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**AUTHORIZATION FOR AVERAGE ANNUAL STRENGTHS  
FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972**

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**SUPPLEMENTAL MANPOWER  
HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**  
**UNITED STATES SENATE**

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

**H.R. 6531**


RELATING TO SELECTIVE SERVICE MILITARY COMPEN-  
SATION AND AVERAGE ANNUAL STRENGTHS FOR THE  
MILITARY SERVICES

APRIL 15, 1971

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**U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE**

**WASHINGTON : 1971**

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## ACTIVE DUTY MANPOWER AUTHORIZATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972

THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 1971

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 212, Old Senate Office Building, Hon. John C. Stennis (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Stennis, Symington, Smith, and Schweiker.

Also present: John T. Ticer, chief clerk; L. R. Garcia; Edward B. Kenney; Charles Cromwell, professional staff members; Nancy Bearg, research assistant; and R. J. Woolsey, general counsel.

The CHAIRMAN. We are meeting in executive session. I don't know how far ranging this may become on manpower, with the war, Europe, or any of the major categories. I wanted the freedom for the membership, for the Secretary, for a truly executive session. A lot of these questions are speculative, and I don't want it to be misinterpreted in any way that the committee is trying to strip from the armed manpower. I frankly think it perhaps ought to be reduced some, even in this bill, but we want to get down to the nub of these matters and see if we can develop the facts, and the committee will discuss them later.

(The opening statement of Senator Stennis follows:)

I want to welcome today Assistant Secretary of Defense Roger Kelley to testify on the active duty military personnel strengths recommended by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1972. These average active duty strengths are to be authorized this year for the first time under a provision of last year's procurement authorization bill.

This Committee will very shortly be considering these active duty strengths in our mark-up of H.R. 6531 together with amendments to the Selective Service Act and certain military pay increases.

Later today we will be hearing from Dr. Theodore C. Marrs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and Rear Admiral C. R. Bender, Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. They will be testifying on the Reserve Forces recommended by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1972. The Reserve Forces will be considered by this Committee during its deliberation on S. 939, the Defense Department Military Procurement Authorization Request for fiscal year 1972.

Secretary Kelley, this is the first time for you and for us in this matter of active duty manpower authorization. I understand that on your side this testimony requires extensive coordination within the Department of Defense since a number of offices are involved. There is also the complication that you work primarily with *end*-strengths, whereas the Act requires us to authorize in terms of *average* strengths. I believe our staffs can continue to work together and minimize any complications which this causes and can translate end strengths into average strengths before our Committee markup of the bill.

The Defense Department staff cooperation in the last few weeks has been most helpful to us. Still, there are some questions left unanswered and those that we don't have time to go into today we will submit to you in writing and hope that you can answer them promptly for us.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you have a prepared statement on the active duty military personnel strengths. We have never done this before. This committee, and the Appropriations Committee of which Senator Smith and I are both members, have passed on these matters in a way, but never in depth, as I recall, in years past. But it is a legislative function, and one particularly tied to this committee. So frankly, when the amendment was offered that we be required to do this on top of all these other matters, I thought it was relevant and we supported it.

How do you wish to proceed now? We want the entire statement in the record. You may read a summary if you wish, or you may give a summary, or you could read the whole statement if it is not too long.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS); ACCOMPANIED BY PHILIP A. ODEEN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS); ROBERT J. PRANGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY PLANS AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MATTERS) OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS); MAJ. GEN. LEO E. BENADE, USA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY) OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS); JONAS M. PLATT, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER UTILIZATION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS); FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS); BRIG. GEN. H. J. McCHRISTAL, JR., USA, DIRECTOR, PLANNING AND PROGRAMING ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; REAR ADM. J. G. FINNERAN, USN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; MAJ. GEN. E. B. WHEELER, USMC, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS; MAJ. GEN. W. W. BERG, USAF, DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE; AND JOHN R. QUETSCH, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to summarize my statement in the interest of conserving time.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a range where we have a reasonable amount of time, but you proceed.

Mr. KELLEY. The statement itself was, as far as possible, confined to the relevant information which you and members of the committee would be concerned with. Time available, I think it might be useful if I were to read the entire statement into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That will give us a chance to concentrate on our own thought on it, if that is the way you want to proceed.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, we appreciate the opportunity to appear before your committee in support of the President's request for average active duty manpower levels which are essential to the Defense Program for fiscal year 1972.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense has previously transmitted a special report to this committee entitled "Defense Military Manpower Requirements for fiscal year 1972." That report contains comprehensive and detailed justification for the President's request. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will now offer that document for inclusion in the record of today's hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be included in the record.

Mr. KELLEY. It contains a lot of comprehensive and important backup to the portion that will be in my statement. I would like to note that on page 33 of the report we have two typographical errors. The report shows that in the Air Force 413,000 personnel are utilized in general support in fiscal year 1971 and fiscal year 1972. The correct figures are 408,000 in fiscal year 1971 and 409,000 in fiscal year 1972, and are shown correctly in appendix I to the report.

(The document follows:)

## DEFENSE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972

### INTRODUCTION

Defense manpower is an essential resource needed to assure national security. The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, to safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and to protect its people. Through its foreign policy and collective security arrangements, the United States seeks an environment in which its security objective can be attained. It is the function of the President of the United States, as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief, to establish policy on broad strategic issues. This is done through a series of policies which relate to our treaty commitments and to other matters vital to the security of the United States. After consultation with his primary foreign policy, defense and military advisors the President sets forth a series of specific strategy directives, such as the "initial defense of NATO Europe," which provide guidance to military planners. Such strategy guidance is, in turn, expanded by the Secretary of Defense and provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services for use in force and manpower planning.

These strategy directives are then converted into military force requirements, or force structure and manpower requirements, in the following manner:

1. The threat is examined; detailed threat estimates are developed.
2. Against the threat, estimates are made of U.S. and allied forces needed to deter attack (i.e., prevent a potential aggressor from being confident that he could achieve his objectives at acceptable cost), or to defeat the enemy.
3. The present and future forces of our allies are then assessed.
4. U.S. forces are also assessed.
5. The combined U.S.-allied forces are then compared with the estimated forces needed.
6. Finally, our force planning is adjusted, and through diplomacy our allies are encouraged to change their force planning, so that our joint capabilities are adequate to achieve our objectives against the threat.

Having gone through the steps above, we have a statement of the forces we need. We must then determine our manpower needs to man and support those forces. We must answer such issues as: how many crews do we need; how many

men are needed to keep a plane serviced and flying; how much support does it take to keep a combat division in the field; what sort of headquarters does one need to direct the combat elements; what sort of training establishment must be maintained. How must this necessary manpower be distributed into forward deployed units, active units, and Reserve units in order to preserve the capability to deter or to respond to attack in a way whose timeliness is adequate to the threat, yet minimize the expense of maintaining adequate forces? Given an approved force goal of, for example, x aircraft and y divisions, the Air Force and the Army respectively are charged with meeting that goal through a combination of equipment, manpower and training. The Services must also take into account personnel policies as well as manpower force requirements. That is, men cannot be treated like machines and shuttled around on a schedule which would be "optimum" for meeting force requirements but would lower the morale of the Services or unreasonably and unnecessarily disrupt the family lives of the men involved.

Part I of this paper outlines the key policies and strategies which underlie our military force requirements. Part II depicts the military force by major categories (e.g., Strategic Forces, General Purpose Forces), and for each category explains how the forces are sized. Part III discusses the support base needed to maintain the required level of combat forces. Part IV discusses the reasons for the geographic location of our forces. Finally, Part V summarizes military manpower requirements in terms of end and average strengths.

## PART I

### KEY POLICY AND STRATEGY STATEMENTS

In his Report on Foreign Policy of February 25, 1971 President Nixon clearly enunciated a policy designed to move this country and the world toward a generation of peace based on the principles of partnership, strength and willingness to join in meaningful negotiations. This is the basic policy underlying and driving the national security strategy we call Realistic Deterrence.

To achieve these objectives, we must, at a minimum, assure that for the decade of the 1970s the United States:

1. Preserves a sufficient strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent.

2. Develops and/or continues maintenance of Free World forces that are effective, and minimizes the likelihood of requiring the employment of strategic nuclear forces should deterrence fail.

3. Designs an International Security Assistance Program that will enhance effective self-defense capabilities throughout the Free World and, when coupled with diplomatic and other actions, will encourage regional security agreements among our friends and allies.

#### *A. U.S. Nuclear Strategic Policy*

The President has set forth criteria for strategic sufficiency of U.S. strategic offensive and defensive nuclear forces. Defense planning objectives derived from these criteria currently include:

Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.

Providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis.

Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war.

Defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches.

#### *B. Theater Nuclear Forces*

A critical element of our deterrent and our ability to defend against a theater conflict are our theater nuclear forces. In Europe these forces, in conjunction with strategic nuclear forces, deter a Soviet theater nuclear attack and by increasing the uncertainty and risk of escalation help deter a non-nuclear attack. In Asia, theater nuclear forces, in conjunction with strategic nuclear forces, deter Chinese or Soviet theater nuclear threats and may help deter conventional attacks as well.

#### *C. U.S. General Purpose Forces*

The basic U.S. national strategy for general purpose forces requires that we be able concurrently to: (1) either conduct, with our NATO allies, a non-nuclear

initial defense of NATO Europe against a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack, or conduct with our allies, a defense against a CPR-backed aggression; (2) provide materiel, logistic, advisory, and intelligence support and, if necessary, limited U.S. combat force assistance to our Asian allies against non-CPR backed attacks; and (3) meet minor contingencies arising elsewhere in the world.

1. *NATO*.—Nuclear weapons alone cannot pose an adequate deterrent to conventional attack. Given the grave implications of nuclear use, an aggressor could be tempted to move with conventional forces, believing we would fail to respond with nuclear weapons. The advent of strategic parity and mutual strategic deterrence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union makes it even more vital that NATO have a credible conventional deterrent to attack by Warsaw Pact forces. Accordingly:

(a) Allied forces, including U.S. forces in Europe and reinforcements from the United States, must be capable of a strong and credible initial conventional defense against a full-scale attack, assuming a period of warning and military preparation by both sides. In addition, the immediate combat capability of NATO forces, both U.S. and allied, should also be enhanced to provide greater assurance of defending against attacks made after the Pact gains a lead in mobilization.

(b) All NATO partners should contribute their full share to the effort required to maintain an effective deterrent. The U.S. will continue to play a major and key role. But our allies must also do their part and cooperate in enhancing NATO's conventional force capabilities.

2. *Asia*.—In Asia, our policy is one of helping our allies develop and maintain the capability of defending themselves against threats short of a conflict involving Communist Chinese (CPR) or Soviet forces. We plan for materiel, logistics, and intelligence support, and backup tactical air and naval support. Moreover, we plan only a limited backup ground force capability for non-Chinese, non-Soviet supported contingencies. Our allies must accept primary responsibility for such contingencies. We will aid them but we will look to the nations threatened to assume primary responsibility for providing the manpower.

We also maintain the capability to assist our Asian allies against a CPR attack with conventional forces provided we are not fighting in Europe.

3. *Communist China*.—Whereas the existence of mutual deterrence at the strategic level between the United States and the Soviet Union may affect the extent to which our strategic forces serve as a deterrent to theater nuclear or conventional attacks by Soviet forces, it may be that our nuclear superiority with respect to the Communist Chinese, together with an effective area ABM defense, can contribute significantly to deterrence of CPR nuclear attacks, or even large conventional attacks, on our Asian Allies. However, we do desire that our Asian Allies strengthen their conventional forces, both to defend themselves against non-CPR attacks and, in regional conjunction, to build a defensive capability which might deter the CPR from initiating hostilities.

#### SUMMARY

The Nixon Doctrine requires that we take a total force approach. Accordingly, in considering the spectrum of potential conflict, we will be guided by the following principles in our defense planning:

In deterring *strategic nuclear war*, primary reliance will continue to be placed on U.S. strategic deterrent forces.

In deterring *theater nuclear war*, the U.S. also has primary responsibility, but certain of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities.

In deterring *theater conventional warfare*—for example, a major war in Europe—U.S. and allied forces should share the responsibility.

In deterring *sub-theater or localized warfare*, the country or ally which is threatened bears the primary burden, particularly for providing manpower, but when U.S. interests or obligations are at stake, we must be prepared to provide help as appropriate through military and economic assistance to those nations willing to assume their share of responsibility for their own defense. When required and appropriate, U.S. help would consist primarily of backup logistical support and sea and air combat support. In some special cases, it could include ground combat support as well.

#### PART II

##### FORCE LEVELS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

###### A. Introduction

The manpower levels requested for Fiscal Year (FY) 1972 are based on the mission forces we plan to operate and the support necessary to sustain these forces.

The force levels are, in turn, based on our foreign policy objectives and the national strategy approved by the President.

The following discussion depicts how the force levels shown in the FY 1972 Defense program were developed, and explains how the manpower needs of those forces were determined. The table below summarizes the Defense Department (DOD) active military manpower strength by mission category.

#### DOD MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

[Active duty end strengths in thousands; end of fiscal years]

	Fiscal year—		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Strategic forces.....	143	134	139
General Purpose Forces:			
Land Forces.....	747	652	591
Tactical Air Forces.....	188	173	170
Naval Forces.....	232	212	203
Mobility Forces.....	84	74	68
Total General Purpose Forces.....	1,251	1,111	1,032
Other mission forces:			
Intelligence and security.....	93	90	87
Communications.....	59	56	52
Research and development.....	39	38	34
Support to other nations.....	23	24	25
Total other mission forces.....	214	208	199
General support:			
Base and individual support.....	658	538	502
Training.....	617	538	471
Command.....	154	141	133
Logistics.....	29	29	29
Total general support.....	1,458	1,246	1,135
Total DOD.....	3,066	2,699	2,505

### B. Strategic Forces

Our strategic forces are the cornerstone of our deterrent against nuclear attack against the United States. In planning strategic forces, our objectives are derived from the sufficiency criteria established by the President. To satisfy these criteria, we strive to maintain reliable retaliatory forces, placing primary emphasis on measures that both reduce their vulnerability to attack and assure their penetration of Soviet defenses. In addition, we seek to provide reliable reconnaissance and early warning capabilities to minimize the likelihood and consequences of surprise, appropriate defensive forces to protect against both air and ballistic missile attack and effective and reliable command and control of these forces.

Since we rely on these forces for deterrence, we must ensure that they are adequate to convince all potential aggressors that nuclear attacks or nuclear blackmail of the US or its allies poses unacceptable risks to them.

Vigorous negotiation is a key element of our national strategy. Thus, we view the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as a vital adjunct to our strategic programs. But, because we cannot predict the outcome of SALT, we must maintain the capability to satisfy the sufficiency criteria with or without an agreement.

**1. Strategic Offensive Forces.**—The basis for our offensive force planning is the retaliatory capability of these forces. Our forces must be capable of absorbing a surprise Soviet first-strike and still be capable of destroying a significant fraction of the Soviet population and industrial base. To ensure high-confidence in our second-strike capability, we plan a mix of mutually supporting forces: land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. Such a force mix provides (1) assurance that a Soviet technological breakthrough against any one element will not negate the effectiveness of the entire force, (2) a hedge against widespread failures of any element due to unanticipated nuclear weapons effects, (3) a compounding of Soviet offensive and defensive problems in attempting to defeat or defend against US forces, and (4) reinforcement of the viability of each element by the presence of the other, thereby strengthening the credibility of the total deterrent posture.

Land-based missiles have a high alert rate, quick response capability, reliable command and control, and the capability to cover a broad range of targets.

Sea-based missiles offer dispersion and concealment, pose a threat from several directions with short time of flight, and because of their survivability are capable of extending responses over a long period of time.

Bombers can deliver large payloads with the accuracy needed to destroy hard targets, can restrike targets as necessary, and can provide damage assessment of earlier strikes. They also can perform tasks in nonnuclear war, such as their conventional bombing role in Southeast Asia. Air Force manpower increases slightly in FY 1971 and FY 1972 to improve bomber readiness by increasing flight training hours and by reducing B-52 and tanker vulnerability by dispersing alert aircraft to more inland bases.

For FY 1972, in the absence of a SALT agreement, the only significant numerical change that will take place in our strategic offensive forces is the inactivation of three B-52 squadrons. We currently plan to keep the aircraft from one of these inactivated squadrons, plus those of the two B-52D squadrons in Southeast Asia, as rotational aircraft to support our mission requirements in that area.

We are continuing the program to deploy MIRVs in our Minuteman and Poseidon missiles. We consider this program essential to preserve the credibility of U.S. deterrent forces when faced with the growing strategic threat. Should part of our missile force be unexpectedly and severely degraded by Soviet preemptive action, the increased number of warheads provided by the remaining MIRV missiles will ensure that we have enough warheads to attack essential soft urban/industrial targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the MIRV program gives us increased confidence in our ability to penetrate current and projected Soviet ABM defenses, even if part of our missile force were destroyed.

Although we are continuing development work on two new strategic offensive systems, the Undersea Launched Missile System (ULMS) and the B-1 manned bomber, they will not be deployed in FY 1972 and no operational manpower is provided for them.

The table below shows the forces we have programmed:

	Fiscal year—		
	1970	1971	1972
<b>Strategic offensive forces:</b>			
<b>Bombers:</b>			
B-52 (AA).....	513	501	450
FB-111 (AA).....	4	68	71
<b>Missile launchers:</b>			
Titan II.....	54	54	54
Minuteman.....	1,000	1,000	1,000
Polaris/Poseidon.....	656	656	656
Ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN).....	41	41	41
<b>Active military manpower (thousands):</b>			
Navy.....	18	18	18
Air Force.....	73	74	77

2. *Strategic Defensive, Control and Surveillance Forces.*—These forces consist primarily of the Safeguard ABM system, our warning and surveillance systems, and the CONUS air defense units. During fiscal year 1972, we will make certain reductions in the current air defense forces, primarily in surface-to-air missiles, but we will maintain our aircraft early warning capability and continue research and development to provide effective bomber defenses. The major change planned for these forces in fiscal year 1972 is a reduction in the number of NIKE-HERCULES missile batteries. Our current air defense posture has two major deficiencies: limited effectiveness and lack of survivability. In order to correct these deficiencies we have embarked on research and development programs on improved air defenses. The Budget includes research and development funds for two key systems: the CONUS Over-the-Horizon radar (OTH-B) and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). We may need to modernize our air defenses with these new systems in the late 1970s. No manpower is programmed for these systems in fiscal year 1972, however.

This program also includes ballistic missile early warning systems, the satellite early warning system, and related command and control centers. These systems provide the essential capability to alert our retaliatory and defense forces, and provide the means by which the President exercises control of the U.S. response.

Strategic defensive forces will include the SAFEGUARD system which we are currently developing to defend against ballistic missile attack. Since SAFEGUARD will not reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in fiscal year 1972, no operational manpower is provided.

The programmed forces and manpower are shown below:

	Fiscal year—		
	1970	1971	1972
Strategic defensive, control, and surveillance forces:			
Interceptor squadrons:			
Active Air Force .....	14	11	11
Air National Guard .....	17	16	16
Surface-to-air missile batteries:			
Active Army .....	40	21	21
Army National Guard .....	38	27	27
Active Air Force .....	5	5	5
Active military manpower (thousands):			
Army .....	9	6	6
Navy .....	1	1	6
Air Force .....	43	35	31

### C. Mission of General Purpose Forces

About 40% of total US military manpower in FY 1972, or slightly over one million men, is attributable to the Land, Naval, Mobility, and Tactical Air Forces which comprise our General Purpose Forces.

The size and mix of General Purpose Forces (GPF) are not driven by the need to defend the territory of the United States. Rather, these forces are maintained to support other nations under commitments predicated upon two policy judgments which have been in force for over a decade and through four Administrations. These policies are: (1) that the security of our own nation is inextricably tied to a forward defense and thus to the security of our allies; and (2) that strategic nuclear forces, in and of themselves, cannot be relied upon to provide a credible deterrent or a reasonable response to the entire spectrum of aggression which we must be prepared to face.

As noted earlier, our General Purpose Forces are sized so that the United States will be prepared for an initial defense of NATO Europe or a joint defense of Asia and to assist allies in Asia against a non-CPR attack, while providing forces for a relatively minor contingency and for a strategic reserve. In our force planning, we do not attempt to build forces to meet every possible contingency or to become engaged in numerous different areas simultaneously. Our conventional forces are designed so that major operations in one theater must be conducted at the expense of the major capability in the other. By sizing our forces to meet certain major threats, we expect to be able to handle lesser threats with the same forces.

1. *Land Forces for Theater Conflict.*—Total active land forces manpower depends on the number of divisions in the force and how ready they are for combat. Each division is composed of battalion-size elements of roughly similar structure that fight (e.g., infantry, armor, and artillery battalions); that prepare the battlefield and help the fighting elements to maneuver and communicate (e.g., combat engineer, signal and aviation battalions); and that supply feed and administer the fighting troops and maintain their equipment (e.g., medical, supply and transportation, and maintenance battalions).

The fighting elements are structured according to their respective modes of combat (e.g., infantry, amphibious, airmobile). The other divisional elements are tailored to support the particular type of division, the quantity and type of equipment employed in combat, and the types and numbers of troops in the fighting element.

The division is designed to fight, but if it is to be sustained in combat, additional troop elements are needed. The sustaining elements are normally battalion and company-sized troop units that provide the added (e.g., communication, logistic, transportation, construction, maintenance) services that keep the division fighting. The sustaining increments are tailored to fit the particular nature of combat, the environment in which it is taking place, and the supporting facilities which exist there. On average, the sustaining increments include roughly twice the total manpower found in the division. This is the result of military judgment and experience concerning what it takes to keep the division fighting in sustained operations; fewer sustaining troops would mean the division's fighting strength would be diminished by the need to assign sustaining functions to its own troops.

A division's readiness for combat depends in part on how completely it is manned; the same is true of sustaining increments. In peacetime, for efficiency, we do not man our combat units at 100% of the strength required for combat. For example, the NATO units are manned at about 90% of full combat strength. During an emergency or mobilization, these units would be brought to full strength by a variety of measures which would draw upon the pipeline and non-committed units for combat replacements.

Land forces manpower and the number of divisions manned for FY 1970, FY 1971, and FY 1972 are shown below.

Land forces	Fiscal year	Estimated	
	1970 (actual)	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Army divisions:			
Active.....	17½	13½	13½
Reserve.....	8	8	8
Active manpower (thousands).....	649	565	501
Marine Corps divisions:			
Active.....	3	3	3
Reserve.....	1	1	1
Active manpower (thousands).....	94	82	87

<sup>1</sup> Marine Corps division strength includes helicopter squadrons from the air wings.

We have determined the requirement for land forces by analyzing the total package of allied and US troops needed in a particular region to provide a credible deterrent against the ground force threat to that region. The three regions of most concern and potential danger are Europe and the Mediterranean, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The level of allied and US troops needed is generally lower than the threat level, because it is assumed our forces are on the defensive. An examination of the threat has revealed that the defense of Western Europe is more demanding than that of Asia. Together with our allies, our force levels are sufficient to defend in Europe, and are clearly sufficient to defend in Asia, provide we are not simultaneously faced with a crisis in Europe. In the unlikely event of such an occurrence, our commitment to Europe would take precedence. Even while fighting in Asia, we will maintain the capability to provide, together with our NATO allies, an adequate defense of Europe, although at the possible expense of an adequate defense in Asia.

#### (a) NATO

Our NATO commitment to the common defense of Western Europe is the most significant factor in determining the size of our land forces. Fundamentally, this has been the case for the past ten years, and based on extensive analysis, three successive Secretaries of Defense have concluded that a conventional defense of Western Europe against a full scale conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact is both feasible and desirable.

USSR and other Warsaw Pact forces facing NATO probably have as their basic objectives the defense of the territories of the Pact members against direct military threats and the maintenance of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. While these forces also pose a substantial military threat to NATO, a war is not presently considered likely in Europe. We assume that the Soviets are deterred from attacking NATO by the high risk that a conventional conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would escalate to the level of a general nuclear war and pose grave risks to the Soviet State itself. But now that the USSR has achieved strategic nuclear parity with the United States, it is essential that NATO's conventional and tactical nuclear forces at the lower levels of conflict be maintained so that the Pact would lack sufficient confidence that an attack against NATO would be successful in achieving the objectives sought, or believe that even if the objectives were attained, the losses involved would be unacceptable.

#### (1) The Warsaw Pact Threat

While we do not consider an unprovoked aggression by the USSR likely, the fact remains that the Soviets have a vital interest in preserving the status quo in Central Europe and in retaining their hold on Eastern Europe. A crisis that could lead to a conflict could arise if the political situation substantially changed in a way which threatened the USSR, or if a Soviet government saw opportunities for a way to apply critical pressures on the cohesion of the Alliance. Such a crisis could escalate to hostilities.

Whatever the immediate cause, the crisis could trigger localized hostilities or mobilization by the Pact and NATO. Even at that stage, both sides might desire to avoid or extinguish any hostilities to avoid the risk of escalation.

## (2) NATO Conventional Defense

Given the large, in-place Warsaw Pact forces, their rapid mobilization capability, and their ability to launch an attack with limited warning, the feasibility of a conventional defense by NATO has often been questioned. This issue was given very detailed examination over the past year, both by the US Government and NATO. The results of these studies were summarized by the President in his Foreign Policy Report, in which he stated:

"The economic strength of the NATO Nations, we found, makes us considerably stronger in military potential than the Warsaw Pact. We and our allies collectively enjoy a three-fold advantage in Gross National Product and a two-fold advantage in population.

"The actual balance of conventional military forces in Europe is much closer, however. NATO's active forces in peacetime are roughly comparable to those of the Warsaw Pact. Following mobilization, NATO is capable of maintaining forces larger than the Warsaw Pact. But geographic proximity and differences in domestic systems give the Warsaw Pact the significant advantage of being able to mobilize its reserves and reinforce more rapidly than NATO.

"Our strategic review illuminated the need for specific qualitative improvements. Several components of our posture require additional attention: the sheltering of our tactical aircraft, our logistical stocks and transport, the peacetime disposition of Allied equipment; our armored and anti-armor forces; our overall maritime capabilities, particularly for anti-submarine defense; our machinery for mobilization and reinforcement; and NATO communications for crisis management purposes. Our studies have shown that many improvements in these areas can be made at acceptable costs."

NATO has a major conventional capability and, under many circumstances, should be able to stop a Pact attack. This capability could be enhanced significantly by the force improvement actions now being considered by each of the NATO countries.

In-place NATO forces are roughly comparable to those of the Pact immediately available in the Central Region. An exception is the armored forces where the Pact has an advantage. After a period of mobilization, NATO has an advantage in total manpower and certain major equipment items. Nevertheless, the Pact retains a substantial advantage in the number of tanks in their forces.

If NATO is to deter the Warsaw Pact from judging that offensive military action is an attractive option during a period of political crisis, the NATO peacetime forces must possess a total capability close to that of the Pact. As long as there is no major imbalance in strength between the two opposing sides, neither one can realistically assume that the initiation of hostilities is an attractive means of achieving some political objective. The current deployment of NATO forces is considered adequate to deny the Warsaw Pact high confidence that a Pact attack would be successful.

Quantitatively, US forces constitute a large, but not the major, portion of NATO's M-Day force in the Center Region. During peacetime, the US maintains 4½ Army divisions in Europe. In the event of war, we must plan for the mobilization of the reserves both to supply the forces necessary for NATO and also to maintain our strategic reserves.

The adequacy of NATO's land forces have been carefully analyzed through field exercises, war games, and computer simulations. Within reasonable bounds of tolerance, the NATO forces, both in their current peacetime deployment posture and mobilization posture, have been judged adequate to deprive the Pact of assurance of a successful outcome should the Pact initiate hostilities. However, important weaknesses in NATO's conventional capabilities have been pinpointed and an active effort is underway to solve these problems. Once these improvements are made, NATO's deterrent and combat power will be significantly enhanced.

In summary, certain critical factors related to our land force contributions to NATO have been established. They are as follows:

- (a) NATO has on balance an adequate conventional deterrent force. Any substantial reduction in US forces would seriously change the balance,
- (b) Our forces in Europe play a key role both in assuring our allies of our commitment and adding to NATO's defensive power during the critical initial period of mobilization,

(c) Reductions in our Europe-based forces would not save any significant amount of money unless the withdrawn forces were eliminated. Such action would further reduce our flexibility to meet other contingencies and make it impossible for us to meet our NATO commitment.

(b) *Asia*

In Asia, our primary objective is to help our allies develop and maintain the capability of defending themselves against threats short of an invasion supported by Communist Chinese or Soviet forces. We plan for materiel, logistics, and intelligence support, and backup tactical air and naval support. We plan for only a limited backup ground force capability for non-Chinese, non-Soviet supported contingencies. We also maintain the capability to assist our allies against a CPR attack with conventional forces in Asia, provided we are not fighting in Europe. In the event of a conflict in Asia, we would draw on those forces in CONUS maintained either for a NATO conflict or as part of our unallocated strategic reserve. By calling Reserve and Guard forces to active duty, we would rebuild our capability to meet our NATO commitment. Our strategy does not require us to support large forces earmarked solely for Asia. In keeping with the Nixon Doctrine, our long-term policy places more reliance upon our allies.

2. *Tactical Air Forces.*—The most demanding situation for tactical air forces is, of course, in NATO. Our tactical air theater force requirements for NATO are largely determined by planning for US and allied conventional forces, which after a period of warning and of mobilization will be able to defend NATO Europe against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack. We and our allies also must ensure an ability to sustain the deployed forces through control of the air and sea lanes.

In Asia we plan to maintain a long-term tactical air support capability in order to assist our allies. In addition, if a large land war involving the CPR should occur in Asia, we must be prepared to respond initially using our non-NATO committed forces as well as portions of those forces based in the United States and earmarked for NATO.

Based on an assessment of the national strategy, likely threats and available resources, we have programmed the tactical air forces shown in the table below:

PROGRAMED U.S. TACTICAL AIR FORCES  
[Authorized Active Inventory for End Fiscal Years]<sup>1</sup>

	2 1970	1971	1972
Active attack and fighter aircraft:			
Air Force.....	2,410	2,258	2,168
Air force wings.....	(23)	(21)	(21)
Navy.....	1,562	1,342	1,303
Navy attack wings.....	(13)	(12)	(11)
Attack carriers (CVA).....	(15)	(14)	<sup>3</sup> (13)
Marine Corps.....	502	556	554
Marine Corps wings.....	(3)	(3)	(3)
Subtotal active forces.....	4,414	4,156	4,025
Reserve attack and fighter aircraft:			
Air National Guard.....	659	741	740
Navy-Marine Corps Reserves.....	352	354	328
Subtotal Reserve Forces.....	1,011	1,095	1,068

<sup>1</sup>AAI for the USAF includes UE, CCTS, O.T. & E., 10 percent command support, plus test and test support aircraft. For the USN and USMC, AAI includes UE, CRAW, 15 percent pipeline, other program 288, plus R.D.T. & E. aircraft. For the Reserve Forces, AAI includes UE plus CCT (ANG only), and 10 percent command support or 15 percent pipeline as appropriate.

<sup>2</sup> Represents average operating number actually experienced in fiscal year 1970 rather than programed AAI.

<sup>3</sup> Includes 12 CVA and 1 CV for fiscal year 1972.

Tactical air forces have the ability to carry out a variety of missions. The attack mission is perhaps the most critical, providing highly mobile firepower which can be concentrated quickly to counter an aggressor's inherent advantage of being able to mass forces where he chooses to attack. Different types of attack missions are best categorized by their proximity to friendly ground forces. Close air support missions are flown against targets close to and in direct support of friendly troops. Interdiction missions are flown against (1) enemy forces maneuvering behind their front lines, (2) enemy lines of communication, (3) enemy airbases, and (4) the command and support elements and storage and production facilities in the rear areas of each enemy field army.

For attack capabilities to be effective, tactical air forces also must be able to gain the air superiority needed to permit air support of our forces. Aided by surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery, these same fighters protect our forces from enemy air attack. The criticality of this air superiority/defense mission is dependent on the situation. While not critical during the current SEA conflict, it could be crucial in a NATO war.

If we are to be confident that our tactical air forces are adequate, a favorable balance must be struck between different mission capabilities. In addition we need sufficient flexibility to meet less likely, but nonetheless important, demands.

The issues involved in force planning are further complicated by the need to make the best use of assets already on hand and to compensate for the varying capabilities of our friends and allies to contribute to their own defense. For example, while our NATO Allies together have versatile tactical air forces about as large as the tactical forces we could deploy after mobilization, our Asian Allies generally have small air forces with limited capability. In addition, the levels of training and support of many of the allied air forces need improvement. Our technically advanced allies are surely able to provide fully capable air forces, but other allies can maintain credible air forces only with U.S. assistance.

To determine the requirements for U.S. tactical air forces, the likely enemy threat must first be determined. Then the capability of U.S. forces to deploy and reinforce our allies is calculated. Finally, the mix of aircraft by type and whether they would be land or sea based depends on the circumstances of the particular contingency. For example, in a conflict limited to Central Europe, we would rely almost entirely on land based aircraft. In addition, given the major Pact air threat we would have to give emphasis to the air defense mission. In a contingency in a less developed area, we might have to rely primarily on sea based forces because of the lack of suitable airfields. Also we might give primary emphasis to attack aircraft since the hostile air threat would be limited.

In the planning of our tactical air forces we rely heavily on the Reserve and Guard. The Reserve components maintain a large and ready tactical air capability, which could be mobilized and committed to combat very quickly. Therefore, in our planning we consider these Reserve component forces in essentially the same manner as those of the active forces. Because of the reduction in the size of the active duty forces now underway, the Reserve forces are receiving more modern equipment which will substantially enhance their capability and effectiveness in a conflict.

Once we determine the overall level of forces, where and how we operate them determines their level of activity (e.g., sorties and flying hours). We have a well developed and systematic way of then calculating how much manpower is needed to man the force at the specified activity levels. For example, manpower needs for an Air Force F-4 tactical fighter squadron capable of flying 56.5 hours per aircraft per month are calculated as follows:

*Flight Crews.*—we need 60 pilot/navigators to fly the 24 squadron aircraft the desired number of sorties (allowing for sufficient crew rest between sorties).

*Maintenance Crews.*—based on engineering criteria, we need about 32 maintenance manhours for each aircraft flying hour. This amounts to 401 maintenance men per F-4 squadron.

*Munition Crew.*—based on workload standards, we need 6.5 munitions men per squadron aircraft, or 156 men per squadron.

*Weapons Security.*—55 men per squadron based on workload standards.

*Supervision and Wing Overhead.*—based on historical criteria, we provide 49 men for squadron supervision and the squadron contribution to wing overhead.

Based on these calculations for an average F-4 unit, we need 721 military men per F-4 squadron.

Similar sets of factors are applied to each type of tactical air unit. The total manpower for these fighter units when combined with the manpower needed for tactical support units (e.g., Tactical Air Control Systems) comprises the total tactical air forces manpower requirements shown below:

## TACTICAL AIR FORCES

Active military manpower (thousands)	Fiscal year—		
	1970	1971	1972
Navy.....	65	63	61
Marine Corps.....	31	28	29
Air Force.....	92	82	81
Total DOD.....	188	173	171

### 3. Naval Forces.—

#### (a) Threat

In the event of a conventional war, the United States must possess the capability to support and reinforce our allies and our own deployed forces. In sustained conflicts overseas in which the United States might be involved either directly or indirectly, U.S. forces would depend on free access to and use of the sea lines of communications. The defense of NATO is critically dependent on a major reinforcement of combat troops and the provision of equipment, POL, and supplies, the majority of which must come by sea.

Soviet naval forces in the north pose a significant threat to shipping destined for NATO. The Northern Fleet is the largest Soviet fleet and the only one of the three Soviet European fleets with unimpeded access to the open ocean. In times of crisis, the Soviets might seek to augment the Northern Fleet with units from the Baltic. However, such augmentation would be difficult to achieve in war. The Soviet Pacific Fleet also poses a threat since it can be deployed to other areas.

Naval forces might also be needed to counter the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO's flanks. On the southern flank, for example, the Pact could launch an offensive against Greece and European Turkey, supported by the Soviet theater forces from the Odessa Military District. The Soviet Black Sea fleet and Mediterranean squadron would be important to such an offensive. The Black Sea fleet can also support land operations and conduct limited amphibious assault operations in the Black Sea.

#### (b) Planning Assumptions

Our planning for general purpose naval forces begins with estimates of U.S. and allied land and tactical air force needed to meet alternative objectives in various areas of the world. Force requirements, by theater, are needed for two reasons. First, our planning considers the need for amphibious assaults. Second, U.S. and allied forces committed to conflicts in various theaters determine, to a large extent, the amount of military support shipping for which we must plan. Estimates of the need for tactical air also relate to the number and location of operating aircraft carriers. Finally, economic support shipping will also have to be protected.

We size our Navy to support forward deployments as necessary, and to provide sufficient protection for our amphibious assault forces, convoys, support forces, and aircraft carriers. We plan protection for these four elements against surface, submarine, and air threats in those areas where we might expect to operate. The best number and mix of protection and support forces depends upon the size and sophistication of the expected threat, which, in turn, is area-dependent.

There are five major considerations affecting naval forces which do not depend on the level of wartime activity in any one theater. The first, is the degree of simultaneity of operations in the Atlantic and the Pacific. Forces planned for sufficiency in one ocean might also be sufficient in the other since, given enough time, naval forces are capable of transmitting between oceans. However, any war with the Soviet Union may be a two-ocean war. It is therefore necessary to plan U.S. naval forces world-wide.

The second major consideration is the degree of simultaneity of naval activities within one theater or ocean. For example, if individual carriers operate independently of one another in separate locations instead of in multi-carrier task forces, the number of escorts and underway replenishment ships needed will change.

The third major consideration is the extent of Soviet involvement. Soviet naval forces are designed specifically to counter the U.S. Navy since the U.S. is the only other country possessing a formidable world-wide Navy.

The fourth major consideration is that Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) force requirements depend on geography (e.g., for ASW aircraft, attack submarines) or on the number of forces to be protected (e.g., for naval escorts) as well as the number of Soviet submarines or on the level of wartime activity.

A fifth consideration is availability of forward bases. For example, due to transit times involved, forward basing of submarines in England allows manning of northern barriers with fewer submarines than if basing in the United States were required. The same is true of support ships. The closer to the area of operations that they can resupply, the fewer are required to maintain the same level of support.

Finally, our planning must consider the contribution of allied naval forces. This is particularly true of surface ships and air ASW where our NATO and Asian Allies have forces which, in some cases, are as capable as U.S. ships and ASW aircraft.

Naval forces are designed around projection and sea control missions which determine the three major components of the U.S. Navy: (1) amphibious assault ships which project U.S. military power ashore, (2) aircraft carriers which project tactical air power ashore and protect the sea lanes, and (3) protection forces (submarines, surface ships, and aircraft). Requirements for underway replenishment ships and other naval support forces depend almost entirely upon the number and deployments of CVAs and amphibious assault forces planned.

(c) *Programmed Forces*

The next table shows the naval forces programmed for FY 1972. Their contribution to conventional defense, based on the criteria described in the above sections, has been assessed by specific region or task.

NAVAL FORCES (END OF FISCAL YEAR)

Forces	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Attack carriers (CVA) <sup>1</sup> .....	14	<sup>2</sup> 13
ASW carriers (CVS).....	4	3
ASW carrier air groups (CVSG).....	4	4
Attack submarines.....	101	93
Surface combatants.....	226	227
Amphibious lift (marine amphibious forces).....	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$

<sup>1</sup> Manpower for CVA's and associated air wings are included in tactical Air Forces.

<sup>2</sup> Includes 12 CVA and 1 CV for fiscal year 1972.

(b) *Naval Forces Manpower Requirements*

Once the force levels are determined, the force manpower requirements must be developed. The first need is to compute the number of operating positions that must be continuously manned by watch-standers in order to permit the ship to carry out her mission under wartime conditions. The next step is to apply engineering criteria to determine how many maintenance manhours are needed to sustain the ship's wartime capabilities. These maintenance manhours are then translated into manpower requirements using standard workweek and productivity factors. (The standard workweek for a watch-stander at sea is 74 hours.) Finally, administrative and support personnel (such as cooks) are added, based on prescribed work standards. These requirements are further subdivided by pay grade to provide the proper mix of skill levels and to provide for command and supervision. Thus, a DDG-2 class destroyer has a manpower requirement of 338 personnel. Of these, 19 are officers, 16 are Chief Petty officers, and 303 are other enlisted grades. One-hundred eighty-nine of the 338 men are required to continuously man operational positions, and the remainder are needed for maintenance, administration and support. Aircraft squadrons are similarly manned based on the air crews, maintenance, and support personnel needed to support the wartime flying rate. All of these individual requirements for each ship and squadron are summed to determine the total manpower needed for Naval Forces. These requirements are shown below:

NAVAL FORCES MANPOWER

[In thousands]

Navy active duty military manpower	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Fiscal year (estimated)—	
		1971	1972
Antisubmarine and fleet air defense forces.....	127	125	125
Amphibious ship forces.....	43	36	34
Navy support forces.....	62	49	44
Total naval forces.....	232	210	203

#### D. Mobility Forces

1. *Introduction.*—Mobility forces are comprised of strategic and tactical airlift, sealift, pre-positioned equipment, and mobility support forces including air and sea terminals. Specialized forces such as aero-medical evacuation, aero-space rescue, and air weather service are also included. The following discussion concentrates on strategic airlift and sealift, and tactical airlift.

2. *Strategic Mobility Forces.*—The size and composition of the strategic airlift and sealift forces and pre-positioned equipment is determined by the potential need to deploy and support combat forces in a contingency. Based on detailed analysis and planning, we have developed a mix of strategic airlift, sealift and pre-positioned equipment which will enable us to respond to a spectrum of possible contingencies. Our most rapid response is obtained through a combination of airlift and pre-positioned equipment. Commercial aircraft would be used to move the bulk of the troops to the pre-positioned equipment, with a combination of military and commercial aircraft employed to move equipment which is not pre-positioned. Airlift would also move most of the support equipment for tactical air forces. Additionally, it could be used to move some entire divisions from the United States to the contingency area, and provide follow-on air delivery of critically needed supplies.

We rely very heavily on sealift to move the bulk of our equipment and supplies. Massive lift capability is essential. For example, although the equipment for an infantry division weighs only 30,000 tons, the equipment required for the supporting units for the division weighs 86,000 tons. The division and its support units consume supplies at the rate of 1,300 tons per day when in sustained combat.

Despite pre-positioning of equipment and significant advances in strategic airlift capability as the C-5A enters the airlift force, there remains a critical shortage of sealift assets. The U.S. Merchant Marine is rapidly shrinking and the majority of its new cargo ships are container ships. Consequently, there is a need for more responsive sealift to bring the capability of ground forces to bear in a contingency as early as possible. Towards this end, we are attempting to acquire ten multipurpose ships which would provide controlled responsive sealift.

3. *Tactical Airlift.*—The tactical airlift force consists of the Air Force C-7, C-123, and C-130 aircraft. The primary function of tactical airlift is to provide a Line of Communication (LOC) within the combat theater which can supplement the surface lines of communication. If secure surface lines of communication are available, it is significantly cheaper to use them instead of airlift. However, there are many situations where the surface LOC is either unavailable or insecure. This has been quite common in Vietnam, particularly in the mid-1960s. As a result we have had to rely on tactical airlift in Vietnam at an unprecedented level.

In analyzing future requirements for tactical airlift, we must start with estimates of the capability and security of the surface LOC, using our Vietnam experience as a reference point. In 1965-1966 between 20 and 25% of all line haul cargo moved in South Vietnam went by air. By 1970 less than 10% moved by air. In 1965, 65% of all line haul cargo moved by water in South Vietnam.

However, in a country that does not have the long coast line or internal water ways possessed by South Vietnam, it is quite possible that we would have to move an even greater percent of our cargo by air than we did in South Vietnam. Thus, we plan to be able to move some resupply cargo by air in the early stages of a possible future contingency in an undeveloped area. In contrast, for a NATO contingency, we would expect to make good use of Europe's sophisticated surface lines of communications, and would move by air only part of the resupply cargo required by the combat divisions. Our current tactical airlift forces are adequate to meet the demands for either contingency.

4. *Mobility Force Levels and Manpower Requirements.*—The table below displays the current program for selected major Mobility Force components. The Navy military manpower requirements is quite small since the ships operated by the Military Sealift Command are civilian manned. Manpower for Navy tactical support airlift are included in Naval Forces requirements. Army military manpower requirements are primarily for the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) which is the DOD operating agency for surface transportation. Manpower is also provided in this category for the Navy and Air Force Weather and Oceanographic services.

## MOBILITY FORCES AND MANPOWER (END OF FISCAL YEARS)

	Fiscal year—		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
<b>Forces:</b>			
Active strategic airlift (AAI).....	334	329	339
Troop ships, cargo ships, and tankers.....	113	105	98
Active tactical airlift (AAI).....	651	549	417
Navy/Marine Corps tactical airlift (AAI).....	152	138	134
Reserve/Guard airlift (AAI):			
Air Force.....	367	313	288
Navy/Marine Corps.....	58	51	48
<b>Active military manpower (thousands):</b>			
Army.....	2	2	2
Navy.....	3	3	3
Air Force.....	78	69	63
<b>Total DOD.....</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>68</b>

*E. Sub-Theater Conflict, Contingencies and Strategic Reserves*

We must face the prospect that conflicts running from localized insurgency or guerrilla warfare to the type of conventional attack which North Korea itself could mount against South Korea will continue to threaten the security of our friends and allies through the 1970s. We have chosen this year to discuss such potential conflict separately from large-scale conflict directly involving the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, or the Chinese Peoples' Republic. Such a distinction between theater and sub-theater conflict may be considered artificial by some, particularly in the case of an intense localized conflict such as the war in Southeast Asia. It is important, however, because under the Nixon Doctrine, as exemplified by the Vietnamization Program, we believe that our allies can and must increasingly bear the primary burden for planning to cope with sub-theater and localized conflicts.

However, as we move in this direction under President Nixon's Strategy for Peace, there may be situations where only U.S. capabilities would provide the flexibility of action which may be necessary in the future. Therefore, in addition to the forces required for a NATO or Asian conflict, we also maintain added forces for a limited contingency elsewhere in the world. This force also provides a hedge (a strategic reserve) should the actual force requirements for theater conflict exceed those we estimate would be required. We also maintain certain special mission forces for specific needs in selected areas. This category includes the separate brigades located in Alaska, Panama and Berlin.

As was noted in the discussion of forces for NATO and Asia, we would need to call the Reserve and Guard Forces to active duty in the event of a major crisis or conflict. The Army's high readiness National Guard brigades are planned for early commitment. The Marine Reserve division also can be mobilized rapidly and would be available for early employment. The other Guard divisions take longer to ready for combat but would be available for reinforcement in Europe or another threatened theater.

*F. Other Mission Forces*

Although an important element of our national military posture, other mission forces constitute a small fraction of our total manpower and their size is determined separately from the major mission forces. The table below breaks out other mission forces manpower by major category.

## OTHER MISSION FORCES

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year—		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Intelligence and security.....	93	90	87
Communications.....	59	56	53
Research and development.....	39	38	34
Support to other nations.....	23	24	25
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>199</b>

1. *Intelligence and Security.*—This category includes the centralized intelligence gathering agencies of the Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency. Tactical intelligence units are a part of the mission forces and are not included here. The intelligence information developed by these units is used for strategic planning and serves as the basis for threat estimates. We plan these activities on a completely integrated basis to ensure that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort. As a result of centralized direction, manpower efficiencies have been possible without a reduction in intelligence effectiveness.

2. *Communications.*—This category is made up of the centralized communications systems of the Services and the Defense Communications Agency providing the backbone common-user system for all elements of DOD. This program is also centrally managed in order to avoid duplication of effort and to improve the responsiveness of the communication system to our national command authorities. As a result of our improved management, we have reduced the manpower needed to support our communications systems without reducing our capabilities.

3. *Research and Development.*—It is essential that the United States maintains a solid technological base so that we can respond quickly to changes in the nature of the threats our forces must face. By remaining abreast of new technologies and retaining the option of rapid development and production if the threat materializes, a strong and viable R&D program makes it possible for us to avoid the deployment of costly new weapon systems to meet uncertain threats. The military personnel assigned to R&D perform technical and management duties at laboratories and development activities, and provide program support such as developmental aircraft units and experimental troop units. Our R&D program is also centrally managed to ensure the most efficient use of scarce technical resources.

4. *Support to Other Nations.*—This category consists of Military Assistance groups and international military headquarters. In conjunction with the Department of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the host nation, each assistance activity is individually tailored to meet the needs of the country to which it is assigned. In view of the emphasis placed in the Nixon Doctrine on helping our allies help themselves, this program has increased slightly. Most of the increase is related to the Vietnamization program.

5. *Other Mission Manpower Summary by Services.*—The table below displays manpower by service. The differences in distribution of Other Mission manpower between services is due to differences in missions and also, to some degree, differences in cost allocation procedures.

#### OTHER MISSION FORCES

[Active duty end strengths in thousands]

	Fiscal year—		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Army.....	72	74	69
Navy.....	42	42	41
Marine Corps.....	2	2	2
Air Force.....	98	90	87
Total.....	214	208	199

### PART III

#### GENERAL SUPPORT MANPOWER

Support activities must be able to sustain the mission forces in peacetime at desired levels of readiness. In addition, they must be capable of meeting a range of wartime demands well above peacetime levels. General support functions are grouped into four categories: (1) Individual and Base Support, (2) Training, (3) Command, and (4) Logistics.

The number of support people needed depends on the force levels, their activity rates, and their manning levels. As a result, general support manpower needs are reduced as force levels decline. Moreover, demands during wartime are greater than in peacetime. The combination of these two factors will result in a reduction of 22% in general support manpower from end FY 70 to end FY 72. The FY 72 level will be 32% below the peak SEA conflict levels of 1968.

Because of the far greater demands for general support functions in wartime, many forces that fall in this category are maintained in the Reserve components, available for recall in an emergency. However, the peacetime structure must be adequate to handle minor contingency situations without a Reserve recall and to serve as a core for the greatly expanded support needs of a mobilization situation.

Support activities are discussed below by major category:

**A. Individual and Base Support.**—This category includes the manpower needed for base operations and personnel support and is grouped into the following sub-categories:

1. *Base Operations manpower* operate and maintain our worldwide network of bases. In addition to base construction and upkeep, these people perform such service activities as police, transportation, supply, maintenance, and administration.

The total base operations manpower is largely a function of how many bases are operated. Currently, 886 principal Defense installations worldwide support an average population of about 5,000, of which approximately 750 are base operations support people. We determine the manpower needs at each location based on detailed engineered standards and criteria. In each case, the type of output is established (for example, meals to be prepared or trucks to be maintained), the standard productivity of individuals with needed skills is determined, the total productive man-hours needed are calculated, and based on individual availability criteria, the total manpower requirement is specified.

The mix of military and civilian manpower for base operations support has been under continuous review, and as a result of efforts to civilianize support jobs, the mix has changed from 45% civilian in FY 65 to 53% in FY 71.

2. *Medical Manpower* supports the Department of Defense system of clinics, dispensaries, and hospitals which care for our sick and wounded active and retired personnel and their dependents. The number of people needed to do these tasks is based on detailed workload studies. For example, the number of nurses in a hospital depends on patient load which is based on an estimate of the expected number of patients and the expected duration of illness. In addition to the personnel needed to man medical facilities, we provide the Services with extra people to offset the time lost as a result of those people in a patient status during the year. This "patient" allowance enables our units to remain effective despite the loss of personnel because of wounds or illness. While the demand for medical services has increased substantially since 1965 due to the larger number of retired people, medical manpower has been maintained at a relatively constant proportion (about 3%) of total Defense manpower.

3. *Other Individual Support* includes the manpower used for recruitment and examination, disciplinary activities, and personnel assignment, including personnel being transferred from one duty station to another. The manpower needed for personnel assignment activities comprise the largest share of this category. The Services are authorized added manpower spaces to offset the productive time lost by "transients"—personnel engaged in Permanent Change of Station moves. These extra people ensure that units are able to maintain desired manning levels and readiness. The number of spaces authorized each Service is based on a formula which considers the number of people traveling, the duration of travel, and the availability of financial resources. It is therefore related to our rotation policies. During the war in Southeast Asia, we have maintained a one-year tour there for our military personnel. This tour policy in the past created a substantial turbulence throughout the Services' personnel system. As our forces are withdrawn from Southeast Asia, this turbulence is diminishing. For example, these extra spaces, which were 5.1% of our total military manpower needs in FY 69, have been reduced to 3.8% for FY 72. We anticipate that these pipeline needs will be further reduced as we continue to reduce our presence in Southeast Asia.

**B. Training.**—This category consists of the students, instructors, and overhead personnel for initial military, skill, professional, flight, and unit training programs. To ensure that units are manned and ready, the training base must provide the right number of men, with the proper skills, at the right time. Training rates are determined by the difference between manpower requirements and inventories. To calculate the total manpower required for training, training rates are converted to average student-load (student spaces) by considering current average course lengths. Numbers of instructors and direct support people are based on the student load. In FY 72 DOD will be training about 470,000 recruits for an average of about eight weeks, and will provide basic skill training for 85% of them for an average of an additional eleven weeks.

**C. Command Functions.**—This category of personnel includes those needed to staff (1) headquarters at the division and higher levels, (2) special headquarters (involving communications, training, and research and development), and (3)

operating command facilities, such as finance centers, security, data processing centers, and airborne command posts. In general, headquarters functions are related to the size and composition of the forces. While we have not yet developed quantitative criteria for many headquarters functions, there has been substantial effort to make our command structure more efficient through reorganizations and consolidations. As a result, the number of people in headquarters activities in the Department of Defense will be decreased by over 15% below the 1969 level. The success of this effort is shown in the table below:

## STRENGTH OF DOD HEADQUARTERS ACTIVITIES (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN END STRENGTHS)

	Fiscal year—		
	1969 actual	1970 actual	1972 estimated <sup>1</sup>
Army.....	27,906	25,369	21,512
Navy/Marine Corps.....	30,279	28,789	25,092
Air Force.....	26,977	25,243	22,693
Defense agencies.....	8,049	7,552	6,787
Total.....	93,211	86,953	76,084

D. *Logistics*.—This category includes the manpower required to (1) distribute, store, and ship supplies which are used to repair weapon systems (aircraft, ship, tanks, etc.), and (2) perform maintenance on these weapon systems at the Services' depot maintenance facilities. In FY 72 about 422,000 men will provide logistics supply and maintenance support for the Services, with 25% of these performing required weapons systems maintenance. Some 95% of our logistics manpower is civilian.

Manpower requirements for logistics functions are based on workload data. Workload varies with force size, activity rates, and maintenance standards. The SEA conflict led to sharp increases in demand for logistics and supply support as well as maintenance. As our force levels are reduced, logistics needs will also be reduced. The actual manpower needs for each specific function are based on workload estimates and personnel productivity studies. For example, the Air Force will have 397 B-52s in FY 72. Based on FY 72 planned operating levels (flying hour rates), 108 of these aircraft will require overhaul in FY 72 at the Air Force's B-52 depot maintenance facility. To support this workload, the Air Force calculates the work force needed in the depot.

## GENERAL SUPPORT MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

(Active Duty End Strengths, in Thousands)

	Actual fiscal year 1970	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Individual and base support:			
Base operating support.....	315	301	284
Medical support.....	109	101	92
Other individual support.....	234	136	126
Total, individual and base.....	658	538	502
Training.....	617	538	471
Command.....	154	141	133
Logistics.....	29	29	29
Total, general support.....	1,458	1,246	1,135

## PART IV

## FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS

A. *Overview Rationale*

We maintain forward deployments of our forces in order to accomplish the following objectives:

1. To deter aggression by demonstrating to potential enemies and allies the U.S. resolve to honor its commitments;
2. To enable the United States to assist our allies in collective defense in the event they are attacked; and

3. To provide the President with the flexibility necessary in responding promptly to contingencies.

At the end of FY 1970, we had one million men stationed overseas, including 415,000 in Vietnam. Presently, we have about 800,000 personnel, including those in Navy ships. These personnel include about 300,000 in Europe, 200,000 in the Western Pacific and 300,000 in Vietnam.

As the Vietnamization program continues, and as we further modernize and improve the forces of our allies in consonance with the Nixon Doctrine, we may anticipate further adjustments in our deployments. However, these changes will be undertaken only after consultation with our allies, and only when our collective security interests permit.

In determining whether forces are to be deployed overseas or retained in the US, a number of factors must be considered. There are clear advantages and disadvantages of overseas deployments, so a balance must be struck for each area which depends on the threat, the military requirements peculiar to the area, costs and political considerations.

The advantages of forward deployments include:

- Immediate availability in the event of a crisis;
- Greater assurance to our Allies of the firmness of our commitments;
- Greater deterrent to a potential enemy; and
- Reduced requirement for mobility forces.

The disadvantages include:

- Some small additional budget costs related to personnel moves and rotation base;
- Balance of payments costs;
- Increased likelihood that US forces will become engaged should a conflict occur;
- Limitation on flexibility in that forward deployed forces may not be readily available for conflicts in other areas;
- Potential political problems caused by the presence of large numbers of American personnel in a foreign country; and
- Adverse impact on morale if separated from families.

The advantages of forward deployments are greatest for our land forces. Land forces depend on heavy and bulky weapons and support equipment. Moving large land forces rapidly from the United States to a conflict area therefore requires large and very costly airlift forces or a mix of airlift and forward positioning of major equipment items. Even if less rapid reinforcement is acceptable, sealift needs could be large. In addition, forward deployed land forces pose a greater deterrent to a hostile power, since their presence makes it more likely that the United States would be involved should a conflict break out.

Tactical air forces are less dependent on forward deployments for immediate employment because additional planes can be quickly flown in during a period of crisis. For this reason, we have forward deployed a relatively smaller percentage of our tactical air forces than ground forces.

Naval forces forward deployed consist primarily of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific. The 6th Fleet provides flexible coverage of the southern NATO flank and serves as a significant counterweight to the Soviet influence in the Middle East. The 7th Fleet supports our Southeast Asia operations and protects Taiwan and Japan and Korea from threats to the sea lane. Naval forces with their embarked Marine Amphibious Forces, provide both potential ground and air forces on station during a crisis situation, while avoiding the political repercussions and forced involvement associated with land-based forces.

The political impact of changes in forward deployments cannot be ignored. Where we have had troops stationed in a particular country for a decade or more, the sudden removal of those troops can have a destabilizing political effect, regardless of the analytical rationale or assurances of continued commitment which may accompany the redeployments.

### B. NATO Deployments

U.S. forces deployed in NATO Europe are now our largest overseas deployment. They also are perhaps the most critical to our national security interests. Therefore they are discussed below in more detail.

We have deployed in the European theater at the present time an Army combat force of 4½ divisions and a number of tactical air squadrons. In addition, many of our CONUS based forces, including Navy ships, are firmly committed to NATO. As the President noted in his 1971 Foreign Policy Report, the total assets available to NATO today are substantial because:

"No token presence could serve our purpose. Our substantial contribution of United States forces—about 25 percent of NATO's peacetime capabilities in Central Europe—insures the viability of the strategy of flexible response. It enables us to found Alliance defense on something other than reliance on the threat of strategic nuclear war. It is the basis of our allies' confidence in us. It links European defense to a common strategy and to the nuclear power of the United States."

The FY 1972 Budget provides for the maintenance of our current force in Europe in order to demonstrate to our European Allies that we are doing our full share and that we expect them to maintain and improve their own forces. This policy is consistent with the President's pledge last December that:

"... given a similar approach by the other Allies the United States would maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and would not reduce them except in the context of reciprocal East-West action."

In NATO, the firmness of the U.S. commitment is important from a political as well as a military standpoint. Our allies will continue to display anxiety about any U.S. reduction of forward deployed forces. However, our allies have also been modernizing their forces, although the pace until 1970 was less than we thought adequate. The European countries, like the U.S., are faced with competing demands for their resources, including the skilled manpower necessary to maintain modern arms. The resurgence of concern about the Soviet threat that followed the Czech crisis, the necessity they felt to persuade the U.S. to keep substantial forces in Europe, and the hope for a mutual force reduction with the Warsaw Pact have succeeded in arresting some downward trends in Allied forces and given them a renewed resolve to improve those forces.

Moreover, European political leaders have recognized that our nuclear umbrella is not a sufficient deterrent for the range of possible NATO/Pact crises which may confront them. At the NATO Ministerial meetings last December, these leaders evidenced a new spirit towards NATO—one in which our allies fully recognize the existing realities and resolved one their own to assume more of the defense burden.

Three items of particular significance emerged from these meetings. First, the Ministers approved the conclusions and recommendations of the NATO AD-70 Study undertaken during the preceding six months. The Study highlighted the need for more conventional deterrence and pointed out specific inadequacies in existing NATO capabilities. There was a unanimous feeling that more must be done in the conventional field and that modern and sufficient NATO tactical and strategic nuclear capabilities must be maintained.

Second, while the Ministers reaffirmed the importance they attached to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) they noted that Warsaw Pact countries have not directly responded to past evidence of NATO interest for such reductions. Consequently, they understandably did not go beyond the previous Rome communique in their treatment of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

Third, concerning burden sharing, the ten European nations agreed among themselves to provide almost a billion dollars of additional expenditures over the next five years, divided about equally between improvements to their own forces and contributions to an additional infrastructure program for better communications and aircraft shelters. This agreement is the most tangible evidence yet of European recognition that Europe must do more in its own behalf. The agreement also represents the first significant NATO endeavor undertaken solely by European members with the United States playing no direct role. This demonstration of European awareness of strategic, fiscal, manpower, and political realities and a determination so face them will be of substantial benefit to both Europe and the United States.

## PART V

## SUMMARY OF MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

## A. Summary

Our FY 72 military manpower requirements have been developed by summing the force and general support manpower needs discussed in Parts II and III.

ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS <sup>1</sup>

	Fiscal year		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
<b>Army:</b>			
Force mission.....	660	575	509
Other mission.....	72	74	69
General support.....	590	458	364
Total end strength.....	1,322	1,107	942
Average strength.....	1,431	1,228	1,024
<b>Navy:</b>			
Force mission.....	322	299	288
Other mission.....	42	42	41
General support.....	329	282	275
Total end strength.....	692	623	604
Average strength.....	732	656	617
<b>Marine Corp:</b>			
Force mission.....	128	111	116
Other mission.....	2	2	2
General support.....	129	98	88
Total end strength.....	260	212	206
Average strength.....	295	237	210
<b>Air Force:</b>			
Force mission.....	285	259	257
Other mission.....	98	90	87
General support.....	407	413	413
Total end strength.....	791	757	753
Average strength.....	835	767	759
<b>DOD total:</b>			
Force mission.....	1,394	1,245	1,171
Other mission.....	214	208	199
General support.....	1,458	1,246	1,135
Total end strength.....	3,066	2,699	2,505
Average strength.....	3,294	2,888	2,609

<sup>1</sup> Totals may not add due to rounding.

As the above table indicates, we have reduced our FY 1972 manpower by almost 200,000 below the FY 1971 level. This is 180,000 lower than our FY 1964 peacetime strength of 2.7 million.

## B. Average Strengths

The average strength estimates for FY 1970, FY 1971, and FY 1972 are consistent with the man-years shown in the President's budget. Average (man-year) strength estimates are based on the plans of the individual Services. These plans consider, month by month, anticipated normal losses and unit inactivations. Unit inactivations are in turn governed by operational considerations such as projected withdrawals from Southeast Asia. These considerations have resulted in some unit inactivations being delayed until the latter part of FY 1972, therefore increasing average strength above the "straight-line average."

Large reductions in manpower inevitably result in personnel management problems. Unit inactivations trigger the need to reassign those personnel who are not leaving the Service. These reassignments increase the turbulence in the remaining units and temporarily reduce readiness. Early releases programs may also

be required, which further increase the turbulence. In addition because of grade limitations, promotion plans must be revised and, if the drawdown is very severe, excess personnel in grade must be reduced. The only way to minimize these problems is to phase the reduction over as long a period as possible, recognizing the need to achieve budget savings. Our FY 1972 strength plans are consistent with this objective.

## DEFENSE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972

### APPENDIX I

#### DETERMINING THE MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES

##### INTRODUCTION

Defense manpower is an essential resource needed to assure national security. The need for military manpower is determined by the national strategy which in turn is based on our national security objectives. The President, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, establishes policies on broad strategic issues. These strategy directives are then converted into military force requirements.

When we have a statement of the force levels we need, we must then determine our manpower needs to man and support those forces. We must answer such issues as: how many crews do we need; how many men are needed to keep a plane serviced and flying; how much support does it take to keep a combat division in the field; what sort of headquarters does one need to direct the combat elements; what sort of training establishment must be maintained. Given an approved force goal, of, for example, x aircraft, y divisions and z ships, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force respectively are charged with meeting that goal through a combination of equipment, manpower and training.

Each Service has a carefully managed manpower management system. Although there are differences between the Services, because of their different missions, they have the following points in common:

(1) Each Service has a manning document system, which establishes the required strength for each unit or activity.

(2) Each Service has a set of manning factors called by different names (e.g., engineered or statistical standards) which are used in all areas which lend themselves to the application of standards and criteria. In areas where these standards are not used the Services employ operational experience (e.g., the number of men in an infantry squad).

(3) Each Service has a validation system using manpower surveys, on-site standards, operational feedback, etc.

(4) Each Service has an internal check and balance system, e.g., mission forces compete with general support for manpower.

(5) Each Service looks at military and civilian manpower requirements in a unitary fashion and emphasizes the use of civilians where it is practical to do so.

The Services must also take into account personnel policies as well as manpower force requirements. Once the manpower (space) requirements are established, real people must be assigned to each individual job. These personnel cannot be treated like machines and shuffled around on a schedule which would be "optimum" for meeting force requirements but which would unreasonably and unnecessarily disrupt the lives of the men involved. Thus, personnel policies, such as tour lengths, reenlistments, and early release programs inevitably impact on manpower planning.

The basic paper, "Defense Military Manpower Requirements for Fiscal Year 1972," outlines the relationship between the national strategy and our military force requirements. This appendix will discuss in greater detail, the steps by which the Department of Defense translates force requirements into manpower requirements.

Over the years, many functional views of manpower have been used. Throughout this paper, a common framework of mission categories will be used. This approach is useful since (1) the missions of defense are so complex that they must be broken down into meaningful pieces in order to be understood; (2) the categories generally describe the missions to be accomplished; and (3) the framework provides a way of examining pieces without losing sight of the whole.

The DOD manpower program is displayed by mission categories below.

DOD MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
Active duty end strengths in thousands; end of fiscal year[s]

	Fiscal year 1970 (actual)	Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)	Fiscal year 1972 (estimated)
Strategic forces.....	143	134	139
General purpose forces:			
Land forces.....	747	652	591
Tactical air forces.....	188	173	170
Naval forces.....	232	212	203
Mobility forces.....	84	74	68
Total general purpose forces.....	1,251	1,111	1,032
Other mission forces:			
Intelligence and security.....	93	90	87
Communications.....	59	56	53
Research and development.....	39	38	34
Support to other nations.....	23	24	25
Total other mission forces.....	214	208	199
General support:			
Base and individual support.....	658	538	502
Training.....	617	538	471
Command.....	154	141	133
Logistics.....	29	29	29
Total general support.....	1,458	1,246	1,135
Total DOD.....	3,066	2,699	2,505
Army.....	1,322	1,107	942
Navy.....	692	623	604
Marine Corps.....	260	212	206
Air Force.....	791	757	753

Note: Service details may not add to DOD totals due to rounding. Defense agency manpower are shown with their parent military service and are included in the command category in this table.

The remainder of this paper will discuss, by Service, the following items for each category:

- (1) What the function is and how it relates to the overall mission.
- (2) How the manpower requirements are developed.
- (3) Examples of specific manpower calculations.

ARMY

The Army manpower program is displayed below:

ARMY MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
[Active duty end strengths in thousands; end of fiscal year[s]]

	Fiscal year actual 1970	Fiscal year 1971 estimated	Fiscal year 1972 estimated
Strategic forces.....	9	6	6
General-purpose forces:			
Land forces.....	649	567	501
Mobility forces.....	2	2	2
Total, general-purpose forces.....	651	569	503
Other mission forces:			
Intelligence and security.....	30	32	29
Communications.....	16	15	13
Research and development.....	8	9	9
Support to other nations.....	18	18	18
Total, other mission forces.....	72	74	69
General support:			
Base and individual support.....	232	164	134
Training.....	318	257	196
Command.....	33	30	28
Logistics.....	7	7	6
Total, general support.....	590	458	364
Total, Army.....	1,322	1,107	942

The following sections summarize the rationale, policies, and problems associated with determining manpower requirements for each category of the Army.

*Army Strategic Forces*

These forces consist of CONUS AIR DEFENSE forces, the Office of Civil Defense, and the SAFEGUARD system now under development. They provide surface-to-air missile units, and supporting facilities to assist in the defense of the United States against hostile air and missile attack. Included are the United States Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) NIKE HERCULES batteries, their command and fire control centers, and the developmental elements of the SAFEGUARD system. The reductions in missile batteries shown below reflect a transfer of batteries from active forces to the national guard as well as a reduction in the total number of CONUS AIR DEFENSE missiles.

	Actual, fiscal year 1970	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Forces:			
Surface-to-air missile batteries.....	40	21	21
Military manpower (thousands).....	9	6	6

The manpower needs of these forces are arrived at by first determining the number of operating positions needed in each firing unit. Using a standard work week, the number of men needed to operate the system on a continuous basis is calculated. In a similar way, engineering standards are used to estimate the number of maintenance manhours the system will require. These are also then translated into numbers of men. Finally, using standard factors based on experience, the numbers of administrative and support personnel needed (e.g., cooks, clerks) are determined. The sum of these calculations is the manpower requirement for the unit. This number is then set forth in a Table of Organization (TO) which is the official Army manpower authorization document. TO's are periodically audited and reviewed to ensure that the original estimates (in the case of new kinds of units) are valid. For example, a TO of a NIKE HERCULES firing battery consists of the following:

*Air Defense Firing Battery—CONUS*

Functional area:	Manpower spaces
Battery headquarters.....	16
Fire control platoon.....	47
Launcher platoon.....	58
Security section.....	13
<b>Battery total.....</b>	<b>134</b>

Additional personnel are needed to man command and fire control centers and to provide system-wide supervision.

*Land Forces*

Army land forces manpower requirements for a given year are based on Secretary of Defense approved force levels and deployments. These force levels and deployments are established after considering threat and strategy and are provided to the Army as given requirements.

Deployment and number of active Army divisions the Army will support for FY 70-72 is shown below:

ACTIVE ARMY DIVISIONS

	Fiscal year—		
	1970	1971	1972
Vietnam.....	6	23 $\frac{1}{2}$	7
United States.....	42 $\frac{1}{2}$	43 $\frac{1}{2}$	
Europe.....	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	41 $\frac{1}{2}$	41 $\frac{1}{2}$
Hawaii.....	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	1	1
Korea.....	2	1	1
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>17<math>\frac{1}{2}</math></b>	<b>133<math>\frac{1}{2}</math></b>	<b>13<math>\frac{1}{2}</math></b>

Fifty-three percent of the total Army are assigned to land forces. Thus, we must examine this category in greater detail in order to understand how the manpower requirements are determined. We have further divided land forces into Division Forces and Special Mission Forces.

*Division Forces.*—This category includes Army divisions and brigades, and all units which directly support or are planned to support their operations in a combat theater. Included are all combat, combat support, and combat service support units required within a theater of operations. Theater land forces maintenance, supply, medical, and other support units which can be identified as contributing directly and primarily to the support of Army divisions and brigades, whether located contiguously to the division or not, are included in Division Forces. This category does not include unified command headquarters, theater forces in support of other Services or Free World forces, and elements of CONUS commands located in the theater. Division Forces are stationed in CONUS and overseas.

*Special Mission Forces.*—This category includes units specifically provided to satisfy requirements other than the direct support of Army divisions and brigades in combat. Included are forces for the initial defense of areas such as Alaska, Panama, and Berlin. Special Mission Forces are stationed in CONUS and overseas.

Total active land forces manpower depends on the number of divisions in the force and how ready they are for combat. Each division is composed of battalion-size elements of roughly similar structure that fight (e.g., infantry, armor, and artillery battalions); that prepare the battlefield and help the fighting elements to maneuver and communicate (e.g., combat engineer, signal and aviation battalions); and that supply, feed and administer the fighting troops and maintain their equipment (e.g., medical, supply and transportation, and maintenance battalions).

ARMY LAND FORCES

	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Fiscal year (estimated)—	
		1971	1972
Active divisions.....	17 $\frac{1}{2}$	13 $\frac{3}{4}$	13 $\frac{1}{2}$
Separate brigades.....	9	[Deleted.]	
Armored cavalry regiments.....	5		
Special forces groups.....	6		

For force planning purposes, each division requires 48,000 men to conduct sustained combat operations. These 48,000 spaces in a Division Force Equivalent (DFE) are divided into three parts of approximately 16,000 spaces each:

*Division (DIV).*—Those personnel assigned directly to and identified with an Army combat division. The building block for Army Land Forces is the battalion. For example, an Infantry Battalion is a typical unit found in Division Forces. It consists of three rifle companies of 181 men each, and a Headquarters company, containing supporting weapons, command and control elements, of 306 men. Thus the TO strength of an Infantry Battalion is 849 men.

*Initial Support Increment (ISI).*—Those personnel assigned to non-divisional units which provide support to a combat division in the initial stages of combat. ISI units must be deployed when a division is deployed, and are capable of providing support for the first 60 days of combat operations.

Typical of the units found in an ISI is an Engineer Construction Battalion. It consists of the following:

Element:	<i>Engineer Construction Battalion</i>	<i>Manpower spaces</i>
Three Construction Companies (209 men each).....		627
Equipment Maintenance Company.....		180
Headquarters Company.....		121
Battalion total.....		928

*Sustaining Support Increment (SSI).*—Those personnel assigned to non-divisional units required to support a combat division and its ISI after 60 days of combat. SSI units are similar to ISI units and cannot be distinguished once the DFE (DIV+ISI+SSI) is fully deployed in a theater.

An example of the units found in the SSI is a Signal Operations Battalion. Its TO is shown below:

<i>Signal Operations Battalion</i>		<i>Manpower spaces</i>
Element:		
Construction Company	-----	210
Long Lines Company	-----	238
Trunk Switch Company	-----	193
Radio Relay Company	-----	317
Headquarters Detachment	-----	58
Battalion total	-----	1, 016

The ISI and SSI are thus tailored to meet the support requirements of the combat theater using unit building blocks similar to those described above.

A division in combat is fully supported with an ISI and SSI. Divisions forward deployed but not in combat, such as divisions now in Europe, normally have all ISIs and some SSIs. The net result is that in peacetime the Army maintains less than two active support increments for each active division.

Active divisions and support increments for FY 70-72 are shown below. For force planning purposes, each independent Brigade Force is counted as  $\frac{1}{2}$  of a Division Force:

	Fiscal year—		
	1970	1971	1972
Active divisions	17 $\frac{1}{8}$	13 $\frac{3}{8}$	13 $\frac{1}{8}$
Active support increments	27 $\frac{3}{8}$	} [Deleted.]	
Total	44 $\frac{3}{8}$		

Each active division and active support increment requires approximately 16,000 personnel in combat. Depending on location, mission, and budget constraints, active divisions are normally manned at between 80% and 100% of the combat requirement. A unit with less than 80% of its combat personnel requirement does not function efficiently on active duty. The objective is to provide 100% of the combat personnel requirement to Division Forces in Vietnam and less to other Division Forces as mission, location, and readiness requirements permit. The net result is that average manning of active division forces is approximately 90% of the full wartime personnel requirement.

*Special Mission Forces* include Defense Forces and Missile Forces.

*Defense Forces.*—Provide for the initial defense of selected areas. The forces provided are not normally available for other missions. Should additional forces be required, augmentation from Division Forces would be necessary. Includes one brigade in Panama, two brigades in Alaska, and the Berlin Brigade.

*Missile Forces.*—Provide surface-to-surface missile support, air defense missile support, and special ammunition support on a theater wide basis. Included are Pershing units, missile commands, NIKE HERCULES and HAWK units intended for theater-wide air defense, special ammunition support units supporting Allied or U.S. missile units, and units provided specifically for command, control, or direct support of U.S. missile units. Excluded are surface-to-surface missile units (Sergeant, Lance, Honest John) which provide direct fire support for U.S. divisions, and surface-to-air units (Hawk, Vulcan/Chapparel, 40 m.m./ .50 cal AAA) which provide light air defense for U.S. forces in the field.

Their manpower needs are calculated in the same way as described for the Strategic Defensive Missile Forces.

#### ARMY SPECIAL MISSION FORCES

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year (estimated)—		
	Fiscal year 1970, actual	1971	1972
Defense forces	} [Deleted.]		
Missile forces			

### *Mobility Forces*

This category consists of those military personnel for the operation of Department of Army non-industrially-funded water ports in the overseas areas. Personnel provide traffic management services in support of the movement of DOD cargo and passengers within CONUS and to overseas commands. Traffic management services involve the supervision, direction, and control of all functions incident to effective and economical procurement and use of commercial transportation, including the routing and costing of traffic. Included are Army elements of the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS), the DOD single manager for surface transportation.

This is the smallest category, in terms of manpower, in the Army. Furthermore, the bulk of the work force (81%) is civilian. Essentially, the manpower requirements are based on the number of terminals to be operated, and the command, control and management requirements derived from the estimated volume of cargo and passengers to be moved. These factors are reviewed annually, and the manpower needs adjusted accordingly. As an example, the Army terminal at Bayonne, New Jersey is manned with 50 military and 1,090 civilians, for a total of 1,140 personnel.

Army mobility forces (military manpower) :

Fiscal year 1970 (actual) .....	2,000
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated) .....	2,000
Fiscal year 1972 .....	2,000

### *Army Other Mission Forces*

*Intelligence and Security.*—This category includes Army military personnel who are assigned to the military intelligence units of the Army both within the United States and at overseas bases. The category also includes military personnel assigned to intelligence positions within Defense Agencies and the intelligence staffs of the Unified and Specified Commands. Units of the Army for which military intelligence personnel are required may be categorized as world-wide cryptologic activities (the Army Security Agency units engaged in communications and electronic intelligence), combat intelligence units engaged in intelligence collection, processing, analysis, production, image interpretation, target designation support, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, [deleted] collection operations, technical intelligence and mapping, charting and geodesy, and counterintelligence and investigative activities.

Intelligence resource policies are established by the Secretary of Defense. Intelligence requirements, however, are established at many levels: the Army establishes its requirements for intelligence to support force planning, field operations, such as those in Vietnam and other contingencies, and research and development. The Joint Chiefs of Staff compile its own intelligence requirements along with those of the Unified and Specified Commands. These and other strategic guidance issuances from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) form a basis for budget and manpower allocations. The national intelligence community (the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State) relies heavily on the intelligence resources of the DOD and through the medium of the United States Intelligence Board establishes requirements and priorities for which the intelligence elements of the DOD and Army must apply dollar and manpower resources.

In general, manpower requirements are determined by applying operational manning factors to equipments, staffing and support factors to operational manning levels, and by workload measurement and project requirements. The manning of individual military intelligence units of the Army is determined by their Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). These normal manning assignments are altered from time to time to fit unusual situations; for example, military intelligence battalions and groups assigned to Vietnam have been altered to meet the special situations found there to support the combat units and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The manning of intelligence staffs (the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of Army, the intelligence staffs (G-2's) of the armies, divisions, and corps, the intelligence staffs of the Unified and Specified Commands) by Army personnel is established by the Staff's Table of Organization and Equipment (for Army staffs organic to Army units) and Tables of Distribution for joint staffs (Unified and Specified Commands). The criteria for these manpower tables have been arrived at through experience and they are modified from time to time as broad missions of the staffs change, science and technology impacts on the methods and procedures of intelligence, and as actual combat experience requires. Changes in Army manpower for the Defense Agencies are determined

by intelligence requirements which call for specialties for which Army intelligence personnel are trained (Order of Battle of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam, for example) plus overall changes in workload for which the Army must provide a proportionate share along with Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

## ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

[Manpower in thousands]

	Actual, fiscal year 1970	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Army.....	30	32	29
Army portion of Defense agencies.....	2	2	3
Total, Army portion of DOD intelligence and security.....	32	34	32

*Communications.*—This category provides forces in support of world-wide strategic communications for the Army as well as support of the Defense Communications System (DCS). Included is the United States Army Strategic Communications Command (STRATCOM) and elements supporting the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS).

Command and control of our forces is exercised through the Defense Communications System and the supporting Army communications system. The basic communications requirements are established by the deployment of our forces. Then, based on prior experience and the expressed needs of the field commander, the required capacity for each of several modes of communication (e.g., voice, teletype, etc.) is determined. The required capacity and the technical state of the act then determine the number of location of transmitter sites, relay stations, etc. Each such operating location is manned based on the number of operating positions to be filled, maintenance manhours required, and the need for administration and support. The total strength of the communications category is then determined by the number of operating locations, the manning of each, and additional personnel for supervision and support of the system as a whole.

## Army communications (military manpower in thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual).....	16
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated).....	15
Fiscal year 1972.....	13

*Research and Development.*—This function consists of Army personnel working in research and development activities. Included is support of DOD research, laboratories, test boards, research and development activities of the Army Materiel Command (AMC), industrially funded research and development activities, Kwajalein Missile Range, White Sands Missile Range, Army Electronic Proving Ground, and international cooperative research and development activities.

The Army maintains laboratories in order to preserve a technological capability in military research which does not exist in the private sector. Each laboratory is staffed with a mix of military and civilian personnel in order to provide a blend of combat experience and technical expertise. In FY 1972, 71% of R&D personnel are civilian.

The military and civilian manpower requirements are controlled by the funding of the R&D program. There is a fixed and stable requirement to man the R&D laboratories and a variable requirement dependent upon funds available to initiate or continue specific projects. The management spaces of this account provide for overall direction and control and for the offices of the project managers appointed to ensure the intensive management requirements of costly projects is sustained.

## Army research and development (military manpower in thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual).....	8
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated).....	9
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated).....	9

*Support to other Nations.*—This category consists of Army personnel for the support in International Military Headquarters, Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), Missions, and Military Assistance Groups (MAGs).

Military assistance groups are established at the request of the host country, after consultation within the executive branch and approval by the President. The size of each group depends on the nature of the assistance requested, but usually consists of members of all Services. In conjunction with the U.S. Ambassador and the State Department, military assistance activities are periodically reviewed to ensure that their manning is appropriate for their current mission.

ARMY SUPPORT TO OTHER NATIONS

[Military manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal years		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Assistance activities:			
Vietnam.....	12	13	13
Other worldwide.....	3	3	3
International military headquarters.....	3	2	2
Total.....	18	18	1

*Army General Support*

*Workload and Manpower Productivity.*—The determination of manpower requirements in the support (non-TOE) forces of the Army is a building-block process utilizing skills and techniques of management engineering, work measurement, (both statistical and engineering standards) and performance evaluation.

At the operating level, engineered and/or statistical standards are used to measure manpower requirements and to evaluate performance effectiveness. The management engineering and analysis staff of the installation commander are used to maximize organizational structure, work processes, and management improvement. These are continuous processes at the operating level. The manpower standards used at this level are of two types:

a. DA Staffing Guides are developed for the major types of TDA units, such as Garrisons, Hospitals, Training Centers and Schools. These publications provide standardized, DA approved guidance to field commanders on organizational structure, numbers of positions required for incremental workload levels, and qualitative staffing (MOS, grade, etc.).

b. Standards are developed locally for functional areas not covered by DA Staffing Guides. These standards include engineered standards for industrial-type activities, such as warehousing, major overhead and repair, and manufacturing activities, which are part of the Defense Integrated Management Engineering System (DIMES). They also include engineered and statistical standards for other non-industrial type functions for which a DA Staffing Guide has not been developed.

For periodic in-depth validation of manpower requirements, the Manpower Survey Program is used. Comprehensive surveys are manually conducted every two, and not less frequently than every 4 years by major command headquarters of their subordinate TDA units. The survey is comprehensive, including examination of mission, functions, organizational structure, and quantitative staffing requirements. Surveys are staffed and approved by the major command headquarters and implemented by directives which effect changes in organizational structure, revised recognized requirements, and revised authorization of manpower spaces, as appropriate.

To maintain objectivity and validity of the survey program, HQ, DA surveys major command headquarters, as well as monitoring the program of major commands. This monitorship is carried out by on-site observation of surveys conducted by major commands and agencies and by review of manpower survey reports on a selective sampling basis. Such observations and reviews help ensure compliance with OSD and DA policies, provides direction to major commands in improvement of their survey programs, and provides HQ, DA a basis for evaluation of the effectiveness of commands' manpower management programs.

As indicated above, the method of determining detailed manpower requirements makes comprehensive use of work measurement and manpower standards for objective measurement. This is carried out as an integral part of operations on a decentralized basis and is blended with periodic in-depth comprehensive surveys from major command and HQ, DA levels.

In addition and on a continuous basis, DA guidance and regulations place special emphasis on such policies as:

- a. Elimination of nonessential activities.
- b. Elimination of dual staffing.
- c. Avoidance of organizational layering and "stove-pipe" organizational structure.
- d. Economic ratios of supervisors to workers and of clerical to action level positions.

Manpower requirements are based on the standard 40 hour work week plus a 11% non-productive time factor. Generally speaking, a 168 hour month or 2,016 hour year, the norm.

In the sections that follow, each general support category will be discussed in turn.

*Base and Individual Support.*—This category includes these functions:

*Base Operating Support.*—Consists of base operations support world-wide for strategic defensive forces, general purpose forces, communications, United States Army Reserve (USAR), central supply and maintenance, and training, medical and other general personnel activities.

*Medical Support.*—Includes all Army patients, personnel in support of hospitals, and Army personnel supporting Medicare and other non-service facilities.

*Other Individual Support.*—Includes all Army transients and prisoners, personnel in support of recruiting and examining activities, personnel support, and support of the overseas dependent education program. This category includes the United States Army Band and Chorus, the United States Army Disciplinary Barracks, and the United States Army Recruiting Command. Support in this account directly influences morale and is programmed to support the Army effort to create an environment favoring an all-volunteer Army.

ARMY BASE AND INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT (MILITARY MANPOWER IN THOUSANDS)


	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Fiscal year 1971 estimated	Fiscal year 1972 estimated
Base operating support.....	42	42	32
Medical support.....	56	40	41
Other individual.....	134	73	61
Total.....	232	164	134

*Base Operating Support.*—Base operations manpower is dictated primarily by the number and identity of the posts, camps, stations, and other installations which the Army maintains in an active status.

Total manpower for base operations is about 80% civilian. This has increased from 70% in FY 65. Base operations manpower has a fixed and a variable component. For example, there is a certain complement of military and civilian manpower required at Fort Bragg just because it has a certain number of barracks, buildings, firing ranges, a telephone system, a water and sewage system, and a mission to operate and maintain these facilities. Other requirements evolve because the 82d Airborne Division is there and drop zones have to be cleared and parachute drying towers, packing facilities, and resupply facilities have to be provided. The XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters creates a greater than normal requirement for the post communications system, and the concentration of artillery units requires an abnormal amount of range road maintenance, impact area surveillance and inspection, and ammunition storage and handling.

Since 1965, 4 major CONUS installations have been closed. There are 39 major Army bases which are supported by this account. This chart identifies this number in four categories which specify the principal mission of the installations and thus the basic nature of the station complement provided for each. Support requirements are determined by varied, interrelated factors, including the basic mission, the size and character of the population supported, facilities to be maintained, and the availability of contract support.

## CONARC MAJOR INSTALLATIONS



## ● HEADQUARTERS (6)

FT MONROE  
 FT MEADE  
 FT McPHERSON  
 FT SAM HOUSTON  
 PRESIDIO OF S. F.  
 FT MYER (MDW)

## ● DIVISION BASES (6)

FT HOOD  
 FT BRAGG  
 FT CAMPBELL  
 FT LEWIS  
 FT CARSON  
 FT RILEY

## ● SCHOOLS (22)

FT DEVENS  
 FT MONMOUTH  
 FT BELVOIR  
 FT EUSTIS  
 FT LEE  
 FT HOLABIRD  
 FT Mc NAIR  
 FT BENNING  
 FT GORDON  
 FT KNOX  
 FT BENJAMIN HARRISON

PRESIDIO OF MONTEREY  
 FT SILL  
 FT BLISS  
 WHITE SANDS MSL RANGE  
 FT WOLTERS  
 FT HAMILTON  
 FT RUCKER  
 FT STEWART  
 FT McCLELLAN  
 FT LEAVENWORTH  
 CARLISLE BKS

## ● TRAINING CENTERS (5)

FT DIX  
 FT JACKSON  
 FT LEONARD WOOD  
 FT ORD  
 FT POLK

Every Army installation is unique in its base operations requirements because of these differences. This table highlights the differences at four installations, each of which is manned in accordance with standard work measurement and other staffing criteria which are applied to each function performed at each installation.


4 TYPICAL ARMY INSTALLATIONS

Function	Fort Hood 1st Cavalry and 2d Armored Division	Fort Benning infantry school	Fort Dix training center	Fort Bliss school
<b>Assets:</b>				
Acreage.....	218,600	182,300	32,000	1,128,000
Buildings (million sq. ft.).....	14.4	214	12.8	16.9
Road-miles.....	477	448	140	932
Average expense (millions).....	\$26.9	\$36.2	\$22.4	\$33.0
Base operations complement.....	2,800	4,400	3,840	4,008
<b>Population supported:</b>				
Troop strength.....	37,200	16,200	10,400	31,600
Trainees/students.....		7,500	16,140	3,100
Retirees.....	4,000	4,400	100	11,200
Dependents.....	43,900	43,100	12,000	21,200

Base closures provide manpower savings in the base operations account. The fiscal year 1972 program already reflects the closures which have been announced or approved for planning. There is seldom a complete saving of the manpower associated with a base closure, however, because closing an installation invariably requires the transfer of some function or activity to another installation and a concurrent, hopefully lesser, increase in manpower requirements at the new location.

*Medical Support.*—The medical services of the Army are a category which involves many factors. Some of these factors include the one to two year time lag in the reduction of combat casualty patient loads, the cost effectiveness of an in-house capability compared to Champus, and an increase or decrease in dependent and retired personnel care as it relates directly to the standard of service to be provided.

As a result of studies carried out by the Army, basic decisions have been made which fix the manpower requirements of the medical services for fiscal year 1972 and the future. The first of these was acceptance of a medical staffing ratio based upon a factor called the MCCU, the medical care composite unit. A ratio of 125 medical service spaces to 100 MCCU is required to provide an acceptable standard of medical care. This decision followed the reports made by the Surgeon General which established the need for improvement, not only as a service attractiveness measure, but also as a requirement to meet the standards of service the Army is morally committed to provide for its soldiers.



This chart depicts graphically the medical program. FY 72 budget allocations and the proposed manpower program provide for a ratio of approximately 118 to 100 ratio as a step toward a baseline level of 125 to 100.

The medical category also includes an allowance for patients. Patient manpower requirements are based on the projected strength in Vietnam, and that of the remainder of the Army. Rates for patient origin in these two categories of strength are used to determine the total patient requirement. The Vietnam strength is, of course, the driving force. It should be understood that spaces for patient manpower are not provided for the personnel who will be temporarily absent from their assigned units while sick or injured. Nor are they provided for outpatients. Patient manpower spaces are provided only for those personnel who are assigned to a hospital for treatment.

ARMY MEDICAL SUPPORT  
(Military Manpower in Thousands)

	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Fiscal year 1971 estimated	Fiscal year 1972 estimated
Medical staff.....	41	40	35
Patients.....	15	9	6
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>41</b>

Manpower in the *Other Individual Support* category represents the overhead required to support the strength in division, general support and special mission forces. The Other Individual Support authorizations provide manpower spaces for transients and prisoners. The category also includes the Army recruiting service.

Requirements for transients are based on the required number of permanent change of station moves to support the strength in units, as it is deployed in various geographical areas. With a knowledge of the moves required, and the length of time it takes to make moves of various types, the Army computes transient strength requirement. Transient requirements are driven primarily by the strength in oversea areas, tour lengths, and by the number of new accessions brought into the Army.

The requirements of Southeast Asia have heavily impacted on the Army's transient requirements. In FY 70, the Army experienced 2,400,000 Permanent Change of Station (PCS) moves. Of these, 687,000 involved moves to and from Vietnam. In FY 71, the Army plans 1,895,000 PCS moves, of which 510,000, or 27%, are to and from Vietnam.

Prisoner space requirements are based simply on an Army-wide rate and are a function of the total Army strength. Spaces are provided only for prisoners serving approved sentences of over 30 days. No spaces are provided for personnel in pretrial confinement, those serving sentences of less than 30 days or those prisoners who have been discharged punitively.

The Army Recruiting Command has a key role to play in the transition to a zero draft environment. We have added 3,500 personnel in FY 72 in order to increase our recruiting effectiveness.

#### ARMY OTHER INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT

[Military manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1970 (actual)	Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)	Fiscal year 1972 (estimated)
Transients.....	120	59	45
Prisoners.....	3	2	2
Recruiting.....	6	6	9
Other individuals.....	5	6	5
Total.....	134	73	61

*Training.*—This category includes Army personnel conducting and supporting training activities world-wide to include recruit, specialized, professional, flight, United States Military Academy, Junior ROTC, and ROTC training. This category includes the Army School System, the Army War College, and DOD schools for which the Army is the Executive Agent (NWC, ICAF, DLI, and DIS). Also included are Army trainees, students, and cadets. By law the Army is required to provide the equivalent of 16 weeks of formal training to personnel before deploying them to overseas units. The training account is based on the requirement to provide this and other training.

The training establishment accounts for more than 54% of the military manpower in general support in the FY 72 program. It comprises the training centers, the Army school system, the school troops, and the students.

The training centers provide basic combat training (BCT), advanced individual training (AIT), and combat support training (CST) to men entering the Army from civilian life, both draftees and volunteer enlistees. The training center system is the most efficient and most effective way to add trained manpower to the Army; it provides essential training in concentrated doses by highly qualified trainers and instructors during the 16 weeks required by law to qualify a man for overseas combat.

All men receive this basic training, 8 weeks of training in the rudiments of soldiering applicable to all new recruits. Approximately 64% of BCT graduates move on to AIT/CST. AIT trainees receive additional training in the skills of the combat arms—infantry, armor, and artillery. They become proficient as members of small units, squads, platoons, tank crews, and gun sections. The CST trainees are taught to be supply or administrative clerks, signal wiremen, or radio operators, engineer pioneers or heavy equipment operators. Approximately 11% of BCT graduates, because of skills developed in civilian life, move directly to units without additional training. Approximately 25% of the total BCT graduates, along with selected AIT/CST graduates, move into the Army school system for more

advanced training. They may become radio repairmen, radar technicians, vehicle mechanics, aviation specialists, cooks and bakers, draftsmen, nuclear weapons specialists, etc.

The size and composition of the training centers are dictated by the accessions of new men into the Army, both active and reserve. The accession rate, a combination of the draft and first enlistments, is determined by how the trained strength of the Army will be affected by the loss rate, that is by the number of draftees or enlistees who entered the Army two or three years ago, offset by the reenlistment rate among these potential losses.

The accessions by month establish a requirement for the number of BCT companies needed to provide basic training. Active Army accessions vary directly with the need for replacements, but we assure maximum utilization of the training centers by calling reserve replacements from a pool awaiting training. Each company formed establishes a standard requirement for trainers, drill sergeants, a company commander, and the administrative overhead necessary to run the company. The size and composition of this company complement has been established through work measurement studies, the application of Army staffing guides, and the historical experience of the training center system. Pertinent to this is the fact that the authorized size and composition of this complement is extremely austere. The Army has programmed only minimum essential manpower to this function, a fact that has required drill sergeants and company officers to work a 12 to 16 hour day, 6 days a week since the 1965 expansion of the Army began, a requirement which is not conducive to high retention rates or family satisfaction with Army life.

The size of the Army does have a relationship to the size of the training center system. As requirements for trained soldiers are reduced, the number of accessions is reduced, consequently, a major reduction in this account has occurred since withdrawals from Vietnam began. It is this reduction which has allowed us to eliminate the centers activated during the Vietnam war and we plan to retain only centers located geographically in areas of dense population to reduce travel requirements for trainees and graduates. The WAC center at Fort McClellan will continue to provide WAC basic training and a small installation at Fort Sam Houston will provide training for conscientious objectors. The planned training center system is believed to offer a cost effective distribution at centers which provide optimum training areas and facilities.

The Army School system is a second portion of the training establishment. It is also composed of fixed and variable elements. Fixed requirements cover installations such as the Military Academy, the Army War College, Command and General Staff Colleges, the Armor, Infantry, Artillery, Air Defense, and Logistics schools which provide advanced education for the professional officer corps and the schools which provide training in critical technical military occupational specialties for enlisted technicians and non-commissioned officers who operate, maintain, and repair weapons, instruments, vehicles, aircraft, and other items of equipment. This fixed base is a key instrument in the development of professional competence in the officer corps and the non-commissioned officer corps of the Army. It is particularly important during times of peace when the reduced size of the Army prohibits practical on-the-job training because of the limited number of units to which personnel can be assigned.

Manpower requirements for this base are relatively constant, dependent primarily upon school capacities and the long range professional training program.

Other school requirements are variable and more directly related to the size of the Army; more precisely to the output of the training centers.

Reductions in the variable elements of the school system, i.e., the war-time expansion of technicians, officer candidate schools, the NCO candidate school, and the expansion of basic officer courses have been programmed. Much of the reduction has already occurred; final elimination is phased with the withdrawal of Army units from Vietnam and Korea.

By the end of FY 72, with a school load approximately twice the size of 1965, we are programming a complement of instructors, staff, and administrators approximately equal to 1965. Through the use of new techniques, closed circuit television, better training aids, etc., we hope that an increased instructor/student ratio can be attained even in the face of the apparent requirements for longer courses and more complex instruction required by the new items of equipment being introduced.

A highly important function of the school system is performed by school troops. These are a small group of units located at our major school centers which are used for practical training, student field exercises, and demonstrations. They

support the basic and advanced training of officers at the branch schools and provide practical training for officer and non-commissioned officer candidates. They maintain the equipment which is used for practical training by students, and the men assigned to these units must be experts as drivers, gunners, communicators, and small unit leaders because they serve as coaches, demonstrators, and instructors for students during their practical training. School troops are not part of the deployable forces of the Army. In time of emergency the school troop mission remains essential and in fact these units continue to perform their primary function. The units are organized uniquely for their mission and are not suitable for combat operations.

There were 14,000 school troops in the structure in 1965. This total expanded to almost 20,000 in 1968 and 1969. By the end of 1971, we will have reduced the total to 16,000 and we have planned a further reduction to only 11,000 during FY 72. This reduction is budget driven and does not reflect a change in the school troop mission or a reduction of requirements from the 14,000 level maintained in 1965.

Student manpower requirements are based on the number of new accessions brought into the Army, the number of personnel who will be trained to qualification in the Army's MOS producing schools, and the number of other personnel who will attend various schools on a permanent change of station basis. To be classified as a permanent change of station school, the course length must be of at least 20 weeks duration. No manpower spaces are provided for attendance at short course training, commonly referred to as temporary duty schooling.

Spaces for cadet strength at the United States Military Academy are established by public law.

#### ARMY TRAINING

(Military manpower in thousands)

	Fiscal year—		
	Fiscal year 1970 (actual)	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Recruit trainees .....	131	106	80
Students and cadets .....	77	59	45
Instructors and school troops .....	115	92	71
Total .....	318	257	196

*Command.*—This category includes headquarters elements of NORAD/CONAD, Joint Systems Integrated Planning Staff (JSIPS), Alaska Command (ALCOM), Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM), U.S. Forces Japan, UN Command in Korea, DOD agencies, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve to include advisors, and Department of the Army. Also included are major field headquarters (CONARC, CONUS Armies, and the White House Transportation Agency), District Engineer facilities in CONUS, support of other DOD headquarters elements, the Federal Aviation Agency, Selective Service, and NASA.

This category provides spaces for the departmental headquarters of the Army to include the Secretariat, Chief of Staff, and the General and Special staffs. Special staff activities included in this aggregation are the Chief of Engineers, Chief of Information, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Military History, the Chaplain's Board, the Director of Military Support, the Army Audit Agency, the Army element of the Office of the President, the Nuclear Weapons Surety Group, and the Strategy Analysis and Tactics Group, to mention a few. These staff activities have been subjected to personnel reductions in consonance with the 15% reduction programmed for headquarters activities in the Army through FY 71 and are programmed for additional reductions in FY 72. The account also provides for the Computer Systems Command, a consolidation of Information and Data Systems Agencies of the Army. The Computer Systems Command, and other data agencies and installations have grown in spite of tremendous pressure to restrict their growth, but they have grown in direct response to demands for

management information and data essential to tight control of the force structure, the manpower program, and the budget. These activities also provide for the command and control of the Army in CONUS and the direction of specialized activities. CONARC and the CONUS Army headquarters provide command, control and administrative services for all units and installations located in a specified geographical area. With the consolidation of Fourth and Fifth Armies this year, the Army will have effected a second reduction in Army areas, relying now on four headquarters to accomplish the functions for which six were required previously.

## ARMY COMMAND

[Military manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Fiscal year 1971 estimated	Fiscal year 1972 estimated
Departmental.....	3	3	2
Headquarters support <sup>1</sup> .....	4	3	3
Field.....	26	24	23
Total.....	33	30	28

<sup>1</sup> Includes Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and Army other headquarters support.

*Logistics.*—This category consists of Army personnel supporting supply depots, inventory control points, procurement operations, munitions facilities, weapons facilities, depot maintenance activities, missile facilities, second destination transportation, industrial preparedness, and logistic and maintenance support activities.

The logistics establishment is our largest employer of civilian manpower spaces. Ninety-five percent of this category is civilian. There are 26 supply and maintenance depots and six arsenals which include the Army's munitions plants and weapons production facilities and the installations which procure, process, repair, and distribute the materiel resources of the Army.

The permanent work force of the Army Materiel Command has remained relatively stable during the period of the war in Vietnam. The Command is the Army's largest employer of civilian manpower and contains a small complement of military personnel responsible for management and control. Expansion to support the war in Vietnam was accomplished almost entirely by contract, and the work force added 122,000. This addition almost doubled the strength of the Command at the time of its greatest buildup.

Manpower requirements for the logistics establishment are most susceptible to calculations based on measureable workloads. Items of equipment produced, tons of supplies procured and delivered, numbers of vehicles rebuilt, and requisitions processed all provide work measurement factors. Considering the current projected requirements for supply tonnages and end items to be rebuilt, the programmed manpower assets and funds for contract hire provide a very favorable comparison with 1965. Rebuild in 1965 was \$212.5 million and is projected in 1972 to be \$430.4 million. Supply operations in 1972 are projected to be the same as 1965—2.5 million tons.

## ARMY LOGISTICS (MILITARY MANPOWER, IN THOUSANDS)

	Actual, fiscal year 1970	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Supply.....	4	4	3
Maintenance.....	3	3	3
Total.....	7	7	6

## NAVY

The Navy manpower program is displayed below:

NAVY MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS <sup>1</sup>

(Active Duty End Strengths in Thousands; End of Fiscal Years)

	Fiscal year 1970 (actual)	Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)	Fiscal year 1972 (estimated)
Strategic forces.....	19	19	19
General purpose forces:			
Land forces.....	3	3	3
Tactical air forces.....	65	63	61
Naval forces.....	231	211	202
Mobility forces.....	4	3	3
Total general purpose forces.....	303	280	269
Other mission forces:			
Intelligence and security.....	17	17	16
Communications.....	12	11	11
Research and development.....	9	9	8
Support to other nations.....	4	5	6
Total other mission forces.....	42	42	41
General support:			
Base and individual support.....	144	109	106
Training.....	137	130	126
Command.....	39	34	34
Logistics.....	9	9	9
Total general support.....	329	282	275
Total Navy.....	692	623	604

<sup>1</sup> Includes Naval personnel serving with the Marine Corps.

The following sections will describe the basis for calculating the manpower needed for each category.

*Strategic Forces*

This category consists primarily of the 41 Polaris/Poseidon ballistic missile submarines, and their supporting tenders. Also included are a few support personnel, who provide technical assistance material support, and program management.

## NAVY STRATEGIC FORCES

	Fiscal year—		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Forces:			
SSBN.....	41	41	41
Tenders (AS).....	5	5	5
Manpower (thousands).....	19	19	19

The ships are manned on the basis of the operating, maintenance, and administrative workloads to which Navy manning criteria are applied. The resulting manpower requirements are expressed in Ship Manning Documents (SMD) for each class of submarine and tender. The development of SMDs is discussed in detail in the presentation on Naval Forces. For an SSBN, the standard manning is 26 officers and 248 enlisted men. Manning levels are also provided for ships in overhaul and conversion since a portion of the planned work is accomplished by the crew.

Given these standard factors, the manpower requirements for Strategic forces computed as follows:

FISCAL YEAR 1972 NAVY STRATEGIC FORCES MILITARY MANPOWER

Type of ship	Average manning factor	Number of units	Total manpower (thousands)
SSBN.....	1 263	41	10.8
Tenders.....	1, 157	5	5.8

<sup>1</sup> Includes active ships and those in overhaul/conversion. For active ships only, the manning is 274.

Additional personnel are needed to man the support craft (e.g., floating dry-docks) and other related activities (e.g., Atlantic Fleet Polaris Material Office.)

*Tactical Air Forces*

These forces are the Navy's attack aircraft carriers (CVA) and attack aircraft wings (CVW).

NAVY TACTICAL AIR FORCES

	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Forces:			
CVA.....	15	14	13
CVW.....	13	12	11
Total manpower (thousands).....	65	63	61

<sup>1</sup> Includes 12 CVA and 1 CV.

Each carrier air wing consists of a mix of aircraft, including fighters, attack planes, reconnaissance aircraft, and support aircraft such as inflight tankers. Aircraft of a similar type are organized into squadrons. For each type of aircraft, criteria are established for the number of aircrews and maintenance personnel needed to keep the plane flying a specified number of hours per month. To these requirements are added additional personnel for administration and support. These total manpower requirements are expressed in Squadron Manning Documents for each type of aircraft squadron.

As an example, the manpower for an F-4B squadron is developed as follows.

Aircrew per aircraft: 2 (1 pilot, 1 radar intercept officer)

Aircrewmen needed for a 12 aircraft squadron: 32 (provides additional aircrews in order to fly the required number of sorties with sufficient crew rest between sorties).

Maintenance men: 202

Administration and Support: 68

F-4 Squadron total: 302

The requirements for aircraft carrier crews is expressed in Ship Manning Documents.

The total requirement for Navy tactical air forces is then computed by multiplying the individual manning factors times the number of units in the force.

FISCAL YEAR 1972 NAVY TACTICAL AIR FORCES (MANPOWER IN THOUSANDS)

Type of unit	Average manning	Number of units	Total manpower
Aircraft carriers (CVA).....	2, 648	13	34.4
Fight/attack squadrons.....	285	61	17.3
Other squadrons.....	261	29	7.6

The average manning shown above is intended only to illustrate the planning used to develop the FY 72 manpower needs. The actual budget is based on a more detailed approach for each squadron. A few additional personnel spaces are also provided to achieve a continuous maintenance capability for Naval Reserve tactical air units.

*Naval Forces*

The bulk of the Navy fleets, including amphibious assault ships, sealane protection forces (submarines, surface ships, and aircraft), and the ships and units which support the combat forces at sea are included in this category.

## NAVAL FORCES

Forces	Fiscal year—		
	1970	1971	1972
ASW carriers (CVS).....	4	4	3
ASW carrier air groups (CVSG).....	4	4	4
ASW patrol squadrons (VP).....	24	24	24
Attack submarines (SS/SSN).....	103	101	93
ASW escorts.....	163	156	156
Fleet air defense escorts.....	68	70	71
Amphibious assault ships.....	97	81	75
Replenishment and support ships.....	190	183	157

With the determination of the force mix, associated force manpower requirements are determined on the basis of factors applicable to specific ship and aircraft types. The primary device for establishment of these factors is the Navy Manning Documentation Program. Using accepted scientific techniques such as work study, manpower productivity criteria, etc., minimum essential manpower to permit a given class of ship or aircraft squadron to perform its mission is established. These manpower levels are reflected as Ship Manning Documents (SMDs) and Squadron Manning Documents (SQMDs) for the specific type in question. Applying these type manning factors to the force structure provides the Naval force manpower requirements.

In developing manning documents, the following workload, manpower productivity and time available for work (i.e., standard work week, etc.) assumptions are used:

Standard work week for enlisted personnel afloat:

At sea:

Watchstander..... 74 hours.

Non-Watchstander..... 66 hours.

In port:

Watchstander..... 45 hours.

Non-Watchstander..... 41 hours.

1-in-6 Duty Rotation Minimum Objective.

## STANDARD WORKWEEK ROUTINE

	Watchstander		Nonwatchstander	
	At sea	In port	At sea	In port
Watch.....	56.00	9.33	.....	.....
Training.....	2.00	2.83	2.00	3.00
Service diversions.....	2.50	3.37	3.00	3.50
Scheduled work.....	13.50	28.67	37.50	31.00
Unscheduled work.....	.....	.80	22.50	3.50
Total workweek.....	74.00	45.00	66.00	41.00

Service Diversions consists of such activities as attendance at formal military training classes and visits to medical facilities which must be or are normally accomplished during normal off-watch working hours and which therefore deduct from individual capacity to do productive work. These factors have been developed from experience, based on work sampling techniques.

A percentage allowance is also applied to basic productive work requirements to reflect those delays arising from fatigue, environmental effects, personal needs and unavoidable interruptions which serve to increase the time required for work accomplishment.

Application—20% factor applied to all maintenance transactions.

Example: Maintenance work required (1) times productivity allowance (0.20) equals 1 hour 12 minutes allotted to complete transaction.

A further time allowance for tool drawing, publications gathering, equipment entry, transaction recording and put away is also used for preventive maintenance efforts.

Application, 30% applied to all PM transactions.

Example: (1) times make ready/put away allowance (0.30) equals 1 hour 18 minutes allotted to complete transaction.

The workweek on board a ship at sea under wartime readiness conditions that is used for manpower planning is summarized below:

WATCHSTANDER	
Available for work.....	74
Watchstanding.....	- 56
Available for maintenance.....	18
Total service diversion.....	- 4. 5
Available for maintenance (includes allowances).....	13. 5
NON-WATCHSTANDER	
Available for work.....	66
Total service diversion.....	- 6
Available for maintenance (includes allowance).....	60

Using these standards, manning documents are prepared for each class of ship, establishing the manpower requirements. These requirements are further subdivided by pay grade to provide the proper mix of skill levels and to provide for command and supervision. Thus, a DDG-2 class destroyer has a manpower requirement of 338 personnel. Of these, 19 are officers, 16 are Chief Petty officers, and 303 are other enlisted grades. One-hundred eighty-nine of the 338 men are required to continuously man operational positions, and the remainder are needed for maintenance, administration and support. Aircraft squadrons are similarly manned based on the air crews, maintenance, and support personnel needed to support the wartime flying rate.

#### EXAMPLES OF FISCAL YEAR 1972 NAVAL FORCES MANPOWER

Unit	Average manning	Number of units
ASW carrier.....	1, 630	3
ASW air group.....	847	4
ASW patrol squadron.....	351	24
Attack submarines.....	105	93
Destroyers (DD/DDG).....	296	123
Major fleet escorts:		
Cruiser (CG/CCG).....	1, 030	8
Frigate (DLB).....	401	29
Amphibious assault ships:		
Other than LST.....	418	46
LST.....	194	28
Underway replenishment ships.....	313	62

The above figures illustrate the planning that is used in developing manpower requirements. The actual budget is based on a detailed analysis by individual, ship and aircraft type, with special allowances used for ships in overhaul, conversion, and precommissioning status. Additional manpower are provided for such combat support units as Mobile Construction Battalions (Seabees), Underwater Demolition Teams, and Fleet Support Squadrons. All of these individual requirements for each ship and squadron are then summed to determine the total manpower needed for Naval Forces.

#### NAVAL FORCES MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

[Active duty end strengths in thousands]

	Fiscal year—		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
ASW and fleet air defense forces.....	127	125	125
Amphibious forces.....	43	36	34
Naval support forces.....	62	49	44
Total naval forces.....	231	211	202

Note: Totals do not add due to rounding.

### *Navy Mobility Forces*

The primary element included in this category is the Military Sealift Command (MSC). However, since MSC ships are civilian manned, the only military personnel required are those in the headquarters elements.

This category also includes the Navy Weather Service and the Navy Oceanographic Office. The weather service consists of Fleet Weather Centrals at major navy bases, and detachments at other naval air station and operating bases. The manpower requirements are determined by the services required by the fleet. Using standard work measurement and workweek criteria, the number of men needed to produce the required services is determined. A small number of administrative personnel are also needed to control and supervise the operations.

Navy mobility forces (manpower in thousands):

Fiscal year 1970	4
Fiscal year 1971	3
Fiscal year 1972	3

### *Land Forces*

About three thousand Navy medical personnel serve with the Fleet Marine Forces of the U.S. Marine Corps. The requirements for medical personnel are determined by the structure of the Marine Corps division elements of which they are a part.

### *Navy, Other Mission Forces*

Each of the four categories included here (Intelligence and Security, Communications, Research and Development, and Support to Other Nations) serve defense-wide missions. For this reason, these activities are subject to policy control from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to ensure they perform effectively without unnecessary duplication of effort. The specific manning practices are developed by the individual Services and defense agencies, but they are coordinated to ensure that a common approach is used wherever the similarity of function permits.

Navy manpower in both Navy activities and defense agencies is discussed and shown in following sections.

*Intelligence and Security.*—This category includes Navy military personnel who are assigned to the military intelligence units of the Navy both within the United States, at overseas bases, and afloat. The category also includes military personnel assigned to intelligence positions within defense agencies and the intelligence staffs of the Unified and Specified Commands. Units of the Navy for which military intelligence personnel are required may be categorized as world-wide cryptologic activities (the Navy Security Group units engaged in communications and electronic intelligence), combat intelligence units engaged in intelligence collection, processing, analysis, production, image interpretation, target designation support, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, [deleted] collection operations, technical intelligence and mapping, charting and geodesy, and counterintelligence and investigative activities.

Intelligence resource policies are established by the Secretary of Defense. Intelligence requirements, however, are established at many levels: The Navy establishes its requirements for intelligence to support force planning, field operations, and research and development. The Joint Chiefs of Staff compiles its own intelligence requirements along with those of the Unified and Specified Commands. These and other strategic guidance issuances from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) form a basis for budget and manpower allocations. The national intelligence community (the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State) relies heavily on the intelligence resources of the DOD and through the medium of the United States Intelligence Board establishes requirements and priorities for which the intelligence elements of the DOD and Navy must apply dollar and manpower resources.

In general, manpower requirements are determined by applying operational manning factors to equipments, staffing and support factors to operational manning levels, and by workload measurement and project requirements. The manning of individual intelligence units of the Navy is determined by their manning criteria as expressed in manpower authorization documents. These normal manning assignments are altered from time to time to fit unusual situations; for example, detachments for special missions aboard ships. The manning of intelligence staffs (the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Fleet Commanders in Chief,

the intelligence staffs of the Unified and Specified Commands) by Navy personnel is established by Navy manpower authorizations and Tables of Distribution for joint staffs (Unified and Specified Commands). The criteria for these manpower tables has been arrived at through experience and they are modified from time to time as broad missions of the staffs change, science and technology impacts on the methods and procedures of intelligence, and as actual combat experience requires. Changes in Navy manpower for the defense agencies are determined by intelligence requirements which call for specialties for which Navy intelligence personnel are trained (Order of Battle of the Soviet and other communist Navies, for example) plus overall changes in workload for which the Navy must provide a proportionate share along with Air Force, Army and Marine Corps.

NAVY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal years		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Navy .....	17	17	16
Navy portion of Defense agencies .....	2	2	1
Total Navy portion of DOD intelligence and security .....	19	19	17

*Communications.*—This category provides forces in support of world-wide communications for the Navy as well as support of the Defense Communications System (DCS). Included is the Navy Communications Command and elements supporting the Defense Communications Agency.

Command and control of our forces is exercised through the Defense Communications System and the supporting Navy communications system. The basic communications requirements are established by the deployment of our forces. Then, based on prior experience and the expressed needs of the fleet commander, the required capacity for each of several modes of communication (e.g., voice, teletype, etc.) is determined. The required world-wide coverage, capacity, and the technical state of the art then determine the number and location of communications stations, transmitter sites, message centers, etc. Each such location is manned based on the number of operating positions to be filled, maintenance manhours required, and the need for administration and support. The total strength of the Communications category is then determined by the number of operating locations, the manning of each, and additional personnel for supervision and support of the system as a whole.

Navy communications (manpower in thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual) .....	12
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated) .....	11
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated) .....	11

*Research and Development.*—This function consists of Navy personnel working in research and development activities. Included is support of DOD research, Navy laboratories, and research and development activities.

The Navy maintains laboratories in order to preserve a technological capability in military research which does not exist in the private sector. Each laboratory is staffed with a mix of military and civilian personnel in order to provide a blend of combat experience and technical expertise. Military personnel also man R&D project ships and aircraft. In FY 72, 83% of R&D personnel are civilian.

The military and civilian manpower requirements are controlled by the funding of the R&D program. There is a fixed and stable requirement to man the R&D laboratories and a variable requirement dependent upon funds available to initiate or continue specific projects. The Navy currently operates 15 major experimental and testing activities and 9 major research laboratories.

Navy Research & Development (Manpower in Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual) .....	9
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated) .....	9
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated) .....	8

*Support to Other Nations.*—This category consists of Navy personnel for the support of International Military Headquarters, Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), Missions, and Military Assistance Groups (MAGs).

Military assistance groups are established at the request of the host country, after consultation within the executive branch and approval by the President. The size of each group depends on the nature of the assistance requested, but usually consists of members of all Services. In conjunction with the U.S. Ambassador and the State Department, military assistance activities are periodically reviewed to ensure that their manning is appropriate for their current mission. The small increase in this program relates to the advisory effort in Vietnam.

Navy support to other nations (manpower in thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual)-----	4
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)-----	5
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated)-----	5

#### *Navy General Support*

About 45% of the Navy's military manpower is included in General Support. Because these personnel are not on board ships and squadrons, there is a tendency to believe that they are less essential to the performance of the Navy's mission. This is emphatically not the case. General Support manpower is absolutely essential to the readiness of the mission forces.

We will discuss in the following sections, the methods we use to size General Support, and how this relates to the forces being supported.

#### *Base and Individual Support*

This category, which includes 38% of the General Support manpower, consists of three elements: Base Operations Support, Medical Support, and Individual Support.

Activities in the Base Support category provide shore-based support requirements for Naval sea and air operating forces. Medical includes the manpower associated with Naval hospitals and medical centers as well as the patients receiving care in the hospitals. The Individual Support category includes personnel assigned to recruiting and examining centers, and a group of non-available personnel generally identified as transients. Additionally, Naval prisoners are included within this grouping. We will discuss each element in turn.

*Base Operating Support (BOS).*—This manpower is assigned, primarily, to Naval Stations, Naval Air Stations, and base support facilities, both in CONUS and overseas, which directly support the fleet. A major determinate of BOS manpower is the number of bases which must be operated. In addition, changes in the amount and kind of services provided to the fleet influence the level of base support manpower. Admiral Zumwalt's emphasis on people programs will increase the level of personnel support being provided by the shore establishment to the entire Navy.

The support establishment is characterized by elasticity which permits expansion and contraction to suit changing force levels within a relatively fixed base. For example, since FY 63, total Navy manpower has varied from about 664 thousand to over 775 thousand down to 604 thousand in FY 72. During this same period, the total number of major bases ranged only from 246 to 295 with the average about 271. Major bases in the U.S. have ranged from 201 to 230. Typical bases range in size from 60 military men at the Naval Station Philadelphia to 1,500 military men at the Naval Station Norfolk.

Manpower requirements are established separately for each base. This is done using the same approach used to develop manning factors for ships and aircraft. In essence, this approach tabulates the workload associated with all facets of operating and maintaining a Navy organization, and translates that workload into manpower requirements. The methodology includes the application of selected work study and other industrial engineering techniques to the analysis of operations, maintenance, training, support, administration, etc. in order to quantify workload and distribute it in the most efficient manner.

About half of the BOS manpower is civilian. The mix of military and civilian personnel used in any one base depends, among other things, on the availability of suitable local labor, the nature of the needed skills (some of which are unique to active Navy personnel), and the need to maintain an adequate number of military billets to provide equitable sea-shore rotation opportunities for all Navy personnel. Sea-shore rotation is a particularly important concern as the Navy strives to improve its personnel retention rates.

The total manpower requirement for BOS, then, is determined by the number of bases we need to maintain, in order to support our deployed forces and the

workload present at each base. In order to keep our manning factors current we regularly send manpower survey teams to our shore activities to monitor their workload and validate their manpower requirements.

*Medical Support.*—Medical support manpower needs are directly related to the anticipated patient workload. Over the years considerable experience has been gained in relating patient loads to staffing needs.

The patient load is determined not only by the number of Navy active duty personnel, but also by the number of dependents and retired personnel of all Services in the vicinity of Navy hospitals. This is a particular problem for the Navy because our largest medical facilities tend also to be located in major population centers where many dependents and retired personnel live.

This category also includes an allowance for Navy personnel hospitalized for extended periods (one month or more). This patient allowance is provided in order to maintain the personnel strength of mission units. The number of patients in the Navy is statistically projected based on the Navy's strength and the proportion has remained relatively stable (about .5%) over the past years.

*Individual Support.*—This element consists of principally of transients, disciplinary activities, and the Navy Recruiting Service.

Transient spaces are provided to make up the manpower lost to mission activities while assigned personnel are making PCS moves. If transient spaces were not provided, the readiness of the mission forces would be directly effected since it would not be possible to man them at their authorized level.

About 50% of the PCS program consists of movements fixed by the size of the Navy: accessions, training, and separations. These fixed movements and a large portion of the operational/rotational move needs are due to the current low retention and high turnover of non-career personnel. The Navy is in a period of great turbulence due to large reductions below a peak strength of 776,000 in 1969, reduction of force levels and supporting structure, consolidation and relocation of some activities, and reorientation of effort in Vietnam from combat to advisory. The number of moves in FY 72 is less than in FY 71. However, gains made through improved personnel distribution procedures have been somewhat offset by the unplanned moves required to accommodate changes in Navy force levels and the establishment of new people oriented programs as we work toward a zero-draft force.

The Navy is a sea duty force and must provide sufficient opportunities for shore duty to offset the personal privations associated with sea duty. Tour lengths for most personnel are driven by the need to offer equitable sea-shore rotation opportunities and to a great extent the rotation policy of the Navy must be geared to tour lengths of personnel afloat. Minimum sea and shore tours for all enlisted are 24 months, while many specific types of duty, such as service craft and staff assignments, require 36-48 month tours. Officer tour lengths range from a minimum of 18 months for certain commands to 48 months in many staff corps billets. Where an officer's experience, qualifications, and professional needs permit, extension beyond normal tour lengths are being programmed.

As we move to a zero-draft environment, our recruiting service effort will become even more important. We have therefore increased this program in FY 72 by about 1,000 persons.

The next table summarizes the Individual and Base Support Category.

#### NAVY INDIVIDUAL AND BASE SUPPORT

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1970 (actual)	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Base operating support.....	62	55	54
Medical support:			
Staff.....	16	16	15
Patients.....	3	3	3
Individual support:			
Transients.....	55	28	27
Recruiting.....	3	3	4
Other.....	4	2	2
Total individual and base support.....	144	109	106

None: Does not add due to rounding.

### Training

This is the largest category of General Support, contains 21 percent of our total Navy manpower, and is absolutely essential to the readiness of the fleets. Training can be subdivided into: recruit and specialized training; undergraduate and advanced flight training; professional, and other specialized training.

The turnover of our personnel imposes severe training loads on the Navy. Because of the shortage of career personnel, heavy reliance must be placed on first term personnel to support the fleet. Readiness demands that the lack of experience in these new men be made up, to the extent possible, with whatever appropriate training we can give them. Over 100,000 men will require an absolute minimum of nine weeks of recruit training to give them the skills and knowledge necessary to enter the Navy environment. In addition, over 58,000 of these people will be given initial skill training (Class A schools for Navy rate training). The average length of the schools is only 18 weeks though, of course, the range is wide depending on the skill. The Navy must, in effect, take a new civilian from his environment, introduce him to the Navy, give him some basic skill training, and make him an effective man-of-wars man in a very short time. This continuous process of making sailors out of young civilians imposes a tremendous resource load on the Navy which is unavoidable until significant improvement in retention occurs.

Initial entry training needs are a direct function of: (1) the size of the Navy; (2) the number of new accessions needed to make up our losses; and (3) the length of the training courses. Our policy is to train 100 percent of the required input in support of each enlisted skill grouping (rating) via formal initial skill training, within training facilities constraints, following the nine weeks basic or recruit course.

Officer procurement comes from a multitude of sources and our policy is to provide training in such areas as Naval tactics, navigation, shipboard watch procedures and leadership/management procedures. With minor exceptions in the highly professional direct procured Officer Corps (e.g., physicians and lawyers), all candidates receive a minimum of 19 weeks training in the above areas.

Flight training needs are determined by the number of aircraft we plan to operate in future years. Because of the time required to produce a skilled naval aviator, the undergraduate flight training we conduct this year is planned to meet our FY 73-74 requirements. Advanced flight training trains both new aviators and experienced pilots returning from non-operational tours in the combat skills needed to fly a particular model of operational aircraft. Advanced flight training also provides operational training for aircrewmembers such as Radar Intercept Operators. The courses are tailored to the needs of the individual so that no student stays longer than is necessary to achieve the required proficiency.

Fleet training consists of many short courses for personnel already assigned to operating units. Students usually attend on a temporary duty basis and remain attached to their parent units. Therefore, the primary requirement is for the instructor staff. This staff is sized based on the number of school locations operated and the anticipated fleet student load.

Professional training includes postgraduate education for career naval officers to better fit them to manage and command in an even more complex Navy. Training is also provided for specialist officers, such as physicians, in their specialties. The size of this requirement is primarily a function of the size of the career officer corps.

Finally, the training category also includes the Naval Academy, and staffs for ROTC units. The students and staffs in the Navy training programs are summarized below:

NAVY TRAINING (MANPOWER IN THOUSANDS)

	Estimated		
	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Recruit and specialized.....	78	78	73
Undergraduate and advanced flight.....	39	36	36
Professional and other.....	20	16	17
Total training.....	137	130	126

### Command

All major Naval Command Staffs are included within this category. Included is Navy manpower assigned to Joint Staffs, Departmental Headquarters, and Fleet Staffs from ship division to the Fleet headquarters. Also included are command support activities such as Finance Centers and Audit Offices.

For the end of FY 72, we have programed a 13% reduction in the military staffing of command activities below the end FY 70 level. This reduction was made in keeping with the reductions in the size of the operating forces.

The difficulty in developing staffing criteria for headquarters turns primarily on the problem of defining the workload. For command support functions such as finance centers, normal workload measurement and staffing techniques can be used. Operational staffs (such as ship division commanders) can be adjusted as the forces they command change. Headquarters staffs are managed primarily by manpower surveys, command inspections, and audits which seek to identify unnecessary or duplicative functions. Finally, we rely on aggregate measures which seek to require new functions to be performed at the expense of old, and basically attempt to hold the total manpower requirements for Command at a constant or declining level.

NAVY COMMAND MANPOWER  
[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1970 (actual)	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Navy departmental headquarters.....	3	2	2
Headquarters support <sup>1</sup> .....	2	3	2
Fleet commands <sup>2</sup> .....	23	18	18
Field headquarters.....	11	11	12
Total command.....	39	34	34

<sup>1</sup> Includes Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS, and Navy other headquarters support (e.g., Navy finance centers).

<sup>2</sup> Program 1 and 2 commands including Navy portion of unified commands.

### Navy Logistics

This category includes Navy manpower assigned to units such as Supply Depots, Inventory Control Points, Ship Maintenance Activities, Naval Ordnance Activities, Public Works Centers, Navy Inactive Ship Maintenance Facilities, and Maintenance Support Activities.

Military personnel make up only 5% of the total manpower in Logistics, since most of these jobs are industrial in nature. Navy personnel, including many of our technical specialist officers, are assigned to supervisory and technical management positions, in order to ensure that the logistics complex is responsive to the needs of the fleet. Since the hard core supervisory and management positions have not changed significantly in the past few years, the manpower requirement has been level.

#### Navy Logistics (Manpower in Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual); 9.

Fiscal year 1971 (estimated); 9.

Fiscal year (estimated); 9.

### MARINE CORPS

The Marine Corps, in fiscal year 1972, will arrive at its baseline post-Vietnam posture.

MARINE CORPS MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS <sup>1</sup>

[Active duty end strengths in thousands; end of fiscal years]

	Fiscal year 1970 (actual)	Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)	Fiscal year 1972 (estimated)
Strategic forces.....	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )
General purpose forces:			
Land forces.....	94	82	87
Tactical air forces.....	32	28	29
Naval forces.....	1	1	1
Total general purpose forces.....	128	111	116
Other mission forces:			
Intelligence and security.....	2	2	2
Communications.....	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )
Research and development.....	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )
Support to other nations.....	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )	( <sup>2</sup> )
Total other mission forces.....	2	2	2
General support:			
Base and individual support.....	61	42	36
Training.....	56	45	42
Command.....	10	9	8
Logistics.....	2	2	2
Total general support.....	129	98	88
Total Marine Corps.....	260	212	206

<sup>1</sup> Includes Marine Corps personnel serving with the Navy. Totals may not add due to rounding.<sup>2</sup> Less than 500 spaces.

## GENERAL

The Marine Corps FY 72 manpower plan represents that manpower necessary to man at a viable level the three active divisions and air wings authorized by law. Although it is somewhat higher than our strength prior to the beginning of the commitment in Vietnam, the FY 72 Marine Corps will possess a greater combat capability because of the incorporation of advances in technology, equipment, training and knowledge gained since 1964. In keeping with the Commandant's goal of a lean, tough and truly professional Marine Corps, a higher proportion of Marines in FY 72 will be in the operating forces, that is, the combat units, than in most pre-Vietnam years.

The objectives of the FY 72 manpower plan are:

(a) Improvement in the overall readiness of all Marine Corps combat units as we leave the turbulence of the FY 71 strength reductions and enter the final stage of our phasedown.

(b) Continued improvement in the professionalism of Marines, and at the same time, their welfare.

(c) Continuation of the reduction underway since FY 70 in the grade structure of both officers and enlisted Marines.

This plan provides for a reduction in total strength to 206,300, a reduction of 21% from FY 70, and an average strength of 209,800. This strength includes 19,800 officers and 186,400 enlisted.

*Major Mission Forces*

*Strategic Forces.*—This category includes about [deleted] Marines serving with the Navy or assigned to a joint strategic planning staff.

*General Purpose Forces.*—The combat forces of the Marine Corps are organized around the division wing team.

In general, Marine Corps manpower requirements are based on:

(a) The approved force level; that is, the structure which is to be manned. For the Marine Corps, this consists of three Divisions and three Wings.

(b) The number of manpower billets, by grade and skill, required in each of the component structure units which make up the major forces authorized. This is determined by the operational capability required, and is related to the equipment necessary to perform the tasks or missions which are envisioned. [Deleted].

All manpower requirements for these units are based upon a detailed analysis of the missions of the units, combat requirements, desired unit operational capabilities, and the items of equipment to be operated and maintained in that unit (e.g., pilot to seat ratios for aircraft).

Military manpower requirements are not based on any fixed standard work week, but on operational requirements based on the mission capability of that unit. As a part of a continuous review of manpower needs, a major task analysis study for all occupational fields is currently in progress to update manpower needs in relation to job requirements. This study will serve to better identify manpower requirements and training requirements.

The manpower requested for the Marine Corps in FY 72 would permit a manning level world-wide for the Fleet Marine Force of [deleted] which will make these units substantially combat ready. At the end of FY 72, [deleted]. Marines will be assigned to General Purpose Forces units, including Marine detachments aboard naval ships.

#### *Other Mission Forces*

This category includes:

1. Intelligence and security units and activities such as radio battalions and the Marine Barracks at the National Security Agency. About [deleted] Marines are assigned to this category, primarily in support of Navy programs.
2. Research and Development and Support of Other Nations. Less than 500 Marines are assigned to these areas, primarily in support of functions external to Marine Corps programs such as the Pacific Missile Range and the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam.

#### *General Support*

The General Support functions are:

1. Individual and Base Support which includes: base operating support, (e.g., Marine Corps base operating personnel and Marine Barracks personnel) medical support (e.g., patients), and individual support (e.g., transients, prisoners).
2. Training activities including recruit, specialized, professional and flight training, and the students/trainees associated with these.
3. Logistics activities, e.g., supply and maintenance depot operating personnel.
4. Command activities, e.g., departmental headquarters and Marines assigned to unified and specified commands.

*Base Operating Support Command and Logistics.*—In the General Support category, base operating support and command and logistics manpower requirements are determined by an analysis in depth of the support functions required of these activities. Certain minimum manpower requirements to staff these activities are necessary to maintain even a low peacetime level of operations and, therefore, do not vary proportionately with force mission manpower changes. These minimum manpower requirements also provide the nucleus for rapid expansion in manpower to a wartime support capability. About [deleted] of Marine Corps manpower is assigned to base operating support, command and logistic activities.

*Individual Support.*—Transient numbers are derived from a computer gaming model and vary according to overseas strength, total strength, tour length, force structure and manning level parameters. The isolation of transients permits direct management control over the number of Marines in this category. Transients are influenced primarily by the number of gains and losses and tour lengths.

Even in the peacetime Marine Corps, the vast majority of overseas tours are "hardship" tours, unaccompanied by dependents. For this reason, a precise balance must be maintained between the length of unaccompanied overseas tours and the length of accompanied tours in CONUS or elsewhere. If the tour length is increased in accompanied billets, the required deployments cannot be sustained without also increasing the length of the unaccompanied "hardship" tours. This is because, with respect to flow between CONUS and overseas, lengthening CONUS tours has the effect of reducing the rotation base to sustain deployed forces. Frequency of rotation is similarly related to overseas tour length and strength.

The numbers of patients and prisoners are obtained by using historical factors and are a function of end strength and, in the case of patients, a function of combat commitment.

*Training.*—Students and trainees required are determined by a calculation of the number of Marines which must be accessed and trained in each skill in order to sustain manpower requirements, over time. The total number of Marines who will be in this category at any given time is a function of the number of accessions, the length of each of the various courses, and the mix of students engaged in training, in long and shorter courses. Also included in this category are more senior Marines engaged in higher level training. This number is relatively constant.

All new enlisted personnel are given basic and occupational specialty training averaging approximately six months in duration (a minimum of 16 weeks training

prior to deployment is required by law) and incoming officers receive 26 weeks of basic training. A significant portion of these new officers will go on to flight training and a majority of the remaining ground officers will receive additional occupational specialty training.

#### Average Strength

The discussion thus far has concerned determination of end year strength requirements which are based on requirements at one point in time. Average strength, however, is dynamic and is derived by combining the changing manpower requirements from month to month during the year.

#### Summary

The Marine Corps planned for FY 72 will have a higher proportion of its manpower assets in the fighting forces—the Fleet Marine Force and other operating forces—than in any year since 1965. This percentage is [deleted].

The average strength of 209,846 requested is believed to be the minimum necessary to fulfill our manpower objectives and to provide a highly disciplined, lean and ready force.

#### AIR FORCE

The Air Force manpower program is displayed below:

AIR FORCE MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS  
[Active duty end strengths in thousands; end of fiscal years]

	Fiscal year—		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Strategic.....	115	108	113
General purpose forces:			
Tactical air forces.....	92	82	81
Mobility forces.....	78	69	63
Total general purpose forces.....	170	151	144
Other mission forces:			
Intelligence and security.....	43	39	39
Communications.....	31	30	29
Research and development.....	23	20	18
Support to other nations.....	1	1	1
Total other mission forces.....	98	90	87
General support:			
Base and individual support.....	219	224	225
Training.....	106	107	108
Command.....	71	66	64
Logistics.....	11	11	12
Total general support.....	407	408	409
Total, Air Force.....	791	757	753

Air Force manpower requirements for a given year are based on DOD force levels and deployments. These force levels and deployments are established after considering threat and strategy and are provided to the Air Force as given requirements.

The number of active Air Force major forces for FY 70-72 is shown below:

#### AIR FORCE MAJOR FORCES

	Fiscal year—		
	1970	1971	1972
Strategic bombers (AAI).....	517	569	521
Manned fighter interceptor squadrons.....	14	11	11
Intercontinental ballistic missiles.....	1,054	1,054	1,054
Tactical Air Force wings.....	23	21	21
Strategic airlift squadrons.....	18	17	17

The following sections will provide a summary of the rationale, policies, and problems associated with determining manpower requirements for each category of the Air Force.

#### *Air Force Strategic Forces*

Strategic Forces consist of Offensive, Defensive and Control and Surveillance Forces.

a. *Strategic offense forces* are a mixture of combat aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC). SAC is responsible for the delivery over enemy targets of the major portion of the Free World's nuclear firepower. SAC's primary mission is to prevent nuclear war through its ability to deliver this nuclear firepower to any part of the world, even if subjected to surprise attack. SAC also has the capability of delivering conventional (non-nuclear) weapons with its aircraft. To perform this mission there are 26 B-52 squadrons composed of 397 U.E. aircraft, 4 FB-111 squadrons composed of 66 U.E. aircraft, almost [deleted] Hound Dog and Short Range Attack Missiles, 38 KC-135 tanker squadrons with a U.E. of 615 aircraft, 6 Titan missile squadrons with a U.E. of 57 missiles and 20 Minuteman squadrons with a U.E. of 1,000 missiles. Strategic offensive force manpower includes the crews and organizational and field maintenance and (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category) weapons system security and munitions maintenance personnel required to support the weapons systems. Force manpower also includes the personnel required to man the necessary command posts and mission planning functions of the squadrons and wings. Finally, it includes the remainder of the squadron and wing staffs who perform such functions as staff intelligence, unit training, flying safety, command and administration.

#### Strategic Offense Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual) -----	73
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated) -----	73
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated) -----	77

b. *Strategic defensive forces* contain the aircraft and missiles in the Aerospace Defense Command, Alaskan Air Command and Air National Guard as well as the ground environment systems which support them in their detection, identification, interception and, if necessary, destruction roles. These forces are required for the defense of the North American Continent and certain oversea land areas against any aerospace threat. To perform this mission there are 11 F-106 squadrons with a U.E. of 198 aircraft, 2 EC-121 squadrons with a U.E. of 18 aircraft, 10 F-102 squadrons with a U.E. of 180 aircraft in the Air National Guard (ANG), 6 F-101 squadrons with a U.E. of 108 aircraft also in the ANG and 5 BOMARC squadrons with a U.E. of [deleted] missiles. The ground environment systems include 3 NORAD Manual Control Centers in Alaska and one in the CONUS, 99 Surveillance Radar sites of which the Air Force mans all but 26 located in Canada and 32 Distant Early Warning (DEW) stations primarily manned by contractor personnel. Defensive forces also include equipment for combat defense against [deleted]. The manpower charged to defensive forces includes the crews and organizational and field maintenance (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category), weapons system security and munitions maintenance personnel required to support the aircraft and missile weapons systems. For the ground environment systems manpower is required to operate and maintain authorized equipment as well as perform some 60 functions directly associated with the system. For example, in the case of surveillance radar, manpower is needed to perform the following functions: command, administration, radar operations, radar maintenance, radio maintenance, crypto maintenance, refrigeration/air conditioning maintenance, heating systems maintenance, etc. Personnel are also required to man the wing and squadron staffs as discussed in the offensive forces section.

#### Strategic Defensive Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual) -----	29
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated) -----	22
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated) -----	22

c. *Strategic control and surveillance forces* are a mixture of strategic offensive and defensive detection, tracking, control, communications and surveillance systems. Although the equipment and manpower for these forces are addressed separately, they are an integral part of our offensive and defensive forces. C&S forces consist of the following aircraft: 1 squadron of SR-71s consisting of 12

U.E. aircraft; [deleted] Post Attack Command and Control Aircraft (PACCS) which are used by the Strategic Air Command for airborne command posts, communication relay, launch control centers, and will take charge should SAC ground facilities become inoperative, and 3 EC-135 aircraft which are the National Emergency Airborne Command post aircraft located at Andrews AFB. The ground environment includes the NORAD Combat Operations Center in Cheyenne Mountain by Colorado Springs which is the nerve center for air defense of the North American Continent, 14 Back-Up Interceptor Control System sites, three Ballistic Missile Early Warning sites, 7 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile sites, 7 SPACETRACK sites consisting of radars and Baker-Nunn cameras and including the FPS-85 phased array radar at Eglin AFB, [deleted] Over-the-Horizon Radar sites with transmitters [deleted] and receivers [deleted] the Defense Support Program and portion of the national military command and control system. Finally, C&S forces include communications and command and control support equipment associated with the Strategic Air Command forces. The C&S manpower is varied because of the numerous one of a kind systems identified above. The manpower associated with the aircraft is based on force levels and activity rates. The ground environment manpower requirements generally are based on equipment authorized and positions which must be manned. However, there are many complications such as, contractor support, internal support, and climate. An example of the type of functions which are performed by C&S personnel is the operation of the Eglin AFB FPS-85 phased array radar. Radar operations functions include, but are not limited to, computer operations and maintenance, satellite object identification, control and analyses, radar operations and maintenance, communications operations and maintenance and refrigeration/air conditioning.

Strategic Control & Surveillance Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual).....	13
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated).....	13
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated),.....	13

*Tactical Air Forces*

The tactical air forces consist primarily of the aircraft and direct control elements of the Tactical Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, United States Air Forces Europe and the United States Strike Command. They provide world-wide tactical strike forces for air superiority, interdiction, close air support, and reconnaissance missions in support of friendly ground forces in the theaters of operation. United States Strike Command is responsible for coordinating certain joint Army and Air Force exercises within the total program affecting CONUS strike forces. To perform the tactical air forces mission there are 21 tactical fighter wings consisting of 70 squadrons, 4 reconnaissance wings consisting of 13 squadrons, 12 special operations squadrons, various Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve aircraft and basically three control systems (the Overseas Air Control Southeast Asia component called the SEA Tactical Air Control System). Active Force aircraft are extremely varied but include the following (does not include Guard and Reserve): 15 B-57 aircraft, 144 A-7s, 72 F-105s, 1,026 F-4s, 288 F-111s, 234 RF-4s, Special Operations Force (12 CH-53s, 16 AC-119Ks, 14 AC-130s, 25 A-1Es, 41 A-37s, 8 C-47s, 4 T-28s, 2 U-10s, 13 C-123s, 6 UC-123s, 12 C-130s, 28 UH-1s, 9 O-2Bs, and some combat crew training aircraft), 29 EB-66s and varied aircraft assigned to the tactical air control system and the SEA tactical air control system.

Tactical air forces manpower includes the crews and organizational and field maintenance (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category), weapons system security and munitions maintenance personnel required to support these weapons systems. Also included are personnel required to man the necessary command posts and mission planning functions of the squadrons and wings. Finally, manpower is needed for the squadron and wing staffs which perform such functions as staff intelligence, unit training, flying safety, command and administration. In the case of the Overseas Air Weapons Control System it includes the manpower required to operate and maintain the radar equipment and control the aircraft for this system located in Europe. For the Tactical Air Control System and the Southeast Asia Tactical Air Control System it includes the manpower required to operate and maintain assigned equipment as well as the Forward Air Control and Air Liaison Officers required to support Army and allied ground forces.

As an example, the manpower requirements for an A-7 squadron are developed as follows:

*Crews:* The crew composition of the A-7 is one pilot. The crew ratio is 1.25 per aircraft. Crew ratios are based upon five factors; combat readiness requirements, sufficient capability to maintain aircrew proficiency required to accomplish the mission, lead time required to adjust or alter procurement, training of aircrews, operational requirements (type of aircraft and when flying, i.e., nighttime, daytime, 24-hour alert, etc.), and estimates of time lost due to sickness, leave, TDY, and other causes.

*Maintenance:* The key determinant in computing maintenance manpower requirements is the maintenance manhour per flying hour factor. This factor is developed by examining maintenance manhour expenditure data that are collected daily from each maintenance activity in the Air Force. The maintenance manhour per flying hour factor for the A-7 is 25 hours, i.e., it takes 25 manhours of maintenance to produce one flying hour. The maintenance manhour factor times the number of flying hours each aircraft must generate per month equals the total maintenance manhours that must be made available for the A-7 squadron each month. To this must be added manhours for maintenance of the aerospace ground equipment, e.g., starters, generators, etc., associated with the weapon system. On the average this requires an additive amounting to 10% of the maintenance manhours. The manhour requirement developed thus far pertains only to the worker or "wrench turner." Accordingly, it is necessary to add a factor for overhead. This factor varies by weapon system and by deployment configuration but Air Force-wide the factor amounts to 10% of the manhours required to maintain the weapon system and the aerospace ground equipment. Certain weapon systems require special additives. The A-7 requires one space per aircraft for the workload associated with tiptank maintenance and with electronic counter-measures equipment maintenance. The manhour requirement thus determined is converted to authorizations by dividing by the number of hours an individual is available for productive work in an average month. Air Force surveys have determined that an individual who is on a 10 hour shift six days a week is available for work 218 hours per month. This number excludes the time lost for sickness, leave, training, etc. Further surveys have determined that he is productive, that is doing actual "wrench turning", 60% of this time. To summarize the requirements computation for the A-7, multiply the maintenance manhour factor of 25 by the 24 authorized aircraft per squadron by the 58 flying hours each aircraft must generate.

*Munition:* These requirements are based on management engineering criteria. Included in this area is the manpower required for: loading, unloading, arming, dearming of committed munitions; inspection, testing, maintenance and repair of all aircraft weapons release systems; maintenance, ammunitions loadings, activation and deactivation of aircraft gun systems; and a 30 day capability for munitions maintenance, storage and handling. The factor for the A-7 is 7.1 manpower authorizations per aircraft.

*Supervision and Wing Overhead:* These requirements are based on management engineering standards and criteria. Included are the men required for squadron supervision and the squadron contribution to wing overhead. These personnel perform such jobs as administration, operations, plans, flying safety, command, quality control on aircrew training and proficiency, etc. Each A-7 squadron requires 16 Officers, 32 Airmen and 2 Civilians.

*Weapons Security:* These requirements are based on manpower determinants. Security personnel are required for entry control, close and distant boundary support, security alert teams, etc. The requirement for an A-7 squadron has been determined to be 1 Officer and 54 Airmen.

*Flying Hours:* 58 hours at 218 hour work month (10 hours a day and 6 days a week).

## APPLICATION OF FACTORS

[24 aircraft, each flying 58 hours per month with personnel working 10 hours a day and 6 days a week]

	Officers	Airmen	Military	Civilians
Crews: 24 times 1.25 times 1	30		30	
Maintenance: 24 times 14.3 <sup>1</sup>	9	334	343	
Munitions: 24 times 7.1	4	166	170	
Overhead	16	32	48	2
Weapons security	1	54	55	
Manpower required	60	586	646	2

<sup>1</sup> Man-hour factor converted to manpower with 2½ percent as officers.

Manpower requirements for other types of squadrons are calculated in a similar manner.

Tactical Air Forces Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual)-----	92
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)-----	82
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated)-----	81

*Mobility Forces*

Mobility forces perform the strategic and tactical airlift missions of the Air Force, operate the aerial port terminals for the transportation of cargo and personnel, and perform Air Force weather, aeromedical evacuation and aerospace rescue/recovery missions. Mobility forces contain a mixture of active, reserve and guard units. There are 17 squadrons of C-130 aircraft containing 272 U.E. aircraft, 2 squadrons of C-7A aircraft containing 32 U.E., 32 U.E. of C-123 aircraft, 2 tactical aeromedical airlift squadrons containing 12 U.E., 13 squadrons of C-141 aircraft containing 234 U.E., 4 squadrons of C-5A aircraft containing 64 U.E., 5 squadrons of Special Mission aircraft (includes Presidential support aircraft at Andrews AFB), one aeromedical airlift squadron and miscellaneous Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces. Also included are 54 U.E. aircraft to perform weather surveillance and reporting functions and 269 helicopters of various sizes and types to perform the aerospace rescue/recovery mission.

Mobility force manpower includes the crews and organizational and field maintenance (depot maintenance is included in the Logistics category) and weapons system security and airlift support services personnel required to support these systems. Airlift Support Services manpower is distributed throughout the Military Airlift Command airlift wings, support wings, support groups and various support squadrons and detachments. This is primarily because of the requirement for enroute maintenance support. Force personnel are also needed to man the squadron and wing staffs which includes such functions as unit training, flying safety, command and administration. In the case of weather it also includes the personnel required to operate base weather units. These manpower requirements are based on specific equipment, hours of operation and mission requirements for each individual base. There is also manpower to support Army weather requirements and the Air Force weather and aerospace rescue/recovery headquarters.

Mobility Forces Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual)-----	78
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)-----	69
Fiscal year 1972-----	63

*Intelligence & Security*

I&S forces include manpower which is primarily for support of national or centrally directed DOD I&S objectives which are subject to an overall strength ceiling. I&S manpower is committed to many varied activities, primarily in the areas of intelligence collection, intelligence production, mapping, charting and geodesy and counterintelligence and investigation. Manpower for special intelligence communications and data handling systems is also included in this category.

The major collection programs for which manpower is required include:

a. *Big Team*—world-wide electronic intelligence collection effort using [deleted] aircraft based at Offutt AFB, Nebraska.

b. *Cryptologic Activities*—These activities encompass both communications security for the Air Force and cryptologic activities [deleted] directed by the National Security Agency. A majority of the resources in [deleted] assigned to the USAF Security Service which operates at approximately 80 locations world-wide.

c. *Human Intelligence*—[Deleted.]

d. *Technical Sensors*—Collection of signals, photographic and electronic intelligence from a variety of sources using several different platforms and techniques [deleted].

e. *Creek Rib*—Manpower for managerial and logistical support of electronic collection and processing activities [deleted].

f. *Clear Sky*—Operation of the atomic energy detection system for detection and determination of atomic energy activities of foreign nuclear powers [deleted].

Intelligence production activities are engaged in the processing, collation, interpretation and evaluation of raw intelligence data. Manpower devoted to this effort is assigned to 1 Reconnaissance Technical Wing and 6 Reconnaissance Technical Squadrons dispersed world-wide.

Mapping, charting and geodesy activities are a responsibility of the USAF Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC), St. Louis, Missouri, and the Aeronautical Charting and Geodetic Service (ACGS) of the Military Airlift Command. The ACGS operates 4 RC-135s and 2 C-130 aircraft.

These organizations acquire, produce and provide DOD users with aeronautical charts, air-target materials, flight-information publications, geodetic [deleted] data, astronomical and geophysical charts, and related reference materials.

Counterintelligence and investigative activities are a responsibility of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (OSI). OSI personnel are deployed worldwide to provide counterintelligence, criminal investigations, and other special investigative services to Air Force commanders.

#### AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

[End strengths in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Air Force.....	43	39	39
Air Force portion of defense agencies.....	3	3	3
Total Air Force portion of DOD intelligence and security.....	46	42	42

#### Communications

Air Force communications forces consist of manpower to support the Defense Communications System (DCS), the Ground Electronics Engineering Installation Agency, most base communications, and most of the Air Force Communications Service. More than half of all the circuitry and personnel making up the DCS long-haul global system are provided by the Air Force. During the past two decades these communications facilities and operations have developed into the most extensive and highest quality long-haul communications systems. Included in the Defense Communications System for example are Defense Satellites and digital communications such as the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) switching centers. In the AUTODIN switch area, the Air Force operates 10 of the 20 switches in the entire system. GEEIA personnel perform communications-electronics engineering and installation functions and provide a mobile depot maintenance capability. Base communications personnel support the communications operations for all commands except SAC and ADC, as well as communications associated with the Air Force that are not part of the DCS.

The need for communications manpower is determined by the equipment to be operated and maintained. Following is a partial list of equipments/areas/functions which must be manned or performed: AN/MSC-46 and AN/TSC-54 defense satellite terminals, Hqs Air Force Communications Service and its subordinate echelons of command, base communications facilities, AUTOVON operations, AUTODIN switches, AUTODIN tributaries, operational HF stations, wideband communications, weather automated relays, weather satellite tracking communications and the Air Force contribution to the manning of the Defense Communications Agency. Manning requirements are based on Air Force Management Engineering standards/criteria or programming factors for the particular equipment authorized.

#### Communications Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual).....	31
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated).....	30
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated).....	29

#### Research and Development

In order to respond quickly to changes in the nature of the threats our forces must face, it is essential that the United States maintains a solid technological base. Aerospace R&D—providing the USAF virtually all its new systems, weapons, and equipment—is the responsibility of the Air Force Systems Command (AFSC). The mission of AFSC is to advance aerospace technology, adapt it into operational aerospace systems, and acquire qualitatively superior aerospace systems and materiel needed to accomplish the national objectives.

To accomplish this mission, AFSC operates four divisions, five centers, ten laboratories, and other R&D facilities such as the Space and Missile Systems Organization.

One division (National Range Division) supervises DOD range facilities in support of national ICBM and space programs (specifically the Eastern Test Range), one (Aerospace Medical Division) provides an in-house scientific and technological research capability, and two (Aeronautical Systems Division and Electronic Systems Division) act as product divisions to develop, test, and acquire equipment.

The five centers which furnish development and testing facilities are: Arnold Engineering Development Center, Armament Development & Test Center, Air Force Flight Test Center, Air Force Special Weapons Center, Rome Air Development Center (Communications/NAVAIDS).

Through the following laboratories, AFSC plans and manages exploratory and advanced development programs which create a broad research and technology base for development of superior aerospace weapon and support systems and equipment: Human Resources Lab, Flight Dynamics Lab, Aero-Propulsion Lab, Avionics Lab, Materials Lab, Rocket Propulsion Lab, Weapons Lab, Cambridge Research Labs (Environmental Research), Aerospace Research Labs (Physical & Engineering Sciences), Frank J. Seiler Research Lab (Mechanics, Mathematics, & Chemistry).

Through this organization of highly specialized and centralized activities, the Air Force is able to remain abreast of new technologies and retain the option of rapid development and production if the threat materializes. The resources expended in R&D are established at the level of effort considered essential to maintain a strong and viable program which makes it possible for us to meet the threat, but avoids the deployment of costly new weapon systems to meet uncertain threats.

Research and Development Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual)-----	23
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)-----	20
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated)-----	18

*Support to Other Nations*

Air Force manpower for Support to Other Nations consists of personnel supporting the Military Assistance Program (MAP). It includes personnel in certain international military headquarters and agencies and in military assistance advisory groups (MAAGS), military missions and military assistance groups (Mil Groups).

Air Force personnel support international headquarters and agencies such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). Of the three, most personnel are assigned to NATO activities, primarily the U.S. representatives to the Military Committee. Total authorizations are very limited (under 100) and are justified on a basis of providing the U.S. share of support for the activities previously cited.

Air Force personnel are assigned to MAAGS, Missions and Mil Groups located in 45 European, Pacific area and Central and South American countries. These are Joint Service activities under the direct control of European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). Their functions are to:

- a. Make recommendations to their Unified Command concerning military assistance in their respective countries.
- b. Develop military assistance plans and programs, in cooperation with the Ambassador, and submit them to their Unified Commands.
- c. Observe and report on the utilization of materiel furnished and personnel trained by the military assistance program.
- d. Administer foreign military sales transactions in accordance with current instructions.
- e. Provide advisory services and technical assistance to recipient countries.
- f. Arrange for the receipt and transfer of military assistance materiel.
- g. Arrange for recipient country personnel to receive training at appropriate schools.

Manpower levels required for each country are based on the level of assistance being provided. These levels are approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are included on Joint Tables of Distribution.

## Support to Other Nations Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual)-----	1
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated)-----	1
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated)-----	1

*Base and Individual Support*

Base and individual support forces include equipment and personnel for medical support, individual support and base operating support.

a. Medical support includes 95 Air Force hospitals and manpower authorizations (doctors, etc.) to cover military personnel patient requirements. Medical support manpower supports physiological training and epidemiological activities, central medical laboratory operations and other activities associated with the School of Aerospace Medicine at Brooks AFB, Texas. Finally, support manpower includes medical personnel associated with medical evacuation activities and casualty staging units. The personnel associated with flying and maintaining the medical evacuation aircraft are assigned to Mobility Forces. Medical support manpower requirements are being more precisely determined every year. For example, this year a new USAF management engineering standard was completed for hospitals. Manpower for other areas is continuously reviewed by the Surgeon General who insures efficient utilization of resources. For example, reductions in SEA associated casualties has resulted in reduction in casualty staging units and medical evacuation activities manpower.

b. The individual support category includes various support type functions: the Air Force Recruiting Service, oversea dependent education in the Pacific (the Army has this responsibility in Europe), transient manpower authorizations, Project Hire and other personnel support functions.

1. The Air Force Recruiting Services includes the manpower for all recruiting offices, recruiting groups, headquarters USAF Recruiting Service and our share of the Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations. The recruiting workload is not primarily a function of personnel procurement but varies inversely with the size of the draft calls.

2. The Air Force is the executive agent for overseas dependent education for the Pacific area. Manpower is based on the number of schools, teachers, supervisors, and support personnel required to support the education program for eligible dependents in overseas areas. Manpower also is incrementally adjusted through annual projections of the number and age of overseas dependents.

3. The transient manpower authorizations are those manpower spaces required to make up work time lost due to permanent change of station (PCS) moves. For the Air Force, this account is not yet fully funded.

4. Project Hire is an effort to train Alaskan natives and contains 100 U.S. direct-hire civilians. Other Personnel Support is the 3520th Retraining Group. This group rehabilitates Air Force personnel convicted and sentenced to confinement for over 30 days except those personnel for whom confinement at the Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth is appropriate.

c. Base operating support (BOS) includes the manpower required to operate and maintain approximately 170 major installations and approximately 3,500 other support facilities of varying size. BOS functions include operation of: Dispensaries, Base Administration, Wing Level History, Base Level Judge Advocate, Information Office, Chaplain, Ground Safety Office, Driver Training, Base Procurement, Comptroller, Base Military Personnel Office, Base Civilian Personnel Office, Base Audio-Visual Support Office, Base Supply, Transportation, Security Policy (except for Weapons Systems Security), Civil Engineering, Personnel Services, Food Services, etc. Also included in this sub-category are the indirect support aircraft, Red Horse Squadrons and Traffic Control Approach and Landing Systems.

1. Manpower requirements for operating and maintaining our bases are finitely determined for each location based on a combination of management engineering standards/criteria and programming factors. The primary factors which drive our manpower requirements in this area are the number and size of bases and the population to be serviced.

2. Indirect support aircraft are manned for maintenance only. Their manpower is a result of the type aircraft, flying hours and maintenance manhours required for each flying hour. Red Horse squadrons have a standard size based on equipment and capability decisions.

3. The Traffic Control Approach and Landing Systems are manned based on equipment, hours of operation of facilities and changes in aircraft traffic. The equipment in this area includes, but is not limited to, control towers, RAPCONS, ground control approach systems, instrument landing systems, TACANS and air/ground communications.

## AIR FORCE BASE AND INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Estimated	
		1971	1972
Base operating support.....	185	181	178
Medical support.....	30	31	31
Individual support.....	3	11	16
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>225</b>

Note: Total does not add due to rounding.

*Training*

Training manpower supports basic enlisted, officer, technical, and professional military training; undergraduate pilot and navigator flying training; advanced aircraft and missile combat crew training. Total manpower requirements for training are determined by comparing projected requirements for trained manpower to projected inventories of trained personnel. Basic, technical and undergraduate flying training are a responsibility of the Air Training Command. Combat crew training activities are conducted chiefly by commands employing the systems in which training is being conducted—Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, Aerospace Defense Command and Military Airlift Command. Professional training as well as the Air Force Reserve Officers Training Corps program is a responsibility of the Air University. Air Force Academy manpower resources are also included within this category.

All Air Force basic or recruit training is conducted at Lackland AFB, Texas. This is a six week program designed to serve as a general indoctrination in military fundamentals and discipline as well as a screening and testing period. For Fiscal Year 1972, approximately 107,000 inputs are projected.

Approximately 80% of the basic military training graduates are selected to enter formal specialized or technical training at one of five continental U.S. locations. The average course length will be 15 weeks. In addition, approximately 55,000 students will require advanced specialized training. Training is required in a great number of skills ranging from basic theory to the maintenance of very complex equipment. The advanced courses are required for individuals who already have field experience but must acquire a new or higher degree or skill or become familiar with new equipment or operating techniques.

Undergraduate pilot and navigator flight training is conducted at eleven bases and must produce approximately 3,500 pilots and 1,200 navigators during FY 72. Undergraduate helicopter training is conducted for the Air Force by the Army and only student manpower authorizations are required by the Air Force for this program. Staff personnel for fixed wing pilot and navigator training include both instructors and aircraft maintenance personnel.

Combat crew training is required to prepare individuals trained in flight or missile fundamentals for combat employment of the primary Air Force weapons systems—strategic, tactical and airlift. As in other training areas, manpower requirements include students, instructors and aircraft/missile maintenance personnel.

Professional training activities include Air Force operated professional military schools designed to prepare officers for the command of Air Force units or comparable staff duties and technical and scientific degree granting programs conducted both by the Air Force and in civilian institutions to Air Force needs for advanced scientific, engineering, medical and managerial skills. Fiscal Year 1972 projected student inputs in all professional training categories will be approximately 25,000.

## AIR FORCE TRAINING

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Estimated	
		Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Recruit and specialized.....	50	52	54
Undergraduate and advanced flight.....	41	41	40
Professional and other.....	14	14	13
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>107</b>

## Command

Command manpower supports management, supervision, direction, and control of forces. It can be described as containing those resources (mostly people) devoted to command above the wing/base level. The people in this category can be sub-divided into two elements—those dedicated to supervision of units of the Department of the Air Force (DAF), and those performing command functions outside the DAF. Examples of activities within these elements follow:

*Department of the Air Force Activities:* Secretary of the Air Force, HQ USAF (Air Staff), Major Command Headquarters (SAC, TAC, ADC, MAC, etc.), Numbered Air Forces and Air Divisions.

*Activities Outside the Department of the Air Force:* USAF personnel assigned to OSD, JCS and certain of their agencies, Unified Command Activities (ALCOM, LANTCOM, PACOM, etc.), Joint Systems Integration Planning Staff, Airborne Command Posts (CINCEUR and CINCPAC), Activities Outside the DOD (White House Staff, AEC, etc.).

The manpower resources devoted to purely Air Force activities are tightly controlled, and receive constant scrutiny when forces are reprogrammed or when new concepts are developed which allow for headquarters consolidations or eliminations. In addition, the Air Force has committed itself to the conduct of a continuing review of its headquarters in an effort to derive manpower efficiencies without loss of effectiveness. Determination of the numbers of people required to support other activities is largely a function of the particular activity involved, and is therefore outside the control of the Air Force.

### AIR FORCE COMMAND

(Manpower in thousands)

	Estimated		
	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Air Force departmental.....	5	5	5
Field.....	20	16	16
Headquarters support <sup>1</sup> .....	46	46	43
Total.....	71	67	64

<sup>1</sup> Includes Air Force portion of OSD, JCS, defense agencies, unified commands as well as support functions such as: the Data Systems Design Center; Accounting and Finance Center; base operating support for Andrews AFB, Bolling AFB, Howard AFB, and Albrook AFB; the Civil Air Patrol and audio visual services.

## Logistics

Logistics manpower performs four basic functions: Materiel Management, Depot Maintenance, Distribution (Supply & Transportation of equipment), and Prime Procurement. These activities are performed at each of five AMAs: Sacramento, Ogden, San Antonio, Oklahoma City, and Warner Robins; at three specialized logistics activities; and one supporting installation at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. Additional manpower is provided to operate the Air Force Logistics Command Headquarters at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.

AFLC provides logistics support during the total life cycle of a weapon system or piece of equipment. Logistics personnel provide supply and maintenance support early in the weapon system acquisition process. An AFLC system manager is designated at the same time that the Project Management Office is established by the Air Force Systems Command, thereby ensuring logistics support during the design of the weapon system. After the system is added to the operating inventory, AFLC assumes total responsibility for its logistic support.

Depot level weapon system maintenance consists of the repair, overhaul, and modification of equipment that is beyond the capability of operational units. Functions performed include IRAN (Inspect and Repair as Necessary) and overhaul of complete aircraft, missiles and other equipment; overhaul of engines and recoverable components for all equipment; and technical assistance to units engaged in intermediate or field level maintenance. The maintenance performed at the AMA level requires highly developed skills; large, centralized facilities; specialized, sophisticated equipment; and environmental repair facilities not normally available at base or units level. The work is accomplished "in-house" at the AMAs, at contractor industrial facilities, or by specialized depot and contractor teams deployed to operational sites.

The distribution materiel management activities consist of warehousing, packaging, and transporting of 870,000 items of supply managed by AFLC to support worldwide customers, and 1,300,000 items to support depot maintenance activities, other AMA assigned activities, and tenants. To provide high-priority movement of critical weapon or support systems components to CONUS Air Force bases and to aerial ports of embarkation, AFLC operates the Logistic Airlift (LOGAIR) System on a contract basis.

The prime procurement function includes negotiation and award of contracts, including amendments, changes and terminations, for the procurement of major electronic supporting systems and follow-up spares for weapon and support systems. Contract Administration provides for the administration of prime and sub-contracts covering thousands of contractor facilities. It includes contract readjustment, property administration, pricing and financial analysis, contractor procurement evaluation, termination of contracts and quality assurance.

Logistics manpower needs are directly related to the size and activity rate of the forces. The SEA conflict led to sharp increases in demand for logistics supply and maintenance support. As force size and activity rates decline from the SEA level, logistics needs will be reduced. Actual manpower needs are calculated based on weapon system workload estimates and personnel productivity rates. Of the total manpower in the Logistics category, only 12% is military.

Logistics Manpower (Thousands):

Fiscal year 1970 (actual) .....	11
Fiscal year 1971 (estimated) .....	11
Fiscal year 1972 (estimated) .....	12

Mr. KELLEY. My statement this morning will summarize this report and put particular emphasis on the process by which we develop our manpower needs.

Defense manpower is a vital resource needed to assure national security. The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, to safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and to protect its people. Through its foreign policy and collective security arrangements, the United States seeks an environment in which its basic security objective can be attained. It is the function of the President of the United States, as Chief Executive and as Commander in Chief, to establish policy on broad strategic issues. This is done through a series of policies which relate to our treaty commitments and to other matters vital to the security of the United States. After consultation with his primary foreign policy and defense advisers, the President sets forth a series of specific strategy directives which provide guidance to military planners. Such strategy guidance is, in turn, expanded by the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services for use in force and manpower planning.

These strategy directives are converted into military force structure and manpower requirements in the following manner:

First, the threat is examined and detailed threat estimates are developed.

Second, against the threat, estimates are made of the United States and allied forces needed to defeat the enemy or to deter possible attack—that is, to prevent a potential aggressor from believing that he could achieve his objectives at acceptable cost.

Third, the present and future forces of our allies are then assessed.

Fourth, U.S. forces are also assessed.

Fifth, the combined U.S. and allied forces are then compared with the estimated forces needed.

Sixth, based on these considerations, our force planning is adjusted accordingly, and our allies are encouraged to alter their force planning where necessary, in order that our joint capabilities are adequate to achieve our objectives against the threat.

You have heard comprehensive testimony on the threat and on these various estimates by both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As a result of a thorough examination of all these considerations we have developed a detailed assessment of the forces required to meet the strategy objectives in such terms as numbers of divisions, ships, and aircraft. In order to determine the manpower needs to man and support these forces, we must then address such issues as:

How many men does it take to man a missile base or a given type of ship?

How many men are needed to keep a plane serviced and flying?

How many men does it take to man an infantry division and sustain it in combat?

How many of these forces should be forward deployed in order to preserve the capability to deter or to respond to attack in a timely way adequate to meet the threat, while minimizing the cost of maintaining adequate forces?

Given approved force goals, for example, of X aircraft and Y divisions, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force respectively are charged with meeting those goals through a combination of manpower, training, and equipment. The services must also take into account personnel policies as well as calculated manpower requirements. This includes consideration of the need to avoid treating men like machines. While shuttling military people around on a tight schedule may be "optimum" from the standpoint of meeting force requirements, the benefits of doing so must be weighed against the lower morale of the services which results from unreasonably and unnecessarily disrupting the personal lives of the men involved.

If members of the committee are going to be coming in in the course of this morning it might be useful if I summarized rather than read the entire statement. What are your wishes, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I really think if you are in position to summarize and point out your problems it would work better that way.

Mr. KELLEY. And may I go back and recap for Senator Symington?

The CHAIRMAN. All right. There will be others coming in and you just have to handle that part.

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate this if I may say so because I have to go to the floor at 11.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KELLEY. Senator, I introduced at least for the file and suggested as a part of the record a comprehensive report entitled "Defense Military Manpower Requirements for Fiscal Year 1972." My statement will summarize this report and highlight some of the more important aspects of it.

I started by explaining that the strategy directives of the President are converted into military force structure and manpower requirements by a six-step process. First, detailed threat estimates are made. Second, estimates are made of the U.S. and allied forces needed to defeat the enemy or to deter possible attack. Third, the present and future forces of our allies are then assessed. Fourth, U.S. forces are also assessed. Fifth, the combined U.S. and allied forces are then compared with the estimated forces needed. Sixth, based on all of these considerations our force planning is adjusted accordingly, and our allies are encouraged to alter their force planning as appropriate

in order that our combined capabilities are adequate to meet the test and achieve our objectives.

Now, as a result of an examination of all these considerations, we develop a detailed assessment of the forces required. We must then address such issues as how many men it takes to man a missile base or a given type of ship or a given type of Army unit. Given approved force goals, for example, of a given number of aircraft or a given number of divisions, the respective services are charged with meeting those goals through a combination of their manpower training and equipment, and the services must of course take into account personnel policies which are consonant with meeting these manpower requirements in the most effective ways.

Our manpower levels are based on the forces we need to carry out the specific missions (which, as you know, are called our mission forces), the support personnel needed to sustain these forces (generally referred to as general support), and the personnel policies applied in each of these mission areas.

While I talked to each of these categories in terms of active duty forces, I want to emphasize that we did not consider active duty forces and the manpower manning problems in isolation. They were developed under a total force concept as outlined by Secretary Laird in his defense report to the Congress, and once the total forces and their needs are determined, the full capabilities of the Guard and Reserves are then considered in determining what portion of the total force job belongs to the active forces, and what portion of the total force job belongs to the Guard and Reserve.

In terms of active duty mission forces our manpower requirements for fiscal year 1972 are as follows: The strategic forces which serve as our deterrent against nuclear attack on the United States will require 139,000 personnel. The land, tactical air, naval and mobility forces which comprise our general purpose forces, require 1,032,000.

Now within this figure of 1,032,000 the category breakdown is as follows: 591,000 men are needed to man Army and Marine Corps land force elements. 170,000 are needed in the tactical air forces of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps; 203,000 are needed for our naval forces, and 68,000 for mobility forces.

For the other mission forces 199,000 are required for intelligence and security, communications, research and development and support to other nations.

All of these mission forces must be sustained by manpower assigned to general support activities which, in peacetime, must be able to sustain the mission forces at desired levels of readiness. In addition, they must be capable of meeting a range of wartime demands well above peacetime levels.

General support manpower is grouped into four categories. Individual and base support, training, command, and logistics.

The number of people needed depends on force levels, on their activity rates and their manning levels. Because of the far greater needs for general support functions in wartime, many forces that fall in this category are maintained in Reserve components available for recall in an emergency. However, the peacetime structure must be available or must be adequate to handle minor contingency situations without a Reserve recall, and to serve as a core for the greatly expanded support needs of a mobilization situation. To meet general support requirements in fiscal year 1972 will require 1,135,000 men.

I have tried to summarize quickly the very complex process of determining defense force levels and their resultant manpower requirements.

The process, and the specific requirements are explained in detail in the paper that I have introduced for the files.

Specifically this paper provides the detailed justifications for these average military strengths for fiscal year 1972. For the Army 1,024,000; for the Navy 617,000; for the Marine Corps 210,000; and for the Air Force 759,000.

I think it is worth pointing out, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that our total DOD military end strength in fiscal year 1969 was 3.5 million men and women. For fiscal year 1972, the manpower levels we are requesting will give us an end strength of 2.5 million. This is a 1-million reduction during three years. To illustrate the magnitude of this reduction, and the significance of present levels or projected levels for fiscal year 1972, in fiscal year 1972 the defense share of the total labor force of the United States will be at its lowest level since 1950. Further, the defense portion of all public employment in fiscal year 1972 will be reduced to its lowest level since before World War II.

We believe that our military strength authorization request is minimal. We believe, however, that it is adequate to support our national security policy.

Mr. Chairman, I think that quickly summarizes the longer statement that I will introduce for the record with your permission and, of course, the more comprehensive and detailed backup report which supports each of these military manpower figures.

The complete statement of Secretary Kelley follows:

We appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to support the President's requests for average active duty manpower levels which are essential to the Defense Program in FY 1972.

As you know, the Secretary of Defense has previously transmitted a special report to this Committee entitled, "Defense Military Manpower Requirements for FY 1972." That report contains comprehensive and detailed justification for the President's request. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will now offer that document for inclusion in the record of today's hearing.

My statement this morning will summarize that report and will place particular emphasis on the process by which we develop our manpower needs.

Defense manpower is a vital resource needed to assure national security. The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent nation, to safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and to protect its people. Through its foreign policy and collective security arrangements, the United States seeks an environment in which its basic security objective can be attained. It is the function of the President of the United States, as Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief, to establish policy on broad strategic issues. This is done through a series of policies which relate to our treaty commitments and to other matters vital to the security of the United States. After consultation with his primary foreign policy and defense advisors, the President sets forth a series of specific strategy directives which provide guidance to military planners. Such strategy guidance is, in turn, expanded by the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Services for use in force and manpower planning.

These strategy directives are converted into military force structure and manpower requirements, in the following manner:

First, the threat is examined and detailed threat estimates are developed.

Second, against the threat, estimates are made of the U.S. and allied forces needed to defeat the enemy or to deter possible attack—that is, to prevent a potential aggressor from believing that he could achieve his objectives at acceptable cost. Third, the present and future forces of our allies are then assessed.

Fourth, U.S. forces are also assessed.

Fifth, the combined U.S.-allied forces are then compared with the estimated forces needed.

Sixth, based on these considerations, our force planning is adjusted accordingly, and our allies are encouraged to alter their force planning where necessary, in order that our joint capabilities are adequate to achieve our objectives against the threat.

You have heard comprehensive testimony on the threat and on these various estimates by both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As a result of a thorough examination of all these considerations, we have developed a detailed assessment of the forces required to meet the strategy objectives in such terms as numbers of divisions, ships, and aircraft. In order to determine the manpower needs to man and support these forces, we must then address such issues as:

How many men does it take to man a missile base or a given type of ship?

How many men are needed to keep a plane serviced and flying?

How many men does it take to man an infantry division and sustain it in combat?

How many of these forces should be forward deployed in order to preserve the capability to deter or to respond to attack in a timely way adequate to meet the threat, while minimizing the cost of maintaining adequate forces?

Given approved force goals, for example, of  $x$  aircraft and  $y$  divisions, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force respectively are charged with meeting those goals through a combination of manpower, training, and equipment. The Services must also take into account personnel policies as well as calculated manpower requirements. This includes consideration of the need to avoid treating men like machines. While shuttling military people around on a tight schedule may be "optimum" for meeting force requirements, the benefits of doing so must be weighed against the lower morale of the Services which results from unreasonably and unnecessarily disrupting the personal lives of the men involved.

Our manpower levels, therefore, are based on the forces we need to carry out specific missions ("mission forces"), the support necessary to sustain these forces ("general support"), and the personnel policies we apply to each mission area. We have subdivided our mission forces into strategic forces, general purpose forces, and other mission forces. Similarly, we divide support into several categories. I will discuss each in turn.

Although I will talk to each of these categories in terms of active duty forces, I wish to emphasize that they were not determined in isolation. They were developed under the Total Force concept as outlined by Secretary Laird in his Defense Report to Congress. Once the total force needs are determined, the full capabilities of the Guard and Reserves are then considered in determining what portion of the total force must be Active and what portion Guard and Reserve. In this regard, I shall not address the details of Guard and Reserve manpower requirements today since we will make a full report on this topic during subsequent hearings on Guard and Reserve strength authorizations.

#### I. STRATEGIC FORCES AND MANPOWER

In FY 1972, we need 139,000 men to man the strategic forces which serve as our deterrent against nuclear attack on the United States. In planning these forces, our objectives are derived from sufficiency criteria established by the President. To satisfy these criteria, we strive to maintain reliable retaliatory forces, placing primary emphasis on measures that reduce their vulnerability to attack and assure their penetration of Soviet defense. In addition, we seek to provide:

One, reliable reconnaissance and early warning capabilities to minimize the likelihood and consequences of surprise;

Two, appropriate defense forces to protect against limited air and ballistic missile attack; and,

Three, effective and reliable command and control of these forces. Since we rely on these forces for deterrence, we must ensure that they are adequate to convince all potential aggressors that nuclear attacks or nuclear blackmail of the United States or its allies pose unacceptable risks to them.

##### A. Strategic Offensive Forces

The basis for our strategic offensive force planning is the retaliatory capability of these forces. These forces must be capable of absorbing a surprise Soviet first-strike and still be capable of destroying a significant fraction of the Soviet popula-

tion and industrial base. We, therefore, plan a mix of mutually supporting land-based, sea-based, and bomber weapons systems. Land-based missiles have a high alert rate, quick response capability, reliable command and control, and the capability to cover a broad range of targets. Sea-based missiles offer dispersion and concealment, pose a threat from several directions with short time of flight, provide for rapid retargeting, and are capable of extending responses over a long period of time. Bombers can deliver large payloads with the accuracy needed to destroy hard targets, can restrike targets as necessary, and can provide damage assessment of earlier strikes.

For FY 1972, in the absence of a SALT agreement, the only significant numerical change that will take place in our strategic offensive forces is the inactivation of three B-52 squadrons. We are continuing the program to deploy MIRVs in our Minuteman and Poseidon missiles. This program is essential to preserve the credibility of U.S. deterrent forces when faced with the growing strategic threat. Although we are continuing development work on two new strategic offensive systems, the Undersea-Launched Missile System (ULMS) and the B-1 manned bomber, they will not be deployed in FY 1972 and no operational manpower is provided for them.

#### *B. Strategic Defensive, Control and Surveillance*

Our Strategic Defensive, Control, and Surveillance Forces consist primarily of the Safeguard ABM system, warning and surveillance systems, and the Continental U.S. air defense units. During FY 1972, we will make certain reductions in the current air defense forces, primarily in surface-to-air missiles. However, we will maintain our aircraft early warning capability and continue research and development to provide effective bomber defenses. The major change planned for these forces in FY 1972 is a reduction in the number of NIKE-HERCULES missile batteries.

Strategic defensive forces will include the SAFEGUARD system we are currently developing to defend against ballistic missile attack. Since SAFEGUARD will not reach Initial Operational Capability in FY 1972, no operational manpower is planned.

#### II. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES AND MANPOWER

About 40 percent of our total U.S. military manpower in FY 1972, or 1,032,000 men, is attributable to the Land, Tactical Air, Naval, and Mobility Forces which comprise our General Purposes Forces. These forces are maintained to support our commitments predicated upon two policies which have been in force for over a decade spanning four Administrations. These policies are:

First, that the security of our own nation is inextricably tied to a forward defense and thus to the security of our allies; and

Second, that strategic nuclear forces, in and of themselves, cannot be relied upon to provide a credible deterrent or a reasonable response to the entire spectrum of aggression which we must be prepared to face.

Our General Purpose Forces are sized so that the United States will be prepared for either a defense of NATO Europe or a defense of Asia. In addition we would be prepared to assist allies in Asia against an attack by one of its neighbors (but not Communist China) and also provide limited forces for a strategic reserve and for minor contingencies. Our forces are designed so that major operations in one theater must be conducted at the expense of the major capability in the other. By sizing our forces to meet certain major threats, we expect to be able to handle lesser threats with the same forces.

We are committed to help defend Western Europe in part because our national cultural, economic and political interests are closely tied and in part because we would prefer to meet the Soviet threat in conjunction with our allies rather than alone. Based on extensive analysis, three successive Secretaries of Defense have concluded that a conventional defense of Western Europe against a full scale conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact is both necessary and attainable. This NATO commitment to the defense of Western Europe is the most significant factor in determining the size of our forces.

We believe that the Soviets are deterred in part from attacking NATO by the high risk that a conventional conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would escalate to the level of a general nuclear war and pose grave risks to the Soviet State itself. However, now that the USSR has achieved strategic nuclear parity with the United States, this deterrence may be less credible, in view of the great damage the United States would suffer in a nuclear exchange. Therefore, it is essential that adequate NATO conventional and tactical nuclear forces for lower levels of conflict be maintained.

If NATO is to deter the Warsaw Pact from judging that conventional offensive military action is an attractive option during a period of serious political crisis, the NATO peacetime forces must possess a total capability that is not markedly inferior to that of the Pact. As long as there is no major imbalance in strength between the two opposing sides, neither one can realistically assume that the initiation of hostilities is an attractive means of achieving some political objective. The current deployment of NATO forces is considered adequate to deny the Warsaw Pact high confidence that a Pact attack would be successful.

NATO forces now in place are roughly comparable to those Pact forces immediately available in the Central Region.

Quantitatively, U.S. forces constitute a large, but not the major, portion of NATO's M-Day force in the Central Region.

Given the large, in-place Warsaw Pact forces, their rapid mobilization capability, and their ability to launch an attack with limited warning, the feasibility of a conventional defense by NATO has been frequently questioned. This issue was given very detailed examination over the past year, both by the U.S. Government and the combined NATO nations. The results of these studies were summarized by the President in his Foreign Policy Report, in which he stated:

"The economic strength of the NATO nations, we found, makes us considerably stronger in military potential than the Warsaw Pact. We and our allies collectively enjoy a three-fold advantage in Gross National Product and a two-fold advantage in population.

"The actual balance of conventional military forces in Europe is much closer, however. NATO's active forces in peacetime are roughly comparable to those of the Warsaw Pact. Following mobilization, NATO is capable of maintaining forces larger than the Warsaw Pact. But geographic proximity and differences in domestic systems give the Warsaw Pact the significant advantage of being able to mobilize its reserve and reinforce more rapidly than NATO."

In summary, certain critical factors related to our force contributions to NATO have been established. They are as follows:

NATO has on balance an adequate conventional deterrent force. Any substantial reduction in U.S. forces would seriously change the balance.

Our forces in Europe play a key role in both assuring our allies of our commitment and adding to NATO's defensive power during the critical initial period of mobilization.

Reductions in our Europe-based forces would not save any significant amount of money or manpower unless the withdrawn forces were eliminated. We cannot eliminate these forces so long as we intend to meet our NATO commitment. Furthermore, the costs of forward-deployed forces are not significantly greater than CONUS-based forces, especially since we have already paid for our European bases. Finally, a reduction in our forward deployments would require an increase in our air and sealift forces in order to be able to deploy our troops in time to defend NATO during the critical first few weeks.

#### A. Land Forces

In FY 1972, 591,000 personnel, comprising almost 25% of total DOD military manpower, will man our Army and Marine Corps land force elements.

Total active land forces manpower depends on the number of divisions in the force and their readiness for combat. The combat component of a division consists of battalion-size elements of roughly similar structure. If a division is to be sustained in combat, additional troop elements are needed. The sustaining elements are normally battalion and company-sized troop units that provide added services such as supply, maintenance, transportation, and communication. A division's readiness for combat depends in part on how completely it is manned; the same is true of sustaining increments. In peacetime, for efficiency, we normally do not man our combat units at 100% of the strength required for combat. For example, the NATO units are manned at about 90% of full combat strength. However, in an emergency, these forces would be brought to full strength by drawing on reserve manpower and manpower in the pipeline, non-committed units.

We have determined the requirement for land forces by analyzing the total package of allied and U.S. troops needed in a particular region to provide a credible deterrent against the ground force threat to that region. The three regions of most concern and potential danger are Europe (including the flanks) and the Mediterranean, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia. The level of allied and U.S. troops that we believe are needed is generally lower than that of the likely enemy since it is assumed our forces will be on the defensive. As I noted previously, our NATO commitment is the most significant factor in determining the size of our

land forces. In the event of a conflict in Asia, we would draw on those forces in the United States maintained either for a NATO conflict or as part of our unallocated strategic reserve. By calling Reserve and Guard forces to active duty, we would rebuild our capability to meet our NATO commitment.

#### *B. Tactical Air Forces*

In FY 1972, we need 170,000 men in the tactical air forces of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

The most demanding situation for tactical air forces is, of course, in NATO. Our tactical air theater force requirements for NATO are largely determined by planning for U.S. and allied conventional forces, which after a period of warning and of mobilization will be able to defend NATO Europe against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack. We and our allies also must ensure an ability to sustain the deployed forces through control of the air and sea lanes.

In Asia we plan to maintain a long-term tactical air support capability in order to assist our allies. In addition, if a large land war involving the CPR should occur in Asia, we must be prepared to respond initially using our non-NATO committed forces as well as portions of those forces based in the United States and earmarked for NATO.

In the planning of our tactical air forces, we rely heavily on the Reserve and National Guard. The Reserve components maintain a large and ready tactical air capability, which could be mobilized and committed to combat very quickly. Because of the reduction in the size of the active duty forces now underway, the Reserve forces are receiving more modern equipment which will substantially enhance their capability and effectiveness in a conflict.

Once we determine the overall level of forces, their level of activity—for example, sorties and flying hours—is based on determinations of where and how we plan to operate them. We have a well developed and systematic way of then calculating how much manpower is needed to man the force at the specified activity levels. For example, manpower needs for an Air Force F-4 tactical fighter squadron capable of flying 56.5 hours per aircraft per month amount to 721 military men. The total manpower for the various types of aircraft squadrons required with the manpower needed for tactical support units comprises the total tactical air forces manpower requirements.

#### *C. Naval Forces*

Our FY 1972 program provides for the assignment of 203,000 Navy and Marine Corps personnel to our Naval Forces.

In the event of a conventional war, the United States must possess the capability to support and reinforce our allies and our own deployed forces. In sustained conflicts overseas in which the United States might be involved either directly or indirectly, U.S. forces would depend on free access to and use of the sea lines of communications. The defense of NATO is critically dependent on a major reinforcement of combat troops and the provision of equipment and supplies the majority of which must come by sea.

We size our Naval Forces to support forward deployments as necessary, and to provide sufficient protection for our amphibious assault forces, convoys, naval support forces, and aircraft carriers. We plan protection for these four elements against surface, submarine, and air threats in those areas where we might expect to operate. The best number and mix of protection and support forces depends upon the size and sophistication of the expected threat, which, in turn, is area-dependent.

Once we determine Navy force levels, we must then calculate our manpower needs. Naval Forces manpower requirements are developed by first computing the number of operating positions that must be continuously manned by watchstanders in order to permit the ship to carry out her mission under wartime conditions. The next step is to apply engineering criteria to determine how many maintenance manhours are needed. This determination is then translated into manpower requirements using standard workweek and productivity factors. Finally, administrative and support personnel (such as cooks) are added, based on prescribed work standards. Aircraft squadrons are similarly manned, based on the air crews, maintenance, and support personnel needed to support the wartime flying rate. All of these individual requirements for each ship and squadron are summed to determine the total manpower needed for Naval Forces.

### III. MOBILITY FORCES

Mobility forces which will be manned by 68,000 men in FY 1972, are comprised of strategic and tactical airlift, sealift, pre-positioned equipment, and mobility

support forces including air and sea terminals. Specialized forces such as aero-medical evacuation, aero-space rescue, and air weather service are also included.

#### IV. OTHER MISSION FORCES AND MANPOWER

In FY 1972, 199,000 personnel are required for the four categories of Other Mission forces: Intelligence and Security; Communications; Research and Development; and Support to Other Nations.

Intelligence and Security includes the centralized intelligence gathering agencies of the Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency.

Communications is made up of the centralized communications systems of the services and the Defense Communications Agency providing the backbone common-user system for all elements of DoD.

The military personnel assigned to Research and Development perform technical and management duties at laboratories and development activities, and provide program support such as developmental aircraft units and experimental troop units.

Support to Other Nations consists of Military Assistance groups and international military headquarters. In conjunction with the Department of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the host nation, each assistance activity is individually tailored to meet the needs of the country to which it is assigned.

#### V. GENERAL SUPPORT AND MANPOWER

General support activities must be able to sustain the mission forces in peacetime at desired levels of readiness. In addition, they must be capable of meeting a range of wartime demands well above peacetime levels. General support functions are grouped into four categories: (1) Individual and Base Support, (2) Training, (3) Command, and (4) Logistics. The number of support people needed depends on the force levels, their activity rates, and their manning levels. As a result, general support manpower needs are reduced as force levels decline. Moreover demands during wartime are greater than in peacetime. Because of the far greater demands for general support functions in wartime, many forces that fall in this category are maintained in the Reserve components, available for recall in an emergency. However, the peacetime structure must be adequate to handle minor contingency situations without a Reserve recall and to serve as a core for the greatly expanded support needs of a mobilization situation. To meet general support requirements in FY 1972 takes 1,135,000 men.

##### *A. Individual and Base Support*

Individual and Base Support includes the manpower needed for base operations and personnel support, and is grouped into: Base Operations (to operate and maintain our world-wide network of bases); Medical (to support the Department of Defense system of clinics, dispensaries, and hospitals which care for our sick and wounded active and retired personnel and their dependents); and Other Individual Support (which includes the manpower used for recruitment and examination, disciplinary activities, and personnel assignment, including personnel being transferred from one duty station to another).

##### *B. Training*

Training consists of the students, instructors, and overhead personnel for initial military, skill, professional, flight, and unit training programs. To ensure that units are manned and ready, the training base must provide the right number of men, with the proper skills, at the right time. Training rates are determined by the difference between manpower requirements and inventories. Numbers of instructors and direct support people are based on the student load. The manpower associated with training is directly related to the turnover rate of our personnel. As we move towards the achievement of an all-volunteer force, we anticipate a reduction in our personnel turnover and a consequent savings in our training manpower.

##### *C. Command*

The Command category of personnel includes those needed to staff headquarters at the division and higher levels, special headquarters such as those involving communications, training, and research and development, and operating command facilities, such as finance centers, data processing centers, and airborne command posts. In general, headquarters functions are related to the size and composition of the forces.

#### D. Logistics

Logistics includes the manpower required to distribute, store, and ship supplies which are used to repair weapon systems, and to perform maintenance on these weapon systems at the Services' depot maintenance facilities. Manpower requirements for logistics functions are based on workload data. Workload varies with force size, activity rates, and maintenance standards. The Southeast Asia conflict lead to sharp increases in demand for logistics and supply support as well as maintenance. As our force levels are reduced, logistics needs will also be reduced. The actual manpower needs for each specific function are based on workload estimates and personnel productivity studies.

My purpose in this statement has been to summarize the complex process of determining Defense force levels and their resultant manpower requirements. Both the process and the specific requirements are explained in detail in the paper on Defense Military Manpower Requirements which I have submitted for the record. Specifically, this paper provides the detailed justification for these average military strengths for FY 1972. For the Army, 1,024,000; for the Navy, 617,000; for the Marine Corps, 210,000; and for the Air Force, 759,000.

In 1969, our total DoD end strength was 3.5 million men. For FY 1972, the manpower levels we are requesting will give us an end strength of 2.5 million men. This is a one million man reduction during the past three years. To illustrate the magnitude of this reduction in another way, in 1972 the Defense share of the total labor force will be at its lowest level since 1950. Further, the Defense portion of all public employment will be reduced to its lowest level since before World War II.

We believe that our military strength authorization request is the minimum that we need to support our national security policy.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made a real contribution, Mr. Secretary, giving the real figures and the reasons in a very fine report which spells it all out more so than anything I have ever seen, and we are grateful to you for that.

I said in the beginning, Senator Symington, that we would have a very frank discussion of the manpower matter. We will have questions and a good discussion. I said also in the beginning that I was hopeful that we would find some basis for making some reasonable—not drastic—some reasonable reduction on this manpower, assuming the war will continue to be wound down, which we can't say as a fact, so we can't make it as strict as otherwise we would.

I am impressed with the fact that about 60 percent of every military dollar appropriated goes for manpower and manpower costs.

The cost of weapons is continuing to go up, and we are going to have to have fewer men, if possible, in the service, and put more on the effective research, and so forth.

Now, going into this troop level proposition in Europe, that is a matter that is of concern to the country, to a degree. It is an active matter on the floor of the Senate, and you spelled out a lot of it in this good statement. I have some questions that go to these U.S. force levels in Europe. I am not wanting to withdraw a great number or do anything drastic or do anything precipitous, but we know, too, the administration has been pressing the Europeans to do more in their own defense.

There has resulted a commitment here for \$1 billion of effort by our allies, and that is a start. We want to see if there is any basis though for reducing the number of our men there which now is over 300,000. The material which you have provided to this committee indicates that whereas the United States spends about 7 percent of its gross national product on defense our leading European allies spend far

less. Germany, for example, spends about 4 percent, Italy less than 3, France and England around 5.

You might not be prepared to answer this question but we want to get the more recent figures in the record.

Do you want to state an opinion about this comparison, and then supply for the record your more recent figures?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; we would be happy to supply for the record the most current figures we have on the percent of gross national product invested in defense by each of our European allied nations.

(The information follows:)

*Allied defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product—1970*

Belgium.....	3.2	Netherlands.....	4.0
Denmark.....	3.0	Norway.....	4.0
France.....	4.8	Portugal.....	6.7
Federal Republic of Germany.....	4.1	Turkey.....	5.5
Greece.....	5.1	United Kingdom.....	5.2
Italy.....	2.9	NATO Europe (including France).....	4.4
Luxembourg.....	1.0	NATO Europe (excluding France).....	4.3

The CHAIRMAN. All right, do that. I don't think this is an absolute guide but it has some bearing, and I can see where Greece certainly wouldn't be called on to put up a large percent of this. In one of the questions asked by the staff heretofore, the Defense Department indicated that our allies seem to be planning to fight a considerably shorter conventional war in Europe than we are if hostilities should break out. West Germany, for example, maintains only slightly over [deleted] worth of stocks for most major supply items. Other stocks of ammunition for some of our allies are apparently even lower than the [deleted] supply.

We, on the other hand, seem to maintain not only ammunition and supplies but also a considerable number of military personnel in units which would not be used until [deleted] after hostilities began.

What about this comparison to their [deleted] preparation, or [deleted] preparation, and our personnel, some of it, at least, would not be brought into play until something like [deleted] after the war started, if it lasted [deleted].

Mr. KELLEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, one of the subjects of primary concern in our conferences with NATO partners is the disparity between their [deleted] stock practices and the longer [deleted] NATO standard to which we are complying. We are encouraging our allied partners to increase the [deleted] assumption which they have followed to something closer to the [deleted] accepted NATO standard. We think the [deleted] stock practice that we seek to follow is a prudent one. We think it tends to compensate for the inadequacy of the [deleted] supply line on the part of allied nations and, of course, in our case a very important consideration must be insuring the safety and the resupply of our own troops on European soil.

We intend to urge, and think we are succeeding modestly in persuading, our allied partners to improve their stock standard [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. If you know now, why do they just hold this to [deleted]? Is it because we evaluate the threat greater than they do or because they are unable to move beyond the [deleted] or is it a matter of policy with them? I will illustrate that policy now:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense in West Germany told me 2 years ago, 18 months ago, that——

(Off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your response to this question of mine? Is it a matter of policy with them or inability to do more or do they look on the threat as less than we do? What do you think?

Mr. KELLEY. I think one of the principal factors, that accounts for the difference is that they are operating in home territory and we are operating in Europe, therefore having to maintain longer supply lines than they have to maintain.

Beyond that, I would suggest that we draw upon the greater knowledge that Mr. Odeen, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, has this in his area, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure Mr. Odeen would be capable and willing to comment further on it.

The CHAIRMAN. He is here with us.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not just now, thank you, we will come back to that. We will give everyone a chance to ask you some questions.

Here is another one that goes into this division matter, and I have got someone to get into these figures. Is it not true that the normal division force equivalent of 48,000 to 50,000 men in the Army is broken down for planning purposes into three approximately equal parts? First, a division of about 16,000 support troops, an initial support increment of support troops necessary for the division to have from the beginning of hostilities, and then a sustaining support increment of units which will be needed after [deleted].

Is that the general outline of a division?

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would have to draw upon General McChrystal in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. General, is that approximately correct?

General McCHRISTAL. That is correct, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. How many support sustaining increments, including approximately how many men, are there in the U.S. Army in Europe? This is the third category now, this sustaining support increment needed only after [deleted]. Do you have those available?

General McCHRISTAL. Yes, sir; If I may have just a moment, sir, I have it here.

The CHAIRMAN. If you don't readily have it, we can supply it, if you can in a few minutes, and I will go back to this other question. Mr. Secretary, who was it you called on for this other question about the difference in the European nations and all.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Odeen.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Odeen, let me take a little extra time on this if the members would permit. We will be as brief as we can. All right, you answer that question if you are ready to answer it, please.

Mr. ODEEN. Yes, sir.

As Secretary Kelley indicated, [deleted]—and as you indicated we are making a major effort right now to get our allies to do more in terms of their own defense capabilities. This entire area is one of our priority areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, I gave them credit for that to start with.

Mr. ODEEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why has it been kept so low all the time. I asked two or three different prongs of that question. Is it because they don't measure the threat as we do or because they can't do it or is it a policy to them not to over do it from the European viewpoint.

Mr. ODEEN. I think one consideration is the threat consideration. In some ways they, I think, have a more pessimistic view of the threat than we do, and in particular they look at the very immediate threat that the Soviet forces can pose. These are attacks with relatively little warning and with very rapid buildup. Therefore, the allies tend to spend their money on immediate forces, forces that can be in place right away with immediate capability; and on reserves that can be mobilized within a matter of hours, or days. With the competition for funds for defense they have tended to focus most of the funds into the capability to fight the first day or the first week and, therefore, tended to hold their stock levels to around [deleted].

Now the Germans are up to about [deleted] based on our latest calculations and we are pressing the Germans particularly to increase that. We have some hopes they are going to respond in the coming series of NATO negotiations to raise their stock levels. But the main reason is, I believe, that the allies have given most of their attention to the immediate near term threat, the first days and weeks of combat and neglected the longer term, an area we feel should be covered and given more attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you speaking from your personal contact with this problem over there or is this based on what someone told you?

Mr. ODEEN. It is a combination. I have worked over there and I have been involved with these questions for some time, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. How recently have you been there?

Mr. ODEEN. I have been there on visits twice last year.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you on duty there?

Mr. ODEEN. Mid-1960's; 1964 and 1965.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you find any sentiment there like "let Uncle Sam do it? He is Mr. Big and there is not much we can do any way compared with what Russia has." Have you ever run across any sentiment like that either in official circles or in social hours and so forth?

Mr. ODEEN. No, sir; I don't think I have seen this. They have the same kind of resource problems we have. You know they have difficulty getting all the funds they want, and I think it has been a question of how they have used their money. They have tended to focus this on this initial few days of combat.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Identify yourself a little more.

Mr. ODEEN. I am in the Systems Analysis Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Now back to this other question, did you find those figures?

General McCHRISTAL. Mr. Senator, I have figures that indicate we have four and a third divisions in Europe and six plus support increments. I will have to supply for the record the breakdown of these elements.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you will be given a chance, of course. My question related to the sustaining support increment units which will be needed after [deleted]. Now that is the third leg of the question you answered a few minutes ago, that this was the proper division.

General McCHRISTAL. That is correct.

(The information follows:)

In the development of the Army force structure, manpower programs, deployment plans, and the distribution of supporting units among the active and reserve components, it is useful to divide the division force into three increments: the division, the initial support increment (ISI), and the sustaining support increment (SSI). The ISI is an aggregation of units required to support the operations of the division when it is initially committed to combat. The SSI is an aggregation of the additional units required to sustain the combat operations of the division for an indefinite period.

The distinction between the ISI and the SSI depends on the use of the division force. ISI units are normally required to be deployed when the division is deployed; SSI units may be required either before or after the deployment of the division, depending on the situation. If a division is deployed into an active combat area to reinforce other divisions or to initiate combat operations, SSI units need not be immediately available. If a division is deployed prior to the initiation of combat, SSI units may be required before or at the same time as the division to open and operate aerial and seaports, depots, and lines of communications. Divisions deployed in peacetime need SSI units for sustaining support of training and peacetime operations. Introduction of SSI units for base development in a new theater may be required before divisions can be deployed and supported.

The ISI and SSI are planning concepts only; they are not organizations. Their composition in each instance must be determined by analyzing total support requirements. For planning purposes, however, the general composition of these increments may be stated in terms of organizational concepts. The ISI is comparable to the non-divisional support provided in the army corps and field army. It includes additional combat units such as an armored cavalry regiment, supporting artillery, attack helicopter units, and the combat service support units of the field army support command which are needed to establish maintenance, repair, and supply capabilities. These units are normally deployed at the same time as the division itself. The SSI is comparable to the communications zone support provided the field armies. It also includes combat units such as infantry brigades provided for security of the rear areas, and air defense units and the service support units called theater army troops in the theater army support command.

The Europe force for FY 72 contains  $4\frac{1}{2}$  divisions,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  initial support increments (ISI), and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  sustaining support increments (SSI). The total manpower authorizations for these division forces is 152.7 thousand military spaces. Of these, 64.6 thousand are in the  $4\frac{1}{2}$  divisions; the remaining 88.1 thousand are distributed to the ISI and SSI units.

The CHAIRMAN. My information is it is from 23 to 35,000 men that are in that third category. So my next question is why do we maintain several thousand men in units to be used after [deleted] of conventional combat when our allies appear to be maintaining stocks and supplies to fight a considerably shorter conventional war and, as I understand it, this third category that my question relates to are men that are more for repair of tanks or repair of things that might have been in the forefront of the early battle.

Now the question, why do we maintain those men over there in that large number. It won't be needed until [deleted] and which is beyond the time that most of our allies are preparing for in the first place.

Mr. KELLEY. You are directing that question to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you are ready to give an opinion on that.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, a part of the answer, Mr. Chairman, is suggested by Mr. Odeen's comments a few moments ago. The [deleted] standard, which is the NATO standard, is the one that we are seeking to follow and it is the one that from a military security point of view should be followed, in the best judgment of our people, in order to secure Europe and also secure the reasonable safety and redeployability of our own troops.

The CHAIRMAN. We are building the C5A and everything of that kind to take things over there in a hurry, but I don't mean to count

the chickens too much before they are hatched, I don't think we have got it in use much, but it is very revealing to me to keep all these people there for [deleted] and beyond when the rest of the package is not geared for that length of time.

Mr. KELLEY. If I may make one further comment, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will indulge me for a few more minutes.

Mr. KELLEY. In a meeting of the Allied defense ministers, held last December there was increased recognition by them of the need to build up the conventional force capability. In other words, a recognition that if and when hostilities came in Europe they would not necessarily be of the nuclear type, [deleted] and so there had to be increased emphasis and buildup in the conventional force areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Now one other question while we are on this. On page 41 of your statement it indicates there is to be an increase in actual manpower of U.S. Forces in NATO—that 41 must be in error, your statement was not that long—but any way, that there be an increase in actual manpower of U.S. Forces in NATO of [deleted] men between fiscal 1970 and fiscal 1972.

I understand these increases are largely to replace Army combat forces drawn down for Vietnam.

Now, could you give us a more detailed breakdown of what types of troops make up this [deleted] increase. I wouldn't expect you to do that right now but here is what I am coming to. Given the fact that compared to our allies we have a larger number of units designed to support combat for longer than [deleted] why should there not be a readjustment of our forces in Europe. For example, why couldn't our overall force in Europe be kept at the lower level, 302,000, say, without an increase and the empty combat slots be filled by a reduction in the number of jobs for the support troops.

In other words, I am not suggesting that you not resupply those support troops, the ones you have had to pull out, but that every time you plugged one of those holes sending that man or one of his competence back over there, why not pull out one of these lower echelon of these support troops and hold this thing at 302,000. I mentioned that 302, just to be specific. What is your comment on that?

Mr. KELLEY. Well, first, as your question indicates, the increase from fiscal year 1970 to fiscal year 1972 in our NATO forces is to fill the holes, the vacancies, that occurred earlier. These are especially conspicuous in reference to [deleted] where there was about [deleted] percent short fall, and more important in [deleted] where there was a shortfall approaching [deleted] percent.

Now these slots have to be filled in order for those combat units to train and to function effectively.

The CHAIRMAN. My question assumes that.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

By the end of this fiscal year, by July 1971, the Army forces in Europe will be—correction, the total U.S. forces in Europe will be at about [deleted] percent of authorized strength.

Now, in reference to your question why not let the support forces be reduced by the increase made in the general-purpose force, well, the support forces during peacetime are manned at 90-percent of what we would operate under in wartime conditions. So you start with the fact that you have a pared down austere organization, and to

pare down that organization further below the 90 percent manning level would simply not provide adequately for the support needs of the combat units, and that is the reason for not reducing support units at the time the shortfalls in the combat units are provided for.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand I was talking about that third echelon, you know, of these support troops coming in for use after [deleted].

Mr. KELLEY. Excuse me. I didn't understand that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. My proposal was, as you fill a blank spot in this armored unit, we will say, that you take out one man in these support troops that come into being only after [deleted] of operations, I mean of combat.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, of course, there is an important psychological reason for not making unilateral and arbitrary reductions within our force units in Europe. A part of the psychology of the reason relates to what our adversaries do. It would be self-defeating psychologically for us to reduce unilaterally without any indication of reciprocal or corresponding initiatives being taken by the Warsaw Pact nations, notably Russia.

Beyond that, however, we have the problem of sustaining the confidence and the working cooperation of our allied nations in Europe, and the President has stated that we will not reduce our forces in Europe unless there is indication of corresponding reductions being made by the Warsaw Pact nations.

This is partly by way of maintaining a strong NATO security posture. It is partly also by way of encouraging our NATO allies to pull their share of the load.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, militarily though; you have given a good psychological statement, but militarily you see no great fault in the proposal that as we plug up [deleted] unit we take out one of these supply men in this unit of [deleted].

Mr. KELLEY. Militarily, Mr. Chairman, I think the Army should supply a comment on that point for the record because that goes beyond my competency.

The CHAIRMAN. We will get that later, but we have to make a civilian judgment around here at this time, Mr. Secretary, and we value your civilian judgment. I don't want to pull a surprise question on you but it seems to me like you would have to think more about that. (See page 92.)

Mr. KELLEY. Well, sir, I have commented within the scope of my capability, and I would have nothing more to add.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, within the scope of your responsibility.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Senator Smith, I am sorry I took so much time.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions I would like to have answered for the record. I have one or two to ask the Secretary but if Senator Schweiker doesn't object I would be glad to yield to Senator Symington since he has to go to the floor.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. I hope to get back. I appreciate it, Senator Smith.

Mr. Secretary, when I was in Europe last week, at a nuclear Army base, one of my constituents, a private, asked me why his wife was not

allowed to have a job although she would work for the same pay that a German would work. I asked the general to answer the question, and his answer was the Germans would not permit it.

Now the Germans have imported people from other countries, they have no unemployment of any kind, and they import Greeks, Italians, Spaniards, and Arabs, and yet they won't allow a wife of an American soldier defending their country to work on the base.

I went to a nuclear Air Force base with Senator Pastore a little while after that, asked the same question and received the same answer. For the record I will put in the number of people who were working at that base which they gave me as quickly as they could, 743 Germans authorized and 77 Americans authorized.

Mr. KELLEY. Would you repeat those figures?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes; 743 Germans authorized and 77 Americans authorized.

The unemployment in my State is up to 6 percent, I understand in the State of Washington it is up to 14 percent, and I would like to have somebody tell this committee what is going on.

Mr. Chairman, I hope to get back. I thank Senator Smith.

Mr. KELLY. Senator, do you wish for me to comment now?

Senator SYMINGTON. I can't wait, but would like to have you comment for the record.

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, sir. I would like to, and with reference to your first question, in the course of preparing myself for these hearings I came face to face with the same problem that you have exposed by your question, and I don't think that our present practices are defensible.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is a very frank and candid remark, and I appreciate it. But you know it is like Mark Twain and the weather, everybody talks about this particular problem but nobody has done anything about it since I have been around.

Mr. KELLEY. If I don't do anything about it, I expect to be criticized.

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate that; I am not criticizing but just asking you to look into it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you supply the answer.

Senator SCHWEIKER. May I hear the answer; I was going to raise the same question which I have raised in other hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. I think it is good to get it.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, there is nothing in the law that would place this no employment of U.S. citizens constraint upon us. I have not completed my searching out of the policy and its genesis; but on the face of it, it would appear to me that the practice is wrong of giving secondary priority to the employment of Americans vis-a-vis the employment of first-country nationals, and I intend to look into it, and your committee will be informed of our total findings and our recommendations to the extent we believe policy should be changed.

Senator SCHWEIKER. In other words, it isn't in the Status of Forces Treaty in any way at all, no legal basis.

Mr. KELLEY. There is no legal basis in the Status of Forces Pact for the employment of first-country nationals over Americans.

Senator SCHWEIKER. It is sort of a "gentlemen's agreement" of the parties there.

Mr. KELLEY. I have to assume that, Senator Schweiker, but I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you wish to supply a further answer?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I would appreciate the opportunity to do so because it is a critical area.

The CHAIRMAN. You will be given a reasonable time, but the day will come when we want to close the record, so you search your memory.

Mr. KELLEY. We are looking into it now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fine.

(The following information was subsequently furnished:)

STATEMENT CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT OF DEPENDENTS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN AREAS

Department of Defense policy requires that, when it has been determined that civilians can be used advantageously in foreign areas, maximum utilization will be made of persons available locally, U.S. as well as local nationals, in the interest of good management and economy, before civilian employees are transferred from, or recruited in, the United States. Current policy specifies no preference for either U.S. citizens or local nationals. In the event U.S. citizens are employed, locally available dependents are considered.

The policy also provides that local nationals be utilized as extensively as practicable by the U.S. Forces in order to reduce the need to import workers in the host country. This is intended to prevent the importation of persons from the United States or from third countries with the attendant additional expense and requirements for logistical support. It is not intended to restrict the employment of U.S. citizens, primarily dependents, who are available in the locality.

There is no provision in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement which would prohibit our employment of U.S. citizens, who, like the dependents of our military personnel, are not ordinarily resident in the host country.

In appropriated fund logistics and support activities overseas, the specific manpower mix—The U.S. military, U.S. citizen civilian and local national civilian—is developed within a command's authorized manpower ceilings, foreign national employment ceilings, assigned limitations on expenditures entering the international balance of payments, and its allotment of appropriated funds. When a manpower mix is developed which is considered to be the optimum compatible with all these necessary limitations, the command undertakes to operate within it. For example, the fact that the cost of a U.S. citizen employee is considerably higher than that of a local national employee is a factor for consideration as to the feasibility of further substitution of U.S. citizens for local nationals.

Since 1961, Department of Defense policy has required that, as vacancies occur through attrition of local national employees in the nonappropriated fund activities, they will be filled, insofar as possible, by United States dependent personnel already in the country.

Although DoD policies encourage the employment of locally available U.S. citizens for those positions for which such employees are required, and this encourages the employment of dependents, there is no policy which requires that dependents be given preference. Similarly, there is no requirement that dependents be given preference in employment for any vacancy which may occur. This lack of preferential treatment for dependents has been seriously questioned within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and is being reexamined in depth. In this examination, the feasibility of a policy which will provide high priority to dependents of military and civilian personnel in filling all vacancies is being explored.

Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask right there, Mr. Secretary, in your exploration of the various status agreements and so forth, will you be sure to check and give us the benefit in the record of what you find with respect to this matter?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Also, Mr. Chairman, you asked a question and the Secretary said he had answered as far as he was capable of answering and suggested that the Army make a statement. I would ask that the chairman reconsider and give the Army the right to provide a statement at that point so that we can have the benefit of the civilian and military.

The CHAIRMAN. I will make myself clearer, Senator Smith. I had in mind calling on the Army this morning. I just didn't want to take up any more time for my time, and we will come to the Army. I hope there will be someone here to be prepared and we will come back to that question shortly.

(See page 92.)

Senator SMITH. I have two questions I would like to get in at this time. I have some other questions to be answered for the record, Mr. Secretary.

The tour of duty in Vietnam is 1 year still, isn't it?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, it is.

Senator SMITH. What effect would there be if that were extended to 15 months or 18 months as far as the draftees are concerned?

Mr. KELLEY. That question has been asked periodically within the defense organization, and the judgment of military people and people in the Office of the Secretary who have studied people's reactions to duty in Vietnam, is that the extension of the tour beyond 12 months would have a demoralizing effect, specifically on those people who are expected to serve longer than 12 months, and even more specifically the draftees who, by now, are quite accustomed to the pattern of going over to Vietnam for 12 months only and having an opportunity for one recreational leave during the period of 12 months that they are assigned.

Senator SMITH. Would there be any effect on the overall numbers if such a ruling would be made?

Mr. KELLEY. On the overall force level?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Mr. KELLEY. Certainly it would have an effect on the assignment of men to Vietnam but offhand I would not believe it would affect the number requested for the Army worldwide in fiscal year 1972.

Senator SMITH. If you would expand or wish to expand for the record I would be pleased to have you do so. There is so much interest and so many questions being asked. We hope this is not going to be necessary for too long.

What is the policy, Mr. Secretary, of using civilians and military on bases? Are you using more military for housekeeping purposes, and so forth, or are you increasing the civilians under these new figures that you are proposing?

Mr. KELLEY. The policy is to prohibit the use of military for jobs that can be just as well performed by civilians. There are many individual situations where that literal policy has not been followed. The temptation to deviate from policy has given way most in time periods where there has been a rather sudden reduction in the civilian force, and given the need to perform a job which has been done by a civilian but having fewer civilians on the base, a military commander with no other alternative has sometimes turned to military personnel to get the

total job done including some jobs that were performed previously by civilians.

If you look at the civilianization program of the Department of Defense over a period of years, the mix of civilians to military has increased some but certainly our record in respect to civilianization is not a perfect record.

I was especially interested in the experience of the British forces in the context of converting from conscript to a volunteer organization which, as you know, they accomplished in the early 1960's.

One of the effects, one of the after effects of converting to a volunteer organization is they have today a much higher mix of civilians in their total defense organization than they had previously. As a matter of fact, they have almost as many civilians employed as they have military. I believe the ratio is something like 45 civilian, 50 military, and if you go back to 1960 and earlier in the United Kingdom the ratio of civilian to military was just about the same as our ratio is today, which is slightly more than one civilian to three military.

Senator SMITH. Is the policy flexible enough so that each service can issue its own orders as to the use of military-civilian?

Mr. KELLEY. Oh, yes. As a matter of fact, there is really no other way that it could be implemented but on a service-by-service basis, and really on a base-by-base basis.

The policy is clear enough. The matter of implementing policy has posed some rather difficult practical problems over a period of time.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After Senator Schweiker finishes, I have questions from Senator Thurmond and Senator Dominick which should go into the record and be answered but I believe they should follow Senator Schweiker who is here.

(Questions of Senator Smith and answers subsequently furnished follow:)

*Question 1. For example, what would be the specific impact on military end strength if the tour policy in Vietnam were to require a man to stay 15 months instead of 12 months?*

Answer 1. There would not be an impact on FY 72 end strengths if new assignees to Vietnam are required to stay 15 months instead of 12 months. Realizing that we are now selecting men for transfer to Vietnam in the June-July time period, a 15-month tour individual would not have to be replaced until the fall of 1972 (1st quarter FY 73). A normal 12-month tour individual would not come back until June-July 1972 (end of FY 72). Therefore, end FY 72 strengths would not be affected.

If personnel now in Vietnam were required to extend involuntary an extra 3 months, up to 6,000 training and pipeline spaces might be saved in FY 72. However, it has been the continuing policy of the DOD that unaccompanied tours to remote/undesirable locations be held to 12 months. Changing this policy after a man has been already assigned to Vietnam would impact very adversely on troop morale.

*Question 2. How much additional would it cost and what would be the impact on manpower levels if all KP and base maintenance on Army bases in the United States were contracted out to civilian employees rather than being done by soldiers?*

Answer 2. If all of the KP functions in the United States were performed by civilian employees, there would be no impact on the military strength since military personnel perform KP on a detail or additional duty basis. By civilianizing KP the military will be free to perform basic military missions, training and equipment maintenance. It is estimated that it would cost about \$97 million to civilianize the KP functions in the United States. If the base maintenance functions consisting of operation of utilities, maintenance and repair of real property,

minor construction and other engineering support were civilianized, approximately 1,600 military spaces would be displaced. However, base maintenance now employs approximately 13,000 civilians and the military spaces provide a rotation base and a skill development base for military personnel returning from or being trained for an overseas tour.

The function has been civilianized to an appropriate level. If the additional spaces were civilianized, pay costs would be approximately \$14 million, but the military personnel would have to perform related duties because of the rotation base requirement. Base maintenance is a part of base operations. All base operations activities in the United States require approximately 23,000 military and 99,000 civilian spaces in 1972. The observations made above concerning Civilianization of base maintenance apply also to the total base operations program, however, Army manpower managers conduct continuing studies aimed at replacing the maximum number of military personnel with civilian employees in these functional areas.

#### NUMBER OF HIGH-RANKING FIELD GRADE OFFICERS

*Question 3. I see from some of the preliminary material you supplied to the staff that there are over 17 thousand full Colonels and Navy Captains now in the service. Could you provide for the record, please, if you don't have it today, how many full Colonels and Navy Captains there were in the active forces in each year since World War II?*

#### ON FIELD GRADE OFFICERS

Answer. The information requested is shown below:

#### Colonels/Captains

Year:	Total	Year—Continued	Total
June 30, 1945	14, 898	June 30, 1958	14, 231
June 30, 1946	13, 384	June 30, 1959	14, 209
June 30, 1947	9, 821	June 30, 1960	14, 196
June 30, 1948	7, 808	June 30, 1961	14, 488
June 30, 1949	7, 816	June 30, 1962	14, 997
June 30, 1950	7, 752	June 30, 1963	15, 183
June 30, 1951	10, 794	June 30, 1964	15, 323
June 30, 1952	12, 490	June 30, 1965	15, 288
June 30, 1953	12, 782	June 30, 1966	16, 703
June 30, 1954	12, 625	June 30, 1967	17, 301
June 30, 1955	12, 828	June 30, 1968	17, 969
June 30, 1956	13, 786	June 30, 1969	18, 277
June 30, 1957	14, 171	June 30, 1970	18, 083

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, thank you, Senator Smith.

In just a moment, Senator Schweiker, I am going to call on you.

The Chair wishes to announce now that arrangements for the hearings have been finished for next Monday and Tuesday. We will have open hearings on the ABM. We will open the hearings with Dr. Foster testifying, a proponent, of course, for the Secretary of Defense, and then next we will have four witnesses, outside witnesses, two as proponents and two as opposed, very similar to what we had last year, and somewhere in there we might go into executive session for some small parts of the hearing, but this is an open hearing so the public may be present, and then after that is over we would have a strictly executive session, closed session, for the more complicated and intimate parts for the committee to hear.

May I say further that I hope that we can complete those hearings in 2 days, and to give them a chance to study what Dr. Foster's testimony is.

We will carry over after Dr. Foster testifies, until the next day, which will give all of them a chance to see just what his position is.

The hearing will be in the Commerce Committee room 5110 of the new building. That will be at 10 o'clock and we will have the usual recess time.

Senator Schweiker, we are glad you can be here and I recognize you.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, of the figure 591,000 land forces that you cite on page 12 of your testimony, how many of these people would be NATO people. In other words, when you say our total land forces which comprise 25 percent of our military power are 591,000, how many of these would be NATO based.

Mr. KELLEY. Senator Schweiker, could you tell me what page you are referring to?

Senator SCHWEIKER. Page 12 of your first statement. In other words, what I am asking is how many land forces do we have in NATO?

Mr. KELLEY. Between [deleted].

Senator SCHWEIKER. That would be about over [deleted] some percent I gather roughly, I am not sure of my arithmetic, [deleted], you say.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SCHWEIKER. About [deleted] percent. I have some of the same concern that the chairman has in his line of questioning, when we are stationing [deleted] percent of our land forces in Europe, it just seems to me we are sort of out of whack. I dare say if this issue comes up on the floor of the Senate frankly the Defense Department is going to get clobbered on it. Let me put it very candidly. I think here is an area unlike some other areas if we slackened our belt there are other areas where other people can take up that slack. There are many areas where if we slacken there is nobody can take up the slack.

I was at the NATO assembly this fall and we had a terrible time just getting a resolution through to have everybody willing to spend 5 percent of their gross national product.

It just seems to me before we increase our support forces there, that maybe we ought to say on the conditions of any increment changes a 5-percent gross national product and a [deleted] materiel and supply thing, because the American people really think we are being taken.

Maybe we are, and I frankly tend to agree with them, but they are getting fed up, and I see an overreaction coming along, and if we don't adjust to it now then the pendulum is going to go so far the other way we are going to seriously hurt our defense posture and that is what concerns me.

By not moving now and modestly changing these things you are going to build up such a public concern that you are going to sweep the whole thing clean which would be very bad. The Gallup poll this morning showed that 50 percent of the people in this country think we are spending too much on military and only 12 percent thought we were spending too little. That doesn't apply to NATO, don't misunderstand me, but it is building up. There are some areas where we have to spend the money because nobody else is spending the money and it is just a concern to me because I think if the issue

comes up for a vote the Defense Department will be set back and it will be the wrong sign, the sign we want to pull out of NATO.

I don't feel that way and the people who want to see us cut back don't feel that way. I am really disturbed that this is building up to the point where we are overreacting. I realize there is not much of an answer you can give it but I just want to convey some of the concern that a lot of our people have back home and I am sure other colleagues have.

You are perfectly free to respond, I don't mean to cut you off.

Mr. KELLEY. I think you focus on a matter of grave concern to all of us, Senator. The fact that a significant number of people in this country believe that we are spending too much on defense in spite of the fact that our level of defense spending, using any measurement you wish to use, is at the lowest level it has been in the last 20 years, and under most measurements at the lowest level it has been since World War II.

Of course, you can take the simplistic view, which I realize you do not take, but many people do, that whatever the level of spending is it should be some lower, and this only suggests to us that all of us have a tremendous responsibility in reference to educating the American public to the facts of life.

Senator SCHWEIKER. I didn't want to get into the overall spending thing. I just point that out as a show of the rising tide that is going to come and hit us at some point. There wasn't any breakdown of the NATO troops, but I daresay if it were broken down in some way instead of 50 percent you would have an overwhelming number who would feel that we are getting taken in the NATO thing, and they are all healthy countries now. It just strikes me very poorly that we don't take a stronger position with our friends there who seem to have been taking us for some 20 years, that is the hard part to get through to people back home and myself, too.

There are so many other areas of military defense where we really need to spend money that our allies ought to be spending, that is what concerns me as much as anything.

Mr. KELLEY. Of course, while we have about 300,000 American personnel in Europe for NATO defense, we should not overlook the fact that our NATO friends, allied nations in Western Europe, have over 3 million people in their active forces. Granted our percent of investment related to gross national product is higher than that of any NATO ally, but their investment is reasonable and growing measured against the fact that most of those countries are small countries and most of them have neither a nuclear capability nor a responsibility in nuclear warfare nor do they have global responsibilities beyond Europe; and taking these factors into account, it is not altogether surprising that their investment as a percent of gross national product is less than 5 even though our is higher than 6.

Senator SCHWEIKER. That argument cuts both ways because you can also say that since they don't have global responsibilities, since they don't have the burden of nuclear capability, they sure ought to be willing to put more money on their home defense forces. I recognize what you say on the one side but it seems to me also to be an argument that since we have to carry the burden of global responsi-

bility and strategic deterrence and they don't, it seems to me, this is the area of their own homes, they ought to be willing to pick up more of it, forgetting the figures of it.

Mr. KELLEY. Of course, it is always difficult to discuss these things in absolute terms. I think you have to find some kind of a practical comparative yardstick. Now the investment of our NATO allies in terms of their own defense, and using manpower terms as the reference, is greater than the Warsaw Pact nations investment in their own defense. The share of the total responsibility taken on by Soviet Russia [deleted] is considerably greater than the share of the total NATO defense responsibility which is ours at [deleted].

Senator SCHWEIKER. Say that last statement again.

Mr. KELLEY. I said the share of the responsibility assumed by Soviet Russia to the Warsaw Pact nations is much, much higher than the responsibility of the United States in reference to NATO Pact at [deleted].

Senator SCHWEIKER. I saw that figure, and I saw that other figure that we put up 25 percent and they put up what, 45 percent initially?

Mr. KELLEY. I have forgotten the percentages.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Of the NATO figures; but I wonder how good that is because they are worried about Czechoslovakia, they have got to have the fist there to stop their own force from revolting so we don't have that problem. We don't have to have a gun pointing down Germany's or England's neck so they have to maintain the Communist Party discipline structure and their world empire, so they have got to have that. But our role is certainly different. I don't think that that is quite analogous because of what happened in Czechoslovakia. Now we certainly have to take the total forces into account; I don't discount that. I agree with that point.

I don't want to pursue it. I just wanted to convey a growing feeling, and I think of all military spending this is one area that is awfully soft in terms of people's thinking.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, Senator, without being contentious, if I can just make one final observation. After you have battled statistics and make such comparisons as one can make between what the United States is doing in NATO versus what Soviet Russia is doing in Warsaw Pact, you still come down to the point where the President and the Commander in Chief has the responsibility of maintaining a strong NATO defense against the possibility of Soviet domination in Western Europe, and the only way that this can be accomplished insofar as NATO allies are concerned, is to build the confidence of those countries in relationship to their alliance with us, and do it in a way that does not cause them to give up on the whole ball game because of our withdrawing forces or our withdrawing support from the NATO alliance.

The President has declared in the interest of this objective of a strong NATO defense, that given a similar response by our allies, we would maintain and improve our forces and not make reductions, unless and until there is some indication of similar action or initiative being taken by the Soviet alliance. Given that position and given the extreme difficulty of maintaining this proper balance, we think it would be imprudent from the standpoint of bargaining psychology

and militarily unsafe to reduce our forces in Europe below their present level.

Senator SCHWEIKER. I acknowledge that argument, but what then concerns me is that rather than do that, I think we ought to go back and simply say we could sell the public and people this policy a lot easier if we could go back and say that we are requiring our allies to put up 5 percent of gross national product or keep [deleted] spares and supplies and things. If we were doing that, I think the feeling would be a lot different. But, you know everywhere we look we are not doing it, just like the other point about you cannot let American GIs' wives work, everywhere you look the signs are the other way and this is what is griping people. I think if we were doing all these things, there would be far less push, and this is what concerns me about unilateral withdrawal.

My point is the more this buildup the more danger there is, the very point you make with which I concur, I am not for substantial unilateral withdrawals for the obvious reasons you are not either. But we are heading toward that with not doing anything, not being flexible, and not being reasonable, I think, in our approach, we are heading toward that.

That is just what the public is getting geared up to and we will all wonder what happened and that is what is going to happen.

Mr. KELLEY. Of course, it remains to be seen whether our Western European allies will, in fact, spend the \$1 billion to which they committed themselves in the Defense Minister's talks last December. If they do, and it is expected they will, this is a substantial additional investment on their part to improve the security system in Western Europe.

Approximately half of that billion dollars will be spent to provide shelter facilities on military air fields in Europe, and to provide a total communications system within the allied system, and the other half of the billion dollars will be spent, within those individual countries, improve their own defense system.

The CHAIRMAN. Right there, would you yield, will any of that go for personnel, this second half of the billion dollars?

Mr. KELLEY. I can't say that none of it will go for personnel, Mr. Chairman, but I can say that any investment made of the second half of the billion dollars would not relieve us of any of our manpower commitment or responsibility in the NATO alliance.

The CHAIRMAN. But if it went for personnel that would be a very encouraging fact to us and also make it a little more reasonable that we could overwithdraw some of our supply troops. I didn't mean to interrupt your thought too much. I just thought you could delineate that.

Mr. KELLEY. I don't think there can be much criticism of the total personnel investment made by the NATO alliance. In terms of numbers they have invested many people but in some instances those people are underequipped and undertrained and it is in these areas that the billion dollars or the second half of the billion dollars would be invested.

Senator SCHWEIKER. I just have one other area. What is the latest situation on the Coast Guard Reserve picture. Where do we stand on that?

Mr. KELLEY. Well, the—

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me, were you going to be a witness on this this afternoon?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator, we have deferred that until this afternoon. If he is prepared to answer—

Mr. KELLEY. I would rather defer that question to this afternoon because I am not right up to speed on it.

Senator SCHWEIKER. Those are all the questions I have.

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND AND ANSWERS FURNISHED BY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROGER KELLEY

*Question 1. Mr. Secretary, it appears to me that the Reserve Revitalization Act passed by the Congress is not being followed in connection with the Naval Air Reserve base closures and reorganizations. Would you supply for the Record your findings on this point and also advise me by separate correspondence?*

Answer. I am satisfied that the reorganization of the Naval Air Reserve to provide combat ready units is in accord with the intent of the Reserve Revitalization Act. Implementation has involved some adjustments and the Navy is proceeding aggressively in these areas.

As to base closures, there have been significant changes in the base closure processes as a result of implementation of the Reserve Revitalization Act. While the reserve focal point of my office had not previously been consulted in regard to base closures, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) is now a member of the "OSD Base Realignment and Personnel Reduction Screening Board." The attached memoranda, coordinated with the Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics, have, we believe, established full compliance with the Reserve Revitalization Act.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, D.C., April 28, 1970.

Memorandum for Secretary of the military departments.  
Subject: Utilization of Reserve Force facilities.

Established Department of Defense policy relating to closure or acquisition by other components of Reserve facilities states that, "whenever it becomes necessary for the active military forces to dispossess or relocate permanently-housed units of the reserve components, the dispossessing agency shall provide for replacement facilities (sic, including plans and funds for construction if need be) equal to those from which dispossessed, or otherwise provide facilities acceptable to the department having cognizance over such dispossessed reserve component unit(s), which will meet approved space requirements, including storage, so as not to impede the execution of training programs."

In conjunction with the above, established guidelines for utilization of Reserve Force facilities that were primarily intended for reserve purposes, requires that first consideration upon closure action be given to other reserve components. In other words, a facility no longer needed by the owning or controlling component will not be diverted to other use until it is determined (1) that it cannot economically fulfill a valid requirement of another reserve component or (2) that it would result in construction or other acquisition at full cost to the government.

There has been increasing evidence, that as reserve base closures occur or are announced, the bases are not actually closed but the reserve units are merely diverted to another site. This is accompanied with follow-on action by the Active Forces to repossess those facilities vacated by the Reserves. These actions are not consistent with established policies.

Accordingly, closure actions of reserve facilities must be developed in conjunction with, and formally coordinated, as required by statute and DoD Directives, with the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The DASD (RA) will serve on the OSD Base Realignment and Personnel Reduction Screening Board when any reserve activities or facilities are on the agenda in order to facilitate such coordination. The DoD is interested in significant savings, but cannot condone the creation of new problems through violation of existing laws, failure to be complete in cost factoring, failure to provide adequate properly located training facilities for the reserve components, or failure to maintain Reserve Forces mobilization readiness and combat capability.

In accord with current policy, close interdepartmental coordination and cooperation among those responsible for Reserve Forces facilities matters at all levels should be encouraged to the end that the investment in such facilities may continue to contribute maximum support to Reserve Forces training.

ROGER T. KELLEY.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, D.C., April 3, 1970.

Memorandum for Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments (I&L).  
Subject: Policy Guidance on National Guard and Reserve Base Closures.

The Defense Department policy concerning National Guard and Reserve Forces is that the readiness of these forces will be strengthened and improved as reductions in the Active Forces occur. As the Secretary of Defense has stated publicly and in Congress, he strongly supports the provisions of the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act (Public Law 90-168). In connection with base closure actions, as well as in other areas, we must be governed by this policy.

The success of Reserve programs is completely dependent on population—unlike the Active Forces, the Reserves can exist only in or adjacent to population centers to gain personnel. The transfer of a Reserve unit from one area to another is not a simple procedure and can result in serious personnel losses. The funds required to recruit, equip and train additional personnel necessary for the unit to attain meaningful readiness may offset any savings indicated through disestablishment of the original unit.

We can appreciate that the civilian reservist is dedicated to his mission, and we should endeavor to apply the same Human Goals established for the Active personnel across the total force structure to include the National Guard and Reserves. In this connection, even though the Reserve bases were identified as one area to explore for potential savings, this may not be feasible if a proposed realignment results in the redistribution of Reserve units over a wide geographical area which exceeds a reasonable commuting distance.

I want to make it crystal clear that I am not against the closure or transfer of Guard and Reserve installations provided the action does not impair force readiness and is properly phased and supported. However, it is most important in managing the organization and support of all Reserve Components that we act in accordance with the policy stated above.

In considering base closures for Guard or Reserve Forces, the following factors should govern:

1. Maximum collocation of Guard and Reserve and Active Forces should be achieved on Active military installations whenever the location of the Active installation will not be an unacceptable detriment to operations of the Active Forces, the missions of Guard and Reserve personnel.
2. Maximum collocation of Army and Air Guard, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reservists into common facilities and common locations, preferably on Active installations.
3. Army and Air Guard, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force Reserve flying forces should be consolidated on Active military airfields or as tenants on civilian-operated airfields wherever possible without restriction by service affiliation. This is not only a matter of economy and improved logistical and administrative support, but it is also a matter of continuing to reduce operations in highly congested metropolitan areas.
4. Maximum use of existing facilities through the elimination of support functions not necessarily required for a training facility.
5. The Active Forces, the missions of Guard and Reserve personnel.
6. Recommended actions will not result in the average strength for the Guard or Reserve Component involved being reduced below current authorized level.

In addition, when Guard and Reserve bases are recommended for closure, such actions should be formally coordinated, as required by statute and Department of Defense Directive, with the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The rationale for the recommended action should include, but not be limited, to the following:

- a. Effect on unit and individual readiness.
- b. Plans for reassignment of units and personnel.
- c. Military construction required to support reassigned units.

- d. Support personnel required at new facility.
- e. Other Guard and Reserve Forces affected.
- f. Estimated personnel losses occasioned by move and proposed action to maintain authorized personnel strength.
- g. Information on the planned use of the trained personnel from the Reserve Component unit programmed out by the closure action.
- h. Comments from the Chief of the Guard and/or Reserve Components concerned.

The above guidance is provided to insure that, while we are interested in effecting significant savings in Defense expenditures, we do not create new problems through violation of existing laws, through failure to provide adequate training facilities for the Guard and Reserve Forces, or failure to maintain their mobilization readiness and combat capability.

ROGER T. KELLEY.

*Question 2. Who is responsible to see that Reserve funds are protected when Reserve stations are closed and regular forces take over the facility?*

Answer. Under the provisions of the attached memorandum, published August 12, 1969, the Secretary of Defense or his Deputy is personally responsible for approving actions that result in withdrawals of funds from Guard and Reserve programs after funds are appropriated by Congress to support Guard and Reserve activities. Funds made excess by the closing of Reserve stations are included under the provisions of this memorandum. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) administers these programs for the Secretary of Defense. All actions that impact upon the Guard and Reserve funds are required to be coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs monitors these actions for the Assistant Secretary.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, D.C., August 12, 1969.

Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments,

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Subject: Separate Budget Accounts for Reserve Forces.

As you know, Public Law 90-168, 90th Congress, requires that the Reserve Forces shall be adequately funded, equipped, trained, manned and otherwise supported in order to insure their readiness for active duty in any emergency.

At present, funds for the Reserve Forces are found both in separate appropriations for Reserve Personnel and Construction, and in the general Service appropriations for O&M and Procurement. All Army and Air National Guard O&M funds are also contained in separate appropriations.

To insure effective control over funds designated for the Reserve Forces, I have decided to assign control of all such funds to the Chiefs of the Reserve Components and the Chief, National Guard Bureau, respectively. This action reserves to my office only the authority to transfer Reserve Forces funds to meet high priority Active Force needs.

To implement the above, I desire that, beginning in FY 1971, separate budget accounts be created for the Operations and Maintenance (including depot maintenance) and the Procurement areas, respectively, of each of the Reserve Forces. In addition, separate budget accounts for ARNG and ANG Procurement will also be established for FY 1971 and subsequent years. All existing separate Reserve and Guard appropriations will continue without change.

While separate budget accounts will be established for Reserve Procurement, the actual procurement of Reserve equipment will be accomplished through the existing Active Force procurement systems, and the Reserve Chiefs will reimburse these procurement systems. Equipment thus procured for the Reserve Forces will be separately identified and delivered to each Reserve Component.

Henceforth, no reprogramming actions involving the transfer or expenditure of funds appropriated by the Congress for the support of Reserve Forces activities (including Reserve O&M and Procurement) or for the equipment of Reserve Forces will be initiated without the personal, specific approval of the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

All pertinent DOD Directives and Instructions and implementing Service regulations should be immediately revised in accordance with the foregoing.

MELVIN R. LAIRD.

*Question 3. In the Navy Air Reserve reorganization it appears the Navy Reserves were pushed out of Los Alamitos and are having to pay to build facilities at regular Navy bases where the units were relocated. Kindly advise the committee reference the facts on this move?*

Answer. The Navy planned to move Reserve units from Reserve bases to active fleet bases in order to supply more modern, combat serviceable equipment, better ground support and an interface with the active fleet units. In order to accommodate these displaced Reserve units, the Navy has requested the use of Reserve construction funds, on a one-time waiver basis, at NAS Whidbey, MCAS El Toro and PMR Pt. Mugu. This waiver was granted in order to enhance the development of combat readiness.

*Question 4. The Navy has used a figure of \$24 million in construction backlog and \$21 million in land costs to justify closing Los Alamitos. These figures do not hold water. The land is not needed to continue flying at this station and the construction backlog is not of high priority when compared with other stations. At the same time the Navy is spending \$20 million to move to new sites. They could stay at Los AI for only a few million. How can the Navy justify such actions when money savings are so important?*

Answer. [Deleted.]

*Question 5. How does the Defense Department justify this base closure (Los AI) as an economy move?*

Answer. Mr. Packard's memorandum of 29 September 1969 to the Secretaries of the Military Departments initiated action for the Services to inventory their facilities, especially support functions, and forward to him a list of those bases or stations that could be closed that would have the least impact on their overall readiness. He specifically stated "I merely want to reemphasize my interest in this subject and my conviction that savings in this area are much to be preferred over equivalent savings in combat forces and force modernization."

In his response, the Secretary of the Navy included the Naval Air Reserve Station, Los Alamitos, California. DoD approved the recommendation for the closure of Los Alamitos Naval Air Reserve Station based on the attached recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy.

This action was recommended in the interest of economy and the assigned Reserve units were programmed to be collocated with active Navy units having like aircraft. The obvious advantage of identifying savings through elimination of support bases as opposed to reduction in combat forces and force modernization is recognized. However, closure of a Reserve facility also temporarily eliminates any unit readiness capability since the members can not automatically be reassigned due to geographical consideration. Subsequent events have demonstrated that closures affecting units of the Reserve result in loss of human assets, immediate construction requirements and increased base loading (not included in the base closure balance sheets on which recommendations were based).

*Question 6. Secretary Kelley, in the Naval Air Reserves reorganization the Navy has moved its reserve units away from major population centers to regular Navy bases. At many of these new sites they have been unable to man the units. Do you believe this nation can afford to reduce its reserve strength at the same time we are reducing our regular forces?*

Answer. No. I do not. I would like to add, also, that the size of the Guard and Reserve Forces, at any time, will be predicated on the total force structure required to meet the demands of national security. In turn, the mixture of active and reserve forces within this total force should be based on such considerations as economy, required response time and specific mission requirements. Requirements not met within the active forces must be compensated by an increase in the responsiveness and combat readiness of the Guard and Reserves.

*Question 7. Why did the DoD not propose programs for FY 1972 to make Reserve service more attractive?*

Answer. As I indicated in my testimony during the Personal Authorization Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee, the reasons for not including specific recommendations for Reserve programs that would involve money in our Project Volunteer package for FY 1972, other than the general pay recommendations, were the budget constraints and the fact that we do not expect to have a supply problem in the Reserves in FY 1972. Additionally some of the measures, which we plan to submit to you, were in need of further development and refinement. We share with you, however, the recognition of the need for

timely action in this area and will be forwarding legislative proposals, tailored to increase the attractiveness of service in the National Guard and Reserve Forces, to the Congress at an early date—within the next two to three months.

*Question 8. Do you feel Reserve strengths can be maintained in a zero draft environment?*

Answer. Yes. However, maintaining required strengths of the Guard and Reserve will be heavily dependent on the provision of new incentives. It should be noted that a combination of many things will impact on our capability to maintain strengths in the decreasing draft call environment. The vigor with which we conduct our recruiting effort and especially the national attitudes toward the Guard and Reserve will play an increasingly important role.

*Question 9. What do you see as the greatest problems for reserve and guard forces in the next two or three years?*

Answer. Generally speaking, I believe they can be catalogued into three broad areas: equipping—in which we must continue the program of modernizing the inventory of the Guard and Reserve with mission capable equipment; training—in which we must insure the equipment, facilities and training areas, necessary to achieving the required levels of readiness are made available to the Guard and Reserve; and the maintenance of strength levels in the face of a reduced or zero draft.

*Question 10. Do you anticipate DoD will introduce, or have introduced, legislation which will provide incentives for Guard and Reserve people to participate in Reserve programs in adequate numbers and of sufficient quality to meet strength levels set by Congress?*

Answer. Legislative proposals addressing incentives for Guard and Reserve participation will be forwarded to the Congress at an early date—within the next two to three months. Secretary Laird realizes the mandatory nature of the law with regard to Selected Reserve strengths and has directed compliance. My office, in turn, will monitor very carefully to insure that the strengths are met by the Military Departments.

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QUESTIONS OF SENATOR PETER H. DOMINICK, AND ANSWERS FURNISHED BY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROGER KELLEY

*Question 1. What would be the effect on FY 72 and FY 73 end strengths if the draft were terminated on July 1, 1971?*

Answer. If the draft were terminated on July 1, 1971, the supply of voluntary manpower would not be adequate to meet the FY 1972 budgeted strength of 2,505,000 of which 2,145,000 are enlistees.

The planned requirement for new enlisted accessions for FY 1972 is 528,000 for all Services to maintain budgeted strengths. The Department of Defense estimates that the maximum potential voluntary enlistment supply in FY 1972 would be about 315,000 in the absence of the draft and new Project Volunteer incentives. This would be about 213,000 fewer men than needed and enlisted strengths would be 213,000 less than the 2,145,000 budgeted. The shortage would primarily occur in the Army where enlisted strengths would be about 651,000 instead of the 808,800 budgeted for FY 1972.

In addition the strengths of the Reserve and National Guard components would fall rapidly and shortages in particular skill areas, such as Army's ground combat arms, would be severe.

If the Project Volunteer incentives are enacted, the FY 1972 shortfall in new accessions would be in the range of 110,000-130,000 depending on the program enacted and whether the actual results in terms of increased enlistments are closer to the optimistic or more conservative estimates.

The President's Budget for FY 1973 has not yet been determined and firm strength objectives are not available. If the FY 1972 strength levels are maintained for the end of FY 1973 the estimates for FY 1973 would be comparable to those for FY 1972. If strength reductions occur fewer new accessions would be required in FY 1973 than in FY 1972 and the "shortfall" between requirements for new personnel and the supply of new personnel in the absence of the draft would be smaller in FY 1973 than in FY 1972.

The effect on end strengths in FY 1973, however, would be cumulative: the FY 1973 shortfall in accessions would be added to the FY 1972 shortfall in accessions to determine the shortfall by June 30, 1973.

*Question 2. Explain the disparity between the Army FY 72 strength in General Support vis-a-vis Marine Corps.*

Answer. The Marine Corps does have a somewhat higher percentage of its military manpower assigned to general support functions than the Army. The difference stems mainly from the manner in which Army and Marine troop units are deployed. The Army has large numbers of troops concentrated in Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States where it is practical to hire civilians to perform a great many general support tasks; the Marine Corps units, on the other hand, are frequently dispersed (for example, aboard ship) under circumstances where civilians either are not available or cannot practically be used.

The Army therefore employs a great many more civilians in the general support role than the Marine Corps, and when total (military and civilian) manpower is considered, the percentage of the total assigned to general support is nearly the same (about 50%) for the two Services.

*Question 3. For the entire DOD the General Support field represents about 44% of the total strength request. This seems like a disproportionate share. What can be done and what are you doing to reduce this support tail? What technological endeavors will assist you in this?*

Answer. General support military manpower has declined from a high of 47.5% in FY 70. Much of this manpower is devoted to the training function (41% of General Support in FY 72). As we move toward a voluntary Service and increase the retention of skilled veterans, this percentage is expected to drop significantly. In addition, we are continuing the review of "civilian type" functions where civilians can replace active duty military personnel in nonmission jobs. Since the late 1960's, a major civilization program resulted in converting 114,000 military spaces to 90,000 civilian spaces. In addition, command functions have been reduced by 13,500 spaces since June 30, 1969, in an overall effort to reduce the supervisory layers and functions in the DOD.

Each year, as an integral part of the program review cycle, we carefully analyze the mission/support ratios of each Service to assure a balanced program. Whenever man/machine tradeoffs can be made, we endeavor to implement them as soon as possible. Arbitrary reductions of strengths without changes in force or support levels tend to create unready or "paper" forces and thus open the risk of trying to implement strategy with unready forces. A balanced manpower program must provide for enough people to man the forces, provide support for the forces and do this with acceptable personnel workloads and policies.

*Question 4. What is the increased manpower required to improve Air Force bomber readiness through increased training hours and the dispersal programs? What specifically is the increased monthly training hours per crew going to be?*

Answer. An increase in total flight training hours over FY 71 is planned in the FY 72 budget due to returning to pre-SEA levels of manning bomber crews. The training hours per assigned crew, however, will remain level at approximately 25 per month. These manpower spaces are sufficient to maintain 28 squadrons of B-52/FB-111 bombers at planned alert levels and one squadron of B-52 bombers for combat crew training and one squadron of B-52 bombers in support of SEA activities. Additional manpower is also included in the FY 71/72 budgets for base support requirements caused by basing the bomber force at satellite bases.

We believe these resources and this degree of alert bomber readiness are adequate for the strategic bomber forces and would not plan to increase the manpower requirements or the flying hours for crew training.

*Question 5. Are all combat units in SEA manned at 100%? If not, will reduced activity allow you to man these units at less than 100%? When?*

Answer. As of December 31, 1970, the authorized military strengths in South Vietnam and Thailand were 382,100 with an actual manning of about 372,300 (or 97.4%). It is our policy to man SEA units at 100% of authorized strengths. In anticipation of withdrawal levies we try not to send replacements for units scheduled for early withdrawal, thus explaining the slightly less than 100% manning at the end of December.

Rather than purposely man units at less than 100%, we would prefer to keep all units deployed in SEA manned at authorized levels to assure full combat capability.

*Question 6. You mention that any substantial reduction in US forces in NATO would seriously change the existing balance of power. What is your definition, in this case, of substantial? Relate your answer to the absolute minimum Army and Air Force units necessary in relation to the current strength.*

Answer. First of all, there is no way to establish an absolute minimum of units. [Deleted.] We feel that approximately the present manpower authorizations are about right but that our units need to be restructured somewhat to make more efficient use of that manpower. In particular, we feel that the US and our NATO Allies must build our conventional capability in Europe so as to deny the Warsaw Pact the ability to mount a successful "blitzkrieg" type of attack. We can probably do this within the present manpower authorizations by increasing unit effectiveness and by replacing items and personnel taken from Europe to support SEA. A substantial reduction would thus be defined as any reduction which either reduced combat units or their capability, reduced our ability to support these units in peacetime or through the early stages of a war, say up to [deleted] or so, or which undermined Allied confidence in our commitment or overall NATO conventional capability to the point where they made reductions in their own forces.

*Question 7. Reference Europe-based forces, you state reductions would not save any significant amount of money unless the withdrawn forces were eliminated. Specifically, how much would be saved for each Army division withdrawn? For each Air Force squadron?*

Answer. It costs about \$35 million a year less to maintain an armored division and its associated support increments in the U.S. than in Europe. About half of this incremental cost results from savings in personnel movement costs. Similarly, it costs about \$1.2 million more to maintain a 24-UE F-4D or F-4E squadron in Europe than in the U.S.

*Question 8. What has been the size of reductions in Other Mission category by Service and what further reductions are planned for FY 72?*

Answer. Between the end of FY 68 and end of FY 70 actual strengths in the Other Mission category were reduced by 14,000 or approximately 6%. During FY 71 we plan to reduce Other Mission category strength by an additional 6,000 and during FY 72 by still another 9,000. Detail by Service is as follows:

OTHER MISSION ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTHS (MANPOWER IN THOUSANDS—END OF FISCAL YEARS)

	Actual—		Estimated—	
	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1970	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
DOD.....	228	214	208	199
Army.....	71	72	74	69
Navy.....	43	42	42	41
Marine Corps.....	2	2	2	2
Air Force.....	112	98	90	87

*Question 9. Regarding support to other nations, you state the program has increased slightly. Please provide a breakout by Service and to what countries these increases have occurred.*

Answer. As you may know, support to other nations consists primarily of MAAG, Missions and Attaches. The slight increase is in Vietnam where it represents the Navy's transition from a Combat Force to an Advisory Force. Detail by Service is shown below:

SUPPORT TO OTHER NATIONS (ACTIVE DUTY END STRENGTHS, IN THOUSANDS, END OF FISCAL YEARS)

Component	Actual,	Estimated	
	Fiscal year 1970	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
DOD.....	23	24	25
Army.....	18	18	18
Navy.....	4	5	6
Marine Corps.....	(1)	(1)	(1)
Air Force.....	1	1	1

† Less than 500 spaces.

*Question 10. The strength of the services have been reduced significantly since FY 70. As these reductions occurred have the number of general officers on board at end of FY 70 and FY 71 been reduced and the number projected on board by end FY 72 by service?*

Answer. The numbers of General and Flag Officers have reduced slightly. The following table shows the latest numbers of General and Flag Officers by service and includes retirees on active duty and officers serving outside DoD (i.e., reimbursables).

	End fiscal year—		
	1970 actual	1971 estimated	1972 estimated
Army.....	513	497	497
Navy.....	312	315	315
Marine Corps.....	79	77	74
Air Force.....	438	431	427
DOD.....	1,342	1,320	1,313

Note: If retirees and reimbursables are excluded the total DOD numbers are: end fiscal year 1970—1,289; end fiscal year 1971—1,286; end fiscal year 1971—1,277.

Over the years, the DoD-wide authorizations for General/Flag Officers have become less and less oriented to individual service strengths and more and more related to actual and expanding requirements, not only within each service, but especially within the joint duties area, such as the unified and specified commands, the JCS and OSD and related activities. Each service has continually stated the need for General/Flag Officer authorizations greater than the numbers currently authorized in law and limited by the Senate Armed Services Committee's administrative ceiling.

In 1968, DoD completed a thorough and extensive position-by-position review of individual General/Flag Officer requirements. Even without the inclusion of those requirements that were directly attributable to Southeast Asia, the overall requirements, as carefully validated, proved to be substantially greater than those currently authorized in law or by administrative limitation. The study also showed that only about 25% of all existing General/Flag Officer requirements were strength-related.

During the period of declining total strength, there are a number of General/Flag Officer positions directly attributable to Southeast Asia that will be eliminated as our involvement declines. However, the overall requirement for General/Flag Officers does not significantly decline since many of the Southeast Asia positions were filled, within permissible legal and administrative authorizations, at the expense of temporarily leaving other long-standing positions of near-equal importance unfilled.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

If the gentleman here representing the Army is ready, we will return to this question that I asked. Who will answer this question now about this division.

Mr. KELLEY. That will be General McChrystal.

The CHAIRMAN. General McChrystal, will you come around and have a seat here, please.

To refresh your recollection now, General, you know the testimony already shows that in a general way the Army, the division force equivalent of 48,000 to 50,000 men in the Army, is broken down for planning purposes into three approximately equal parts; 16,000 support troops, and coming down to those the question relates to a sustaining support increment which supports units which will be needed after [deleted] you heard the discussion we had on that.

General McCHRISTAL. Yes, sir, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. My question then is, when we go to fill in these armored divisions, I mean units and other units, we depleted some for

the war in Vietnam, as we do fill in those vacancies, why couldn't we take out a corresponding number in this lower echelon of responsibility, the group that won't be needed until [deleted] after hostilities start.

General McCHRYSTAL. Yes; Mr. Chairman, I understand your question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General McCHRYSTAL. Sir, if I may, I would like to start by a very short discussion of the concept of the division, ISI/SSI setup.

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever is necessary to make your answer meaningful, but we want you to just give us an answer based in nonmilitary terms that we can readily grasp.

General McCHRYSTAL. It is not possible to make a sharp distinction between an ISI (Initial Support Increment) and, an SSI (Sustaining Support Increment). These terms are used for broad planning purposes and refer to the 16,000-man block associated with the division, the ISI and the SSI. Within an ISI and an SSI you will find identical units and once they are deployed there is no way to identify which belongs to either the ISI or the SSI.

For example, sir, we have an ISI associated with the 82d Airborne Division, however I could not today give you the exact troop list for that ISI unless you told me what mission the 82d Airborne Division was going to perform. The ISI is a variable force that is brought together from available units and its composition depends on the mission.

So there is no sharp break, and situation in Europe is no different. You could go to Europe and ask General Goodpaster which of his units are SSI units and he couldn't tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will yield there just a minute, it is not accurate then to say that there is such a thing as an identifiable SSI, as you call it, supporting, sustaining support increment.

General McCHRYSTAL. Not by specific units, sir. When we perform a mission, there will be, generally speaking, for each division a 16,000-man ISI required to support it, and then by the time you reach D-plus [deleted] you will require more support in the form of the SSI units. But the point I am trying to get across, sir, is you will find construction battalions in the ISI and you will also find construction battalions in the SSI. Since at that point in time there is a requirement for more of them. Dental units could be in both. I don't believe I could identify a single specific unit that would fall just in an SSI and not in both.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General McCHRYSTAL. Both could have combat units in them, too, Mr. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Suppose you have these divisions then at these levels, and you were told that you had to reduce the numbers, let's see, I was using that illustration, from [deleted] to 302,000, I believe it was. That is the overall total number, suppose you were told then you had to reduce each division 5,000 men, how would you go about doing it.

General McCHRYSTAL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would you take them out?

General McCHRISTAL. Sir, if we were told to reduce Europe by a set number, we would send a message to CINCUSAREUR and tell him the degree of reduction and direct him to identify the spaces he would give up. In my best judgment he would look across his command and reduce both, combat and service units. He would be forced to make the hard choice of giving up units that, in his judgment, would leave him with the best balanced force. This is not the kind of a judgment we could make here, sir. We would have to go to CINCUSAREUR and ask him to make it.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but you have an idea about this, General. We don't know, I don't, at least, wouldn't know where to start, but there is such a thing as being told to reduce your manpower level, and if you were a commander there, what would you do? In your opinion, what should be done?

General McCHRISTAL. Sir, I would simply have to give you my own opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want.

General McCHRISTAL. And I have not been in Europe since 1949.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I don't want to take advantage of you on short notice but, you know, there is a method that you as commanding officer would use, you see.

General McCHRISTAL. Yes, sir. What I would do is, I would take a look at the mission I had to perform, the split I had between combat units and support units, how my support stacked up as I judged it, and I believe I would probably make a comparable reduction in both combat and combat support and combat service support units.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't want to leave you with the idea—excuse me just a minute—I didn't want to have you leave us with the idea that it couldn't be done or you thought it couldn't be done.

General McCHRISTAL. May I make one other point that I think is very relevant?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

General McCHRISTAL. With regard to the function that the ISIs and SSIs perform in Europe today, the statement was made that we have units deployed in Europe that have no function until D-plus [deleted]. Today these units perform the general support mission for the four and a third divisions that are deployed in Europe in the same way that the general support base here in CONUS supports our CONUS base divisions. We have no CONUS type general support in Europe. That is all performed by division forces. So your maintenance battalion that you might classify as an SSI unit is today working in the general support area to maintain the Third and Fourth armored divisions and the two mechanized infantry divisions there. That is what they do today, sir.

Senator SMITH. May I ask a question there, General, what is the ratio between the combat and the support.

General McCHRISTAL. Senator, in Europe today we have [deleted] in divisions. We have [deleted] in combat support, combat service support, or theater army service support or what we could classify as ISI/SSI. There are [deleted] more support than division troops but I think you can say that if you need a division, an ISI and an SSI for a complete division force completely supportable in combat that we are about [deleted] short to have an even split today.

Senator SMITH. What would your combat man have to have to support him in numbers. 1 to 6 to 1 to 10?

General McCHRISTAL. Well, in the forward area, in this break we would say about two in ISI/SSI units for one in the division unit.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KELLEY. With reference to the Senator's question, the ratio of support to mission forces in DOD over a period of years has been fairly constant. Now this will vary between services by all services taken into consideration it has been a fairly constant relationship.

I was going to suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you might want Mr. Odeen to comment or to supplement the General's answer to your question if a commander was ordered to reduce his forces how would he go about it. May Mr. Odeen comment further on that question.

The Chairman. Let's see if the General, has finished his statement.

General McCHRISTAL. Yes, sir; if I have satisfied your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to put something in the record, you had referred to some background material.

General McCHRISTAL. Yes, sir; I would like to put in the record the specific break between units and the numbers associated with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good.

You prepare that and send it in and put it at this point in the record.

(The information follows:)

The present force structure in Europe includes  $4\frac{1}{3}$  divisions,  $4\frac{1}{3}$  ISI, and  $2\frac{1}{3}$  SSI. Two additional SSI must be deployed to round-out these forces in an emergency which requires combat operations for a period extending beyond [deleted] days. The  $2\frac{1}{3}$  SSI now in Europe are required to perform peacetime functions normally provided by the general support forces for units stationed in the continental United States. These functions include base operations, medical services, the operation of major supply depots, transportation, repair, maintenance, and utilities, and the operation of commissaries and other services provided for the dependent population. The ISI units must be prepared to move into field operations with the combat units in an emergency. The SSI units during the initial stages of combat would have to prepare for a transition to their sustaining support mission, ending their peacetime functions and moving also into field operations. Because of the requirement for peacetime support, CINCUSAREUR has contended that any reduction in Europe must begin with the withdrawal of combat forces, a contention supported at the time of the REFORGER reduction when two-thirds of a division and an armored cavalry regiment made up approximately one-half of the forces withdrawn. During FY 1971, to meet a forced reduction of 3000, USAREUR nominated a preponderance of combat support units, artillery and engineer units, rather than service support units because of the current support requirements.

The ratio of combat to support forces in Europe requires first a definition of these classifications. Every infantry unit includes personnel whose primary mission is something other than combat with the enemy, and every supply company contains truck drivers and helicopter pilots who may travel in the combat zone where they are subject to hostile fire. With these qualifications in mind, the Army classified as combat forces all those units whose primary mission is to take some kind of direct action against the enemy force. These forces include the combat divisions, all other infantry, artillery, and armor units, certain aviation units, and the combat engineer and signal units. All others (maintenance, supply, transportation, medical, military police, civil affairs) are classified as support forces.

The worldwide posture of the deployable forces of the Army, including the Reserve Components, provides for a balance of 57% combat and 43% support forces. The ISI and SSI include combat units as well as support units. In Europe, where forces must be ready to initiate combat operations before reinforcements arrive, we maintain a balanced picture with 58% combat, 42% support. There are in addition special mission forces in Europe which are there for purposes other than supporting the combat divisions. These include the long range strategic missile units (Pershing and Sergeant), the Berlin Brigade, theater air defense units, and Army intelligence and communication units which are part of the total defense system. If these units are included, the ratio changes to 60% combat, 40% support.

Mr. ODEEN. Sir, the question you asked we posed to our commanders in Europe within the very recent past. We asked exactly the same kind of question: What kind of forces would you cut? We asked the Army that specific question as a result of an exercise which was called Redcoste. Redcoste was an effort to make cuts of support forces in Europe and we did make substantial cuts, over [deleted]. [Deleted] military and civilian billets overall. These cuts were almost entirely from headquarters and support units, and that reduction has just been completed. The answers we got from our European commanders at the time was that if they had to make any further cuts of any consequence, thousands of men, they would want to cut back on combat units. They felt that in the Redcoste and other efforts we had actually gone as deep as they felt we safely could go and they would prefer to have combat brigades and other combat outfits come out. That is the military judgment on the question we had posed to them that was similar to the one you asked.

The CHAIRMAN. Making no reduction, you took them out of headquarters units and then down lower and then supply units.

Mr. ODEEN. Yes, sir, this entire effort was focused on support effort. We did not make any reductions in combat units and we looked at support and headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. And that constituted how many men?

Mr. ODEEN. I would have to furnish that for the record, sir, I am sorry, I don't remember offhand.

(The information follows:)

*Question:* How many men did you reduce as the result of the REDCOSTE Program?

*Answer:* The Reduction of Costs in Europe (REDCOSTE) program was begun in FY 1970 and was aimed at reducing our balance of payments costs by achieving greater efficiencies in headquarters and support activities. By the end of FY 1971, we will have reduced [deleted] military manpower spaces in Europe under the REDCOSTE program.

The CHAIRMAN. During what period of time were those reductions made, please.

Mr. ODEEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the reductions you are talking about were not the men that we pulled out of these spots and put in Vietnam.

Mr. ODEEN. No, sir; these are reductions in the authorized strength and in specific types of units.

The CHAIRMAN. Now some questions about the possibilities of reductions in manpower requirements.

Checking back, we find here that your estimates have not run so close after all to what the budget provided. For example, in 1970 the fiscal year 1970 end strength was nearly 390,000 less than the estimate in the fiscal year 1970 budget. In fiscal 1971 it is estimated there will be about 210,000 fewer men in the forces at the end of 1971 than were estimated when the 1971 budget was presented to the Congress.

The Defense Department has already indicated, in answer to questions by the staff, that one of the major reasons for these overestimates was that Vietnam withdrawals were accelerated, is that correct, in your opinion, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just for your thinking.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I expected that to be your answer and expected that to be their answer.

Here is what I am coming to, the President announced on April 7 there would be a new withdrawal rate from Vietnam of about 14,300 troops per month for the rest of this year, that is until December 1. What was the withdrawal rate which was the basis for the manpower estimate of this 1972 budget. Do you see what I am striking at there? If your estimate is based upon one withdrawal rate and the President has decided upon another, why that could make some difference.

Mr. KELLEY. The withdrawal rate, starting in [deleted] and up until November will in relative terms be [deleted] more per month than it was under the previous rate.

The CHAIRMAN. For how many months now is that.

Mr. KELLEY. [Deleted] through November.

The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted] months. That is [deleted] months.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Now, because of that faster withdrawal rate that should be reflected in lower draft calls. The June calls will be reflected in the strength figures in November because there is about a 5-month leadtime for the training and availability of recruits. So we anticipate, Mr. Chairman, that the draft calls for the rest of calendar year 1970 will be [deleted].

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you have, can you give us quickly, the number for the other services. You say this was Army, [deleted] additional men, [deleted] per month, you said.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the others.

Mr. KELLEY. I will have to supply that for the record, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would.

Mr. KELLEY. I addressed myself to the Army problem because of the draft call.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; that is all right.

(The information follows:)

The increase of 1800 in the overall withdrawal rate is in comparison with the rate during the period April 1970 to April 1971. It will be some time before we will have the detailed plans which will enable us to specify reductions in the withdrawal rate by Service. This will require the development, in conjunction with the field commanders, of a complete time-phased plan by service and by unit for the period May 1 to December 1, 1971.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we were talking about your planning rate when you made this budget up, we now have a request for manpower at a certain level. You planned all that, as you said this morning, you figured it all out. What was your withdrawal rate that you used then in reaching the figure that is in the budget request.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, of course, the earlier withdrawal anticipated that we would reduce from the 280,000 level in fiscal year 1972. The President has accelerated that redeployment schedule by announcing that 184,000 will be attained by December 1. He also stated specifically that judgments beyond December 1 would be dependent upon developments between now and then.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have not told us what your planned rate withdrawal was per month, as I understand you.

Mr. KELLEY. I would have to provide that for the record, Mr. Chairman. I remember it in relative terms because that was the context in

which I addressed it yesterday on draft calls but I do not recall from memory the rate.

The CHAIRMAN. You give us that for the record as soon as you can, because we are going to mark up this bill, we are talking now of the selective service bill, and we are going to put these figures in it.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And let it move along with the rest of the manpower so we need that right away.

The CHAIRMAN. You have already told us about what this money was going to be used for, the extra billion dollars in NATO, and I agree with you, as you related, that manpower itself was not the problem over there, the committal of manpower already made now. Did you mean by that these men were trained and they have a sufficiency that are trained and are ready to go, and you don't mean any more Europeans, I mean.

Mr. KELLEY. I mean that that in relative terms the investment of military people by our NATO allies stands up well to any tests. The total manpower capability of Soviet Russia and the Warsaw Pact nations. So in relative terms the number of people invested by the NATO allies seems to be the least of the problem. The greater part of the problem would be in insuring that they are compatible and that they are supported by the necessary training, equipment, and logistics support.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, another area here that has been very properly touched on by the Senator from Maine, Senator Smith, the men that you have in the commissaries and the post exchanges and so forth, I never have made an issue on it but I just don't believe it is in keeping with the spirit at all of the Selective Service Act to draft a man into a service and then put him in working in a post exchange or commissary or something of that kind unless it is a remote area or on a ship or something of that kind where the rule of necessity has to apply. But the calculations we got from the Department here this week, and it is subject to revision, as I understand, is something like 5,000 enlisted men serving full time in your post exchanges and in round numbers again 3,000 that are serving in commissaries.

Now, except in the remote areas, isn't that an area where you could employ civilians, and why hasn't this been done? As I say, these figures are subject to revision.

Mr. KELLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that Gen. Jonas Platt, who is in my office and Director of Manpower Utilization, comment or respond to your question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Just stand up.

Mr. PLATT. Mr. Chairman, Defense Department policy is that military personnel will only be used in commissaries or post exchanges or similar activities if they are in a supervisory or managerial capacity or if the activity is in a location where civilians cannot be readily hired or if the military personnel are specialists where there is a rotational need for them.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be an illustration of that last one?

Mr. PLATT. Well, a man who was a specialist in commissary stores in the handling of food supplies in Vietnam, very well could be employed when he is not overseas in a similar capacity in a commissary. Over the years this whole area has been scrutinized a number of times

and we believe that the actual military employment figures that we submitted for the record are really minimal.

The CHAIRMAN. How many did you submit, do you have it in mind?

Mr. PLATT. I don't have it here.

The CHAIRMAN. These figures, as I understood, are subject to revision but if you don't have these with you we will just use them to talk about.

Mr. PLATT. I believe the ones furnished were applied to open messes, commissaries and exchanges, and it was broken down by full time and part time and part time nonappropriated funds, and the total for the entire Defense Department for fiscal year 1970 was for open messes 4,404 full time, for commissaries 2,786, and for exchanges 5,066.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have a different—

Mr. PLATT. Then the part-time figures—

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead and give those.

Mr. PLATT. For personnel paid by appropriated funds 389 for open messes; for commissaries 1,248; and for exchanges 338. Then, of course, there are those who are paid by nonappropriated funds, and in that case it is 20,098 for open messes, and 6,852 for exchanges. And I might add that many of those part-time employees obviously bolster their military income by off-duty employment in this manner.

The CHAIRMAN. Are all of them on this work beyond their call of duty.

Mr. PLATT. Most—the full-time figures the men are actually assigned.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but these part time is what I am talking about.

Mr. PLATT. The part time is outside of their regular military duties, that is, off-duty employment.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to get at. That is beyond their call of duty.

Mr. PLATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are paid from nonappropriated funds. I was not directing my remarks to them. I said to draft a man and then put him on duty of selling groceries or something like that.

Mr. PLATT. A number of these men are careerists who are serving in supervisory capacities which is in accordance with our policy.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you give us any number now on that basis?

My information from year to year, as I say I never have made an issue of this, has been quite to the contrary as I talked to some of the men who worked in these commissaries and post exchanges. Some of them like it very much, but they were not put there because it was anything they had been trained to do, and the reason given, one youngster told me he was working there because he was in a managerial capacity, working these men in there to hold down the price of groceries, the retail cost of groceries. As I say, I don't think any man ought to be drafted and then put to work in a store just to hold down the price of groceries.

I don't imagine you do either.

Mr. PLATT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have a problem, and I know you have this isolated area problem that you could not readily obtain people to do the work. Ships at sea, for instance, are a perfect illustration of

that but I think, Mr. Secretary, there ought to be a special effort made to reduce this practice.

Thank you very much, General.

Mr. PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KELLEY. May I comment on that, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KELLEY. We have recently completed a study of personnel practices within the nonappropriated fund activities. One of the reasons that we got into this study is because we have recognized as we looked at this area in the past couple of years that there clearly was a need for some kind of clear policy and mechanism for establishing the wages of people who work in nonappropriated fund activities, and when you get into questions of wage determination you also get into the very point that you are making, that military people in some instances have been employed so as to save money and thus make it possible to sell items in commissaries and PX's at lower prices. Unquestionably there are malpractices that need attention, and many of these areas were unattended for a number of years, and the total volume and complexity of the nonappropriated funds program suggests it is going to take us some time to make these corrections, but we are addressing these problems.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you need time, too. I agree with that, but I don't have any figures to compare, and I have not seen any improvement since I have been on the committee.

Senator Smith, do you have any questions you wanted to ask?

Senator SMITH. Just one question. Mr. Secretary, what happens if there is a drastic cut in civil service personnel at bases, what does the commanding officer do to meet the need, can he transfer the military into those positions? This is what I had in mind mostly.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, in many cases military commanders have done just that. If their civilian personnel cuts bring their civilian force to a level which is below their work requirements, then inevitably they fill those work needs by assigning military personnel to them.

Senator SMITH. And that is taken into consideration with these new figures that you are giving.

Mr. KELLEY. The figures we have given you take into consideration that some of these drastic civilian cut exercises are not in the best balance interest of either dollars or people. The budget exercise 703 which was imposed upon the organization over a year ago caused draw-downs in personnel, civilian personnel, that created great turbulence and great insecurity for the people, and I don't blame military commanders for having to turn to military personnel to get those jobs done which were vacated by civilians, and vacated according to arbitrary rules that just didn't square with the facts of work need.

So one of the things that we have tried to do in the last couple of years is to graduate scale down so as to be considerate of the people and the work needs that exist within the military unit.

Senator SMITH. I think perhaps at times, Mr. Secretary, more emphasis could be placed on that before the committees because there isn't too much understanding of how hard it is for the commanding officers of these places to carry out their mission.

Thank you, that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KELLEY. We would be happy to do so. A rather drastic horror story could be drawn of some of the effects on people of fast draw-downs in force.

Senator SMITH. It is extremely harmful in some places.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Smith.

I have a letter here from the Office of the Secretary of Defense dated April 1, 1971, on the question of DOD military personnel by open messes and commissaries and exchanges, fiscal 1970. Without objection we will put that in the record at this point.

(Letter follows:)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,  
Washington, D.C., April 1, 1971.

HON. JOHN C. STENNIS,  
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is information requested by Mr. Braswell for the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Sincerely,

J. F. LAWRENCE,  
Brigadier General, USMC,  
Deputy Assistant to the Secretary  
(Legislative Affairs).

[Enclosures]

DOD MILITARY PERSONNEL EMPLOYED BY OPEN MESSES, COMMISSARIES AND EXCHANGES (FISCAL YEAR 1970)

	Open messes	Commissaries	Exchanges <sup>1</sup>
<b>Army:</b>			
Full time (appropriated fund).....	2,407	254	777
Part time (appropriated fund).....	363		
Part time (nonappropriated fund).....	9,948		4,563
<b>Air Force:</b>			
Full time (appropriated fund).....	915	1,177	
Part time (appropriated fund).....	( <sup>2</sup> )		
Part time (nonappropriated fund).....			
<b>Navy:</b>			
Full time (appropriated fund).....	314	1,320	3,861
Part time (appropriated fund).....	26	1,248	338
Part time (nonappropriated fund).....	4,787		1,533
<b>Marine Corps:</b>			
Full time (appropriated fund).....	768	35	428
Part time (appropriated fund).....			
Part time (nonappropriated fund).....	5,363		756
<b>Total DOD:</b>			
Full time (appropriated fund).....	4,404	2,786	5,066
Part time (appropriated fund).....	389	1,248	338
Part time (nonappropriated fund).....	20,098		6,852

<sup>1</sup> Air Force exchange personnel are included in Army total as part of Army-Air Force exchange system. Navy exchange personnel include those operating ships' stores.

<sup>2</sup> Not available at headquarters without field research.

The CHAIRMAN. Now a few more questions on the manpower proposition. I have already given the response why I am interested in it. I am not wanting to weaken anything but I think we have got to reduce the manpower where we can in the regular services and put the same amount of money on fewer men and transfer some of these duties over to the Reserves. Of course, we could not transfer the commissary duties but generally.

I have a figure here that you have 133,000 men in the command category at the division and higher levels, the division and higher. You could not answer this question, but the 133,000 men are a lot of

men, as I see it, and it is the equivalent of about seven divisions so far as the combat level of those divisions, approximately that.

I wish you would supply a comment for the record, after looking into it, I don't know whether those figures have come to your attention lately or not, but—I just pointed out, Senator, in the question I am informed there are 133,000 men in the command category at the division level and higher and I asked the Secretary to comment on that when he could.

As I understand it now, that does not mean they are in command but sergeants, say, who are attached to something at those levels would be a part of command.

(The following information was subsequently furnished:)

*Question:* Explain requirement for 133,000 men in Command.

*Answer:* The Command Mission category not only includes staffing of headquarters at or above division level, it also includes staffing for special headquarters (e.g., research and development, training) and operating facilities which support headquarters (e.g., finance, security, and data processing activities).

The table below divides the Command category into subgroups which demonstrate the broad variety of activities which are included under the title of Command.

*Command military strength, fiscal year 1972*

[Manpower in thousands]

Department headquarters (e.g., Office of the Secretary, Chief of Staff)---	8
Field headquarters and major commands (e.g., CONARC and numbered armies, CINCLANTFLT, SAC Headquarters)-----	30
Lower headquarters and headquarters support (e.g., systems commands, unified commands, data processing, Reserve commands, fleet commands down to shop division, numbered Air Forces, audiovisual activities)----	95
Total -----	133

By the way, I have a very vulnerable member of my staff who is a retired sergeant, he is excellent, just performs a mighty good function there and I am proud of him.

Now, back to this support matter. In the summary of military manpower requirements you indicate that while the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have had very considerable reductions in general support forces since fiscal 1970, the Air Force general support is actually to be increased from 407,000 to 409,000.

(Note: The 413,000 general support figure on page 40 of "Defense Military Manpower Requirements for fiscal year 1972" is a typographical error; the correct figure, 409,000, may be found on page 45 of Appendix I.)

Why is it that the other services during the time of reduction in military forces have been able to reduce their general support establishments by around 350,000, but the Air Force has found it necessary to actually increase its general support?

Do you know what this is based on?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir; I would like to comment generally on that and then I would like to ask General Berg of the Air Force to supplement my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. KELLEY. First, you can't make an exact comparison between the ratio of general support to mission forces between services. Let me use the Air Force and the Navy as examples of my point, or to illustrate my point. A Navy carrier contains aircraft squadrons. All of the per-

sonnel needed to support and fly those aircraft squadrons are counted as mission forces because the whole aircraft carrier is a unit and all personnel assigned to the carrier are counted as mission forces.

Now, by contrast an aircraft squadron in the Air Force would be supported by many personnel who are attached to air bases, and those air base personnel would be counted as support personnel not mission personnel, and this would account in large part for the fact that the percent of support personnel in the Air Force is higher than the percent of support personnel in the Navy and the other services. Beyond that I would suggest that General Berg respond to your question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General, you address yourself to why the increase, while the others were reducing. You usually have a good answer in the Air Force.

General BERG. Mr. Chairman, I am General Berg, the Director of Manpower of the Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. I remember, you have been over here with us.

General BERG. Yes, sir. The specific action which causes our support manpower to go up is the fact that before 1971 the Air Force did not carry any people in the category known as transients. This is a category of people who are supposed to equate to the number of manpower that is lost due to permanent changes of station within the service. Such an account, such an authorization of people, has existed for the other three services, and we now have in fiscal year 1972, 12,000 authorizations in the transient account which we did not have in 1970 and before and those are all carried in the support category and that is what accounts for the increase. Our actual number of people working in support went down but the inclusion of this new category tends to show the line to go up.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very interesting. Will you give us the actual figures of how much they actually went down, those in support?

General BERG. I would be glad to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. And then also under that you show why it went up.

General BERG. I will do that.

(The information follows:)

The tabulation provided below reflects that part of Air Force military end strength defined as "general support", together with those adjustments which should be considered in addressing the apparent increase in this category. The transient account has already been discussed. In addition we have programmed the indicated increase in medical personnel in an effort to upgrade our overall medical capabilities and have increased the size of Air Force Recruiting Service in support of all-volunteer force objectives. The final adjustment allows for a reclassification of the Eastern Missile Test Range in Florida from "other mission", where it is carried in FY 70 and FY 71, to "general support." After these adjustments have been taken into account, there remains a projected decrease in general support authorizations between end FY 70 and end FY 72 amounting to 15,186 military personnel.

AIR FORCE MILITARY MANPOWER DEFINED AS GENERAL SUPPORT

	Fiscal year 1970 actual	Fiscal year 1971 estimated	Fiscal year 1972 estimated
General support, fiscal year 1972 budget.....	407, 223	408, 252	408, 560
Less significant increases:			
Transient account.....		-7, 896	-11, 976
Increased medical capability.....		-2, 316	-2, 742
Recruiting increase.....		-110	-731
Eastern Test Range reclassification.....			-1, 074
Adjusted general support.....	407, 223	397, 930	392, 037

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Here is a matter that is no earth-shaking event but it shakes us here when we try to weigh testimony. The General Accounting Office has just reported to our committee something on the manpower situation in Korea, and I understand that a large part of their findings were based on surveys by the U.S. Army in the Pacific.

Last October the Assistant Secretary of the Army reported that some steps had been taken to improve the situation but there are several important matters on which further action may be necessary. One finding was that when the Army's own surveys recommended reductions, that is the Army recommended reductions in authorized strength, the 8th Army commanders tended to recommend increases in other slots almost exact offsetting the proposed reduction.

The gap between the decreases recommended by the survey and the increases recommended by the commanders were about 23 percent of the 8th Army support strength. In other words, they found when the Army survey team recommended certain reductions, the commanders then recommended certain increases in other categories that just about balanced off. Would you comment on that?

Mr. KELLEY. I can't comment on it now, Mr. Chairman, because I am not informed on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it leaves a kind of an uncertain taste in our mouth, it does mine, and I wish you would prepare yourself and comment on it.

Mr. KELLEY. I wonder if any of our support witnesses are informed on that.

General McCHRISTAL. Mr. Senator, I am prepared to discuss the levels in Korea in any way and break them down for you, sir. On that particular aspect I was unable to get the specific GAO report.

I understand that the GAO is currently conducting a survey of the logistical aspects of our redeployments.

The CHAIRMAN. You can comment on that for the record, I hope you can, before we close the record.

General McCHRISTAL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And we will help you get the actual report.

(The information follows:)

The command manpower authorization is an aggregate of the spaces required to man all units at the readiness level prescribed for the command. Within the total authorization the commander may find it necessary to give priority to some units. The shortfall in manpower authorizations for the latter units thus is, for the commander, a requirement not met. In some cases, the commander may allocate authorized spaces to bring a Table of Distribution and Allowance unit to the "required" strength which has been approved by higher command and which is recorded in the Army Authorization Document System for each unit in the Army. In this case, the commander must reduce the authorization for some other unit, within his total authorized and required spaces, the "excess" spaces are reallocated against other already approved requirements. In the current environment of budgetary and manpower limitations, USARPAC manpower resources, as in most commands, are not equal to the total spaces required. It would not be practical to withdraw manpower spaces unless they were excess to the unsatisfied requirements of the command without a commensurate adjustment in total functions and missions.

The principal benefit of surveys, therefore, is the refinement of requirements within the command and subsequent comparison with resources to insure distribution of manpower spaces consistent with priorities of missions and functions. In order to improve manpower space management HQ USARPAC recently

completed a comprehensive study of methods to accomplish this. As a result of this study, a timely, comprehensive review is conducted at HQ USARPAC level of proposed reallocations by subordinate commanders, such as CG USAEIGHT, of manpower spaces found excess by surveys. In this review, other command-wide demands which have not been met because of inadequate manpower space authorizations will be considered in competition with the subordinate commander's proposed reallocation. CINCUSARPAC will then be able to make a decision on whether to approve the internal redistribution or to withdraw all or part of the spaces for more critical requirements. Redistribution of spaces generated as a result of surveys improves the command capabilities and provides the commander maximum flexibility in utilization of resources.

The CHAIRMAN. Another finding was that the 8th Army did not consider in determining its manpower ceilings the 11,000 Korean troops serving in American units. This amounted to about 20 percent of the 8th Army troops at the time and the percentage may be even higher now that some American units are being withdrawn from Korea.

Will you please comment on that, too, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The finding is considered incorrect. Korean troop augmentation (KATUSA) was considered in determining the manpower ceiling of Eighth Army. The authorized strength of Eighth Army, at the end of FY 70 was [deleted] approximately [deleted] of full TOE requirements [deleted]. This reduced manpower authorization requires that the internal organization of units within Eighth Army be at levels less than full TOE. Based upon the commanders priorities, units are organized at different levels consistent with mission requirements. The introduction of KATUSA personnel [deleted] in FY 70) into Eighth Army units raises the total authorized manpower levels to [deleted] or approximately [deleted] of full TOE.

Since the utilization of KATUSA personnel is only an in-country program, plans for the deployment of U.S. units elsewhere must consider the loss of these personnel. Failure to do so would create an unrealistic personnel strength projection for contingency planning.

KATUSA personnel represented approximately [deleted] of Eighth Army manpower at end FY 70 [deleted] KATUSA [deleted] U.S.). KATUSA strengths will be reduced to [deleted] by end FY 71 and remain stable through end FY 72. Current Eighth Army force reductions in Korea will result in an end FY 71 and FY 72 authorized manpower ceiling of [deleted]. Based on these reductions, KATUSA personnel will comprise [deleted] of the Eighth Army manpower assets by the end of FY 71. The KATUSA strength combined with the US authorized manpower ceiling [deleted] equals total manpower assets of [deleted] of full TOE authorizations.

The CHAIRMAN. The report has just come in. It came in yesterday, so we will supply you with that report. As I say it is no earth-shaking event but if the Army itself recommends reductions after a survey and the reductions are carried out and then if a commander in the field recommends and gets a like number in some other category why it is just stop and go and go and stop. Are there any other questions?

I am glad you could get back, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, we have a rule now if you have time on the floor you have to be there and I had 15 minutes to 11 o'clock so I had to leave. What was your answer to the problem incident to the refusal of the Germans to let the wife of an American work on a United States base?

Mr. KELLEY. My response was that I learned of this problem in the course of preparing myself for these hearings, and I am in the process of challenging that policy.

Senator SYMINGTON. How long ago did you learn about it?

Mr. KELLEY. I learned of it 2 days ago.

Senator SYMINGTON. I imagine because I brought it up in several places. Did it have something to do with that?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; I learned of it in connection with going through the various aspects of manpower to prepare myself for these discussions and in the course of that preparation I found that there is a policy which could be interpreted as encouraging the employment of first country nationals in preference to American military dependents.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who established that?

Mr. KELLEY. I have not learned the genesis of that policy. On its face it seemed unreasonable to me, and I am in the course of running it down. I have learned on the basis of investigation in the last 24 hours that there is nothing in the law which carries this constraint. It apparently, therefore, is a Defense Department or military practice that was established at sometime in the past. I don't understand the practice, and on the basis of my limited information I don't agree with it, and I further responded to your question by saying I appreciated the matter coming up here and would report back to this committee after I have completed my investigations on it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

You cut manpower from three and a half million to two and a half million. What happened to the civilians involved or are they included in that figure.

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; the civilians were not included in that figure. The civilian cut over the same period of time was from 1.3 to 1.1 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you ought to include that in the record. Going back to the previous subject of hiring Germans, is this policy required by our Status of Forces Agreement?

Mr. KELLEY. I was told it was not required by our Status of Forces Agreement, Senator Symington, but I have not had an opportunity to confirm the accuracy of that first report. As I said, I just learned of this 2 days ago.

Senator SYMINGTON. One morning I was listening to television and heard an interview with a lieutenant colonel and a sergeant at a United States military base in Europe. The sergeant was pretty strong in his criticism of living conditions on the base and the colonel seemed to support the criticism. When I was in Europe earlier this month in connection with the Joint Atomic Energy Committee I talked to this same colonel and sergeant with respect to their complaints. During the course of the discussion, I asked the sergeant if he used drugs; and he said I didn't have a right to ask him that.

Frankly, I thought his pupils were dilated, he was a very fine looking boy, and I said I thought I did. I paid his salary and he paid mine. He said, "Yes, I use drugs," and either I or Senator Pastore asked "all the time?" and he said, "all the time." And we asked "how many people in your outfit use it?" and he said "I would say between 80 and 90 percent of them." We then asked, "Do you use LSD?" And he said yes, he used LSD. We said "How many trips roughly have you taken on LSD?" and he replied "I would say roughly about 200." We then asked if he used heroin and he said no. We asked why not and he said because he understood that was bad for you. Senator Pastore asked

him if he had taken any drugs that day, and he said no, that he hadn't done it that day. When asked why not, he said because he wanted to be sharp in answering any questions that we might ask him.

When we asked the colonel if he agreed with what the sergeant said, and he said he did not know much about drugs but that in general he did agree with the complaints. Later at an Air Force base a man came up to me and left a long complaint signed by a good many members of the military, the meat of which was that the President should be impeached. My impression is that the morale of the armed services in Europe is in very bad shape.

I would like to ask you if you have any comments in a general way about the obvious deterioration in Army morale, what it could do to a country if it continues. I would also appreciate your comments with respect to the drug problem.

Mr. KELLEY. Let me comment first in the drug area, Senator, and then in the broader area of the deterioration of morale in the Armed Forces generally.

As to the drug area first, we have recognized a geometric increase in the drug problem over the past couple of years within the body of my job experience. Vice Admiral Mack, who is my principal deputy and soon to leave me to take on the responsibility of the 7th Fleet, has devoted an increasing portion of his total time to the drug control area, and we are about now to take on, as a special assistant to me, a very talented Air Force colonel who is the most knowledgeable person we could find in the drug area to coordinate our drug efforts on a total DOD-wide basis.

We searched out candidates for this job over many months. I contacted John Ingersoll at BNDD and asked for Mr. Ingersoll's help in giving us, in a director, a type person who had the greatest body of experience and judgment in this area, and it is shocking to find how few people really understand the drug problem and have what could be called expertise in the sense required to give policy direction to a program. But we do have such a person in a Colonel Hobson and he is about to take on this responsibility.

The two main areas in which we have concentrated our efforts in the last 2 years have been education and corrective programs. We have revised and reissued DOD policy on drug control to allow for the first time an encouragement of amnesty programs, providing an opportunity for people who find themselves hooked or potentially hooked on drugs to turn themselves in to the military commander and to medical authorities and get professional help which they need.

With respect to the rest of the population which is not hooked, we think that we have a tremendous responsibility for massive doses of education in the dangers of drug usage.

Now the candor with which this young man admitted to you and other members of your party the frequency of his usage of drugs is only symptomatic of the candor that you find in discussing the same problem with high school and college audiences today.

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me though, you see Senator Hughes told me, and he has made a report on it, he told me at a base in this

country, the commanding general told him there were 800 men on mainline heroin and, therefore, a school child who has relatively little to do with the security of the United States is one thing and it is not my problem, and I say with the greatest respect it is not particularly yours, but the morale of the Armed Forces is your problem, and to a lesser extent is our problem to look at, and I am convinced after this trip that the morale of the Armed Forces is badly deteriorating if not disintegrating, and the drug aspect is one reason for it.

I think other things have contributed to it like a no-win war policy and so forth.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. But the facts are that even with the finest weapons system in the world, and heaven knows we are being asked for enough money to create weapons systems, if you don't have morale in a military unit it doesn't make any difference what else you have. But once again we have been talking about this now for a long time and the drug problem, from the standpoint of numbers—if this testimony given us abroad was correct—is getting worse instead of better.

I read in the Wall Street Journal several months ago an article that said 50 to 80 percent of all the troops in Germany were on drugs. Now if this sergeant is correct in his analysis, it has gone up instead of down.

This situation has gotten to the point now I am wondering whether we haven't something here which is a true cancer when it comes to morale.

Mr. KELLEY. Well, Senator, I tend to believe it is a true cancer, as applied to morale, and despite the substantial efforts that have been made in the last couple of years I would have to say that the drug problem is visibly worse today by many times than it was 2 years ago when I made my entry efforts into this field.

I think that the severity of the problem and the rate at which it is growing in our society, which of course, effects the new entry military man, suggests the possibility that we may have to take more drastic action with respect to drug control than we have taken thus far.

I am not trying to salve you with the assurance that we have the problem under control because I don't believe we do, and without any question this is a serious deterrent to effective morale, and it has run to such serious proportions that it can't help but imperil our military capability unless we do something about it.

But I also wish to make the point, sir, that the amount of education that the services have undertaken in the drug area and the initiatives taken to provide effective medical rehabilitation programs, including amnesty programs, amounts to something considerably more than just wringing your hands about the problem. We are doing a lot of things but we are not doing enough.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are there any new orders that have been issued on definite programs.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. Within the past year we issued a Department of Defense directive on drug control and drug abuse. Now the only previous directive on this subject, which goes back, I suppose, to 1960 or thereabouts, really did nothing more than assign my office the responsibility of coordinating on drug matters, and providing for drugs organizationally is not to solve the drug problem.

The directive recently issued is the first time that policies were developed in a problem-oriented sense.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is the directive very long?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir; it isn't, and I would be happy to provide it for the record.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could you supply it for the record? Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

(The information follows:)

#### DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE

Subject: Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs by Members of the Department of Defense

Reference: (a) DoD Directive 1300.11, "Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs by Members of the Armed Forces," February 2, 1968 (hereby cancelled)

#### I.—PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This Directive establishes Department of Defense policies for preventing and eliminating drug abuse by personnel of the Department of Defense and for restoring members of the armed forces so involved to unseful functions. It assigns responsibilities for carrying out its provisions.

#### II.—APPLICABILITY AND CANCELLATION

The provisions of this Directive apply to all components of the Department of Defense. (Reference (a) is hereby superseded and cancelled.)

#### III.—DEFINITIONS

The following definitions are intended for administrative use and are not necessarily applicable to the administration of military justice under the Uniform Code of Military Justice:

A. *Narcotics*.—Any opiates or cocaine.

B. *Marijuana*.—The intoxicating products of the hemp plant, *cannabis sativa*.

C. *LSD*.—Lysergic acid diethylamide, a dangerous drug.

D. *Dangerous Drugs*.—Those non-narcotic drugs that are habit-forming or have a potential for abuse because of their stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect, as determined by the Attorney General of the United States. (See Title 21 of the Code of Federal Regulations.)

D. *Drugs*.—As used in general terms in this directive means any of the narcotics, marijuana, or other dangerous drugs defined in A, B, C, and D, above.

E. *Drug Abuse*.—The illegal, wrongful or improper use of any narcotic substance, marijuana, or dangerous drug, or the illegal or wrongful possession, transfer, or sale of the same. When such drugs have been prescribed by competent medical personnel for medical purposes their proper use by the patient prescribed for is not drug abuse.

F. *Drug Abuser*.—One who has illegally, wrongfully, or improperly used any narcotic substance, marijuana or dangerous drug, or who has illegally or wrongfully possessed, transferred, or sold the same.

1. *Drug Experimenter*.—One who has illegally, wrongfully, or improperly used any narcotic substance, marijuana or dangerous drug as defined herein not more than a few times for reasons of curiosity, peer pressure or other similar reason. The exact number of usages is not necessarily as important in determining the category of user as is the intent of the user, the circumstances of use, and the psychological makeup of the user. Final determination of the category should be within the judgment of the Commanding Officer, aided by medical, legal, and moral advice.

2. *Drug User*.—One who has illegally, wrongfully, or improperly used any narcotic substance, marijuana or dangerous drug as defined herein generally several times, and for reasons of a deeper and more continuing nature than those which motivate the drug experimenter. Final determination of the category should be within the judgment of the Commanding Officer aided by medical, legal and moral advice.

3. *Drug Addict*.—One who exhibits a behavioral pattern of compulsive drug use, characterized by overwhelming involvement with the use of a drug, and the securing of its supply. As the term "drug addict" is used herein, one may or may not be physically dependent on the drug. Rather the term refers in a quantitative sense to the degree to which drug use pervades the total life activity of the user.

G. *Supplier*.—One who furnished illegally, wrongfully, or improperly any of the proscribed drugs defined herein to another person.

H. *Casual Supplier*.—One who furnished illegally, wrongfully, or improperly to another person a small amount of any of the proscribed drugs defined herein for the convenience of the user rather than for gain.

#### IV.—POLICIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to prevent and eliminate drug abuse within the armed forces and to attempt to restore members so involved to useful service. The illegal or improper use of drugs by a member of the armed forces may have a seriously damaging effect on his health and mind, may jeopardize his safety and the safety of his fellows, may lead to criminal prosecution and to discharge under other than honorable conditions and is altogether incompatible with military service or subsequent civilian pursuits. Further, these policies shall extend, as appropriate, to the civilian components of the Department of Defense.

##### A. General

1. The Department acknowledges a particular responsibility for counseling and protecting members of the armed forces against drug abuse, for disciplining members who use or promote the use of drugs in an illegal or improper manner, and for attempting to restore and rehabilitate members using drugs who evidence a desire and willingness to undergo such restoration.

2. Appropriate disciplinary and administrative actions in cases of drug abuse will be dependent upon all the facts and circumstances of each case and will include consideration of whether the service member involved is a drug experimenter, drug user, drug addict, supplier, or casual supplier (as defined herein).

a. Prior to initiating any administrative or disciplinary action against a person for using proscribed drugs, consideration will be given to the referral of such individual for medical evaluation.

b. In addition where restoration and rehabilitation efforts are deemed feasible, use will be made of such administrative and judicial tools as will insure that the service member is not prematurely and permanently precluded from participation in service sponsored or other government agency rehabilitation programs.

##### B. Marijuana

Marijuana use is dangerous. It is a drug which has no known beneficial use. Its use, possession, transfer or sale is prohibited by law. The maximum penalty prescribed for conviction by court-martial includes confinement at hard labor for five years and dishonorable discharge. Other laws of the United States, the individual states, and most countries in the world prohibit involvement with marijuana. The penalties vary and in some jurisdictions are much more severe than a court-martial may adjudge.

1. There may be very definite and substantial detrimental effects on both the mental and physical well-being of the individual from the use of marijuana. Depending on the dose of the active ingredient, tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), found in marijuana, its use can induce psychotic reactions in almost any individual.

2. Its use may also produce visual hallucinations, pronounced anxiety, and paranoid reactions lasting for hours. The muscular incoordination and the distortion of space and time perception commonly associated with marijuana use are potentially hazardous.

3. The more prominent subjective effects include irritability, confusion, impairment of judgment and memory, and impairment of the verbal facility both in speaking and writing. The use of marijuana with other drugs may have a synergistic effect and result in the death of the user.

4. All the results of marijuana use on the human body, mind, personality and genetic system are not yet known. Research is being conducted to determine the full scope of its impact in these areas.

### C. LSD

1. Permanent damage may result from LSD usage. The nature of this damage appears to be related to the individual's physical, mental, and genetic makeup as well as the quantity used and the frequency of use. Recurrence of hallucinogenic effects by users is wide-spread.

2. In view of this LSD recurrence phenomenon, and the documented unpredictable conduct of an individual under the influence of LSD, any military person or civilian employee having taken LSD will be scrutinized carefully and special determination made as to what, if any, duty he may be trusted to perform with particular attention to any duty where the security of the nation or the safety of personnel or equipment is a prime factor.

### D. Drug Abuse Control Program

1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), or his designee is assigned overall responsibility for developing a coordinated program consistent with the provisions of this Directive.

2. The ASD (M&RA) shall be advised by a Drug Abuse Control Committee comprised of two representatives of each Military Service who will be designated by the Secretary concerned, and such additional advisors as the ASD (M&RA) or the Chairman of the Drug Abuse Control Committee shall deem appropriate.

a. The Committee shall also include a Chairman, an Executive Assistant, and a Recorder, and it shall meet monthly or more frequently as called by the Chairman.

b. The ASD (M&RA), his designee, or at his discretion, the Chairman of the Committee, shall submit appropriate reports to the Secretary and/or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

### E. Screening Out Drug Addicts or Potential Drug Addicts

The Military Departments shall develop a program to identify drug users and to screen out drug addicts or potential drug addicts (as defined herein) from entry into the Military Service.

### F. Drug Abuse Education

1. The ASD (M&RA), or his designee, shall provide for the procurement and development of materials on the dangers of illegal or improper drug use, including films, pamphlets, posters, and radio and television programs which shall be used for the orientation and continuing education of all persons in the armed forces, civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and their dependents.

a. Materials developed shall:

(1) Emphasize the physiological and psychological dangers inherent in the use of such drugs;

(2) Stress the inconsistency of their use with military responsibility and national security and the implications of such behavior in security determinations and administrative actions; and

(3) Contain an explanation of disciplinary actions which can be taken for drug abuse.

b. Upon review by the Committee and approval by the ASD (M&RA), informational materials developed shall be made available to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of Defense Agencies for distribution to military personnel and civilian employees and their dependents, and the Reserve Components.

2. In addition, the ASD (M&RA), his designee, or the Committee shall:

a. Through on-site inspections review, evaluate, and monitor existing programs of the military departments concerning drug abuse and the rehabilitation of drug users and addicts.

b. Recommend new policies for more effective control of drug abuse and the rehabilitation of users and addicts.

c. At their discretion, require DoD components to submit such information for collation and dissemination to other DoD components as is deemed useful in the matter of drug abuse, the methods employed to combat it, and the rehabilitation of drug users and addicts.

d. Obtain reports and recommendations from DoD components assigned responsibility for the programs described in subsections IV.E., IV.F.1. and 3., and IV.G., H., I., and J.

e. Take action to:

(1) keep abreast of the activities of other agencies of the Federal Government and private organizations in examining and combating drug

abuse, the treatment of drug users, and the rehabilitation of drug users and addicts, including a continuing effort to keep DoD components informed of research projects being conducted by other governmental and private organizations, and

(2) where appropriate, recommend additional research.

3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of Defense Agencies shall insure that action is taken to:

a. Extend education and training for the prevention of drug abuse to all military educational and training levels from basic training to the senior service schools and joint colleges.

(1) Appropriate portions of the curricula or training programs of these activities shall be devoted to information on the dangers of drug abuse, methods of prevention of drug abuse, and in the higher level of education and training, to the administration of discipline and rehabilitation.

(2) Medical Officer, Judge Advocate, and Chaplain training programs shall include identification, treatment, discipline (as appropriate) rehabilitation, and counseling on drugs and their abuse.

b. Extend education and training for the prevention of drug abuse to the National Guard and Reserve forces and opportunities for such education and training to civilian employees of the Department of Defense and to the dependents of military and civilian personnel.

c. Disseminate drug abuse information material to all military and civilian personnel and their dependents under their cognizance including Reserve Components.

d. Devise orientation, refresher training and supplemental information programs for all military and civilian personnel and their dependents including Reserve Components.

e. Provide orientation programs to all military personnel before their departure to overseas areas. Further, provide refresher training, as well as other supplementation of this informational material, on a regular basis to members, particularly those in overseas areas where drugs may be illicitly obtained with relative ease.

f. Make proper notations in each military member's appropriate personnel record at the time of attending the initial and the pre-overseas departure drug orientation programs.

#### *G. The Control of Smuggling*

Each Military Department and Defense Agency shall:

1. Develop additional procedures to prevent illicit trafficking and shipping of drugs by civilian personnel and military members of the armed forces.

2. Devote special attention to the possibility of illicit drugs being transported by members traveling from one country to another, and develop procedures to prevent the same.

3. Maintain cooperation with the United States Post Office Department, Bureau of Customs of the Department of the Treasury, and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs of the Department of Justice.

#### *H. Quarantine Areas Program*

1. The Military Departments and Defense Agencies shall develop implementing instructions designed to identify areas and business establishments located in areas within their jurisdiction which should be declared "off-limits" by local commanders because of the availability of narcotics, marijuana or other dangerous drugs in that area or at that establishment.

2. In foreign countries, the military commander additionally shall be required to inform the appropriate local authorities and attempt to formulate coordinated law enforcement procedures.

#### *I. Restoration and Rehabilitation of Drug Users and Drug Addicts*

1. The Military Departments are encouraged to develop programs and facilities to restore and rehabilitate members who are drug users or drug addicts when such members desire and are willing to undergo such restoration. Rehabilitation programs will not be used in lieu of appropriate disciplinary or administrative actions, but they may be used in connection with or as an adjunct to such actions.

2. When it is appropriate and feasible to do so, the Military Departments may develop drug rehabilitation programs in cooperation with suitable private and government agencies. The potential for further useful military service shall be the governing factor in determining whether rehabilitation will be attempted.

*J. The Military Departments are authorized on a trial basis to establish amnesty programs.*

1. Under this program individuals shall be informed that:
  - a. Medical assistance will be made available.
  - b. Action under the UCMJ may be suspended for the unauthorized use of drugs against a person who is sincere in seeking help to eliminate his drug dependence, and who voluntarily comes forward before he is apprehended or detected as a drug abuser.
  - c. If the degree or type of drug involvement precludes rehabilitation and restoration to full duty, a discharge under honorable conditions shall be considered.
  - d. In recognition of an individual's personal moral responsibility for his actions and their consequences, and in evidence of his sincerity, a grant of amnesty shall stipulate the member's full cooperation in his own rehabilitation.
2. Those who elect to enter the amnesty program should receive a thorough psychiatric examination. Subsequent action by commanding officers should be guided by other provisions of this Directive.

V.—EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

This Directive is effective immediately. Each Military Department shall issue or revise existing regulations to carry out the policies set forth in this Directive. Two (2) copies of the implementing instructions shall be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) within forty-five days for approval prior to issuance.

DAVID PACKARD,  
*Deputy Secretary of Defense.*

Enclosure.

DOD DRUG ABUSE INFORMATION MATERIALS

1. All material listed herein can be obtained through Service Information channels.

2. Publications: *Drug Abuse: Game Without Winners (DoD GEN-33)*

This 80-page handbook is designed to help commanders understand and combat drug abuse problems. It describes various harmful drugs and non-drug products, what to do when drug misuse is suspected and the overall command relationship to drug matters.

*Drugs and You (DoD FS-51)*

This 12-panel folder is written for the individual serviceman. It describes the five basic drugs that are misused: opiates (heroin), marijuana, hallucinogens, depressants, and stimulants.

*A Federal Source Book: Answers to the most frequently asked questions about drug abuse (unnumbered)*

This publication presents the latest scientific answers to some of the questions most frequently asked about drug misuse. The answers are based upon the latest research findings of NIMH and presented in accordance with policies and programs of DoD, HEW, Justice, Labor, and OEO.

*Drug Dependence—A Guide for Physicians (unnumbered)*

This book was published by the American Medical Association and consists of a group of papers on the subject of drug abuse. The book discusses the pharmacological, psychological, and sociological basis for drug abuse and dependence as an aid to understanding the major root causes, especially among youth, who constitute the majority of the abuser problem. Other sections are on medical treatment and management, the role of law and education in deterring abuse and finally, the needs for on going research in several facets of the problem.

*Beware of the Booby Trap (unnumbered)*

This is an illustrated pamphlet highlighting the dangers of drug abuse.

### Commanders Digest

There have been three special issues of the Commanders Digest on the subject of drug abuse. The October 25, 1969 issue was devoted to the White House Task Force Report on Marijuana. The Commanders Digest gives the latest official DoD and Administration positions.

#### 3. Visuals:

##### a. Posters:

Things Could Be Worse.....	DoD P-55
Keep Off the Grass.....	DoD P-62A
Speed Gets You Nowhere.....	DoD P-62B
Don't Be Needed by Drugs.....	DoD P-62C
Don't Blow It.....	DoD P-62D
Speed Trap.....	DoD P-62E
Escape to Nowhere.....	DoD P-65

##### b. Motion Pictures:

#### *The Hang Up (AFIF-189)*

This film is a dramatic presentation of the harmful effects of drug abuse. Produced by the Office of Special Investigations, USAF, the film discusses the morale, physical, psychological, and legal consequences of drug abuse.

#### *Trip To Where (AFIF-139)*

This film considers all aspects of drug abuse, but with strong emphasis on the effect of LSD and the consequences of its use, illustrated by the experiences of three seamen. This film was produced by the Bureau of Medicine, Department of the Navy.

#### *Marijuana (AFIF-196)*

Sonny Bono narrates this film which deals solely with the subject of marijuana. Questions are posed and answers given and both sides of youth state their reasons for either using pot or their need not to.

#### *Trip Back (AFIF-197)*

Florence Fischer tells her story of 23 years of drug addiction to a group of young people at the *New York Daily News*. She answers questions in a straightforward, hard-hitting, give-and-take session with the youth.

#### *People vs. Pot (AFIF-198)*

This film explores the causes and effects of the use of marijuana with special emphasis placed on use by military personnel. The cases depicted are true.

#### *Drug Abuse: Everybody's Hangup*

This film takes a documentary look at the drug scene and is designed to heighten awareness of and concern with the problem of drug abuse.

##### c. Pentagon Forums:

Four Pentagon Forums (video taped), a 30-minute panel discussion, have been devoted to the subject of drug abuse. Copies are available by writing the Director, Office of Information for the Armed Forces, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 20301.

A special Pentagon Forum in an audience participation question-answer format is also available.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Just a few minutes and I will be through.

We will resume our sitting at 2:30 this afternoon on the procurement bill.

Senator McIntyre sent in some questions here for submission for answers, and without objection they will be included in the record at this point.

(The questions follow:)

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MCINTYRE TO BE ANSWERED FOR THE RECORD

1. In your statement you indicate that total active duty military will decline from 2,699,000 at the end of fiscal 1971, to 2,505,000, a reduction of 194,000 by the end of fiscal 1972. This is a reduction of 7.2 percent. Within these totals military personnel in the R&D function decline from 38,000 to 34,000 during the same period. This is a reduction of 4,000 people or 10.5 percent. Moreover, the decline

in R&D manpower is inconsistent with the requested increase in the amount of funds proposed for R&D fiscal 1972.

Will you explain why R&D manpower is sustaining a greater reduction than the over-all reduction for the Department of Defense, particularly since the Secretary of Defense put such strong emphasis on the need for maintaining a strong technological base.

2. On page 30 of your statement you say that by remaining abreast of new technologies and retaining the option of rapid development and production if the threat materializes, a strong and viable R&D program makes it possible for us to avoid the duplication of costly new weapons systems to meet uncertain threats. This statement implies that in the past we have duplicated costly new weapons systems to meet uncertain threats.

(a) Can you cite any examples of where such duplication has occurred in the past.

(b) How do you define "uncertain threats"?

(c) Are you saying in effect that there are elements in the budget which are proposed by the Department of Defense in anticipation of "uncertain threats" when we are told over and over that the size of the defense budget is seriously constrained even to meet the specific threats that are the basis for our budget preparation?

3. Your statement indicates a decline in number of active duty personnel in the training function from 617,000 at the end of fiscal 1970 to 538,000 at the end of 1971 and to 471,000 by the end of 1972.

This decline presumably reflects the reduced need for training manpower as our total force level declines. However is such a reduction in training manpower consistent with the increased emphasis on improving the attitude of the soldier and making the military more amenable as evidenced by the large increase in dollars requested in R&D for this purpose and the tens of millions of dollars being spent in recruiting military personnel?

4. If we should have a war in Europe, how many days after mobilization are the first reserve units to arrive in Europe? How long after that would additional units arrive?

5. It is my understanding that the readiness of both active and reserve forces is a more critical factor in our deployment capability to Europe than the lift resources as C-5A and ships we have available to move them. What are we doing to improve the readiness of our forces—both active and reserve?

6. There have been some steps taken to get our NATO allies to share more in expenses. The White House just announced that the allies will increase their share by about \$1 billion over the next five years. Much of this is for aircraft shelter and I commend the Administration for this success.

We now have 4 $\frac{1}{3}$  divisions in Europe. What kind of plans do we have over the next five years for a gradual replacement of U.S. units?

7. We have enough supply units in Europe to refight World War II. Is this realistic in terms of what our next war would be?

8. How many people are stationed at headquarters in Europe—that is, above division level—of all kinds?

9. How many bases do we have in Europe? What plans are there for consolidation of these bases?

#### ANSWERS TO SENATOR M'INTYRE'S QUESTIONS

*Question 1. Will you explain why R&D manpower is sustaining a greater reduction than the overall reduction for the Department of Defense?*

Answer 1. The reduction in military personnel assigned to R&D at the same time that R&D funds are increasing reflects the increased reliance on contractors in FY 72. The discussion of our contractor efforts was included in Mr. Foster's statement to the Armed Services Committees. With respect to the apparent inconsistencies in the respective rates of R&D and total manpower, the R&D manpower referred to in the statement is exclusively military manpower. Total DOD R&D manpower is shown below:

[Manpower in thousands]

	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1972
Military.....	38.0	34.5
Civilian.....	86.9	83.7
Total.....	124.9	118.2

This table shows that while the FY 72 R&D military manpower reduction (9.5%) exceeds the total DOD military manpower rate of decline, the total R&D manpower reduction (5.4%) is consistent with the total Defense manpower reduction (5.7%). This enrichment of the civilian mix is part of our continuing effort to civilianize support jobs whenever possible.

*Question 2. On page 30 of your statement you implied that in the past we have duplicated costly new weapons systems to meet uncertain threats.*

*a. Can you cite any examples of where such duplication has occurred in the past?*

*b. How do you define "uncertain threats?"*

*c. Are you saying in effect that there are elements in the budget which are proposed by the Department of Defense in anticipation of "uncertain threats" when we are told over and over that the size of the defense budget is seriously constrained even to meet the specific threats that are the basis for our budget preparation?*

Answer 2. The implication is incorrect. In the past we have had a strong and viable R&D program which served us well. Our present problem is that we are in increasing danger of weakening our R&D program, particularly when compared with the Soviet Union.

If a country's R&D program has been weak and a new threat appears, two things are likely to happen:

1. The threat won't be very well understood—the capability uncertainties will be large. The country just won't have enough awareness of advanced technology to interpret what the other country is doing.

2. For safety's sake, several production responses may be initiated in the hope that at least one will turn out to be adequate.

We have been fortunate that we have seldom been placed in this position in military systems. On the space side, however, we were in some difficulty in the 1958-1962 period and the U.S. by actions of NASA and DOD did respond by fielding a larger number of satellite launchers than a more orderly R&D program might have generated. The Soviets, quite possibly, found themselves in this situation in naval weapons R&D until recently.

*Question 3. Your statement indicates a decline in number of active duty personnel in the training function from 617,000 at the end of FY 70 to 538,000 at the end of 1971 and to 471,000 by the end of 1972. This decline presumably reflects the reduced need for training manpower as our total force level declines. However, is such a reduction in training manpower consistent with the increased emphasis on improving the attitude of the soldier and making the military more amenable as evidenced by the large increase in dollars requested in R&D for this purpose and the tens of millions of dollars being spent in recruiting military personnel?*

Answer 3. The reduction in training manpower between FY 70 and FY 72 is caused by the substantial reduction in forces over that period. Enlisted new accessions alone declined by more than 150,000 (almost 25% of the FY 70 new accession level). We recognize that the quality of service training and the opportunity to receive that training help induce enlistments and reenlistments. For this reason, we have maintained the same level of quality and the same opportunity to receive training in our FY 72 budget as in our FY 70 program. However, with fewer new accessions requiring initial entry training and with a smaller career force requiring advanced training, we have been able to reduce our manpower in training functions. The reduced turnover consistent with a Volunteer Force should provide further training manpower savings. We look forward to realizing that savings once we have achieved our goal of an all Volunteer Force.

*Question 4. If we should have a war in Europe, how many days after mobilization are the first reserve units to arrive in Europe? How long after that would additional units arrive?*

Answer 4. [Deleted.]

*Question 5. It is my understanding that the readiness of both active and Reserve forces is a more critical factor in our deployment capability to Europe than the lift resources such as C-5A and ships we have available to move them. What are we doing to improve the readiness of our forces—both active and reserve?*

Answer 5. [Deleted.]

Further, we are taking steps to modernize and improve equipment maintenance and readiness for all Services as set forth in the Secretary's FY 1972 Defense Report. For example, the equipment we have prepositioned in Europe for 2 and  $\frac{2}{3}$  divisions will undergo extensive inspection and rehabilitation.

Secretary Laird addressed actions to increase Guard and Reserve readiness in his statement to the House Armed Services Committee on March 9th.

His new policy of preparing Guard and Reserve forces as the initial and primary source of augmentation for the active forces in times of emergency has permeated the Defense Establishment, and has resulted in many measures to improve readiness. These include the implementation of management techniques to provide visibility to the Guard and Reserve programs and extensive modernization programs by each of the Services. These programs were described by Secretary Laird in pages 102-105 of his FY 1972 Defense Report.

I believe these actions indicate genuine progress to increase the readiness of our Guard and Reserve Forces. It should be noted, however, that modernization—particularly conversion to new weapons systems—will be followed by an interval of lowered readiness status in the Air Force, Reserve and Air National Guard. Also, I am far from satisfied with Army Guard and Army Reserve equipping levels.

*Question 6. We now have  $4\frac{1}{3}$  divisions in Europe. What kind of plans do we have over the next five years for a gradual replacement of US units?*

Answer 6. We have no current plans to replace US units in Europe. We are emphasizing in NATO qualitative improvements to existing units rather than the formation of new units.

*Question 7. We have enough supply units in Europe to refight World War II. Is this realistic in terms of what our next war would be?*

Answer 7. We do not believe that we have an excess of supply units in Europe. Those that are there are necessary to supply and maintain units already there in peacetime. Unit workloads are constantly reviewed and units are dropped from the European force structure whenever possible. Our present support structure is nowhere near the scale large enough to sustain prolonged World War II-type operations.

*Question 8. How many people are stationed at headquarters in Europe—that is, above division level—of all kinds?*

Answer 8. We have approximately 11,500 military and civilians stationed at all headquarters in Europe above the division level.

*Question 9. How many bases do we have in Europe? What plans are there for consolidation of these bases?*

Answer 9. As of July 1970, DOD controlled 246 major installations in Europe. DOD is constantly reviewing the entire base structure in terms of basing requirements and the need for efficient operations; however, there are at present no approved plans for base consolidations in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Secretary, here are two or three questions we hardly have time to go into but I will ask them and you can answer them later. I note that in 1965 with an enlisted strength of 855,000 men, the Army could field over 16 divisions. Why is it that in fiscal year 1972 with a prospective enlisted strength of only slightly lower, about 810,000, why is it we can field only  $13\frac{1}{3}$  divisions.

The committee needs detailed information on this matter. If there has been a sizable increase in support forces since 1965 we need to know specifically what kind of support units are carrying out what missions.

You may provide all this for the record when you have had time to go into it.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

In FY 64 and FY 65 we had  $16\frac{1}{3}$  active Army divisions (860,000 and 855,000 enlisted personnel). In FY 72 we plan for  $13\frac{1}{3}$  active Army divisions (809,000 en-

listed personnel). The table below shows comparable selected statistics for these two years:

ARMY MANPOWER AND FORCE COMPARISONS, FISCAL YEARS 1964 AND 1972

	Fiscal year 1964	Fiscal year 1972
Military manpower (in thousands):		
Major mission forces.....	555	512
Other mission forces.....	59	69
General support forces.....	359	361
Total, Army.....	973	942
(Enlisted strengths).....	(860)	(809)
Ratio of mission category manpower to total manpower:		
Major mission/total.....	0.57	0.54
Other mission/total.....	0.06	0.07
General support/total.....	0.37	0.39
Active Forces:		
Divisions.....	16½	13½
Maneuver battalions.....	176	
Cavalry squadrons.....	29	
Artillery battalions.....	109	[Deleted]
Engineer battalions.....	59	
Signal battalions.....	25	
Aviation units.....	92	
Total manpower/active division (in thousands).....	60	71

The following points are significant:

1. In FY 72, SEA expands Army manpower requirements outside of divisions in two ways. First there are non-divisional combat support and combat service support units added on for SEA activities. Second, SEA substantially increases the manpower pipeline because of increased rotation, training and medical needs. By FY 73, we expect this number to be reduced significantly.
2. We have experienced some shifts in the numbers and types of Army units in the program to reflect changing tactics and strategy and the new units tend to require more manpower. For instance the number of Aviation units has increased from 92 to [deleted] and it takes more men to maintain a helicopter than a truck.
3. By FY 73, the percentage of major missions to total manpower will return to the FY 64 level (57%) and the total Army manpower per active division will be 63,000 in FY 73 compared to 60,000 in FY 64.

The CHAIRMAN. Question No. 2: We often hear it said that the ratio—the second question—we often hear it said that the ratio of combat troops to support troops in our Army is considerably lower than in many other armies. Could you provide for the record the combat to support ratios for our Army and the armies of our major NATO Allies, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, if possible. You have sources of information, ultimate sources, on all that. I understand there is always some ambiguity in the question, and sometimes it is ambiguous in the answer because it is difficult to decide whether to count combat troop units as combat troops or support troops.

Consequently, it would be useful if you would provide this data in several alternative formats describing the types of units which you have placed in each category.

(The information follows:)

*Question. Could you provide for the record the combat to support ratios for our army and the armies of our major NATO allies, the Soviet Union, and Communist China if possible?*

*Answer. Comparison of the combat-to-support ratios of U.S. and foreign armies are difficult to formulate and potentially very misleading because of national differences in organizational structure, terminology and operating practices.*

The most straightforward way to make such a comparison without getting involved in definitional problems is to calculate what percentage of each country's total military manpower is made up of men whose primary personal duty is to engage and fire weapons at the enemy. The United States Army has a specific number of troops assigned such personal combat responsibilities in its infantry, artillery and armor units, and we can determine the number by examining their manpower program in detail. If we could calculate the number of such troops that other nations supported within their total military strengths, we could make comparisons that would really tell us something concrete about the respective teeth-to-tail ratios of the U.S., its allies, the Russians and the Chinese. Unfortunately, data in such depth on the armies of other nations are not available, so this most elementary and meaningful comparison cannot be made.

The most frequently used method for comparing combat-to-support ratios of the U.S. and foreign armies is at a much higher level of aggregation, the division. The division is an organizational concept common to all armies, but attempting of the definitional uncertainties inherent in the division-level approach by uncertainties over how much of our resources within and above division level are "combat", how much "combat support" and how much "combat service support". If we try to apply our yardstick of U.S. military definitions we find insufficient hard detailed information on the composition of other nations' forces and substantial uncertainty about the roles and missions of the elements and the individuals within the elements we can identify. Trying to apply our concepts of ISI's and SSI's and our definitions of combat and support to the forces of other nations has led to misleading statements in the past which have produced more uncertainty over comparative "teeth-to-tail" ratios than they have settled.

Use of an even higher aggregative level, which might tend to smooth out some of the definitional uncertainties inherent in the division-level approach by casting manpower into extremely broad program categories (for example, our fiscal guidance mission and general support categories), is similarly unproductive because we lack sufficient detailed knowledge of the foreign armies to so categorize their employment of manpower.

The only level of aggregation at which it appears we can make a somewhat meaningful comparison is the unit level. Though the available data will not support a count of individuals as seen above, it will support a count of roughly similar combat units. Although in the different armies they are of somewhat different sizes and structures, and although not every man in the "combat unit" has a combative role to play (some are primarily cooks, drivers, medics, etc., at even the smallest unit level), we can aggregate the combat units of the various nations at, for example, the battalion level; multiply the number of battalions each nation has by the average number of men that nation puts in a battalion; and compare the total "battalion-population" to the nation's total military strength. This would give us a "teeth-to-tail" ratio that is considerably more aggregative and subject to error than we would like, but the data are at least available for all the nations we are interested in, and we might produce a table showing the ratio of "combat battalion population" to total military manpower calculated as described above.

Such a comparison would involve extensive analysis of many documents and would require a great deal of time. We can demonstrate the procedure, however, and hopefully respond adequately to the question by limiting the comparison to two forces about which we possess considerable data, the opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in Germany.

(Off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else you wish to say, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. KELLEY. I don't believe so, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been very helpful to all of us. You have been helpful to me, and I appreciate it very much for the committee as well as for myself the preparation you made and your good statement, and your willingness to answer questions. Your frankness and candor about it are quite helpful.

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's see if there is anything else anyone wants to say, especially those gentlemen who helped out when they were called on or anyone else who is with the Secretary who wishes to say something for the record.


Mr. KELLEY. One of the more outstanding invitations we have had, Mr. Chairman.


(Laughter)


The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much.

We will take an adjournment until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p.m., of the same day.)







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