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# SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PART 3

SEPTEMBER 26, 1972

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## SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

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TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
SUBCOMMITTEE OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The subcommittee met, in executive session, at 10 a.m., in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order.

It is now 10 years since Soviet policy in the Caribbean, and particularly in Cuba, became of critical importance to the security of the United States.

In 1962, the introduction of land-based intermediate ballistic missiles into Cuba by the Soviet Union brought the world's great superpowers to the verge of nuclear war. The missiles were withdrawn but Soviet use of Cuba as a pawn in its worldwide competition with the United States has persisted.

In 1969, the Soviets began a series of naval visits to Cuba. Two years ago this week those visits led to a sharp warning by the White House when it was discovered that a naval support facility was being constructed at Cienfuegos, Cuba. The Soviets denied any intention of building a base and our Government announced that there was "understanding" between the United States and U.S.S.R. over the use of Cuba as a base for offensive strategic weapons.

Exactly what that "understanding" means, if anything, has remained a mystery to this subcommittee. To date, the Soviets have not sent a Y Class, Polaris-type submarine to Cuba but that may only be a matter of time. We know, however, that only 5 months ago the Soviet Union for the first time sent a G-II submarine to Cuba—a submarine which carries strategic missiles with nuclear warheads which can be fired from underwater. Only 2 weeks ago, long-range Soviet aircraft, operating from Cuba for the first time conducted airborne reconnaissance along the east coast of the United States.

Whether these latest Soviet activities are part of some secret agreement with the Soviet Union or are simply one more logical step in a carefully planned Soviet strategy for the use of Cuba is not known since the executive branch has been reluctant over the years to comment on this subject in detail. Perhaps our witnesses today will be able to help us reach our own conclusions in this regard. Certainly in the past, the Defense Intelligence Agency has been most cooperative in providing this subcommittee with information which falls within its area of responsibility.

To brief us on Soviet activities in Cuba during the last year, Cuban activities in the hemisphere and other related subjects, we are pleased to have with us this morning Maj. Gen. Richard R. Stewart, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency.

General Stewart is accompanied by Mr. Paul F. Wallner, Western Area Analyst, DIA; Comdr. John P. Heekin (USN), Soviet Area Analyst, DIA; Mr. Kenneth E. Geisen, Deputy Chief, External Affairs Division, DIA; and Col. Charles W. Hammond (USAF), Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Defense.

Before proceeding, I want to mention that much of the information to be discussed this morning is extremely sensitive. The hearing, therefore, has been classified "top secret" at the request of the Defense Department. It is our intention to publish as much as possible in a declassified version as we have done in previous years.

General Stewart, you may proceed.

**STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. RICHARD R. STEWART, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I am the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Vice Admiral de Poix, who recently took over the Defense Intelligence Agency, with the departure of General Bennett, has asked me to express his regret on being unable to be present at the hearing this morning.

We are here to update you on developments concerning Soviet naval activities in Cuban waters, U.S.S.R. military and economic aid to Cuba, and Cuban export of subversion to Latin America.

Since our last presentation to your subcommittee last year, there have been two additional Soviet naval deployments to Cuba, and the Soviet Union has continued its program of military and economic assistance to the Castro government.

Fidel Castro has also persisted in providing support to insurgent and terrorist groups in Latin America, although the level of this support remains small.

I would like to assure you that the Defense Intelligence Agency recognizes the importance of developments in this area and is keeping close watch on both Soviet and Cuban activities in Latin America.

I have two analysts with me to present detailed briefings on these developments. Commander Heekin, who appeared before your subcommittee previously, will discuss U.S.S.R. naval activities in Cuban waters. Mr. Wallner will review activities in Cuba and Castro's support of insurgency in Latin America.

Our presentations will follow the general outline of the briefing given last year, with an additional discussion of Cuba's relations with Chile.

The overall classification of the briefing is "top secret" but we are prepared to sanitize the transcript so that it may be published in open record, if you so desire.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, General.

General STEWART. With your permission, we will proceed with Commander Heekin.



STATEMENT OF COMDR. JOHN P. HEEKIN (U.S. NAVY), SOVIET  
AREA ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Commander HEEKIN. We will first present a summary of Soviet naval activity in Cuba from 1969 until September 1971 when we last briefed this subcommittee. We will then describe Soviet naval activity since that time.

The first Soviet naval deployment to the Cuban area occurred in the summer of 1969. It included a guided-missile light cruiser, guided-missile frigate, guided-missile destroyer, submarine tender, merchant tanker, intelligence collector, two F Class submarines, and an N Class submarine. The N Class nuclear-powered attack submarine did not enter a Cuban port; however, she did participate in antisubmarine warfare exercises with the other combatants in the Gulf of Mexico after they completed their visit to Havana.

The second deployment was almost a year later. It included a guided-missile light cruiser, guided-missile destroyer, submarine tender, merchant tanker, E-11 Class submarine, two F Class submarines, and an intelligence collector. All except the intelligence collector visited Cienfuegos. The cruiser and destroyer also called at Havana.

The arrival of the E-II Class nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarine was the first time such a submarine visited a port outside the Soviet Union. The cruisers and the E-II Class submarine carry the SS-N-3 cruise missile. This missile is primarily an antiship weapon; however, its theoretical maximum range is considered to be 450 nautical miles, and it could be used against land targets.

In early September 1970, the third group of Soviet ships arrived in Cuba. It consisted of a guided-missile light cruiser, guided-missile destroyer, tank landing ship, submarine tender, merchant tanker, buoy tender, ocean rescue tender, merchant tanker, guided-missile frigate, naval oiler, and an F Class submarine.

U-2 photography disclosed the rapid construction that had taken place on Alcatraz Island since August 15. In less than a month, a personnel support facility had been established on the island. The new construction included two large structures that may house barracks and a messhall (180 feet by 60 feet; 140 feet by 55 feet). Recreational facilities included a nonregulation-size soccer field, a basketball court, a tennis court, and volleyball court. A U-shaped pier on the west side of the island has been extensively repaired, and a water tower had been erected.

Additionally, the buoy tender placed some navigational buoys near Alcatraz Island and also laid a floating barrier made up of what appears to be floats strung between buoys. It extends across the deep-water channel that leads to the southeast section of the harbor.

The barrier is in four sections, one of which swings open to allow passage into the southeast section of the harbor. The barrier, together with an existing shoal bank that averages a depth of 6 feet, effectively closes off the southeast section of the harbor to oceangoing ships. Four mooring buoys are located about 1 mile north of Alcatraz Island. They have been there since at least [security deletion] 1968. We have observed Soviet submarine tenders moored to these buoys.

Also in September of 1970, two barges were carried to Cuba by the tank landing ship. [Security deletion.] They are still at Cienfuegos.

The fourth visit began in February 1971. Units involved were a guided-missile light cruiser, guided-missile destroyer, merchant tanker, intelligence collector, and an N Class submarine. This time the N Class submarine did go into port. She spent 2 weeks in Cienfuegos. During the fifth deployment, only the Port of Antilla in Nipe Bay on the northeastern coast was visited. Deployed were a submarine tender, E-II Class submarine, and an intelligence collector. This did, however, mark the first visit of an E-II Class submarine to this bay and was the first time an intelligence collector visited a country outside the Soviet Union with the exception of Egypt.

The following events have occurred since our last briefing.

The sixth deployment began in October 1971. Units arriving were a guided-missile light cruiser, guided-missile frigate, two F Class submarines, merchant tanker, and an intelligence collector. On at least 12 occasions during December and January, one of the F Class submarines conducted ASW exercises with Cuban submarine chasers.

In mid-January of this year, a naval oiler and an ocean rescue tug arrived at Mariel. The tug relieved the tug that had been in Cuba since September 1970. The frigate, submarine, oiler, and tug left Cuba on January 20.

The seventh deployment began in late February 1972. It consisted of a guided-missile destroyer, F Class submarine, merchant tanker, and a naval oiler. During March and April, the destroyer and submarine conducted training exercises south of Cienfuegos with Cuban motor torpedo boats and submarine chasers.

In mid-April, the destroyer, submarine, and oiler moved to Havana. Operating out of both Havana and Mariel, the destroyer and submarine continued to conduct exercises with Cuban torpedo boats and subchasers.

During this time, a submarine tender was en route to Cuba from the Mediterranean. She entered Nipe Bay on April 27 and joined the destroyer which had arrived there from Havana a day earlier. On April 28, the destroyer left Nipe Bay headed east. The following morning, the destroyer returned to the bay in company with a G-II Class ballistic-missile submarine.

The G-II submarine is diesel powered and carries three SS-N-5 ballistic missiles that have a maximum operational range of 700 nautical miles. This was the first time a Soviet ballistic-missile submarine visited a country outside the Soviet Union.

The G-II Class submarine remained in Nipe Bay until her departure from Cuba on May 6. She was escorted to the area east of the Bahama Islands by the destroyer. The submarine submerged on May 9 and returned to the Northern Fleet. The oiler joined the destroyer and both units rejoined the Northern Fleet.

The submarine tender left Nipe Bay on May 8 and went to Santiago de Cuba on the 9th. This was the first time a Soviet submarine tender visited Santiago. The tender left there on May 12 and returned to European waters.

On May 15, the remaining F Class submarine and tug left Mariel and transited the Straits of Florida. The tug escorted the submarine to the area northeast of the Bahamas where on May 18 she parted company with the submarine and returned to Cuba. The F Class submarine then returned to the Northern Fleet.



No surface combatants, submarines, or submarine tenders have been in the Cuban area since May 1972. Several Soviet surveying ships have been conducting joint hydrographic operations with Cuban surveying craft. The Soviet tug that arrived in January is still there as are the two support barges at Cienfuegos.

Soviet Naval Aviation has also made deployments to Cuba. Since April 1970, nine flights, each of two Bear D (TU-95) naval reconnaissance aircraft have flown from a Northern Fleet base to Havana's Jose Marti Airport. The most recent two flights were earlier this month.

Two Bear D aircraft arrived in Havana on September 5 followed by two more the next day.

During the first seven deployments, the aircraft remained on the ground while in Cuba. However, during the deployments this month, two Bears flew a round-robin reconnaissance mission of the western North Atlantic on September 9 and again on September 11. These flights were the first time Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft have conducted flight operations while deployed to Cuba. Three of the aircraft left Havana on September 15 and returned to the U.S.S.R. The fourth is still there.

In summary—we have seen Soviet naval ships, including guided-missile cruisers, make periodic deployments to Cuba since mid-1969. The Soviet naval air force has been deploying there since April 1970. The Soviets have slowly escalated their submarine visits there, from F Class diesel-powered attack submarines, in 1969, to an E-II Class nuclear-powered cruise-missiles submarine in 1970, an N Class nuclear-powered attack submarine in 1971, and, most recently, a G-II Class ballistic missile submarine earlier this year.

Crew rest and recreation facilities are available on Alcatraz Island at Cienfuegos. If a submarine tender were at Cienfuegos or other Cuban ports, submarines and even surface combatants could be provided with maintenance, repair, and replenishment support that is not available to them anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere. Such support increases considerably the Soviet Navy's operational capability at a time when that capability is expanding in other areas of the world.

This concludes this portion of the briefing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Commander.

General STEWART. Mr. Wallner will discuss activities in the south.

#### STATEMENT OF PAUL F. WALLNER, WESTERN AREA ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. WALLNER. Mr. Chairman, this portion of the briefing will deal with developments in Cuba and Cuban activities in Latin America. The main topics are: Military assistance, economic dependence, export of revolution, Cuban view of terrorism, and Cuba-Chile relations.

Discussing first the overall trend in military aid, Soviet military shipments to Cuba, following the 1962 missile crisis, reached their peak in 1967, when [security deletion] tons were received. After reaching a low in 1968, deliveries increased to about [security de-

letion] tons last year and are expected to remain at approximately this level during 1972.

Most of Cuba's weapons systems predate the missile crisis period and most military shipments in recent years have consisted largely of replacement items for wornout equipment and spare parts. Major weapons provided Cuba by the U.S.S.R. are jet fighters, subchasers, and patrol and torpedo boats. They include MIG-15, 17, 19, and 21 fighters, MIG-15 and 21 trainers, MI-1, 4, and 8 helicopters, Osa I Class PTFG, Komar Class PTG, Kronshtadt Class PC, S.O.I. Class PCS, P-6 Class PT, P-4 Class PT, auxiliaries, and service craft. The weapons obtained during the past year are Fishbed J (MIG-21) aircraft and Osa I Class patrol boats.

In late 1971, delivery began on Fishbed J (MIG-21) all-weather fighters, a newer model of the MIG-21 series. [Security deletion] of these aircraft [security deletion] have been delivered to date.

Additionally, in January 1972, two Osa I Class patrol boats were towed to Cuba.

Osa I Class units fire the same missile as Cuba's [security deletion] Komar patrol boats, but have four launchers compared with only two on the Komar. Cuba will probably be receiving more Osa's, the most advanced units in the Cuban Navy. The arrival of this equipment shows that the Soviets have not changed their policy of providing military aid to Cuba. From 1959, this aid has amounted to some [security deletion].

The arrival of the Fishbed J's and the Osa Class patrol boats enables Cuba to maintain the most effective military force in Latin America. All Soviet military equipment provided to Cuba in recent years has been of a defensive nature.

Looking now at operational assistance, Soviet hydrographic research ships have operated periodically in Cuban waters since 1963, but have been there on a continuous basis since early 1971. Two survey ships are presently engaged in a joint Cuban-Soviet survey of all harbors and navigational routes around Cuba.

The type information collected includes currents, temperatures, salinity, acidity, and composition. These data may be used for exploitation of commercial routes and ports. In addition, a Cuban source reported that the Soviets were also gathering data for use by submarines. [Security deletion.] Their areas of interest are all major harbors and navigational routes round Cuba.

The Soviets have also continued their economic assistance to Cuba. To date, they have invested almost \$4.6 billion in the Cuban economy. Key areas have been the attempts to modernize Cuba's antiquated maritime facilities and to bolster the sagging sugar industry. Best estimates are that about 4 million tons were harvested this year, the second smallest since Castro came to power and far below the record 8.5 million tons in 1970.

Other areas of economic aid include construction projects for steel mills and a fertilizer plant. Castro has consistently mismanaged the economy and conditions in Cuba are dire despite the massive Soviet aid program.

It is interesting to note that Cuba has received about 55 percent of the Soviet foreign aid for developing countries and has thus far repaid almost none of it.



There are several developments during the past 2 years which point up increasing Soviet dominance of the Cuban economy.

In December 1970 the Soviet-Cuban Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation Commission was established. Cuba's Minister Without Portfolio, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who signed the agreement for Cuba, predicted "wider Soviet-Cuban cooperation which would enter a new phase." The new phase, according to Rodriguez, would require "enormous financial resources."

Since then, several hundred more Soviet economic administrators and "advisers" have arrived in Cuba. [Security deletion.]

A Soviet-style 10-year plan for the reconstruction of major Cuban ports was implemented last year. Construction projects are currently underway in the ports of Havana, Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, and the Bay of Nipe. The transportation net and electric power production facilities are also being upgraded.

The latest development was Cuba's initiation into the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) this past summer. This development occurred shortly after Castro returned from a 65-day trip to Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union. This trip was Castro's longest absence since coming to power.

Cuba's induction into CEMA was most likely discussed during his 2-week stay in Russia at the end of this trip. This move may be designed to spread the cost of supporting the Cuban economy among the member countries, although the Soviets will continue to carry most of the costs.

Considering Soviet aid to Cuban export of revolution, I will discuss the lack of Soviet participation and their emphasis on a relatively moderate approach.

[Security deletion.]

There is no evidence that the U.S.S.R. has furnished arms or training to Cuba for the specific purpose of supporting violent revolution in Latin America. Neither is there evidence that it has directly participated in Castro's earlier guerrilla ventures.

[Security deletion.]

The Soviets have emphasized a nonviolent approach and have attempted to persuade Castro to pursue less risky forms of subversive activity.

This Soviet pressure and Castro's unsuccessful ventures in Latin America, highlighted by Che Guevara's disastrous effort into Bolivia in 1966-67, compelled Castro to reassess the situation.

Other factors in reaching this decision are: Domestic problems; political-diplomatic trend; and ineffective insurgent groups.

Events of the past several years—notably the political developments in Peru, Chile, [security deletion]—have probably led Castro to believe that a trend in Cuba's favor has materialized and is growing.

Other factors influencing his belief are: Restored relations with Chile and Peru; unofficial ties with other countries; and, the OAS vote on normalization of relations.

In November 1971 Castro took a 25-day trip to Chile with short stops in Peru and Ecuador. During these visits, Castro tested the political and diplomatic waters and tried to portray Cuba as a vital part

of the Latin American community. The trip reflected Castro's interest in renewing relations with selected countries.

Although the Peruvian OAS proposal to allow restoration of relations with Cuba was defeated, it reflects an increasing willingness by some Latin Americans to reconsider the value of OAS sanctions against Cuba. As long as Castro believes he can benefit from this trend, he will be less inclined to chance an international political reversal by blatant involvement in violent subversive operations.

The reduction in Cuba's subversive activities, from the mid-1960's when Castro provided support to groups in nearly every Latin American country, may make it appear that he is no longer a threat to Latin American security. This is not the case. He has refined his techniques and has become much more selective in determining which subversive groups have the greatest potential for success and deserve Cuban support. But he has not changed his long-term objective of fostering violent insurgency in Latin America.

It is difficult to determine either the amount or type of support for any particular group. In some cases, Castro's efforts are limited to propaganda attacks against the existing government or in favor of a particular guerrilla organization. In other countries, he may train selected insurgents in Cuba, or provide financial assistance.

[Security deletion.]

We have indications that Cuba has continued to provide limited support to subversive groups in [security deletion], Venezuela, Colombia, [security deletion], Bolivia, Uruguay, and [security deletion].

[Security deletion.]

In Venezuela, according to press reports, for the first time since 1968, there is evidence of Cuban support to Punto Cero guerrillas. [Security deletion.]

After several small-scale operations in late 1971 and early this year, security forces have reportedly arrested or killed most of its members. Therefore, it would appear that further Cuban aid will not be forthcoming.

In Colombia, Cuba has provided [security deletion] a limited amount of [security deletion] aid to the National Liberation Army over the past several years. Recently, however, successful government actions have further weakened the National Liberation Army, and Cuban support has declined.

[Security deletion.]

Turning to Bolivia, Castro continues to supply moral as well as material support to extremists. [Security deletion.]

Looking to Uruguay, the Tupamaro terrorists have received very little support from Cuba [security deletion]. The terrorists have continually stressed their independence and self-reliance, but their severe setbacks in recent months may now prompt them to accept funds and weapons from Cuba if offered.

[Security deletion.]

From these examples, it can readily be seen that Castro is still vitally interested in exporting revolution. At the same time, however, it is clear that Cuban support for Latin American insurgents is at a low level.

It should be emphasized that none of these Castro-supported insurgent groups pose a serious threat to the governments concerned.



[Security deletion.] Regarding Cuban attitudes toward terrorism, historically, rural terrorism has been accepted as a primary insurgent tactic.

Failures in rural insurgency and successes by such groups as the Tupamaros have convinced Castro that urban terrorism can also be an effective tool. In short, the Cubans probably view terrorist acts of any variety as justified whenever they enhance the revolutionary effort.

In looking at Cuba's relations with Chile, they have historically been cordial. Chile voted against Cuba's exclusion from the OAS and the subsequent economic and diplomatic sanctions. President Salvador Allende resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba immediately following his inauguration in November 1970.

Castro recognizes Allende and his popular unity coalition as a revolutionary government of the type he seeks in Latin America. [Security deletion.]

[Security deletion.] Castro has lost some patience with Allende's slow pace [security deletion].

Although Castro and Allende are close friends, Allende feels that the Cuban has sometimes overstepped his authority in Chile. [Security deletion.]

In spite of these differences, the two leaders remain very close. Castro has urged Allende to look to the Soviet Union for more assistance and has supported all the radical proposals of the Allende regime.

In summary, the Soviet Union's involvement in Cuba continues strong and is not likely to lessen in the foreseeable future. In spite of the economic failures so far, Moscow is committed to insuring Cuba's eventual economic success and providing a suitable amount of arms for Cuba's defense.

Steady replacement of Cuba military hardware and active Soviet involvement in the Cuban economy are prime examples of this commitment. In return the Soviets obviously look to Cuba for support of naval combatants and for its use as a showplace for communism in the Western Hemisphere.

The Cubans, on the other hand, can be expected to continue their limited, selective support to Latin American insurgents.

We also see a continuation of the trend toward normalization of relations between Cuba and other Latin American countries.

This concludes the briefing.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Wallner.

Gentlemen, is there anything else?

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, this concludes the formal portion of the presentation.

We would like to try to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. FASCELL. Fine.

Mr. KAZEN.

Mr. KAZEN. General, do these countries in Latin America know what is going on?

General STEWART. Yes, sir; I think they do.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; they do, generally speaking.

Mr. KAZEN. Do they have some of this information you have given us today?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; they do. [Security deletion.]

Mr. KAZEN. Do they seem disturbed that Castro influence is what it is?

Mr. WALLNER. As I tried to point out in the presentation, sir, it is limited; it is low level; and none of the insurgent movements pose a serious threat to the governments concerned. They are watching it closely and, in the case of Guatemala, if I can refer to that for an example, they are conducting rather extensive small-unit counter-insurgency operations continually since the first of the year. This is designed to keep the insurgents off balance, keep them disorganized, keep them frustrated, from starting something which might escalate to a serious threat.

Mr. KAZEN. I have no further questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. I yield to Mr. Whalen for the moment.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Whalen.

Mr. WHALEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Does your intelligence detect any significant shifts in other countries toward easing relations with Cuba, recognizing Cuba again for diplomatic purposes?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. We have some indications [security deletion] that are in that direction. Again, these are preliminary indications and we are not sure when they might come to fruition.

Mr. WHALEN. I realize that you are a fact-gathering agency and, rather therefore, are not in a position to make recommendations. But what do these facts mean in terms of the future of America's relations with Cuba? Is there any way of interpreting that?

Mr. WALLNER. I believe that that question, and it is a very good one, is in the foreign policy area. I am not qualified in that area. I can give you my personal opinion, if you would like that.

Mr. WHALEN. Well, if we may, Mr. Chairman, I would be delighted.

General STEWART. In the interest of being constructive, I think you could comment on Castro's willingness to cooperate with the United States and so on.

Mr. WALLNER. Castro has continued his belligerent attitude toward the United States. He has been very much anti-American throughout his tenure. However, if you look at his speeches very carefully, you will notice that he does not quite shut the door all the way.

At the end of his most recent one in celebration of the 26th of July movement when he got his start, he lambasted the United States for several minutes, I believe, 45 minutes, and then at the very end started listing conditions which he would accept for an improvement in relations with the United States. These were:

Complete withdrawal from the Guantanamo Naval Base; cessation of overflights over the island and, in his words, I believe, to stop supporting the exiles and their operations against Cuba, and also to cease the economic blockade of Cuba.

Lesser officials in Cuba have added to that list one other criterion and that is complete withdrawal from Vietnam.

But it still remains he is listing conditions; he has not quite shut the door all the way.



Mr. WHALEN. I was rather interested that you listed as one of the Soviet objectives for Cuba that it be a showplace for communism in the Western Hemisphere.

I think from what you have indicated, from what we all know, it has been a disaster.

I don't recall the economic statistics relating to Cuba vis-a-vis other Caribbean Latin American states prior to 1959, but I presume that the Cuban economy was comparatively healthy at that time.

Could you comment, first of all, why this deterioration of the Cuban economy has occurred and, second, just what the prospects are for the future?

Mr. WALLNER. The first question is that the economy has deteriorated primarily because of mismanagement by the Cuban officials, starting with Fidel, himself.

Mr. WHALEN. Now, may I just interrupt you here?

Is this due, would you say, to the stupidity, the incapability of the management, or the fault of the system?

Mr. WALLNER. I don't think it is due to stupidity. I think it is due to Castro's being essentially a very political animal. He will make some high-level decisions and he will give certain people responsibilities and then he will turn around and subvert them by changing his mind, by saying, "No; I don't want that done; I want something else done." He also fails to delegate full responsibility and authority down the line to his lower echelon. I don't think the man is stupid.

Mr. WHALEN. You would say poor administration, not necessarily the fault of the system which he has instituted?

Mr. WALLNER. That is right.

Mr. WHALEN. What about the prospects for future economic advancement, especially the fact that you indicated that there is a great deal now of Russian influence in terms of economic advice, veto of proposed projects, et cetera?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. Because of the Soviet influence, we look for the economy as a whole countrywide to start picking up, to start improving, and with better management, to start becoming much more viable and to increase in overall productivity.

Mr. WHALEN. Would resumption of relationships with the United States give a significant boost to the economy, do you feel?

Mr. WALLNER. If it returned to that amount of aid that we had permitted prior to Castro, yes, sir; it might.

Mr. WHALEN. I have no further questions.

Mr. KAZEN. How many Russian people are in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. We estimate that there are about [security deletion] Russians in Cuba at the present time.

Now, let me break that down, if I might.

About [security deletion] of them are military instructors, advisers, and technicians. The remaining [security deletion] we believe are involved in various aspects of the economy and industries as advisers and technicians.

Mr. KAZEN. They have infiltrated into all of his civilian agencies?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; in varying degrees.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. KAZEN. One last question.

What, in your opinion, has led Castro to make these opening overtures for normalizing relations with the United States? Have we given any indication at all in that direction?

Mr. WALLNER. Not that I am aware of. It has been developments within Latin America. It has been Allende's victory in Chile. It has been the reformist government in Peru. It has been the nationalistic cult that is starting to become evident in South America; and it is the realization that more and more countries on the continent want to rid themselves of dependence on the United States.

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There were reports that Castro had had a heart attack in Poland. Do you have any information on his health?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. We saw those reports, also. We do not give them a great deal of validity. We think he was very tired at the time and may have had to curtail his schedule in Poland and to rest and recoup. It was a long, strenuous trip. The man is dynamic. He likes to get out, do skin diving, play basketball, do all sorts of things and still keep up with the official functions.

Mr. BINGHAM. So far as you know, he has resumed his normal activities since he has been back in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BINGHAM. What are the relations between Cuba and Mexico? Do they have full diplomatic relations?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; they do. They were never severed. Mexico denied the OAS sanctions and continued diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Mr. BINGHAM. Is there much trade?

Mr. WALLNER. There is some trade; yes, sir. The Cuban civil airline that goes to Mexico.

Mr. BINGHAM. What about Canada?

Mr. WALLNER. We have no evidence of Cuban subversive activities in Canada. [Security deletion.]

Mr. BINGHAM. Is there much trade developing between Canada and Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. No; not a great deal. There has been some throughout Castro's tenure but not a significant amount.

Mr. BINGHAM. A year ago or so there were a number of abductions of people, diplomatic personnel and others in Latin America. Was there any indication that these were stimulated or there were Cubans involved in this type of terror?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; we have no indications of Cuban involvement in any of these. There is a possibility that we might not necessarily get that sort of information.

Mr. BINGHAM. One hears from time to time that the Soviets are kind of tired of the burden that Cuba has become to them. I don't suppose this is your field particularly but is there any substance to that?

Mr. WALLNER. We see no intelligence evidence that that is the case. In fact, everything we have seen would indicate the opposite view.

Mr. BINGHAM. That is quite a figure you have, 55 percent of all Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries goes to Cuba.



Mr. WALLNER. That is aid to developing countries.

Mr. BINGHAM. Underdeveloped is the old term.

That brings me to something you referred to earlier in terms of U.S. aid to Cuba before the Castro regime. I used to be involved in this. I don't recall that we had any substantial aid program in Cuba. We had a very small technical assistance program. Of course, the purchase of sugar was very important. But aid in the normal sense, I don't think we had any substantial amount.

Mr. WALLNER. I thought there was some but I would have to check my records.

Mr. FASCELL. We had some military assistance, didn't we?

Mr. BINGHAM. Very little. I think we had a small amount of technical assistance less than in most Latin American countries.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, gentlemen. It is certainly good to have you here. Is the Cuban threat today to the United States as great as it was a few years ago?

General STEWART. No, sir. The Cuban threat to the United States, which was not very great several years ago, has not increased. So, there is not a serious Cuban military threat to the United States.

For example, the aircraft which they have, naval ships which they have, are defensively rather than offensively oriented. They do not have much of a capability against the United States.

Mr. WHALLEY. At that particular time there was a lot of question about what submarines and so forth were in Cuban harbors and we didn't seem to know anything about it.

Are we familiar today with what is going on in Cuba so far as Russia is concerned?

General STEWART. Yes, sir; we are able to keep a good track on Soviet naval deployments to Cuba.

[Security deletion.] Our information is pretty good in this regard.

Mr. WHALLEY. How about our naval base at Guantanamo? At that particular time, there were all kinds of threats; they shut off the water. In fact, Cuba and the United States were in the papers practically every day.

Are we getting along satisfactorily with the water supplies we have today?

General STEWART. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. They have never been turned on?

General STEWART. No. During the past year, things have been quiet with respect to Guantanamo. There have been one or two propaganda blasts in respect to Guantanamo. [Security deletion.]

So, this year things have been relatively quiet.

Mr. WHALEN. I was curious. You mentioned how many Russians are in Cuba.

How many Americans, civilian and military, are stationed there in Guantanamo?

Mr. WALLNER. About 6,000, including military dependents and support personnel.

Mr. WHALEN. Thank you.

Mr. WHALLEY. What is the total Russian commitment to Cuba each year?

General STEWART. I think their military commitment is to maintain just about the kind of force they have there now. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WHALLEY. Does this belong to Cuba or can Russia take it out any time, whatever military commitments there are in the way of military planes and vessels and so forth?

Mr. WALLNER. This equipment belongs to Cuba. But if the Russians wanted it, I am sure they could get it back.

Mr. WHALLEY. We were told that Russia was giving \$1 million a day to Cuba and they were very unhappy with what they were receiving in return.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; that is a reasonable estimate.

Mr. WHALLEY. What are they paying Cuba over and above the world price for sugar? What does that credit amount to?

General STEWART. I think we can look this up and give it to you.

Mr. WHALLEY. Someone mentioned the fact that United States-Cuba relations apparently would improve greatly if U.S. tourism was permitted in Cuba. What would U.S. tourism mean to Cuba? Would it not be much greater than anything that Russia has offered to date?

You get down through the Caribbean and see the American tourists everywhere—I was in Cuba in 1931; it was full of American tourists at that time. I have no way of knowing, but I would think it would mean at least a billion dollars or \$2 billion per year because Cuba is closest to the United States and I think has as much to offer as any other island.

General STEWART. Yes. If we may, I think we would like to take a little time to research that and provide it to the chairman for the record.

(The following was subsequently submitted for inclusion in the record.)

#### EFFECT OF RESUMPTION OF U.S. TOURISM ON CUBA'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE

The resumption of U.S. tourism would result in an increase in Cuba's foreign exchange, but not near the amount that the island received in pre-Castro days. Under Castro, Cuba has become a relatively drab island and has little of the appeal to the average tourist that the island had before Castro came to power. Although the Castro government is interested in expanding tourist facilities and would most likely seek to attract American tourists as a means of obtaining foreign exchange, it is not believed that large numbers of Americans would flock to the island and spend much money. The visitors would be primarily leftists, scholars, newspapermen, and the curious.

Mr. WHALLEY. [Security deletion.]

General STEWART. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WHALLEY. Does he trust Russia or does he just want to go far enough to get the aid from Russia but not have a takeover or find himself in second place?

Mr. WALLNER. We have indications that he does not trust them completely. He realizes his dependence on them for this aid and therefore is willing to go along with them. Where else can he turn?

Mr. WHALLEY. In your opinion, would it be better for us to resume or at least start off on a little thing, tourism, get that started and then get back to what would be the ouster of Russia, because they certainly would gain much more from us being so close than they could ever get from Russia some 5,000 miles away? You don't have to give that



opinion if you don't care too. But I would think it would be better for them, by far.

General STEWART. I can see a lot of good reasons for not being in a hurry about doing certain things with Cuba. I think we may have an example of not getting in too much of a hurry when you look at what is happening to the Soviets, for example, in Egypt. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WHALLEY. I think you stated that the other inter-American countries are a little wee bit afraid of Cuba's influence being too great and they don't quite trust Cuba and are about half afraid to accept the programs. I think this was helpful as compared with a couple of years ago when they were all accepting the guerrillas, trained guerrillas from Cuba, coming in and trying to upset their governments.

Has that continued now or has that guerrilla movement pretty well stopped?

Mr. WALLNER. Except in the countries that were listed in the briefing, sir; [security deletion].

Mr. WHALLEY. There has been great improvement industrially in the South American countries, especially like Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina, that a few thousand dollars would not mean as much to them now or outside influence when they are doing pretty well themselves.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; I think that is generally true.

Mr. WHALLEY. In other words, overall would you not think we are in better shape today with Cuba than we were a few years ago when they were threatening to have the missiles and everything else in shape to knock us out if they wanted to?

General STEWART. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. You are sort of optimistic enough to believe that maybe in the next year or two this feeling can be better? Has Castro still got the great hold on the people that he had?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. He still has his personal dynamic nature. He is still very popular with the man in the street.

Mr. WHALLEY. What percentage of the people in Cuba do you think might rise up if they had the opportunity in the country, who are not in favor of his—

Mr. WALLNER. Very small.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you want to supply that answer for Mr. Whalley for the record?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. Sugar subsidy programs paid by the Soviet Union to Cuba from 1960 through the middle of this year have amounted to \$1.1 billion.

If my recollection is correct, I think they are paying something like 2 or 3 cents a pound more than the current world market price.

Mr. FASCELL. What was the United States paying for Cuban sugar when we were friendly?

Mr. WALLNER. I do not know. I will have to provide that for the record.

(The following was subsequently submitted for inclusion in the record.)

#### U.S. SUGAR SUBSIDY PAYMENTS TO CUBA

During 1959 and 1960, the U.S. paid Cuba 5 cents per pound for raw sugar under existing regulations. This was 2 cents per pound above the world open

market price. In June 1960, when Secretary of State Herter called for a cut of the sugar quota, the price of sugar on the open market dropped from \$0.03 to \$0.0285 per pound. The following month, the U.S. eliminated Cuba as a supplier of raw sugar.

The total Cuban quota for 1960 had been 3,119,655 tons. When the quota was cut, all but 700,000 tons had been delivered. In addition to the quota, Cuba could have sold an additional 156,000 tons, bringing the total to 3,275,655 tons, worth \$327,565,500 under U.S. sugar regulations. Of the amount actually shipped to the U.S. in 1960, the world market value was \$145,179,300. Since the U.S. actually paid \$241,965,500, the U.S. subsidy to Cuba that year amounted to \$96,786,200.

When the quota was cut, Fidel Castro claimed that the quota system was a drain on Cuba's economic development because it forced Cuba to be a one-product country and tied the economy too closely to U.S. sugar interests.

Mr. FASCELL. Whatever Russia is paying Cuba for the sugar it is not in hard currency. They are not going to give the Cubans gold.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. So, what do they give them?

Mr. WALLNER. Development projects, equipment for their steel mills, fertilizer plants.

Mr. FASCELL. So, it is just a straight trade-off?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. It does not help Cuba's international financial posture, is that right?

Mr. WHALEN. Would it be in the form of credits, would it be applicable to products purchased from Soviet Russia?

Mr. FASCELL. It would be Soviet equipment. The Soviets will sell a tractor which you could buy from Czechoslovakia for \$2,500 less than you could buy it from Russia but they will insist that Cuba buy a much more expensive Russian tractor. They are not stupid. They are writing off their investment very fast.

It seems to me, that if you were able to compare every piece of equipment Russia is selling Cuba with the total amount of sugar Cuba sells to Russia, you would see that the Cubans are really getting no bargain.

Mr. WALLNER. That is true.

Mr. WHALLEY. They probably have to take things in barter for the sugar that they don't even need.

Certainly, as the Chairman says, if they received cash, then they would be prepared to deal wherever they could.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Because of Cuba's close ties with the Soviet Union and because of Cuban efforts to export revolution, the United States policy has been to isolate Cuba. As I understand our policy, we do not see any reason to change our policy right now. As the General has inferred, we might as well let the Russians suffer for awhile and let them pay for whatever they are getting; we ought not to be in any particular hurry to bail them out.

That is the way I understand U.S. policy.

Do you see any factors beyond those you have already testified about, either in the short run or in the long run, which might bring about any changes? Have you detected any trends such as a lessening of guerrilla activity, for example? Castro's listing of conditions at the end of a diatribe might be a trend. Recognition by Mexico, Chile, Peru and possibly the tendency in the Caribbean is a trend.

Do you see any trends which would impinge upon what is the present U.S. policy?



Are there factors, in other words, which may affect our policy without us having much to say about it?

General STEWART. I think one of the trends which we are all aware of and, of course, we have to take account of is these continued Soviet military and naval deployments to Cuba. The trend speaks for itself.

The trend is that you go from an old attack diesel-type submarine up through the G Class ballistic-missile submarine.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. We have all known, General, that this kind of trend was going to continue. From the very first time that there was a deployment, we did not have to speculate. Everybody knew what the Russians were going to do and they kept right on doing it. I don't know at what point we have to draw the line. I guess we have tried to draw it in some way.

Is this policy of gradual escalation by the Soviets in any way tied in with the Moscow summit or with our home porting arrangement in Greece?

General STEWART. I don't think it is now [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion] it is possible they might put themselves in a position to make a trade-off?

Mr. WHALEN. I think the word we use is "leverage," Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, leverage or trade-off.

What does the United States have in Guantanamo besides 6,000 people?

Commander HEEKIN. It is a training base. There are no combatants or submarines permanently stationed there. We usually have one or two diesel submarines to provide training. We have some auxiliary ships.

However, our ships come in and out of there. At any one time, there can be a dozen destroyers, an aircraft carrier, and so forth. These ships are not stationed there. They come down for 5 or 6 weeks' training and leave.

We also have aircraft, jets, I forget which types there are, which are stationed on the base with marine pilots; I think a squadron.

Mr. FASCELL. What does a squadron consist of?

Commander HEEKIN. Twelve aircraft at Guantanamo.

Mr. FASCELL. Basically, Guantanamo is a training base. We send naval units in there just to be sure that the base is open.

General STEWART. Yes, sir. I think the point should be made, Mr. Chairman, as a military planner and concerned with contingencies in the Caribbean, that a base such as Guantanamo is a fine asset so far as the United States is concerned, and so far as drawing up military plans are concerned.

Mr. FASCELL. We, of course, get inputs from other sources that seem to be in conflict with what you have just said.

General STEWART. It is my opinion, from the point of view of having to draw up contingency plans for the Caribbean area that Guantanamo is a good resource.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it really counted on in our contingency planning? How can we use it if it is right in the middle of Cuba? Why would you put anything in there?

General STEWART. I am talking in terms of the different kinds of contingencies that could arise throughout the area.

Mr. FASCELL. In case you had to use it, you would like to have it?

General STEWART. As a forward supply base, for example, it would be useful.

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe one of these days we can nail down just exactly what the Navy's policy is toward the Caribbean and South Atlantic. I have never been able to understand exactly how we view our active operational responsibility particularly in the South Atlantic.

Does anybody in here know?

Commander HEEKIN. The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, CINCLANT, has the responsibility for the South Atlantic, as he does the Western and North Atlantic.

Mr. FASCELL. That is defense responsibility?

Commander HEEKIN. Yes. Our own Navy only goes through the South Atlantic area transiting to the Indian Ocean or perhaps on our yearly UNITAS cruises where we go around the whole continent of South America and train with the friendly South American governments. Our own deployment down there are minimal.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there not an operational headquarters at Puerto Rico?

Commander HEEKIN. COMCARIBSEAFRON under CINCLANT, Commander Caribbean Sea Frontier, is stationed at San Juan. It is his responsibility for the defense of the Caribbean. He is an admiral. The commander at the naval base at Guantanamo is under him administratively and operationally.

Mr. FASCELL. He does not have any operational units, does he?

Commander HEEKIN. No. CINCLANT would have to send him ships.

Mr. FASCELL. It is a support facility and administration point?

Commander HEEKIN. Yes. But he could command—in crisis or wartime, he could command a ship under CINCLANT.

Over in Panama, we have CINCSOUTH, Commander in Chief, Southern Command. That command has been cut down a little.

General STEWART. I guess, Mr. Chairman, we are better prepared to talk about the Soviets in Cuba. It is more our line of endeavor.

Mr. FASCELL. Does Cuba have any submarines of its own?

General STEWART. No, sir; it does not have any submarines of its own. It has the ASW surface ships, the ones that conduct antisubmarine warfare, but they do not have any submarines. That, of course, is one reason why the Soviet submarines were down there. They took advantage of that Soviet visit, then, to give the Cubans a chance to exercise their ASW capability.

Mr. FASCELL. All that equipment you have shown on the chart is theoretically Cuban-owned and there has been a constant upgrading in quality. That is the way it looks to me. That seems to tie in directly with Russian escalation in improving their naval and air capability.

Are there any MIG-23's in or on the way to Cuba?

General STEWART. No, sir; I would not expect them to send any down there.

Mr. FASCELL. Why is that, General?

General STEWART. I think it is probably a more sophisticated airplane than the Cubans could handle. From the Soviet point of view, I don't think they would gain enough with the increased performance



of the airplane to go through all the problems that go with the spare parts and training of the maintenance personnel.

Mr. FASCELL. Plus raising the alarm.

General STEWART. That is true, too. But they have a good airplane, the export version of the MIG-21 is a good airplane for a small island, and operating over the top of your radars, it is probably as good an airplane.

Mr. FASCELL. How does the Fishbed J MIG-21 compare with U.S. aircraft?

General STEWART. It is comparable to the U.S. Air Force F-104, which was about a 1960 aircraft.

Mr. FASCELL. How many generations are there above the F-104 now?

General STEWART. About two.

Mr. FASCELL. That is where a Fishbed J is?

General STEWART. It is two down the line.

The Russians approach the problem a little bit differently than we do. The MIG-21 is a very old airplane. It is a 20-year old airplane, but they continue to update it, improve it, go back and change the engines, and they change the wings and change the fuselage, and so on and so forth. Their approach is different from ours.

But it is a good airplane for the Cubans, and for what they are trying to do with it down there.

Mr. FASCELL. The last time we talked, it seemed to me that we had pointed out that there were at least three major airfields in Cuba that could be used for military aircraft. Are they strictly military, or are they jointly used?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; they are strictly military.

Mr. FASCELL. Would you mind telling where they are, and generally what is at each base?

Mr. WALLNER. The San Antonio de los Banos, south of Havana, [security deletion].

Santa Clara, in the central part of the island [security deletion].

Holguin, in the eastern part of the island, [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. What about aircraft support facilities? How do you rate those?

Mr. WALLNER. Very good.

Mr. FASCELL. Modern?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. They obviously can take the TU-95?

Mr. WALLNER. Any of those three can. The TU-95 in their visits have used the international airfield, Jose Marti, south of Havana. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

General STEWART. We have watched the Bear flights carefully. [Security deletion.] I assure you we are watching it very closely.

Mr. FASCELL. General, what is a MIG-23? Is that a figment of somebody's imagination?

General STEWART. Could I answer it off the record?

Mr. FASCELL. Sure.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. General, I get the impression from what you have told us that we have some reason to believe that the Russians are interested in bettering relationships between the United States and Cuba. Am I correct?

General STEWART. No, sir.

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. We have some evidence that Cuba is interested in better relationships with the United States?

Mr. WALLNER. They might be, if all of their conditions were met.

Mr. FASCELL. The point was not whether the conditions would be met or not. The point was that the door was not closed.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You stated that there were conditions, which meant that it was not a total standoff.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. At least that is one interpretation. We don't know whether it is true or not.

We have no information from any other sources that there is any kind of feeler going out anywhere on this whole question?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. The reason I keep asking that is because I just hate to see us get in a bind because of the force of events in the Western Hemisphere, so that we don't have any choice. It seems to me that we ought to have something to say about what is going to happen. The way it sounds from what I have heard in the last several briefings is that it is just a question of time.

I am not arguing the merits or demerits of the issue. I am trying to analyze what the posture of our foreign policy will or will not be at a given point in time if the present projection keeps going.

Do you get the same feeling that I do, that the question of future United States-Cuban relations is just riding along?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; I get that impression.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me turn it around another way and be specific.

Is there a National Security Council paper on United States-Cuban relationships which projects U.S. policy toward Cuba over the next year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, or 5 years? Do you know of such a document?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

General STEWART. No, sir; and we would not necessarily know that.

Mr. FASCELL. They would not call you in on it?

General STEWART. We are continually called in to prepare estimates on the situation, but we would not necessarily know what document was being written or rewritten at any given point.

Mr. FASCELL. When was the Defense Intelligence Agency last called in by the National Security Council on the question of Cuba-United States relations?

General STEWART. We have not been called in on that, and that is because that is not the way the system happens to operate. That does not mean that the way the system is operating is not proper, or it is not operating right.

If the National Security Council, for example, to address your question, if they were working the Cuban problem, and I assume that they do this through a continuous process, they are using the latest intelligence [security deletion]. It is a continuous process.



Mr. FASCELL. Only if there is a difference in evaluation would they ever come back. Is that right?

General STEWART. Yes; if there is a difference in evaluation, we would know it. [Security deletion.]

I would like to make the point—

Mr. FASCELL. You mean as far as NSC review is concerned?

General STEWART. Yes; and as far as our providing current and updated intelligence information.

Mr. FASCELL. You provide intelligence estimates every day?

General STEWART. That is right. So we keep those people informed, just as we keep you informed.

Mr. FASCELL. So what NSC is or is not doing may not be within your purview?

General STEWART. We would not necessarily be called in.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the scuttlebutt?

General STEWART. I am sorry, sir, that I cannot be more helpful.

Mr. FASCELL. Secretary Laird said on television Sunday that the Soviets have been using Cuba as a reconnaissance base for some time prior to the arrival of the TU-95. What was he talking about?

General STEWART. I don't know. The only aerial reconnaissance I am aware of is that which has been flown by the Bears, that kind of reconnaissance.

Mr. FASCELL. Maybe he might have been talking about the intelligence collectors—what is the intelligence collector? What kind of vessel is she, and what does she do?

General STEWART. The Soviets have so-called intelligence collectors which are similar to their ships, very similar in nature to the U.S.S. *Pueblo*. Their job, of course, is to collect electronic signals, just exactly like the *Pueblo*. That is the Soviet intelligence collector.

Mr. FASCELL. I suppose that is reconnaissance of a sort.

General STEWART. Yes; the Secretary could have made reference to that.

Mr. FASCELL. Does that reconnaissance which you described to us today in any way improve Soviet capability? The TU-95 went out and looped around the Atlantic and came back. What does that do for them?

General STEWART. So far as we can tell, the kind of thing that particular flight did, I believe there were some U.S. naval units en route to a NATO exercise in the Norwegian Sea area. We believe that the Bear aircraft overflew those U.S. naval units and got a position on their Atlantic transit.

Mr. FASCELL. They could have done it from the Russian end just as easily.

General STEWART. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. They have that capability, do they not?

General STEWART. That is right. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Would it be fair to conclude that the Russians were trying to kill two birds with one aircraft by flying to Cuba and flying reconnaissance?

General STEWART. It is showing their presence, [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. General, we have to ask this question every time you are here, but since it comes up frequently, we have to get the answer every time we see you.

Are there any offensive weapons in Cuba which could inflict any significant damage on the United States?

General STEWART. No, sir; there are not. I think we have a high degree of confidence. As you know, we have the U-2's that overfly Cuba.

[Security deletion.]

The Soviet weapons systems which are in Cuba have a good defense capability, but they do not give the Soviets or the Cubans an offensive capability.

Mr. FASCELL. On this list of equipment in Cuba, is there anything in the way of a missile or aircraft that can reach the United States and do any damage?

General STEWART. No, sir; these aircraft are the kind of aircraft that would be assigned to an air defense force, protection of the homeland.

Although I suppose you could put some iron bombs under the wing and deliver a few iron bombs in a daylight situation, it is not the kind of thing that anybody would do rationally.

They do not have an offensive capability.

Mr. FASCELL. Another question that comes up is whether or not there are any planes or missiles hidden in the extensive caves that seem to underlie all of Cuba?

General STEWART. [Security deletion.]

We have high confidence that there have been no Soviet weapons systems such as missiles, intermediate range missiles, as were introduced before.

Mr. FASCELL. Another question that comes up is what is going on on the Isle of Pines.

As I recall, on the south side of the Isle of Pines, the water drops off to 600 fathoms almost immediately. Do we have any information on any unusual activity at the Isle of Pines?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; we don't. [Security deletion.]

We continue to get the same reports you refer to. We are watching it, and we will keep watching it. As of right now, there is nothing of military significance.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we have any information on any significant shifts of population from any one part of Cuba to another?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; we do not.

General STEWART. The Isle of Pines is a sort of test area. It is a place where they go down and fire their missiles, for example.

[Security deletion.]

If anyone had some sort of indirect access to activities in Cuba, with that kind of activity going on, it would tend to stimulate a few rumors.

Mr. FASCELL. You have covered air and navy, but you have not covered the army in Cuba. Does the army have Soviet equipment, mobile equipment, and if so, how current is it? Give us an example.

Mr. WALLNER. It is, again, post-World War II vintage, including their T-34's, T-54/55 tanks. It includes some FROG rockets, which is a free rocket, not a guided missile.

They have artillery, including their 130-mm., 122-mm., and 152-mm. howitzers. They have 120-mm. mortars and the conventional armament for a defensive army.



Mr. FASCELL. How many men does Cuba have under arms in its military establishment? What is the condition of the army, and its capability?

Mr. WALLNER. They have about [security deletion] men under arms. This includes the active and the reserve army, the air force, and the navy.

The condition of their army is that they are reasonably well equipped with conventional weaponry, as I have just described. They do a good deal of training, particularly during that period of the year when the sugar harvest is not in process. And there are indications that they are becoming more proficient, they are escalating the size of units that they train.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know whether my memory is accurate on this point, but was it ever true that at one time Cuba had a 600,000-man military establishment?

Mr. WALLNER. Not to the best of our knowledge, sir, unless that source, and I am not familiar with it, although I also have seen figures that have gone that high, unless that source included several paramilitary type organizations, their police, their department of state security, their border guard forces, which are essentially sort of like our border patrol units. In addition to those three there is a civil defense unit which is a rear guard and industrial security type organization. We do not have firm figures on its size.

It is possible that this has [security deletion] thousand persons involved, but they are paramilitary in nature, not military. They would only be able to provide limited military capability in the event of hostilities. They would be filler for army units.

Mr. FASCELL. How long has the Cuban military establishment been at or about [security deletion] people?

Mr. WALLNER. Since about 1965, sir, about that level, with minor variations.

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Are the phone lines still open between the United States and Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. I think select ones are; yes, sir. My counterparts in the State Department inform me that they can talk to the Swiss Embassy in Havana on the phone.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you know whether or not an ordinary citizen can pick up the phone and call Havana?

Mr. WALLNER. It seems to me there was a report not too long ago that some man in New Jersey had tried and was unsuccessful.

Mr. KAZEN. General, when you say that these airplanes and all these ships had been deployed, had left to join the Northern Fleet, what are you talking about? Where is their Northern Fleet, their North Atlantic Fleet?

General STEWART. Was this in reference to the reconnaissance flight?

Mr. KAZEN. Yes, sir.

General STEWART. There was a NATO exercise conducted off the western coast of Norway during the past 2 or 3 weeks. There were some U.S. naval units which were en route from the United States over to join that exercise.

Mr. FASCELL. From Norfolk?

General STEWART. Yes. We conjectured that these Soviet Bear flights were for the purpose of locating the U.S. naval units which were going to Norwegian waters.

Mr. KAZEN. Where were their planes going when they went back?

General STEWART. The Soviet airplanes?

Mr. KAZEN. Yes.

General STEWART. When they left Cuba to go back?

Mr. KAZEN. Yes.

Commander HEEKIN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. KAZEN. That is a distance of how far from Cuba?

General STEWART. It is probably about 5,000 miles.

This is a four-engine propeller airplane. It has a range of about 8,000 nautical miles.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I would like to ask three more military questions before we move on to some economic ones.

Do we have any evidence or knowledge that the Russians are in command positions in the Cuban military establishment?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; we do not. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. We get continuing reports that there are young officers within the Cuban military, particularly in the army, who are anti-Castro. Do we have any reliable information on that?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. Do the Cubans maintain any identifiable guerrilla training camps in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Are we fairly certain that a program is continuing?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. That is, a training program in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. That people are being brought into Cuba for training in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; we are.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we have any knowledge of Cuban activity in the Caribbean, particularly in Puerto Rico, the smaller islands, or the Bahamas which are coming up for independence on July 10.

Mr. WALLNER. The only indications we have is propaganda that the Cubans have released in support of the Puerto Rican independence movement, sir; [security deletion] and also by the special committee of the United Nations decision to study the question of Puerto Rican independence.

With regard to the other Caribbean islands, Cuba has a consulate in Jamaica. They also have some trade with Jamaica, and also with Trinidad and Tobago.

Mr. FASCELL. Where would we get an overall briefing on conditions in the Caribbean, not related to Cuban activities?

General STEWART. We can provide that.

Mr. FASCELL. We may have to do that sometime soon, General. I have been very nervous about what is going on in the Caribbean.



We are talking now about millions of people, and a lot of governments. I have the distinct feeling that as far as the United States is concerned, first, we don't care, and, second, we are out. I just don't think that is good.

I am for getting more information as soon as things quiet down here and we get another chance to take a look at what is going on in the Caribbean.

Now let us talk about economics. You said the sugar crop was the lowest or smallest that they have ever had?

Mr. WALLNER. The second smallest on record, sir. We don't have firm figures on this year's harvest. We are estimating about 4 million tons.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the reason for that? Bad administration, weather, or a combination of factors?

Mr. WALLNER. It has been weather, bad administration. More importantly, it has been the effort that the Cubans put into the 1970 harvest, when they were shooting for 10 million tons. You may recall they only obtained 8.5 million. That was a massive, countrywide effort. Everybody and everything was involved. In trying to reach this goal, they have damaged a lot of crops, they have hurt the transportation systems. They have seriously impaired many of their mills. This has had its effect.

Mr. FASCELL. Have all the mills been changed over now? They used to have American equipment. How are they operating?

Mr. WALLNER. I will have to give you the answer later on that, sir.

(The following was subsequently submitted for inclusion in the record:)

#### EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO CUBA BY U.S.S.R. FOR REFINING SUGAR

The Soviet Union has extended Cuba some [security deletion] in credit, exclusively for the sugar industry. Most of this has gone toward purchases of equipment to renovate and reequip many of Cuba's [security deletion] sugar mills, [security deletion]. Examples of equipment purchases probably include steam presses, generators, and high pressure heating vats. In addition, some of the credit extension has most likely gone to purchases of railroad rolling stock and trucks for hauling cane to the mills.

Mr. FASCELL. What about their public transportation? Do they have any in Cuba? The only buses they were getting were from the British.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. They get some Leyman buses from the British. Other transportation is in sad straits. Their automobiles are older.

Mr. FASCELL. They don't have any assembly plants for automobiles and trucks in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. All of them have to be imported through a straight trade deal with the Russians?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Because they don't have any hard currency, they cannot buy it.

What about their fuel and energy needs? Is all of that supplied directly by the Russians?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; most of the equipment is supplied by the Russians. I think there is some that comes from other East European countries, a small amount. The bulk of it is from the Soviet Union.

Mr. FASCELL. What does it require, oil and coal?

Mr. WALLNER. Oil and coal primarily; yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we know the magnitude of their requirements?

Mr. WALLNER. In terms of tonnages?

Mr. FASCELL. Or however you measure it.

Mr. WALLNER. We probably have that available.

(The following was subsequently submitted for inclusion in the record:)

#### CUBA'S NEEDS FOR FUEL AND ITS SOURCES

Cuba's fuel requirements have steadily surpassed its supply since 1966 causing serious petroleum shortages. This has led to rationing and an attempt to eliminate waste rather than cut back production and economic growth. Of all POL requirements, those for fuel oil, used to keep Cuba's basic industries running, have consistently been the highest, normally representing over half the total fuel consumption. Electric power, sugar, nickel, and cement facilities use about [security deletion] percent of the total fuel oil consumed and are the greatest consumers of fuel oil.

The greatest increase in consumption, however, has been in gas-oil required to operate the heavy machinery, military equipment, and transportation vehicles which Cuba has received over the years. The requirement accounts for between [security deletion] percent of all fuel consumption. [Security deletion] the gas-oil consumed is allocated to the Agriculture and Transportation Ministries, with another [security deletion] percent used by the Ministries of Construction, Fishing, Industries, Sugar, Water Resources, and Food. The remaining gas-oil is believed used principally by the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. The requirement for gasoline has diminished with the decrease in the number of privately owned automobiles, and accounts for less than 20 percent of total fuel needs. The remainder of the POL requirements is for kerosene, primarily for household use.

While there are no exact figures for Cuba's fuel requirements, it is estimated that approximately [security deletion] metric tons of POL will be consumed this year, [security deletion]. The surplus, or reserve stock, is believed earmarked for military use. These reserves are sacred to Cuba, but at times of severe shortages, they too have had to be used for other than military requirements [security deletion].

Cuba is almost completely dependent upon imports to satisfy fuel requirements. There is a small domestic production capability and some [security deletion] metric tons are produced annually, but this accounts for less than [security deletion] percent of total supply. Cuba has explored for additional petroleum reserves but without success. Nearly all imported petroleum comes from the USSR. Thus it is estimated that Cuba will import some [security deletion] metric tons of petroleum this year. Of this, about [security deletion] metric tons are in refined products and the rest in crude oils. Cuba's two refineries, one in Havana and one in Santiago de Cuba, then turn out the refined products needed. They have a refining capability of [security deletion] tons a year.

Mr. FASCELL. We would like to get an idea of what would happen if the Russians shutoff a valve overnight. What would happen to Cuba? It would be disaster; would it not?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir. It would be very dark and cold.

Mr. FASCELL. All they have to do is stop sending the tankers and freighters in there. Cuba would come to a stop.

Mr. WALLNER. For all practical purposes; yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. They are totally dependent on the Russians for energy and fuel needs.



What is our information with respect to the actual shortage of the necessities of life in Cuba? We hear all kinds of different reports. What is your estimate?

Mr. WALLNER. Sir, there is rationing of almost everything, particularly the consumer products or anything that even comes close to being a luxury.

Mr. FASCELL. You are talking about food and clothes?

Mr. WALLNER. Food, clothes, and other consumer products.

Mr. FASCELL. Housing?

Mr. WALLNER. Housing to a lesser degree.

Long lines are every place waiting to get their weekly supply of food.

Mr. FASCELL. How about medical care?

Mr. WALLNER. There are lines there, also, as I recall. The Cuban Government is making efforts to have their medical facilities expanded throughout the major cities so that people can get to clinics.

Mr. FASCELL. Local clinics?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; clinical facilities, so that the people can get the attention they need.

There has been an interesting development lately. The Cuban Government is now making a couple of luxury products more available. One is rum, and the other is cigarettes. But there is a catch to it. They have upped the price. The price on a liter of rum used to be 5 pesos. It is now 25 pesos. Cigarettes are about the same.

Mr. FASCELL. The Cuban Government is still monolithic; is it not?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. What about Chinese influence?

Mr. WALLNER. We have no evidence of significant Chinese influence at all.

Mr. FASCELL. How about Chinese influence in Guyana? Is that related in any way with Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; we see no tie-in of that with activity in Cuba. The Chinese relations in Guyana is primarily of a trade nature, at this point in time, at least.

Mr. FASCELL. Mexico has been having some problems lately. I believe they threw out a whole bunch of Russians not too long ago.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any Russian involvement in the apparent increase of guerrilla activity in Mexico?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. What about the alleged landing of the 23 Cubans in Mexico? Is there any truth to that?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. We think that may have been a fishing vessel that got lost.

Mr. FASCELL. It could have been a Mexican press release?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Last week, the Latin American foreign affairs chief of Russia (Dimitry Zhukov) was in Brazil, and a man named Nikolay Alekseyev was in Brazil on a secret mission. What were they up to? Do you know?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. How about supplying that for the record, if there is anything.

(The following was subsequently submitted for inclusion in the record:)

SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET OFFICIALS VISIT TO BRAZIL

Nikolay Borisovich Alekseyev, a representative of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, visited Brazil between August 10 and 15 for high-level talks on subjects to be discussed in the United Nations General Assembly.

[Security deletion.]

Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Dimitri Aleksandrovich Zhukov is visiting Brazil in conjunction with the Export 72 Trade Fair in São Paulo. He will travel to Brasilia for talks after the fair, ostensibly to promote Soviet-Brazilian trade agreements.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Recently in Colombia they uncovered a large guerrilla network and at about the same time discovered a spy allegedly working with the Soviets. Is there any truth to that? Do we know anything about it?

Mr. WALLNER. They have expelled a Swedish newsman, allegedly for espionage activities, for being a KGB agent in Bogotá, Colombia, earlier this year, sir.

[Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. We have had continuing reports, particularly after the tragedy at the Munich Olympics, that there is a worldwide organization of guerrillas and terrorists. Do we have any information that there is any kind of cooperative or coordinating group throughout Latin America?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; we do not.

Mr. FASCELL. Castro, as I understand your testimony, is basically supporting indigenous groups that do not pose a threat to the local governments.

Mr. WALLNER. That is correct, as they exist now.

Mr. FASCELL. Your estimate last year was that there had been a decrease in total guerrilla activity in Latin America generally as well as in that emanating from Cuba. What is your estimate today?

Mr. WALLNER. It has remained at that level on both counts.

Mr. FASCELL. Could you give us some information or analysis of the significance of the Conference of Caribbean Revolutionary Groups that was held in Georgetown, Guyana?

Mr. WALLNER. It appears to have been a political image building effort by the man in Guyana, Jagan, or something of that nature.

The meeting, itself, did not accomplish a great deal. They all agreed that they should be anti-American, anti-imperialistic. It just seemed to be a lot of rhetoric and propaganda that came out of the conference.

The countries involved were Trinidad and Tobago, Puerto Rico, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Surinam, and French Guyana.

Mr. FASCELL. Do we know all the participants, the individuals?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; we do not.

Mr. FASCELL. I gather from what you tell me that we don't attach very much significance to the meeting.

Mr. WALLNER. No, we do not. Propaganda, primarily.

Mr. FASCELL. Does Cuban policy today, which seems to be an isolationist policy, have an ideological purpose, if any?



Mr. WALLNER. I am not sure I understand the question, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. With respect to the United States, or the West, Cuba seems to be maintaining an arm's length posture.

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Does that have an ideological base in terms of creating the "new man," or whatever it is they are creating?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; it probably does. We believe Castro's philosophy is that development of societies in the so-called Third World must be independent from capitalism and U.S. influence. He believes that these societies must develop from revolution by the working classes. During the mid-1960's, Castro felt that the Cuban Revolution best exemplified this ideology and, therefore, he should be the Third World leader. Since then, pressing domestic problems, increasing dependence on the Soviet Union, failures in exporting revolution, and perhaps, the realization that the capitalistic world must be considered forced Castro to abandon his goal of Third World leadership. It remains likely, however, that he still harbors the same ideological views.

Mr. FASCELL. Would you say that it is fair to assume that because of Castro's total dependence on the Soviets, his effectiveness is also reduced?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. What about Cuban espionage in the United States?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I recently read a detailed report complete with quotes, on the tough treatment of hijackers in Cuba. Is that true?

Mr. WALLNER. Our indications are that they are not welcomed with open arms, that they are treated roughly; yes, sir. They are a nuisance for Castro because of mental unbalance in a lot of cases.

Mr. FASCELL. So while we would like to have them back for purposes of trial and for other reasons, the truth of the matter is that they are incarcerated in Cuba.

Mr. WALLNER. That is correct. Most of them are; yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Earlier this year, the DOD adopted new orders authorizing the use of force in any altercation on the high seas between Cuban vessels and ships of third nations.

While it all appeared in the Wall Street Journal, and they had the exact quotes from the orders, we have not been able to get a copy yet. Have there been any incidents involving the application of these orders?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; there have not. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Cuba said they were CIA ships. Were they?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; they were not [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. At that particular time, when they were seized, were they under any U.S. contract of any kind?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; not that we know of.

Mr. FASCELL. As I recall it, the Cubans have given those two ships back to the Panamanians, and we are confronted with the problem of what we are going to do about it, since they are technically owned by U.S. citizens.

Mr. WALLNER. They have not actually given them back, sir. They have agreed to do it early next month. There has been a hangup. According to press reports, the Cuban Government has told the Pana-

manians that we won't actually give them to you until you can guarantee that they won't be used in subversive activities against Cuba. [Security deletion.] I personally think they will be released shortly.

Mr. FASCELL. Did the orders that we talked about a few minutes ago have any effect on Soviet policy or Cuban policy, so far as we know?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; I don't think they have any effect, so far as I know.

Mr. FASCELL. Is there any indication that the Cubans or Soviets are involved in the extensive drug traffic in the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Has your agency been requested to supply any information at all on this problem, General?

General STEWART. I don't know of any.

Mr. WALLNER. I don't know of any, only as we come under DOD.

Mr. FASCELL. I was thinking you might have been consulted about how it relates to the military in the Western Hemisphere, but you evidently have not been.

Castro went to Chile and he went to Africa. Did that have any impact on his relationships with the Russians?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir; none that we know of. We think this was part of his image-building process, a part of his effort to reinforce the trend that he has seen developing in South America and to build friendship among the East European and African nations.

Mr. FASCELL. While he was gone for 65 days, who ran the country?

Mr. WALLNER. Primarily his brother, Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, Raul Castro; and the President, Osvaldo Dorticos.

Mr. FASCELL. Do they look like natural successors if something happens?

Mr. WALLNER. Raul looks like the natural successor at this point in time. Second behind him might be the Minister Without Portfolio, Rodriquez; and behind him Dorticos.

Mr. FASCELL. Is our estimate the same, that if Fidel Castro dies, nothing will really change in Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Are the Soviets interested in the freedom flights, the exiles coming out of Cuba to the United States or to Spain?

Mr. WALLNER. We have seen no evidence of their interest in those flights.

Mr. FASCELL. Has Cuba increased its vigilance to prevent people leaving Cuba?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir; they have increased their patrols, and their internal security apparatus to where it is quite effective.

In addition, they have built a fence around the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo, which was completed last year. It is their fence. It is on their property. It is in addition to the fence that serves as a boundary line. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Are the Soviets involved in the security system?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Is it routine for Soviet or Cuban vessels to ask identification of other vessels on the high seas?

Commander HECKIN. No, Mr. Chairman. The warships customarily ask perhaps each other, merchant ships, by flashing light for identification, but that is a traditional thing that is done at sea.



We have no information of Cuban or Soviet ships taking any aggressive attitude toward any ships at sea in demanding to know who they are, so forth.

Mr. FASCELL. Are Soviet vessels being fueled and provisioned in the United States?

Commander HEEKIN. Not naval ships, sir. There is some merchant trade, you know, with this country. I presume that fuel for their return trip, water or something like that, is available to the merchant ships that come here to the United States.

Mr. FASCELL. Can Russian ships pick up cargo in the United States? Could they go out, for example, and act as mother ships to smaller naval vessels out on duty or patrol?

Commander HEEKIN. Not those ships. The ships are engaged in cargo carrying back to the Soviet Union. Of course, there are extensive fishing fleets off mostly the eastern coast. I cannot recall that any of these fishing vessels have come into the United States. They stay at sea and support their smaller ships at sea.

Mr. FASCELL. Last year we had some information about construction of an airfield and a new road at Cienfuegos. Obviously, it is to tie in supply capability in that area in the event it was ever used. Is that completed? Is there any new evidence of construction activity with regard to the road or tunnels?

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. So there is no real urgency involved about what they are up to?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. The remaining facilities in the area have stayed pretty much as were presented to you last year, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Getting back to guerrilla activity for a moment, General, would you supply for the record whatever detailed information you have on guerrilla training in Cuba?

General STEWART. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You said you think they have about [security deletion] training centers. Where are they, how many people are involved?

(The followed was subsequently submitted for inclusion in the record:)

#### FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN CUBA FOR TRAINING GUERRILLAS

The number of confirmed guerrilla or subversive training facilities in Cuba gradually declined during the late 1960's and early 1970's. This reduction is directly related to Cuba's shift in the export of revolution from a broad approach to any movement that asks for support to a highly selective process of providing limited support to viable organizations. [Security deletion.] Subjects taught at the active facilities include political subversion, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and sabotage.

Mr. FASCELL. I am trying to get an idea of the magnitude of Cuba's operation in terms of effort and people.

Are the Chileans supporting guerrilla movements around Latin America?

General STEWART. No, sir.

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. None that we know of. They are besieged with a lot of internal problems of major magnitude.

Mr. FASCELL. They do not supply money to anybody?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. If Castro is taking it easy, with respect to exporting revolution and supporting these groups, and the Chileans are not able to do it, is anybody else doing it? Do they have any external support—Chinese, Russian?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Do we have any information that guerrilla support is from the United States, either directly or indirectly?

Mr. WALLNER. No, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. I want to ask a couple of fast questions. Is the equipment that Russia is supplying the latest, newest equipment, or is it obsolete?

Mr. WALLNER. Military equipment is essentially fairly old.

Mr. WHALLEY. It is the material that they probably would want to get rid of?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. How about the automatic weapons? Do they have M-16 rifles?

Mr. WALLNER. The principal small arm is the AK-47 rifle, which is a semiautomatic.

Mr. WHALLEY. How about the Cubans—do they train easily? Do they really want to be aggressive fighters, or are they going to be not able if something would happen?

Mr. WALLNER. They train quite well. Indications are that the training is being improved constantly, and that they are becoming more involved in it.

Mr. WHALLEY. They would never do as well as the Soviets?

Mr. WALLNER. No; I don't believe so.

Mr. WHALLEY. What is a TU-95? Is that a plane?

General STEWART. Yes, sir. That is this large Soviet reconnaissance airplane that visits Cuba periodically.

Mr. WHALLEY. How about the U-2? We used to have U-2's flying over Cuba. How high would they fly?

General STEWART. They still overfly Cuba. They fly on the order of [security deletion].

Mr. WHALLEY. They cannot be brought down with anything that anyone has today. Is that right?

General STEWART. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WHALLEY. You say we still do this?

General STEWART. Yes.

Mr. WHALLEY. Do they know we do it?

General STEWART. Yes.

Mr. WHALLEY. Do they have anything like this flying over the United States?

General STEWART. No, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. This is [security deletion] feet up. Is that right?

General STEWART. That is right.

Mr. WHALLEY. Does Castro have an efficient government, balanced budget? How about national debt?

Mr. WALLNER. I will have to get those figures for you, sir.

(The following was subsequently submitted for inclusion in the record:)



## THE CUBAN BUDGET

Budgetary information on Cuba has not been published since 1966. The overall trend can be seen by comparing the budgets of previous years. They are as follows, expressed in billions of Cuban pesos (officially 1 peso=1 U.S. \$):

1961	-----	1.4
1962	-----	1.8
1963	-----	2.2
1964	-----	2.4
1965	-----	2.5
1966	-----	2.7
1967 (estimated)	-----	3.0

It is estimated that the Cuban budget is in the general vicinity of 4 billion Cuban pesos. The budget is probably balanced only in the sense that Soviet economic aid to Cuba enables it to make up the differences between revenue and expenditures.

Mr. WHALLEY. Guantanamo, is it the base that it used to be? As I remember, there used to be thousands of Cubans working at Guantanamo. They were let out, of course, by President Johnson when they had difficulty.

Mr. WALLNER. There are not thousands now. There are only 250 Cubans working on the base. There are also about 1,000 Jamaicans working on the base.

Mr. WHALLEY. Does Guantanamo have the same efficiency now as it did then for our country?

Mr. WALLNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. Was it not a sort of Navy base in addition to training?

General STEWART. Yes, sir. It is an efficient base.

Mr. WHALLEY. How about our bases in the Caribbean? Are they just as strong, or phased out because of different type of weapons?

General STEWART. Fewer bases than there were 5 or 10 years ago. The bases are well equipped. They are as well or better equipped than they were 5 or 10 years ago; yes.

Mr. WHALLEY. Along with the chairman, I want to thank you very much.

Where is the Isle of Pines?

Mr. WALLNER. It is southwest of the main island, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. How far?

Mr. WALLNER. About 30 miles.

Mr. WHALLEY. Alcatraz?

Mr. WALLNER. Alcatraz is inside Cienfuegos Harbor.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. FASCELL. Do you expect Soviet air and naval visits to continue at or about the same rate that they have? About three naval visits per year?

General STEWART. Yes, sir; that would be a good estimate.

Mr. FASCELL. Is your statement just based on their track record, or do we have some specific knowledge or is there some arrangement in the mill?

General STEWART. Some of it is looking at it in historical perspective. If you are looking at it in terms of Soviet requirement, I don't see that they have a requirement to come down more often than that. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. The point was whether the United States had said that this would be a satisfactory level, and whether we have said it directly or indirectly or by inference or by "agreement" or "understanding."

I have not discovered what the last "understanding" meant, much less the new one.

General STEWART. I have no direct knowledge, but I don't believe there is any sort of agreement that says two visits or five visits or three visits. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. We were talking earlier about a trend that would be helpful to Castro in terms of his relationships. I am not too sure of who the help is for, there. I think it is more the help of the Russians than it is Castro.

I am wondering about how Panama might be involved in this whole thing. Would it make sense to have a Cuban-Panamanian-Russian understanding with respect to a "trend?"

Mr. WALLNER. We see no agreement between those three principals. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Mr. WALLNER. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you very much. We will adjourn this meeting. I express my appreciation to all you gentlemen for being so cooperative and thorough.

General STEWART. Thank you. We appreciate the opportunity.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)



## APPENDIX

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### ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANTE B. FASCELL AND REPLIES BY DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Question. Has the remaining TU-95 aircraft flown any additional missions since September 11?*

Answer. As of 28 September, the (TU-95) BEAR D aircraft remaining in Cuba had flown no additional missions.

*Question. What kind of support has Cuba provided Chile's security agency?*

Answer. [Security deletion.]

*Question. What is the reaction of the Allende government and the military to the provision of Cuban arms to Chilean leftists?*

Answer. [Security deletion.]

*Question. In November of last year, DIA reported to the Subcommittee that no formal arms agreement had been reached between Chile and the Soviet Union. What is the present state of Soviet-Chilean military cooperation?*

Answer. There is yet no known formal agreement. [Security deletion.] The Soviets have been extremely eager for the Chileans to accept some equipment [security deletion].

[Security deletion.]

*Question. [Security deletion.] Was Staf a Soviet agent and is the USSR considering direct involvement in Guerrilla activities?*

Answer. Swedish journalist Karl Staf's precise connection with Soviets has not been determined. [Security deletion.] Staf is a known Soviet sympathizer and has been active in Communist Party affairs for many years. [Security deletion.] The Colombians chose to expel him from the country [security deletion].

[Security deletion.] Since Colombian-Soviet relations were reestablished in 1968 after a 20-year break, the Soviets have tried to maintain a relatively low profile. [Security deletion] on two occasions have expelled Soviet officials.

[Security deletion.]

