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FOR RELEASE SUNDAY A.M. SEPTEMBER 26, 1971

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

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HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 30, OCTOBER 13, NOVEMBER 19 AND 24, 1970

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
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
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THE CARIBBEAN REGION



The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.



MAP NO. 3871 UNITED NATIONS
 JULY 1964

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 1970

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in room H-227, the Capitol, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will please come to order.

We are meeting this afternoon to be briefed on the details of the Soviet naval and military buildup in Cuba, which forms the background of the warning given the Soviet Union late last week by the White House.

The subcommittee's hearings in July and August indicated that more than usual military and naval activity was taking place in Cuba.

To fill us in on just what has taken place, and what the Soviets and Cubans are presently doing, we have with us today Col. John Bridge, Chief, Soviet Area Office, Defense Intelligence Agency; Lt. Cmdr. John Heekin of the same office; Col. C. S. Freed, Chief, Liaison Group, Defense Intelligence Agency; as well as a representative of the State Department, Colgate S. Prentice, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.

Colonel Bridge, you may start out, and if Commander Heekin has anything, or wants to say anything afterward, or at the same time, go right ahead; then we will have some questions.

STATEMENT OF COL. JOHN BRIDGE, CHIEF, SOVIET AREA OFFICE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Colonel BRIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In response to your requirement, Commander Heekin will present a briefing that will summarize for you and the members of the committee the activities which have taken place in and around Cienfuegos, for about the past 3 weeks.

Mr. FASCELL. All right, Commander.

STATEMENT OF LT. CMDR. JOHN HEEKIN, SOVIET AREA OFFICE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Commander HEEKIN. Gentlemen, the third Soviet naval deployment to the Caribbean, in a little over a year, has apparently resulted in efforts to establish a Soviet naval facility at Cienfuegos, Cuba, which might support naval operations in the Caribbean area, including submarines.

A *Kresta*-class guided missile light cruiser, a *Kanin*-class guided missile destroyer, and a submarine tender and a merchant tanker entered the Caribbean via Mona Passage on September 5; a buoy tender and an ocean rescue tug passed through Caicos Passage on September 2, and were followed the next day by a tank landing ship.

These last three ships transited along the northern coast of Cuba, and probably entered Havana by the 6th. The cruiser group continued west, and rendezvoused with the LST, the buoy tender, and the tug outside Cienfuegos Harbor on September 9, after which they all entered port.

The buoy tender and tug were each towing an 82-foot barge. These barges were transported from the Northern Fleet by the LST.

A merchant tanker had left the cruiser group on the 8th, made a port call to Kingston, Jamaica, and arrived in Cienfuegos on the 10th. Two additional ships, a naval oiler and a surveying ship, arrived in the area on the 18th.

Some of the ships have subsequently left the Caribbean. The cruiser, destroyer, and merchant tanker on the 22d, and the LST and buoy tender on the 28th.

The submarine tender, tug, and oiler remain in Cienfuegos; the surveying ship is operating south of Cuba.

Reports from the Cienfuegos area since mid-August describe the rapid construction of buildings and possible recreational areas on Alcatraz Island. This consists of construction of two possible barracks-type buildings, a few other buildings, repair of a pier, and construction of a probable soccer field and other recreational facilities. The submarine tender had been moored to four buoys about 1 mile north of the island, but has since moved alongside a pier.

The combination of the submarine tender and the construction on Alcatraz Island appears intended to provide the Soviets with an increased capability to support the naval operations in the Caribbean area, including those of submarines.

Public statements of the U.S. Government have stated that the Soviet activity may be associated with naval, including submarine, support facilities. It has been noted that we do not know what the Soviet intentions are, but are watching the matter closely. [Security deletion.]

That is the end of my briefing, gentlemen.

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, that is a summary of the physical facts of the case, as they pertain to this particular port.

Mr. FASCELL. OK. Well, suppose I start right out.

Whose statement is that?

Colonel BRIDGE. This is the briefing that we prepared in DIA in response to your inquiry.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I know, but who is responsible for the statement? What officer? I don't mean who prepared it, but by what authority is it rendered?

Mr. COLGATE PRENTICE (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations). Colonel Freed and Colgate Prentice.

I wonder, sir, would it be possible for Colonel Freed to speak briefly to Colonel Bridge? He has some messages to give him.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, sir, by all means, especially before he was about to answer some questions.

Mr. PRENTICE. Could we step outside?

Mr. FASCELL. Sure, absolutely. The one thing we need is coordination and agreement.

Mr. PRENTICE. Yes, sir, we appreciate it. That is what we are trying to do.

Mr. FASCELL. You have already anticipated my question.

(Brief recess)

Mr. PRENTICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. All right, gentlemen.

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, let's see, now, the authority business. This statement was prepared, as a briefing, in DIA it was reviewed—

Mr. FASCELL. Now when you say it is prepared as a briefing, sir, do you mean it was prepared as a briefing for this committee?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, a special briefing.

Colonel BRIDGE. As a result of the committee's requirement, and it was—

Mr. FASCELL. And therefore, whoever heads DIA is responsible for the statement.

Colonel BRIDGE. However, this has been reviewed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and approved by him.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, the head of DIA is the Chief of Intelligence, isn't he, for the military?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, then, isn't he responsible for a statement that he sends to the Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, that is true, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. So the fact that the Deputy Secretary of Defense has cleared it is what, just a policy kind of thing?

STATEMENT OF COL. C. S. FREED, CHIEF, LIAISON GROUP, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Colonel FREED. That is right.

Mr. FASCELL. It doesn't change the information, because the Deputy Secretary can't add anything to it.

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. So why does he review it? I don't understand.

Colonel FREED. So that he will know what is being said, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Oh, I see. OK. I didn't know we had review for policy questions on intelligence. I thought intelligence was intelligence, and didn't have anything to do with policy review, as far as DOD is concerned. But you learn something every day.

Mr. MORSE. I don't think Colonel Bridge said anything inconsistent with that. This wasn't cleared for policy, it just cleared as a matter of information.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes.

Mr. MORSE. That certainly isn't what you just said.

Mr. FASCELL. No.

Mr. MORSE. You implied that it was being cleared for policy.

Mr. FASCELL. That is right.

Mr. MORSE. I think the record should show that.

Mr. FASCELL. I am not trying to badger them; I am just trying to find out where the thing came from; that is all. Is it intelligence exhibit F, a single opinion on the nature and extent of the Soviet naval activities in and around Cuba?

Colonel BRIDGE. To the best of my knowledge, sir, there are no significant differences of opinion.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, what are the insignificant differences?

Colonel BRIDGE. It is a little embarrassing. I guess I shouldn't have said—there are no differences of opinion, if I may amend my remarks to that extent.

Mr. FASCELL. The intelligence input for this briefing—does it coincide exactly with the intelligence estimate that went to the White House?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, I can't answer that question because I do not know the content or the format of any intelligence estimate on this subject that went to the White House.

Colonel FREED. I am not aware of a specific estimate on this subject having gone to the White House. We have given—

Mr. FASCELL. How does this information get into the daily estimate, then? DIA has some input into the intelligence community?

Colonel FREED. Yes, sir, we advise the White House of elements of information that we gather from time to time; that goes into the White House situation room, and they then decide what will go to the President and in what form. We do not do that.

Mr. FASCELL. Right.

Colonel FREED. And by the same token, the significant items of information are reported on the basis of current intelligence to various people in the Pentagon, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, we have established the fact, then, that there was no specific estimate with respect to this particular situation, so it arose someplace else.

All right. I will stop. I have got a whole host of other questions, obviously, but I want to yield to my colleagues. We will go right down the line.

Mr. MORSE.

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry, Commander, that I wasn't here to hear the whole briefing, and I didn't pick up very satisfactorily.

Do I understand that the submarine site is in fact being built there, according to your intelligence?

Commander HEEKIN. What apparently was, in effect, their third deployment there has apparently resulted in an effort to establish a Soviet naval facility at Cienfuegos, Cuba, which might support naval operations in the Caribbean area, including submarines.

Mr. MORSE. When did you first get information of this sort?

Colonel BRIDGE. The history on this, sir, was that the current activity first came to our attention [security deletion] in late August, when [security deletion] a Soviet task force that at that time consisted of the guided missile cruiser, the destroyer, and I believe, sir, an oiler, that were in the mid-Atlantic, traveling in a southwesterly direction. As a result of continued surveillance, of this ship—this fleet, rather—

they were followed, and the presence of the buoy tender and the tug was confirmed, as was the LST. They were watched as they came down through both the Caicos and Mona Passage, and around both ways around Cuba, and finally into Cienfuegos.

Mr. MORSE. What is the significance of the tug and the buoy tender?

Colonel BRIDGE. The tug apparently has a support role in the rather small scale operations that are going on in Cienfuegos. The buoy tender was used, to the best of our knowledge, to lay some rather heavy concrete blocks in the harbor, that then was—they were used as moorings for the submarine tender that accompanied the fleet.¹ This is a general purpose tug, sir. It is just an oceangoing salvage tug.

Mr. MORSE. But [security deletion] in late August was the intelligence also such that we inferred that this task force was on its way in order to construct some sort of naval installation?

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir. As a matter of fact, we could only say at that time that its probable destination was the Caribbean; we could not specify Cuba. It was not until the 9th of September, when we saw the two components of the force meet, that we knew that they had gone into Cienfuegos.

Mr. MORSE. And then they were under constant surveillance, I presume.

Colonel BRIDGE. Fairly constant surveillance, yes, sir.

Mr. MORSE. What was the next intelligence, in terms of chronology, that was available to DIA?

Colonel BRIDGE. Once the ships had entered Cienfuegos, we became aware, in reports that were available to us [security deletion] that the construction had occurred on Cayo Alcatraz, the small island in the eastern portion of Cienfuegos Harbor. Subsequent reports simply indicated the general activity of the ships. [Security deletion] the mooring of the sub tender in the eastern portion of the bay, on the prepared moorings that had been laid several years previously. That is about the size of it.

Mr. MORSE. Why is that significant?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion.] I must make very clear that we have absolutely no indication that any submarine ever entered Cienfuegos Harbor—that is, on this current go-round of activity.

Mr. MORSE. I infer that you have no information that a submarine has not entered the harbor, too?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, sir, I would say that is correct.

Mr. MORSE. So you can't prove the negative.

Would extensive construction be required in order to create the kind of facility that is implied in the commander's statement?

Colonel BRIDGE. His statement, sir, just simply describes what was there. Now, it is most difficult to answer this question, because you would have to assume a purpose, a fairly specific purpose for which the facility was being prepared.

Mr. MORSE. Well, let me rephrase the question: Is the natural state of the harbor such that the mere mooring of a submarine tender is adequate to make it a submarine base?

Colonel BRIDGE. A submarine tender, sir, would afford a capability of support for submarines.

¹ Colonel Bridge later in the hearing corrected his testimony to indicate that the concrete blocks for the buoys had been laid some time previously. (See p. 7.)

Mr. MORSE. And that would, by itself, create a submarine base?

Colonel BRIDGE. In that sense, yes, sir. It would provide a facility for support; that is, when we say "support" we mean replenishment of stores, minor repairs, charging the batteries, and so forth.

Mr. MORSE. Is that sufficient for the purpose?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, it is sufficient to replenish and enable a submarine to go on, barring major mechanical malfunctions.

Mr. MORSE. Yes. When was the mooring of the submarine tender determined?

Colonel BRIDGE. Do you recall the exact date?

Commander HECKIN. [Security deletion.] Mid-September, I believe.

Colonel BRIDGE. And it stayed there, then, for a matter of a week.

Commander HECKIN. Until about [security deletion] September.

Colonel BRIDGE. And then it broke its moorings, and is now in another part of the harbor, simply tied up beside a pier.

Mr. MORSE. But this was at the particular mooring you speak of?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MORSE. Which was one that had been constructed in recent weeks for the purpose of accommodating, apparently, this particular sub tender?

Colonel BRIDGE. To the best of our knowledge, this is quite true, sir. The mooring blocks have been laid, yes.

Mr. MORSE. In other words, the full impact of this Soviet maneuver was known in [security deletion] mid-September.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes; as we now see it, the indications were present on or about that time, sir.

Mr. MORSE. What action has been taken—I presume it is your function to get this intelligence to the proper sources. Was the Secretary of Defense notified of this at the time, sir?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, I can't answer that question exactly; because of my own knowledge, I don't know.

Mr. MORSE. Could Colonel Freed help in that regard?

Colonel FREED. I don't know specifically that the Secretary of Defense was briefed. I do know that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was briefed on the developments as they occurred.

Mr. MORSE. And that would be this particular development on the [security deletion]?

Colonel FREED. The development on the [security deletion] would have been briefed probably on the [security deletion] and I am speaking in probabilities now, rather than personal knowledge, but I do know that the information is passed as it is gained, when we feel it is significant.

I would also like to point out that we are assuming, I think, a purpose here in this discussion which we are not really safe in assuming. The existence and the actions of this submarine tender in the harbor could have been a training exercise. They could be checking their capability to establish a facility. That is, a field- or a hasty-type installation.

Mr. MORSE. Sort of a long walk for that kind of exercise, isn't it?

Colonel FREED. Yes, sir; I would agree it is, but we have also—this is the third deployment to the Caribbean, that we have seen, and [security deletion] and this may be—

Mr. MORSE. Even without a major base?

Colonel FREED. Even without a major base. They have made these trips in the past, and that is perhaps a demonstration of their right to use the open seas.

Mr. MORSE. Yes.

Colonel FREED. And their ability to operate a distance from home.

Mr. MORSE. One final question, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Does the moored sub tender lend itself to any but the two interpretations that have been offered: [security deletion].

Colonel FREED. I offered that as a possibility.

Mr. MORSE. Are there any other possibilities?

Colonel BRIDGE. Oh, yes, sir, there are. It could just represent a mobility exercise, a deployment exercise on the part of these selected components of the Soviet Navy.

Mr. MORSE. I have a number of other questions, Mr. Chairman, but I will pass to some of the other members.

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, if I may, I would like to amend my remarks. I made a remark that was incorrect; Commander Heekin has called my attention to it. I said that the four buoys to which the tender was moored had been laid recently. I was in error there, because Commander Heekin says that the blocks for the buoys had been laid some time previously.

Mr. MORSE. I see. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Roybal.

Mr. ROYBAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry that I came in late, and didn't hear the briefing, but I would like to ask a question perhaps already answered, and that is what is the real threat to the United States in the event that a sub base is built in Cuba?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, I can answer that only in terms of the advantages that would accrue to the Soviets in their submarine operations, [security deletion] they would be able to increase the on-station time of any submarines that they would have in the Atlantic [security deletion].

You understand, I believe, sir, that any submarines that would operate in the Atlantic now have to rely on bases in the Soviet Union, either the Baltic or North Sea, for their support. This would move a support facility of some sort, of some capacity, some thousand miles or so closer to the—

Mr. ROYBAL. Well, it would of course expand the area of operation, would it not, and make it possible for them to review that facility within a 90-mile distance from the United States? But what specifically can result from that, if the base is, as I now understand it, just a limited base? If it is not a full nuclear base of any kind? Or am I correct in my assumption that it is not a full-grown base?

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir; by no means is it full grown by terms of submarine support bases such as we have, or such as the Soviets have in the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, as we stated in the briefing, that they have established—we say it is a facility, at Cienfuegos, which might support naval operations, including those of submarines. It is by no means to be construed, I think, as a formal full-scale base. It is a support facility, a possible support facility.

Mr. ROYBAL. Well, it is the concern not to be; let's take a good look at it, and perhaps react to it, so far as increasing it is concerned.

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, I am not qualified to address myself to the possible reactions of the administration, sir. From the standpoint of the intelligence watch that we maintain over the Soviets, any out-of-area movement on the part of the Soviet forces is an object of interest that is followed as closely as we can.

Mr. ROYBAL. I imagine that the idea of other Cuban missile crises looms in this particular publication. Just how much of a threat is it, and what is it that the administration is going to do, and what can we as Members of Congress do, to support whatever action is contemplated? Just where do we stand on this thing, outside of just getting information that they are building a facility in that area?

We don't know how big the facility is going to be; we don't know how much of a threat it is going to be, if it is built. Where do we stand, insofar as we, the members of this committee, and the administration, with regard to this problem?

Mr. PRENTICE. Mr. Chairman, may I say something on that, with your permission?

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly you may. I was about to add that these gentlemen are from the intelligence community, and probably wouldn't testify on policy, although they have got private opinions.

Mr. ROYBAL. I understand. I would like to get their opinions. They came from the intelligence community and they have no doubt made recommendations to the executive branch.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know if they can do that.

Mr. ROYBAL. Well, I am sure they do.

Mr. PRENTICE. I would just like to say it was my understanding that the hearing was purely an intelligence briefing, and that from the standpoint of the State Department, when we helped to arrange it, it was with that understanding that we would not get into policy questions, but would merely brief you on the intelligence situation.

Mr. FASCELL. Right, Well, let's stick to the intelligence and we will go after State on the policy.

Mr. ROYBAL. How long do we have to wait to go after State on the policy?

Mr. FASCELL. As soon as they decide they can come down here, Mr. Roybal. I don't have any control over it.

Mr. ROYBAL. These things are so vitally important that I think we ought to know the answer to some of these questions.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Roybal, we have asked them, and they are under wraps; they can't come down.

Mr. ROYBAL. I think unless we start getting some answers to these questions we are not getting any place.

Mr. FASCELL. We are doing the best we know how. We are trying to get, from the military intelligence community, the intelligence, the facts, if any, upon which recent actions allegedly have taken place—if indeed they have.

Mr. ROYBAL. But you agree, Mr. Chairman, it would be a lot better if we could just follow through on this thing, don't you?

Mr. FASCELL. We are going to try. Believe me. We have requests in to get all of the rest of the people who are involved with the decision

down here, so that we on the committee can understand what the process is that is taking place, and not rely on our own conjecture.

After all, we are just after the facts. If we can get them.

It would make it a lot easier if we could limit ourselves a little bit—in this briefing to the presentation of the facts as made by this team. That would help considerably.

I think you have to start here first. For example, we have established that there was no specific intelligence estimate on this particular thing, except for the movement of ships, which is routinely and automatically reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is an important fact.

MR. ROYBAL. Well, is it also not true that they really don't know just how big this is, and what the real situation is with regard to it?

Colonel FREED. I don't think you can say—excuse me. Go ahead.

Colonel BRIDGE. I am sorry. I will support what Colonel Freed started to say, sir. All we can say now as to the physical facilities that exist in Cienfuegos, we have informed the committee. The ships that were there, their positioning, and I might add here that there was miscellaneous movement by these ships in the harbor, [security deletion]. And the construction on the small island. It appears to be some sort of personnel and recreational facility. It was apparently accomplished in a period between roughly the middle of August and the middle of September.

MR. FASCELL. Mr. Hamilton.

MR. HAMILTON. What kind of construction activity is going on right now?

Colonel BRIDGE. None that we know of, sir.

MR. HAMILTON. How many men are there?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion.]

MR. HAMILTON. Is it capable at this point of taking a submarine and servicing the submarine?

Colonel BRIDGE. This is an inherent capability of any submarine tender, sir.

MR. HAMILTON. But there is no base there of any kind that can do that.

Colonel BRIDGE. There is not a shore base specifically for the servicing of Soviet submarines, no, sir. The only thing there that could help the submarine now is the tender.

Colonel FREED. Which is the tender in a protected harbor.

MR. HAMILTON. Right. Now, where is the home base of that tender?

Commander HEELIN. Northern Fleet.

MR. HAMILTON. Where is that fleet?

Commander HEELIN. Severomorsk; to the Severomorsk area in the upper part of the White Sea, which is that estuary in the southeastern corner of the Soviet Union.

MR. HAMILTON. How many ships have gone in there in the past months? How many Soviet ships?

Colonel BRIDGE. There have been a guided missile cruiser, a guided missile destroyer, two tankers, the buoy tender, the tug, and the sub tender. Those are the only ones we know of that have gone into Cienfuegos. There is another survey ship that is operating off the southern coast of Cuba at the present time.

Mr. HAMILTON. And that has all gone in the last month? Is that a sharp increase over previous Soviet naval activity in that area?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, the last known Soviet naval activity in the area, sir, occurred in May when—if I may consult my poop sheet here—

Mr. FASCELL. Surely.

Colonel BRIDGE (continuing). In May, between May 19 and June 3, a task force was active in the Caribbean. It consisted of a guided missile cruiser, a guided missile destroyer, two nuclear-powered submarines of the *Echo* class, two other submarines—what in the heck is an AS?

Commander HEEKIN. That was one *Echo* class submarine, two Fox-trot submarines, one submarine tender, a merchant tanker, intelligence collector. This was in this year's visit, May 9 to June 3, 1970.

Mr. HAMILTON. You don't know at this point that they are going to try to establish a submarine base?

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir; we do not have either a conclusive or a persuasive statement of what the future course of Soviet actions would be.

Mr. HAMILTON. There could be a great variety of reasons for this naval activity there, other than the establishment of a submarine base.

Colonel BRIDGE. There could be other reasons, yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. I don't know whether this question is legitimate or not, but how do we get our information on this? I know we have overflights. Do we have on the ground observation of any kind?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, we have given you a summary that is a synthesis of information from a great variety of sources. [Security deletion.]

Mr. HAMILTON. There is some talk about the building of a big highway down to this base.

Colonel BRIDGE. I read that in the paper, sir. I have no personal knowledge at this particular time of that, nor did I have time after I saw it in the paper this morning to check it out.

Mr. HAMILTON. We have no information about a highway.

Colonel BRIDGE. I do not personally have it at this time, and apologize to the committee for not being able to check this out.

Mr. HAMILTON. If this were not a submarine base, but merely a refueling or a refitting base of some kind, how much of a threat would that be to the United States? How concerned would we be about it?

Colonel BRIDGE. Again, sir; I can only answer your question in terms of what we know of the amount of support a submarine tender can furnish to submarines. The previous remark I made about restocking of the submarine, the adjustments, the minor repairs, the battery charging, the other services that a tender can render, would enable a Soviet submarine to increase its time on station, wherever that station might be, in the Atlantic, of course, since we are addressing the facility in Cuba.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, that wasn't my question, though, Colonel. My question is, suppose this is not a submarine base but a base for refitting and refueling Soviet naval ships. How much of a threat is that?

Colonel BRIDGE. Of course, basically, this would be a function of the type ship expressed in terms of a threat. It would simply permit more endurance of any selected Soviet force that they would choose to put in the Caribbean.

Mr. HAMILTON. I suppose this is out of your area, but I will ask the question, but do you know why our note to the Soviets was sent at this particular time?

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir; I do not. That is outside of my area of competence.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Fraser.

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Have we had any response from the Soviets?

Colonel BRIDGE. Again, sir; this is outside my area of competence.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know of any.

Mr. FRASER. The State Department doesn't know of any?

Mr. PRENTICE. Well, it is really not in my field, sir. But I know of no note or response.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, we will nail that down specifically when we get the State Department's presentation.

Mr. FRASER. Let me see if I can recapitulate what you have told us, as far as my understanding is concerned.

There were these ships which put into Cienfuegos. These included a submarine tender. They constructed a couple of wooden buildings that appear to be for housing personnel.

Colonel BRIDGE. These appear to be barracks type buildings. One is slightly in excess of a hundred feet long, the other is slightly less than a hundred feet long. There are, oh, five or six smaller structures, of an unidentified type. They have constructed a soccer field, and a basketball court, specifically, and they have rebuilt a smallish pier that apparently had fallen into some disrepair previously, on the north coast of the island.

Mr. FRASER. Does the pier have the capability of submarine tie-up?

Colonel BRIDGE. It is only 170 feet long at its longest dimension, sir. What would you say?

Commander HEKIN. No, the water is too shallow. It appears that they have enclosed a small area, perhaps, as a swimming area, or something like that. The pier would be too small, and the water is too shallow.

Mr. FRASER. When were those barracks buildings completed?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FRASER. Is that the first time a submarine tender has called at a port in Cuba?

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir. In 1969, a submarine tender, together with other naval elements, visited the Caribbean. They called at Havana, in this case. They also conducted some exercises in the Gulf of Mexico, and they called at ports in Martinique and Barbados. This past May the force that we had mentioned previously visited the Caribbean, and all of these units, including the submarine tender, visited Cienfuegos, and in addition to that, the guided missile cruiser and destroyer paid a visit to the Port of Havana.

Mr. FRASER. So in the preceding 18 months there were two other visits.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. At that time was there any basis for concluding that the Soviets might be building a submarine base, or a base capable of giving major support to submarines?

Colonel BRIDGE. Of my own knowledge, sir, I can't answer your question, because I was reassigned to the Washington area only within the past 6 weeks.

Colonel FREED, were you aware of any?

Colonel FREED. I know of no conclusion at that time that there was a submarine base anticipated. I am confident that there was not. I am talking about—

Mr. FRASER. In other words, at that time there was no foundation for assuming they were building a permanent submarine base?

Colonel FREED. That is correct, sir.

Mr. FRASER. What is different about this visit, now?

Colonel BRIDGE. It is basically the construction that occurred on Cayo Alcatraz.

Mr. FRASER. You mean these two wooden barracks buildings?

Colonel BRIDGE. The barracks buildings, the recreational areas, and so on.

If I may digress here for just a moment, our people place some significance on the fact that a soccer field was built there, and it quite obviously by all description is a soccer field, because soccer is not a sport that is common to Cuba. A baseball diamond, we would have said, you would expect to find baseball diamonds.

Mr. FRASER. So that one conclusion may be that the soccer field is for Soviet sailors.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir, that the indications point more to a possibility of utilization by Soviet personnel than by others.

Mr. FRASER. Now how do you explain away, then, these barracks, if you say there is no base being built?

Colonel BRIDGE. There is no really final agreed opinion on this. Anything I would say would be conjecture.

Colonel FREED. I would like to ask for clarification of that question.

Mr. FASCELL. Colonel Freed would like to have you clarify your question.

Mr. FRASER. Well, my question is, How do you explain the construction of these two barracks, if there is no base being constructed?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, a possible explanation, sir, would be that it was a facility for rest and recreation of crews of Soviet naval vessels that came into the harbor. We have no indication that this has actually been done but this is—I want to be careful about this—this is a possibility.

Mr. FRASER. Have they built any such structures anywhere else on the island?

Colonel BRIDGE. Not to my knowledge, sir.

Mr. FRASER. To your knowledge, were the materials that were used in this construction brought in by sea?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion].

There is one refugee report that was printed in a Cuban-language newspaper in Miami, in which a refugee reported that he had worked with a crew of unspecified size on some construction on Cayo Alcatraz.

Mr. FRASER. Do you have any report that the Soviets did the construction?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion].

Mr. FRASER. Now a submarine tender, as I understand it, could be used at sea, as well as in harbor, for servicing submarines.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. So that getting a place to anchor for the tender doesn't really add that much to its ability to service the submarines.

Colonel BRIDGE. Aside from the factors of a stable and protected anchorage, no, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Right. Now, if they were going to build a base, what I would understand by that would be that they would be building permanent facilities, or at least semipermanent facilities, which would be independent of the tender; that is, they would try to build docks and machine shops, and supply depots, and conceivably some kind of drydock. Am I wrong in what I would understand to be a permanent base? Would it be something of that kind?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, you are quite right in the type facilities that are involved in a major permanent naval base of any sort, yes, sir. Whether or not—as far as what is defined classically as a permanent naval base, yes. It would involve—

Mr. FRASER. I am trying to find out what it is that would augment the Soviet capability in an important and substantial way above that, or beyond that which they can get by just having access to a Soviet submarine tender. Because what would they have to do, in order to have substantially increased capability with respect to providing support to submarine forces?

Mr. FASCELL. One way to elicit that—

Mr. FRASER. Beyond the submarine, you know, beyond the services the submarine tender could provide.

Mr. FASCELL. One way to elicit that, Mr. Fraser, if I might suggest, is to get on record exactly what services a tender provides to a nuclear sub and then find out exactly what services would be on a land base that you can't get by tender. If you want to do it that way.

Mr. FRASER. Can you deal with the question as the chairman has phrased it, then?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, I can give you our general holding as regards the sort of facilities that a Soviet submarine tender is capable of providing. It can furnish, of course, provisions, restock the water supply, furnish miscellaneous stores to build up the stocks; again, it provides a berthing facility for the submarine; of course, it is capable of such services as charging batteries, giving communications support when the submarine is berthed alongside, and furnishing a wide variety of workshop services.

Mr. FRASER. Right.

Colonel BRIDGE. Repairs and adjustments to motors, for example.

Mr. FRASER. Right.

Colonel BRIDGE. Repairs to such pieces of gear as periscopes, and that sort of thing.

Mr. FRASER. Right.

Colonel BRIDGE. Checks and maintenance, and so on, for electronic equipment.

Mr. FRASER. Now, what would a land base have to have to offer services substantially in excess of those offered by a submarine tender?

Colonel BRIDGE. I can't respond to that quantitatively, sir, because the only upper limit is a facility that would be capable, such as for example, Pearl Harbor, of practically building a submarine. This involves an immense—

Mr. FRASER. I am sorry. Was there a floating drydock involved here somewhere?

Colonel BRIDGE. Not a Soviet drydock, no, sir. As a matter of fact, is there a floating drydock?

Commander HEKIN. Not in Cienfuegos. Any place on land that could do heavier machine work could, of course; warehouses could contain more stores, more spare parts, more equipment, and so forth. And then any type of drydock or something you could pull a submarine up on a way would be most helpful to get at the hull of a submarine, and so forth, if it was required. Right, now, they can't do that with a submarine tender.

Mr. FRASER. Now, is there any evidence of the construction of any of the elements that would be required to have this kind of augmented support facility?

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir; the only construction that we associate with that is that on Alcatraz.

Mr. FRASER. How did the report get circulated publicly that the Soviets may be building a base there? What was the foundation for that?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, I can't answer that question. I have no idea as to the—

Mr. FRASER. Was there any information that you forwarded to higher levels that formed a foundation for such a tentative conclusion?

Colonel BRIDGE. This would involve a conclusion on my part, sir, that I don't think I can make. I simply don't know.

Mr. FRASER. All right, but so far as you are concerned, you have not yet observed anything that would lend support to that conclusion?

Colonel BRIDGE. We have not observed any construction beyond what we have described here today. Certainly, we have not noted any major—

Mr. FRASER. The curious thing is that the whole country for a few days, and maybe still, believes that there is in progress a major new substantive facility in Cuba. They presumably think the information is grounded on something that you forwarded or the CIA forwarded to higher levels, but you are unable to enlighten us on that?

Colonel BRIDGE. As to the derivation of the press reports, I can't.

Mr. FASCELL. Let's pursue that for a moment, if we may.

As I understand it, the briefing which you presented to this subcommittee was prepared pursuant to the request of the subcommittee. Is that correct?

Colonel BRIDGE. That is right, for a summation of the activities in Cienfuegos.

Mr. FASCELL. Right; and I have also, under your previous testimony, to say that no specific intelligence estimate had gone forward in recent days as part of the regular normal operation with respect to this whole question of a sub base at Cienfuegos.

Colonel BRIDGE. As I recall, sir, the question was an estimate that had gone to the White House. Now—

Mr. FASCELL. Well, don't they all go there, eventually?

Colonel FREED. They receive our routine intelligence publications, yes, sir. They do receive our routine publications, and the information that the committee has been given has been contained in those publications.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Colonel FREED. So essentially, I would say they have just about the information that has been given here today.

Mr. FASCELL. Right; except in those estimates that went in on a daily basis.

Colonel FREED. I think we have probably a technical bind here on terminology. We don't consider these to be estimates. These are current intelligence reports.

Mr. FASCELL. All right; so the current intelligence reports go forward or are printed up, or whatever happens to them, on a daily basis?

Colonel FREED. On a daily basis.

Mr. FASCELL. I see; and an intelligence estimate in the trade is what? A request from the National Security Council?

Colonel FREED. It is a longer term evaluation of a body of intelligence information.

Mr. FASCELL. Submitted on request or regularly, or how?

Colonel FREED. Usually on request. There are certain estimates that are kept updated on a cyclic basis.

Mr. FASCELL. As I recall, because they went through all this in this committee some years ago with respect to this same problem of what the routing is for these things, the Joint Chiefs of Staff get all copies of all current intelligence reports and all estimates. Am I correct?

Colonel FREED. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. The National Security Council gets them all?

Colonel FREED. I would be reluctant to say all. They get most.

Mr. FASCELL. They get all the estimates.

Colonel FREED. All of them; yes, sir. All of the national estimates.

Mr. FASCELL. That is what I mean.

Colonel FREED. All of the national estimates.

Mr. FASCELL. Now, what is the title or what is the name of the body of fact that goes to the President every day, which is a distillation of the current intelligence on any problem?

Colonel FREED. Sir, that question would have to be addressed to the White House staff.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree, but your input to whatever that document is called comes either by way of your current intelligence reports on a daily basis or estimates when called for.

Colonel FREED. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. And what we are saying today, then, is with respect to this problem, on the Cienfuegos situation, all of these matters have been reported on a daily basis by the military intelligence community.

Colonel FREED. By the community, and not—

Mr. FASCELL. And there has been no request for a special estimate on the subject. This briefing came at the request of this subcommittee.

Colonel FREED. I will have to qualify that, sir, and say to my knowledge, and I would also qualify it to say I think I would have knowledge.

Mr. FASCELL. Right. I understand.

Well, this is the way we want to do it. Believe me, that I am not interested in just simply getting the facts of the situation. All of us have our own opinions about what happened and why it happened and all that. That is something else again. We will get into that another time, but on this particular subject, with respect to the knowledge of

the intelligence community, its estimates and the manner in which it operates, it is fundamental to what we are going to do later. Whether we agree or disagree with what happened later at the Department of Defense, the White House, or the State Department. Those are separate matters. This is vital, as far as I am concerned, and I am sure my colleagues feel the same way, or they wouldn't have interrogated so carefully. I know you feel that way, or you wouldn't respond so carefully. So we are not really trying to strap you into anything.

By the way, what instructions are you under, if any, in coming before this committee?

Colonel BRIDGE. The general instruction to me was to give you a summation of the information that we have on the Soviet activities at Cienfuegos.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, you are not under any restraint of any kind?

Colonel BRIDGE. I am under no restraint.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that true for you, Commander?

Commander HEekin. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I am delighted to hear it, because I can't think of any reason why you should be.

Colonel FREED. He is the junior member of the party, sir; he is sitting in between two senior representatives.

Mr. FASCELL. I see. You guys are holding his hand.

Mr. HAMILTON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly.

Mr. HAMILTON. When you make your reports, and I am not just sure to whom it is made, but in this instance, did you report that in your judgment, one of the possibilities here was construction of a submarine base?

Colonel BRIDGE. A submarine facility. Now I have to be very careful about this, sir, because "base" has so many different connotations, they range all the way, as I said, from something in the order of a naval gun factory, which is a naval support base—

Mr. HAMILTON. But your report, on the activity here, your intelligence report—

Mr. FASCELL. Now excuse me. Let's see if we can get the same language.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right, I understand.

Mr. FASCELL. On the technical document.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I am trying to find out, Mr. Chairman, where the concept of submarine base first arose. Did that arise with your report?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, we described—to the best of my knowledge, again—our provisional conclusions from what we saw, in terms of the establishment of a facility.

Mr. HAMILTON. Submarine facility?

Colonel BRIDGE. Which could be used for support of naval craft, including submarines.

Mr. HAMILTON. That was in the report which you passed on.

Colonel BRIDGE. That is the language that has been used, yes, sir. You say "the report." Mind you, we have said that the day-by-day accumulation of information on this was presented in incremental parts, day by day.

Mr. HAMILTON. Presented to whom? The Chief of Staff?

Colonel BRIDGE. In our case it was circulated to various customers in the Defense Department, including Joint Chiefs of Staff, yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Now to pursue your question, Lee, which is a very good one, you would have to go back to find out exactly when the defense intelligence community, in their daily current digest, or whatever the title of that thing is—what is the name of it again?

Colonel BRIDGE. There are no real titles.

Colonel FREED. There are several versions of it, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. What do you call it, so I can identify it and speak about it? I don't want to keep saying "that piece of paper," you know.

Colonel FREED. Current intelligence reports.

Mr. FASCELL. Current intelligence reports. You have to go back and find out in their current intelligence reports exactly what dates and what language they used when they first ran this past everybody, because this is, you know, the old protection game. Everybody got it, so let's get it on paper. They can't ever come back and nail them. So they did it early. Didn't you?

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, when did that first appear in these reports? They ought to be able to respond to that question.

Mr. FASCELL. Oh, they certainly can.

Colonel BRIDGE. I can't give you an exact date or exact language, sir, because this would require a precision of knowledge that I don't feel that—

Mr. HAMILTON. Perhaps you can supply it for the committee.

Mr. FASCELL. Perhaps you can supply it for the record. But let's try it another way. From what did you prepare the briefing?

Colonel BRIDGE. There was a series of reports, sir, that go all the way back to the first time that we saw the Soviet ships in the Atlantic.

Mr. FASCELL. OK; then what you are saying now, as I understand it, is the intelligence community, particularly DIA.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Right?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. That you have certain subject areas or activities which are kept on the basis different than the current intelligence reports, and are updated constantly. Is that correct?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, any continuing situation is updated as long as it is of interest or significance or even in those cases where we can't figure out what is going on.

Mr. FASCELL. All right. Now, is that data locked in your case—I mean, you are in the Soviet-country area. Do you have a special thing on Cuba, where you have a chronology, in which you keep everything, by movement, by date, so that you know exactly where you are at any given moment?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. What do you call it?

Colonel BRIDGE. This is part of the normal functioning of the intelligence analyst. We don't call it anything, really.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it just a file?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir; it is an analyst's working file.

Mr. FASCELL. Analyst's working file on Cuba or Soviet action in Cuba, or what?

Colonel BRIDGE. In this particular case, sir, I must explain I am advertised as the Chief of the Soviet Office, which I am. Because of the fact that this involved exclusively Soviet naval units, as far as we knew, Soviet personnel, it came under the aegis of my office to watch, and we watched every scrap of information we could.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, you have been doing that all along, have you not?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. At least for the 6 months you have been there.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir; we would do the same—6 weeks, sir—we would do the same thing in the case of any other activity if it was—

Mr. FASCELL. Right. So what you did was you went back to this analyst's working file and you prepared your briefing for this committee? Right?

Colonel BRIDGE. That is right.

Colonel FREED. Exactly.

Mr. FASCELL. You didn't go back and dredge out 365 days of current intelligence reports to bring us.

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir; we put this together on the basis of the complete body of information.

Mr. FASCELL. OK; you see, that is important.

Mr. FRASER. In the normal course of surveillance of the island, how often would you be photographing this area?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, I frankly don't know.

Mr. FRASER. Do you know if it would be 30 days, 60 days? You have no information on that?

Colonel BRIDGE. The scheduling of this type of technical resource is outside my department.

Mr. FRASER. Well, but you must have some notion of how often you are going to get inputs.

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, I would be actually making a statement based on someone else's business, which I would prefer not to do.

Mr. FRASER. Well, let me ask you a related question. To your knowledge, has there been any alteration or change in the pattern of flights on account of the possibility of something emerging here?

Colonel BRIDGE. There has been an increase in surveillance and generally following the—well, actually, following our knowledge that these units had entered Cienfuegos Harbor. I am unable to quantify that.

Mr. FRASER. Well—

Colonel BRIDGE. But the same thing occurred, I understand, on the previous visits, too.

Mr. FRASER. On the other two visits.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir, because this is the sort of thing that we must watch—any unusual out-of-area activity on the part of any Soviet forces: air, sea, ground.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Surely. Fire away.

Mr. BINGHAM. I wonder if any of you gentlemen could comment on whether Cienfuegos would be a logical location for a submarine

facility, in view of the fact that it is on the south coast of Cuba, rather than the north coast?

Colonel BRIDGE. I could only address myself, sir, to that in terms of the fact that it is a good harbor. It is a sheltered harbor, and the geographical distances involved between the south coast and the north coast are really in the general sense not very significant.

Mr. BINGHAM. Are there not comparable harbors on the north coast, aside from Havana?

Colonel BRIDGE. Havana itself.

Mr. BINGHAM. Looking at the map, it seems like it would be a strange place to put a facility that would presumably be servicing submarines to go north.

Commander HEEKIN. There are several other ports on the north coast that this same setup or facility could occur in. However, Cienfuegos has free and more unlimited access to it for ships coming from the Caribbean, than those would in the passage. St. Nicholas Channel, and so forth, too close to the coast, perhaps. And more maneuvering room, south of Cuba, looking at it in a naval operating sense.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. How far is Cienfuegos from Guantanamo?

Commander HEEKIN. Almost at the other end of the island. Close to 350 miles, I think.

Mr. FASCELL. What is the largest town next to Cienfuegos? The bay?

Colonel BRIDGE. The town is Cienfuegos. It is right on the shore of the bay.

Mr. FASCELL. Right on the shore of the bay. How big—

Colonel BRIDGE. I don't know the size. I am sorry, sir; I don't know the size.

Mr. FASCELL. Is that the only town on the bay?

Colonel BRIDGE. Except for a few villages, yes, sir. It is the only town of any consequence.

Mr. FASCELL. Now there is no major road going to Cienfuegos Bay other than to the town of Cienfuegos. Is that correct?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, I don't believe so, but I am sorry I didn't check the highway access.

Mr. FASCELL. How big is Alcatraz Island?

Colonel BRIDGE. Oh, it is a tiny little thing. Do you have any idea how big it is, a mile and a half long?

Commander HEEKIN. Yes.

Colonel BRIDGE. About 600 yards long by perhaps 125 yards wide. It is a rather irregular shaped thing.

Mr. FASCELL. How far is the island from the town?

Colonel BRIDGE. Check your chart there, will you?

Commander HEEKIN. A mile and a half. South of Cienfuegos City.

Mr. FASCELL. And obviously intelligence people put some weight on the fact that the Russians would build any kind of a facility, whatever it is, whether it is temporary barracks, or a soccer field.

I made notes, immediately on the basketball courts and soccer field, which to me indicates all I need to know, but what is that estimate? I mean, why didn't they go into town? What is the intelligence community telling our people on why the Russians didn't just R. & R. their men in town?

Colonel BRIDGE. Honestly, sir, we haven't addressed that.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, how many people will be held in these facilities, according to your estimate?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion] we have really no clear idea of the ultimate [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. Do you know whether or not it is true that there are no Cubans on that island?

Colonel BRIDGE. I have no way of knowing.

Mr. FASCELL. You have no way of knowing that. Well, you did say you had a Cuban refugee who worked on the island? And I was amazed at his speed in getting into the United States.

Colonel BRIDGE. He said he had worked there.

Mr. FASCELL. He said he had worked there. Big difference.

[Security deletion.]

Colonel BRIDGE. We assume not.

Mr. FASCELL. You assume not, because there wasn't any reason for them.

Now there is nothing being built around the island in terms of any facilities, in terms of a seawall, piers, lights, or anything that would indicate any naval—

Colonel BRIDGE. Beyond what we have described, sir, we know of nothing.

Mr. FASCELL. Right. And there is nothing anywhere else in Cienfuegos Bay, is there?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, there is a fairly substantial commercial port. There is a small Cuban naval installation, on an island fairly close to the town.

Now I say "installation," rather than base, because that is what it is. It supports the gunboats, patrol craft. Anything bigger that you know of?

Commander HEekin. No. There are piers in the city, north of the city, that the Soviet ships are tied up to.

Colonel BRIDGE. These are commercial piers, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. So Cienfuegos could lend itself reasonably, with some small improvements, to a relatively isolated place for land-based logistical support for Soviet combatant naval units. Correct?

Colonel FREED. Could.

Colonel BRIDGE. It could.

Mr. FASCELL. And that is the big thing everybody is watching. Is that correct?

Colonel FREED. That is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. The bay is there, so it is a potential base, just like the ones up on the north coast are potential bases, but the fact is that they put in here.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir; you are right.

Mr. FASCELL. And the fact is that they have made it possible for a submarine tender to tie up, and otherwise, to service in protected waters.

Colonel BRIDGE. That capability exists, yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And they brought in four barges, or three barges?

Colonel BRIDGE. Two barges.

Mr. FASCELL. From two different directions?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, not exactly, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Both barges came the same way?

Colonel BRIDGE. They were transported from the Soviet port to Havana on the deck of the LST.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Colonel BRIDGE. They were probably offloaded and put into the water in Havana, and then they were towed around the western part of the island, because they were observed in tow.

Mr. FASCELL. Now what is the estimate as to why the Russians went to all that trouble?

Colonel BRIDGE. There are many, many types of harbor support barges.

Mr. FASCELL. It wouldn't be the admiral's fishing barge, though.

Colonel BRIDGE. Not from the descriptions we have, no, sir. Nothing that size.

Mr. FASCELL. Now the sub tender was in place there to service the submarine for about a week. Is that correct?

Colonel BRIDGE. It was moored. North of Alcatraz, yes, sir, for about a week.

Mr. FASCELL. Right, and what happened during that week?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Where was the sub?

Colonel BRIDGE. We have no indication that any submarines have entered Cienfuegos on this current go-round of activity.

Mr. FASCELL. But we are looking for one any minute, right?

Colonel BRIDGE. We are observing as carefully as we can.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes. Well, there wouldn't be any reason to go to all that trouble unless they are going to service something.

Colonel BRIDGE. But mind you, the sub tender has broken its moorings now, and the last word was it was back tied up alongside one of the commercial piers.

Mr. FASCELL. And what estimates have you made or evaluations with respect to what the Soviets are up to? For example, have you stated that it is your evaluation that the Soviets are in the process of establishing air and naval land-based logistical support? Have you gone that far yet?

Colonel BRIDGE. No, sir. We have not. The question of trying to assess the implications of what we have seen and described to you in longer-range terms is still very much under consideration, and analysis is progressing.

Mr. FASCELL. I meant to ask the question. Thank you for offering it to me. I think somebody else did ask about how long a tender can stay on a station.

Commander HEEKIN. They usually stay about—the ones we see in the Mediterranean—about 6 months.

Mr. FASCELL. They can go into the Atlantic, for example, with tenders, on a 30-day basis, and that is primarily what? Servicing personnel? What is the time limitation with respect to a submarine on station in the high seas serviced from a tender? You said it was [security deletion] days in the high seas, but if she is—

Colonel BRIDGE. The [security deletion] days, sir, are the general figure for the time on station of a submarine that comes from a Soviet port.

Mr. FASCELL. Right, with no tender.

Colonel BRIDGE. No replenishment during that time. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. But if she gets a tender, either way, either on the high seas or from a bay, why, then it changes to about [security deletion] days.

Colonel BRIDGE. In the case of a support facility at Cienfuegos, it could extend this [security deletion].

Mr. FASCELL. And if it comes from a tender, then the tender would have to change approximately every 6 months.

Colonel BRIDGE. This is a figure contingent on its activity during that 6 months. Of course, it could very well service a lot of submarines in a fairly short period of time and go back.

Mr. FASCELL. Of course, that is the cheapest way to service them, isn't it, on a temporary basis?

Commander HEEKIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Move them in the bay like this.

Now if the Soviets wanted to proceed to establish their military posture on a permanent basis, and to raise even further political implications than they now have, all they have got to do is start pouring some concrete. Isn't that right?

Colonel BRIDGE. I would say that this would cause considerably more—

Mr. FASCELL. I mean you have changed your estimate immediately.

Colonel BRIDGE. Oh, absolutely, sir, at any indication of major shore establishment.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know how this was done. Frankly, I am not sure yet. That is one of the things we are going to find out. I think it was leaked to some reporter on the New York Times—but one day what was happening was deemed important enough for the United States to allegedly have a warning issued by the President of the United States to the Soviet Government. On the next day Raul Roa comes out and holds his hand out to the United States again and says, "Well, we are ready to have bilateral talks with respect to the return of hijackers." What is your own estimate on that?

Colonel BRIDGE. Sir, in order to answer that question, I would have to possess knowledge of the rationale involved in decisionmaking processes at these levels which I do not possess.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes. Well, where does that kind of decision and rationale take place? In your shop? I am trying to find out who sends these opinions over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and how they eventually work their way over to Henry Kissinger's shop, the National Security Council. I mean, DIA has some intelligence evaluation input, doesn't it?

Colonel FREED. Yes, sir. That is true.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You don't let CIA do it all.

Colonel FREED. That is absolutely right, sir. On the other hand, we don't attempt to tell our consumers how to use the intelligence.

Mr. FASCELL. No, I understand that, you just give them your best judgment based on the facts? Right? That is all I am asking for.

Colonel BRIDGE. Right.

Mr. FASCELL. To me it doesn't look like a coincidence. I just wondered how the military rated it, or whether they would rate it at all.

Colonel FREED. Whether we see an interrelationship between the offer to exchange?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, sure, right, and the fact that we issued a big blast about a sub base in Cuba.

Colonel FREED. I frankly, personally, can see no relationship between the two events.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I can as a politician—

Colonel FREED. A different viewpoint.

Mr. FASCELL. Which translated into the English language means "Even the Cubans play politics."

What is the total Russian presence in the Caribbean as of now?

Commander HEEKIN. They have a submarine tender, and a tug and a naval oiler and a surveying ship. Those are the only military ships.

Mr. FASCELL. Is it your evaluation that the Russians are going to keep sending units of their combatant forces to the Caribbean and Cuba?

Colonel BRIDGE. I can only answer that in terms of the historical precedent. They have done it three times in the past 18 months. It would be unwise, I think, to say that they would not continue.

Mr. FASCELL. So we are all looking for them to keep it up. I mean, that is a logical conclusion, is it not?

Colonel FREED. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, the reason I ask that, of course, is obvious. I would draw that conclusion as a layman but I am interested in knowing how the intelligence community views it.

Colonel FREED. I think you can draw that conclusion safely, unless there is some change in their logic which would not be apparent to us; they would probably continue on a periodic basis, at least.

Mr. FASCELL. How about supposing that they put enough pressure on us to make us think about pulling some units out of the Mediterranean?

Colonel BRIDGE. I couldn't comment on that, sir, because this would involve, again, judgments that are beyond my capability.

Mr. FASCELL. But has that been looked at?

Colonel BRIDGE. I haven't the faintest idea, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You don't know. No estimate has been made on that. At least not in your shop, and we don't have any intelligence on that, either. Maybe they will play it both ways. Maybe they will keep us busy in the Mediterranean and they will just keep pumping a few ships into the Caribbean; and the Navy is mighty fast on their feet, I must say. Admiral Smith at Key West said, "The Russians have got to do something with their navy."

This is a newspaper account of what he said:

Admiral Smith, speaking at his first news conference since arriving in the area to take over command of the Key West Forces, stressed that the Russian naval activity in the Caribbean is not of a nature to become alarmed about. He tossed out the chip that "The Russians have a large naval force, and have to do something with their ships," and went on in the rest of the interview to laugh the rest of the whole operation out of existence.

I thought that was a pretty good gambit on the part of the Navy.

Well, let's get back to some reports we have about facilities being installed by the Russians for 130 medium-sized ships, a floating dock, repair shops, and a long-range communications center in Havana. Is that correct?

Colonel BRIDGE. We have no information that would support that, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. You have no information to support that?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, they are there. It is reported that 30 Soviet fishing trawlers operate regularly out of Havana, and one of these trawlers tried to pick up the debris of a Poseidon test missile in August. Do we have any intelligence on these trawlers?

Commander HEKIN. Those are the intelligence collectors.

Mr. FASCELL. What is that, the *Omega* class?

Commander HEKIN. That basic one, whose name is the *Lapder*. I forget the class. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. No. Well, where do they operate from?

Commander HEKIN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. [Security deletion.]

Commander HEKIN. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. So it is incorrect to lump them together as fishing trawlers, as such.

Commander HEKIN. It is, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. They don't even look the same, and they are not configured the same.

Commander HEKIN. They are the same class of ship, but of course they have much more, they have intelligence collecting, the electronic communications, intelligence collecting equipment that the trawler does not possess.

Mr. FASCELL. Now from time to time we in this committee have had reports of increased Soviet military activity in Cuba both in terms of the introduction of new personnel and the terms of the introduction of new material identified as Russian, photographed, seen, painted, sworn to under oath.

What is your intelligence on that?

Colonel BRIDGE. Well, again, sir, I can only say that in my rather limited tour in time, I have not addressed myself to the problem of the overall equipment of the Cuban force.

Mr. FASCELL. I see. Would that be in the same analyst's working file as all this other information?

Colonel FREED. No, sir, I would like to explain something. A very unfortunate circumstance from our standpoint. We are speaking now of the people who deal with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's operations.

Mr. FASCELL. And not Cuban?

Colonel FREED. Not Cuban. The Cuban people are not presently—

Mr. FASCELL. I understand, but how about the Soviets in Cuba? Aren't they Soviet?

Colonel BRIDGE. This all falls under the heading of the military aid program, sir, and it would be handled by another office.

Colonel FREED. It would be handled by another office. Excuse me. Soviet military aid program to Cuba is in a different office than Soviet military operations.

Colonel FREED. This office that the Colonel is responsible for is monitoring the presence of the Soviet Fleet wherever it is.

Mr. FASCELL. That is just the fleet?

Colonel FREED. A strategic force, and we are dealing with the fleet.

Mr. FASCELL. Does that include airplanes, too?

Colonel BRIDGE. Absolutely, Soviet aircraft, military transports or activities outside of the area, we follow them until the question can be resolved.

Mr. FASCELL. Do the Soviets have land-based logistical support for long-range aircraft in Cuba, such as the TU-95, and any and all of their now modern long-range aircraft?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. Well, there are airfields that can take the aircraft.

Colonel BRIDGE. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And the aircraft can be serviced at these Cuban airfields?

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir. They can be serviced in a rather elementary sense. Now any major—

Mr. FASCELL. Well, they can't repair them. What do they do, run the time on the engine? They can't do that.

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. All right, but they could stage in Cuba. That is the whole thing.

Colonel BRIDGE. Oh, yes, you can stage on any airfield that will accommodate an aircraft. It is simply a function of what you want to do and how many support aircraft you want to put in with it.

Mr. FASCELL. I see. Is it your estimate that that is what the Russians have been building up to, because of their flights, of the TU-95 and because of their staging flights on the way to Peru?

Colonel BRIDGE. [Security deletion.]

Mr. FASCELL. I know, we just couldn't figure out why they would stop in Cuba on the way to Peru when you don't have to. That is the reason I asked the question. We just didn't know.

Okay. I guess we had better go answer this rollcall, gentlemen.

I do want to ask a question, because it goes to the heart of this. This New York Times story on September 26 indicates the intelligence disclosure from some source, which preceded by 1 day the White House statement which came afterward.

Now specifically, how did this intelligence get released?

Colonel FREED. Is that the Sulzberger article?

Mr. FASCELL. No, this is the Robert M. Smith article.

Colonel BRIDGE. I have not read that particular article, sir, and I feel that I couldn't comment on the genesis of any newspaper article.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes. Well, I can understand that. It sure isn't customary, is it, to disclose the intelligence first, and then have the White House make a statement afterward. You don't even have to be an intelligence expert to answer that one.

Well, we will be interested, of course, in knowing whether or not this was a deliberate policy decision, and why DOD was chosen to make the statement, and all that kind of thing, but that will come from other people.

I thank you for coming. We do have a lot of other questions, and I don't know what we can do about it, since we have got to answer a rollcall. We had better go catch that first, but suffice it to say if we need to we will ask you to come back. If we plow up anything else that we think has to be corrected on the record, we will come back to you for that purpose.

Colonel BRIDGE. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And we want to thank you very much for cooperating with us so promptly.

Colonel FREED. Sir, this may—

Mr. FASCELL. And taking the trouble to prepare a special briefing for us. We really appreciate that. Just like you, we can't take any chances, either, and if we are involved in something we want to know exactly what it is.

Colonel FREED. Well, I hope it has been useful.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, it has been. It has been extremely useful, as you can tell from the series of questions that have been asked. A lot of people got answers to things that were troubling them, specifically about the seriousness of the situation.

Thank you very much.

Colonel FREED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1970

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in room H-227, the Capitol, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will please come to order.

Gentlemen, I appreciate your coming here this afternoon, and to start this hearing off, I will ask Marian Czarnecki, staff consultant to the Foreign Affairs Committee, to brief us quickly on the chronology of events, so that we can have in our mind the background of where we are, before we go any further.

STATEMENT OF MARIAN A. CZARNECKI, STAFF CONSULTANT, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Mr. CZARNECKI. At 12:30 p.m. on Friday, September 25, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Friedheim, in responding to press inquiries, said that—and this is a quote—“There are some new naval facilities in the Cienfuegos area within the past few months.” (See exhibit 1, p. 30.)

He indicated that the Defense Department was watching the matter carefully, and he added, “We do not know exactly what the facilities intend to be, nor whether they are intended to be bases. We are not sure that they are building a submarine support facility.”

He then talked about the movement of various Soviet ships in the Caribbean.

Mr. CULVER. Excuse me. We are not sure? Is that what you said?

Mr. CZARNECKI. Yes, sir; I was quoting Mr. Friedheim.

On the same day, at a White House briefing, an unnamed official who was briefing the press on the President's trip to Europe, which was to begin the following day, made some further comments on this subject. He said, according to one newspaper report which I shall quote since we have been unable to obtain the transcript of his remarks, “We are watching the development of Soviet naval activity, and of possible construction there,” meaning on Cuba. “We are watching it very closely. The Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness.” (See exhibit 2, p. 32.)

The unnamed official then went on to quote the following passage from a speech of President Kennedy of November 20, 1962:

“ * * * if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.”

(For full text of President Kennedy's press conference, see exhibit 3, p. 33.)

On September 28, in a speech delivered in the House of Representatives, you, Mr. Chairman, urged the executive branch to “act promptly and decisively to nip this new Soviet challenge in the bud.” In an exchange with you, Chairman Mendel Rivers, of the House Armed Services Committee, said that he had known about “the proposed [Soviet] base for some time * * *.” (See exhibit 4, p. 37.)

On September 30, various newspaper articles referred to Soviet construction activity on Cuba. (See exhibit 5, p. 38.) One article in the New York Times, with a Moscow dateline, stated that the “Soviet Union scoffed today at the White House expression of concern about possible Soviet construction of a strategic submarine base in Cuba.” This reaction was not attributed to any Soviet official by name—only to an “authoritative source.” (See exhibit 6, p. 40.)

On the same day, the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs held an executive hearing on the situation. The subcommittee requested the presence of State Department policy officials, as well as of Defense Department intelligence briefers. The briefers were asked to bring along with them photographs and any other evidence of the developments in Cuba which led to the September 25 Defense and White House statements. (For an account of the hearing by Reuters, see exhibit 7, p. 42.)

The State Department was under constraint not to testify, and the Defense Intelligence Agency was designated as the one to brief the subcommittee. The briefing took place, and, during the briefing, the chairman reiterated the subcommittee's request for a further meeting with policymaking officials.

We were advised at that point that policymaking officials could not appear before the subcommittee until the President returned from Europe, and the State and Defense Departments received further instructions on this matter.

When the President returned, we renewed our request, first, to Mr. Colgate Prentice, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; then to Mr. David Abshire, the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; and, finally, to the Defense Department. The request to the Defense Department specifically mentioned the missing part of the information requested earlier: namely, the photographs and someone to interpret them.

As of yesterday, the subcommittee did not receive the names of any executive branch witnesses.

Mr. KAZEN. When did you make the request?

Mr. CZARNECKI. The request was made originally around September 26. It was renewed about 10 days later, when the President returned from Europe.

Mr. KAZEN. What I was trying to get at was how long has it been since you renewed your request? How long ago was it that you renewed the request?

Mr. CZARNECKI. It was either on Monday or Tuesday of last week. I do not have my notes with me.

Mr. KAZEN. So it has been a week?

Mr. CZARNECKI. Yes, sir.

On October 10, some American newspapers reported that the official Soviet Government newspaper, *Izvestia*, "firmly denied United States allegations that Russia may be building a submarine base on Cuba."

On the preceding day, Secretary of State William Rogers, in the course of a press conference, said that the United States had "very serious questions about their [Soviet] intentions." (See exhibit 8, p. 42.)

Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Melvin Laird, in reply to questions posed by the press, made a number of additional statements about the situation in Cuba. He stated, and I quote: "We have no evidence that a submarine of the Polaris-type has used any base in Cuba, and particularly this particular naval base"—meaning Cienfuegos. He reiterated that the Defense Department was watching the matter closely and he said that previously the Defense Department has made it clear that there is evidence of naval base construction going forward in Cuba, but that the Defense Department does not have evidence that a Polaris-type submarine has been used at that particular facility.

The Secretary went on to explain that the United States would view with grave concern the establishment of a strategic submarine base in Cuba, and he pointed out that such an event, such a development, would change what he called the entire balance, meaning the entire power or strategic balance, at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were going forward with the SALT talks. (See exhibit 9, p. 44.)

After the Secretary's statement yesterday, I had a further call from Mr. Abshire, the Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations in the Department of State, who indicated that the matter of Soviet naval construction in Cuba was so delicate that high Department officials felt that this was not the appropriate time to discuss the matter with a congressional committee. He then indicated that he would call the chairman and talk to him about this matter.

At that point, I put in a call to the Defense Department, to find out whether they had the names of the witnesses that were to come today. I was told that they did not, and that they were discussing the matter with the Department of State.

This morning, the newspapers carried a statement which appeared in the Soviet press, an official statement of the Soviet Government, which read as follows:

Tass, the Soviet news service, has been authorized to state that the Soviet Union has not built and is not building its military base in Cuba, and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962.

(See exhibit 10, p. 45.)

Just before noon, or just around noon, I had a call from General Lawrence who is in charge on the military side of the liaison for the Department of Defense. He said that he was surprised to see an announcement in the Congressional Record that there was going to be a subcommittee meeting today, because it was his impression that the meeting had been canceled.

I told him that I had no knowledge of any cancellation, and that I had just seen the chairman 15 minutes previously and he did not instruct me to call either Department and say that there was no requirement for witnesses. I asked at that point whether I should interpret General Lawrence's statement that no Defense Department witnesses will be appearing this afternoon, with the photographs requested more than 2 weeks ago by the subcommittee.

He said that my interpretation was correct, that they would not appear.

At 12:30 today the Department of State and the Department of Defense issued simultaneous statements indicating that four Soviet ships—an LST, a submarine tender, a rescue tug and a destroyer—have left Cienfuegos in Cuba. (See exhibit 11, p. 48.)

The statement, as we received it over the telephone, also said that the United States considers the TASS article to be a positive step, and that the United States will continue to watch the situation in Cuba closely. (See exhibit 12, p. 48.)

That, in brief, is the chronology.

(The exhibits referred to by Mr. Czarnecki follow:)

EXHIBIT 1

EXCERPTS OF REMARKS MADE IN RESPONSE TO PRESS INQUIRIES BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JERRY W. FRIEDHEIM ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1970

Mr. Friedheim made these general points in response to press inquiries at 12:30 Friday, September 25. This is not a verbatim transcript and must not be used as direct quotes. The paper is prepared from notes which contain the sense of the answers only.

We have had several inquiries during recent days and today concerning what the Soviets are doing in Cienfuegos, also if their activities have had anything to do with submarines. We know that Soviet ships and aircraft have made several visits to Cienfuegos in the past few months. There have been three Soviet fleet visits to Cuba in the last year, July-August 1969, May-June 1970 and this month. We are keeping a close watch on the current Soviet activities. They are under close surveillance. As you know, in Mr. Henkins speech last Monday, he said that the Soviet Union is demonstrating an apparent intention to achieve a capability for sustained surface and submarine operations in the Caribbean, close by our shores.

We have seen the printed reports that the Soviets are conducting activities in Cienfuegos in association with submarine bases. There are some new naval facilities in the Cienfuegos area within the past few months. Some of the Soviets' support ships have visited there. There are no submarines there at the present time. We do not know exactly what the facilities intend to be nor whether they are intended to be bases. We are not sure that they are building a submarine support facility. We fly U-2 flights and still do. The LST we have talked about in recent weeks carried three barges which were off loaded, possibly at Havana and towed as you know to Cienfuegos. We listed for you yesterday the ships in Cienfuegos. We are following very closely these developments, but we can't be sure yet what they can be.

Question: What can you tell us about the sub bases in Cuba?

Answer: I can't add anything more to what we have said.

Question: Can you address the significance of Russia having a sub base in Cuba?

Answer: No, I prefer not to address that.

Question: Is that sub tender at Cienfuegos?

Answer: A couple moved and a couple are still there. The LST and submarine repair ship left Cienfuegos and are east of Great Inagua, northeast of Cuba's eastern tip. Remaining in Cienfuegos are the salvage and rescue tugs.

EXHIBIT 2

[From the New York Times, Sept. 26, 1970]

U.S. WARNS SOVIET NOT TO BUILD BASE FOR SUBS IN CUBA

INTELLIGENCE INDICATES IT MAY BE CONSTRUCTING FACILITY—1962 WARNING
RECALLED

Data Remain Unclear

Efforts at Cienfuegos being watched closely, perhaps with U-2 spy planes

(By Robert M. Smith)

Washington, Sept. 25—The White House, recalling the Moscow-Washington understanding that ended the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, warned the Soviet Union today against building a strategic submarine base in Cuba.

The White House warning followed a disclosure that the United States had intelligence data indicating that the Russians might be building facilities at Cienfuegos, on Cuba's south coast, to support the operations of their submarines.

The Administration official, who asked reporters to identify him as a White House source without using his name, said that the Government was watching developments in Cuba carefully but that it was not yet in a position to say what the Russians were building.

KENNEDY SPEECH RECALLED

"We are watching the development of Soviet naval activity and of possible construction there," the official said. "We are watching it very closely. The Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness."

The White House official then turned to a quotation on a piece of paper he had brought with him to the briefing—a briefing that had been arranged to provide reporters with background on President Nixon's forthcoming trip to Europe.

The quotation was from a speech by President Kennedy on Nov. 2, 1962, at the conclusion of the crisis created by the Soviet attempt to introduce medium- and intermediate-range missiles into Cuba. The President said:

POLICY STILL THE SAME

"If all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean."

After reading that sentence, the official said: "The operative part, of course is 'If all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future.' This, of course, remains the policy of this Government."

The official appeared to be reminding the Soviet Union of the understanding reportedly reached in 1962. In his speech, President Kennedy defined the commitments of each side:

"Chairman Khrushchev . . . agreed to remove from Cuba all weapons systems capable of offensive use, to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba, and to permit appropriate United Nations observation and supervision to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments. We on our part agreed that once these adequate arrangements for verification had been established we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurances against an invasion of Cuba."

The Pentagon comment on Soviet activity at Cienfuegos, which is southeast of Havana, came from Jerry W. Friedheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. He said that the Pentagon had indications that led it to believe that the Russians wanted to establish a permanent submarine facility in Cuba.

Mr. Friedheim stressed that Defense Department officials were not sure of Soviet intentions and not sure the Russians were building a submarine support base. They have noted Soviet naval activity in the area, including recent visits by ships and the towing of three barges from Havana to Cienfuegos.

Mr. Friedheim implied that some of the American intelligence came from flights over Cuba by U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.

U-2 FLIGHTS CONTINUE

U-2 flights over Cuba have continued since the missile crisis and have been tolerated by the Cubans, apparently without incident. President Kennedy, in his speech, said the United States had "no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba" if offensive weapons were to be kept out.

At a briefing this afternoon, a second White House official reiterated that "there is no confirmation that there is a strategic base" in Cienfuegos and said there were no Soviet submarines in Cienfuegos Bay. Pentagon spokesmen said there were four Soviet ships in the port: a submarine tender, a tank-landing ship, a rescue tug and a salvage ship.

Observers here pointed out that the strategic implications of a Soviet naval facility in Cuba—even one that would service submarines carrying missiles with a 1,500-mile range—were quite different from the Soviet attempt to put missiles in Cuba in 1962.

In 1962, they say, the United States had overwhelming nuclear superiority, which the Soviet Union was trying to redress. Now there is much greater parity, and the Russians can and do operate submarines within missile range of the United States.

A Cuban naval facility would give the Soviet Union two advantages, according to Rear Adm. Norvell Ward, commander of the Caribbean sea frontier. Reached by telephone in San Juan, Puerto Rico, Admiral Ward said that submarines "could spend more time off the East Coast if they are based in the Western Atlantic than if they were based in the Soviet Union—they wouldn't have to spend time going back and forth."

Submarines have to have a protected anchorage—"smooth water"—to make repairs and get provisions, he explained.

The second gain the Russians would derive, the admiral said, was "political advantage."

A naval officer at the Pentagon pointed out that the Russians had shown their flag in the Caribbean only since July of last year. "This clearly indicates their intention to operate in our waters," he said. "We can obviously look forward to seeing Russians off our coasts more and more."

Some observers speculated that Soviet naval activity in the area might pose more of a hazard to political stability in Latin America than to the United States security.

A source in the intelligence community said that what the Russians appeared to be building was a rather limited facility, not a submarine base on the scale of American bases at Holy Loch, Scotland, or Rota, Spain.

In The New York Times today, C. L. Sulzberger reported in his column that the Administration was investigating information that a Soviet naval installation was being built at Cienfuegos.

[From the New York Times, September 1970]

UGLY CLOUDS IN THE SOUTH

(By C. L. Sulzberger)

UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK.—As if the United States were not sufficiently beset by problems in Southwest and Southeast Asia, it is about to enter a new time of troubles in Latin America. Already two points of possible and probable danger are discernible.

The possible danger could come in that old familiar crisis area, Cuba, where reports that a Soviet submarine base is under construction are being quietly investigated. It must be stressed that there is not yet any confirmation of these reports.

Initial information suggests, however, that a naval installation is being built at Cienfuegos, on the southern coast, and that it is designed to service "Y" class submarines, Moscow's equivalent of the American Polaris-launching vessels.

In a sense, if proven, this would be the equivalent of installing land-based missiles as Russia attempted in 1962, then touching off a dramatic confrontation. However, there is a quintessential difference.

Were the U.S.S.R. to contemplate surprise attack against the U.S.A., its submarines could fire their missiles from the open seas. A Cuban base would therefore not materially change the prevailing situation. But any new facility, designed to improve offensive Soviet striking power, would not (if confirmed) be well-regarded.

The probable danger, although not military, could ultimately prove far more important. The great likelihood is that Senator Allende, a Marxist-Socialist, will be formally chosen Chile's President by Congress on October 24.

Dr. Allende may well lie low, stress his moderation and international respectability, and only perhaps proceed with more drastic aspects of a revolutionary program once his government is firmly established.

Yet there are signs that such logic may not prevail and that the Chilean Communist party, which dominates the Union Popular (a front that supports Allende) is already using tough intimidation tactics against its opposition.

The immediate objective of this tactic appears to be an effort to gain control of Chile's principal newspapers, television and radio stations prior to the electoral session of Congress. Anti-Communist journalists and commentators have been threatened with physical violence if they do not yield, and communications workers' groups are demanding "popular" control of mass media.

Many editors feel openly harrassed. The Union Popular (composed of Communists, Socialists and Radicals but primarily guided by the first) demands direction of facilities and wants its own members to be promoted to top positions.

Some organizations have already begun to cede to these pressures. The program director of one television channel, still officially under government supervision, has received so many personal threats that he has decided to leave the country and plans have already been made for Union Popular to take over.

Chile's largest afternoon paper will soon be sold for a modest down payment to a group believed to be representing the popular front. Last week the owner told his staff he had been warned that the paper would be taken over by a workers' cooperative if it did not switch its support to Dr. Allende.

Both he and the owners of El Mercurio, the leading conservative daily, have been menaced. El Mercurio, strongly opposed to Union Popular, belongs to a very wealthy family with widespread investments and which has long been engaged in a feud with Dr. Allende. The paper's staff indicates a fear it will be taken over by a cooperative dominated by Communists and even more extreme Popular Action groups.

The role of the press in South American ideological turnovers is seen as crucial by a hemisphere which remembers Peron's seizure of the principal Argentinian newspapers as a major move to consolidate his power. What now happens to Chile's freedom of expression will be a striking indication of Dr. Allende's ultimate intentions.

There is slight doubt that a strongly anti-U.S. regime is about to take over in Chile and it could well be tempted to employ totalitarian methods to achieve its aims. The consequences, as reflected in neighboring countries like Bolivia and Peru, are unpredictable.

But what can be predicted is an era of growing difficulty in relations between Washington and some of its southern neighbors. If a legally installed hostile regime in Chile were even inferentially backed up by any kind of Soviet military installation in Cuba, the entire effort to arrange a global detente between Washington and Moscow could be jeopardized.

EXHIBIT 3

[From President John F. Kennedy's News Conference of November 20, 1962]

The President. I have several statements.

[1.] I have today been informed by Chairman Khrushchey that all of the IL-28 bombers now in Cuba will be withdrawn in 30 days. He also agrees that these planes can be observed and counted as they leave. Inasmuch as this goes a long way towards reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere 4 weeks ago, I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine.

In view of this action, I want to take this opportunity to bring the American people up to date on the Cuban crisis and to review the progress made thus far in fulfilling the understandings between Soviet Chairman Khrushchev and myself as set forth in our letters of October 27 and 28. Chairman Khrushchev, it will be recalled, agreed to remove from Cuba all weapons systems capable of offensive use, to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba, and to permit appropriate United Nations observation and supervision to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments. We on our part agreed that once these adequate arrangements for verification had been established we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.

The evidence to date indicates that all known offensive missile sites in Cuba have been dismantled. The missiles and their associated equipment have been loaded on Soviet ships. And our inspection at sea of these departing ships has confirmed that the number of missiles reported by the Soviet Union as having been brought into Cuba, which closely corresponded to our own information, has now been removed. In addition, the Soviet Government has stated that all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Cuba and no offensive weapons will be reintroduced.

Nevertheless, important parts of the understanding of October 27th and 28th remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba.

Consequently, if the Western Hemisphere is to continue to be protected against offensive weapons, this Government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The importance of our continued vigilance is underlined by our identification in recent days of a number of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba, although we are informed that these and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems, and will also be withdrawn in due course.

I repeat, we would like nothing better than adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba, and we are prepared to continue our efforts to achieve such arrangements. Until that is done, difficult problems remain. As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, "we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere."

We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic, and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.

In short, the record of recent weeks shows real progress and we are hopeful that further progress can be made. The completion of the commitment on both sides and the achievement of a peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis might well open the door to the solution of other outstanding problems.

May I add this final thought in this week of Thanksgiving: there is much for which we can be grateful as we look back to where we stood only 4 weeks ago—the unity of this hemisphere, the support of our allies, and the calm determination of the American people. These qualities may be tested many more times in this decade, but we have increased reason to be confident that those qualities will continue to serve the cause of freedom with distinction in the years to come.

* * * * *

[4.] Q. Mr. President, with respect to your no-invasion pledge, there has been considerable discussion and speculation in the press as to the exact scope of this pledge. I believe that Chairman Khrushchev, in his letter of the 28th, made the assumption, or the implication, or the statement, that no attack would be made on Castro, not only by the United States, but any other country in the Western Hemisphere. It appeared to be an implication that possibly you would be willing to guarantee Castro against any and all enemies anywhere. Now I realize that in your letter there was nothing of that sort and you've touched on this today, but I'm wondering if you can be a bit more specific on the scope of your no-invasion pledge.

The President. I think that today's statement describes very clearly what the policy is of the Government in regard to no-invasion. I think if you re-read the statement you will see the position of the Government on that matter.

Q. Mr. President, in speaking of "adequate verification," does this mean that we insist upon onsite inspection? Would we be satisfied with anything less than actual, on-the-spot inspection in Cuba?

The President. Well, we have thought that to provide adequate inspection, it should be onsite. As you know, Mr. Castro has not agreed to that, so we have had to use our own resources to implement the decision of the Organization of American States that the hemisphere should continue to keep itself informed about the development of weapons systems in Cuba.

* * * * *

[6.] Q. Mr. President, apparently you've established quite a free-flowing channel of communications with Chairman Khrushchev. I wonder if you could comment any on this, perhaps telling us how many messages you've exchanged some of the tenor of those, and if this will be a pattern for the future?

The President. We've exchanged several messages in an attempt to try to work out the details of the withdrawal of the IL-28's and also a system of verification, in an attempt to fill in, in detail, the assurances given in the letters of late October. So that's what the correspondence has been about.

I think that's been very clearly stated. And as I say, today a message was received, several hours ago, indicating that the IL-28's would be taken out. The main burden of the negotiation, however, has been borne by Mr. McCloy and Governor Stevenson in their conversations, but I have continued to indicate how we defined offensive weapons, which has been the subject of this correspondence and, really, the subject of the negotiations between Mr. McCloy and Mr. Stevenson on the one hand, and the Russians on the other.

In addition, the question of adequate verification has been a subject of the correspondence and a subject of the negotiations.

Q. Mr. President, in the various exchanges of the past 3 weeks, either between yourself and Chairman Khrushchev or at the United Nations, have any issues been touched on besides that of Cuba, and could you say how the events of these past 3 weeks might affect such an issue as Berlin or disarmament or nuclear testing?

The President. No. I instructed the negotiators to confine themselves to the matter of Cuba completely, and therefore no other matters were discussed. Disarmament, any matters affecting Western Europe, relations between the Warsaw pact countries and NATO, all the rest—none of these matters was to be in any way referred to or negotiated about until we had made progress and come to some sort of a solution on Cuba. So that has been all we have done diplomatically with the Soviet Union in the last month.

Now, if we're successful in Cuba, as I said, we would be hopeful that some of the other areas of tension could be relaxed. Obviously when you make progress in any area, then you have hopes that you can continue it. But up till now we have confined ourselves to Cuba, and we'll continue to do so until we feel the situation has reached a satisfactory state.

[7.] Q. Mr. President, your administration, like others, is being criticized for its handling of information. The point is being made that reporters are being hampered in carrying out their role as the link between Government and the American people, that we're not keeping the American people well informed, as a result of Government policies. LeRoy Collins, former Governor of Florida, now head of the National Association of Broadcasters, has accused both the Defense Department and the State Department of news suppression in the Cuban crisis. Would you care to comment on your general feeling about that, Mr. President?

The President. Well, it is true that when we learned the matter on Tuesday morning until we made the announcement on the quarantine on Monday afternoon, that this matter was kept in the highest levels of Government. We didn't make any public statement about it. And I returned to Washington that Saturday morning because I had a campaign trip that was going to take until Sunday evening, and I had to come back, and we did not want to indicate to the Soviet Union or to Cuba or anyone else who might be our adversaries, the extent of our information until we had determined what our policy would be, and until we had consulted with our allies and members of OAS and NATO. So for those very good reasons, I believe, this matter was kept by the Government until

Monday night. There is—at least one newspaper learned about some of the details on Sunday evening and did not print it for reasons of public interest.

I have no apologies for that. I don't think that there's any doubt it would have been a great mistake and possibly a disaster if this news had dribbled out when we were unsure of the extent of the Soviet buildup in Cuba, and when we were unsure of our response, and when we had not consulted with any of our allies, who might themselves have been involved in great difficulties as a result of our action.

During the week, then, from Monday till Sunday, when we received Mr. Khrushchev's first message about the withdrawal, we attempted to have the Government speak with one voice. There were obvious restraints on newspapermen. They were not permitted, for example, to go to Guantanamo because obviously that might be an area which might be under attack.

Since that Sunday we have tried to, or at least intend to attempt to lift any restraints in the news. And I'm really—as a reader of a good many papers, it seems to me that the papers more or less reflected quite accurately the state of our negotiations with the Soviet Union.

They have, in a sense, been suspended because we've been arguing about this question of IL-28's, so there hasn't been any real progress that we could point to or any hard information that we could put out until today, which we're now doing.

Now, if the procedures which have been set up, which are really to protect the interest and security of the United States, are being used in a way inimical to the free flow of news, then we'll change those procedures.¹

* * * * *

[11.] Q. Mr. President, another question on Cuba. Is it your position, sir, that you will issue a formal no-invasion pledge only after satisfactory arrangements have been made for verification and after adequate arrangements have been made to make sure that such weapons are not reintroduced once more?

The President. Quite obviously, as I said in my statements, serious problems remain as to verification and reassurance, and, therefore, this matter of our negotiations really are not—have not been completed and until they're completed, of course, I suppose we're not going to be fully satisfied that there will be peace in the Caribbean.

In regard to my feelings about what remains to be done, and on the matter of invasion, I think my statement is the best expression of our views.

Q. Mr. President, what would we accept as a guarantee, as a safeguard against reintroduction? Can that be achieved by anything short of continuous aerial reconnaissance?

The President. Well, I think that what we would like to have is the kind of inspection on the ground which would make any other means of obtaining information unnecessary.

Q. A continuing inspection after the settlement—

The President. Inspection which would provide us with assurances that there are not on the island weapons capable of offensive action against the United States or neighboring countries and that they will not be reintroduced. Obviously, that is our goal. If we do not achieve that goal, then we have to use other resources to assure ourselves that weapons are not there, or that they're not being reintroduced.

* * * * *

[13.] Q. Sir, would you please clear up for us our relationship with the United Nations? If we wanted to invade Cuba, if we wanted to take unilateral action in any way, could we do so without the approval of the United Nations?

The President. Well, I don't think a question—you have to really give me a much more detailed hypothetical question before I could consider answering it, and even under those conditions it might not be wise. Obviously, the United States—let's use a hypothetical case, which is always better—the United States has the means as a sovereign power to defend itself. And of course exercises

¹ Earlier, on October 24, the White House had released a memorandum to editors and radio and television news directors listing 12 categories of military information vital to the national security concerning which no further releases would be issued by the Department of Defense. The memorandum requested that during the tense international situation all news media exercise caution and discretion in the publication of such information which possibly might come into their possession from other sources.

that power, has in the past, and would in the future. We would hope to exercise it in a way consistent with our treaty obligations, including the United Nations Charter. But we, of course, keep to ourselves and hold to ourselves under the United States Constitution and under the laws of international law, the right to defend our security. On our own, if necessary—though we, as I say, hope to always move in concert with our allies, but on our own if that situation was necessary to protect our survival or integrity or other vital interests.

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EXHIBIT 4

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 28, 1970]

REMARKS OF HON. DANTE B. FASCELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

THE UNITED STATES MUST RESPOND PROMPTLY TO NEW SOVIET THREAT IN CUBA

(Mr. Fascell asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, the White House statement last Friday, September 25, that the United States would view with grave concern any attempt to establish a base in Cuba for the servicing of Soviet nuclear submarines, came none too early.

I fully support the President's statement.

This public warning to the Soviets appears to be based on intelligence developed by the Department of Defense, indicating that such a base is in the process of being established at Cienfuegos in the southern part of Cuba.

I am today calling the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs to meet in an urgent executive session with high Government officials, to review this situation.

I am also requesting the chairman of the Armed Services Committee to give every consideration to the requirements of strengthening our military and naval capability in the Caribbean region.

Nearly 3 months ago, in the course of my subcommittee's hearings reviewing the security situation in the Caribbean, I raised this very issue with high-ranking officials of the administration and the top U.S. military commanders responsible for the Caribbean region.

I had stressed that only a short time earlier, in May of this year, the second group of Soviet naval units visited the Caribbean and first stopped in Cuba at the port of Cienfuegos.

That Soviet naval force included an Echo II type submarine which had nuclear capability, eight firing tubes, and a range of approximately 400 miles.

I had pointed out to executive branch witnesses that the presence of Soviet nuclear naval units was drastically changing the security balance in the Caribbean and required the U.S. Government to take prompt steps to reverse the policy of curtailing our naval and shore facilities at Key West, at Boca Chica, at the Homestead Air Force Base, and at other installations in Southeastern United States.

Adm. E. P. Holmes, commander in chief of our Atlantic Command, agreed that it would be a "folly" to cut down U.S. military and naval capability in the face of this new Soviet threat.

On July 8, and during subsequent hearings, I repeatedly called to the administration's attention the many reports which I received indicating that facilities for servicing Soviet nuclear submarines were being constructed in Cuba.

Information now available to the Department of Defense and the White House seems to confirm those reports.

I believe that it would be a drastic mistake for the administration to invite a repetition of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis by failure to act promptly and decisively to nip this new Soviet challenge in the bud.

The track record of Soviet policy has demonstrated that once they embark upon the course of trying to change the military balance in a given region, they will continue ahead until they are stopped.

This has almost happened once in Cuba. It has happened since in the Mediterranean, in the Indian Ocean and in other areas.

As the first step, I believe it is imperative that the United States move promptly to beef up our military capability in the Caribbean region. This means that our facilities at Key West, Boca Chica, and Homestead should be immediately restored to full strength.

The stakes involved in any potential conflict in the Caribbean, and particularly in any United States-Soviet confrontation in that region, are going up each day.

I warned about this months ago, and I am today repeating that warning.

I believe that to wait any further is to court disaster.

The United States should and must respond promptly and forcefully to this new Soviet challenge.

I am gratified that the White House is turning its attention to this urgent problem. I hope that this will result in actions along the lines I have suggested.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, will my distinguished colleague yield?

Mr. FASCELL. I yield to my distinguished colleague from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. I wish to commend my distinguished colleague from Florida upon his statement. I endorse what he has said and join in his concern. I feel that the United States must move, and move vigorously, and that the committees of Congress should fully explore the threat to our security and to the hemisphere, which appears to be developing, in the area to which the gentleman referred.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FASCELL. I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. RIVERS. I thank the gentleman. I assure him that we have known about the proposed base for some time, and I have been preparing to release some remarks on the subject. For 4 months I have been preparing remarks, which I intend to deliver today. In a conference report, consideration of which we concluded on Thursday, we have included \$435 million for the Navy as a beginning effort to beef up our Navy to be able to meet the threat we know the Soviets are creating. The item is in the conference report which will be up tomorrow. But this afternoon I intend to speak on the subject.

I want to thank the gentleman. The time is now to do something about this.

Mr. FASCELL. I agree with the gentleman from South Carolina.

EXHIBIT 5

[From the Washington Evening Star, Sept. 30, 1970]

A-SUB EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN CUBA, NEW DATA SHOWS

(By Orr Kelly)

Equipment specifically associated with the new Yankee class Soviet nuclear missile submarine is being installed at Cienfuegos on the south shore of Cuba, according to informed sources.

This specific information, which goes well beyond the guarded references to possible construction made by the Pentagon and White House on Friday, led to the stern warning by the White House to the Soviet Union that the installation of a strategic base in this hemisphere would be viewed with the utmost seriousness by the United States.

The Yankee class submarine, which is very similar to the American Polaris, is designed to deliver nuclear-tipped missiles and is considered a strategic weapon, like an intercontinental ballistic missile, rather than a tactical weapon, such as an attack submarine.

Pictures taken by high flying U2 airplanes reportedly show the Russians installing a more elaborate shore-based station than that used in support of the American Polaris submarines.

Almost all the support for Polaris submarines at such stations as Holy Loch, Scotland, is provided by a floating drydock and a special submarine tender equipped with cranes to lift missiles out of the submarine and set them back down in special holders in the tender.

SAME SETUP IN CUBA

The evidence now available here reportedly shows a shore station being set up at Cienfuegos to provide the same kind of support for the Yankee class submarines.

Because the Russians maintain submarines on station off the American Atlantic Coast and could support them from floating submarine tenders, the apparent intention to establish a permanent shore installation seems to U.S. officials to be more productive.

The firm information that led to the White House warning apparently became available only during the last two weeks of September since the recess of the strategic arms limitations talks and more than a month and a half after the conclusion of hearings on Cuba and the Caribbean by the House subcommittee on inter-American affairs.

'SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT'

On Sept. 2, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told newsmen a Soviet task force of five vessels was moving toward the Caribbean. Without saying why, Laird described the movement of the task force as "significant development."

On Sept. 14, Pentagon press spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim mentioned for the first time publicly that three barges were being towed toward Cienfuegos by two of the Soviet vessels.

Two days later, a high-ranking Nixon administration official, speaking to a group of editors in Chicago, mentioned the Soviet fleet visits and made a careful distinction between them and the operation of Polaris-type submarines out of the Cuban depot.

The United States, he said, would study that very carefully.

MEANING OVERLOOKED

Although the significance of his words was overlooked when the transcript of the briefing was made public, it is now obvious that the start of construction at Cienfuegos was what he had in mind.

The establishment of a submarine base in the Western Hemisphere, either with a shore station or supported by a tender, has certain advantages.

MATTER OF ECONOMY

A base in Cuba will permit the Russians to keep more submarines on station or to get by with fewer boats and to operate them more easily close to U.S. shores. In this sense, the establishment of a base may be a simple matter of economy.

A base close to the continental United States may also require the American Navy to spend more money and use more manpower to keep track of the potentially hostile submarines.

Such a base could permit the Soviet submarine force to get into position quickly for a surprise attack on the United States.

RIVERS URGES U.S. ACTION

Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, D-S.C., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said in a speech Monday that, "We must take every diplomatic, and, if necessary, military step to excise this cancer from the body of the Western Hemisphere."

The diplomatic effort apparently had begun Friday when a White House official told reporters the United States views the establishment of a strategic base "with the utmost seriousness."

There is no indication so far, however, that the administration is considering the use of anything as drastic as military action against the base.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 30, 1970]

WARNING ON CUBA PUZZLES U.S. AIDES—WHITE HOUSE DATA IN REPORT ON BASE TERMED OLD

(By Tad Szulc)

WASHINGTON, Sept. 29.—American officials said today that the United States had only dubious and dated information to indicate that the Soviet Union might be planning to build a strategic submarine base in Cuba.

For this reason, these officials, who include members of the intelligence community, said they were at a loss to explain why the White House chose last week to warn Moscow against the establishment of such a base.

Officials and diplomats have suggested the possibility that the White House acted for broader policy motivations including the Middle East crises, or that an alleged Soviet threat in Cuba was being used to signal dangers that might develop if Dr. Salvador Allende, a Marxist, became Chile's President in November as expected.

The whole question of the reported Soviet plans for a naval base is delicate because in the Administration are inhibited from commenting on background briefings by the White House.

SOURCE OF EMBARRASSMENT

The practice of background briefings, by officials who cannot be publicly identified, has often turned into a source of embarrassment to the State Department.

While Latin-American diplomats wondered why the United States chose to create at this time what appeared to be an artificial crisis in the Caribbean, American officials acknowledged that the unconfirmed reports of construction of a Soviet base in the Cuban port of Cienfuegos had been available since early this year.

The officials said that little, if any, new information had been obtained in recent months that would account for the warning on Friday that "the Soviet Union can be under no doubt that we would view the establishment of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost seriousness."

HEARINGS ARE RECALLED

It was recalled that virtually all the information on the reported Cuban base had been presented to the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs during hearings between July 8 and Aug. 3.

The possibility that the Soviet Union might seek to build a base was raised in the closed-door hearings by Adm. E. P. Holmes, commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, and by G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Mr. Nutter's remark that the establishment of a Soviet base "cannot be discounted as long as Castro's hostility to the United States persists" was partly deleted from the transcript for security reasons. But no witness reported actual evidence of base construction.

Officials said there was still no evidence of suspicious construction activities, despite flights by U-2 surveillance planes.

However, reports from refugees from Cuba indicated that a section of Cienfuegos Harbor had been closed to visitors, except Soviet personnel.

In what may be a related effort, the Cuban press agency Prensa Latina reported Sept. 17 that an eight-lane highway from Havana to Cienfuegos, a section of the new southern coast superhighway, was being built under the supervision of a Soviet engineer.

Officials commented that normal automotive traffic in Cuba did not seem to justify an eight-lane highway unless it was intended for military use.

These were the possible explanations offered for the White House response to these reports.

EXHIBIT 6

[From the New York Times Oct. 1, 1970]

MOSCOW SCOFFS AT SUB-BASE ISSUE—SAYS U.S. STIRS WAR FEVER BY WARNING ON CUBA

(By Bernard Gwertzman)

Moscow, Sept. 30.—The Soviet Union scoffed today at the White House's expression of concern about possible Soviet construction of a strategic submarine base in Cuba. It accused the United States of fanning a "war psychosis."

An authoritative commentary in Pravda, the Communist party paper, constituted Moscow's first public reaction to a warning by the White House last Friday about the implications for Soviet-American relations if such a base were built.

In Washington, United States officials, including members of the intelligence community, have expressed puzzlement over the charges, noting that these had been based on dubious and dated information.

The White House accusations have not been reported in the Soviet Union, and Pravda did not explicitly deny that anything was going on in Cuba, only alluded to the White House's concern by saying:

"It is clear to anyone that the furor about preparations on Cuba that supposedly threaten United States security has been raised for a definite purpose."

Since the average Russian probably knew nothing about the Cuban affair, it was clear that Pravda's remarks were aimed directly at the United States.

Pravda also dismissed as another "concocted invention" previous United States charges of Soviet complicity in reported Egyptian violations of the Suez cease-fire accord in the Middle East.

The Pravda article, written by Georgi Ratiani, head of the newspaper's American desk, said the United States knew "perfectly well that the Soviet Union is persistently and vigorously striving for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and if Washington wanted such a settlement just as sincerely the problem would have been solved long ago."

The Times of London was quoted as having suggested that the Cuban matter had been raised to "create a favorable atmosphere" for the Congressional elections and the current trip to Europe by President Nixon.

"And so why the fuss?" Pravda asked. "Only for the purpose of artificially aggravating the international situation, creating an atmosphere of military hysteria among ordinary Americans and exerting political pressure on the capitals of some other capitalist states."

Soviet media have shown irritation over Mr. Nixon's trip, particularly his visit to the Sixth Fleet. The media also have responded to caustic commentaries in the American press on Soviet intentions.

CHICAGO BRIEFING RECALLED

A recent briefing in Chicago held by White House officials for newspapers there was pointed to as a source for the inspiration for the critical articles.

Pravda said that in a column last Sunday James Reston of The New York Times sought to scare readers by writing that "the times of the cold war may return."

"In an attempt to confuse readers, he wrote that something serious and dangerous was happening in Soviet-American relations," Pravda said.

"In the style of the psychological dramas of Dostoyevsky's heroes, Reston declared that a struggle was going on in Richard Nixon's mind between his former anti-Communist instincts as a cold war advocate, and his new Presidential duties."

Paraphrasing Mr. Reston's comments, Pravda said:

"The former instincts are being revived. They were provoked by the Soviet Union by its military movements in the Middle East and Cuba."

The lack of concern shown by Moscow so far about the questioning of Soviet intentions by American officials and newspapers has perturbed several senior Western diplomats.

MISREADING IS FEARED

Some say that Washington may be overreacting to Soviet moves, but others say that Moscow may be misreading the state of American public opinion and not taking seriously enough the effect of the alleged Middle East violations and the Cuban warning.

Most in danger, they say, are the talks on the limitation of Strategic Weapons, which are due to resume Nov. 2 in Helsinki.

A basic cause for the charges and countercharges in recent weeks has been the poor state of communications, some diplomats said. Ambassador Jacob D. Beam of the United States is virtually ignored by the Soviet leaders. He has not met with the party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev and has had only ceremonial meetings with Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin.

A high-level meeting seems necessary to some diplomats to clear the air, and if Mr. Kosygin goes to the United Nations, he may meet Mr. Nixon. But Mr. Kosygin's plans are still undecided.

EXHIBIT 7

[From Reuters News Agency]

HOUSE UNIT HOLDS HEARING

WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 (Reuters).—A House Foreign Affairs subcommittee chairman said today that it was hard to determine whether the Soviet Union was in fact establishing a submarine base in Cuba.

Representative Dante B. Fascell, Democrat of Florida, who heads the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee, spoke with reporters after his panel had heard testimony behind closed doors from two Defense Department experts on Soviet affairs.

Mr. Fascell said the recent use of the port of Cienfuegos by visiting Soviet naval ships made the potential for establishing a submarine base more specific.

Asked whether any submarines had used the port, he replied that "the point is the Soviets are operating naval units in the Caribbean and once they start that they are going to keep it up."

EXHIBIT 8

[From the Baltimore Sun, Oct. 10, 1970]

U.S. IMPUGNS RUSSIANS' INTENTIONS—ROGERS LIKENS DENIALS ON
MIDEAST, CUBA TO COLD WAR TACTICS

(By Peter J. Kumpa)

WASHINGTON, Oct. 9.—William P. Rogers, the Secretary of State, said today that the United States is "disappointed" with the Soviet Union's "very strident" denials of connivance in Egypt's Middle East missile violations.

He called the denials "reminiscent of cold-war days," and the connivance unquestioned.

Asked at an afternoon press conference whether a series of seemingly more aggressive Soviet moves in Cuba and Berlin, as well as in the Middle East, meant that Moscow was miscalculating American intentions, the secretary replied:

"We are not sure what it means. It is too early to determine. We can't but have very serious questions about their intentions."

WILL STILL NEGOTIATE

But while the U.S. will be wary about the Soviet Union Mr. Rogers said, it will continue to negotiate with the Russian "realistically" and with a "full realization" of their record of violations.

Mr. Rogers has two scheduled appointments with the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei A. Gromyko, at the United Nations on October 16 and 19.

He said he would then present photographic evidence providing "conclusive" proof that surface-to-air missiles, including the more sophisticated low-altitude SAM-3's, had been moved into the prohibited 32-mile zone west of the Suez Canal. He told of personally studying the U-2 pictures with technicians for four hours.

The secretary said he had doubts that the Soviet Union was involved in decisions leading up to the violations that have affected the military balance of power in the area against Israel.

He added he was "convinced without a doubt" that Soviet personnel are now in the prohibited zone helping in the construction and manning of SAM-3 missile sites.

Reminded that the Soviet Union had formally denied that it was a party of the Middle East standstill-cease-fire agreements, the usually unflappable Mr. Rogers showed annoyance.

"We don't have to get into that," he answered.

Mr. Rogers, the chief architect of the agreement, said there was "no doubt all parties agreed"—meaning the Russians as well—that there should be no strengthening of relative military positions.

Asked about an Egyptian complaint that the U.S. itself had violated the agreement by supplying Israel with arms, the secretary seemed exasperated.

He said the U.S. had agreed only to "get with restraint" in arms shipments, which it did. But he added that in view of the missile violations and the continuing flow of Soviet arms to the Egyptians, the U.S. was now "under no restraints" in supplying military equipment to the Israelis.

The secretary, who is the leading optimist in the administration on the Middle East despite the apparent collapse of the cease-fire, continued to show some cheer, though. He pointed out that there is no shooting, and recalled that he had told both sides there is no alternative to peace.

DEADLOCK POINTED OUT

Mr. Rogers was reminded of the present deadlock in which Israel has declared that it will not engage in peace negotiations unless Egypt rolls back illegal missiles while Egypt again reiterated today that it would not remove them because they serve "the holy objective of liberating occupied territory."

Under these conditions, he was asked the meaning of the term "rectification" that the U.S. keeps seeking in the missile dispute.

"Rectification," he said with a smile, "is the bringing about of a condition to get both parties to start negotiating."

While he could still express some optimism on the Middle East despite the gloom, the secretary was positively enthusiastic about President Nixon's five-point Indochina peace plan.

He did not go as far as the deputy defense secretary, David W. Packard, who told a meeting today that North Vietnam "will accept the cease-fire in due course and proceed toward negotiations."

Mr. Packard echoed the Secretary of State in a growing official distrust here of Soviet motives in the Middle East. He said increasing Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean had convinced the United States "to put continuing emphasis on maintaining our naval capability around the world."

Mr. Rogers opened his news conference with reports of "uniformly favorable" national and international response to President Nixon's Indochina peace initiative. With support for the President so deep and complete, he said, the enemy should seriously consider the proposals, for they no longer could depend upon domestic American dissension to serve their aims.

BELLICOSITY EXPECTED

He said the initial critical Red reaction at the Paris talks yesterday was "expected" and was not regarded as a rejection. He thought the "foundations for a real negotiations" had been laid and expected bargaining in "private" not public talks.

"We are sure we could find a peaceful settlement fair to all concerned," Mr. Rogers insisted. Yet he admitted that he had been given "no reason" based on information from the Communists that they were willing to accept a cease-fire, or an international conference, or any other part of Mr. Nixon's plan.

Emphasizing progress in turning the war over to the South Vietnamese and reduction of combat activity, Mr. Rogers said the Nixon proposals were made "not from weakness but from strength."

"JUST MAKES SENSE"

How did this square, he was asked, with past administration briefings holding that North Vietnam would not negotiate from weakness nor would they talk when military elements were separated from political ones. (Mr. Nixon broke these up in his proposals.)

"It just makes sense, that's why," Mr. Rogers replied.

Asked why the Indochina plan was not discussed secretly first, Mr. Rogers said essentially that it was important to win international support so that "maybe the other side will think twice before rejecting it."

Asked about reports of the Soviet Union building a nuclear submarine base in Cuba on which the White House issued a warning two weeks ago, the secretary said there had been "no significant changes" since then.

But it was a matter that he would raise with Mr. Gromyko next week.

[From Reuters News Agency]

IZVESTIA ISSUES SUB BASE DENIAL

Moscow, Oct. 9 (Reuters)—A government newspaper article tonight firmly denied United States allegations that Russia may be building a submarine base on Cuba.

It was the fullest repudiation here yet of a Washington report last month. Writing in the government newspaper, *Izvestia*, a top commentator, Vikenty Matveyev said, "These assertions have no ground beneath them."

He claimed the U.S. version of Soviet activities on Cuba was being publicized in connection with the Pentagon's efforts in Washington to get more money for the arms race.

"They must also be seen in connection with the support rendered by Washington to the ruling circles of Israel," he added.

The article gave an assurance that Moscow was sticking to its side of the agreement between it and Washington after the November, 1962, Cuban missile crisis. The Soviet Union then agreed to withdraw missiles and the United States agreed not to invade the island.

EXHIBIT 9

EXCERPTS FROM NEWS BRIEFING BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD,
OCTOBER 12, 1970

Question: Mr. Secretary, can you straighten out for us the situation regarding the sub bases in Cienfuegos? There's been a lot of confusion, a lot of people off the record and some on the record, deny there's any evidence there. Can you tell us exactly what we know and what it means?

Secretary Laird: I think we've been rather forthcoming in our position. We've given you the movement of ships from time to time to and from Cuba. We have recently given a briefing down here regards to the possibility of a naval base being under construction. I think I would stand by the statements that have been made without any question by our Defense Department briefers as far as Cuba is concerned.

We have no evidence that a submarine of the Polaris-type has used any base in Cuba, and particularly this particular naval base. We would look upon the use of Cuba for this purpose as a very serious challenge, and one which does not follow the understandings that I believe were comprehended by both sides in 1962.

I was asked yesterday concerning the threat, if the threat situation was the same as it was in 1962. I think one has to point out that there is some difference because you had a situation in 1962 where land-based missiles were being inserted into a third country, with some third country control, as far as the weapons were concerned. In this particular case, the threat will continue whether Cuba is used as a missile submarine base or not because missile-carrying submarines are already on station as far as the United States is concerned.

The added increment, however, that would be acquired by the Soviet Navy should it use Cuba for such a base would be that it would increase the threat because these submarines could remain on station for a longer period of time. Thus, through this simple act which we regard as a very serious problem and one which we are watching very carefully, the threat could be substantially increased as far as the United States is concerned.

This fits in with my concern that I have expressed to the Congress on numerous occasions that the Polaris fleet of the Soviet Union is expanding on a very rapid basis. It has gone up to the point where they have 28 submarines—I'm talking about the Polaris-type submarines—28 submarines in being and under construction, and will reach or go ahead of us early in 1974 as far as their Polaris missile-firing fleet is concerned.

We do regard this as a very serious matter but in answering your question, I can say that there is no evidence at this time that a Polaris-type Soviet submarine has used Cuba as a base and we would regard this as a very serious matter and I want you to know that we are watching it very closely.

Question: Isn't it true that you have pictures showing that in one-month's time they increased their building at this base from 2 to 8 or 10? Don't you have evidence that they're building . . .

Secretary Laird: 2 to 8 or 10 what?

Question: Eight or 10 structures they're building, increased their building from 2 to 8 or 10 buildings. Isn't it true that you have evidence that they're building an 8-lane highway from this port to Havana?

Secretary Laird: I don't care to comment at this time on the intelligence gathering information which we have. I think we've made it clear that there is evidence that a naval base construction is going forward. In answering Mr. Kelly's question, he limited his question to a submarine base and I think that in answering his question we have no evidence that a Polaris-type submarine has used this particular base. I want to make it abundantly clear that we are watching this very closely. We do not have the evidence that a Polaris-type submarine has used this particular facilities.

It is true, though that over the last four or five years that there have been ship calls by the Soviet Navy to Cuba. We have had several submarine visits of a different class of submarine from time to time almost on a yearly basis. We have announced the visits of Soviet missile-carrying cruisers and destroyers over the past three or four years. We followed the policy since I've been Secretary of Defense of announcing it right here. So, the last two years I think we've announced three different visits of Soviet fleet units to Cuban ports.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you say you have no evidence that these Polaris-type subs have visited this base in Cuba? What does our evidence show this base to be—a submarine base or what?

Secretary Laird: We are watching it very carefully. As far as the movement of ships into the Mediterranean and the Caribbean, I will see that an update is given to you this week of the Soviet Navy movements in the Caribbean, as well as in the Mediterranean. I'll set up such an update here one morning this week so that you have up-to-date information regarding the activities of Soviet naval units.

We've tried to do that from time to time and rather than get into the specific movements at this press conference, when I know you have other areas that you want to cover, I'll see that such an update is made available to the Pentagon Press Corps this week.

Question: Mr. Secretary, how do you answer the argument of those who say that Cienfuegos will be no different than Rota or Holy Loch?

Secretary LAIRD. I think there is a great difference as it changes the entire balance during this important period when we're going forward with the SALT talks. The situation that existed as far as NATO, as far as the British base and as far as the Spanish base is concerned, was in existence prior to the time we went into the SALT negotiations. This was certainly well understood by the other side. It was understood by our NATO allies. It was understood by the Warsaw Pact. It was understood by the Soviet Union. A change in balance at this time would have to be considered as a very serious act as far as any defense planner is concerned in the United States.

EXHIBIT 10

[Tass as monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 13, 1970]

SOVIET DENIAL OF ACTIVITY IN CUBA

Moscow Tass International Service in English at 1134 GMT on 13 October begins transmitting a Tass statement to the effect that the "Soviet Union has not built and is not building its military base on Cuba and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the Soviet and U.S. Governments in 1962." Further details as available.

[From the Washington Evening Star, Oct. 13, 1970]

SOVIET DENIES BUILDING MILITARY BASE IN CUBA

Moscow (UPI).—The Soviet government said today it "has not and is not building" a military base in Cuba.

It said U.S. reports the Soviets were building a nuclear submarine base in Cuba represent a "concoction."

"The Soviet Union has not built and is not building a military base on Cuba and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the government of the U.S.R.R. and the United States in 1962," a government statement said.

The year 1962 marked the Cuban missile crisis, when President John F. Kennedy got the Soviets to withdraw their missiles from Cuba.

The statement, distributed by the official news agency Tass, was the first direct Soviet government reaction to reports of a Soviet nuclear submarine base being built in Cuba.

The Nixon administration warned Moscow last month against establishment of such a base.

The Soviet government statement said Moscow always adhered to the 1962 Soviet-American agreement and "will adhere to it in the future, too, proceeding from the assumption that the American side will also strictly fulfill this understanding.

"Any assertions on a possible violation by the Soviet Union of the above mentioned understanding through the construction of a naval base in Cuba are a concoction," the statement said.

... The Soviet Union has not built and is not building its military base on Cuba and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

"It is well known that the Soviet Union, in general, condemns the building of military bases by some states on the territory of other states. More, the Soviet government has repeatedly made specific proposals at relevant UNO agencies and the disarmament committee for the dismantling of foreign military bases on alien territories."

[From the Baltimore Sun, Oct. 14, 1970]

CUBAN BASE DENIED: U.S. NOT CONVINCED—SOVIET ONLY DISAVOWS ITS OWN NAVAL STATION; RUSSIAN SUBMARINE TENDER LEAVES CIENFUEGOS

SOVIET DENIAL

(By Dean Mills)

Moscow, Oct. 13.—The Soviet Union denied emphatically today that it is constructing "its own" submarine base in Cuba and said it seeks a peaceful foreign policy and the relaxation of international tension.

But the phrasing of the denial was such that it implied Moscow may be helping the Cubans build their own base.

DENIES VIOLATION

The statement released by Tass, the official government news agency, specifically denied violating the terms of the 1962 Soviet-American understanding on Cuba. At that time, after the now-famous diplomatic clash between President Kennedy and the Soviet premier, Nikita S. Khrushchev, Mr. Khrushchev backed down and agreed to remove long-range offensive Soviet missiles from Cuba. Moscow also agreed not to install any new missiles, and got assurances in return that the United States would attempt no invasion of Cuba.

Today's statement, with its emphasis on peace and on 1962—generally considered a low point in Soviet diplomacy—was aimed clearly at reassuring the United States.

It amounts to an answer to two points covered by the U.S. Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, at a news conference last week.

Mr. Rogers said then that there seemed to be a pattern of rising tension between the world's two great powers in the Middle East, Cuba and Berlin.

"NOT A SIGNAL"

He also expressed American hope "that this is not a signal—that these things do not signal a change of policy on the part of the Soviet Union."

The Tass statement today concluded, as if in direct answer:

"The Soviet Union, proceeding from its peaceable foreign policy, will continue consistently pursuing a course in accordance with the interests of a relaxation of tension, irrespective of the region of the world involved, of improvement of the international situation, and strengthening of world peace."

But in answering charges on the construction of a submarine base, the Tass statement seemed to limit its discussion to a Soviet-owned base. The Russian-language version of the text said specifically: "Tass has been authorized to state that the Soviet Union has not built and is not building *its own military base on Cuba...*"

U.S. PRESS BLAMED

It blamed the American press for "spreading concoctions that the Soviet Union allegedly began building on Cuba 'a permanent strategic naval base for its nuclear submarines.'"

Pentagon and White House spokesmen, the statement said, had questioned whether the Soviet Union is observing the terms of the 1962 understanding.

"In this context Tass has been authorized to state that the Soviet Union has always strictly adhered to the understanding reached in 1962 [and] will adhere to it in the future. . . ." Tass said.

U.S. RESPONSE

(By Charles W. Corddry)

WASHINGTON, Oct. 13.—The Defense Department reported today that a Soviet Navy submarine-tender has left the harbor at Cienfuegos, Cuba, but that there is continuing uncertainty as to whether a Russian "submarine-support facility" is being established at that port.

These statements were made shortly after the Soviet government issued a denial, distributed in Moscow by the Tass news agency, that it has built or is building "its own military base on Cuba."

"POSITIVE" STATEMENT

The Soviet declaration, denying any violation of the 1962 "understanding" under which Russian missiles were removed from Cuba, was described at the State Department here as "positive." Nevertheless, Robert J. McCloskey, department spokesman, added that "we will continue to watch the situation" in Cuba.

The Cienfuegos situation began to develop September 25 when the Pentagon reported discovery of some new naval facilities there which might be useful for supporting submarines, and the White House warned that it would view with "utmost seriousness" the establishment of a strategic naval base in Cuba.

The concern expressed then, and still existing, is related to the potential use of Cienfuegos to support Soviet ballistic-missile carrying submarines like the American Polaris type.

"We have said on numerous occasions that we were watching the Soviet ship movements closely," today's Pentagon statement said, "but were not sure as to whether or not a submarine-support facility was being established at Cienfuegos. That is the situation today."

The statement, issued by Daniel Z. Henkin, assistant defense secretary for public affairs, also reported the departure from Cienfuegos last Saturday of the Soviet submarine-tender and a salvage tug. Both had been there since they accompanied a Soviet naval group into the harbor September 9.

After reading the prepared statement, Mr. Henkin volunteered further that the absence of the submarine-tender would make less likely the use of the harbor to support submarines.

A submarine-tender provides repair facilities and provisions and, in the case of missile-carrying subs, servicing for the weapons. What the United States professes not to know is whether similar facilities are involved in what Melvin R. Laird, defense secretary, referred to yesterday as "naval base construction" in progress at Cienfuegos.

The Cuban matter took another new turn today when the State and Defense departments refused to let "policy-level" witnesses testify before a Latin American affairs subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

This caused Representative Dante Fascell (D., Fla.), subcommittee chairman, to open question of "domestic political motives" in the submarine-base affair.

Senator Frank Church (D, Idaho), chairman of a similar Senate subcommittee which was briefed by Defense intelligence officials last week, issued a statement today that the departure of the ships from Cienfuegos tended to bear out his own appraisal. It was that the evidence is "too thin and inconclusive" to sustain a charge that a submarine base is under construction.

Diplomatic observers extracted from the administration's firm stand on a potential base a connection with the strategic-arms limitation talks resuming November 2 in Helsinki. Secretary Laird said yesterday, for example, that such a base would "change the entire balance" at a time when the talks are going forward and would be "considered as a very serious act."

EXHIBIT 11

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS

OCTOBER 13, 1970.

You will recall that on September 2 we reported that a Soviet Navy Task Force, including a guided missile light cruiser, a guided missile destroyer, an Alligator-class landing ship and a submarine tender were moving toward the Caribbean.

We have kept you informed about this Soviet Navy deployment to the Caribbean—the third since the summer of 1969. The Soviet naval vessels entered Cienfuegos harbor on September 9.

On September 18, we advised you that the cruiser and destroyer, together with an accompanying tanker, had gone to sea and were heading East.

On September 25, in response to a number of queries about Cienfuegos, we said we were watching the situation very closely. We stated then that we were not sure that they are building a submarine support facility.

Secretary Laird said on Sunday, October 11, that we have no evidence that a Soviet submarine has used the Cuban base. At his news conference yesterday, the Secretary reiterated that while we would regard the development of a base for nuclear-powered missile submarines in Cuba as a very serious matter, "I can say that there is no evidence at this time that a Polaris-type Soviet submarine has used Cuba as a base." The Secretary said, as has been stated previously, that we are watching this very carefully.

In short, we have said on numerous occasions that we were watching the Soviet ship movements closely, but were not sure as to whether or not a submarine support facility was being established at Cienfuegos. That is the situation today.

The submarine tender and a salvage tug today are north of Havana and currently are proceeding on an easterly course.

These ships departed Cienfuegos Saturday morning.

The LST and a buoy tender, which had been in Cienfuegos, at last report are in the Atlantic west of Ireland on a north easterly course. We reported their departure on the 28th of September.

With regard to the Mediterranean, there are currently approximately 60 Soviet ships of all types, combatant and auxiliary, most of them in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. This fleet includes three guided missile cruisers, one of them the guided missile cruiser which had been in Cienfuegos. The guided missile destroyer and tanker, which also had been in Cienfuegos, also are currently operating in the Mediterranean.

The total of 60 Soviet ships compares with the record high of 65, which operated in the Mediterranean in March of this year in connection with Exercise OKEAN, in which more than 200 Soviet ships participated on a world-wide basis.

EXHIBIT 12

U.S. REPLY TO TASS ARTICLE DENYING SUBMARINE BASE CONSTRUCTION

(Statement by State Department press secretary Robert J. McCloskey,
October 13, 1970)

We have noted the TASS statement and consider it to be positive, but will, of course, continue to monitor the situation.

Mr. BINGHAM. Could I ask one question about Secretary Laird?

Did you mention, was I wrong in taking that in the early stage, Secretary Laird had said that any such thing would be intolerable, or some such words, stronger than "of grave concern"? In the first couple of days, that he said it would be unacceptable, or intolerable, or something like that?

Mr. CZARNECKI. No, sir. The only statement of Secretary Laird—

Mr. BINGHAM. I don't think I heard you mention that, and I was of the distinct impression that I had heard some word like that used by him. Am I wrong about that?

Mr. FASCELL. That statement you are referring to is the statement that allegedly came out of the White House from some unidentified source.

Mr. BINGHAM. Using words like "unacceptable" or "intolerable"?

Mr. FASCELL. Quoting the Kennedy position, and the exact language—

Mr. BINGHAM. A statement from the Kennedy agreement.

Mr. FASCELL. And the exact language we have not been able to get, although we requested it, and the White House has so far refused to release that transcript. All we have are the press reports of what was said. And we have requested it several times, and still have not been able to get it.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. And we are just going to finish the chronology of where we are and then we will ask—

Mr. MORSE. That's what I want to find out, where we are. I am sorry I was late but I would like you to fill me in on what we are doing.

Mr. FASCELL. As soon as we get the record straight, we will go back and fill you in.

So answering your question specifically, again, the statement you referred to was allegedly a White House statement, from some unidentified source or individual. All we have are the press copies. We have asked for the original transcript. It is not available; they refuse to deliver it.

Secretary Laird's statements are something else again, and his exact language we do have. We have requested that, and have obtained it.

Now, in addition to what Mr. Czarnecki has filled you in on, there are some missing parts, and that relates to me.

When the decision was evidently made in the executive branch that the administration would not send us any witnesses. I got a call from David Abshire, and he said it was urgent, and he wanted to see me, so he came up to see me and he said that the administration had discussed this matter, that Secretary Rogers was meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin here this week, and that this was an extremely sensitive matter. They just did not want to get anybody to come to a congressional meeting. I told him that I could not call off the meeting, and that I would not cancel my requests for information. I stated my reasons which were, basically, that despite some of the obvious political implications involved this subcommittee could not abandon its responsibilities. I felt that the public posture presented by the execu-

tive branch on this issue made it necessary for the Congress to find out whether this was just an effort to get the military appropriations bill passed, or whether there was something more to it.

I thought that there was a lot more involved in all those statements made to the press by the executive branch officials than just a bill. That's one of the reasons why I insisted on having the policy people discuss with us the foreign policy implications of raising this issue, and then putting the lid on it.

I laid all my cards on the table with Mr. Abshire, and told him straight out that we had a very serious responsibility in the Foreign Affairs Committee to review the policy decisions, the impact that they would have on the current situation, and their implications for the future—and that as chairman of this subcommittee, I was very much interested in knowing who had decided to do what, who had said what, and why they said it to the press and not to the Congress.

I would like to review that now because I don't want to wake up one day in the future, like after the election, and suddenly find that we have a major confrontation on our hands, with none of us—meaning the committee—having had any opportunity to get any of the basic information.

He said, "Well, I have taken this up at the highest level. We can't do it, and I wish you would cooperate." And I said, "I can make no commitments of any kind, and don't intend to, at this point, I am just not at liberty to do that."

And he said, "Well, you know this thing is not"—his words were—"this thing is not going to wait until after the election. This thing is going to bust before the election."

So he wouldn't elaborate on that, except that I got the inference, the clear inference, that this was a matter of such importance that there was no way they could keep the lid on it until after the election. So I said, "Well, that's all the more reason why we ought to know what's going on." And he said, "Well, I will get back to you."

Mr. KAZEN. What excuse did they give you for not even bringing the photographs that were requested by us for the briefing last week?

Mr. FASCELL. I just told you what Mr. Abshire's comments were, and that's the answer we got.

Now he called me today—around noon—to—it was 20 minutes to 12 exactly—and he said, "I just want to tell you so you won't be caught by surprise that we are making an announcement at noon, that the Russians have withdrawn their ships, certain ships—LST and some barges and a destroyer—from Cienfuegos; that we accept their statement issued this morning as positive evidence; and that we are going to continue to watch the situation carefully."

And I said, "David, you know, that doesn't begin to tell us what we want to know. This is not right. You just can't play it this way."

And he said, "I am sorry, I have taken it up to the highest level. That's all I can say." And he wouldn't discuss anything any further, and that's where we are today.

Brad, what we have done so far is simply to go over the chronology of the events that transpired, as we understand them, since 12:30 on Friday, September 25, when the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense made an announcement raising this whole issue for the first time.

We then detailed on the record the various events. Apart from that, it suffices to say that the evidence that we wanted to examine, in order to arrive at our own independent judgment, has not been forthcoming. And the witnesses whom we wanted to question specifically with respect to policy questions have been refused; that's it.

Mr. MONAGAN. Just a couple of questions.

Was that made clear, that this would be an executive session?

Mr. FASCELL. Yes—and so stated in the Congressional Record.

Mr. MONAGAN. I mean was there an invitation—there is no question about that; is there?

Mr. FASCELL. John, there is no question about the fact that we are holding a hearing, no question about the fact that we have requested witnesses and are willing to cooperate all the way, that this was to be an executive session, and that we know we are dealing with extremely sensitive matters and policy decisions.

But their point was that this issue is so sensitive at this time that they cannot talk about it to the Congress.

But they did hold briefings for the press. The press seems to have been filled in on everything. The inference in newspaper articles is that the press people have seen some photographs, and have received all the background briefings. Everything apparently was made available to them. As a matter of fact, part of the announcement, as I understand it, by the Secretary of Defense today, is that he is going to arrange a special briefing for the press on the whole range of Soviet activity in the Caribbean and the South Atlantic.

So it is OK for the press to know, but it is not OK for the Congress.

Mr. BINGHAM. May I ask a question about other committees?

Chairman Rivers stated on the floor the other day that there was a submarine base.

Mr. FASCELL. He said he had known about it for some time.

Mr. BINGHAM. No question about it. I am wondering, do you know anything about information given to other committees?

Mr. FASCELL. No.

Mr. MORSE?

Mr. MORSE. Dante, I apologize. I was here at the first hearing, but I have been out of town for the last 10 days, so I have just sort of lost track.

Mr. FASCELL. Right. Well, that's the reason we decided to give you a chronology.

Mr. MORSE. I would like to read that, if you will give it to me. When did you issue an invitation which was denied?

Mr. FASCELL. Right at the beginning—on September 26.

Mr. MORSE. For what particular witness or witnesses?

Mr. FASCELL. State and Defense Departments.

Mr. MORSE. But for whom? To whom?

Mr. FASCELL. Three things, Brad. We wanted all of the evidence dealing with the information which led to the press comment.

Mr. MORSE. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. We wanted the transcript of the White House press briefing. They refused to let it be given to us.

Mr. MORSE. Transcript of the 1962 understanding?

Mr. FASCELL. No, no; the White House press briefing on the President's trip to Europe where some unidentified official said that the U.S. would view with "grave concern" the construction of a Soviet submarine base on Cuba and issued a warning to the Soviets. To this day nobody knows who that official was, except the press. Nobody knows exactly what was said, because we can't get the transcript, although we have requested it.

The other thing we requested were the intelligence data on Soviet naval construction in Cuba, including any relevant photographs and somebody to translate them for us, so that we could arrive at our own independent judgment. That, too, has been refused.

Mr. MORSE. When did they refuse it?

Mr. FASCELL. Right from the start.

Mr. MORSE. And this was 10 days ago or so?

Mr. FASCELL. September 26, when we first started to set up our hearings. And the request has been renewed from time to time. In addition, and from the beginning, we have requested that a policy planner, somebody in a high enough position in the State Department, come and discuss with us the policy questions: The decisions; who made them; what their implications are, if any; what was the meanings of the various warnings given to the Soviets and why they were issued; and how the executive branch intends to pursue this matter in the future. All of that has been denied to us.

We were told originally that a full response to our request would have to wait until the President returned from his European trip. When the President returned, we renewed our request. But here we are today, without witnesses. So that's where we are.

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, it seems to me there are two questions here. One is whether we are entitled to get this material at all. That is something that we have been arguing about for years, discussing executive privilege and so forth.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, they haven't claimed executive privilege.

Mr. MONAGAN. They haven't claimed it, but that is what it would come down to, if you subpoenaed them.

But let me say this. The other point is: What about the other committees and press and other people getting that? Certainly we are entitled to equality with other committees or the press, and I think that we ought to have the executive in here, and have them explain what they did, why they did it, and the House, they may do so.

Mr. FASCELL. John, they won't come.

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, I think you can subpoena whoever you want, and if they want to raise an issue of contempt of—

Mr. FASCELL. Frankly, John, I am not ready to cross that bridge.

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, then, what are we talking about?

Mr. FASCELL. The first thing I wanted to do was to bring everybody up to date so that all of us may understand exactly where we are. Frankly, I don't want to wake up 10 days from now or 5 weeks from now with a global crisis on our hands. That's all.

I am just trying to get the facts.

Mr. MORSE. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman. I think under the rules of the committee a subcommittee chairman does not have the right of subpoena; only the committee chairman does. It might be pretty hard to issue a subpoena.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know about that. I wasn't going to discuss that angle, Brad, because I don't see where that would do any good, one way or another.

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, invite them to come up and tell us what happened.

Mr. KAZEN. We have.

Mr. MONAGAN. We are certainly entitled to have some explanation of it.

Mr. FASCELL. John, we have been through all this, trying since September 26.

Mr. MONAGAN. You have been through it, but not the committee and the House as such.

Mr. KAZEN. The committee has been through it through our chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. I am open for discussions as to how you think we can get them to testify. I was thinking of asking Brad to go and get them.

Mr. MORSE. I will be glad to try.

Mr. MONAGAN. It is one thing to testify about the substance of what is going on or isn't going on in Cuba but—I mean—I think it is another question, testifying as to why we can't get information. That's a different thing.

Mr. CULVER. Could we go to the press briefing?

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know—

Mr. CULVER. Can we ask?

Mr. FASCELL. Show up at the press briefing as a committee?

Mr. MONAGAN. I don't think we could get in.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I don't know. This is a serious matter, as far as I am concerned, particularly with respect to the policy questions.

Mr. MORSE. I agree.

Mr. FASCELL. Separate and apart from the facts are, because that worries me, too. I would like to know what the facts are, and if the administration wants to play it one way or the other, that's their responsibility. We can arrive at an independent judgment on that once we get the facts.

We don't even have the facts at this point. That's the thing that disturbs me.

Mr. FRASER. The hearing that the subcommittee held on September 30 was the same day that the afternoon Star—the Evening Star—published in Washington, said that informed sources indicated that pictures “taken by high-flying U-2 airplanes reportedly show the Russians installing a more elaborate shore-based station than that used in support of the American Polaris submarines,” and refers to equipment specifically associated with new Yankee-Soviet nuclear missile submarine being installed at Cienfuegos.

Now this contradicts directly what we were told that same day. I don't know what is going on over in the executive branch, but I for one would be prepared to do whatever might be done to make clear that the treatment that they are giving us, you know, is going to be reciprocated in some fashion.

You know. I maybe feel more strongly about this than other members, but I personally believe that we have been misled rather consistently by officials in the Pentagon over the past year, and I am prepared to do anything I can to bring it to an end. I don't know if

this is such a case or not, but it is consistent with what has been the pattern of representation that has been coming from the Pentagon. And I just think this is bad for the country.

I feel very strongly about it and would support any action that anybody might—the chairman might want to take.

Mr. FASCELL. Well—

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, as you know, in the Hardy subcommittee we often had similar questions raised, but in an executive session Dillon or whoever the appropriate official was at least would appear. You might get down to one question that they would say they didn't want to answer. That's why this refusal even to appear is so extreme.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes. Well, several things caused me to worry. Normally, I would be inclined to let this kind of thing pass—but when the Secretary of Defense comes out with a statement as he did yesterday, and reiterates his concern, and talks about the possibility of a shift in the strategic balance of power, and implies that this would or might affect the SALT talks, then, it seems to me, we are not just playing cute games.

That was a major policy statement by the Secretary of Defense. And the Secretary of State has also made a statement on this matter. It is, therefore, no longer a question of whether or not the Soviets are building a sub base on Cuba, or whether any base is there, or it isn't there. What we are talking about now is a major policy decision affecting the entire foreign policy of the United States.

That's the thing that disturbs me.

Mr. MORSE. Dante, what is the substance of the press conference that was held today?

Mr. FASCELL. Do you want the counsel to read Mel Laird's exact words?

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CZARNECKI. This is from yesterday's press conference of Secretary Laird. The part that pertains to Cuba begins with a question:

Mr. Secretary, can you straighten out for us the situation regarding the sub bases in Cienfuegos? There has been a lot of confusion. A lot of people off the record and some on the record deny there is any evidence there. Can you tell us exactly what we know and what it meant?

Secretary LAIRD. I think we have been rather forthcoming in our position. We have given you the movements of ships from time to time, to and from Cuba. We have recently given a briefing down here regarding the possibility of a naval base being under construction. I think I would stand by the statements that have been made, without any question by our Defense Department briefers as far as Cuba is concerned. We have no evidence that a submarine of the Polaris type has used any base in Cuba, and particularly this particular naval base. We would look upon the use of Cuba for this purpose as a very serious challenge, and one which does not follow the understandings that I believe were comprehended by both sides in 1962.

I was asked yesterday concerning the threat, if the threat situation was the same as it was in 1962. I think one has to point out that there is some difference, because you had a situation in 1962 where land-based missiles were being inserted into a third country, with some third country control, as far as the weapons were concerned. In this particular case, the threat will continue, whether Cuba is used as a missile submarine base or not, because missile-carrying submarines are already on station as far as the United States is concerned.

The added increment, however, that would be acquired by the Soviet Navy, should it use Cuba for such a base, would be that it would increase the threat, because these submarines could remain on station for a longer period of time.

Thus through this simple act, which we regard as a very serious problem and one which we are watching very carefully, the threat could be substantially increased as far as the United States is concerned.

This fits in with my concern that I have expressed to the Congress on numerous occasions that the Polaris threat of the Soviet Union is expanding on a very rapid basis. It has gone now to the point where they have 28 submarines. I am talking about the Polaris-type submarines, 28 submarines in being and under construction, and will reach or go ahead of us early in 1974 as far as their Polaris missile firing capability is concerned.

We do regard this as a very serious matter, but in answering your question, I can say that there is no evidence at this time that a Polaris-type Soviet submarine has used Cuba as a base, and we would regard this as a very serious matter, and I want you to know that we are watching it very closely.

Question: Isn't it true that you have pictures showing that in one month's time they increased their building at this base from two to eight or ten? Don't you have evidence that they are building?

Secretary LAIRD. Two to eight or ten what?

Question: Eight or ten structures they are building, increased their building from two to eight or ten buildings. Isn't it true that you have the evidence that they are building an eight-lane highway from this port to Havana?

Secretary LAIRD. I don't care to comment at this time on intelligence-gathering information which we have. I think we have made it clear that there is evidence that a naval base construction is going forward.

In answering Mr. Kelly's question, he limited his question to a submarine base, and I think that in answering his question, we have no evidence that a Polaris-type submarine has used this particular base. I want to make it abundantly clear that we are watching this very closely. We do not have the evidence that a Polaris-type submarine has used these particular facilities.

It is true, though, that over the last four or five years that there have been ship calls by the Soviet Navy to Cuba. We have had several submarine visits of a different class of submarine, from time to time, almost on a yearly basis. We have announced the visits of Soviet missile carrying cruisers and destroyers over the past three or four years.

We followed the policy, since I have been Secretary of Defense, of announcing it right here. So the last two years, I think we have announced three different visits of Soviet fleet units to Cuban ports.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you say you have no evidence that these Polaris-type subs have visited this base in Cuba. What does our evidence show this base to be, a submarine base or what?

Secretary LAIRD. We are watching it very carefully. As far as the movement of ships into the Mediterranean and Caribbean, I will see that an update is given to you this week of the Soviet Navy movements in the Caribbean, as well as in the Mediterranean. I will set up such an update, here one morning this week, so that you can have update information regarding the activities of Soviet naval units.

We have tried to do that from time to time, and rather than get into the specific movements at this press conference, when I know you have other areas that you want to cover, I will see that such an update is made available to the Pentagon Press Corps this week.

Question: Mr. Secretary, how do you answer the argument of those who say that Cienfuegos will be no different than Rota or Holy Loch?

Secretary LAIRD. I think there is a great difference, as it changes the entire balance during this important period when we are going forward with the SALT talks. The situation that existed as far as NATO, as far as the British base, and as far as the Spanish base is concerned was in existence prior to the time we went into the SALT negotiations. This was certainly well understood by the other side. It was understood by our NATO allies. It was understood by the Warsaw Pact. It was understood by the Soviet Union.

A change in balance at this time would have to be considered as a very serious act, as far as any defense planners concerning the United States.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Chairman, you reported earlier, I think, there was some announcement made today that there were certain dismantling operations going on. Could that be repeated please?

Mr. CZARNECKI. There are two items relating to Soviet naval activity in and around Cuba. One is a "Memorandum for Correspondents," dated October 13, 1970, which we received this morning from the Defense Department, pursuant to our request. It runs a page and a half.

And then there is a statement that was issued at 12:30 today, jointly by the State Department and the Defense Department, which we have received over the telephone.

The statement released at 12:30 relates to a TASS story denying that the Soviet Union is building its base on Cuba and is as follows: "We consider the TASS article to be a positive step, and we will continue to watch the situation in Cuba closely."

Mr. FASCELL. Now the TASS article that this joint announcement refers to is an official statement in the Soviet newspaper, representing the governmental position, that the Soviets are not—exactly what is that quote—Soviet quote?

Mr. CZARNECKI. The Soviet quote is: "TASS has been authorized to state that the Soviet Union has not built and is not building its military base in Cuba, and is not doing anything that would contradict the understanding reached between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States in 1962."

Mr. MORSE. What was the State-Defense reference to that TASS article?

Mr. CULVER. It was viewed as a positive statement.

Mr. CZARNECKI. "We consider the TASS article to be a positive step."

Mr. MORSE. Thank you, Dante.

Mr. FASCELL. So, that's where we are.

Now without any conjecture, as far as that base in Cienfuegos is concerned, the Secretary of Defense was very careful in talking only about a Polaris-type submarine. But is that the real issue?

(Discussion off the record.)

I can't remember now, but it seems to me that the Secretary of Defense estimated that it would significantly increase the life on station of a nuclear sub, to have a tender on the spot in Cuba. Obviously if they could run into the Cienfuegos Bay, where they have quiet waters and servicing facilities, it could make it a lot easier for them to maintain their military capabilities. In addition, of course, the Soviet political thrust in the Caribbean is something not to be ignored.

(Discussion off the record.)

It seems to me, and all of this is conjecture on my part, that the Russians are playing a real clever game of putting the heat to the United States. They are making sure that the Caribbean is not going to be a "U.S. lake." They have decided to make it tough for us, militarily. They are also putting the pressure on United States politically in carrying out their new "grand design" in Latin America, which includes the ostensible rejection of violence and use of established institutions to seize power.

And you know, the things that are happening coincidentally in Chile and Bolivia, and the whole thrust of nationalism in Latin America, suits their design perfectly. The Soviets have the apparatus and

if they build up their strength, politically, they can put a tremendous burden on the United States.

If we play it cool, we may be fine. On the other hand, who knows?

These are some of the things that go through my mind. I am sure there are others of equal importance that go through yours.

Mr. BINGHAM. Just kind of thinking out loud, could I suggest this as a possibility? I would suppose that the executive branch would be very reluctant to have you get up on the floor of the House in a special order, and recite this series of events, which you could do, in a very restrained factual way.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, Jack, I have been thinking about issuing a statement, and, as of this moment, I am not sure that I want to do that.

Mr. BINGHAM. Well, I just started by saying I think they would be very reluctant to have you do that, and I think if their chronology were typed up, and you had a meeting with them, and said, "Look, we don't think this is the way things ought to be done, and without revealing any confidential information, I have seriously considered advising the House that this is what has been done to the House. Now will you have your people up here to talk about it, or what do you want to do?"

Mr. FASCELL. Well, we are going to be leaving here at the end of business on Wednesday. We couldn't possibly get this thing set up, and they probably couldn't make their decision that fast. The question really boils down to, "Can any of us gamble and wait until after the elections?"

That's the question as I see it. If this whole issue has some political overtones, can we, as Members of Congress, in carrying out our responsibility, gamble on the administration until after the election? Should we do that? That seems to me to be the issue. Otherwise each of us, in our own way, has the responsibility of doing whatever needs to be done.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. KAZEN. During the last hearing, Mr. Prentice said, and I quote: "I would just like to say it was my understanding that the hearing was purely an intelligence briefing."

He is talking about this hearing, I presume.

Mr. FASCELL. No; he was talking about that hearing of September 30.

Mr. KAZEN. This hearing, the one that was held, was purely an intelligence briefing, "and that from the standpoint of the State Department. When we helped to arrange it, it was with the understanding that we would not get into policy questions, but would merely brief you on the intelligence situation."

Did you agree to that?

Mr. FASCELL. What happened was this, Chick. They had refused at that time to send any policy people down, and we said, "Well, give us at least the intelligence briefing now, and send the policy people later."

They weren't even going to do that.

Mr. KAZEN. So, therefore, just to get it clear in my mind, we have never had any policy spokesman before this subcommittee.

Mr. FASCELL. No.

Mr. KAZEN. They have refused to come in and give us any policy statement.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Prentice, simply as a matter of the State Department maintaining their liaison, sat in on that meeting, but they refused at that time to designate anybody to come up and testify.

Mr. KAZEN. That's right, but what I wanted to make clear in the record, Mr. Chairman, is that you did ask for policy personnel to come—

Mr. FASCELL. Oh, yes; and we asked after that meeting, also.

Mr. MORSE. Dante, is that the only hearing that has been held on this entire exercise?

Mr. FASCELL. By anybody? Well, Senator Frank Church had a briefing. I assume it was the same briefing we received.

Mr. MORSE. That's the only briefing that this subcommittee has had, even though there have been requests for several meetings?

Mr. FASCELL. Right; except for this one, where we wanted to bring everybody up to date. I didn't feel we could leave here on Wednesday without everybody being informed and deciding what it is that we ought to do.

Mr. MORSE. Right; do we know what the Armed Services Committee has received? Any way of finding out, through the staff?

Mr. WHALLEY. He had a photograph.

Mr. MONAGAN. That would be Defense probably, wouldn't it?

Mr. CULVER. Mr. Chairman, have you had occasion to make a public statement on this question yourself?

Mr. FASCELL. I have made several public statements, John, with respect to this issue.

Mr. CULVER. I was curious what statements you made.

Mr. FASCELL. My first statement was that if the Russians are expanding their military and political thrust in the Caribbean, causing the obvious problems that that will cause, that it was inconceivable for the United States to be cutting back on our military capability in southeast Florida.

The reason I said that was because last year the Department of Defense considered closing the Key West Naval Base, which is one of the finest on the Atlantic Seaboard.

I also called on the administration to nip the new Soviet challenge in the bud—not to do anything irrational, but to level with the Congress and the American people in explaining the developments in Cienfuegos which the President thought important enough for the White House to issue a warning to the Soviets.

That is the public posture I took in my district, and also up here in the House Chamber.

Mr. CULVER. But I was curious what conclusion you personally had drawn, based on the intelligence briefing and/or the cumulative assessment of this chronology?

Mr. FASCELL. My own conclusion, derived from my observations over the years, is that the Russians are trying to turn Cuba into a major military base, one that would give them fantastic logistical support for air, ground and naval operations. Although they may not choose to threaten us militarily, the political ramifications of such a development could be so great in Latin America that guys would start choosing up sides.

Mr. CULVER. Were you persuaded? I wasn't in on that earlier intelligence briefing, but were you persuaded on the information that was made available at that time that there was, in fact, sufficient hard evidence to justify the conclusion of a naval base facility being constructed?

Mr. FASCELL. Not a naval base facility, because that involves a question of definition. If you are thinking in terms of hard concrete and great big machine shops, and drydocks, that does not seem to be there.

Mr. CULVER. Well, what specific evidence was there to give rise to this conclusion?

Mr. FASCELL. Well, there is a little group of islands in the middle of Cienfuegos Bay which contains a Cuban naval installation. Now the Secretary of Defense himself said yesterday that the Russians were constructing some identifiable things there, including some buildings.

They don't seem to be sure what they are.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. KAZEN. And are those moorings permanent?

Mr. FASCELL. Is any mooring permanent? It is, if you latch onto it, Chick. We don't know what kind.

Mr. KAZEN. It is there now. From now on any vessel could come in and tie up to it.

Mr. FASCELL. The way I read it, they have done the minimal kind of thing which would make this bay a nice place to come into and run a little task force into, and take care of their people.

Mr. CULVER. For all practical purposes, then, they have established a base.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, it depends on your definition, don't you see?

Mr. CULVER. Did they offer any military conclusion as to the relative degree in which this would increase their overall military capability in the area, to have a stationary tender capability as distinguished from one at sea? What that really means in military terms?

Mr. FASCELL. I believe it would substantially increase the time that Soviet subs could remain at sea.

Mr. CULVER. I see.

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, they would stay on station about twice as long as they normally could.

Mr. FRASER. But the tender can service the submarines at sea.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. The only advantage so far in there is that the waters are quiet, but in the Caribbean there are a zillion islands, so it is a matter of finding a quiet lee of an island, you know, to tie up some submarines next to.

But what they made clear, the briefers.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. Yes, it depends on your definition exactly.

Mr. FRASER. If you said "facility," that is something else. The only explanation is that there appear to be barracks buildings and the soccer field; that might be an R. & R. thing.

Mr. CULVER. Now independent of the Church-Fulbright suggestion that this could well be a political ruse to develop increased support for an appropriation—and I don't see why they need it anyway—

Mr. FASCELL. That's the thing. They didn't need it. The appropriation bill wasn't in trouble.

Mr. CULVER. But independently of that, is it possible that this could be a leak that was intended to buttress our negotiation posture at the SALT talks, for some reason or another?

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know. This is the kind of stuff we don't know. And I told Dave Abshire when I talked to him, I laid all the cards on the table, and I said:

Look, I am trying to find out who is the guy that dreams up this kind of stuff, what's his name, how long has he been in the Department? What is his purpose? What are we doing?

That's all we are trying to find out.

Mr. CULVER. The difficult thing, frankly, in just very basic political terms, is I have been approached by several constituents who have said, "What about the building of a Soviet base in Cuba?" I know you get it far more intensively, of course, than we ever would, but I even have it and "as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, what do you have to say about it?"

And I must say, on the basis of what evidence you have available, independent of their refusal to even come, it makes it extremely difficult, if not obviously, impossible to give an informed answer of any kind.

Mr. FASCELL. That's right, John because you may have to say the whole thing has been overplayed.

Mr. CULVER. Or they think so little of our subcommittee that they will float it in the paper, but won't float it with us.

Mr. FASCELL. I wasn't thinking about that, but if you look at the evidence that we have so far, you wonder why they would go so far as to arrange White House and Defense statements, especially when the appropriations bill is not in trouble.

So that's one thing. A type of a "leak."

Mr. FRASER. A series of leaks.

Mr. FASCELL. Then you would say, OK, they dropped that baby and they got past that hurdle, and they want everybody to quiet down, because the bill passed and it is all over. But it isn't all over. They keep coming back and making additional statements to the press.

Mr. CULVER. Or the President's Vietnam initiatives. They don't want to adversely affect that, in terms of Soviet-United States relations.

Mr. MONAGAN. At the moment they are going to look pretty good. They have spoken, and now the Russians are taking the ships out of there. So that—

Mr. CULVER. It is a mini-facedown.

Mr. MONAGAN. But that point of view, it makes it more difficult for us to raise our objection.

Mr. FASCELL. I understand. As far as the White House timing is concerned, with the ships leaving, and they were probably going to leave anyway, they may have done a beautiful thing politically.

I wouldn't deny that. But what's going to happen next?

Mr. MORSE. This doesn't compare with the 1962 and 1968 exercises.

Mr. FASCELL. We have already characterized it as a mini-confrontation.

Mr. MORSE. Right.

Mr. FRASER. That tender has called at Cuban ports in the past.

Mr. FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. CULVER. Couldn't you say, though, "we were squint-to-squint, and they blinked"?

Mr. FASCELL. Anyway, the ships left Saturday and it was announced by us today at noon.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Kazen.

Mr. KAZEN. As a fairly new member of the subcommittee, and in the Congress, I am very disturbed by the questions that this whole situation poses. And I think that you put your finger on it.

There is something much more important than the base now. Just what jurisdiction does this subcommittee have? Are we entitled to get this information or are we not?

Mr. FASCELL. Well, Mr. Kazen, we are entitled to it, but whether we get it from the administration is something else again.

Mr. KAZEN. All right, then. Suppose, as some other member said, we—

Mr. FASCELL. If we could pass the Zablocki resolution, you see, we might have had that clear signal to the administration which could eliminate this kind of foolishness.

Mr. KAZEN. All right, what can this subcommittee do then in order to make them at least talk to us?

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know. That's something we want to discuss here. I think, first of all, the responsibility is on each Member to call it like he sees it.

Secondly, from a subcommittee or committee standpoint, I can't see that there is any wisdom in a subcommittee posture, as a subcommittee.

Mr. KAZEN. Well, why do we insist then?

Why do we have—

Mr. MONAGAN. You mean as related to the full committee?

Mr. FASCELL. Well, as related to the Executive. You can't have a confrontation with the Executive on an issue of this type and win.

Mr. MONAGAN. How about something short of that? I mean, we have talked about subpoena, and about bringing—no, now wait a minute. I am saying another thing that is possible is to talk either to the President or to the Secretary of State, as a committee, and point out these things.

Mr. FASCELL. John, I am willing to do those kinds of things—except that we are running out of time—

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, I don't know—

Mr. FASCELL. After the election we will have a whole different ballgame, a whole different problem. I will guarantee you that.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, I am not thinking about now. I am thinking about in the future. Why should we as Members of Congress, on this subcommittee or on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, say to the administration or ask them, "Will you please come in here and tell us" And if they say "No," we become just stepchildren. There is not a darn thing we are entitled to.

Mr. FASCELL. Chick, if you can figure a way around this, let us know right away.

Mr. KAZEN. Mr. Chairman, let me ask you this—just how free are we, as Members of the Congress, and particularly of this committee and this subcommittee, to go out and speak our minds on this thing?

Mr. FASCELL. Well, I would say this: That is your own responsibility. I would not, however, specifically release any information that came to use through a secret briefing.

Mr. KAZEN. No, no.

Mr. FASCELL. I would not do that.

Mr. KAZEN. I am talking about the chronology, the fact that they refused to come in here and honor a request from this subcommittee.

Mr. FASCELL. That's different.

Mr. KAZEN. Is this privileged?

Mr. CULVER. If you know anything, we will swear you as a witness.

Mr. KAZEN. I mean we know that we have asked them to come in and testify, and that they have refused. Is this privileged?

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. I had promised to recognize Clem Zablocki first, Irving Whalley next.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, I seem to recall a similar incident. I think it involved the CIA—where a subcommittee wanted the intelligence agency to testify and they refused to do so. Then the chairman had called them, and they testified before the full committee.

They may have some question as to the jurisdiction of this subcommittee, as far as the overall aspects of this development are involved. I think, however, that it can be done before we adjourn if you go to the chairman and the chairman gets on the phone and says that more than half of his Foreign Affairs Committee wants a meeting tomorrow, at 2 o'clock, I think you will wake them up.

I think they will come. Otherwise, you could try a resolution of inquiry. You won't get it tomorrow, however.

Mr. FASCELL. I think we can get plenty of action when we come back, Clem.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. But you want it now. And I think the chairman would be sufficiently interested.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Morse.

Mr. MORSE. You mentioned facetiously that maybe that I could work on them.

I would be pleased to do it, and just let the Secretary know how concerned the subcommittee is, properly so, in my opinion, and just tell him if he doesn't move—

Mr. FASCELL. Brad, I don't think we have been unreasonable. I don't think our posture is unreasonable.

Mr. MORSE. I agree.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't think any of us are going to jeopardize the security of the country.

Mr. KAZEN. And the press knows more than we do.

Mr. MORSE. The press has received more.

Mr. KAZEN. And they have been promised some more.

Mr. FRASER. The Russians know even more. Those who don't know are we and the American people.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. This is inexcusable, particularly since the executive branch took the position that they will have closer cooperation with the legislative branch.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, gentlemen, that's the whole story, as of right now, and if we get anything else, we will keep you posted on it, as rapidly as possible.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, is there any chance of following Clem's suggestion?


Mr. FASCELL. I was going to say that I will talk to Chairman Morgan and see if there is any possibility of doing anything tomorrow. I would rather do that, and get turned down, than not try and have something happen between now and the election.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. FASCELL. All right, gentlemen, the subcommittee will stand adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)



SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1970

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met in open session at 10:18 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John S. Monagan (acting chairman) presiding.

Mr. MONAGAN. We call the hearing to order.

Unfortunately, because of the complications relating to our schedule, other Members have not been able to get here, but I think we should go ahead, in deference to Mr. Reyes and to those who are here to listen to his testimony, and we shall hope that other Members will come along as we proceed.

We meet this morning to continue the subcommittee's inquiry into developments in Cuba and elsewhere in the Caribbean area.

In July of this year, the subcommittee had the pleasure of receiving testimony from Mr. Manolo Reyes, a leader in the Cuban exile community of Miami, and director of Latin American news at station WTVJ in Miami.

In his interesting testimony, Mr. Reyes called the subcommittee's attention to some unusual naval activity in Cuba, including the buildup of facilities for servicing of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines. It was on that occasion that the possibility of a Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos was mentioned by Mr. Reyes.

As we all know, 2 months later, on September 25th, the White House caused a considerable international stir by announcing that the Soviets appeared to be building a naval facility which could be a submarine base in Cienfuegos Bay.

The developments which followed that disclosure have never been fully explained to the subcommittee. We will continue to pursue them with the appropriate officials of the executive branch.

In the meantime, however, we are happy to welcome Mr. Reyes here again to present us with further information on developments in Cuba, particularly those that may relate to the submarine base issue.

Mr. Reyes, you may proceed with your statement, sir. We welcome you.

STATEMENT OF MANOLO REYES, DIRECTOR OF LATIN AMERICAN NEWS, STATION WTVJ, MIAMI, FLA.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee:

I want to thank you for this opportunity to be back before you, to disclose the latest information I have been furnished with concerning the Soviet military domination in Cuba.

I want to make it very clear that I am not a military expert, and I don't have the means to know technical matters. But I feel it my duty I should tell you all the facts, figures, and evaluation that I have, so you find out if what I say is true or not.

For many years, I have been a catalyst of the Cuban situation, so today, it is not my voice addressing you, but the voice of many thousands of Cubans, who are suffering in the island from one end to another; the voice of many Cubans, who are actually risking their lives, working in the underground, and furnishing information that otherwise we would not know, and the voice also of many Cubans who have told the truth, upon arriving in this land of freedom.

In other words, it is not my credibility, but that of the Cuban people.

On June 29, 1970, I was for 3½ hours testifying in a closed-door meeting of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate. Less than a month later, this is, on July 27, I had the honor and the privilege of testifying before this subcommittee. I was called again today, and I can state with full responsibility that the different pieces of the Soviet military strength in Cuba have been put together, like a puzzle, and you will hear, in a few minutes, the conclusion of our evaluation.

Since I am actually a Cuban citizen, I first want to state that in no way, and at no time, the sovereignty of a future free Cuba will be endangered by what you are going to hear. On the contrary. The following declarations will take place, considering the traditional friendship between this wonderful country of the United States of America and my country, Cuba.

That friendship dates back to our ancestors, and I make these statements to protect and safeguard the freedom and security of the Western Hemisphere.

The foregoing history is the repetition of the case of the Trojan horse in America—that horse, who externally was naive and beautiful, and on the other hand, internally, had the military strength to destroy their opponents.


To begin with, if you allow me, I will go to the maps that I just brought to your attention.

Mr. MONAGAN. Very well.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My presentation has two parts: the reference about Cienfuegos, and then the general scope of the military strength of the Soviet Union in my country.

(The following map of Cienfuegos, Cuba, area was shown:)



Mr. REYES. This is the Bay of Cienfuegos, in Cuba. It is approximately 6 miles wide. And here is the city of Cienfuegos.

To begin the description, let me tell you—

Mr. GROSS. How large is Cienfuegos? The population?

Mr. REYES. I would say about 200,000 people, but I have to state that it is difficult to pinpoint how many people are in a city right now, under Castro, because he moved the troops back and forth so rapidly that to make a guess is difficult.

Now, on July 27, when I came here, I said, and I reaffirm today, that in some place, somewhere in the Caribbean, there is a permanent Soviet naval squadron, headed by a nuclear submarine; and the chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Fascell, asked me—and it is on page 179 of the record—where do I think it would be based, and according to the information I have from the underground sources, I said, either Cienfuegos or Havana.

Why we made that statement: In 1963, the Castro regime began to show an interest in Cienfuegos, in the way, saying that they were making a yard, a shipyard, in Cienfuegos Bay, near the port industrial area.

This yard, in 1963, in April, was reported as beginning to build up ships for the Castro regime, and actually the Castro regime said that the yard was only for sugar, to put out sugar sacks for the different nations with which they trade.

In 1967, that yard was concluded; and it cost, according to the information we got, about \$8 million, and not a single sack of sugar came out of that yard.

Then after a period of time, in 1970, we began to hear about the activity in Cienfuegos, Cienfuegos Bay, especially near Cayo Alcatraz. Cayo Alcatraz is about five blocks long, and about two blocks wide.

From the city of Cienfuegos, you don't see, in a normal day, Cayo Alcatraz. At night, the city of Cienfuegos, right now, is under a tremendous shortage of electricity, like the population of Cuba, the civil population. I am not talking about the military. The civil population of Cuba.


So in the blackout of the city of Cienfuegos, at night, it can be seen—until last Monday, when I came here to Washington—and this was the last report I have. At night, you can see the lights on the horizon. You can't see the key, but you can see the lights, the floodlights of the people working in that Cayo Alcatraz.

Cayo Alcatraz about 3 years ago was taken by the Soviet Union, and nobody is allowed to be in the vicinity. The middle of this year, in this place, that is called La Milpa, and it is right in front of Alcatraz Key, there were a lot of fishermen. All the Cuban fishermen have been taken out from that place, under the orders of not being back here, and they have been moved to different places in Cuba.

Now in Cayo Alcatraz, they have put an underwater net, like this, surrounding the key. Nobody knows for what, they have that net. And the work continued 24 hours a day.

In this area, called Jagua, which is the entrance of the bay, with La Milpa, there are Soviet soldiers, guards, over there, watching the entrance of Cienfuegos Bay.

Right here (indicating), the information we have is that they have put an antisubmarine net at the entrance of Cienfuegos Bay.



Mr. REYES. Just for your information, about 1 year ago, there was a spy ship of the Soviet Union, and this spy ship was in the vicinity of Punta de Ladrillos, right here, and that ship was there for almost 4 months.

The waters of the bay are very calm, proper to do any kind of job on ships. Soviet sailors have been seen lately, in the last 3 months, walking in Cienfuegos streets, and the sailors are with full uniform, white and light blue.

These sailors are transported by six Leyland buses, and apparently they come from here (indicating) up to there, near Cayo Alcatraz, and then they are taken to Cayo Alcatraz.

We don't have all the details, because you can imagine that the Cubans in these areas, and the Cubans right here, have been disbanded by the Castro regime, and if somebody is caught around here, who is not military personnel, he is taken to a concentration camp.

Now it is important to remark to the subcommittee that the whole thing on the Cienfuegos story began when the Soviet Union sent three barges to that bay.

Let me point it out that the first Soviet naval squadron that went to Cuba went on July 26, 1969, went as a courtesy visit. That is what they said.

On May 14, this year, the second naval squadron went to Cuba and entered in Cienfuegos Bay, and this time, they stated that they were there to refuel and resupply.

And the third naval squadron went to Cuba on September 9, with the big barges, and they anchored here.

Mr. MONAGAN. What was that last?

Mr. REYES. September 9.

Mr. MONAGAN. You said they entered here?

Mr. REYES. They entered in Cienfuegos Bay and they have three barges, that on September 25, prompted the statement of the Pentagon saying that there was a possibility that the Soviet Union was building a submarine nuclear base in Cienfuegos.

Now on the evaluation and the reports that we have—and I repeat, I am not a military expert, but as a resident of this country, I feel my duty to tell to the community, to analyze if it is true or not—all these areas, up to Cienfuegos, have been banned to Cuban people. And here the Soviets are working.

There is a pipeline, a big pipeline, from the bottom of the Alcatraz key to Cienfuegos. They have established big warehouses on the key, and apparently a powerful radio station, as if putting out the headquarters for some naval complex.

Mr. GROSS. How deep is that bay?

Mr. REYES. Here, all the green line (dotted) is 20 feet in depth. And the rest could be a hundred to 500 feet in depth.

Mr. KAZEN. And did you say that the pipeline was under the bay?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. When was that pipeline built?

Mr. REYES. In the last 3 months. Since Cayo Alcatraz began with all these stories in the news. From here to Cienfuegos.

Mr. KAZEN. A distance of 5 miles?

Mr. REYES. More or less. I would say 3 to 5 miles. Between here and here, if it is 6. I think it is about 3 miles, I would say.

Now continuing the description: all of this place has been banned to Cubans. And right here, the Castro regime has built a road of eight lanes and has prohibited the Cuban people from taking these roads; and this road goes directly to the Escambray Mountains, and there is a place, called the Hill of the Winds, Colina de los Vientos, where the Soviets have been working for almost 8 months. Nobody, nobody that is not Soviet, is allowed to be there. And the underground got the word that they have been transporting lead units to this place of Los Vientos.

Mr. MONAGAN. Transporting what?

Mr. REYES. Lead units. I would like you to excuse my English, and please—bear with me, because sometimes I don't express myself correctly.

Mr. MONAGAN. Ingots? Pieces of lead?

Mr. REYES. The report I have is lead units. Unidades de plomo. I can't pinpoint this exactly, but this is the way I was told.

Now there is another thing that is very important. The Soviet barges have been here, the two barges. And the Russian barges left through El Mariel port in the northern part of Cuba, and let me point out that El Mariel port is the No. 1 military port of the Soviet Union since 1961-62, during the crisis, and most of the offensive weapons that were

introduced in Cuba were introduced precisely through El Mariel port.

So my question is this: Either the barges had something, and left Cienfuegos Bay to go to El Mariel and leave it there, or they were empty and went to El Mariel, picked up something, and came back to Cienfuegos.

And according to the information I have, I am inclined to believe that they went empty, picked up something in El Mariel, and came back to Cienfuegos.

Let me explain what has been seen in Cuba on the barges, and this is very interesting.

In this place, around here—

Mr. MONAGAN. You are pointing to a point.

Mr. REYES. Cayo Carenas; and Punta de Ladrillos is here. It is very deep; here it is very deep, and it is far away from the city.

Now the barges first—the spy Soviet ship was there, as I told you before. Then it left. And when the barges came, the two barges, they stayed here, in this way. This is the barge (indicating), and then they dropped four things like anchors. I can't say they are anchors. They are pieces of steel, to hold the barge.

And then they put a buoy in each of the anchors. One here, one here (indicating).

The report of the underground is that a nuclear submarine came from this area, in the entrance of Cienfuegos at night; it came to Cienfuegos at night, so that it can't be detected from the air, and immediately went between the two barges, and it was marked through the buoys.

The submarine came here, and they put canvas from barge to barge, to disguise what was going beneath the canvas. During nighttime, it is impossible to detect it. During the daytime, they put the canvas on, and they were working down there.

Mr. KAZEN. What date was that?


Mr. REYES. I would say it was around September the 15th. I don't want to be exact, but it was around that time, between September the 13th to the 20th, in that vicinity, that they were there. And this is the way the drydock is functioning in that area of Cienfuegos.

Now you can ask, What about Cayo Alcatraz? Cayo Alcatraz is a place far away from Cienfuegos, and in our evaluation, it is a maintenance and supply point for the submarines. It is not a proper base. And I say maintenance, because the nuclear submarines do not need fuel, as you well know. They have the atomic reactor, and they go up and down.

But it is a proven fact, and I think it was a U.S. submarine, nuclear submarine, that was 270 or 280 days beneath the water; and when it comes up, one of the effects that they noticed was on the crew.

So actually, the nuclear submarines need water, need medicines, they need food, but they need the crew, too; and the crew, according to the information I had, can be replaced through Cayo Alcatraz, in Cienfuegos. Send it here, and it gives a strategic military value to the whole place. Plus the fact that Cayo Alcatraz is the motor nerve, is the center, of a total military naval complex of the Soviet Union.

This is a picture, more or less, of the barges. Not a picture, but a drawing. The eyewitness gave me the information, and we drew these.



Mr. REYES. Now going further, I show you the map of Cuba and analyze. Cienfuegos is right here. But for your information, Cayo Largo is a key, 64 miles south-southwest of Cienfuegos; and since 1961-62, this key has been taken by the Soviet Union. We can call it in English "Key Largo," but I don't want to say Key Largo, due to Florida; it is Cayo Largo, in the southern part of Cuba.

Mr. REYES. No fisherman is allowed to go near this Cayo Largo, and the Soviet Union since 1962 has been building here. First in the shape of a V, at the western part of the key, they have built a big pier, plus a strip, about, I would say, 1,000 feet, between 1,200 to a thousand feet, right here, and on the surface of the key they have huge buildings of irregular forms, that we can't determine what they are.

In the eastern part of that key, the water—the regular water, not the salt water—but the regular water is tremendous. They have a lot of water.

And on the southern part of that key, there is a beautiful, wide beach, and you walk 5, 10 feet, and then the depth is about 500 feet, a thousand, 2,000; it is the open Caribbean.

That is why many people realize, or believe, in the underground, that the Soviet has something very important there, that I will tell about later on.

Right here [indicating] we have Isle of Pines. The Isle of Pines was the base of the prisons of Cuba up to 1967, and this is important to note. The capital is Nueva Gerona, and the island is almost divided in two by a big swamp.

Here in the Bay of Sigüanea, the Soviet Union established the base of the so-called Comsomol boats, that I told you in the last presentation that I had here, that they have missiles, with a capability of 40 to 50 miles, and that once we affirm that they are surface-to-surface, and offensive weapons, and the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate, by the United States intelligence department of the Coast Guard.

In this Bay of Sigüanea, for years, the Soviet Union has established the bases of these Comsomol boats, and all of the people, all the civilians in the northern part of Isle of Pines, little by little have been drained out of Isle of Pines, into the different provinces of Cuba. In the southern part of Isle of Pines, there were a lot of people, fishermen and those people who collect, who cut the trees, to make—

Mr. MONAGAN. Lumbermen.

Mr. REYES. Lumbermen. That's it. I am sorry—lumbermen from Great Cayman. These lumbermen from Great [Grand] Cayman came here, and in the last few years, the Castro regime has been taking them out of the southern part of Isle of Pines, and sending them to Nueva Gerona, and from Nueva Gerona they have sent them to the different provinces of Cuba.

In 1967, to be exact, the political prisoners that were there in the number of 5,000 were taken out of the island, and Castro put out a big display of propaganda, saying that the prisons in Cuba, or the typical prison of Isle of Pines, was going to be closed, and from thereon, it was going to be called the Island of the Youth.

The problem is that the political prisoners were taken out to the fields to work, on slavery work, and they saw the Russians, and many times, they fed information back. I don't want to go into all the details, because they are people that can be harmed. They are still in Cuba. But they were removed from there, and taken to different prisons, throughout the island.

They didn't end the prisoner situation in Cuba; they removed it to different prisons. They took the prisoners from Isle of Pines, the civilians from Isles of Pines, and they left the island alone, almost alone, for the purposes of the Soviets and the hard-core Communists of the regime.

Right here [indicating], in the Bay of Siguanea, 2 miles from the coast, are the hills called Altura Central, and in these hills, the Russians have been working, putting in nobody knows what, and nobody is allowed to come near Siguanea, Altura Central, or the southern part of Isle of Pines. Plus, the rest of the island is in the hands of the hard-core Communists of Cuba—of the Communists, plus Soviets.

Right here, they have a lot of jungle and woods, and immediately, a beautiful beach, and the depth here, as in Cayo Largo, 1,500, 2,000, 4,000 feet.

I said at the beginning of my presentation that the puzzle has been put together. You remember the last time I came here, I showed different convoys, and it was printed in the record, and these are Soviet convoys, that have been seen in the last 6 months in Cuba, with Soviet soldiers, in full uniform, and no Castro soldiers.

To be exact, just at the beginning of this month of November, in Pinar del Rio Province, in the southern part of Pinar del Rio, there was a convoy, with a high-ranking officer of the Soviet Union, that the underground believes is a general, with a driver at his side, no weapons, and behind him, five trucks, big trucks, following that convoy.

All these convoys that I reported, that were coming through Pinar del Rio, through Havana, and through Matanzas—and you will remember that I never mentioned Las Villas, Camaguey, or Oriente—had one point to come for most of them—I don't say all—most of them—Surgidero de Batabano—in the southern part of the island.

They came here, here, and here, Surgidero de Batabano, these Soviet troops, in full uniform, have been shipped to Isle of Pines and to Cayo Largo, which leads us to believe that there is a naval military complex of the Soviet Union in the southern part of the island, with an operational base on Cayo Largo, a base of surveillance in Isle of Pines, and the headquarters, transmitting orders in Cienfuegos Bay, challenging Guantanamo Naval Base.

And furthermore, I brought this map to your attention. And you can see that the Caribbean, the Mediterranean of the Western Hemisphere, is here the center, the heart of the whole continent. And this heart has been guarded, and safe, by the United States, with a base in Puerto Rico, a base in Guantanamo, and right here, in the Panama Canal.

But if the Soviet Union challenged the United States in the southern part of the island, through Cienfuegos, Cayo Largo, and the Isle of Pines, here you have the complete challenge to Guantanamo Naval Base, and to the Caribbean.

And if they take this seaway, the Western Hemisphere, the roots of navigation will be in the hands of the Soviet Union.

Right here, in the northern part of Camaguey, in the east, Cayo Romano, and Cayo Sabinal, in the northern part of Camaguey, the Soviet Union has strengthened the Castro regime with weapons. All the traffic from Panama, and South America, coming from here through Maisi up here, has to go exactly in front of the Archipelago of Romano, because the depth here is very poor, and the channel, the old Channel of Bahamas, is right there, dominated by the Castro regime.

And they are challenging in the northern part, and remember, Cienfuegos is right on the same parallel to Panama, directly to the Panama Canal.

And if this is a reality, then the ships will have to cross through Tierra del Fuego, through the southern part of the continent, because this will be in the hands of the Soviet Union, dominating the Caribbean.

This is the picture that we have puzzled together, and that we bring to your attention, and I repeat—I have something more to say there, but I repeat, I am not a military expert. I don't have the means to prove, by pictures, and so forth, all of what we are saying.

But I have the feeling that all of this is true, and history has shown that people that have been in advance saying things like this, sometimes have been taken as ridiculous, or regarded in a hilarious way. I never forget Col. Billy Mitchell.

Continuing my presentation, and I don't want to take more of your time, I have prepared something that I would like to read, to describe the Trojan horse of Cuba. Because it is not only Cienfuegos, it is the complete island, from one end to another, that is an armed camp of the Soviet Union.

There is one Cuba on the top, and there is another Cuba on the bottom, in the caves, beneath the surface.

To reaffirm the Trojan horse thesis, let us start saying that if at this moment the radar screen of the United States projects an enemy aircraft carrier ready to attack, it will be immediately intercepted and attacked.

Cuba today is an aircraft carrier of the Soviet Union, consisting of 900 miles, entrenched in the heart of the hemisphere, within 90 miles of the United States.

We are going to try to prove in the next few minutes that the enemy aircraft carrier has turned into the Trojan horse, which externally does not show the tremendous military installation, and tactical arms on the Cuban soil, to avoid being detected through the means which democracies possess.

Let us start saying that Cuba is very rich in minerals, such as nickel, copper, chrome, cobalt, iron, and manganese. Cuba has always been considered as the second country in America in iron reserves—the first is Venezuela—and the third country in the world in nickel, cobalt, chrome, and manganese.

At times of world wars, Cuba has been considered as the first world producer of some of the aforementioned minerals. Because of these regions, Cuba is considered an immense strategic mineral country.

Following the Cuban Trojan horse analysis, let us say that in 1960, a military study was initiated in Cuba, done by Cuban speleologists and Soviet military personnel who covered all the national facilities of the island, including the keys, for the purpose of using these facilities for military ends, such as the storage of missiles, ammunition, reserve weapons, fuel, communications, medicines, and different routes to go in and out.

In this study, it was especially taken into consideration the many natural caves in Cuba. In relation with the above, a micrometric study was made of the exact dimensions of the caves, their internal temperatures, their humidity degrees, external and internal communications, internal ventilation, water possibilities, the relation of caves in comparison to the surrounding vicinity, and also, very especially, a study was made of those caves which merged with the rivers and the sea.

A similar study, as an example, was made on the boundaries of the Escambray Mountains, in the southern area of the San Juan River, where several roads were built for the transportation of weapons and ammunition in big trucks.

Also in this study, they measured the resistance of the superior cover of the caves, in case of bombing. As a result of the above study, many of these caves were reinforced with 6-inch wide concrete. In some cases, they were wider. Work of this nature, of a military character, has been done in the Sierra de los Organos, in the province of Pinar del Rio, in the Sierra de Lupe in Oriente Province, and in Altura Central in Isle of Pines.

There is a definite fact, meanwhile I am talking, that I am going to bring to your attention.

In 1962, a Soviet "technician," in quotations, named Alexei Sigarief, was invited to a house in which some Cuban of the underground was working, and he revealed, because he was intoxicated with liquor, that he was 24 years of age, that he was a military officer, and that he was in Cuba making a survey to establish the missile bases.

June 5, 1962, this officer was taken out of Cuba, after 16 months on the island.

Mr. MONAGAN. How many?

Mr. REYES. Sixteen months of being in the island. So it means that the Russians were working on the island, in the preparation of the missile bases, 20 months before, because the October crisis was 4 months later, and this man was 16 months in the island. And he was a Soviet military officer.

Evident proof of how they have worked underground with military character is as follows: Up until 1958, Cuba produced 4 million barrels of cement a year. Each barrel was equivalent to four sacks of cement, and each sack weighed 130 pounds. There were four cement factories in Cuba, with the aforementioned annual production, working 8 hours a day.

All of this cement, before Castro—and I don't mention any particular regime, I am talking about 10, 15, 20 years before—was used for civilian construction, and for export, never for military aggressive purposes.

When Fidel Castro stole power in Cuba, he absorbed all the cement production of the island, and from the usual 8 hours of daily work, he raised it to 20 daily hours.

What has been the destiny of this cement, whose production was raised under Castro in Cuba 12 years ago, and which has definitely not been used in urban or rural construction for the people, or for export?

There is only one answer to this question. This enormous quantity of cement has been used for the military underground construction of the Soviet Union, and the Castro regime in Cuba.

Reaffirming the character of the Cuban Trojan horse, let us say that in 1963, great shipments of hydraulic cement were sent from Belgium to Cuba, and unloaded precisely at Cienfuegos Bay. This hydraulic cement is not precisely for service construction. Rather, this cement hardens at high speed, that is, in a humid area, by which it is understood that hydraulic cement was used for underground construction for the storage of missiles and weapons that meets the humidity coefficient.

However, let us say that in 1963, only on this occasion, more than 300 cement trucks were unloaded in Cienfuegos, and taken to an unknown destination.

However, the Cuban underground has pointed out that the cement was taken to the missile base of La Campana, Manicaragua. This place is located on the farm formerly owned by a German-American by the last name of Kopp.

Following the mineral riches in the caves, let us point out that in the Isle of Pines, as I said before, there are marble caves. To describe all the aforementioned, and the many others which will take quite some time. Cuba today has an underground perforated by the Soviet Union and the Castro regime, in order to construct strategic underground military bases, so that the Soviet Union will be able to take out of Cuba the nickel, chrome, cobalt, copper and manganese.

Without fear of being in error, we can affirm that in Cuba, there are actually more than 3,000 prebuilt or natural caves, adapted by the Soviet Union and the Castro regime, with strategic military goals.

Cuba today is the Trojan horse of America.

I spoke before about the Soviet soldiers, the Soviet officer that was drunk, and that he went to Cuba, according to the information we got, to study the caves to put in the missiles.

I am referring now to 1967: Communist threat to the United States through the Caribbean, hearings of the subcommittee to investigate the situation in the Senate. And here on page 1287, there is a report of two Soviet ships that went to Cuba, to survey the Caribbean area.

Mr. MONAGAN. What is the date of that report?

Mr. REYES. June 28, 1967—that they went to Cuba to survey all the Caribbean. What I am trying to get at is that the Soviets, when they wanted to establish the missile bases underground, they sent in a group first. When they wanted to establish a submarine base, and this is only a speculation, they sent the Soviet ships to analyze the whole Caribbean area.

Furthermore, and these are definite facts and figures, in 1963, a man by the name of Dr. Miguel Jaume, one of the Communists of the Castro regime, was requested, by a man of the Academy of Science of Cuba, to use Soviet ships in determining different classes of fish around the island.

And the report of this Dr. Jaume, who is still in Cuba—and he is a Communist on the side of Castro—says that the ships of the Soviet Union were in military situations, military purposes around the island, and can't be used for this purpose.

Furthermore, in March, 1963, a Russian by the name of Dr. Ghyrko went to Cuba, and in a private meeting with several members of the Science Academy of Cuba, disclosed that he went in the vicinity of Guantanamo Naval Base, and he equipped the vicinity with electronic equipment. Immediately, Captain Nuñez Jimenez jumped on the story, and told the people at that meeting not to disclose what the Russian said, because it could be erroneously interpreted.

But the underground was there, and we got the story here.

In 1963, Dr. Miguel Jaume, also in another meeting of the Academy of Science, very private, a small group, said that in the caves of Guane, there are 15 kilometers explored. And they were converted, in 1963, for military storage of the Russians.

January 15, 1963, at 9 o'clock in the morning, there was a ship from Poland called *Lidice* that came into Havana port, and in the interior of the ship there was radioactive material. And this was known, I will say, through a pilot that was there who guided the boat inside, and he was waiting for a captain of Castro's army to get inside the boat, and the Cuban army captain came late, and the captain of the ship showed him the manifest order; and this radioactive material was unloaded in a barge in the middle of Havana Harbor.

Later on, the ship was taken to one side of the waterline shipyard, and they unloaded the rest. The radioactive material, according to the manifest, was put in at Stettin, Poland, and then the captain of the ship requested from the Castro regime to make an evaluation of radioactivity inside the ship, to see if there was no problem.

The same thing happened 5 days later, January 20, 1963, with a ship called *Baltic*, and they used the same procedure. It was a Polish ship. It could be, in evaluation, medical things for medical purposes.

But my question is this: If it was for medical purposes, why in the world were they waiting for a captain of the Castro regime, and why was it secretly unloaded in the middle of the Havana Harbor, to a barge.

Continuing our analysis, let us see how the Reds have used a fertile ground for their offensive attack to the continent, and have especially, to the United States of America.

We must analyze that the Castro regime has conventional military equipment, and all weapons to keep themselves in power, and to try to combat any internal revolt.

However, there is a series of tactical arms in Cuba that undoubtedly exceeds the conventional military power of the regime, and leads us to believe that they will be used in open aggression against neighboring countries.

The Soviets, supported by the Red puppet, Fidel Castro, are using Cuba in possible preparation for that.

At this time, it has been told to us that there is an average in Cuba of 20,000 to 30,000 Russian soldiers, scattered in different military bases through the Cuban national territory.

We must bear in mind that on July 26, 1962, Russian military troops landed in Cuba, wearing uniforms, equipped with weapons, at the Dubroc dock in the Province of Matanzas, at the inlet of Maria Elena, at Mariel Bay, in Pinar del Rio. We know that it was said that the Russians have dismantled the missile bases after the October, 1962, crisis, but did the Soviet soldiers leave Cuba? Or are they still there? Have they dismantled the bases, or have they been reactivated again?

Did the Soviets really remove the missiles from Cuba? The Cuban people understand they did not.

And I am here today to reaffirm it on behalf of the Cuban people.

As a final data, in this general analysis, let us say that the Castro regime has been building different underground hospitals, among which are the Sierra de Cristal, in Oriente Province, near the Nipe and Levisa bays. Also, there is another underground hospital in La Loma de San Vicente, on the road to Santiago de Cuba to Guantanamo.

The underground hospitals are an indication that the Castro regime is preparing for something else.

Ninety percent of the fuel reserve in Cuba is underground, and in a merciful way they also put weapons under the schools, weapons and oil. Exactly a year ago, there was a terrible explosion at the former Jesuit Belen School, which was attended by Fidel Castro when he was a youngster. Eight girls were killed, and more than 20 were injured.

The Cuban underground informed that the explosives placed in the school's basement caused the explosion.

Let us say as further information that the underground fuel tanks used by the regime in Cuba are 20 meters long, and 3 meters wide, respectively. They are painted in black, have been imported by the Soviet Union, and are buried 4 to 5 meters in depth.

To wind up this presentation, I can inform you that lately the Castro regime, assisted by the Soviets, has been conducting warfare games, using anti-personnel gas. All the military personnel in Cuba now have gas masks. The principal warehouse where the anti-personnel gas is stored in Cuba is located south of Manicaragua, in Las Villas Province, near a small town known as La Moza.

As an affidavit in support of this denunciation, let us say that at the middle of 1967, there was a leak of one of these anti-personnel gas tanks at that location, and the accident provoked the poisoning of more than 80 percent, including military personnel and civilians.

These people were treated in two hospitals. One is known as the Polyclinic of Manicaragua, and the other one, the Santa Clara Hospital.

The above concludes my presentation, and reaffirms what we said at first: that Cuba, on the surface presents a picture that is totally different of what is really happening in caves and beneath the surface.

Actually, as I said at the beginning, there is another Cuba, below the surface, that poses a real danger and an actual threat, not only to the United States but to all the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

Distinguished gentlemen of the Congress, it is not only Cienfuegos, because Cuba is a modern Trojan horse.

Mr. MONAGAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. Reyes, first of all, I would like to ask you a question about—and it has to be in a relatively general way, but about the reliability of the information that you have.

You personally, of course, have not observed any of these things, and it seems to me that they range from very specific information, such as that of the case of the Russian lieutenant who, as you say, was intoxicated, through what the interpretation may be of the lights that are seen at night, to the use of the cement, which could be conjectural, and to your last point, when you say the Cuban people "understand" that the missiles have not been removed.

That, it seems to me, is pure conjecture, on the basis of the hard evidence that has been presented here.

We are limited in time, but I should like to ask you about the reliability and the method of obtaining information of the type that you have presented here.

Mr. REYES. My answer to that will be, sir, on three facts. Of course, I can't disclose sources.

Mr. MONAGAN. I understand.

Mr. REYES. I can't disclose means, because it will endanger the lives of people. But I will refer to three facts—

Mr. FASCELL. Have you got some information, Mr. Reyes, you can give us in executive session?

Mr. REYES. Somewhere, somewhat.

Mr. FASCELL. I don't know about the identification of the individuals, but the sources.

Mr. MONAGAN. We are not interested in that, but you see my point.

Mr. REYES. I do see your point.

Mr. MONAGAN. Certain things are specific; other things are apparently based on some facts, which might be justified, and finally, there are conclusions that are not based on any facts, so far as I can see.

Mr. REYES. I repeat, I will base my answer in three facts.

On August 7, 1962, we were the first to disclose on TV in this country that there were 5,000 Russian troops in the vicinity of the Canimar River in Cuba, in Matanzas Province. In that time, nobody believed it.

Twelve weeks later, we had the missile crisis.

April 10, 1970, we disclosed that Castro has the Komar boats, with the missiles, that they can either hit the Homestead Air Force Base, or the Key Biscayne White House, and that was disclosed in a speech, at the Greater Miami Kiwanis Club.

These are the type of boats, that has a range of 100 miles, and the rockets, the missiles, 40 to 50 miles range.

Three months later, June 30, 1970, in the Congress of the United States—in the hearing of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Coast Guard Policy and Operations with Respect to Foreign Vessel Activities in or Near U.S. Waters of the State of Florida—an intelligence commander by the name of Philip P. Coady was under interrogation, and this is one of the questions:

"Does the Cuban Navy have and operate Komar-type, missile-carrying vessels in the waters surrounding the island and can these waters be used for offensive purpose?"

Answer of Commander Coady: "Yes, sir."

There was another question:

"Could such vessels so operated be used for offensive purposes?"

"Coady: Yes . . . and it has an offensive capability possessing two missiles, one on either side of the vessel which can be fired approximately 15 miles with accuracy."

And the third fact is that I came here before this subcommittee on July 27, and I disclosed the name of Cienfuegos, and as far as I remember, it was the first time it was disclosed. Two months later, on September 25, the Pentagon put out a story, that there was a possibility of a nuclear submarine base in Cienfuegos. I relied on these facts, sir.

Mr. MONAGAN. Did you say that Cayo Alcatraz was not a base, but it is set up for maintenance and supplies?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. MONAGAN. In other words, you make a distinction between the two.

Mr. REYES. May I go to the map, sir?

Mr. MONAGAN. Go ahead.

Mr. REYES. The idea that Cayo Alcatraz is a support base for Cayo Largo, and Isle of Pines, and the headquarters of the whole naval

strategic complex is right there where the orders are given, and who knows what they have in storage, to be transported to the barges, and to the nuclear submarine.

Mr. MONAGAN. You have said that you had come to the conclusion that there was a permanent Soviet naval squadron operating in the area. Is that correct?

Mr. REYES. In the Caribbean.

Mr. MONAGAN. Yes.

Mr. REYES. And it is still on, headed by a nuclear submarine.

Mr. MONAGAN. What do you suggest, or do you make any suggestion as to what the United States should or ought to do about this situation?

Mr. REYES. Sir, it is difficult for me, because as I said before, I am not a military expert, and I am a guest in this country, as a legal resident.

But my position, as an ally of the United States, is to tell the facts that I have, and if they are true, take a course of action. I don't know.

Mr. MONAGAN. Take what?

Mr. REYES. A course of action. But that, I don't know.

Mr. MONAGAN. All right.

You referred to Cuba as being an aircraft carrier, but you didn't give any information about planes, I mean, Soviet planes, and military planes landing or using it as such.

Mr. REYES. If you want, I tried to use—I don't know how to say it in English, a metaphor? I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I tried to use a metaphor.

But if I want to know about the planes in Cuba, let me tell you, first of all, that the Castro regime has three big airfields, and these fields are dominated by the Soviet Union.

The big airfield in Havana, in the western part, is San Antonio de los Banos, and right here is the only place where they have a Mig-21. They have underground hangars, and they have also, right here, a radar of 115 miles, that can sweep up to Florida, and check the landings and taking off in Homestead Air Force Base and Boca Chica Air Naval Base, right here, in Havana, San Antonio de los Banos.

There is a second airfield of the Soviet Union, in Santa Clara, near a place called Las Malezas. And here are bases, I believe, for the Mig-17 and Mig-19. I have to check my notes. And they have also underground hangars, and they have surrounded the place with the big tanks for fuel on the ground.

And there is a third airport right here in Cacocum, in Oriente, near Holguin, and this is the largest of all of them.

So actually, they have three main military airports, supported by and in the hands of the Soviet Union.

There is another particular thing that I would like to bring to the attention of the subcommittee, since you ask the question.

Here in Camaguey, they have a civilian airport, but they have built a big road from Camaguey to Nuevitas, an eight-laned road, and they have taken all the palm trees and all the bushes around the road. And the underground believes that this big road, that has no purpose in the long run, that has been reinforced in the asphalt, can be closed, right here, and right here [indicating] and serve as a landing strip.

They have also one airfield in San Julian, in Pinar del Rio, but not of too much military presence or too much military value.

The three big ones are San Antonio de los Banos, Las Malezas, and Santa Clara, and Cacocum in Oriente.

Mr. GROSS. Do they have a radar station near Guantanamo?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I mentioned that Russian who has put in electronic equipment. But around here, there are two big radar: one perispheric radar at Anafe Hill near Havana, and also Bahia de Nipe and Banes in Oriente. Also, they work with two bays. Two bays. Right here, they have El Mariel and Cabañas, in Pinar del Rio, and they work with two bays in Oriente.

This is the way they are also presenting their military strategic situation.

Mr. GROSS. How many Soviet troops now? You said 10,000?

Mr. REYES. 10,000, but it has been increasing, sir, to 20,000 to 30,000, because they are pulling in the island.

Mr. MONAGAN. I think we shall move along.

Mr. Whalley, would you like to ask some questions?

Mr. WHALLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, we have had a request to have the witness go into executive session as soon as we can. If the members would ask their questions in open session as rapidly as possible, we would still have time to hear the witness in executive session.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Whalley?

Mr. WHALLEY. Have you talked to the U.S. Defense Department?

Mr. REYES. To the Pentagon? No, sir.

Mr. WHALLEY. Are you acquainted with the Cuban military setup? What size army do they have?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir. How much they have? They have about 150,000 men and weapons.

Mr. WHALLEY. Do they have a navy of any kind?

Mr. REYES. They have the Komar boats. It has been said that they have small submarines, but I can't affirm it, and they have the Migs 15, 17, 19, and 21.

Mr. WHALLEY. How many Migs would they have in their air force? Do you have any idea?

Mr. REYES. Speculation would be 200, 250. And I repeat, sir, these planes are not for putting down an uprising in Cuba. These are tactical weapons that they are storing in Cuba. For what purpose? We don't know.

But there is one thing that I want to reaffirm to the members of the subcommittee: I know my people. I am a Cuban. I lived 36 years of my life in my country, and as I said before, and I want to warn again, the Cuban people are going to rise up. And these tanks over there, and these planes, could be used to try to stop an overthrow of Fidel or the Russians, but the Cuban people are going to rise up against the Communist system. That is a fact.

I don't know how long, and when, but this is going to be a reality, and I feel it my duty as a Cuban to bring this to the attention of the subcommittee, so a Hungary or a Czechoslovakia could not be repeated in the Western Hemisphere.

I am not saying this only to the United States. I say this to the whole world, and particularly, to the Organization of American States.

Mr. WHALLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MONAGAN. Any other questions at this point?

Mr. ROYBAL. I have just one I wanted to establish something for the record, if you don't mind.

I would like to ask some questions, later, in executive session.

For the present, am I right in assuming that you sincerely believe that the Soviet activities in the southern part of Cuba present a definite problem of security to the United States, and to the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. REYES. Definitely.

Mr. ROYBAL. Are you at liberty, or will you, make this presentation, not only to this subcommittee, but to any authorities in the United States?

Mr. REYES. Anyone. From the President down.

Mr. ROYBAL. Will you also be in a position to reveal, while not the names of individuals, but pretty much the reliability of your source?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROYBAL. Thank you.

Mr. MONAGAN. All right, we will now go into executive session. We will ask our guests to kindly leave.

(Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned and the subcommittee proceeded into executive session.)

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MONAGAN. Can we resume here?

Mr. REYES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. My apologies, but the gentlemen of the press had questions.

Mr. MONAGAN. We have limited time.

Mr. ROYBAL, do you want to continue with your questions now?

Mr. ROYBAL. What I wanted to try to establish and put in the record were any particular figures which you may have with regard to the missiles that are now in these caves which you have been describing, the type of missile that it is, and its capability, if you have it, and whether or not it can be made readily available. Because they are in caves. Can they be made readily available to the Cuban military, or the Russian military?

Mr. REYES. I have a breakdown, province by province, and what I can do is either to read it or to submit it to the subcommittee later on. Whatever you want. I am talking about pressing time for you. I am willing to read it, what I have here. I have province by province what they have, and where they have the storage.

Mr. ROYBAL. And do you have the location of the caves?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir. Where the high Russian command is.

Mr. MONAGAN. Well, I think Mr. Roybal is talking about missiles, specifically. And that's what I had in mind when I asked my question.

Mr. REYES. Well, first of all, I can say that in El Cangere it is called La Punta Gobernadora, they have the general Russian headquarters for the western side of Cuba. They have electric lines of 33,000 volts, all of which is necessary for missiles. The same electric voltage system is the one used at La Campana, Manicaragua, Las Villas Province.

They bring that electricity from El Mariel, and from Cabanas. I can't state how many missiles they have, but they have the volts over there.

Mr. MONAGAN. Or that they do, in fact, have missiles.

Mr. REYES. Well, there is another place that I will say, where they apparently have the missiles.

Mr. ROYBAL. But at that particular place, El Cangere, La Punta Gobernadora, you do not know they actually have missiles in these caves?

Mr. REYES. The report that I have is that they have missiles there.

Mr. ROYBAL. That they do have missiles there.

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROYBAL. Is that assumed because of the fact that they have the necessary energy, electric and so forth? Is that an assumption, or is it pretty well established they do have missiles?

Mr. REYES. Pretty well established. That was the place where the missiles were stored, were established, in 1962.

Mr. ROYBAL. All right. Now what I can't understand is how these missiles are made readily available, if they are in caves, underground. How are they put into operation, usually?

Mr. REYES. Sir, as I said, I am not a military expert. I don't know. But the report that we have is that they have the missiles storage there.

Mr. FASCELL. Excuse me. Why don't we get to a more specific thing, about how he gets his information—if you want to insure reliability, if that's your purpose. His information is, he says, that they have missiles there.

Question: how does he get that information? What kind of missiles are they? See, are they old ones, or new ones, or what?

Mr. KAZEN. Well, more important than that, too, Mr. Chairman, do they have the launching sites?

Mr. ROYBAL. Well, this is what I was trying to get at, to try to find out whether they have the capability that does present a danger to the United States. I think all these questions are relevant, and one can be asked following the other.

Mr. FASCELL. Sure, go ahead.

Mr. REYES. My answer to the question about the credibility and about the sources. I have the people from the island sending reports to me. I have the Cubans coming here, that tell me all about this. I have people that have worked in intelligence, not of the United States but in my country. And they are devout, devoted to this.

Mr. KAZEN. Let me ask you this: From all of your sources of information, how new is that information, or within what length of time do you get it?

Mr. REYES. Sometimes it takes a week, 10 days.

Mr. KAZEN. So it is up-to-date information that you are getting.

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir. Sometimes it is 7 days, 10 days. Sometimes it will delay a month, because there is the life of people in the middle.

Now according to the report that I have, I can't say there are so many missiles in La Gobernadora or Pinar del Rio Province, but the conclusive report of the underground in Cuba is that they are there. And with the—let me read this, because I was not prepared to read all of these.

The altitude of the hills in Gobernadora are 1,870 feet. There is a residential district, only for Russians. No Cubans. The residential district is surrounded by wire fences.

The report of the underground says that the missiles in the caves of La Gobernadora have a range of 1,100 miles, and they can attack the arch between Corpus Christi, Tex., and Pensacola, Fla. This is called the arch of the Oriental Gulf of the United States.

Mr. KAZEN. But Mr. Reyes, what about the launching pads? Where are they situated?

Mr. REYES. Sir, the place is so surrounded by Russians that you can't go in. There are caves that have elevators, that have air-conditioning. There have been cases in which medical doctors have been taken in, because a Russian has been dying, and he has been masked. he felt the air-conditioning, he felt the elevators, a Cuban doctor—and then when he opened the eyes, he saw a man that was dying of some kind of illness, and he saw maps on the wall.

Mr. KAZEN. Well, let me follow this, then. If your information is that they do have missiles—

Mr. REYES. That is right.

Mr. KAZEN. And that they are stored underground—

Mr. REYES. Right.

Mr. KAZEN. And that they do have all of these elaborate underground structures—

Mr. REYES. Right.

Mr. KAZEN (continuing). That then it must then follow, since no one has seen any launching pads on the surface, that this can be used as a launching pad, that some launching pads have been inherently built.

Mr. REYES. Underground?

Mr. KAZEN. Underground.

Mr. REYES. It could be. I repeat, I don't know how they are launched. I am not a military expert. I repeat what I have been fed, and the people that give me the information, as I said before, have been actual, in the examples that I have mentioned before.

You see, for example, it has not been disclosed too much, but in Cuba, there is a nuclear reactor, and it was brought to Cuba in 1968, and it is right there in the middle of the Province of Havana.

And this nuclear reactor, it was said it was going to be used for peaceful means, for peaceful purposes, and up to now, in 2 years, this reactor has not produced any peaceful thing. And it is located right now in Managua Madruga, where the Cuban Commission of Nuclear Energy is. And the man in charge is Luis Larragoitia—L-a-r-r-a-g-o-i-t-i-a—Luis Larragoitia.

Different electric power lines have been built from Mariel, Havana, and Matanzas to feed the nuclear reactor on Managua. It is calculated that over 1,000 Russian soldiers are in Managua, on Santiago de las Vegas, only in that place alone.

It is also revealed that the Soviets are building a small—I am sorry. That is not part of this.

Mr. KAZEN. Let me ask you this question, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. According to everything that you have told us here this morning, then, neither the United States nor anybody else, through their usual surveillance methods, could actually get photographs of anything that is happening in Cuba.

Mr. REYES. My personal belief is that it is very difficult. Because they are people that have been working in the landscape, and they are here in exile.

There is a man by the name of [deleted] and I am disclosing names—I shouldn't—but this gentleman has put out a statement in this matter, that he worked on the landscape for the Castro regime, and they are completely covered. It is like the southern part of the Isle of Pines. There are jungles over there that have not been cut, and something is going on, beneath those trees; and they use it as cover, because they know the U-2 planes are flying.

Mr. KAZEN. All right. Now one last question.

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. Has this information been transmitted to the people in the Pentagon, to your knowledge?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. How long ago is this?

Mr. REYES. I don't know, sir. I have the feeling it has been transmitted, and I have the hope it has been transmitted, because I have a tremendous faith in this Nation, and in this Government, and all the agencies.

Mr. KAZEN. Well, have you personally talked to anyone in the Pentagon?

Mr. REYES. At the Pentagon here in Washington? No, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. Or anyone from the Pentagon?

Mr. REYES. That I don't know, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. You, personally.

Mr. REYES. Nobody has identified himself as a member of the Pentagon. And—

Mr. FASCELL. In other words, he has talked to our security people and they have checked every single source that he has mentioned. That's what he is saying.

Am I correct?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. All right, that is what I want to know.

Mr. ROYBAL. But he is also saying, Mr. Chairman, that even though these sources have been checked, it isn't possible to really check them at all, because—

Mr. KAZEN (continuing). Of the difficulty encountered.

Mr. ROYBAL (continuing). Of the difficulty that he has. In other words, I think he believes that they haven't really been checked.

Is this correct, Mr. Reyes?

Mr. REYES. No, Mr. Roybal.

Mr. FASCELL. I think we are talking about apples and oranges. Excuse me, Ed. The only point I was making is that individuals or other sources who deliver information to Mr. Reyes are all known to our own intelligence people, and they have the opportunity to obtain exactly the same information which he has; they have the same information.

Mr. ROYBAL. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. That's the only point he is making.

Am I correct?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAZEN. All right. One more question, then.

Mr. Reyes, are there others like you in the United States, in the same position that you are, that gather this information also?

Mr. REYES. Cubans?

Mr. KAZEN. Yes. Because I can see now that a lot of your time is devoted to the gathering of information.

Mr. REYES. My whole life.

Mr. KAZEN. All right, sir. Are there others like you in the United States now that are doing the same type of work that you are? In other words, what I was getting at was the possibility of correlating whatever information you have, whatever information someone else gathers.

Mr. REYES. Yes, there is another gentleman here in Washington, whom I have a lot of confidence in and respect. His name is [deleted].

Mr. FASCELL. But all of these sources are directly communicating to our intelligence people, Chick. That's the point.

Mr. KAZEN. That's what I wanted.

Mr. FASCELL. Our intelligence people have the various bases by which they can cross-check all information and evaluate it. This is what they are supposed to do.

Mr. REYES. See, for example, I showed you the last time, and repeat it—this is a letter from a Cuban prisoner. It is in the record. I showed it to you, and it can be read in my hand, asking for help, because they are blind, losing their lives, and I also keep this with me as a prayer. Sometimes, you know, you feel that the whole world is on your back.

Mr. KAZEN. Is this a letter from somebody in there now?

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir, in a prison. I put it in the record last time.

Mr. FASCELL. He discussed this last time.

Mr. MONAGAN. Lee, do you want to ask some questions? You haven't had an opportunity.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I am interested in the question of the sources of your information, too. You referred a number of times to the underground, and specific information you get. Is this a systematic procedure that you get?

Mr. REYES. Most of the time, yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it by radio contact, with people on the island?

Mr. REYES. No. Let me explain.

I worked in my country for 22 years. I began at the age of 13, in 1938, and I worked in one radio station for 22 years, CAQ, and they saw me finishing high school, entering into the University of Havana, finishing law, and entering TV, you know, the family-type, the family environment that we have in our country. I was never mixed, generally, in politics.

I came to the United States, and by the will of God, have been placed in a position to help the Cuban people, to be a bridge of understanding between the American people and the Cuban people in this ordeal. And they trust me. They have faith. And they come to me, and they see. They fight.

You see, I am here on vacation. Here I am, here on vacation. This is my vacation, to come to the Congress of the United States and explain all of this.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, so you get your information from people who seek you out; they're observers from all over the island of Cuba, who come to you with bits and pieces of information. Now how do you sort this information out?

Some people can—I couldn't tell whether you have got offensive missiles or defensive missiles, from looking at one, and most people would be like that.

Mr. REYES. I am sorry I didn't bring with me, but I have, for example, a letter that was sent to Miami to another person, and this other person sent it to me. The envelope was not addressed to Dr. Manolo Reyes. It was addressed to another person, and this other person sent it to me.

With all due respect, I don't like the procedure. I read what is in it, and I make my own evaluation, but I don't consider in the same way as other information that comes to my hands.

Mr. HAMILTON. How can you make the assertion that your information is a week to 10 days old, that if the system is this informal, and seems to me a rather hit-or-miss operation—

Mr. REYES. Well, remember in the Second World War there was a French resistance, working very effectively. I won't say that the Cuban underground is as large and as wide as it was in the Second World War, but there are people that are willing to risk any risk, just to see Cuba free.

Mr. HAMILTON. And these people that give you this information, do they remain in this country or do they go back?

Mr. REYES. Sometimes they remain in Cuba, sometimes they come on the Freedom Flights.

Mr. HAMILTON. Some of the information is given by the underground to people who are coming, I presume.

Mr. REYES. And sometimes it is sent to me. There are people that come also in boats.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you, yourself, do any cross-checking of information? One person reports one fact—do you dig to find out whether that fact is true, or do you just—

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. How?

Mr. REYES. With [deletion] people.

Mr. HAMILTON. What do you mean, [deletion]. Who are they? Where are they?

Mr. REYES. Well, sometimes I pass the information to the proper channels.

Mr. MONAGAN. You mean [deletion].

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. REYES. And we help each other.

Mr. HAMILTON. Have they found your information to be accurate?

Mr. REYES. They are still talking with me.

Mr. HAMILTON. You don't have any evaluation from them?

Mr. REYES. Never.

Mr. HAMILTON. Of your information.

Mr. REYES. Never. I never request it.

Mr. FASCELL. They wouldn't give it, anyway.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I am sure that is true.

Mr. REYES. For example, last year we flew a plane over Cuba. The station, channel 4, because there are two air corridors between Mantanzas and Camagüey, and this plane was going to Grand Cayman to film a documentary, but when the plane was flying over Cuba, he shot a lot of pictures. And it was an altitude of 8,000 feet, and these pictures were given immediately to the proper people of the U.S. Intelligence.

Evaluation, we don't know. We didn't request it.

Mr. HAMILTON. If I can sort out what you said to us today, that the most important development in very recent weeks, I take it, you relate to the base being established in the southern part.

Mr. REYES. It is established.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is established?

Mr. REYES. That is my feeling.

Mr. HAMILTON. And Soviet ships are moving in and out of that base on a regular basis?

Mr. REYES. And nobody is allowed in that perimeter of the water. No Cuban is allowed to be there. If they are caught, they are sent immediately to a concentration camp.

Mr. HAMILTON. They are going in between these two barges, and you indicated to us, with the canvas covering, they are being repaired, in your judgment, and then they are coming back out.

Mr. REYES. Or changing crew, or giving medicines or food, or who knows what—or who knows what, because I am thoroughly—how can I say it—concerned with the trip of the barges to El Mariel, and then coming back to the same port, to Cienfuegos, to the same bay—what they did transport to El Mariel, or what they picked up in El Mariel and brought to Cienfuegos.

And once they anchor, what are they doing? I repeat, it is not anchor, it is these things that—

Mr. FULTON. They are moored.

Mr. REYES. Muertos—in English, I don't know.

Mr. FULTON. "Moored" is the word. I used to be in the Navy.

Mr. REYES. And then they put up a buoy.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you also said there had been a very sharp increase in the number of Soviet soldiers in Cuba.

Mr. REYES. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Since when?

Mr. REYES. Since the last 5 to 6 months. Increasing number of Soviets. They have been seen. I brought what they have seen, sailors in Cienfuegos.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. FASCELL. You know, an interesting observation that Jim Fulton just made—Jim, do you want to make it now?

Mr. FULTON. Go ahead.

Mr. FASCELL. No, go ahead. It is better coming from you, about the missiles.

Mr. FULTON. At 1,100-mile range, they will have to be guided missiles to be of any account whatever. If you have a missile that is 100 to 500, 600-mile range, you can hit the ballpark, but when you get beyond that you won't even be able to hit the ballpark, so that at that range, you would have to have a guided missile system for it to mean anything.

Now the likelihood is against a range of that length on what I have been hearing, and what I have been hearing today.

Mr. FASCELL. Except that he has testified that they have got all the electronic system in.

Mr. REYES. There is something more to it, sir.

Mr. FULTON. Well, I haven't been here for the whole hearing.

Mr. REYES. Something that I think is important. All of the Soviet missile system in Pinar del Rio is protected by a perispheric radar from the Anafe Hill, near Havana. This radar system perfectly covers Pinar del Rio and Havana Province, and screens the northeast and northwest sections.

It took 3 years to build this perispheric radar system, and this took place after the 1962 missile crisis, and it is right there, between Pinar del Rio and Havana.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me explore one other thing with you.

You were very positive in your assertion that the Cuban underground would rise up and go against Castro.

Mr. REYES. Yes, sir.


Mr. HAMILTON. You were not definite at all as to time. Could you tell us why you feel that way? And is there any evidence that the underground is sufficiently organized now so that we might expect that to happen in the immediate—well, I will say within the next year or so?

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. MONAGAN. We will adjourn the meeting, and thank you very much for coming, sir.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, to all of you.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.)



SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN CUBA

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1970

The subcommittee was further briefed on the Soviet naval activities in Cuba in an executive session by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson and a team of briefers from the Defense Intelligence Agency. The transcript remains classified.

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THE HISTORY OF THE

ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON

AND OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SCIENTISTS
AND ARTISTS IN GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND

1700

1700

