AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

JOINT RESOLUTIONS

TO CONSIDER APPROVAL OF INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

JULY 20, 27; AUGUST 2 AND 9, 1972

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
82-108 WASHINGTON : 1972

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[1] An index to these hearings appears on p. 149.

AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

TUESDAY, JULY 20, 1972

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:20 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman MORGAN. The committee will come to order.

This morning the Committee on Foreign Affairs begins consideration of resolutions expressing congressional approval of the Interim Agreement on limitation of strategic offensive arms concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Two agreements were signed affecting strategic arms limitation at the time of the President's visit to Moscow last May.[1]

The agreement on defensive weapons has been submitted in the form of a treaty to the Senate only for its "advice and consent."

The Interim Agreement on offensive weapons has been submitted to both Houses of the Congress for approval. This approval is to be given through the passage of a joint resolution.

Several such resolutions of approval have been introduced into the House and today's hearing is concerned with them.

On June 15, the President addressed members of this and other concerned committees on the subject of these arms limitation agreements.

At the time he said:

> I think that the hearings that you will conduct must be searching, because only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and only in that way will the nation also be convinced.

Mr. Secretary, this committee intends to give full consideration to this legislation, and to the agreements. For that purpose, hearings will be held during the next 2 weeks.

To open this series, we are privileged to have with us this morning Secretary of State William P. Rogers. He is accompanied by Hon. Gerard C. Smith, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chief U.S. negotiator at the SALT talks.

Do you both have statements or just one of you has a statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary ROGERS. I have a statement; also Ambassador Smith will be able to answer any questions on specifics of the negotiations themselves.

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[1] For text of agreements, see p. 117.

Chairman MORGAN. You may proceed.

Secretary ROGERS. It is a pleasure to meet with this committee to support the treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and the Interim Agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

The President, in his June 13 letter to Speaker Albert, urged congressional support for the two agreements. He asked for an expression of support from the House of Representatives for the Interim Agreement.

The two agreements before you represent an uprecedented step in controlling strategic arms. These agreements lay a basis for enhancing strategic stability. They are concrete evidence of what can be achieved through patient negotiation.

The United States and the U.S.S.R. remain competitors with important differences between them, but both recognize that there can be advantages in reaching agreements in certain areas.

Placing limitations on strategic arms is a continuing process. The United States and the U.S.S.R. will seek additional mutual limitations.

The SALT agreements are not only in the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union; they are in the interests of all nations. They are the most significant achievements to date in the era of developing negotiations.

SALT PROCESS ITSELF USEFUL

The SALT process has in itself been useful. The negotiating dialogue has led to greater understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As a result of the SALT talks and SALT agreements, we appreciate and understand better Soviet interests and concerns in the strategic area—the most sensitive area with respect to national security—as they do the concerns and interests on our side.

This has led to a more accurate perception of each by the other, which should be an important contribution to a more stable relationship between us.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

Mr. Chairman, during the course of the SALT negotiations over the past several years, we have endeavored to maintain close contact with the Congress, and to consult regularly with our allies.

I understand the SALT delegation consulted with Mr. Zablocki's subcommittee on a regular basis. We have undertaken this continuing consultation in order to ensure the broadest possible support for agreements reached.

The administration is pleased that the Congress is giving full consideration to these two documents. Our allies have approved of the results of SALT, and recognize them as enhancing our common security interests.

I believe there is also broad support for these agreements in the Congress. Judging them on their merits based on a realistic assessment of what has been achieved, can, I submit, lead only to a positive conclusion.

A "ROUGH BALANCE" IN STRATEGIC FORCES

As you know, in the mid-1960's the United States chose to concentrate on improving its strategic offensive weapons through modernization programs, rather than deploying more missile launchers.

The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, was engaged in an intensive program to increase the number of its missile launchers. Enhancing U.S. security by strategic arms limitations seemed good sense to the present administration when it came into office early in 1969.

We faced a situation where there would be in the not-too-distant future a rough balance in strategic forces between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

However, there was not then, and there is not now, any question that the United States could and would maintain strategic forces adequate to meet its security requirements—forces second to none.

This situation presented an opportunity to maintain a sound strategic posture and—at the same time—to achieve a more stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union through success in SALT.

The agreements that have been reached achieved these objectives.

The President recognized that a continuing arms race would be pointless. Intense strategic competition could only dissipate resources and make more difficult the bettering of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations which might otherwise occur in other areas to the advantage of the American and Soviet peoples, and, indeed, of all peoples.

The administration, therefore undertook detailed studies to prepare for what the President has termed the most important arms control negotiation in history.

HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations began in November 1969, in Helsinki. We learned quickly that both of us had much to learn about how the other viewed the strategic situation. The early dialog was devoted mainly to exploring strategic principles and establishing an agenda to guide the more detailed negotiations to come.

In the next several rounds of discussion, alternating between Vienna and Helsinki, problems developed with respect to the scope of initial limitations.

Although various comprehensive approaches and proposals were discussed, it became doubtful that a single comprehensive agreement could be negotiated as a first outcome of SALT.

The U.S.S.R. had been pressing for an initial agreement only limiting ABM systems. It was our judgment that the first outcome of SALT should include limitations on offensive as well as defensive strategic forces, since an agreement only limiting ABM's would make less of a contribution to strategic stability.

The problems in SALT that made it evident that an initial single comprehensive agreement was not likely were resolved by the breakthrough announced by the President on May 20, 1971.

As you recall, it was agreed to work out a definitive limitation on ABM's, and at the same time to agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

The May 20 understanding provided a new impetus for the negotiating process. A number of major issues, and many more lesser ones, re-

mained to be addressed by the negotiators. The main issues were two: how much limitation of offensive forces could be agreed, and how to formulate mutually acceptable specific limitations on ABM's.

SALT AGREEMENTS: CONTRIBUTE TO STRATEGIC BALANCE

The two agreements reached as a result of the ensuing year of negotiating on these difficult questions will contribute to maintaining a stable strategic balance and thereby reduce the likelihood of nuclear war.

In the ABM Treaty, both sides have committed themselves not to build nationwide or heavy ABM defenses. The importance of this undertaking is fundamental. It places both sides in a position where neither will have a substantial defense against major missile attacks. In effect, we agree to maintain mutual deterrence.

I am convinced that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced as a result of the ABM Treaty.

BASIC PROVISIONS REVIEWED

I think it would be useful now, Mr. Chairman, for me to run through some of the basic provisions of the two agreements. I will not go into detail since the committee has before it the documents transmitted by the President, which include a detailed article-by-article analysis.

As I said at the beginning, at the conclusion of my remarks, Ambassador Smith will be glad to join with me in answering questions.

Our aim in both agreements has been—where necessary—to put detailed obligations in the texts of the agreements themselves.

If one of the sides had a preference for including clarifying material or elaboration in agreed interpretations, and this was sufficient, that approach was used.

The agreed interpretations include initialed statements and other common understandings. They have been included in the President's transmittal package to the Congress.

The transmittal package also included formal unilateral statements of U.S. views in certain cases where agreement could not be reached. There are, Mr. Chairman, and I want to make it clear there are no secret agreements.

What we have submitted to the Congress represents the agreements that were reached between the Soviet Union and the United States.

THE ABM TREATY

Let me start with the ABM Treaty. It is a definitive agreement of unlimited duration, the central feature of which is the commitment by both sides to no more than a low level of ABM defenses, at two small and widely separated locations.

The treaty permits deployment of one ABM complex in an ICBM deployment area, and one for defense of the National Command Authority. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers and an equal number of associated interceptors at each complex, for a total of 200.

Strict limitations are placed on ABM radars, a matter of particular importance since radars are the long leadtime item in deployment of an ABM system.

Important limitations are also placed on deployment of certain non-ABM radars to contain their potential for application to an ABM role.

Because of the tehcnical complexity of the radar issues, intense and protracted negotiation was required to resolve them.

QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON ABM'S

The commitment to low ABM levels is further enhanced by several important qualitative limitations. We and the Soviet Union have agreed not to develop, test, or deploy:

1. ABM systems or components that are sea based, air based, space based, or mobile land based;

2. Automatic or semiautomatic or other similar systems for rapid reloading of ABM launchers;

3. An interceptor missile with more than one independently guided warhead; and

4. An ABM launcher capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, or to modify launchers to give them such a capability.

Such undertakings are important. It may be of even greater importance that both sides have agreed that future types of ABM systems based on different physical principles, for example, systems depending on such devices as lasers, that do not consist of ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, cannot be deployed even in permitted areas. So there is a limitation on what may be employed in the ABM systems now in operation and it prohibits the deployment of new esoteric systems in these areas.

I might note, Mr. Chairman, that limiting ABM's to these low levels will increase the deterrent value of each of our offensive missiles for retaliatory purposes. In the long term it should be possible to achieve greater deterrence at a lower cost.

One of our principal aims in SALT has been to reduce tensions, uncertainties, and high costs which go hand in hand with an upward spiralling strategic arms competition.

We could have maintained a strong strategic posture without the SALT agreements, but in that event, beyond continued expenditures for maintaining a sufficient defense posture in the circumstances of a very low level of Soviet ABM deployment, there would have been heavy pressures as a result of unconstrained arms competition to spend additional billions of dollars for widespread ABM systems and greater offensive forces.

COST SAVINGS FROM SALT AGREEMENTS

Cost savings from these first SALT agreements will be limited initially. It is not possible to predict when particularly significant savings can be achieved, but this is certainly our aim.

The agreements which have been achieved will result in break in the cycle of action and reaction in the strategic arms area, which, until now, has been a principal factor in pushing the strategic arms race.

In the agreements there is a general undertaking not to provide an ABM capability to non-ABM systems. One important aspect of this

prohibits the upgrading of antiaircraft systems to provide them with an ABM capability.

Conversion or testing of non-ABM systems, or components of such systems, to perform an ABM role is prohibited. This further reinforces the prohibition on a nationwide ABM defense.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

In order to monitor compliance with the undertakings in the ABM Treaty, and in the Interim Agreement, it has been agreed to rely on national technical means of verification.

The provisions of the agreements were developed so that we could rely for verification on such national means. Modern national technical means of verification provide the most practical and effective assurances of compliance.

Mr. Chairman, we have full confidence that we can adequately verify the agreements by the use of our national technical means of verification.

I believe it important to point out the very basic commitment that each side not interfere with the other's national technical means of verification and not use deliberate concealment to hinder or impede the effectiveness of these means of verification.

I have mentioned the importance we attach to a continuing and developing strategic dialog with the U.S.S.R. to lend support to what has been achieved, and to assist the effort to place additional limitations on strategic arms in the future.

A manifestation of this is another significant "first" in American-Soviet arms control.

STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

A Standing Consultative Commission to be established under the treaty will consider, on a regular basis, such matters as the operations of the treaty and questions of compliance.

Also, the commission will have as one of its tasks to consider proposals to enhance the viability of the treaty.

Although the ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration, it contains a withdrawal clause under which either party can withdraw on 6 months' notice if it ever decided that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the treaty had jeopardized its supreme interests.

An appreciation of the impact of the ABM Treaty obligations is fundamental to a sound judgment of the merits of the two agreements looked at together.

Achieving limitations on strategic offensive forces in conjunction with the ABM Treaty assuredly enhances the importance of the overall achievement.

THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

The interrelationship between limitations on both the offensive and defensive sides of the strategic equation, which we have continued to stress, is reflected in the intention expressed in the agreements to continue active negotiations to limit strategic arms.

U.S. views as to the particular importance of the offense-defense relationship were contained in a formal statement made by Ambassador Smith, which set forth the position of this Government that if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within 5 years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized, and should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

This right of withdrawal protects U.S. security interests if the follow-on negotiations do not succeed and if the strategic situation should develop in such a way that we felt the need to exercise our withdrawal right.

Before turning to the Interim Agreement, I want to make one point which is perhaps not fully appreciated.

NEED FOR PROCEEDING WITH NCA ABM SYSTEM

Questions have been raised as to the need for proceeding now with the second ABM site—that is, at the NCA—permitted under the treaty.

The administration believes we should move forward now with that site. We believe it prudent, as early as possible, to have this form of insurance against a situation where, because of our inability to assess the nature of an attack and thus to make timely decisions, an unwanted nuclear exchange could be triggered.

This is not a population protection defense. Its mission would be to protect the national command authority against an unauthorized or accidental strike. Its radars would also afford additional warning in case of a general nuclear attack.

THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL

Let me now, Mr. Chairman, briefly discuss the Interim Agreement and its associated protocol. The Interim Agreement essentially freezes for up to 5 years the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers on each side.

This curbs the momentum of the Soviet offensive missile launcher buildup, but places no limitations on ongoing or planned U.S. offensive programs.

Under the agreement, the future effectiveness of our retaliatory deterrent can be insured. The Interim Agreement freeze is limited in duration and scope.

However, it provides time and creates a good basis for further negotiations. It is our hope that it will be replaced well before 5 years by a more comprehensive agreement.

The agreement includes a basic undertaking not to construct additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers, and not to convert launchers for light or older ICBM's into launchers for heavy or modern ICBM's. Thus, the numbers both of light and heavy IBCM launchers cannot be increased.

The fact that the agreement does not specify the number of ICBM's operational and under construction when it was signed is not of importance, since the construction of even one new ICBM for operational purposes is banned.

When we made clear to the Soviet Union that we consider their number of ICBM's to be 1618, they did not dissent. But the point is that no further ICBM launchers may be constructed.

LIMITS ON SLBM LAUNCHERS

SLBM launchers are frozen at present levels, except that additional such launchers can be built so long as they replace older strategic launchers on a one-for-one basis.

A ceiling on operational modern submarines—Y-class nuclear-powered submarines—for the U.S.S.R. has been set at 62. A ceiling for SLBM launchers for the U.S.S.R. has been set at 950, to include all launchers on nuclear-powered submarines—Y-class and H-class submarines, and modern launchers on older submarines—G-class diesel-powered submarines.

The Soviets are permitted no more than 740 launchers on nuclear-powered submarines of any type, operational and under construction, except as replacements in accordance with agreed procedures for other older strategic launchers.

The figure 740 is a negotiated figure; it establishes a clear and unambiguous baseline which avoids uncertainty or debate over the definition of "under construction."

Thus, the first SLBM launcher after the 740th launcher must be a replacement. The older ICBM or SLBM launcher being replaced will have to be dismantled beginning no later than the date on which the submarine containing the 741st launcher begins sea trials.

Launchers for modern SLBM's on the G-class diesel-powered submarines would also have to be included in the 950 SLBM launcher ceiling.

Both sides may improve their missile forces through modernization and replacement. The restriction against converting launchers for light or older heavy ICBM's to launchers for modern heavy ICBM's, however, places significant restrictions on the U.S.S.R.

Conversion of our ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles and conversion of Polaris submarines to handle Poseidon missiles by contrast, is not prohibited.

Modernization may relate both to launchers and missiles. There is an agreed interpretation that the dimensions of launchers will not be significantly increased through modernization, and a further understanding that the word "significant" prohibits an increase in a launcher dimension greater than 10–15 percent.

AREAS NOT COVERED BY AGREEMENTS

We were unable to reach agreement on a definition for a heavy missile. In the end, our delegation made a formal unilateral statement that the United States "would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM."

The Interim Agreement does not cover all strategic delivery vehicles. For example, aircraft are not limited. Mr. Chairman, the United States has a very large advantage in this area. The Interim Agreement also does not cover systems not presently in existence. An

example of this would be mobile ICBM's. Our delegation did state that the United States would consider deployment of operational mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of the agreement.

The Interim Agreement provides for the application of the same verification procedures and commitments about nonconcealment and noninterference that are contained in the ABM Treaty.

Thus, national technical means of verification, in which we have full confidence, will monitor compliance with the obligations undertaken.

The Standing Consultative Commission will also be used to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement.

Both sides commit themselves in the Interim Agreement to continue active negotiations for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms.

The agreement also provides that its terms shall not prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations which may be worked out during future negotiations.

EFFECT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

The effect of the Interim Agreement is to place limitations on current Soviet offensive programs, but not current U.S. programs.

The Soviet Union may not increase the aggregate total of its strategic offensive missile launchers.

Taken together, the limitations on Soviet strategic offensive forces plus the low ABM limits on both sides are decidedly in the United States security interest.

United States strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect U.S. and allied security interests, and under the Interim Agreement will remain so.

The SALT agreements make a major contribution in protecting our security and in moderating many of the dangers we would otherwise face over the next several years.

It is because of the potential dangers that have not as yet been brought under control that the United States must keep its strategic forces up to date if they are to continue their central role for deterrence. We must keep these strategic forces up to date.

These forces must be such that no one underestimates our ability and determination to protect U.S. and allied security interests.

BENEFITS OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS

Mr. Chairman, the SALT agreements—dealing as they do with the central security interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—respond to each side's interests.

Otherwise, we could not expect them to last very long. In strategic arms limitation, both countries gain, or neither does.

Through these agreements, we shall be able to maintain—and even increase—a sound U.S. strategic posture. A brake has been applied to the build-up of Soviet strategic forces.

There will be a break in the action-reaction pattern that up to now has fueled strategic arms competition. These agreements create a good basis for further negotiations to limit strategic arms, and enhance the prospects that such efforts will be successful.

As a result of our current success we are provided a more secure and stable strategic relationship with the U.S.S.R. And, I believe, Mr. Chairman, the security of the United States has been strengthened.

The gains of the United States and the U.S.S.R.—and the world—through SALT are achieved without compromising basic security interests.

International security and world order are preserved and strengthened. The threat of nuclear war is dramatically reduced, and the world thus has greater hope for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I urge this committee and the House of Representatives to support the agreements that have been reached in SALT.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TIMETABLE FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, am I correct that questions are to be answered by you and Ambassador Smith?

During the White House briefing on the SALT agreements in June, the President indicated his desire to have congressional action completed by September 1 in order that further negotiations with the Soviets could go forward in October.

Do you at present have concrete plans to resume further arms talks with the Russians in October?

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, our position is the position that you have just referred to which was stated by the President.

We would like very much to have the agreement approved and the treaty ratified by that time because we would hope to start the second phase of the SALT talks in October. I don't believe a specific date has been set yet but that is our goal, and I think that is the goal of the Soviet Union.

Maybe Ambassador Smith will reply to that.

STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD SMITH, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Ambassador SMITH. The evidence we have, Mr. Chairman, is that the Soviets are ready to start as soon as we are and the only limiting factor is approval by the Congress of the first product of SALT.

We are doing preliminary planning on a contingency basis in terms of housekeeping and other arrangements abroad, but have not been able to set a date under the present circumstances.

Chairman MORGAN. Ambassador Smith, if it is not possible for Congress to complete its action on the agreements before the August 18 recess for the Republican Convention, what would be the effect on current plans?

Would it be possible to go forward with the talks despite no final action?

Ambassador SMITH. The answer to that question, sir, is how soon after the resumption, presumably after Labor Day, the Congress could act.

I think that we cannot make a commitment for a date to start negotiations until we have the action of the Congress, favorable action, on the first agreements.

Secretary ROGERS. I think, Mr. Chairman, to answer that question, the likelihood of being able to start as early as we would like to is greatly reduced unless this Congress acts by the 18th.

I certainly would want to have the committee and the Congress to act by that time if at all possible. I think it is important now to continue the negotiations, and I think it is also important to indicate to the Soviet Union that the agreements that the President has signed have the support of the Congress and the American people and I think the earlier we do that the better.

Now we would like very much to start these negotiations in October.

DID HASTE AT MOSCOW HURT U.S. POSITION?

Chairman MORGAN. Ambassador Smith, I know you have testified on the other side of the Capitol. I have been reading that certain individuals in the other body have charged that due to the rush to have the SALT agreements signed by the time the President visited Moscow last May, the United States has put itself over a barrel in terms of bargaining its position.

As a result, according to the story the self-imposed deadline led to major concessions by the United States which gravely increased the disadvantages to us in the final agreements.

What is your comment on those charges, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador SMITH. My instructions from the President were not to consider that I had any deadline, that we were to negotiate provident agreements and not look at any specific point in time as a deadline.

In fact, that is the way it worked out. The discussions in Moscow were not conducted in a rushed fashion. They were based on a large amount of negotiation that had already taken place, in Helsinski, and I don't believe that they resulted in any concessions because of time pressure.

I don't believe there were any major concessions in Moscow.

AN ABM SYSTEM FOR WASHINGTON, D.C.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, there has been a great deal of criticism about the need to build an ABM system around the Capitol. How important do you feel that building this system is to carrying out the SALT agreements?

We know that several weeks ago, it was suggested in the House, Congress might be opposed to the ABM system for Washington and that we should go slow because in the new phase 2 of the negotiations we might realize that this section of the ABM agreement would be unnecessary.

How do you feel about that?

Secretary ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, as you will notice in the prepared statement, I indicated we think we should proceed with that ABM construction.

We do think it is important. We think when we make agreements with the Soviet Union that it is clearly intended that they will go ahead as permitted under the agreements and we should, too.

There was no doubt in the minds of the Russians when we talked to them that they were going to proceed within the limits permitted and we feel we should, too.

I think it is important to proceed. I think we should proceed as we would have otherwise proceeded. I don't think we should slow it down or speed it up. I think we should proceed in the way we think serves our national interests but we do think it is important to go ahead with the ABM site at the National Command Authority.

BREZHNEV AS SIGNATORY TO AGREEMENTS

Chairman MORGAN. I have a second question. I notice the President signed the agreements with Chairman Brezhnev, who is general secretary of the Communist Party. Wasn't it unusual that he didn't sign with the Chief of State or the Prime Minister, but signed rather with the general secretary of the Communist Party?

What are your views on that?

Secretary ROGERS. Because we recognize the right of every nation to decide on how it will run its government, and who has the authority, we fully recognize the authority of Chairman Brezhnev to sign these agreements and, of course, we didn't question it.

You undoubtedly noticed that all the other members of the government were there, and those who were not members of the government, the politbureau.

By and large, I think there were 11 or 12 there. It is quite unusual. Some agreements Mr. Kosygin signed, and some agreements Mr. Podgorny signed. Those were decisions by the Soviet Government.

AN ABM SYSTEM FOR WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Mr. Secretary, I think it is pretty obvious the ABM complex around Washington is going to be controversial. In your prepared statement, you emphasized, and then again in response to the chairman, that you think it is important but you have not given us much of a scenario as to why it is important.

Secretary ROGERS. I assume there will be separate hearings on that and I think we should have hearings. I guess there is a provision in the present budget for the acquisition of some land for that purpose; isn't there?

Ambassador SMITH. There are requests for some preliminary planning work.

Secretary ROGERS. I am sure Congress will have full opportunity to go into the details of it but the reasons I think it is important to proceed are the reasons I mentioned in my statement.

Mr. MAILLIARD. As I understand the situation, the Soviet Union in effect has deployed an ABM system around its National Command Authority. We have gotten fairly well along in developing one around one of our main ICBM bases and had started on some others, as I understand it.

Secretary ROGERS. Those we have agreed to abandon.

Mr. MAILLIARD. And we are permitted to build one around Washington, but it seems necessary to explain pretty clearly what advantage it gives us to proceed with the defense of the National Command Authority. Maybe this is not the right time to ask that question.

Secretary ROGERS. I think it is the right time. I don't know that we can go into detail but, one, it protects against an accident or unau-

thorized launch and gives us additional time as a result of the radar equipment we have to detect a serious attack.

So, it does have advantages and I think we can explore them more fully at the appropriate time.

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION

Mr. MAILLIARD. Also in your prepared statement you, a number of times, stressed your confidence in a national technological method of——

Secretary ROGERS. Verification.

Mr. MAILLIARD (continuing). Verification. Again, maybe this is not the appropriate time, but it seems to me if we are going to do an intelligent job of trying to sell this whole proposal not only to the Congress but to the public at large, this needs to be expanded on to some extent.

You stress that both in the treaty and the Interim Agreement that it is understood that there is—how did you put it?—nonconcealment?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; no attempt to interfere with detection methods and no concealment of missiles under construction, et cetera.

Let me say this: If the committee wants to, of course, in executive session, we are prepared to go into this matter fully.

I don't believe there is anyone that has any doubts about the detection systems that we now have. We are certain that they provide adequate protection against the violation of the agreements.

We don't say that there might not be a beginning made that we could not detect, but very quickly before it had any substantial meaning it would be detected.

We could also detect if there was any method of interfering with our detection methods.

The Soviets feel the same way. I don't believe that it is a matter of concern.

OPERATION OF STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Mr. MAILLIARD. If it should happen in the course of these agreements being enforced that we did detect something that gave rise to concern on our part that maybe something was going on that ought not to be, could you tell us a little bit more about how this standing commission is to be constituted and whether it is to meet regularly and whether it is a forum for any complaints, or doubts, or questions.

How is this going to operate?

Secretary ROGERS. I will turn this over to Ambassador Smith.

Let me merely say, the fact that we have this commission is, I think, a very good safeguard. It would provide a method immediately to discuss any such suspicions if the suspicions were verified, if it turned out there was violation, like any other agreement, then it would be subject to cancellation if a party violates it.

I believe that the fact that we have a commission and there is an agreement that we will discuss any such matters together provides adequate protection.

This is one area I don't think we should have any concern about, this question of noncompliance, because I think we will be able to detect any such noncompliance and they will, too.

ROLE OF COMMISSION

Ambassador SMITH. To answer specifically your question, sir, about the Standing Consultative Commission, Article XIII of the treaty covers it and lists a number of the functions that this commission will have. The first three directly bear on your question.

One of the functions is to consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous.

The second is to provide on a voluntary basis such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed.

The third is to consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification.

As for the question you asked about the operation of this commission, we do not yet have a charter for it. I think one of the first things we will want to do in the follow-on negotiations is to work up an agreed charter for this commission.

Personally, I have in mind a body that will meet periodically. I hope that it will not be very large. Perhaps while the SALT negotiations continue, the delegations themselves can be considered as functioning as a standing commission.

But, in time I would think that there might be five or ten officials on both sides, meeting two or three times a year regularly to look into the operations of these agreements.

It is recognized that we can't foresee the future very clearly, and we will want to monitor the operation of these agreements regularly.

Mr. MAILLIARD. In the course of agreeing to this commission, at least I can't find anything in here that spells out whether it is going to have a permanent home or a permanent secretariat or whether it is going to meet on an ad hoc basis.

None of these things appear to be spelled out but I would assume you must have had something fairly specific spelled out?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, sir; that is correct.

That will be spelled out in the charter, and I hope one of the first things we will get to.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Will that commission also have jurisdiction—I have article XIII of the treaty, but does it also have monitoring authority as far as the agreement is concerned?

Ambassador SMITH. No, sir; the commission will have no responsibility to take action. It will be a consultative commission.

Mr. MAILLIARD. But applying both to the treaty and the agreement?

Ambassador SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the very outset, Mr. Secretary, I want to underscore your understanding that Ambassador Gerard Smith and his associates had consulted with the subcommittee of this committee.

They have given full and complete regular reports and the consultations with the subcommittee are deeply appreciated, and we are hopeful in the future we will have cooperation with the SALT agreements and negotiations.

PROBLEM OF LAND-MOBILE MISSILES

There is a question why the United States was unable to obtain agreements from the Soviets banning mobile missiles. What is the strategic importance of such missiles and is there a grave danger the Soviets might deploy such missiles without the United States knowing about it?

Secretary ROGERS. I would like Ambassador Smith to discuss this at greater length. This was the subject of long negotiations by the delegation.

I think I can say at the moment we don't believe it is an important factor in the planning of the Soviet Union.

Certainly it is not in our planning. We attempted to have some language in the Interim Agreement to that effect, to ban them, but we were not able to achieve that. But as I said in my statement, Ambassador Smith made it clear if there was any attempt to employ such mobile missiles, we would consider it a very serious violation of the spirit of the agreements and I think they understand that.

This is a subject that will, of course, be discussed further at the next phase of the SALT talks. We do not think that they could employ mobile launchers for missiles except over a short period of time.

Over a short period of time we think they would be detected so we don't think this would be a significant strategic factor.

WERE THERE SECRET UNDERSTANDINGS?

Mr. ZABLOCKI. This understanding that you have on mobile missiles, that you referred to, it further encourages this question. There has been speculation that there were some discussions or understanding between the United States regarding the SALT agreements which were either not put down on paper but understood by both sides but not yet made public.

Are there such understandings, and, if so, when will, or can, they be made known to the Congress and the American public?

Secretary ROGERS. There are no such understandings. This is one where we made a unilateral statement. Ambassador Smith can explain it.

PROBLEM OF LAND-MOBILE MISSILES

Ambassador SMITH. May I first say that the rationale that the Soviets gave for not wanting to include mobile missiles was twofold. They said this is just a freeze, it is not a definitive limitation on all offensive strategic weapons. Therefore, since mobile ICBM's are not in existence on either side, they should not be covered by a freeze.

Second—and they didn't say this, but it is my surmise—they want in the subsequent formal agreement to have mobile missiles permitted under some sort of aggregate ceiling. They don't want to have that option closed and, therefore, they didn't want to set any precedent or prejudice that outcome by agreeing to what, in effect, would be a complete ban on mobile missiles during this interim negotiating period.

On the question of our capability to detect any deployment, I don't think I can improve on the Secretary's analysis, I think that is quite right.

POSSIBILITY OF A MIRV BAN

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We were unable, of course, to have any serious negotiations on MIRV's. Yet, Mr. Secretary, on page 12 listing the agreement not to develop certain phases of ABM's and interceptor missiles—would this be an indication that in SALT phase 2 negotiations we may look forward to some agreement on banning MIRV's?

Ambassador SMITH. I think the two questions are quite separate. The multiple target warhead for defensive missiles is a relatively marginal question. No such systems are in existence at the present time and as long as you keep the level of the interceptors very low as we have, to 200, it does not offer potential for expansion of the defense capabilities.

Whereas in the offensive field, as you know, we have already deployed a substantial number of MIRV's. The Soviets have not yet tested any and I think that they would not agree to a MIRV ban. They indicated they would not, on the terms that we proposed at least, back in 1970.

Whether in subsequent negotiations we will go for a MIRV ban or not, or some sort of MIRV limitation, we are not now in a position to say.

We do not yet have our guidance on the subsequent negotiations. But I don't think one should take very much comfort from the fact that the Soviets have agreed to this in the defensive field and consider it as a precedent for a MIRV ban in the offensive field.

PROXY WARS AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Secretary, you end your prepared statement with a very optimistic note that the threat of nuclear war is dramatically reduced and the world thus has greater hope for the future.

Some speculate, indeed, since the chance of nuclear warfare has lessened among the superpowers, that the liklihood of smaller proxy wars among the smaller nations may, indeed, have increased.

Is this, first of all, in your opinion, true and, if so would it not therefore equally be important to seek some kind of international agreements to stop or limit proliferation of nonnuclear weaponry and lastly, is the Nixon administration prepared to aggressively seek such agreements?

Secretary ROGERS. I think you are correct. Among the smaller nations there is some slight concern on the score you mentioned. I had discussions with some leaders on this subject in my recent visits.

I don't believe it is a realistic concern, but in any event, there is no reason why this is not a subject that should be discussed and considered at a European Security Conference which may take place in 1973.

It certainly is a good reason for encouraging other nations to sign and ratify the NPT, which has the very objective that you referred to, of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons and to do what we can to minimize the concern that is felt on the part of some.

As I say, I don't believe it is a realistic concern. I think that the threat of nuclear war, as I said in my statement, has been dramatically reduced as a result of the ABM Treaty, and I think that is recognized by most nations.

When you think about it and just limit your thinking to the ABM Treaty, you will see why that is the case. Both of us have agreed not to protect our populations. Each of us recognizes that a first strike would not succeed in destroying the other nation's retaliatory capability.

The result is that each of use realizes that a nuclear war would be the destruction of both countries. That seems to me to be about the strongest possible deterrent human beings can be living under, that realization.

The thought that other nations will engage in nuclear conflicts I don't think is realistic.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Frelinghuysen?

PRAISE FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin by congratulating Ambassador Smith and other members of our delegation for the substantial achievements they have accomplished. I hope that Ambassador Smith especially will continue in his present position, because it does seem to me he has a very unique experience and he certainly has proven his ability, so I hope you have no plans for a change of activity, Ambassador.

I was very much interested in the discussion——

Secretary ROGERS. In that connection, he said he is tired of hotel rooms and is looking for a small house.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I hope he can find something suitable.

UNA REPORT ON NPT RATIFICATION

The discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty calls to my mind the fact I met yesterday with some individuals who were discussing the new report issued by the United Nations Association.

They seem much concerned about the fact that a number of countries with nuclear capacity have not ratified the treaty. I don't know how much leverage we have, but I assume it remains a high priority objective to secure ratification of more nations to the Treaty?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

ROLE OF THE HOUSE IN SALT PACTS APPROVAL

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is not clear to me yet the relationship between the treaty and the Interim Agreement is or why the House is involved in the process of approval.

Of course, it is good for our own self-esteem to be brought into a problem like this that normally would fall to the lot of the Senate.

This is called an Interim Agreement. Does this have anything to do with an executive agreement. It is called interim because it is not substantial enough to be called a treaty; is that it?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct. But it is an agreement of considerable importance. It relates to the treaty for obvious reasons, reasons I mention in the statement.

Therefore, they should be acted upon together. We did not submit the Interim Agreement to the Congress because of congressional self-esteem, but we think it is a matter of national interest, and we think the House should give full consideration to the agreement and in a

sense to the treaty itself, although, as you point out, you do not have the power of ratification. But they are of such significance, these two agreements, that we felt it was desirable to have full consideration by Congress.

I think it was a wise decision.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is a peculiar role for the House.

You spent most of the time talking about the treaty, which, in theory, has no relationship to our immediate responsibilities, yet the Treaty is so bound up with the Interim Agreement that you couldn't appreciate the agreement without understanding what the treaty provides.

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

I suppose we could have proceeded on the basis that it was only necessary to get ratification of the treaty and the agreement could be signed by the President without any congressional authority, but we decided that was not the wise course to follow for the reasons I mentioned.

Your analysis is correct. They are linked together. They are linked together in the Interim Agreement itself. It says this Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notice of acceptance by each party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the treaty on the limitation of ABM's.

PRESIDENT'S POWERS ON AGREEMENTS

There is a clear expressed linkage.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The Executive would have the power to notify them of an acceptance once the treaty is ratified without respect to a formal approval of the Interim Agreement, would he not?

It is a judgmental decision on the Executive's part that he wants full approval of both documents before the notice of acceptance is——

Secretary ROGERS. As long as we have proceeded this way, I would rather not get involved in a controversy over the President's power.

In this case it is academic.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wasn't looking for a contest. I think this is a good thing. There is an increasing interest on the part of Congress in Executive agreements.

But this is a different kind of agreement.

Secretary ROGERS. That is right.

THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It is not clear to me, either, about the way the Standing Consultative Commission will work.

I think Ambassador Smith said their responsibilities would have to do with enforcement of both the agreement and the treaty. I don't see any reference to the agreement in the description of what the consultative commission's responsibility would be.

Ambassador SMITH. There is a specific provision in the Interim Agreement: Article 6, which spells that out.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Yes, I had not seen that.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan?

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am delighted that we have reached this stage in these negotiations and certainly there could be no more significant objective for the major powers than to bring about some control of the use of nuclear weapons and I also want to express my appreciation as a Member of Congress for the dedicated efforts of Ambassador Smith through this whole long period of negotiations.

I think that he has made a great contribution to the Nation in this work.

POSSIBILITIES FOR LAUNCHER IMPROVEMENT

This communication to the Congress from the President says that the agreement provides for restriction of 5 years on strategic offensive missile launcher deployments.

I think it is true, however, that this does not act as a complete straitjacket on the Russians, isn't that so?

There are certain things they can do under this agreement?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Zablocki referred to the mobile launchers. You said that Mr. Brezhnev indicated that they were going to go ahead with certain developments. What was he referring to at that time, specifically?

Secretary ROGERS. He was referring to the fact that they intend to continue construction of their offensive weapons within the limitations prescribed by the Interim Agreement.

We didn't go into the details, of course; what he is saying, in effect, is, you understand that there are limitations on the construction of offensive weapons and we are going to continue to do what we can within those limitations.

We indicated we would, too.

LIMITATION ON NUMBERS OF LAUNCHERS

Mr. MONAGAN. Now, there is a limitation on the overall number of launchers, is that so?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

Mr. MONAGAN. Within that limitation, is it a fact that the heavy launchers are at a stage where that number can be increased?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

Mr. MONAGAN. There is no leeway between the number that exists at the present time and the limitation?

Secretary ROGERS. On the ICBM launchers, they cannot start any new construction of those launchers. They can improve within the present system so they could increase the number of warheads on a missile but they cannot build or start construction on any new ICBM silos.

Mr. MONAGAN. The number of warheads could be increased by modernization?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, just as we can.

Mr. MONAGAN. Is that a serious defect in this whole agreement?

Secretary ROGERS. It is not a defect in the agreement, it is a recognition that we have not reached a comprehensive agreement on offensive weapons yet.

That is why we are going to have a second phase of the SALT talks.

Mr. MONAGAN. It does, in your opinion, leave something further to be desired in a substantial way?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, sure.

INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIETS

Mr. MONAGAN. Also involved in this whole matter, I think, is the credibility of the negotiators. There are indications and activities elsewhere of the U.S.S.R. that clearly show that they are willing to move ahead in rather dangerous proceedings.

Ambassador, what is your appraisal?

Do you believe there is a serious, bona fide desire on the part of the Government of the U.S.S.R. to bring about real progress in controlling these weapons?

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, I do, Mr. Monagan.

I think that regardless of what Soviet policy in other areas is, and hopefully it will be more constructive after the summit meeting than before, they do have a purpose to control strategic arms with us.

They have, I think, succeeded in compartmenting to some extent their strategic arms policy and I think they realize it is in their interests to avoid a completely unlimited competition in strategic arms.

Mr. MONAGAN. And the civilian aspect of the Government of the U.S.S.R. is effective in persuading the military that this is an objective that should be pursued?

Secretary ROGERS. We are not sure how they do it, but we are sure of the conclusion Ambassador Smith just mentioned. I don't think there is any doubt about that conclusion.

Mr. MONAGAN. I am delighted that that is the appraisal and I certainly want to express my hopes that we will move ahead and into the other areas and that we can continue to achieve concrete results.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. du Pont?

VERIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENTS

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, some of the other Members have touched briefly on the question of policing and I think some of the questions I have had best wait for an executive session.

But, in article 5 of the Interim Agreement on the limitation of offensive arms, and I believe in some other places, the phrase crops up concerning verification, technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

I am not sure I understand that. What do you have in mind, what are you ruling out when you are talking about generally recognized principles of international law?

Secretary ROGERS. This was the subject of long debate. I will let Ambassador Smith answer that.

Ambassador SMITH. Perhaps one example will answer your question. There is a technical means of verification which you will recall as being designated the U–2. I think the use of U–2's over the So-

viet Union would not be considered in accordance with international law.

Secretary ROGERS. Does that make it clear?

Mr. DU PONT. Yes.

The other question in the same phrase, maybe I am hung up on semantics, but we keep talking about national technical means.

Secretary ROGERS. That is opposed to on-site inspection.

Mr. DU PONT. Or opposed to international?

NO ON-SITE INSPECTION

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, I suppose, but what we are really talking about is that there is no on-site inspection provided for. But we think the systems we have now for inspection are adequate without on-site inspection.

Mr. DU PONT. Was there any feeling on either side that international inspection or any kind of on-site inspection might be acceptable?

Secretary ROGERS. Certainly not any kind of international inspection, no. After a while we didn't press for on-site inspection. That was a subject of great discussion in previous negotiations. We didn't press it because we don't need it at the moment.

Mr. DU PONT. I have several other questions, but, Mr. Chairman, I think they would be best asked in an executive session.

Will an executive session be held to consider some of these questions?

Mr. ZABLOCKI (presiding). I understand there will be an executive session.

Mr. DU PONT. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Fraser?

SECRETARY LAIRD'S POSITION ON AGREEMENTS

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, first I want to express my appreciation for the work and the success which has crowned that work in bringing these agreements to completion.

I think there are some minor problems with the agreements but I can't find any basis on which I could justify their rejection.

I think both are important agreements. I guess my concern is about the statements by Secretary Laird in which he said if the United States does not go forward on an accelerated program on the Trident or the new B–1 bomber, he would oppose these agreements.

That would be in violation of the agreements. It is possible that he is doing this for the internal politics of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I don't know, but I can't find anything in these agreements that justifies an accelerated program for the B–1 bomber or the Trident.

Can you throw any light on this?

Secretary ROGERS. Well, Mr. Fraser, I testified on this at some length in the Senate. What I said essentially was this: That, as I said a moment ago, it was understood by both the Soviet leaders and by the President and those of us on our side that we would proceed within the limitations permitted under the agreements.

In other words, proceed to construct those offensive systems we thought necessary for our national security as long as they didn't violate the Interim Agreement.

We do think that is important to do. We would not want to convey the impression to the Soviet Union that now that we signed these agreements we would not maintain a strong national defense capability.

We think it is important to proceed to maintain our strength until there is a more comprehensive agreement.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary, let me phrase the question this way: What you are arguing or saying on behalf of the administration is we should proceed with whatever our security requires insofar as it is not in violation of the agreement?

Secretary ROGERS. That is correct.

SECURITY REQUIREMENT FOR OVERKILL CAPACITY

Mr. FRASER. Now, since defensive capabilities have been sharply limited and since even those limited defensive capabilities are not constructed yet in the Soviet Union, the only ABM system they have is around Moscow and it is only partially completed; as I understand it, half the payload of one submarine could completely exhaust that defense capability and still have enough missiles in that one-half payload to incinerate Moscow.

Since that is the situation, why do we have to build additional submarines and why do we have to build bombers since we have the capacity to impose on them virtually total destruction?

What is the security requirements for what one would call further overkill capacity?

Secretary ROGERS. I think to have the balance necessary for our security and also for continuing negotiations, we should maintain what we refer to as sufficiency, which means an equivalent to that the Soviet Union has.

Now, it is not easy to determine exactly what that should be, but we do think the programs that we advocate are in that order of magnitude and therefore we strongly support them.

A "BARGAINING CHIP" ARGUMENT

Mr. FRASER. May I just make the observation that you are now shifting your ground somewhat or adding a new basis?

You are now arguing that we also need this for bargaining purposes?

Secretary ROGERS. For both purposes; yes.

Mr. FRASER. I want to understand the first—that is what you originally said and I think we should pursue it. Why do we need additional submarines and a new bomber in view of the capacity we have now to destroy the Soviet Union?

Secretary ROGERS. Because we are convinced the reason we have been able to make progress in these negotiations and in the world situation generally, and one of the reasons we think the visit to Moscow succeeded, and one of the reasons we think the visit to the People's Republic of China was possible; that is, because we did maintain a defense capability that was sufficient to convince the world we were not going to fall behind the Soviet Union and we think it is important not to create any impression that we are behind, that we have become

a second-rate military power. Therefore, within the limitations of the agreements, we want to proceed with our defense capabilities.

No. 2, we also think that position will be helpful in our further negotiations. Otherwise, if the Soviet Union thinks we are in effect going to curtail our defense capabilities unilaterally, then there will be no particular incentive on their part to do it by a reciprocal arrangement.

That would add further to their zeal to move ahead in the offensive field and they would say:

Why bother working out a comprehensive limitation as long as it is happening anyway? We are moving ahead in this field, we are getting a lot stronger, the world can see what we are doing. The United States is standing still, why should we bother with an agreement?

Mr. FRASER. In both parts of your answer you come back to bargaining table. You have not indicated, since we have the power to destroy the Soviet Union, you have not answered why we need these additional weapons; you come to the bargaining chip in both cases. Why wouldn't you get that with a more protracted Trident development?

For instance, if we went ahead with the long-range missile development, if we stretched it out from a 7-year program to a 12-year program, for one thing, we don't know what we are building into the Trident in the way of providing a capability to avoid a vulnerability to our present submarine force which does not now exist.

In other words, we don't know why the Poseidon equipped submarine might be vulnerable or how. It isn't now. We don't know how it might become so. We are talking about a bigger submarine, bigger missiles, and we don't know what kind of hazard the present submarine may be exposed to.

I am not in favor of abandonment of the Trident program but in favor of a stretch-out. Leaving our intention clear, but saving our taxpayers money. But the Secretary wants a crash program. This is what I have difficulty understanding.

IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING SUFFICIENCY

Secretary ROGERS. I think it is important to keep in mind the fact that we have been able to maintain what we contend is a balance or sufficiency; I think that has been an important point in diplomacy and brought a fair return.

If the other nations in the world, and the Soviet Union especially, came to the conclusion that they are way ahead of us militarily, it would be destabilizing.

Obviously I am not speaking of any particular program, whether it should be 5 years or 7 years. I see your point on that.

But I think the programs we have advocated are reasonable programs and I think in view of the fact we are succeeding in foreign affairs and we certainly are succeeding in our negotiations with the Russians, it would be a mistake to change our policy, to indicate now that we are prepared to be less than strong or that we are prepared to fall behind a bit.

SENATE ACTION ON NCA ABM SYSTEM

Mr. FRASER. One last question.

On the National Capital ABM defense, the information I have is that in the other body, Senators Stennis, Jackson, Ervin, McIntyre, Byrd of Virginia, Hughes, and others, voted to delete without prejudice the ABM from the 1973 budget.

The only two opposing that budget were Smith and Schweiker on the ground that there shouldn't be any further expenses on the ABM.

Is that your conclusion? There is no value in bargaining chips. It makes no difference whether we build another ABM because we have put a limitation on that.

Secretary ROGERS. I am not familiar with that vote, I have been out of the country.

Ambassador SMITH. As I understand it, the action of the Senate Armed Services Committee was, without prejudice, to leave out the sum of money for the NCA defense, pending further supporting arguments and data.

They felt they had not heard a sufficiently strong case. I don't understand that they categorically rejected it.

Mr. FRASER. I said they rejected it without prejudice.

Senator Jackson said it was a useless thing to build. You wouldn't argue we need to build the ABM in order to have a bargaining chip?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

NEGOTIATING VALUE OF THE U.S. ABM PROGRAM

Mr. THOMSON. I think we are getting into the same round of arguments we had for a long time on the ABM's and the same people are opposing the Trident as opposed to the ABM system.

I just wonder, Mr. Smith, what value, in your negotiation, if any, came from the fact that America was building ABM system?

The argument was made that it would contribute to the arms race and escalate the costs and the danger by even building an ABM system in this country to protect our missiles.

When you got to the bargaining table, was the fact that America did have an ABM system or was putting one of any value to you in your negotiations with the Russians?

Ambassador SMITH. Governor, I think clearly the prospect of a large-scale American ABM program was something that motivated the Soviets to come to the negotiating table and agree to a very low-level limitation on ABM's.

I don't think there is doubt about that.

Mr. THOMSON. Then it did contribute to the success of the SALT talks so far as defensive weapons are concerned?

Ambassador SMITH. I think it was central to it because, absent that, if there was no prospect of the United States building an ABM, or of the Soviets building an ABM, there would not have been much pressure on either side to negotiate a treaty.

CONCEPT OF A "BARGAINING CHIP"

Mr. THOMSON. This talk of bargaining chips is a subject raised since you were successful there. You did have bargaining chips to negotiate

with the Russians. What is your necessity to have bargaining chips in the second stage of talks such as Trident, maybe the B–1, for our security?

Is that going to be an important factor in the second round?

Ambassador SMITH. Speaking personally, I have never been very happy with this concept of a "bargaining chip." Both major powers come to this type of negotiation because they think it is in their national security interest. I believe we ought to go ahead with whatever strategic arms programs we think are necessary for our security, and from that process there will be plenty of motivation for us and the Soviets to reach an additional strategic arms agreement.

I don't think one should start strategic arms programs just for the purpose of having a bargaining chip.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary ROGERS. First, my own view on the question you asked is the same as Ambassador Smith's, but I want to state it more categorically.

I don't think we would have had an ABM treaty if we had not had an ABM program.

"BARGAINING CHIP" TERM DISPARAGED

Secondly, I don't like the words "bargaining chip." It sounds like a poker game. It is too serious for that. I think if the Soviet Union had any idea now that we were not going to proceed to build what we should build by way of offensive weapons their incentives for bargaining in the future in a way that would be likely to produce a more comprehensive agreement in our national interest would be greatly lessened.

I agree with Ambassador Smith we shouldn't do it just for bargaining purposes, but we should recognize in fact and reality that one of the ways we are going to be successful in phase 2 of the SALT talks is to have a strong national defense capability and we should proceed in a way our people think is best for our national interests.

Those in Congress will have to carefully consider those recommendations with the full realization that first they are important to the national defense and, secondly, they will increase the possibility of successful SALT talks in phase 2.

PRAISE FOR THE SALT NEGOTIATING TEAM

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Before I conclude, I want to join the others in thanking Ambassador Smith for what I think is an unprecedented effort to keep the Congress informed on the developments in the negotiations he so ably conducted.

Secretary ROGERS. May I just make a point on that note to express my appreciation not only for Ambassador Smith's work that has been commented on here so properly, but also for the other members of the negotiation team: Paul Nitze, General Allison, Dr. Brown, Jeff Parsons, Phil Farley, all of whom did yeoman's work; Ray Garthoff from State, who is executive secretary of the negotiating team.

I don't think the United States has ever been more ably represented and I think the result of that work speak for themselves.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Wolff?

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A MEMORANDUM ON SALT?

Ambassador Smith, did your office circulate any memoranda on a limited basis or brief the Armed Services Committee that set certain minimum requirements that the security of the United States has been compromised by the agreement that has been set up?

Ambassador SMITH. I don't know the document you are referring to and I don't know of any aspects of the SALT agreements that would compromise the capabilities that we need to have.

Can you identify this document?

Mr. WOLFF. Well, as I understand it, there was either a document or discussion with the Armed Services Committee that there were certain minimum requirements you believed should be observed. Some of these were not present in the final agreements that were made.

Ambassador SMITH. I will have to check into it.

We have not discussed this sort of problem with the Armed Services Committee, to my recollection. You are speaking of the Senate Armed Services Committee?

Mr. WOLFF. No.

Ambassador SMITH. I don't believe I ever appeared before the House committee.

INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENTS

Mr. WOLFF. That is why I asked if there was a memorandum.

Let me proceed.

On the agreements that have been reached, Mr. Secretary, I have noted there have been a number of objections that have been filed or special interpretations that we have made; now, so far interpretations vary from those of the Soviet interpretations.

If there is any question of interpretation, who will be the judge of the final interpretation?

Secretary ROGERS. I don't believe there were any objections filed. There are, as we stated here, understandings, some verbal agreements and also some unilateral statements.

Now, if there are questions which arise about interpretations or about compliance, they will be considered by this consultative committee and, in the final analysis, if the arguments cannot be resolved, then each nation, of course, has the right to take whatever action it thinks necessary.

AN ATTACK FROM CHINA

Mr. WOLFF. One of the arguments given originally for the deployment of the ABM system was that it would protect us from an attack by the People's Republic of China.

They are not signatories to this agreement. Are there any moves afoot to bring them into this agreement in any way?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't think there are, Mr. Wolff.

Mr. WOLFF. Then the fact still does remain, however, that there is a vulnerability which has been stated as the reason for the deployment of the ABM's before, to a Chinese attack.

Ambassador SMITH. Yes, sir; there is a vulnerability. I think that the issue was whether it would be better to go ahead with a system to protect against that risk or to go for an agreement with the Soviet Union that would hold their ABMs down to a very low level.

The choice was perfectly clear—the security of the United States would be much increased by an agreement prohibiting a nationwide Soviet system rather than trying to protect against a Chinese attack.

As a postscript, in the light of developments in Chinese-American relations, hopefully the risk of that sort of attack is or will be reduced.

SOVIETS AND A FIRST STRIKE

Mr. WOLFF. Is there anything in the present agreements that would prevent the Soviets from developing a first-strike capability in the 5-year period of their application?

Ambassador SMITH. There is nothing in this agreement that would prevent the Soviets from improving the accuracy of their missiles or of MIRVing their missiles. To the extent that looks like developing a first-strike capability, the answer is "No."

But the fact that the Soviets have agreed to, in effect, leave their industry and population defenseless to a retaliatory attack by the United States strikes me as being the best evidence that they do not have any intention to go for any first strike.

That is, to my mind, one of the most significant aspects of this pair of agreements.

CHINA AND NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Secretary, in view of the answer to the question before to Ambassador Smith, relative to the vulnerability from a Chinese attack at some time or other, why has there not been moves made to bring the Chinese into this type of pact?

Secretary ROGERS. I think there are obvious political reasons why it would be difficult at this stage.

I don't want to leave the impression—when we talk of vulnerability, we think of it in absolute terms, for the reason that we think that the ABM Treaty provides a very important mutual deterrent as far as the Soviet Union and the United States are concerned.

Certainly our tremendous lead in offensive missiles provides an even stronger deterrent as far as the People's Republic of China is concerned.

Do I make myself clear?

Mr. WOLFF. Well, you make yourself clear, but I don't see any reason since the great success you have had with the Soviets, why initial steps are not taken to reach some sort of bilateral agreements with the People's Republic of China to bring them into the agreements you have, unless we are pitting one side against the other.

Secretary ROGERS. No; we are not doing that. We have improved our relations with the People's Republic of China. We have a tremendous lead in nuclear capability. We want to proceed in an orderly way to improve our relations with the People's Republic of China.

At the moment, we haven't thought it proper to enter into this kind of discussion for the reasons I mentioned.

Ambassador SMITH. I think you know, Mr. Wolff, it has been made clear by the People's Republic of China that, with respect to the arms discussions taking place in Geneva under the U.N. aegis—they have not indicated they wanted to participate.

I think the primary obstacle to engaging the People's Republic of China in an arms negotiation is the great differential between their forces and ours and the Soviets.

It is almost impossible for me to conceive of the Chinese People's Republic agreeing to, let's say, a freeze which would have them here and the other two powers there.

That is just a fact of life.

Mr. WOLFF. On the last day of the negotiation, as I understand it, we gave the Soviets some 20 additional submarines; is that true?

Ambassador SMITH. No, that is not true.

I think the question was whether or not the G-class boats, which are diesel-powered, not first-line strategic submarines, should be included in the permitted total. The final agreement was that only if modern missiles were deployed in these G-class boats, would their missiles launchers be counted.

The others are outside of the agreement.

Mr. WOLFF. Is that the agreement——

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Your time has expired.

PRAISE FOR AMBASSADOR SMITH

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Secretary and Mr. Ambassador, I want to join in the applause you have been so deservedly accorded.

In the case of Ambassador Smith, the applause for your leadership has been so universal I am sure many others like myself are distressed to read the report that you spent so many nights in hotels that you may not wish to continue.

I hope in your visits to Helsinki and Vienna you have found accommodations which, if secured, might cause you to reconsider?

Can you give us some assurance that you are reconsidering?

Ambassador SMITH. I suppose things like this are always open to reconsideration.

Mr. FINDLEY. I know we all hope you will find accommodations that will allow you to continue.

I would like to support any provision for accommodations that would cause you to reconsider. Seriously, I am sure the burden has been great but I hope you can continue.

CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO ALLIES

Mr. Secretary, the negotiations over SALT involved the vital interests of our very close allies in NATO as well as our own, and that of the Soviet Union. Can you and/or Mr. Smith give us a report on the extent to which our NATO allies were kept informed and consulted about the agreements?

Secretary ROGERS. I will have Ambassador Smith give a full accounting on that. I think I can say, because I went to the NATO meetings immediately after these agreements were signed, they were received with tremendous enthusiasm and every nation expressed its

appreciation; every nation in the alliance expressed appreciation for the consultations we undertook with them on a consistent basis and even on the eve of the agreements themselves I met with all the NATO ambassadors in Moscow to brief them.

Ambassador Smith met with them I don't know how many times. I don't believe the process could have worked any more satisfactorily than they did.

Mr. FINDLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Bingham?

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, would like to say that I think Ambassador Smith and his team have done a fine job in these negotiations and have shown great patience and restraint. It has been most gratifying to be kept informed as we have been of the progress of the negotiations.

URGES MORE ACDA PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITY

By way of comment and not particularly by way of question, I would like to say I still feel, Ambassador Smith, and maybe the Secretary is not familiar with this, that some of us have felt very dissatisfied with the job your agency has done in publicizing your own activities and in promoting the understanding of these activities in this country.

Mr. Culver and I have pursued this in past meetings. We think that your modesty is commendable but that this is an area where the public and high school kids, college kids, and others, should be much better informed than they are and we feel your programs show a lack of aggressiveness in this area.

I think the Defense Department overdoes this to an extraordinary degree but I think you could take a bit of a leaf out of their book.

ABM AS BARGAINING CHIP

Passing to other points mentioned, on the matter of bargaining chips, is it not so, as far as the Interim Agreement that we are talking about is concerned, that we succeeded in getting that agreement although we had no program for expanding our offensive capabilities?

Was anything discussed or considered at that time that might be taken as a bargaining chip that we were surrendering when we got this agreement?

Ambasador SMITH. That is correct, we did not have any ongoing launcher programs that would correspond to the Soviet programs that are limited by the Interim Agreement.

I think, starting in 1970, the Soviets wanted very much to have the first agreement limited just to an ABM treaty, and we insisted that there had to be certain measures in the offensive field to accompany such a first treaty.

I would say the Soviet interest in getting ABM's under control led them to conclude that they should respond to our wish to have measures in the offensive field, even though they affect just one side.

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NO U.S. PROGRAMS IN OFFENSIVE AREA

Mr. BINGHAM. When you say "they affect just one side"—I know that statement was mentioned twice in the Secretary's statement—just what do you mean by that?

Do you mean it in the sense that we didn't have any intention to go beyond that?

Surely we are limited under the agreement to existing ICBMs and so forth.

Secretary ROGERS. Due to the fact this is a 5-year agreement and we had no programs that were contemplated at that point which we could have put into effect during that period of time, that is what we had in mind.

Ambassador SMITH. As a footnote, I think you are quite right, that is an oversimplification; the agreement would prevent the United States from starting up a new program.

We have no such intention, but that would be the effect of the application to us.

Secretary ROGERS. It would be difficult for us to get such a program under way so quickly, so we are limited in that sense.

But, we didn't have anything on the drawing board that was interferred with by this offensive weapons agreement.

THE ABM SYSTEM FOR WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. BINGHAM. On the matter of the ABM's for Washington, am I not correct that there was no plan to have such a system, at least under the Safeguard proposals?

Ambassador SMITH. I think under the Safeguard program a Washington defense site was included.

The Congress did not show a great deal of appreciation for that part of the Safeguard program and some parts of the Congress didn't show great appreciation for other parts.

But right from the start a Washington site was projected.

Mr. BINGHAM. Would you agree with Mr. Fraser's characterization of the Moscow ABM system as now constituted, that it is highly vulnerable?

Ambassador SMITH. I am not an expert on strategic targeting, but I think that is the conventional wisdom on the Moscow system; it is not a very hard system.

THE NPT AS A MATTER OF HIGH PRIORITY

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Secretary, I think you said in answer to the chairman's questions, you did consider pressing of further ratifications of the nonproliferation treaty as a matter of high priority.

Can you tell us what the Department is doing? Can you tell us with reference to France; you have spoken about China, apparently nothing is being done there, but what about France and the other countries?

Secretary ROGERS. We do as much as we can to encourage ratification.

Mr. BINGHAM. Does your answer mean the Department is doing nothing in this area?

Secretary ROGERS. No; it means we are doing all we can.

We have discussions, we urge others to sign and ratify, we exhort them.

We don't like to refer to it publicly all the time; it is counterproductive.

Mr. BINGHAM. How is it counterproductive?

Secretary ROGERS. Other nations say that is their decision. They are sovereign nations and will make their decisions. They don't want the United States to put pressure on them.

Mr. BINGHAM. Could we have, for the record, statements which have been made in this regard?

Secretary ROGERS. I wouldn't want it to become known for the reason I mentioned, I think it is quite unwise. But, in all instances, we have discussed this from time to time with the nations concerned.

I certainly don't want to have it a matter of record.

Mr. BINGHAM. Could we have it on a classified basis?

Secretary ROGERS. I will be glad to talk to you about it.

UNA REPORT ON NPT

(Subsequently, the following information on U.S. diplomatic activities in support of the nonproliferation treaty was supplied by the Department of State.)

U.S. DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE NPT

The U.S. Government considers the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty a major arms control measure which will significantly assist in the maintenance of peace and security. In order to ensure the widest possible participation in the Treaty, the US has repeatedly urged other countries to sign and ratify the NPT.

This effort was begun in the spring of 1968. On July 1 of that year the NPT was opened for signature in the three depository capitals: Washington, Moscow and London. At that time we made approaches on behalf of the NPT in almost all countries with which we had diplomatic relations.

A total of 97 countries signed the treaty before it came into effect on March 5, 1970. Since then, 72 countries have ratified and become parties to the treaty. A list of countries that have signed and those that have ratified the NPT is attached.

For the past two years we have repeatedly made diplomatic representations in support of the NPT, not only in countries that signed but have not yet ratified the NPT, but also in countries that have taken no action whatever wtih respect to the treaty. In 1971 we made demarches in some 30 countries. So far this year our embassies have made formal approaches on this subject in some 35 countries, in several cases on more than one occasion.

SIGNATORIES TO TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT WASHINGTON, LONDON, AND MOSCOW ON JULY 1, 1968

(Signature at Washington on July 1, 1968, unless otherwise indicated. States which have deposited their instruments of ratification, accession or succession are italicized, and the first date of deposit is indicated in parenthesis.)[1]

Afghanistan—(Feb. 4, 1970)
Austrialia—Feb. 27, 1970
Austria—(June 27, 1969)
Barbados
Belgium—August 20, 1968
Bolivia—(May 26, 1970)
Botswana—(Apr. 28, 1969) (L)[2]
Bulgaria—(Sept. 5, 1969)
Burundi—(Mar. 19, 1971) (M)[2]
Cameroon—July 17, 1968 (Jan. 8, 1969)
Canada—July 23, 1968 (Jan. 8, 1969)
Central African Republic—(Oct. 25, 1970)
Ceylon
Chad—March 10, 1971
China, Republic of—(Jan. 27, 1970)

[1] The United States has not accepted notification of the signature, nor of the deposit of ratification instrument, in Moscow, of the "German Democratic Republic".
[2] See footnote on p. 32.

SIGNATORIES TO TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT WASHINGTON, LONDON, AND MOSCOW ON JULY 1, 1968—Continued

Colombia
Congo (Kinshasa)—July 22, 1968 (Aug. 4, 1970)
Costa Rica—(Mar. 3, 1970)
Cyprus—(Feb. 10, 1970)
Czechoslovakia—(July 22, 1969)
Dahomey
Denmark—(Jan. 3, 1969)
Dominican Republic—(July 24, 1971)
Ecuador—July 9, 1968 (Mar. 7, 1969)
Egypt (M.L.)[2]
El Salvador—(July 11, 1972)
Ethiopia—September 5, 1968 (Feb. 5, 1970)
Finland—(Feb. 5, 1969)
Gambia—September 20, 1968
Germany, Federal Rep. of—November 28, 1969
Ghana—(May 5, 1970)
Greece—(Mar. 11, 1970)
Guatemala—July 26, 1968 (Sept. 22, 1970)
Haiti—(June 2, 1970)
Holy See—(Feb. 25, 1971)
Honduras
Hungary—(May 27, 1969)
Iceland—(July 18, 1969)
Indonesia—March 2, 1970
Iran—(Feb. 2, 1970)
Iraq—(M)[2] (Oct. 29, 1969) (M)[2]
Ireland—(July 1, 1968)
Italy—Jan. 28, 1969
Ivory Coast
Jamaica—April 14, 1969 (Mar. 5, 1970)
Japan—February 3, 1970
Jordan—July 10, 1968 (Feb. 11, 1970)
Kenya—(June 11, 1970) (M)[2]
Khmer Republic—(June 2, 1972)
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait—August 15, 1968
Laos—(Feb. 20, 1970)
Lebanon—(July 15, 1970)
Lesotho—July 9, 1968 (May 20, 1970)
Liberia—(Mar. 5, 1970)
Libya—July 19, 1968
Luxembourg—August 14, 1968
Malagasy Republic—August 22, 1968 (Oct. 8, 1970)
Malaysia—(Mar. 5, 1970)
Maldive Islands—September 11, 1968 (Apr. 7, 1970)
Mali—July 14, 1969 (Feb. 10, 1970)
Malta—April 17, 1969 (Feb. 6, 1970)
Mauritius—(Apr. 8, 1969)
Mexico—July 26, 1968 (Jan. 21, 1969)
Mongolia (M) May 14, 1969 (M)[2]
Morocco—(Dec. 16, 1970)
Nepal—(Jan. 5, 1970)
Netherlands—August 20, 1968
New Zealand—(Sept. 10, 1969)
Nicaragua
Nigeria—(Sept. 27, 1968)
Norway—(Feb. 5, 1969)
Panama
Paraguay—(Feb. 4, 1970)
Peru—(Mar. 3, 1970)
Philippines
Poland—(June 12, 1969)
Romania—(Feb. 4, 1970)
San Marino—(Sept. 10, 1970)
Senegal—(Dec. 17, 1970)
Singapore—February 5, 1970
Somali Democratic Republic—(Mar. 5, 1970)
Southern Yemen—November 14, 1968 (M)[2]
Sudan—December 24, 1968 (M)[2]
Swaziland—June 24, 1969 (Dec. 11, 1969)
Sweden—August 19, 1968 (Jan. 9, 1970)
Switzerland—November 27, 1969
Syria (M)[2]—(Sept. 24, 1969) (M)[2]
Togo—(Feb. 26, 1970)
Tonga—(July 7, 1971)
Trinidad and Tobago—August 20, 1968
Tunisia—(Feb. 26, 1970)
Turkey—January 28, 1969
United Kingdom—(Nov. 27, 1968)
United States—(Mar. 5, 1970)
U.S.S.R.—(Mar. 5, 1970)
Upper Volta—November 25, 1968 (Mar. 3, 1970)
Uruguay—(Aug. 31, 1970)
Venezuela
Vietnam, Republic of—(Sept. 10, 1971)
Yemen Arab Republic—September 23, 1968 (M)[2]
Yugoslavia—July 10, 1968 (Mar. 4, 1970)

Mr. BINGHAM. I don't know if you are familiar with the statement that was made yesterday by the United Nations Association group headed by Burke Marshall, who has been studying this matter in cooperation with some Soviet representatives. They expressed very grave concern at the lack of progress in the ratification of the NPT and expressed the view that the signing of the SALT agreements makes this all the more imperative than in the past.

I would urge you—if you are not familiar with their statements——

[2] Denotes place of signature (or, if after parenthesized date, deposit) as follows:
(M) in Moscow only.
(L) in London only.
(ML) in Moscow and London.

Totals: 97 Signatures (88 of which were in Washington, D.C.); 72 Deposits (66 of which were in Washington, D.C.).

Secretary ROGERS. I am familiar in a general way but I have not read it.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Steele?

Mr. STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NEGOTIATING PRIORITIES IN SALT II

Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Ambassador, I want to add my recognition and congratulations for the outstanding job you have done in negotiating this agreement. I am particularly interested in your statement, Mr. Secretary, that the United States and U.S.S.R. will seek additional limitations which are referred to as phase 2 of SALT.

Precisely in which areas are we going to place priorities in phase 2; what are we looking to conclude negotiations on in phase 2, and when are those negotiations likely to get under way?

Secretary ROGERS. We discussed the last point before you came into the room. We hope they will get under way in October and very much hope the Congress will act before the recess so that we can get started in October.

I think as a practical matter what we are looking for in phase 2 are agreements that can be worked out in the offensive field that are mutually acceptable.

We are not sure what they are, but it is the whole range of offensive weapons that will be under consideration.

MIRVING SOVIET MISSILES

Mr. STEELE. One of the major criticisms of the agreement has been that it allows the Soviets to MIRV their missiles and the fact that although multiwarhead missile technology in the Soviet Union is not as advanced as ours at the present time, they may well be able to move up on us rapidly in this area, where we are currently substantially ahead.

How do you answer that question? It seems you began to answer it when you talked about the essence of this agreement being the lack of defensive systems, which indicates a lack of interest in going for a first-strike capability.

Nonetheless, this continues to bother certain people and I wonder how you would answer that?

Secretary ROGERS. As you state the question, I am sure it was not intentional, but you make it sound as though the Soviet Union could MIRV their missiles and we can't.

We are permitted to go head and we have a considerable lead in this aspect. We feel quite confident we will continue to have a lead.

Mr. STEELE. The number of missiles are limited but MIRVing is not, is that not correct?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes, but MIRVing is not limited for us, and this is the field where we are ahead.

Mr. STEELE. We have provided the Soviets with more numbers of missiles in this agreement.

SOVIET MISSILE NUMBERS FROZEN BY PACT

Ambassador SMITH. I would like to say, Mr. Steele, we have not provided through this agreement that the Soviets will have more missiles.

This is a fact of life that existed on the 26th of May when the agreements were signed. I think it should be made perfectly clear that we have not, by agreement, set a definitive limitation on the number of Soviet missiles.

We agreed to a freeze, that they could not build more. At the time, they had more launchers than the United States in the ICBM field.

If they wanted to reduce that margin in the ICBM field, they could modernize their forces by building more SLBM's. In the MIRV field, we tried to get agreement there but were not successful.

We sought the freeze arrangement in order to continue negotiations on the offensive side. As I told Mr. Fraser, we have not received any definite guidance as to what we will be going for, but perhaps we can get further restraints, possibly including MIRV's.

In the meantime, even if this agreement went to its full term, 5 years, which I hope it will not, I hope it will be supplanted by a treaty long before that. It is my belief the Soviets, not yet having tested a MIRV, are going to be far from MIRVing their entire force by the end of the 5 years, and we will retain an advantage in that respect during the whole period of 5 years.

Mr. STEELE. We are betting our assessment is right. If it is not right, it could be a problem, could it not?

IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET MIRV'S

Secretary ROGERS. It could be a problem. I think basically no matter how many MIRV's the Soviets have, the American total deterrent is going to remain integral and firm.

The Soviet MIRV's are important from the point of view of Minuteman vulnerability. They are not important from the point of view of submarine survival capability.

No matter how many submarines they have, the American Poseidon, with Minuteman and our tremendous advantage in manned bombers will together preserve the integrity of our deterrent.

Mr. STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Culver.

NEED FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION ON ARMS CONTROL

Mr. CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Smith, I also would like to join in the tributes paid to you this morning for your most dedicated work in this area and also to commend you and your able staff on these painstaking and protracted negotiations and their ultimate fruition in these agreements being recommended to the Congress.

I don't think you will have any difficulty recalling on March 9 before this committee we had a rather spirited exchange concerning the adequacy as viewed by some of us on this committee and the effectiveness of the public relations program of your agency.

I think Mr. Bingham indicated the concern we have essentially is that the American public be afforded the opportunity to be edu-

cated in this field in some comparable way with the type of information they have been exposed to in the entire postwar period from the defense establishment of our national government.

I know you provided information for the record.

I was a little concerned when I was in Europe following our discussions on this subject. I had the opportunity to meet your most charming daughter. She approached me in a hotel in Brussels. She said, "You are Congressman Culver, aren't you?"

I said, "Yes," and I was rather startled, not being a common household word in this country, that she recognized me there or anywhere else.

She came up and said that she had attended one March hearing and wasn't used to having her father talked to in that fashion. I felt particularly badly that after several years of tough negotiating with the Soviet Union, she should feel my remarks with you on that occasion merited that distinction.

Secretary ROGERS. I wish you could meet my daughter. [Laughter.]

STUDIES ON NUCLEAR ATTACK CONSEQUENCES

Mr. CULVER. One question by way of followup on the adequacy and, indeed, the availability of reports or studies done on the subject of trying to scientifically assess the political, the ecological, and social train of events which might plausibly follow from the detonation of just one megaton bomb in just one modern city in this country or in the world.

It seems we have relatively reliable estimates of what might ensue in the first few hours in terms of physical destruction and megadeaths, but there is nothing, I understand, available on the social and economic disintegration.

At this point, ignorance and unsupported speculation seems to descend on all of us. It seems to me, in view of the fact that nuclear power has been with us some three decades, that it is an appropriate time for your agency to try to help educate the American people and, indeed the world, on this most vital subject and perhaps it would be appropriate if studies were initiated into the kind of degree of society left if the bombs did go off.

I think this would serve to enforce the vital and critical importance of the work involved. Here, I would be interested to know if you have that kind of information or have given any kind of attention to that area.

DIFFICULTY WITH BARGAINING CHIPS

I also share the difficulty that you have already heard expressed this morning by Mr. Bingham and others on bargaining chips.

What appears to be the basic inconsistency in the proposed SALT agreements and in the 1973 Defense budgets? I know you have been asked that but I am still uneasy about the answers the committee has been provided with.

The real issue is how can we justify the arms limitation agreements and at the same time asking Congress for greater and more weapons systems. It seems you say one thing in favor of the arms accord and then turn around and say quite the opposite for more weapons systems.

How do you now come before the Congress and ask for more weapons programs, not before but after the Moscow agreements which was supposed to be won from a bargaining chip strategy, although the Russians by your own agreements have the momentum on their side 5 years hence minus the SALT agreements?

I noted in response to your answer to Mr. Bingham's question you talked about the ABM being a bargaining chip of sorts against their superior missile capabilities and so on. I am troubled by the nuances of this kind of exchange, frankly.

I start with a more fundamental assumption that the name of the game is a creditable deterrent capability and that we assess the strength and credibility of that on the basis of our capacity to withstand the first strike and still enjoy the capacity to inflict even greater death and destruction on any adversary who would be so foolish or unwise either by design or accident to launch an attack on us.

OVERKILL AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS

It seems to me that is the conventional consideration, the fundamental one, and I am a little troubled at what I sense is a very basic inconsistency here if we have, as most of us are led to believe through our briefings, fortunately, a degree of overkill, the capacity to inflict many times over this kind of deterrent consequence on any kind of enemy in the world.

Why, then, are we talking about the acceleration in all these new systems at these staggering costs as needed to maintain this edge?

I was concerned when Mr. Rogers talked, in response to Mr. Fraser's question, about sufficiency and equivalency. I don't think those two terms in the context of nucelar arms discussions should be confused or be interpreted to mean the same thing.

Sufficiency is the key, not equivalency, whether we are talking about a quantitative or qualitative superiority. You mentioned yourself you were persuaded the U.S.S.R. was not going for a first-strike capability. In fairness, I will let you elaborate on that, but I thought that was the case.

Mr. Rogers said the rest of the world has to look and see whether instability will be created if they feel the Soviet Union is developing this superior margin.

Well, the Soviet Union could not be more sophisticated in their intelligence on our true capability.

SMITH TO BRIEF ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

I was also concerned when you said you never appeared before the House Armed Services Committee; is that correct?

Ambassador SMITH. I believe that is correct.

Mr. CULVER. It is also disturbing if we are going to try to have this correlation which I think we must have in our efforts for a meaningful reduction in the arms race and have a meaningful regulation to the Defense budget.

Ambassador SMITH. I understand I have an invitation to appear next week.

Mr. CULVER. I hope so. I would suggest to the committee it be extended if you don't have it.

Could we talk about this bargaining chip business? I have rambled on too much, but maybe there is something there you could respond to.

Secretary ROGERS. I am not sure I can add to what I said.

NEEDS FOR EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC POSTURE

Ambassador SMITH. As I answered Governor Thomson, Mr. Culver, I don't like the term "bargaining chip." I don't think I have used it. I think we have sufficient forces in being and in prospect to do two things:

One, to be sure that there is an adequate capability for retaliatory action after a first strike; and the other to be capable of such action in the eyes of our allies and third countries around the world. There are two functions—military and psychological.

I think the questions with regard to new systems relate to the fact this is a dynamic situation.

We today have survivable forces, and I think as a result of the ABM Treaty they are going to have greater penetration capability than would have been the case had the Soviets deployed a large ABM system.

That represents an extraordinary increase in our security. The penetration problem is largely gone. The question is survivability, and we have that now in our forces. Will we have it in the 1980's?

We are not talking about developing forces like Trident for operation in the 1970's. We have to prepare for the longer range future, and I understand that is the purpose of these new programs.

PRESIDENT'S ESTIMATES OF SOVIET FORCES

Mr. CULVER. In his press conference in late June, President Nixon said, had the Moscow agreements not been reached he was prepared to ask Congress for a $15 billion, I believe, crash program for nuclear strategic weapons.

Such an increase would have pushed the 1973 defense budget over $100 billion, in that neighborhood. The reason the President gave for this startling figure was that had there been no arms agreements the Soviets called for an increase in their ABM's of 1,000 over the next few years and the arms agreements limit them to 200 as it does us.

Had there been no arms control agreements—this is, the most important part—in terms of strategic weapons, the Soviet Union—that has not passed us—they would have built 1,000 more over the next 5 years.

Where did the President get his figures, 1,000 ABM interceptors, over 90 subs, 1,000 more offensive missiles?

Were these figures backed up by intelligence and so forth?

Ambassador SMITH. I understand that on the offensive side these were straight extrapolations of past Soviet building rates and are well within the Soviet capabilities.

I think on the ABM side this was derived from intelligence estimates of the past.

Mr. CULVER. Can you tell us what was the national intelligence estimate for the next 5 years, for these three systems for the Soviet Union?

Ambassador SMITH. Not in open session; no, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. We will have an executive session.

Mr. CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Whalen?

THE WASHINGTON ABM SITE

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to pursue further this question of the Washington ABM site.

It seems to me the agreement reached in Moscow was designed to accommodate two varying concepts of the utilization of ABM systems. The administration already rejected one of these concepts, and I quote in part from President Nixon's statement made on March 14, 1969. It says:

> The heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. casualties from a deliberate Soviet attack.

In discussing the ABM sites, has the U.S. changed its views?

Secretary ROGERS. No.

Mr. WHALEN. If a population-protection system is deemed ineffective, it is difficult for me to see why the Washington site is proposed. Certainly, I think there is no objection to including this in a treaty if the Soviets want to use this concept. But I don't think it is necessary that we go ahead if, indeed, we find a population-protection system ineffective, as the President stated in March of 1969.

Secretary ROGERS. What the President said at that time was that it would not be totally effective. But we think as we did then that the NCA would be effective in the event of an accidental launch or certainly would be effective in detecting a major launch because it would give us more radar capability.

NCA OFFENSE NOT TO SAVE POPULATION

Mr. WHALEN. You mention this on page 21 of your statement. Let's talk first of the detection.

Don't we have adequate detection devices, devices which, indeed, can detect a missile launch almost from the time the launch is made?

It seems to me this rationale would be redundant.

Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Whalen, if I may go back to your other question, the President in 1969 was talking about a general defense of the United States and concluding that it was not possible to protect the population of the United States.

The NCA defense that we are talking about here is not aimed at defending the population of Washington.

Mr. WHALEN. It is aimed at defending people, not just the Pentagon?

PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCH

Ambassador SMITH. No; it is aimed at protecting the command and control system for a short period, to permit prudent decisions to be made if an attack is the result of an unauthorized launch of a few missiles.

If Washington is destroyed, a decision might be made to go to general nuclear war, which would be a catastrophe. The purpose of this system is to buy a short amount of time during which the com-

mand and control system could work to make the proper decisions and pass them on from the President.

Mr. WHALEN. We are talking first about detection; we say detection can be made without installing this system around Washington.

Ambassador SMITH. This is the second part of your question. We have good capabilities for early warning. This warning would be an additional bonus from the system; it is not the prime justification for it.

Mr. WHALEN. I suppose it is redundant. The accidental launch, then, Mr. Ambassador, obviously you conclude that it would be aimed at the command and control post in Washington?

Ambassador SMITH. An unauthorized launch, rather than an accident.

Mr. WHALEN. Don't we now have contingency plans whereby this command and control could be established elsewhere?

Ambassador SMITH. There are other ways of approaching it; yes. But, it seems to me that on a central problem like this we should have more than one approach. You may not think highly of redundancy, but as you know, in this type of work, redundancy is an essential part of the system.

WASHINGTON WIPED OUT IN ALL-OUT ATTACK

Mr. WHALEN. Going back to the President's 1969 statement, it seems to me if an all-out attack were launched we would be wiped out with or without an ABM system around Washington?

Ambassador SMITH. I think if an all-out attack were made on Washington, it would be wiped out; yes, sir.

Mr. WHALEN. You are talking about two or three missiles—in the event of an unauthorized launch. I don't know what "unauthorized" means; I presume it is authorized some place for some purpose.

Can you foresee that, if Russia decided they want to knock us out, they would launch just three or four ICBM's?

Ambassador SMITH. I can think of other scenarios.

PEOPLE'S REACTION TO ABM SITES

Mr. WHALEN. Let me ask a practical question. When the Sentinel system was under consideration, you may recall there was a great deal of concern expressed by the people in Seattle, Chicago, and Boston about sites proposed in those communities. As a matter of fact, if the administration continued with that system, it is doubtful those sites would have been erected.

I think the people of the Washington area have shown their muscle in other respects. They have knocked out the Three Sisters Bridge and the extension of Route 66.

I wonder what would happen if the people in Washington area saw an ABM site going up in their backyard.

Ambassador SMITH. It seems to me likely that a system authorized under a treaty would have better public acceptance than the Sentinel.

ROGERS AND LAIRD STATEMENTS CONTRASTED

Mr. WHALEN. Your comment on page 28, and I quote:

Taken together, the limitations on Soviet strategic offensive forces, plus the low ABM limits on both sides are decidedly in the U.S. security interest. U.S. strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect the United States and allied security interests and under the Interim Agreement will remain so.

This seems to me to contradict the reaction of Secretary Laird who stated he couldn't support the treaty or Interim Agreement unless we moved ahead substantially on defensive weapons.

Secretary ROGERS. Why is that inconsistent?

Mr. WHALEN. Just reading your own language, the U.S. strategic offensive forces are sufficient to protect U.S. and allied security interests.

Secretary ROGERS. They are sufficient.

Mr. WHALEN. They are sufficient now?

Secretary ROGERS. Yes; and under the Interim Agreement we are permitted to proceed with the offensive systems Secretary Laird referred to.

By proceeding with them, they will continue to be sufficient. There is nothing inconsistent about that.

NO ABM'S: SUFFICIENCY EASIER TO DEFINE

Mr. WHALEN. I have a further interest in the treaty itself and the Interim Agreement. It seems to me that in limiting or stabilizing defensive weapons, we make nuclear sufficiency or strategic sufficiency more definable.

Let me explain it this way: When nations increase their defensive forces—in this case the ABM—and even though we may find that they are not as efficient as advertised, at least I think it clouds the effectiveness of the offensive weapons. Now that these defensive systems are stabilized, does it not make the definition of sufficiency more easily determined?

Isn't that the purpose, the thrust of the agreements on the defensive weapons?

Secretary ROGERS. To the extent in the equation you do not have to consider defensive systems, it does make it easier to define "efficiency."

Mr. WHALEN. I have never been an advocate of the ABM. It can be overwhelmed and put out of commission. Nevertheless, a military commander can't take that for granted. Therefore, he wants to push ahead and accelerate the inventory of his offensive weapons.

NECESSITY OF B-1 BOMBER, TRIDENT SUB

I wonder, in view of this fact, why is it necessary to move ahead so rapidly with the Trident, the B-1, and other offensive weapons?

Secretary ROGERS. I think it is important to continue to build our offensive weapons within the limitations prescribed by the Interim Agreement.

First, we have to make it clear we won't become second-rate militarily, and secondly, I think it will help the prospects of the phase 2 SALT talks.

Chairman MORGAN (presiding). Mr. Reid?

MAINTAINING A STRONG DETERRENT

Mr. REID. I want to welcome you, Mr. Secretary, and say how much I appreciate the thoughtfulness of your testimony. It seems your efforts, along with those of our President, have resulted in a very significant advance, a very hopeful one, and I think Ambassador Smith and his colleagues are much to be commended for their personal skill and patience.

Mr. Secretary, I have just one basic question, and it is a question.

I think this has run through the testimony here this morning. Let's see if I can phrase it a little differently.

I think it is clear from the testimony that you and the present administration are concerned in trying to avoid an arms race where possible and equally that you not only want to break but maintain a break in the cycle of action and reaction, as you phrased it several times in your testimony.

Equally, I don't think there is any basic disagreement, at least with me, that we must maintain a strong and balanced deterrent for a long time in the future.

I certainly see that a deterrent is deserving in this regard. I am aware there are critical domestic needs and budgetary restraints that enter into this position.

My question, given those premises, is how we can help negotiations and meet our needs at home, while maintaining a strong and balanced deterrent yet insuring that we do not take actions or initiatives that would reopen or accelerate the action-reaction curve.

Ambassador Hammond has made the point on several occasions he thinks some of the statements coming out of the Department of Defense may be read somewhat differently in Moscow from the intention of the administration, and that there is the danger that if we go too far in some of these other initiatives, the marshals in the Soviet Union may interpret that to proceed more aggressively in certain areas. Inadvertently, the result could be to stimulate even though we seek to slow down or maintain a break in the cycle of action-reaction.

The question, therefore, is, have you made some kind of judgment, can you give some kind of guidance to the Congress here as to those steps that perhaps the military would like to take but, nonetheless, could result in misinterpretation and start the cycle all over again.

What would constitute an example of going too far in this area versus an action you think prudent and essential to future negotiations in our balanced deterrent strength?

CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS

Secretary ROGERS. I think if we stay within the limitations of the agreement, we do not have that fear.

In the discussions we had with the Soviet leaders, it was clear on both sides that each of us would proceed as we saw fit as long as we didn't exceed the limits.

We also talked of the necessity to start phase 2 of the SALT talks quickly. If we can reach an agreement, we would like to and they indicate they would like to. I don't think there is any danger that they will misconstrue our efforts to have what we think is necessary for our national defense purposes as long as the agreement is not violated.

They were more explicit on this than we were.

Chairman Brezhnev, I guess he is called General Secretary Brezhnev, told President Nixon on a couple of occasions, very vigorously, that he was going to proceed and that he wanted us to understand that he was going to continue to have a buildup as long as it didn't violate the agreement and, if we were able to reach an agreement in the second phase of the SALT talks, that would limit it further and that would be fine with them.

I don't believe there will be misunderstanding on that score at all.

On the first part of your question, that is, of course, something Congress will consider. It has to consider our domestic needs and balance those against the defense requirements which we think are necessary.

We have not asked for anything in our defense budgets that we think is unnecessary or wasteful both from the standpoint of our national defense and to the success of our negotiations in SALT phase 2.

Mr. REID. Are there any specific examples you can give as to the kinds of things you mentioned to the Soviets, that we thought we must continue to do during pendency of the phase 2 negotiations, or an example of what the Soviets said they could continue to do absent an agreement on phase 2?

Secretary ROGERS. No, I don't recall offhand there was any discussion about specifics.

The Soviets are well aware of what we have on the drawing board.

RESTARTING THE ACTION-REACTION CYCLE ON ARMS

Mr. REID. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

One final question, Ambassador Smith.

Is there anything you care to comment on on the danger of the restarting of the action-reaction cycle?

Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Reid, I think that if the United States continues to modernize its forces as the Soviet Union will continue to modernize its forces, the action-reaction cycle should not start up again.

I do think there is also a line at which it could be started if, for instance, we started an entirely new program that is technically permitted by the agreement. For example, there is nothing that would not permit us from putting a lot of launchers on surface vessels. I think that would indicate we are increasing our forces instead of modernizing.

There is a problem of balancing between too little and too much, between not keeping up the modernization of our forces and going too far in the arms drive.

I believe we are prudent enough to avoid getting into such extreme positions.

Mr. REID. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The committee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, July 27, 1972. The committee met on July 27, 1972, as scheduled and heard testimony on the Interim Agreement from the Honorable Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, which was classified "Top Secret" and therefore is not included in the printed record of the hearings.)

AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2, 1972

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:15 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman Morgan. The committee will come to order.

This morning the committee is meeting to continue our consideration of a resolution expressing congressional approval of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded last May between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Our witnesses this morning are the Secretary of Defense, Hon. Melvin R. Laird, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, of course, with them at the witness table are two members of the U.S. negotiating team at SALT, Hon. Paul H. Nitze, who represented the Department of Defense at the talks, and Lt. Gen. Royal B. Allison, who represented the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. Secretary, we will open the session by presenting your statement, followed by the admiral's statement, and after that we will direct our questions to you individually or as a team.

You may proceed, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary Laird. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to continue discussions with the Congress on matters related to the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons. As you know, I heartily endorse the consultative process with the Congress which this administration has fostered. I recognize the need fort his exchange of views—a recognition which originated in my days as a Member of Congress and a recognition which has been reinforced during my tenure as Secretary of Defense.

Today, I am here to respond to your questions and to briefly outline for this committee my perception of the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons.

The specifics of the agreements and other considerations related to them are, of course, being treated by other officials of the administration who have appeared before the committee, such as the Secretary of State, the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President has asked me to concentrate on the relationship of the agreements to the defense of the United States. In doing so, I will emphasize the critical importance of proposed U.S. strategic programs to the viability of the agreements already reached, and the continued importance of these programs to the follow-on negotiations which could begin this autumn.

In my view, the national security requirements of the United States make it urgent that: (1) the Senate ratify the ABM Treaty; (2) the Congress approve the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons; and (3) the House and Senate reinforce these initiatives for arms limitation with strong support for the President's defense budget proposals.

SUPPORTS SALT AGREEMENTS

As you know, the limitations contained in the SALT agreements were brought about through carefully prepared, lengthy and intensive negotiations. We did not pursue a course dictated by wishful thinking, but rather a course based on the realities of the existing strategic balance and the potential inherent in ongoing programs. As a result, the agreements reflect the fruits of our successful national security programs upon which realistic negotiations were based.

I believe the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons now before the Congress move us closer to our ultimate goal—a world system in which peace is a universal practice rather than a hope. These agreements enable us to sustain our confidence in the effectiveness and realism of our strategic deterrent and to maintain a position of strength—the essential foundation for successful negotiations. I am confident that the provisions of these agreements can be verified by national means.

NEED FOR A STRONG DEFENSE POSTURE

In my view, the opportunities for enhanced security embodied in the SALT agreements would be nullified and our national security jeopardized in the long term unless there is continued strong support for an adequate defense budget. The success of SALT and prospects for ultimate peace depend on sustained strength. I believe the majority of the Members of Congress and the majority of all American citizens agree on the need for a strong defense posture.

The programs that we are recommending in the defense budget now before Congress will provide this strength. The President reported upon his return from Moscow that Mr. Brezhnev and his Soviet colleagues had made it absolutely clear that they intended to go forward with programs in the offensive area that are not limited by these agreements. It should be no surprise when I report to you that this is precisely what they are doing.

Both as a Member of Congress and when I became Secretary of Defense, I thought it was essential to apply the brakes to the onrushing Soviet strategic weapons momentum. With ratification of these agreements, we will have accomplished this objective.

As a legislator and as a member of the executive branch, I have always felt that it is essential for us to maintain technological superior-

ity. With approval of the President's budget request, this crucial objective also will be sustained.

The defense programs that are before the Congress are needed to preserve the effectiveness of our deterrent, both with and without SALT. Without the current agreements before you, we would be forced to take further measures to protect our deterrent capability. With the agreements, we can continue our programs in prudent fashion as we move into follow-on negotiations in SALT II.

REQUIREMENT FOR TRIDENT AND B-1 BOMBER

Let me briefly summarize the basis of our need for the major programs which are included in the revised defense budget for fiscal year 1973.

We need Trident at the earliest possible date. Last year we made the decision to accelerate Trident as the most appropriate new initiative to preserve the sufficiency of our strategic deterrent for the future.

As you know, Trident is presently planned as a replacement system. It should be noted that our programs will not get the first Trident submarine into operation until after the scheduled expiration date of the Interim Agreement. Even though an increase from the present 41 to 44 boats is permitted, the United States total number of operational SLBM submarines will not increase during the period of this agreement.

We also have an urgent need to keep the development program for the B-1 bomber on schedule. This program is designed to provide us an option to deploy the first aircraft in the late 1970's.

THE NCA ABM DEFENSE

With regard to the defense of the National Command Authority (NCA), we can fund the NCA defense in fiscal year 1973 and still reduce the budget request for ABM by $650 million. As I have reported to the Congress, system components originally slated for defense of Minuteman sites will be continued with the objective of using these components at Washington. During fiscal year 1973, we propose to continue studies of NCA defense, continue advanced site preparation, and retain options for specific NCA defense configuration. The actual request on the NCA when these preparations have been made would not be included until the 1974 budget request.

The prototype development program for site defense preserves the option to deploy a terminal defense of U.S. ICBM's should that become necessary. This prototype program is permitted by the treaty and it will provide for earlier availability of developmental hardware, earlier development of software, and earlier test and demonstration.

REVISED SATELLITE BASING PROGRAM

The revised satellite basing program accelerates the funding for improved facilities at our strategic bomber bases and makes these facilities available in a more timely fashion. Our bomber alert force will be able to use inland bases at an earlier time period and existing main operating bases will have added launch facilities sooner than initially planned.

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SLCM AND COMMAND/CONTROL SYSTEMS

The development of a submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) system is necessary to assure that we have options for increasing our strength in the future, if the need arises. The funding we are proposing will allow more intensive study of the SLCM system and initiate the development of propulsion and guidance components, some of which may challenge the existing technology. The Soviets, as you know, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, now have significant numbers of SLCM's deployed on nuclear boats and an active production program for the SLCM within the Soviet Union.

The SALT agreements, in my view, underscore the importance of having reliable, effective command, control, and communications systems. We are recommending additional funding in fiscal year 1973 to the Department of Defense to improve the degree of secure communications with the airborne command post; advance our technology using satellite communications; improve the survivability features of data systems, especially those associated with advanced computers; conduct system engineering studies of the worldwide military command and control system. These are all included in the 1973 presentation which has been made to the Armed Services Committee in the House and Senate and to the Appropriations Committees of both the House and the Senate.

We are also requesting moderate increases in funding to move forward with work on improved reentry vehicles for our ballistic missiles.

Clearly, adequate and effective verification capabilities are necessary. We have such capabilities now and are proposing moderate increases in funding to assure that verification of the provisions contained in these agreements will remain adequate in the future. All of these particular items requiring authorization of the Armed Services Committee were included in the bill which was enacted in the House of Representatives as reported from the House Armed Services Committee.

STRONG CONVICTIONS ABOUT SALT AGREEMENTS

I want to repeat what I told the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in testimony last month: We enter these agreements with the following interdependent strong convictions:

> Our security will be enhanced.
>
> We have applied brakes to the momentum of Soviet strategic missile deployments.
>
> We have adequate means of verification.
>
> Congress will support, I am confident, the strategic programs we have proposed and will propose.
>
> We have taken the initial steps and have laid a solid foundation for further arms limitation and potential arms reductions in the future.

As you note, we need the help of the Congress, which is a full partner with coequal responsibilities in providing for the defense and the security of our Nation. The executive branch cannot succeed alone.

I urge your support of these agreements and continued support of the programs necessary for the future sufficiency of our forces. With them we can, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, continue to preserve our security and to negotiate successfully from a position of strength as we move into the follow-on negotiations in SALT II in this very important strategic area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Admiral Moorer, you may proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral MOORER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss with you today the SALT agreements and their interrelationship to our strategic force posture. The Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and our strategic forces have been designed to serve a common purpose—to preserve peace.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff share with all the people of the United States a sincere desire to relieve mankind of the burden and terror of modern weapons. On October 23, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised President Truman that they—

> * * * regard it as of great military importance that further steps * * * be promptly and vigorously pressed * * * in an effort to forestall a possible race in atomic weapons * * *.

At that time the Joint Chiefs of Staff further suggested, as a matter of immediate importance, measures for—

> * * * restricting or outlawing the use of atomic weapons and for encouraging the full development of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, recognized in 1945 and still maintain today that a credible strategic deterrent is indispensable to peace. For that reason, no task is more important, from a military standpoint, than that of maintaining and protecting such a force. Our strategic nuclear weapons have but one essential purpose—to deter conflict. The real objectives is that these weapons never be used. Arms control agreements, to be either enduring or effective, must mutually enhance the security of both parties. We must, in order to survive as a Nation, retain the power needed to deter aggression, not as a symbol of national aggrandizement but as an essential shield for the preservation of our security. It is in this context that the treaty, the agreement, and the U.S. strategic posture must be viewed.

JCS REPRESENTED ON SALT DELEGATION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were officially represented on the SALT delegation and were consulted prior to signature. If we press forward vigorously with our programs designed to protect against a degradation in national security posture, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the deterrent capability of our strategic forces will not be impaired,

that the peace of the world may be enhanced, and that the undertakings will be in the best interests of the United States.

There are two essential ingredients in any analysis of the strategic consequences of these undertakings: first, the relative balance between the U.S.S.R. and the United States projected over the life of the agreement; and second, drawing upon that analysis, a discussion of the essential continuing steps we must take to preserve U.S. security and the stability of international order as we move into the future.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

It is necessary that we examine a little of the past in order to understand the present and to put the future in perspective. In discussing the fiscal year 1971 budget with the Congress, Mr. Laird and I both said that the United States no longer had clear superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. In the course of considering our relative military posture during the fiscal year 1972 budget hearings, I reported that the "balance is tenuous." This year my report to the Congress reflected that the balance is turning against us in quantitative terms and that short of an effective agreement on strategic arms limitations, the momentum of the Soviet strategic force buildup would likely carry Soviet forces well beyond the level planned for United States forces in the mid- or late 1970's. This momentum resulted from the fact that the U.S.S.R. has had an active ICBM and SLBM construction and deployment program since the mid-sixties, while in a quantitative sense, the United States remained static—concentrating instead on qualitative improvements. We, therefore, must examine the impact of these agreements on the basis not only of what they freeze, but also upon what they forestall.

I would like now to briefly analyze the strategic military balance and project it into the future in order to describe how the Strategic Arms Limitations (SAL) undertakings affect that balance. I will address specifically those forces affected by the undertakings: ICBM's, SLBM's, and ABM's. In addition, the three general quantitative measures which have been used to summarize the overall strategic military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union—numbers of delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads—will be discussed.

Turning now to the numbers of United States and Soviet ICBM launchers, the U.S.S.R. is expected to have approximately 1,550 ICBM's on launchers by July 1 of this year. They have been deploying ICBM's at the rate of about 250 per year. Thus, if unconstrained, they could have had by midyear 1977 well over 2,000 such missiles on launchers. The number of ICBM launchers projected for the Soviets under SAL is between 1,600 and 1,400, depending on how many they choose to convert to SLBM's. In the SAL environment, we actually consider the lower number of ICBM launchers to be the more severe threat. The reason for this apparent anomaly is that a lower number of ICBM launchers reflects the phaseout and replacement of older missiles with modern SLBM's. It should be noted, however, that the maximum numbers of ICBM's and SLBM's that the Soviets could have had without the constraints of the undertakings were much in excess of those permitted by the agreement. United States ICBM's as projected in our 5-year defense program would not have increased beyond the current level of 1,054.

SLBM LAUNCHERS

SLBM launchers are the next item of interest. The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have about 580 operational SLBM's and is building at the rate of about 128 per year. They were, therefore, capable of operating about 1,200 SLBM's by 1977. A Soviet maximum of 950 modern launchers is all they are permitted by the undertakings. The U.S. SLBM launcher level will remain constant through 1977, at 656. Although under the agreement we are permitted to build up to 710 SLBM launchers by converting our 54 Titans to SLBM launchers, we cannot deploy our first new Trident submarine until 1978 and, thus, add to our SLBM launcher force.

The total number of intercontinental delivery vehicles projected for the United States and the Soviet Union should now be considered. The 140 U.S.S.R. and 457 U.S. bombers must now be added to the numbers of intercontinental delivery vehicles previously discussed. They are unaffected by the agreement. Approximately 2,100 deployable vehicles are now available to each party. The Soviet Union was expected to overtake us in this measure by mid-1972 and to have over 3,000 delivery vehicles operational by 1977. Under the terms of the undertaking, our best estimates reflect a level of 2,167 United States and 2,499 U.S.S.R. delivery vehicles. This factor, more than any other, points out the significance of interrupting Soviet momentum. Granted, we have a freeze at a ratio of about 2,499 to 2,167 in favor of the Soviet Union, but we have forestalled a 1977 ratio of about 3 to 2 in their favor.

U.S.S.R.: SUPERIOR IN MEGATONNAGE

The U.S.S.R. was already far superior to us in total intercontinental strategic offensive megatonnage. Only in the numbers of strategic offensive warheads was the United States projected to maintain a lead over the Soviet Union during the next 5 years. Even here, the U.S.S.R. has the potential to overtake us. Given the technology which we have every reason to believe the Soviet Union either has or is acquiring, it is anticipated that they will move vigorously into the MIRV's, both in their ICBM's and SLBM's. The considerably greater "throw weight" or payload capacity of the Soviet missile force particularly the SS-9 type missile, is especially adaptable to this task. It is still anticipated that they will considerably narrow our lead in terms of numbers of warheads by the late 1970's. However, the restraint on their deploying more than the 313 SS-9 type missiles now operational or under construction will impact upon this growth. Here we benefit from both what we freeze and what we forestall.

As I have noted on several prior occasions, an objective evaluation of the overall strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union requires consideration of all the factors in the strategic equation—delivery vehicles, megatons, and warheads—in an appropriate combination, together with prelaunch survivability, reliability, accuracy, range, and penetrability of enemy defensive systems.

SUMMARY OF OFFENSIVE BALANCE

To summarize the offensive balance:

The agreement stops Soviet ICBM deployment at some 1,600 missiles, and, if the U.S.S.R. elects to exercise the option of replacing SS–7 and SS–8 ICBM's with SLBM launchers, it would result in a net decrease of ICBM's to around 1,400. It also limits their modern large ballistic missiles to the 313 SS–9 types now operational or under construction. The agreement also limits SLBM's to 950 modern launchers. Additionally, there is a limit of 62 modern nuclear-powered submarines. The number 740 was used as a base figure for Soviet SLBM's To reach the 950 limit, the Soviet Union must dismantle and remove from the inventory either older ICBM or SLBM launchers or a selected combination thereof. The United States will be limited to the current levels of ICBM's and SLBM's (1,054 and 656 respectively), but has the option to modernize the 54 Titan launchers or replace them with light ICBM's or SLBM's.

The agreement thus permits the Soviet Union more strategic offensive launchers than the United States, but prevents them from having the strategically significant lead previously projected. We had no program to construct additional strategic launchers in the 5-year time frame of the agreement. We thus reduced the growth of the Soviet lead through negotiations rather than by adding to our force structure.

Now, I would like to discuss the strategic defensive balance with regard to the ABM Treaty. Under this proposal both sides are limited to a maximum of two sites, with 100 launchers at each site. The U.S.S.R. currently has one site deployed around Moscow, with a total of 64 launchers. We have one site under construction at Grand Forks, N. Dak., which is about 90 percent complete at this time. The Soviet Union is limited to one additional site at an ICBM field, and we are limited to an additional 100-launcher site around Washington, D.C., for defense of our national command and control mechanism. As far as ABM launchers are concerned, therefore, both sides can have a comparable defense. This defense will protect our decision-making process and command and control facilities and provide additional time to implement appropriate retaliatory measures. The perception of assured response by those who would be our adversaries reduces the potential for attack. Further, the undertakings are structured to provide a degree of strategic equality and balance. Our failure to construct the Washington site to balance off the Soviet capability would leave an undesirable asymmetrical relationship which could be destabilizing and weaken our overall deterrent posture.

NATIONAL SECURITY ASSURANCES IN A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION ENVIRONMENT

No discussion of these undertakings would be complete without consideration of the future. We must look beyond the 5-year period of the Interim Agreement and consider the actions required now to preserve an appropriate strategic equilibrium should follow-on negotiations fail. The relaxation of tensions evidenced by the mutual determination to agree, reflected by these undertakings, reduces the proba-

bility of war. There is, however, no guarantee that successive arms-limiting steps can be taken so that a more permanent solution will be reached. The present undertakings, if properly pursued, should assist us in achieving a substantial diminution in tension and lead to peaceful progress. In the meantime, however, we must continue taking those essential military steps designed to maintain our deterrent. If we fail to follow the legitimate dictates of our own security, the leadership of the U.S.S.R. will chalk it up, not to good will, but to a failure of will; not to our confidence, but to our weakness. They, thus, might be encouraged to engage in acts which could threaten the peace and security of the world. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, believe that action to achieve the following assurances must be taken now if the United States is to guard against a degradation of its national security posture:

Assurance I: "A Broad Range of Intelligence Capabilities and Operations to Verify Soviet Compliance in a Strategic Arms Limitation Environment."

Provide high confidence monitoring of Soviet compliance with the terms of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement.

Provide information on Soviet strategic activity, capabilities, and achievements as insurance against both technological and strategic surprise and for use in follow-on arms limitations negotiations.

Assurance II: "Aggressive Improvements and Modernization Programs."

Maximize strategic capabilities within the constraints established by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Offensive Agreement.

Plan for rapid augmentation of strategic forces beyond the constraints of the treaty and agreement to be made in the event of abrogation, withdrawal, or collapse of negotiations.

Assurance III: "Vigorous Research and Development Programs."

Maintain weapons systems technological superiority.

Continue testing to insure the effectiveness of new and existing nuclear weapons systems.

NEED FOR MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

The Secretary of Defense has outlined, in prior testimony and communications, as well as today, the major programs designed to provide the assurances that I have enumerated above. It is the conviction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that these programs are essential in order not to jeopardize the future security of the United States. Furthermore, these programs will:

Firstly, place the United States in a position to negotiate further acceptable limitations on offensive systems,

Secondly, prevent the United States from being placed in a position of strategic inferiority in the years ahead, and

Finally, provide positive evidence to our allies of our intention to maintain our strategic deterrent power, so necessary to their security within the SAL environment.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S INSTRUCTIONS

When the discussions leading to these undertakings began on November 17, 1969, President Nixon advised the delegation:

> You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations ever entrusted to an American delegation * * *.
>
> I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task * * *. I am nevertheless hopeful that your negotiations * * * will serve to increase mutual security.
>
> I have stated that, for our part, we will be guided by the concept of maintaining "sufficiency" in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities. I believe it is possible, however, that we can carry out our respective responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accord with the undertakings that are before you today, provided they are properly safeguarded, as discussed earlier. They may well constitute the essential first step toward an era of negotiation and a generation of peace.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ONSITE INSPECTION

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Admiral Moorer.

Mr. Secretary, when the United States was negotiating and a position for SALT was being formulated, it was reported in the press that the Department of Defense insisted that an onsite inspection should be required in order to monitor any agreement with the Soviet. As you know, there is no onsite inspection in the final agreement, only the use of national technical means of verification.

Is the agreement totally acceptable to the Department of Defense?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, it is for the items that are covered in the treaty and in this offensive agreement. This limitation as far as offensive weapons and as far as the treaty is concerned deals primarily with numbers and these numbers can be verified. This has been the position of the Department of Defense, that the limitations included in these two agreements are verifiable.

ROLE OF JCS IN SALT

Chairman MORGAN. Admiral, what role did the Joint Chiefs of Staff play in the formulation of the execution of the United States negotiation position for SALT?

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Chairman, as I noted in my statement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff fully participated. General Allison, sitting on my right, was the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was a member of the delegation.

In addition to that, sir, I attended meetings of the committee charged with the responsibility for issuing guidance to the delegation and, of course, I attended the National Security Council meetings which dealt with the proposals.

JCS AND STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Chairman MORGAN. Admiral, what role do you see that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will play with regard to the standing consulting committee established under the SALT agreements?

Admiral MOORER. I think, sir, certainly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be required to submit their opinion as to the military impact of any proposal. Furthermore, I think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are duty-bound to recommend that certain points be brought up if, in our opinion, the trend is such as to adversely affect the security of the United States.

Chairman MORGAN. Will the Joint Chiefs of Staff carry on the some function in phase 2 of these negotiations?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

SOVIET INTERPRETATION ON NATO SUBS

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Secretary, the interim agreement on offensive weapons provides that the United States can deploy a maximum of 44 nuclear missile-carrying submarines. Although it is not in the agreement, the Russians have said that they would regard 50 such submarines as the upper limit for the whole Western Alliance, and they regard France as a full partner as a member of the alliance.

Now, it has been reported, again in the press, that the French plan to build several more submarines, which would take the Western Alliance to a total of more than 50.

Could this in any way possibly justify or jeopardize the agreement?

Secretary LAIRD. No. Our position on that matter was made very clear to the Soviets all during the negotiations and at the time of the signing, that it would not jeopardize in any way the numbers involved in this agreement.

Chairman MORGAN. Do we have any position at all in regard to the additional French submarines?

Secretary LAIRD. Do we have a position?

Chairman MORGAN. Yes. Say France goes ahead with the production of 10 more missile-carrying submarines.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, that is the business of the Republic of France, and that is not the business of the U.S. Department of Defense. I would certainly hope that the NATO allies and the Western European allies would share a greater responsibility for the security of the alliance and the security of Western Europe, but that is not covered in this agreement. That would be a decision which would be made by the French themselves. We would not have an input to that decision except in our discussions in the NATO Council, where we have encouraged our allies to share a greater portion of the defense and security burden of the NATO Alliance.

DOES THE MILITARY SUPPORT AGREEMENTS

Chairman MORGAN. Admiral, I note in the last paragraph you gave assurance that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accord, but while these negotiations were going on and even after the agreements were signed, there were repeated stories on Capitol Hill that some of the American

military leaders were not happy with the strategic weapons agreements reached in Moscow last May.

Can you assure the committee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are fully in accord with these agreements?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir; I stand on the statement as presented in the last paragraph. I think that, we of course, have always felt that it is necessary to go forward with these new programs. We have testified to this effect for the last 3 or 4 years. The buildup of the Soviet capability was not because of SALT, it was taking place all the time anyway and we called attention several times to this fact, and this is why we are strongly supporting the new programs which are designed to prevent us from slipping into a position of obsolescence or even inferiority.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Moorer.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

PRAISE FOR U.S. NEGOTIATORS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome these gentlemen back to the committee and say at the outset that I hope that Congress does approve this Interim Agreement promptly and that the treaty also is ratified promptly.

I agree thoroughly that we should maintain a strong defense. It does seem to me that approval is important if there is to be an early initiation of further negotiations.

I would hope that those negotiations will include some of those who have negotiated so successfully in the past. I think the fact that we have Mr. Nitze here, and also General Allison, indicates that there is recognition of the quality of those who have done the negotiating. I don't think enough has been said. They have contributed very substantially to what I consider significant developments, and I hope that some of you gentlemen will surely continue in the talks.

There really are only two questions that I have even heard in connection with these agreements. One was expressed by Senator Fulbright when Mr. Kissinger briefed us in the White House initially. I am paraphrasing what he said. He indicated immediately an affirmative response to the agreements but he seemed to think that the proposed level of our defense expenditures was in some way inconsistent with the SALT agreements, that this might be a contribution to the arms race and that perhaps the Soviets would think we were insincere in our desire for further reduction of arms.

I wonder if you would comment on that.

ADVISABILITY OF WASHINGTON ABM

The only other point that I have heard is the advisability of a defense of Washington as part of this program. Admiral Moorer suggested that we might jeopardize our future security interests if we didn't go ahead with the whole package.

Would you care to comment on what would happen should there be a failure of Congress to respond to the suggestion that we should build up the defense of Washington? What would the Soviets think? How would it affect the overall picture?

DEFENSE SAVINGS FROM SALT

Secretary LAIRD. Well, let me answer the first part of your question and I will ask the Chairman to address the second part of your question, Mr. Frelinghuysen.

The level of defense spending which was proposed to the Congress in our 1975 budget will be able to be reduced because of the ABM Treaty, although there are offsetting increases because of the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam. Instead of moving forward on the 12-site Safeguard ABM program we will reduce that program to a two-site program. The overall savings as far as the ABM program is concerned will be close to $9 billion over the period of the ABM deployment and the saving in our 5-year program level will be in the area of $7 billion.

The total savings in this particular budget, on the ABM program will be slightly over $700 million.

Now on the offensive agreement, there will be no savings as far as the offensive agreement is concerned because the offensive agreement merely limits the numbers to approximately the numbers that are currently in the U.S. inventory with the exception of the submarines. The limitation on the submarines is a total of three submarines more than we have at the present time. We have 41, as you know.

The modernization program which is going forward and which is included in our budget will continue, because these agreements do not limit the modernization of our force structure as planned in the 1973 budget, and outlined in the defense report which we filed with this Congress in the early part of this year.

Those particular programs were not limited. There was discussion of limitations on modernization, but such limitations did not find a place in the Interim Agreement.

TRIDENT AND B–1 PROGRAMS

One important program that we have going forward in the 1973 budget is the so-called Trident submarine program. The first of those submarines would not be available until 1978, until after the end of this particular agreement, even with the accelerated approach which was approved last year.

The B–1 is a development program and the production decision will not be made on the B–1 for another year. That development program calls for building three prototypes.

Those particular programs are the major items in the strategic offensive field that were in the 1973 budget.

SOVIETS CONTINUING SUB CONSTRUCTION

The Soviet Union is continuing its program of construction of submarines. At the present time they have in being or under construction a total of some 43 Polaris type, or Y class submarines. They can move to the 62 permitted in this agreement. We expect that that program will continue and that they will go forward to build up to that number of 62.

They are not permitted to go forward with any more construction as far as numbers of ICBM silos are concerned, but the improve-

ment of their silos and the equipment of their missile systems can continue to go forward. They have a fast-moving test program in the area of land-based missiles.

On the very day this agreement was signed the Soviet Union fired the SS-9 in a test firing. They have had firings of the SS-9, SS-11, and other missiles during this particular period. They are going forward with the research and development program as far as their multiple reentry vehicle program is concerned. We know that they are now deploying multiple reentry vehicles on some of their land-based systems. We believe that within a period of 18 to 24 months they will be deploying the multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles on their systems. They have gone forward and are testing an inertial guidance system on their submarines at the present time. Those Soviet programs are going forward. We have in our budget improvements—items and systems that are allowed under the offensive agreement.

I would recommend that all of these programs go forward. I think they are quite essential to the security of our country and to maintaining the effective, realistic deterrent that I think is so essential to prevent nuclear war during this period.

So in answer to your question: We are able to make some reductions in the defensive area. We cannot make any reductions in the offensive area. If we were to make reductions in the offensive area at this time, I believe that the effectiveness of these particular agreements as far as our national security is concerned would be jeopardized.

NEED FOR WASHINGTON ABM SYSTEM

I would like the Chairman to answer the second part of your question.

Admiral MOORER. Mr. Frelinghuysen, with respect to the ABM site at Washington—the NCA—I should point out first that from the outset the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that the NCA be a key part of the Safeguard program. As a matter of fact the fiscal year 1972 budget, as well as the President's budget for fiscal year 1973, contain funds which would be used for site exploration and development.

The reason for this is that it is vital that we protect our decision-making process. A part and parcel of the entire deterrent package is the decisionmaking that takes place before the execution order is sent out to the forces which actually operate the weapon systems. Therefore, if this decisionmaking process is in jeopardy, then the whole deterrent package is degraded. That is the prime reason for providing these defenses around the Washington area.

In addition, the system, of course, will provide defense against accidental or irrational attacks of any kind on the Capital, where the decisions are made—the President, of course, is required by law to make these decisions. So I and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that this is a very vital part of the overall deterrent.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to join in welcoming the Secretary and Admiral Moorer, General Allison, and Mr. Nitze before this committee this morning.

I wish to underscore what the Secretary has said. When there is a question of U.S. sincerity in limiting strategic arms it must be remembered that under the SALT agreements the U.S.S.R. will be permitted to modernize effective qualitative improvements in nuclear weaponry. If we are not going to have a strong defense posture as you so well emphasize in your presentation, Mr. Secretary, then there is no point of going into SALT II talks because we can only be effective at getting some agreement if indeed we enter the SALT talks strongly.

BUDGET LIMITATIONS AND DEFENSE SPENDING

However, now in view of your great emphasis on the need for a strong defense posture, Mr. Secretary, is this possible, in view of the request of the President that Congress stay within the limitation of the budget that he has proposed last week?

Secretary LAIRD. Congressman Zablocki, the defense budget which is currently before this Congress and the security assistance programs that are currently before this Congress are the only two major appropriation bills which have not been acted upon by both Houses of the Congress. There has been no action on these two appropriation bills by even one House of the Congress, and if we are going to apply the spending limitation only to those two bills, I believe the security interests of our country would be very adversely affected. I could not support these spending restrictions and would not recommend to this Congress that those spending restrictions be applied to the military assistance programs or to the Defense Appropriation Act, which are a vital part of our overall defense and security program.

Unfortunately, those are the only two bills in the appropriation area left, and I take strong exception to applying that spending restriction merely to those two bills.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I know, Mr. Secretary, you cannot speak for the entire executive branch or specifically for the President, but if indeed Congress passes the two remaining appropriation bills in the amounts requested he will have to impound moneys that were appropriated in other programs in order to meet that budget limitation. Is that not true? Would you expect him to do so?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. If that spending limitation is to be met it can be done in this way. Now it is very difficult for a spending limitation to be applied. The Congress in its wisdom has seen fit to increase the social security benefits by 20 percent. This was a decision that was made by the Congress and it has been signed by the President. I am making as strong a plea as I possibly can that national security spending be exempt from any kind of a limitation.

QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON WEAPONS

Mr. ZABLOCKI. I shall not pursue this line of questioning particularly since this is a political year.

If I may follow up on a question that the chairman had asked in regard to onsite inspection, the point has been made on many occasions that the SALT agreements will have only a narrow impact because although they put quantitative limits on weapons deployment they would have little effect on qualitative improvements in nuclear weaponry.

Given the difficulty in monitoring qualitative improvements and weapons systems and other problems, do you think it is possible for meaningful qualitative limitations to be negotiated during the SALT II?

What difficulties would you foresee in such an attempt?

Finally, would the Defense Department again take a position of a necessity of on-the-spot inspection in the agreements in SALT II?

Secretary LAIRD. I think it is possible to negotiate qualitative limitations, and I believe that that is a subject that should be foremost in the minds of our negotiators as we move into SALT II.

However, I would have to agree, at least partially, with the second part of your question. I believe that verification of some qualitative improvements would require onsite inspection.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Well, probably it is a little premature. Would one of the team that served as negotiators be in a position to tell us whether the Soviets would be willing to include onsite inspection.

Secretary LAIRD. I think you would probably have to have onsite inspection in most areas of qualitative improvement. I would like Mr. Nitze and General Allison to comment on that question. They were in close contact during the negotiations, and I think that they could be better witnesses.

VERIFYING VOLUME BY NATIONAL VERIFICATION MEANS

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Particularly, Mr. Secretary, in view of the fact that I detect that some qualitative improvements could not be determined by national means of verification in your opinion.

Secretary LAIRD. I think that by national means we could verify volume. I do not believe that we could verify some other qualitative improvements which are possible in these particular systems without onsite inspection but I would like Secretary Nitze to comment on that.

Mr. NITZE. I would like to emphasize what the Secretary has just said on controls on the volume of missiles. Those controls are inherently observable by national technical means, and therefore this would not require onsite inspection to have such controls. We attempted to get agreement by the Soviets that light missiles would not be increased in volume beyond the volume of the largest light missile currently deployed by the other side. We were not able to get the agreement of the Soviets to that. We did, however, make a unilateral statement that we thought it would be contrary to the basic intent of the agreement if such missiles were deployed.

Now, I think it wholly possible to negotiate for that kind of limitation in non-follow-on negotiations. As the Secretary said, there are other types of qualitative control which are not verifiable by national technical means. During the earlier negotiations there was discussion of the possibility of a MIRV ban. We felt that that would require both onsite inspection and a ban on flight testing MIRV'd missiles.

This the Soviets were unwilling to agree to. And with regard to the final part of your question, I think it unlikely that the Soviets in the follow-on negotiations will agree to onsite inspection.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is good to see you, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Moorer.

MONITORING THE AGREEMENT

I hope the Defense budget is approved as has been requested and that the treaty is OK'd in the time mentioned. I believed the U.S. ability to monitor the Soviet compliance is very important, and you apparently seem to believe that we have that ability.

Secretary LAIRD. In both the treaty and in the offensive agreement, the numbers that are provided in these two agreements can be verified.

Mr. WHALLEY. Mr. Secretary, on page 3 you said you believe the majority of American citizens agree on the need for a strong U.S. defense posture. We send questionnaires every year to every home in our congressional districts and the answers are practically unanimous in that the United States must always be the top man in the military strength, so it just adds what you are saying there. I wish the majority of Congress felt the same way.

TIMETABLE FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

It has always been stated that September 30 is the date that Congress should approve these agreements so that other meetings can be held in October.

What sort of timetable is necessary for the House and Senate if this is to be done? This is August 2, so time is sort of running out.

Secretary LAIRD. I think the timetable that the Congress is moving on right now is adequate from the standpoint of the offensive agreement and the treaty. You know, since I am over in the executive branch of the Government, I have never wanted to establish timetables for the Congress. I have been very careful to stay away from that. I asked the Congress to consider the authorization of the Trident program and the B–1 development program prior to the time that they considered the agreement and the treaty. The Congress in its wisdom accepted that advice and has gone forward and approved the Trident program in the authorization bill and the B–1 and some other programs that we feel are absolutely essential. They have moved those ahead of the agreement and the treaty, and for that I thank the Senate and the House.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fascell.

TERMS FOR PULLING OUT OF AGREEMENTS

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my congratulations to the negotiators who did a fine job, and to say that I support ratification of the treaty and the Interim Agreement.

Nevertheless, I feel constrained to pursue several points that I believe will set the future tone for what we do.

As I understand, the treaty itself is really a conditional treaty with an option for U.S. pullout in the event that at the end of 5 years we have not been able to pursue an ongoing treaty, understanding or agreement which would guarantee the survivability of our retaliatory nuclear strike. Is that correct?

Secretary LAIRD. That is true of the offensive agreement but that is not true of the treaty.

Mr. FASCELL. I read somewhere in the unilateral notes it seems to me that——

Secretary LAIRD. The treaty has a supreme national interest clause which would permit one of the signators to set aside the treaty, but it is the supreme national interest clause and it is not tied up with SALT II in the offensive area.

Mr. FASCELL. Let me read this note, maybe I misunderstood it:

> If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved with 5 years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM treaty.

Secretary LAIRD. That could occur if we felt that because of a failure to arrive at a follow-on offensive agreement, the supreme national interests of the United States could be jeopardized. The word "could" is deliberate and this would require a decision at that time. I do not want to give the impression that that decision has already been made.

Mr. FASCELL. Of course not.

Secretary LAIRD. It could be made.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand. The United States left our options open.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct.

THE OVERKILL ISSUE

Mr. FASCELL. What difference does it make, as to the issue of qualitative and quantitative posture when both sides already have all the kill that is necessary, either on first strike or second strike? Why play the numbers game? Why is that important?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, it is important from the standpoint of the deterrent. I would like to have the Chairman address that question because it is very important and goes to the heart of all of our development programs and our budget request.

Admiral MOORER. As you know, our policy has been to maintain three types of delivery systems; namely, the strategic bomber, the ICBM, and the submarine-launched ballistic missile. The numbers are important in order to insure reliability and thereby maintain the credibility of the deterrent.

Now, as far as the qualitative improvements are concerned, as you know, as time goes on technology marches on. It is necessary, in my view, not to let our system become obsolescent.

I know that people frequently say, "Well, both sides have essentially unlimited kill capability," but when one looks at all of the factors associated with the deterrent equation; namely, the numbers of the delivery vehicle, the megatonnage, the number of warheads, and the survivability of the command and control system, all these things put together require quantity as well as quality in light of the capabilities of the other side.

FACTORS IN DETERRENCE CREDIBILITY

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that, Admiral, and I think I could agree with all of those statements, but I think the issue is not how many back-up systems do you have and what it takes to determine reliability or

credibility—that is the political, that is not military except in the sense that you are going to use it.

Admiral MOORER. Well, the reliability of the system is certainly military.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that.

Secretary LAIRD. And the survivability of your systems is certainly military.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand that.

Secretary LAIRD. And how many we have surviving after they are subject to an attack.

Mr. FASCELL. That gets me to the next question, Mr. Secretary. It is very clear to me that the trend is away from fixed concrete missile silos; that the land mobile missile is something in the future that probably cannot be justified economically and militarily and there is some considerable debate about an airplane delivery system as a primary one.

So that leaves the sumbarine launched missile as the crux of this whole agreement. If that system does not have your first strike, and the retaliatory strike capability, the other two are meaningless. Therefore, submarines in the Interim Agreement and the protocol are the vital issues of this understanding reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

RELATIONSHIP OF INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL

I would like to hear from the negotiators what brought about the protocol and what was the length of the time differential between the Interim Agreement and the protocol.

If it is so important, why did we give them a 5-year lead on both submarines and submarine launched missiles? The other matters, as I see it, are totally secondary.

Secretary LAIRD. The important thing is that we are halting their momentum in the submarine construction program. One of the primary reasons why I have supported the agreement as Secretary of Defense is that it brings their operational deployments to a halt at 62 submarines. Based upon their present construction capabilities, at the end of the 5-year period, they could have up to 90 operational and under construction. The agreements have put an upper limit on submarine levels.

At the time when they could have had 90 without this agreement, we would still have 41. We gave up our momentum in the ABM field, and they gave up their momentum in the submarine-launched missile field. Each side had to be willing to give up something. We gave up our momentum on the ABM program, they gave up theirs on the submarines and halted at 62 instead of 90. We would have been at 41 when they got to 90 without this particular agreement.

Mr. FASCELL. I think that is fine as far as coming down on which side did best. I am agreeing with you on that, but I think the latched door is open as far as the Russian subs are concerned. We will have to wait and see what the Russians do.

THE CUBAN SITUATION

Was anything discussed with respect to Cuba, because the Russians are already laying the predicate for SALT II and saying we are going to have to give up our bases everywhere, especially the submarine bases? What about their base in Cuba?

Secretary LAIRD. The Cuban situation was not directly related to the SALT talks. Overseas bases for our submarines was not a consideration in the SALT agreements. This is a consideration in the other part of the program, which we have presented to this Congress, and that is why we are urging that we go forward with a submarine system that does not have to be forward based.

I appreciate the support that the House of Representatives has given to the Trident program. This is a very important part of that program as we move forward with our modernization of American submarines.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, somewhere in the record I would like to get a response as to the protocol.

Secretary LAIRD. Do you want it in the record at this point?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, that would be fine, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. It will be furnished for the record.

(Subsequently, the following information was supplied by the Defense Department in response to Mr. Fascell's request:)

The Soviets suggested that the details of the limitation on submarines be included in a Protocol, which would be an integral part of the Interim Agreement rather than in Article III of the Interim Agreement. The United States agreed to the suggestion.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan.

SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you say in your statement that Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it clear they intended to go forward with programs in the defensive area which are not limited by the agreements and it should be no surprise to report that this is precisely what they are doing. What are they doing?

Secretary LAIRD. They are going forward with their submarine construction programs, and with their test programs for improved land-based missile systems. The test program is very sophisticated. I will put in the record here data on the tests by system.

Mr. MONAGAN. A whole variety of tests?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, there are tests that are going forward at the present time. There has been no change. If anything, there has been some increase in the test program during the past few months. They also are working on improved anti-ballistic-missile systems at the same time.

Mr. MONAGAN. Is that the Moscow site——

Secretary LAIRD. The Moscow site construction continues, but the test program is not carried on at that complex.

(The information referred to is classified and is in the committee's files.)

REASONS FOR SOVIET SUBMARINE BUILDUP

Mr. MONAGAN. Admiral, there has been a tremendous submarine buildup in recent years. What is the Soviet purpose in doing this?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I think the Soviets perhaps since the Cuban crisis recognized the need for expanding their navy, particularly the undersea forces, although they have expanded other parts of it, too.

As you know, they have developed construction capabilities which far exceed those of the United States. They have been making, for instance, seven to nine of the so-called Yankee-class submarines a year. I believe the reason they do this is simply to make use of the oceans for the first time. Heretofore, they have been primarily a land power and now they have ambitions to be a world power, adding to their land capabilities and increased sea capabilities. This is something that has come about in the last 10 or 15 years.

Mr. MONAGAN. Yes. When you say they "recognized the need" for expansion, of course it could be a matter of argument whether their basic interests required them to be involved in the Caribbean, and in some other areas. So that what this trend really is, at least so far as we can see now, is a new policy that does involve expansionism, isn't that so?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. It is quite true that they are operating at greater distances from home. Associated with this overall concept is a very large expansion of the merchant marine, for instance. They are building attack-type submarines as well as strategic-missile-firing nuclear submarines. So, this is, in my view, simply a manifestation of their new policy to operate worldwide.

AGREEMENT PERMITS SOVIETS MORE SUBMARINES

Mr. MONAGAN. And this agreement even though it does, as the Secretary has said, represent a slowing of the momentum, still does permit an increase of 50 percent rather than a hundred percent in the construction of submarines. Isn't that so?

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. It permits an increase over the number of strategic-missile-firing nuclear submarines that they have today, as you say, of approximately 50 percent.

Mr. MONAGAN. From 40 to 60, roughly.

Admiral MOORER. Something like that.

Mr. MONAGAN. Instead of from 40 to 80. And, that does not give you pause in view of the apparently new philosophy of expansionism on the part of the Soviet?

Admiral MOORER. Well, it does not surprise me if that is what you mean by giving me pause.

Mr. MONAGAN. No, I mean with reference to this treaty you are still supporting this agreement, in spite of the fact that it does permit a very, very substantial expansion on the part of the Soviets in this area.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. As I said earlier, I have reported to the Congress over the last 3 years the Soviet buildup of these submarines. They are not directly associated with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks per se. The Soviet Union was going ahead with these programs anyway. On the other hand, the United States had no ongoing submarine contruction programs which would result in an increase in

force levels prior to the expiration of the 5-year limitation on the agreement.

So, the situation that will prevail in 1977, so far as the United States is concerned, will be the same. In other words, we will still have the 41 submarines. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, could, if it continued its current rate of building, run its numbers to in excess of 80 operational and under construction.

So, this will forestall the Soviet's maximum building rate now being demonstrated.

SOVIET SUBMARINE PROGRAMS

Secretary LAIRD. What they have right now is approximately 43 in being or under construction. This will limit them to 62 operational. Without this agreement, at the end of this period, they could have as many as 90 in being and under construction. Their construction program for additional modern SSBN's will have to close out at 62 under the agreement.

Now, this should not be new information as far as the Congress is concerned. When General Wheeler and I first testified, after I became Secretary of Defense, in our defense presentation in 1969, we pointed this construction program out at that time.

Since that time, Admiral Moorer and I, in our defense reports and statements each year, have pointed these figures out. There were some people who questioned the figures back a year or 18 months ago and were very critical of the figures that I was using at that time.

It turns out now that those critics found that I was conservative instead of overstating the threat.

Mr. MONAGAN. I certainly never questioned that. I think this buildup has tremendous significance, and I think that the validity of the treaty should be judged at least to some extent by the degree to which this buildup will be restricted.

Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Findley.

THE SALT AGREEMENTS AND NATO

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Secretary, I realize that the SALT agreements did not involve the tactical nuclear weapons that form the basis for our nuclear participation in NATO defenses, but would the agreements in any way inhibit us from a modernization of the tactical weapons that are in Europe?

Secretary LAIRD. These agreements do not.

Mr. FINDLEY. I think there is a feeling held by a good many people that NATO is a fading institution, that if we can get the SALT agreement settled and approved and ratified and, then go to the next stage of negotiations with the Soviet, we can soon see the day when NATO will not be needed.

Do you regard it as a fading institution?

Secretary LAIRD. No, I do not. I think that the alliance and the NATO partnership takes on increased importance. I do not see it as a fading institution, and I would hope that a majority of our people in this country would not.

We are in a position where there are opportunities to negotiate, but we were able to negotiate this SALT I agreement in part because of the

strength of the great NATO alliance. I do not believe that future negotiations, whether they be in SALT II or in the mutual and balanced force reduction discussions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, have any chance of success without a strong NATO organiaztion.

U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE

Mr. FINDLEY. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified before a subcommittee of this committee just a short time ago, and in his testimony, in response to a question I raised, he made what struck me as a very astounding observation.

He said that, for his part, he would be willing to see the United States take whatever risk would be involved in an agreement with the Soviet Union, under which we would take all of our troops out of Europe, if the Soviet Union would take all of its troops out of eastern Europe.

What would be your reaction to such a deal?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I do not believe that that would necessarily be a mutual and balanced approach and I believe that such an approach would have to be very carefully examined not only by the United States, but also by our NATO allies.

We are not going to make a bilateral arrangement with the Soviet Union, we are going to use the proper consultative procedures with our NATO allies before any decisions like that are made. Any decision that is made must recognize the difference between the land mass of Eastern and Western Europe, and the great distance that does exist between the United States and Europe. All of these things must be considered in any negotiations.

This Congress, in its wisdom through the constitutional process, has approved the NATO treaty, and the NATO treaty places special obligations on the United States and special obligations upon each of our allies.

These are mutual obligations which we all share. Any attack on our NATO allies is considered an attack upon the United States, and this is recognized under the treaty.

So, it is absolutely essential that we maintain a realistic and credible deterrent as far as Europe is concerned because of these obligations that we have.

Now, there is no one in the Congress or in the Senate that is advocating doing away with these obligations or repealing or repudiating the NATO treaty. So, as long as that treaty is in existence, we must move carefully and in a very measured way to see that we do have a realistic deterrent there, so that we can prevent war. That is what the NATO agreement is all about.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Findley?

Mr. FINDLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fraser.

WARNING TIME FROM WASHINGTON ABM

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I welcome you and your colleagues. On the National Capitol ABM defense, would the construction of the ABM defense add to the warning time that the

United States would get if we were subjected to a full scale attack by the Soviet Union?

Secretary LAIRD. If we were subjected to the use of all of the Soviet Union's weapons in a first strike?

Mr. FRASER. Or, let's say many hundreds of them.

Secretary LAIRD. The warning time would be increased, there is no question about that. I would like the chairman to address the amount of time that is involved. I am sure that we could supply that to you in your classified record, but I think even in this unclassified testimony, the chairman could give you some estimates of the time that is involved.

Mr. FRASER. I would like to have that.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. As you know, the United States is subject to attack by ICBM's, SLBM's and some bombers. So, the warning system must cover these three different types of delivery systems.

The submarines firing at the United States of course would use weapons that have the shortest time of flight, since they can position themselves in the Atlantic. Our NCA installation would definitely give advance warning of such an attack.

Mr. FRASER. I do not understand how that would happen. Supposing that there were enough submarine launched missiles or missiles and warheads to exhaust our 100 interceptors, plus additional offensive warheads that were targeted on Washington.

If they were all launched, where would we get additional warning time by having an ABM?

Admiral MOORER. That warning time is provided by the radars, and you have to add to that the time of flight from the point of detection to the point of impact.

Secretary LAIRD. The important point here——

Mr. FRASER. Would we get the same warning time——

NCA ABM WOULD REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT SUB MOVEMENTS

Secretary LAIRD. The important point to bear in mind is that 100 interceptors in the National Command Authority area would require the Soviet Union or a potential aggressor to move their submarines into position; and because of the numbers required to saturate such a system, the strategic warning provided by the movement of the submarines into position would be very significant.

Without the system, the National Command Authority could be jeopardized by one submarine close to our coast, whereas 100 interceptors in the National Command Authority area would require the movement of additional submarines, which would be a major signal to our National Command Authority.

This strategic warning is, indeed, most significant. I am confident that that is the important factor you should bear in mind, not the firing of the missile itself, but the concentration of forces required to overwhelm the 100 interceptors that would be available.

This is a significant fact to keep in mind.

EFFECTIVENESS OF NCA ABM WARNING

Mr. FRASER. I am glad to learn, Mr. Secretary. I have yet to discover where the early warning would emerge, but you say it comes because of the number of submarines getting into a launch position.

Supposing the Soviets, understanding that, decided to take out our interceptors, and let's suppose they were to fire 110 ICBM offensive missiles, or enough to take out our interceptors and to come on into Washington. Would we get additional warning time by having the ABM system?

Secretary LAIRD. I do not want to get into the question of targeting and the numbers that would be involved, because I really think the example you gave is not militarily sound, but I would like the chairman to comment on that.

Admiral MOORER. I just want to make the point that you can postulate a scenario and keep adding to the numbers and so on, which would——

Secretary LAIRD. But, Mr. Chairman, I think it should be pointed out that in an ICBM attack you have about 30 minutes. We are not talking about a few minutes.

Mr. FRASER. But ABM does not add anything to that warning time, does it?

Secretary LAIRD. It does add something as far as that warning time is concerned. It does do away with that short warning time that we are concerned about from a single, close-in submarine.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary LAIRD. I would like the chairman to finish.

Admiral MOORER. I would like to finish by pointing out to you that the overall deterrent posture is measured in the eyes of the other side, of course, and consequently, the objective is not to provide what I would call a "free ride" for any one part of the whole target system.

You cannot just separate one little segment from the whole system. The idea in developing deterrence is to present to the planners on the other side as much doubt as possible as to the probability of success.

A THIRTY-MINUTE WARNING

Mr. FRASER. Admiral, my question was limited to the question of how we get additional warning time out of a Washington-centered ABM system, and I cannot discover that we get any additional time except for the one hypothesis that the Secretary has advanced. Can you give me any other illustrations of how we get warning time?

Admiral MOORER. In the hypothesis the Secretary deals with submarines which I pointed out at the beginning constitute the major threat in terms of the time element that you mentioned.

So there are two parts to the problem: One is the warning as to the deployment of the submarine and, two, the fact that the missiles are actually airborne.

Mr. FRASER. Isn't it true, Admiral, that you get that through the radar, so that the intercepting missiles are of no value in terms of warning time? If you have a radar time that detects the launch, that is what you are claiming gives you the time, but the ABM system as a total system does not give you additional time.

Secretary LAIRD. The interceptors are what would cause the Soviets to increase the number of submarines needed to attack the NCA. And an ICBM attack would increase your warning time from at least 7 minutes to 30. Now, that may not seem significant to you, but it is significant to me.

Mr. FRASER. Would you say that again?

Secretary LAIRD. The warning time as far as the sub is concerned is about 7 minutes.

Mr. FRASER. That is from the time they launch until the time of impact?

Secretray LAIRD. Yes, for an ICBM, it is some 30 minutes. By building your ABM system around the National Command Authority, you are in a position where you will know well in advance of any submarine-launched attack upon the Washington center. Because you would have 100 interceptors involved, it would take a concentrated movement of ships and equipment. So it changes your warning time, which I believe is important, by this number of minutes, and I think you can get your Comamnd Authority airborne or otherwise relocated in that particular time period. That airborne capability increases the credibility and the realism of the deterrent and that, in turn, helps to prevent a nuclear exchange.

DOD PROPOSALS FOR NCA DEFENSE

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary, for 3 years you never suggested a National Command Authority.

Secretary LAIRD. That is not correct, Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. The first time that you proposed it in a defense budget has been as a result of the SALT agreement that provides——

Secretary LAIRD. That is not correct, and I want to make that clear. I have heard that statement made by some people, and we were sitting right here in this room when I presented the 12-site program.

Mr. FRASER. Was it in last year's?

Secretary LAIRD. In every presentation I have made there has been a National Command Authority site as one of the 12 sites. In 1967, when this Congress approved the Sentinel program, a National Command Authority site was in that program. The National Command Authority protection has been in every ABM presentation that has been made by the Department of Defense since that time.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your great speech, but the fact is that you abandoned the Sentinel program as being unworkable.

Secretary LAIRD. But the Sentinel and——

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask the question, and you answer it, if that is all right with you. That is the way we work it on this committee.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I work it sometimes a little differently.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary, you run for Congress again, and then you can get the chance to ask the question. I will ask the questions, and you respond to them, if you will.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I will respond to them if I think they are proper.

Mr. FRASER. Well, I appreciate your courtesy, Mr. Secretary. I think that your contempt for the committee is suggested by that kind of response.

EFFECT OF MIRVING ON WARNING TIME

Now, you predict that the Soviets are going to MIRV their submarine missiles, do you not?

Secretary LAIRD. I do.

Mr. FRASER. Isn't it a fact that the United States with a half of a boatload, one submarine, could wipe out the Soviet Golosh system and still have enough in the other half of the boatload to destroy Moscow?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I would hope that the Soviets would grant us that capability, because it would add to our deterrent, but we cannot be certain that they do.

Mr. FRASER. How many warheads?

Secretary LAIRD. I would never downgrade the capability of our country.

Mr. FRASER. How many warheads does a Poseidon boat carry?

Secretary LAIRD. The warheads depend upon the particular system that we have deployed at the time. We could have——

Mr. FRASER. They range from 10 to 14 roughly?

Secretary LAIRD. They range in that general area.

Mr. FRASER. Per vehicle?

Secretary LAIRD. I am not going to answer all of your questions, you know that.

Mr. FRASER. Well, Mr. Secretary——

Secretary LAIRD. Because I am here testifying in a public session, and I will make the determination, Mr. Chairman.

I recognize that as a Member of this Congress for nine terms, and I will retain the option in public session of answering or not answering questions.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary——

Secretary LAIRD. That is the understanding that I have with this committee when I come before it in public session. And if that is not the understanding, then we will go into executive session now at my request.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman——

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. FRASER. May I just make a comment. If the Secretary is claiming this is classified information, I would have no objection to his refusing to answer. The fact is we have touched on nothing classified. Nothing I have asked is classified, and I really have a strong feeling that the Secretary is unwilling to follow the logic of this because, so far, no case has been made for a National Capital ABM system.

PAST DOD PRESENTATIONS FOR NCA DEFENSE

Secretary LAIRD. We will be making that case if the gentleman will permit in our 1974 budget presentation. I may not be the witness, but there will be someone here making that presentation. I would only call to your attention, and I hope the gentleman from Minnesota will permit this, that in every presentation I made to this Congress on the Safeguard system the National Command Authority site, the Washington site, was included. It was included in the presentations made by Secretary McNamara in the Sentinel system. It was included in the presentations made by me when we changed Sentinel to the Safeguard presentation. Anyone who implies that somehow or other there has been a change just is not familiar with the facts. We have stopped

our momentum in the ABM field in the treaty that we have entered into. We have given up the 12-site program. That is what the Soviets wanted for their giving up their momentum in the offensive field.

Each side in the negotiations has to be willing to give up something in order to reach agreement. The United States gave up on the 12-site ABM system, and the Soviet Union gave up the offensive momentum that they had going forward. In every presentation I have made a Washington site was included.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Secretary, I may have erred on that, I am sorry. I don't remember it in last year's budget request and the year before. So I have probably forgotten in the full scale of things that——

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Secretary LAIRD. With my former colleague I hate to have a disagreement here that is somehow or other not cleared up, but what we have done in our presentation is that we have phased our program. In the Sentinel system all sites were asked for at one time. What we tried to do was to build our program because negotiations were going forward on a phased basis. But in every presentation of the total program the Washington site was always included, although funding for that particular site had not been authorized. In every presentation it was one of the 12 sites that we were presenting in our total program.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary LAIRD. I also would like to add that the chairman reminded me that it is the Joint Chiefs of Staff that insisted that one of the two be the NCA.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Secretary and Admiral Moorer, I would say that the gentleman from Minnesota is tough-minded and has strong convictions and speaks very eloquently for himself, but permit me to say as another member of the committee that during my term of service here we have not tended to put our witnesses in straitjackets, and I certainly think the distinguished Secretary has shown no disrespect or contempt for the committee.

Secretary LAIRD. I appreciate very much your comments, but I really don't have any problems taking care of myself, and I will be able to handle that all right.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, sir; I am quite aware of that fact.

ENDORSEMENT OF SALT AGREEMENTS

May I say, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Moorer, that the weight of your collective wisdom and eloquence, has almost persuaded me to go along with you altogether on your proposal. I would like to hear from Admiral Moorer once more the unequivocal statement that in your judgment the Senate ratification of the treaty, the approval by both houses of the interim agreement, coupled with support for the President's defense proposals, that such action by the Congress would be action in your judgment and without any equivocation to strengthen the national defense and support the national security and not in any way to weaken or to undermine our security.

Admiral MOORER. That is correct, sir. Bear in mind that the offensive agreement is an interim measure of 5 years' duration. What it accomplishes is to forestall the buildup of the Soviet offensive systems significantly beyond what is provided in the proposed agreement.

So, my answer to your question is, "yes, I will give you that assurance."

Mr. BUCHANAN. And you speak not only for yourself but the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Admiral MOORER. That is correct, sir, and this is expressed in the last paragraph in my statement.

PROTECTING THE NCA

Mr. BUCHANAN. I don't entirely share the concern about what may happen to Washington, I accept your judgment as to the warning time, but if they should manage to blow up Washington, it might improve the country.

I hope, however, that your judgment of our security and defense would include important metropolises like Birmingham and some of the cities of south Alabama, Admiral. That may be covered in your analysis as well.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir. What we are doing here is to protect a decisionmaking process which is so vital to the proper use of our weapon systems. In other words, the people who operate the systems must receive timely and adequate instructions in order to carry out the decisions made by higher authority.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Wolff.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am sure that you could take care of yourself.

VIETNAM COSTS AND AMERICAN DEFENSE

I think what we are trying to find out is if you are able to take care of all of us, too.

I might, at the outset, say that I do believe in a strong America. However, there are certain points that I think are some questions that perhaps led up to some of the SALT talks.

I would like to quote from your presentation for 1973. It says:

> Since 1966 when the net available to the Soviet Union first exceeded that of the United States, the Soviet Union has had some $21 billion more available for modernization than the United States. This difference has had a different and adverse impact on the military posture of the United States relative to that of the Soviet Union. This built-in Soviet advantage has been greatly enhanced at our expense since 1965 because of the costs of the war in Viet Nam.

What I am concerned about, Mr. Secretary is whether or not we have contributed to the weakening of our defenses as a result of Vietnam.

I know that we have long recognized that the Soviets, the Communists, have been our principal threat. Why did we permit ourselves to divert our energies and our resources into Southeast Asia when our adversary was able to build his strength to where today they either have parity or supremacy over us?

Secretary LAIRD. I think a conscious decision was made by the Soviet Union back in 1953, or in that particular time period, to go forward with a Vietnamization program as far as North Vietnam was concerned. During the period of the past 20 years they went forward with

a program of training troops and pilots, providing military equipment, sending advisory missions, and they made it clear to the North Vietnamese that Indochina would be their responsibility.

We moved large forces into Vietnam on a program in 1965, after this program had been going forward in the North; and it was not until 1969 that I believe it was clearly made apparent to the South Vietnamese that they would have to build up their own capabilities and take over the ground responsibilities as well as the air responsibilities for their own in-country security.

So the North with the help of the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China did move forward on this kind of program over a longer period of time. When I became Secretary of Defense, the incremental costs of the war in Vietnam to the United States were running approximately $22 billion, and the Soviet Union's cost was close to a billion dollars. So the ratio was about 1 to 22.

REDUCTIONS IN VIETNAM COSTS

We have changed that direction. We have reduced those costs by over two-thirds. We have now established a program which has already turned over the complete ground combat responsibility to the forces of South Vietnam. In 1968 there were 11 American divisions in South Vietnam. One South Vietnamese division had the capability to actually take over ground combat responsibility and be effective. Today we have 11 divisions removed and the South Vietnamese operating under the Vietnamization program——

Mr. WOLFF. I don't want to get into a discussion with you about the Vietnam war as such, because, although you may have removed the ground troops today according to a statement that has been made by the Defense Department we are spending about $16½ million a day to meet the North Vietnamese thrust.

Now, if that indicates the thrust of Vietnamization, it gets us back to about a $13 billion budget.

Secretary LAIRD. That is not the budget that we have submitted to this committee.

Mr. WOLFF. Your budget is about $6.5 billion, and if you add to that another $16.5 million a day, which the Defense Department has indicated——

Secretary LAIRD. No, that is not the case. You could be talking about the 1972 fiscal year budget. The fiscal year 1972 cost is in that general area, but the 1973 cost is below that. You could be talking about the 1972 fiscal year.

Mr. WOLFF. What is the figure that we have budgeted for Vietnam for 1972?

Secretary LAIRD. Approximately $7 billion.

Mr. WOLFF. The Defense Department supplementary?

Secretary LAIRD. No, that is the incremental cost of war in fiscal 1972. The 1973 figure includes the regular budget plus the supplemental request that is before the Congress at the present time. The regular budget is in the area of over $4 billion, but a supplemental request was sent to this Congress and is part of the budget submission of the President of the United States. The Southeast Asia incremental cost in 1973 should be below the 1972 spending figure. The spending figure was

reduced when I became Secretary of Defense from $22 billion down to a little over $7 billion in fiscal 1972 or a reduction of two-thirds. Even with the supplemental request that is currently before the congressional committees being considered by this Congress, it is lower in 1973 than it was in 1972.

I wanted to clear that up because I feel that your question presupposed that the supplemental was not included with the 1973 figures that I was giving you. It is.

Mr. WOLFF. Of course, this is for Vietnam, or is this for Indochina?

This is the incremental cost of the war. The figures include all of the expenditures except those expenditures that would have been needed in peacetime and those that are covered under the military assistance program.

Mr. WOLFF. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. The military assistance program for Thailand will now be outside of the Vietnam cost for the first time. As you know, the change has been made from MASF to military assistance, so this year the Thai costs will be over in the military assistance program and not in the MASF program. But the figures I have given you include all of the MASF program. The Thai program is not included in MASF for the first time in 1973.

In 1972 and 1968 it was in the MASF area.

DEFENSE SPENDING PRIORITIES

Mr. WOLFF. What I am saying to you, Mr. Secretary, according to your figures on page 33 of your report, with the serious threat that was posed to us pertaining to parity or superiority, we have not met the Soviet expenditures for their own programs. Even though you have come before Congress and the amount of your requests have been approved by the Congress, you have never been able to match the Soviet expenditures; you continue to spend money in an area that has little or no relationship upon the Soviet ability to challenge us.

My point is that there is a question of priority. If we talk about priority, we should also talk about——

Secretary LAIRD. That is why we have changed the priorities. That is why I believe one of the great accomplishments has been bringing Americans back from Indochina, and we have been very successful. We can bring all of them back much more rapidly should the negotiation track work, but if the negotiation track fails, we have this program available to terminate completely and totally American involvement. That is what the Vietnamization program was all about, to give this dual track so that we could terminate American involvement and reestablish the priorities which I think are so important as we face the challenges from the Soviet Union in the future.

I do hope that you will pardon this digression, but I want you to realize that during the next 5 years in our defense program we are going to have difficulties in competing with the Soviet Union in terms of the allocation of resources.

RISE OF MANPOWER COSTS

Mr. WOLFF. Isn't that primarily due to the Vietnam war, however?

Secretary LAIRD. No; it is due primarily to the higher priority which

we place on manpower. We have been able to cut back two-thirds of the costs of the Vietnam war and the cost of our Indochina involvement, but we have used every one of those dollars plus some more to pay our manpower costs. Our manpower costs now are taking up about 57 percent of the outlays in this particular budget that we have before the Congress.

The Soviet Union is spending a comparable amount on defense, but it is only spending from about 25 to 32 percent of its budget on military manpower. That gives them a greater flexibility within their budget, not only in the procurement field for modernization, but it also gives them greater flexibility in other areas.

We believe, however, that the young people that are serving in our military forces should be compensated just as anyone else is in our society. We believe that in order to move toward volunteerism we should not use conscript labor any more to fulfill the manpower requirements of the Department of Defense. Since 1939 conscript labor through the use of selective service has been the only means, each time the Defense Department got in trouble with a labor problem, that they filled manpower requirements.

We have gone in a different direction. The entire peace dividend, as we have moved toward peace, as we have cut down our involvement, has been used in this manpower area, and I hope that that is understood by a majority of this committee.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you.

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Steele.

Mr. STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SALT II: TIMETABLE AND PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENTS

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Moorer, I think that together you have presented the most precise and the best argument for the SALT agreements that I have yet heard or seen, and I want to compliment you on that.

I have two questions. First of all, Mr. Secretary, you point out that we have taken initial steps and laid a solid foundation for potential arms reductions in the future. I am wondering the extent to which you can tell us in this session of the committee what kind of timetable you envision for phase 2 and specifically what kinds of agreements do you see as being most likely in phase 2 and something that we are targeting on 2 to 3 years out or something that we hope to conclude for the period when phase 1 expires?

Precisely what is the timetable and what kinds of agreements do we hope first to achieve in phase 2?

Secretary LAIRD. I think it is rather difficult to give a complete answer to your question. For one thing, I think that in the negotiations it is difficult to lay before the other side the negotiation position that we may be pursuing before SALT II starts. We are hopeful that it can start as soon as this agreement and this treaty have been approved and hopefully by October.

But to answer your question in broad general terms, rather than getting into specific negotiating procedures and positions, I would hope that the whole question of the equality of strategic offensive forces would be taken into consideration.

The ABM treaty is concerned, which is a continuing document with the supreme national interests escape clause, of course does have equality. It has equality as far as numbers are concerned. Yet I would hope that we could move in that general direction in SALT II in the offensive area.

FREEZE ON LAUNCHERS

Mr. STEELE. As Admiral Moorer points out very carefully in numbers, we have a freeze at a ratio of about 2,499 to 2,167 in delivery vehicles in favor of the Soviet Union. The main criticism, I think, of the SALT agreements has been that those agreements freeze in the Soviet lead in terms of missiles and that lead is about 800 when you exclude bombers.

Here is where the MIRVing comes into play. I wonder the extent to which this bothers you. The big question mark in the treaty it seems to me remains what kind of progress is the Soviet Union going to make in MIRVing, and is it not true that if that progress is more than we expect now, it could have serious implications, again depending on the extent of the progress that they make?

It seems to me that is a logical criticism; it seems to me it is a fair criticism; and I just wonder how you meet it.

Admiral MOORER. As the Secretary pointed out, the treatment of offensive systems is in terms of an Interim Agreement, so you must look at what the Soviets could do during this 5-year period. Now, they have made efforts to MIRV, they have conducted tests, and, consequently, I think we would be imprudent not to assume that they are going to MIRV their systems, particularly in view of the fact that the big missile, the SS-9, has a very large capability in terms of throw weight.

On the other hand, we also have the MIRV system and so forth. So, in terms of warheads, at the moment that happens to be the area in which we have superiority numberswise.

Now, to answer your question—what would be the balance at the end of 5 years—I think this points up the importance of the new programs that the Secretary of Defense has talked about, namely, the Trident and the B-1. Incidentally, of course, the bombers can carry more than one warhead, too, so, in a sense, you could say the bombers are MIRVed.

SALT II: SUBJECT OF EQUIVALENCY

The SALT II discussions will have to go into some detail on this subject of equivalency.

As the Secretary pointed out, the ABM system is the equivalency theme that runs throughout in terms of the number of missiles, the size of the site, the number of sites, et cetera.

So, in my opinion, when one looks at the overall capabilities, the technological features, the geographical aspects and so on, I feel confident that we do have today and will have during this interim period adequate forces for a credible deterrent.

So our real problem in my view, Mr. Steele, is the out-years after the expiration of this interim agreement. That is what we should concentrate on, and we should concentrate on this regardless of whether we had the SALT agreement or not. This is the important thing that Mr.

Laird and I have continually pointed up in the last 3 or 4 years. So the new programs that we have will give us the options to deal with the problem that you raise which I think will be quite evident as to the extent and nature at the time that the Interim Agreement is scheduled to expire. Then we would have to take certain vigorous action in the event that the SALT II talks do not move us toward equivalency along the lines of the ABM treaty.

Mr. STEELE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

POSITION OF SECRETARY LAIRD ON PACTS

Mr. Secretary, Admiral Moorer, and gentlemen, I would like to join in complimenting all of you, and particularly Ambassador Smith, for what I think is a great achievement in these SALT accords.

I think that in addition to the specific agreements that were reached, the method of negotiation was a tremendous advance—the absence of polemics and the ability to keep the discussions secret and all of that. I think it argues very well for the future, and I hope that the momentum of the SALT I can be maintained.

I notice, perhaps wrongly, Mr. Secretary, a slight difference—and one that I welcome—in the nature of your testimony here today and what I understood it to be from press reports when you first broached the matter in the Senate. I might approach the subject in this way: when the President signed these agreements, certainly there was no indication that there was any condition in his mind on what congressional action might be on defense expenditures, and when he submitted the agreements to us in his message of June 13, there was no suggestion of a condition. But the press reports indicated that in some of your testimony in the other body you indicated that you would not be in favor of these agreements unless the Congress acted favorably on some of the Defense Department proposals.

Today you do not state your support of these agreements in that way.

I understand you to state it unconditionally. Is that a fair statement?

Secretary LAIRD. No, I have not changed my position. I would only say that I think the press usually reports people pretty accurately and I will abide by the press reports. I hope I didn't mislead you today, because I still take the same position. The only difference is that the Congress has gone forward and authorized the two major programs which I did make a part of my support for these two agreements. The Congress has moved since that testimony in the Senate and in the House when I asked for authorization of those programs. They have given that authorization. So conditions today are somewhat different than the conditions under which I testified before the other committees, but I have not changed my opinion.

Mr. BINGHAM. Well, I hardly need point out to you that the process of appropriation is far from complete, and that that process will probably continue long after these agreements have been acted on, hopefully favorably.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. The authorization is the major hurdle because I wanted the Congress to put their stamp of approval and authorize these programs. They have done that, and I commend them for it.

LAIRD AND THE PRESIDENT: POSITIONS COMPARED

Mr. BINGHAM. But, Mr. Secretary, if your recommendation in favor of the approval of the treaty and the agreements is in any way conditional, then isn't your position different from that of the President of the United States?

Secretary LAIRD. My position may be somewhat different from the President's position. I believe under the National Security Act Congress established certain requirements on the Secretary of Defense which no other Cabinet officer has levied against him. He is the principal adviser in the national security area, not only to the President, but also to the Congress because under our constitution the Congress has this authority as far as the military services are concerned, and in the National Security Act of 1958 the Congress provided certain of that authority to the Secretary of Defense to make recommendations in this area. Since I have served in this position, I have tried to be as forthright and as candid with the Congress and congressional committees as I can. I have followed that procedure, so, when I am asked a question, I try to give an answer to it—my opinion—and that was my opinion. I believe that the President has expressed his support for all of these positions. The Trident submarine program, the B-1, and these other programs that I have discussed have the approval of the President, they are submitted in his budget.

A QUESTION OF SEMANTICS

Mr. BINGHAM. I am not questioning that for a moment, Mr. Secretary, but there is a great difference between expressing support for the programs and saying that unless the programs are approved, then the agreement should not be ratified.

Secretary LAIRD. The President may have used a little different language and perhaps his language is better. He said that they were equally essential—the strategic program, the agreement, and the treaty. Now, his language is—and I would like to put the exact quote from the President of the United States in the record at this point—is that he does say that "they are equally essential." I say that all three are essential.

(The material referred to follows:)

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS

I transmit herewith certified copies of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers.

The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effort is this: The ABM Treaty

limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.

Besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.

These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace.

Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes—a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected—I strongly recommend that the Senate support them, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay.

RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 13, 1972.*

EXCERPTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 29, 1972

ARMS CONTROL AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

Q. Mr. President, hardly had you signed the arms control agreements in Moscow, than your Administration asked for new money for new strategic weapons. Some of your critics are saying that this is almost a deception giving the Pentagon what it wants, namely concentration on developing quality weapons. Will you try to dispel this contradiction?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Morgan, the problem with regard to arms control is that we do not deal with it in a vacuum. We have to deal with the problem as it affects the security of the United States. Now, first, let me say that if we had not had an arms control agreement, a limitation of ABM's and a temporary limitation for 5 years on certain classifications of offensive weapons, I would—and I am saying this conservatively—have had to ask the Congress of the United States to approve an increase in the defense budget for nuclear strategic weapons of at least $15 billion a year on a crash program. Reason: Had there been no arms control agreement, the Soviet Union's plans called for an increase of their ABM's to 1,000 over the next 5 years. The arms control agreement limits them to 200 as it does us. Had there been no arms control agreement, the Soviet Union had a program underway in the field of submarines which would have brought them up to over 90. The agreement limits them to 62.

Had there been no arms control agreement—and this is the most important point—in the terms of offensive strategic weapons, the Soviet Union that has now passed us in offensive strategic weapons—they have 1,600; we have roughly 1,000—they would have built 1,000 more over the next 5 years. Now, under those circumstances, any President of the United States could see that in 5 years the United States would be hopelessly behind; our security would be threatened, our allies would be terrified, particularly in those areas, and our friends, like the Mideast, where the possibility of Soviet adventurism is considered to be rather great.

Therefore, the arms control agreement at least put a brake on new weapons. Now, with regard to the new weapons that you refer to, however, let me point

out they are not for the next 5-year period. We are really talking about the period after that. And they are absolutely essential for the security of the United States for another reason—because looking at this not in a vacuum but in terms of what the other side is doing, Mr. Brezhnev made it very clear that he intended to go forward in those categories that were not limited.

Now, in fairness to him, he also said, and made it very clear—he made it perfectly clear, I should say—he said that he expected that we would go forward. Now, under these circumstances, then, for the United States not to go forward in those areas that were not controlled would mean that at the end of the seventies we would be in an inferior position and no President of the United States can take the responsibility of allowing the United States to be the second most powerful nation in the world, nor because of any jingoistic idea but because if we are in that position, our foreign policy, our commitments around the world would be very, very seriously jeopardized.

Now the most important point I have saved for the last and that is this: I think these agreements are in the interest of the United States. I think that they are very much in the interest of arms control and therefore in the interest of world peace. But, they are only a beginning; they are only the foundation. Now, what we have to do is to really go forward with the second step. That is why the phase 2 of the arms control limitation, which we hope will begin in October, provided the Congress approves the ones that we have before them at the present time—phase 2, which will be a permanent arms control agreement on all offensive nuclear weapons—this is the one that we think can have far greater significance even than phase 1.

Phase 1 is the breakthrough and phase 2 is the culmination. And phase 2, if we can reach agreement with the Soviets—and it will take long and hard bargaining—but if we can reach it, it will mean, then, that we not only hold our arms budgets where they are, but that in these new programs instead of going forward with them on the basis presently projected we will be able to cut them back.

That is our goal and I think we can achieve it provided we approved phase 1 and provided we continue a credible arms program because, believe me, the Soviets are not going to agree to limit their future programs unless they have something to get from us.

B-1 BOMBER

Q. Mr. President, in consideration of your argument on our need for offensive weapons, why, then, do you insist on development of the costly B-1 bomber when in fact the Soviet Union has shown little interest in the bomber force in recent years and as far as we know has no new bomber force on the drawing boards at this time?

THE PRESIDENT. Each power, the Soviet Union and the United States, must have those forces that are needed for its own security. We basically are not only a land power but a land and sea power. The Soviet Union is primarily a land power with certain definite requirements; having that in mind, we believe that the B-1 bomber is, for our security interest, necessary.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the fact that they are not developing bombers does not mean that they do not respect ours. And I would say, too, that had we not had our present advantage in bombers we could not then stand by and allow the Soviets to have a 1,600 to 1,000 advantage in terms of missiles that are land based. So, our bombers is an offset for that.

Mr. BINGHAM. Well, I don't want to pursue the matter because I think we could get into a question of semantics, but at this point and, recognizing that the legislative process is far from concluded, I want to be sure that you are recommending the approval of the ratification of the treaty and the prompt approval of the resolution supporting the agreement.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes; I indicated that position right along, that I was asking the Congress for their approval of these programs. There was some question in my mind as to whether the Congress would face up to the Trident program this year and authorize that as an ongoing program. The Congress by very substantial votes in both the Senate and the House has gone forward with that program, they have put

their stamp of approval on the B–1 program this year, and they have indicated the other approvals that we have for our overall support, and I am not going to—when you are ahead, you know, you don't push it too far. I think we have pushed it pretty far, and we have done very well.

NUCLEAR CARRIER: RELATED TO STRATEGIC FORCES?

Mr. BINGHAM. If I may turn to a slightly different part of the budget request, would it be correct to infer that the support of the Defense Department for an additional nuclear carrier and attendant other forces is not part of the strategic force and therefore not related to these other matters which are of strategic significance?

Secretary LAIRD. I do not consider that related to the strategic forces as such. It has some benefit in that area, but that is not the manner in which we have presented the request for the carrier and you are quite correct.

EVIDENCE OF SOVIET MIRV TESTING

Mr. BINGHAM. I was surprised at your indication that you expected MIRV deployment by the Soviets in a period of 18 to 24 months. That does not coincide with other information that we have received. Is it not correct that there is no evidence as of now that the Soviets have tested a MIRV system?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, as far as the testing is concerned, I have never gotten into the semantics of whether the MRV they have tested had an independent capability. I don't think there is any sense in getting into that discussion. I just say that it does not have it under the definition that we use. The MRV's which they have tested—the so-called MRV's they have tested—I think change the impact pattern somewhat, but I do not under our definition include that in what I refer to as MIRV's.

I would think that that test would probably be going forward within the next 3 to 6 months and that they would not have the capability of deployment before 18 to 24 months. Those are the estimates based upon the best information available to me—24 months is an estimate. It is the best estimate that I can give you based on the information available to me.

Usually my estimates have been conservative; it has turned out that way in the past, and I have tried to be conservative in my estimates.

Mr. BINGHAM. Would it be a fair statement with regard to those estimates that they are based more on an estimate of what the Soviets are likely to be doing and likely to be trying to do than on any actual information that these are their intentions?

Secretary LAIRD. I would say that there is some fairly hard evidence that they will be doing this kind of testing within the next few months, but this is a matter which they control and we do not control. They have all of the technical capability available to them at this time to carry on such a test.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you. I think my time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

PROGRESS IN ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that the admiral can answer in detail the question I may have, but, indeed, there is concern that the Soviets do have a superiority in submarine warfare, and therefore the question of antisubmarine warfare comes into consideration.

Do you have any reason to believe that antisubmarine warfare techniques are improving at such a rate as to jeopardize—on the part of the Soviets that is—our Polaris/Poseidon fleet in the foreseeable future?

Admiral MOORER. We know, sir, that the Soviets are spending quite a bit on development and training in ASW techniques, but my answer to your question is, so far as jeopardizing the survivability of the Polaris system at the moment, I don't think that that capability exists.

On the other hand, we would be less than prudent if we didn't follow this very closely. One of the big advantages of the Trident system is to thwart the possibility of a major ASW breakthrough.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Given the Trident system, nevertheless, I read that the Soviets are expecting to achieve a breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare. Do we have knowledge about that?

Admiral MOORER. No, sir. I think everyone is always expecting to achieve a breakthrough in ASW warfare because it is a very, very difficult type of warfare due to the physics of the water, if nothing else.

So, as I say, we continually guard against this by improving our own submarines as well as our own ASW capability, but there has been no major breakthrough to my knowledge that would jeopardize, as you say, the survivability of the Polaris/Poseidon system.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It is, however, safe to assume that the U.S. ASW technology is in advance of the Soviets at the present time?

Admiral MOORER. I think that is a fair evaluation, yes, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator——

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you very much for demoting me.

Secretary LAIRD. I always refer to you by the name that I first got to know you by.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. When life was much easier and more pleasant in the State legislature as a Senator, yes, sir.

NO WAY TO INSURE INVULNERABILITY

Secretary LAIRD. I think, though, Congressman Zablocki, that it is well for us to point out, as we did when we appeared before this committee in 1969, that you can never insure the invulnerability of any weapon system. Now, I think we have an invulnerable system right now as far as the Polaris/Poseidon fleet is concerned, but to predict the invulnerability of those particular boats or ships—I guess you call them ships now, don't you?—it would be a great mistake to predict that beyond 4 or 5 years.

I just think that it is very dangerous to do that, and that is why I made that statement in 1969. I really stand behind that statement. I

think it is important to stay with that approach, particularly in the weapon development area. That is why it is necessary, I think, to have some follow-on modernization programs moving forward in the Department of Defense not only in this area, but in others as well.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. And the Trident, indeed, is a particular program that gives us some assurance?

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If we do have a negotiated offensive weapons agreement, then of course the Trident or any other advances in technology may not be necessary in order to achieve that agreement. Again we must be in a position to deal on a position of strength.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes. I think we will always have the need to move forward as far as modernization is concerned. I think that in any kind of an agreement that I can foresee on down the road, modernization of the forces within certain limits will always be permissible.

MOVEMENT TOWARD ARMS REDUCTIONS

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Of course, many of us hope that after phase II we can go into a phase III or even IV, not only of controlled armaments, but disarmament.

Secretary LAIRD. I would hope that we could get into the question of reductions. That is a matter which I think should be a very important part of our discussions. We want to move from arms competition to arms limitation, and then to arms reduction.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Any further questions?

Mr. Fraser.

ACCELERATION VERSUS VULNERABILITY

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I support the agreements that were made between the Soviet Union and the United States as a consequence of the SALT talks. My concern, which I think is the concern of many members of the committee, is this new urgency to push ahead with the Trident and the B-1 bomber and to develop both ABM sites. For example, I accept that in negotiating with the Soviet Union one ought not to be in a position of declining strength or even declining relative strength.

I am not arguing bargaining ships but just in terms of hard dealing. Don't you get the same leverage, for example, from Trident if you were to limit it so that instead of a speed up on the whole program, we might put the money into the development of the Trident missile which would have the effect of giving you a much larger part of the ocean in which existing boats could patrol and be within striking range.

My understanding is that at the moment we do not know from what source the Poseidon equipped submarines might become vulnerable. We don't know what kind of technological breakthrough might make them vulnerable. I think today they are invulnerable.

The admiral has said that. The one thing that would appear to be useful would be to increase the range of the missiles on those

boats so that they would have a much larger part of the ocean to patrol.

If this is phase I of a program for the Trident, which may be a program we should consider going ahead with at a measured pace, why don't we get the position of strength that we need in our subsequent bargaining with the Soviet Union?

Why the accelerated program on the whole enterprise when we don't know what we are designing against in terms of increased vulnerability of the submarine?

TRIDENT, B–1: NOT "BARGAINING CHIPS"

Secretary LAIRD. First, I agree with you that the B–1 and the Trident are not bargaining chips for SALT. I have never been one that has referred to the Trident system or the B–1 as any kind of a bargaining chip. They are modernization programs as far as our forces are concerned.

They are modernization programs that need to go forward whether we have a SALT agreement or not. The question as to the timing of the Trident program which goes to the heart of the matter that we are discussing right now, is one that we have looked at very carefully and thoroughly.

We could have perhaps accelerated this program by an additional 12 months. We could perhaps have stretched it out another 18 months. Last year when the decision was made on the timing of the Trident program—to bring it into inventory at the end of 1978—we did have this agreement at that particular time.

Perhaps if we had known we would have gone into a crash program to produce the three additional submarines during the life of this agreement. But after looking at the comparative costs to accelerate or to stretch out, we decided that the phased program which we have developed is the best use of the resources.

Unfortunately, we did not go forward in April with the design work that we wanted to, because I felt that Congress should make that decision and it should not be done through a reprograming action. So, we came up with a separate supplemental request for $35 million to go forward with the advanced engineering work.

The Congress decided, no, we will consider that along with the overall FY 1973 budget request. So, the Congress made the decision to include the engineering work plus the other funding in the 1973 authorization bill.

We will go forward now with that engineering contract very shortly. The point I am making is that we need to have a submarine construction program ongoing. It will take us these 5 years even to have that kind of a program.

We are going to have to replace the first 10 Polaris submarines during these out-years. As you know we cannot economically put the Poseidon missile system on them. What we will have here is merely an on-going submarine construction program. I don't want to get this Trident program tied up as some sort of a bargaining chip because it is not a bargaining chip.

It is important for us to be strong as we go into these negotiations but I do not anticipate that the Trident or a follow-on modernized sub-

marine is going to be used as a bargaining chip in any further SALT.

PRODUCTION OF NEW WEAPON SYSTEM

Mr. FRASER. The Trident of all your systems you are talking about I find most acceptable in terms of its invulnerability. Was it not true that last year you were talking about 1980 and now it is 1978?

Secretary LAIRD. I think the estimate we were using last year was the 1980 or 1981 time period. We are now trying to bring it in in December of 1978.

I just hope you don't hold me to that exact date but that is our program. We are going to try to bring it in by that particular date. There was some talk, and this was all in the development stages, that 1979 would be the date of the first submarine.

We are going to try to do the best we can to bring it in soon after the end of this agreement. The B–1 decision, however, that we have asked the Congress to make is a prototype decision to build three prototypes.

We have not made a production decision as far as the B–1 is concerned. We will be making a production decision on the submarine—to proceed with this first one—based on the authority that the Senate will be acting on this afternoon.

WARHEAD FIGURES BY 1977

Mr. FRASER. The background papers for the briefings that were produced by the National Security Council indicate that by 1977, which will be the end of the 5-year period, the United States will have under the SALT limitations 9,690 separately targetable warheads and the Soviets under the SALT agreement would have 3,950.

Secretary LAIRD. That does not have anything to do with the SALT agreement.

Mr. FRASER. Well, there is an estimate that without the SALT agreement the Soviets might have 6,750. In other words, by their being subjected to the limitations of the interim agreement——

Secretary LAIRD. You have included the heavy bombers there. They are not in the SALT agreement, and the number of warheads is not in the SALT agreement either.

Mr. FRASER. No; I am talking about the total warheads the United States will have by 1977, which is over 9,600. Under SALT the Soviets would have a total of 3,900 plus.

Secretary LAIRD. I think the chart that you refer to has the Soviets going to over 1,000 SLBM's and also going forward with their current construction program as far as the heavy missiles are concerned, and with deployment of over 2,000 ICBM's by 1977. I believe that is the projection in that chart.

Mr. FRASER. The point that I am trying to make, and this is the chart that comes out of the National Security Council as I understand, is that under the 5-year agreement——

Secretary LAIRD. I have the chart here now.

Mr. FRASER (continuing). We will have twice as many separately targetable warheads as the Soviet Union. The reason I stress this is

we get a lot of talk about how the United States is falling behind the Soviet Union and that we are in real trouble.

I don't believe it. I wonder if that is a serious position that is being urged by you or your Department.

U.S. STRATEGIC DETERRENT IS REALISTIC

Secretary LAIRD. No, I have stated that I believe our strategic deterrent is today a realistic deterrent. It is an adequate deterrent. It does deter nuclear war at the present time and it is important for us to maintain this deterrent during this period.

Mr. FRASER. And at twice the numbers of the Soviet Union?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, the number——

Mr. FRASER. I know they don't take in megatonnage and so on.

Secretary LAIRD. The SALT agreement has nothing to do with these numbers that we are talking about. I know the chart and I have it now before me but the SALT agreement has nothing to do with this chart.

Mr. FRASER. In a sense they do. Your own projections under the chart show that without the SALT 5-year interim agreement they would be up substantially, and—these are obviously estimates under the 5-year agreement—they will be limited to 3,900. Admittedly, these are estimates.

Secretary LAIRD. Those are estimates on the basis that they do not start MIRVing for 24 months and I think that is a fairly realistic estimate.

U.S. OVERKILL CAPACITY

Mr. FRASER. But at the end of 5 years we are going to have twice as many. We will have a tremendous overkill capacity. We will still have the triad whereas the Soviets are dependent on two systems. I just find it hard to believe that these figures project disaster for the United States.

Secretary LAIRD. I think we are protected during the period of this 5-year agreement, but with the momentum that they could acquire in the MRV program and because of the throw weight that they have in the period after this agreement, the situation could be quite different. It could be quite different and that is why it is important for us to work toward more equality numbers in the out-year agreements.

Mr. FRASER. But isn't it a fact that once we have the capacity to destroy them and many times over and since we have now banned defensive missiles that there really is not much that they can add that shifts the balance?

In other words, we both have this capacity to destroy each other. We both have abandoned a defensive strategic posture. What more do you get by adding on?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, the important thing is to have a survivable system. Survivability must be built into our system in order to have realism in our deterrent because we are not in a first strike position.

That is not part of our strategy. As they move forward with modernization force, it is the question of survivability that becomes so very important. I am talking about the survivability of a retaliatory force.

NEED FOR FOLLOW-ON WEAPON SYSTEMS

Mr. FRASER. I just repeat my first concern and then I will quit. We are now designing a new submarine system against some unknown technology that might make our present submarines vulnerable and all we are really getting out of it is a submarine with longer range, which I think has an advantage. I don't dispute that. We are ahead with advanced missiles.

Secretary LAIRD. The submarines that we have now could wear out.

Mr. FRASER. But they are programed to continue. Other than the 10 which you are not converting to the Poseidon, the others were programed to last for a long time.

Secretary LAIRD. Even those 31 will wear out.

Mr. FRASER. Sure they will some day. But, there is an increase now for these strategic systems.

Secretary LAIRD. No, we have not increased. We have decreased our request.

Mr. FRASER. Because of the ABM deletions?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. But you have not decreased under the Tridents and B-1.

Secretary LAIRD. We have not decreased the strategic offensive force because as far as numbers are concerned we gave up our momentum in the ABM area, and the Soviet Union has given up some of theirs in the offensive area. That is why we got an agreement.

Mr. FRASER. I think the agreement is fine. I just wish we would pace ourselves to do what we now need to insure our survival.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Bingham?

THE F-14 AND GRUMMAN CORPORATION

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if I could ask one question since we have gotten into the area of the defense program even though it is not related to this particular matter of the SALT but it is a matter that I have been interested in personally for several years.

Could you give us your estimate now of the situation as far as the F-14 is concerned and whether you plan to go ahead with it in the light of the action taken by the House the other day in support of the House Armed Services Committee's position that the authorization for the F-14 was conditional on that being for a price per unit that the company says they cannot meet?

Secretary LAIRD. The decision was made on January 17, 1969, to go ahead with this contract. It was finalized and it had been worked on over a period of time.

We take the position that we have a firm contract with the Grumman Corp. Now they have expressed some desire to renegotiate some of that contract. I have taken the position—and with the language that is presently written in the Senate bill no other position could be taken even if I desired to take a different position because the Senate language is very firm—that we will hold Grumman to the contract.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Buchanan?

PRESIDENT BACKS ARMS MODERNIZATION

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would point out and underline that the letter of transmittal from the President of the United States to Speaker Albert and also the letter of transmittal to the U.S. Senate for the treaty under their consideration and the agreements which we are considering here today said, and I quote:

> Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and insure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitations agreements can be reached.

Now, I have heard the Secretary and understand his response that this was essential with or without the SALT agreement. However, it does seem clear in the President's language—and even as the Secretary can speak for himself, the President has spoken for himself in this letter of transmittal—as the Secretary indicated, the President states that he considers it "equally essential," and that he deems our having a credible defense posture to have been essential to our achieving this first agreement and to the achievement of further agreements.

He also took this position in our briefing as did Dr. Kissinger. Therefore, I am a little at a loss to understand anything other than that the President has indicated he strongly urges us to adopt these agreements but he also with equal fervor urges the implementation of the modernization.

As I understand, these are the specifics of that modernization that you spelled out to us today.

Secretary LAIRD. I don't believe there is basically any difference at all. In a press query back when I was testifying over here, I was asked the question whether I could support these agreements without the approval of the defense budget as we had submitted it, and I answered no.

The President, I think, says essentially the same thing in his letter of transmittal but it is a matter of semantics. I just want everyone in this committee to know that the President supports these programs, he supports these agreements and it is up to the Congress to either approve or disapprove.

You are a coequal branch of this Government. You have these recommendations from the President. You have had the recommendations and the testimony on our defense budget and now it is the Congress that must approve.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Right on.

Mr. BINGHAM. The gentleman, of course, has correctly quoted the President and I have the statement in front of me, also. The point I

was trying to make was that the President while stressing the urgency of going ahead with these other systems did not in any way suggest that his support of the SALT agreement was conditional on the Congress doing it.

Mr. BUCHANAN. They both were essential, he said.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Moorer and Mr. Nitze and General Allison.

The committee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m. the committee adjourned.)

AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1972

House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 10:20 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Thomas E. Morgan (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman Morgan. The committee will come to order.

Today, the Committee on Foreign Affairs concludes its public hearings on legislation approving the interim agreement on strategic offensive arms concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union last May.

Our first witness is a distinguished Member of Congress from Iowa, the Honorable Fred Schwengel.

Congressman Schwengel, you may proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRED SCHWENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

Mr. Schwengel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today, to voice my support for the Interim Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit offensive strategic weapons.

The conclusion of this agreement by the two great powers of the world marks an historic moment in the record of the long and difficult efforts to achieve nuclear arms control.

Moreover, while one cannot emphasize enough the significance of the agreement in itself, an equally important consideration is the fact that it represents one step on the path toward a downward turn in the arms spiral, hopefully toward an end to that spiral, with the assurance of enhanced security for all.

Thus, there are two aspects of the strategic arms limitation problem to which this body must address itself in its action on this agreement.

For the sake of an immediate measure to gain some control over the arms race, and to increase the chances of more limitations in the future, the choices before us must be weighed carefully. An examination of these elements of the problem and of this agreement leads me to the unavoidable conclusion that there is much to be gained by our approval of this decisive international agreement.

A CONVINCING CASE FOR SUPPORT

The debate on this agreement promises to be a vigorous one, since it affects an integral part of those forces which maintain our security. But a profile of the existing forces of the two countries and assertions regarding their respective technological situations provide a convincing case for support of the agreement.

It is important to remember that a combination of factors must be considered in assessing the situation created by the SALT interim agreement.

First, let's look at the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

For several years now, the Soviet Union has engaged in active deployment of its large SS–9 missile and, more recently, there has been evidence of development of an even larger Soviet missile. These weapons have been a major source of concern as a potential threat to United States missiles, and the interim agreement freezes that deployment at a level much lower than that projected, if it had been continued unchecked.

Since this deployment has been stopped for the time being, we are able to witness a control measure whose effects are felt at once. Moreover, it has been an acceptable approach to arms control to freeze development at existing levels, as a first step which could lead to further limitations, perhaps reductions, in arms. Thus, the limitation which the agreement places on the SS–9 contributes to a long-term goal of arms control.

How do our own forces compare with those of the Soviet Union?

I find it a little too convenient to use any variety of number which can demonstrate either an advantage or disadvantage for the United States; numbers alone cannot portray the total situation accurately.

THE EFFECT OF MIRV

There is sufficient evidence to support the view that the United States has an undisputed advantage in the number of deliverable warheads on its ICBM's. How these warheads can be used, however, is decidedly more significant than their number. Just as the SS–9 has become a household word, I needn't dwell on the definition of that touch of American ingenuity known as MIRV.

While the idea of spraying warheads from a single missile to a number of designated areas has earned for this weapon the title of a hydra-headed monster, one must be realistic in recognizing it as an integral component of our retaliatory forces, thereby representing a necessary element of deterrence.

The status of United States technological expertise in this area has been proven and deployment has been under way for quite some time.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has yet to flight test a single MIRV—that's a reentry vehicle with independently targeted warheads—although they have tested an MRV, a missile with a number of warheads which can fall in a fixed pattern.

The setbacks in the Soviet space program have demonstrated weaknesses in the area of guidance; United States abilities have displayed a mastery of this technology. Nor are we likely to become complacent.

For the present, the United States is in a position which remains un-

challenged in the field of land-based ICBM's. And I reiterate that this agreement does not mark an end of our efforts to control strategic arms.

For the sake of United States security, we are not going to allow the qualitative arms race to continue unbridled. Many have raised alarms about the possibility of the Soviets' gaining an advantage over the United States by MIRVing their large missiles to the point where the number of warheads exceeds those of the United States.

We are not about to let the diligence and persistence of our efforts in SALT I be made worthless by threatening United States security in SALT II. The President has repeatedly emphasized that this agreement is temporary and a first step; it does not purport to solve all of our problems. But it is a step in the right direction and does not detract from the strength of this Nation.

SITUATION ON SUBMARINES

A similar situation exists in the case of submarines.

The Soviet effort in this area has been characterized by a rapid deployment which would have given them about 80 submarines by 1977, as compared with our 41. The interim agreement from SALT I has stopped this frightening momentum, which was endangering United States security and international stability.

Moreover, a sizable portion of our forces remains untouched by this agreement, forces for which there is not a comparable counterpart in the Soviet Union. United States forward based systems—bombers and carriers in Europe which can reach the Soviet Union—stand ready and provide a viable deterrent to attack.

The fact that FBS was not affected by SALT marks a major exception to the agreement and illustrates to the Soviet Union and the world that the United States will not falter from its responsibilities and will maintain its position in the course of the bargaining process.

While the House has been called on to act only on the interim agreement, the treaty to limit defense weapons systems cannot go unnoticed in our deliberations. The combination of the two agreements denotes a recognition by both countries of the principles behind mutual deterrence.

We have demonstrated that we will not allow ourselves to become a second-rate power. We have demonstrated that it is futile for another country to attempt to gain a superior strategic position.

URGES PROMPT HOUSE APPROVAL

For over a quarter of a century, the people of the United States and of the world have cried out for restraint in this senseless arms race. It is our responsibility to respond to this mandate. The time is long overdue to make a move toward greater stability with security. Prompt House approval of the interim agreement is the logical and necessary course we must follow.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Congressman Schwengel, for appearing before the committee this morning.

I am sure you gave this a great deal of thought, and the committee appreciates your appearance here this morning.

Mr. Mailliard.

Mr. MAILLIARD. I join you in extending appreciation to Mr. Schwengel, but I have no questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Hays.

Mr. HAYS. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Frelinghuysen.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. But I appreciate the gentleman's statement. I think he presented his views very clearly and succinctly.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fascell.

Mr. FASCELL. No questions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalen.

Mr. WHALEN. I have no questions, but I congratulate Mr. Schwengel on his thoughtful statements, and I concur with his conclusions.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Wolff.

Mr. WOLFF. I want to compliment the gentleman from Iowa even though he comes from the opposite side of the aisle. He has been a most progressive Member of this House and his statement adds emphasis.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Mr. Schwengel, for appearing.

Our next witness is one of America's most distinguished nuclear scientists, Dr. Edward Teller of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, University of California.

Dr. Teller, it is a pleasure to have you come before the committee to provide us with your expert knowledge.

Dr. Teller, you have a prepared statement and when I talked with you, you said you did not wish to read your complete statement, so you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD TELLER, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. TELLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I agree with the preceding conclusions of Congressman Schwengel, but I have to disagree with some of the most important details that he has stated.

The numbers which appear in the treaty are significant and worrisome. These numbers concede to the Russians 50 percent more missiles than the United States. This I do not consider very important.

They concede to the Russians what is called a greater throw weight, a greater ability to deliver nuclear weapons weighing great amounts from their submarines or from their land bases on to the United States. That ratio has been estimated as 4 to 1. This is a significant advantage for the Russians.

It has been stated, and as we just heard, it is undisputed, that the number of individual explosives that can be thrown out of these missiles is greater in the United States inventory by a factor of two. But this number is not regulated by the treaty and it has been reliably estimated by our Secretary of Defense that the Russians will catch up with our technology of multiple warheads in approximately 2 years. Then they will be ahead of us in the number of deliverable explosives and they may be ahead of us by a considerable amount.

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON NUMBERS

Now, I would like to say something about these numbers.

I repeated the statement that the number is undisputed. It is, indeed, undisputed; it is also uncertain. Every one of these ratios is an estimate. We know what we have. We have estimated what the Russians have and these estimates—and I have had plenty of opportunity to look into the way these estimates are made—these estimates are conservative.

If our intelligence community states that the Russians have a capability, they, indeed, have a capability and the intelligence community, contrasted with many other sources, has not indulged in over-estimation or in scare tactics.

In the negotiations, the Russians have been completely silent concerning the number of weapons and the weight of weapons they have. We have agreed that they can retain what they have and this may well be more, even more than what we believe they have.

Our intelligence estimates are fairly reliable and I do not want to raise an unnecessary alarm but I want clearly to distinguish between something we know and something that we merely estimate.

I have said that in everything that the treaty regulates, essential number of missiles and the weight of missiles, we have conceded an advantage to the Russians. There are many other areas in which there is as yet no agreement but where we know that the Russians are ahead.

RECOMMENDS ACCEPTANCE OF SALT PACT

I recommend that we approve this agreement even though the agreement, itself, puts us at a disadvantage. I do so because the deployment of Russian aggressive strength has a great momentum and they have agreed to stop that momentum.

We have no such momentum; we are not building new rockets. To try to catch up with the Russians would be extremely expensive and to believe that we shall even attempt to do so is, in my opinion, unrealistic.

Therefore, we have struck a bargain which is the best bargain we can strike under these conditions. For this reason I do fully recommend concurrence with both the missile defense agreement treaty and the preliminary agreement on missiles.

I have, however, recommendations with respect to safeguards. I apologize that I will not be able to formulate these safeguards in a very sharp and clear-cut manner. I believe they are significant and I would like to discuss them point by point.

First I recommend that using article 13 of the treaty and article 6 of the Interim Agreement we shall make every effort to enforce the agreement. It is spelled out in the agreement and in the treaty that the main check will be the national means of verification. I have to point out that the details of these means of verification are highly classified and we have the peculiar situation where you approve an agreement but the means to verify the agreement is not completely open to you.

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To open up at least to Congress the means of verification would seem to me an important measure and a step in the direction of your being able to check what is happening in a properly careful manner.

IMPORTANCE OF STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Article 13 and article 6 also says, and this is an excellent provision, that a commission shall be established on which the United States and the U.S.S.R. will be represented and in which questions can be raised and answers should be given to assure the other party that the treaty is, indeed, observed.

It is extremely important that imaginative people be put on that commission and people who are conscious of the danger that could arise from Russian superiority.

By raising the proper questions, by receiving the answers from the other side and by open discussion on our side of everything that should be discussed, there is the possibility to gain the assurance that, indeed, we have made progress in arms limitation.

There is also the possibility to find out that there is no proper assurance and in that case we should be aware of that fact.

So, my first recommendation is attention to the various means of verification.

NEED FOR VIGOROUS DEFENSE RESEARCH

My second recommendation concerns defense research.

Applied science has been unpopular in our universities for two decades. Research oriented toward the defense of the United States has been vigorously opposed on many campuses, including the foremost in that field, MIT and Stanford.

This will necessarily result in the decrease of the number of well-educated people who could perform defense research. We are already feeling the pinch.

At the same time, the Russians are going ahead with research and with defense-oriented research. In their magnificent new laboratory called Academ Gorodok, they have established the biggest institution of research and the highest level of technological education.

We are paying more and more attention to social sciences while technology has become unpopular.

In Russia, the tendency is the opposite and it is my opinion, which I give you as an opinion and which I cannot prove, that Russian defense research as of today is ahead of that of the United States.

Under these conditions, I am deeply disturbed by the fact that half a billion dollars have been cut from the defense research appropriation for the fiscal year, 1973.

I believe that support of defense research and means to stimulate technological education and technological development in the United States is among the most important of measures that one can take.

Some people may argue that such research shall be restricted in SALT II. I will raise the questions: how will one check research? How will one check the work performed in laboratories? How will one check new ideas generated by ingenious people?

Furthermore, every bit of defense research is usable in the peaceful economy. Every bit of peaceful applied science can be used for defense. The one cannot go on without the other.

Most people consider nylons peaceful. They were developed for peaceful purposes but when the development of nylons succeeded, no girl got any stockings; the Second World War was on and all of the nylon went into parachutes.

Nuclear explosives have the reputation to be destructive and nothing but destructive; yet, we have extensive plans to utilize them in constructive ways for digging canals, for stimulating gas production. The Russians have told us and shown us evidence that in this particular field, the peaceful application of nuclear explosives, they are ahead of us by a long distance.

I strongly recommend that research in all its aspects, but very particularly in its defense aspects, be given every possible support.

It has been stated here half an hour ago that we are No. 1 and no one can ever dream of catching up with us. In every point covered by the agreement the Russians are already ahead of us. In many as yet secret aspects they may also be ahead of us. In research, they are forging ahead rapidly.

The handwriting is on the wall and for that reason I want to repeat what I said in this room in 1966. At that time the subject of the discussion was Atlantic union, some form of close cooperation with other free and advanced democracies. The United Free World, whose interests are really the same, is still potentially very much more powerful than any aggressor and very particularly than the Soviet Union.

CLOSE COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES

My third recommendation is therefore: close cooperation with our allies for the purpose of common defense. We should bring about the situation where we are not the only ones who are footing the bill. We should develop agreements whereby the burden of common defense is commonly shared. This is one direction in which we must make every possible effort.

The Russians tried again and again in the SALT talks to include agreements concerning NATO. We have very rightfully refused to discuss these points without the presence of our NATO partners. A common policy in NATO established before the talks with Russia start and inclusion in the common defense of other powerful industrial countries such as Japan—these are points which deserve the most serious consideration if the Free World is to be free and if that is to be accomplished without undue hardship and undue cuts in other needed expenditures.

SOVIET CIVIL OFFENSE PLANS

Last, but by no means least, I have to mention that 3 years ago the Russians published a number of regulations and plans in 100,000 copies. They republished it in an undated form a half year later in half a million copies.

These plans concerned emergency evacuation of their cities.

I have to raise the dreadful question: What may happen if, indeed, Russia becomes the undisputed No. 1 in military preparedness?

There is the nightmare of a surprise attack. I cannot rule it out. I also do not believe it.

There is another danger which I think is more real, the danger of blackmail, of nuclear blackmail. The Russians have made preparation to evacuate their cities so that a retaliatory force, even if it should get off the ground, even if our submarines go undetected—all of which is uncertain—even in that case, the damage they would suffer will be very much smaller than they have suffered in the Second World War.

By damage, I mean people killed.

They have made arrangements to save their people. We have made only the most elementary arrangements to save our own, even though it could be done at a small fraction of our defense budget.

What is needed is a consistent plan—what to do if the Russians blackmail us; how to tell our people where to find safety.

I don't want to force anybody into evacuation but I also want to be prepared for the danger of blackmail as we are now prepared for the danger of a hurricane. Hurricane Caroline in 1961, Hurricane Camille 2 years ago, would have had tens of thousands of victims except for successful evacuation.

This successful evacuation has been carried out on the basis of civil defense plans on which we have spent, fortunately, something, although much too little. These same plans have proved to be useful quite recently in the floods that occurred all over the East.

All these plans, however, have been supported by a negligibly small budget. Proper precaution in that respect, the ability to put our people into a safe position everywhere, has received some thought but practically no support in appropriations.

SUMMARY OF VIEWS

Mr. Chairman, let me summarize.

We have to exercise surveillance; we have to do research; we have to work with our allies and we have to look after the safety of our own people. If we do all these things, then we and the other parts of the free world can remain safe. If we don't, our safety will end in not more than 3 years as far as I can see.

I recommend the approval of the treaty and the agreement.

I also strongly recommend the elementary and necessary precautions which I have discussed.

Thank you very much.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Dr. Teller.

We will print your statement in the record.

(The statement follows:)

STATEMENT OF DR. EDWARD TELLER, PHYSICIST, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Though the SALT Agreements signed in Moscow put us at a dangerous disadvantage, I recommend approval by the House of Representatives. It would take many billions of dollars in the next five years if we tried to catch up with the Soviets. In the absence of treaties, the Russian advantage would grow faster.

These agreements freeze our present disadvantage, but leave the door open for the Russians to catch up with us and surpass us in any field where we are still ahead.

It is claimed that we have a two-to-one lead in numbers of nuclear explosive missile warheads. This claim is probably correct but this advantage will not last. Mr. Laird's specific estimate that the Russians can develop MIRV's in two years is plausible.

The ABM Treaty has a valuable and novel provision: Article XIII. It establishes a standing commission with the purpose to strengthen the credibility of the treaty. It should be staffed by experts who possess vision and are dedicated to the defense of our Country.

According to this article, proof of compliance should be offered on a voluntary basis. Since it is difficult to establish foolproof checks, this provision is wise. It is, for instance, difficult to verify the exclusion of rapid reloading capability of ABM launchers. The question of whether or not missiles such as the SA–5 could be changed into an ABM defense by rapidly moveable radars is most worrisome.

The agreement on rocket deployment contains an Article VI which is similar to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty. In this case as well as in the ABM Treaty, it is important to pay attention to the national means of verification which is supposed to furnish *prima facie* evidence of compliance. These means of verification are secret. It is disturbing that on this vital point the public cannot get detailed information. In fact, even the information available to Congress is less than complete. One should raise the question whether these national means of verification should be declassified.

The greatest immediate danger of the agreements is unjustified euphoria. The great potential advantage is that the agreements spell out American inferiorities in vital fields; thus, needed preparation of our defenses may be spurred.

One phase of such preparation is research directed toward means of defense. Today such an activity is unpopular. If this does not change, our future is dark.

In the understandings which accompany the treaty, a most doubtful point is a limitation placed in the implementation of novel ABM ideas, should they develop in the future. It is indeed a mistake to limit the use of systems which do not exist as yet and may not even be imagined at present.

It is also important to know that the Russians have a decisive advantage over us in another vital respect. They have an effective plan to evacuate their cities, which they have published in half a million copies. In case they choose to subject us to nuclear blackmail, they would be able to protect their population so that their losses will not exceed under any circumstances 4%. At the same time in such an exchange more than half of the Americans would be killed.

Therefore, the generally accepted statement that our retaliatory power will certainly suffice is of most doubtful validity. It behooves us to take economically feasible measures to protect our people and thereby to insure peace for America as well as freedom from coercion.

Since we have lost leadership in the military field, it becomes even more important to cooperate closely with our Allies for the common defense of freedom. A united, free world could insure safety, peace and democracy. Nothing in the treaty or in its interpretation should stand in the way of the effort to build a better world based on the ideas of human dignity and safeguarded by proper measures to defend the citizens of a free society.

In summary, I recommend as safeguards:

(a) That thorough use should be made of Article XIII of the Treaty and Article VI of the Agreement to make it probable that the treaty is honestly observed;

(b) That defense-oriented research receive vigorous support;

(c) That practical and economic measure be taken to improve our preparedness in civil defense; and

(d) That we establish better cooperation between the free and advanced democracies to insure our survival by collective action.

Once these safeguards are adopted, I recommend wholeheartedly the endorsements of the treaty and interim agreement, including particularly the planned cooperation in several fields which our President has called "building blocks of peace."

CONSTRUCTION OF PERMITTED ABM SYSTEMS

Chairman MORGAN. What is your position to protect the Nation's Capital as permitted by the SALT treaty?

Mr. TELLER. I am strongly in favor of constructing such a system. I am in favor of it even though it is not sufficient to stop or even substantially delay a massive Russian attack.

It can provide you with safety against any other nuclear power, China, or any other future member of the nuclear club. This is an elementary precaution.

I also say that what we do today determines our defense posture in the next 5 years. Deployment of such a system will give us experience in the manner in which such systems can work. This will be important for all future planning and for all future negotiations.

U.S. POSITION ON FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS

Chairman MORGAN. Dr. Teller, you mentioned forward-based systems. This matter is almost certain to be raised by the Soviets in the next series of talks.

What would you recommend to the United States—what would you recommend should be the U.S. negotiation position on forward-based systems?

Mr. TELLER. I recommend that this problem be discussed most carefully with our NATO allies and that a united position of the NATO alliance be worked out and that we do not impose our decisions on our allies but give serious and realistic consideration to their wishes, to their plans, to the potential contribution which they, themselves, can make to the common safety.

This is not a question which can be decided by us. We can and should put great emphasis on a common NATO position.

Chairman MORGAN. Then you feel, Dr. Teller, that negotiations with our European allies should take place before we begin this next series of talks that concern forward-based systems?

Mr. TELLER. I consider such negotiations to have the highest urgency.

Chairman MORGAN. Thank you, Dr. Teller.

Mr. Frelinghuysen.

DECLASSIFYING SATELLITE DATA

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Dr. Teller, as always, you make a very stimulating witness.

You have suggested that the method we employ for verification should not be considered classified information, that this should be made available to the public.

My question is: What would be accomplished by this?

I would assume if it were made available to 535 Members of Congress, this would constitute making it available to the public. I assume that we are no barrier to the public's knowledge.

What would be accomplished?

We have been briefed by the Director of the CIA about the problem and I would think we can rely on their assurances without having full public disclosure of the nature of the methods by which verification is made.

Mr. TELLER. First of all, sir, I beg very slightly to disagree with you.

I have confidence and I want to have confidenc ein Members of the Congress; if there is a Member of Congress who will leak secret information, we should know about it and the American people should know about it. We should not take it for granted that what is told you is told to everybody, although I grant you the danger exists.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. In your statement you suggested declassifying information. You are now arguing that the information should

be kept classified but that Members should keep quiet as to whether this is a wise course. Those are two different positions.

Mr. TELLER. Sir, thank you very much for forcing me to be precise.

BELIEVES CONGRESS SHOULD BE INFORMED

I intended to recommend to reduce the classification to the point where it can be fully disclosed to Members of Congress, to declassify it and make it available to everybody is a further step which deserves consideration, which I would favor, but which I think I cannot argue for with the same force.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. What would be the point of giving Members of Congress complete access to this information?

Mr. TELLER. The point, sir, would be this: I have complete confidence in Mr. Helms. He has to make judgments on matters that are difficult and dubious.

I would like to see Congress, which bears a great portion of the responsibility fully to share this responsibility and they can do so only if they do not merely receive judgments but receive the material on which this judgment is based.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The only thing I think you could be sure of is you would get a disagreement with those presently making it. With a group of 535, wouldn't we be failing in our obligation if some of us didn't disagree with some part of the judgments being made and what would be accomplished except to raise doubts about the means of verification?

I would think you could agitate the public confidence about the adequacy by exposing the basic process to the independent judgment of 535 members but I am not sure that it adds to the process very much.

Mr. TELLER. Sir, I happen to believe in the democratic process.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So do I.

Mr. TELLER. I happen to believe that disagreement and debate and doubt, and occasionally even agitation, are necessary parts of the democratic process. I hope and I believe that you have the wisdom to keep the agitation within bounds.

But to have absolute judgments and mere conclusions to come before Congress means depriving Congress of much of its positive input into the governing process.

HOW COULD EVACUATION OF U.S. CITIES WORK?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. If I have time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dr. Teller what he envisages by plans for emergency evacuation of our cities. In a sense, we have evacuation of our cities every weekend which results in temporary nightmares in almost every case.

Would an emergency evacuation be something that would take place over a period of weeks or days? Is there any real safety in masses of our population being provided a detailed plan on how to seek safety?

Mr. TELLER. The Russian plan calls for evacuation within 48 hours. It is difficult to do but I am sure that with careful planning it can be done.

Furthermore, it calls not merely for evacuation; it also calls for measures to provide for the people after they have been evacuated.

All this, I am sure, can be done at a minimum cost.

I want to make one more remark.

This evacuation will not be taken lightly and should not be taken lightly and will not be taken lightly even by the Russians. If they ever resort to nuclear blackmail, if we can respond and survive a conflict; they will have alerted us and this they don't want to do.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I live in the most populated State in the Union, about 30 miles west of New York City. I am not certain whether we would be in an evacuation area or part of the evacuees. It strikes me as an attempt to try to move millions of people.

Mr. TELLER. The Office of Civil Defense has considered this question with some care. Preliminary plans exist even today. It is an exceedingly difficult problem. I am sure it can have only limited success but there is a great difference between having 80 percent of our people at risk or having 10 percent of our people at risk.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Monagan.

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FORCES FOR MODERATION IN THE U.S.S.R.

Dr. Teller, you have spoken about the potential in the increase of the power of the Soviet Union, of their weaponry, and so forth, but I think one of the foundations for the recommendations of this agreement is that there is some limit in the capacity of the U.S.S.R. to expand, some increasing opposition on the part of the people to military expansion at the expense of the expansion of the civilian sector and what I would like to ask is: Do you feel that it is possible that there are forces in the U.S.S.R., given these agreements, that will be on the side of moderation, of limitation, and expansion of the civilian economy?

Mr. TELLER. I am confident that such forces exist in the Soviet Union. And one of the great virtues of the agreement, one of the great virtues that President Nixon was on television in the Soviet Union and addressed their people, is that all this will lend more force to this resistance to brute power within the Soviet Union.

That these forces exist, that they must be supported by us, with that I agree. To what extent they will prevail, I do not know.

COORDINATION OF SALT WITH NATO ALLIES

Mr. MONAGAN. Do you feel that the developments of the negotiations that led to the formulation of the treaty and the agreement were coordinated adequately with our allies, with our NATO allies, for example?

Mr. TELLER. I understand that our NATO allies have been promptly informed and informed in considerable detail.

However, I am, myself, not familiar with the day-to-day procedure. My impression is that we have behaved in that respect in a highly proper manner but this is only an impression; it is not positive knowledge.

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, you have suggested that there should be greater coordination between the United States and our allies and I wondered whether you were implying that there had been some defect in our coordination in connection with the formulation of these agreements.

Mr. TELLER. There has been, so far as I know, no defects in the formulation of these agreements but, indeed, these agreements have

been kept outside the area that would directly affect our allies. The negotiations that would affect our allies are planned in the near future and I am suggesting that prior to the beginning of those negotiations we should arrive at a common basis with our allies to plan those negotiations.

I further suggest that we do more about planning for the common defense as distinct from the negotiations concerning disarmament.

DEFENSE PLANNING WITH THE JAPANESE

Mr. MONAGAN. You have also suggested in this planning for the common defense that we should take steps that we have not taken up to now in connection with the Japanese.

Just what do you have in mind here and wouldn't this involve a rather substantial change in what has been the position of the Japanese so far as military activities are concerned up to the present time?

Mr. TELLER. Japan is becoming a great power. A change in the position of the Japanese within the next couple of decades is, in my opinion, unavoidable.

The question is whether this change should occur without respect to our common interests or in full recognition of our common interests.

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalen.

PARITY AND SUFFICIENCY

Mr. WHALEN. Dr. Teller, I appreciate your willingness to testify before our committee and appreciate your fine statement.

I would like to question you on two terms of which we hear a great deal, that is, offensive parity and offensive sufficiency.

Do you think our goals should be both, or is offensive sufficiency primarily our goal?

Mr. TELLER. It is a difficult question and a question about which many statements and many misleading statements have been made.

I would not argue for more than sufficiency. But I have to say that it is a most serious and almost dubious question what sufficiency is.

A retaliatory force will be sufficient if there is enough of it and if it is safe from a first strike. This safety from a first strike is today in serious doubt for our land-based missiles and also for our bombers.

The ability of our bombers to penetrate is another doubtful question.

The most reliable instruments of our retaliatory force are the missiles carried by the submarines; but this reliability is not absolute, either. Antisubmarine warfare is making rapid progress. You will never know whether your sufficiency is sufficient without a lot of research in the first place and without some measures based on that research which will depend from year to year on the progress of that research.

STABILIZING DEFENSIVE WEAPONS

Mr. WHALEN. In your opinion, would stabilizing defensive weapons make sufficiency more easily definable?

Mr. TELLER. I have a strong inclination to favor defensive weapons to the extent that they are effective. For some time we have neglected, and wrongfully neglected, that area. Recently we have done something

about missile defense and whether missile defense is effective or not is a debatable question. I, myself, am doubtful on this point. I am arguing that deployment of such a defensive system around Washington will teach us more about this ability. About civil defense I have no doubt. It is the cheapest, the most peaceful, the most obviously justified. The safeguarding of the lives of people and this defensive system we have neglected to the extent that we are spending no more than one mill out of each civil defense dollar. Our civil defense spending is less than one-thousandth of our total defense expenditures and that certainly is wrong.

Mr. WHALEN. I conclude from your comments that your rationale for going ahead with the Washington site is the advancement in the state of the art which it will provide?

Mr. TELLER. This is precisely what I meant to convey.

ABILITY OF U.S. BOMBERS TO PENETRATE USSR

Mr. WHALEN. In your comments a few moments ago, you stated the ability of our bombers to penetrate Russia's defense is doubtful.

In your opinion, in view of that, should the Congress go ahead with both the Trident and B–1 systems? Do we need both?

Mr. TELLER. Sir, to the extent I can answer, I believe the answer is yes. However, I do not consider myself an expert on the subject. I do not want you to pay a great deal of attention to my answer, which is a slightly educated guess.

SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

Mr. WHALEN. Dr. Teller, I was quite surprised by your reference to the Russian civil defense document, which I have not read. You indicated, I believe, if the plans are carried out that the loss of life would be approximately 4 percent?

Mr. TELLER. The maximum possible loss of life will be 4 percent. However, if the Russians succeed in their antisubmarine warfare efforts, if they catch our missiles on the ground, if in some crash program and in violation of the present treaty, they deploy missile defense, if their counter measures against our bombers are successful—and they are making efforts in all these directions—then their losses may be cut to a completely negligible number.

Mr. WHALEN. So, the 4-percent figure is based on a combination of defensive actions rather than just civil defense?

Mr. TELLER. No; the 4-percent figure is based on civil defense alone and on the assumption that our retaliatory strike is fully successful.

Mr. WHALEN. This retaliatory strike—how long would it take from a launching pad here in the United States to one of the cities in Russia?

Mr. TELLER. I believe in the order of 30 minutes.

Mr. WHALEN. So, this could be accomplished successfully in 30 minutes at a cost of at most 4 percent?

Mr. TELLER. The estimate of the Russian casualties, if we launch everything we can launch and if the Russian defense measures are essentially unsuccessful, but if they will have evacuated——

Mr. WHALEN. According to plan?

Mr. TELLER. According to plan—then their losses, as far as I know, will be limited to 4 percent, and that is the best estimate I could find.

Now, the estimate may be wrong. It may be 5 percent; it may be 3 percent; but it is in that order. It goes with the assumption that the only thing that has worked for them is civil defense.

Mr. WHALEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Kazen.

Mr. KAZEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TIME FRAME FOR PROTECTING POPULATION

Doctor, to continue with this line of questioning, I understood you to say earlier that the evacuation under the Russian plan was based on 48 hours' notice; was I correct in that?

Mr. TELLER. You are accurate.

Mr. KAZEN. Then if it only takes 30 minutes to deliver a retaliatory strike, wouldn't the casualty figure be a lot higher than the 4 percent?

Mr. TELLER. In that case, the casualty figure would be much higher than 4 percent. I made one assumption and one statement. I assume that the United States will not engage in a first strike. I assume that the Russians will not strike us without having put their population into a safe position and, finally, I don't assume but I argue that, indeed, we must never plan on a first strike. This would be the greatest crime that I can imagine.

Mr. KAZEN. The converse of that would be any evacuation plan that we would have would not be effective against an unknown first strike or without any lead time or notice to our people?

Mr. TELLER. This is true and it is true that an evacuation plan, I would rather say a counter evacuation plan, an evacuation which occurs because the Russians have started first——

Mr. KAZEN. After the first strike?

EXAMPLE: HURRICANE EVACUATIONS

Mr. TELLER. No. After their evacuation. If we notice the Russians are evacuating, we should start evacuation, also.

Mr. KAZEN. I see your point.

You were talking of the various hurricanes we had and the success of evacuating people. There we had advance notice.

Mr. TELLER. We have 24-hour notice; we have 48-hour notice. Such notice is essential. I do not want to tell you that if we have a counter-evacuation plan, then we shall be safe. We are living in a dangerous world and complete safety is not something that I know how to achieve. But we can provide against the most plausible of dangers and the most plausible of dangers is a Russian threat or a Russian plan to attack us under conditions where they put their people into safety first.

FREEZING U.S. DISADVANTAGES

Mr. KAZEN. I see.

Now, Dr. Teller, these agreements freeze our present disadvantage, according to your statement, and we are agreeing that we are frozen in a disadvantageous position?

Mr. TELLER. Yes.

Mr. KAZEN. The agreements have left the door open for the Russians to catch up with us and surpass us in any field where we are still ahead?

Mr. TELLER. That, I think, is correct.

Mr. KAZEN. So, the only justification, then, for approving the agreements is that in the absence of treaties and agreements the Russian advantage would grow faster if we didn't do it?

Mr. TELLER. That is correct.

Mr. KAZEN. That, to me, sounds like possibly these agreements are not in our best interest.

COSTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE COURSE

Mr. TELLER. Sir, there is an alternative course. Appropriate at least $10 billion per year for deployment of additional aggressive weapons. I don't think you will do it; I do not recommend strongly that you should do it; it is a very serious step to take and in view of this alternative I agree with those who say that we should be satisfied with the quantitative disadvantage that we now have.

Now, let me make another point.

It is often stated that we are engaged in an arms race and one usually thinks of an arms race where one can count arms on one side and the other side and compare them. We are only partly engaged in an arms race. We are much more engaged in a technology race, in a race of ideas.

Instead of spending $10 billion per year on things that we already know how to do, I would rather spend two billion, two additional billion dollars a year on finding out how to behave better and more appropriately.

I argue for that not only because of increased safety but also because that research will strengthen our civilian economy, as well.

Mr. KAZEN. I agree fully we should put more money in research and not cut back on defense research because of the various reasons you give and, in addition to others that exist. But when we do find whatever the results are from this research, it will then take many years to implement the findings of that research, will it not?

Mr. TELLER. That is correct.

Mr. KAZEN. And by that time, if we are putting it on the basis of advantages, the Russians would be way ahead of us. I don't believe we are ever going to have the lead time that we had in World War II to gear up. That time has gone.

Mr. TELLER. That, unfortunately, is correct.

Mr. KAZEN. Then the only salvation that we would have is to find new ways and this means increase our research programs.

Mr. TELLER. This is, indeed, one of the points which I am strongly recommending.

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Thomson.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

DIRECTION OF U.S. DEFENSE RESEARCH

In that same line, Dr. Teller, who would you recommend to direct and conduct the research you are recommending?

Mr. TELLER. The man in charge of defense research and engineering is John Foster. He has occupied that position for 7 years. He is a dedicated man. He is a highly intelligent man. He has this responsibility and he should retain that responsibility.

Mr. THOMSON. You are suggesting the Defense Department should come before Congress and ask for more money for advance research?

Mr. TELLER. The Defense Department has come before Congress and their research requests that were formulated prior to the treaty at the time when the argument for it was less, has been cut back by half a billion dollars.

The first thing to do is to put the half billion dollars back.

The second thing to do is to ask John Foster to come and talk to you and explain to you why he hasn't asked for more. I think you will hear an interesting story from him.

Mr. THOMSON. Thank you very much, doctor.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Wolff.

PROBLEMS OF EVACUATION

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must say, Dr. Teller, yours is a very provocative statement and the answers you have given to our questions are certainly thought-compelling.

I must say, as well, that I want to compliment you on your confidence in the Members in Congress in being able to receive certain information that we have not been privy to in the past.

I have some reservations, however, on the thoughts you have of evacuation. I wonder whether or not you have been in a traffic jam in Washington or New York City or a weekend traffic jam in the way of trying to evacuate in 48 hours the cities of our Nation. It would prove a difficult task, I am afraid.

Mr. TELLER. Sir, I am not one of the truly exceptional individuals who have never been in a traffic jam.

I would also say, however, that while we are evacuating cities, we should prohibit practically all in-coming traffic. That alone—

Mr. WOLFF. Wouldn't that cause our whole machinery of government and economy to fall apart at that point?

Mr. TELLER. If we are on the point of an immediate threat of a Russian attack, a lot of things will fall apart and the question is what still hangs together.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND SMALLER POWERS

Mr. WOLFF. One of the points that you make that I think is a very important one is the question of nuclear blackmail.

This treaty we are signing between ourselves and the Soviets, we have not included the Chinese. One other area that hasn't been mentioned is, with the spread of breeder reactors, the creation of large amounts of excess plutonium. This will make available to smaller

countries of this world the ability to become a member of the nuclear club.

How do you feel about the whole question of these small powers and the availability of or the potential they will possess?

Mr. TELLER. We have a nonproliferation treaty which the Chinese have not signed, which some others haven't signed, and which may not be observed by every country which has signed it.

I am worried about smaller powers and this is, indeed, one of the very important reasons why missile defense must be established around Washington, D.C.

Mr. WOLFF. When you talk of missile defense and you are talking of the improved safeguard system, isn't it true the radar acquisition can be blinded for a period of time by decoys, chaff, or something of a like nature? The system is absolutely useless in the event you have either a MIRV attack or a large concentration attack?

Mr. TELLER. Indeed, if we are going to receive a very massive attack, then the defense system that is now permissible according to the agreement would not be sufficient. Washington will not be defended against the Russians.

THE MEANING OF NUMBERS

Mr. WOLFF. Isn't that contradictory to the statement you made that the numbers don't mean anything?

Mr. TELLER. Sir, I am glad I have not made an oversimplified statement that was completely free of all minor contradictions.

Numbers do mean something. When I compare a 50-percent advantage of the Russians in the number of missiles or even a fourfold advantage, I do say 50 percent means nothing and the fourfold advantage means practically nothing.

But when you talk about a small power or even the Chinese, there the numbers we will have to face will be and will remain for a number of years considerably smaller and those numbers have an important meaning. For at least the next decade—if I am optimistic, I might even say for the rest of the century—we might hope to be able to handle the attack by the amount of defensive power in our hands. Other nations will not challenge us very soon.

ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Mr. WOLFF. On one point of the smaller nations, it has been bandied about that Israel possesses nuclear capability.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. TELLER. I have visited Israel on several occasions. I have, of course, not discussed with them any classified material and I made it perfectly clear to my friends that anything that they will tell me will not be held in confidence. I found out precisely nothing about the subject that you mention.

Chairman MORGAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Steele.

Mr. STEELE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. ARMS DEVELOPMENT

Dr. Teller, it is the first time I have had the opportunity to listen to testimony by you and I must say it is very stimulating and refreshing and an unusual experience. I think your testimony was excellent.

I have one question.

On page 1, you say, "The SALT agreements freeze our present disadvantage, but leave the door open for the Russians to catch up with us and surpass us in any field where we are still ahead."

Isn't it true that the agreements give us the same opportunity to stay ahead and move farther in front of the Russians in fields where we are already ahead?

Mr. TELLER. I have to agree.

Mr. STEELE. Thank you.

Mr. TELLER. May I perhaps add that I hope we shall take advantage of this freedom.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Zablocki.

INVULNERABILITY OF THE SEA-BASED DETERRENT

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wish to join others and not only welcome you but commend you for your knowledgeable and excellent testimony.

Earlier in these hearings, I asked Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if he believed that the United States sea-based deterrent could become vulnerable during the period of the interim agreement—that is, within the next 5 years—without ruling out some kind of complete breakthrough in ASW on the part of the Soviet Union. He indicated there was no evidence the Soviets could detect and destroy our submarine fleet in a surprise move.

In your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the SALT agreements in June, you indicated secrecy prevented you from discussing how the United States sea-based strategic units might be handled. Your testimony indicates some variance with that of Admiral Moorer.

Do you believe the United States sea-based deterrent is vulnerable? Without revealing any classified information, can you say something on this subject?

Mr. TELLER. I can do so but only in the most general terms.

To detect a submarine is obviously a tricky business. There are a number of different possibilities which have been discussed, which have been investigated, and I would have no real confidence, based on what I know, that I could reliably detect Russian submarines.

I know, however, that such developments could easily occur in the next 5 years and this is a prediction concerning the rapidity in which science and technology can progress.

It is in this area of making predictions that perhaps Admiral Moorer, who has his eye on what exists, may be a little more conservative and where I may allow my imagination and, correspondingly, my apprehension to view a greater number of dangers and view them with a higher probability.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Anticipating, then, a possible breakthrough would give further reason for going ahead with research and development in deployment of the Trident, which would be less detectable?

Mr. TELLER. The Trident would certainly have available to it much more ocean space and there.ore it would be harder to keep track of all the Trident's at sea.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, doctor.

Mr. Mailliard.

POSITION ON THE SALT AGREEMENTS

Mr. MAILLIARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

May I say I am also interested to hear what you have to say, Dr. Teller. You are one of the most distinguished residents of my part of the country and I am happy to see you here.

I was going to ask almost precisely the question Mr. Zablocki asked. I was out of the room for a while so you may have answered it while I was not here.

I would take from the thrust of your prepared statement, as well as what you said here this morning, that your approval of the treaty and the agreement is positive but not wildly enthusiastic?

Mr. TELLER. That, I think, is an eminently fair statement.

Mr. MAILLIARD. Then there has been some discussion, as you know, in the press and by others, that sort of stirred up the pot where at least apparently Secretary Laird was saying something a little different than Secretary Rogers was saying in that Secretary Laird laid a heavy emphasis that our security would be jeopardized if, during this 5-year period where we are trying to obtain a more definitive agreement, we failed to take the necessary steps to develop replacement of present weapons systems. In case we fail to get a more definitive agreement we wouldn't be in a position in the 1980 time frame of having no replacement for Polaris and no replacements for the B-52.

Would you agree with what Secretary Laird said?

Mr. TELLER. I would generally agree.

I have said, and will repeat, Mr. Laird is an expert on these subjects. I am not.

In research, I am an expert and I have said similar things with respect to defense-oriented research. We are in danger unless it is fully supported and this, to my mind, is as important as any single new weapons system and possibly as important as all new defense systems put together.

Mr. MAILLIARD. I thank the gentlemen.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Fascell.

THE ADVANTAGE CONCEDED TO THE SOVIETS

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Teller, I appreciate your testimony.

I don't think the bitter pill—if it is one—needs sugar coating and we should have truth in packaging in this committee, and I support the conclusions for the same reasons which you have stated.

As I understand it, we have conceded, in your language, an advantage to the Russians. If a 4-to-1 throw weight is relatively meaningless or is dispensable in the logic of this issue as is the number of deliverable explosives; and if the Russians by keeping what they have now are getting more only in of numbers and weights, what is the advantage? Is it qualitative, or quantitative, or both?

Mr. TELLER. You mean the advantage of the treaty?

Mr. FASCELL. The advantage you say that we have conceded to the Russians.

Mr. TELLER. The advantage we have conceded to the Russians is in the throw weight which I think need not be over-emphasized, but which is important if they plan to destroy our retaliatory capability and retain enough weapons to do many other things, including to defend themselves against others like the Chinese; then this advantage in throw weight does play an important role.

Mr. FASCELL. This is the advantage you referred to when you said that under this treaty and agreement the United States has conceded an advantage to the USSR?

Mr. TELLER. That is what I did mean.

DESTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

Mr. FASCELL. Are people the primary target of nuclear exchange?

Mr. TELLER. I do not know. I think that people are an exceedingly important target. If you destroy the people in our country—in the absence of civil defense—then the United States will cease to exist.

I think that industrial capability is another important target and, while I would like to see a policy whereby we try to safeguard our people, I also think that to plan to retaliate against the Russian industrial capability rather than against Russian people makes sense.

I am sure that the Russians will be very anxious not to lose their industrial capability and, if they believe we have a retaliatory capability and if they know that as a nation we can survive, then, indeed, I hope we can deter them.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I would certainly agree people are important, but it seems to me the question is whether they are the primary target. Industrial capability protection after a first or second strike is of doubtful value, it seems to me.

There seems to be agreement that the maximum lead time on a missile strike is 30 minutes or less. If you don't have the capability at that point, except for continuing your society, I doubt that industrial capability after a first or second strike has any value. Saving people might; I say "might."

Is the destruction of people in the concentrated areas of cities, assuming that they are the primary target, is that by thermonuclear force or radioactivity? If you evacuate the people, what is the difference whether they die by thermonuclear force or 2 weeks later by radioactivity?

RADIOACTIVITY AND CIVIL DEFENSE

Mr. TELLER. I would like to answer the question you just raised and I would like to come back to your previous remarks.

Evacuation would, indeed, relieve the danger of radioactivity. The Russian document contains blueprints for the erection of hasty shelters that can be erected—and we have proved it can be done—in 48 hours. These shelters give protection against quite a bit of blast and give complete protection against radiation. It will be only a few places where the danger lasts for as long as 2 weeks.

If the country keeps functioning, clean-up procedures are possible.

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It is difficult to save people. It is also possible to save people.

With respect, however, to the destruction of industrial capability, this, indeed, is almost impossible to prevent. It is not impossible to stockpile, at relatively low cost, those goods which are needed for the survival of the people and which are needed to put the economy back into a functioning order in a short time.

You probably know that the total material value in the United States is approximately $3,000 billion, that it is about the same as our GNP for 3 years. Every bit of economic study and every bit of historical evidence shows that if people survive, then the rest of the economy can be brought back. We who have a mature economy, we who have reserves, can do that more readily than the Russians who are in an earlier stage of the industrial development.

LACK OF SUPPORT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

Mr. FASCELL. Dr. Teller, let me just say that I recommended many years ago doing exactly what you are talking about, as did a committee of this Congress. But we never got the appropriations.

What you are talking about has been rejected by every national administration since that time.

One of the reasons, it seems, we are unable to get a national policy to do as you have recommended is this question: How many megatons does it take, delivered anywhere in the United States—I think delivery system has, frankly, become immaterial, yet I can understand why we have to get sophisticated.

How many megatons does it take to destroy by radioactivity, the land, air, and water? Let's take a given area, to wit, the United States.

Mr. TELLER. Very much more than what the Russians have agreed to as a limitation in the present treaty. The establishment of such a ceiling is, indeed, one of the truly positive aspects of the treaty.

May I say I would argue for civil defense even in a country like England. But if this question were raised in England, I would have to concede that if the Russians concentrated all they've got on England, the devastation would be so complete that no civil defense measure would help. This would seem to me an unlikely eventuality.

This is one of the reasons why I say that in addition to civil defense the firm establishment of a common cause in the free world is an essential deterrent which will indefinitely delay a nuclear conflict.

DIFFERENCES ON NUCLEAR DESTRUCTION

Mr. FASCELL. Dr. Teller, I regret I don't have the opportunity to go into more detail on this with you because I think more questions have been raised than I can answer. My recollection is that there is a considerable difference of opinion between what you have just said in terms of total destructive capability in existence and what some other scientists say.

I was under the impression that the allegation has been made that there existed years ago the nuclear capability by radioactivity to destroy all the land, water, and air everywhere on this earth.

Mr. TELLER. Sir, I know of these statements. They are gross and improper exaggerations and you are absolutely right that a detailed discussion of that point is very necessary.

Mr. FASCELL. It seems to me it is fundamental.

Mr. TELLER. I am sure it is and I am deeply grateful to you for pointing it out in this fashion.

I have made the statement several times. I recognize a more detailed documentation of this point is essential.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MORGAN. Mr. Whalley.

HOW MUCH TO "CATCH UP"?

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is good to see you again, Dr. Teller.

You say on page 1 it would take many billions of dollars in the next 5 years if we tried to catch up with the Soviets.

Do you have any idea how many billions of dollars it would take?

Mr. TELLER. I have stated in answer to another question that if we don't sign this treaty we should spend $10 billion per year on additional offensive weapons in order not to catch up but to give us a chance to catch up.

Mr. WHALLEY. Doesn't the danger of the Russians having greater superiority in this type of weaponry make it necessary for the United States to give this subject top priority, in your opinion?

Mr. TELLER. In my opinion, top priority has to go to defense research, not to deployment of systems which may be obsolete by the time when they are deployed.

I am not referring here to the new systems that the Secretary of Defense recommends. I believe that those, indeed, should be deployed, but if the question were raised whether we should simply put in more Minutemen of the old kind, more submarines of the old kind, without giving careful thought how to improve them, I would recommend that the first priority should go to the improvements.

Mr. WHALLEY. Does our Defense Department know your views?

Mr. TELLER. The man responsible for defense research and engineering, John Foster, is my very good friend. I am sure he knows my views.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. ZABLOCKI (presiding). Mr. Culver.

Mr. CULVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Are you totally persuaded the deployment of the Trident and B-1 now being recommended are sufficiently superior to make the exception you have just made in terms of the justification of their deployment as distinguished from increased sophistication of the present warehouse of strategic hardware?

Mr. TELLER. I have qualified my statement before, and I repeat: This is not a field of my special expertise. My guess is these weapons should be deployed. I am sure they received very careful and very expert consideration but, as for my own knowledge, I can only say it is probably right; I cannot say I am certain.

STUDIES OF NUCLEAR ATTACK EFFECTS

Mr. CULVER. With reference to your earlier colloquy with Mr. Fascell, concerning the necessity for more detailed study and discussion of

the immediate impact of a nuclear strike, I am curious if you are aware of any studies taking place within our own Government that attempt to assess the long-term political, social, and economic consequences of a nuclear exchange.

It seems the emphasis we have placed on megatonnage and numbers is terribly misleading in terms of what the genuine and actual consequences of a nuclear exchange would be. We should seriously consider whether or not a nuclear attack on one city alone would set in motion events that would unravel the social fabric of our society. I doubt, therefore, the usefulness of speculating on the total elimination of human life or the total inhabitability of the environment. We will not get to that point before it's too late. We should focus instead on a more modest exchange and the question of whether that exchange might not by itself unravel our social fabric.

Mr. TELLER. I am sure that continued human life on this planet or even in the United States is not in real danger.

With respect to the social fabric, the unraveling of that social fabric, this is a much more difficult, a much more delicate question and, if a person claims that he understands the social fabric, he might try to answer. I am not one of these people.

I can tell you, however, that I discussed these questions in the past and also quite recently with Governor Davis, who is in charge of civil defense, and with General Lincoln, who is in charge of emergency preparedness.

There are some historic examples that our social fabric, that the general human social fabric, has some resilience. If there is a catastrophe, people will tend to help each other. But there is one very important point: If there is an attack and no preparedness, the result may be panic and chaos. If people feel that thought has been given to the question of what should be done under these conditions, that little guidance can make the difference between panic and chaos or an orderly and cooperative type of behavior.

NEED FOR GREATER PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING

Mr. CULVER. The point I was trying to get at, what is so critical is a greater degree of public understanding of what we are really talking about in the nuclear weapons field. It seems to me, quite candidly, a scientific dialog on the consequences of megatonnage exchange is not nearly as relevant or as useful as a tough-minded focus on the very painful and hard realities of the social and human consequences of a less than all-out nuclear exchange.

This really gets back to the basic questions: What constitutes a first-rate power in nuclear warfare? What constitutes nuclear parity? What constitutes sufficiency? And what is the political value of nuclear weapons to the superpowers today?

I have been increasingly distressed when one by one official witnesses come before this committee and talk about numbers games in nuclear warfare. When you really press the point, when you say, do you think we possess an adequate nuclear deterrent? The witness says yes. But they nevertheless want to keep going up this maddening numbers spiral for political reasons—because we shouldn't dare let the NATO powers believe we are second-rate. The time has come for us to recog-

nize that it is a lot more expensive for us to continue this maddening effort than it is to make an effort to come to a proper understanding in the world about what are the actual results of an exchange in nuclear warfare.

When we talk about the reaction of NATO in political and psychological terms rather than coming to grips with a forthright discussion of the basic questions involved here, this is the thing that troubles me so much. I don't see any political out if we don't address ourselves to this question.

Mr. TELLER. Let me perhaps say I agreed with Mr. Fascell from the point of view that exaggerated statements have been made which are simply wrong and which have to be clearly disproved.

You are raising a number of questions which are much more intricate, much more difficult and no less needful to be discussed.

I am not convinced that I can furnish answers and I hope I have avoided oversimplification in a situation where no such oversimplification is justified.

THE UNITED STATES AND A FIRST STRIKE

Mr. CULVER. I was interested in your statement about United States policy with regard to first strike capability. You said the United States did not plan for a first strike and that that process itself would set in motion certain adverse reactions which would be——

Mr. TELLER. I would go further than that.

We should have a firm policy that excludes a first strike by the United States.

Mr. CULVER. Then, in that connection, Dr. Teller, I wonder if you would comment on the story in this morning's Washington Post, titled "U.S. Plans High Impact Missile Warhead", which begins: "In what could become a crucial shift in U.S. weapons policy, the Pentagon will develop and flight test a new type of missile warhead designed to knock out some of the most vital and well-protected targets in the Soviet Union."

I am referring to the new MK–19 warhead project.

Despite the U.S. Government's declared policy of denying any first strike ambitions or, indeed doing anything which would cause the other side to fear a first strike on our part, it now appears plans are under way with regard to silo-killing technology.

Would you say "hard target" missile warheads are inconsistent with our policy of deterrence, or do you believe the mere hint of our developing this type of highly sophisticated missile technology might be perceived by the Soviets as a threat to their missile force no matter what explanation the United States offers with respect to first strikes? Don't first strike weapons breed first strike thinking?

UNITED STATES MUST RULE OUT FIRST STRIKE

Mr. TELLER. I believe what I have said, that we must never engage in a first strike, that we must rule out this possibility.

I also believe that apart from the extremely important moral considerations which makes me say this, there is a second reason: The Russians are stronger. If we wanted to, we could not knock out their retaliatory capability. The Russians, in my opinion, cannot perceive

this missile as a first strike threat because we don't have the missiles to carry out the first strike and they know it.

However, you are right, that a missile so designed may give rise to dangerous speculation.

I happen to argue, whenever I can, against the type of missile that is called a counter force missile, the type of missile you describe that is directed against an enemy silo, and argue against it for reasons already mentioned.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Bingham.

ROTC AND UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CONTRACTS

Mr. BINGHAM. I was impressed with your remarks about carrying on defense research.

I wonder if you have a view on the subject of prohibition that has been favored in some quarters in Congress against universities being given research contracts where they do not have ROTC programs.

Mr. TELLER. I wish I could answer your question by the statement that I don't know enough about the subject. I have spent practically all my life at universities. I know about the very dangerous movements, spiritual movements, the destructive movements, which are going forward at universities.

I am not sure whether the kind of prohibition you mention is right or not. I can say that there is logic in it but it also has weaknesses. A university administration may have ruled out ROTC. This may have occurred in spite of the determined opposition of one department at the university which is highly capable to do defense research and would like to do so.

I would like to see a policy where we encourage defense research at universities in every case where there is an honest effort on the part of the university to help in research, in defense research.

EXAMPLE: DRAPER LABORATORIES

Now, I would like to be very specific. Just a few days ago, MIT has completely divested itself of or, rather, has introduced final proceedings to divest itself of the Draper Laboratory, which affects one of the foremost defense and educational institutions in the country. I think that this action together with many other indications should give anyone pause who wants to place a defense contract at MIT.

A more important part of what I should say is: We should consider this as an incentive to find ways and means to transform the Draper Laboratory and other laboratories in the MIT area which are defense-oriented into an organization which not only can do defense research but can educate graduate students so that a continuing vital need shall be served.

If we don't look into the future, if we don't discriminate between those who do want to help defend the country and those who are opposed to defense, then I believe we are not going to have defense research and within the 1980's at the latest, we won't have adequate defense.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

Mr. BINGHAM. Dr. Teller, with regard to your expressed fear that the Soviets might engage in nuclear blackmail because you have calculated or you have evidence that they have taken measures such that not more than 4 percent of the population would be killed in a nuclear attack, do you have any historical evidence that would lead you to conclude the Soviets might take action, bearing in mind that even 4 percent of the population would be a very large loss and that in a nuclear chain the Soviet economy would be heavily damaged, if not wiped out?

Mr. TELLER. One way in which I might try to answer this question, is this: If the Russians manage to knock out the United States completely to achieve world leadership, to establish a position where they can command slave labor from anywhere in the world, then a loss of 4 percent of their people might conceivably be acceptable. After all, they killed more than 4 percent of their own people in the concentration camps.

Also, their economy, with the help they can commandeer from abroad, could be reconstituted in a number of years smaller than was needed after the Second World War.

So, this danger might still exist.

If, on the other hand, the United States survives the attack, if they will not have accomplished world leadership but lost their industries, then I believe our deterrents might, indeed, suffice to deter them.

CALCULATIONS OF LOSS IN NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

Mr. BINGHAM. If I follow your argument, you are saying that the Soviet decision in this regard might depend not so much on what they anticipate in terms of destruction of their own economy and destruction of their own people as to what they would anticipate in terms of destruction of the United States; is that correct?

Mr. TELLER. I believe their decision is apt to be influenced by both. There is a limit to what losses they are willing to accept.

There is also a very serious question of what they can accomplish. If they can accomplish more, if, indeed, they can accomplish unquestioned power over the whole world, they may accept much heavier losses than they are willing to accept otherwise.

SOVIETS AS DEFENSE-MINDED

Mr. BINGHAM. Just one final question in this regard.

Would you agree with the statement frequently made in matters of strategy and military policy that the Russians have been for a long time defense-minded?

Mr. TELLER. In the whole history of Russia, they have been defense-minded; they have engaged in aggression against Finland. That, I think, has taught them a lesson. They engaged in what I would call aggression against Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In that case, they took no risk.

The Russians will be defense-minded as long as they are very sure to have no risks or else they are very sure that the risks are strictly limited. In that sense, they are defense-minded and that can give us a measure of assurance.

But, unless we look to our defenses and very particularly unless we do something to safeguard the lives of our own people, a situation may arise when the Russians can play extremely dangerous games, even engage in aggression and the risk may remain sufficiently limited for them to do so.

That is the main reason why I think that measures of civil defense, of sufficient defense, will remain necessary.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Dr. Teller.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. If there are no further questions, the committee will stand adjourned.

Thank you, Dr. Teller.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs will meet again in this room at 10 a.m. tomorrow, Thursday, in executive session, for the purpose of considering and voting on a resolution expressing approval of the interim SALT agreement on offensive arms.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the committee adjourned.)

APPENDIX

92D CONGRESS, 2d Session } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { DOCUMENT No. 92-311

SALT AGREEMENTS

COMMUNICATION

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

COPIES OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON MAY 26, 1972

JUNE 13, 1972.—Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 13, 1972.

Hon. CARL B. ALBERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: I transmit herewith copies of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the President of the Senate. I am asking the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers.

The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces.

Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.

Besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.

These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace.

Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes—a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected—I strongly recommend that the House of Representatives support The Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON.

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

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RICHARD NIXON.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 13, 1972.*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, June 10, 1972.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including an associated Protocol. It is my recommendation that the ABM Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Interim Agreement, as its title indicates, is an agreement limited in scope and time. It is designed to limit the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines, pending the negotiation of a treaty covering more complete limitations of strategic offensive arms. In these circumstances, I am submitting to you the Interim Agreement and its Protocol (which is an integral part of the Agreement), with the recommendation that they be transmitted to both Houses of Congress for approval by a Joint Resolution.

The Interim Agreement can by its terms enter into force only upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance by both countries and only when and if the ABM Treaty is brought into force. Both signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither will take any action that would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement and Protocol, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or acceptance.

ABM TREATY

In broad outline, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, provides that:

A nationwide ABM deployment, and a base for such deployment, are prohibited;

An ABM deployment for defense of an individual region is prohibited, except as specifically permitted;

Permitted ABM deployments will be limited to two widely separated deployment areas in each country—one for defense of the national capital, and the other for the defense of ICBMs;

For these purposes no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites may be deployed within each 150-kilometer radius ABM deployment area, for a total of 200 deployed ABM interceptors and 200 deployed ABM launchers for each Party;

ABM radars will be strictly controlled; radars to support the ABM defense of the national capital may be deployed only in a specified number of small radar complexes within the ABM deployment area; radars to support the ICBM defense will be limited to a specified number within the ABM deployment area and will also be subject to qualitative constraint.

In order to assure the effectiveness of these basic provisions of the Treaty, a number of detailed corollary provisions were also agreed:

Development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or ABM components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based are prohibited;

Deployment of ABM systems involving new types of basic components to perform the current functions of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars is prohibited;

The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air defense systems, or components thereof to perform an ABM role is prohibited.

The Treaty also contains certain general provisions relating to the verification and implementation of the Treaty and to further negotiations:

Each side will use national technical means for verification and the Parties agree not to interfere with such means and not to take deliberate concealment measures;

A Standing Consultative Commission will be established to facilitate implementation of the Treaty and consider questions arising thereunder;

The Parties will continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

The ABM Treaty consists of a preamble and sixteen Articles. As indicated in Article I(1), it provides for limitations on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems as well as certain related measures. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Treaty. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

PREAMBLE

The preamble contains six paragraphs that set forth common premises and objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union which are the basis for entering into this Treaty.

The first preambular paragraph states the basic premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second and third preambular paragraph indicate the rationale for the ABM Treaty and the accompanying Interim Agreement. Effective limits on anti-ballistic missile systems will be an important factor in curbing competition in the strategic offensive arms race, will decrease the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, and will, together with certain agreed measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, create a favorable climate for future negotiations on limiting strategic arms.

The fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs indicate the relationship of this Treaty to the undertaking of the Parties in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an

early date and to nuclear disarmament", and express the intention of the Parties to achieve further progress in disarmament at the earliest possible date.

The sixth paragraph reflects the broad international consensus that effective measures to limit strategic arms will assist in relaxing international tensions and strengthening trust between nations. As the first bilateral agreements between nuclear powers limiting strategic nuclear arms, this Treaty and the Interim Agreement should serve as historic steps toward these broader political goals.

A. LIMITATIONS ON ABM SYSTEMS

(1) Deployment

Article I(2) prohibits the deployment of ABM systems which would provide defense covering substantially the whole of the territory of a Party. ABM defenses of individual regions are also prohibited except as specifically set forth in Article III. As more fully explained below, that Article limits not only the number, size and location of the permitted ABM deployment areas of each Party, but also limits to low levels the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM interceptors at launch sites, and places restrictions on ABM radars, and thus has the effect of precluding thick regional ABM defenses.

Article I(2) also includes an undertaking not to provide a "base" for a nationwide ABM defense. This would, for example, prohibit the construction and deployment of ABM radars, or even ABM-capable radars deployed for other purposes, that could provide a base for a nationwide ABM system. (Articles III, IV, V and VI contain specific constraints that reinforce this prohibition.) The Treaty does not restrict air defense, space tracking, intelligence or other non-ABM systems *per se*. However, it does prohibit the testing or conversion of such systems or their components to perform an ABM role; moreover, the Parties have agreed not to deploy any phased-array radars over a certain size except as otherwise provided in the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. This would prevent the possible use of such radars as a base for a nationwide ABM defense.

Article II defines an ABM system as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory". It indicates that such systems currently consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. ABM interceptor missiles are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode. ABM launchers are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles. (A launcher associated with an interceptor missile that is hereafter tested in an ABM mode falls within the definition of an ABM launcher.) ABM radars are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role (including target tracking or missile control, but not early warning), or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode.

The second paragraph of Article II makes it clear that the ABM system components listed in the first paragraph of the Article include not only those which are operational, but also those under construction, undergoing testing, undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion, or mothballed.

Article III prohibits the deployment of any ABM systems or their components except as provided therein. Under Article III, the Parties may deploy only systems consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The limited deployment of such systems described in the next two paragraphs below is permitted only (a) within one deployment area centered on the nation's capital and having a radius of 150 kilometers, and (b) within one other deployment area having the same radius and containing ICBM silo launchers. The centers of the two deployment areas will be separated by no less than 1,300 kilometers.

In each of these deployment areas a Party may deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites. These totals would include any deployments within such areas for training purposes and, as indicated in Article II(2), would not be confined to those in operational status. In view of Article V(1), discussed below, only fixed, land-based ABM components may be deployed.

The restrictions on ABM radars cover radars of both existing types: phased-array radars (a modern type which scans by electronic means, a capability especially useful for ABM purposes) and mechanical-scan radars (an older type). These restrictions are as follows:

(i) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area centered on the nation's capital, no qualitative or quantitative constraints on radars are imposed, but location is circumscribed as follows: a Party may have ABM radars within no more than 6 ABM radar complexes, the permitted area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than 3 kilometers. Phased-array ABM radars may not be located outside such complexes, regardless of when they become operational. Mechanical-scan ABM radars that become operational after May 26, 1972 are similarly constrained. The Parties understand that in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with this provision, the Soviet mechanical-scan ABM radars operational on May 26, 1972 within the deployment area for defense of its national capital may be retained.

(ii) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, the location of radars is not circumscribed, but qualitative and quantitative constraints are imposed. A Party may have:

> 2 large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in such a deployment area: and
>
> No more than 18 ABM radars each having a potential less than that of the smaller of the 2 large phased-array ABM radars referred to above.

The only two large phased-array ABM radars operational or under construction in such a deployment area on the date of signature were the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) and Missile Site Radar (MSR) under construction near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. The Parties understand that the potential—the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters—of the smaller of these two radars (the MSR) is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

The impact of Article III on ABM systems currently deployed or under construction would be as follows: it would not prohibit the ABM system deployed around Moscow or the ABM system being deployed by the United States in the vicinity of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, but it would preclude the completion or retention of the ABM complex on which construction had been started in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. (The signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that would be prohibited thereby in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.)

The United States has not started construction at a deployment area centered on its national capital, and the Soviet Union has not started construction at a deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

(2) *Development, Testing, and Other Limitations*

Article IV provides that the limitations in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or ABM components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. It is understood that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes, and that non-phased-array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. Article IV further provides that each Party may have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges. The current United States test ranges for ABM systems are located at White Sands, New Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. The current Soviet test range for ABM systems is located near Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan SSR. ABM components are not to be deployed at any other test ranges without prior agreement between the Parties.

Article V limits development and testing, as well as deployment, of certain types of ABM systems and components. Paragraph V(1) limits such activities to fixed, land-based ABM systems and components by prohibiting the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. It is understood that the prohibitions on mobile ABM systems apply to ABM launchers and ABM radars which are not permanent fixed types.

Paragraph V(2) prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher; modification of deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability; and the development, testing or deployment of automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. The Parties agree that this Article includes an obligation not to develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

(3) *Future ABM Systems*

A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is that which would be created if an ABM system were developed in the future which did not consist of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty would not permit the deployment of such a system or of components

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thereof capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars: Article II(1) defines an ABM system in terms of its function as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory", noting that such systems "currently" consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Article III contains a prohibition on the deployment of ABM systems or their components except as specified therein, and it permits deployment only of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM system, provided that such devices were not capable of substituting for one or more of these components. Finally, in the course of the negotiations, the Parties specified that "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty." (As explained below, Article XIII calls for establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, and Article XIV deals with amendments to the Treaty.)

(4) *Modernization and Replacement*

Article VII provides that, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Modernization or replacement of present ABM systems or components is constrained by the various limitations and prohibitions in the Treaty. (See paragraph 2 of Article I, Article III, Article V, and Article VI.)

(5) *Destruction and Dismantling*

Article VIII provides that ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in the Treaty, as well as ABM systems or components prohibited by the Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Since no more than one ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers is permitted by Article III, this Article will apply, when the Treaty enters into force, to the ABM components previously under construction in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

B. OTHER RELATED MEASURES

(1) *Constraints on Non-ABM Systems or Components*

Article VI is designed to enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the basic limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty. To this end, each Party undertakes in this Article (a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory; (b) not to test such non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars "in an ABM mode" and (c) not to deploy in the future radars for early

warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

The first of these undertakings would, for example, prohibit the modification of air-defense missiles (SAMs) to give them a capability against strategic ballistic missiles.

The undertaking not to test non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars in an ABM mode subsequent to the date of signature of this Treaty would prohibit testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes, but would not affect ABM testing of ABM components, or prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes.

With respect to the third of the undertakings in Article VI, it should be noted that the Treaty, while not intended to prohibit the further deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, requires their location along the periphery of each Party's national territory and oriented outward in order to minimize the possibility that they could contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Article VI also has the effect of prohibiting the future deployment in third countries of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack. Existing ballistic missile early-warning radars would not be affected. Article VI imposes no limitation on radars for national means of verification.

In recognition of the fact that phased-array radars with more than a certain potential, though deployed for non-ABM missions such as air defense or air traffic control, would have an inherent capacity for ABM use, the Parties agreed not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential exceeding three million watt-square meters, except as provided in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. Deployment of non-ABM radars currently planned by the United States would not be affected.

(2) *International Transfers*

Article IX provides that, to assure the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by the Treaty. The Parties understand that the first undertaking includes an obligation not to provide to other states technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty. In addition, the United States Delegation made clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provisions may be considered for a treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms, noting that the question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

(3) *Conflicting Obligations*

Article X contains an undertaking by the Parties not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with the Treaty. The obligations in this Treaty are not inconsistent with any obligation of the United States under any international agreement.

C. VERIFICATION AND CONSULTATION

(1) Verification

Article XII relates to verification of compliance with the Treaty's provisions, which is to be accomplished by national technical means. Paragraph 1 states that each Party will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of providing assurance of compliance with provisions of the Treaty. It does not require changes from current operating practices and procedures with respect to systems which will be used as national technical means of verification.

The second paragraph of this Article provides that each Party agrees not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article. This provision would, for example, prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used for verification of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 contains an agreement not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. This paragraph expressly permits continuation of current construction, assembly, conversion and overhaul practices.

(2) Standing Consultative Commission

Article XIII provides that the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting framework within which the Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels.

A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance. Thus one Party might raise a question of compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter.

Attention was called above to the provisions in Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to consider any questions of interference with such means. The Commission may also consider questions of concealment impeding verification by national means. The Commission may consider changes in the general strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty—such as agreed interpretations after the Treaty has entered into force—and to consider proposals for amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other appropriate measures, not specifically

enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components. (For corresponding responsibility of the Commission under the Interim Agreement, see section C of the discussion thereof.)

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other diplomatic channels.

The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic channels.

D. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of unlimited duration, but contains a withdrawal clause of the type that has become standard in post-war arms control treaties. This clause provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such decision is to be given to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice is required to include a statement of the extraordinary events involved.

In this connection, the United States has stressed the unique relationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interrelationship lends extraordinary importance to the undertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms."

The special importance we attach to this relationship was reflected in the following formal statement relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972:

- The US Delegation has stressed the importance the US Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish

to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the US Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The US Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the US position.

E. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article XIV deals with amendments and review. Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties may propose amendments to the Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification. The second paragraph of Article XIV provides for formal review of the Treaty by the Parties at five year intervals. Paragraph 2 does not preclude agreement on proposed amendments of the Treaty during the first five years, or between formal reviews thereafter; it simply reflects recognition of the possibility of changes in the strategic relationship and the development of new strategic systems. These questions are also within the purview of the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article XVI and the final paragraph of the Treaty contain standard provisions on entry into force, registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter, and equal authenticity of the English and Russian language texts.

INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL

The Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including a Protocol which is integral thereto, was signed on May 26, 1972. The Interim Agreement consists of a preamble and eight operative articles. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Interim Agreement. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

This Agreement provides for a restriction of five years on strategic offensive missile launcher deployments pending negotiation of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The main effects of the Interim Agreement will be that:

the aggregate number of fixed, land-based ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers will be limited;

starting construction of additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers is prohibited;

the number of launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9, will be limited to that number currently operational and under construction;

ceilings will be placed on the number of SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines operational on each side; and

up to the agreed ceilings, deployment of additional SLBM launchers above a specified number for each Party requires an offsetting reduction of ICBM launchers of older types or SLBM launchers on older ballistic missile submarines.

In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Agreement the Parties express the conviction that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiation on limiting strategic arms and will improve international relations. In the second paragraph the Parties acknowledge the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, and in the third they acknowledge their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations.

A. ICBM launchers

Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibits starting construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers. While the text of Article I prescribes July 1, 1972, as the freeze date, the United States and the Soviet Union understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that will be prohibited thereby, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

This construction freeze covers all fixed land-based ICBM launchers, both silo and soft-pad, but does not include test and training ICBM launchers or mobile land-based ICBM launchers. Test and training launchers are, however, subject to other constraints. The United States has made clear to the Soviets that we would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement to be inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The Parties have agreed that the term ICBM includes any land-based strategic ballistic missile capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment systems are considered to be ICBM launchers.

On May 26, 1972, the United States had 1,054 operational, land-based ICBM launchers and none under construction; on that date, the Soviet Union had a total of land-based ICBM launchers operational and under active construction estimated to be about 1,618. (ICBM launchers for testing and training purposes are excluded in each case.) Under the freeze, the Soviet Union may complete construction of ICBM launchers under active construction on May 26, 1972. While the Interim Agreement remains in effect, neither Party may start new construction (nor resume previously suspended construction) of fixed ICBM launchers except test and training launchers.

B. Heavy ICBM launchers

Article II provides that the Parties shall not convert land-based launchers for light, or older heavy, ICBMs into land-based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS–9. All currently operational ICBMs other than the SS–9 are either "light" (the United States Minuteman and the Soviet SS–11 and SS–13) or "older" ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the United States Titan and the Soviet SS–7 and SS–8).

Article II would thus prohibit the conversion of a launcher for an SS–7, SS–8, SS–11 or SS–13 ICBM into a launcher for an SS–9 or any new modern heavy ICBM, and would similarly prohibit the conversion of a launcher for a Minuteman or Titan into a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM. The Parties agree that in the process of

modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased, and that this means that any increase will not be greater than 10–15 percent of the present dimensions. The United States has also made clear that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side (which is the Soviet SS–11) to be a heavy ICBM.

C. SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines.

Article III limits SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on May 26, 1972.

In addition, Article III and the Protocol permit launchers and submarines beyond 740 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the Soviet Union and 656 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the United States, subject to two constraints. First, additional SLBM launchers may become operational only as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964, or for launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines or for modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine. Second, such substitution may not result in:

> the Soviet Union having operational more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines or more than 950 SLBM launchers, including all SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines and all modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine;
>
> the United States having operational more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines or more than 710 SLBM launchers.

Construction of replacement SLBM launchers up to the limits under the Protocol would require the dismantling or destruction, under agreed procedures, of an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types or of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines. Moreover, modern SLBM launchers deployed on any type of submarine would count against the total ceiling on SLBM launchers. Dismantling or destruction would be required to commence no later than the date on which sea trials of a replacement ballistic missile submarine begin and to be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Thus the Soviets will have to begin dismantling older ICBM or SLBM launchers no later than when the 741st SLBM launcher on a nuclear-powered submarine enters sea trials. Dismantling or destruction, as well as timely notification thereof, are to be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

D. Test and training launchers

The Parties agree that the number of test and training launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, including "modern heavy" ICBMs, shall not be increased significantly above the current number of test and training launchers for such missiles. It is understood that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for the purposes of testing and training. It is also understood that ICBM launchers for test and training purposes may be constructed at operational sites.

E. Modernization and replacement

Article IV provides that, subject to the provisions of the Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic missiles and launchers covered by the Interim Agreement may be undertaken. The conversion of current United States ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles, the conversion of current submarine launchers to handle Poseidon missiles, and the construction of new submarines as replacements for older submarines, are not prohibited by the Agreement.

F. Other provisions

Article V of the Interim Agreement contains the same provisions on verification as appear in Article XII of the ABM Treaty. Verification will be carried out by national technical means operating in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. Interference with, or deliberate concealment from, such means is prohibited. Neither Party is required to change its current practices of construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul.

Article VI provides that in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission to be established pursuant to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.

In Article VII the Parties agree to continue active negotiation for limitations on strategic offensive arms. This Article also provides that the terms of this Interim Agreement will not prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the subsequent negotiations. It is expected that these subsequent negotiations will start in the near future.

The first paragraph of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement provides that it shall enter into force upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance, simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII provides that the Interim Agreement shall remain in effect for five years, unless earlier replaced by agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

The third paragraph of this Article provides each Party with a right, parallel to that contained in paragraph 2 of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, to withdraw upon six months' notice if such Party decides its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Interim Agreement.

CONCLUSION

I believe the Treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, together with the accompanying Interim Agreement and its Protocol constraining strategic offensive arms, constitute the most important step in arms limitation ever taken by this country. In these agreements, the two most powerful nations on earth are adopting measures designed to curb the deployment of strategic arms.

The Parties have protected their vital interests during the careful negotiation and elaboration of these agreements. We did not agree to anything adversely affecting the national interests of our Allies, who

were regularly consulted during the negotiations. The Congress has been kept closely informed throughout the negotiations. Ambassador Smith and other Delegation members conducted a total of thirty executive session briefings for Congressional Committees.

These Agreements should help to improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order. The entry into force of these measures should significantly advance the cause of peace in the world, and I hope that they can be brought into force as soon as practicable.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM A. ROGERS.

(Enclosures: 1. The ABM Treaty. 2. The Interim Agreement and associated Protocol. 3. Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements.)

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

ARTICLE II

1. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.

ARTICLE III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

ARTICLE IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

ARTICLE V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

ARTICLE VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars,

capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

ARTICLE VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

ARTICLE VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

ARTICLE IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

ARTICLE X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

ARTICLE XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

ARTICLE XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON,
President of the United States of America.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

ARTICLE II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

ARTICLE IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

ARTICLE V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

ARTICLE VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

ARTICLE VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national soverignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America:

RICHARD NIXON,
President of the United States of America.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. BREZHNEV,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Protocol to the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The US may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned levels, in the U.S.—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

Done at Moscow this 26th day of May, 1972.

For the United States of America:

Richard Nixon,
President of the United States of America.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

L. I. Brezhnev,
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

[Enclosure 3]

1. AGREED INTERPRETATIONS.

(*a*) *Initialed Statements.*

The texts of the statements set out below were agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972.

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[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[E]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[F]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile or more than one independently guided warhead.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

[H]

The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the continental USSR.

[I]

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed.

[J]

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased.

[K]

The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

[L]

The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties further understand that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.

(*b*) *Common Understandings.*

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. *Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions.*—Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The Parties agree that the term 'significantly increased' means that an increase will not be greater than 10–15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers".

Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

B. *Location of ICBM Defenses.*—The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the

following statement: 'The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.' In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area." (See Initialed Statement [C].)

C. *ABM Test Ranges.*—The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972: "Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that 'the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges.' We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to 'additionally agreed test ranges' to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges."

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

D. *Mobile ABM Systems.*—On January 28, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?"

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

E. *Standing Consultative Commission.*—Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 23, 1972: "The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,* agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under

* See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971.

these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, *ad hoc* arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels."

Minister Semenov replied that, on an *ad referendum* basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

F. *Standstill.*—On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: "In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents."

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval."

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

2. UNILATERAL STATEMENTS

(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:—

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement: "The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes than an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position."

B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement."

C. Covered Facilities

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of Article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines."

D. "Heavy" ICBM's

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

E. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Article II of the Joint Draft Text uses the term 'tested in an ABM mode,' in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the side should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of 'tested in an ABM mode,' we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be 'tested in an ABM mode' if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind re-

ferred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria."

F. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution."

G. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement."

* * * * * * *

(b) The following noteworthy unilateral statement was made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and is shown here with the U.S. reply:

On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet Side:" "Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the U.S., but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement the U.S. and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the U.S. Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all the questions of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the U.S., will be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations."

On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov: "The United States side has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side' of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that statement."

On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 24. Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26.

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