for the military and there would be a system of charges. That would include an explicit contribution to retirement.

Two factors complicate the matter quite a bit. One is the fact that if you would avoid having military people take a loss, a reduction in take-home pay, you first have to have an increase of 7 percent in order to have them have the same take-home pay.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you willing now to recommend that they make that change, that they make the contribution but give them an increase in pay now to start?

General BENADE. The Secretary of Defense had publicly announced several times that an ultimate goal is a salary system for military personnel but there are certain costs of admission to the salary system that right now, in view of the competing demands for resources, the administration is not prepared to recommend.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not pressing you. Just for the information of the committee, one word further. There has been a calculation made on the present basis that by the year 2000 or near thereto, the annual cost of military retirement will surpass \$16 billion and that is why I say it has become unmanageable and something must be done about it.

The committee makes the following comments for the record concerning the question of 7.0% imputed military retirement contribution.

The committee would point out that since there is no accepted comparability system linking the various military and Civil Service pay grades it cannot there-

fore be reasonably said that military basic pay is being depressed by any percentage as an imputed contribution toward reducing military retired pay costs.

The committee never has been presented with evidence nor has it adopted a comparability system of equating military and Civil Service pay grades. It is acknowledged that this is a very difficult matter. Within Civil Service grades themselves both the duties and responsibilities vary widely. This is also true of military pay grades.

A comparison of the Civil Service and military retirement systems alone poses a formidable problem of comparing values, benefits, costs and other elements involved. For example, at the present time, the so-called "normal cost" of the military retirement system is approximately 22% of basic pay as compared to approximately 14% for the Civil Service retirement system. Normal cost is defined as that percentage of salary which would have to be contributed (which would be reinvested and earn interest) during the working lifetime of a particular group of new members, in order to provide to those members all the benefits promised by the system.

In view of the difference in normal cost between the Civil Service System (14%) and the military retirement system (22%) there would have to be a considerably higher percentage of imputed contribution on the part of the individual in the military system than the Civil Service System, even if the "imputed" concept was accepted. Even here, however, the assumption would have to be accepted that two systems are otherwise equatable in terms of benefits and requirements which would be difficult to uphold.

Senator SYMINGTON?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I will be brief. I would appreciate your answers being brief. I cannot be here this afternoon. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to study this interesting statement and submit questions to be answered for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Without objection it will be so ordered.

UNCLASSIFIED STATEMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, why is all this secret? Why should not this information be known to the taxpayers?

Mr. KELLEY. The majority of the statement, I think, should be known by the taxpayers, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you give us a supplementary statement that has in it everything except what you think should be classified?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; be happy to.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is one ready yet?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Don't you think, with a \$45-billion deficit coming up, some economists say—the administration admits to \$38.8 billion—that we ought to get these facts out to the people?

Mr. KELLEY. I think public disclosure of the manpower problem is very important and I seek opportunities to speak to it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you release as much as possible of this statement?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

NATO TROOP REDUCTIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. On page 9 you say that the size of our general purpose forces is determined largely by our NATO commitments. Some of us for years have been trying to cut the NATO troops commitment. The big argument against such a cut has been that we wanted a mutual reduction of forces.

Recently the press has been carrying stories about the complications of any mutual reduction of force agreements; more complicated, for example, than the SALT talks; therefore as of now we are not particularly interested in reducing our forces in Europe through mutual agreement.

Would you comment?

Mr. KELLEY. Within the limits of my knowledge, Senator, my comments would be these. I have never regarded the rationale for NATO support forces as being strictly a military matter or strictly a political matter and I think it relates both to military requirements and political considerations.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it accurate to say that we are no longer interested in a mutual reduction of forces? Do you know about that?

Mr. KELLEY. I am aware of no decrease in our interest in a mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

Senator SYMINGTON. So far as you know we are proceeding with that policy and will reduce our forces if the enemy will reduce theirs?

Mr. KELLEY. Consistent with our NATO requirements and security obligations in Europe, yes.

BATTLE CASUALTIES

Senator SYMINGTON. On page 14 you give interesting figures about battle deaths going back to the Civil War, running through World Wars I and II, also Vietnam. Have you any figures about the cost to the taxpayers per death?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; I do not have.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think you could supply those for the record, cost per casualty?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes. I am not sure that I know just how you want them provided.

Senator SYMINGTON. We spend so much money for each war. The cost of the Vietnam War, I am sure can be segregated from other costs. You say battle deaths are 3.6 percent per thousand men. I wonder what the cost per death is per man.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, it may be of interest. I think it is a loaded figure, frankly, sir. Our objective is to reduce battle casualties, and to the extent we reduce them we increase their unit cost, all other things being constant. But, we can provide the figures for whatever use they may be.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you provide them?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

(The information follows:)

The number wounded in action in Southeast from July 1, 1964 through June 30, 1971 for which hospital care was required was 151,305, as shown in the following table. This figure is most comparable to the "wounds not mortal" as reported for earlier wars. The total number wounded in action in Southeast Asia for this period was 299,652, including 151,305 requiring hospital care and 148,347 not requiring hospital care. The "requiring hospital care" figures were used because they are most nearly comparable to the other data available.

Estimates of incremental war spending have been regularly prepared for the war in Southeast Asia. These, shown on the last line of the table, represent the estimated costs of the war, over and above the on-going costs for the baseline force. Such estimates are not available for the earlier wars shown in the table; for these, total Defense spending is shown for the years indicated. The fiscal year after the war is included, to reflect the carry-over impact of war spending. The Federal fiscal year throughout this period is the same as it is today (July 1-June 30).

It is emphasized that these data are furnished in response to a specific inquiry. It should not be inferred that the Defense Department finds any particular significance in data arranged in this way.

	Total Defense spending (dollars in billions)	Number of battle deaths	Wounds not mortal	Total battle deaths and wounds not mortal	Defense spending per—		
					Battle death	Wound not mortal	Casualty (battle death nonmortal wound)
Civil War (Union forces only; fiscal year 1862-66 total Defense spending).....	\$3. 36	140, 414	281, 881	422, 295	\$23, 913	\$11, 920	\$7, 957
World War I (total Defense spending fiscal year 1918-19).....	17. 16	53, 402	204, 002	257, 404	321, 340	84, 117	66, 666
World War II (total Defense spending fiscal year 1942-46).....	290. 40	291, 557	670, 846	962, 403	996, 032	432, 886	301, 745
Korea (total Defense spending fiscal year 1951-54).....	163. 50	33, 629	103, 284	136, 913	4, 861, 875	1, 583, 014	1, 194, 189
Southeast Asia (total Defense spending fiscal year 1965-71)....	496. 14	45, 175	151, 305	196, 480	10, 982, 623	3, 279, 072	2, 525, 143
Southeast Asia (incremental war costs fiscal year 1965-71).....	95. 21	45, 175	151, 305	196, 480	2, 107, 582	629, 259	484, 579

SUSTAINED FRONT IN EVENT OF EUROPEAN WAR

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, we are glad to have you with us.

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, how long do you believe the United States and NATO Forces can wage a successful conventional war with the Warsaw Pact Forces if the enemy were to launch an all-out conventional attack and the United States had very little warning?

Mr. KELLEY. Senator, I believe the answer to that question should be provided by Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer when they appear before this committee later this month. I am not able to provide it.

Senator THURMOND. Could you provide it for the record?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The probability of a massive—80 plus divisions—attack coming as a complete surprise is considered highly unlikely. A large number of Pact divisions are not stationed close to the border areas and would have to deploy in many cases several hundred kilometers to reach attack positions along the NATO border. Existing intelligence organizations should be able to detect activity of this scale and provide some warning time. The timely political interpretation and coordinated response by NATO will to a great extent determine whether the Allies could meet an attack with sufficient conventional force. The myriad of uncertainties involved in a combat operation and the limited methodologies available with which to predict the outcomes of the conflict make it difficult to state precisely how long the Allies could hold. As stated above a massive, surprise attack is considered highly unlikely. For an attack with some warning we feel that the existing force levels committed to NATO ensure a reasonable chance for successful defense of NATO.

Senator THURMOND. It is our understanding that the Joint Chiefs assume we will receive [deleted].

Is this correct?

Mr. KELLEY. I am not familiar with that figure. I would have to comment on that for the record.

Senator THURMOND. Maybe General DePuy could answer that question.

General DEPUY. Senator Thurmond, the strategy guidance that the services are given which in turn tells them how many divisions they have but not the level of support has the assumption that there would be [deleted]. In other words, that the Soviets would require [deleted] of mobilization and [deleted] after they started mobilization we would have strategic warning. Now, that is just in one set of scenarios.

Senator THURMOND. Could you tell me who made this judgment and the considerations it is based on?

General DEPUY. I cannot tell you what consideration it is based on except considered judgment. It is a piece of guidance which assists the services in determining the readiness of reserve components called to active duty because, as you know, Senator, they need a certain amount of training. The guidance says that, if "D" Day were to be [deleted] after "M" Day that the National Guard and Reserve components would have a [deleted] start.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel as a military man it is a sound and valid assumption?

General DEPUY. I think that it is a reasonable assumption but it is not a guarantee. You could very well have none.

EFFECT OF REMOVAL OF A DIVISION FROM EUROPE

Senator THURMOND. What would be the effect of removing one U.S. division from Europe this year? Maybe you would like him to answer that.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, I would.

Senator THURMOND. General DePuy, in your opinion, what would be the effect of removing one U.S. division from Europe this year?

General DEPUY. I am very much in the same boat as Secretary Kelley. I would prefer not to answer this question on this premise. I am not qualified to answer, which is the best reason. We are appearing here today to explain, as we should, the manpower that we think we need in order to support the forces that the strategy requires. I think it is much more appropriate that the Secretary and Admiral Moorer from the Joint Chiefs of Staff answer the type question that you are now asking.

Senator THURMOND. Could you get that answer from them for the record, then, so we will have it on the record here?

General DEPUY. I will pass that on, yes.

(The information follows:)

This question has military, political and cost implications. Militarily, withdrawal of one division from the current European force would create a hole in the NATO forward defense since all U. S. divisions are assigned missions in forward sectors. A reduction of one division would require that another unit assume a share of the responsibility and would further extend another NATO unit. Additionally, this change would impact on the mission for REFORGER

forces and increase the urgency of its return. In short, the threshold at which a PACT limited warning attack would achieve success would be lowered and NATO would face a greater risk of confrontation.

Politically, the unilateral reduction of U. S. forces would certainly cause the Allies to re-evaluate their obligations and commitments to NATO and place in jeopardy the force improvements pledged in the European Defense Improvement Program. Also, NATO bargaining position in a Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) would practically disappear, and our Allies might be forced to make accommodations with the Soviet Union.

As the following table shows, the cost impact of withdrawing a division from Europe varies significantly depending on whether the unit is (1) maintained on active duty so that it can be returned to Europe rapidly in a crisis or (2) deactivated.

Cost/Savings of withdrawing one mechanical division from Europe¹

[In millions of dollars]

1. Maintain on active duty and pre-position equipment in Europe.	
First year cost.....	\$458
First year savings.....	42
Annual outyear savings.....	39
2. Deactivate: ²	
First year cost.....	54
First year savings.....	441
Annual outyear savings.....	580

¹ Costs are based on a 16,500-man division plus an equal number of support troops.

² Assumes that a proportional part of the U.S. training and logistics base is also deactivated.

If we desire to be able to return the unit to Europe rapidly in a crisis, then it is necessary to (1) construct facilities to house a set of prepositioned equipment in Europe and (2) purchase an additional set of equipment to be used for training in the U.S. These costs, plus other one time costs (e.g., cost of renovating existing barracks in CONUS, cost of moving the unit from Europe to CONUS), exceed the expected annual savings by a factor of over 10. It should be noted that these costs are based on the assumption that troops returned to the U.S. can be housed in renovated World War II type barracks. If—in line with the All Volunteer Army Concept—new barracks are required, the cost of stationing these troops in CONUS could increase substantially, i.e., on the order of several hundred million dollars.

OPERATION REFORGER

Senator THURMOND. Another one—any of these you feel should not be answered you tell me and we will handle it that way. How is it that the United States was able to withdraw 28,000 troops in the last few years as a result of Project Reforger and yet this did not apparently adversely affect NATO?

General DEPUY. I think the NATO allies agreed to what the Air Force would call a dual basing concept and we call Reforger in which we took two-thirds of an infantry division and two-thirds of its support back to the United States. The division is at Fort Riley. The United States also sent certain squadrons of fighters back to the United States on the premise that during a period of strategic warning they could return.

In the case of the Reforger units, both support and the division itself, the equipment for two-thirds of the division is in Europe, so the troops would be flown back, and we would then have 5 instead of 4 $\frac{1}{3}$ divisions. The European allies accepted that, perhaps not with wild enthusiasm, but as perhaps a more economical way of meeting our initial onsite commitment.

Senator THURMOND. So, what you are saying in short as I understand, is that the European allies accepted that but were not too happy with it.

General DEPUY. Most of the European allies, to include the British and ourselves, have plans for reinforcement. What we have is consistent with what the other allies are doing.

TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT TO EUROPE IN CASE OF WAR

Senator THURMOND. Is it a fact that U.S. planning calls for [deleted] people and [deleted] tons of equipment to be transported to Europe within 30 days after the outbreak of hostilities, or are you familiar with that?

General DEPUY. I have some charts. Later I can show you the number of Army forces to be deployed at 30, 60, and 90 days. I am not quite sure whether you include Air Force in that or not. I would have to consult with my charts.

Senator THURMOND. I see. Could you just summarize that, then, and answer this question for the record?

General DEPUY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

During the first 30 days following mobilization for a NATO contingency, U.S. lift assets have the capability of delivering over [deleted] personnel and approximately [deleted] tons of supplies and equipment to Europe.

Senator THURMOND. What is our capability today to carry out the transportation of this large number of men and materials to Europe within 30 days?

General DEPUY. That is a question which either should be reserved for the appearance of the chairman, because the lift which is made available to the services for the 30, 60 and 90 days is a function of the allocation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have been allocated sufficient lift for planning purposes to get us there. Perhaps General Crittenberger would like to speak to that.

Senator THURMOND. We will be glad to have him if he is qualified to speak to that. Did you understand the question, General?

General CRITTENBERGER. Yes. I am General Crittenberger. I am from J-5, Joint Staff.

The strategic lift question is one that has been looked at for a number of years, as you know. Basically, there is a problem in airlift in the first [deleted] days but that is resolved by the end of that timeframe. The big problem is going to be in sealift because the Reserve Fleet has gone down, as you know, from about 5,000 vessels to around [deleted]. Further, with a short warning time we could not get enough of our Merchant Marine collected to use, so for about the first [deleted] days, there is a problem in sealift. At the end of the first [deleted] days, however, most of these problems have been resolved and hoping for not a very high attrition rate, there would be enough air and sealift to move the forces that would have to be moved.

Senator THURMOND. And you feel there would be?

General CRITTENBERGER. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

NEED FOR UNIFIED EUROPEAN COMMAND

With 22 separate NATO headquarters charged with the wartime mission in Europe and with each individual U.S. service, namely, the Army, Air Force, and Navy, having a major command of its own in Europe, why is it necessary to have another large headquarters organization, namely, a unified U.S. headquarters known as the U.S. European Command?

Mr. KELLEY. Senator, I believe that is a question to which Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer should respond when they are here and if you wish, we can provide an answer.

(The information follows:)

The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR), with present headquarters at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, FRG, is the commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is Western Europe including the UK, the Mediterranean Sea and the islands therein, the entire Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East land mass to the eastern border of Iran, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

EUCOM is the Unified Command which coordinates and controls the overall peacetime activities of all U.S. Forces in Europe. It performs the primary task of war planning as well as the routine daily tasks of inter-Service coordination which permit our forces to perform as a team in war time instead of as individual fighting units. This is the underlying premise of the Unified Command concept.

The U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe performs the following functions:

1. Maintain the security of the U.S. European Command and protect the U.S. its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion.
 2. Support SACEUR.
 3. Exercise operational command over assigned forces through the Service component commanders.
 4. Administer the Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Programs.
 5. During peacetime, plan and utilize military resources available to reinforce and support political, economic, and psychological programs for the achievement of national security interests.
 6. Evacuate and assist in the evacuation of U.S. non-combatants and certain non-U.S. persons abroad.
 7. Prepare for the conduct of unconventional and psychological warfare in military conflict.
 8. Coordinate and direct the intelligence activities of the U.S. European Command.
 9. Implement the public affairs policies of the Department of Defense.
 10. Coordinate International Cooperative Logistics Program.
- Of particular importance in wartime is the control of nuclear weapons in the European Command. USCINCEUR is assigned the important task of control of nuclear weapons in accordance with NATO and unilateral U.S. procedures.

WARTIME MISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMAND

Senator THURMOND. All right. I would appreciate it. Is it not a fact that each individual service headquarters performs the peacetime responsibilities of personnel, training and logistics for its own personnel?

Mr. KELLEY. It does in coordination with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Senator THURMOND. Is it a fact that the European Command does not have a wartime mission of directing U.S. forces in combat?

Mr. KELLEY. I would like to comment further for the record because I think that, too, falls within the range of Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer's comments.

(The information follows:)

The wartime mission of the European Command is the control of nuclear weapons in Europe. USCINCEUR is assigned the important task of control of nuclear weapons in accordance with NATO and unilateral U.S. procedures.

ELIMINATION OF COMMAND LOCATED AT STUTTGART

Senator THURMOND. Thank you. At the headquarters for the European Command in Stuttgart, there are 369 officers, 295 enlisted and 124 civilians. Is it not possible to eliminate this headquarters, recognizing that the 22 SHAPE headquarters have a wartime mission to conduct and fight a NATO war and the individual services with their own separate headquarters take care of the peacetime mission requirements for their own personnel, training, and logistic requirements?

Mr. KELLEY. I will have to comment on that for the record. I cannot answer the question.

(The information follows:)

In the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which amended the National Security Act of 1947, Congress reaffirmed the validity and necessity of the unified command concept of executing United States national interests. A single, clear line of authority and responsibility, emanating from the President, assures the country of responsible and responsive leadership of the forces it provides. The importance of this structure is given credence by the fact that the President personally approves and signs the Unified Command Plan, which assigns missions and responsibilities to the Commanders.

The reasons for selecting Stuttgart as the headquarters site continue to militate against elimination of the headquarters in Stuttgart. The decision resulted from the FRELOC (elimination of the French line of communication) study, necessitated by France's request to move NATO-associated representation out of France, and have since been reinforced by expanded missions/areas given to EUCOM by the President in the 1971 revision of the Unified Command Plan.

EUCOM must have a staff, structure, and communications facility devoted solely to its unified command mission to execute its responsibilities in Western Europe, the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean Sea and islands therein, the entire Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East land mass to the eastern border of Iran, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

Combining EUCOM headquarters with 7th Army/USAREUR (U.S. Army, Europe) headquarters, or with other Service headquarters elements in Europe, would result in triple-hatting of commanders and staff personnel. With present missions, these headquarters structures have been decimated by personnel reductions to the extent that they are barely capable of properly performing. Adding an additional, even more critical mission, would seriously detract from the attention given to any one mission, and would be contrary to the national interest as regards the security of Europe.

While short-term economies can be gained by closing headquarters, the longer-range impact of a less secure Europe and of less than maximum support and attention to the leadership of American forces militate against such action.

SENIOR OFFICERS IN EUROPEAN COMMAND

Senator THURMOND. The European Command Headquarters has 14 generals and admirals, 71 colonels, captains, and captains of the Navy, and 165 lieutenant colonels assigned out of 362 officers. Do you feel this is an imbalance of too many senior officers assigned?

Mr. KELLEY. I would like to comment on that for the record. I will make the general comment here that in the course of my visits with senior officers in Europe I was not struck by an overindulgence in

stars and rank considering the total size and responsibilities of the organization, but I think your question deserves a more precise answer than that.

(Further information follows:)

The manpower structure for Headquarters, EUCOM, as shown in the chart below, is reviewed annually by the Joint Staff and the Services to insure that the commander has the appropriate number of qualified personnel to accomplish his assigned missions. In addition, an on-site survey is conducted by the Joint Staff and the Services at least every three years to validate the manpower requirements. Each position is reviewed to insure that the proper skill level, qualifications and experience level is accurate. Because EUCOM is the senior US headquarters for the European area with management requirements for some 300,000 manpower assets and their costly weapons systems, it is quite evident why the jobs require an experience level greater than subordinate commands. Therefore, you will find it normal to have more senior officers in these positions who must have varied experience and expertise that can only be acquired through years of services. The attached chart reflects the FY 1972 authorized staffing requirements for Headquarters, EUCOM.

	Authorized ¹				Total
	Army	Navy	USMC	USAF	
Officer:					
G/F.....	6	3	1	5	15
06.....	31	13	3	24	71
05.....	72	36	8	83	199
04.....	39	16	1	27	83
03.....	8	7	1	7	23
02.....	0	0	0	0	0
WO.....	1	0	0	0	1
Total.....	157	75	14	147	393
Enlisted.....	99	80	5	125	309
Total military.....	256	155	19	272	702
Civilian.....	145	0	0	0	145
AGG.....	401	155	19	272	847

¹ This includes a 54 space increase that was approved effective Jan. 1, 1972 to support change in the unified command plan. The increase includes 26 additional 05's, 7 04's and 1 03.

IMBALANCE BETWEEN COMBAT AND COMMAND UNITS

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, the European Command Headquarters have increased from 740 persons authorized in July 1967 to 793 in July 1971. Yet, the total U.S. personnel in the Command was reduced from 307,100 in 1967 to [deleted] in 1971.

Why do headquarters staffs continue increasing even though the combat units are substantially reduced?

Mr. KELLEY. We shall comment for the record on that.

(The information follows:)

The reductions in authorizations for elements of USEUCOM since 1967 are reflected in Chart A. It should be noted that EUCOM Headquarters is smaller now than it was in 1966. The major reduction of 34,000 for Reforger/Crested Cap units did not reduce the planning and training function of USEUCOM for these units. In fact, these functions required greater emphasis because of the detailed planning required for movement of the units in the event of an emergency and the necessity for conducting training maneuvers in theater periodically to test the various plans. In addition, during this period technological developments in the fields of management, intelligence, communications, readiness/effectiveness, and command and control have required increases in manpower to support these expanding functions.

CHART A—FORCES UNDER EUROM

Major basis for change	Auth. change	Period
Frelco (elimination of French lines of communication).....	-13,000	December 1967.
Reforger/Crested Cap (Army/Air Force units returned to CONUS under dual basing concept).....	-34,000	December 1968.
Command and control logistics study, 70 (reductions and consolidations of headquarters and support).....	-5,000	December 1969.
Redcoste, Libya closeout (program to reduce costs in Europe by cutting headquarters and support).....	-4,000	December 1970.
Other miscellaneous reductions.....	-2,000	September 1971.
Total.....	-58,000	

CHART B—HEADQUARTERS EUROM MANPOWER

	Officer	Enlisted	Civilian	Total
July 1966.....	384	331	117	832
July 1967.....	353	258	129	1 740
July 1968.....	359	289	131	2 779
July 1969.....	342	271	131	3 744
July 1970.....	358	293	137	4 788
July 1971.....	358	298	137	5 793

¹ 1966-67, -92. SECDEF directed 15 percent military reduction in move from France.

² 1967-68, +39. JCS Manpower Survey (+13 J-2 ADP and +26 J-3 ADP).

³ 1968-69, -35. -47 Redcoste reduction; +4 electronics warfare (J-3); +3 combat logistics support (transfer) J-4;

+5 elimination of joint area petroleum offices (transfer) J-4.

⁴ 1969/70 +44. JCS manpower survey (+44 fiscal year 1971) net change by staff activity:

J-1.....	-1
J-2.....	+11
J-3.....	+16
J-4.....	+2
J-5.....	+4
J-6.....	+10
Military assistance director.....	-3
Comptroller.....	+1
Surgeon.....	+1
Public affairs.....	+1
Commandant.....	+1
Secretary of Joint Staff.....	+1
Total.....	+44

⁵ 1970/71 +5:

J-3.....	+4
J-6.....	+1
Total.....	+5

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, what manpower reduction in this headquarters is possible, or do you want to comment for the record?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; please.

(The information follows:)

Manpower requirements for EUROM headquarters are based on desired readiness/effectiveness of component forces, necessary command and control, and the changing technology in the fields of management, intelligence, and communications.

Due to the nature and the level of the current and projected workload, no reductions in EUROM headquarters are feasible at this time.

TURNOVER OF EUROPEAN PERSONNEL

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, is it not a fact that the Army has experienced a tremendous personnel turnover in Europe, approximating [deleted] percent annually, for the past few years, and does this not indicate that the Army would find it extremely difficult to train and maintain effective combat units in the light of this constant and rapid turnover in personnel?

Mr. KELLEY. I would like to comment on that. The Army has indeed experienced high turnover and turbulence. The forces of the

Army in Europe became the supply grounds for filling up the vacancies in forces in Vietnam.

At the present time, Reserve forces here in the United States, Reserve units of the Active Forces, are being used to build up the active forces in Europe of the Army. As General DePuy will describe in the course of his comments, this factor of severe turbulence is a condition which the Army expects to overcome in the later months of this calendar year. In other words, in the early part of fiscal 1973. Were this turbulence to continue, it would without any question impair the ability of the Army to provide combat-effective and trained units.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry, gentlemen, but the time is up.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd?

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a number of questions, so when my time expires, if the chairman will let me know.

Mr. Secretary, I want to join with the chairman in commending you on this statement you have given today. I think it is a good statement. I think that the Government is fortunate in having a man of your ability and dedication in this important position.

That is not to say, however, that I agree completely with the judgment expressed in each of these matters, naturally.

CLASSIFIED PORTION OF STATEMENT

I want to start first pursuing the question raised by Senator Symington. I want to raise it in a little different way. I would like to have pointed out to me just what secret information there is in this statement. I have read it twice. It is true I have read it hurriedly but I am used to reading rapidly and I cannot see anything secret in it.

I would like to have somebody in the room point out just what secret information is involved.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. I will do that in a moment. A secret piece of information is found at the top of page 10. "Forces in Europe" include over four divisions [deleted.]

That latter information is not treated as public information.

Senator BYRD. The fact that there are four divisions in Europe is public information, is it not?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes. I said the latter portion of that is not public information.

Senator BYRD. What else?

Mr. KELLEY. That is to my knowledge, the only secret portion of the entire statement.

Senator BYRD. That is about 10 words in 40 pages, 46 pages. I think that is dubious because all you are talking about is what you might possibly do at some future time.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, it is—

Senator BYRD. But, anyway, we will not argue that point.

Mr. KELLEY. It is a plan.

Senator BYRD. It is a fact that there are only about 15 words out of 46 pages that you yourself say should be considered secret. It seems to me you could either have left out those 15 words or declassified the whole document.

Mr. KELLEY. First, the judgment as to whether it deserves to be classified or not is a judgment which is made by others than myself.

Senator BYRD. I am aware of that.

Mr. KELLEY. In immediate response to your question, this is the only thing that I can think of in the entire statement which deserves the classification of secret.

Senator BYRD. I do not think this whole document of 46 pages containing a lot of information that the American people should know, that the press should know, that the other Members of the Congress ought to know, should be classified secret on the basis of 15 words.

Mr. KELLEY. I welcome your reaction, Senator, and as I said to Senator Symington, I would be delighted to provide an unclassified version of this statement.

Senator BYRD. As I understand it, everything is unclassified except those 15 words.

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; I did not say that. I said on the basis of my immediate recall that is the only thing which in my judgment deserves a secret classification, but I am not standing in judgment on the entire statement here.

Senator BYRD. If you are going to—of course, you will comply with what Senator Symington requested but I would like for you to comply in a different way and that is submit along with it any information that you regard or the Pentagon regards, the Defense Department regards as secret.

Mr. KELLEY. All right.

Senator BYRD. Because if we get another big 45 pages back, whatever it might be, I will not know what has been deleted.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, if you would yield to me there, the committee would join you in your request that a clean copy be sent over not later than tomorrow morning and it be delivered to the membership of the committee.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, that is only part of it. By a clean copy I assume you mean—

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe a cleared copy.

Senator BYRD. I assume you mean a copy that can be released.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BYRD. I want to know what has been eliminated without having to pore over every word.

The CHAIRMAN. I see your point.

Mr. KELLEY. I understand.

Senator BYRD. We get down to the question that touched on—

Mr. KELLEY. Excuse me, Senator. Before we leave that subject, I should just like to register a reaction which is that it may be inappropriate to release for public consumption the manpower portion of the Defense statement before Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer have had the opportunity to appear before this committee.

Senator BYRD. It seems to me this is a waste of time to have this meeting, then. I thought we could stand on the figures you submitted. If we cannot, then I have no more questions.

Mr. KELLEY. We certainly stand on it.

Senator BYRD. Then, what is the objection to making the information available?

Mr. KELLEY. I assume that the posture of the Defense Department could be better appreciated against the broader backdrop of Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer's statement than if my statement were to be taken by itself.

Senator BYRD. I am not asking that it be released but I was just trying to understand why a document of 46 pages that I went over

hurriedly, admittedly, twice, and by your own assertion so far as you know, there are only 15 words involved, but I will not pursue that further and I am not asking that it be released but we can stand on the figures, can we?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Regardless of subsequent testimony.

Mr. KELLEY. We can stand on the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Just yield to me 1 minute there. The question of whether or not it is classified is for some other department to pass on. Mr. Secretary, if you send us one that is not classified, we will make a judgment whether to release it or not. That is the committee's business. We are driven to the fact that we had to ask you gentlemen to come in here ahead of Mr. Laird, and I know you are in deference to him. But we will release it if it comes over. Thank you.

RATE OF REDUCTION

Senator BYRD. In your statement you say "I want to present not only the reasons why we are recommending a further reduction to the level of the 2.4 million."

The chairman touched on this. I want to pursue it a little bit. Technically, you are right in recommending a further reduction, but it seems to me it is a miniscule reduction, practically no reduction; 33,000 out of 2,400,000, or something like that. A 1-percent reduction—I do not even call that a reduction.

Mr. KELLEY. I think your criticism is well founded. Perhaps my choice of words might have been better. There has been a continuing downslide of manpower strength in the last 5 years, particularly in the last 3.

Senator BYRD. That is because you eliminate, or will have by next May eliminated, 500,000 men from Vietnam, and I think the administration has done a good job on that. I support their position. I think they have made great progress and I do not agree with these people who criticize the administration every day on what is happening in Vietnam. I think the administration has done a good job there; 500,000 people have been brought back since President Nixon took office. But I do not regard this as any reduction in our military forces if you talk about 33,000 men out of 2,400,000.

RISE IN MANPOWER COSTS

On page 2, "Despite substantial reductions in the size of our military forces, total manpower costs have risen sharply in recent years and now account for more than 50 percent of every defense dollar spent."

I think that is a highly significant statement and I assume, Mr. Secretary, it is the first time that that has been a fact, isn't it?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; it is not the first time. When I came into my job 3 years ago we had a force of 3.5 million military and 1.3 million civilians. In the year just preceding fiscal 1968, the manpower related costs were 42 percent of the total budget, and, as the forces declined, the percent of manpower to the total budget increased. So it has been true in each of the last 3 years.

Senator BYRD. That more than 50 percent—

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir. It is true that the manpower percent of the total budget has increased.

Senator BYRD. Yes. But what I am speaking of, I was not aware that before this more than 50 percent of each defense dollar went to manpower.

Mr. KELLEY. That has been true since fiscal year 1971. If you will refer to page 19, Senator Byrd, you will see that starting in fiscal year 1971 the percent of the total budget allocated to pay and related costs has been in excess of 50 percent.

Senator BYRD. Do you mean that for fiscal year 1973 the manpower costs will be 57 percent?

Mr. KELLEY. Fifty-seven percent of the outlays, 52 percent of the total budget authority.

Senator BYRD. Let me see if I can understand this now. Let us take the 57 percent. Does that mean that of every dollar which the Defense Department will spend in fiscal year 1973, that 57 cents will go to you?

Mr. KELLEY. That is correct.

Senator BYRD. That is all the more reason. That is an astonishing figure. That is all the more reason, it seems to me, that you ought to reduce the number of military personnel we have. In other words, the American people now are buying a lot less defense than they have ever bought before. They are buying—for manpower-per-dollar-spent they are buying a lot less defense.

Mr. KELLEY. That, of course, is the reason why I was so anxious to discuss where these costs come from and some of the principal manpower issues that relate to costs.

Senator BYRD. Yes. And you have done it very ably.

Mr. KELLEY. Because it is not as simple as saying, "Let us chop off 100,000 people and we will save a lot of dollars." Certainly we would, but we would also have to reckon with our total international security commitments and some of the byproducts of sharp reductions in force such as turbulence.

Senator BYRD. How are you going to buy new equipment and new military materiel when you are now spending—you have gone from 52 percent to 57 percent in 2 years and the total outlays for manpower, and I assume that will continue to go up—

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir. I think really the more significant trend figure is the manpower percent of the total budget authority, and as you can see, that hit a 53-percent plateau in fiscal 1971, 1972, and 1973.

Senator BYRD. Why do you say it is a better way to look at it?

Mr. KELLEY. Because the budget authority represents the total plan of the Defense Department for a given fiscal year.

Senator BYRD. But the outlay—

Mr. KELLEY. Even though some of the dollars are not spent during that year. In the case of—

Senator BYRD. That outlay represents what you actually spend?

Mr. KELLEY. That is correct.

Senator BYRD. In other words, if you spend \$1,000, \$570 is going for manpower, is that right?

Mr. KELLEY. That is right.

Senator BYRD. 57 percent.

Mr. KELLEY. But during the year in which 57 percent is going for manpower, the Defense Department commits themselves to procurement and other spending programs whose dollars will be outlaid in subsequent years. That is the greater significance of the lower figure.

Senator BYRD. All right. We can argue between 52 and 57 percent. In any case, it is very, very high.

Mr. KELLEY. In any case it is.

Senator BYRD. In any case, the American people are buying less defense today for the same dollar than they have ever bought before.

Mr. KELLEY. I do not think one conclusion follows from the other. I think it follows from these figures that the manpower portion of the defense investment being made is more heavily weighted than it was earlier.

Senator BYRD. If they are buying less defense, they are bound to be buying less defense equipment per dollar.

Mr. KELLEY. It depends on how much of the defense capability is equipment and how much of the defense capability is manpower.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry. Your time has run out.

Senator BYRD. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Senator Byrd.

Let me say a word here for the record about these proceedings. Mr. Secretary, my information from our staff who has checked these matters out is that there has been a steadily rising percentage of the military dollar going for personnel and it is higher percentagewise now than it has ever been. I want to make a second point. In 1967 we switched over to what is called the unified budget, which includes all the trust funds, some of which are in the black, and created what I think are false and inaccurate figures. So, I want us to operate here on what I call the operating budget. That means the income and the outgo of the operations of the Government, not putting in the social security funds and others that are running in the black. We had that before the Appropriations Committee the other day and Mr. Shultz had the figures there and read them. It showed what the deficit would be under the so-called unified budget and then it showed what it would be under the operational basis budget, you know, income and outgo, the operations of Government, and according to his calculations, that deficit reached \$38 billion.

When you go to comparing percentages here for prior years, we just have to use the operating budget because that is the only one reflected in the picture.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, the unified budget concept would not be involved in these figures because you are speaking only of the defense budget.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There are charts, though, that are put out by the Budget Bureau that show the percent of the Department of Defense appropriation is way down percentagewise. I think to use that is just not accurate because we have to compare them with the operating budget for years past. Putting those extraneous funds in there is just misleading. So, that is an observation and the staff will be governed accordingly in preparing figures for us.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, may I just comment briefly? I certainly do not want to leave the impression by my responses to Senator Byrd's very excellent questions that I disagree with his conclusion that we should be terribly concerned about the rising cost of manpower. I agree wholeheartedly with that conclusion, and I believe that we must take actions to reduce the manpower portion of the total DOD budget.

The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much. I think we understand each other.

MANPOWER FOR GENERAL SUPPORT

Back to this matter of support. You have developed some good statements about it, but your statement indicates that the proportion of mil-

itary manpower devoted to general support is significantly greater than it was in 1964. In 1964, general support required 45 percent of the active duty military personnel. It now requires approximately 47 percent. This seems to indicate that the vast buildup in support manpower which was needed for Vietnam has not yet been brought back down to the pre-Vietnam level. This 2 percent excess is a significant figure, nearly 50,000 men.

Why has the general support establishment which totaled 1,116,000 men, not been brought back down to at least the 1964 level? What is your reply or the reply of those who are with you to that?

Mr. KELLEY. I would like General DePuy to respond to that in the context of the Army portion of general support forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Make it quite brief now, if you will, and you can supplement your answer later for the record.

General DEPUY. The short answer is we are down below that in the Army. Second, in all categories of general support, with the exception of three, we are either at or below prewar level and going down. Those are medical services, the recruiting command, and the school instructors and overhead. In the latter case, Senator, we are level but we have expanded the recruiting. We have expanded the number of medical aides, not doctors, primarily, and in all other cases we are below the prewar level and going down in the Army. I cannot speak for the others.

(Further information follows:)

The level of military manpower in General Support in FY 64 was approximately 1,208,000. The level of military manpower in General Support in FY 73 is programmed to be approximately 1,115,700. This is a decrease of 92,400 personnel. Additionally there are at least 51,100 individual billets included in General Support in FY 73 which were not included in FY 64. These include:

Transients ¹	31,700
Recruiters	8,600
Prisoners ¹	3,100
Patients ¹	3,600
POW/MIA	1,600
Support outside of service ²	2,500
Total	51,100

Excluding these additional billets from General Support yields a total decrease of 143,500 and a FY 73 General Support level of 1,064,700.

¹ Indicates a change in the manpower accounting system rather than an increase in requirements.

² Includes personnel assigned to Unified Commands, and Defense and Federal Agencies.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, perhaps you would want to hear from Mr. Sullivan of Systems Analysis on the broader aspects of all services.

The CHAIRMAN. I will tell you, gentlemen, when you have a lot of witnesses here, we just cannot go to all of them. I am going to have to leave in just a minute.

Senator Byrd, can you stay here a few minutes? I would like for you to provide, Secretary Kelley, you or your crew, a service-by-service breakdown of the average strength devoted to support in 1964, 1968, 1971, 1972, and 1973. The committee also needs this service-by-service breakdown in average strength for each of the other 14 manpower categories.

In other words, we are going to try to get into this important matter. We are not trying to embarrass you or the services. It is going to be gone into in debate and we need whatever answers you have that we can stand on.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

ARMY MILITARY MAN-YEAR PROGRAM

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1964		Fiscal year 1968		Fiscal year 1971		Fiscal year 1972		Fiscal year 1973	
	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent
Strategic offensive.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Strategic defensive.....	24	2.5	16	1.0	8	.6	6	.6	6	.7
Control and surveillance.....	1	.1	1	(1)	1	(1)	1	.1	1	.1
Total (strategic).....	25	2.6	17	1.1	9	.7	7	.7	7	.8
Land forces.....	535	55.3	739	49.7	609	49.2	485	49.8	449	51.6
Tactical air.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Naval forces.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Mobility.....	2	.2	2	.1	2	.1	2	.2	1	.1
Total force mission.....	562	58.1	758	51.0	620	50.1	494	50.7	457	52.5
Intelligence and security.....	30	3.1	32	2.2	32	2.6	29	3.0	23	2.6
Communications.....	7	.7	14	.9	16	1.3	15	1.5	14	1.6
Research and development.....	13	1.3	9	.6	9	.7	9	.9	9	1.0
Support to other nations.....	9	.9	15	1.0	17	1.4	13	1.3	10	1.1
Total, other mission.....	59	6.1	70	4.7	74	6.0	66	6.8	56	6.4
BOS.....	60	6.1	52	3.5	45	3.6	47	4.8	48	5.3
Medical.....	39	4.0	60	4.0	53	4.3	46	4.7	41	4.7
Individual.....	24	2.5	140	9.4	112	9.0	68	7.0	55	6.3
Family housing.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	(1)	1	.1	1	.1
Total (BOS).....	123	12.7	252	16.9	211	17.0	162	16.6	143	16.4
Training.....	177	18.3	365	24.5	293	23.7	213	21.9	179	20.6
Command.....	38	3.9	35	2.4	31	2.5	28	2.9	25	2.9
Logistics.....	9	.9	7	.5	9	.7	10	1.0	10	1.1
General support.....	347	35.8	659	44.3	544	43.9	413	42.4	357	41.0
Grand total.....	968	-----	1,487	-----	1,238	-----	974	-----	870	-----

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

1 Less than 500.

NAVY MILITARY MAN-YEAR PROGRAM
[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1964		Fiscal year 1968		Fiscal year 1971		Fiscal year 1972		Fiscal year 1973	
	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent
Strategic offensive.....	12	1.8	18	2.4	18	2.7	18	3.0	18	3.0
Strategic defensive.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Control and surveillance.....	8	1.2	3	.4	1	.2	1	.2	1	.2
Total, strategic.....	20	3.0	21	2.8	19	2.9	19	3.1	19	3.2
Land forces.....	3	4.7	5	6.6	3	5.5	3	5.5	3	5.5
Tactical air.....	58	8.7	67	8.6	63	9.6	61	9.9	62	10.3
Naval forces.....	245	36.8	288	38.2	217	33.1	205	33.8	199	33.1
Mobility.....	7	1.1	4	.5	4	.6	3	.5	3	.5
Total, force mission.....	333	50.1	385	51.1	306	46.7	291	47.9	286	47.6
Intelligence and security.....	15	2.3	20	2.7	18	2.7	15	2.5	14	2.3
Communications.....	8	1.2	13	1.7	11	1.7	10	1.6	10	1.7
Research and development.....	13	2.0	9	1.2	8	1.2	8	1.3	8	1.3
Support to other nations.....	2	.3	2	.3	4	.6	5	.8	5	.8
Total, other mission.....	38	5.7	44	5.8	41	6.3	38	6.3	37	6.2
BOS.....	72	10.8	65	8.6	59	9.0	55	9.1	56	9.3
Medical.....	13	2.0	18	2.1	19	2.9	18	3.0	19	3.2
Individual.....	46	6.9	62	8.2	54	8.2	38	6.3	33	5.5
Family housing.....										
Total, IBOS.....	131	19.7	145	19.3	134	20.4	111	18.3	108	18.0
Training.....	115	17.3	132	17.5	130	19.8	124	20.4	127	21.1
Command.....	37	5.6	39	5.2	38	5.8	35	5.8	34	5.7
Logistics.....	11	1.7	8	1.1	8	1.2	8	1.3	8	1.3
Total general support.....	294	44.2	324	43.0	308	47.0	278	45.8	277	46.1
Grand total.....	665		753		655		607		601	

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

1 Less than 500.

MARINE CORPS MILITARY MANPOWER PROGRAM

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1964		Fiscal year 1968		Fiscal year 1971		Fiscal year 1972		Fiscal year 1973	
	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent
Strategic offensive.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Strategic defensive.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Control and surveillance.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Total (Strategic).....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Land Forces.....	81	42.6	123	41.3	84	35.9	75	36.9	78	39.4
Tactical air.....	20	10.5	29	9.7	29	12.4	27	13.3	27	13.6
Naval Forces.....	2	1.1	1	.3	1	.4	1	.5	1	.5
Mobility.....	8	4.2	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Total, force mission.....	111	58.4	153	51.3	114	48.7	103	50.7	106	53.5
Intelligence and security.....	1	.5	2	.6	2	.8	2	1.0	2	1.0
Communications.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Research and development.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Support to other nations.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Total, other mission.....	2	1.0	2	.6	2	.8	2	1.0	2	1.0
BOS.....	22	11.6	29	9.7	24	10.3	22	10.8	20	10.1
Medical.....	(1)	(1)	6	2.0	2	.8	1	.5	1	.5
Individual.....	14	7.4	30	10.1	26	11.1	15	7.4	15	7.6
Family Housing.....										
Total (IBOS).....	36	18.9	65	21.8	52	22.2	38	18.7	36	18.2
Training.....	31	16.3	65	21.8	54	23.1	49	24.1	44	22.2
Command.....	7	3.7	11	3.7	10	4.3	9	4.4	9	4.5
Logistics.....	3	1.6	2	.6	2	.8	2	1.0	1	.5
General support.....	77	40.5	143	48.0	118	50.4	98	48.3	90	45.5
Grand total.....	190		298		234		203		198	

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

1 Less than 500.

AIR FORCE MILITARY MAN-YEAR PROGRAM

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1964		Fiscal year 1968		Fiscal year 1971		Fiscal year 1972		Fiscal year 1973	
	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent	Average strength	Percent
Strategic offensive.....	106	12.2	80	8.9	72	9.4	70	9.3	71	9.8
Strategic defense.....	63	7.3	49	5.5	25	3.3	21	2.8	19	2.6
Control and surveillance.....	9	1.0	13	1.4	13	1.7	13	1.7	13	1.8
Total (strategic).....	178	20.5	142	15.8	110	14.4	104	13.8	103	14.2
Land forces.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Tactical air.....	55	6.3	101	11.2	79	10.3	80	10.7	78	10.7
Naval forces.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Mobility.....	57	6.6	86	9.6	73	9.6	66	8.8	57	7.8
Total, force mission.....	290	33.4	329	36.6	262	34.3	250	33.3	238	32.7
Intelligence and security.....	37	4.3	45	5.0	41	5.4	36	4.8	32	4.4
Communications.....	27	3.1	31	3.4	30	3.9	28	3.6	28	3.6
Research and development.....	25	2.9	23	2.6	20	2.6	20	2.7	19	2.6
Support to other nations.....	1	.1	2	.2	2	.3	2	.3	7	1.0
Total, other mission.....	90	10.4	101	11.2	93	12.2	87	11.6	86	11.8
BOS.....	242	27.9	226	25.1	184	24.1	184	24.5	177	24.3
Medical.....	36	4.1	33	3.7	31	4.1	32	4.3	33	4.5
Individual.....	3	.3	3	.3	11	1.4	13	1.7	14	1.9
Family housing.....	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)
Total (IBOS).....	281	32.3	262	29.1	226	29.6	229	30.5	224	30.8
Training.....	120	13.8	122	13.6	107	14.0	111	14.8	108	14.9
Command.....	82	9.4	81	9.0	65	8.5	63	8.4	58	8.0
Logistics.....	5	.6	4	.4	11	1.4	11	1.5	12	1.7
General support.....	488	56.2	469	52.2	409	53.5	414	55.1	402	55.3
Grand total.....	868		899		764		751		727	

Note: Detail may not add due to rounding.

1 Less than 500.

MILITARY PAY INCREASES

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any further questions?

Senator BYRD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you gentlemen will all excuse me now. If you will run on for about 15 minutes more and then adjourn until 2:30, if that is agreeable.

Senator BYRD (presiding). Mr. Secretary, continuing questioning you on manpower and costs, as I understand the information on page 25, from between January 1964 and January 1972, there have been 10 salary increases for the military, is that not correct?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, that is correct.

Senator BYRD. During that 8-year period there were 10 increases.

Mr. KELLEY. Excuse me. Did you say for the military or for the civilians?

Senator BYRD. I said for the military. Is that right?

Mr. KELLEY. These are civilian at the top of page 25.

Senator BYRD. Where is the military?

Mr. KELLEY. I do not know if General Benade happens to have with him a schedule of the military increases that occurred during that same period of time, but there was, as my statement notes, a 13-year period until 19—

Senator BYRD. I am aware of that but I would like to get a table comparable to this table.

Mr. KELLEY. Right.

Senator BYRD. In other words, I would like to start with January of 1964.

Mr. KELLEY. We will see if we have it here, Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Fine.

General BENADE. Do you want me to read from it?

Senator BYRD. Let me take a look at it and then I will put it in the record.

It would appear to me from—if I am reading it correctly, that there have been 10 increases in that 8-year period.

General BENADE. Yes, sir. That would be about right.

Senator BYRD. We will put this in the record—I want it comparable, so I will not put the entire table in—you go back to 45 here, but I would like to start in January of 1964 to make it comparable to the figures that you previously submitted.

General BENADE. My recollection is that here was a military pay increase in 1963. There was one—2.3 percent—in 1964. There has been an annual increase since 1965, two increases in 1971, and that would add up to 10 increases.

Senator BYRD. There were two increases in 1971. What about 1970?

General BENADE. There was an increase in 1970.

Senator BYRD. There was one increase in 1970 and two in 1971, so there were three increases in 2 years.

General BENADE. Yes, sir. The second increase in 1971 as you will recall, Senator, was an integral part of the Draft Extension Act and became effective on November 14 so far as the pay portion.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

(The table follows:)

TABLE 5.—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PAY INCREASES AND PAY AND PRICE INDEXES SINCE 1963

Effective date	Military and civilian pay increases		Pay and purchase price indexes (fiscal year 1964=100)			
	Military basic pay (percent)	Classified civilian salaries (percent)	Fiscal year	Military basic pay	Classified civilian salaries	Purchase price ¹
Oct. 1, 1963	14.2		1959	90.4	86.3	98.1
Jan. 5, 1964		4.1	1960	90.4	86.3	97.6
July 1, 1964		4.2	1961	90.4	92.9	99.3
Sept. 1, 1964	2.3		1962	90.4	92.9	98.9
Sept. 1, 1965	10.4		1963	90.4	96.5	99.4
Oct. 1, 1965		3.6	1964	100.0	100.0	100.0
July 1, 1966	3.2	2.9	1965	105.6	106.3	102.3
Oct. 1, 1967	5.6	4.5	1966	116.6	109.2	104.2
July 1, 1968	6.9	4.9	1967	120.3	113.3	106.8
July 1, 1969	12.6	9.1	1968	125.3	117.1	109.6
Jan. 1, 1970	8.1	6.0	1969	135.8	124.2	113.7
Jan. 1, 1971	7.9	6.0	1970	159.1	139.6	118.7
Nov. 14, 1971	² 11.6		1971	171.9	147.9	125.3
Jan. 1, 1972	7.2	5.5	³ 1972	198.5	156.4	129.9
			³ 1973	224.8	164.5	133.5

¹ Noncompensation component of the deflator for Federal purchases of goods and services.

² 55 percent for personnel with less than 2 years of service, and 2 percent for those with over 2 years.

³ Reflects Jan. 1, 1972, pay raise and assumes slightly smaller pay raise Jan. 1, 1973, plus enactment of proposed volunteer-related pay legislation effective July 1, 1972.

NOTE: Military basic pay and civilian salaries are not comparable. A 4 percent increase in basic pay is approximately equivalent to a 3 percent salary increase.

Source: 1949-71, Department of Commerce. Fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973, estimated (3.7 percent increase for fiscal year 1972 and 2.8 percent increase for fiscal year 1973).

Senator BYRD. What is the second column on page 25?

Mr. KELLEY. The second column on page 25 shows the Wage Board employees in the civilian sector as distinguished from the General Schedule, Wage Board being essentially blue collar and General Schedule being white collar.

Senator BYRD. On that same page you say military members are eligible to retire with a substantial annuity after 20 years of service. Would you submit for the record—and send a copy to my office, what the annuity would be under the new schedules for—we will take a general, take a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, and so forth.

Mr. KELLEY. I assume you would like to have some enlisted grades, too.

Senator BYRD. And also some enlisted grades, yes.

Mr. KELLEY. We will provide that information.

(The information follows:)

SELECTED EXAMPLES OF MILITARY RETIRED PAY ANNUITIES

	Years of service at retirement	Annual amount ¹	Total lifetime retired pay ²
Pay grade:			
O-10-----	30	\$27,000	\$607,284
O-9-----	30	25,264	568,237
O-8-----	30	22,780	512,367
O-7-----	30	19,805	445,444
O-6-----	28	16,239	389,814
O-5-----	24	11,357	308,384
O-4-----	22	8,706	250,580
O-3 ³ -----	20	6,950	211,587
W-3-----	23	6,885	192,522
E-9-----	30	9,407	240,438
E-8-----	26	7,282	209,593
E-7-----	22	4,928	158,390
E-6-----	21	3,880	128,035
E-5-----	20	3,136	106,175

¹ Nondisability retirements based on Jan. 1, 1972 basic pay rates.

² Total lifetime retired pay for persons retiring on or after Jan. 1, 1972, based on the 1937 standard annuity table with entry age 23 for officers and 19 for enlisted—nondisability retirements.

³ More than 4 years service as an enlisted man.

NEED FOR REENLISTMENT BONUS

Senator BYRD. Since there have been these substantial changes in salaries, has there been a review as to the necessity for a reenlistment bonus?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. The Second Quadrennial Review, which was reported in January of this year, includes a review of the effectiveness of a variety of special pays including the reenlistment bonus. If I may make a general comment about the reenlistment bonus, we find that to be cost-ineffective.

Senator BYRD. Explain what you mean by cost-ineffective.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, simply that the amount of money spent in bonus does not have a good payoff in terms of the number of people retained for the money invested.

Senator BYRD. Do you plan to eliminate the reenlistment bonus?

Mr. KELLEY. The final recommendations based on the Quadrennial Review study will require further discussion within DOD and the executive branch. We will be making final recommendations after that review has taken place. On the basis of our Quadrennial Review study which was supervised by General Benade and which I have carefully gone over, I believe that there should be changes made in the area of reenlistment and variable reenlistment bonus. I think we should pay a bonus to those people who are in short supply and whom we need and might lose but for the paying of a bonus. I do not think we should pay a bonus to everyone who reenlists.

Senator BYRD. And you found on the basis of your Quadrennial study, you found it to be cost-ineffective?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. We are spending, if my memory serves me, almost \$200 million a year in the standard or straight reenlistment bonus. We are spending an additional amount of money for the variable reenlistment bonus. I think in this area our annual expenditures are slightly over a half billion dollars in reenlistment and variable reenlistment bonuses and proficiency pay.

Senator BYRD. Which is over and above, of course, the normal pay scale.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. And there is evidence that the variable reenlistment bonus, which is varied according to the criticality of the supply problem and the availability of people, has proved to be a cost-effective way of maintaining force stability in the specialized categories where you are facing a critical shortage. But paying a reenlistment bonus to everyone who reenlists is a terribly expensive way of running the system.

Senator BYRD. I am glad that you are reexamining it because it seems to me, in the light of the very substantial changes that have been made in the military pay in recent years, that that should be reexamined.

Mr. KELLEY. That is precisely why it should be, Senator. Perhaps there was some justification for paying a reenlistment bonus to people who were otherwise underpaid, but when your pay scales are competitive there remains no justification for paying a reenlistment bonus to people who are not in short supply.

RETIREMENT SCHEDULES

Senator BYRD. As a result of the changes that have been made in military pay, are you also reexamining the retirement schedules?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. We have done this through the Interagency Committee study and the recommendations of the Interagency Committee study are being further examined by a special DOD study group which I am chairing. And those further studies will be completed about the end of March.

Senator BYRD. The next question I ask, would you submit for the record, the retirement cost years beginning 1960 through your estimates for 1973. Your estimate as I recollect, is \$4 billion, is it, for 1973?

Mr. KELLEY. \$4.9 billion, which includes \$300 million recommended by the President for reform of military retirement pay.

Senator BYRD. It is not \$4 billion but \$5 billion. \$4.9 billion.

Mr. KELLEY. Almost \$5 billion.

Senator BYRD. Thank you. And if you would supply the other years for the record.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

SUMMARY OF RETIRED PAY PROGRAM

[In millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year—										
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
TOA for retired pay:											
Nondisability.....	537.9	788.0	927.1	1,086.5	1,265.8	1,459.2	1,716.7	2,032.7	2,464.0	2,903.5	3,255.5
Temporary disability.....	36.7	35.8	34.7	32.3	32.5	37.7	46.7	36.9	68.8	84.4	100.9
Permanent disability.....	218.6	240.5	265.8	283.6	315.6	342.2	382.2	431.1	493.4	534.2	605.7
Fleet Reserve.....	117.6	142.3	161.7	181.9	210.4	246.5	288.3	322.2	348.1	376.1	381.6
Survivors' benefits.....	4.0	4.6	5.3	6.1	6.9	7.9	9.0	10.3	11.7	13.2	15.0
Total.....	1,014.8	1,211.2	1,358.6	1,592.4	1,831.2	2,093.5	2,442.9	2,859.0	3,389.0	3,931.4	4,358.7
Average number receiving retired pay:											
Nondisability.....	202,967	241,190	281,350	316,835	358,623	400,713	447,740	491,409	542,792	601,579	660,725
Temporary disability.....	15,448	14,625	13,774	12,457	12,363	14,380	17,472	21,929	23,792	24,508	25,729
Permanent disability.....	78,548	82,840	87,197	92,857	99,441	104,533	111,897	118,991	124,475	131,499	138,288
Fleet Reserve.....	58,392	68,266	75,734	81,521	88,414	98,754	107,746	110,255	106,759	105,486	102,186
Survivors' benefits.....	3,475	3,932	4,408	4,896	5,439	6,116	6,833	7,560	8,316	9,149	10,088
Total.....	358,830	410,853	462,463	508,566	564,280	624,496	691,688	750,144	806,139	872,221	937,016
Accrued past service cost ¹											
.....	48,868	56,071	58,252	66,585	70,396	77,228	86,269	103,426	117,870	126,385	129,854
Current service cost.....	1,680	1,865	1,903	2,057	2,240	2,365	2,736	2,957	3,191	3,421	3,421

¹ As of the end of the fiscal year, based on pay rates in effect on that date for fiscal years prior to fiscal year 1972 and Jan. 1, 1972, rates for subsequent years.

Note 1: None of the above figures make any allowance for increases in basic pay rates or for increases in the Consumer Price Index after Jan. 1, 1972.

Note 2: No reduction in accruing or accrued costs has been made for nonpayment of retired pay by reason of VA waiver, dual compensation laws, etc. Accrual costs are calculated at 3½ percent interest.

Note 3: Figures are unavailable for fiscal years 1960, 1961 and 1962.

Senator BYRD. Incidentally, do you happen to have the other years handy?

General BENADE. I can give you figures for 1967, which I happen to have. For 1967, \$1.831 billion, and the estimated cost for 1973 is \$4.358 billion, and the balance is accounted for—

Senator BYRD. What is the total? That is what I want.

General BENADE. It is \$4.9 billion, but I think it is important to recognize, Senator, that that \$4.9 billion includes two other factors. One is the proposed recomputation of retired pay that Secretary Kelley referred to. The other is an anticipated cost-of-living increase.

Senator BYRD. I think it is fine to have the details of that but what I want to try to understand is the figure. Now, the figure for military pay retirement, military retirement, is \$4.9 billion.

General BENADE. In total, Senator.

Senator BYRD. That is what I am saying. I am interested in total figures.

General BENADE. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. The total is \$4.9 billion.

General BENADE. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. What was it in 1967?

General BENADE. \$1.8 billion.

Senator BYRD. \$1.8 billion.

General BENADE. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. You might as well give me 1968.

General BENADE. \$2.093 billion. 1969 is \$2.443 billion. 1970, \$2.859 billion. 1971, \$3.389 billion.

Senator BYRD. So, it has gone up \$2 billion in 2 years. What have you got for 1972?

General BENADE. \$3.931 billion.

Senator BYRD. What was 1971?

General BENADE. 1971 is \$3.389 billion.

Senator BYRD. \$3.389 billion.

Thank you.

"GRADE CREEP"

On page 39, I do not understand the term "grade creep."

Mr. KELLEY. The term "grade creep" is concerned with the average grade of those people who are employed on the civilian side of manpower in either DOD or Government-wide, as the case may be.

"Grade creep" is a term indicating that, over a period of years, we are classifying people higher to do the work which in an earlier period of time was classified lower.

Senator BYRD. I note on page 39 under Government-wide employment for 1971, 1972, and 1973, you state it is not available, the figures are not available. Would not those figures be available?

Mr. KELLEY. I am sorry, Senator. I cannot comment on their non-availability, and I should be able to, but I will—

Senator BYRD. 1971 is already through. Somebody must have known how many people were employed in 1971. 1972 is almost through. Somebody must know how many persons you were employing. On 1973, there must be some estimate—yours must be an estimate because we have not gotten to 1973 yet.

Mr. KELLEY. We will provide that information.

(The information follows:)

Grade Trends (General Schedule Positions)

Government-wide employment (thousands) :

1971 -----	1, 298. 3
1972 (estimated) -----	1, 300. 0
1973 (estimated) -----	1, 322. 0

LACK OF TRAINED PERSONNEL IN EUROPE

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I will hold my other questions and yield to Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, if you feel you should let someone answer this for the record, just say so. Are there not significant shortages of properly trained personnel in the U.S. Army, Europe?

Mr. KELLEY. There are shortages, and they are in the process of being corrected and will be corrected by later this year. Correcting those shortages will also correct the problem of severe turbulence and instability which has plagued the Army for several years.

Senator THURMOND. The information I have, for instance, was that in September 1971 [deleted] and so forth.

Is it not a fact, Mr. Secretary, while the Army may have physically present the men authorized in Europe, that there is a severe shortage of personnel with the necessary military skills required to carry out the Army's assigned combat missions?

Mr. KELLEY. I do not think it is a fact that there is a severe shortage of the skills required to carry out the Army's mission. But on examining the facts further, we will provide additional information for the record—

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

Mr. KELLEY (continuing). If my answer is not entirely correct.

(Information classified and retained in committee files.)

Senator THURMOND. How would you overcome these shortages if war started tomorrow?

Mr. KELLEY. Well, the immediate answer to the question is by augmenting the forces in Europe with strategic reserve forces from the States and by augmenting the active forces by the use of Army Reserve and Army National Guard units. If further information is appropriate, we will furnish it for the record.

Senator THURMOND. Do you not believe that, in looking at the 22 NATO headquarters, the vast number of senior officers and personnel at the European Command Headquarters, plus the array of senior officers and total people at the U.S. headquarters, U.S. Air Force headquarters, and U.S. Navy headquarters, that reasonable people could properly conclude that there are, first, too many headquarters, and second, too many military personnel, particularly senior officers, involved in staff work?

Mr. KELLEY. I think I should respond in the record to that question, Senator.

(The information follows:)

We do not believe that the number of headquarters or the number of senior officers exceeds the need, considering the functions that must be performed. The headquarters and their manning are discussed in detail below.

ALLIED COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

During the formation years of NATO, various subheadquarters were established for the Allied Command Europe as tasks were identified and responsibilities assigned. The structure has varied with requirements, yet there has been a conscious effort in the last few years to streamline the headquarters and eliminate those which are not absolutely necessary. For example, the land and air forces headquarters for the Center Region were formerly organized under an intermediate headquarters called LANDCENT and AIRCENT. In the interests of efficiency and savings, these intermediate headquarters were disestablished and the four subheadquarters now report directly to the Commander of the Center Region (CINCENT). There are also changing requirements which call for new headquarters. For example, Commander Maritime Air Mediterranean was established to accommodate the changing threat in the Mediterranean.

It is important to highlight the basic concepts behind the NATO headquarters structure. It is a pre-planned, pre-organized, and pre-established headquarters structure which is designed to accept and immediately employ the massive forces necessary to defend Europe in an all out attack.

The NATO structure has the complex problem of melding the combined forces of 14 nations into a single fighting force. Inescapable political considerations require establishment of certain portions of the necessary headquarters structure.

The trend in recent years is to streamline and reduce wherever possible. The U.S. manpower contribution to NATO is reviewed each year.

Today there are 37 Headquarters in the Allied Command Europe and the U.S. participates in 24. Congressional discussion has centered on 22 headquarters. These headquarters included SACEUR's major and principal subordinate commands and Signal Support Groups. The 22 headquarters count did not reflect the reorganization in Air Force North (reduction of 1 headquarters) and the Naval Forces, Southern Europe, subordinate commands. The number of U.S. personnel in each headquarters varies with responsibilities.

Europe is divided into regions (North, Center, South, and Flanks). There are Land, Naval, and Air organizations for each region.

The reasons for the current structure are:

- a. political accommodations to meld the forces of 14 nations into a cohesive organization result in some minor headquarters duplication;
- b. to provide the necessary command, control coordination and planning structure for full scale fighting forces;
- c. the existing organization and plans permit the immediate application of defense forces in wartime.

UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND (USEUCOM)

The requirements for headquarters and their staffing are established by the Commander of the unified command. These requirements are processed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Any sensitive items or major changes are presented to SECDEF for approval. There is an annual review of manpower requirements and a triennial manpower survey conducted by a JCS team in order to validate workload and mission requirements. Each Service sponsors a unified command under the provisions of DOD instruction 5100.3; the U.S. Army is the EUCOM sponsor and furnishes administrative support to HQ, EUCOM and its subordinate headquarters.

Each Service is allowed to comment on a yearly review of the Joint Manpower Program, but the JCS is the decision point for initiating reductions in the joint or combined headquarters.

Of course, we must bear in mind that the requirement for headquarters in Europe stems basically from the requirement of command and control of our forces which would be deployed to Europe in the event of war.

UNITED STATES ARMY—EUROPE (USAREUR)

Headquarters, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army is the command and control element of a field command of Department of the Army and in the United States Army component of the unified United States European Command (USEUCOM) and provides:

- a. a combat ready force which, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, serves to deter aggression in Western Europe or to repel aggression if such should occur.

b. administrative and logistical support to United States ground forces in Western Europe.

c. command control over assigned forces and other forces as directed by competent authority.

UNITED STATES NAVY—EUROPE (USNAVEUR)

Commander in Chief, USNAVEUR, provides Navy support of Commander in Chief, US European Command and SACEUR. CINCUSNAVEUR is also commander, Eastern Atlantic (COMEASTLANT). The mission of USCOMEASTLANT is to: conduct combat and operational tasks as assigned to assist in gaining and maintaining control in the U.S. Atlantic Command area; provide logistic and administrative support to U.S. Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) Forces in the USEASTLANT subarea and the NATO IBERLANT (Iberia/Atlantic) area.

In order to accomplish the above mission, the following tasks have been assigned to USCOMEASTLANT:

1. Exercise operational control of combatant forces as may be assigned.
2. Conduct anti-submarine warfare operations with forces as may be assigned.
3. Exercise operational control of assigned logistic forces and escorts.
4. Provide logistic support, including nuclear weapon logistic support to U.S. LANTFLT forces in the area.
5. Provide administrative support to USLANTFLT forces in the area.
6. Plan for and, when directed, employ forces to close the Baltic exits by mining.
7. Conduct additional offensive mining operations if directed.
8. Be prepared to replenish previously established mine fields.
9. Provide stowage and maintenance of prepositioned mines.
10. Provide protection for underway replenishment group in the area.
11. Conduct NATO meteorological flights.
12. Provide logistic and evacuation support to USCINCEUR, as directed.
13. Maintain custody of U.S. nuclear weapons in the USEASTLANT organization.
14. Control and protect shipping and act as OCA in the USEASTLANT subarea.
15. Act as CINLANTFLT's alternate Eastern Atlantic representative for amphibious matters.
16. Provide operational intelligence support to USLANTFLT forces.
17. Coordinate, as required, with LANTFLT commands, CINCUSNAVEUR, and European authorities.
18. Represent CINLANTFLT in base rights and base construction matters in USEUCOM area.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE—EUROPE (USAFE)

During the past year HQ USAF, with full participation of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE) and the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR), conducted an in depth review encompassed all aspects of the mission responsibilities and functions charged to HQ USAF, Lindsey Air Station, Germany; HQ Third Air Force at South Ruislip on the outskirts of London, U.K.; HQ 16th Air Force, Torrejon Air Base, Spain; HQ 17th Air Force, Bamstein Air Base, Germany, and those subordinate units providing direct and indirect support, including detachments and operating locations throughout Europe. Primary objectives were to 1) assure that the major command headquarters (HQ USAF) is composed solely of true headquarters staff functions; 2) streamline the numbered Air Force headquarters to an operational configuration by eliminating or significantly reducing staff management functions (i.e., Personnel, Comptroller, Civil Engineering, etc.), centralizing the latter at major command level where absolutely necessary; 3) realign, consolidate and reduce support functions within subordinate echelons for optimum mission accomplishment and improved management of manpower resources; and 4) sharply reduce aggregate manpower and dollar costs associated with the headquarters management function, and organizationally align those resources to preclude duplicative effort, improve resource management, and assure functional costing and sizing in the future.

The review has been most successful. It resulted in a thorough streamlining of the three numbered air forces and a sharp reduction from an aggregate of

616 to a new total of 166 manpower authorizations. The reorganization reduced the numbered air forces to operational configuration and economically centralized at HQ USAFE the staff management of tactical units throughout the command. The manpower authorizations centralized at HQ USAFE have served to enhance staff capabilities in broad management areas, and to enhance the capability to work directly with tactical wings and squadrons. Major command teams such as Inspector General, Security Performance and Aircraft Maintenance and Munitions were expanded on a centralized basis to perform assistance, standardization and evaluation tasks.

These comprehensive headquarters streamlining actions produced overall savings of 235 manpower spaces, as shown below:

NUMBERED AIR FORCE MANPOWER AUTHORIZATION REDUCTIONS

	Before	After	Total reductions
3d Air Force.....	229	66	163
16th Air Force.....	186	60	126
17th Air Force.....	201	40	161
Total.....	616	166	450
Centralized at Headquarters, USAFE.....			186
Support/operating functions realigned to host base units.....			29
Subtotal.....			215
Net savings.....			235
Aggregate.....			450

By the summer of 1972, after all reorganization actions have been implemented, the manpower authorizations for the numbered air forces and HQ USAFE proper will represent less than three per cent of the total manpower resources allocated to the United States Air Forces in Europe. In consideration of the enemy threat, the mission, the diversity in weapon systems, the established force levels (In-Theater, Dual Based, Rapid Reactor and follow-on augmentation) and the required command, control and management of tactical units further large headquarters reductions appear unlikely. The review of headquarters functions will continue, however, in the effort to eliminate lower priority requirements, to reorganize and/or consolidate for increased efficiency, and to effect further manpower and dollar reductions wherever possible. By way of example, the planned relocation of Headquarters Third Air Force and several other units in FY 73 from the London area to established USAF bases in Great Britain should produce notable manpower and dollar economies through functional consolidations and reduction of support costs.

EUROPEAN HEADQUARTERS STAFFING

USEUCOM (and the U.S. elements of the various SHAPE headquarters), USAREUR, USAFE, and CINCUSNAVEUR are responsible for the management of some 300,000 manpower assets and their costly weapons systems (including nuclear weapons) in the European area. This task requires an experience level which is greater than that required in subordinate commands. Therefore, you will find it normal to have more senior officers in these headquarters because the jobs require the varied experience and expertise that can only be acquired through years of service.

REDUCTION RECOMMENDATION

Senator THURMOND. Thank you. I am calling this to your attention because I think it might be worth looking into. I am interested in helping the Defense Department all I can but we continually have these things thrown up to us and I think it is well for us to have an answer to justify the situation if it can be justified. If it cannot, then I am sure you appreciate having it called to your attention for correction.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. What reductions in headquarters can you recommend to the committee today and what future reductions do you plan on instituting? I presume that is one you would want to look into.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, it is; except as I commented on it previously in my statement. We can expand on the subject for the record.

(The information follows:)

I provided your Staff a complete analysis of headquarters manning on 8 February 1972. The analysis showed that we plan an overall reduction of 2,000 spaces in Headquarters in FY 73 over FY 72 (77,300 to 75,300), representing a 2.5% decrease. A discussion of these decreases plus possible future decreases is provided below by Service.

ARMY

During FY 71, the Army consolidated Fourth U.S. Army with Fifth U.S. Army for a savings of 371 military spaces. The Army currently has three studies underway in an effort to reduce headquarters manning. These are:

- (a) Review of the organization and functions of the Army Staff.
- (b) TOAMAC—Reorganization of Army Materiel Command to achieve the Optimum Army Materiel Command.
- (c) Project Fender—Consolidation of selected subordinate commands and activities of USAREUR.

The results of these studies should reduce the level of headquarters manning.

NAVY

Fleet headquarters, type command headquarters, and subordinate headquarters have been under review. The review of fleet headquarters was initiated in August 1970 and the review of other headquarters was initiated in September 1970. As a result of the fleet headquarters review organizational improvements were made, command and control responsiveness was improved and, in addition, staffing reductions of 10% to 15% (FY 71 to FY 73 level) were achieved. These decreases result from the consolidation of Mine Warfare Type Command headquarters (eliminated 82 military spaces); the disestablishment of 22 ship divisions, 4 ship squadrons, and 2 ship flotillas (eliminated 331 military spaces); and the consolidation of functions within retained headquarters.

Navy-wide training functions were realigned at the beginning of FY 72. This resulted in the creation of Chief of Naval Training, the disestablishment of Chief of Naval Air Basic Training and Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training, and the consolidation of Chief of Naval Air Training and Chief of Naval Air Technical Training. The initial savings is 84 military spaces, but potential future significant savings are foreseen.

Currently underway, is a study concerned with headquarters organizations in the Washington area. The objectives of this review is to streamline organizations, eliminate duplication, and accomplish personnel savings.

Further review of fleet headquarters staffs, other headquarters organizations outside of the Washington area, such as the Naval Reserve Training in Omaha, Nebraska, the newly established Naval Training Command in Pensacola, Florida, and the 11 CONUS Naval District Headquarters is planned. The overall naval district organization concept and structure will be reviewed including their staffs. However, any consolidation or elimination of Naval Districts will require amendment to PL 90-110.

AIR FORCE

The Air Force is currently completing the broad Air Force initiatives undertaken in late 1970 to streamline their headquarters management structure. This effort entailed fundamental restructuring of each of the principal command and management echelons. It was motivated by:

- Concern over headquarters manpower/dollar costs.
- Congressional/OSD/USAF desire to reduce/economize.
- Apparent duplications in existing management structure.
- Existing misalignment of staff versus operating/support functions.

The key to the entire effort has been a function-by-function analysis of headquarters activities, to arrive at an accurate identification and accounting of

properly constituted headquarters staff functions as opposed to support/operations functions.

Intermediate headquarters are being streamlined to an operational configuration, by either eliminating or significantly reducing staff management functions such as Personnel, Comptroller, Civil Engineering, Material, Administration, Intelligence, Judge Advocate General, Surgeon, History, Inspector General, and Information. (Intermediate headquarters are defined by the Air Force as numbered air forces, air divisions, and similarly constituted organizations between the major air command headquarters and the operational units). In large part, these functions will be accomplished at the major air command level. As a result, and on the basis of thorough function-by-function analysis, some functional centralization at major command level has taken place, with a commensurate increase in manpower resources at major command level devoted to those functions.

Initially 1100 military manpower spaces are being eliminated. Additional savings may accrue as major commands gain additional experience under the new structure.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley. I want to commend you for the fine job you are doing over there as Assistant Secretary of Defense.

I have no more questions at this time, Mr. Chairman, unless you are going to General DePuy.

Senator BYRD. If it suits you, Senator Thurmond, Senator Stennis suggested that we adjourn until 2:30 and come back then.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., of the same day.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973— MANPOWER AUTHORIZATION

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:30 p.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman).

Present: Senators Stennis (presiding), Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, and Thurmond.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; L. R. Garcia, John A. Goldsmith, C. J. Conneely, Edward B. Kenney, professional staff members; and Ben Gilleas, director of investigations, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. Our committee will please come to order.

I believe we finished that second round of questions when we recessed; is that right, Senator?

Senator BYRD. We finished up to that point; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you finished your second questioning series?

Senator BYRD. I finished my second period and yielded to Senator Thurmond.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond, I call on you.

Senator THURMOND. I have propounded the questions I had. I dictated some more and they are being typed, but let us go ahead and we will come back to the second and he can answer them for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, Senator Thurmond's questions as he may wish.

Senator THURMOND. If we have time we will propound them and, if not, he can answer them for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. He will answer them for the record unless otherwise asked.

Mr. Secretary, I asked some questions this morning, not going into these command structures and all. Senator Thurmond touched on that some. I want to go back over a certain number of figures here, just a few.

I would like to thank you for the material that you sent over to the committee, it is a long way beyond anything we have had time to do before.

ADDITIONAL MEN REQUESTED

You have everything here in the statement, but the study material indicates that the 121,000 men requested for command is in addition to the men requested for headquarters, at the division and corps level

in the Army, and similar levels in the other services. This material also indicates that there are 58,000 men in these lower level headquarters, in addition to the 121,000 that I mentioned, for total of 179,000 men in headquarters and headquarters support of all kinds.

We have enough men, it seems, in these headquarters to man more than 11 full infantry divisions.

Is it your position that this number of people is actually required for these military headquarters? Do you have a personal knowledge of that and is that your position here?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE A. DAOUST, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. LEO A. BENADE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY, OASD (M. & R.A.); FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, OASD (SA); CARL DETWYLER, DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); CHARLES BREWER, DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); JONAS M. PLATT, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. W. D. CRITTENBERGER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND POLICY, J-5 (INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS), OJCS; ROBERT E. MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. DE PUY, ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; REAR ADM. JOHN G. FINNERAN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, USN; MAJ. GEN. E. B. WHEELER, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF—G-1, U.S. MARINE CORPS; AND MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. BERG, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, DCS/P. & R., U.S. AIR FORCE—Resumed

EXPLANATION OF DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would not represent the viewpoint that we cannot effect efficiencies in our headquarters as well as other units. But it seems to me the most logical way to address your question is to have each of the services explain how their total people are distributed, in the case of the Army, for example, starting with a 13-division active force requirement and the various headquarters and staff deployments, how we account for the 869,000 people projected for the Army in fiscal 1973.

I think we should do that service by service and in the backdrop of that explanation I think you and we will be better able to judge whether there are excesses in the headquarters structure.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to hear that, I assume, from them. I assume you have already heard?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I have.

The CHAIRMAN. We cannot get to but one witness at a time. We need the opinion here of a civilian official in a position of high responsibility, and you are the man——

Mr. KELLEY. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). That we look to primarily.

Mr. KELLEY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you represent to this committee that your hard belief and recommendation is that that number is required in these positions for our military departments?

OVERSTAFFING NOT UNIQUE

Mr. KELLEY. I think it is consistent with the way organizations are manned, but it is my opinion that the military services as well as the civilian components of defense as well as administration organizations outside of defense tend to be overmanned in the command and headquarters structure. So I cannot say to you that, in my opinion, the armed forces cannot do with fewer people in the headquarters and command structure. I think they can, but I think the disability from which they suffer is a typical disability and not one that is unique to the Armed Forces.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean not unique to the armed forces?

Mr. KELLEY. I mean, there is a general tendency in organization life to overstaff on the side of headquarters and command and management structure. I think the Armed Forces reflect that just as other organizations do.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean, in civilian life?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is done there, it seems to me it is an error, and there is no use for the military to follow that example.

Mr. KELLEY. I am not condoning it, Mr. Chairman. I am just answering your question as frankly as I can.

FEWER MEN NEEDED?

The CHAIRMAN. If that is the situation, it is up to us to try to turn it around some, because, as I have said before, we are taxing little people barely making a living to pay this enormous bill every year for Federal expenditure. We do not feel like saying to them that we allowed more than was actually needed. I just do not know, as I said this morning, how much work you get out of civilian employees. I am not picking on any individual. You may have men above the average. But we have got to get down into this thing and get somebody digging on it. So, your answer is, and I certainly do not want to misunderstand you, you personally think they can do with fewer men in these positions?

Mr. KELLEY. I personally think also that the relative efficiency of the Armed Forces as reflected in the number of people who are in command and headquarters positions compares favorably with other organizations.

The CHAIRMAN. I was not suggesting it was not. They are supposed to be better. I like to think of it as being far better. That is not the question at all. The question is what is the need. We have to get down to it. As long as we run from it we are not doing our duty, as I see it. In order to get what is actually needed, I think we are going to have to convince the general voting Senator that what is asked for is needed, otherwise we are going to lose some votes on this bill. Illustrating why I believe this, on reducing the troops in NATO and Europe, the amendment that the Appropriations Committee put on the appropriations bill has a limitation. I believe it reduced by one-third, at least. That was the committee's recommendation and that amendment by the Appropriations Committee was defeated on the floor only after a real battle in which the President of the United States had to give a letter to be read on the floor and sent to the Senators. It was an excellent letter, and gave specifically the reasons why he wanted this kept like it was as a matter of foreign policy.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the military can help the President's position a lot, if they go into the command structure. If you did not reduce it but 2,000 that would show a good faith effort on the part of the military to get things a little more in order and help meet these arguments that are made.

Does that impress you any? I do not want to embarrass you; I have a great deal of respect for you as a responsible official.

HEADQUARTERS REQUIREMENTS NOT ABOVE NEED

Mr. KELLEY. It does not embarrass me at all, Mr. Chairman, but I regard 2,000 as a sky hook figure which needs to be measured against what each of the four services is doing with its command and headquarters structure and how they relate to the total size and configuration of the organization otherwise.

It is not difficult for any of us who work inside the Pentagon to say that we could be more efficient in terms of headquarters and in terms of other manning specifications. But looking at the overall picture, service by service, I cannot be unduly critical of the headquarters manning requirements of the services.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I am not a man of great experience but I have looked at life a good while and had a good deal of down to earth experience. You get more confusion and conflict when you have too many people than you do anything else.

Do you have any specific recommendations to make to the committee that would help us get to this problem?

Mr. KELLEY. If by the problem you mean headquarters and command structure?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; none other than those reflected in our recommendations to you.

STREAMLINING COMBAT COMMAND

Going on then to the President's Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. There were some very strong recommendations there for streamlining the combatant command which the panel states, "should result in a sub-

stantial reduction of the total number of personnel required to staff the structure."

What is the view of the Office of the Secretary of Defense that you represent on this subject on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel position that this command structure is not only large and cumbersome but "unwieldy and unworkable in crisis and too fragmentary to provide the best potential for a coordinated response to a general war situation."

You have been through all of that, I know. I do not want to take you by surprise. What is your view as representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense on that?

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, that portion of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel is one in which the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs, more so than I, concerned themselves. I think it would be appropriate for me to pass that question and suggest that you direct it to the Secretary and Admiral Moorer when they are here.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us pass that question over then, members of the staff, and bring it back to my attention.

While we are on the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, we would like to have a specific response to each of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's recommendations in this area, specifically the recommendations in section (I) (5) of the panel report on pages 56 and 57.

(The information follows:)

This provides a response to the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendation I-5 which recommended in part:

The establishment of an operations staff, separate from all other military staffs, to provide staff support on military operations, and channel of communications from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commands;

The responsibilities now delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of Defense to serve as military staff in the chain of operational command with respect to the Unified Commands be rescinded;

The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be limited to include only the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a reconstituted Joint Staff consisting of not more than 250 officers augmented by professional civilian analysts as required;

Unified Commanders be given unfragmented command authority for their Commands, and the Commanders of component commands redesignated as Deputies to the commander of the appropriate Unified Command;

Major realignment of Unified Commands;

Redelegate responsibilities related to civil disturbance to the Tactical Command which are currently delegated to the Army; and

Unified Commanders be given express responsibility and capability for making recommendations for operational capabilities objectives and allocations of force structures needed for the effective accomplishment of their missions.

Total implementation of this recommendation is partly dependent on establishing three Deputy Secretaries, which the Secretary of Defense has rejected in favor of two deputies. However, certain related actions taken by the Department have been consistent with the thrust of certain aspects of the recommendation. Prior to the issuance of the Blue Ribbon Panel Report, the Department had initiated a study to examine some elements of the Unified and Specified Command structure. We concluded that the Unified Commands, as they were then structured, together with the distribution of responsibilities among the various commands, did not represent the most effective organization of U.S. combatant forces in support of national policies, nor the most effective arrangement for the deployment of U.S. forces to meet likely contingencies.

In view of this conclusion, changes have been made that have resulted in the realignment of the headquarters arrangements for command and control

of the Armed Forces world-wide. These changes are in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine and are consistent with our on-going efforts to revitalize the organizational structure in support of our policy of Realistic Deterrence. The Unified Command Plan, which had not been changed since 1963, represents, as revised, the best judgment of the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. This Unified Command structure will be reviewed periodically to assure that, as changes occur in U.S. policies, interests, and other considerations, the command structure will be modified to support them.

Specifically, the changes are:

U.S. Strike Command.—US Strike Command was disestablished, along with the title Commander in Chief, Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (USCINCMEDIAFSA). In its place, a new command, US Readiness Command, was established at MacDill Air Force Base. The new command is manned austere to control US-based major combatant general purpose forces not assigned to other unified commands. It has the responsibility to provide a general reserve of combat ready forces to reinforce other U.S. commands, perform deployment planning, and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing doctrines and techniques for the joint employment of forces. (Deleted.)

U.S. European Command.—USCINCEUR's area of responsibility was expanded to include the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East to the eastern border of Iran. We think that the growing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and Middle East represents an increased threat to the southern flank of NATO; that all U.S. military planning and operations in this area and Europe should be coordinated and controlled by one military commander.

Pacific Command.—PACOM area responsibility was expanded to include the Indian Ocean to 62° East Longitude, those South Asian countries formerly assigned to USCINCMEDIAFSA, the Aleutian Islands, and a portion of the Arctic Ocean. This change is more compatible with the forces likely to be deployed for contingencies in these areas.

Atlantic Command.—LANTCOM area responsibility was expanded to include the water areas around the continents of Africa and South America. It also includes a portion of the Arctic Ocean. This arrangement is more compatible with the existing and likely deployment of U.S. naval forces.

The Alaskan Command retained its mission in the state of Alaska and responsibility for Alaskan coastal islands.

The Strategic Air Command and the Continental Air Defense Command also retained their present missions.

The US Southern Command is unchanged.

The Department is in full accord with the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel concerning the streamlining of the combatant commands thereby reducing the personnel required to staff the structure. The changes in the Unified Command Plan which became effective January 1, 1972, provided for an improved command structure as well as effecting an overall reduction in the headquarters manning of the commands. For example, the disestablishment of US Strike Command and the establishment of the US Readiness Command resulted in the reduction of 306 personnel spaces. As a separate action, all major headquarters staff elements are being examined with a view toward reducing their size. Approximately a 20 percent reduction in the major staff elements is planned for FY 73 from the FY 69 level.

The decision has been deferred regarding that portion of the recommendation concerning (1) the reorganization of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and (2) the establishment of an operations staff, separate from all other military staffs, to provide staff support on military operations, and a channel of communications from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the Unified Commands. This aspect of the recommendation has been examined very closely. While it has not been implemented as suggested, we have taken action to improve the present system to provide a more effective, efficient, and economical command and control system to support the President and Secretary of Defense (DoD Directive 5100.30).

Certain limited advantages may perhaps be realized by separating the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the operational chain of command and other responsibilities related to operational matters as recommended by the Panel; however, the total impact of this action must also be considered. This includes, among other things:

The creation of another high level military staff organization and an associated layer of responsibility and authority which would accompany it.

The impediment of the decision-making process at the national level.

Receipt of operational advice by the civilian leadership from a corporate body who, removed from the operational chain of command, would lack full awareness of support capabilities and would bear no responsibility for the readiness of the combatant forces.

Usurpation of the statutory responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In an effort to improve the current system, guidelines have been issued to define the functional, organizational, and operational relationships among all elements of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), and to set forth responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in relation to this system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have statutory responsibility to serve as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense. This function is recognized and has been interfaced with WWMCCS. Further, under WWMCCS, the Chiefs have responsibility to serve in the chain of operational command with respect to Unified and Specified Commands, to provide a channel of communication from the President and Secretary of Defense to Unified and Specified Commands.

Changing the title of the Chief of Naval Operations to Chief of Staff of the Navy would serve no useful purpose and could create confusion by conveying the idea that major changes were being made in the Department of the Navy. Furthermore, this change would entail administrative costs which would be difficult to justify under the austere fiscal climate.

The current Unified Command Plan gives the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands maximum authority possible consistent with statutory requirements. This includes the authority to exercise operational command over all forces assigned to the command. The Unified Commanders have the authority to exercise those functions of command involving the control of assigned resources, composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and full authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission of the command. In consonance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, each Military Department is responsible for the administration of the forces assigned by that department to the combatant commands. The Defense Department is operating under this system at the present time.

Action has not been taken on the subject of redelegating the responsibilities related to civil disturbances to the Tactical Command since this command has not been established. In August 1971, as a separate action, however, the Department did reissue a Directive on the subject. This Directive established uniform DoD policies, assigned responsibilities, and furnished general guidance for utilizing DoD military and civilian personnel, facilities, equipment and supplies in support of civil disturbances. It improved the organization and clearly defined command relationships for the discharge of this Department's responsibilities relating to civil disturbances.

It is current practice for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to solicit recommendations from the Unified Commanders concerning operational capabilities, objectives and allocations of force structure needed for the effective accomplishment of their missions. The Services and the Unified Commanders actively participate in the formation of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan as well as short range operational planning. Moreover, the views of the commanders are also considered in the Force Structure Annual Manpower Review.

JUSTIFICATION OF HEADQUARTERS REQUIREMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. In addition, the committee would like to have specific justification for the requirement of headquarters of commanding chief of the U.S. naval forces in Europe and a discussion of the reasons why the functions of that headquarters cannot be carried out by either U.S. naval command for the Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia or commander for the Mediterranean in Naples, Italy.

Would you rather defer on that one?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, located in London, is the naval component commander of the unified command under the Commander in

Chief, U.S. European Command. His mission is to conduct operations to ensure control of the seas and air in and around the U.S. European Command area and to provide forces (including administrative, logistic and planning support) to the Commander in Chief Europe and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in order to support and assist in establishing control of contested areas in Europe. His forces include the Sixth Fleet and other U.S. Navy forces at sea and ashore in the European and Middle East areas.

Additionally, Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe has the area command of the U.S. Eastern Atlantic Command under the Atlantic Fleet Commander. This area is one of the most strategically important areas in the world. (Deleted). The sheer volume of this logistics task makes it necessary that the U.S. Navy, and the Atlantic Fleet Commander have an area commander in the United Kingdom who is on the spot, and immediately responsive to events in this area and who can fulfill wartime tasks in logistic support, anti-submarine warfare and offensive mining.

Further Navy responsibilities include the provision of timely, (deleted) support (deleted) as senior U.S. naval commander in the Europe and Middle East areas he is responsible for coordination of all Navy components to achieve economy and efficiency. As such, he represents the Chief of Naval Operations for U.S. naval matters in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. His location in London is the ideal headquarters site for fulfillment of the integrated Naval Forces, Europe responsibilities.

The above responsibilities of Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Force Europe/U.S. Commander Eastern Atlantic emphasizes the requirement for the present location of his headquarters. In discussing the reasons why these functions cannot be assumed by the Atlantic Fleet Command in Norfolk, you will recall that Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet is the naval component commander under the unified Atlantic Command. As such the Atlantic Fleet Commander provides forces to the Atlantic Command and the NATO Allied Command Atlantic. The primary mission of these forces during a NATO conflict is the successful reinforcement of resupply of U.S. forces in the Central Region of Europe from ports in the United States. [Deleted.] Through his type commanders, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet also directs the training and readiness of all Atlantic Fleet naval forces preparing for overseas movement from the U.S. to Europe, especially for peacetime operations with the United States Sixth Fleet. In addition, he has continuing responsibilities in the Atlantic and the Caribbean for surveillance of Soviet naval activities in these areas. These requirements are met with U.S. based forces. All of these functions are exercised from Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. Few of these functions could be performed efficiently from any headquarters in Europe. Conversely, the assumption of the CINCUSNAVEUR function by CINCLANTFLT in Norfolk would be inefficient due to moving USCINCEUR's naval component commander so far from his area of geographic responsibility.

The other aspect of your question is the assumption of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe functions by the U.S. Commander in the Mediterranean (Sixth Fleet commander). The Sixth Fleet command is primarily concerned with tactical naval operations and exercises designed to improve the combat effectiveness of his forces against the Soviet submarine, surface and air threat in the Mediterranean. For him to assume the Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe functions would broaden the scope of his responsibilities beyond that normally assigned a combat commander and would not enhance the effectiveness of his command. [Deleted.] To be effective in a support role and to give credible assistance in the Northern Europe area, a naval headquarters presence is required in that region.

In summary, the present headquarters located in London, provides a dual purpose staff for Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe/U.S. Commander Eastern Atlantic in order to effectively accomplish their dual missions. These missions are the provision of naval forces to the European command and the maintaining of control of the sea lines of communication to Europe in strategic eastern portions of the Atlantic Command.

BREAKDOWN OF HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL

The CHAIRMAN. The material submitted to the committee shows that each service has between 11,000 and 14,000 men in headquarters

which are below the departmental level and above the level of division or corps. This comes to a total of nearly 40,000 men in these high-level headquarters. The committee would like to have a listing of each such headquarters, a description of its function and responsibilities, and the number of men assigned to each. The number of general officers and other officers by grade should also be listed as should the location of each such headquarters. I ask that in the form of a question and ask you to supply that for the record.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I will.
(The information follows:)

HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES

The accompanying list of headquarters and the manner in which they are categorized differs significantly from the Headquarters Activities information which is provided annually by OSD (Comptroller) to the Congress. Headquarters contained in this list which are also a part of the OSD (Comptroller) Headquarters categorization are indicated by a footnote containing a lower case letter. When a footnote appears after a headquarters category title in this list, all organizations in the associated category are in the same OSD (Comptroller) category. The OSD (Comptroller) Headquarters categories and their designators in this list of Headquarters are:

- (a) Department Level
- (b) Field Headquarters
- (c) Systems Command Headquarters
- (d) Major Command Headquarters
- (e) Naval District Headquarters
- (f) Unified Command Headquarters (not used in this list)

The headquarters included herein are Service headquarters only. The number of Service personnel in Unified Headquarters and Defense and Federal Agencies is addressed in a separate response.¹

HEADQUARTERS CATEGORIZATION

Due to organizational differences between the Services, it is difficult to categorize organizations so that comparable responsibilities and functions are solely and entirely contained in the same category for all Services. The following categories are intended to show for all Services the illustrative relationship of organizations and is not necessarily the categorization system used by the Services.

Each of the categories contains at least two echelons of organizations, as described below.

Departmental Headquarters

This category contains the organizations responsible for overall policy formulation, determination of resource requirements, allocation of resources, and long range planning of the Service programs. Contained herein are the Service secretariats and the staffs of the Service chiefs.

Major Headquarters

This category contains organizations which are responsible for the planning, resource management, and execution of operations for a primary mission (i.e., strategic operations) or a principal geographic area (i.e., Europe). Subsidiary headquarters of many of the major organizations are included in this category. This is done because they are primarily administrative rather than tactical (or deployable) in nature. Examples include: Theater and Field (Numbered) Armies, Fleet Commands and Force/Type Commands, AMC and Commodity Command, NAVMAT and Systems Command, AFLC and AMAs.

Intermediate Headquarters

This category contains organizations which are responsible for the direct operational control of tactical (deployable) units. These headquarters are tactical (deployable) in nature and their location changes as subordinate units are relocated. Examples of the echelons included are: Army Corps and Divisions, Numbered Air Forces and Air Divisions, and Ship Squadrons and Ship Divisions.

¹ Refer to insert to record, page 398, line 7, 15 February 1972.

SUMMARY

SERVICE HEADQUARTERS MILITARY MANNING—JUNE 30, 1971

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Departmental headquarters.....	3,070	1,515	1,343	2,276
Major headquarters.....	14,441	13,125	2,375	12,053
Intermediate headquarters.....	5,318	6,361	-----	7,714
Service headquarters, total.....	22,829	21,001	3,718	22,043

These numbers do not in all cases agree with previous information provided to the Committee.² These numbers are based on more recent, and more complete information, than was previously available.

Manpower data has been submitted to the Committee, which refers to the fiscal guidance category Command. The fiscal guidance category Command and the term Headquarters are not synonymous. Command includes administrative support activities (e.g., finance centers, data processing centers, personnel record centers, manpower in Defense and Federal agencies, etc.) as well as headquarters. Also, not all headquarters are contained in Command (e.g., excluded are Army divisions and corps). The following table shows the relationship of Command and Headquarters manning.

COMMAND AND HEADQUARTERS MILITARY MANPOWER, JUNE 30, 1971

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Command: (a)+(b)+(c).....	29,568	36,030	9,818	64,939
(a) Unified command activities.....	2,194	2,979	126	3,023
(b) Administrative activities in command.....	16,615	15,036	5,995	42,074
(c) Service headquarters in command.....	10,759	18,015	3,697	19,842
(d) Service headquarters not in command.....	12,070	2,986	21	2,201
Service headquarters: (c)+(d).....	22,829	21,001	3,718	22,043

The headquarters in the accompanying lists which are contained in the fiscal guidance category Command are preceded by the symbol (#). When this symbol precedes a headquarters category title, all organizations in the associated category are contained in the fiscal guidance category Command.

² Refer to letter to Senator Stennis of 8 February 1972 from DATSD (Legislative Affairs).

PART B.—SERVICE HEADQUARTERS MILITARY MANPOWER AND LOCATION

<u>ARMY HEADQUARTERS</u>		
<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>DEPARTMENTAL HEADQUARTERS a/</u>	(3070)	
Office of Secretary of the Army	128	Washington, D.C.
Office of Chief of Staff of the Army	2942	Washington, D.C.
<u>MAJOR HEADQUARTERS</u>	(14,441)	
<u>Army Materiel Command</u>	(1732)	
# USAMC Hq a/	332	Washington, D.C.
# USA Electronics Command	387	Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
# USA Missile Command	260	Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
# USA Tank-Automotive Command	108	Detroit Arsenal, Michigan
# USA Munitions Command	171	Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey
# USA Aviation Systems Command	136	St. Louis, Missouri
USA Test & Evaluation Command	100	Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland
# USA Weapons Command	100	Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois
# USA Mobility Equipment Command	100	St. Louis, Missouri
SAFEGUARD Logistics Command	38	Redstone Arsenal, Alabama
<u>Military Traffic Management and</u> <u>Terminal Service</u>	(401)	
MTMS Headquarters a/	63	Washington, D.C.
Eastern Area	128	Brooklyn, New York
Western Area	210	Oakland, California
<u>Strategic Communications Command</u>	(1004)	
STRATCOM Headquarters	169	Fort Huachuca, Arizona
STRATCOM - Pacific	130	Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
STRATCOM - Europe	312	Schwetzingen, Germany
STRATCOM - CONUS	97	Alexandria, Virginia
STRATCOM - MTMS	19	Arlington, Virginia
STRATCOM - SAFEGUARD	55	Fort Huachuca, Arizona
STRATCOM - ARADCOM	100	Ent Air Force Base, Colorado
STRATCOM - Alaska	46	Fort Richardson, Alaska
STRATCOM - South	76	Fort Clayton, Canal Zone
# <u>Army Air Defense Command</u>	(562)	
ARADCOM Headquarters	410	Ent Air Force Base, Colorado
1st Region	100	Stewart AFB, New York
6th Region	52	Fort Baker, California

NOTE: Organizations preceded by an asterisk(*) are scheduled to be disestablished during FY 72 or FY 73.

<u>Organization</u>		<u>Military Manpower</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>Continental Army Command</u>		<u>30 June 1971</u> (3112)	
CONARC b/		752	Fort Monroe, Virginia
1st U.S. Army b/		454	Fort Meade, Maryland
3rd U.S. Army b/		467	Fort McPherson, Georgia
5th U.S. Army b/		695	Fort Sam Houston, Texas
6th U.S. Army b/		582	Presidio of San Francisco, California
MDW		162	Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
<u>U.S. Army - Europe</u>		(3320)	
# USAREUR/7th U.S. Army b/		1002	Heidelberg, Germany
Theater Army Support Cmd (TASCOM)		726	Frankfurt, Germany
Southern Europe Task Force (SETAF)		77	Vicenza, Italy
USA Engineer Command - Europe		262	Frankfurt, Germany
USA Medical Command - Europe		160	Heidelberg, Germany
USA Transportation Cmd - Europe		199	Ober Ursel, Germany
USA Materiel Command - Europe		259	Zweibrucken, Germany
Berlin Command		635	Berlin, Germany
<u>U.S. Army - Pacific</u>		(2831)	
# USARPAC b/		544	Fort Shafter, Hawaii
USARHAW (Hawaii)		135	Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
USARJ (Japan)		173	Sagamihara, Japan
USARV (Vietnam)		850	Long Binh, Vietnam
USARYIS (Ryukyu)		256	Fort Buckner, Okinawa
USARSUPHAI (Support Cmd Thailand)		189	Korat, Thailand
8th U.S. Army		684	Seoul, Korea
<u>Other Army Commands</u>		(1479)	
USA Security Agency		365	Arlington Hall Station, Va.
USA Intelligence Command		110	Fort Huachuca, Arizona
USA Combat Develop. Command b/		437	Fort Belvoir, Virginia
USA Criminal Investigation Cmd 1/		-	Washington, D.C.
# U.S. Army - South b/		239	Fort Amador, Canal Zone
# U.S. Army - Alaska b/		328	Fort Richardson, Alaska
<u>INTERMEDIATE HEADQUARTERS</u>		(5318)	
<u>CONUS</u>		(1423)	
III Corps		298	Fort Hood, Texas
XVIII Airborne Corps		302	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
1st Cavalry Division (TRI-CAP)		166	Fort Hood, Texas
2nd Armored Division		172	Fort Hood, Texas
82nd Airborne Division		136	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
101st Airborne Division (Ambl) a/			Fort Campbell, Kentucky

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
1st Infantry Division (Mech)	173	Fort Riley, Kansas
4th Infantry Division (Mech)	176	Fort Carson, Colorado
9th Infantry Division <u>3/</u>	-	Fort Lewis, Washington
<u>Europe</u>	(1859)	
V Corps	362	Frankfurt, Germany
VII Corps	382	Mohringen, Germany
1st Armored Division	188	Goeppingen, Germany
3rd Armored Division	186	Frankfurt, Germany
3rd Infantry Division (Mech)	209	Wurzberg, Germany
8th Infantry Division (Mech)	217	Bad Kreuznach, Germany
32nd Air Defense Command	315	Kaiserslautern, Germany
<u>Pacific</u>	(2036)	
* I Corps	295	Uijong-Bu, Korea
IX Corps	11	Fort Buckner, Okinawa
* XXIV Corps	358	DaNang, Vietnam
2nd Infantry Division	142	Tongduchon, Korea
* 23rd Infantry Division	247	Chu Lai, Vietnam
25th Infantry Division	125	Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
101st Airborne Division (Ambl) <u>2/</u>	201	Camp Eagle, Vietnam
* 2nd Logistics Command	657	Naha, Okinawa
 TOTAL ARMY HEADQUARTERS	 <u>22,829</u>	

1/ USA CIC established during FY 72.

2/ 101st Airborne Division (Ambl) scheduled to return to CONUS during FY 72.

3/ 9th Infantry Division scheduled to be established during FY 73.

NAVY HEADQUARTERS

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>DEPARTMENTAL HEADQUARTERS a/</u>	(1515)	
SECNAV	74	Washington, D.C.
Department of Navy Staff	179	Washington, D.C.
OPNAV	1247	Washington, D.C.
Hq, U.S. Marine Corps	15	Washington, D.C.
<u>MAJOR HEADQUARTERS</u>	(13,125)	
<u>Departmental Level a/</u>	(1776)	
# Bureau of Naval Personnel	676	Washington, D.C.
# Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	144	Washington, D.C.
# Naval Materiel Command	122	Washington, D.C.
Naval Intelligence Command	104	Washington, D.C.
Naval Communications Command	141	Washington, D.C.
Naval Security Group Command	478	Washington, D.C.
Oceanographer of the Navy	14	Washington, D.C.
Naval Weather Service	30	Washington, D.C.
Military Sealift Command	67	Washington, D.C.
<u>Sealift Area Commands</u>	(209)	
COMSCLANT	58	New York, New York
COMSGULF	9	New Orleans, Louisiana
COMSPAC	53	Oakland, California
COMSELM	23	Bremerhaven, Germany
COMCMED/MIDEAST	8	Leghorn, Italy
COMSCFAR EAST	58	Yokohama, Japan
<u>Systems Commands c/</u>	(1032)	
# Naval Air Systems Command	324	Washington, D.C.
# Naval Ordnance Systems Command	139	Washington, D.C.
# Naval Ships Systems Command	205	Washington, D.C.
# Naval Electronics Systems Command	77	Washington, D.C.
# Naval Supply Systems Command	94	Washington, D.C.
# Naval Fac Engineering Systems Cmd	77	Washington, D.C.
Strategic Systems Project Office	75	Washington, D.C.
Office of Naval Research	41	Washington, D.C.

NOTE: Organizations preceded by an asterisk (*) are scheduled to be disestablished during FY 72 or FY 73.

<u>Organization</u>		<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>Training Commands</u>		(745)	
Chief of Naval Training 1/			Pensacola, Florida
Chief of Naval Air Training d/	216		Pensacola, Florida
Chief of Naval Technical Training	78		Memphis, Tennessee
Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training	161		Glenview, Illinois
Chief of Naval Reserve Training d/	76		Omaha, Nebraska
* Chief of Naval Air Advanced Training	108		Corpus Christi, Texas
* Chief of Naval Air Basic Training	104		Pensacola, Florida
Navy Recruiting Command	2		Washington, D.C.
# <u>Naval Districts</u> e/		(1408)	
First	87		Boston, Massachusetts
Third	103		New York, New York
Fourth	112		Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Fifth	118		Norfolk, Virginia
Sixth	120		Charleston, South Carolina
Eighth	82		New Orleans, Louisiana
Ninth	147		Great Lakes, Illinois
Tenth	47		San Juan, Puerto Rico
Eleventh	145		San Diego, California
Twelfth	93		San Francisco, California
Thirteenth	79		Seattle, Washington
Fourteenth	77		Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMUSNAVSO/COMFIFTEEN	94		Rodman, Canal Zone
* Seventeenth	47		Kodiak, Alaska
Naval District Washington	57		Washington, D.C.
# <u>Major Commands</u> d/		(1494)	
CINCLANTFLT	706		Norfolk, Virginia
CINCPACFLT	565		Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
CINCUSNAVEUR	223		London, England
# <u>Fleet Commands</u>		(771)	
COMFIRSTFLT	146		San Diego, California
COMSECONDFLT	148		Norfolk, Virginia
COMSIXTHFLT	164		Gaeta, Italy
COMSEVENTHFLT	313		Yokosuka, Japan
# <u>Force Commands</u>		(1315)	
COMASWFORLANT	147		Norfolk, Virginia
COMASWFORPAC	118		Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMMIDDLEEASTFOR	75		Manama, Bahrain

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
COMSOLANTFOR	30	San Juan, Puerto Rico
COMKEYWESTFOR	34	Key West, Florida
COMNAVFORJAPAN	193	Yokosuka, Japan
COMNAVFORKOREA	76	Seoul, Korea
COMNAVMARIANAS	119	Guam, Marianas
COMNAVFORVIETNAM	355	Saigon, Vietnam
COMUSNAVPHIL	168	Subic Bay, Philippines
<u># Sea Frontiers</u>	<u>(284)</u>	
COMEASTERNSEAFRON	53	New York, New York
COMCARIBBEANSEAFRON	35	San Juan, Puerto Rico
COMHAWAIIANSEAFRON	70	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMWESTERISEAFRON	126	San Francisco, California
<u># Type Commands</u>	<u>(4091)</u>	
COMPHIBLANT	228	Virginia Beach, Virginia
COMPHIBPAC	217	San Diego, California
COMSERVLANT	186	Norfolk, Virginia
COMSERVPAC	382	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMCRUDESLANT	272	Newport, Rhode Island
COMCRUDESPAC	298	San Diego, California
COMTRALANT	43	Norfolk, Virginia
COMTRAPAC	68	San Diego, California
COMCEBLANT	31	Davisville, Rhode Island
COMCBPAC	87	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBLANT	276	Norfolk, Virginia
COMSUBPAC	266	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMNAVAIRLANT	577	Norfolk, Virginia
COMNAVAIRPAC	563	San Diego, California
COMOPIEVFOR	320	Norfolk, Virginia
COMINENAVFOR 2/	-	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMINELANT	100	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMLINEPAC	102	Long Beach, California
FMFLANT	15	Norfolk, Virginia
FMFPAC	60	Kunila, Hawaii
<u>INTERMEDIATE HEADQUARTERS</u>	<u>(6361)</u>	
<u># Operations/Support Commands</u>	<u>(258)</u>	
COMPHIBOPSUPLANT	54	Virginia Beach, Virginia
COMPHIBOPSUPPAC	88	San Diego, California
COMJOEMINCOUNTREASCOM	18	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMCOSURVFOR	19	Saigon, Vietnam
* COMDELTANAVFOR	12	Binh Thuy, Vietnam
COMAVSUPFORANTAR	67	Washington, D.C.

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
<u># Fleet Air Commands (1343)</u>		
COMFAIR ALAMEDA	93	Alameda, California
COMFAIR ADAK	35	Adak, Alaska
COMFAIR HAWAII	84	Barbers Point, Hawaii
COMFAIR JAX	116	Jacksonville, Florida
COMFAIR KEFLAVIK	123	Keflavik, Iceland
COMFAIR LEMOORE	64	Lemoore, California
COMFAIRMED	160	Naples, Italy
COMFAIRMIRAMAR	59	San Diego, California
COMFAIRMOFFETT	171	Moffett Field, California
COMFAIRQUONSET	83	Quonset Point, Rhode Island
COMFAIRS DIEGO	88	San Diego, California
COMFAIRWESTPAC	128	Atsugi, Japan
COMFAIRWHIDBEY	106	Vancouver, Washington
* COMFAIRALASKA	33	Kodiak, Alaska
<u># Fleet Air Wings (510)</u>		
FLTFAIRWING 1	130	Naha, Okinawa
FLTFAIRWING 2	60	Barbers Point, Hawaii
FLTFAIRWING 5	103	Patuxent River, Maryland
FLTFAIRWING 6	40	Iwakuni, Japan
FLTFAIRWING 8	39	Moffett Field, California
FLTFAIRWING 10	40	Moffett Field, California
FLTFAIRWING 11	98	Jacksonville, Florida
<u>Ship Flotillas (998)</u>		
<u># Cruiser/Destroyer (574)</u>		
COMCRUDES FLOT 2	51	Melville, Rhode Island
COMCRUDES FLOT 3	46	Long Beach, California
COMCRUDES FLOT 4	68	Norfolk, Virginia
COMCRUDES FLOT 5	30	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMCRUDES FLOT 6	74	Charleston, South Carolina
COMCRUDES FLOT 8	78	Norfolk, Virginia
COMCRUDES FLOT 9	48	San Diego, California
* COMCRUDES FLOT 10	61	Newport, Rhode Island
COMCRUDES FLOT 11	53	San Diego, California
COMCRUDES FLOT 12	65	Mayport, Florida
<u># Mine Warfare (67)</u>		
COMINE FLOT 1	28	Guam, Marianas
COMINE FLOT 2	6	Charleston, South Carolina
COMINE FLOT 3	33	Long Beach, California

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>Submarine</u>	(357)	
COMSUBFLOT 1	60	San Diego, California
COMSUBFLOT 2	69	New London, Connecticut
COMSUBFLOT 5	6	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBFLOT 6	96	Charleston, South Carolina
COMSUBFLOT 7	46	Yokosuka, Japan
COMSUBFLOT 8	80	Naples, Italy
<u>Ship Groups</u>	(865)	
# <u>Anti-Submarine Warfare</u>	(148)	
ASWGRU 2	46	Quonset Point, Rhode Island
ASWGRU 3	60	San Diego, California
ASWGRU 4	42	Quonset Point, Rhode Island
# <u>Amphibious</u>	(199)	
COMPHIBGRU 1	94	San Diego, California
COMPHIBGRU 2	105	Virginia Beach, Virginia
# <u>Submarine</u>	(68)	
* COMSUBGRUSFRAN	68	San Francisco, California
# <u>Carrier</u>	(450)	
CARDIV 1	60	San Diego, California
CARDIV 2	53	Norfolk, Virginia
CARDIV 3	61	Alameda, California
CARDIV 4	53	Norfolk, Virginia
CARDIV 5	100	San Diego, California
CARDIV 6	58	Mayport, Florida
CARDIV 7	58	Alameda, California
* CARDIV 9	7	Alameda, California
<u>Ship Squadrons</u>	(2205)	
# <u>Escort</u>	(36)	
COMCORTRON 1	13	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMCORTRON 8	10	Naples, Italy
COMCORTRON 10	13	Newport, Rhode Island

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# Destroyer (557)		
* COMDESRON 1	17	San Diego, California
COMDESRON 2	17	Norfolk, Virginia
COMDESRON 3	16	Long Beach, California
COMDESRON 4	17	Charleston, South Carolina
COMDESRON 5	21	San Diego, California
COMDESRON 6	16	Charleston, South Carolina
COMDESRON 7	17	San Diego, California
COMDESRON 8	20	Mayport, Florida
COMDESRON 9	13	Long Beach, California
COMDESRON 10	19	Newport, Rhode Island
COMDESRON 11	18	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMDESRON 12	17	Newport, Rhode Island
COMDESRON 13	17	Long Beach, California
COMDESRON 14	21	Mayport, Florida
COMDESRON 15	18	Yokosuka, Japan
* COMDESRON 16	15	Newport, Rhode Island
COMDESRON 17	20	San Diego, California
COMDESRON 18	15	Key West, Florida
COMDESRON 19	19	Long Beach, California
COMDESRON 20	18	Newport, Rhode Island
COMDESRON 21	17	San Diego, California
COMDESRON 22	18	Norfolk, Virginia
COMDESRON 23	16	San Diego, California
COMDESRON 24	18	Newport, Rhode Island
COMDESRON 25	15	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMDESRON 26	17	Norfolk, Virginia
COMDESRON 29	13	Long Beach, California
COMDESRON 31	7	San Diego, California
COMDESRON 32	17	Norfolk, Virginia
COMDESRON 33	10	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMDESRON 35	15	Long Beach, California
* COMDESRON 36	15	Norfolk, Virginia
COMDESRON 27 (Naval Reserve Fleet)	11	Long Beach, California
COMDESRON 30 (Naval Reserve Fleet)	8	Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
COMDESRON 34 (Naval Reserve Fleet)	9	Charleston, South Carolina
# Mine Warfare (285)		
* COMMINERON 4	21	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMMINERON 8	21	Charleston, South Carolina
COMMINERON 10	217	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMMINERON 11	15	Long Beach, California
* COMMINERON 5 (NRF)	6	Long Beach, California
COMMINERON 12 (NRF)	5	Charleston, South Carolina

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>Amphibious</u>	(432)	
COMPHIBRON 1	44	San Diego, California
COMPHIBRON 2	45	Norfolk, Virginia
COMPHIBRON 3	47	San Diego, California
COMPHIBRON 4	41	Norfolk, Virginia
COMPHIBRON 5	45	San Diego, California
COMPHIBRON 6	45	Norfolk, Virginia
COMPHIBRON 7	48	Long Beach, California
COMPHIBRON 8	43	Norfolk, Virginia
COMPHIBRON 10	45	Norfolk, Virginia
* COMLANSHIPRON 9	29	San Diego, California
# <u>Service</u>	(578)	
COMSERVGRP/RON 1	74	San Diego, California
COMSERVRON 2	48	Newport, Rhode Island
COMSERVGRP/RON 3	157	Sasebo, Japan
COMSERVRON 4	59	Norfolk, Virginia
COMSERVRON 5	28	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSERVRON 6	96	Naples, Italy
COMSERVRON 7	29	Alameda, California
COMSERVRON 8	68	Norfolk, Virginia
COMSERVRON 9	19	San Diego, California
# <u>Submarine</u>	(317)	
COMSUBRON 1	17	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBRON 2	16	New London, Connecticut
COMSUBRON 3	22	San Diego, California
COMSUBRON 4	14	Charleston, South Carolina
COMSUBRON 5	23	San Diego, California
COMSUBRON 6	18	Norfolk, Virginia
COMSUBRON 7	22	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBRON 10	18	New London, Connecticut
COMSUBRON 12	18	Key West, Florida
COMSUBRON 14	34	Holy Loch, Scotland
COMSUBRON 15	42	Guam, Marianas
COMSUBRON 16	29	Rota, Spain
COMSUBRON 18	44	Charleston, South Carolina
<u>Ship Divisions</u>	(182)	
# <u>Destroyers</u>	(64)	
* COMDESDIV 22	3	Norfolk, Virginia
* COMDESDIV 42	4	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMDESDIV 62	2	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMDESDIV 82	8	Mayport, Florida
* COMDESDIV 102	7	Newport, Rhode Island

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
* COMDESDIV 122	7	Newport, Rhode Island
* COMDESDIV 142	6	Mayport, Florida
* COMDESDIV 202	3	Newport, Rhode Island
* COMDESDIV 222	7	Norfolk, Virginia
* COMDESDIV 242	7	Newport, Rhode Island
* COMDESDIV 262	8	Norfolk, Virginia
* COMDESDIV 601	2	Key West, Florida
<u># Mine Warfare</u>	<u>(48)</u>	
* COMINEDIV 21	3	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMINEDIV 43	3	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMINEDIV 45	4	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMINEDIV 71	5	Long Beach, California
* COMINEDIV 72	5	Long Beach, California
* COMINEDIV 81	2	Panama City, Florida
* COMINEDIV 83	3	Charleston, South Carolina
* COMINEDIV 91	5	Long Beach, California
* COMINEDIV 92	6	Long Beach, California
* COMINEDIV 93	12	Long Beach, California
<u>Submarine</u>	<u>(70)</u>	
COMSUBDIV 11	4	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBDIV 12	4	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBDIV 13	4	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBDIV 21	4	New London, Connecticut
COMSUBDIV 22	4	New London, Connecticut
COMSUBDIV 31	4	San Diego, California
COMSUBDIV 32	3	San Diego, California
COMSUBDIV 41	4	Charleston, South Carolina
COMSUBDIV 42	4	Charleston, South Carolina
COMSUBDIV 51	2	Mare Island, California
COMSUBDIV 52	5	San Diego, California
COMSUBDIV 61	1	Norfolk, Virginia
COMSUBDIV 62	3	New London, Connecticut
* COMSUBDIV 63	3	Norfolk, Virginia
COMSUBDIV 71	3	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBDIV 72	5	Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
COMSUBDIV 101	3	New London, Connecticut
COMSUBDIV 102	3	New London, Connecticut
COMSUBDIV 121	4	Key West, Florida
COMSUBDIV 122	3	Key West, Florida
 TOTAL NAVY HEADQUARTERS	 <u>21,001</u>	

All established on 1 August 1971.

2/ COMINEMARFOR established on 1 July 1971.

MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>DEPARTMENTAL HEADQUARTERS</u> a/	(1343)	
Secretary of the Navy	29	Washington, D.C.
OPNAV	45	Washington, D.C.
Hq. U.S. Marine Corps	1269	Washington, D.C.
<u>MAJOR HEADQUARTERS</u>	(2375)	
<u>Departmental Level</u> a/	(25)	
# NAVMATCOM	4	Washington, D.C.
NAVSECGRUCCOM	19	Washington, D.C.
NAVINTCOM	1	Washington, D.C.
NAVCOMMCOM	1	Washington, D.C.
<u>Systems Commands</u> c/	(37)	
# NAVAIRSYSCOM	27	Washington, D.C.
# NAVELECSYSCOM	6	Washington, D.C.
# NAVORDSYSCOM	2	Washington, D.C.
# NAVSHIPSYSCOM	1	Washington, D.C.
ONR	1	Washington, D.C.
# <u>Training Commands</u> d/	(6)	
CHNAVAIRTRA	5	Pensacola, Florida
CHNAVRESTRA	1	Omaha, Nebraska
# <u>Naval Districts</u>	(8)	
Various	8	Various
# <u>Major Commands</u> d/	(38)	
CINCLANTFLT	9	Norfolk, Virginia
CINCPACFLT	21	Kunua, Hawaii
CINCUSHAVEUR	8	London, England
# <u>Force/Type Commands</u>	(2261)	
FMFIANT	723	Norfolk, Virginia
FMFPAC	1263	Kunua, Hawaii
Various	275	Various
TOTAL MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS	<u>3718</u>	

AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>DEPARTMENTAL HEADQUARTERS</u> a/	(2276)	
Office, Secretary of the Air Force	177	Washington, D.C.
Air Staff	2099	Washington, D.C.
<u>MAJOR HEADQUARTERS</u>	(12,053)	
<u>Major Commands</u>	(9461)	
# <u>Mission Forces</u>	(6035)	
Alaskan Air Command d/	213	Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
Aerospace Defense Command d/	881	Ent AFB, Colorado
Military Airlift Command a/d/	624	Scott AFB, Illinois
Pacific Air Forces d/	549	Hickam AFB, Hawaii
Strategic Air Command d/	1540	Offutt AFB, Nebraska
Tactical Air Command d/	1031	Langley AFB, Virginia
U.S. Air Forces Europe d/	1061	Lindsey AS, Germany
U.S. Air Forces Southern Cmd d/	136	Albrook AFB, Canal Zone
<u>Other Forces</u>	(3426)	
AF Communication Service d/	303	Richards-Gebaur AFB, Missouri
# AF Logistics Command a/	521	Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
# Air Force Reserve d/	210	Robins AFB, Georgia
AF Systems Command d/	833	Andrews AFB, Maryland
# Air Training Command d/	685	Randolph AFB, Texas
# Air University	169	Maxwell AFB, Alabama
# HQ Command USAF d/	245	Bolling AFB, D.C.
USAF Security Service d/	460	Kelly AFB, Texas
<u>Subsidiary Commands</u>	(2592)	
<u>AFCS - AF Communication System</u>	(1670)	
European Communications Area	225	Lindsey AS, Germany
Central European Comm. Region	88	Ramstein AB, Germany
United Kingdom Comm. Region	70	South Ruislip AS, England
Mediterranean Comm. Region	140	Torrejon AB, Spain
Pacific Comm. Area	249	Wheeler AFB, Hawaii
Far East Comm. Region	73	Fuchu AS, Japan
Alaskan Comm. Region	96	Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
Northern Comm. Area	285	Griffiss AFB, New York
Southern Comm. Area	245	Oklahoma City AFS, Oklahoma
Tactical Comm. Area	199	Langley AFB, Virginia

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>AFLC</u> - AF Logistics Command a/	(160)	
San Antonio AMA	33	Kelly AFB, Texas
Sacramento AMA	32	McClellan AFB, California
Oklahoma City AMA	32	Tinker AFB, Oklahoma
Ogden AMA	31	Hill AFB, Utah
Warner-Robins AMA	32	Robins AFB, Georgia
<u>AFSC</u> - AF Systems Command	(415)	
Electronic Systems Division	45	L.G. Hanscom Field, Massachusetts
Aerospace Systems Division	68	Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
Aerospace Medical Division	34	Brooks AFB, Texas
Foreign Technology Division	57	Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
Space/Missile Systems Org.	146	Los Angeles AFS, California
Contract Management Division	64	Los Angeles Intl Apt, California
National Range Division	1	Andrews AFB, Maryland
<u>USAFSS</u> - U.S. AF Security Service	(347)	
European Security Region	179	Frankfurt, Germany
Pacific Security Region	168	Wheeler AFB, Hawaii
<u>INTERMEDIATE HEADQUARTERS</u>	(7714)	
<u>Air Forces</u>	(6013)	
# <u>ADC</u> - Air Defense Command	(280)	
14th Aerospace Force	280	Ent AFB, Colorado
# <u>MAC</u> - Military Airlift Command	(757)	
21st AF	358	McGuire AFB, New Jersey
22nd AF	399	Travis AFB, California
# <u>PACAF</u> - Pacific AF	(2024)	
5th AF	445	Fuchu AS, Japan
7th AF	1220	Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam
13th AF	359	Clark AFB, Philippines
# <u>SAC</u> - Strategic Air Command	(1406)	
2nd AF	544	Barksdale AFB, Louisiana
8th AF	306	Andersen AFB, Guam
15th AF	556	March AFB, California

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Military Manpower</u> <u>30 June 1971</u>	<u>Location</u>
# <u>TAC</u> - Tactical Air Command	(1070)	
9th AF	420	Shaw AFB, South Carolina
12th AF	385	Bergstrom AFB, Texas
19th AF	85	Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C.
USAF Special Operations Forces	180	Eglin AFB, Florida
# <u>USAFE</u> - U.S. AF - Europe	(476)	
3rd AF	172	South Ruislip AS, England
16th AF	147	Torrejón AB, Spain
17th AF	157	Ramstein AB, Germany
<u>Air Divisions</u>	(1701)	
# <u>ADC</u> - Air Defense Command	(548)	
20th AD	92	Fort Lee AFB, Virginia
21st AD	119	Hancock Field, New York
23rd AD	96	Duluth Intl Apt, Minnesota
24th AD	74	Malmstrom AFB, Montana
25th AD	95	McChord AFB, Washington
26th AD	72	Luke AFB, Arizona
# <u>PACAF</u> - Pacific AF	(715)	
313th AD	53	Kadena AB, Okinawa
314th AD	235	Osan AB, Korea
327th AD	165	Taipei AS, Taiwan
326th AD	71	Kunia AS, Hawaii
834th AD	191	Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam
# <u>SAC</u> - Strategic Air Command	(402)	
19th AD	21	Carswell AFB, Texas
40th AD	19	Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan
42nd AD	16	McCoy AFB, Florida
45th AD	9	Pease AFB, New Hampshire
47th AD	7	Fairchild AFB, Washington
1st Strat. Aerospace Division	275	Vandenberg AFB, Colorado
4th Strat. Missile Division	13	F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming
12th Strat. Missile Division	21	Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona
14th Strat. Missile Division	21	Beale AFB, California
# <u>TAC</u> - Tactical Air Command	(36)	
832nd AD	15	Cannon AFB, New Mexico
839th AD	21	Pope AFB, North Carolina
TOTAL AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS	<u>22,043</u>	

**PART C.—OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION OF PRINCIPAL SERVICE
HEADQUARTERS**

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR PRINCIPAL ARMY HEADQUARTERS, FEBRUARY 11, 1972

	0-7 to 0-10	0-6	0-5	0-5	0-1 to 0-3 W-1 to W-4	Total officers
Departmental Level:						
AMC.....	17	82	140	25	7	271
MTMTS.....	1	18	12	6	3	40
Subtotal.....	18	100	152	31	10	311
Field Headquarters (CONARC):						
CONARC.....	15	108	283	78	8	492
1st U.S. Army.....	4	51	91	97	42	285
3d U.S. Army.....	4	46	71	91	28	240
5th U.S. Army.....	5	58	131	109	40	343
6th U.S. Army.....	4	42	59	57	21	183
Subtotal.....	32	305	635	432	139	1,543
Field Headquarters (Other):						
USAREUR.....	6	89	231	108	35	479
USARPAC.....	8	72	139	70	17	306
USARAL.....	2	15	32	38	15	102
USARSO.....	1	14	42	28	22	107
CDC.....	3	55	130	58	10	256
Subtotal.....	30	245	574	302	99	1,250
Total.....	80	650	1,361	765	248	3,104

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR PRINCIPAL, NAVY HEADQUARTERS, JUNE 30, 1971

Departmental Level:						
CHNAVPERs.....	6	74	112	131	103	426
BUMED.....	7	44	18	32	13	114
CHNAVMAr.....	8	35	45	17	7	112
NAVINTCOM.....		10	13	17	16	56
NAVCOMMCOM.....		9	20	14	32	75
NAVSECGRUCOM.....		13	27	62	81	183
OCEANAV.....	1	3	5	2	1	12
NAVWEASERV.....		5		7	2	21
MILITARY SEALIFTCOM.....	2	10	7	4	7	30
Subtotal.....	24	203	254	286	262	1,029
Systems commands:						
NAVAIrSYSCOM.....	7	95	117	72	30	321
NAVORDSYSCOM.....	4	38	51	34	10	137
NAVSHIPSYSCOM.....	7	51	65	55	19	197
NAVEXLSYSCOM.....	2	14	14	24	10	64
NAVSUPSYSCOM.....	2	12	28	35	12	89
NAVFACENGCOM.....	2	16	30	11	9	68
SSPO.....		13	24	24	7	68
Subtotal.....	24	239	329	255	97	944
Training commands:						
CHNAVAIRTRA ¹	1	15	18	8	10	52
CHNAVAIRADVTRA ²	1	5	17	9	18	50
CHNAVAIRBASICTRA ²	1	5	15	10	18	49
CHNAVTECHTRA ¹	1	4	7	13	11	36
CHNAVAIRESTRA.....	1	12	26	12	5	56
CHNAVRESTR.....	1	9	11	5	8	34
Subtotal.....	6	50	94	57	70	277

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR PRINCIPAL, NAVY HEADQUARTERS, JUNE 30, 1971—Continued

	O-7 to O-10	O-6	O-5	O-5	O-1 to O-3 W-1 to W-4	Total officers
Naval Districts:						
First.....	1	9	6	12	18	46
Third.....		8	9	10	21	48
Fourth.....	1	8	8	13	18	48
Fifth.....	1	10	13	13	31	68
Sixth.....	1	12	9	15	23	60
Eighth.....	1	8	7	9	12	37
Ninth.....	1	11	9	12	32	65
Tenth.....		2	3	4	3	12
Eleventh.....	1	11	18	17	38	85
Twelfth.....	1	8	9	14	19	51
Thirteenth.....	1	7	7	9	23	47
Fourteenth.....		4	4	7	9	24
COMUSNAVSO/COM 15.....		5	6	12	14	37
Seventeenth ³			2	1	2	5
NAVDISTWASH DC.....	1	9	7	2	19	38
Subtotal.....	10	112	117	150	282	671
Major commands:						
CINCLANTFLT.....	9	30	40	39	55	173
CINCPACFLT.....	5	28	52	52	51	188
CINUSNAVEUR.....	3	21	39	24	17	103
Subtotal.....	17	79	131	115	123	465
Fleet commands:						
COMFIRSTFLT.....	1	7	8	8	10	34
COMSECONDFLT.....	1	6	7	9	8	31
COMSIXTHFLT.....	1	4	13	6	12	36
COMSEVENTHFLT.....	1	4	24	13	16	58
Subtotal.....	4	21	52	36	46	159
Force commands:						
COMASWFORLANT.....	1	7	14	17	21	60
COMASWFORPAC.....	1	5	12	10	16	44
COMMIDDLEEASTFOR.....	1	1	3	7	8	20
COMSOLANTFOR.....	1	1	3	2	2	9
COMKEYWESTFOR.....		1	4	4	3	12
COMNAVFORJAPAN.....	1	7	6	14	20	48
COMNAVFORKOREA.....	1	1	2	11	3	18
COMNAVFORMARIANAS.....	1	7	9	5	15	37
COMNAVFORVIETNAM.....	1	8	13	33	65	120
COMUSNAVPHIL/N.B. SUBIC.....	1	6	7	13	23	50
Subtotal.....	9	44	73	116	176	418
Sea Frontiers:						
COMEASTERNSEAFRON.....		1	4	2	7	14
COMCARIBBEANSEAFRON.....	1	3	3	2	5	14
COMHAWAIIANSEAFRON.....	1	4	6	8	14	33
COMWESTERNSEAFRON.....	1	5	10	7	18	41
Subtotal.....	3	13	23	19	44	102
Type commands:						
COMPHIBLANT.....	1	10	10	18	19	58
COMPHIBPAC.....	1	14	17	20	20	72
COMSERVLANT.....	1	12	8	24	34	79
COMSERVPAC.....	2	15	21	34	37	109
COMCRUDESANT.....	1	9	8	27	15	60
COMCRUDESPAC.....	1	10	8	26	19	64
COMTRALANT.....		2	2	7	2	13
COMTRAPAC.....	1	3	1	7	7	19
COMCBLANT.....		1	3	3	7	14
COMCBPAC.....		1	2	5	5	13
COMSUBLANT.....	1	8	28	30	19	85
COMSUBPAC.....	1	7	23	22	17	70
COMNAVVAIRLANT.....	1	28	62	58	52	201
COMNAVVAIRPAC.....	2	19	50	51	42	164
COMOPTEVFOR.....	1	6	24	38	27	96
COMINELANT ⁴	1	2	6	10	17	36
COMINEPAC ⁴	1	1	3	7	11	23
Subtotal.....	16	148	276	387	350	1,177
Total.....	113	909	1,349	1,421	1,450	5,242

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR PRINCIPAL MARINE CORPS HEADQUARTERS, JUNE 30, 1971

	0-7 to 0-10	0-6	0-5	0-5	0-1 to 0-3 W-1 to W-4	Total officers
Departmental level:						
SECNAV		7	13	7	5	32
OPNAV	1	9	13	3		26
HQ USMC	29	91	219	257	129	725
NAVJAGCOM		2	2			4
NAVSECGRU COM			4	3	2	9
NAVJAGCOM				1		1
NAVJAGCOM			1			1
Subtotal	30	109	252	271	136	798
Systems commands:						
NAVAIRSYSCOM		3	9	12	3	27
NAVELECSYSCOM		1	2	2	1	6
NAVORDSYSCOM			1		1	2
NAVSHIPSYS COM		1	1			1
ONR						1
Subtotal		5	13	14	5	37
Major commands:						
CINCLANTFLT			4			4
CINCPACFLT			6	4		10
CINCUSNAVEUR		1	3			4
Subtotal		1	13	4		18
Type commands:						
FMFLANT	2	23	43	55	60	183
FMFPAC	4	36	91	106	109	346
Subtotal	6	59	134	161	169	529
Total	36	174	412	450	310	1,382

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR PRINCIPAL AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS, JUNE 30, 1971

Major commands:						
Alaskan Air Command	1	25	32	24	31	113
Aerospace Defense Command	9	103	98	123	168	501
Air Force Command Service	3	36	24	37	81	181
Air Force Logistics Command	13	88	59	81	127	368
Air Force Reserve	2	17	14	20	18	71
Air Force Systems Command	15	114	220	184	119	652
Air Training Command	7	61	94	92	133	387
Air University	1	16	31	15	24	87
Hq, Command USAF	1	9	19	14	23	66
Military Airlift Command	8	89	79	100	87	363
Pacific Air Forces	9	87	78	83	85	342
Strategic Air Command	16	158	226	297	201	898
Tactical Air Command	10	95	155	176	99	535
U.S. Air Force Europe	8	79	124	143	169	523
U.S. Air Force South	1	17	15	22	19	74
U.S. Air Force Security Service	2	21	26	27	97	173
Subtotal	106	1,015	1,294	1,438	1,481	5,334
Subsidiary headquarters:						
AFCS:						
European Command Area	1	9	7	21	49	87
Central European Command Region		3	4	2	14	23
United Kingdom Command Region		2	3	3	18	26
Mediterranean Command Region		3	3	3	21	36
Pacific Command Area	1	9	5	11	42	68
Far East Command Region		2	1	6	21	30
Alaskan Command Region		2	6	3	21	32
Northern Command Area		9	8	13	53	83
Southern Command Area		10	5	12	43	70
Tactical Command Area		7	5	14	31	57
Subtotal	2	56	47	88	313	506

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR PRINCIPAL AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS, JUNE 30, 1971—Continued

	O-7 to O-10	O-6	O-5	O-5	O-1 to O-3 W-1 to W-4	Total officers
Subsidiary headquarters—Con.						
AFLC:						
San Antonio AMA.....	2	4	4	5	7	22
Sacramento AMA.....	2	4	5	4	6	21
Oklahoma City AMA.....	2	4	4	7	4	21
Ogden AMA.....	2	4	6	2	6	20
Warner-Robins AMA.....	2	4	5	6	3	20
Subtotal.....	10	20	24	24	26	104
AFSC:						
Electronic Systems Division.....	1	2	5	6	18	32
Aerospace Systems Division.....	7	6	14	15	12	45
Aerospace Medical Division.....		3	3	3	21	30
Foreign Technology Division.....		2	4	6	20	32
Space and Missile Systems Organization..	2	5	20	24	54	105
Contract Management Division.....		8	8	8	23	47
National Range Division.....					1	1
Subtotal.....	10	26	54	62	149	301
USAFSS:						
European Security Region.....		5	4	14	25	48
Pacific Security Region.....		5	7	12	22	46
Subtotal.....	0	10	11	26	47	94
Intermediate headquarters:						
ADC:						
14th Aerospace Force....	1	14	13	26	109	163
20th Air Division.....		7	9	10	25	51
21st Air Division.....		8	10	11	32	61
23d Air Division.....	1	3	12	10	23	49
24th Air Division.....		3	10	8	20	41
25th Air Division.....		4	16	8	23	51
26th Air Division.....		4	10	8	18	40
Subtotal.....	2	43	80	81	250	456
MAC:						
21st Air Force.....	2	25	33	50	53	163
22d Air Force.....	2	24	35	35	60	156
Subtotal.....	4	49	68	85	113	319
PACAF:						
5th Air Force.....	1	27	40	47	76	191
7th Air Force.....	7	40	116	143	161	467
13th Air Force.....	2	25	29	38	62	156
313th Air Division.....	1	4	5	7	7	24
314th Air Division.....	1	7	22	29	42	101
326th Air Division.....		3	1	4	10	18
327th Air Division.....	1	3	7	12	40	63
834th Air Division.....	1	4	24	15	14	58
Subtotal.....	14	113	244	295	412	1,078
SAC:						
2d Air Force.....	2	34	71	68	82	257
8th Air Force.....	2	11	31	39	31	114
15th Air Force.....	2	35	73	73	87	270
19th Air Division.....	1	5	4		2	12
40th Air Division.....	1	4	3	2	1	11
42d Air Division.....	1	2		1	2	6
43th Air Division.....	1	2	2	1		6
47th Air Division.....	1	1		1		3
4th Strategic Missile Division.....	1	1	2	1	1	6
12th Strategic Missile Division.....	1	2	2		1	6
14th Strategic Missile Division.....	1	3	2	1	1	8
1st Strategic Aerospace Division.....	1	9	20	22	59	111
Subtotal.....	15	109	210	209	267	810

OFFICER GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR PRINCIPAL AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS, JUNE 30, 1971—Continued

	0-7 to 0-10	0-6	0-5	0-5	0-1 to 0-3 W-1 to W-4	Total officers
Intermediate headquarters—Con.						
TAC:						
9th Air Force.....	2	28	50	49	53	182
12th Air Force.....	2	24	62	55	53	196
19th Air Force.....	1	8	12	11	14	46
USAF Special Operating Force.....		11	34	32	23	100
832d Air Division.....		3	3	2	1	9
839th Air Division.....	1	9	20	22	59	111
Subtotal.....	6	83	181	171	203	644
USAFE:						
3d Air Force.....	2	9	23	21	22	77
16th Air Force.....	1	10	17	18	23	69
17th Air Force.....	2	10	16	24	34	86
Subtotal.....	5	29	56	63	79	232
Total.....	174	1,553	2,275	2,542	3,340	9,884

¹ Consolidated with establishment of Chief of Naval Training on Aug. 1, 1971.

² Disestablished with establishment of Chief of Naval Training.

³ Disestablished July 1, 1971.

⁴ Consolidated on July 1, 1971, into Commander, Mine Warfare Force.

PART D.—MISSION OF SELECTED SERVICE HEADQUARTERS, ARMY ORGANIZATIONS

UNITED STATES ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND

Mission

The mission of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, a major commander of the Department of the Army is to—

a. Perform assigned materiel and related functions of the Department of the Army comprising research and development; product improvement, production, maintenance, and human factors engineering; test and evaluation; procurement and production; product assurance; integrated materiel inventory management; new equipment training; scientific and technical intelligence production; international logistics programs; and storage and distribution, transportation, maintenance, demilitarization, and disposal as related to the CONUS wholesale supply and maintenance system, and systems overseas as directed by Headquarters, Department of the Army.

b. Develop and provide, in response to objectives and specific requirements established by Headquarters, Department of the Army, materiel and related logistics services to the Department of the Army, Department of the Army elements of unified and specified commands, and other United States and foreign customers.

c. Command subordinate commands, installations, and activities as may be assigned by Headquarters, Department of the Army; plan, program, coordinate requirements for, and supervise use of resources for accomplishing USAMC basic and support missions, functions, and responsibilities; budget and fund for financial resources as specified in AR 37-1; provide base operation and other support through subordinate commanders to Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or other Government activities which are tenants of or are satellited on USAMC installations; and satellite USAMC activities on other facilities for all or a portion of required base operation support when it is more economical.

d. Provide worldwide technical and professional guidance and assistance for planning and conducting logistics support of Army materiel.

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND TERMINAL SERVICE

Mission

a. Within the mission of the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS), provide transportation planning support to the organization

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the unified and specified commands, the military services, and DOD agencies in support of plans of the JCS and other military operations as required.

b. Provide traffic management, common-user and commercial ocean terminal support for assigned functions and responsibilities to the DOD components as required.

c. Develop, establish, and operate an integrated transportation information data system to support the mission of MTMTS.

d. Develop plans to assure the efficient use and control of military-owned and commercial continental United States (CONUS) land transportation resources and capabilities made available to DOD under mobilization or other emergency conditions.

e. Receive, consolidate, and analyze total overseas passenger and cargo requirements from DOD components to determine CONUS transportation and terminal capability needed to satisfy the requirements. Advise the JCS and other appropriate DOD components of insufficient CONUS transportation and CONUS ocean terminal capabilities with recommendations to the JCS for appropriate action when requirements exceed capabilities.

f. Provide for diversions of passenger groups or release unit cargo within CONUS between modes of transportation to a CONUS port of embarkation other than that originally intended, or to intransit storage of cargo. However, no diversion is to be made without the concurrence of the shipper service or shipper agency.

g. In cooperation with Military Airlift Command (MAC) and Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS), perform analytical studies of all international passenger movements inbound and outbound from CONUS and make appropriate recommendations to the Secretary of Defense (copy to JCS) regarding improvements in passenger traffic management and relationship between CONUS and overseas movement.

h. Monitor the effectiveness of the Single Passenger Reservation System (SPRS) and make recommendations to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) and MAC on procedural modifications to improve service to the Department of Defense.

i. Control the use of, and as directed by the Secretary of Defense, operate military-owned CONUS land transportation resources required to supplement the capability of commercial transportation carriers when the land transportation resources of such carriers operating within CONUS are inadequate to meet military requirements.

j. Command oversea Army terminal units providing terminal service in oversea areas in support of the Department of the Air Force and other agencies as assigned.

k. Provide worldwide traffic management for the DOD Personal Property Movement and Storage Program.

l. Command and operate, or arrange for the operation of, holding and reassignment points and other in transit control activities or installations when required for en route shipments of cargo within CONUS.

m. Command and operate common-user military ocean terminals assigned to MTMTS by the Secretary of Defense, providing such fleet support requirements to the Navy as are required by the Department of the Navy and delineated in applicable cross-servicing agreements. (Assignments of command and operation of ocean terminals to either Navy or MTMTS will be based on the concept that the entire terminal operation at any one installation will be conducted by only one DOD activity.)

n. Arrange for utilization of common-user military ocean terminals operated by any military service on a reimbursable basis. The Navy will operate common-user ocean terminals at designated tidewater installations for manifested DOD cargo in accordance with interservice support agreement between MTMTS and the Navy. This function may include responsibility for all manifested DOD cargo moving through the entire port complex, if in accordance with the interservice support agreement in effect between MTMTS and the Navy.

o. Arrange for the operation or use of commercial ocean terminals within CONUS for the shipment of military manifested cargo.

p. Control and direct the operation of military-owned railway rolling stock registered for interchange service other than that permanently assigned to intrabase or intraplant operations, to include supply accountability and maintenance of the Defense Freight Railway Interchange Fleet.

q. In coordination with affected DOD components, establish the size of passenger groups and release unit cargo.

r. Prescribe, under guidance of the JCS, methods and format for use by the military services and other DOD components to develop and forecast their CONUS transportation requirements by mode or modes (including the assumptions and computations on which they are based), which will assure responsiveness to their individual logistic systems. Evaluate and question, when necessary, the validity of requirements specified.

s. Develop and improve the small shipment consolidation programs and develop and improve the loss and damage prevention program including sponsoring the joint regulations governing the submission of transportation discrepancies in shipments reports (DISREP) and assembling and coordinating all material affecting its development, maintenance and modification. Effect traffic management improvements and take corrective action in conjunction with appropriate DOD elements to correct deficiencies attributable to carriers.

t. Administer DOD activities pertaining to Highways for National Defense and the transportation-oriented portion of the DOD Engineering for Transportability Program assigned to DA.

u. Command the United States Army Transportation Engineering Agency at Fort Eustis, Virginia. Command the MTMTS area commands and subordinate elements.

UNITED STATES CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND

Mission

The CGUSCONARC is charged with missions as an Army component command and as a major field commander of the Department of the Army.

a. As component commander, CGUSCONARC is designated the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Readiness Command under the Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command. He will designate necessary personnel to operate the headquarters and conduct the functions of this command. In addition, he will provide Army component command planning assistance to CINCLANT.

b. As a major field commander of the DA under the Chief of Staff, United States Army, the mission of CGUSCONARC is to—

1. Command the numbered armies (CONUS armies) within the continental United States (CONUS).

2. Command all United States Army troop units located within the CONUS except those expressly assigned by Headquarters, Department of the Army to another command or agency.

3. Command such subordinate installations and activities as may be assigned by HQDA.

4. Command the Army service schools.

5. Organize, train, equip, and insure combat readiness of all assigned United States Army troop units; develop and approve training procedures and techniques for the units; and prepare and supervise training programs to fulfill DA training objectives.

6. Receive, process, equip, and train all personnel from time of entry into the United States Army until assigned by HQDA to first unit or station.

7. Command, support, and supervise the training of United States Army Reserve (USAR) TOE and TDA troop units and reinforcement training units within CONUS.

8. Direct, supervise, and support the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC).

9. Support training of foreign nationals, to include training in DA service schools, observer and on-the-job training, orientation tours, and providing mobile training teams to foreign countries.

10. Formulate the annual DA training film program; prepare, review and approve that portion of the Army-wide training literature program which has been assigned by HQDA; direct and supervise operations of the training aids center system and the DA competitive marksmanship program.

11. Assure effective conduct of general educational development of military personnel at all DA installations and activities in CONUS.

12. Participate in combat developments and materiel developments which concern individual and unit training, combat readiness of assigned troop units, and the requirement and capability for movement of all CONUS Army units, and provide advice and assistance and direct support of the Commanding Generals of the United States Army Materiel Command and United States Army Combat Developments Command in these areas.

13. Provide support as required to accomplish the DA research program in training, motivation, and leadership which is conducted within CONUS by the Army Human Resources Research Office.

14. Provide intelligence support to senior and subordinate headquarters under the provisions of applicable DA plans.

15. Plan for and execute functions having CONUS geographic area implications and, through CONUS armies, provide logistic and administrative support and assistance on a nonreimbursable basis to all DA installations and activities within CONUS.

16. (a) Plan, program, coordinate requirements for, and supervise use of resources for accomplishing CONARC basic and support missions, functions, and responsibilities; budget and fund for financial resources through subordinate commanders:

(1) Provide base operation support and other support to DA activities which are tenants on CONARC installations except as otherwise authorized by HQ DA.

(2) Provides base operation support to DA activities which are satellited on CONARC installations, and satellite CONARC activities on other facilities for all or a portion of required base operation support when it is more economical.

(b) Program, budget, provide resources for, and furnish administrative and logistical support and services to United States Army Air Defense Command units except as otherwise assigned by HQ DA.

(c) Provide resources for operating CONARC Army Medical Service activities and for medical and dental service provided by Army Industrial Fund installations, as part of chartered operations, to military personnel, dependents, and intransit civilian employees authorized medical care.

(d) Provide resources that are available and required by civil works field agencies of the Chief of Engineers in carrying out his statutory responsibilities for water resources development and management, responsibilities to include providing assistance in flood, hurricane, and coastal storm emergencies.

17. Manage the CONARC Division of the Army Stock Fund.

18. As directed, plan for and support civil authorities in domestic emergencies.

19. As directed, plan for and execute those missions that have been assigned to the Chief of Staff, United States Army by the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to defense, other than air defense, of the CONUS and to military participation in civil defense.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST UNITED STATES ARMY

Mission

a. Command, supervise, and support all U.S. Army troop units located within assigned geographical areas, except those expressly assigned by HDQA to another command or agency.

b. Command, supervise, and support all Class I Activities located within Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, and Kentucky; and supervise and support attached units.

c. Provide support to Class II Installations and Activities; tenant and satellite units and activities, organizations, units and personnel of other military departments and commands, and to other departments or agencies of the Government as prescribed in appropriate regulations, directives or agreements.

d. Provide administrative and logistical support to Class I Activities commanded directly by CG, USCONARC which are located on Class I Installations. Provide reimbursement to industrial fund custodians for administrative and logistical support provided Class I Activities located at industrially funded Class II installations, except where specifically exempted by other funding arrangements.

e. Provide for and coordinate the acquisition, utilization, and management of all personnel, financial and material resources of the command.

f. Organize, train and equip all units and individuals to perform assigned mission functions, and assure an appropriate combat readiness posture.

g. Provide for mobilization expansion, land defense of CONUS, military assistance to civil authority, survival measures, continuity of operations and support to other commands under conditions of cold, limited and general war.

h. Command, support and supervise the training of United States Army Reserve (USAR) units. Supervise the training of non-unit Ready Reserve personnel (other than mobilization designee) when ordered to active duty for training or annual active duty for training, or when attached to ARNGUS or USAR units within CONUS.

i. Supervise, inspect and support the training of Army National Guard.

j. Supervise and support the training of cadets of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC).

k. Conducts annual general inspections of the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard units in the First U.S. Army area, and in the MDW.

l. Conducts intelligence activities and training in accordance with guidance and requirements established by USCONARC. Supervise and support the military security program.

m. Plan and provide funding, personnel, and logistics support for the National Matches, Camp Perry, Ohio.

n. First U.S. Army assumes the responsibilities in h, i, and j above within the Military District of Washington.

o. First U.S. Army assumes the responsibility for land defense in the MDW.

HEADQUARTERS, THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

Mission

a. Command, supervise and support all U.S. Army troop units, Class I installations and activities and support industrial defense activities located within the States of Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida, except those expressly assigned by HQ DA to another command or agency.

b. Provide support to Class II installations and activities, tenant and satellite units and activities; organizations, units and personnel of other military departments and commands, and to other departments or agencies of the government as prescribed in appropriate regulations, directives or agreements.

c. Provide administrative and logistical support to Class I activities commanded directly by CG CONARC, which are located on Class I installations. Provide reimbursement to industrial fund custodians for administrative and logistical support provided Class I activities located at industrially funded Class II installations except where specifically exempted by other funding arrangements.

d. Provide for and coordinate the acquisition, utilization and management of all personnel, financial and materiel resources of the command.

e. Organize, train and equip all units and individuals to perform assigned mission functions and ensure an appropriate combat readiness posture.

f. Provide for mobilization expansion, land defense of CONUS, military assistance to civil authority, survival measure, continuity of operations and support to other commands under conditions of cold, limited and general war (includes mobilization planning and mobilization during emergencies of ARNG units within assigned geographical areas).

g. Command, support and supervise the training of USAR units, supervise the training of non-unit Ready Reserve personnel (other than mobilization designees not assigned to Third U.S. Army) when ordered to active duty for training or annual active duty for training, or when attached to ARNGUS or USAR units within Third U.S. Army area.

h. Supervise, inspect and support, as required, all training and coordinate field training of the Army National Guard units within Third U.S. Army area.

i. Supervise and support the training of cadets of the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC).

j. Conduct intelligence activities and training in accordance with guidance and requirements established by CONARC. Supervise and support the military security program.

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH UNITED STATES ARMY

Mission

a. Commands, supervises, and supports all Class I installations located within the assigned geographical area (Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois and Indiana).

b. Commands, supervises, and supports all United States Army troop units located within assigned geographical areas except those expressly assigned by Headquarters DA to another command or agency.

c. Provides administrative and logistical support to Class II installations and activities, tenant and satellite units and activities and to organizations, units and personnel of other military departments and commands and to other departments or agencies of the government as prescribed in appropriate regulations, directives, or agreements.

d. Provides administrative and logistical support to CONARC schools, separate courses, and other CONARC activities located at Class I installations. Provide reimbursement to industrial fund custodians for administrative and logistical support provided Class I activities located at industrially funded Class II installations except where specifically exempted by other funding arrangements.

e. Provides for and coordinates the acquisition, utilization, and management of all personnel, financial, and material resources of the command.

f. Organizes, trains, and equips all units and individuals to perform assigned mission functions and assures an appropriate combat readiness posture.

g. Participates in planning for cold, limited, and general war; contingencies; mobilization; contingency operations; and military support of civil defense and domestic emergencies, as directed. Accomplished mobilization missions, as directed or as prescribed by appropriate regulation.

h. Provides for the ground defense within the Fifth United States Army area.

i. Commands, supports, and supervises the training of Army Ready Reserve units and individuals of the United States Army Reserve (USAR).

j. Supervises, inspects, and supports the training of Army National Guard (ARNG).

k. Supervises and supports the training of cadets of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC).

l. Conducts intelligence activities and training in accordance with guidance and requirements established by CONARC. Supervises and supports the military security program.

m. Maintains relations with state governors and adjutants general, civilian aides to the Secretary of the Army, civilian leaders, governmental agencies, and conducts certain Inter-American relations activities.

n. Prepares and implements, as necessary, plans for assistance to civilian agencies in the event of civil disaster or emergency.

o. In conjunction with adjacent area commanders and appropriate Navy and Air Force authorities, accomplishes planning and preparation for achieving a coordinated defense of the area and implements such a plan, as directed or required.

p. Protects, to the maximum extent possible, the rights of Army personnel who may be subject to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by Mexican tribunals or who may be confined in Mexican penal institutions.

HEADQUARTERS, SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY

Mission

a. Command, supervise and support all Class I installations and activities; command, supervise, and support all U.S. Army troop units located within assigned geographical area (Washington, Montana, Oregon, Idaho, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, California, and Arizona) except those expressly assigned by HQ, DA to another command or agency.

b. Command, supervise, and support all Sixth U.S. Army activities and supervise and support attached units.

c. Command, support and supervise the training, organization, recruiting and administration of USAR units. Supervise the training of non-unit Ready Reserve personnel (other than mobilization designees not assigned to CONARC) when ordered to annual training or annual active duty for training, or when attached to ARNGUS or USAR units within CONUS. Conduct and/or support field training exercises, field evaluations, field experiments, troop tests, confirmation tests, and operational readiness training tests; local, field, and command post exercises; and practice alerts and mobility exercises as directed.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY

Mission

Headquarters, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army is the command and control element of a field command of Department of the Army and in the United States Army component of the unified United States European Command (USEUCOM) and provides:

a. A combat ready force which, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance, serves to deter aggression in Western Europe or to repel aggression if such should occur.

b. Administrative and logistical support to United States ground forces in Western Europe.

c. Command control over assigned forces and other forces as directed by competent authority.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, PACIFIC

Mission

a. Exercise command of all U.S. Army Units (Forces) in the Pacific Command, less operational control of those elements assigned to unified commands, or specifically exempted by higher authority. Exercise operational control over U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, Pacific.

b. As the U.S. Army Component of CINCPAC, organize, equip, train, employ and support USARPAC forces to insure their optimum readiness for combat. Participate in planning for deployment, and nominate and deploy forces to fulfill CINCPAC operational requirements, including forces for support of other PACOM Commanders in accordance with CINCPAC OPLANS, orders and instructions; maintain a capability within the theater for executing unconventional warfare; civic action and psychological operations. Establish and maintain bases, communications, facilities and line-of-communications required to support operations as directed. Provide logistical and administrative support to all U.S. PACOM component services, unified and specified commands, DOD agencies, and other U.S. governmental activities and defense treaty alliance forces in PACOM as directed. Provide enemy ground order of battle intelligence. Recommend to CINCPAC the proper employment of forces and equipment; discharge responsibilities assigned for civil defense and domestic emergencies; assist subordinate unified commands in the conduct of coordinated planning with host governments; and discharge functions and responsibilities for the Military Assistance and related programs within PACOM in accordance with CINCPAC instructions.

c. In response to DA direction, provide effective management of the resources, i.e., men, money and material. Develop tactical and strategic intelligence on ground forces and the operational environment of countries and areas within the PACOM area to include the conduct of intelligence operations to provide for the security of USARPAC forces and installations. Maintain a defense of land areas in PACOM. Maintain operational custody of those nuclear, chemical or selected munitions to be delivered by USARPAC delivery systems. Performs planning in support of DA programs and conduct uni-service operations, as directed. Functions as Head of the Procurement Activity in Hawaii and the Western Pacific; administer the security trade control program on sales of all foreign excess personal property in PACOM. Establish policy on the operation and employment of Army Communication Systems and Electronics in support of PACOM. Support those elements of the defense communications systems in PACOM for which Army has responsibility assigned by the Department of Defense.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, ALASKA (USARAL)

Mission

a. Responsible for the planning and execution of all Army Missions and Tasks derived from missions assigned to the Alaskan Command by Joint Chiefs of Staff and missions assigned to the Alaskan NORAD Region by NORAD and those additional missions assigned by Department of the Army.

b. Major missions are as follows:

(1) Plan, provide for and be prepared to conduct ground defense as prescribed by the Alaskan Command.

(2) Provide operational ready resources prepared to participate in the conduct of air defense of Alaska.

(3) Develop doctrine for summer and winter operations in northern areas and operate the United States Army Northern Warfare Training Center.

(4) Provide certain administrative, logistical and troop support to U.S. Army Arctic Test Center, U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command-Alaska, and other non-USARAL Army tenants in accordance with support agreements.

(5) Provide designated logistic support to Air Force and Naval elements in Alaska.

(6) Plan for and provide assistance to Federal, State and Local Governmental agencies during domestic emergencies under the overall guidance and control of the Alaskan Command.

- (7) Command and supervise USAR Troops Program and reinforcement training units in Alaska.
- (8) Supervise training of the Alaska Army National Guard.
- (9) Administer the ROTC program in Alaska.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SOUTHERN COMMAND (USARSO)

Mission

- a. Under the direction of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, and under the operational command of Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command, command and administer USARSO forces, maintain a combat ready operational posture, maintain proficiency in the art of jungle warfare, and provide support of the Unified Command.
- b. Provide the ground defense of the Canal Zone and the Panama Canal and its vital installations and accomplish operational missions assigned by the Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command.
- c. Conduct a Jungle Operations Training Program with emphasis on the training of CONUS Active Army Junior Officers and NCO's designated by the Department of the Army and conduct similar training for USNG, USAR, and US Marine personnel.
- d. Supervise training of and provide training support to Reserve Components in the Canal Zone.
- e. Provide service support for USA TTC and POTLID Test facilities in the Canal Zone.
- f. Implement and support US policies in Latin America.
- g. Assist the Armed Forces of Latin America in the mutual defense of the Western Hemisphere under the direction of the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command.
- h. Provide assistance (advice and equipment) to Latin American Government Forces through US Military Groups, Military Assistance Advisory Groups, and Military Training Teams; provide military training at US Army Schools for Latin American Officer and Enlisted Men; provide advice and logistical assistance to disaster areas; and provide assistance in civil affairs (civil actions to include contingency planning, operations, and civil defense planning).
- i. To provide technical assistance, logistical support and specialized equipment for map making through the In'er-American Geodetic Survey.

UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND (USACDC)

Mission

The mission of the headquarters, USACDC, a major field command of the Department of the Army, is to command assigned personnel and manage allocated resources in order to: Provide the broad base of military, analytical and engineering expertise across the spectrum of planning for operational testing, execution, analysis and evaluation for the U.S. Army.

The principal USACDC headquarters functions are to plan, program, fund, coordinate and review the conduct of the combat developments program to assure that subordinate elements:

- (1) Secure guidance from the Army Force Development Plan, the Army Analysis of Intelligence, the Army Strategic Objectives Plan, separate official correspondence, and other official acts.
- (2) Provide guidance to the major developing agencies during all phases of development regarding objectives and requirements reflecting the viewpoint of the users in the field.
- (3) Recommend items of equipment and ammunition for deletion from the supply system either by complete elimination or reduction in the quantities desired.
- (4) Review doctrine, materiel, and organization of other US armed services to determine implications with respect to the US Army. Maintain liaison with counterpart organizations of these services to insure the conduct of combat developments in the joint area and the elimination of unnecessary duplication.
- (5) Maintain liaison with combat development or similar activities of industry, civilian institutions of higher learning, and other nonmilitary agencies to maintain an awareness of their developments and exchange information pertaining to matters of mutual interest.
- (6) Maintain liaison with counterpart agencies of friendly nations in order to take cognizance of foreign combat developments, improve standardization,

harmonization, and interoperability with allied forces, and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

NAVY HEADQUARTERS

CHNAVPERS

Mission.—The Chief of Naval Personnel shall plan and direct the procurement, distribution, administration, career motivation, education, and training assigned, of Navy personnel, including those of the Naval Reserve, to meet the quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements of the United States Navy, as determined by the Chief of Naval Operations.

BUMED

Mission.—The Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (who is also the Surgeon General of the Navy), under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations, commands the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and shore activities as assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations. He shall provide all professional and technical assistance requisite to safeguarding and promoting the health of the Navy and Marine Corps personnel, and he shall provide professional and technical guidance in the care and treatment of sick and injured Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their dependents, and other personnel as authorized by law.

CHNAVMA

Mission.—The Chief of Naval Material under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations, commands the Naval Material Command. In addition to such other tasks as may be assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations, he shall:

1. Meet the total system and material support needs of the Operating Forces of the Navy for equipment, weapons and weapon systems, materials, supplies, facilities, maintenance, and supporting services, including the development, acquisition, procurement, construction, maintenance, alteration, repair, and overhaul of ships, aircraft, surface and undersea craft, space and oceanographic systems, and equipment; training equipment and devices; land vehicle systems and equipment; fixed ocean systems; and shore facilities and utilities, all consistent with approved programs.

2. Respond directly to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in meeting those particular support needs of the Marine Corps which are required to be provided by the Naval Material Command.

3. Respond to the heads of other Department of Defense and Department of the Navy organizations in meeting their material support needs (including those of the Naval Reserve) that are provided by the Naval Material Command.

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

Mission.—To direct and manage the activities of the Naval Intelligence Command to ensure the fulfillment of the intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative and security requirements and responsibilities of the Department of the Navy.

OCEANOGRAPHER OF THE NAVY

Mission.—The mission of the Oceanographer of the Navy is to act as the Naval Oceanographic Program Director for the Chief of Naval Operations, under the policy direction of the Secretary of the Navy, through the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development), and to exercise centralized authority, direction and control including control of resources, in order to insure an integrated and effective Naval Oceanographic Program.

NAVAL WEATHER SERVICE

Mission.—To command assigned activities of the Naval Weather Service; to insure the fulfillment of Department of the Navy meteorological requirements, and the Department of Defense requirements for Oceanographic analyses/forecasts; and to provide technical guidance in meteorological matters throughout the naval service. Fleet Weather Centers/Facilities will have concurrent responsibility to the Fleet Commanders in Chief and the Chief of Naval Air Training who shall exercise authoritative control over the product output to meet the requirements of the Operating Forces.

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

Mission.—To command the Military Sealift Command ashore and afloat, worldwide, acquire and employ ocean shipping and shipping space, and establish and maintain supporting facilities as required for accomplishment of the MSC mission.

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROJECT OFFICE

Mission.—The Project Manager shall support Navy Strategic Weapons Systems requirements, provide technical support for justification of Navy Strategic Force inputs to the planning and budgeting processes, including inputs to the Joint Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP) and Program Objective Memorandum (POM), and manage approved Navy Strategic Programs.

CHIEF OF NAVAL TRAINING

Mission.—The Chief of Naval Training is responsible, under the Chief of Naval Operations, for the training of Navy personnel (other than that assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations, to Fleet Commanders and the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery), and for the training of Marine Corps aviation personnel, and members of the Naval Reserve.

CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING

Mission.—To provide undergraduate pilot training and undergraduate Naval Flight Officer training for Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel and selected foreign nationals. Supervise and coordinate the functioning of all Naval Aviation Activities in the Naval Training Command not specifically assigned to other functional commanders. Prosecute such other aviation training tasks as the Chief of Naval Training may direct.

CHIEF OF NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING

Mission.—To coordinate and direct Navy recruit and technical training, Marine Corps aviation technical training, and such other training as is directed to be undertaken at activities under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Technical Training.

CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR RESERVE TRAINING

Mission.—To train individuals for their mobilization assignments and train personnel prior to their assignment to the Naval Air Reserve Force; direct and coordinate the procurement of Aviation Air Reserve Force; direct and coordinate the procurement of Aviation Officer Candidates (AOC), Aviation Reserve Office Candidates (AVROC), Naval Aviation Officer Candidates (NAOC), Naval Flight Officer Candidates (NFOC), and when activated, Naval Aviation Cadets (NAV-CADS): furnish logistic support for the Marine Air Reserve Training Command, and to perform such other functions as directed by the Chief of Naval Air Training.

CHIEF OF NAVAL RESERVE TRAINING

Mission.—To administer the Selected Reserve and other participating reservists (other than air), and manage the assigned resources, in a manner to maintain Naval Reserve units and personnel in a state of training, readiness and availability for immediate employment as units and as personnel augmentations of the active forces when authorized and directed; and to perform such other functions or tasks as may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

NAVY RECRUITING COMMAND

Mission.—To recruit men and women for enlisted, officer candidate, and officer status in the Regular and Reserve components of the Navy. Prepare for the Secretary of the Navy the documents required for original appointment to warrant and commissioned grades.

NAVAL DISTRICT

Mission.—To exercise command of assigned naval shore activities; to exercise area coordination over all shore activities in the naval districts; to represent the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the offices, com-

mands, and bureaus of the Navy Department in such matters as may be assigned, to execute responsibilities with respect to specified functions as assigned by the appropriate Sea Frontier Commander and the Chief of Naval Reserve Training; to administer the Naval Reserve Program (other than air) as assigned; and to coordinate public affairs matters throughout the naval districts.

NAVAL DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

Mission.—To exercise command of assigned naval shore activities; to exercise area coordination over all shore activities in the naval district; to represent the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the offices, commands, and bureaus of the Navy Department in such matters as may be assigned; to execute responsibilities with respect to specified functions as assigned by the appropriate Sea Frontier Commander and the Chief of Naval Reserve Training; to administer the Naval Reserve Program (other than air) as assigned and to coordinate public affairs matters throughout the naval district; to provide personnel support functions for permanent and transient naval personnel in the Washington, D.C. area and logistic support and other services as directed and assigned.

COMUSNAVS0

Mission.—Principal Advisor to USCINCSO on Navy matters. Assist planning and coordination of Naval Defense of Latin America. Develop, plan and program Military Assistance Program for Latin America Naval Forces. Monitor implementation of approved and funded Navy portion of the Military Assistance Program for Latin America. Provide personnel, operational and administrative support to U.S. Southern Command for routine and contingency operations. Exercise operational control over U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command. Develop employment and deployment plans in support of USCINCSO Plans.

CINCLANTFLT

Mission.—In cold war, limited war, and general war, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet will conduct operations to ensure the control of the sea and air in the Atlantic Command area and provide combat ready U.S. Naval Forces (including administrative, logistic and planning support thereto) to the Atlantic Command and other commands as directed in order to defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea, maintain the security of the Atlantic Command and support the operations of adjacent allied and national commanders.

CINCPACFLT

Mission.—To gather and evaluate detailed and accurate information on all phases of the existing situation—strategic, tactical and logistic. Prepare plans, schedules, directives and reports based upon such information, or in compliance with directives received from higher authority. Translate the decisions of the Commander in Chief into directives. Disseminate information and directives to subordinate commanders, and information and reports to higher authority, rapidly, accurately, and completely. Supervise and evaluate the execution of the Commander in Chief's directives by subordinate commands.

CINCUSNAVEUR

Mission.—This force will, in cold war, limited war, or general war, conduct operations to ensure control of the seas in and around the U.S. European Command area in order to support and assist USCINCEUR and SACEUR in establishing control of contested areas in Europe.

COMFIRSTFLT

Mission.—COMFIRSTFLT, as a principal PACFLT operational commander, normally conducts his operations in EASTPAC and MIDPAC. He conducts operations supporting national objectives; defends the Pacific Sea approaches to the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii except as assigned to COMASWFORPAC; plans for and conducts contingency operations as directed by CINCPACFLT including the evacuation of U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens, conducts joint, intertype, and fleet training exercises; develops intertype tactics; plans for wartime offensive operations; and is prepared to augment forces of the Seventh Fleet on short notice.

COMSECFLT

Mission.—Be prepared to defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic Ocean by conducting offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces, shipping, and sources of support.

COMSIXTHFLT

Mission.—Responsible for the conduct of such naval operations as may be directed by competent national authorities within the Mediterranean Sea and ashore in countries contiguous to or near the Mediterranean Sea. Maintaining the security of assigned forces and by conducting the full range of naval operations in support of national policies and objectives.

COMSEVENTHFLT

Mission.—COMSEVENTHFLT, as a principal PACFLT operational commander, normally conducts his operations in WESTPAC. The operations of the Seventh Fleet are conducted in support of national objectives and represent a balance between (1) maintaining the advanced readiness status of assigned forces through the allocation of training and upkeep time, (2) maintaining a posture of instant readiness for either general or limited emergency operations, and (3) accommodating the political environment of overseas operations.

COMASWFORLANT/COMASWFORPAC

Mission.—To act as the principal adviser in all matters pertaining to anti-submarine warfare, and the control and protection of shipping. To exercise operational control of assigned forces and be responsible for the overall direction and coordination of ASW and Control-and-protection-of-shipping operations.

COMIDEASTFOR

Mission.—Exercise operational control of assigned ships, aircraft, and landing forces. Also, conduct operations as directed in support of U.S. National objectives.

COMSOLANTFOR

Mission.—Under the direction of COMASWFORLANT, plan for and, when directed:

1. Conduct defensive operations, including ASW, within the capabilities of forces assigned.
2. Conduct submarine contact investigations. Exercise operational control of assigned ships and units.

COMKEYWESTFOR

Mission.—Conduct operations to ensure the control of the sea and air in the areas assigned and provide combat ready naval forces to the Atlantic Command and other commands as directed, maintain the security of the area assigned and support the operations of adjacent allied commanders.

COMNAVFORJAPAN

Mission:

1. Conduct ASW operations.
2. Act as the naval component commander of U.S. Forces, Japan.
3. As CINCPACFLT representative, coordinate with COMUSJAPAN in providing for the conduct of combined planning with the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF). Effect Liaison with COMSEVENTHFLT in the planning and conducting of combined exercises.

COMNAVFORKOREA

Mission.—COMNAVFORKOREA performs tasks assigned by CINCPACFLT within the Korea area. He also serves as the naval component commander of USKOREA, the subordinate unified command of PACOM.

COMNAVMARIANAS

Mission:

1. Conduct training and operate forces assigned.
2. Conduct ASW operations in assigned area, assuming operational control of Naval Forces when necessary for cold war, anti-submarine, and Naval ASW reconnaissance operations, keeping the normal operational commander of these forces advised of action taken.

COMNAVFORV

Mission.—Although not an area commander, COMNAVFORV performs tasks assigned by CINCPACFLT in South Vietnam. He also serves as the naval component commander of USMACV, the subordinate unified command of PACOM in South Vietnam, carrying out such tasks as may be assigned through unified command channels, including tasks assigned by CINCPACFLT as the naval component commander of PACOM.

COMUSNAVPHIL

Mission.—To develop readiness of bases, support fleet forces, assist in domestic emergencies, control shipping and evacuation in Southeast Asia, coordinate SEATO and bi-lateral operations and training and support U.S. Mission in South-east Asia.

COMSEAFRON

Mission.—Under the appropriate Fleet Commander in Chief, Sea Frontier Commanders will:

1. Coordinate and conduct operations in the sea frontier area and coordinate other matters in support of cold war objectives; and
2. Plan for and be prepared to coordinate and conduct operations in defense of the sea frontier area and to coordinate other matters in the event of a national emergency, natural disaster, limited or general war.

COMPHIBLANT

Mission.—Plan for and conduct Amphibious Operations. Plan for and coordinate joint and intertype amphibious training. Control and supervise training for Naval Gunfire Support. Develop and improve tactics, doctrine, and operational procedures. Provide sea transportation for troop units and land-based forces in connection with Amphibious Operations.

COMPHIBPAC

Mission.—Coordinate and conduct training, operations and research, including the development and improvement of tactics, doctrine and operational procedures in Amphibious operations, counter-insurgency, unconventional warfare, restricted water and river warfare and other special operations, and maintain forces to conduct amphibious assault and special operations in support of approved plans in order to support the cold war objectives of the Pacific Fleet and carry out assigned responsibilities in the event of limited or general war.

COMSERVLANT

Mission.—Function as the Type Commander for Service Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet and act as Logistics Agent for Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet in execution of tasks assigned in support of CINCLANTFLT.

COMSERVPAC

Mission.—Basically, the Service Force is the logistic arm of the Pacific Fleet. Its mission, as derived from Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet's tasking is: Provide logistic support to naval forces in the Pacific; to those bases for which CINCPACFLT has command, administrative or logistic responsibilities; and—as directed—to other services, agencies of the Government and allied forces.

COMCRUDESANT/COMCRUDESPAC

Mission.—Conduct type training for cruiser/destroyer forces, and support inter-type training. Inform Fleet Commanders immediately of the status of any ships or units assigned that do not meet established performance standards.

COMTRALANT/COMTRAPAC

Mission.—To provide Atlantic/Pacific Fleet-Type and Numbered Fleet Commanders training services ashore and afloat, less specialized training peculiar to air operations, and submarine, amphibious, and mine warfare; to command and administer those Fleet schools, centers, and units required to provide ashore training; and to provide for the administration of certain curricula prescribed by the Chief of Naval Personnel, as agreed to by Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic/Pacific Fleets.

COMCBLANT/COMCBPAC

Mission.—The mission of the Naval Construction Battalions, Atlantic/Pacific is to provide an administrative and technical organization by which the Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic/Pacific Fleet can effectively fulfill his responsibilities as fleet commander pertaining to the deployment of Naval Construction Forces.

COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC

Mission.—Function as the Type Commander for Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic/Pacific.

1. Exercise operational control of assigned forces.
2. Conduct type and refresher training of all submarines and support operational training.
3. Coordinate the unit training of the Submarine Force with other LANTFLT/PACFLT commanders as appropriate.

COMNAVAIRLANT

Mission.—Commander Naval Air Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. COMNAVAIRLANT, is CINCLANTFLT's logistic agent with respect to the aeronautical establishment in the Atlantic. In this capacity, he:

1. Exercises type command functions.
2. Exercises technical and other control functions over Navy and Marine Corps air stations and facilities as delegated by CINLANTFLT and the Navy Department.
3. Takes action as necessary to insure that all Fleet Support Navy and Marine Corps air stations in the Atlantic area are planned, developed, and provided with necessary facilities to support assigned or planned CNO missions.
4. Reports to CINCUSNAVEUR when exercising type command functions for Naval Air Organizations in the European area.

COMNAVAIRPAC

Mission.—As Aviation Type Commander, COMNAVAIRPAC's mission is to train and support aviation forces (including certain Marine Air Forces), in order to assist in fulfilling the operational requirements of CINCPACFLT.

COMOPTEVFOR

Mission.—COMOPTEVFOR is an operational commander for the support of the Navy's research, development, test, and evaluation program. Although under the administrative command of CINCPACFLT for all operational matters under the purview of CINCPACFLT.

COMINWARFOR

Mission.—This command will provide the administrative and technical mining and mine countermeasures support essential to both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. The centralized operation of the mine areas as minefield planning, mine readiness, and training. Ultimate operational control of Atlantic and Pacific mine warfare units is exercised by the respective fleet commanders.

COMNAVSUPFORANTAR

Mission.—Carry out planning and conduct operations in order to support United States scientific and other programs in Antarctica.

COMFAIR

Mission.—Responsible for the supervision and coordination of the type administration and logistic support for all Navy shore-based air units and units temporarily based ashore, except in matters of policy.

FLEET AIR WINGS (FAW)

Mission.—To conduct and coordinate offensive and defense air antisubmarine operations throughout the ocean areas of the world.

COMMANDER CARRIER DIVISION

Mission.—Immediate operational commander of an attack division consisting of one or more attack aircraft carriers and associated aircraft and supporting escorts. Directs the employment of assigned ships and aircraft in offensive and defensive operations to maintain control of the sea and provide support to other friendly forces.

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON

Mission.—To command amphibious task force, landing force, and air control groups during amphibious operations.

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON

Mission.—To command assigned destroyers to operate offensively with strike forces, hunter/killer groups in support of amphibious assault operations, and screen support forces and convoys against submarine, air, and surface threats.

COMMANDER MINE WARFARE SQUADRON

Mission.—To command assigned ships engaged in mine warfare to locate and/or sweep mines.

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON

Mission.—To command submarines squadron engaged in locating and destroying ships, particularly other submarines.

AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS

MISSION OF MAJOR COMMAND AND INTERMEDIATE HEADQUARTERS

Major Commands.—Major commands are major subdivisions of the Air Force and are each assigned a major segment of the overall USAF mission. They are divided into two categories: (1) operational commands which are composed of strategic offensive, strategic defensive, tactical, or mobility forces; and (2) support commands which provide logistical, systems development, administrative, training, communications, and similar types of specialized support for the operational commands.

Intermediate Headquarters.—Intermediate headquarters (numbered air forces, divisions, and equivalent levels) are primarily established to reduce the span of control of the major commanders with respect to operational matters; generally, major command staffs deal directly with field units in non-operational areas such as personnel, comptroller, and administration. A continuing effort is made to insure that the numbers of intermediate headquarters and the size of their staffs are held to the minimum required to insure combat effectiveness. Security regions and the communications areas and regions function in the same capacity as the numbered air forces and air divisions and serve to reduce the span of control for the USAF Security Service and the Air Force Communications Service. The Air Force Logistics Command air material areas, the Air Training Command training centers, and the Air Force Systems product divisions are large industrial/training complexes, a small part of which has been identified and costed as headquarters.

Headquarters U.S. Air Force Europe

The United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) was formed from the World War II U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe. Hq. USAFE was established at St. Germain-en-Laye in France on 7 August 1945 and was relocated to Wiesbaden, Germany in September 1945. During the immediate postwar years USAFE, consisting of about 15,000 personnel, provided theater air transportation and communications while possessing virtually no combat capability. The advent of the Berlin Blockade and the establishment of the NATO defensive shield in 1949 reversed the postwar trend toward reduction of U.S. air power in Europe. The Command's manning and equipping underwent quick expansion, spurred by the Korean conflict during the early 1950s, to meet the U.S. military commitments to NATO. USAFE reached a peak strength by the mid-1950s and from that point its resources began a downward trend, interrupted only briefly by the Berlin crisis of 1961. Current strength shows approximately a 50 percent reduction from the mid 1950's posture.


Although the USAFE command structure has been revised many times during the years, the general geographic area of USAFE has remained basically unchanged since the establishment of NATO. This area includes Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, West Germany, the Iberian Peninsula, the Canary Islands, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Italy, Greece, Turkey and the Mediterranean Islands. USAFE presently has major units in seven countries. An exception is that, effective 1 January 1972, USCINCEUR will assume those military assistance responsibilities for Africa south of the Sahara now assigned to CINCSTRIKE/USCINCEAFSA. The implications for USAFE are being assessed; USAFE already has responsibility for the commissary in Addis Ababa and a decision on the hospital in Teheran is pending. In addition, the Command has retained the responsibility to equip, train and maintain at a high state of combat readiness the USAF tactical units committed to NATO.

The Command's overall mission, which is to plan, conduct, control and coordinate offensive and defensive air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by USCINCEUR, can best be explained in terms of its relationship with other command elements. As shown by the attached schematic, CINCUSAFE accomplishes its responsibilities within the complex framework of three military chains of command. First, as a Commander of a major command, CINCUSAFE is responsible to USAF for organizing, equipping and maintaining the operational readiness of assigned operational and support units and accomplishing individual and unit training according to AF directives and procedures. In addition, USAFE provides administrative and logistic support to other AF commands, component commands (USNAVEUR and USAREUR), and U.S. and Allied agencies as specified in interservice agreements or as directed by HQ USAF. Second, as the Air Component USCINCEUR for accomplishing assigned operational missions. In this capacity, he functions as the senior advisor to USCINCEUR on the employment of aerospace forces. Third, CINCUSAFE is responsible to SACEUR as Commander of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force (4 ATAF). In this role, CINCUSAFE as 4 ATAF Commander would control the USAFE Tactical Squadrons designated to NATO as well as other designated Allied Air Units upon assignment to SACEUR. When this occurs, USAFE HQ retains airlift, intelligence and logistics responsibilities which are national not NATO.

a. Relationship with NATO and SACEUR is that of providing combat forces to SACEUR and providing for national command of US Air Forces in a NATO conflict.

b. Relationship with USNAVEUR and USAREUR is that of all three being lateral components of USCINCEUR. In certain areas, for example Turkey, USAFE is charged with common item support and administration for all services; in others it receives similar support from USAREUR. While a command relationship as such doesn't apply, USAFE's interface with USAREUR and USNAVEUR is close to assure complementary application of forces.

CINCUSAFE wears several hats. He is responsible to USAF as a Major Air Commander—to USCINCEUR as the Component Commander—and to SACEUR as Commander of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force.



United States Air Force in Europe

USAFE plans, conducts, controls, and coordinates offensive and defensive air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by the Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command (USCINCEUR). The responsibilities of CINCUSAFE as a component commander and as a commander of a major command are closely interrelated. As a component, Commander, CINCUSAFE, is responsible to US CINCEUR for accomplishing assigned operational missions. CINCUSAFE functions as the senior advisor to USCINCEUR on the proper employment of aerospace forces. As commander of a major command, CINCUSAFE exercises command over all Air Force operational and support units in theater and over USAF dual-based units when in theater. CINCUSAFE coordinates with commands shown below as appropriate to insure optimum mission readiness of forces/equipment.

Air Force Communications Service

AFCS resources in Europe are organized under the HQ European Communications Area at Lindsey Air Station, the United Kingdom Communications Region at South Ruislip and several communications groups at locations throughout Europe. AFCS provides manpower to support the Defense Communications System and the engineering and installation effort (B&I Sqdns). AFCS personnel provide for operation/maintenance of base communications facilities, Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), switching centers/tributaries, AUTOVON, HF stations, wide-band stations (UK-Spain, UK-Germany, Central Germany, Berlin, and UK wide-band systems), weather automated relays, weather satellite tracking communications, aircraft landing and approach control systems; performs communications-electronic engineering and installation functions and provides for a mobile depot maintenance capability.

Military Airlift Command

MAC resources in Europe are authorized in four principal functions: Air Weather Service, Aerospace Rescue and Recovery, Aerial Ports, Strategic Airlift and enroute support maintenance, Standard Weather Observer and/or forecaster service is provided for flying activities at 37 locations. Aerospace Rescue and Recovery (ARRS) units equipped with H-43s provide local base rescue (LBR) operations for flying units at 14 locations. Additionally, ARRS units at two of the locations are equipped with HC-130s/H-53s, which provide a search and recovery (SAR) capability. Aerial Ports provide for cargo/personnel handling/processing at 11 locations. Enroute support maintenance provides for refueling/maintenance turnarounds at 10 locations for all MAC airlift aircraft transiting European bases.

Strategic Air Command

SAC resources in Europe provide for two KC-135 aerial refueling rotational squadrons on continuous duty at Torrejon AB (15 UE) and Mildenhall RAF (4 UE) [deleted]. The refueling mission includes maintaining tactical fighter combat readiness through peacetime training and to provide a long-range fighter strike capability. [Deleted.]

Aerospace Defense Command

ADC resources in the European area provide for the Ballistic Missile Warning System at Thule AB, Greenland, and Fylingdales, UK; [deleted] air support between Sondrestrom AB and Greenland Dye Sites; one 12 UE F-102 fighter interceptor squadron and a three UE EC-121 airborne early warning and control rotational unit at Keflavik, Iceland. The forces at Iceland provide for the air defense of Iceland and are an extension of the Air Defense mission of the North American continent.

Tactical Air Command

TAC resources in Europe provide for two 16 UE C-130 tactical airlift rotational squadrons on continuous duty at Rhein Main AB and Mildenhall RAF. These squadrons provide contingency and intratheater logistics/troop carrier airlift for USEUCOM.

USAF Security Service

[Deleted.]

Aeronautical Chart and Information Center

ACIC resources in Europe provide for all routine flying publications (i.e., airways charts, maps, enroute supplement, and terminal approach charts) used by US forces' flying operations in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East areas. ACIC personnel operate a store and distribute publications to all users.

Air Force Logistics Command

AFLC resources provide for depot maintenance liaison and contract maintenance supervision to insure adequate logistic support for BMEWS, F-4, F-111, and other weapons systems and for petroleum quality assurance for all Air Force aircraft operations in Europe.

Headquarters Command

HQCOMD is the administrative parent unit for personnel who perform duties in a wide range of mission support roles throughout Europe. The functions are, for the most part, self-explanatory, and as follows:

- a. Support to other nations (includes personnel in international military headquarters and agencies and in Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGS), military mission and military assistance groups (Mil Groups, and personnel in all joint activities, such as NATO and EUCOM).
- b. Postal and Courier. The Postal and Courier Service operates a worldwide postal service in support of Air Force personnel and certain other governmental departments/agencies as provided for through specific agreements. Postal and Courier personnel are organizationally aligned into very small units (operating locations, detachments, and squadrons), as required to support the organizations serviced.
- c. Air Force Audit Agency. Air Force Audit Agency personnel are located throughout Europe, primarily on Air Force installations, as required to provide auditor services to the various organizational entities supported.

Air Force Office of Special Investigations

OSI personnel are located in small detachments throughout Europe, primarily on Air Force installations. OSI personnel provide investigational and counter-intelligence services to the various organizational commanders supported.

Air Force Systems Command

[Deleted.]

Air Training Command

ATC resources in Europe are organized in field training detachments which provide F-4, RF-4, and F-111 classroom and in-shop weapons system training

and maintenance management training at six locations. The detachments are collocated with the tactical units they support. During increased defense conditions (DEFCONs), the ATC instructor personnel can be quickly assimilated into the tactical unit to provide additional maintenance/operational capability.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING INCREASE

The CHAIRMAN. One reason I am getting into this is that I feel something must be done in order to strengthen the services. Anything that can be taken out numerically must be to allow us to concentrate on the more qualified men and just what is necessary, and I think in that way we would find strength.

Concerning the question of training, I think we can find a much better way than spending so much time on training so many men. The number of men devoted to both recruit and specialized training will be increased in fiscal year 1973 over fiscal year 1972. Overall training is being reduced by only 2,000 men to a total of 458,000. At a time when we are reducing our manpower in Vietnam, the question naturally arises—why is recruit and specialist training being increased? What do you have to say on that? Here is another phase of it. What planning assumption is each service using for the numbers of men in Vietnam at the end of 1973 when it calculates its training requirements? You can give those figures if you have them ready. What is the answer here to this overall question?

Mr. KELLEY. A partial answer, and it is only a partial answer to the first part of your question, is that we have to replace in fiscal 1973 the people who are leaving the services, many of whom are draftees on a short-term obligation. The total new accession requirements of the services in fiscal 1973 will be in excess of 500,000, which is a considerably higher number than for fiscal 1972. This accounts for the higher manning level and higher cost of recruit and basic specialist training in fiscal 1973 over fiscal 1972. I would like to expand on this subject for the record.

(The information follows:)

The table below summarizes by Service the recruit and specialized training programs in fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973. The manpower increases are explained in detail below for each type of training.

RECRUIT AND SPECIALIZED TRAINING

[Active military manpower in thousands]

	End year	
	Fiscal year 1972	Fiscal year 1973
Army:		
Recruit.....	99.1	92.7
Specialized.....	42.3	41.9
Navy:		
Recruit.....	17.3	23.8
Specialized.....	53.1	53.5
Air Force:		
Recruit.....	14.3	16.5
Specialized.....	41.8	43.0
Marine Corps:		
Recruit.....	18.0	17.9
Specialized.....	15.1	15.2
Total:		
Recruit.....	148.7	150.9
Specialized.....	152.3	153.6

RECRUIT TRAINING

The rate at which recruits must be trained is a function of projected trained strength requirements versus projected trained strength inventories. If the inventory of trained men is not forecast to be as large as the need, new men must be trained. The inventory of trained men in a given year is determined by the inventory in the previous year minus the losses to that inventory.

The number of personnel required to support a given trainee load in each phase of recruit training is established through military staffing guides which result from work measurement studies and historical experience. In general terms, however, the number of instructors and overhead staff in recruit training is related to the trainee load which is the number of recruit trainees in training per week.

In recruit training in FY73 the number of active military men at end year is programed to increase by 2.2 thousand men, or 1.5%, over the FY72 level. The basic reason for this is the 6.5 thousand increase in Navy recruit training and the 2.2 thousand increase in Air Force recruit training.

In the Navy the increased trainee load and consequent increased requirement for instructors and staff is the result of a higher demand for new accessions. These are required to replace expected losses from an unusually large group of four year enlistees that entered the Navy in FY69.

Similarly, in the Air Force, the increased trainee load is due to increased accessions necessary to replace losses from an unusually large group of men procured in FY 69. For example, 117,874 enlisted men were procured in FY 69. This compares to an average procurement of about 90,000 per year.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING

Specialized training provides individuals with new or higher degrees of skills to match specific job requirements. Each year a certain percentage of those who graduate from recruit training receive immediate additional specialized training. Therefore, the number of men in the specialized training establishment in a given year is, in general, a function both of the number of new accessions in that year and the number of men already in the Service who require additional training. As in recruit training, the number of instructors and staff is related generally to the average student load; however, the actual programing of instructors and staff is done at a much more detailed level.

The increase in manpower in specialized training from FY72 to FY73 totals only about 1,300 men. The increase in student loads for the Air Force and the Navy are accountable to the same reasons applicable to recruit training.

The increases discussed take into account the reductions between FY72 and FY73 in total average enlisted strength programed for Navy and Air Force—reductions which total 5,500 manyears for Navy and 20,400 manyears for Air Force.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. You are going to train more men in fiscal 1973 than you did in 1972?

Mr. KELLEY. Basic training; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What about fiscal 1971?

Mr. KELLEY. My recollection is that in fiscal 1971, new accessions were higher than 1972 and about the same as projected for 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. I would think it would be a little less. The draw down was at a faster rate in 1972.

Mr. KELLEY. The gains from civilian life for fiscal 1971 were 649,000, 508,000 in 1972, and projected 570,000 in fiscal 1973. So 1973 is higher than 1972 but lower than 1971.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to take in more men now to require this training during fiscal 1973 than fiscal 1972?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. Because of the very rapid drawdown of forces in 1972, for one reason.

The CHAIRMAN. What planning assumptions are in each of those services for the number of men at the end of 1973? What was the number when you made these training requirements calculations?

Mr. KELLEY. For the end strength?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY. Two million three—are you speaking of the end strength in Vietnam?

The CHAIRMAN. Men in Vietnam. Talking about the drawdown in Vietnam.

Mr. KELLEY. I would have to check the record for that, Mr. Chairman; I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. We checked out the number that you were calculating on, and I do not think it has been gone into in previous years, certainly not enough. We gave you money based on your estimates, and the estimates turned out to be a lot more money than was needed. This year we want to know more about what you definitely are going to need and come near hitting it, so that the President has all of this emergency power and everything else.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Concerning Vietnam, the rest of the drawdown after May is not going to make very much difference anyway if you get it down to—what is that figure?

Mr. KELLEY. Sixty, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. 60,000.

Mr. KELLEY. 69,000.

The CHAIRMAN. That is by May of this year.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; by May of this year.

The CHAIRMAN. The fiscal year will not start until July 1, of course.

Anyway, we would like to know what your planning assumptions were for each service.

Mr. KELLEY. All right, sir.

(The information follows:)

Our answer is in the context of the chairman's earlier question regarding increases in recruit and specialized training in fiscal year 1973 "at a time when we are reducing our manpower in Vietnam."

An explanation of the reasons for increases in recruit and specialized training in fiscal year 1973 is given on page 128. The increases in these training categories, as the explanation indicates are required to replace unusually large enlisted losses of men who entered Navy and Air Force Service in fiscal year 1969 and takes into account the projected decline in average total enlisted strength for these Services between fiscal year 1972 and fiscal year 1973 of 5,500 and 20,400 manyears respectively.

PAY INCREASE

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard rumors about another pay increase this year. As you know, there has been no recommendation made yet but do you personally favor an additional increase now? We need some counsel and advice on the matter.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, in my judgment, military pay has reached competitive levels with civilian pay. That is all I care to say about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it has, too. I know it has reached what I consider enormous levels in certain categories. In conferences on the bill, I felt that more money should go to the benefit of the sergeants rather than to put so much on raw recruits.

Mr. KELLEY. We recognize that arguments can be made that inasmuch as military jobs are not to be compared with civilian jobs, a different level of pay is justifiable on behalf of the military, but I remain with my position that military pay is competitive with civilian pay.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have to stop a while and let you evaluate all of this and see what you can do on the volunteer army concept.

Mr. KELLEY. Of course, as I noted this morning, we have not had an opportunity to measure the impact of the recent pay raises on military retention or accessions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES

Mr. Secretary, I would like to clear up, if I can, the responsibilities of your office compared with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am not completely sure this is clear for the record and I have some questions here. If there are any questions that you feel the Joint Chiefs should answer you can state so. I would like to have them answered for the record.

Mr. KELLEY. All right, sir.

Senator THURMOND. I asked a number of manpower questions this morning that you indicated you prefer to reply by way of inserts for the record.

I understand in talking with the staff that it may be helpful to clear up your responsibilities, which I understand might not be identical with your job title.

Is it correct, Mr. Secretary, that prior to preparation for these hearings, that even though your title here is Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, that in fact, you did not have responsibilities for "manpower" in the Department of Defense?

Mr. KELLEY. That I did not or do not?

Senator THURMOND. That you do not have or did not.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, no, sir; I do not believe that is a correct statement.

Senator THURMOND. Do you have responsibility for manpower?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I do. But let me attempt to explain what my responsibility is.

I included in my statement a section on what my responsibility is. It is to provide a personnel policy structure which serves the best interests of our national security and whose policies are fair to people.

It is not possible, in my opinion, to separate personnel policy on the one hand from manpower and force size considerations on the other. My responsibilities are certainly more heavily weighted on the side of personnel policy than they are on the side of force manning considerations, but I have a responsibility which encompasses manpower and which is even broader in terms of Reserve affairs.

Senator THURMOND. You would set out the policies for individuals in the services? In other words, so-called personnel policies, I guess? Who would determine how many divisions an Army is to have, how many of those divisions will be located in NATO in Europe or other places, and be able to justify or validate that number?

Mr. KELLEY. That would be the determination made on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

Senator THURMOND. So, you would not make that determination?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Is that made by the Secretary of Defense then in his collaboration with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or do you make the recommendation to the Secretary of Defense after you confer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Does that go through you at all?

Mr. KELLEY. On force size and composition?

Senator THURMOND. Yes; number of divisions in NATO and anywhere else. Do you make any recommendations on that after conferring with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or does the Secretary reach a decision from direct conference with them?

Mr. KELLEY. The principal staff assistance provided the Secretary on a subject like that is provided by Systems Analysis and not by Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

However, to the extent that the configuration of forces impacts on individual members of the Armed Forces in a way that does not make them productive and does not make them effective as members of a unit, then I become involved.

Senator THURMOND. I was coming to that. In other words, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis then is a civilian in the Defense Department who, after conferring with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would give the Secretary of Defense a recommendation concerning the number of units the Army should have and where they should be stationed?

Mr. KELLEY. I think it might be more accurate to say, Senator, that he would coordinate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any recommendation made to the Secretary about the number of divisions constituting the Army or the relationship between the Army structure and the structure of the other services.

Senator THURMOND. So, do you have anything to do with making recommendations as to where divisions or units are located?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. That is entirely up to the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis?

Mr. KELLEY. It is not entirely up to him.

Senator THURMOND. And the Joint Chiefs?

Mr. KELLEY. It is a primary responsibility of the Joint Chiefs but is coordinated within OSD with the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis.

Senator THURMOND. Then, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis would not make the recommendation himself after he confers with the members of the Joint Chiefs, but he would join them in making a recommendation or may differ with them?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. They both then make a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. KELLEY. That is correct, or one may make a recommendation and coordinate it with the other.

Senator THURMOND. This is a function for which the Secretary of Defense does not have a direct recommendation from any one civilian under him?

Mr. KELLEY. He would in the case of a disagreement between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis. If those two concurred in a recommendation then there would be, of course, only a single recommendation given to the Secretary. If they disagreed, then their disagreements would be in the form of separate recommendations to the Secretary.

Senator THURMOND. Since the military is always considered subordinate to civilians, I was not sure whether there was a civilian who would make a recommendation to his chief, the Secretary of Defense, directly after conference and conferring with the military. From what I understand, if the Joint Chiefs and the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis agree, then they join in a recommendation; if they disagree they both submit their own recommendations.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; and I think that is the standard procedure that we follow in the management system of the Pentagon today, not only with regard to relationships between the Joint Chiefs and, in this case, Systems Analysis, but in the relationship between any of the senior military officers who have a direct reporting relationship to the Secretary and those of us assistant secretaries who also do.

Senator THURMOND. Who would make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the size and number of units, is it the same Joint Chiefs and Assistant Secretary for System Analysis?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator THURMOND. What role does the National Security Council staff play in this process, if any?

Mr. KELLEY. The National Security Council—and I may need help in answering this question—the National Security Council fulfills mainly the role of evaluating the threat and making judgments as to how we respond to the threat in terms of total force capability. Once that judgment is made, the further determination of how to break down total force capability into units and people becomes a responsibility which largely resides within the Pentagon. In other words, the Service Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis recommend to the Secretary of Defense the force structure decision to be taken.

Senator THURMOND. So, as I understand, then, if I get it clear for the record, the size and number of units in all of the services would be determined by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; to insure committee understanding of this subject I would like to extend my remarks for the record.

(The information follows:)

The National Security Council advises the President on broad policy questions, such as the allocation of resources between Defense and non-Defense programs. The NSC provides the President's policy guidance to the Department of Defense. Decisions on how to translate the President's broad policy guidance into substan-

tive strategic and force planning guidance are made within the Department of Defense. The Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on the planning guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense, recommend definitive force and manpower programs. These programs include recommendations on the number of major military force units by type. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis coordinates the review of these recommendations with the OSD staff and insures that all relevant options are adequately presented. The Secretary of Defense, after consideration of the recommendations of the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the alternatives presented by Systems Analysis, makes the final decision.

PLANNING SYSTEM

Senator THURMOND. They would also determine where those units would be deployed? I mean, they would make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense as to where the units would be deployed?

Mr. KELLEY. The physical location of their deployment?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY. That would be a recommendation made in collaboration with the National Security Council.

Senator THURMOND. The National Security Council would join them on that?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; now, before we leave the record on that point, I think I should suggest to you that Mr. Sullivan, who is Director of Manpower Requirements for Systems Analysis, is present here and can either confirm the accuracy of my responses to your question or make suitable revisions or additions to my responses.

Senator THURMOND. I would be very pleased to have Mr. Sullivan come around and either confirm or make modification, if you care to, as to what Secretary Kelley had to say.

Mr. SULLIVAN. I think Secretary Kelley's statements are a good representation. Let me add a little explanation of the detailed process that takes place in the Defense Department. The planning system—

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to have more time but your time is already over, so please be as brief as you can.

Mr. SULLIVAN. The planning system basically starts with the fiscal and planning guidance. The Secretary issues this early in the year to the Services and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who then each year propose the numbers of units, the kind of units and manning of those units to meet the guidance. Those proposals are then reviewed by various components of the OSD staff. Systems Analysis does play a key role in that process. There are other offices. For example, the Assistant Secretary for ISA looks very closely at what kind of deployments we have. But basically, the process is one of the services proposing and the Secretary getting advice from both the Joint Chiefs and his civilian staff in the OSD itself. So that it is an iterative process that takes place throughout the year and it is one that takes into consideration all of the various things that you have asked about and that Secretary Kelley has answered.

Senator THURMOND. The Secretary of Defense then does not have a civilian as one of his assistants to take responsibility to make him a recommendation solely, certain civilian assistants, and that is the Systems Analysis, as I understand, is joined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making the recommendation.

Mr. SULLIVAN. There are civilians who have the responsibility to review and recommend on the program, yes, sir. There are also recom-

mendations from the military departments as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator THURMOND. My time is up. I am going to submit some questions here and I want to get this record clear as to who is responsible, because from what Secretary Kelley says it seems that he deals with personnel policies and possibly not manpower except in the sense of personnel policies. In other words, where is the manpower going, how much manpower in Europe, and who is going to say how much it should be? I want to get clear cut answers.

Can you and Secretary Kelley get together and answer these questions so the record will be perfectly clear on that?

Mr. KELLEY. There is not the slightest question in my mind about what my manpower responsibilities are. The only embellishment I was looking for from Systems Analysis was an accurate statement of what their role in the force structure decisionmaking process was.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Questions submitted by Senator Thurmond. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.)

Question. Mr. Secretary, are the people in charge of manpower for the individual services here today or not because we want to ask questions of those individuals who do have the responsibility for this important assignment?

Answer. The Service witnesses present are designated by their respective Service Secretaries to discuss their military manpower requirements and personnel problems before this Committee.

Question. An important illustration, I believe, is the number of U.S. forces stationed in Europe in response to our NATO commitments. We have approximately 305,000 people there. This is certainly a manpower issue. Who at the Department of Defense civilian echelon is responsible for deciding whether this number of military forces should be 305,000, 250,000, or 350,000?

Answer. On an issue of this magnitude and political importance, the President, with the advice of the National Security Council, would make the ultimate decision. Within DOD the responsibility rests with the Secretary of Defense. To support the Secretary's judgment on so complex an issue, the opinions and analysis of several internal DOD agencies (the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Assistant Secretaries for International Security Affairs, Comptroller, Systems Analysis, Installations and Logistics, etc.) as well as interagency coordination with State, Treasury, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and others would be required to determine the military, political, and cost implications of such a move so that sound recommendations can be made.

Question. Who is responsible in the manpower area for testifying and justifying the proper number of people who are located in the various headquarters commands about which I questioned you this morning?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense or his Deputy for the Department of Defense as a whole. The Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff can testify on and justify the manning of the headquarters under Service control. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can testify on and justify the manning of joint and international headquarters.

Question. Who is responsible for testifying and justifying whether the number of Generals and Colonels and/or Admirals and Captains in the various commands throughout the world is sufficient, excessive, or understaffed?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense or his Deputy have the responsibility for the Department of Defense as a whole. The Service Secretaries can testify to and justify the numbers of senior officers in commands under their control, and

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can do the same for joint and international headquarters.

Assignments to three and four star positions are made by the President, or by the Secretary of Defense with the President's approval.

The number of officers in each grade above Captain/Lieutenant (Junior Grade) is controlled by the Officer Grade Limitation Act. The number of flag officers is further controlled by the ceiling set by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) reviews the Service programs annually to insure that these ceilings are not exceeded. In addition, the Assistant Secretary (M&RA), at the direction of the Congress, is presently conducting a review in depth of the number of officers in the grades of Colonel/Captain and above.

Question. To whom do we talk about these important subjects, and who is responsible?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense for the whole subject area. For specific subjects, the officials named in the answers to the previous questions can address the subjects in their areas of responsibility in greater detail.

Question. Mr. Secretary, we have 195,000 Army personnel in Europe; 64,000 Air Force; 38,480 Navy; plus 8,800 in NATO activities. Who specifically determines whether each service has the correct level of U.S. forces in Europe?

Answer. The Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense, upon the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries. Major alterations of force deployments would be decided upon by the President with the advice of the National Security Council.

Question. Is it your responsibility or someone else's to determine what reduction in forces can be made in Europe without significantly impairing the NATO alliance.

Answer. The President of the United States has the ultimate responsibility for approving force reductions of any significant magnitude.

Question. Mr. Secretary, can you justify to the committee the number of military manpower that is involved in the Military Assistance Program in Europe recognizing that 750 people are currently associated with this program?

Answer. Prior to 1 January 1972 there were 440 US Military Personnel associated with the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Europe. Forty of these personnel were in Hq, United States European Command (USEUCOM), while the remaining 400 were authorized in MAAGs or similar type organizations within 14 different countries in EUCOM's area. Effective 1 January 1972, USCINCEUR assumed the Military Assistance functions for the Middle East, and Africa South of the Sahara that were formerly performed by Commander in Chief, Strike Command/Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. This functional transfer necessitated an increase of 15 military personnel for Hq, USEUCOM to support MAP activities in seven additional countries. Within these additional seven countries, there are 555 military personnel performing MAP related activities. The military manpower requirement to support the new Security Assistance (SA) Program are based upon the size and complexity of the SA program in each country, the size and structure of the host country armed forces, requirements for end item inspections and the need for personnel for the administration and support of the MAAG. These manpower requirements are reviewed annually as a minimum by the concerned CINC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and finally the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. It should be noted that there has been a decrease of over 50% in the MAAGs authorized manpower in the past 10 years.

Question. Are you aware there are 10 Generals and 55 Colonels assigned to this program? Do you believe that it is necessary to maintain this number of high ranking people in a program of this type recognizing that our grant aid is now limited essentially to three countries—Greece, Turkey, and Spain?

Answer. Yes, within the Military Assistance Directorate in Hq, USEUCOM, and the 14 countries in which USCINCEUR administered the Military Assistance Program prior to 1 January 1972, there were 10 General/Flag Officers and 55 Colonels. Although grant aid is now limited, the Nixon Doctrine of country self-sufficiency necessitates an active and aggressive role by the MAAG personnel to

pursue this goal. The rapport and knowledge of senior military personnel with the host government military organizations has proven to be the most effective means for the US military to influence the host government in areas of mutual concern to the US Government. Any lessening of the current rank structure of the MAAGs could degrade a now productive and efficient organization that has gained the respect and confidence of host country counterparts. In those countries which are military oriented, the ranks of the MAAG personnel are looked upon by the host government as directly proportional to the interest expressed by the US Government in that particular country. A reduction in our representative ranks could be interpreted by the host government as a lessening of our interest in their particular national goals.

Question. Whom do we ask about the justification for 44 full-time people engaged in this program at the European headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, alone?

Answer. The approving authority for security assistance manpower spaces within Unified Command Headquarters is the Secretary of Defense; which has been further delegated to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

As stated previously, the number of military personnel required to administer the MAP in Hq, USEUCOM, is a function of the requirement to administer the military aspects of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, and the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, as amended. These manpower requirements are reviewed by the CINC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs. Additionally, once every 3 years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conduct a manpower survey of the Headquarters of Unified Commands to evaluate and validate manpower requirements. These controls insure that the minimum essential number of military personnel are authorized for the Unified Command to perform the MAP functions.

UNFUNDED RETIREMENT

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To get back on an earlier discussion, Mr. Secretary, the cost of military retirement. In 1967, you testified this morning, it was \$1.8 billion, and the present budget carries a figure, a total figure of \$4.9 billion.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. My question now is what is the unfunded military retirement for fiscal 1973?

Mr. KELLEY. General Benade, do you want to provide that information?

General BENADE. The unfunded liability of the military system at the end of 1971 was \$117 billion. At the end of fiscal year 1973 the estimated unfunded liability will be \$129 billion.

Senator BYRD. The answer, then, would be \$129 billion at the end of 1973, fiscal 1973?

General BENADE. Yes, sir.

MILITARY PAY INCREASE

Senator BYRD. You, Mr. Secretary, have charge of personnel, personnel policy and personnel policy structure with emphasis on fairness to people. I think that is the expression you used and it is a good one. And then, in response to Senator Stennis, I assume that you do not contemplate recommending another military pay increase?

Mr. KELLEY. I suppose you could draw that inference from what I said. I would rather not comment beyond what I said on the advisability of a further military pay increase.

Senator BYRD. This committee, Mr. Secretary, is charged with the responsibility of authorizing money. Now we need the advice and the judgment of the man responsible for personnel policies.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. I thought I addressed that point directly by saying that in my judgment, military pay was competitive with civilian pay. That is the standard which we held out as an objective for the military pay system.

Senator BYRD. That is right. So, I would judge from that that you and the Defense Department do not plan to recommend any military pay increase?

Mr. KELLEY. I am sorry, I cannot say that.

Senator BYRD. To put it another way. I would judge from what you do not say that you are planning to recommend another military pay increase.

Mr. KELLEY. Certainly, you could not say that. But I am not authorized to say to you that the Department of Defense either is or is not.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Secretary, I do not recall exactly whether this question was put to you when you came before the committee for confirmation, it has been put by the chairman to most nominees, and that is, that the nominee, whether he be a military man or a civilian, would give the committee his judgment.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Give the committee his judgment.

Mr. KELLEY. I have always attempted to do so, but I cannot tell this committee, because I am not authorized to, what the Department of Defense may do with respect to further actions in the pay area. I offered the judgment, which is my best judgment, that military pay is already competitive with civilian pay.

Senator BYRD. So, you could not as Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel Policy, you could not recommend that there be a change?

Mr. KELLEY. No; I could not recommend that there be a change.

Senator BYRD. So your recommendation would be that there not be a change?

Mr. KELLEY. I think that is what you have to conclude from what I have said, and I am not trying to be devious. I am simply telling you what my best judgment is in the situation, and it is my judgment that there would be no basis for my recommending a further change in the form of an additional military pay increase.

Senator BYRD. If there was to be an additional change, the recommendation, necessarily, in the chain of command, would come from you as Director of manpower and as one who is charged with personnel policy. Would that not be the case?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. Thank you.

STATION CHANGES

May we stay a moment on this? On page 40 of your statement you say the military member has made a permanent change of station move on the average of one a year and the annual cost of travel alone in such moves exceeds \$1 billion.

Are you making changes in that present system? Is it reasonable to have an average of one permanent station move a year?

Mr. KELLEY. No; it's not reasonable in the sense of being efficient, but the frequency of those moves has been driven by conditions over which the services have very limited control. One of the conditions that drove those frequent moves was, for example, the large number of individuals on 1-year tours in Southeast Asia. Another was the 2-year draft obligation. Another was the requirement that the services, particularly the Army, had to accept releasing people early in order to stay within the limitation of man-years authorized for the individual services.

Senator BYRD. You are getting away from the 1 year, you still have the 1-year limitation but that will apply to fewer and fewer men as far as Vietnam is concerned. You are not drafting to any great extent now, so the 2-year draft requirement will be to some considerable extent eliminated.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; and that will be reflected in a lengthening of the assignment tours of individuals. The average assignment tour will be longer in fiscal 1973 than it was in 1972.

Senator BYRD. I noticed you put the cost at \$1 billion. Do you think that will be reduced?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; it has to be reduced and it will be reduced as the period of assignment is lengthened. My characterizing of the effects of turbulence is recent past tense and not a forecast of things as they will be in fiscal 1973.

Senator BYRD. So you expect an improvement for 1973 in that respect?

Mr. KELLEY. We expect a modest improvement in 1973. The reason that I included this as a chief manpower issue is because I think it bears a causal relationship to so many of the problems that we have with people in the Armed Forces today. I think the problems associated with frequent moves should be a compelling force that drives us to build stability into the system and to consider every one of our major programs and every one of our personnel policies in terms of whether they contribute to stability rather than to turbulence.

DISCIPLINE

Senator BYRD. As one who is responsible for personnel policy, how do you size up the discipline in the Armed Forces now with particular reference to the Army?

Mr. KELLEY. I think it is tremendously improved, Senator Byrd, over what it was, say, 2 years ago. I think this is a reflection of two major factors, and I am sure there are others. One of the factors is that the Vietnam war, particularly because of the extent of our manpower involvement, certainly confused many of our young people and more or less polluted the atmosphere.

The second factor was that the turnover of command personnel—petty officers, squad leaders, first sergeants, company commanders, platoon leaders—was so high that the individual just never had an opportunity to establish an effective working relationship with a group of people, and without the force of good leadership, the breakdowns of discipline were frequent.

As the Army has the opportunity to keep people in place a little longer and is doing an increasingly better job in training people, supervisory as well as non-supervisory, there is a better environment for control and discipline. I think the Army and the other services have made great strides. This is reflected in, if not a lowering, at least an apparent plateau in what had been a disturbing rise in the number of absentee incidents and the rate of desertions in the services.

There are some indications in the first quarter of this year that this picture has seen its worst and is beginning to improve.

Senator BYRD. The desertion rate has seen its worst?

Mr. KELLEY. It has seen its worst.

Senator BYRD. What was the average assignment prior to fiscal year 1964, which is before the Vietnam war? Was it somewhere around a year, slightly over a year?

Mr. KELLEY. I have figures for Army tour lengths in Europe in fiscal year 1964. I will supply them for the record.

(The information follows:)

In fiscal year 1964, the earliest year for which statistics have been maintained, the Army experienced in Europe an average tour-completion rate of 26 months for enlisted personnel and 32 months for officers. In fiscal year 1971, the average had dropped to 16 months for enlisted personnel and 23 months for officers.

RELATED COSTS

Senator BYRD. If my recollection is correct, and if it was not much more than a year, it seems to me there may be other policies within the Defense Department which leads to the short tour.

On page 19 you use the figure 57 percent or 52 percent, as the case might be, that is allocated to pay and related costs; 57 percent in fiscal 1973 of the outlays, 57 percent of the outlays will be for pay and related costs.

My question is this. When you speak of related costs, have you included such things as troop housing, recruiting expenses, medical expenses, other than the command post program. Are all of those related costs included?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir, they are not. I wonder if Mr. Detwyler might respond to that. Can you tell us, Carl, specifically what items are included in the account "pay and related costs"?

Mr. DETWYLER. Yes, sir, we have the military personnel appropriations for both the active forces and the Reserve components. We have retired pay, the cost of our volunteer program, family housing, our medical CHAMPUS program and the civilian payroll.

Senator BYRD. Do you have troop housing?

Mr. DETWYLER. No, sir.

Senator BYRD. Should not that be part of related costs?

Mr. DETWYLER. It could be, but we have difficulty trying to put a cost factor on it, sir. We have tried to identify things that we could specifically put a cost tag on and not have to estimate.

Senator BYRD. How about recruiting expenses?

Mr. DETWYLER. They are not in here.

Senator BYRD. In other words, the 57 percent is really a minimum, then?

Mr. DETWYLER. It certainly does not include all the costs, sir; you are entirely correct.

Senator BYRD. The point I am suggesting is, it seems to me a rather serious one. I am not saying salaries should not to be what they are, but for every defense dollar we spend we are going to have considerably less than 50 cents that can go into military hardware.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. With outlays it goes up to 57 percent for fiscal 1973, even though some of the costs really are not, recruiting, for example, and troop housing is not included in that figure. So what the Congress and the Defense Department, as I see it, are faced with for the future is that we have our personnel costs so high that we are going to have difficulty in buying submarines and destroyers and aircraft and guns and tanks and so forth. Does that seem a fair assumption?

Mr. KELLEY. That is a good statement of the problem.

Senator BYRD. How many personnel do we have? What is the total personnel in the Pentagon now?

Mr. KELLEY. The total personnel, military and civilian, is about 30,000. I can get a more exact figure for the record.

(The information follows:)

The actual number was 24,988 as of 31 December 1971.

Senator BYRD. Approximately 30,000.

To get back to the previous question, perhaps maybe I should address it to you, with the Secretary's permission. The Pentagon spends about a billion dollars each year on beef for the messhall. Is that included in the 57 percent?

Mr. DETWYLER. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. And all of the food for the messhalls?

Mr. DETWYLER. Yes, sir, plus the allowances for subsistences.

HEADQUARTERS IN SHAPE

Senator BYRD. I have some questions in regard to NATO but I am not certain from your responses to other members of the committee whether they should be addressed to you or to someone else. What is your feeling in that regard?

Mr. KELLEY. I do not know what kind of questions you have in mind, Senator.

Senator BYRD. We will start and see how it works out. I understand there are 22 NATO headquarters in SHAPE. Is this not a needless number of headquarters? Do you feel each of these headquarters is essential?

Mr. KELLEY. I think questions of that variety should be directed to Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer. However, we would be happy to supply that information for the record, but I think they can speak directly to it.

(The information appears on p. 74-77.)

RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT TO EUROPE

Senator BYRD. Let me ask you this and I think it is along the line of Senator Thurmond's question but it will not hurt to ask you again.

Who determines whether the number of U.S. personnel assigned to Europe should be 310,000, 250,000, 350,000, or what, or some other figure?

Mr. KELLEY. That is a determination which is made between the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and National Security Council.

OVERSTAFFING

Senator BYRD. Just one final question. You in your colloquy with the chairman very candidly stated you thought that there was overstaffing and that that overstaffing applied elsewhere as well as the military. In private industry, if management runs into problems financially, that sort of tends to take care of the overstaffing, does it not?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; it does.

Senator BYRD. And we do not have that same situation in Government.

Mr. KELLEY. There are many dissimilarities between private industry and Government. That is one of them.

Senator BYRD. As Assistant Secretary for Manpower, would it not be a logical top priority program to reduce the overstaffing?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I think that is a logical priority.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

MANPOWER COSTS

Going back to this thing, I want to make clear when we talk about the personnel costs, retirement costs and manpower costs, that is no reflection on the manpower. If we put a little more money on quality servicemen and stop retiring so many in their forties, we can clear up this manpower cost picture a little, and have a little more money left to buy weapons because they are skyrocketing right along. We want to try to get into that procurement, too. I know you and Mr. Laird do.

On this manpower cost, Senator Byrd, the figures that I have, this was 43½ percent of the Defense budget in fiscal year 1964, and in this budget they are 56.8 percent. If housing, recruiting and similar items are added the figure approaches 67 percent.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, would you yield at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator BYRD. You mean, in other words, two-thirds of each dollar spent is for manpower and pay and related costs.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, really related. If you add housing, recruiting and so on—and recruiting is increased by this increased number of men you are handling, in part at least—you get 67 percent. But I think in the hard thinking that is better to use the 56.8 percent.

Senator BYRD. But, in any case, if the Nation agrees to spend \$80 billion on defense, the Nation will get very little military equipment, very little military hardware for that \$80 billion?

The CHAIRMAN. The relative percentage is what I have said.

Senator BYRD. About a third.

The CHAIRMAN. Matters that go directly and indirectly to the manpower levels approach that 67 percent.

Senator BYRD. Is that not another reason then that every effort should be made to reduce the total manpower that we have in the military?

RETIREMENT PAY: ACTUARIAL TECHNIQUES

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think it is necessary that we stop retiring them at such an early age.

General, you gave us the \$129 billion figure, accrued liability for retirement pay. It would be that at the end of fiscal 1973?

General BENADE. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you calculate that?

General BENADE. Through actuarial techniques.

The CHAIRMAN. What are those actuarial techniques?

General BENADE. It represents the liability incurred for services already performed. It represents that amount of money which if invested at interest, in this case $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent, would be required to pay retirement benefits for service already performed.

The CHAIRMAN. To hold it down to \$129 billion would we have to appropriate it into a trust fund?

General BENADE. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What rate of interest would it draw?

General BENADE. $3\frac{1}{2}$ percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Would we accumulate enough by that time to pay off this obligation?

General BENADE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we do not put up the \$129 billion, what is the situation then?

General BENADE. As it is today, sir. It is handled each year as part of the annual appropriation and the amount steadily rises each year.

The CHAIRMAN. If we do not deposit the \$129 billion obligation in a trust fund and let it draw interest, how much is it going to cost the Treasury year after year to pay it off in addition to the \$129 billion?

General BENADE. I cannot answer that, Mr. Chairman. I would point out that by not having it in a fund the Government, of course, is getting the use of that money, so one balances off against the other.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to get the figures from you. How much would that \$129 billion earn if we put it now in a trust fund? Do you have any calculations on what the earnings would be from now until the time it was paid out?

General BENADE. I do not have it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anyone in the Pentagon who does?

General BENADE. No, sir. We can certainly make such a calculation as to how much interest \$129 billion would earn. It is a simple calculation. I just do not have it with me.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your answer of \$129 billion should have that qualifying factor. It would be \$129 billion provided you put up the money now and let it draw interest, but if you do not you are going to have to pay x billion more.

Senator BYRD. Just to make the record more complete, I wonder if we could ask the general if he would supply for the record the figures for the unfunded military retirement liability beginning with, say, fiscal 1964, 10 years ago. Bring it year by year to fiscal 1973.

General BENADE. I have the figures with me from 1967, sir, which I can provide now and I will be glad to provide the others.

(The information follows:)

Unfunded Military Retirement Liability¹

Fiscal year:	Millions
1964	\$56,071
1965	58,252
1966	66,585
1967	70,396
1968	77,228
1969	86,269
1970	103,426
1971	117,870
1972	126,385
1973	129,854

¹ As of the end of the fiscal year, based on pay rates in effect on that date for fiscal years prior to fiscal year 1972 and January 1, 1972 rates for subsequent years.

NOTE 1. None of the above figures make any allowance for increases in basic pay rates or for increases in the Consumer Price Index after January 1, 1972.

NOTE 2. No reduction in accrued costs has been made for nonpayment of retired pay by reason of VA waiver, dual compensation laws, etc. Accrual costs are calculated at 3½ percent interest.

General BENADE. In fiscal year 1967 the unfunded liability was \$70 billion, \$396 million; in fiscal year 1968, \$77 billion, \$228 million; fiscal 1969, \$86 billion, \$269 million; fiscal 1970, \$103 billion, \$426 million; fiscal 1971, \$117 billion, \$870 million; fiscal 1972, \$126 billion, \$385 million; and as I indicated previously, estimated end fiscal 1973, \$129 billion, \$854 million.

Senator BYRD. If the chairman would permit me just to ask two more questions?

The CHAIRMAN. I yield to the Senator.

Senator BYRD. I took this down hurriedly and I may be in error. Check me. But for fiscal 1969 it went from \$80 billion to \$103 billion?

General BENADE. Fiscal 1969 was \$86 billion.

Senator BYRD. Then it went, next year it went to \$103 billion?

General BENADE. Yes, sir.

Senator BYRD. So that was an increase in 1 year of \$23 billion; the next year it increased \$9 billion; this year the increase is \$3 billion.

I wonder why the increase is descending each year.

General BENADE. The larger years, Senator, represent the effect of pay raises and CPI increases. For example, there were two pay increases in fiscal year 1970; one was effective July 1, 1969, and the other was effective January 1, 1970.

Each year people going onto the retired rolls are going on at the higher rates of pay.

Senator BYRD. In 1969, in that 1 year, it increased \$23 billion, which is more than 25 percent.

General BENADE. In 1969 it increased \$9 billion over fiscal 1968. Between 1969 and 1970 there was an increase of \$17 billion, not 27.

Senator BYRD. Did it go from \$80 billion to \$103 billion?

General BENADE. It went from \$86 billion in 1969 to \$103 billion in 1970.

Senator BYRD. 17?

General BENADE. Right.

Senator BYRD. That has been the largest increase in any 1 year?

General BENADE. Yes, sir. But that is a function, as I say, sir, of rates of pay that are in effect and which determine the Government's liability to the active service and retired groups at that point in time.

Senator BYRD. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd, this is an intriguing subject. In 1957, I chaired a subcommittee that held hearings on a military pay bill and we did go into the subject of retired pay. Mr. Braswell, my staff assistant, made a lot of calculations and an actuary figured out when it would hit the billion dollars. When we asked the Pentagon about that they did not believe it. It was hard to get at but it hit just a little ahead of when he said it would. I think it was 1959 that it hit a billion dollars.

Senator BYRD. That is the funded part, not the unfunded?

The CHAIRMAN. No; that is the per-year cost. It has gone up so rapidly since then that it has really become a problem.

I want to go back just a minute. The cost of this training, it seems to me, is a big item with you and we want you to supply for the record, Mr. Secretary, what were the calculations for the manpower needed for Vietnam when you made this training calculation?

Mr. KELLEY. For fiscal 1973?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, for fiscal 1973. You will be down to 69,000 now before the fiscal year starts.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will just use the basis that you planned it on for Vietnam with the strength in Vietnam during 1973, that will be an index and will be helpful.

(See p. 128.)

The CHAIRMAN. I have already referred to the fact that the NATO matter has come up in debate several times. There are two questions involved there and I have very vigorously defended the idea of not cutting those troops any appreciable amount. We have to have more facts about the situation over there in order to meet these debates. It is important for the committee to have simple, accurate information on our contributions to NATO. We would like to have prepared separate material showing each of our NATO allies' contributions in manpower and forces, together with draft data. Each of our own services' contributions to NATO in terms of forces in Europe and those committed to Europe immediately after mobilization began should be included in this data.

Mr. KELLEY. We will provide that for the record.
(The information follows:)

A summary of our Allies contribution is included below.

Each NATO ally has been drafting the following number of people.

Country:	Annual draft
Belgium.....	38,500
Canada.....	All volunteer.
Denmark.....	25,500
France.....	210,000
Germany.....	154,000
Greece.....	52,000
Italy.....	234,000
Netherlands.....	47,000
Norway.....	22,000
Portugal.....	¹ 50,000
Turkey.....	257,000
United Kingdom.....	All volunteer.

¹ 20,000 additional conscripts drafted in overseas areas for service outside of Portugal.

Our own Service contribution is as follows: [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony and the material provided the committee indicates that the contingency plans for reinforcing NATO do not assume that all of the Reserve forces would be used. The committee needs a breakout of the Reserves and National Guard forces by numbers and by units which are not to be used in Europe under current contingency plans. I think that will help meet the situation on the debate that is likely to come up.

Will you see that we are supplied this information?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I will.

The CHAIRMAN. And request that it be answered.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

Current Department of Defense planning calls for the Reserve Components to furnish combat and combat support units to sustain the fighting capability of active forces in the initial few months of a NATO war. Contingency plans are specific JCS documents. If information is to be transmitted on these, only the JCS can do so. However, department planning documents *do* cover many of these areas, particularly Tac Air. The documents are used when available in answering this question. [Deleted.]

The CHAIRMAN. And, therefore, I put that in the form of a question.

We have formed a Subcommittee on the Volunteer Armed Forces and Selective Service and Senator Bentsen of Texas has agreed to be chairman of it. It is keeping an eye on manpower and under the new system surveillance over it under the new draft act, how it operates, and also the type of men you recruit. I know you are vitally interested in that and I believe they will want you to cooperate with them and make periodic reports. I call that to your attention now.

Mr. KELLEY. I will be happy to work with that committee.

The CHAIRMAN. In that way we can keep informed and supply certain information on the floor of the Senate to the membership of the Senate at large.

Senator Thurmond, do you have any more questions?

Senator THURMOND. No, sir; that is all I have, Senator, thank you.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SMITH

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith has been detained this afternoon on other matters and she asked unanimous consent for her questions to be submitted for the record for Assistant Secretary Kelley's answer for the record. Without objection, so ordered.

(Questions submitted by Senator Smith. Answers supplied by Department of Defense).

Question. It is projected, on conservative estimates, that there will be 1.2 million military retirees by fiscal year 1980 and that the cost of military retirement pay in that year will be almost \$7 billion. In this regard, what is the administration position on integrating the proposed changes in the military retirement system with any changes in recomputation and/or survivor benefits?

Answer. The proposed military retiree survivorship proposal, the one-time recomputation proposal approved by the President, and the military retirement revision recommended by an Interagency Committee and now undergoing review in the Department of Defense, could each be handled independently since they are consistent.

The Department of Defense is particularly concerned that early action be taken on the survivor benefit proposal which, having already passed the House of Representatives, is now pending before the Senate. We strongly believe that early action is essential to establish a meaningful system for military personnel

to share their retired pay with their survivors at a cost which is within reach of all segments of the military retired population.

The recomputation proposal, although devised to dovetail with the Inter-agency Committee's recommendations for revision of the nondisability retirement system is not inconsistent with any foreseeable change which may be made in the military retirement system. Accordingly, the recomputation proposal could be considered either in conjunction with a proposed revision of the retirement system or separately.

Question. It is quite possible, if we define manpower costs broadly, to talk in terms of two out of every three dollars of the defense budget being manpower related. In an All-Volunteer Force environment would the cost per man be greater or less than now? If the cost per man would be greater in an All-Volunteer Force, what is the anticipated percentage of the defense budget in fiscal years 1974 and 1975 that will be manpower-related? What are the predicted manning levels and defense budgets for those years?

Answer. We expect that our average costs per man in an All-Volunteer Force environment will be greater than the FY 1973 costs we have been discussing. This is primarily because we have included military retired pay in the average costs per man and these costs can be expected to increase significantly in the next two years. We cannot predict at this time if any additional costs in the future should be attributed to the All-Volunteer Force concept until we are able to evaluate the results of the programs requested for FY 1973, including the generous pay increases which were authorized this year.

We do not have defense budgets prepared for FY 1974 and FY 1975 and therefore cannot furnish the predicted manning levels and defense budgets for those years as you requested. However, our rough projections for those years indicate that personnel costs as a percentage of the total Department of Defense budget can be expected to remain at about the same levels as in FY 1973.

Question. Is it true that with United States' present augmentation plans and capabilities that a conventional war in Europe would be over before the U.S. could bring its reserve forces to bear? In your answer please comment on our present sealift and airlift capabilities and how long NATO conventional forces in Europe could reasonably hold, giving an all-out conventional Soviet attack?

Answer. The probability of a massive attack coming as a complete surprise is considered unlikely. Existing intelligence organizations should be able to detect activity of this scale and provide some warning time. For an attack with some warning, we feel that the existing force levels committed to NATO insure a reasonable chance for a successful defense of NATO.

During the first 30 days following mobilization for a NATO contingency, U.S. lift assets have the capability of delivering over [deleted] personnel and approximately [deleted] tons of supplies and equipment to Europe. [Deleted.]

Question. I understand that the Army will discharge 462,000 men in fiscal year year 1973, with a net loss of 262,000 men. How does the Army plan to maintain any continuity of force structure with this tremendous turnover?

Answer. Approximately 480,000 men will leave the Army in FY 72 of which 262,000 will not be replaced. To cope with this problem and to minimize personnel shortages within Army troop units, we have [deleted]. These actions will help to lessen the impact of personnel turbulence caused by the early release programs. We recognize the undesirable nature of this turbulence, but regrettably there was no other feasible way to meet the man-year ceiling.

Question. The feasibility of the All-Volunteer Force is questioned by a number of our major military commanders. There is a real concern about the ability to attract quality personnel needed to run the sophisticated weaponry of our armed forces without the impetus of the draft. Presumably, the All-Volunteer Force will require more support troops as conditions of service are changed, working hours shortened, more services provided, et cetera. Please comment on the question of attracting quality personnel to our armed forces in an all-volunteer environment. Also comment on the need for more support personnel in All-Volunteer Force.

Answer. One of our concerns is meeting the qualitative as well as the quantitative requirements of the services. Our studies show that draft motivation has been higher among the upper mental groups. After the end of the draft we may,

therefore, have difficulty in obtaining the high quality personnel needed for electronics, avionics, nuclear power and similar skills. The services have discussed with us the possible need for an enlistment bonus for high aptitude personnel, many of whom serve an initial enlistment of six years. We also have undertaken a review of qualitative requirements so that we will know exactly what we need. To date the number of high school graduate enlistments and the number of enlistments in the higher mental groups has held up very well. We are measuring these trends carefully and at the appropriate time will take such action as may be needed.

I do not think the All-Volunteer Force will require more military support personnel. It is true that working hours are being shortened in comparison with the hours worked during the period of extended Vietnam operation and more services are being provided. Most of the personnel needed will be civilian, rather than military. We have improved services by shifting personnel from other functions, not by increasing the total personnel—military or civilian.

RELiance ON RESERVES

The CHAIRMAN. On the Reserve matter I raised a point this morning that we have to believe stronger that the Reserves actually are being prepared for use and will be used.

One argument regarding manpower is that the active duty manpower budget does not reflect any greater reliance on Reserves than heretofore. For fiscal 1973 the in strength of the Army goes down only 20,000 men, from 861,000 down to 841,000. No reduction in Navy and Marine Corps, and in the Air Force only 13,000 men from 730,000 to 717,000.

What is your response about this reliance on the Reserves? I want to make a case as strong as we can that we are relying on these Reserves. We do have a policy that is firm with reference to their use. However, if they are insisting that we still need all of these men in the service, that is a growing percentage cost and does not argue very strongly for a place for the Reserves. Do you want to comment on that now?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KELLEY. I would like to make three points. The first point is that the Guard and Reserve budget as a portion of the total defense budget has increased in the past 3 years. It has approximately doubled from slightly more than \$2 billion to slightly in excess of \$4 billion in fiscal 1973. So, relatively speaking, the Reserve portion of the budget has increased much, much more than the budget overall.

The second point I would make is that the Reserve components influence in the total force concept cannot be measured by the total numbers of people but rather has to be measured by the readiness of Reserve units. The readiness status of Reserve units has been very greatly improved in the last 3 years.

The third point I wish to make is that the deployment plans of the services include, as will be shown by the military service witnesses, a very substantial reliance on Reserve components, which is exactly the point you said this morning must be done.

It is one thing for us to talk about a total force concept, but it is quite another thing to implement it. I think there are demonstrable signs that the Armed Forces are in fact relying more heavily upon the Guard and Reserves than they were 3 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope that is right, I am encouraged by what you say, Mr. Secretary. I think that is a good answer.

Senator THURMOND.

Senator THURMOND. Nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. If you do not have anything more, let us check on the situation when they think they are going to vote. By the way, without objection, I want to put in the record here the points I raised on the subject of retired pay. I will not take anymore time now. Put that in the record.

(The information follows:)

Retired pay costs have increased from \$1.2 billion in fiscal year 1964 to \$4.9 billion for fiscal year 1973, which does include about \$270 million for legislation yet to be submitted. Retirement costs are estimated to reach \$16 billion per year by the year 2000.

There is presently a net addition to the retired role of about 50,000 men per year with an average age of middle or low forties and most of whom are in their prime of life in terms of experience. This situation results basically from several factors:

1. We have had a large active force on duty since World War II but superimposed on this is rapid promotion and early retirement, far beyond anything contemplated when the laws authorizing the present system were established after World War II. Admittedly, the Congress has not attempted to reform this system to any degree.

2. There has been a lack of management in the Department of Defense on trying to control this matter. We have now reached the point where lack of management threatens to make this entire retirement matter unmanageable just from the cost standpoint.

There will always be strong opposition to any reform of the system. Some means must be found, however, to utilize our military men for a longer period of active service and bring the tight cost within some semblance of control.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much and we have kept you away from your office all day. If you wish to retire now you may. We will move to the next witness.

Mr. KELLEY. I would rather remain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, if you will let the chief witness sit over here.

General DePuy, we do not know how long we will proceed with you but at least, we will get started. For the record, this is Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Department of Army, and we are glad to have you here, sir.


General DePuy. Mr. Chairman, Senator Thurmond, we are very hopeful that we can explain the Army manpower program and force structure fairly thoroughly to the committee.

We have briefed the staff of the committee in greater depth, of course, than I will have time to do here. I have tried to pick out those aspects of it which are highlights in deference to your knowledge, but we are prepared to go behind these charts in greater depth if you wish.

I want to talk a little bit about how we get our force requirements. I want to talk about the things we think are on your mind, which is the support-to-combat ratio, the so-called teeth to tail. I want to talk about the problems of 1972, which feed into 1973, and I would also like to break Europe out into its various parts so that discussions about Europe can take place in the context of what we have got over there.

The CHAIRMAN. The perspective of the Army over the last 7 years is portrayed on this chart. You may recall this chart from 2 years ago.

THE ARMY'S CHANGING SIZE




General DEPUY. Back in the Korean War and again at the Berlin crisis we mobilized some Reserves but, as you know, we did not do so in Vietnam, and so as a consequence the Army grew from 1965 until the peak of the war in 1968 and 1969 from less than a million to over a million and a half with only a token mobilization. This meant, of course, that we promoted many soldiers to sergeant and many junior sergeants to senior sergeants, many junior officers to middle grade officers, and so on. As we started back down we plotted a path which would permit us to rid ourselves of some of the lower quality but at the same time, would not force us to take actions which were not cost effective and which would not be equitable to our people. We managed to do that reasonably well until this year, and I will come back and indicate some of the problems that have occurred this year.

Fundamentally, we came down in this year as far as we would like to have come down in 2 years, and this is the source of many of our current problems.

We have had many discussions of personnel costs as a percentage of the budget. Here is our view of it including subsistence and it has peaked and started down a little bit. It is 60.2 percent of our budget.

Now, of course, this is a little bit of a phony, Mr. Chairman, because you see it has a lot to do with how big your budget is insofar as the total budget varies. For example, if we had a fixed amount of money that we put on our investment accounts, this figure would never change no matter what happened to the pay, so to that extent it is not meaningful.

PERSONNEL COSTS AS PERCENTAGE OF ARMY BUDGET INCLUDING RETIRED PAY



We have had a number of questions today which asked "What would happen if we took a division out of Europe?" Those are the kinds of questions which frankly, Mr. Chairman, we would prefer not to address. I say that because we in the Army are given guidance by the Secretary of Defense after he has checked with the NSC, the President, the JCS, and we have been told to provide certain division forces for certain purposes. We in the Army have been told to meet a requirement in Europe of [deleted].

We are also told if a war started in Asia that we should be prepared to send [deleted].

We have a 13-division force. So if, for example, we sent [deleted] to Asia and if we sent to Europe just those divisions for which we have prepositioned equipment, and that would be [deleted].

We are [deleted].

[Deleted] which we have designated, to which we have issued first line equipment and to which we are giving great attention on readiness. This is faster than we have done it at any time in the history of the country but nonetheless, it is our objective. It is that kind of strategy that led us to 13 divisions and that is the starting point for our structure.

You asked a moment ago of Secretary Kelley the extent to which we rely upon the Reserves. This is a picture of the extent to which we rely on the Reserves for Europe in the first [deleted] days of a war. It shows over here what we would have to start with, and that would be after the deployment of the first division from Fort Riley. The red indicates Reserve component organized units. The numbers represent total Reserve component people.

This little support increment, Mr. Chairman, [deleted] people, and yet [deleted] Reserves would be sent to Europe. The rest are individual replacements. They are the individual ready Reserves sent to fill up active units and to provide for combat casualty replacements.

At the end of [deleted] days [deleted] would be individual replacements.

When the active Army had 16 divisions there was less red on this chart. When we went to 14 divisions more red began to appear. When we went to 13 divisions more red appears. We think that if we have to meet that deployment schedule we cannot take the Active Army down much farther, so you can see over time that the integration of the active and Reserves has taken place each year relying more and more on the Reserves.

This means those Reserve components have to be very ready because they not only have to be called to duty, they have to be trained up to readiness and shipped.

This is a very optimistic picture, Mr. Chairman.

The strategic guidance the Army gets from the Secretary of Defense tell how many divisions and what size special mission forces we must provide. I will speak to that. This Army does not control either one. We think it is entirely proper to appear before you, though. We are pleased to do that, to explain to you the support we put with the divisions and all the general support. We think it is our responsibility to be able to explain that and we hope that we can do it persuasively today.

COMPUTATION FOR 1 DIVISION

Increment	War	Peace
Division.....	16,000	[Deleted.]
Initial support.....	16,000	
Sustaining support.....	16,000	
Total manpower.....	48,000	

[Deleted.]


General DEPUY. Historically in a theater of war we have found that for every man in a division there have been two additional. We have more or less formalized that into calling it an initial support increment and a sustaining support increment, which I will discuss later in more detail.

However, we cannot afford that in the active Army in peacetime nor do we have it, and we call that whole package a division force equivalent. But in peacetime in the active Army our divisions are [deleted]. We have only [deleted] in support. And so if you add those you get [deleted].

We have 13 divisions and if you multiply 13 divisions times [deleted] people which we have in division forces in the fiscal year 1973 manpower program which we have submitted to you.

In case of war we would, of course, mobilize and bring in the extra support.

Let me speak for a moment as to what that support is. If you could visualize for a moment a division as part of a corps with three divisions, the initial support increment and sustaining support increment together would be all of the forces in the theater outside the division. The initial support increment is all you would ever send, for example, if you only sent two or three divisions for a limited period of time. The sustaining support increment is what

DIVISION WITH SUPPORT

you would send if you had a fully mature theater, as we had, for example, in World War II where you had a number of armies and corps.

Let us talk for a minute about what is in the support increment. Around the division are two kinds of forces, combat forces and combat support forces.

We would have in support of each one of these divisions probably under the command of the corps commander, some extra helicopter companies, some aviation, perhaps some surveillance, perhaps gunships. We would have corps artillery with 155 millimeter and 8-inch howitzers. We would have surface-to-surface missiles, a Chaparral/Vulcan air defense battalion. We would have engineers building roads and we would have in addition to that those kinds of units which you can compute on a workload basis: maintenance, supply, transportation, and medical units. All these can be computed on the basis of workload.

The combat units are a matter of judgment, frankly.

In the so-called support increments, 30 to 40 percent of an initial support increment are in fact combat troops. They are aviation, artillery, air defense, maybe more infantry and armor, and even in the sustaining support there are combat troops. For example, there is a full infantry brigade in this increment.

In the workload related units that we have in our force we have ways of computing requirements for them. I will just show you about three, hoping to give you confidence in the way we go about it.

AMMUNITION

User—One 155-mm howitzer battalion (towed).

Supporter—One ordnance ammunition company.

$$\frac{\text{Requirement (75.52 short tons/day)}}{\text{Capability (1680 short tons/day)}} = .0450$$

$$\frac{1}{.0450} = \text{One ordnance company for every 22 155-mm howitzer battalions or equivalent}$$

General DEPUY. For example, a 155-millimeter howitzer battalion fighting in Europe for 90 days at intense rates will fire 75½ tons of ammunition a day. One ordnance ammunition company can handle 1,680 tons. So for every 22 of these battalions we need one company in the force structure.

AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE

User—one armor division.

Supporter—One heavy equipment maintenance company (general support).

$$\frac{\text{Requirement (341,640 general support maintenance man hours/year)}}{\text{Capability (313,200 general support maintenance man hours/year)}} = 1.1$$

One armor division requires 1.1 maintenance companies to perform general support maintenance.

General DEPUY. On automotive maintenance, one entire armored division generates this number of maintenance man hours. This kind of heavy equipment maintenance company can produce that number, so we have 1.1 in the force structure for every armored division.

SUPPORTERS REQUIRE SUPPORT MAINTENANCE

User—One heavy equipment maintenance company (general support).

Supporter—One light equipment maintenance company (direct support).

$$\frac{\text{Requirement (5,037 maintenance manhours direct support/year)}}{\text{Capability (130,480 maintenance manhours direct support/year)}} = .039$$

$$\frac{1}{.039} = \text{One light equipment company for every 26 heavy equipment companies or equivalent}$$

General DEPUY. We could go on. For example, for every seven infantry battalions we need a thousand hospital beds.


Also, of course, this must be iterated once or twice more because the heavy equipment company in turn needs some support and it takes 3 percent of the attention of a light equipment maintenance company. But for all workload related service support units we can show very clearly exactly how many are required.

What we are seeing, of course, as we move from the infantry with rifles and bayonets the more difficult it is to maintain, but with more powerful weapons, we find more people behind them. An infantry battalion of 840 men, even in a very large theater, only has 271 people behind it. But an artillery battalion, with a self-propelled howitzer has 479 maintenance people, ammunition hauling, and the maintenance of the trucks that haul the ammunition, and so on.

If you get to a Cobra gunship company, 213 men require 308 support. So this is a trend which is clear.

I will come back to the relationship of teeth to tail but I would like to go through the rest of our structures.

VARYING SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS



Special mission forces, as far as the Army is concerned, are by and large directed and, although you have asked a number of questions about them today, and in most cases we have asked you to ask the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would like to show you why.

For example, under the distribution of special mission forces, [deleted] roughly, at the end of fiscal year 1973, free world support takes up almost [deleted] and a very large part of that is in Vietnam. Some is in Korea. There are MAAGS and missions around the world. We have a missile force over which the Army cannot make unilateral changes. For example, in Europe we have Honest John, Sergeant, and Pershing battalions. General Goodpaster is the man who set the requirements for that.

We have missile units of the same kind in Korea. We have the air defense of Europe, the Hercules and Hawk battalions. We have air defense of Korea and air defense of Okinawa. These are all under unified commanders.

Strategic communications, this our part of the defense communications agency. The strategic intelligence and security program is centrally controlled by the Department of Defense. They have a new Assistant Secretary, as you know. We are directed to supply these people by types specifically and we are in the process of a very large reduction.

The brigades in Panama, Berlin, and Alaska are fixed, although we did recommend last year to eliminate a brigade. DOD and joint activ-


ities turn up in the headquarters which have been discussed so often today. These include SHAPE, LANDCENT, AFCENT, CINC SOUTH, and EUCOM headquarters. Continental air defense was reduced from 18,000 to 6,000 last year. And this is support of the other services which is directed.

The special mission forces manpower has gone down slightly from 1965 to 1973. It is complex, has changed a little bit.

Over here there was more continental air defense. Over here there is more aid to allies.

SPECIAL MISSION FORCES MANPOWER

MANPOWER
(000)



General support manpower is the one which most people regard as the softest of the tail and the various parts of it are by and large derived either from the people who are resident upon the posts, camps and stations or the workload.

Training establishment is divided into three parts. We have about [deleted] instructors in our schools and school overhead, [deleted] trainers, and about [deleted] school troops.


I might say that with respect to all of this that we are either at or lower than the prewar level except for medical services, which is up, recruiting which is up, and the instructor and school overhead is almost level. And this is because of the training load we are now faced with. This will come down. Those are all computed.

Reserve components support is down, although support of the Reserve components is up, and we did that by paying for more of the full-time technicians who are members of the National Guard on full-time duty for maintenance, command, planning, and whatnot.


We can discuss any one of those in any detail that you like.

Our general support manpower is lower than it has been at any time since 1961 and it is going down and it will go down further.

GENERAL SUPPORT MANPOWER



MILITARY MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS FOR GENERAL SUPPORT FORCES




7/1/72

General DEPUY. In the three large parts of the general support forces the total is down.

The training establishment shrinks from 71,000 to [deleted]. The support establishment is about level and the logistics establishment is down. The total is down from 185,000 to [deleted].

All of these will continue [deleted] as well.


MILITARY MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE SUPPORT ESTABLISHMENT



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General DEPUY. Here in the support establishment you see increase in medical services from 17,000 to [deleted].


ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND — MILITARY MANPOWER



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General DEPUY. Army Materiel Command or logistics establishment never really increased much because of the war. Military manpower has gone from 21,000 down to 11,000 and continuing down.


ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND — CIVILIAN MANPOWER



General DEPUY. Civilian manpower, again a very small reaction to the workload, down from 170,000 to 130,000.

DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINED INDIVIDUALS

(End FY 73 Manpower = 81,400)



General DEPUY. Our individuals, transients, patients, prisoners and students, are all computed now and are derived from the kind of enlistments we have, the number of forces we have and where they are deployed.

We keep an account for this, it is no longer an estimate. For example, we have 34,200 students and I might say that because of the early release program that we are in right now, in which we are early releasing this year 316,000 people, that we are releasing a lot of school trained people who must be replaced. It is going to take us 9 months to a year to get that job done. This will come down even further as the length of our enlistments increase and as the length of tour increases.

I would like to talk about combat to support ratios. In your letter to the Secretary of Defense you asked us to look at this in interesting ways, more ways than one. Well, we have done that. For example, the classic way is to divide the total force by the number of divisions. You are familiar with that. If you did that the combat to support ratio would be [deleted]. If, however, you ignore the maintenance and transportation battalions found in a division and look at the combat battalions, [deleted] percent.

If you say, "No, is that not inaccurate," let us look at the number of infantrymen, artillerymen, cavalrymen and tankers. If you do that, [deleted] percent of the Army would be combat and [deleted] percent would be support. The question really is: "Is this good or bad?"

COMBAT/SUPPORT DISTRIBUTION AND CASUALTY RATES (BY MOS)

[In percent]

	Civil War	World War I	World War II	Korea	Vietnam
Combat.....	93.2	34.1	36.2	33.0	22.2
Support.....	6.8	65.9	63.8	67.0	77.8
Battle casualties ¹	121.4	83.5	30.6	22.7	19.8
Battle deaths ¹	42.9	16.1	9.2	6.4	3.6

¹ Rates expressed as cases per 1,000 average Army strength per year.

General DEPUY. We submit, using some of the same charts that Secretary Kelley had, that as the combat to support ratio changed over time, meaning fewer people up front with rifles and bayonets, the casualties went down, and in a moment I can show you the capability went up.

So we do not apologize for this, Mr. Chairman, we think this is the way that really we are expected to go. We would say that the R. & D. program is trying to get us there.

The CHAIRMAN. The exposure of the rifleman in the Civil War was much greater, was it not, than in the Vietnam war? In the Civil War, as I have read it, they marched out there face-to-face much of the time with their firepower within range and shot each other down.

General DEPUY. Their firepower was rifle firepower. They exposed the rifleman and thus, these kind of casualties. Over here the firepower is artillery, air, gunships, and riflemen, riflemen trying to find the enemy, and you get down to this. This is the way we are expected to go. I am confident that that is the way to go.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean "confident that is the way to go"?

General DEPUY. I am confident that the American people and the Congress and the people who give us money for weapons expect us to fight with weapons that are more sophisticated than a bayonet.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the point; I am talking about the relative exposure of the men in battle. I do not see how you compare the exposure of the Civil War as so much greater.

General DEPUY. That is exactly the point.

The CHAIRMAN. As a target to be shot at.

General DEPUY. That is the point that we want.


The CHAIRMAN. The lack of support or how much volume of support did not have much to do with it, it was the style of fighting.

General DEPUY. I do not think it was the style of fighting; I do not think they had any alternative. The only way they could mass a lot of firepower was a lot of infantry. Now you can get this same firepower from your weapons at greater ranges and, therefore, you have less exposure, and, therefore, you have less casualties. You are doing it with machines here and you are doing it with men there. The machines take more and more support. That is the point we are trying to make on that.

The CHAIRMAN. What we are trying to get at is this matter of support, whether or not too much of it is in that column.

General DEPUY. What we are saying is that the kind of machines that permit you to withdraw fighting men, your own, from the battlefield, take more maintenance. I have tried to show that in a couple of ways. This is not inconsistent with what is going on elsewhere.

"COMBAT TO SUPPORT" DISTRIBUTION - U. S. LABOR FORCE



General DEPUY. Visualize a miner in the coal mine. We used to have a lot of them with picks. Now you have a few of them with a big cutting machine and you have a continuous belt taking the coal out but you have a lot more people back here in the finance market area, so you are doing it with machines, and this is consistent throughout. We

move toward technology. Now for it you get a comparable amount of increased combat power.

INFANTRY DIVISION UNIT FIREPOWER POTENTIAL (UFP) 1951-69¹

Unit and year	Combat strength	UFP	Percent change
Infantry battalion:			
1951.....	538.....	}	+186
1969.....	547.....		
Tank battalion:			
1951.....	406 (71 tanks).....	} Deleted].....	+83
1969.....	294 (54 tanks).....		
Division artillery:			
1951.....	1623 (72 tubes).....	}	600
1969.....	1653 (76 tubes).....		

¹ Based on lethality, ammo expenditure, and number of weapons.

General DEPUY. For example, between 1951 and 1969 the number of people carrying weapons in an infantry battalion is about the same but the weapons are better. A 186-percent increase. If you look at the tank battalion from 1951 to—

The CHAIRMAN. Increase in firepower.

General DEPUY. In firepower, yes, sir; delivered against the enemy. Tank battalion, 83 percent. I would say that is conservative. Artillery, 600 percent, and that is the result of the ammunition, the kind of ammunition and to some extent the rate of fire, but primarily it is the improved conventional ammunition.

TRENDS IN COMBAT SUPPORT RATIO

Combat to support distribution has migrated toward more supporters per fighter.

Degree of migration has been consistent with similar trends in civilian society.

Migration has served to increase combat power per man and per unit with fewer casualties.

Attempts to reverse the migration are inconsistent with philosophy of expending materiel instead of lives.

Understand the migration and attempt to manage it.

So I will not bore you with this. The point is that if you take advantage of technology the price you pay is that you are going to have to have more support because the machines that give it to you require that.

I would like to go very quickly to Europe, because I know this committee has been interested in that and show you what is there. This is the total U.S. Army force authorized in Europe, [deleted]. This part is not under General Davison's command. This part is.

With rare exceptions this is the Defense Communication Agency. These are the headquarters that we have been discussing to some extent. This is the intelligence and cryptologic. So the Department of the Army does not control that except for two little ones, AMC and DA Field Activities, 520 people. Up here in the 183,000 of U.S. Army Europe, one big chunk, [deleted] are special mission forces, and I indicated before, Mr. Chairman, that we cannot change those unilaterally in the Army. You might be able to change them and the

Defense Department can change them. General Goodpaster can. But we cannot because this includes the Berlin brigade. Those offensive missiles and defensive missile forces, air defense, the intelligence program, other service support, so we think that from the standpoint of divisions in Europe and the forces which support divisions we are really talking about the top, which is [deleted]. This is the way we have to look at it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us see now.

General DEPUY. [Deleted] I will show you the next one. Here is the same chart. [Deleted.] This is what we are talking about in division forces.

Now that does not mean that you cannot make a decision to take the brigade out of Berlin or take the missile forces out, but such decision should be in that context.

The CHAIRMAN. A policy question.

General DEPUY. Yes, exactly. So, if you are talking about percentage cuts or take a division out, we are talking about this.

The question is, is the support for these four-and-a-third divisions in peacetime before the war starts, is it too much? Well, we say "No," it is not too much, as a matter of fact, it has been cut, cut, cut and the divisions—

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, General, I was so absorbed in what you said that I did not get the signal. We are having a vote now. As a matter of fact, the way I understand it, we will perhaps have an additional vote, Senator Thurmond, and then another vote; it looks doubtful that we could hold further hearings this afternoon.

Could you be back in the morning at 10 o'clock?

General DEPUY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we would be unable to finish with you anyway. The other gentleman that are going to be heard now, Mr. Braswell, see if they can be back.

Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All of you are prepared to be back.

Senator THURMOND. Could I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

COMBAT TO SUPPORT RATIO

Senator THURMOND. How does your ratio in numbers run combat to support?

General DEPUY. In Europe?

Senator THURMOND. In the Army. Combat to support. You have one combat man and how many supporting that one combat man?

General DEPUY. If you go back and take those [deleted] percent that finally went to [deleted] percent combat, when you look at MOSs, I just have to multiply those times the total strength of the Army and give you the answer, but in percentage the most conservative MOS, just counting infantry cavalymen, artillerymen and armor is [deleted] percent combat. If you count division—

Senator THURMOND. In other words, that would make—

General DEPUY. It is [deleted] percent.

Senator THURMOND. That would make [deleted] percent support.

General DEPUY. That is the worst case. Now, in Europe I am going

to show you in a minute it is 60-40 combat to support in the division forces plus the special mission combat; 60 combat, 40 support.

The CHAIRMAN. You have some very impressive figures there that I think will be helpful to us in debate. I think they should be included in photographic form and put in the record some way so we can have the benefit of them. They are not classified; are they?

General DEPUY. No. Some are, sir; but do not worry about the confidential ones here.

The CHAIRMAN. But these generally show this. I thank all of you very much.

The committee will resume at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, February 9, 1972.)

MILITARY PROCUREMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1973— MANPOWER AUTHORIZATION

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1972

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Senator Stuart Symington (presiding).

Present: Senators Stennis (chairman), Symington, Byrd, Jr., of Virginia, Thurmond, and Dominick.

Also present: T. Edward Braswell, Jr., chief counsel and staff director; John T. Ticer, chief clerk; R. James Woolsey, general counsel; L. R. Garcia, C. J. Conneely, Edward B. Kenney, professional staff members; and Ben Gilleas, director of investigations. Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing will come to order.

General DePuy, good morning to you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. DePUY, ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY—Resumed

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Stennis has been temporarily detained on the floor. I left another hearing to come here and will leave when he returns.

General, you were in the middle of your statement.

Will you sit down?

General DePUY. I prefer to stand if you do not mind, because I would like to use these charts.

Senator SYMINGTON. Before we get on with it, Mr. Secretary, you have looked and most of your statement can be declassified. Correct?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir, that is correct. The only portion that cannot be declassified is the portion that I indicated yesterday was classified.

Senator SYMINGTON. How much, of the 46 pages?

Mr. KELLEY. That is a portion of one sentence on page 10.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is good. Get it out so the people understand.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. They are the ones who in the long run must have it all explained to them. We are having a steadily increasing problem about raising taxes.

General DePuy, will you continue with your statement?

REVIEW

General DEPUY. Let me just say in preface, Mr. Chairman, that what I did yesterday up to this point is explain those requirements which are given to the Army by the strategy guidance and pointed out that the discussion of those requirements would better be undertaken with the Secretary of Defense and the chairman, but that the Army was pleased to explain the supporting forces that went with them.

I pointed out how we computed those; I pointed out that in the active Army in peacetime and in the 1973 program, for every [deleted] men in the division, we have only [deleted] men in support in the deployable forces of the Army, so we have within the active Army a deployable division slice of [deleted].

I pointed out that we have [deleted] people in special mission forces that the Army does not directly control; we cannot unilaterally change those forces. Those are decisions made at a level above us. On the other hand, we are fully responsible for explaining the general support part of the Army. I hope I justified the general support to the satisfaction of the committee.

First of all, I pointed out that our general support program in terms of military manpower and civilian manpower is lower than it was before the Vietnam war, and going down in all categories but three. We have doubled the size of the recruiting service from 3,000 to 6,000. We still have slightly more people training in hard skills than we had before the war. And we have our medical service slightly expanded. In all other cases, the arrows on the chart are all going down and we are well below the lowest period since 1961 in terms of teeth to tail and so on.

I also explained, as the chairman had asked in his letter, the general combat to support ratio throughout the Army.

Senator SYMINGTON. Which is what, now?

General DEPUY. It all depends again on the definition. For example, if you just count division forces and divide it into the total Army, it is 42 percent combat and the remainder support. If you only count combat battalions that deliver firepower, it goes down into the 30 percent range. Then if you are very rigorous in your definition and only count men who carry rifles and feed cannons and drive tanks, it is 23/77.

SOVIET DIVISION

Senator SYMINGTON. General, I know of your record. You have my complete respect as a great soldier, so anything I say, I hope you do not take as criticism. We just want the facts.

General DEPUY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. The last time I looked into this, two-thirds of a Soviet division were combat and one-third was logistics. The reverse was true with respect to our troops.

General DEPUY. Within a division?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, about one-third was combat and two-thirds support. Would you comment?

General DEPUY. I do not have the exact figures, but that does not sound right. There is one big difference. That is, we do have more maintenance in the division. We repair our tanks and our self-propelled howitzers and so on as they go down to the extent we can do it within the division. The Soviets do not. They run the division into the ground, lose people, lose tanks, and when a division gets to the point where it is non-combat effective, the whole division is taken out and put back together and reinserted later. So, we have a different concept.

That, I think, explains the maintenance and the supply and transportation.

I explained that yesterday and I am sorry that you did not have an opportunity to hear it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sorry, too, but I had three committee meetings at the same time.

SUPPORT COMPUTATION

General DEPUY. I showed how we compute support on a workload basis and I gave specific examples of how many maintenance companies and how many truck companies you need to haul ammunition and so on and so forth. These are very hard figures.

In any event, I pointed out that we are not apologizing for the teeth-to-tail ratio. We think we are about right. We can always improve a little bit. But the main point is that we are now using machines of war which are more effective, but unfortunately, take more maintenance and support. This is true of all the services. And I think that this is the direction in which the Congress and the American people expect us to go. It is better to fight that way than with just masses of soldiers with bayonets. So, we think we are about right. We think we know what we are doing. We welcome an opportunity to explain it, because there is some tendency to generalize in the field.

Finally, I wanted to be sure to talk about what is in Europe before this committee, because Europe is very controversial. The Department of the Army will not be making decisions about how big the force is in Europe. But the Department of the Army is very interested, Mr. Chairman, that everybody knows what is in Europe and how it interrelates, so that if any decisions are made, they will be made in the light of what is there. That is the purpose of my briefing.

I got halfway through this last night, but with your permission, I will go back to the beginning.

Senator SYMINGTON. Please go ahead.

EUROPEAN ARMY AUTHORIZATION

General DEPUY. Only this part and then I have one other.

In Europe, the authorization is [deleted].

This part, [deleted] is commanded by General Davison, Mike Davison, who is the commander of USAREUR.

This part [deleted] he does not command. They belong to either the Department of the Army in the case of about 520 people, or they belong to the intelligence program of the Department of Defense, or

they belong to the Defense Communications Agency, or they are Army people serving in joint and combined activity and DOD activities. So the Department of the Army does not have management control there.

There is another large amount which we carry as special mission forces and over which, again, we have no unilateral control, although it is shown here within USAREUR. We are told by the Defense Department to man these: The Berlin Brigade, the Offensive Mission Forces (the Sergeant, the Honest John, the Pershing) which are tactically targeted in Europe. This is a small group in Potsdam. "Other Service Support" consists of an engineer battalion supporting the Air Force. DOD and joint activities are self-explanatory. This last element, "Free World Support," is a MAAG. These we do not control.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you mean, you do not control?

General DEPUY. We in the Department of the Army cannot change these numbers. The Department of Defense can change them and they would only do it with the JCS and CINCEUR, General Goodpaster, being involved.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you have a PAL system on all your nuclear weapons in Europe?

General DEPUY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you sure of that?

General DEPUY. Yes, sir; I am.

So, what we are really talking about are division forces in Europe. The number of divisions we maintain in Europe, we are given by the President and by the Secretary of Defense. However, the support that goes with them, we are prepared to stand up and defend, though we could not unilaterally change the support. So, let us talk about the $4\frac{1}{3}$ divisions and what we have in Europe in combat support.

If we take the $4\frac{1}{3}$ divisions and divide into it the total Army account in Europe, that which we do and do not have managerial control over, it yields the [deleted]. If we divide into it that which is controlled by General Davison, the ratio is [deleted]. To get a more meaningful ratio, we will next divide the divisions by what General Davison commands but minus the special mission and general support. Incidentally, the general support includes about 1,100 people involved in taking care of dependents.

SPECIAL MISSION

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you call by the name of special mission?

General DEPUY. The special mission are these which I had back here, the missile forces, this [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you talking about nuclear weapons when you talk special mission?

General DEPUY. These are mostly nuclear weapons and air defense.

Senator SYMINGTON. The secrecy that has surrounded this entire nuclear picture and I say this as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, is what keeps people from understanding what the true force of the United States is in Europe, also other parts of the world.

General DEPUY. Yes, sir, these include Hawks, which are non-nuclear; Hercules, which are nuclear air defense weapons; and Pershing and Sergeant, which are nuclear capable.

Senator SYMINGTON. I saw one of your Pershing bases last spring in southern Germany and was very much impressed.

General DEPUY. It will not be long before we are putting Lance over there in place of Sergeant.

I just said these are not deployable division forces under our definition and somebody else has to make decisions on them. So, we think it is more accurate if we take out the special mission forces, take out the people supporting the dependents. Now we are [deleted].

If you go a little bit further and recognize that in the support outside the divisions, we have a lot of combat, for example, separate artillery battalions and two armored cavalry regiments. We think it is fair to count those as combat. If you did that, the ratio is [deleted]. Then if you are willing to say a surface-to-air missile battalion and Pershing and Sergeant are also combat troops, we arrive at [deleted] in Europe within the [deleted]. We are [deleted] combat to support.

PRESENT EUROPEAN STRENGTH

Senator SYMINGTON. You talked about $4\frac{1}{3}$ divisions. If you add it all up—names change like in the Air Force—squadrons, wings, troops—what would you have, say in divisions, our total strength, in Europe today?

General DEPUY. We have two cavalry regiments—

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand.

General DEPUY. So, I think it would be fair to say five, roughly.

Senator SYMINGTON. Besides the special forces?

General DEPUY. That is right.

This is the $4\frac{1}{3}$ divisions, the manpower with that, the support elements that are with it. That is the total of [deleted]. I just want to point out what happens when we deploy.

As you know, the first step we would take would be to send the rest of the 1st Division over, which is the Reforger package. The next thing, we would fly the [deleted] troops and 10 other supporting units to Europe. They have prepositioned equipment, as you know, so they can be flown over, fall in on the equipment, and then can be ready very quickly. At that point in time, we go to a [deleted] combat-to-support ratio.

SUPPORT-TO-COMBAT RATIO

Senator SYMINGTON. You say very quickly. How quickly? How many days?

General DEPUY. Oh, they would be over there, sir, within about [deleted] days from the first to the last.

Senator SYMINGTON. So, D-plus whatever it would be, you would be [deleted] days D-plus to combat ready?

General DEPUY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Interesting.

General DEPUY. But the problem here, and the reason I am talking about this is I tried to get the support-to-combat ratio in the proper

perspective. Anytime we go below about [deleted], we get into a situation in which we are afraid we cannot maintain the vehicles and deliver the ammunition and the POL. The divisions, of course, would not be fully effective. In other words, we are right on the ragged edge. We really would be making a mistake from a purely technical military standpoint to take out division support anymore without taking out divisions. So, when the time comes for discussions on that, I hope they can take place within the context of what we really have over there and not so much the so-called fat behind the divisions.

READINESS TIME

Senator SYMINGTON. How many days of warning do you figure you will have before you crank in the [deleted] days?

General DEPUY. The planning guidance which we have been given by the Department of Defense says that we will get [deleted]. But what that really means is they assume that the Russians would mobilize for [deleted]. That is a planning factor that tells you, for example, how many Reserve component units you could bring on duty and have ready to deploy. It is not necessarily what would happen in the real world. People over there still wish to plan on a surprise attack. But for our planning and budgeting and programing, it is [deleted] for mobilization.

Senator SYMINGTON. But if you did have a surprise attack, and had been planning [deleted] you would be in trouble, would you not?

General DEPUY. It all depends on whether the Russians attack with what they had on the ground without mobilization or not. So, it is a judgmental factor as to whether you get warning.


Senator SYMINGTON. I was in school in Switzerland when World War I started. It looked like there was going to be trouble. Nobody had the remotest idea we were going to get caught like that. [Deleted.]

General DEPUY. We are basing our deployment to Europe as far as our deployment schedules [deleted] as we start to deploy on M-day. We can start flying those [deleted] almost immediately.

MANPOWER PROGRAM

The last part of my briefing, Mr. Chairman, has to do with the manpower program that leads to what this whole hearing is about, which is the authorization for our strength in 1973. To do that, I must talk about 1972, because the two are interrelated. Recognizing the danger of oversimplification, I nonetheless would like to use a training aid here to talk about the problem we have. This is a hypothetical picture of the manpower programing, but it permits me to make about four points which I think are necessary.

Let us assume that this is fiscal year 1973, and that those are months and that this line is the trained strength target of the Army. Everybody inside that is trained, they have been through 4 or 5 months of training to include basic training, and they are ready to be assigned to a unit. We are in a steady state. The structure is 13 divisions here and it is still 13 here and we have the same kind of units.



We would like to stay right on that line. Of course, in the last 2 years, that line has been tipped, but we still would always like to be on it. To do that requires that we be able to do two things perfectly, neither of which we can do perfectly.

The first thing is that, because it takes 5 months to train and move a person into a unit and because it takes 1 or 2 months of planning before that, we have to, 7 months ahead of time, estimate our losses by month. These are, just hypothetically, 6,000; then it goes up a bit and then down. Ideally, 5 months ahead of time, we would bring in exactly the number of people that we need 5 months later.


LOSS ESTIMATING

Two things cause us problems. One is our loss estimating is difficult. That is particularly true this year, when we have a whole variety of early release programs in effect at the same time, some of which are optional. So we could not possibly be correct in our estimates. We have been as much as 10 percent off both ways in any particular month.

INPUT CONTROL

The second thing is we would have to have complete control over our input. Well, we do not. Once we get to that stage where we do not have a draft, our losses, which drive what we would like to have, will not fit the sort of cyclical changes in the recruiting program. We always recruit a lot of people in June from high school graduates;

we never recruit a great many people in December, because it is Christmas. So, we are not going to be able to fit. And any changes, of course, will move us off that line.



General DEPUY. So, what will happen to us in 1972 is a combination of many, many things. First of all, when we put in the President's budget, we were on the blue line, which would have taken us into fiscal year 1973 at this point. In other words, at the end of the current fiscal year, the strength of the Army would have been 942,000 people. Then several things happened. First, the President made another announcement on Vietnam which lowered the number of Army people in Vietnam. We then recomputed our manpower program and found we had 23,000 man-years authorized in the President's budget that we did not need.

The second thing that happened is that in the hearings and in deliberations here in the Congress, another 27,000 man-year reduction occurred. Then we did two things. We did not react right away. Perhaps foolishly, we hoped maybe that would be restored; it was not. So, we waited. That cost us some man-years. Then our management was not perfect and for several months, we ran over strength. So the combination of all of that gave us problems. The 50,000 man-year cut would have put us on this line here, the black line, but our actual performance was up here. And it so happens, as you know, that in this man-year average strength business, to the extent that you are above your target line in one part of the year, you have to be equally below it in the other half of the year. These two spaces must be equal.

So, we are now in the middle of a massive early release program. We are releasing from the Army in the months of December and January all the people who would have gone out in a 6-month period. And

now in the month of February, we are releasing people who would have been released next September.


This brought us down very sharply. Instead of coming into fiscal year 1973 at 942,000, we are going to come in at 861,000; 80,000 people lower in actual strength.

It also, as I will show you in a moment, gives you a peculiar phenomenon in that in the middle of fiscal year 1973, we are going to be higher than either the beginning or the end strength, and these are trainees.

I might just say that the gains to the Army should ideally fit precisely the losses, and the losses are in a wave motion. What happened 2 years ago determines the losses we have now.

You might be surprised to know, for example, that in our program that we run out into fiscal year 1974, we have [deleted] we do in 1973—208,000 in 1973 and about [deleted] in 1974 because of that phenomenon.

We just want to explain this hump in midfiscal year 1973 because we are concerned that somebody would just draw a straight line from 861 to 841 and lop off the man-years and the dollars above that line. We do not want to have that happen, Mr. Chairman.



General DEPUY. This just sort of puts the magnitude of the problem into perspective. These are the numbers of end strength we have come down in the Army each year, since we started down at the end of 1968; 59,000, 169,000, 199,000, and this year, 262,000. To get down 262,000 in end strength, 480,000 men are leaving the Army this fiscal year.

Senator SYMINGTON. What percentage of that is your total strength?

General DEPUY. That would be about half of the Army, sir, because we are in the 800,000 to 900,000 bracket as we are coming down.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is going to be more than half.

General DEPUY. A little more than half; yes, sir.

All of our personnel policies were really planned on the basis of doing that in 2 years instead of one, so we have run into a number of problems there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me get this straight. You are going very fast and it is very interesting. It is good you are going fast. I wish I could stay for all of it. As I understand it, 50 percent of Army personnel—over 50 percent of Army personnel, because of policy decisions are going to be cut out of the Army in fiscal 1972?

General DEPUY. Oh, no, sir. A total of 480,000 people as individuals will leave the Army, and 262,000 will not be replaced.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

General DEPUY. So, the net reduction in the end strength of the Army is 262,000 in this fiscal year.


Senator SYMINGTON. So around 30 percent will not be replaced, and the other 20 percent is just a fifth?

General DEPUY. That is part of going down.

Senator SYMINGTON. The trained and untrained?

General DEPUY. You can see this causes us a tremendous problem in retraining, particularly in our skills.

Senator SYMINGTON. Sure.



General DEPUY. Let me discuss just to get to this little hump so that the committee understands it. These blocks are 6-month blocks. This is 1972, this is 1973. These are gains and these are losses. And they are average per month. This says that for the 6 months that we are

now in, the last half of fiscal year 1972, each month we will average losses of [deleted]. We will average gains of [deleted].

We are taking losses in 1972 that we would have taken in 1973, so a strange phenomenon occurs in 1973. Our losses are low, lower than our gains by about [deleted] a month. The gains are higher because they are being put in to take care of later losses. So that difference of about [deleted] if multiplied by 6 is about [deleted]; that is the build-up here. These are all trainees we are building up, not units. If we do not go up to that [deleted] level, we will not be at 841,000 at the end of the year. We will be lower than that, and we will not be able to support our structure. We therefore would like the committee's understanding and support. If you do not change the structure, we would like to follow that particular program.

INCREASED COSTS

Senator SYMINGTON. I noticed yesterday that Secretary Kelley said despite this heavy reduction, the pay cost was greater. Do you think it necessary in order to maintain order and status?

General DEPUY. The total budget, Mr. Chairman, for the Army for military personnel is not up, it is a little down. But the dollars per man are up very, very sharply.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think he said here: "Despite substantial reductions in the size of our military forces, total manpower costs have risen sharply in recent years, now account for more than 50 cents of every Defense dollar spent."

I thought when he said total manpower costs he meant the cost of the people left.

General DEPUY. Per man, but not for the total.

Senator SYMINGTON. He says total.

General DEPUY. That may be for defense, sir, it is not for the Army. I can show you very quickly.

There is the Army's budget, and the total goes from \$8.6 billion to \$8.9, then \$7.7 over the fiscal years. So the total is down. That is military personnel costs only. The end strength is down and the man-years are down. The dollars are not down the way you would like to see them go down, because at the same time the man-years go down, the dollar cost-per-man goes up.

Senator SYMINGTON. It says total manpower costs have risen sharply. I would think the total manpower cost involves what we are talking about.

Do you want to comment on that, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; that statement is correct. The total manpower costs have risen; they do account for more than 50 cents of every defense dollar proposed to be spent in 1972.

Senator SYMINGTON. If these figures are correct, does that mean the costs of the Air Force and the Navy more than offset this reduction?

Mr. KELLEY. When I referred to total manpower costs, I was talking about the military as well as the civilian component.

To respond to your question just now, on a relative scale, the manpower costs have risen more in the Air Force than they have in the Army, and this is reflected in the fact that the total military personnel account is higher today than it was before reduction—

Senator SYMINGTON. To make it clear to all: The figures General DePuy has stated of fiscal 1971 of \$8.687 billion; fiscal 1972, \$8.172 billion; fiscal 1973, \$7.703 billion.—General, I assure you I will read this carefully, and I am very grateful for what has been learned to date. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN (presiding). Senator, I thank you for presiding.


Again, General, I want to express my regrets that I could not be here to hear the preceding testimony. We are running on kind of a doubleheader schedule over there in the Senate, and we will have to do the best we can.

General DEPUY. I am almost at the very end. I would just like to make one point, if I could, with you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely. I would be grateful if you did repeat some of your testimony.


General DEPUY. When we stopped last night, we were on Europe. I will not go back to that. I have finished that up. But on our manpower program, I would like to make just one or two points, because after all, that is the purpose of this hearing, our manpower authorization.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.



General DEPUY. I would like to point out the problem that we have. This is a little training aid that shows that if these are the losses, hypothetical, in a fiscal year, we have to plan our gains 5 to 6 months ahead of time to exactly match those losses if we wish to follow a par-

ticular trained strength level. We have problems in estimating precisely our losses. We are sometimes 10 percent off, and that is particularly true now because of the early release, and we do not precisely control our gains. We have used the draft in the past to control them pretty well, but in the future, that will not be so easy, so we are inevitably never exactly on the line.



General DEPUY. I would like to talk from that basis about what happened in 1972, very quickly. We started out with the President's budget, which followed this blue line and took us at the end of this fiscal year into the next fiscal year, the beginning of the one we are now discussing, at a strength of 942,000, and then came down to the same end point of 841,000. In April, the President made a withdrawal announcement which changed our program, and we pointed out there were 23,000 man-years we did not need over the President's budget. The Congress then added 27,000, and the total reduction became 50,000.

Then we had some management problems. We did not react right away. We hoped it would be turned around; it was not.

Second, our estimates were off a few months. So we were on the red line.

You know, Mr. Chairman, to the extent that you are over in one part of the year, you have to be under in the other, because in a man-year program, these two areas must be precisely the same. This brings us into 1973, 80,000 end strength lower than we wanted to come in. We wanted to be at 942,000. We are actually going to come in at 861,000. So that has caused the early release and some of the personnel hardships which we are now suffering.

The CHAIRMAN. Please go over that last point again.

General DEPUY. It is because of this very sharp decline that we are in the middle of massive early release program and it has some personnel hardship aspects to it. We are releasing from the Army in fiscal year 1972, 480,000 soldiers, and we are not going to replace 262,000. The difference we are going to replace.

You see, we really had planned earlier to split that 262,000 between 2 years, so we are doing in 1 year what we really wanted to do in two. (See p. 174.)

General DEPUY. It has one other phenomenon associated with it. And this is my last point. Because this chart needs a bit of explaining, this is the current fiscal year and that is 1973, and these blocks are 6-month periods.

The figures in them are the average for each month within the 6 months, and these are gains and these are losses. And a peculiar phenomenon has set which the committee really must understand. That is that the losses that we were going to take in the first 6 months of 1973 are largely taking place now. [Deleted] people a month are getting out.

When we get to the first 6 months of next year, the losses are low. But the gains per month are higher, because we are getting ready to replace losses 5 months downstream. Therefore, each month in the first 6 months of next fiscal year, we are going to gain [deleted] people more than we lose and our strength is going to build up, and it makes a hump of trainees to be used further downstream.

What we do not want to have happen, Mr. Chairman, is to have anybody draw a straight line from our beginning strength to our end strength and chop this off, because if that happens, we will not hit 841, we will have a big trained strength shortfall out in the future. We want the committee to understand that dynamic, which is a little bit hard to understand if you do not think about it hard.

Sir, that completes the Army's presentation.

The CHAIRMAN. What you want us to understand on that now, in layman's terms, is that precipitous drop that was intended for the first 6 months of fiscal year 1973 is occurring now.

General DEPUY. Now.

The CHAIRMAN. Your second point is because of that, it causes this hump that you have in training?

General DEPUY. In trainees, the soldiers in training.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked questions yesterday about what the basis was of your withdrawal in Vietnam when you planned your training requirements. It seemed that you were going to have to replace more in your original planning than you do now. But the day you explained it, it worked out that you had that hump there, and you needed at least as much of a manpower training budget as you are asking for.

General DEPUY. Actually, the total manpower, the total strength of the Army, goes up and down in a wave motion depending on the number of trainees. The number of trainees is determined by the number of losses.

We need in fiscal year 1973, Mr. Chairman, 208,000 new soldiers to replace losses in 1973 at the reduced strength. Oddly enough, in 1974, we are going to come in here and tell you that we need [deleted]. In other words, the losses that are the result of what happened 2 years before are going [deleted] are in 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. How many more are you going to need?

General DEPUY. We will need about [deleted] in fiscal year 1974, which we are not discussing now. It just illustrates the point that the number of trainees you have is derived from the losses you suffer that have to be replaced.

The CHAIRMAN. As far as I know, this is the first time that congressional committees have ever asked details about manpower requirements—the amount of training. I found an item of manpower for the services last year of 57,000 men. Of course, a lot of this was intelligence. I have never found anyone in the Department of Defense or the Budget Bureau who has reviewed that.

General DEPUY. I think they are reviewing it this year.

The CHAIRMAN. I know they are because we got into it, but it illustrates how this thing has just been going along.

We are going to need these graphs put in the record or given to us in pamphlet form.

General DEPUY. We have supplied copies of these to the committee. There are about four or five in there, Mr. Chairman, that have to do with the deployment schedule to Europe and they are secret. And I do not think we ought to change that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

While we are on that subject, I had not had a chance to talk to you.

You will excuse us just a minute.

(Discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. The chair asked yesterday to have Secretary Kelley's statement cleared for release this morning. In view of further developed facts—Mr. Laird has not testified—the committee members agree that the release of Secretary Kelley's statement be deferred until after Mr. Laird has testified.

Here is the Secretary over here.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Byrd.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NEW MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

On this same point, General, would you give me those figures again of the replacements for 1973, or was it 1974 that you gave us?

General DEPUY. I said that our requirement for new soldiers, either through the draft or through enlistment, in 1973 is 208,000.

Senator BYRD. And 1974, it would be—

General DEPUY. The whole program, assuming the 5-year Defense program holds the way it is now, requires [deleted] in 1974.

Senator BYRD. Now, what will be the total manpower for the Army in 1973?

General DEPUY. You are talking about man-years or—

Senator BYRD. Men, individuals.

General DEPUY. End strength or man-years? End strength is 841,000.

Senator BYRD. And what will it be for 1974?

General DEPUY. [Deleted.]

Senator BYRD. So, in other words, you would have a turnover, then, of 25 percent, is that right?

General DEPUY. That is right, roughly.

Senator BYRD. Am I interpreting the figures right?

General DEPUY. Exactly, yes.

Senator BYRD. Does that indicate great success for the All-Volunteer Army?

General DEPUY. I have not said whether they would come from the draft or whether they would come from enlistments. We hope they would all come from enlistments. Our optimistic estimate is that they could all come from enlistments or very nearly all of them.

Senator BYRD. Assuming they do come from enlistments, is that not a very substantial turnover?

General DEPUY. About 25 percent is probably about right in the long pull. You know, you just cannot have too many reenlistments, Senator, and feed the promotion structure of the Army. So, the most efficient thing to do is to have a manageable turnover of privates and corporals and select only the ones you want. I think that is a reasonably healthy program.

Secretary Kelley has studied this dynamic more than I have.

Would you agree with that, sir?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, I would.

Senator, if I could just add to what General DePuy has said. Across the board, we would be in a healthy state if we retained about 25 percent of those who complete their first term of enlistment. Obviously, the reenlistment or retention rate is very much higher than that for career personnel—those who are in their second and subsequent terms of enlistment. In that category, it runs over 75-percent retention. But the overall result of about 20- to 25-percent turnover, based on annual losses under stable force conditions, would be achieved if we continued to have high retention of careerists and 25-percent retention of first-term personnel.

Senator BYRD. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

All right, thank you very much, General.

Mr. Braswell, please call your next witness, and ask him to come around.

Mr. BRASWELL. The Navy, Admiral Finneran.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Admiral. You were a part of the audience yesterday. We thank you for being patient and waiting.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOHN G. FINNERAN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY

Admiral FINNERAN. I learned a lot, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I, too, learned a lot.

Do you have a prepared statement?

Admiral FINNERAN. I have some prepared remarks, sir, which go with a set of charts which you will find at tab Echo in your briefing book. I would like, with your permission, to take you through the first 10 of those charts. There are 19 in there.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be fine. I understand Secretary Kelley has other matters and so now I will ask him a question or two.

HEADQUARTERS MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. Secretary, yesterday, there was discussion of the EUCOM headquarters, the need for it, its size and grade structure. Can you

tell us who is responsible for validation of the manpower requirements in joint and international headquarters?

Also, tell us, who validates the requirements for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and defense agencies such as Defense Supply Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency?

Let's go on back to the first part of that question, who is responsible for the validation of the manpower requirements in joint and international headquarters?

Mr. KELLEY. Principally, the validation responsibility for joint and international headquarters resides within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The EUCOM and other international security headquarters report through that chain of command and it is their primary responsibility to determine headquarters staffing requirements.

Within the Office of the Secretary, the surveillance over judgments made as to staffing requirements would reside principally in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) Office of the Secretary of Defense?

Mr. KELLEY. Systems Analysis would advise the Secretary on judgments made by the Joint Chiefs as to manning levels for headquarters staffs in the joint international headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. You are still talking about the international headquarters?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know if anyone in Systems Analysis actually goes over them?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes; I am sure they do. I cannot from personal knowledge, assure you that they examine each and every one of the headquarters staffings.

The CHAIRMAN. We want you to check into that and report to us the name of anyone who has gone into this manpower question. We want to be able to answer any question like that on the floor of the Senate in addition to knowing ourselves.

Mr. KELLEY. All right, sir. I will have to supply that for the record. I do not have it here.

The CHAIRMAN. We must be able to say these different categories have been gone into. This may sound a little severe to you, but let me illustrate.

Last year, the committee unanimously agreed to my request for one additional staff member for this committee. The request then went before the Rules Committee and they unanimously agreed to it. But, when that came up on the floor, I was cross-examined on that point by none other than the chairman of the Appropriations Committee as to why I needed it, why I could not get along without it, and the question of whether or not those on the staff were doing enough work. He hit me hard on all sides.

This is not anything new. Everybody in the legislative branch—that is, in the Senate, has to make justifications. I did on such a matter as increasing my personnel by one. So, we are not asking any more than we have to do ourselves.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Pin that down for us, if you will. Also tell us how the requirements are validated for the Office of Secretary of Defense and defense agencies like the Defense Supply Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency.

Mr. KELLEY. The principal responsibility for validation of manning levels of the Defense Supply Agency or Defense Intelligence Agency or other component agencies of the DOD is the head of the agency. I would have to provide for the record specifically what examination of manning levels has been made during the past year.

I can say from personal knowledge that the Defense Supply Agency, which had approximately 57,000 people when I assumed my position 3 years ago, is down to the level of less than 50,000 today. But how that 50,000 divides itself between reductions in the force overall and reductions in management and command structure, I am not prepared to say.

The CHAIRMAN. I commend you for that reduction. I know it would not have been done if it had not been justified.

Is there anything that you can tell us about the manpower for DIA.

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir, I am not able to provide you with any specific information on manning levels for DIA. Dr. Hall, as you know, has recently taken on the responsibility of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. He is currently consumed in a lot of work about manning levels. He will be prepared to provide further information about manning of our intelligence organization. I cannot give you any information at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Braswell, we want to get this information now. This is the manpower part of the bill that we are on. I suppose Secretary Hall would be the one?

Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, sir, I understand he is.

The CHAIRMAN. But the budget has already been sent in. He did not take office until about the time the budget came over, did he?

Mr. BRASWELL. Yes; sir; we have had statistical data furnished. I understand that Dr. Hall is prepared to testify at any time.

(The information follows:)

MILITARY MANPOWER ASSIGNED TO DoD INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS

The attached data on military manpower in DoD intelligence functions represent revised estimates superseding those provided earlier. It is expected that these estimates may be further refined as results from our computer-based data system become available.

A total of 73,000 military personnel is budgeted for intelligence activities in FY 73 as compared with 81,000 at the end of FY 72 and 96,000 at the end of FY 71. This reduction of military personnel has been made in response to Presidential guidance, the will of Congress and as a result of management actions within the Department of Defense.

Manpower resources in intelligence are under continual review to achieve the most economical and effective utilization of highly trained technicians and analysts in the various intelligence fields. Manpower surveys, work measurement studies and program reviews are an important part of this review. As a result, some very reliable manning and staffing factors have been developed through the years which enable rather accurate forecasting of manpower needs. Manpower factors for technical equipment and normal TO&E allocations form the basis for determination of military manpower at the military unit level.

Military personnel are located at an estimated 1,000 sites throughout the world.

INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY ABBREVIATIONS

CCP : Consolidated Cryptologic Program (Managed by Director, NSA)
 APS: Advanced Program Support (Managed by Director, NSA)
 GDIP : (General Defense Intelligence Program (Managed by Director, DIA)
 SRV : Strategic Reconnaissance Program (Managed by Director, DIA)

RECAP BY SERVICE (EXCLUDES MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO DEFENSE AGENCIES), INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year—		
	1971 Actual	1972 estimated	1973 estimated
Army.....	33	26	21
Navy.....	18	15	14
Marine Corp.....	2	1	1
Air Force.....	39	33	32
Total.....	90	74	67

Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.

RECAP (INCLUDES MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO DEFENSE AGENCIES)

	Details	Rounded (thousands)
Fiscal year 1973:		
CCP/APS.....	[deleted]	[deleted]
GDIP.....		
SRV.....		
Total.....	73,164	73
Fiscal year 1972:		
CCP/APS.....	[deleted]	[deleted]
GDIP.....		
SRV.....		
Total.....	80,657	81
Fiscal year 1971:		
CCP/APS.....	[deleted]	[deleted]
GDIP.....		
SRV.....		
Total.....	96,131	96

TOTAL MILITARY MANPOWER SUMMARY
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROGRAM III

[In thousands]

	Fiscal year—				
	1964	1969	1971	1972	1973
Total.....	86	106	96	81	73
CCP & APS.....	[deleted]				
GDIP.....					
SRV.....					

NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION—PROCESSING/PRODUCTION

This category displays a FY 69 2,627 manpower space increase over FY 64. This is almost totally accounted for by the transfer intact in FY 66 from Program 2 of several Air Force Reconnaissance Technical Groups and Squadrons, and by the first display in FY 66 of the Army and DIA production resources as a separate item. These resources had been carried in the Intelligence Management and Support category. Both the Air Force units, Army and DIA resources described are contained in the Intelligence Production portion of this category. There were minor increases in FY 69 over FY 64 in the Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&T) aggregation, mainly in the Air Force. In contrast the Photo/Imagery aggregation has shown a steady decline from FY 64 to the FY 73 request [deleted]. This decrease has not yet drastically impaired the effort in this area, but further decreases to the Imagery interpretation effort will result in an unacceptable intelligence loss from this prolific source.

Both Intelligence Production and S&T resources FY 69 to the FY 73 Budget show a steady decrease resulting in a loss of 1,752 spaces over this period. These assets are now at such a level as to limit intelligence production on the [deleted] areas to that data which might be required for purposes of evacuation of American nationals. In short our intelligence production resources are sufficient to cover the highest priorities [deleted] leaving little or no capability on other areas of the world.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Over the period FY 64-73 the Telecommunications category has increased from 204 military spaces to 2,627 spaces. This increase is primarily due to a functional transfer of resources from other FYDP programs. These transfers occurred mainly in fiscal years 1965 and 1966 as a result of a 4 November 1964 directive in which the Secretary of Defense approved a DIA plan for consolidation of the three separate military SSO systems into a centrally managed Defense Special Security System (DSSS). He also directed the establishment of a Defense Special Security Communications System (DSSCS) in the same memorandum. There were minor increases in the three Services between FY 1969 and FY 1971 with decreases from FY 1971 on representing the results of management efforts in refining the SPINTCOM system to the point where only those organizations specifically requiring its service are receiving the service. Hence, the requested FY 73 manning authorization represents a base case requirement. The system consists of [deleted] stations serving in excess of [deleted] military organizations world-wide. The manning ratio per station averages 13.4. These stations with few exceptions, operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

MC&G

Between FY 64 and FY 69, MC&G activities decreased by 854 military spaces. The most significant reason for the decrease resulted from a decision by Navy to have ocean survey ships, previously operated by military personnel, to be operated on a contract basis with the Military Sealift Command (MSC), this released 578 military spaces. Within the Air Force, aerial photographic capability was reduced by trimming the RC-130 fleet from 15 to 10 aircraft concurrently with the development of new systems for aerial photography. This saved 394 spaces. Offsetting increases in the Army program resulted in the net reduction of 854 spaces.

Between FY 1969 and FY 1971, military manpower was further reduced by 2,957 spaces. Over 1,000 of this reduction was in the Army, where Balance of Payments (BALPA) reductions affected the Inter American Geodetic Survey (IAGS), deleted topographic battalions engaged in overseas mapping projects in [deleted] and transferred a Topographic Battalion (30th Engr. Topo. Bn) out of the MC&G program element. In the Navy there was a further conversion to the MSC operated ship concept and in the Air Force the number of RC-130's was further reduced from 10 to 6.

Between FY 71 and 72 there was a total military manpower reduction of 536, caused primarily by a further reduction in IAGS, Army, and a transfer out of the Air Force program of all the remaining RC-130's and helicopters operated by the Aerospace Cartographic and Geodetic Survey (ACGS).

Between FY 72 and FY 73, military manpower was reduced by almost 50% or 728 spaces. The majority of these, or 482, were in the Army, where the Topographic Battalions in the EUCOM and PACOM areas were disestablished. The Navy manpower increased slightly, while the Air Force decreased by 280 spaces, caused by deletion of all the remaining aerial photographic capability of ACGS RC-135 aircraft and additional reductions at the 1st Geodetic Survey Squadron.

NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION—CI&JA

The majority of the FY 69 increase in manpower from FY 64 was in the Army portion of the program element resulting from the assignment of additional missions and tasks including:

(1) Assignment to USAINTC of worldwide control of routine background investigations, polygraph certification and quality control, and control of all extended counterintelligence cases.

(2) Increased emphasis on intelligence missions to cope with CONUS civil disturbances and disorders.

(3) Expansion of counterintelligence services and other intelligence programs aimed at detecting subversion.

Reductions of strength in FY 71, 72 and 73 were due to budget cuts and a proposal to change the Personnel Security Investigative (PSI) criteria within both the DoD and USIB. This plan, when approved, will cause reductions in PSI investigative procedures.

SERVICES AND SUPPORT

The general function of this category is to provide the various services and support to intelligence organizations required for the fulfillment of their missions. Military manpower shows an overall decline from 2,616 spaces in FY 64 to 1,999 spaces in FY 73.

This category includes Fleet Tactical Intelligence Support (FTIS) (formerly Task Force 168) FTIS is responsive to fleet commanders requirements in highly specialized sensor areas for important and unique fleet collection programs. It deploys technical and analytical personnel and equipment to support airborne, surface, and sub-surface sensor collection missions. It also provides on-scene intelligence processing and produces integrated, all-system, all-source intelligence analysis. It appears in the GDIP for the first time in 1972, however, military manpower is not reflected until FY 73 because prior to this time the manpower resources were carried in program VII.

IDHS, a major element in services and support, has a world-wide mission to support the data processing requirements of the intelligence organizations to which these activities are assigned. Data processing requirements levied by higher authority are also a vital part of the IDHS mission.

NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION—SERVICES AND SUPPORT

IDHS activities were transferred to the GDIP in FY 64 resulting in a major increase of 1,558 military spaces which are reflected in the 1964 to 69 time frame. The increase in military manpower spaces is also attributable to requirements for increased processing and support to the production of intelligence and to improve the quantity and quality of finished intelligence, telemetry and other sensor data, weapons systems and data base and support systems.

FY 69 was the peak year for IDHS military personnel (1,674) at which point it started to gradually decline to the FY 73 level of 1,493 spaces.

The third major element in Services and Support is intelligence Management and Support Activities (IMSA).

This includes such varied activities as war gaming, inventory of intelligence requirements, training, recruitment and placement, logistical support to intelligence units, procurement, fabrication and modification of small special purpose material, provision of threat data in support of developmental programs, preparation of threat models for military studies and the direction and management of intelligence activities.

The total of 2,616 military spaces in FY 64 includes, in addition to personnel performing IMSA functions, all the service ACSI staffs. By FY 69 these spaces were transferred to program IX.

In addition to the ACSI staffs, the DIA production center was included in IMSA. In FY 66 this activity, which accounted for 613 military spaces, was also transferred out of this element.

Military personnel remains fairly constant for the years following 1969 except for FY 72 at which point an increase of approximately 90 military spaces over FY 71 is noted. This increase is due to the transfer of spaces from the HUMINT & CI&IA program to IMSA and reflects no increase above total GDIP authorization. Personnel transferred in this year perform the same function as before the transfer. The decrease in Military personnel noted from FY 72 to 73 is the result of the various budget cuts imposed as a result of the budget review and other general decrement exercises.

MANPOWER REDUCTION ACTIONS—SINCE FY 1969

The following actions since FY 69 have reduced military manpower in the GDIP area:

FY 69-70.—Presidential directive regarding Balance of Payments (BALPA) and Overseas Personnel Reduction (OPRED).

FY 71.—Congressional limitations on intelligence manpower ceilings contained in the FY 71 Appropriations Act.

FY 72.—Presidential guidance regarding the formulation of the FY 72 DoD Budget request, and, the FY 72 Congressional O&M Appropriations Act.

FY 73.—Presidential guidance and directives on intelligence manpower resources to be contained in the FY 73 DoD Budget request.

Specific actions which have reduced manpower:

1. Disestablishment of the following organizations: 1170th Field Activities Squadron; 67th RTS; 2nd RTS; 8th RTS; 29th TOPO BN; 656th TOPO BN; ACGS.

2. Consolidation of Organization: 6499th Support Group integrated into the 1127th FAG.

3. Shared Administrative Support Agreements with State Department, whereby State assumed administrative, financial and support functions of the Defense Attache System.

4. JCS Manpower Surveys (DIA & U&S Commands).

5. Discontinuance of all Aerial Photographic functions in AF MC&G.

6. Reduction in Clandestine Humint activities—Army and Air Force.

7. Reduction in Counterintelligence and Investigative Activities.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know who, if anyone, went over this, examined it, and validated it as far as the manpower.

Mr. BRASWELL. We have not found that out yet, sir.

Mr. KELLEY. We have furnished statistical data, as Mr. Braswell indicated, and we will provide information on who the validating person was with regard to the intelligence force level.

The CHAIRMAN. We want to know whose judgment we are passing on. Just to say the Joint Chiefs of Staff did it is not enough.

Mr. KELLEY. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a little in doubt whether to ask you or Secretary Hall to follow that up.

Mr. KELLEY. What I would propose to do, sir, is to be sure that you are furnished the information. The furnishing of the information which comes out of these manpower hearings I accept as my responsibility, since my office orchestrates the answers even though I do not provide some of the answers myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, as I said, that intelligence category column had not been examined even by the Budget Bureau, last year. That did make some difference.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The manpower requirements for Defense Intelligence Agency for FY 1973 were first reviewed by the Director of that agency. These requirements were then validated during the annual joint OSD-OMB review of the intelligence budgets submitted by the DoD components. OSD elements participating in this review included the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, and DDR&E. Representatives of the Office of Management and Budget were full partners with OSD in this review. A final review was conducted by the Secretary of Defense, both as a part of his normal budget reviews and during his intensive study of the organization for intelligence that led to the creation of the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. In the future, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) will participate in the Intelligence manpower requirements review process.

HEADQUARTERS STRUCTURE REDUCTION

The CHAIRMAN. The services have all described reductions being taken in their headquarters' structure. Please tell us how many people have been reduced in the joint and international headquarters and also the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the defense agencies. That is a broad general question you can get tabulated.

The first concerns who validates it, and all, and the second as to the number.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

Recommendations for manpower requirements are made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for joint and international headquarters; by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and by the respective agency heads for the Defense Agencies. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) reviews these recommendations and develops a range of alternatives for consideration by the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense makes the final decisions.

The table below reflects manpower authorized to the respective headquarters and agencies for the fiscal years 1968, 1971, 1972 and 1973. A reduction of 6,135 spaces has been implemented since FY 1968, which equates to a 22% overall reduction.

DOD MILITARY MANPOWER ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE AGENCIES, JOINT HEADQUARTERS, AND INTERNATIONAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS AND AGENCIES

	Fiscal years—			
	1968	1971	1972	1973
Office of Secretary of Defense.....	872	966	1,002	841
Defense agencies:				
Joint Chiefs of Staff.....	1,556	1,272	1,314	1,319
Defense Communications Agency.....	1,752	1,706	1,689	1,689
Defense Intelligence Agency.....	2,652	2,372	2,405	2,232
Defense Nuclear Agency.....	4,048	1,604	919	701
Defense Supply Agency.....	1,160	1,081	1,174	1,166
National Security Agency.....				
Total, Defense agencies.....	} [Deleted]			
Joint Headquarters:				
NORAD/CONAD.....	847	815	818	818
ALCOM.....	161	150	152	152
LANTCOM.....	649	636	684	684
USECOM.....	1,565	1,032	963	963
PACOM.....	2,417	2,808	2,630	1,905
USSOUTHCOM.....	255	150	169	169
STRIKCOM.....	1,728	1,080	670	670
Total, Joint Headquarters.....	7,622	6,671	6,086	5,361
International military headquarters and agencies.....	3,627	2,948	4,084	4,065
Total.....	} [Deleted]			

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else you would like to comment on?

Mr. KELLEY. No, thank you, and I appreciate your courtesy on my appearance yesterday.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for being here. You have made an excellent witness and I appreciate your attendance today and all the work that went into this presentation.

Secretary Kelley needs to leave now, if you have any more questions?

Senator THURMOND. I asked my questions yesterday and he has promised to put into the record some of the information.

I have a few questions of General DePuy, but if you are going to go ahead with someone else, I can take him at the conclusion.

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, thank you very much.

The General has been on and we have asked the Admiral to come around, so we will proceed with him now.

Admiral FINNERAN. Senator Thurmond, my charts are in tab "E" of the book if you want to refer to those and I will be speaking to those for about 15 minutes.

I am Adm. John G. Finneran, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Plans and Programs. My presentation will highlight aspects of the Navy's military manpower program for fiscal year 1973.

Navy's active military manpower authorization request is for 601,184 man-years, which reflects a reduction from fiscal year 1972 to fiscal year 1973 of approximately 6,200 man-years. The military pay appropriation request to support this program is \$5.35 billion. This manpower will provide the assets to man 594 ships and 160 aircraft squadrons flying 5,809 average operating aircraft; 323,600 personnel will be assigned to the force missions in our surface, submarine, and aviation operating forces; 150,400 personnel will be assigned to base support, headquarters and service functions; 127,200 are required to meet our replacement training and transient requirements.



Admiral FINNERAN. Chart 1 provides a general historical overview of manpower costs versus total obligation authority and cost per man. We are dedicated to favorably influencing these increasing cost trends. The Navy military manpower cost as a percentage of total obligation authority for fiscal year 1973 will be 22.7 percent. That is military direct payroll. If we include civilian payroll and the personnel support costs, it becomes approximately 47 percent of the total obligation authority.

The Navy has made marked progress in redefining its manpower requirements to effect better utilization, to take advantage of improved technology, and to control the costs associated with personnel.

The limiting factors which size the numbers of people to man a ship or squadron are those watch stations required to be manned on a sustaining basis in a combat or high state of readiness environment. We call this condition III. It demands sufficient trained manpower for a one in three operational watch rotation, a continuous corrective maintenance capability on all ship systems and reduced housekeeping on a round the clock basis. In certain ship classes the requirement is battle station readiness for all hands. The limiting factors under this circumstance become crew exhaustion and/or termination of mission.

In the normal at sea environment in peacetime these manning factors provide a minimum 74-hour workweek for watchstanders and a 66-hour workweek for nonwatchstanders.


SHORE REQUIREMENTS

Turning to the shore requirements for the Navy, our standard workweek factor is 40 hours and the methodology includes a very careful determination of civilian manpower requirements as well as military. At this time we have completed the validation of 19 percent of the Navy shore establishment and are programed to complete 100 percent by 1975. The review of the shore establishment to date has resulted in a redistribution of more than 8,000 billets and reduced headquarters staffing equivalent to 800 man-years since 1968.

A crucial element of Navy's shore manning is the capability to provide a reasonable opportunity for shore duty for our career petty officers. We currently have 25 ratings which we consider deprived of a balanced opportunity for shore duty. This equates to a deficit in the fiscal year 1973 program of approximately 10,000 more billets. In the absence of a viable rotation capability, we have little to offer a prospective high performing reenlistee but the prospect of 14 to 16 years cumulative sea service. As policy, therefore, we opt for a deliberate effort to program shore manpower towards these skills. We have included in this year's program approximately 3,100 billets for this purpose; 1,500 of these are targeted to our engineering and technical skills in fleet maintenance groups concentrated in four major homeports in the continental United States. The remaining 1,600 have been programed to strengthen our recruiting efforts and our commitment to leadership development and human relation programs, including our drug abuse program, sir.

We have also programed some additional spaces from other shore resources by rating substitution and mission redefinition. Since 1966 we have also substituted 4,130 civilians for military personnel to

operate our messes ashore; 500 additional will be substituted by July 1, this year, releasing nonrated personnel for sea assignment, releasing our nonrated personnel for sea duty who would otherwise be involved in those duties ashore.



Admiral FINNERAN. Chart 2 depicts selected examples of our skill requirements growth. I chose to compare a post-Korean war 1955 destroyer, a submarine, and an aviation squadron with their new weapons systems successors. Marked increases in the numbers of skills and numbers of men necessary to maintain and operate these weapons systems are indicated. Complex weapons systems demand complex manpower systems and more capable, highly trained individuals. New ship system designs are being critically reviewed to contain this trend. Design technology includes reduced housekeeping, improved maintainability and reliable automation. We are optimistic for the long term, but our current ship systems will be with us for many years to come and the demands for a trained skill base will continue to drive our manpower costs.

Senator DOMINICK. Mr. Chairman, could I interrupt at that point and ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to deny you that privilege.

Senator DOMINICK. It will be very short.

In looking at this chart No. 2 and the A-6, are we talking about the number of squadrons, the number of aircraft, or what on the line just above 40?

Admiral FINNERAN. The length of the bar, sir, shows 41 skilled specialties and the number of specialties required to make up a squadron.

Senator DOMINICK. So, this is 320 people per squadron?

Admiral FINNERAN. That is a squadron of 12 aircraft, yes, sir, 40 officers, 280 enlisted.

Senator DOMINICK. One more question. You need 41 skilled specialties in that squadron. What happens if one of the specialists gets killed in a war or falls overboard or whatever else? Do you have any backup?

Admiral FINNERAN. In most of those skills, sir, they are manned by two or more technicians. So, one would not be that critical instantaneously unless they were in a very critical point with respect to their maintenance capability. And, of course, we would be dependent upon replacements to provide relief for the squadron.

Senator DOMINICK. Thank you.





CHART 3

Admiral FINNERAN. Turning to chart 3, I present the Navy's combat versus support manpower picture in Europe. The forces indicated in the solid line at the top are the 6th Fleet afloat plus Navy personnel ashore in Europe in support of the mission. The second line is the average 6th Fleet direct mission manpower. These are the ships and the aircraft.

The center broken line presents the support to combat ratio for that theatre, 14 men in support per 100 combat. As indicated on the chart, this ratio has stabilized in the past 2 years.



PROGRAMS:

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| I STRATEGIC FORCES | VI RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT |
| II GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES | VII CENTRAL SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE |
| III INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS | VIII TRAINING, MEDICAL AND OTHER |
| IV AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT | IX GENERAL PERSONNEL SUPPORT, ADMINISTRATION AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES |
| V RESERVE FORCES | X SUPPORT OF OTHER NATIONS |

CHART 4

Admiral FINNERAN. Turning to chart 4, it presents two comparisons of officer to enlisted ratios by defense program definition. Note that under either methodology the force mission manpower at the bottom two lines has a relatively low officer/enlisted ratio. Our high ratios indicated at the top of the chart are the product of a rich mix essentially in defense programs six through 10. This results predominantly from the demand for proportionately heavier officer representation in our shore establishment in order for it to perform its mission.


Please note that reductions in this ratio are programed. We have accomplished this by deliberate reviews to downgrade rank requirements and increase responsibilities for enlisted personnel—400 officer spaces were converted to enlisted this year to date.

This chart does not include Marine Corps forces for which the Navy provides support, particularly in facilities engineering, all health skills and aviation training.


The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, I do not see any chart numbers.

Admiral FINNERAN. At the bottom of the chart, sir, the small 5, synonymous with page.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.



Admiral FINNERAN. Chart 5 presents the Navy's operational headquarters reduction programs. The top graph presents a strength profile. The center graph presents actual numbers of personnel assigned to all our fleet staffs. As you can see, this is a 12.4 percent reduction since 1968. The bottom graph is numbers of staff headquarters. Since 1968 we have created eight, decommissioned 67 and consolidated eight naval operational headquarters. This represents 20 percent reduction in command headquarters in the fleet.



Admiral FINNERAN. Chart No. 6 summarizes in similar fashion Navy Management Headquarters reduction programs. Again, since 1968 we have reduced by 10.5 percent military manpower (center graph). You will also notice a slight increase in 1973 in that program, primarily caused by the increases allocated to the Navy recruiting command.

The numbers of management headquarters are shown on the lower graph.


Turning now to chart 7, Mr. Chairman, I would like to present our permanent change of station program. This chart we call the stabilizing portion of our PCS program. The bars reflect the numbers of moves programed. For fiscal 1971 and earlier, they are actual moves; for fiscal 1972 and 1973, they are projected. At the top of each of the bars are shown the programed funds to support each category. The stabilizing moves are those to support our training requirements on the left hand side, our sea/shore rotation policy and readiness requirements to replace losses from the career force and balance our operational resources in ships and squadrons.

Shown in the two groups called operational and retentional on the right-hand side. As you can see, sir, our training moves are down and under control. Our operational and rotational moves programs have stabilized.

Turning to chart No. 8. These are our destabilizing moves. Please notice the influence on our overall program caused by large variations in our accessions and separations shown on the left-hand side. These moves must be met to maintain the strength programed. Unit moves (right-hand graph) requirements reflect decommissioning, activation and forces relocation.


U. S. NAVY
STABILIZING PERMANENT CHANGEL OF STATION (PCS) MOVES


MOVES
(THOUS)



U. S. NAVY
DESTABILIZING PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) MOVES

(THOUS)
220





Admiral FINNERAN. Chart 9 presents a profile of our enlisted training requirements compared to strength and total gains.

Senator THURMOND. What is the heading of that chart?

Admiral FINNERAN. This is No. 9, sir, U.S. Navy enlisted end strength gains and school loads.

Senator THURMOND. Page 8 or 9. Instead of chart number, it is page number?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir. I am sorry; 6,000 additional student requirements are included in our fiscal 1973 program to meet increased recruiting requirements generated by increased losses shown on the middle graph in fiscal 1973. Note that our service school training (dotted line at bottom) for enlisted personnel differs significantly from our recruit requirements (solid line).





This is because the length of training in our professional, technical schools varies from 5 to 52 weeks and, therefore, is based upon projected requirements 15 months to 3 years in advance. Approximately 60 percent of our recruits shown in the black solid line in the lower graph will attend specialized schools in the coming year, fiscal 1973.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage?

Admiral FINNERAN. 60 percent, sir.

Showing a comparable chart for officers, chart 10. Chart 10 presents our programmed requirements for officer training compared to strength and total gains. The third graph from the top presents officer entry level training. This is our OCS and aviation officer candidate programs combined, and indicates its marked reductions. Our pilot training rates are now leveling out at 1,450 in fiscal year 1973.

U. S. NAVY
OFFICER STRENGTH



The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me, is that on page 10?

Admiral FINNERAN. Page 10, sir, the third graph down, the dotted line, pilot training rate.

The CHAIRMAN. I see it now.


Admiral FINNERAN. On the lower graph, we present our graduate education and our service college training programs.

As a point of interest, in excess of 90 percent of our postgraduate officers remain in the Navy for a full and productive career.

Turning now to chart 11 and on through the remainder of the charts, rather than take you through them one by one, we present in charts 11 through 19 experience data for the past and projected expectations on promotion, retention, our early release programs, our quality control program, and losses, for your information. In the interest of brevity. I will not comment on them at this time, but I do have, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, some extended remarks that explain those charts for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Without objection, the extended remarks of the Admiral will be included in the record.


(The statement follows:)



I will now present some examples of our promotion system. Chart #11 provides the numbers of enlisted promotions by pay grade in recent years and projected through FY 73 (bottom graph) compared to strength and losses on the upper graphs. It is noteworthy that our senior grades are relatively stable (solid line) despite significant variations in strength. The greatest fluctuations occur in those grades most sensitive to retention, petty officer second class (pay grade E-5) and below (dotted lines). An increase in the numbers of promotions in these grades in FY 73 is predominantly the result of relatively high projected losses (middle graph) and does not represent absolute increases in the numbers of people serving in these grades.

ENLISTED GRADE 1964-1973

Chart #12 illustrates two related facets of the enlisted force. First, the issue of increasing gradelevels. I have indicated two years—FY 64 and FY 73. I will speak to the two solid lines first with the left margin percentage scale. These two lines represent the percent of the enlisted force at each pay grade in FY 64 and FY 73. Our principal increase has occurred at pay grade E-6 (petty officer first class). This is a function partially of minimal promotion opportunity and requirements growth for experienced and responsible petty officers required to maintain our weapon systems.




Additionally, we have increases at pay grades E-1 and E-2. This is caused by our increased time in grade requirements which were effected 1 January 1972 and are slowing flow out of these grades. We believe this slow down is appropriate now that Congress has provided substantial increased pay at these grade levels.

An allied issue is illustrated by the two dotted lines and the right hand scale. These lines illustrate how the percentage of careerists has declined at the key pay grades of E-4 and E-5. This represents a loss of skilled experience caused by past years declining retention at the 1st term and mid-career points. The area between the curves explicitly demonstrates the experience gap which results from poor retention and contributes to increased costs not only to provide more junior technicians trained, but narrowly experienced, and also influences our training costs. The solution is increased retention of skilled technicians to reduce this gap.

There has been essentially no growth in our chief petty officer grades (E7-E9).

Essentially, the problem resolves to this—as increasing technology forces increasing responsibility on our petty officers, they are increasingly less experienced because of our inability to keep them long enough.

Chart #13 presents the officer promotion picture. Navy's promotion system is based upon grade controls in the unrestricted line and permits restricted line and staff corps promotions on the running mate principle essentially unconstrained to specific limited numbers in each grade. Therefore, I present both groups by grade on the lower graph and provide a strength profile for comparison on the upper graph. I would point out the following factors: So called "grade creep" in the grade of Captain does not exist now but did from FY 64-68 (lower graph, bottom two lines). This was caused by the need to provide minimal promotion flow and opportunity to large numbers of officers procured in World War II and eligible for promotion in the early and mid-60's. You will note that as these officers leave service, we are making progress to reduce Captain grade representation. We have achieved a 15% reduction in unrestricted line Captains and a 5.7% reduction overall from the peak year, Fiscal Year 68. In the grade of Commander (next two lines) that same influence exists due to increased procurement during the Korean War. Slightly slower progress in reductions is being made in this grade to avoid promotion stagnation and to meet our billet requirements. The grade of Lieutenant Commander (top two lines) is highly sensitive to retention influence and is substantially below requirements. Please



note the upward trend in the restricted line and staff corps communities in the Lieutenant Commander grade which is caused primarily by our direct procurement programs for medical officers.






Chart #14 shows officer promotion from a different perspective. The lower graph presents actual numbers of promotions in the combined grades indicated. Captain, Commander and Lieutenant Commander are essentially stable except as influenced by Lieutenant Commander Staff Corps Officers, primarily medical. The grades of Lieutenant and Lieutenant (junior grade) respond to procurement and changes in upper grade flow rates. Slight increases for 73 are programmed. Flow rates in the grades of Lieutenant Commander, Commander and Captain are retarding slowly as a result of a decreased strength base.



RETENTION (ENLISTED)

An area of vital interest to increased readiness and future cost control is retention. The enlisted retention picture is mixed. Chart #15 (upper graph) shows the numbers of first term reenlistments and compares it with our goals for overall Navy. We have established numerical goals for each of 69 ratings in the Navy which equate to approximately a 31% overall retention objective. The upturn since FY 70 is encouraging but still less than satisfactory. We have 29 ratings whose retention rates are less than 10% and severely inhibit our experience mix, stability and readiness improvements. The Variable Reenlistment Bonus (VRB) is our most useful management device. The average reenlistment rate among ratings eligible is 25% which is 12% higher than those ratings not eligible for VRB. The bottom graph presents the reenlistment profile for a single rating, radioman, as a detailed example of our actual versus desired experience.

RETENTION (OFFICERS)

Retention of high quality officers in proper balance by specialty is our objective. This chart provides on percentage scales our experience with officer retention and projects our expectations for the coming year. The percentage goals are also shown. Marked improvement in aviation and submarine retention has occurred in the past year (upper two lines). Aviation successes may be influenced by reduced commercial hiring. We attribute our success in submarines to the nuclear officer continuation pay which Congress provided two years ago and which expires in FY 73. We anticipate requesting extension of that authority and extending it to include nuclear surface officers for whom we currently realize 11% retention. This must be arrested and reversed. The lower two lines show our poor experience with surface and medical officer retention which continue as our severest officer problems.






Chart 17 presents our statistical experiences with early release programs (officer and enlisted) in recent years. We have been required to exercise significant numbers of early releases to meet force reduction objectives and budget constraints. We regard this as debilitating to readiness but necessary to manage the force with a balanced plan of action. We have early released in excess of 260,000 officers and men from two months to one year earlier than their normal expiration of service in the past four years. We plan no enlisted general early releases in FY 73 but will continue a modest officer program.



Turning to Chart 18, concurrently with force reductions, we have increased our quality control standards, and our professional criteria for continued service have been improved. This has resulted in increased separation of ineligible to reenlist personnel (upper graph) compared to pre-Vietnam years. All of these men leave service with honorable discharges. Our projection for FY 73 shows a decrease in numbers of ineligible anticipated.

In addition, we have experienced increases in separation for cause (lower graph) resulting from adverse attitudes towards military service, increased disciplinary cases and expanded incidents of drug abuse. A significant proportion of these increases are attributable to Project 100,000 New Standard accessions. We anticipate reductions in these trends as a beneficial effect of the All Volunteer Force in the long term, but are not yet confident that the trend will reduce markedly in FY 1973.




Chart 19 presents three breakouts of officer losses. Statutory retirements (solid line) are at high levels due to thirty year service completion of World War II officers. Officers separated with severance pay (center), not retirement eligible, are tapering off and will probably stabilize at about 240 annually. Reserve officers separated with reserve readjustment pay (bottom) are shown.

Finally, as we gain experience in recruiting under essentially zero draft conditions we are finding the resiliency of supply of manpower attracted to the Navy on a voluntary basis is marginal. We are currently experiencing some numerical shortfalls which we hope to overcome in the coming months as our recruiting techniques improve and as we attain full recruiting strength. It is, however, an element of concern at this time. Manpower competition in the marketplace is keen and as we retrench from Vietnam, the Navy appears to be at a disadvantage, particularly because of repeated lengthy deployments at sea and the image of hard work under seagoing habitability conditions. This completes my presentation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am prepared for questions.

COMMITTEE PROCEDURE

The CHAIRMAN. I think your charts are very helpful and we are glad to see you spell it out this way.

Has the Navy made presentations like this before?

Admiral FINNERAN. Not to my knowledge, sir. To the Congress, we have attempted to pull this together so that you could see it in the perspective of the past and the current and future year programs.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it is highly valuable to our staff members. We will have this as a starting point next year. You will have it, too, as a starting point for comparison.

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You gentleman in the Navy—all services—have great personnel problems. I do not see how you handle all of them, particularly the Navy with your offshore duty to complicate the matter.

Admiral FINNERAN. We have some very difficult problems, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You apparently do a good job. At least, you know how to stay out of the newspapers rather well, that is a big item in itself.

I would like to make one suggestion here. We are not as familiar with the abbreviations that you use and often stumble over them in reviewing these papers. In view of your public relations expenditures, it would be helpful if these abbreviations could be written out for our understanding.

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just a few questions here and then I will pass on over to Senator Thurmond.

We have before us that there are 13,600 Navy personnel at management headquarters below the departmental level and another 6,100 in intermediate headquarters. Now, can you and will you provide a list of these headquarters, their functions, and the number of men in each?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot do that now, but you will do it?

Admiral FINNERAN. I will be pleased to provide that for the record, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When we say for the record, we mean sometime reasonably soon, so we will not accumulate a great deal of it later.

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.
(The information follows:)

MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

Mission

The Chief of Naval Personnel shall plan and direct the procurement, distribution, administration, and career motivation, of Navy personnel, including those of the Naval Reserve, to meet the quantitative and qualitative manpower requirements for the United States Navy, as determined by the Chief of Naval Operations. Further, the Chief of Naval Personnel shall develop, coordinate, implement and manage service-wide programs which meet Navy requirements for improved human relations programs and policies.

Functions

To accomplish this mission, the Chief of Naval Personnel shall:

1. Plan and provide for the procurement, distribution, education and career motivation of regular and reserve Navy personnel.
2. Develop and maintain a military manpower and personnel management information system for the Navy.
3. Maintain records of service of Navy personnel.
4. Manage the central-nonappropriated funds available for the welfare and recreation of Navy personnel.
5. Administer those functions prescribed by law involving benefits for Navy personnel and their dependents.
6. Prepare, revise, and publish U.S. Navy Uniform Regulations and the Registers of Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the United States Navy and its reserve components, and jointly with the Comptroller of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, prepare and revise Navy Travel Instructions, and such other publications as are necessary for the proper management of personnel.
7. Budget, administer and account for appropriated funds for: Regular and Reserve personnel of the Navy, and financial operations of assigned activities, commands and programs including recruiting, off-duty education, and other centrally managed personnel programs.

BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY

Mission

The Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (who is also the Surgeon General of the Navy), under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations, commands the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and shore activities as assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations. He shall provide all professional and technical assistance requisite to safeguarding and promoting the health of the Navy and Marine Corps personnel, and he shall provide professional and technical guidance in the care and treatment of sick and injured Navy and Marine Corps personnel and their dependents, and other personnel as authorized by law.

Functions

1. Provide medical and dental care and services as authorized by law or regulation in naval hospitals, dispensaries, and dental clinics for Navy and Marine Corps personnel, other uniformed services personnel, their dependents, retired members and their dependents, eligible survivors of deceased members, Federal civilian employees, and other categories of persons authorized by law or regulation.
2. Provide for medical and dental care in nonnaval facilities of Navy and Marine Corps personnel, other uniformed services personnel, their dependents, retired members and their dependents, eligible survivors of deceased members, Federal civilian employees, and other categories of persons authorized by law or regulation.
3. Accomplish matters pertaining to Marine Corps personnel in coordination with the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
4. Plan and program the health care resources provided by the Bureau through all medical and dental activities under its command, and support for other activities as may be assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations.
5. Act as the chief of the Medical Department of the Navy in the professional and technical supervision of medical and dental matters throughout the Department of the Navy.

6. Issue and maintain manuals and directives to promulgate Medical Department or Bureau policies and procedures on medical and dental professional, technical, and administrative matters.

7. Conduct medical and dental inspections of activities commanded by the Bureau and assist other immediate superiors in command in performing command inspections of medical and dental facilities and health related activities throughout the Navy and Marine Corps.

8. Provide professional and technical advice and assistance to the Chief of Naval Materiel, systems commands, Bureau of Naval Personnel, fleet commands, and other offices, commands, of agencies in the utilization of medical and dental manpower, facilities, equipment, and material requisite to full health care support for the Department of the Navy.

9. Provide professional and technical guidance over design, construction, and equipping of medical and dental facilities ashore and afloat in coordination with the Chief of Naval Materiel Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Naval Ship Systems Command, and when appropriate the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

10. Provide professional and technical guidance over performance requirements, procurement, and utilization of medical, dental, and mortuary supplies and equipment by preparing and maintaining medical and dental allowance lists, by liaison with the Defense Supply Agency and the Naval Materiel Command, by providing representation on the Defense Medical Material Board, and by advising and assisting the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in these matters.

11. Initiate and conduct research, development, test, and evaluation efforts in biological and medical sciences, behavioral and social sciences technology, health education and training health manpower productivity, and operational medical support systems in response to approve Navy and Marine Corps R.D.T. & E. requirements.

12. Provide professional and technical guidance and assistance to the Navy and Marine Corps in the planning and conduct of research, development, test, and evaluation of weapons, aircraft, and support systems.

NAVAL MATERIEL COMMAND

Mission

The Chief of Naval Materiel, under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations, commands the Naval Materiel Command. In addition to such other tasks as may be assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations, he shall :

1. Meet the total system and material support needs of the Operating Forces of the Navy for equipment, weapons and weapon systems, materials, supplies, facilities, maintenance, and supporting services, including the development, acquisition, procurement, construction, maintenance, alteration, repair, and overhaul of ships, aircraft, surface and undersea craft, space and oceanographic systems, and equipment; training equipment and devices; land vehicle systems and equipment; fixed ocean systems; and shore facilities and utilities, all consistent with approved programs;

2. Respond directly to the Commandant of the Marine Corps in meeting those particular support needs of the Marine Corps which are required to be provided by the Naval Materiel Command.

3. Respond to the heads of other Department of Defense and Department of the Navy organizations in meeting their material support needs (including those of the Naval Reserve) that are provided by the Naval Materiel Command.

Functions

1. Supervise and direct all functions, programs, and activities of the Naval Materiel Command.

2. Direct and supervise the performance of project management offices in the management of systems and equipment acquisition programs. Establish and disestablish project manager offices as required.

3. Provide realistic cost estimates and risk assessments for the planning, programming, and budgeting of systems and equipment acquisition, and support.

4. Control changes in the configuration of systems and equipment during development and production, subject to the military performance specifications of the Chief of Naval Operations or Commandant of the Marine Corps.

5. Coordinate and direct the planning, development, procurement, and support of air, sea, and land weapon and support systems, in accordance with operational requirements;

6. Plan, direct, and review the formulation and justification of budgets and apportionments for the Naval Materiel Command;

7. Direct and review the formulation and presentation of Naval Materiel Command inputs to the Department of the Navy and Department of Defense programming systems;

8. Plan and allocate manpower, funds and other resources, assign workloads, and evaluate performance of all components of the Naval Materiel Command;

9. Conduct liaison, exchange information, and coordinate as required with the Commandant of the Marine Corps and with counterparts in other military departments, Defense agencies, and other Federal agencies;

10. Provide advice to the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps as appropriate, on the technical, logistic, economic, and schedule feasibility of meeting material needs;

11. Provide information to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and to other Navy Commands and officials as appropriate, on training requirements for naval personnel in the operation, maintenance, and support of systems and equipment provided by the Naval Materiel Command;

12. Provide using Commands with technical guidance on the operation and logistic support for all weapon systems, support systems and equipments;

13. Provide guidance and services to Navy and Marine Corps Commands as required, in functional areas related to Naval Materiel Command material, supply, facility, and other technical or professional matters as appropriate;

14. Perform research, development, test and evaluation in response to Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps requirements;

15. Develop and operate the Navy Supply System;

16. Develop and promulgate policies regarding the supply, distribution, and disposal of Navy material;

17. Design, acquire, construct, and dispose of naval facilities, including real estate and improvements thereon;

HEADQUARTERS SUBORDINATE TO CHIEF OF NAVAL MATERIEL

Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Naval Ordnance Systems Command Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Naval Ship Systems Command Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Naval Electronic Systems Command Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Naval Supply Systems Command Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; and Naval Facilities Engineering Command Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Mission

The mission of each headquarters activity is to assist the commander thereof in the performance of his command, support, material, and other responsibilities as assigned by the Chief of Naval Materiel.

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND CHARTER

1. General Duties and Responsibilities

Except as otherwise provided herein or by the Chief of Naval Materiel, the Naval Air Systems Command is assigned material support responsibility for:

(a) Navy and Marine Corps aircraft systems including components thereof and fuels and lubricants therefor;

(b) air-launched weapon systems and components thereof but not including torpedoes and mines except for aircraft compatibility aspects, which are a joint responsibility to be exercised with the Naval Ordnance Systems Command;

(c) airborne electronics;

(d) air-launched underwater sound systems;

(e) airborne pyrotechnics;

(f) astronautics and space craft systems, including components therefor;

(g) airborne mine countermeasure equipment except for explosives, explosive components and fuzing, safing and arming devices integral thereto;

(h) aeronautical droned and toward target systems, target complexes and self-propelled land-based targets, including related ground control equipment and launch and control aircraft;

(i) catapults, arresting gear, visual landing aids, and jet blast deflectors;

(j) photographic equipment; and

(k) meteorological equipment.

NAVAL ORDNANCE SYSTEMS COMMAND CHARTER

1. General Duties and Responsibilities

Except as otherwise provided herein or by the Chief of Naval Material, the Naval Ordnance Systems Command is responsible for the following: (a) performing material support functions for:

- (1) shipboard weapons systems and components thereof, including, but not limited to; weapon direction equipment, fire control radars, infra-red devices, computers and switchboards, guns, launchers, ready service magazine stowage and handling equipment integral to the launcher or gun system, ammunition, guided missiles, mines, torpedoes, and all other surface and underwater ordnance expendables;
- (2) air-launched mines and torpedoes, except for aircraft compatibility aspects, which are a joint responsibility to be exercised with the Naval Air Systems Command;
- (3) small arms, infantry equipment, inshore undersea warfare equipment assigned, swimmer weapons, demolition materials and surface and underwater released pyrotechnic and cartridge-actuated devices;
- (4) unmanned seaborne targets, except ship hulks;
- (5) special explosive ordnance disposal tools and equipment;
- (6) ship and body protective armor as assigned; and
- (7) mine countermeasure explosives and explosive components and fuzing, safing, and arming devices integral thereto.

NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMMAND CHARTER

1. General Duties and Responsibilities

Except as otherwise provided herein or by the Chief of Naval Materiel, the Naval Ship Systems Command is responsible for the following: (a) performing material support functions with respect to:

- (1) ships, submersibles, amphibious craft and vehicles, boats, floating dry-docks, ship hulks and manned surface and submerged targets, bathcaphes, underwater labs and shelters as assigned, rescue chambers and vehicles, hydrofoil craft, surface-effect ships and craft, service craft and other surface and subsurface craft of the Navy, degaussing equipment and facilities and ship-related material not otherwise specifically assigned; but excluding service craft assigned to the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and excluding Commissioned (USS) and in-service (USNS) ships administratively assigned to the Military Sea Transportation Service, except for material support directed by the Chief of Naval Operations;
- (2) shipborne components and systems, not otherwise assigned, including:
 - (a) propulsion;
 - (b) auxiliary power generating and distribution systems;
 - (c) navigation equipment, except radio navigation;
 - (d) sonar, search radar, and naval tactical data systems (NTDS), subject to the Naval Ordnance Systems Command responsibilities; and
 - (e) antennas integral to ship hull, subject to Systems Commands, systems requirements.

NAVAL ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS COMMAND CHARTER

1. General Duties and Responsibilities

Except as otherwise provided herein, or by the Chief of Naval Material, the Naval Electronic Systems Command is responsible for the following: (a) performing material support functions for:

- (1) shore (ground) electronics;
- (2) shipboard electronic equipment (except as modified in Part F, 1a(2)(e) of the Naval Ship Systems Command Charter), as follows: communications; Identification Friend or Foe; Electronics Countermeasures; radio-navigation;
- (3) fixed underwater surveillance systems;
- (4) electronic navigation, landing aids and air traffic control aids—except airborne—subject to Air Systems Command requirements;
- (5) communications via satellite and space surveillance systems as assigned;
- (6) shore-based strategic data systems: Operational Control center;
- (7) communication data-link systems;

- (8) radiac equipment;
- (9) special electromagnetic communications for Fleet Ballistic Missile System;
- (10) standardized telemetry equipment and components;
- (11) cryptographic equipment;
- (12) general-purpose electronic test equipment and common components;
- (13) Marine Corps expeditionary and amphibious electronic equipment;

NAVAL SUPPLY SYSTEMS COMMAND CHARTER

1. General Duties and Responsibilities

Except as otherwise provided herein or by the Chief of Naval Material, the Naval Supply Systems Command is responsible for the following:

(a) providing supply management policies and methods (technical guidance) for navy material to activities of the Navy and Marine Corps, including: provisioning, cataloging, inventory management, distribution, materials handling, traffic management, transportation, packaging, preservation, receipt, storage, issue and disposal functions. In the performance of the above responsibility, the Naval Supply Systems Command will consider the unique requirements and responsibilities of other Systems Commands.

(b) providing staff assistance, as appropriate, to higher authority, in matters relating to supply, distribution and disposal of material;

(c) administering:

(1) the Navy Stock Fund; in administering this responsibility, due regard will be given to program support requirements of the other Systems Commands;

(2) the Navy Publications and Printing Service;

(3) the Navy Resale Program;

(4) the Navy Field Purchase System, which includes Naval Supply Systems Command field purchase offices and other field purchasing conducted pursuant to contracting authority delegated by the Commander of the Naval Supply Systems Command; and

(5) the Navy Food Service Program.

NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING COMMAND CHARTER

1. General Duties and Responsibilities

The Naval Facilities Engineering Command provides support to the Operating Forces of the Navy, the Marine Corps, other components of the Naval Material Command, and other offices and organizations in regard to shore facilities and related engineering material and equipment. Except as otherwise provided herein or by the Chief of Naval Materiel, the Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command is responsible for the following:

a. Performing appropriate material support functions with respect to:

(1) public works, floating cranes, amphibious pontoon equipment, fleet moorings, lift docks, and fixed surface and sub-surface ocean structures;

(2) utilities;

(3) mobile ground equipment including construction, transportation (including automotive and railway), fire fighting, public works maintenance, and weight-handling equipment, except that of the Marine Corps and such equipment as is assigned to another command or office;

(4) materials and appliances for defense ashore against chemical, biological, and radiological warfare, except instruments for detection and measurement of radioactivity;

(5) materials and equipment for advanced base and tactical support functional components, except that assigned to another command, bureau, or office; and

(6) tools, equipment and techniques required for construction and maintenance of fixed sub-surface ocean structures.

SSPO

Mission

The Project Manager shall support Navy Strategy Weapons Systems requirements, provide technical support for justification of Navy Strategic Force inputs to the planning and budgeting processes, including inputs to the Joint Strategic Objective Plan (SOP), and Program Objectives (POs), and manage approved Navy Strategic Progress.

Functions

1. Ensure compliance with provisions for the Department of Defense Cost Reduction and Management Improvement Program.
2. Ensure that appropriate standardization methods for components and equipments required for fleet and shore support are employed in compliance with policy.
3. Ensure compliance with the Department of the Navy Contractor Performance Evaluation Program.
4. Ensure compliance with the proposal evaluation and source selection policies.
5. Ensure that Contractor Fund Status Reports are submitted.
6. Ensure that all correspondence or instructions to contractors affecting the terms or conditions of contracts are in writing and signed by the appropriate Contracting Officer.
7. When required or as specifically authorized by Chief of Naval Materiel on a case-by-case basis, provide advice, guidance and assistance to participating organizations in support of Cost Information Reports System.
8. Ensure compliance with the provisions of the Navy Programming Manual.

COMMANDER, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

Mission

The mission of the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations is: to direct and manage the activities of the Naval Intelligence Command to ensure the fulfillment of the intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, and security requirements and responsibilities of the Department of the Navy.

Functions

To accomplish this mission, the Commander, Naval Intelligence Command shall:

- (1) Command the Headquarters, Naval Intelligence Command (NAVINT COMHQ) and assigned shore (field) activities.
- (2) Direct and coordinate intelligence collection, production, and dissemination to satisfy Department of the Navy intelligence information requirements and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) tasking.
- (3) Direct the development, management and operation of ocean surveillance information management systems.
- (4) Direct Department of the Navy participation in the DOD Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) and in the development, management and support of Navy intelligence information systems.
- (5) Fulfill the investigative and counterintelligence responsibilities of the Department of the Navy (less those combat related counterintelligence matters within the functional responsibilities of the Marine Corps).
- (6) Participate as appropriate, in matters pertaining to Undersea Warfare intelligence.
- (7) Direct intelligence support of the participation in Special Warfare and other designated activities as appropriate.
- (8) Act as Navy Special Security Officer (SSO) and manage the systems for the protective handling and dissemination of Special Intelligence and Special Activities materials within the Department of the Navy.
- (9) Provide a translation service for the Department of the Navy.
- (10) Participate in and provide intelligence inputs to naval, joint and national plans and policies and Navy studies and analyses.
- (11) Determine requirements for research, development, test and evaluation of new and improved intelligence equipment and techniques.

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMAND

Mission

1. Commander, Naval Communications Command: To exercise authority over the readiness, operating efficiency and security of Naval Communications throughout the Department of the Navy; to provide, operate and maintain adequate and secure Naval Communications; to approve requirements for the use of existing communications capabilities and resources; to coordinate the execution of approved communications programs; to administer and coordinate radio fre-

quency matters and to exercise command authority over, and be responsible for the primary support of the shore (field) activities of the Naval Communications System as a Naval Service-wide System and such other activities and resources as may be assigned.

2. Headquarters, Naval Communications Command: To assist the Commander, Naval Communications Command in accomplishing his mission.

Tasks and functions

Under the overall policy guidance of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications and Cryptology) perform the following functions:

1. Participate in joint action matters in support of CNO. Review concepts, policy, doctrine, methods, procedures, standardization, and compatibility of Joint and Combined agreements on communications and radio frequency spectrum matters, and recommend provisions to obtain maximum effectiveness of forces.

2. Plan and program for Naval, Defense, National, and Allied communications resources in support of validated requirements.

3. Administer the Naval Communications Command Resource Management System; prepare operating budget estimates for assigned shore (field) activities and present and defend these budget estimates; collaborate with commands, bureaus and offices of the Navy Department concerning the provision of resources to activities of the Naval Communications Command; review resources utilization and prepare and issue progress reports to higher authority as directed.

NATIONAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND

Missions

1. Commander, Naval Security Group Command: To perform cryptologic and related functions; to provide, operate and maintain an adequate Naval Security Group; to approve requirements for the use of existing Naval Security Group capabilities and resources; to coordinate the execution of approved cryptologic programs; and to exercise command authority over, and be responsible for the primary support of the shore (field) activities of the Naval Security Group as a naval service-system, and such other activities and resources as may be assigned.

2. Headquarters, Naval Security Group Command: To assist the Commander, Naval Security Group Command in accomplishing his mission.

Tasks and functions

Under the overall policy guidance of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Communications and Cryptology) performs the following functions:

1. Participates in joint action matters in support of CNO and provides information or specialized assistance on JCS matters. Acts on papers under consideration by the JCS which pertain to the Consolidated Cryptologic Program. Discharges the Department of the Navy's cryptologic responsibilities to the National Security Agency and the National and Defense Communications systems.

2. Provides professional and technical advice relative to the readiness and capability of the Naval Security Group Command to perform its mission in time of war.

3. Develops, plans, and programs for the current and future (including long range) cryptologic requirements for manpower, equipment, materials, supplies, facilities, maintenance and supporting services, including the quantities, characteristics, times, places, and priorities of needs to support the Department of the Navy in cryptologic functions (including the cryptographic needs of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Merchant Marine, and Military Sea Transportation Service), and for those resource requirements essential to the performance of missions assigned to the Naval Security Group.

4. Provides support, technical guidance, and supervision to the operating forces of the Navy or cryptologic matters; supports and provides technical guidance for electronic warfare programs and operations, as required.

OCEANOGRAPHER OF THE NAVY, ALEXANDRIA, VA.

Mission

The mission of the Oceanographer of the Navy is to act as the Naval Oceanographic Program Director for the Chief of Naval Operations, under the policy

direction of the Secretary of the Navy, through the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development), and to exercise centralized authority, direction and control including control of resources, in order to insure an integrated and effective Naval Oceanographic Program.

Tasks and functions

In carrying out his assigned mission, the Oceanographer of the Navy shall:

1. Act as the central point of contact and authority within the Department of the Navy for Naval Oceanographic Program matters and provide required guidance and direction to appropriate elements of the Department of the Navy.
2. Prepare, coordinate, and approve Naval Oceanographic Program requirements.
3. Initiate the preparation of all oceanographic plans and objectives, including research, development, and operations, of the Naval Oceanographic Program.
4. Within the Naval Oceanographic Program, assign priorities and issue plans and objectives, including research, development, and operations.
5. Appraise all Navy oceanographic efforts in relation to objectives and requirements, priorities, overall balance within the National and Naval Oceanographic Programs, the Navy's plans and policies; and direct corrective action, as necessary, for changes in the Naval Oceanographic Program.
6. Determine long-term military and civilian personnel and facility resources required and the effectiveness of the education and training effort for the Naval Oceanographic Program, and initiate required actions.
7. Budget, justify, and administer all funds allocated to the Naval Oceanographic Program as required for implementation of the program; insure that adequate funds are budgeted by activities of the Navy Department for support of the program; and develop and maintain a comprehensive budget documented for presentation to higher executive authorities and Congressional Committees.
8. Administer, as required, national and international agreements to promote the exchange of appropriate Naval Oceanographic Program Information.
9. Represent the Department of the Navy, or coordinate representation as requested in defense, national and international matters involving oceanography, hydrography, navigation, mapping, charting, and geodesy.
10. Initiate and provide support and, as appropriate, technical direction of oceanographic operations including those associated with underwater search and rescue, recovery, salvage, emplacements, and facilities. In carrying out these tasks he shall establish well defined arrangements for division of responsibility with the Commander, Naval Ship Systems Command and through him the Supervisor of Salvage.
11. Plan, procure, and disseminate necessary oceanographic, hydrographic, navigational and geodetic information and support assigned by appropriate authority or required by applicable statute.
12. Advise concerning the organization, administration, training, and support of the Naval Reserve with reference to the Naval Oceanographic Program.
13. Serve as a Member of the Oceanographic Policy and Programs Board, the Standing Committee for Shipbuilding and Conversions, the Ship's Characteristics Board, and the CNO Advisory Board.
14. Provide guidance and planning information concerning the mobilization of manpower and facilities with reference to the Naval Oceanographic Program.
15. Provide in the Program organization structure the framework for including the other environmental sciences in the future.

NAVAL WEATHER SERVICE COMMAND

Mission

The mission of the Commander, Naval Weather Service Command is: to command assigned activities of the Naval Weather Service Command; to insure the fulfillment of Department of the Navy meteorological requirements and Department of Defense requirements for oceanographic analyses/forecasts; and to provide technical guidance in meteorological matters throughout the naval service. Fleet Weather Centrals/Facilities will have concurrent responsibility to the Fleet Commanders in Chief and the Chief of Naval Air Training who shall exercise authoritative control over the product output to meet the requirements of the Operating Forces.

Functions

1. Act as the central point of contact and authority within the Department of the Navy for naval meteorological and assigned oceanographic matters and

provide required guidance and direction to appropriate elements of the Department of the Navy.

2. Provide centralized direction for the operations of the Naval Weather Service Command, discharging responsibilities associated with the elements of command, with primary emphasis directed toward overall operating efficiency and timely and effective meteorological/oceanographic support to the Operating consistent with responsibilities assigned. Provide the Naval Materiel Commanders in Chief and the Chief of Naval Air Training in their authoritative control over the product output of the Fleet Weather Centrals and Facilities.

3. Budget for and allocate operation funds for assigned shore (field) activities and for other functions as appropriate; act as Navy Program Element Sponsor for Weather Service Element in the Five Year Defense Plan.

4. In the exercise of command and in providing technical guidance and direction, coordinate all elements of support of the Naval Weather Service Command consistent with responsibilities assigned. Provide the Naval Materiel Command, bureaus, Navy Comptroller and other commands and offices with timely operational requirements for support consistent with approved programs.

5. Ascertain the current and future requirements of the Department of the Navy for meteorological and short term oceanographic forecasting support, including research, technical equipment and allowances, material, maintenance, intelligence, supplies, communications, and publications; initiate action and collaborate with cognizant commands, bureaus and offices to monitor and meet these requirements.

6. Maintain liaison with and provide naval representation to various committees, groups, and organizations of a military, governmental, commercial, scientific, or professional nature, both foreign and domestic, with regard to meteorological and related subjects.

7. Act as designator sponsor for the meteorological specialty group of the officer corps, as Manpower Allocation Requirements Plan (MARF) line sponsor for Naval Weather Service Command components, and as Manpower Technical Advisor to bureaus, system commands and offices of the Department of the Navy in such matters pertaining to meteorological personnel as availability, training, education, distribution, utilization, and career development.

8. Collect, evaluate, and utilize information pertaining to systems, equipment techniques, procedures, and research and development efforts of other meteorological agencies.

9. Provide professional and technical advice on meteorological and assigned oceanographic matters to the Chief of Naval Operations.

10. Review the policies, programs, efforts, and progress of commands, bureaus, systems commands and offices of the Department of the Navy with regard to their assigned meteorological/oceanographic responsibilities, and initiate in coordination with cognizant OPNAV offices, appropriate measures to effect necessary coordination and direction.

11. Develop, prepare, maintain, review, and submit to the Chief of Naval Operations, meteorological research and development requirements and associated documents.

12. Appraise the capabilities and efforts of the Navy to provide meteorological and specific oceanographic services including readiness, utilization of resources, and operating efficiency thereof in support of objectives established by the Chief of Naval Operations.

COMMANDER, MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mission

(a) To provide an immediate sealift capability in support of approved contingency or general war plans or other emergencies.

(b) To plan for and be capable of expansion in time of emergency or war as necessary.

(c) To meet all requirements of the Department of Defense (except for those met by fleet ships) for ocean shipping for purposes other than transportation.

Functions

(a) Contingency sea lift planning.

(b) Developing of contingency capability.

(c) Fulfilling DOD peacetime sea lift requirements:

1. Command and control of ships

2. Management of traffic

3. Management of sea lift assets

(d) Procurement of ships, systems, and services.

CHIEF OF NAVAL TRAINING

Mission

The Chief of Naval Training is responsible under the Chief of Naval Operations, for training of Navy personnel (other than that assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Fleet Commanders and the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery), and for the training of Marine Corps aviation personnel and members of the Naval Reserve.

Tasks

1. Establishes policies, procedures and techniques for the establishment and operation of naval schools and training programs.
2. Provides planning, programming and budgetary data which form the basis for financial, material, manpower and facility support for the training activities and programs involved.
3. Determines the instructional content and technique used in the courses of training in activities which operate under the command of Chief of Naval Training and assists with respect to these matters in those operating under fleet command.
4. Prepares, procures, or otherwise provides the instructional materials and aids needed to support the education and training activities and programs assigned to the Chief of Naval Training.
5. Ensures that the quality of training is consistent with the needs of the fleet and that the training establishment remains responsive to fleet requirements.
6. Provide guidance as required to Director, Naval Education and Training (Washington agent) in carrying out Office of Chief of Naval Operations responsibilities with respect to training matters.

CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR TRAINING, PENSACOLA, FLA.

Mission

To provide undergraduate pilot training and undergraduate Flight Officer training for Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel and selected foreign nationals. Supervise and coordinate the functioning of all Naval Aviation Activities of the Naval Training Command not specifically assigned to functional commanders. Prosecute such other aviation training tasks as the Chief of Naval Training may direct.

Assignment of functions

The following functions are assigned the Chief of Naval Air Training:

(a) Act as immediate supervisor in command to the commanding officers of such schools, air wings, training squadrons, naval air stations, ships, and other facilities as may be placed under his cognizance, and to assign detailed functions to these activities:

- (1) In support of the training mission assigned to the Chief of Naval Air Training; and
- (2) in accordance with policies delineated by higher authority.

(b) Administer, supervise, and coordinate:

- (1) Pre-flight indoctrination:

CHIEF OF NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING, MILLINGTON, TENN.

Mission

To coordinate and direct Navy recruit and technical training, Marine Corps aviation technical training, and such other training as is directed to be undertaken at activities under the cognizance of the Chief of Naval Technical Training.

Assignment of functions

The following functions are assigned the Chief of Naval Technical Training:

(a) Act as immediate superior in command to commanding officers of such schools, naval air station, naval air maintenance training groups technical training centers and units, and other facilities as may be placed under his cognizance and to assign detailed training functions to these activities:

- (1) In support of the training mission assigned to the Chief of Naval Technical Training, and
- (2) in accordance with policies delineated by higher authority.

CHIEF OF NAVAL AIR RESERVE TRAINING, GLENVIEW, ILL.

Mission

To train individuals for their mobilization assignments and train personnel prior to their assignment to the Naval Air Reserve Force; direct and coordinate the procurement of Aviation Air Reserve Force; direct and coordinate the procurement of Aviation Officer Candidates (AOC), Aviation Reserve Officer Candidates (AVROC), Naval Aviation Officer Candidates (NAOCX), Naval Flight Officer Candidates (NFOC), and when activated Naval Aviation Cadets (NAVCADS); furnish logistic support for the Marine Air Reserve Training Command, and to perform such other functions as directed by Chief of Naval Air Training.

Assignment of Functions

The following functions are assigned to Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training:

(a) Act as immediate superior in command to the commanding officers such naval air stations, naval air reserve training units, and other activities as may be placed under his cognizance and assign detailed functions to these activities:

- (1) In support of the missions assigned to the Chief of Naval Reserve Training; and
- (2) in accordance with policies delineated by higher authority.

COMMANDER NAVAL RESERVE TRAINING, OMAHA, NEBR.

Mission

To administer the Selected Reserve and other participating reservists (other than air), and manage the assigned reserve in a manner to maintain Naval Reserve units and personnel in a state of training, readiness and availability for immediate employment as units and as personnel augmentations of the forces when authorized and directed; and to perform such functions or tasks as may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Tasks and functions

Under the Chief of Naval Operations, and with the support of the Chief of Naval Materiel, Chief of Naval Personnel, Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and other offices of the Navy Department, Commander, Naval Reserve Training Command will:

(a) Direct and supervise the state of readiness and the training and administration of the Selected Reserve, and other participating reservists, in accordance with policies established by the Chief of Naval Operations and standards and curricula prescribed by the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (medical and dental training), as appropriate.

(b) Direct the employment of all Naval Reserve Training ships. Exercise operational control through the District Commandants except as otherwise assigned to Fleet Commands.

(c) As a major claimant, exercise financial management functions for the Naval Reserve as assigned by or with the approval of the Chief of Naval Operations.

(d) Direct and supervise the recruiting and retention programs for the Naval Reserve in accordance with standards and guidelines established by the Chief of Naval Personnel.

(e) Apportion drill pay spaces to district commandants for distribution to Naval Reserve activities and units.

NAVAL DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS (LESS COMNAVDIST WASHINGTON, D.C.)

Mission

To exercise command of assigned naval shore (field activities; to exercise area coordination over all shore (field) activities in the naval districts; to represent the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the offices, commands, and bureaus of the Navy Department in such matters as may be assigned, to execute responsibilities with respect to specified functions as assigned by the appropriate Sea Frontier Commander and the Commander Naval Reserve Training Command; to administer the Naval Reserve Program (other than air) as assigned; and to coordinate public affairs matters throughout the naval districts.

COMMANDANT NAVAL DISTRICT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mission

To exercise command of assigned naval shore (field) activities; to exercise area coordination over all shore (field) activities in the naval district; to represent the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the offices, commands, and bureaus of the Navy Department in such matters as may be assigned; to execute responsibilities with respect to specified functions as assigned by the appropriate Sea Frontier Commander and the Commander Naval Reserve Training Command; to administer the Naval Reserve Program (other than air) as assigned and to coordinate public affairs matters throughout the naval district; to provide personnel support functions for permanent and transient naval personnel in the Washington, D.C. area and logistic support and other services as directed and assigned.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF ATLANTIC FLEET,¹ NORFOLK, VA.*Mission*

In cold war, limited war, and general war, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet will conduct operations to ensure the control of the sea and air in the Atlantic Command area and provide combat ready Naval Forces (including administrative, logistics and planning support thereto) to the Atlantic Command and other commands as directed in order to defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea maintain security of the Atlantic Command and support the operations of adjacent allied and national commanders.

Functions.

Be prepared to defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic Ocean by conducting offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces, shipping, fishing vessels, raiders and sources support

Prepare plans for and when directed, conduct offensive strike force operations including carrier strike force and major amphibious operations for general war and/or contingency operations Atlantic Command area.

Plan for and, when directed:

(a) Conduct offensive submarine operations, including offensive anti-submarine warfare, mining operations and other special submarine operations.

(b) Conduct anti-submarine warfare.

Plan for and conduct operations in support of U.S. scientific programs in the ANTARCTIC area.

Be prepared to conduct major amphibious operations.

Plan for and, when directed, conduct surveillance and other operations within the Atlantic Command area as necessary to ensure control of vital sea areas and protection of sea communications.

Plan and provide, or arrange for, logistic and administrative support, within the capability forces assigned to Atlantic Fleet operating in the USEASTLANT subarea and the NATO IBERLANT area coordinating as required with Commander in Chief of Naval Forces Europe and European authorities.

Forces assigned:

- (a) Second Fleet.
- (b) Naval Air Forces Atlantic.
- (c) Anti-Submarine Warfare Force Atlantic.
- (d) Submarine Force Atlantic.
- (e) Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.
- (f) Amphibious Force Atlantic.
- (g) Service Force Atlantic.
- (h) Training Command Atlantic.
- (i) Cruiser Destroyer Force Atlantic.
- (j) South Atlantic Force.
- (k) Operational Test and Evaluation Force.
- (l) US Eastern Atlantic Command.
- (m) Key West Force.
- (n) Caribbean Sea Frontier.

¹ CINCLANTFLT is also the Commander of the Atlantic Command and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (NATO).

- (o) Eastern Sea Frontier.
- (p) Naval Support Forces Antarctica.
- (q) Marine Warfare Force.
- (r) Naval Base Guantanamo.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC FLEET, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII

Mission

- (a) Conduct training exercises and operations.
- (b) Conduct special Cold War operations.
- (c) Maintain a posture to meet naval responsibilities in the Pacific Command in the event of Open Hostilities or General War.
- (d) Seek and exploit opportunities to support the national Cold War objectives, and;
- (e) Exploit the inherent capabilities of the Pacific Fleet to promote respect, understanding and friendship for the U.S. among foreign nationals, in order to obtain the highest practicable state of training and readiness, support U.S. national Cold War objectives, and be prepared to discharge naval responsibilities in the Pacific Command in the event of Open Hostilities or General War.

Functions

Defend the Pacific sea approaches to the CONUS Panama Canal, Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands from attack.

Coordinate plans for and conduct joint, intertype and fleet training exercises as directed.

Develop and improve fleet tactics and doctrine in the field of intertype and fleet operations, conducting such analysis and evaluation of such operations as may be directed.

Conduct operations in Middle Pacific/Eastern Pacific with force assigned, in support of U.S. national Cold War objectives.

Investigate and prosecute unidentified or hostile submarine contacts.

Participate in combined training with forces of Canada, Latin American nations, Japan, Korea, Government of the Republic of China and SEATO nations, effecting liaison with foreign officials through the appropriate area commander subordinate unified commander or naval attaché as appropriate.

Develop and furnish operational intelligence to support Commander in Chief Pacific in general including nuclear weapons employment and planning.

Conduct Fleet Marine Force type training and sea intertype training, as necessary, to achieve and maintain a condition of tactical and material readiness for the conduct of assault operations, the seizure and defense of advanced bases, or type of expeditionary duty.

Be prepared to provide an amphibious command and forces to conduct amphibious operations.

Conduct operations in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian waters in support of U.S. national Cold War objectives.

Be prepared to assist in the evacuation of U.S. combatants and certain non-U.S. persons.

Forces assigned

- (a) First Fleet.
- (b) Antisubmarine Warfare Force.
- (c) Operation Test and Evaluation Force.
- (d) Fleet Operations Control Center.
- (e) Fleet Intelligence Center.
- (f) Fleet Marine Force.
- (g) Cruiser Destroyer Force.
- (h) Amphibious Force.
- (i) Training Command.
- (j) Service Force.
- (k) Submarine Force.
- (l) Naval Air Force.
- (m) Mine Force.
- (n) Seventh Fleet.
- (o) Western Sea Frontier
- (p) Hawaiian Sea Frontier.
- (q) U. S. Naval Forces, Marianas.
- (r) U. S. Naval Forces, Philippines.

- (s) U. S. Naval Forces, Japan.
- (t) U. S. Naval Forces, Korea.
- (u) U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE,¹ LONDON, ENGLAND

Mission

In cold war, limited war or general war, this force will conduct operations to ensure control of the sea and air in and around the U. S. European Command and provide forces (including administrative, logistic and planning support thereto) to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Forces, Europe (USCINCEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe as directed in order to support and assist the Commander in Chief, U.S. forces, Europe and Supreme Allied Commander in establishing control of contested areas in Europe.

Functions

Plan for, be prepared to, and when directed, conduct naval operations, including offensive striking force and amphibious operations in support of U.S., NATO and/or allied interests.

Be prepared to carry out evacuation of U.S. and certain non-U.S. persons for whom the U.S. government assumes responsibility in local peacetime emergencies.

Be responsible for the administrative and logistic support of all U.S. Naval and Marine shore-based air units within the U.S. Naval Forces Europe area, including replacement air groups and units temporarily based ashore.

Plan and conduct national exercises, and combined exercises with Allied, friendly and NATO nations, affecting liaison with foreign officials as appropriate.

Exploit inherent fleet capabilities in promoting respect, friendship, and understanding of the U.S. among free countries in support of the national cold war objectives.

Plan, arrange and conduct port visits within the Middle East Force operating area.

Coordinate port visit program in the Indian Ocean with adjacent commanders as required.

Forces assigned

- (a) Sixth Fleet.
- (b) Fleet Air Mediterranean.
- (c) Evacuation Force Mediterranean.
- (d) Evacuation Force Northern Europe.
- (e) Fleet Marine Force Europe.
- (f) Middle East Force.
- (g) U.S. Naval Activities United Kingdom.
- (h) Fleet Intelligence Center, U.S. Naval Forces Europe.

COMMANDER FIRST FLEET, AFLOAT EASTERN PACIFIC; HOMEPORT SAN DIEGO, CALIF.

Mission

(a) Defend the Pacific sea approaches to the continental U.S., Panama Canal, Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands from attack.

(b) Conduct operations in the Eastern Pacific/Middle Pacific with forces assigned, in support of U.S. national cold war objectives.

(c) Develop and improve fleet tactics and doctrine in the field of intertype and fleet operations, conducting analysis and evaluation of such operations as may be directed.

(d) Analyze reports of type commanders pertaining to intertype and fleet readiness, in order to attain and maintain the highest cold war objectives and discharge assigned naval responsibilities in the event of open hostilities or general war.

Functions

Augment Seventh Fleet forces on short notice or operate as directed.

Conduct Anti Submarine Warfare operations.

Conduct naval reconnaissance and surveillance with forces signed in direct support of First Fleet operations.

¹ Also serves as Commander, U.S. Eastern Atlantic Command.

Provide facilities and mobile command post for Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet's alternate command element, as required.

Plan, schedule, conduct and participate in type and intertype training including fleet exercises with emphasis on surface strike force, anti-air warfare, electronic warfare, antisubmarine warfare and anti-ship capable missile (ASCM) operations.

Forces assigned

- (a) First Fleet Task Groups.
- (b) Eastern Pacific Emergency Dispersal Force.
- (c) First Fleet Defense Force.
- (d) Logistic Support Force.
- (e) Antisubmarine Warfare Force.
- (f) Surface Action Force.
- (g) First Fleet Amphibious Force.
- (h) Attack Carrier Strike Force.
- (i) First Fleet Landing Force.

COMMANDER SECOND FLEET; AFLOAT IN ATLANTIC OCEAN; HOME PORT NORFOLK, VA.

Mission

(a) Be prepared to defend the United States against attack through the Atlantic Ocean by conducting offensive operations to destroy enemy naval forces, shipping, fishing vessels, raiders, and sources of support.

(b) Prepare plans for and when directed, conduct offensive strike force operations including carrier strike force and major amphibious operations for general war, war at sea, and contingency operations in the Atlantic Command area and in support of other Unified Commanders.

(c) When directed, function as Commander Joint Task Force 122 (CJTF 122).

Function

Plan for and conduct operational training of the Atlantic Fleet assigned forces in fleet exercises. In general they may be defined as large scale Striking Fleet exercises involving forces from several type or operational commanders. The purpose of these exercises are to provide operational commanders and units with realistic training in Striking Fleet operations to enhance the combat readiness of the Atlantic Fleet.

Develop and improve fleet tactics and doctrine in strike force operations, conducting such analyses and evaluations as necessary.

Be prepared to assume duties as Alternate Commander Atlantic/Alternate Commander Atlantic Fleet in order to support Commander in Chief Atlantic and Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet in cold war, limited war, and general war to ensure the control of the sea and air in the Atlantic Command area.

Plan and conduct movements of ships deploying from and returning to the continental United States so as to provide maximum unit and operational training.

Forces assigned

- (a) Surface Strike Force.
- (b) Attack Carrier Strike Force.
- (c) Amphibious Task Force.
- (d) Landing Force.
- (e) Anti-submarine Task Force.
- (f) Mobile Logistic Support Force.

COMMANDER SIXTH FLEET,¹ AFLOAT IN MEDITERRANEAN; HOME PORT GALET, ITALY

Mission

Commander Sixth Fleet/Commander Strike Force South is responsible for the conduct of such naval operations as may be directed by competent national and/or NATO authorities within the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea and ashore in countries contiguous to or near the Mediterranean Sea. Commander Sixth Fleet/Commander Strike Force South (NATO) maintains the security of assigned forces and conducts the full range of naval operations in support of national policies and objectives, including U.S. commitments to NATO and other allied nations.

¹ COMSIXTHFLT is also Strike Force South (NATO).

Functions

Plan for, be prepared to, and when directed conduct naval operations, including offensive striking force and amphibious operations in support of U.S., NATO, and/or allied interests.

Plan, conduct and coordinate U.S. national offensive and defensive anti-submarine operations throughout the Mediterranean and Black Seas.

Be prepared to neutralize rapidly, when directed, the surface, subsurface, and air threats to the Sixth Fleet in periods of increased tension, up to and including hostilities to maintain sea control.

Be prepared to act as the alternate interim successor to Commander In Chief, U.S. Naval Force Europe and to ensure continuity of operations in order to provide for the uninterrupted performance of essential functions for forces in the Mediterranean and the Black Seas and ashore in countries contiguous to or near the Mediterranean.

Be prepared to carry out evacuation of U.S. and certain non-local peacetime emergencies.

Exploit inherent capabilities in promoting respect, friendship, and understanding of the U.S. among free countries in the Mediterranean in support of the national cold war objectives.

Forces assigned

- (a) Attack Carrier Striking Force.
- (b) Amphibious Force.
- (c) Landing Force.
- (d) Service Force.
- (e) Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine Force.
- (f) Anti-Submarine Warfare Force.
- (g) Submarine Force.

COMMANDER, SEVENTH FLEET, AFLOAT IN WESTERN PACIFIC, HOME PORT YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

Mission

(a) Conduct operations in the Western Pacific, Eastern Indian Ocean and Southeast Asian waters in support of U.S. National Cold War objectives.

(b) Unless otherwise directed, maintain forces appropriately positioned to carry out the operations described in Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet's General War Plan 1.

(c) Be prepared to conduct naval operations in the defense of U.S. and Allied interest in the Seventh Fleet area of operations.

Functions

Conduct naval reconnaissance and surveillance with forces assigned in direct support of Seventh Fleet operations.

Be prepared to assist in the evacuation of the U.S. noncombatants and certain non-U.S. persons.

Conduct surface and air patrols in direct support of Seventh Fleet operations.

Participate in combined training with forces of Japan, Korea, Government of the Republic of China, and SEATO nations, effecting liaison with foreign officials through the appropriate area commander, subordinate unified commander or naval attache, as appropriate.

Prepare plans for use in the event of a nuclear accident/incident involving a nuclear reactor or nuclear weapon in order to obtain the highest practicable state of training and readiness support U.S. National Cold War objectives, and be prepared to discharge naval responsibilities in the Pacific Command in the event of open hostilities or general war.

Maintain a high state of antisubmarine readiness and conduct antisubmarine operations in support of other elements of the Seventh Fleet as directed.

Conduct attack carrier striking force operation as directed.

Forces assigned

- (a) Command Force.
- (b) Reconnaissance and Intelligence Support Group.
- (c) Air Logistics and Support Group.
- (d) Anti-Submarine Warfare Group.
- (e) Mine Countermeasures Group.
- (f) Communications Support Group.
- (g) Cruiser-Destroyer Group.

- (h) Submarine Group.
- (i) Patrol Force.
- (j) Logistic Support Force.
- (k) Surface Action Force.
- (l) Amphibious Force.
- (m) Attack Carrier Striking Force.
- (n) Fleet Marine Force.

COMMANDER ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES ATLANTIC

Mission

Exercise control of assigned air, surface and submarine forces as an operational commander and geographic sub-area commander with primary responsibilities for antisubmarine warfare, naval control of and protection of shipping and surveillance including the Oceanographic System in the Atlantic Fleet.

Functions

In cold war, limited war, and general war conduct antisubmarine warfare operations, anti-submarine warfare surveillance/intelligence gathering, and other operations within the Atlantic Command area as necessary to ensure an integrated defense of the continental US and shipping at sea.

Conduct or direct operations to defend the Atlantic approaches to the US, the Panama Canal, essential bases and areas within the Atlantic Command Area, including US possessions, leased bases, and sources of strategic materials in the Caribbean against attack through the sea.

As Commander Ocean Sub-Area function as Operational Control Authority for the Atlantic Command in the control of merchant shipping in time of war or national emergency.

Develop strategic and tactical ASW Doctrine.

Insure the readiness of assigned forces.

COMMANDER ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES, PACIFIC, NAVAL STATION, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII

Mission

C) The Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Force, Pacific will coordinate over-all ASW operations of the Pacific Fleet and direct or conduct antisubmarine and naval control and protection of shipping operations throughout the Pacific and Eastern portions of the Indian Ocean and their contiguous waters. In addition, COMASWFORPAC conducts reconnaissance and surveillance related to ASW in Eastern Pacific and Middle Pacific areas, and plans for and is prepared to conduct ASW operations to defend the Pacific approaches to CONUS, the Hawaiian Islands, and the Panama Canal in order to defend the Pacific approaches to these areas and other areas vital to the U.S.; deny the enemy the effective use of his submarines; assure the safe and timely arrival of shipping; and to enable the U.S. Pacific Fleet to maintain and exploit control of the sea by the projection of offensive naval operations.

Function

C) COMASWFORPAC acts as the principal executive to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet in all matters pertaining to antisubmarine warfare and the naval control and protection of shipping. He exercises operational control of assigned forces and, under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, is responsible for the over-all direction and coordination of these matters. To this end COMASWFORPAC will:

(1) Coordinate over-all antisubmarine operations of the Pacific Fleet and direct the antisubmarine operations of the area commanders and Commander Submarine Forces, Pacific to deny the enemy effective use of his submarines.

(2) Conduct over-all control and protection of shipping operations in the Pacific Command areas and coordinate operations of Operational Control Authorities to assure the safe and timely arrival of shipping at its destination.

(3) Coordinate for Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet the antisubmarine plans and operations of commands adjacent to the Pacific Command area. (Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic and Commander in Chief U.S. Alaska) Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command and Continental Air Defense Command/North America Air Defense Command to insure unity of effort in the conduct of antisubmarine warfare.

(4) Coordinate for Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet the plans and operations for the naval control and protection of shipping of other commands to insure effective control and protection of shipping.

(5) In coordination with appropriate Alaska, Canada and U.S. commands, conduct naval operations with forces assigned to maintain sea lines or communications and to conduct naval operations to defend the approaches to the continental United States and Canada.

(6) Prepare supporting plans for antisubmarine warfare and naval control and protection of shipping.

(U) Type Commanders are responsive to the antisubmarine concepts and objectives, including training and readiness standards, established by Commander Anti-Submarine Force Pacific.

(C) Commander Ocean Systems, Pacific is under the military command of Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Force Pacific and supports the Antisubmarine Task Force Commanders.

COMMANDER MIDDLE EAST FORCE (COMIDEASTFOR), BAHRAIN

Mission

Commander Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) will plan for and conduct operations within assigned area to assist in the attainment of U.S. objectives in the Middle East and Western Indian Ocean.

(a) The Middle East Force is a small naval force normally comprised of a flagship, two or more destroyers, and a flag aircraft. The European Command area of operations for Commander Middle East Force consists of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. In the execution of the mission, functions, or other assigned tasks Commander Middle East Force may operate in that part of Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet's area of responsibility north of 22 degrees South Latitude in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Gulf of Oman, keeping Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet appropriately informed. Additionally, it is expected that Commander Middle East Force Units will conduct port visits in Pakistan, India, Ceylon and various islands of the Indian Ocean, in Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet's area of responsibility.

Functions

(1) Visit ports within the area of operations designated in paragraph 4 above and make personal visits to countries having a shoreline on the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean west of 62 degrees East longitude and north of 22 degrees South latitude, as approved by Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe, to carry out the overall assigned peacetime task of generating good will and prestige associated with showing the flag.

(2) Be prepared to execute risks assigned in applicable Operation Plans.

(3) Collect and report intelligence to satisfy Specific Intelligence Collections Requirements levied upon Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, the essential elements of information in applicable Operations Plans and requirements established by Defense Intelligence Agency and uni-Service directives.

(4) Conduct naval planning for submarine, anti-submarine, and mining operations in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.

(5) Perform naval component planning within capabilities as directed.

(6) Conduct search and rescue operations in coordination with U.S. Air Forces Europe and the Commander Atlantic Air Rescue Center in accordance with the current search and rescue agreements and directives.

(7) Maintain liaison with U.S. diplomatic representatives and other U.S. Government agencies in the maritime nations having a shoreline on the waters of the operational area defined in sub-paragraph 2a above.

(8) Maintain liaison with British authorities and with governments and armed services of friendly and neutral countries bordering on the sea/ocean areas designated in paragraph 2a above, as approved by higher authority. (In carrying out this function, it should be noted that responsibilities for Military Assistance Program matters are separately assigned to other organizations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

(9) Exercise operational control authority for naval control of shipping in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and that part of Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet's area of responsibility indicated in paragraph 2a above.

(10) Designate and train Port Liaison Officers at appropriate evacuation sea ports within the area defined in paragraph 2a above. Plan for, and when directed, conduct noncombatant evacuation operations within this area.

(11) Function as Area Coordinator for the Inspector of Material Petroleum Products, Middle East Area, the Naval Communications Station, Asmara, and Naval Control of Shipping Office, Bahrain, under the overall area coordination of Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Force Europe.

(12) Function as Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Force Europe Representative for Bahrain in matters pertaining to the exercise of foreign criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military personnel and dependents.

COMMANDER, SOUTH ATLANTIC FORCE, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY,
SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO

Mission

To support U.S. Military objectives in the South Atlantic Sub-Area.

Function

(1) (a) Conduct defensive operations, including anti-submarine warfare, within the capabilities of forces assigned.

(b) Operational Control Authority in the control of maritime shipping.

(c) Conduct submarine contact investigations.

(2) Exercise operational control of assigned ships and units.

(3) As directed, render assistance in reestablishing peace in accordance with the Rio Pact.

(4) Represent Command in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet with respect to naval matters in those countries in South America and Africa which border on that part of the Atlantic Command area south of the Tropic of Cancer and in the western Indian Ocean.

(5) When directed, conduct combined exercises with forces of countries in South America and Africa which border on that part of the Atlantic Command area south of the Tropic of Cancer and in the western Indian Ocean.

(6) Coordinate with Commander in Chief U.S. Southern Command and U.S. National Commanders in the Southern Atlantic Command sub-area on intelligence matters pertaining to the Atlantic Fleet.

(7) Provide or arrange for the logistic support of forces operating in the Southern Atlantic Command sub-area as directed.

(8) Direct and coordinate Search and Rescue operations in the Southern Atlantic Command sub-area in accordance with Annex S.

(9) Keep Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet advised of any communications or related deficiencies in the Southern Atlantic Command sub-area which may impair wartime or contingency operations and submit recommendations for corrective action.

COMMANDER KEY WEST FORCE¹

Mission

Defend the United States in the Key West Area with forces assigned; conduct surveillance and Antisubmarine Warfare operations as directed by Commander Task Force 81 (CTF 81); exercise administrative and/or operational control of assigned units; plan for cold war, contingency, and general war operations; direct the operation of the CINCLANT JARCC; coordinate Navy, Army and Air Force logistics.

COMMANDER NAVAL BASE, KEY WEST

Mission

Command assigned Naval Shore (field) activities; coordinate the provision of logistic support to fleet units and other Naval activities; carry out area coordination responsibility over designated Shore (field).

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC JOINT AIR RECONNAISSANCE CONTROL CENTER

Mission

Provide tactical control to various highly classified airborne Navy and Air Force surveillance operations flying out of Key West.

¹ COMKEYWESTFOR is Commander Naval Base (COMNAVBASE), Key West and Director of the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center (JR).

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, JAPAN, YOKOSUKA, JAPAN

Mission

Serves as Naval Component Commander of U.S. Forces Japan. Works directly with Director General Maritime Safety Agency, Commander in Chief, Self Defense Fleet (CINCSSELF DEFLT) and Chief Maritime Staff, Japan Defense Agency (CNO, JMSDF) and other high ranking officers of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and Maritime Safety Agency. Through these relationships he exerts a significant influence on Naval policy and the role of Naval power in National Politico/Military Strategy. Specifically, he advises relative to Joint Training Exercises and development of Joint Operating Procedures, Communications and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities.

Responsible for overall state of training, administration, operational and support effectiveness of forces assigned. He is further responsible that the collective effort of activities in Japan and Ryukyus renders maximum support to the operations of the Seventh Fleet and to U.S. policies and interests in Asia.

Functions

Attendant functions include:

- (1) Support fleet forces.
- (2) Conduct naval operations in the defense of the Japan area, and for security of U.S. Bases in coordination with other appropriate military commands.
- (3) Conduct harbor defense, in accordance with existing directives.
- (4) Activate new facilities and expand present facilities as directed by higher authority in accordance with Navy Support Plans.
- (5) Coordinate the provision of logistic support of fleet forces and overseas bases activities within NAVFORJAPAN area.
- (6) COMNAVFORJAPAN provides logistic and administrative support for approximately 21,300 military, 12,100 U.S. dependents, 1,200 U.S. Civil Service and administers 20,550 local national employees.

COMMANDER U.S. NAVAL FORCES, KOREA, SEOUL, KOREA

Mission

Serves as Naval Component Commander of U.S. Forces Korea and of United Nations Command; and as Chief, U.S. Naval Advisory Group. He is operationally responsible for all forces assigned for the combat readiness and effective utilization under circumstances ranging from peacetime to open hostilities. He is administratively responsible for the readiness, administration, welfare and morale of the forces assigned. He manages and employs U.S. and other United Nations units when assigned and exercises operational control of Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) and Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) forces at all times.

Retains authority to make decisions and to commit resources indigenous to forces assigned and to the extent of Military Assistance Program (MAP) resources allocated to ROKN/ROKMC within guidance provided by Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and Commander U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSK).

Functions

Attendant functions include:

- (1) Conduct local naval defense of Korea, employing assigned forces in support of Korea.
- (2) Conduct intelligence activities in Korea as directed by Commander U.S. Forces, Korea (COMUSKOREA) and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).
- (3) Conduct Naval Control and Protection of Shipping (NCAPS) as directed by Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN), Commander Task Force 36 (CTF-36).
- (4) Conduct inshore undersea warfare including local Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and harbor defense, as directed.
- (5) Support and assist COMUSKOREA in evacuation planning and operations.
- (6) COMNAVFORKOREA has command of 138 U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) staff and advisory personnel, administrative control over approximately 50 other USN and USMC personnel in Korea and operational control over Republic of Korea (ROK) forces including approximately 16,700 ROKN personnel and 31,000 ROKMC personnel.

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, MARIANAS GUAM, MARIANAS ISLANDS

Mission

(C) The primary missions of COMNAVFORMARIANAS:

a. Serves as the senior naval officer in the Marianas Islands area and is responsible for area coordination of all naval activities and units and provision of support for both naval and other military forces currently engaged in operations in WESTPAC and Southeast Asia.

b. As the Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific in Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, maintains liaison with the High Commissioner for the purpose of keeping informed on activities in the Trust Territory, evaluates these activities for military or strategic implications, and make reports and recommendations to CINCPAC as required. In addition, he coordinates and directs actions by and represents all military service elements in local matters of joint concern with civil government authorities, the local population, the press, and other civilian organizations.

Functions

(C) The primary functions of Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas are to:

a. Conduct naval operations in the defense of island positions in coordination with other appropriate military commands.

b. Protect sea and air communications within NAVMARIANAS area of responsibility in coordination with appropriate commands.

c. Reactivate facilities and expand present facilities as directed by higher authority and in accordance with appropriate commands.

d. Support fleet forces.

e. Conduct operations and training of forces assigned for local defense utilizing U.S. Pacific Fleet forces made available.

f. Conduct harbor defense, Inshore Underseas Warfare, (including Harbor Defense) in accordance with approved plans.

g. Plan for and, when directed, conduct civil affairs operations in the Marcus Island, Guam, and Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

h. Coordinate the provision of logistic support of U.S. forces and overseas bases by activities within NAVMARIANAS area as specified in approved plans.

COMMANDER, NAVAL FORCES VIETNAM, SAIGON, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Mission

(C) Serves as the Naval Component Commander for Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and Chief, Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam; performs area coordination functions in Vietnam for purely naval matters; and performs such other Navy functions and assumes such responsibilities directly associated with Vietnam as may be designated by Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet in order to attain the highest state of training and readiness, assist the Government of Vietnam to expand control throughout the Republic of Vietnam, and support U.S. national interests.

Functions

(C) The primary functions assigned Commander U.S. Naval Force Vietnam:

(1) Serves as naval component commander for Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and discharges Navy component command functions for appropriate uniservice Navy matters in the Republic of Vietnam, less planning and coordination concerning 7th Fleet air, naval gunfire, and amphibious operations.

(2) Conducts naval component planning in support of Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam operations plans and conducts their planning as directed.

(3) Exercises operational control of all Naval Forces assigned to Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, except those specifically assigned to the operational control of another commander.

(4) Provides service peculiar support for U.S. Navy and assigned U.S. Coast Guard units throughout the Republic of Vietnam. Provides communications and navigation facilities as required.

(5) Serves as Chief, Naval Advisory Group, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

(6) Supports pacification and development, to include military civic action where practical and appropriate and psychological operations.

(7) Performs the following with forces assigned:

- a. Conduct air and surface surveillance,
- b. Advise and assist the Government of Vietnam military and civil agencies concerned for harbor defense throughout the Republic of Vietnam.
- c. Advise on port security and explosive loading,
- d. Provide naval gunfire support with assigned units as feasible and on a not-to-interfere basis with surface surveillance missions,
- e. Conduct mine countermeasure operations,
- f. Provide combat support of U.S. Forces, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and Free World Military Assistance Force as directed.

(8) Develops the Military Assistance Service Funded for Vietnamese Navy and Vietnamese Marine Corps.

(9) Manages and controls the logistics programs for military assistance and service peculiar items to the Vietnamese Navy and Vietnamese Marine Corps.

(10) Provides intelligence and counterintelligence as directed by Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

(11) Acts as the single point of contact for Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam on all naval matters less air, naval gunfire and amphibious planning and coordination with Commander Seventh Fleet, and less matters relating to employment of III Marine Amphibious Force.

Forces

(as of 1 February 1972) 7,061

COMMANDER, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, PHILIPPINES—SUBIC BAY, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Mission

(C) The primary missions of COMNAVPHIL are:

- a. To exercise operational control for the combat readiness and effective utilization of all forces assigned.
- b. To exercise administrative responsibility for the readiness, administration, welfare and morale of forces assigned.
- c. To represent the U.S. Navy and U.S. Government in the Philippines; work directly with senior Philippine Navy officers in the defense of the Philippines and foster cooperation and effective working relationships with military and civilian officials of the Philippines.
- d. As the Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific in the Philippines, to deal directly at the Secretarial level of the Philippine Department of National Defense and the Chiefs of the Philippine Armed Forces within broad guidelines promulgated by Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet. In addition, he represents all U.S. Armed Forces with the U.S. Ambassador and promulgates policy matters for all U.S. Military Services in the Philippines.

Functions

(C) The primary functions of Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines are to:

- a. Conduct naval operations in the defense of the Philippines, and for the security of U.S. bases in coordination with other appropriate military commands.
- b. Protect sea and air communications within U.S. Naval Forces Philippines area of responsibility in coordination with appropriate commands.
- c. Activate new facilities and expand present facilities as directed by higher authority and in accordance with approved plans.
- d. Support fleet forces.
- e. Conduct operations and training of forces assigned for local defense utilizing U.S. Pacific Fleet forces made available.
- f. Conduct harbor defense, Inshore Underseas Warfare, (including Harbor Defense) in accordance with approved plans.
- g. Coordinate the provision of logistic support of fleet forces and overseas bases activities with U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines area as specified in approved plans.

SEA FRONTIERS

Mission

Under the appropriate Fleet Commander in Chief, sea frontier commanders will:

1. Coordinate and conduct operations in the sea frontier area and coordinate other matters in support of cold war objectives; and

2. Plan for and be prepared to coordinate and conduct operations in defense of the sea frontier area and to coordinate other matters in the event of a national emergency, natural disaster, limited or general war.

Functions

Sea frontier commanders shall perform tasks and functions as may be assigned by the appropriate Fleet Commander in Chief. Tasks and functions vary between the different sea frontiers and are normally associated with, but are not restricted to, the following general areas;

a. Operational control of Fleet units that may be assigned for operations in frontier waters.

b. Naval control and protection of shipping.

c. Harbor defense.

d. Search and rescue.

e. Continental air defense.

f. Establishment and assignment of operating areas, including air space.

g. Logistic and administrative support.

h. Domestic emergencies and mobilization planning.

i. Liaison with appropriate Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard commanders.

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS BASE,
LITTLE CREEK, NORFOLK, VA.

Mission

Coordinate and conduct training, maintain high standards of battle readiness, prosecute the development of amphibious warfare tactics, doctrines and operational procedures, and maintain forces to conduct amphibious assault and special operations in order to support the cold war objectives of the Atlantic Fleet and carry out assigned responsibilities in the event of limited or general war.

Functions

a. Exercise operational control of assigned forces.

b. Conduct type training and support operational training.

c. Act as principal advisor to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) for all matters related to the development of the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet (LANFLT).

d. Be prepared to provide amphibious forces to the operational control of Commander Second Fleet (COMSECONDFLT) and other Commanders as directed.

e. Plan for and provide logistics support to the Amphibious Force, LANFLT.

f. Coordinate the unit training of the Amphibious Force with other LANFLT commanders as appropriate.

g. Provide planning assistance, as directed, to Commander, U.S. Antilles Defense Command (COMANTDEFCON), Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSO), Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command (USCINCEUR), COMSECONDFLT, Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic (COMSTRIKEFLTANT), Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), Commander Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT), Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFORSOUTH), and Commander in Chief, U.S. Readiness Command (USCINCRED) in connection with amphibious operations in support of their contingency planning.

h. Plan for and conduct:

(1) Scheduled amphibious operational training for units assigned in accordance with Annex II.

(2) Amphibious training of U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) and NROTC midshipmen, and of U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and U.S. Air Force Academy (USAF) cadets.

(3) Amphibious training of U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force units as directed

(4) Unless otherwise directed, movement of ships under Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic (COMPHIBLANT) operational control deploying from and returning to the continental United States so as to provide maximum unit operational training.

i. Schedule and supervise training of naval gunfire support and the afloat phase of close air support of troops in accordance with Annex II.

j. Develop and improve tactics, doctrines, and operational procedures, in amphibious warfare operations, conducting such analyses and evaluations as necessary.

k. Conduct tests and evaluation of equipment for amphibious operations.

l. Exercise command over the Amphibious Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

m. Plan for and when directed, conduct those amphibious operations that do not involve strike forces.

n. Be prepared to conduct major amphibious operations under the operational control of COMSECONDFLT as a component of the strike force.

o. Maintain a ready amphibious squadron for deployment to the Caribbean area as required by CINCLANFLT Operation Order 38-YR (to be reissued as CINCLANFLT OPORDER 2138).

p. Direct Commander Naval Special Warfare Group, Atlantic to provide Unconventional Warfare planning and assistance to CINCLANFLT and commanders designated by CINCLANFLT. Commander Naval Special Warfare Group, Atlantic (COMNAVSPECWARGRULANT) will act as CINCLANTFLT's planning agent for unconventional warfare matters.

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS BASE,
CORONADO, SAN DIEGO, CALIF.

Mission

Coordinate and conduct training, operations and research including the development and improvement of tactics, doctrine, and operational procedures in amphibious operations, inshore undersea warfare, and explosive ordnance disposal, counter-insurgency, unconventional warfare, restricted water, and river warfare, and other special operations, and maintain forces to conduct amphibious assault and special operations in support of approved plans in order to support the training objectives of the Pacific Fleet and carry out assigned responsibilities in the event of nuclear war.

Functions

1. Conduct type training and support intertype training. Inform Commander U.S. First Fleet (COMFIRSTFLT) immediately of the status of any ships or units assigned to the FIRSTFLT that do not meet established performance standards.

2. Prepare plans for the deployment of amphibious types, submitting recommendations to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).

3. Coordinate and supervise training for tactical air and naval gunfire support.

4. Support, conduct training, planning and research (including development and improvement of equipment, tactics, techniques, doctrine and operation procedures) to maintain readiness for the conduct of the following:

a. Unconventional Warfare

b. Psychological Operations

c. Tactical Cover and Deception

d. Reconnaissance and Demolition

e. Restricted Water and Riverine Warfare

f. Sensor Operations.

5. Prepare plans as directed in support of CINCPACFLT contingency and general war plans, recognizing that operations in areas other than those identified in CINCPACFLT contingency and general war plans may be required.

6. Be prepared to provide an amphibious commander and forces to conduct special Cold War amphibious operations in addition to those called for by CINCPACFLT contingency war plans, coordinating with Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (CG, FMFPAC) as appropriate.

7. Furnish ships to and support other commands as directed.

8. Administer and provide for the logistic support of the Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet including amphibious construction battalions.

9. Develop and improve tactics, doctrine and operations procedures for amphibious operations, including the defense of amphibious forces against all forms of enemy attack.

10. Act as the principal advisor to CINCPACFLT with respect to amphibious matters, including but not limited to training, readiness, doctrine, tactics, employment, force requirements, ship characteristics and weapon systems development.

11. Support COMFIRSTFLT in the task to conduct operations to defend the sea approaches to the Continental United States.

12. Keep COMFIRSTFLT advised of significant deviations from or exceptions to established progressive training programs for those types of ships and units assigned to the First Fleet.

13. Prepare plans for use in the event of a nuclear accident/incident involving nuclear weapons.

14. Conduct necessary technical and safety inspections and provide for a nuclear safety program to ensure qualification, proficiency and nuclear safety of nuclear capable forces.

SERVICE FORCE, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, NORFOLK, VA.

Mission

Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet is the Principal Logistic Agent of Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet and is responsible in general for the supervision and coordination of the planning, conduct and administration of logistics services and supply of material to the Atlantic Fleet.

Functions

Prepare and issue necessary directives required for logistic support of operations, plans, and policies of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Conduct direct liaison with agencies, bureaus, offices, and commands as necessary to develop and carry out assigned responsibilities. Plan, conduct, and administer furnishing of services and supply of material to the fleet. For example:

a. Provide mobile logistic support to the appropriate fleet commands.

b. Provide repair facilities afloat and coordinate these facilities with repair facilities ashore for maintenance and upkeep of fleet ships.

c. Serve as an agent for Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet in matters concerning towing and salvage.

Coordinate with other commanders the planning for and determination of requirements, stock distribution, and control of conventional ammunition for support of naval forces. For example:

a. Coordinate afloat support stock loading in AEs and stock control and shipment of ammunition to fleet support bases as required by Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Force Europe and Commander in Chief U.S. Southern Command for the support of assigned naval forces.

b. Operate a centralized ammunition stock control system for afloat and overseas ammunition issue activities.

Act for Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet in mobile logistic force matters, supply matters affecting mobile logistic support of forces afloat, assigned overseas bases, and as directed, fleet logistic transportation not assigned to other commands. Make recommendations to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet on matters of policy, or of significant importance involving supply and transportation support of forces afloat. Functions include:

a. Recommend stock levels for Service Force Atlantic Fleet ships and monitor assigned overseas base stock levels. Exercise fleet allowance and load list discipline and overseas base inventory discipline. Ensure that stocks afloat do not exceed authorized levels.

b. Exercise general supervision over fleet food service, procurement, disbursing, Navy exchanges, shipstores, and commissary stores.

Provide fuel support to fleet forces afloat, and recommend to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet the requirements for fuel, fleet oilers, fueling facilities, and supply methods for the fleet both in peacetime and mobilization.

Deploy Atlantic Fleet construction forces for overseas base development as approved by Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

SERVICE FORCE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII

Mission

Commander Service Force Pacific is the Principal Logistic Agent of Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and is responsible in general for the supervision and coordination of the planning, conduct and administration of logistic services and supply of material to the Pacific Fleet.

Functions

Conduct type training and support intertype training.

Administer and provide for the logistic support of the Service Force.

Prepare plans for the deployment of the Service Force.

Provide ships to and support other commands as directed.

As the Principal Logistic Agent for Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, provide logistic support to naval forces in the Pacific.

Act as the principal advisor to Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet with respect to logistic matters, including but not limited to training readiness, employment, force requirements and ship characteristics.

Coordinate all petroleum matters for naval forces in the Pacific for Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and, in connection with these duties, maintain liaison with the Pacific Command Petroleum Office.

Maintain cognizance of advanced base functional components (other than air) and function as Type Commander for ship repair units, service craft, nucleus port crews, cargo handling battalions and mobile construction battalions.

Coordinate and administer the Navy mail service within the Pacific.

Administer the supply inspection program of all ships and units.

Provide logistic support to other services in accordance with joint agreements.

Provide for the Commander Seventh Fleet Logistic Support Force.

Organize and train salvage units, conduct, coordinate and supervise salvage operations.

Maintain a ready accounting system for nuclear weapons and components.

Provide repair facilities afloat and coordinate these facilities with repair facilities ashore for the maintenance and upkeep of the Pacific Fleet ships.

Develop and improve tactics, doctrine and operational procedures for mobile logistic support.

Conduct necessary technical and safety inspections and provide for a nuclear safety program.

COMMANDER CRUISER DESTROYER FORCE, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET

Mission

The primary mission of the Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, is to provide combat ready Naval forces to the operational commanders in the Atlantic and European areas.

Functions

Maintenance of ships under his command in a high state of training, material and personnel readiness, discipline, and morale. In cold, limited, and general war the Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic, will operate as a Type Commander in support of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet, of U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, and will support the operations of adjacent Allied and national force commanders.

The Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic, is further charged with developing tactics, doctrine, and operating procedures for the ship types assigned to his command, and exercises operational control of those units of his force not assigned to other operational commanders.

Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic, is also responsible for maintenance and training of all Navy Reserve Force destroyers and their crews assigned to the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

COMMANDER CRUISER DESTROYER FORCE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

Mission

The primary mission of the Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, is the maintenance of the ships under his command at a state of training, readiness, discipline and morale that will ensure attainment of the optimum degree of battle proficiency.

Functions

In terms of the current conflict, this includes providing Commander SEVENTH Fleet with ships at levels of personnel, material, and training readiness that will gain success at minimum risk to men and ships. Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific, operates as a Type Commander in support of the U.S. FIRST and SEVENTH Fleets in the Pacific Command area, providing them with ships and unit commanders ready for a wide range of commitments such as: overseas presence in the North Pacific, Sea of Japan, and Indian Ocean; assistance in training the navies of allies; and maintenance of a credible deterrent in terms of surface warships capable in anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare.

Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific, exercises operational control of those of his ships not assigned to other operational commanders, and is responsible for developing operating procedures, tactics, and doctrine for all of the ships assigned to his force.

Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Pacific, is also responsible for maintenance and training of all Navy Reserve Force destroyers assigned to the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

COMMANDER TRAINING COMMAND, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, NORFOLK, VA.

Mission

To facilitate development and centralization of management procedures and to effect coordination of shore based formal training in order to support the mission of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.

Functions

Function as principal advisor to and act for Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet on all assigned training matters.

Monitor and review the adequacy and effectiveness of fleet shorebased training other than mission-oriented training. Collect requirements for individual and team shorebased training for the Atlantic Fleet. Measure requirements against current and projected training support programs. Collect data on the utilization and management of fleet training activities ashore and recommend establishment, disestablishment or consolidation as appropriate to support future training requirements. Command designation Fleet Schools, centers and units as the Immediate Superior in Command under the Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet or the Chief of Naval Training as directed.

COMMANDER TRAINING COMMAND, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, SAN DIEGO, CALIF.

Mission

To facilitate development and centralization of management procedures and to effect coordination of shorebased formal training in order to support the mission of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Functions

Act as principal advisor to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Type Commanders on matters of Fleet training. Implement established training plans and meet other training requirements as directed by Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet. Commands Fleet Schools, centers and units in support of the operating forces and assist in developing required training doctrines and procedures. Identify training requirements and monitor the adequacy of current and projected training support programs. Issue directives, guidance and instructions as necessary to insure the maximum efficiency and effectiveness of the Fleet training effort.

COMMANDER NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS

Mission

Provide a force in being to the Fleet Commander in Chief for combat construction support and aid for the Type Commander in matters concerning readiness. Maintain force operational and material readiness. Prescribe standards of training. Recommend deployment and employment of battalions. Exercise operational, administrative and technical control over battalions. Issue operations plans and movement directives.

COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, NORFOLK, VA.

Mission

Carry out tasks assigned by higher authority, fulfill assigned commitments, maintain high standards of personnel and material readiness for naval operations, and strive continuously to improve submarine tactics and techniques in order to support Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet in his mission.

Function

Exercising operational control of submarine forces; planning, preparing and conducting offensive, defensive and special submarine operations in support of Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and Commander Anti Submarine Warfare Force Atlantic Fleet, as well as duties for the several NATO commanders. Combat ready Fleet Ballistic Missile submarines are provided to Commander in Chief U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Commander in Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe, and Strategic Air Command Europe for their employment as directed, while other submarine forces are provided for deployments to Commander in Chief, U.S.

Atlantic Fleet and Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe in support of overseas presence objectives. In addition to development and improvement of tactics, doctrine, equipment and operational procedures for the force, Commander Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet exercises command/control, as appropriate, of submarine facilities, training and logistics within the Atlantic Command.

COMMANDER SUBMARINE FORCE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII

Mission

Carry out tasks assigned by higher authority, fulfill assigned commitments, maintain high standards of personnel and material readiness for naval operations, and strive continuously to improve submarine tactics and techniques in order to support Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet in his mission.

Function

Exercising operational control of submarine forces; planning, preparing and conducting offensive, defensive and special submarine operations in support of Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet. Combat ready Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines are provided to Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet for employment as directed, while other submarine forces are provided for deployments to the Western Pacific in support of overseas presence objectives. Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet conducts research and development and deep submergence vehicle operations in support of Navy's Deep Submergence Systems Program. In addition to development and improvement of tactics, doctrine, equipment and operational procedures for the force, he exercises command/control as appropriate, of submarine facilities, training and logistics within the Pacific Command.

COMMANDER, NAVAL AIR FORCE, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, NAVAL AIR STATION,
NORFOLK, VA.

Mission

Naval Air Force Atlantic Fleet, Task Force 41 (TF 41) will:

- a. Organize, train, equip, prepare, maintain the readiness of and plan the employment in peace and war of forces assigned.
- b. Provide administrative personnel, material, fiscal, and technological support to those forces in order to most effectively and efficiently support the mission of US Atlantic Fleet.

Functions

- (a) Exercises operational control of assigned forces.
- (b) Conduct type training and support operational training.
- (c) Act as principal advisor to Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) for all matters related to the development of the Naval Air Force, US Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT).
- (d) As directed, provide naval air forces to operational control of other commanders.
- (e) Plan for and provide logistic support to the Naval Air Force, LANTFLT.
- (f) Develop and improve unit tactics, doctrines and operating procedures for the combat employment of naval air forces, including enhancing nuclear delivery capabilities.
- (g) Provide antisubmarine and aerial mine warfare training for U.S. Air Force (USAF) units when directed, coordinating with Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Force, US Atlantic Fleet (COMASWFORLANT) and USAF commanders as appropriate.
- (h) Coordinate the unit training of naval air forces with other LANTFLT commanders as appropriate.
- (i) Provide organic airlift services.
- (j) Provide or arrange for intermediate maintenance and logistic support for deployed aircraft squadrons and/or detachments.
- (k) Exercise command over shore (field) activities as assigned in current catalog of Naval Shore Activities.
- (l) Maintain liaison with Commander, Naval Air Reserve Training Command and with COMASWFORLANT in matters concerning readiness of naval air reserve units to perform wartime tasks and procedures to expedite change operational control (CHOP) and deployment under emergency conditions.

COMMANDER NAVAL AIR FORCE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, NAVAL AIR STATION, NORTH ISLAND, SAN DIEGO, CALIF.

Mission

Train and support aviation forces (including certain Marine Air Forces) in order to assist in fulfilling the operational requirements of Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).

Functions

1. Conduct type training and support intertype training. Inform Commander First Fleet (COMFIRSTFLT) immediately of the status of any ships or units assigned to the FIRSTFLT, that do not meet established performance standards.
2. Prepare plans for the deployment of Naval Air Force units and submit recommendations to CINCPACFLT.
3. Provide forces to, and support other commands as directed.
4. Provide VP forces, through Commander Fleet Air Wings, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMFAIRWINGSPAC), to Commander Seventh Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) as required for deployment, to Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces, US Pacific Fleet (COMASWFORPAC) as required to perform currently assigned tasks; and to COMFIRSTFLT when directed.
5. Develop aerial mine warfare capabilities and perform tasks assigned in Annex R, coordinating with Commander Mine Warfare Force, US Pacific Fleet (COMINEPAC).
6. Coordinate with and support Amphibious Force, US Pacific Fleet (PHIBPAC) and Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPAC) amphibious training and operational tasks.
7. Provide aviation logistic support to Navy and Marine Corps aviation units in accordance with Annex O.
8. Maintain cognizance of advance base aviation functional components.
9. Be prepared to conduct training of US Air Force forces in aerial mine warfare as requested.
10. Conduct evasion and escape training in accordance with CINCPACFLT Instruction 003305.1 series.
11. Provide operational control authority (OCA) air commanders to PACFLT OCAs as required.
12. Act as the Principal Logistic Agent for aeronautical materials for CINCPACFLT.
13. Act as the principal advisor to CINCPACFLT with respect to naval air matters including but not limited to administration, training, readiness, employment, force requirements, aircraft characteristics and weapons systems development.
14. Direct COMFAIRWINGSPAC to report to COMASWFORPAC for additional duty as Patrol Air (VP) Task Force Commander.
15. Be prepared to provide air units to Commander Western Sea Frontier (COMWESTSEAFRON) for augmentation of North America Air Defense Command (NORAD) forces for emergency air defense of the CONUS. Participate in planner air defense training exercises when requested and as feasible on a not-to-interfere with normal training basis.
16. Be prepared to deploy, on short notice, forces to meet special Cold War situations, to establish a deterrent posture or to conduct operations in a Limited or General War.
17. Develop and improve tactics, doctrine and operational procedures in the field of naval air operations.
18. Under the overall direction of COMFIRSTFLT, plan for and be prepared to conduct dispersal of operational fleet air units within assigned areas.
19. Prepare plans for use in the event of a nuclear accident/incident involving a nuclear reactor or nuclear weapon.
20. Conduct necessary technical and safety inspections and provide for a nuclear safety program to ensure qualification, proficiency and nuclear safety of nuclear capable forces.

COMMANDER OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION FORCE, NORFOLK, VA. (HQS) AND SATELLITE ACTIVITIES AT SAN DIEGO, NEW LONDON, KEY WEST, PT. MAGU AND CHINA LAKE

Mission

Test, evaluate, and investigate specific systems, ships, aircraft, and equipments as assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations. Develop tactics and proce-

dures for employment of investigated equipment. When directed by the Chief of Naval Operations assist developing agencies in the prosecution of Research and Development Training and Education tasks.

a. In the area of test and evaluation, Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force will:

(1) Conduct operational planning for the cognizant technical agency when the equipment or system requires a technical evaluation in an operational environment. Report on such tests when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(2) Plan for and conduct operational evaluations and operational appraisals of specific equipments or systems to determine the ability to meet specified performance requirements and overall suitability for service use. Plan for and conduct operational assists and concurrent operational tests and evaluations in collaboration with the cognizant technical agency, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

(3) Plan for and conduct fleet operational investigations which involve development, examination or comparison with operating forces of tactical concepts, operating procedures, or techniques.

(4) Report to the Chief of Naval Operations the results of operational evaluations, operational appraisals, concurrent investigations, with recommendations in connection therewith. Report operational assist projects, which will be limited to results of tests conducted.

(5) Recommend to the Chief of Naval Operations, training procedures, training aids, personnel requirements, counter-measures, and basic tactical doctrine to be used, developed, or employed incident to evaluation programs conducted.

b. In the area of development, Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force will:

(1) When directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, assist with the provision of services and facilities to those naval and extra-naval agencies engaged in development projects which require an operational environment involving the use of OPTEVFOR and other fleet units, as assigned.

(2) Coordinate the effort of Operational Test and Evaluation and other fleet units assigned in providing assistance to development agencies' projects, and provide for the establishment of liaison between the fleet units and the agencies concerned.

(3) Insure that in prosecution of tasks of a development nature, careful planning and execution are directed to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and nonessential or unprofitable use of fleet services.

(4) As directed, submit to the Chief of Naval Operations reports on specified development projects, including comments and recommendations.

(5) Review and comment on draft Technical Development Plans when such plans require operational testing and evaluation.

(6) Manage the Aircraft Tactical Manuals program in accordance with reference (b).

COMMANDER MINE WARFARE FORCE, CHARLESTON, S.C.

Mission

Mine Warfare Force, U.S. Navy, will in accordance with U.S. Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) and U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) regulations, carry out tasks assigned by higher authority, fulfill assigned commitments, maintain high standards of personnel and material readiness for naval action, and strive continuously to improve Mine Warfare tactics and techniques, in order to assist the Fleet Commanders in the accomplishment of their missions.

Functions

COMINEWARFOR, in peace time, in cold war, and in military conflict, short of general war, has been assigned missions tasks, and responsibilities by the Commanders in Chief, Pacific and Atlantic as follows:

1. Exercise operational control of assigned forces.
2. Provide forces and support to operational commanders as directed.
3. Conduct type training and support operational training.
4. Act as the principal advisor to Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) for all matters related to Mine Warfare.

5. As technical advisor for mine warfare, conduct minefield planning as requested by appropriate commanders. Review mining plans of operational com-

manders and make such recommendations as are appropriate for the best overall utilization of mine warfare resources.

6. Assist Commander Anti-Submarine Warfare Force, U.S. Atlantic (COMASWFORLANT) in the preparation and maintenance of CINCLANTFLT mining plans. Support CINCPACFLT in his responsibilities to develop integrated Pacific Command (PACOM) mining plans.

7. When directed, advise and assist task force commanders, specified commander and naval component commanders on unified commands on technical and tactical matters concerning mine warfare.

8. Maintain a repository of mine warfare information, including minefield planning sheets, to assist other commands in the technical, operational and planning aspects of mine warfare. Maintain a repository of information on areas mined or swept in PACOM.

9. Conduct shakedown and refresher training for units assigned other than as provided by the appropriate training command.

10. Exercise operational and administrative control over naval reserve training mine warfare forces assigned.

11. Exercise technical coordination with the U.S. Naval Schools Mine Warfare, Charleston, S.C.

12. Plan, assign and coordinate all fleet service mine tests.

13. Exercise operational and administrative control over the Mobile Mine Assembly group and ensure its capability to carry out the mission and tasks assigned. Maintain, coordinate and conduct required training, logistic support and employment of mobile mine assembly teams.

14. Coordinate mine warfare matters with other type/operational commanders as appropriate.

15. Maintain liaison with Commander Naval Reserve Training and District Commandants in matters concerning personnel readiness of naval reserve mine warfare forces.

16. Maintain personnel and material readiness within the mining material support organization to ensure capability to support the tasks delineated in CINCLANTFLT Operation Plan 2200 (OPLAN 2200).

17. Establish, maintain and coordinate the use of a permanent area for mine laying and countermeasures training in the Charleston, Long Beach, and Guam areas.

18. Determine requirements for prepositioned mine stocks, equipment and facilities in support of planned mining operations. Coordinate with appropriate commanders the requirements for prepositioning mine loading and delivery vehicle support equipment.

19. Determine requirements for CONUS mine stocks in support of Atlantic/Pacific/European mining plans.

20. Conduct or assist in conducting as appropriate, mine readiness inspection of prepositioned sites in the Atlantic/Pacific/U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NA-VEUR) area to ensure operational and material readiness.

21. Determine procurement requirements for mines, mine components, associated assembly and handling equipment.

22. Develop a training program for reserve personnel earmarked for augmentation into the mine warfare community.

23. Develop and maintain proficiency in mine countermeasures, including airborne mine countermeasures.

24. Exercise technical coordination with appropriate material commanders regarding mine warfare matters.

25. Prepare plans for the deployment of mine force units and be prepared to deploy, on short notice, forces to meet special cold war situations or to conduct operations in a limited or general war.

26. Plan and provide or arrange for the logistic support of minecraft.

COMMANDER CRUISER-DESTROYER FLOTILLAS

Mission

Are responsible to their Type Commanders for :

1. Readiness of their Flotillas.

2. Supervision of units and ships within the Flotillas and prosecution of type operations and training including the material condition of units, habitability, morale, conduct of special inspections, maintenance of standards of smartness and conformity and, as practicable, advanced training for operational commitments.

3. Preparations for assigned tasks in case of war. Such war planning duties include the establishment of liaison with other operational and administrative commanders and the preparation of necessary and desirable written plans and orders.

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRONS AND COMMANDER ESCORT SQUADRONS

Mission

Are responsible to their Type and Flotilla Commanders for:

1. Administration and supervision of the ships within their units and the prosecution of effective plans and orders to the end that the highest degree of battle efficiency can be attained.

2. Operational responsibilities as defined by specific plans and orders issued by responsible authorities.

3. Preparations for assigned tasks in case of war. Such war planning duties include the establishment of liaison with other operational and administrative commanders and the preparation of necessary and desirable written plans and orders.

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT COMMAND

Mission

Plan for and conduct instruction and training in amphibious warfare for regular and reserve personnel and units, and amphibious training for United States Army and Air Force and allied military personnel as directed. Conduct amphibious training for US Naval Academy and NROTC midshipmen, US Military Academy and US Air Force Academy cadets. Conduct ashore and afloat training courses in Naval Gunfire Support and exercise control of units undergoing training. Assume responsibility for precommissioning training of LST and smaller class ships.

COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS GROUP/COMMANDER AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON

Mission

Coordinate and conduct training, maintain high standards of battle readiness, prosecute development of amphibious warfare tactics, doctrines and operational procedures and maintain forces to conduct amphibious assault and operations to support cold war objectives. Carry out assigned responsibilities in event of limited or general war. Exercise administrative control of ships assigned to their organizations.

COMMANDER SERVICE GROUP/SQUADRON

Mission

Act as Type Commander Representative in mobile logistic support matters dealing directly with other commanders within the scope of Type Commander of orders, plans, instructions and directives.

Make studies, evaluations and tests of new equipment, procedures, tactics and doctrines for use in connection with mobile logistic support including vertical replenishment operations.

Ensure readiness for deployment; keep commanding officers appraised using predeployment briefings of operational matters and of possible tasks.

Exercise necessary administrative functions over all ships and craft assigned in the administrative organization such as ensuring the conduct of all types of inspections.

Function as Mobile Logistics Support Group Commander and/or Underway Replenishment Group Commander. Commander Carrier Division/Commander Antisubmarine Warfare Group.

Mission

Conduct administration training, evaluation and reporting on of assigned ships and embarked air wings. Develop and improve tactical doctrine and operational procedures for combat employment of forces.

Serve as principal advisor to the Type/Operational Commander on matters of employment and support of carriers and embarked air wings.

COMMANDER FLEET AIR COMMANDS

Mission

Exercise command over assigned units located within the specific command area. Exercise administrative and operational control of fleet units temporarily

based ashore. Oversee the training of fleet units ashore; provide logistical support and conduct required inspections of fleet units ashore. Coordinate the logistical support for embarkation/debarkation or other movement of units within specific command area.

Coordinate use of air space within the area and maintain close liaison with the Navy Regional Air Space Office and appropriate civilian authorities. Conduct investigations of alleged flight violations and claims from flight operations within the specific command area.

COMMANDER FLEET AIR WINGS

Mission

Report to the Operational Commander for operational duties. Carry out responsibilities for fleet trials and adoption of newly developed antisubmarine warfare and mining tactics. Provide weather, oceanographic, search and rescue and patrol aircraft when directed. Ensure maintenance of the highest state of material readiness.

COMMANDER SUBMARINE FLOTILLA

Mission

Exercise command of submarine units assigned and under the Type Commander exercise control over local shore supporting facilities. Exercise operational control of units assigned during tender availabilities and refresher training. Carry out rear echelon support functions for squadrons based outside CONUS. This includes training, personnel support, logistics and administrative control of the off crews of ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).

Coordinate scheduling of activities in local operating areas for safety, economy and convenience. Assist in the prosecution of unidentified submarine contacts when directed by higher authority. Originate and promulgate local operating area safety regulations. Organize and direct local submarine Search and Rescue operations.

Designate priorities for logistical support. Plan for and be ready to place into effect procedures designed to minimize the effectiveness of Soviet use of surface/air or submarine units to collect intelligence, harass or interfere in any way with assigned units conducting local operations or proceeding to and from patrol areas.

COMMANDER SUBMARINE SQUADRON

Mission

Exercise administrative control and training responsibilities of units assigned. Maintain units at maximum material readiness using support of assigned tenders, submarine bases and other available shore supporting activities. Develop and approve tactics, doctrine and procedures in anti-submarine warfare, Arctic operations, support, escort, minelaying, amphibious and unconventional warfare.

COMMANDER MINE FLOTILLA

Mission

On a continuing basis exercise operational control of active and reserve mine warfare forces assigned. Assume operational control of mine countermeasures aircraft assigned. Coordinate range safety for raking services for aircraft conducting minelaying. Nominate units to Commander Mine Warfare Force to fulfill the Fleet Commanders in Chief commitments. Assume control over tactical communication circuits as necessary for command and control. Acquire suitable operating areas for training of assigned units. Coordinate logistical support with local shore based commanders.

COMMANDER MINE SQUADRON

Mission

Carry out inter-type training. Carry out inspections, trials and tests of mine-sweeping equipment. Furnish services to the Mine Warfare School and other commanders. Develop and formalize doctrines, tactics, procedures and requirements for equipment to increase effectiveness of units in assault mine countermeasures. Develop and improve tactics for mine countermeasures in riverine warfare operations.

EUROPEAN NAVAL HEADQUARTERS REQUIREMENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Who validates the requirement for the headquarters of the Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and how many men are assigned to this headquarters? Do you know offhand who validates the manpower requirements?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, who is Vice Adm. David Bagley, validates the manpower requirements for all U.S. Navy staffs.

Because CINCUSNAVEUR also has an interface with the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure, there is a cross validation that affects that portion of staff that serves the joint staff structure. That is coordinated with the Joint Chiefs, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What civilian official goes over this and looks over it, do you know?

Admiral FINNERAN. None, to my knowledge, has conducted a specific review of that headquarters, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. As far as we can, in any unit comprising an appreciable number of men, we want the record to reflect that this was gone over by a civilian, also. That is not discrediting the Navy.

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir; we have civilian manpower specialists that participate in that validation process. But at the secretarial level, to the best of my knowledge, it has not been the—

The CHAIRMAN. We want the proof where it is available that someone in a responsible civilian capacity went over these matters and approved them if they are in the budget. If that was not done, we want to know it.

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be very helpful to us in proving the case, so to speak, and understanding it if someone did, in fact, go over it. It would be a concurrence of opinion, a jury of two, with a unanimous verdict, you see.

Admiral FINNERAN. I will provide a statement for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Do that and give us the name of that official if you will, and also the number of men assigned to these positions.

Admiral FINNERAN. Very well, sir.

(The information follows:)

CIVILIAN REVIEW OF STAFFING OF HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NAVAL FORCES, EUROPE, AND STRENGTH OF HEADQUARTERS

Each year the offices of the Secretary of Defense undertake complete reviews of the Navy budget as submitted. Specifically, twice a year at apportionment and budget time the overall headquarters manpower numbers are subjected to close scrutiny at the appropriate OSD hearings by civilian analysts of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) (Comptroller) and ASD (Systems Analysis). Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has civilian representatives who join the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) analysts in the interrogation of witnesses concerned with justifying the various aspects of programs; e.g., Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe.

Subsequent to the hearings, the analysts of OSD and OMB often collaborate in writing official decisions which, when approved by the Secretary of Defense, become binding upon Navy.

The foregoing reviews are after the Navy's budget has been reviewed and judged internally by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) and the Secretary of the Navy.

Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, London, England, Fiscal Year 1972. There are 212 officers and enlisted billets authorized with the following pay grade structure:

Flag	5
O-6	20
O-5	36
O-4	27
O-3	17
O-2	1
W-2	1
W-1	1
Total officers	108
E9	3
E8	8
E7	10
E6	37
E5	30
E4	12
E3	4
Total enlisted	104

TURNOVER RATE AND SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS

The CHAIRMAN. Let us comment on your rate of turnover.

You said 60 percent of your men each year went to specialized schools, which pleased me very much, but what are some of those specialized schools?

Admiral FINNERAN. For fiscal year 1973, Mr. Chairman, if I may correct that statement, we anticipate that 53 percent of the new recruits coming into the Navy will go to specialized schools. In this current year, that percentage has been a little higher than that. It has been closer to 63 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. I assumed that is what you were talking about. You get them into one of these specialized schools during the first year?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you will average that high year after year?

Admiral FINNERAN. That is correct, sir. Our specialized school program is designed to provide replacements for the petty officers that we will lose from the technical skills at the end of the length of the training periods. To give you an extreme example, it takes 2½ years for us to produce a qualified watchstander in a nuclear propulsion submarine or surface ship. So, our training projection is 2½ years into the future.

As you know, that program is growing relatively fast, steadily, and with the introduction of large surface ships, it tends to grow at a greater pace.

NAVAL TRAINING SCHOOLS

We have 69 ratings in the Navy, each of which have their own specialized technical school.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I know several of them, but would you give me the names of some of these schools.

Admiral FINNERAN. All right, sir, our electronic school, we have two locations. One is in Treasure Island, one is at Great Lakes.

Our data systems technician school, which is located at Great Lakes. Our torpedoman's school is located in Orlando, Fla. Our radioman's school is at Great Lakes and in Bainbridge.

Our nuclear power school includes four basic ratings in the Navy that go through their own specialized skills first and then go to nuclear power training at Bainbridge and out at Mare Island. From there, they go to four separate prototypes for 6 months of on-the-job training on the prototype before they go to sea.

RATE OF VOLUNTEERS

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Before my time runs out, what about your personnel? What percentage of your men, before we went into this so-called volunteer services were actual enlistees and what percentage were induced by the draft? Do you have that information?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir. Prior to the reduced draft calls, we calculated, using the lottery numbers as a technique to measure from, that we had about 65 percent so-called true volunteers. These were people who did not have a high probability of being drafted.

Since July of 1971, when the talk about an All-Volunteer Force began and there was gradual reduction in the draft calls, and through the current time frame, we are calculating approximately 80 percent of our people coming into the Navy are true volunteers, using that same basis as a base for calculation. In the current year, we have a requirement for 90,000 USN enlistees to join the Navy in order to maintain our strength. That is this fiscal year, 1972. Through this point in time, we are running 6,000 to 7,000 behind our programed inputs that we would like to see coming into the Navy. We anticipate being able to recover from that shortfall before the end of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. How are you going to do it?

Admiral FINNERAN. To do so, we will have to make some additional program changes to make it a little more attractive. We will have to come up with a better way, for example, to attract using the school guarantee program technique to a better advantage. One of the Navy's strengths for years has been its ability to train and educate. It has been an attractive device. But we have not gotten a system that allows us at the moment specifically to guarantee a man a particular school before he enlists. We hope to be able to broaden that capability.

The CHAIRMAN. If they keep announcing that there are not going to be any draft calls, it is naturally going to make it more difficult for you to get your quota, will it not?

Admiral FINNERAN. It will be at this time; yes, sir. It keeps us on our toes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I say it will make it more and more difficult.

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

TURNOVER PER YEAR

The CHAIRMAN. What is your percentage of personnel turnover per year?

Admiral FINNERAN. Using the same basis that was discussed earlier, sir, about 26 percent. We have a basic 4-year enlistment program.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you plan it that way? Is that the way you want it? The Army has testified, as I understand it, that they want it that way.

Admiral FINNERAN. We have a higher objective for retaining people than, I believe the Army does, sir. We state our objective as being 31 percent of the initial enlistees that we would like to see reenlist for additional terms of service. When we break that down discretely by rating the percent varies from rating to rating. We calculate it, including the training investment we have made and the experience mix objective that we have set.

For example, going back to the nuclear propulsion community of ratings again, we have a very high desired retention rate for that particular group of skills. For the lesser skilled people in whom we do not make that rich an investment, we have a lower objective. But it averages 31 percent for the whole Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about enlisted men?

Admiral FINNERAN. Enlisted; yes, sir. In the case of officers, we have an officer objective of approximately 33 percent overall. Again, for our nuclear trained officers, it is very high, 62 percent is what we would like to see retained. We would like to retain our pilots at 47 percent of those completing their term of service.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. My time is about up.

You say you wanted to see 31 percent reenlist, but you are not getting that now? You are getting only about 25%, are you not?

Admiral FINNERAN. No, sir. We are currently getting about 20, sir. As a matter of fact, chart no. 15, sir, presents that Navy enlistment program in terms of numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you expect this to increase now with the pay increase?

Admiral FINNERAN. We are optimistic that it will, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you base your optimism on?

Admiral FINNERAN. I personally would agree with Mr. Kelley's observation that military pay is pretty comparable with the economy. We have some specialized pay interests that we would like to see to strengthen our capability.

For example, the Navy has had a long-term interest in sea pay, which would be a very specialized kind of pay for encouraging people to stay with us, put up with the hardships of long deployments. We would be very encouraged by some kind of action on that kind of a proposition.

ENLISTMENT BONUS

The CHAIRMAN. What about this so-called bonus pay, this special bonus that we enacted last year?

Admiral FINNERAN. For the Navy, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral FINNERAN. As you know, sir, it is available to us. As you mentioned yesterday, the Navy is not particularly enthusiastic about using it for a variety of reasons, including your observation. But the main issue is that we cannot figure out a way to selectively utilize it and at the same time, make it apply to skills that are going to bear the burden of the duty.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, I do not have but a few questions here and I think they can be answered briefly and we can move right on.

SHIPS AND PERSONNEL IN EUROPE

How many ships does the Commander in Chief, U.S. Navy Europe command today?

Admiral FINNERAN. As of yesterday, sir, the operational control of CINCUSNAVEUR, was 40 ships in the 6th Fleet and [deleted] aircraft.

Senator THURMOND. Now, that is in Europe?

Admiral FINNERAN. They are in the Mediterranean, sir. This is the 6th Fleet.

Senator THURMOND. They are commanded out of London?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. What is the size of your headquarters that commands these ships? How many officers and men?

Admiral FINNERAN. There are 212 personnel assigned to the headquarters of CINCUSNAVEUR, sir.

Senator THURMOND. How many officers and how many enlisted men?

Admiral FINNERAN. I would have to provide that for the record, sir. I do not have that.

Senator THURMOND. Can you tell us how many admirals there are in that and how many captains?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, London, England, Fiscal Year 1972. There are 212 officers and enlisted billets authorized with the following pay grade structure:

Flag	5
O-6	20
O-5	36
O-4	27
O-3	17
O-2	1
W-2	1
W-1	1
Total Officers	108
E-9	3
E-8	8
E-7	10
E-6	37
E5	30
E4	12
E3	4
Total Enlisted men	104

NATO HEADQUARTERS: PLACE IN OVERALL COMMAND PICTURE

Senator THURMOND. How does the NATO headquarters at Naples under Admiral Rivero fit into the command picture as regards the U.S. Navy European Commander in Chief and the 6th Fleet Commander in Chief.

Admiral FINNERAN. May I provide that answer for the record, sir?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

(The information follows:)

Operational command of the 6th Fleet is exercised through two command arrangements, one national, the other NATO. In peacetime, and in the event of U.S. unilateral action, command is exercised by Commander-in-Chief U.S. Naval Forces Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR), the naval component commander for the commander of the unified command, European Command.

In the event of a NATO war, earmarked elements of the 6th Fleet become Strike Force South and pass to the operational command of Admiral Rivero (Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces South), a major subordinate commander under Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Remaining naval elements, including amphibious, certain underway replenishment groups and assigned escorts, remain under the U.S. National Command of CINCUSNAVEUR. During wartime, CINCUSNAVEUR continues as the senior U.S. Naval Representative in European, Mediterranean, and Middle East area.

SIXTH FLEET: PERSONNEL LEVEL

Senator THURMOND. How many naval personnel are in Europe and the 6th Fleet?

Admiral FINNERAN. There are 41,000 personnel in Europe and the 6th Fleet at this time, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Do you have figures there to show how many admiral slots are assigned to these areas? If not, you can supply it for the record.

Admiral FINNERAN. Not readily available, sir. I will provide it for the record.

(The information follows:)

FLAG OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO EUROPEAN AREA

	Requirements	Assigned
Navy activities:		
U.S. Naval Forces Europe, London.....	5	3
Fleet Air Mediterranean, Naples.....	2	1
Submarine Flotilla 8.....	1	1
Military Sealift Command, Bremerhaven.....	1	
Total.....		5
6th Fleet (as of Jan. 31, 1972):		
Commander, 6th Fleet.....	2	1
Carrier Division 2.....	2	1
Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla 6.....	2	1
Service Squadron 6.....	1	
Total.....		3
Other than Navy activities:		
U.S. European Command, Stuttgart.....	3	3
Joint U.S. Military Mission for Aid, Turkey.....	1	1
Military Assistance Advisory Group, Portugal/commander, Iberian Atlantic.....	1	1
Iceland Defense Force, Keflavik.....	1	1
Allied Forces Southern Europe, Naples.....	2	2
Naval Striking Force Southern Europe, Naples.....	1	1
NATO Military Committee, Brussels.....	1	1
U.S. mission to NATO, Brussels.....	1	1
NATO Defense College, Rome.....	1	1
Defense/naval attache, United Kingdom, London.....	1	1
Supreme Allied Command, Europe, Casteau.....	1	1
Total.....		14
Total assigned.....		22

MISSION STATEMENT

Senator THURMOND. Did I understand you to say that the admiral in London operational controls the 6th Fleet on a day-to-day basis?

Admiral FINNERAN. He, commander of the 6th Fleet, reports directly and is under the operational control of CINCUSNAVEUR in London, yes, sir.

May I provide a mission statement on CINCUSNAVEUR which I think will clarify part of the questions you are asking, Senator?

Senator THURMOND. All right, thank you.

(The information follows:)

The following is the mission statement on CINCUSNAVEUR:

In cold war, limited war or general war, this force will conduct operations to ensure control of Command area and provide forces (including administrative, logistic and planning support thereto) to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe (USCINCEUR) and the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) as directed in order to support and assist USCINCEUR and SACEUR in establishing control of contested areas in Europe."

As stated previously 6th Fleet is under the operational control of CINCUSNAVEUR in peacetime or in the event of unilateral action. In a NATO war, earmarked elements of the 6th Fleet become STRINKFORSOUTH under the NATO Command, Allied Forces South.

A further responsibility of the US Naval Commander in London is that of US Commander Eastern Atlantic, an area commander under Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet. The mission of USCOMEASTLANT is:

"Operate assigned Atlantic Fleet units, provide logistic support to Atlantic Fleet units, and maintain readings to conduct anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and naval control of shipping operations (NCSS) during peacetime, cold war, limited war, and general war in order to assist Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet in the accomplishment of his mission in the Atlantic Command Area."

NAVY STRENGTH IN RELATION TO PAST YEARS

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Finneran, what is the personnel strength of the Navy today as compared with 1964, 1960, and 1955?

Admiral FINNERAN. I will provide that also for the record, sir, if I may.

(The information follows:)

	Fiscal year—			
	1955	1960	1964	1973
Officers.....	74,527	69,559	76,400	72,198
Enlisted.....	579,864	545,037	586,327	525,231
Midshipmen.....	6,304	3,388	4,869	4,243
Total.....	660,695	617,984	667,596	601,672

EFFECT OF IMPOSED PERSONNEL CUT

Senator THURMOND. How did the 3,000 average man-year cut imposed on the Navy for fiscal year 1972 impact on your personnel management problems?

Admiral FINNERAN. The 3,000 man-year reduction that was imposed by the Authorization Act required us to program our strength down earlier in the year than we had originally planned in the budget. It caused slight imbalance, if you will, in our projected loss plan and our projected gain plan for this fiscal year. The net effect was that we, instead of programming our plan to a man-year average of 616,000 as was originally requested, we programed it at 613,000. We were, during

this year, coming from a strength at the beginning of the year of 623,248 down to a projected end of the year strength of 603,548.

Senator THURMOND. Did it hamper operations to any great extent?

Admiral FINNERAN. That alone did not, sir. But combined with the dollar cuts that were imposed by the Appropriations Act over and above the 3,000 man-years, we were required to reprogram again and that included the requirement to extend our early release programs which we originally planned to terminate in December on through March.

SEPARATION OF COMBAT AND SUPPORT

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Finneran, how does the Navy separate combat from support, recognizing there are about 75 combat aircraft on a carrier which is manned by about 5,000 men and backed up by an extensive shore establishment?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir. Senator, as you know, you can define combat and support six or seven different ways. I believe Mr. Kelley has presented examples in his statement of four or five different ways. From the Navy's point of view, every man in a ship is a combat combatant. He is a man-or-warsman. If you take the extreme example and just count people who are pulling triggers, you can come to a position that only 11 percent of the Navy's manpower resources are fighters. When that ship goes down, sir, all hands go, including the cooks and the compartment cleaners.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral, how many ships did the Navy have in fiscal year 1964 versus people and how many ships does the Navy have now versus people?

Admiral FINNERAN. In fiscal 1973, we will have 594 ships and 601,000, approximately, people.

Senator THURMOND. Would you like to supply that for the record?

Admiral FINNERAN. I will have to supply the 1964 data for the record, sir.

(The information follows:)

	Fiscal year—	
	1964	1973
Ships.....	917	594
Personnel.....	667,596	601,672

SAVINGS THROUGH SHORE ESTABLISHMENTS REDUCTION

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Finneran, what manpower savings has the Navy realized through reduction of shore establishments?

Admiral FINNERAN. I will have to provide that for the record, too, sir, to be exact.

(The information follows:)

There have been little or no savings in manpower through the disestablishment of shore stations or facilities since 1964. However, overall manpower reductions in the support establishment through horizontal assessments have been approximately 17,700 from 1964 to our planned FY-73 level. The net reduction since 1968, which was one of our peak years, will be 78,300. The following is a breakdown by years:

[Military end-strength in thousands]

	Fiscal year—				
	1964	1968	1971	1972	1973
Support forces.....	151.0	174.2	148.6	145.4	147.1
Special activities (outside Navy).....	14.2	21.0	18.6	16.7	15.8
Training.....	123.3	132.8	113.0	112.8	118.5
Transients, patients and prisoners.....	41.6	62.7	47.6	31.2	31.0
Total.....	330.1	390.7	327.8	306.1	312.4

EFFECT IF LARGER CUT IMPOSED

Senator THURMOND. If the Navy had to reduce its manpower by 5 or 10 percent, how would it be accomplished, and what effect would this have upon the Navy?

Admiral FINNERAN. At this point, sir, to answer that question is somewhat speculative. We would opt very highly for reducing the support, the training, and the shore side of the problem in the interest of protecting our combat forces and keeping the strength and the manning in the ships and squadrons up. We would have a very difficult time doing that.

In order to reduce the manning in our shore establishment, we have already taken a substantial amount of what we call horizontal reductions throughout the shore establishment, to the point where we have had to redefine in some cases the missions of those shore activities and reduce the demand imposed on them because of shortages of people.

The next real potential for making a substantial reduction in the shore establishment in the Navy would require the closing of a number of shore activities.

Senator THURMOND. What effect would that have on our national security?

Admiral FINNERAN. I am not prepared to give you a complete answer to that question, sir. If you are asking for my personal views—

Senator THURMOND. In other words, if the Navy had to reduce manpower 5 or 10 percent, just how in your judgment, would that affect our national security? If you would like to supply that for the record, you may.

Admiral FINNERAN. I would appreciate that, sir.
(The information follows:)

If the Navy had to reduce manpower by five or ten percent, the initial impact would fall on the shore establishment and support elements. Navy would opt to maintain the strength and readiness of the operating forces in order to accomplish primary missions. A significant reduction of the shore establishment would soon be transmitted to operating ships and aircraft in the form of reduced services, degraded training and marginal logistic support. With the current high tempo of operations, exacting operational commitments and fiscal constraints, the readiness of operating forces would deteriorate, impacting on the strategy these forces were supporting. Broad and arbitrary changes to Department of Defense manpower will inevitably affect the national security posture.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, that is all the questions I have.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much Senator.
Senator Dominick?

LEVEL OF FLAG RANK OFFICERS

Senator DOMINICK. Admiral, we have a statutory limit on the number of admirals, do we not?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. Is it not a fact that through the chairman's rule, as we call it, actually the limit is below what the statutory limit is?

Admiral FINNERAN. That is correct, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. So that whatever number of admirals you have, are they within the chairman's limit now?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir. The chairman authorizes 302 and we have 302 in accordance with that limit, sir.

RETENTION: FAMILY PROBLEMS

Senator DOMINICK. It is my understanding, from your testimony and also from previous witnesses, that part of your retention problem revolves around family. Have you found that trying to put the families in overseas bases is helping on this?

Admiral FINNERAN. I can answer that question this way, Senator. I have personally conducted a study of the two squadrons that were formerly homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, two squadrons of destroyers. There was a marked difference in the retention rates in those ships; there was a marked increase in the stability of the personnel assigned to those ships, which in turn was reflected in a higher state of readiness in those ships from the period 1966 to 1969.

INCREASED SUBMARINE CONSTRUCTION: MORE COMMANDERS

Senator DOMINICK. You have programmed, as I understand it, a fairly substantial increase over the next 5 years in terms of submarines and at least budgeted in some of the other surface ships. This requires, does it not, an increase in the number of officers—commanders, lieutenants, in that area—over what you now have?

Admiral FINNERAN. In absolute numbers, sir?

Senator DOMINICK. Yes.

Admiral FINNERAN. I do not think it will affect the absolute number of commanders that we would have. It has a very real impact on the kind of training that they receive. I would anticipate that as those new ships were brought into being and into the program, they would replace old ships; therefore, the tendency for growth in the absolute numbers of commanders would be minimal.

Senator DOMINICK. In terms of attack submarines, for example, there are six, as I recall now, which are authorized and under construction.

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. Those will be added to the fleet, will they not?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. They will not replace ones that are now there? Or will they?

Admiral FINNERAN. That decision has not been faced yet. There are still, I believe, 14 diesel submarines in service and potentially, they will become replacements for those, particularly as those older boats phase out of life cycle. It remains to be seen, sir, as to whether the program austerity would be so severe that it would force us to remove those boats from the program prematurely.

Senator DOMINICK. It was my understanding that you were programming, at least, in the junior officer category, a fairly substantial increase over the next 3 years.

Admiral FINNERAN. Of submarine-qualified officers, yes, sir, to meet the introduction of the new boats.

Senator DOMINICK. So this would mean, then, as I understand your answer, that you would be training in a different way the officers who you either now have available or who are coming into the program and train them for this purpose as opposed to shore duty or support duty or line duty, something of that kind?

Admiral FINNERAN. In response to the introduction of new hardware, and in this case, new submarines, we would increase the numbers of officers that we train in submarine school and in the submarine nuclear propulsion program in order to meet those requirements in time to crew those boats when they are commissioned. That would generate a gradual increase, presuming that the building rate continues at six per year, in the representation of qualified submariners in the officer corps of the Navy. And if you assume that the rate of growth in the submarine force is going to be greater than that in the rest of the Navy, then their representation through the entire officer corps would be higher, yes, sir.

RETRAINING OF SUBMARINE PERSONNEL

Senator DOMINICK. Let me ask you this. In the process of bringing the new nuclear subs in and the potential of taking the diesel subs out of commission, would you believe from past experience that you would be transferring the officers from the diesel subs over into nuclear training and then on to this, or would there be new men coming into the service?

Admiral FINNERAN. Both, sir, but predominantly new men coming into the service. Admiral Rickover has essentially completed screening those officers that are currently in the diesel submarine force that he considers qualified to go into the nuclear program. We have provided alternative career path options, if you will, for those diesel submariners who have not been successful in gaining access to the nuclear propulsion training program.

For example, in the past year, we have selected a few ex-nuclear submariners for surface command and they have been, in other cases, reassigned throughout the Navy, both at sea and ashore, in the surface Navy. We would expect that trend to continue as the diesel submarines phase out of the program.

INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL LEVEL

Senator DOMINICK. Admiral, would you supply for the record the number of people in the Navy who are assigned to intelligence duties?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The number of people in the Navy who are assigned to intelligence duties: 14,737 for Fiscal Year 1972 with a reduction to 13,937 for Fiscal Year 1973.

Senator DOMINICK. That is all, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

EFFECT OF LAST YEAR'S LAW

Admiral, did I understand you had 613,000 man-years authorized by the Congress? Is that the level?

Admiral FINNERAN. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You use 607,000 out of that 613,000; that is, you are proposing.

Admiral FINNERAN. I believe that is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. My real question is now, you testified here about the small reduction that we imposed on you in the Authorization Act last year that caused dislocations and so on. I judge they were not too serious because you did not use all the slots that you were allowed.

Admiral FINNERAN. Your judgment is correct, Mr. Chairman. If our problem had been limited just to reacting to the 3,000 man-year reduction imposed by the Authorization Act, we would have been able to make that adjustment without too severe an effect. However, the Appropriations Act also took some dollars away on top of that, which required us to take additional reductions in order to live within the dollars made available.

DISLOCATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. How serious were these dislocations?

Admiral FINNERAN. The most serious effect, sir, we had originally planned to stop our general early release programs in December of this year in our budget submission. Because of the combination of the 3,000 man-year reductions in the Authorization Act plus the dollar reductions of the Appropriations Act, we have been forced to continue those early release programs through March of this year for the enlisted personnel.

In addition, we have released early, approximately 1,100 additional officers that we had not intended originally to do.

The CHAIRMAN. That early?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were expecting to do it, but not that early?

Admiral FINNERAN. Not that early; that is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else you want to say about any of these matters that you have or have not been asked about?

Admiral FINNERAN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you finished, Senator?

UTILIZATION OF RESERVES

Senator THURMOND. I have just one other question.

Admiral, speaking about the reductions and the utilization of personnel, what about the Reserve? You are still using Reserve, are you not?

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. For instance, Air Reserve, I believe you had about 30,000 allocated and only had about 25,000 actually utilized. Is that not about right?

Admiral FINNERAN. Actually utilized? We are speaking about the man-year strength authorized.

Senator THURMOND. That is 1971-72.

Admiral FINNERAN. We are slightly below strength today, sir. I do not have those figures with me, but I can provide them for the record.

Senator THURMOND. You are a good deal below strength on your Reserve, are you not?

Admiral FINNERAN. As I recall the figures——

Senator THURMOND. According to the figures I had some time back.

Admiral FINNERAN. Yes, sir; from the man-years authorized of 129,000, I believe we had running around 122,000, but I would have to verify that for the record.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

(The information follows:)

PRELIMINARY STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON THE STRENGTH OF THE NAVAL RESERVE SELECTED
RESERVE AS OF DEC. 31, 1971

	Air	Surface	Total
On board.....	26,855	93,796	120,651
Man-year average.....	26,365	97,995	124,360

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Admiral, thank you very much for coming and testifying.

Admiral FINNERAN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness will be Maj. Gen. E. B. Wheeler, assistant chief of staff, G-1, U.S. Marine Corps.

We are glad to have you here. I have never heard of the Marines having too many men or any surplus men. In your posters you say that you are just looking for a few anyway.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. E. B. WHEELER, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF
STAFF—G-1, U.S. MARINE CORPS**

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, what do you have for us that you want to go into?

General WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen I would like to, if I may, address the charts in your book, which I think are tabbed at either tab "F" or under "Marine Corps." There are six charts there, sir.


I think it fair to say at the outset that the Marine Corps, too, is deeply concerned with the rising cost of manpower. I hope to demonstrate this concern with some facts within the next 15 minutes allotted to me.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

General WHEELER. The thrust of my remarks are designed first to illustrate the actions we have already taken in the past several years to conserve on manpower in response to the expressed desires of the Congress and of the Secretaries of Defense and of the Navy; secondly, to describe some of the things that we are doing and plan to do in fiscal 1973 in pursuit of the same aim.

Looking at chart 1, in discussing current manpower reductions, I think it is helpful to recall fiscal year 1970 and 1971. These are a period, as you have already heard and well know, a period of great

MARINE CORPS TOTAL STRENGTH REDUCTIONS



personnel turbulence caused by large-scale strength reductions and troop redeployments resulting from our reduced Vietnam role.

In fiscal year 1972, as you can see where the line levels out on chart No. 1, fiscal 1972 is one of more stabilization and 1973, we hope, will be a year of increased readiness in our force.

Now, as you can see, at the very top left of chart No. 1, the peak strength of the Marine Corps was achieved in March of 1969 with a strength of—

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me. These charts are not numbered that I can find. You have a figure down here, but you punched holes for your looseleaf books and cut some of these numbers out. You do have chart 2 here on the next page.

General WHEELER. Yes, sir, the charts should be numbered. I would hope they are.

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about the first one now?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir, which has the big curve on it, which is organized to show on the vertical scale thousands of Marines and on the horizontal scale, the fiscal years 1969 through 1973.

Entering that chart at the left top, as I pointed out, we reached our peak strength, 317,000, in fiscal year 1969. The remainder of the chart is organized to show strength changes, as you can see, across the top middle in terms of officer and enlisted and the totals, and the cumulative total as we ran through the years, 1971 and planned to through 1973.

At the bottom of the chart, sir, are the end strengths for fiscal years 1969-71. Those are actual strengths, and the projected strength for 1972 and 1973.

You notice that at the end of fiscal 1971, addressing this period of 1971, we reduced some 97,000 officers and men in a space of about 2 years from the end of fiscal 1969. Interestingly enough, that cumula-

tive total of 97,000 is almost equal to one-half of the total strength that we request in fiscal 1973, which is 198,000 as indicated at the bottom right of this chart.

Addressing the period 1972-73, you can see that during fiscal 1972, we plan to reduce another 14,000 for a cumulative total reduction of 111,000. And in fiscal 1973, the last column at the right top, we have a minor reduction, actually the strength is almost level; the numerical reduction is 55 marines.

But I would like to point out to the committee there that we do continue to reduce our officers some 700, as you can see, although we raise the total of enlisted about 600. So, we are continuing the officer reduction in fiscal 1973.

Relatively dramatic or drastic management actions were taken to achieve these manpower reductions by over 97,000 in fiscal year 1970 and 1971. If you will address chart No. 2, gentlemen.

CHART 2

FISCAL YEAR 1970 AND 1971 ACTIONS TO REDUCE STRENGTH

Early release.
Reversion of temporary officers.
Forced retirement and severance of reserve officers.
Easing of administrative bars to retirement.
Sharply reduced accessions.

FISCAL YEAR 1972 AND 1973 ACTIONS TO REDUCE STRENGTH

Early release.
Reduced accessions.
Restricting augmentation into regular force.

SAVINGS

Strength reduction during fiscal year 1972.
Application of pay raises—Increase time in grade between promotions.
Better manpower utilization.

General WHEELER. Chart No. 2 is a summary at the top of the actions that we took in 1970 and 1971 to achieve these reductions. First, large-scale early release; almost 92,000 officers and men were released early during that period of time. We reverted almost all of our temporary officers who were elevated from enlisted ranks to fulfill wartime requirements. They were reverted back to their enlisted ranks.

We reluctantly implemented forced retirement and severance of Reserve officers up to and including the grade of colonel. We eased the administrative bars to retirement for the more senior regular officers, and we effected sharply reduced accessions, promotions, and augmentation into the regular Marine Corps. These actions, Mr. Chairman, continue in 1972 and are planned to continue in 1973, including further early release of a relatively small number of officers reduced accessions well below losses for our officers; and we are going to continue to restrict augmentation of Reserve officers into the regular Marine Corps.

Addressing at the bottom of the chart under savings, I would like to point out—

The CHAIRMAN. Which chart is that now?

General WHEELER. Chart 2, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General WHEELER. Early in this fiscal year 1972, management actions were taken to more nearly align fiscal 1972 end strength with

1973, thereby permitting an orderly phase down from 1972 into the 1973 level strength and minimizing turbulence. This action reduced the pay raise supplemental request by some \$17 million.

Public Law 92-129 provided a much-needed raise in pay for junior servicemen. But consistent with our long-standing intent to reestablish a more deliberate promotion flow and to regain our more pyramidal grade structure of pre-Vietnam years, we plan to lengthen the time between promotions somewhat.

These actions will not denigrate the valuable effect of these raises, but it will space them out a bit. The cost savings attributable to this action was in excess of a million dollars for 1972 and will be about \$5 million for fiscal 1973.

Also, we are trying to make savings in other ways, especially those that are realized through better manpower utilization. We initiated a program called Task Analysis almost 2 years ago and it is well underway at the present time. In this program, we examine exactly what the marine is doing, why he does it, how he does it, and what skills he actually needs to carry out his job. We go to the field and talk to the marine on the job to get these answers. The net effect is definitely improving utilization of our personnel.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, in addition to the Task Analysis, we have deliberately downgraded colonels' billets within our Marine divisions and Marine air wings and certain of our Marine barracks. This has had a chain reaction effect by also downgrading some lieutenant colonels and majors. Now, we have done this for two reasons: (1) to give more challenge and responsibility to the junior officers as well as to better utilize our personnel.

CHART 3
OFFICER GRADE STRUCTURE

	Fiscal years				
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Generals: END STRENGTH					
Chargeable.....	75	75	75	73	71
Nonchargeable.....	3	4	2	1	1
Colonels.....	760	748	747	713	639
Lieutenant colonels.....	2,094	1,872	1,650	1,591	1,521
Majors.....	4,010	3,718	3,350	3,026	2,991
Captains.....	5,545	6,554	5,643	5,579	5,330
Lieutenants.....	11,878	10,698	8,606	7,170	6,950
Warrant officers.....	1,333	1,272	1,692	1,659	1,630
Total.....	25,698	24,941	21,765	19,812	19,133
	Fiscal years				Cumulative total
	1970	1971	1972	1973	
STRENGTH CHANGES					
Generals.....	+1	-2	-3	-2	-6
Colonels.....	-12	-1	-34	-74	-121
Lieutenant colonels.....	-222	-222	-59	-70	-573
Field grade and above.....	-525	-593	-420	-181	-1,719
Company grade.....	-232	-2,583	-1,533	-498	-4,846
Total.....	-757	-3,176	-1,953	-679	-6,565
Cumulative total.....	-757	-3,933	-5,886	-6,565	

General WHEELER. Turning to chart 3, sir, which is officer grade structure, the top half shows the officer grade from general down to warrant officer on the left, and across the center is the array of the end strengths for fiscal 1969 through 1973 in those grades.

The bottom half of the chart addresses the strength changes that occur, particularly in the grades of general, colonel, and lieutenant colonel. Then field grade and above, which are the majors through general, and the company grade, which are captains down through warrant officers, with the totals, and at the bottom, the cumulative total.

You notice that at the bottom in the cumulative total, the second figure, in fiscal 1971, we had accomplished a reduction at this point in time of 3,933, almost 4,000 officers, from the peak total of fiscal 1969, which is the left hand total at the top, of 25,698.

The decrease among the field grade officers and above during fiscal 1970 and 1971 was greater percentagewise than the overall officer decrease.

Officer strength is further reduced some 2,632, or 12 percent, during fiscal year 1972 and 1973, for a cumulative total reduction, as you can see, at the bottom right of the chart, of 6,565, which is in excess of 25 percent since the peak.

The percentage reduction among colonels for fiscal years 1972 and 1973 exceeds the overall officer force reduction and each grade reduction, with the exception of a reduction among lieutenants, and the reason for that is that lieutenants increased at a greater rate during the war.

We have also taken action to reduce the number of general officers, Mr. Chairman, as well as colonels and lieutenant colonels on active duty. For example, the planned number of general officers at the end of fiscal 1973 is 71, which is well below the ceiling of 75 established by the chairman.

In addition, we will have reduced the number of marines serving in the grades of lieutenant colonel and above from the end of fiscal year 1969 to the end of fiscal year 1973 by some 24 percent, or 700, which is the total of the right-hand column, cumulative total of generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels.

We have also lowered the proportion of the total officer force in the grades of colonel and lieutenant colonel to a point below that in the pre-Vietnam era of 1959 to 1965.

ENLISTED GRADE STRUCTURE

[In thousands]

	Fiscal years—				
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
END STRENGTH					
E4-E9 (top 6).....	116.2	103.5	88.1	82.1	82.1
E1-E3.....	167.9	131.3	102.5	96.1	96.7
Total.....	284.1	234.8	190.6	178.2	178.8

	Fiscal years—	
	1970-71	1972-73
STRENGTH CHANGES		
E4-E9 (top 6).....	-28.1	-6.0
E1-E3.....	-65.4	-5.8
Total.....	-93.5	-11.8
Cumulative total.....	-93.5	-105.3

General WHEELER. Turning now to chart 4, enlisted grade structure. This chart is organized to show what in the manpower trade is often called the top six, the grades E-4 through E-9, and then the lower three grades, E-1 to E-3, again for the fiscal years 1969 through 1973 with the totals. The bottom half shows the strength changes that occurred in those gradations.

The two interesting things here are, sir, that you will notice under strength changes for the period fiscal 1970-71, we reduced some 93,000, of which the greater part, 65,000, were in the lower grades, E-1 to E-3. But in fiscal 1972 and 1973, which is the lower right-hand column, you notice both the proportion and the portion of the reduction is in the top grades—6,000 to 5,800.

Of greater significance, even, I believe, Mr. Chairman, is the fact that up through fiscal 1972, the most populated enlisted grade was E-3, what we call a lance corporal. But in 1973, we plan that the most populated grade will be E-2, which means that we have driven down the base of our manpower pyramid to the grade of E-2.

CHART 5

Fiscal 1970-71 Force Structure Changes

Total strength.....	-97,000
Operating forces.....	-52,000
All other.....	-45,000
Training and support bases.....	(-27,000)
Individuals.....	(-18,000)

General WHEELER. Referring to chart No. 5, sir, I would like to turn from a discussion of the numbers and grades to the structural changes that occurred within the Marine Corps associated with these reductions. Chart No. 5 shows a period 1970-71 and the force structure changes which occurred as we reduced some 97,000. I would point out that, although the operating forces were reduced some 52,000, the training and support bases and individuals were decreased by 45,000, including training and supporting bases, some 27,000, and individuals by 18,000.

Fiscal year 1972-73 force structure changes

Total strength.....	-14,000
Operating forces.....	+ 4,000
All other.....	-18,000
Training and support bases.....	(-12,000)
Individuals.....	(- 6,000)

Units activated

Two Cobra Squadrons.
One Harrier Squadron.

FMF manning levels

Fiscal year 1971 (actual percent)-----	80
Fiscal year 1973 (planned percent)-----	90

Base authorizations

Fiscal year 1971 :	
Camp Pendleton-----	6.3
Camp Lejeune-----	3.5
Fiscal year 1973 :	
Camp Pendleton-----	2.3
Camp Lejeune-----	2.1

General WHEELER. The last chart concerns the force structure changes planned during fiscal years 1972 and 1973. You notice during this 2-year period we plan a reduction in total strength of some 14,000. At the same time, we plan an increase in our operating forces of 4,000, which is to be done in spite of a 10-percent cut leveled across all Fleet Marine Force headquarters above the battalion level. This will permit us to activate two Cobra squadrons and one Harrier squadron in addition to improving the manning of our FMF up to a level of about 90 percent as compared with our lower levels today of around 80.

The reductions in the training and support bases of 12,000 and individuals of 6,000 were done, Mr. Chairman, particularly the training and support bases, by severely constraining our base activities. For example, at the bottom of the chart, you notice the base authorizations of Camp Pendleton were up around 6,300 in 1971. We have constrained them to 2,300 in 1973. At the same time, Camp Lejeune goes from a high of 3,500 down to 2,100.

So, Mr. Chairman, in summary, what I have tried to point out is that the fiscal year 1970-72 drive down to post-Vietnam manpower levels from the wartime peak has been prosecuted vigorously, and, we think, with foresight; second, that the reduction in the size of the force has been accompanied by proportionate reductions in the grade structure, and that the grade structure that we planned for fiscal 1973 provides the balance between fiscal conservatism and the requirement to maintain a high-quality, ready, professional air/ground force in an all-volunteer environment; and last, that the Marine Corps definitely shares the deep concern of the chairman and the Congress and the Secretaries of Defense and Navy that we must continue to seek improvement in the allocation and utilization of our manpower. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REDUCTION IN FIELD GRADE OFFICERS

The CHAIRMAN. I am very much impressed with your statements and your charts. You show what can be done. I will want to go over this again after the staff has had a chance to examine it, and I may have further questions. I am very favorably impressed, General.

This cutting of manpower and reducing your field grade officers, this was all done without any requirement by the Congress, is that right? I know it was not any requirement unless you got caught a little in this small reduction last year?

General WHEELER. I would generally say that that was correct, Mr. Chairman. On the other hand, we have in the hearings last year and

the year before derived certainly the desires of the Congress in this area to get down and get down as rapidly and effectively as we could.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but there was not any mandate or any mandatory requirement under statute?

General WHEELER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And no mandatory cutting of your money last year by the Appropriations Committee?

General WHEELER. No, sir; in general that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. I commend you, but I want to know your rock-bottom feeling about why you did it. Do you feel that you have a stronger force now for the purposes intended than you had prior to these reductions?

General WHEELER. Numerically, Mr. Chairman, of course, obviously, we have a smaller force.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General WHEELER. But I do believe that in the field of quality, which perhaps in many respects is more important in our force, I think that we have gained, or perhaps to put it more accurately, we have put ourselves in a position to gain, especially during fiscal 1973, a better trained, better prepared force.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a new commandant. I am not asking you to deal in personalities, but generally, he is planning to continue this same course, is that correct?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir; that is correct. He has so stated several times.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he told us here in hearings before he was confirmed.

General WHEELER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the budget that has come in for the Marine Corps bears that out, of course, in the form of money, does it not?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir; I believe it does.

PRE-VIETNAM STRENGTH

The CHAIRMAN. I want the staff to go over this now with me and other members of the committee. We may have a few more questions for you. I am not planning any particular comparison, but this certainly does call for more discussion about what you have done.

So, you did have a rather rapid rise in manpower going into the war in Vietnam. Would you touch on that just a little? I am sure it is reflected here in your chart somewhere.

General WHEELER. No, sir; I commenced my base figures from fiscal year 1969. Before we went into Vietnam, our strength was running about 189,000 to 190,000 for several years, in the period 1963-64. So, we rose from a base of about 190,000 up to the peak, which was reached in March of 1969, some 317,000.

The CHAIRMAN. You took some selectees in that course, did you not?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir; we did. We took a little over 44,000 draftees during that period of time. And the last of them will have left the Marine Corps this month unless they have shipped over in the Regular Marine Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you still having to operate under this requirement about taking a certain percentage of these men that do not grade very high?

General WHEELER. In the mental group IV, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General WHEELER. No, sir; that restriction has been lifted.

The CHAIRMAN. Entirely lifted?

General WHEELER. As a restriction, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, do you have any questions?

Senator THURMOND. Yes, the Army has the category IVs, do they not?

General WHEELER. We do, too, sir. As a matter of fact, today in the Marine Corps, we have on duty, about 13 percent of our enlisted population who are categorized in the mental group 4 category, yes, sir.

MORE MARINES NOW THAN IN WORLD WAR II

Senator THURMOND. General Wheeler, is it true that the Marines had more people aboard during the Vietnam war than they did during World War II?

General WHEELER. Yes, sir; that is correct. During World War II, our records show that about 670,000 Marines wore the globe and anchor, and during the period of the Vietnam war, something approaching 730,000 have.

MARINE ENLISTMENT GOALS

Senator THURMOND. I had to step out of the room. You may have answered this. Since the Marines are having difficulty reaching their volunteer goals, I was just wondering what is planned to met this problem?

General WHEELER. Senator Thurmond, we are, of course, quite concerned about meeting our enlistment goals, not so much numberwise, Senator. I think that numberwise, we could probably meet our goals. But, of course, we are primarily concerned in meeting it qualitywise. We have given a tremendous amount of thought over the past few months as to how we can best do this. For example, we are considering at the present time reducing what we call our ground enlistment program from a 4-year enlistment contract to a 3-year enlistment contract to try to attract more young men of the type that we would like to have. That and other measures are being considered, Senator.

END STRENGTHS COMPARED WITH PAST YEAR

Senator THURMOND. General Wheeler, how does the Marine end strength at the end of fiscal year 1973 compare with the end strength in 1964, 1960, and 1955?

General WHEELER. I do not have the exact figures. May I supply them for the record?

Senator THURMOND. That will be all right.

(The information follows:)

The Marine Corps end strengths for fiscal years 1955, 1960, and 1964 are compared with our requested end strengths for fiscal year 1973 in the following table:
(The table follows:)

[In thousands]

	Strength	Fiscal year 1973 strength	Difference
END STRENGTH			
Fiscal year:			
1955.....	205.2	198.0	-7.2
1960.....	170.6	198.0	+27.4
1964.....	189.8	198.0	+8.2

EFFECT OF NEW HELICOPTER SQUADRONS

Senator THURMOND. General Wheeler, how has the addition of helicopter gunship squadrons to Marine forces affected the overall personnel strength?

General WHEELER. I did not quite follow you. The addition of the Marine helicopter squadrons?

Senator THURMOND. Yes, that is right, of helicopter gunship squadrons to the Marine forces. How has that affected the overall personnel strength?

General WHEELER. Sir, as I indicated, we plan to take that out of our hides, so to speak. As I pointed out in my statement, during the fiscal years 1972-73, although we are reducing in strength, we hope to make up enough in the savings from the base reductions to man those helicopter squadrons within the 198,000 end strength that we are requesting.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, General.

Mr. Chairman, that is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

We are going to proceed until 12:30.

Major General Berg, Director, Manpower and Organization, U.S. Air Force.

General, you have been waiting patiently, and we will get started. You have your charts, I am sure.

If it is agreeable to the committee now, the chair proposes to go until 12:30 and then take a recess until 2:30.

Senator, I think we are going to have that vote that was shifted over to 1 o'clock.

Senator THURMOND. I have another committee. I will try to get here.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed in your own way. As I say, we will take a recess from 12:30 until 2:30. You will be on as a witness when we return.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. BERG, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, DCS/P. & R., DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

General BERG. I am Gen. William W. Berg. I am the Director of Manpower and Organization in the Air Force. I have been in my job since August of 1968.

I would like to make a couple of general remarks, before I explain the detailed charts, in order to acquaint you with some of the general manpower problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

General BERG. As a Director of Manpower for the Air Force, it is my responsibility to try to determine how many people we need in the Air Force, and incidentally, when I say people, I am talking not only about military people but about civilians. To give you an appreciation of precisely what I do, let me describe the total process. The Air Force goes through a planning cycle each year in connection with each fiscal budget and we come up with what is called the Air Force program. It is actually published in the form of a book. What is listed in the program is precisely how many squadrons we are going to have, what kind, where they are going to be located and what total number of hours they are going to fly each month. That information is in there not only for manpower planning purposes, but also for the purpose of buying POL and ammunition, and for spare parts.

Then the program goes on from the forces to indicate what we need in the way of a training base to train the people that will be coming in. It indicates what we need in the way of logistics and so forth.

Within my office, I have a staff and we have what we call management engineering teams that are stationed at every one of our air bases, our major air bases. We have 123 of these in the Air Force and the total number of people who are actually working on those teams aggregates to about 1,300 people. We try to use what we call industrial engineering techniques to determine precisely how many people it takes to do all these functions. This is possible because a lot of the functions that we have in the Air Force are similar to industrial functions, such as the care and maintenance of aircraft, the care and maintenance of electronics equipment, and so forth.

So, when a program document is published, then my people can sit down and say how many people it takes in order to make that B-52 wing run, for instance, based on how many hours they are going to fly.

When we get all done, what we say is here is how many people it takes and that is the judgment that is the basis for the request for the average strength that the Air Force has submitted. It is a function of the program that has been decided and then the application of what my people think we need in the way of people.

I do not get into the determinations of whether or not we should have that many squadrons. I simply saying this is how many people it takes.

The CHAIRMAN. After the function is determined?

General BERG. Correct, yes, sir.

That does not mean that that is the only thing I do. Whenever we get into a crunch and somebody says, OK, we have to get by with fewer people, then they come around and say, do you have any ideas about what things we ought to cut out? Then, I am in the position of being able to say, well, I think this or that is a low-priority function. But in the normal day to day function that I perform, what I do is price out how many people it takes to do the job.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made a very helpful statement.

TRAINING PROGRAM

General BERG. Another point that I would like to make, Mr. Chairman, is about training, which was brought up earlier. You had a real

concern about it, and since it is a very difficult problem to understand, I would like to add to what has already been said by General DePuy and by Admiral Finneran. That concerns the number of people you need in training.

In fiscal year 1973, the Air Force has programed 20,550 officers, 83,018 airmen, and 4,417 cadets in training program elements—that is all of our elements; flight training, technical training, basic training, combat crew training, and so forth. These authorizations comprise 15 percent of the total military spaces and they are required to replenish the 15-percent average yearly loss of trained Air Force personnel and to provide additional training consistent with technological advances. It should be noted that over 50 percent of the training manpower authorizations are in basic military and technical training and that these requirements are heavily influenced by the personnel procurement levels existing, in the case of the Air Force, 4 years prior to 1973. This is because we have a 4-year enlistment.

For example, the Air Force in fiscal year 1973 will lose approximately 60 percent of the 117,874 enlisted men procured in fiscal year 1969 after considering the 10-percent attrition prior to fiscal year 1973, we will ultimately retain 30 percent of the fiscal year 1969 procurement.

PERCENT OF RETENTION

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me a minute. Could you tell us what percentage you would like to retain?

General BERG. I would like to furnish that for the record.

(The information follows:)

The basic role of the Military Services is combat. To effectively carry out this role, the proper mix of youth and experience is required. For the size Air Force we currently have we have determined that 20,100 enlisted men must attain career status and move into what we refer to as the "career force" annually. (The career force is defined as that part of the Air Force enlisted inventory serving in their 5th through 30th year of service.) With these 20,100 career men moving into the 5th year group annually, we will achieve the proper mix of youth and experience.

Historically, about 25 out of every 100 recruits leave the force before they reach reenlistment eligibility—normally the completion of four years service. We must retain about $\frac{1}{4}$ of the remainder to meet our 20,100 requirements, therefore, our reenlistment objective has been set at 34%.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you correctly, you do not want to keep all that may be qualified.

General BERG. There are some cases where we may not want to, Mr. Chairman. They might have skills in which there has been a change and we do not require those skills anymore, and it may be cheaper for us actually to bring in new people and train them than to try to retrain these people, particularly if they do not have the education and the qualifications to take on our high level training.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army said that they wanted a certain number coming in every year so that they would have room for promotions.

General BERG. I think in our case, Mr. Chairman, since we do not have as many people who are involved directly in combat, we are not concerned with the same age requirement that the Army may be concerned with.

The CHAIRMAN. They want the younger ones?

General BERG. I would assume, yes, sir. I am a little bit out of my field in saying what they would want.

The CHAIRMAN. You know the reasoning behind the problem. They want the younger ones, as I have understood from them.

TRAINING ESTABLISHMENT

General BERG. In fiscal year 1974, we anticipate a relatively smaller basic military technical training requirement because the personnel procurement for fiscal year 1970, which would have been 4 years earlier, was only 73,768, and our losses due to the termination of enlistment 4 years later will be smaller. And that is the thing that is kind of hard to understand, because it occurred 4 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General BERG. I would like to make a couple of other comments about the training establishment, because it is large and it is important, I think, to understand.

The Air Force has made significant strides in reducing the cost of training. In fiscal year 1971, we organized a consolidated survival training school and saved 63 spaces. Our pilot and navigator programs have undergone extensive revision; 1,298 manpower authorizations were saved when the undergraduate pilot training flying hours—this is the length of time they go to school—was reduced from 240 to 208.5. Forty-five flying hours were also eliminated from the undergraduate navigator program, with a resulting saving of 178 manpower authorizations. The Air Training Command has also been tasked to reduce 2,291 manpower authorizations associated with a reduction of 735 in our undergraduate pilot training production. This is for 1973. And we have taken a number of other actions in our technical training, in which we have revised the courses and reduced the training length. I would like to provide additional information on this subject for the record.

(The information follows:)

With respect to technical training, a systematic restructuring of training courses, through applications of Instructional System Development (ISD), is now achieving course length reductions which will generate considerable manpower savings. As of 1 July 1971, 55 courses were reviewed under the ISD program. The average course length reduction was 8% which equates to approximately 1.2 weeks per course. Ninety-five courses have been scheduled for ISD review in FY 73 and the Air Force budget request has been reduced by 1,000 authorizations in anticipation of the results.

In the future, we expect further savings with the introduction of the Boeing Model 737 aircraft to Navigator Training. At minimum, we anticipate a manpower reduction of 500 authorizations associated with this program due to the drastically reduced aircraft maintenance requirement, and the increased instructional capacity of the Boeing 737.

Expansion of the ISD program and more extensive use of simulators in lieu of flying hours (UPT, UNT programs) should continue to produce savings in aggregate resources dedicated to the training mission.

General BERG. But the main point I wanted to make, sir, is that the fact that there is not a direct relationship between how many people you have in recruit training and the total strength, it is rather a function of both the total strength and how many people you took in 4 years before.

The CHAIRMAN
out so well.

The time has come when we have to go.

Senator, do you want a quick question? You said you might not be able to get back.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I was just wondering, if these officers are going to go out to lunch or if they are going to be around here and if it would not inconvenience them—and it would be entirely up to you and General DePuy—I have a few questions I can ask before we adjourn if it meets the approval of the chairman. If they are staying around here for 2 hours, they might as well work.

The CHAIRMAN. You think perhaps you can finish up?

Senator THURMOND. I think I can finish up with both of them. I can finish up in about 30 minutes with both of them and they will still have an hour and a half for lunch.

Does that meet your approval, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it does. Would you yield to me for just a minute?

Senator THURMOND. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have two questions for General DePuy. I will ask you to ask them if you do not mind, Senator, when you have finished yours.

If it gets too involved, he can supply the information for the record.

I want to say this for the staff. I think it would be helpful to make a special study about this turnover and determine what each service has and what they would like to have, and try to get at the feel of it in that way. I think that will be interesting to the general membership in the Senate, too. In normal times, we used to compare it, going back several years because of the war. I had thought we were going to step up those retentions a great deal under the effort to have the volunteer services. Now I find out that you want a higher turnover so there will be the chance to promote men.

I know you have to have some promotion room, of course. Perhaps with the pay increases, there could be a longer period between promotions. Very fine witnesses have testified that unquestionably the military pay is now comparable to what is generally paid outside the services.

Thank you very much, Senator. I am glad you can stay. I will turn it over to you.

Senator THURMOND (presiding). General Berg, you understand we will just go ahead with you, then?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

COMBAT-TO-SUPPORT RATIO

Senator THURMOND. What is the Air Force combat-to-support ratio, if you count combat as only those men flying this aircraft or, say, pulling the trigger, as some count in the Army?

General BERG. Senator Thurmond, if you just count the actual combat crews in our strategic offensive and defensive force and in the general purpose forces—and this excludes, obviously, the people flying the airlift forces—the ratio is 2.5 percent of the total. The total number on combat crews is 2.5 percent of the total number of military manpower.

Senator THURMOND. Did you say the airlift?

General BERG. That excludes airlift.

Senator THURMOND. And military air command?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. What is it in that?

General BERG. I do not know what the percentage would be if you added those in, but you know, although they fly missions, they do not actually drop any ordnance or do not pull any triggers by the definition which you gave.

Senator THURMOND. Could you get us a figure for that, too, the military airlift?

Senator BERG. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Then give us an overall figure for the whole thing?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

Percent of Air Force in combat and airlift aircrews

Strategic and general purposes-----	2.5
Airlift (tactical and strategic)-----	1.4
Other aircrews (intelligence, rescue, forward air control, etc.)-----	1.2
Total -----	5.1

COMBAT AND SUPPORT DIFFERENCES

Senator THURMOND. General Berg, what would you consider a fair definition of the difference between combat and support as it applies to the Air Force?

General BERG. Senator Thurmond, you have asked me a question that I have spent a lot of time working on. When you ask what the ratio of combat to support is, it really depends on what you are trying to establish or what you are trying to prove, because you can go from the ratio which I just gave, where you simply count the crews, to one where, in our judgment, you can count not only the crews but the maintenance people who work to the first line aircraft, the weapons loaders who load the ammunition on those particular airplanes, and what we call the weapon system security people. These are the security police who actually guard the airplanes that have the ordnance on them. And when you include those kinds of people, that runs the total up someplace to, roughly around, I would say, 25 to 30 percent of the total.

Then if you make the same comparison——

Senator THURMOND. What is 25 percent?

General BERG. 25 percent is combat.

Senator THURMOND. I understand your pilots would constitute 2.5 percent?

General BERG. Pilots and other combat crew members, that is correct.

Senator THURMOND. And support the balance. What do you mean by 25 percent?

General BERG. What I am saying, sir, in answer to your first question, is if you said take the total force and what is combat and support, you would say 2.5 percent of the force—in other words, the crews—are combat, and the other 97.5 percent are support.

You asked me if we had any other combination.

Senator THURMOND. Is that in the average command or does that include Pentagon and everything?

General BERG. That is the total.

Senator THURMOND. All the Air Force?

General BERG. Yes.

Senator THURMOND. So pilots are about 2.5 percent of the entire Air Force—except MAC?

General BERG. The pilots and other crew members who are assigned the duty in the aircraft or with the missiles which have some sort of an offensive or defensive capability.

Senator THURMOND. Except MAC?

General BERG. That is essentially correct.

Senator THURMOND. Yesterday, there was considerable discussion about the 121,000 people in the command category. Material provided the committee shows 56,000 belong to the Air Force. Are these all headquarters people or is there something else in this category?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The "command" category to which you refer is a combination of program elements used by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It includes both the elements of Defense Program IX, Administration, and the command elements of all of the force programs. As such, for the Air Force it includes both headquarters activities and activities which, because they have either commandwide or Air Force-wide responsibilities, are not charged to individual force program elements. Of the approximately 56,000 military personnel programmed for this category, about 23,000 are in headquarters or direct headquarters support activities from Departmental through Division level. Another 11,000 are outside the Air Force in Defense and Joint activities. The remaining 22,000 are required for such varied activities as combat evaluation groups, bands, non-commissioned officer academies, audit and inspection activities, the Air Force Accounting and Finance Center, the Civil Air Patrol and the operation of Bolling, Andrews, Howard and Allbrook Air Bases.

Senator THURMOND. The committee has been furnished information on manpower in Europe which shows roughly two Air Force people in "support" and "other mission" for every one in "force mission." The other services show roughly the opposite relationship. Why should the Air Force require so much more support for its combat mission?

General BERG. I will supply that for the record.

(The information follows:)

The definitions of "support," "other mission" and "force mission" as used in the information you were furnished are not comparable across the Services. The so-called "general support" category includes, for the Air Force, those direct combat support personnel responsible for the daily operation of bases launching and recovering combat aircraft. As such, they are analogous to support personnel on board naval vessels and organic to Army/Marine combat divisions. These types of direct combat support personnel for the other Services are, however, defined by the Office of the Secretary of Defense as "force mission" personnel. As my presentation will illustrate, the addition of Air Force direct combat support personnel to those identified as "force mission" results in essentially the same mission/support relationship as the other Services.

NATO REQUIREMENTS

Senator THURMOND. What is the Air Force NATO requirement for tactical wings and aircraft?

General BERG. We have stationed over there as the present time, Senator Thurmond [deleted] TAC fighter squadrons and

[deleted] tactical airlift squadrons and [deleted] tactical reconnaissance squadrons.

Senator THURMOND. Are we meeting our full requirement on that? If not, what is the full requirement?

General BERG. Let me say that I think we are meeting it as nearly as I can understand it.

Senator THURMOND. Would you like to supply that for the record, then?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, I would like to know what is our share or portion of responsibility and then how many we are furnishing to meet that responsibility?

General BERG. I should just amend what I said, sir, to say that the number that I described, the [deleted] are actually in Europe. Then we have in the States other squadrons including reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and airlift squadrons, that are devoted to NATO, you know, but are stationed here in the States and are scheduled to go back on a moment's notice.

General BERG. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

NATO REQUIREMENT FOR TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

The United States Air Force is meeting its full NATO commitment, which is in the form of tactical fighter and fighter interceptor squadrons (TFS/FIS), tactical reconnaissance squadrons (TRS), tactical electronic warfare squadrons (TEWS), and tactical airlift squadrons (TALS), as reflected in the chart below.

FORMAL NATO COMMITMENT FOR TACTICAL SQUADRONS IN PLACE AND DESIGNATED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE

Squadrons	TFS/FIS	TRS	TEWS	TALS	Total
In place.....	} [Deleted].				
Dual based.....					
[Deleted].....					
Total.....					

The [deleted] in place fighter squadrons include [deleted] tactical fighter squadrons in Europe and [deleted] fighter interceptor [deleted]. The tactical electronic warfare squadrons consist of [deleted] in place [deleted] squadron and [deleted] dual based [deleted]. Dual based and [deleted] squadrons are based in the United States. [Deleted] squadrons in addition to the [deleted] shown are based outside Europe and are designated for [deleted].

Senator THURMOND. I would like to know, of the ones we are furnishing to NATO, what percent does that represent of the total tactical force, if you can furnish that?

General BERG. I would like to furnish that for the record. I am not certain what that is, sir.

(The information is classified and retained in committee files.)

SAVINGS IF TACTICAL WING ELIMINATED

Senator THURMOND. We talked yesterday about reducing an Army division. What would be the cost savings in manpower and equipment if an Air Force tactical wing was eliminated?

General BERG. I would like to elaborate on that a minute, if I may, Senator Thurmond.

Take, for example, an F-4 wing. If you talked about a wing that had 72 aircraft in it, the number of people who are actually in that wing would approximate about 2,500. What you would have to consider, of course, is where you took them from. For example, if that wing happened to be stationed, let's say, at Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, S.C., and all you did was take that wing out and left the base there, all you would be reducing is the 2,500 people plus whatever people were on that base supporting the wing. But if on the other hand, you brought another mission and put it in there and did not in fact reduce the base—if you just take out the one wing itself, it is 2,500. If in fact you were able to reduce a base along with it, then it would be—

Senator THURMOND. I am just thinking of reducing the wing.

General BERG. Just 2,500 people.

Senator THURMOND. Then could you give an estimated savings in cost if that was done? What would be the cost of an average man per year?

General BERG. Again I am a little out of my field, but I think the way we cost people is an average of about \$10,000 per average man per year.

Senator THURMOND. It would be about \$21½ million?

General BERG. I would like to confirm that for the record.

(The information follows:)

AIR FORCE : COST OF AIR FORCE TACTICAL WING

The cost of 2,500 military personnel approximates \$25 million, (\$10,000 per manyear). In addition, there are supporting costs to be considered; for example, aircraft space parts, base material support, aircraft fuels, depot maintenance, and training munitions. In total, the annual costs associated with an Active F-4 Wing would be about \$52 million.

Senator THURMOND. How would a wing reduction impact on NATO readiness or the overall mission capabilities of the Air Force?

General BERG. May I respond to that for the record sir? That is a little out of my normal field of competence.

Senator THURMOND. Yes, you can supply that answer.

(The information follows:)

IMPACT ON NATO READINESS AND OVERALL AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES OF REDUCTION OF ONE AIR FORCE TACTICAL AIR WING

It has long been apparent to the Air Force that any reduction below the currently programmed FY 73 active fighter/attack force level would require adjustment in the USAF commitment [deleted]. This is due to the requirement to maintain forces forward deployed in the Pacific, and to support worldwide contingency plans. Additionally, throughout this period the majority of the remaining CONUS force is either engaged in training replacement crews for overseas assignments or in conversion to new aircraft. Specifically, a reduction of one wing (72 aircraft) would have to come from [deleted] to provide an equitable balance between CONUS and overseas [deleted] resources in order to adequately support training and personnel requirements.

Air Force studies indicate that a reduction of 72 F-4 aircraft [deleted].

NEW WINGS : ADDITIONAL MANPOWER

Senator THURMOND. General Berg, as you know, the Air Force plans to buy seven tactical wings of the A-X aircraft to add to its present

21 tactical wing force. Two of these wings will go to the Reserve; the other five will be added to the regular force for a total of 26 tactical wings. How many additional people will be required as an add-on to the present Air Force strength to meet this requirement?

General BERG. May I furnish that, sir? I am not familiar with how many people it takes for seven A-X wings.

Senator THURMOND. I believe General Momeyer told me at the close air support hearings last fall that an additional 6,210 men would be needed at an annual cost of \$211 million. This is minus the cost of the aircraft.

General BERG. Yes, sir. I would be glad to verify that, sir.

(The information follows:)

COST OF AIR FORCE TACTICAL WING

The information provided by General Momeyer is correct. The addition of five wings of A-X aircraft will require 6,210 military personnel at an annual cost of \$118 million. In addition, there are other supporting costs; for example, base operating support, including medical support, training, depot maintenance and command administration. In total, the estimated annual costs associated with the addition of five wings of A-X aircraft would be about \$211 million.

Senator THURMOND. General Berg, Air Force strength will be 730,000 at the end of this fiscal year, I believe.

General BERG. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. This represents a 25,000-man cut during the year. How does this size force compare with the size of the Air Force in 1964, 1960, and 1955 from a personnel strength standpoint? If you want to supply that, you may.

General BERG. No, sir, that was a part of my presentation later on. Actually, in 1964, the Air Force had 854,890 people as compared to 730,342. In 1969—

Senator THURMOND. 1960.

General BERG. 1960 I do not have, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Could you supply that, and also 1955?

General BERG. Yes, sir, be happy to, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Could you give the same personnel figure for the civilian force hired by the Air Force on these dates?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

USAF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN END STRENGTH, FISCAL YEARS 1973, 1964, 1960, 1955

	Military	Civilian
Fiscal year:		
1973	717,210	299,466
1964	856,890	1,322,416
1960	814,752	1,354,928
1955	959,946	1,397,252

¹ Excludes ANG technicians: fiscal year 1964, 15,350; fiscal year 1960, 13,158; fiscal year 1955, 9,265.

EFFECT OF IMPOSED REDUCTION

Senator THURMOND. How does the 3,000 average man-year reduction imposed by this committee impact on the Air Force during fiscal year 1972?

General BERG. I do not think it caused us any major problem, Senator Thurmond. We had asked for an end strength of 752,782 and the committee in the authorization bill determined that we should take a 3,000-reduction and then subsequently, in our appropriation bill, we had the intelligence, headquarters and public affairs functions reduced an additional amount, I think about 5,000. And we have been able to program those reductions without reducing any of our forces.

Senator THURMOND. Was the strength reduced of the Air Force?

General BERG. Yes, sir, the strength is being reduced, but we will accomplish it simply by letting people go and not replacing them.

Senator THURMOND. How does that effect the national security, if at all from the Air Force standpoint?

General BERG. I do not think it has significant impact on it, sir. I would qualify that by saying that I do not know about the intelligence reduction, because again, that is a little bit beyond my competence.

Senator THURMOND. If you took that reduction with no detrimental effects on the national security, could you take further reductions, and if so, how much, without effecting the national security?

General BERG. Senator, if I could go back to the point that I made to the chairman when I started my presentation, my job is to say that for this program which you have drawn up, here is how many people it takes. I did not participate in drawing up the program and the program is the thing that responds to the threat.

Senator THURMOND. Are you familiar with that or would you rather not comment?

General BERG. Yes, sir, in a general sense, I am. But it would depend on what kind of a reduction we got, and how we were able to take that reduction as to whether or not it would have a significant impact on national security.

Senator THURMOND. That is what I was asking you about the 3,000 man-year reduction for the fiscal year 1972, whether you could take it and whether it affected the national security, and if it did not, and you indicated it possibly did not too much—

General BERG. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND (continuing). Then can you take further reductions and if so, how much?

General BERG. If we were to take a reduction of another 3,000 and if we could take it, say, from headquarters-type function and support-type functions, then I think the answer would be that it would not affect national security very much. If on the other hand, we were required to "x" out one of our TAC fighter wings, it would affect it.

Senator THURMOND. Who could say if you could take 3,000 from the support function without affecting the national security?

General BERG. I would think our Chief of Staff and the Secretary.

Senator THURMOND. I wonder if you could get an answer to that for me, can the Air Force stand further reductions without affecting the national security in the tactical or the support, combat or support facets?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

"Support" manpower is an essential component of the total fighting force. Adjustments to "support" manpower impact on combat capability, although the

degree of impact will vary with the type of manpower adjustment. To illustrate, a cut back of Research and Development personnel might have no immediate visible impact yet it could be the direct cause of a serious deficiency in U.S. readiness vis-a-vis potential enemies five to ten years in the future. At the other extreme, a reduction of direct combat support personnel, such as those who sweep runways or refuel aircraft would immediately degrade our ability to launch combat sorties. Accordingly, the impact of a further support strength reduction on national security can only be assessed after identification of the specific area or functions in which the reduction is to be taken.

A manpower reduction in tactical or combat forces would have a direct and measurable effect on combat capability and would definitely impact on national security. Again however, the exact impact would depend on the size of the reduction the type of forces involved.

In summation then, any further reductions would be expected to affect national security to some extent, although limited reductions, if effectively managed and taken in non-force areas could in all probability have an indirect and minimal impact.

EUROPEAN PERSONNEL LEVEL

Senator THURMOND. What is the total number of people in the U.S. Air Force Europe, including officers, airmen, and civilians?

General BERG. There are two figures, Senator Thurmond. The authorized strength, what we authorized, in fiscal 1972 is about 77,000, and they actually have about 97 percent of that number assigned to Europe.

Senator THURMOND. So you did not use the full authorized strength?

General BERG. No, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Why?

General BERG. In some cases, we have —

Senator THURMOND. You felt a greater need somewhere else?

General BERG. We have used them in Southeast Asia.

Senator THURMOND. Or just because you did not use them at all?

General BERG. We have used them in Southeast Asia.

Senator THURMOND. How many Air Force personnel are assigned to the Air Force command headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany?

General BERG. Approximately 1,800.

Senator THURMOND. According to the figures I had, they were authorized 10 generals and 75 colonels and a total of 1,559 personnel. They had assigned seven generals, 80 colonels, and a total of 1,419 personnel. Does that sound about right to you?

General BERG. Yes, sir; I was including the support squadron.

Senator THURMOND. Is that a good many generals and colonels to have assigned to that number of personnel? That 1,400 to have seven generals and 80 colonels?

General BERG. I think the proper relationship, Senator Thurmond, would be the number of generals related to the total number of people that are under the command of the headquarters in Europe, rather than just the number of people in the headquarters itself.

Senator THURMOND. I am trying to do all I can to protect the Defense Department, but unless you give us some answers to justify a lot of generals and admirals, it is hard for us to do it.

General BERG. The point I am making is the seven related to 1,400 people. I am saying that that is one relationship. Another relationship is seven related to 77,000 people that are over there that they are responsible for. Because in addition to those seven which you cited as being in the headquarters of the European Command, there are only

three other generals in the whole theater that belong to the Air Force within that command structure. So that makes a total of 10 for 77,000.

Senator THURMOND. 77,000 Air Force?

General BERG. That is correct, sir.

FUTURE HEADQUARTERS REDUCTION

Senator THURMOND. What reasonable reductions can be made in this headquarters in the future, if any, do you think?

General BERG. Senator Thurmond, I think we have made tremendous progress in Europe. If I could just tell you about it for a second, I would like to.

We had and we have today under the command of the Air Force in Europe what we call headquarters USAF, which you have just been talking about. In addition to that, we have three numbered air forces—the 3d Air Force in England, the 16th Air Force in Spain, and the 17th Air Force in Germany. We are making a determined effort in the Air Force to reduce headquarters. General Jones, who is the commander in Europe, has made a great contribution in my judgment of the reductions that we have made. He has reduced those three numbered air forces from the number that they originally had of 616 people total down to a point where they now have about 166 people total assigned to them. In other words, each of those headquarters has now been reduced down, one of them to 66, one of them to 60, and the other to 40. And all of the people that remain are people whose function is operation and maintenance of the aircraft. There are no support-type people included in any of those headquarters. When you take that total number of people and add it to the total number of people that he has in his headquarters, the ratio of headquarters to total people is best in Europe.

Senator THURMOND. Does that indicate they had too many before, or does it indicate that he has no need for them now?

General BERG. It indicates our recognition that as we go down, we have to try to squeeze people out of places that do not directly affect the combat capability of the Air Force.

Senator THURMOND. How many generals and colonels are there in the Air Force command throughout Europe?

General BERG. I do not know that, sir. May I supply that for the record?

When you say the Air Force commands, I am assuming you are talking about the people in the international headquarters?

Senator THURMOND. Yes; I am speaking about throughout the whole of Europe.

General BERG. I do not have that figure.

Senator THURMOND. If you can furnish that. I have heard they are authorized 30 generals and 283 colonels and have assigned 14 generals and 315 colonels.

General BERG. May I verify that, sir?

Senator THURMOND. I wish you would.

(The information follows:)

NUMBER OF AIR FORCE GENERAL OFFICERS AND COLONELS IN EUROPE

The data cited is as of November 30, 1971, and pertains to USAFE and its subordinate elements and not to Europe overall. The following additional information is provided for clarification:

The number of colonels assigned to USAFE (315) as previously reported included 17 colonels who were filling general officer billets and 22 colonel selectees who had not yet assumed the rank. With these variations in mind, there were actually 276 colonels assigned against 283 colonel authorizations.

General officers and colonels authorized and assigned (1) to joint activities (e.g., SHAPE, NATO, US European Command) and (2) to other Air Force major commands represented in Europe (e.g., Air Force Communications Service and USAF Security Service) must be added to the USAFE figures to arrive at total general officer and colonel strength in Western Europe and related areas. The following figures, also as of November 30, 1971, reflect the overall picture.

	General officers		Colonels	
	Authorized	Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
USAFE-----	30	14	283	293
Other ¹ -----	27	23	225	221
Total-----	57	37	508	² 514

¹ Joint activities and other Air Force commands.

² Includes 20 colonels filling general officer billets.

Senator THURMOND. What is the requirement for 30 generals in Europe?

General BERG. I would like to, if I may, supply that by breaking it out.

Senator THURMOND. I would like an answer to that to be supplied too.

General BERG. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

GENERAL OFFICER REQUIREMENTS IN U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (USAFE)

USAFE is the air arm of the United States in Europe and is responsible for providing air support for NATO commanders in accordance with policies of the JCS and USCINCEUR. The command conducts, controls, and coordinates offensive and defensive air operations, provides administrative and logistical support for assigned Air Force personnel and U.S. Air Force installations in Europe and the Middle East, and provides support to other services, agencies, and allied nations as required by mutual agreements. The readiness and capabilities of USAFE forces impact on U.S. national security and influence in Europe. The Nation is dependent on USAFE forces to a large degree to demonstrate determination to defend freedom in Europe and the Near East. The resources under the control of USAFE represent a sizeable investment as well as a significant portion of the nation's tactical air capability. In light of the responsibilities involved in the organizational mission, the resources managed, and the effect of command performance on the credibility of national aims and capabilities, USAFE is considered one of our most important military activities and is managed accordingly.

The annual Air Force General Officer Manning and Position Review Board, which is chaired by the Vice Chief of Staff, validates all Air Force general officer requirements. The validation process involves a position-by-position review using detailed justification submitted by each commander. Each requirement is judged in the context of total Air Force requirements and weighed against general officer resources available. Using these concepts, the board validated thirty positions in USAFE which it considered of sufficient importance and responsibility to warrant a general officer. Due to the limited number of general officers authorized under current ceilings, however, only 15 positions were identified for general officer manning. There were 14 generals assigned to USAFE as of November 30, 1971. The general officer positions validated for USAFE are:

Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe, Lindsey Air Station, Germany. Additional duty: Commander, Fourth Allied Tactical Air Forces, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe.

Vice Commander-in-Chief, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Chief of Staff, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Deputy Chief of Staff, Materiel, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Inspector General, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Deputy Chief of Staff, Civil Engineering, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Staff Judge Advocate, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Surgeon, Lindsey Air Station, Germany.
 Commander, Third Air Force, South Ruislip Air Station, England.
 Vice Commander, Third Air Force, South Ruislip Air Station, England.
 Commander, Tenth Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Alconbury, England.
 Commander, Twentieth Tactical Fighter Wing, Upper Heyford, England.
 Commander, Forty-eighth Tactical Fighter Wing, Lakenheath, England.
 Commander, Eighty-first Tactical Fighter Wing, Bentwaters, England.
 Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, Torrejon Air Base, Spain.
 Vice Commander, Sixteenth Air Force, Torrejon Air Base, Spain.
 Commander, 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, Torrejon Air Base, Spain.
 Commander, Turkish/United States Logistics Group (TUSLOG), Ankara, Turkey.
 Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
 Vice Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
 Commander, Thirty-sixth Tactical Fighter Wing, Bitburg Air Base, Germany.
 Commander, 50th Tactical Fighter Wing, Hahn Air Base, Germany.
 Commander, Twenty-sixth Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Ramstein Air Base, Germany.
 Commander, 601st Tactical Control Wing, Sembach Air Base, Germany.

Senator THURMOND. I would like to know if you feel that each of these is a justified requirement?
 General BERG. Yes, sir.

SQUADRONS IN EUROPE

Senator THURMOND. How many Air Force wings are positioned in Europe?

General BERG. Senator Thurmond, as I indicated earlier, we do not refer to them as wings over there. We actually call them squadrons. There are [deleted] fighter-bomber squadrons, [deleted] reconnaissance squadrons, and [deleted] tactical airlift squadrons.

Senator THURMOND. How many general officers are required for each squadron?

General BERG. There are none assigned to any of the squadrons. The only ones that are assigned are the ones that are in the headquarters in Wiesbaden that you originally referred to.

Senator THURMOND. There are no generals with the squadrons at all; they are in the headquarters, the ones who are over there?

General BERG. That is right—in headquarters activities.

Senator THURMOND. I believe the Air Force has 32 more colonels assigned than authorized. Do you know why this was?

General BERG. I have a detailed explanation for it, sir. Generally what it pertains to is that some people who were in Europe at the time they got promoted, it was more economical to leave them there and return them when their tour normally finished than simply return them because they had been promoted.

Senator THURMOND. So colonels are serving in generals' billets, too?

General BERG. Yes, sir; that is true.

Senator THURMOND. And medical officers not legally restricted.

What future reductions can the Air Force make in its European command? Maybe that would not fall in your sphere, but if you can get an answer to that.

General BERG. Be glad to.

(The information follows:)

FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN AIR FORCE STRENGTH IN EUROPE

The Air Force on-going review of its missions in Europe will continue in the effort to eliminate low-priority requirements, to reorganize and/or consolidate organizations and functions for increased efficiency and streamlined command channels. Current plans include 1) the relocation of Headquarters Third Air Force and several other units from the London area to established USAF bases in Great Britain, 2) the reduction of one standby deployment base to caretaker status, and 3) the inactivation of a group headquarters and transfer of its headquarters function and subordinate units to other organizations. These and other economy measures will result in further manpower reductions in support areas within the coming year.

Senator THURMOND. How many additional Air Force personnel are in Europe who are not under the U.S. Air Force command?

Would you supply the answer for that?

General BERG. May I supply it, Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. I had a figure of about 19,800, but I would like to have you supply that.

General BERG. All right, sir.

(The information follows:)

NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL IN EUROPE OUTSIDE OF USAFE

The number of Air Force personnel not under the command of the Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe (CINCUSAFE) is 26,697.¹ These personnel are in other major USAF commands represented in Europe such as Air Force Communications Service, Military Airlift Command, and USAF Security Service and joint activities such as SHAPE, NATO, and Military Assistance and Advisory Groups.

PERSONNEL JUSTIFICATIONS

Senator THURMOND. Who is responsible for justifying the personnel in the Air Force? Who determines that?

General BERG. I do indirectly, sir, once the decision is made—

Senator THURMOND. Do you determine how many squadrons or how many units?

General BERG. No, sir, but once the determination is made on how many squadrons there are, the force determinations, we determine how many people are needed in those squadrons.

Senator THURMOND. Do you feel any reductions can be made in those areas?

General BERG. In our program for fiscal year 1973, we have 1920 reductions programed in Europe from the end strength in 1972.

HOW REDUCTION ACHIEVED

Senator THURMOND. The committee understands the Air Force has instituted commendable reductions in its three numbered Air

¹ Assigned strength as of December 31, 1971.

Forces. That is, the Third Air Force would be reduced from 229 to 60 personnel—I believe you referred to that. The 16th Air Force would be reduced from 186 to 60, and the 17th Air Force from 221 to 40. That is a commandable reduction, from 616 to 166.

General BERG. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. You say this was achieved—in what way was that achieved?

General BERG. Well, Senator, it is a program which I was going to describe later on that we undertook about a year and a half ago that was pointed at what we call intermediate headquarters. These are the ones that have been referred to by the chairman as the headquarters below department level and above air division level. For some period of time, we have had from 17 or 18 to 20 what we call numbered Air Forces and similar type headquarters that have had both operational people in them, operational staffs, and support staffs. We have undertaken a project to try to eliminate or at best reduce the number of people in those intermediate headquarters in the support area. And the actions taken by General Jones in U.S. Air Force, which you just referred to, is his effort to do this.

Senator THURMOND. What will be the remaining mission of these three air forces?

General BERG. Well, what they are going to do primarily is devote their time to operational matters to make sure these people are operationally ready, to visit the units and to, in effect, be the eyes of General Jones in insuring that these people's capability is maintained. But they will have nothing to do with the support type activities such as personnel, controller, material, civil engineering.

Senator THURMOND. Will the Air Force still require two generals for each numbered air force when they have only this smaller number of people that your refer to there?

General BERG. I do not recall what General Jones had in his plan with regard to that. May I furnish that?

Senator THURMOND. I wish you would furnish that for the record. (The information follows:)

The mission charged to the numbered air forces demands that commanders, vice commanders and senior staff officers possess top executive ability in order to effectively manage assigned personnel and the considerable dollar investment represented by modern tactical aircraft, associated equipment, facilities, supplies and war reserve materiel.

For these reasons both the commander and vice commander general officer authorizations have been previously validated. Subject, of course, to reconfirmation by the next Air Force General Officer Review Board, it is still considered that the scope and magnitude of responsibilities of numbered Air Forces are such that both general officer authorizations are appropriate. However, current plans call for manning the vice commander positions with full colonels as long as our total general officer requirements exceed limitations on general officer strength.

Senator THURMOND. Could you give us an estimate on the personnel increases that will be involved in seven new and additional A-X wings on top of the 21-wing tactical force?

General BERG. Yes, sir; may I supply that for the record?

Senator THURMOND. Answer for the record, too.

General BERG. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The addition of five active wings of A-X aircraft will require 6,210 military personnel.

Senator THURMOND. Have we pretty well covered your statement?

General BERG. No, sir; I had not really started it yet.

Senator THURMOND. I was just thinking that. If there is no objection, we might just let you put your statement in the record in full.

General BERG. I do not have a statement, Senator. Actually I have some charts that I intended to talk to. I would very much like to talk to them if I may.

Senator THURMOND. We will vote now and we may come back at 2:30.

Let me see, I do not know whether I can finish up here quickly with General DePuy in about 5 minutes.

General DePuy, you might step over here and see if we can finish in about 5 minutes.

General Berg, this afternoon at 2:30, those of us who can come back will try. We would like you to submit those charts for the record, so we will have it officially, and we will then have it available for the Senators.

Is that agreeable with you?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

(The statement follows:)





Chart Number 1 depicts the reductions in total Air Force manpower, both civilian and military, from the end fiscal year 1968 peak associated with the Southeast Asia buildup to the end fiscal year 73 position projected in the President's Budget. Even though this hearing is addressing military personnel, and the remainder of my presentation will be largely oriented toward military personnel, we do not develop our military manpower program in isolation from the civilian program. We begin by calculating total position requirements, then determine

which must be filled by military and which may be filled by civilians. I believe it is appropriate, therefore, to review what has been happening to our total work force before moving on to purely military requirements. Overall, since end fiscal year 1968, we will have reduced our manpower authorizations by 229,137 or 18.4%. The civilian part of this reduction is 41,588, a 12.1% reduction in civilians. The military reduction amounts to 187,549 or a 20.7% reduction. The lower rate of civilian reductions and accompanying increase in civilian proportions remaining in the Air Force results chiefly from the fact that we have made significant reductions in forces and capability (readiness), heavily military oriented, and the fact that there have been concurrent civilian increases in Air Guard and Reserve technicians and in military to civilian conversion programs in support areas within the active forces.



At the beginning of the Southeast Asia buildup, end fiscal year 1964, our total strength was 1,179,306. At the height of the Southeast Asia buildup, end fiscal year 1968, our total strength was 1,245,813 or a 5.6% increase. Our projection for fiscal year 1973 represents both an 18% reduction from our Southeast Asia build peak as well as a 13.8% reduction from our pre-Southeast Asia (1964) strength. In fact, our projected end strength positions for both fiscal years 1972 and 1973 will be the lowest total Air Force manpower strength since the pre-Korea strength of 1950.

Chart Number 2 summarizes our military strength reductions since 1968 by year. The column on the left side of the chart shows the amount of the military manpower reduction by fiscal year. The right side of the chart lists the principal areas in which manpower reductions have been made: forces, capability (readiness), and base structure. Also listed are several special areas in which reductions have been made which may be of special interest to the Congress. These are headquarters, intelligence, peripheral activities and associated support. The remainder of my presentation will highlight and present examples of reductions in each of these areas. A point which I would like to emphasize here is that manpower levels are changed as missions and workloads change; they are not independently established. As forces are reduced, manpower is reduced. As capabilities are reduced, manpower is reduced. As our base structure is reduced, manpower is reduced. When a decision is made to reduce manpower, there is implicit in that decision some change in our method of operation. Some mission or func-

tion being performed before the reduction will either no longer be performed or it will be performed in a different manner and, in all likelihood, at a lower level of activity.

All military manpower requirements are based on the need to operate, maintain and support our combat forces. A principal means by which manpower reductions are achieved, therefore, is through a reduction in forces. Chart Number 3 summarizes reductions in active force mission squadrons. Since the end of fiscal year 1968, 120 squadrons of one kind or another will have been deleted. The effect of these drawdowns on combat capability has, of course, been offset to some degree by concurrent modernization of remaining squadrons: F-100's and F-105's have been replaced by F-4's, F-111's and A-7's; C-124's and C-133's have been replaced by C-5's. In addition, most of the aircraft withdrawn from active forces have been transferred to the Reserve forces, replacing older Reserve force aircraft.

CHART NO. 3—AIR FORCE CHANGES IN ACTIVE FORCES (SQUADRONS)

Strategic	Fiscal year				
	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Offensive—bombers.....	-4	-5	+2	-3	-----
Defensive:					
Interceptors.....	-7	-5	-3	[deleted].	[deleted].
Air defense missiles (BOMARC).....		-1	-----	[deleted].	[deleted].
General purpose:					
Fighter tactical.....	1-2	-6	-2	-----	[deleted].
Fighter interceptor.....		-5	-2	-----	[deleted].
Other attack.....		+2	-2	-1	[deleted].
Reconnaissance.....	-3	+1	-5	-1	[deleted].
Special operations squadrons.....	+6	-7	-7	-2	[deleted].
TEWS.....	+2	-1	+1	-----	[deleted].
Tactical airlift.....	+2	+1	-6	-10	[deleted].
Mobility forces:					
Airlift.....	-12	-2	-1	-----	-----
Aeromedical airlift.....		-3	-----	-----	-----
Net change in squadrons.....	-28	-31	-27	-21	-13

The manpower withdrawn when combat units are withdrawn includes not only the combat crews and maintenance personnel directly associated with the aircraft, but also the personnel required for command, control and support of the combat unit. Elimination of a typical F-106 fighter interceptor squadron, for example, would reduce 514 crew, maintenance, security and operations staff active duty personnel. In addition, approximately 86 military personnel performing supply, transportation, medical, administrative and similar duties would also be reduced. These figures assume there would be no base closure.

A second way manpower reductions have been achieved has been through the reduction of operating capability (readiness). Chart 4 shows active force manpower reductions which have been realized in the C-141 fleet from end fiscal year 1968. The C-141 capability, in terms of utilization rate, has been cut from 240 flying hours per month per aircraft to a planned 118 flying hours per month by end fiscal year 1973. As a result, crew ratios have been cut from 4 per aircraft to 2.25 per aircraft saving 3,100 personnel. Maintenance personnel have been reduced by 9,700. We have also reduced capabilities in other areas. From fiscal year 1972 to fiscal year 1973, for example, tactical fighter crew and maintenance authorizations have been cut by approximately 3,250 by reducing the flying hour capability per month of certain aircraft.


CHART NO. 4
AIR FORCE C-141 CAPABILITY

Crew ratio			Utilization rate		
Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1973	Manpower savings	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1973	Manpower savings
4	2.25	3,100	240	118	9,700

¹ 1,200 officers, 1,900 airmen.

² 190 officers, 8,540 airmen, 970 civilians.

A reduction in the numbers of hours per month the aircraft of a given unit can be flown allows a concurrent reduction in the personnel assigned to a unit without a reduction in numbers of aircraft.




Installation reductions as depicted on Chart 5 are a third area in which we have realized manpower savings. The chart shows the numbers of major installations within the US and overseas, at the end of each fiscal year since 1968. Within the 50 States and Puerto Rico, we have either closed or reduced to minor installation status a net of 16 bases. Overseas, by end fiscal year 1973, we will have reduced 20 major bases. In percentage terms, this amounts to a 12% reduction in the US and 32% overseas. Closure of a base, independent of reductions associated with force reductions, would normally reduce between 1,000 and 1,500 total personnel and between 600 and 900 military personnel. These are the "fixed" or "base opening" costs required to maintain and operate the base itself.

As the Air Force has become smaller, through reducing forces capability (readiness) and bases, it has been aggressive in restructuring and reducing the manning of its headquarters. Chart 6 shows military and civilian personnel reduction in headquarters and direct headquarters support since fiscal year 1968. The fiscal year 1969 reduction, known as Project 693, saved 2,200 personnel, both by eliminating headquarters and reducing the numbers of personnel in remaining headquarters.

Project 703 which took place during fiscal year 1970 reduced an additional 5,400 headquarters people. Also in 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed a 15% departmental and major command headquarters reduction from a fiscal year 1969 baseline which was to be phased through fiscal years 1970 and 1971. The Air Force "bogey" was 4,100 spaces; 2,700 of the reductions under Project 703 were creditable to this bogey and the remaining 1,400 were reduced during fiscal year 1971. As reflected on the chart, an additional 1,100 were also reduced by the end of fiscal year 1971 and a 250 space reduction applied to the Air Staff is projected for the end of fiscal year 1972.

Mindful of Congressional guidance to avoid arbitrary across-the-board percentage cuts in reducing headquarters, the Air Force has, during the past year, undertaken several major headquarters restructuring and redefinition projects. These projects have been directed toward two key objectives: First, standardiz-



ing the definition of headquarters staff, headquarters support and operating functions to permit an accurate assessment of true headquarters costs and, second, reducing these costs through restructuring and elimination of marginal activities. The additional 1,000 reduction projected for end fiscal year 1972 and the 800 for end fiscal year 1973 are the initial results of this restructuring effort.



Further savings will undoubtedly accrue as major commands gain additional experience under the new structure. It is imperative, however, that in the near term we allow our management structure to "settle down" in its overhauled configuration without imposing further reductions. The only alternative would be an arbitrary percentage reduction which is neither viable nor acceptable. As I previously suggested, the Congress specifically cautioned against such action during the fiscal year 1971 and fiscal year 1972 Appropriation Act Proceedings.

Overall, then, a total of 12,150 personnel will have been reduced as a result of headquarters reductions from end fiscal year 1968. This represents about a 24% reduction of the personnel in headquarters and headquarters support activities compared to an 18% reduction in total Air Force manpower over the same period. Of the total headquarters personnel reduced or to be reduced, approximately 65% or 7,900 are military. Before leaving the subject of headquarters, one final point: in all cases from fiscal year 1969 through the projection for fiscal year 1972, the reductions identified achieve the headquarters cost reductions directed in the annual appropriation bills.

Turning now to an illustration of how these various types of reductions impact on one Air Force major command, Chart 7 shows the military strength reductions of the Aerospace Defense Command since fiscal year 1968. Overall, Aerospace Defense Command has been reduced by about 38,000 military or 54%. As depicted on the chart, these manpower savings are the result of aircraft and base reductions together with reductions in associated detection, surveillance and control systems. Not depicted but also contributing to the reductions is a significant reduction in headquarters manpower. Because of reductions in mission resources, one level of intermediate command has been completely eliminated and overall, three numbered air forces and six divisions have been inactivated.




FY 68	45,171
FY 69	45,936
FY 70	42,320
FY 71	38,527
FY 72	33,116
FY 73	31,400

CHART NO. 8

Chart 8 illustrates a non-force area in which significant military reductions have been realized since 1968. Manpower in the General Defense Intelligence Program has been reduced by 13,771 or 31%. The Program, which is essentially made up of intelligence collection and technical processing activities is centrally managed by the Department of Defense and supports National intelligence objectives. Of the total reductions taken or programmed, approximately 8,000 are associated with dollar reductions directed in fiscal year 1971 and 1972 appropriations bills. The remainder were reductions initiated by the Air Force.

Public Affairs has been another special interest area in which Congressional reductions have been directed. As shown on Chart 9, military strength has been




reduced by 536 or 55%. These reductions have largely been achieved through management efficiencies such as the consolidation of base information offices where more than one office existed on a base.

Let me now touch on the subject of military/civilian mix and conversion programs. As a continuing objective, the Air Force strives to insure that military personnel are utilized only in military essential positions. Fundamentally, these are command, combat and direct combat support positions plus those positions required to maintain a viable overseas rotation base or to provide for career progression. Our remaining work force requirements are filled by civilians. Attaining our military/civilian mix objectives is not always easy, however. First, although the general guidelines for military essential positions are reasonably clear, considerable judgment and interpretation may be involved in their application to specific situations. In addition, there has always been a tendency to think of the Federal military and civilian work force as two separate entities. This has, in the past, resulted in such paradoxical situations as military to civilian conversion programs followed shortly thereafter by arbitrary across the board civilian "productivity" reductions. The net result of such actions produces considerable reluctance on the part of Air Force commanders and managers to push the civilian conversion program.

Simply stated, this is viewed as a circuitous method of making arbitrary across the board reductions. Despite these frustrations, we have made progress with the civilianization programs. Chart 10 is an example of an area where we have been very successful. From end fiscal year 1968 to end fiscal year 1973, we project a 63% reduction in military personnel working in commissaries. Our budget program for 1973 calls for a commissary work force made up of 96%

AIR FORCE

MILITARY PERSONNEL IN COMMISSARIES



FY 68	1,366
FY 69	1,197
FY 70	1,352
FY 71	1,475
FY 72	852
FY 73	502

CHART NO. 10

civilian personnel. Overall, for fiscal years 1972 and 1973 we are planning to convert approximately 1,900 military positions to civilian, chiefly in the commissary, redistribution and marketing, accounting and personnel functions.




CHART NO. 11

Chart 11 introduces a new subject, the reduction of our presence overseas, by showing military strength reductions in Japan since 1968. There, the 1968 to 1973 military reduction is projected to be [deleted]. It is of particular note that although prior year reductions resulted in part from redeployment of tactical units, reductions projected for fiscal years 1972 and 1973 will be achieved chiefly through a support drawdown made possible by closure and consolidation of facilities in [deleted].




Chart 12 depicts a similar drawdown from the European area. This chart depicts authorized strengths for fiscal years 1971 and prior years and projects an overall 1968 to 1973 reduction of 15,499 military personnel.

As was the case in Japan, reductions have been achieved both through force redeployments and efficiency reductions in support areas, notably those associated with Projects 703 and REDCOSTE in 1970 and 1971 and, more recently, the headquarters restructuring projects which I previously mentioned.

Chart 13 portrays European mission and support trends on a proportional basis and clearly shows that the percentage of military personnel in combat organizations and functions has been increasing. We are defining as combat manpower those personnel in tactical fighter, reconnaissance, airlift and other flying organizations while direct combat support includes the combat support groups collocated with these tactical organizations. Other mission activities include intelligence, communications, MAAGS/Missions and traffic control and landing systems. In the general support category are intermediate and major command headquarters, hospitals and such supporting elements as postal and courier and auditor activities. In percentage terms, combat and direct combat support personnel represented 60% of our military manpower in Europe at end of fiscal year 1968. By the end of fiscal year 1973, this proportion is projected to increase to 65%. Over the same period, the other mission proportion shifts from 24% to 23% while general support has been reduced from 16% to 12%.

This leads naturally to the question of mission/support trends for the Air Force as a whole. Chart 14, my final chart, arrays proportions of mission and

AIR FORCE
EUROPE AND RELATED AREAS
MILITARY STRENGTH




CHART NO. 13

AIR FORCE
MISSION/SUPPORT TRENDS
MILITARY STRENGTH




CHART NO. 14

support manpower in terms of the ten major programs, that is, strategic forces, general purpose forces, and so forth, customarily used for presentation of the Defense budget. Programs I through V are force related or mission programs consisting essentially of combat and direct combat support personnel. Programs VI through X are essentially support type programs. Overall, the percent of military manpower in Programs I through V, combat and direct combat support, increased between end fiscal years 1964 and 1968 and has declined slightly since. At end fiscal year 1973, 70% of our total military manpower is projected to be in these programs. Within the total mission category, the base operating support of strategic, general purpose and mobility forces, which we classify as direct combat support, has decreased from 25% to 20% of total military manpower.

The shift in the proportion of military personnel in the force programs—74% at end fiscal year 1964 to 77% at end fiscal year 1968 to the 70% projected for end fiscal year 1973—is attributable to multiple factors but, in general, results from two trends. First, the buildup for Southeast Asia was largely in the operating forces. This was achieved primarily by increasing the utilization (readiness) of our existing aircraft through increased monthly flying hour rates with accompanying higher crew ratios and higher aircraft maintenance capabilities. Although there was some increase in the support base, it was not proportional to the essentially temporary buildup in mission forces. After peaking at 77% in 1968, forces and force manpower were drawn down, again, at a proportionally greater rate than other programs. The C-141 example provided earlier in the briefing is an illustration of this type buildup. As Southeast Asia airlift needs decreased, C-141 manpower was cut roughly in half. Military manpower requirements in Research and Development, Logistics, Administration and Support to Other Nations Programs did not change proportionately as a result of this force drawdown.

The second trend, which accounts largely for the further downward shift in Programs I through V from end fiscal year 1970, is a planned increase in the proportions of military personnel in medical, individual support and Support to Other Nations elements. We have significantly upgraded our medical capabilities through the application of engineered manpower standards for medical functions. This will result in a higher standard of medical care in in-service facilities and contribute directly to all-volunteer force goals.

The individual support increase results from the establishment of an Air Force transient account which provides additional manpower to offset time lost from performance of primary duties due to permanent change of station moves. Before fiscal year 1971, the Air Force made no provisions for this lost time and, as a result, many required positions were effectively unmanned while their incumbents were in a travel status. This resulted in excessive overtime for remaining personnel as well as deferral of work and degradation in work quality. For fiscal year 1973, the transient account stands at 10,328 versus a total requirement of approximately 33,000. A fully funded transient account has been available to the other three services since approximately 1954. We have as a continuing objective a phased buildup of this account until it fully offsets all manyear losses.

An increase in the Support to Other Nations program accounts for most of the remainder of the proportional increase in Programs VI through X.

In summation, then, the Air Force has made extensive manpower reductions to date and projects continuing reductions through the end of fiscal year 1973. Our projected end FY 1973 end strength is the lowest since FY 1950. We have, to the best of our ability, developed our manpower requirements to maximize mission capability while limiting "support" and "overhead" to the minimum required for effective operation of the forces. Based on our professional judgment and experience, we are reasonably confident that our manpower program for fiscal year 1973 reflects the right numbers of personnel needed for operation and support of planned forces and missions. This is not to say that the projected 717,210 end year strength is the precise number required and that the mission could not be accomplished with 100 less or 1,000 less or some greater reduction or, conversely, that additional personnel could not be effectively utilized. If further reductions became necessary, we would have to review the work we had planned to perform and determine what could be eliminated or what could be done with fewer people. Nevertheless, although we recognize that further improvements are possible and are actively seeking ways to realize them, we believe that the program for which we are requesting authorization represents a valid

estimate based on the best information available at this time and that it should be approved.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DISCHARGE RATE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972

Senator THURMOND. General DePuy, how many men will the Army discharge during the coming fiscal year 1972?

General DePUY. 480,000.

Senator THURMOND. What percent does this represent of the Army's total strength?

General DePUY. That is 480,000 out of an end strength of 861,000. I could figure it out.

Senator THURMOND. That is all right.

General DePUY. The staff can figure that out.

Senator THURMOND. You can figure it and give it for the record later.

General DePUY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The 480,000 net losses during FY 72 represent 56% of the FY 72 end strength of 816,000. As these losses are spread over the year, they can also be compared to the average strength of 974,000. They represent 49% of the average strength for FY 72.

Senator THURMOND. As I understand, 262,000 of these will not be replaced.

General DePUY. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. Does this not represent a tremendous turbulence?

General DePUY. What it represents is a tremendous decrease in the size of the Army in 1 year, a decrease of 262,000 in end strength in 1 year. We wanted to do it in 2 years, but we did it in one and it is water over the dam. What has happened, of course, is that we have had to do a lot of very cost-ineffective things. We have had to release people immediately after they were promoted, we have had to release people immediately after graduating them from an expensive school. We have had to release people who have served only 1 year out of the 2 years for which they were drafted, then we had to bring a new man in and train him. So this is a very expensive venture.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, it would strike most people, I think, that it probably was a very unwise course to follow. I am just wondering if a corporation in this country had such a turnover as that if it could continue in operation?

General DePUY. It would not be competitive, Senator.

PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

Senator THURMOND. General DePuy, what type of personnel problems has this tremendous turbulence created for the Army, other than what you have mentioned? Can you think of any others?

General DePUY. It has caused this massive early release program which, as of right now, has made [deleted]. We shall repair the damage, but it will take that long.

Senator THURMOND. Since the Army has been in the business of inducting and discharging soldiers all along, why do you claim you have

these problems this year? Simply because of the tremendous reductions that were forced on you at once, as I understand it.

General DEPUY. That is right.

Senator THURMOND. What has been the personnel turnover in Europe during fiscal year 1972 and how has it affected the combat readiness of the divisions there?

General DEPUY. I will have to give you the percentage per quarter for the record. But of course, it is, I think [deleted] people are coming home from Europe in December and January and [deleted] people are going over in December and January. That just gives you an indication. Of course, it will be much less in February and the rest of the remaining months.

By and large, the Army will be stable, relatively stable, by summertime.

(The information follows:)

[Deleted.] The quarterly turnover rate that major units in USAREUR can sustain without degradation to their combat effectiveness and training proficiency has been estimated to be about 16 percent. Higher rates cause units to compress and in some cases repeat training cycles. Thus, our objective is to reduce and maintain turnover to at least this level and by so doing provide increased stability to the command as a whole.

Senator THURMOND. The last affected the combat readiness, though?

General DEPUY. Oh, yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. General DePuy, the Army's fiscal year 1972 end-year strength, I believe, is 861,000 and the Army will go down to 841,000 by the end of fiscal year 1973. Why, then, will your average year strength for fiscal year 1973 be 869,932?

General DEPUY. Sir, I entered an explanation of that into the record while you were not here. I will show you the picture of it. I think that your staff has that. It is a combination of the fact that the losses we were going to take in the first half of next year have actually been taken in the last half of this year. So that in the first 6 months of 1973, we are going to be gaining [deleted] people per month more than we are losing; that piles up strength. These are all trainees needed to replace losses further downstream. Thus the hump—you see, we go up to [deleted]. Then when you turn that into average strength, it becomes 869,000.

Senator THURMOND. What percent of the total Army force must be turned over annually to keep enough fighting age recruits in uniform at the lower grades of the combat armies?

General DEPUY. I speculated that it was about 25-percent reenlistment of first term, but I want to go back home and check with the experts and put that in the record.

Senator THURMOND. I wish you would.

General DEPUY. It is somewhere between 25 and 30 percent.

(The information follows:)

With regard to your question concerning turnover rates to maintain enough fighting age recruits, the required turnover percentage is about 25 percent. With the size force being planned, this equates to about 200,000 new enlisted accessions each year.

Senator THURMOND. There are just a few more questions I have, I'll give them to Mr. Braswell because I have to catch that vote.

Thank you very much, General.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR THURMOND

Mr. BRASWELL. We can put all of these in the record if you want to.

(Questions submitted by Senator Thurmond. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.

Question. General DePuy, what percent of Category IV personnel (8th grade or less) are in the army at the present time?

Answer. At present, approximately 20 percent of all enlisted personnel in the Army are Category IV men.

Question. General DePuy, what percent of the European Army Force of 158,000 men are Category IV's?

Answer. Approximately 19 percent of the Army in Europe are Category IV men.

Question. Do Category IV personnel cause any special morale or discipline problems for the Army?

Answer. Category IV personnel have not caused any special morale or disciplinary problems for the Army. As a group, they have a higher failure rate in training and their disciplinary rates are higher than others. However, the Army can utilize Category IV men who meet the current enlistment standards, provided they have high enough aptitudes for jobs in which they can be used. We estimate that between fifteen and twenty percent of the new men entering the Army in FY 73 will come from this group.

Question. What was the impact on the Army of the 50,000 man year cut in FY 72? In end strength? In dollars? In readiness?

Answer. Reduction by the Congress of the Army's average FY 72 strength by 50,000 man-years from the FY 72 President's Budget, resulted in a FY 72 man-year ceiling of 974,000 and an end strength of 861,000 (down 81,000 from the FY 72 President's Budget end strength position and down 262,000 from the strength at the beginning of FY 72). In order to meet the man-year ceiling, it is necessary for the Army to accelerate losses in FY 72 to include the early release of approximately 86,500 men originally scheduled for release during FY 73 (July-December 1972 time frame). This 50,000 MY reduction will result in a 133.8 million savings in MPA funds. In terms of Personnel Readiness, the early release programs have had the following impacts: [Deleted].

Question. Is the Army losing a lot of top quality trained men during the phase-down? If so, does this adversely affect readiness?

Answer. In FY 1972 the Army is releasing 480,000 military personnel, both officer and enlisted. Enlisted personnel being separated under the early release programs are, in many cases, top quality. However, these individuals would be a loss to the Army in any case. Thus far we have not to release any top quality personnel involuntarily, but we are having to release some good personnel, both officer and enlisted. 262,000 will not be replaced. This turbulence is causing a reduction in readiness, but readiness will be enhanced as stability is achieved in FY 1973.

Question. The use of the average strength guideline appears to cause undue turbulence. General DePuy, would you favor a return to the old end strength guideline for regular forces, and if so, why?

Answer. In my view, it is easier, particularly during periods of rapidly declining strength, to be constrained only by an end strength target rather than a prescribed average strength for the year. In a relatively steady state condition, however, management by average strength is not significantly more difficult than by end strength, provided there is some degree of latitude permitted. With an absolute ceiling on average strength and no margin for error permitted, we would always operate slightly below the authorized level. Therefore, either a small over program should be allowed or a small percentage of deviation permitted which would permit proper management while at the same time meeting the intent of the Congress. We are studying this matter and will make appropriate recommendations in due course.

Question. General, why was it with an 870,000 man Army in 1964 the U.S. had 16 combat divisions, and this June with an 861,000 man Army the U.S. will have only 13 combat divisions [deleted]?

Answer. The FY 1964 end strength of the Army was 972 thousand which permitted the Army to have 16 divisions. The FY 1972 end strength is 816,000 which permits the Army to have 13 divisions [deleted]. This FY 1972 end strength is 111,000 manpower spaces less than the FY 1964 level.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR STENNIS

(Questions submitted by Senator Stennis. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.)

Question. If war breaks out in Europe first, rather than Asia, how many of the active Army divisions are committed to NATO and how many Reserve divisions? Lastly, how many does this leave uncommitted to NATO in each category?

Answer. For FY 73, the following active and reserve forces are committed to NATO. These include the four active divisions stationed in Germany—

- 3d Infantry Division (Mech)
- 8th Infantry Division (Mech)
- 1st Armored Division
- 3d Armored Division

The 1st Infantry Division (Mech), a REFORGER unit, has one brigade in Europe with the remainder of the division at Fort Riley and is an M-Day, NATO-committed unit.

The [deleted].

The United States has advised NATO that an additional [deleted] as a potential source of reinforcement for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Our current strategy calls for their use in Europe in the event of war as "reinforcing forces" for NATO. [Deleted.]

The remaining (deleted) reserve divisions planned for deployment to NATO by [deleted] are: [Deleted.]

Question. You indicated yesterday that if war breaks first in Asia the Army plans to call for sending [deleted]. How can you reconcile these plans with the Nixon doctrine if this doctrine means that the Asian nations must depend on their own resources for ground troops?

Answer. The Nixon doctrine stresses the need for our Asian Allies to improve their defensive war fighting capabilities with emphasis on ground forces. Our military assistance programs are providing the equipment to achieve that goal.

We visualize our Asian Allies as developing the competence to use their ground forces to control an insurgency, and to contain for example an attack by North Korea *only* against South Korea or an attack by North Vietnam *only* against South Vietnam. The Military Assistance programs are not intended to provide our Asian Allies the capability to resist by themselves PRC aggression. While such a goal is desirable, it does not appear feasible in the near time frame.

Thus, if war breaks out first in Asia, our level of involvement would vary and would depend upon our interests, the threat and the level of war fighting capability achieved by our Asian Allies. These Army plans do not conflict with the Nixon doctrine, but rather complement its goal.

Question. You testified that 23,000 man-years were reduced by the Army due to an over-estimation of manpower required for Vietnam. Thus reduction imposed by the Congress was only 27,000 in addition to this over estimation which was predicted by the Committee. Are you maintaining in your testimony that this 27,000-man reduction out of 1,123,000-man Army was significantly responsible for the Army's turbulence in FY 77 or do you believe that this 27,000-man reduction was a minor factor compared with the reductions included in the budget, the mis-estimations of gains and losses, and the late start in making reductions about which you testified?

Answer. The problems now impacting on the Army stem from the fact that four developments were all added to the already large and difficult reduction in both end strength and manyears incorporated in the President's Budget (165,000 reduction in strength in FY 72). They were:

- a. The 23,000 manyear reduction associated with the Vietnam program.

- b. The 27,000 man-year reduction added by Congress.
- c. The fact that the Army did not act immediately, hoping that the Congressional reduction would not materialize.
- d. Several months in early FY 72 in which the Army overestimated its losses and underestimated its gains, thus aggravating the man-year problem.

PREPARED QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR SMITH

(Questions submitted by Senator Smith. Answers supplied by Department of Defense.)

Question. The Army intended to reduce its end strength from 861,000 in fiscal year 1972 to 841,000 in fiscal year 1973. Will this be a gradual draw-down or will there be perturbations in the draw-down such that there will actually be greater numbers on active duty at a later time in fiscal year 1973 and at an earlier period in fiscal 1973?

If there will be perturbations in the system, please provide a full explanation.

Answer. To achieve the average strength of 974,000 in FY 72, an extended early release program was developed which accelerated losses for first term soldiers, who would have left the Army the last half of FY 72. Additionally, some 86,500 first term personnel programed for separation the first half of FY 73 are being separated the last half of FY 72. The acceleration of losses for first term soldiers from first half FY 73 into the last half FY 72 causes gains to exceed losses in the first six months of FY 73 with a resultant increase in strength, since strength depends directly on these two factors. In the last half of FY 73 losses return to normal and the total strength declines to the 841,000 level.

This creates a mid FY 73 hump in total strength consisting primarily of trainees.

Question. Provide a breakout similar to what the Army has done between combat and support elements in the Navy. In other words, define combat and support by appropriate definitions, such as occupational specialty, et cetera, and provide these on a percentage basis for the record.

Answer. 1. *Combat Skills.*—This category includes all of those skills that could be related to combat forces. For Navy, it includes gun crews and force aircrews.

2. *Major Combative Units.*—This category covers large organizational elements that engage in combat as an entity even though parts of the organizations may not directly face hostile fire as their primary mission. For Navy, it includes the fleet structure, encompassing fleet commands, type commands and all subordinate units.

3. *Minor Combative Units.*—This category covers smaller organizational units, excluding those elements above that do not have a primary responsibility for directly engaging the enemy, such as: medical, supply, transportation and maintenance and administrative functions. For the Navy, since it is not possible to split manpower below ship level, this category is the same as the modified fiscal guidance break.

4. *Fiscal Guidance Categories.*—The fiscal guidance category break is functionally oriented, dividing all military manpower into force mission, other mission and general support. Force Mission Manpower includes that manpower combative and direct combat support forces.

5. *Modified Fiscal Guidance Categories.*—This is the same as above, excluding the direct combat support elements.

6. *FYD Programs I, II, IV.*—This category includes the Five Year Defense Programs I (Strategic Forces), II (General Purpose Forces) and IV (Airlift, Sealift Forces). In addition to combative and combat support units, this array includes all base support, crew and unit training, logistics support, and command and control support necessary to accomplish the mission of the program.

7. *Operating Forces.*—This category consists of all combative units, combat support units, and all deployed support. This represents a close approximation of the operating forces categories that were previously used in budget presentations to the Congress prior to FY 1962. The main categories of which are Operating Forces, Supporting Forces (including special activities), Training Forces, and Individuals (transients, patients and prisoners).

PERCENT OF MILITARY MANPOWER IN COMBAT/FORCE MISSION UNITS

Navy	Fiscal year				
	1964	1968	1971	1972	1973
Combat skills.....	11	11	11	11	11
Major combative units (fleets).....	53	53	49	50	49
Intermediate combative units (ships/squads).....	38	35	33	35	34
Fiscal guidance categories.....	50	50	46	48	47
Fiscal guidance categories (Mdfd).....	38	35	33	35	34
FYD programs I, II, IV.....	63	63	58	59	57
Operating forces.....	62	63	60	61	60

Question. Provide a breakout similar to what the Army has done between combat and support elements in the Marine Corps. In other words, define combat and support by appropriate definitions, such as occupational specialty, et cetera; and provide these on a percentage basis for the record.

Answer. Dividing a military service into only two categories, combat and support, is a simplistic approach to the categorization of military manpower. It should be viewed with caution as it carries with it the implication that one is desirable and the other is not. The approach is analogous to analyzing a professional football team by placing the ball-carriers in one group and the remainder of the team in another.

The Marine Corps views itself as all combat since every Marine is trained to be a rifleman first, and some are also trained in an additional specialty. The value of this philosophy was proven during World War II at Guadalcanal, during the Korean War at the Chosin Reservoir and daily in Vietnam. In this latter case; office clerks, cooks and mechanics regularly occupied defensive positions at night and performed as riflemen in a war which had no front lines.

Dividing military manpower into the combat and support categories also fails to reflect the changing character of warfare. Advanced technology has led to greatly increased firepower but a requirement for more personnel to perform in a support role. The lesser manpower involved in close combat and overall increased firepower has resulted in significant improvements in combat power but at the same time has decreased the number in the combat category and increased the number in support.

Alternatives for display of combat and support categories are set forth in the below tables:

ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF COMBAT

Methodology	Included	Rationale	Combat percentage in Marine Corps
1. Skill field-broad-----	Combat, combat support, and combat service support skills.	Deploy to combat area, likely to engage enemy/sustain casualties in amphibious operations.	79
2. Skill field-narrow-----	Infantry, artillery armor, pilot, naval flight officer, engineer and parts of anti-air warfare (AAW), and operational communications.	Engage the enemy or his weapons systems directly (engineers clear mines, part of AAW, man the light anti-aircraft missile batteries) or be directly subjected to enemy fire on a routine basis. (Platoon, company, and battalion radio operators are easily identified by their antennas and are prime targets.)	31
3. Major combative units-----	Divisions, wings, force troops units, fleet escort ships, carriers, assault ships, support ships, Navy fleet, and type commands, and barracks at naval stations and naval air stations.	Major units whose mission is to engage the enemy or his weapons systems, and barracks, which have a base defense mission.	¹ 61
4. Minor combative units-----	Major combative units less combat service support units.	Same as major combative units, but defined at a lower level of aggregation.	² 40
5. Fiscal guidance categories—broad interpretation.	Major mission forces as defined by Assistant Secretary of Defense systems analysis.	Excludes all program elements included in Assistant Secretary of Defense, systems analysis definition of general support.	55
6. Fiscal guidance categories—narrow interpretation.	Force mission forces-----	Strategic forces, land forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces.	54
7. Fiscal guidance categories—broad interpretation and modified to reflect Marine unique support of other services/agencies.	Same as item 5, above, plus Marine barracks and non-students in combat crew readiness training groups.	Same as item 5, above, plus Marine barracks' base defense mission, and continental air defense mission of the nonstudents in combat crew training groups.	60
8. Army/Marine Corps land forces classification system—broad interpretation.	Division/wing forces plus special mission forces.	Essentially the same concept as 7, above.	59
9. Land forces classifications narrow.	Division/wing forces-----	Essentially the same as item 6, above.	52
10. FYDP programs I, II, and IV----	Strategic forces, general purpose forces (to include base support, crew training) air-lift/sealift forces.	Includes combat, combat support, plus base, crew and unit training, logistics support, and command/control necessary to accomplish mission of the program.	64
11. FYDP programs I, II, IV, and V--	Same as above plus Guard and Reserve.	Same as above plus those active duty marines who support the Reserve, occupy mobilization billets in combat units.	66
12. Operating Forces-----	Fleet Marine Forces ground and air (including non-students in crew readiness training) Security Forces (Marine Barracks at naval stations, naval air stations, National Security Agency, embassy guards) Marine support battalion, Marines afloat and Marines with Reserve ground and air.	Excludes transients, patients and prisoners and Marines in units with an administrative or training support mission. Also permits ready historical comparisons as far back as the early 1950's.	63

¹ 77 percent of authorized billets.² 50 percent of authorized billets.

Note: The above table is graphically displayed in the following chart.

Combat to support ratio alternatives as a percent of total strength

Skill fields, broad interpretation :	
Combat -----	79
Support -----	21
Skill fields, narrow interpretation :	
Combat -----	31
Support -----	69
Major combative units :	
Combat -----	61
Support -----	39
Minor combative units :	
Combat -----	40
Support -----	60
Fiscal guidance, broad :	
Combat -----	55
Support -----	45
Fiscal guidance, narrow :	
Combat -----	54
Support -----	46
Fiscal guidance, modified :	
Combat -----	60
Support -----	40
Land forces categories, broad :	
Combat -----	59
Support -----	41
Land forces categories, narrow :	
Combat -----	52
Support -----	48
FYDP programs I, II, and IV,	
Combat -----	64
Support -----	36
FYDP programs I, II, IV, and V :	
Combat -----	66
Support -----	34
Operating forces :	
Combat -----	63
Support -----	37

Question. Provide a breakout similar to what the Army has done between combat and support elements in the Air Force. In other words, define combat and support by appropriate definitions such as occupational specialty and provide these on a percentage basis for the record.

Answer. There are many possible definitions of "combat," "mission" and "support." Two such definitions have been discussed in earlier testimony, that is, the classification as "combat" of only the combat crew members who "pull triggers" and then the extension of the definition to include those responsible for maintaining, loading and guarding aircraft and missiles. There is, in our opinion, no one "right" definition. Forces are structured to accomplish missions in furtherance of attaining national objectives. The mix of resources to operate and support these forces is developed with the objective of providing maximum capability at minimum cost. "Support" manpower, regardless of definition, is an essential component of the total fighting force and all adjustments to manpower in this category will impact to some degree on fighting capability. For Air Force purposes, the most useable definition for "combat," "mission" and "support" is one based on the ten major program structures which has been used for Budget presentation for

the past several years. This structure divides all Defense resources into ten programs as follows:

- I. Strategic Forces
- II. General Purpose Forces
- III. Intelligence, Communications, Weather and Rescue
- IV. Strategic Airlift
- V. Guard and Reserve Forces
- VI. Research and Development
- VII. Central Supply and Maintenance
- VIII. Training, Medical and Individual Support
- IX. Administration and Associated Activities
- X. Support of Other Nations

Manpower in Programs I through V is essentially force related and is considered "mission" manpower. Manpower in Programs VI through X, may be considered "support." Internally, each major force program is divided into program elements which can generally be grouped into force or mission elements, training elements, command elements and base operating elements. Within the force related or "mission" programs (I-V), the force elements of Programs I, II and IV (which include manpower for combat crews, maintenance, munitions, aircraft/missile security, operations staff, command, and control and surveillance activities), plus the military advisor authorizations in counterpart Reserve combat forces are considered "combat." The remaining manpower in Programs I-V, which includes base operating personnel directly involved in the daily operation of bases launching and recovering primary mission aircraft (analogous to support personnel on board aircraft carriers or organic to Army/Marine combat divisions) as well as intelligence, communications, weather and rescue personnel are considered direct combat support.


Using the definitions discussed above, Air Force manpower projected for end fiscal year 1973 may be divided into combat, direct combat support and support, on a percentage basis, as follows:

	<i>Percent</i>
Combat	32
Direct combat support.....	38
Total "mission" manpower.....	70
Programs VI through X ("support" manpower).....	30
Total	100

Senator THURMOND. The committee will stand in recess.

(Whereupon the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, February 15, 1972.)

(NOTE.—The hearings in this volume were devoted exclusively to the Manpower portion of the Authorization bill, however, throughout the entire series of hearings which are contained in subsequent volumes, reference is made to the Manpower matter.)



CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

Tuesday, February 8, 1972-----	1-79
Hon. Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs-----	10
Maj. Gen. Leo A. Benade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, OASD (M. & R.A.)-----	47
Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Army-----	51
Maj. Gen. W. D. Crittenberger, Deputy Director for Plans and Policies, J-5 (International Negotiations), OJCS-----	53
Tuesday, February 8, 1972-----	81-164
Hon. Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs-----	82
Francis J. Sullivan, director, Manpower Requirements, OASD (SA)-----	134
Maj. Gen. Leo A. Benade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, OASD (M. & R.A.)-----	137
Carl Detwyler, Director for Military Personnel, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)-----	140
Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Army-----	149
Wednesday, February 9, 1972-----	165-295
Hon. Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs-----	165
Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Army-----	165
Rear Adm. John G. Finneran, Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Plans and Programs, U.S. Navy-----	180
Maj. Gen. E. B. Wheeler, Assistant Chief of Staff—G-1, U.S. Marine Corps-----	250
Maj. Gen. William W. Berg, director, Manpower and Organization, DCS/P. & R., Department of the Air Force-----	259

WITNESSES

Benade, Maj. Gen. Leo A-----	47, 137
Berg, Maj. Gen. William W-----	259
Crittenberger, Maj. Gen. W. D-----	53
DePuy, Lt. Gen. William E-----	51, 149, 165
Detwyler, Carl-----	140
Finneran, Rear Adm. John G-----	180
Kelley, Hon. Roger T-----	10, 82, 165
Sullivan, Francis J-----	134
Wheeler, Maj. Gen. E. B-----	250

INDEX

A

	Page
Additional men requested.....	81
Aerospace defense command, military strength, Air Force.....	281
Air Force manpower, 1968 to 1973.....	276
Air Force military man-year program (table).....	67
Allied manpower contribution to NATO.....	145
All-Volunteer Force.....	147
Army military man-year program (table).....	64

B

Battle casualties.....	49
Berg, Maj. Gen. William W., statement of.....	259
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendations.....	85-87

C

C-141 capability.....	278
Category IV personnel.....	289
Changes in active forces by Air Force (table).....	278
Classification of statement.....	58
Combat, alternative definitions of.....	293
Combat and command units, imbalance between.....	56
Combat and support, separation of.....	245, 264
Combat command streamlined.....	84
Combat troops in Europe.....	45
Reductions.....	46
Combat units in West Germany.....	44
Combat/mission categories, definitions of.....	291
Combat-to-support ratio.....	263
Command and headquarters military manpower, June 30, 1971 (table).....	90
Commissaries, military personnel in, Air Force.....	283
Communications personnel.....	43
Contributory retirement system.....	46
Cost of Air Force Tactical Wing.....	267

D

DePuy, Lt. Gen. William E., statement of.....	150
Army materiel command—manpower.....	158
Civilian manpower.....	159
Army's changing size.....	150
Combat/support distribution and casualty rates (by MOS) (table).....	160
Computation of manpower for one division (table).....	152
Division with support.....	153
General support manpower.....	157
Infantry division unit firepower potential (table).....	162
Personnel costs, including retired pay.....	151
Special mission forces manpower.....	156
Support establishment.....	158
Trained individuals, distribution of.....	159
Trends in combat support ratio.....	162
Varying support requirements.....	155
Discharge rate for fiscal year 1972.....	287
Discipline.....	139
Dislocations.....	249

IV

E

	Page
Effect of imposed reduction.....	268
Effect of last year's law.....	249
Enlistment bonus plan.....	40, 241
Europe and related areas, military strength, Air Force.....	284
European command, wartime mission of.....	54
European force level decision.....	135
European Naval Headquarters requirements.....	238
European personnel level determination.....	45, 270
European war, sustained front in event of.....	50

F

Fewer men needed.....	83
Flag officers assigned to European area (table).....	243
Flag rank officers, level of.....	246
Forces under EUCOM (table).....	57
Future headquarters reduction.....	271
Further reductions.....	42

G

General support manpower.....	62
Grade creep.....	73

H

Headquarters activities.....	89
Headquarters categorization :	
Departmental	89
Intermediate	89
Major	89
Headquarters EUCOM manpower (table).....	57
Headquarters personnel, breakdown of.....	88
Headquarters requirements	84
Justification of.....	87
Helicopter squadrons, effect of new.....	259
How reduction achieved.....	274

I

Imposed personnel cut, effect of.....	244
Effect if larger cut imposed.....	246
Intelligence assignments.....	43
Intelligence, military strength, Air Force.....	281
Intelligence personnel level.....	248
Interagency committee report.....	39

J

Japan, military strength, Air Force.....	283
--	-----

K

Kelley, Hon. Roger T., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, statement of.....	10-38
Active duty pay and end year strength (table).....	27
Active military manpower summary (table).....	12
With general support manpower allocated to major missions (table)	12
All-Volunteer Force	19, 31
Initiatives	30
Base and individual support.....	16
Budget trends	26
Casualty rates per 1,000 men (table).....	16
Civilian pay (direct hire) and end year strength (table).....	28
Civilianization	24
Command	17

V

Kelley, Hon. Roger T.—Continued	Page
General purpose forces	13
NATO commitment, effect on	14
General support	15
Components	16
Manpower, total DOD (table)	16
Military and civilian personnel in, fiscal years 1964 and 1973 (table)	15
General trends (general schedule positions) (table)	35
Guard and Reserve forces	29
Budget authority	30
Pay and paid end strength (table)	30
Guard and Reserve, role in total force concept	21, 33
Logistics	17
Logistics military manpower (table)	18
Manpower and pay and related costs (outlays) (table)	25
Manpower issues	31
Manpower requirements for force levels	12
Military grades	22, 34
Military personnel in other mission forces (table)	15
Military retirement	21, 34
Military retirement costs (table)	29
Military versus civilian	36
Officer force distribution, including and excluding physicians, dentists, and nurses (table)	35
Other mission forces	14
Pay and related costs, percent allocated to (table)	26
Pay increases, annualized DOD cost of (table)	27
Proposed manpower strength	10
Quality considerations	37
Quality objective	24
Reductions in force	11
Retired costs increase	18
Rise in manpower costs	18
Special pays	38
Stable force, importance of	36
Strategic forces	13
Training	17
Summary of elements as of June 30 (table)	17
Women, utilization of	37

L

Lack of trained personnel in Europe	74
-------------------------------------	----

M

Major installations, Air Force	279
Manning level costs for fiscal years 1974 and 1975	147
Manpower costs	142
Manpower costs, rise in	60
Marine Corps military manpower program (table)	66
Marine end strengths compared with past year	258
Marine enlistment goals	258
Military assistance program in Europe	136
Military reduction, 1968-73	277
Military/civilian strength, Air Force	280
Mission statement	243
Mission/support trends, Air Force	285
More Marines now than in World War II	258

N

National Security Council	133
NATO headquarters	74-77, 242
Allied Command Headquarters	75
European Headquarters Staffing	77
United States Air Force—Europe (USAFE)	76

	Page
NATO headquarters—Continued	
United States Army—Europe (USAREUR).....	75
United States European Command (USEUCOM).....	75
United States Navy—Europe (USNAVUER).....	76
NATO requirements.....	265
NATO troop reductions.....	48
Naval training schools.....	239
Navy headquarters missions and functions:	
Afloat Eastern Pacific, Commander First Fleet.....	218
Afloat in Atlantic Ocean, Commander Second Fleet.....	219
Afloat in Mediterranean, Commander Sixth Fleet.....	219
Afloat in Western Pacific, Commander Seventh Fleet.....	220
Air Reserve training.....	215
Air Systems Command Charter.....	207
Air training.....	214
Amphibious force:	
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.....	227
U.S. Pacific Fleet.....	228
Amphibious support.....	236
Antisubmarine warfare forces:	
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.....	221
U.S. Pacific Fleet.....	221
Atlantic Joint Air Reconnaissance Control Center.....	223
Atlantic Fleet, Commander in Chief.....	216
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.....	205
Chief of Naval Personnel.....	205
Commandant Naval District.....	216
Communications Command.....	210
Construction battalions.....	231
Cruiser destroyer force:	
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.....	230
U.S. Pacific Fleet.....	230
Cruiser-destroyer flotillas.....	235
Destroyer and escort squadrons.....	236
District headquarters.....	215
Electronic Systems Command charter.....	208
Facilities Engineering Command charter.....	209
Fleet air.....	236
Intelligence Command, commander.....	210
Key West force.....	223
Material Command.....	206
Middle East force.....	222
Military Sealift Command.....	213
Mine squadron/flotilla.....	237
Mine warfare force.....	234
National Security Group Command.....	211
Naval Air Force:	
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.....	232
U.S. Pacific Fleet.....	233
Naval Base, Key West.....	223
Naval Reserve training.....	215
Naval training.....	214
Oceanographer of the Navy.....	211
Operational test and evaluation force.....	233
Ordnance Systems Command charter.....	208
Pacific Fleet, Commander in Chief.....	217
Sea frontiers.....	226
Service force:	
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.....	229
U.S. Pacific Fleet.....	229
Service group/squadron.....	236
Ship Systems Command charter.....	208
South Atlantic Force.....	223
SSPO.....	209
Submarine flotilla.....	237

VII

Navy headquarters missions and functions—Continued

	Page
Submarine force:	
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.....	231
U.S. Pacific Fleet.....	232
Submarine squadron.....	237
Supply Systems Command charter.....	209
Technical training.....	214
Training Command:	
U.S. Atlantic Fleet.....	231
U.S. Pacific Fleet.....	231
U.S. naval forces:	
Korea.....	224
Japan.....	224
Marianas, Guam.....	225
Vietnam.....	225
U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, Commander in Chief.....	218
U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines.....	226
Weather Service Command.....	212
Navy military man-year program (table).....	65
Navy strength in relation to past years.....	244
New wings, additional manpower.....	267

O

Officer grade distribution of principal service headquarters:

Air Force.....	108-110
Army.....	106
Marine Corps.....	108
Navy.....	106-107
Officer, staff, level decision.....	135
Overstaffing.....	83, 142

P

Pay increase.....	130, 137
Pay increases.....	68
Increases and pay and price indexes since 1963 (table).....	69
Percent of retention.....	261
Personnel:	
Distribution explained.....	82
Justifications.....	274
Problems.....	287
Reductions.....	41
Turnover.....	147
Planning system.....	134
Pre-Vietnam strength.....	257
Public affairs, military strength, Air Force.....	282

R

Recruit and specialized training (table).....	128
Recruit training.....	129
Reduction in field grade officers.....	256
Reduction rate.....	60
Reduction recommendation.....	77
Air Force.....	78
Army.....	78
Navy.....	78
Reenlistment bonus, need for.....	70
Reforger.....	52
Related costs.....	140
Removal of a division from Europe, effect of.....	51
Reserves:	
Level.....	39
Reliance on.....	148
Utilization of.....	249

VIII

	Page
Responsibilities, delineation of.....	131
Responsibility for personnel assignment to Europe.....	141
Retention, family problems.....	247
Retired pay program (table).....	72
Retirement changes, implementing of.....	146
Retirement fund payment.....	47
Retirement pay, actuarial techniques.....	143
Retirement schedules.....	71
Retirement, unfunded.....	137
Liability (table).....	144

S

S. 3108.....	2-7
Sealift and airlift capabilities.....	147
Selected examples of military retired pay annuities (table).....	70
Selected service headquarters, mission:	
Air Force:	
Aeronautical Chart and Information Center.....	127
Aerospace Defense Command.....	127
Communications Service.....	126
Headquarters Command.....	127
Logistics Command.....	127
Major Command and Intermediate Headquarters.....	124
Military Airlift Command.....	126
Security Service.....	127
Special Investigations, Office of.....	127
Strategic Air Command.....	127
Systems Command.....	127
Tactical Air Command.....	127
Training Command.....	127
U.S. Air Force Europe.....	125
Army:	
Alaska (USARAL).....	116
Combat Development Command (USACDC).....	117
Continental Army Command.....	112
Fifth U.S. Army.....	114
First U.S. Army.....	113
Materiel Command.....	110
Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service.....	110
Pacific.....	116
Sixth U.S. Army.....	115
Southern Command (USARSO).....	117
Third U.S. Army.....	114
U.S. Army, Europe and 7th Army.....	115
Navy:	
Amphibious Squadron Commander.....	124
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED).....	118
Carrier Division Commander.....	124
Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training.....	119
Chief of Naval Air Training.....	119
Chief of Naval Materiel (CHNAVMA).....	118
Chief of Naval Personnel (CHNAVPER).....	118
Chief of Naval Reserve Training.....	119
Chief of Naval Technical Training.....	119
Chief of Naval Training.....	119
CINCLANTFLT.....	120
CINCPACFLT.....	120
CINCUSNAVEUR.....	120
COMASWFORLANT/COMASWFORPAC.....	121
COMCBLANT/COMCBPAC.....	123
COMCRUDESLANT/COMCRUDESPAC.....	122
COMFAIR.....	124
COMFIRSTFLT.....	120
COMIDEASTFOR.....	121

IX

Selected service headquarters, mission—Continued

Navy—Continued	Page
COMINELWARFOR	123
COMKEYWESTFOR	121
COMNAVAILANT	123
COMNAVIRPAC	123
COMNAVFORJAPAN	121
COMNAVFORKOREA	121
COMNAVFORV	122
COMNAVMIANAS	122
COMNAVSPUPFORANTAR	123
COMOPTVFOR	123
COMPHIBLANT	122
COMPHIBPAC	122
COMSEAFRON	122
COMSECFLT	121
COMSERVLANT	122
COMSERVPAC	122
COMSEVENTHFLT	121
COMSIXTHFLT	121
COMSOLANTFOR	121
COMSUBLANT/COMSUBPAC	123
COMTRALANT/COMTRAPAC	123
COMUSNAVPHIL	122
COMUSNAVSO	120
Destroyer Squadron Commander	124
Fleet Air Wings (FAW)	124
Intelligence Command	118
Military Sealift Command	119
Mine Warfare Squadron Commander	124
Oceanographer of the Navy	118
Naval District of Washington, D.C.	120
Recruiting Command	119
Strategic Systems Project Office	119
Submarine Squadron Commander	124
Weather Service	118
Senior officers in European command	55
Service headquarters military manning—June 30, 1971 (table)	90
Service headquarters military manpower and location :	
Air Force	103-105
Army	91-93
Marine Corps	102
Navy	94-101
SHAPE, Headquarters in	141
Ships and personnel in Europe	242
Shore establishments reduction, savings through	245
Sixth Fleet, personnel level	243
Smith, Senator Margaret Chase, prepared questions	43, 146, 291
Specialized training increase	128, 129
Squadrons in Europe	273
Station changes	138
Stennis, Senator John C., prepared questions	290
Stuttgart Command, elimination of	55
Submarine construction increased	247
Submarine personnel retention	248

T

Tactical Wing, savings if eliminated	266
Thurmond, Senator Strom, prepared questions	135, 289
Training establishment	262
Training program	260
Training requirements	129
Troops and equipment to Europe in case of war	53
Turnover of European personnel	57

X

	Page
Turnover rate -----	239, 240
Turnover rate of Army personnel in Europe -----	44
U	
Unified European command, need for -----	54
V	
Volunteers, rate of -----	240
W	
Wheeler, Maj. Gen. E. B., statement of -----	250
Actions to reduce strength -----	252
Savings -----	252
Enlisted grade structure -----	254
Force structure changes -----	255
Manning levels -----	256
Officer grade structure -----	253
Reduction in field grade officers -----	256
Total strength reductions -----	251
Units activated -----	255

