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GOVERNMENT

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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H.J. Res. 1146

AUTHORIZING A GRANT TO DEFRAY A PORTION OF THE COST
OF EXPANDING THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS IN
THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 23, 1970

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THE

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THE

EXPANSION OF UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS

THURSDAY, APRIL 23, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:18 a.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Cornelius E. Gallagher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee will come to order.

We meet this morning to receive executive branch testimony on legislation proposing to authorize a grant of not more than \$20 million to defray a portion of the cost of expanding the headquarters of the United Nations in New York.

This legislation has been recommended to the Congress by the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Bureau of the Budget.

The text of the joint resolution which I introduced by request embodying the executive branch recommendation will be made part of the record, if there is no objection.

(The following is the text of H.J. Res. 1146.)

[H.J. Res. 1146, 91st Cong., second sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION Authorizing a grant to defray a portion of the cost of expanding the United Nations headquarters in the United States

Whereas the Congress authorized the United States to join with other governments in the founding of the United Nations;

Whereas the Congress unanimously, in H. Con. Res. 75 (Seventy-ninth Congress), invited the United Nations to establish its headquarters in the United States, which invitation was accepted by the United Nations;

Whereas the United States has continued to serve as host to the United Nations;

Whereas the membership of the United Nations has increased substantially and the organization has outgrown its existing facilities;

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1969 authorized the construction, subject to suitable financing arrangements, of an additional headquarters building south of and adjacent to the present headquarters site on land to be made available without charge by the city of New York;

Whereas the total financial burden of expanding its headquarters in New York would severely strain the resources of the United Nations;

Whereas a special contribution by the United States as the host government would constitute a positive act of reaffirmation of the faith of the American people in the future of the United Nations: Be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, a sum not to exceed \$20,000,000, to remain available until expended, for a grant to be made at the discretion of the Secretary of State, to the United Nations to defray a portion of the cost of the expansion and improvement of its headquarters in the

city of New York on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of State may determine. Such grant shall not be considered a contribution to the United Nations for purpose of any other applicable law limiting contributions.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We are pleased to welcome Ambassador Charles Yost, the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations and Hon. Samuel De Palma, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, who are here this morning to testify in support of House Joint Resolution 1146.

Ambassador Yost, we will begin with your statement, and then follow with Secretary De Palma. At the conclusion of both statements, the subcommittee will have questions. On behalf of the subcommittee and myself personally, I am delighted to have both of you gentlemen here this morning.

Please begin.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador Yost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad to have this opportunity to testify in support of House Joint Resolution 1146, which authorizes a grant of \$20 million to defray a portion of the cost of expanding the United Nations headquarters facilities in New York.

In this statement I shall deal first with the facts which have created an urgent need to expand the headquarters facilities; second, with the physical construction plan that has been devised to meet this need; third, with the financial plans of which the proposed U.S. Government contribution is intended to form one key part; and, finally, with the U.S. interests which are involved in this matter and which, in my opinion, and that of the administration, more than justify the proposed expenditure.

FIRST, THE NEED

The United Nations decided in its earliest years to establish its permanent headquarters in New York. The Congress made the implementation of that decision possible when in 1948 it authorized by joint resolution an interest-free loan of \$65 million—of which \$40 million has thus far been repaid—for construction of a permanent headquarters on the East River.

After several years in temporary quarters, the United Nations began to move into its headquarters in 1951, and first convened the General Assembly there in 1952. In the 18 years since that time the original headquarters facilities have remained essentially the same, except for the construction of the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, which was financed by a foundation grant and completed in 1961. However, in those same 18 years the United Nations itself has grown enormously. Its membership has more than doubled, from 59 member states to 126. Its Secretariat employees in New York requiring office space have almost doubled from some 2,900 to about 4,900 today, in order to serve the needs of the increased membership and to do the additional staff work required to implement decisions made during these years by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and other organs.

The result is that the headquarters facilities have long since been completely outgrown. Not only is office space in the headquarters itself over-crowded; but many United Nations offices—including the entire headquarters staffs of the U.N. development program and the children's fund, as well as parts of other departments, primarily Economic and Social Affairs, Public Information and Conference Services—have had to be moved into rented space elsewhere in New York. About 20 percent of United Nations employees in New York are now in rented quarters outside the U.N. building and this proportion is growing steadily.

This dispersal is not only inefficient from a management standpoint, it is also increasingly expensive. The cost to the U.N. for 1970 includes about \$2 million for rented office space in New York, and this figure is bound to increase rapidly in future years unless the planned expansion is carried out.

In addition, the headquarters facilities are becoming more and more inadequate for reproduction, distribution, and storage of documents, for language training, conference support, eating and parking facilities for both staff and delegates. These shortcomings further detract from the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations.

As all these inadequacies became more obvious over the years, a great deal of thought and discussion took place at the U.N. as to how to overcome them. One school of thought, although never a majority, has contended that the disadvantages of location in New York have come to outweigh the advantages, and has favored the outright removal of the permanent headquarters from New York and, presumably, from the United States. Many others, while not prepared to go to that length, have pressed increasingly—and in some instances successfully—for greater and greater decentralization of U.N. offices to other parts of the world.

Up to a point, of course, decentralization, especially of operational and liaison activities, is logical and desirable; and it is perhaps not generally realized to what extent this kind of decentralization is already a fact. Of the U.N.'s nearly 13,000 employees, including those of UNICEF and the U.N. development program, less than 40 percent, or about 5,000 work in New York. The rest are in Geneva, Vienna, four regional centers, and over 90 other places around the world. These include the secretariats of two U.N. bodies established in recent years, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) with its headquarters in Geneva, and the U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) with its headquarters in Vienna. In this connection, I offer for the subcommittee's records a table showing the numbers of United Nations employees located at headquarters and in other places around the world.

UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD EMPLOYEES AS OF JAN. 1, 1970

	United Nations Secretariat ¹	UNDP	UNICEF	Total
New York.....	² 4,361	475	235	³ 5,071
Geneva.....	2,348	5		2,353
Vienna.....	735			735
Addis Ababa.....	379	22	5	406
Bangkok.....	433	27	60	520
Santiago.....	362	27	16	405
Beirut.....	114	19	25	158
Other locations.....	409	2,129	759	3,297
Total number of employees.....	9,141	2,704	1,100	12,945
Total number of locations.....	58	98	36	98

¹ Includes, as listed by location, the following United Nations Secretariat employees: Headquarters in New York; regional economic commissions in Geneva, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, and Santiago; U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) with headquarters in Geneva; U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) with headquarters in Vienna; U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) with headquarters in Beirut; International Court of Justice (ICJ) with headquarters in the Hague; U.N. information centers in 51 locations, and various special missions.

² Excludes U.N. international school teachers and staff. They are not U.N. employees and do not occupy space in U.N. buildings or in private space rented by the United Nations. Includes the 50 employees of the U.N.I. for Training and Research (UNITAR), but these are not housed in the U.N. building and UNITAR will continue to occupy a suitable rented building on long-term lease at 45th St. and 1st Ave., which rental is paid from voluntary funds contributed to it.

³ Every employee does not require an office space. The number of office spaces being provided in New York at the present time are:

In U.N. buildings.....	3,890
In rented space.....	1,019
Total.....	4,909

Ambassador Yost. When we add to this the staffs of the specialized agencies, whose headquarters are all outside of New York and which employ about 15,000 people, we find that less than 20 percent of the 28,000 employees of the United Nations system work in New York.

This decentralization is, as I said, entirely sound where field operations are concerned; but what is very important is that the central functions of planning, coordination, and control over major U.N. activities should not be dispersed but should remain centralized at the headquarters so that the Secretary General and his principal assistants, including Paul Hoffman at the head of the U.N. development program, can manage the entire system as effectively as possible. To the extent that we fragment these command functions, we inevitably cause a loss of efficiency and a diffusion of purpose, as well as increased costs. In fact, the Secretary General has repeatedly warned the General Assembly of this danger, particularly in connection with its decisions on the location of UNCTAD and UNIDO in Geneva and Vienna. Yet such a fragmentation will certainly increase over the coming years if the present inadequacy of the New York headquarters buildings is not overcome.

SECOND, THE PLAN

All these considerations gradually led the General Assembly to the conclusion that there was an urgent need for major expansion of U.N. facilities in New York. In 1968 the Assembly authorized the Secretary General to prepare detailed plans and specifications for its consideration in 1969, to help it decide whether new construction and major alterations to existing premises should take place at headquarters. The study was to take into account projected space requirements in New York "considered in the overall context of the development of the

United Nations during the next 20 years and the disposition of staff during this period in relation to available and potential accommodations in New York, Geneva, or at U.N. offices in other localities." The Secretary General employed the architectural firm of Harrison and Abramovitz—architects of the original U.N. building—to develop these detailed plans and specifications.

Last fall, on the basis of this study, the Secretary General proposed, and the General Assembly approved, an architectural and engineering package for further construction in New York, subject to working out acceptable financial arrangements. The plan provides for—

Construction of an eight-story building on land owned by New York City between 41st and 42d Streets, immediately to the south of the present U.N. grounds, and the extension of that building over the F.D.R. Drive and park area;

Extension of the south end of the present conference building at its first basement and first floor levels, in what is presently the South Garden, to the property line at 42d Street;

Extension of the same south end of the present conference building by an additional 20 feet on the 2d, 3d, and 4th floor levels;

Construction of a covered connecting bridge between the present, but extended, building over 42d Street to the new building, which will provide two floors of working as well as transit space;

Replacement of the area on which the new building is to be built, which area currently serves as a New York City playground surrounding the Tri-Borough Bridge and Tunnel Authority air intake, with a riverside park usable by both UN staff and New York City residents; and, finally,

Extension of the north end of the present conference building by an additional 20 feet.

This proposed new construction would serve two purposes. First, it would meet the need for Secretariat office space at headquarters until 1979, perhaps longer. It would accommodate, when completed, approximately 2,500 people. Second, it would greatly increase the utility of the conference building—both by improved office and conference space and by meeting the needs of delegations for eating, parking, and other facilities which are now totally inadequate.

This was the proposal which the General Assembly had before it last fall. Despite the concerns and reservations of many members, the Assembly voted overwhelmingly—95 to 14 with 10 abstentions—to authorize the Secretary General to proceed with construction, subject to two conditions concerning financing.

THIRD, ON FINANCING

The Assembly's first condition was that payments from the regular, U.N. budget for this construction shall not exceed \$25 million. Second it required that the United Nations Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions should review the entire financial package this June and determine on behalf of the Assembly that the Secretary General does in fact have satisfactory assurances that all of the funds required will be available before he proceeds to award contracts.

Now I come to the financial package itself. The report of the Secretary General, based on the architectural and engineering plans and on an estimate by a qualified general contractor, John Lowry, Inc., estimates that a cash outlay of \$80 million will be required. This is in addition to the value of the land, which will be provided without cost by the city of New York.

As its part of the \$80 million, the General Assembly has authorized the appropriation of \$25 million from the United Nations regular budget spread over a period of 10 years. It is hoped that the balance of the financing package will be made up of a \$20 million contribution from the U.S. Government, a matching contribution of \$20 million from the city of New York over and above its contribution of land without charge, and approximately \$15 million from the United Nations development program and the United Nations Children's Fund in the nature of "commuted rent" which they would otherwise be required to pay for space in New York over a period of years. The Secretary General, based on the cost estimates of \$73.4 million as of last October and the rate at which prices have been rising, prudently estimates that the full \$80 million will be required to finish the job without other overruns or allowance for contingencies. Unfortunately, there is unlikely to be any major leveling off of rising costs in New York City during the present year, in view of the huge construction backlog. This rising price trend, of course, argues strongly for the prompt beginning of construction.

As for the U.S. Government's share of this cost, I believe strongly that the contribution of \$20 million which the President has requested in his fiscal year 1971 budget is equitable—and, as a practical matter, that it must be made if the building is to be built. It has become traditional in international organizations that the host government make a substantial contribution to the cost of the headquarters in view of the advantages that flow from being the permanent host. For example, the Austrian Government has paid the entire cost both in land and in buildings in order to have the permanent headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization located in Vienna.

In this situation, the U.S. Government contribution is necessary in order to trigger the whole \$80 million financial package. New York City, with the recent concurrence of its board of estimate, has agreed to match the Federal contribution after it is actually appropriated and, in fact, to advance a limited amount to get the project started at that time. In turn, the U.N.'s contribution, and those of the United Nations development program and the United Nations Children's Fund, are predicated on the contribution of the U.S. Government and New York City.

THE U.S. INTEREST

For the United Nations, as we have seen, the issue is how to make an obsolescent physical plant adequate to the organization's needs today and in future years.

For the United States, a variety of benefits will result. Not to be ignored are the economic and balance-of-payments benefits. Congress explicitly recognized these in its joint resolution in 1948 to which I referred earlier, which included the preambular statement that "the permanent establishment of the headquarters of the United Nations

in this country will result directly and indirectly in substantial benefits to the United States from the expenditures of the organization and its member nations." This forecast has been fully borne out by experience. In addition, the United Nations is a major tourist attraction with some 2 million visitors a year, most of them Americans; and that fact represents not only good business but also, I think, good education for a great number of our citizens in the affairs of the world community.

Of more direct importance to the U.S. interest is the ability of our country and its nationals to play a role in the United Nations commensurate with our world position. Further dispersal of the headquarters would very probably impair our ability to exert a proper influence on decisions with important budgetary consequences. Indeed, as I have already pointed out, the inherent inefficiencies of such dispersal would mean extra cost increases of which we would of course bear our share. Moreover, the more United Nations functions are located outside the United States, the fewer qualified Americans will be available to serve in specialized positions, which would be a loss both for us and for the organization. The truth of this assertion is demonstrated by the fact that in New York 25 percent of the U.N.'s professional employees are Americans, whereas abroad the figure is only 8 percent.

But regrettable as all these effects would undoubtedly be, in my view the worst result of all would be an inevitable decline in U.S. leadership in, and commitment to, the United Nations of the future.

When the United States was chosen as the permanent host country to the United Nations, this fact was a recognition not only of our unique standing in the world community, but also of our major role in founding the United Nations and our profound commitment to make it succeed. Inevitably, people thought of the historical comparison with the League of Nations, located in Geneva and shunned by the United States, and of the failure of that organization, lacking American support, to prevent the tragedy of World War II.

In my view, it is impossible to consider this headquarters expansion project in isolation from that larger issue. The underlying question is whether the destiny of this world organization, which every President and every Congress since 1945 has supported as being in harmony with the fundamental American interest, is to remain an important concern in U.S. foreign policy and in international life generally—or is to be gradually allowed to drift out of sight and out of mind.

I do not for a moment suggest that this expansion project will guarantee the future success of the United Nations, or of American policy in the United Nations. But I do strongly believe that if this project were not carried through, the outlook for success would suffer a grave material injury. This would be particularly the case if, in the session of the 25th anniversary this year, when all member states are reaffirming their commitment to the United Nations and endeavoring to reinforce its effectiveness, this project, which is necessary to its effective performance in New York City, should fail due to lack of U.S. support.

President Nixon has given many signs of his administration's continued strong support for the United Nations. In his recent foreign policy message to Congress he concluded his discussion of the United Nations with these words:

As the United Nations begins its second quarter century, America reaffirms its strong support for the principles and promise begun at San Francisco in 1945. Our task now—as for all U.N. members—is to help the organization in steady progress toward fulfillment of that promise.

I believe the proposed U.S. contribution to the headquarters expansion, as requested by the President, would indeed be, as the joint resolution before you says, “a positive act of reaffirmation of the faith of the American people in the future of the United Nations.” Indeed, I consider this contribution to be a crucial step toward assuring us the chance to make the future of the U.N. constructive and fruitful in the cause of peace.

But let me strongly emphasize, in conclusion, that action at an early date is needed—including the actual appropriation of funds in time for the U.N.’s Advisory Committee to give its approval to begin construction at its June sessions. If this timetable can be met, the Secretary General believes that actual construction can be started next October or November and that the project can be completed within the presently estimated \$80 million total. I therefore urge the prompt passage of this legislation in order to safeguard the interest of the United States in the United Nations.

Thank you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Ambassador.

Before we proceed to questions, I think it might be better if we proceed to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, the Honorable Samuel De Palma.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAMUEL DE PALMA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

Mr. DE PALMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity of appearing before this committee. There is little that I would add to the cogent statement of Ambassador Yost. I think he has indicated clearly the extent of the problem, and the major considerations which we feel must be kept in mind in considering this important legislation.

I would like, however, to underscore Ambassador Yost’s remarks on three points.

1. As he has pointed out, because 1970 is the U.N.’s 25th anniversary year, other U.N. members will be very attentive to what they perceive to be our attitude toward the United Nations. Hence this request at this particular time assumes an international political significance of rather large proportions. The President has stated that his decision to ask Congress for funds to assist the expansion of the U.N.’s New York headquarters is an example of U.S. support for the United Nations. Favorable action by the Congress will be important evidence of that continuing support.

2. The present request for authorization will be followed by a request for an appropriation in this fiscal year. As Ambassador Yost has made clear, this is necessary to assure the viability of the financial package before the United Nations. However, there will be no expenditure of these funds until fiscal year 1972.

3. All of us who are interested in the future of the United Nations are concerned, as Ambassador Yost has pointed out, with the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations. We are making a major

effort throughout the U.N. system to increase coordination of joint operations, to improve efficiency and to stress the need for cost-effectiveness studies. We want to strengthen performance with the greatest possible economy of expenditures. Allowing a further fragmentation of the central headquarters staff would produce exactly the opposite result. In this connection, we are concerned also with the effectiveness of our own participation in the U.N. of our ability to persuade qualified Americans to work for the Organization, and of our ability to influence the Organization in constructive ways.

I feel strongly that the U.N. needs the kinds of outlook, drive and experience which Americans can bring to it. This is particularly true for the practical elaboration and implementation of measures relating to U.N. programs of economic development, the exploration and exploitation of the seabeds, population growth, and the development of more effective peacekeeping procedures and of ways to promote the rule of law among nations—all of these activities will be growing in the years ahead. The amount of enthusiasm and American know-how involved in such U.N. activities can make an enormous difference to the success of these programs.

Yet, unless we act to make it possible to keep together in New York the essential headquarters staff to support these activities, fewer Americans will be involved and our influence will decline proportionately.

For these reasons, as well as the many others cited by Ambassador Yost, I believe it is important to the national interest that favorable consideration be given to the administration's proposal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

After all of the dire predictions on Earth Day, it is renewing to have you suggest that the United Nations has another 20 years to go, as I read in your cost statements.

Mr. Ambassador, I note the estimated cost in your statement on this project has risen from \$50 million in 1968 to \$60 million in the early fall of 1969. It was \$73 million in December of 1969, and now it is \$80 million.

I might ask just how firm is this current estimate, especially if there should be continued delay in starting this project?

Ambassador Yost. Well, Mr. Chairman, we believe that this is realistic, and as firm as any estimate of this kind can be. The initial \$50 million estimate that you referred to was a very rough estimate, and did not, indeed, include some of the elements which it was later decided should be included in the plan. These were added in order to meet the U.N.'s needs over a longer period and to include some additional space in the existing building for badly needed improved conference facilities, increased parking, and increased dining space, accommodations which have become very overcrowded in these last 18 years.

As I said in my statement, the present estimate is in fact \$73.4 million, but having in mind exactly the prudence and contingencies that you allude to, the Secretary General felt it wise to provide for \$80 million. In view of the time that it will necessarily take to get this project completed, even if all of the funds are provided promptly, this seems a reasonable amount. His own advisers, the architects and

the contractors, have studied all elements of the program thoroughly and they believe that this estimate is realistic.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Under the proposed cost-sharing, it appears that combined U.S. sources would make up better than three-fourths of the cost of this project. There are some who say that this is an unfair formula. What other countries who participate in this international organization or different United Nations organizations, where they are host countries, have been as generous as this? Other than Austria?

Ambassador YOST. Well, as I mentioned, the Swiss have also contributed very heavily.

We have here a detailed account of what has been contributed by a substantial number of countries, which I can make available for the record, if you want.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes; we would like to have that.

Ambassador YOST. This includes Chile, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, France, Phillipines, Switzerland, quite a substantial number of countries which have contributed varying amounts to buildings.

Mr. GALLAGHER. We would like that for the record.

(Detailed account of contributions follows:)

ACCOMMODATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: HOST GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE

Host governments customarily assist in providing suitable accommodations for international organizations established on their territories. The most common types of assistance, often provided in combination, are, (a) land donations, (b) gratis construction, (c) nominal building rentals, (d) rent-free buildings, (e) interest-free or low-interest loans for construction, and (f) grants for construction.

The following tables are based on information provided by the secretariats of the organizations involved. They list by type of assistance the support provided by 19 governments including the United States for 31 headquarters and field accommodations of international organizations.

A. LAND DONATIONS

Land has been donated or provided at nominal rental by the following governments for the construction of international organization facilities.

Government	Site	International organization
Austria.....	Vienna.....	UNIDO—U.N. Industrial Development Organization.
	do.....	IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency.
Chile.....	Santiago.....	ECLA—U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America.
	do.....	Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning.
Costa Rica.....	Turrialba.....	IAIAS—Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences.
Ethiopia.....	Addis Ababa.....	ECA—U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.
France.....	Paris.....	UNESCO—U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.
	Brazzaville.....	WHO—Regional office.
India.....	New Delhi.....	Do.
Italy.....	Rome.....	FAO—Food and Agriculture Organization.
Philippines.....	Manila.....	Asian Development Bank.
	do.....	WHO—Regional office.
Switzerland.....	Geneva.....	U.N.—European office.
	do.....	WHO—World Health Organization.
	do.....	ILO—International Labor Organization.
	Bern.....	UPU—Universal Postal Union.
United States.....	New York.....	U.N.—Headquarters (major portion from private U.S. sources).
	Washington.....	OAS—Organization of American States.
	do.....	PAHO—Pan American Health Organization.

B. GRATIS CONSTRUCTION

Host governments have agreed to construct buildings for use by international organizations free of charge. Such buildings have usually then been leased to the international organizations at nominal or concessional rents. Examples of buildings constructed free of charge include:

Government	Site	International organization
Austria	Vienna	UNIDO—U.N. Industrial Development Organization.
	do.	IAEA—International Atomic Energy Commission.
Canada	Montreal	ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization.
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	ECA—U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.
France	Lyons	IARC—International Agency for Research on Cancer.
Ghana	Accra	FAO—Regional office.
Niger	Niamey	U.N. common premises.
Thailand and Netherlands	Bangkok	ECAFE—U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and Far East.
Switzerland	Geneva	ITU—International Telecommunication Union.
	do.	WMO—World Meteorological Organization.

C. NOMINAL BUILDING RENTALS

Total or partial subsidies are made toward the rental of United Nations Information Centers by 35 of 46 host countries and toward the rental of United Nations Development Program offices by 80 of 97 host countries. (The United States does not, however, subsidize the rental of office space for the UNDP Headquarters in New York.) Besides the 35 UN Information Centers and 80 UN Development Program offices, the following buildings have been leased to international organizations at nominal rentals by their host governments:

Government	Site	International organization
Austria	Vienna	UNIDO—U.N. Industrial Development Organization.
	do.	IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency.
Canada	Montreal	ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization.
Egypt	Alexandria	WHO—Regional office.
Italy	Rome	FAO—Food and Agriculture Organization.
Philippines	Manila	WHO—Regional office.
Switzerland	Geneva	ITU—International Telecommunication Union.
	do.	WMO—World Meteorological Organization.

D. RENT-FREE BUILDINGS

The following host governments have provided rent-free buildings to international organizations. Costs of utilities and maintenance may also be paid by the host government or shared with the international organization.

Government	Site	International organization
Costa Rica	Turrialba	IAIAS—Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences.
Denmark	Copenhagen	WHO—Regional office.
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	ECA—U.N. Economic Commission for Africa.
France	Brazzaville	WHO—Regional office.
Philippines	Manila	Asian Development Bank.
Switzerland	Geneva	UNCTAD—U.N. Conference on Trade and Development.

E. INTEREST-FREE OR LOW-INTEREST LOANS FOR CONSTRUCTION

The following host governments have made interest-free or low-interest loans to international organizations to support costs for office construction.

Government	Site	International organization
Chile.....	Santiago.....	ECLA—U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America.
	do.....	Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning.
France.....	Paris.....	UNESCO—United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization..
Switzerland.....	Geneva.....	U.N.—European office.
	do.....	WHO—World Health Organization.
	do.....	ILO—International Labor Organization.
	Bern.....	UPU—Universal Postal Union.
United States.....	New York.....	U.N.—Headquarters.

F. GRANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION

The following governments have assisted construction of international organization offices with grants covering expenses in whole or in part. Host country grants for construction usually also cover preliminary architectural and engineering studies.

Government	Site	International organization
Cameroon.....	Yaounde.....	U.N. common premises.
Chile and the Netherlands.....	Santiago.....	ECLA—U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America.
	do.....	Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning.
Iran.....	Teheran.....	U.N. common premises.
Philippines.....	Manila.....	Asian Development Bank.
	do.....	WHO—Regional office.
Switzerland.....	Geneva.....	U.N.—European office.
United States.....	Washington.....	OAS—Organization of American States.

DETAILS OF SUBSTANTIAL SUPPORT

Following are the details of those host government contributions noted in the foregoing tables which are at a level comparable to the substantial support regularly accorded by the United States.

1) The Federal Government of Austria (65%) and the city of Vienna (35%) are assuming 100% of the construction costs of facilities for the UN Industrial Development Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency; the land has been donated; the rental is \$0.04/annum for 99 years; during construction temporary offices for these two organizations are being provided rent-free.

2) Switzerland and the Canton of Geneva supported 100% of the costs of construction of secretariat buildings for the International Telecommunication Union and the World Meteorological Organization. Rentals are respectively \$35,000/annum with optional lease purchase and \$18,000/annum. Switzerland supported 100% of the cost of constructing the headquarters of the Universal Postal Union in Bern with an interest-free loan and a 40-year loan at 3%.

3) The Government of Canada supported 100% of the construction costs of the headquarters of the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal. Rental cost is \$1/sq. ft./annum.

4) The Government of France provided an interest-free, 30-year loan to construct a three-building headquarters complex for the UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization on donated land; before Congolese independence, France ceded land and facilities for the use of the WHO regional office for Africa in Brazzaville for the nominal price of New Francs 100. The National Government of France, the Department of Rhone, and the city of Lyons are presently constructing a building to the specifications of the International Agency for Research on Cancer.

5) The Government of Italy made available a two-building headquarters complex for the Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome; rental is \$1/year.

6) The Government of the Philippines is covering 100% of the construction costs of the Asian Development Bank headquarters in Manila; the land was donated; there will be no rental charges; temporary office rental costs are being paid by a grant from the Government of the Philippines.

7) The Government of Ethiopia supported 100% of the costs of constructing the headquarters of the UN Economic Commission for Africa on land donated by the Emperor with permanent rent-free arrangements for occupancy.

8) Costa Rica donated land and facilities for the use of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences in Turrialba.

9) Denmark purchased a building specifically for the regional office of WHO in Copenhagen and placed it at the disposal of the organization without charge.

10) Egypt provided a building in Alexandria to the WHO Eastern Mediterranean regional office at the nominal rate of 10 piasters/annum.

11) Ghana constructed a building in Accra for an FAO regional office and continues to pay for utilities.

12) Niger constructed a common premises building for UN field staff in Niamey.

13) The United States provided for 100% of the construction costs of the UN Headquarters in New York through a \$65 million interest free loan; the land was donated; no rental is charged. In 1906 the United States made a grant to the Organization of American States for the construction costs of the OAS headquarters in Washington, D.C.; the land was also donated. The United States has recently donated land for a new OAS headquarters site in Washington (under the terms of the agreement a portion of the land previously donated will revert to the United States).

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, will you yield at that point?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. I would like to inquire, what is the amount of the contribution by the Austrian Government with respect to the location of UNIDO and IAEA at Vienna, in terms of land and buildings?

Mr. DE PALMA. Mr. Chairman, may I answer that?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. De Palma.

Mr. DE PALMA. It is now planned at more than \$45 million, and that will be a total package to provide a free site and building.

Mr. FASCELL. And how much did the Swiss give for the recent expansion at Geneva?

Mr. DE PALMA. An interest-free loan.

Mr. FASCELL. How much?

Mr. DE PALMA. About \$2 million, I understand.

Mr. GROSS. But it was a loan.

Mr. DE PALMA. A loan, interest free. And the Swiss also made a grant of about \$1 million in connection with a low-interest loan of \$14 million.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The testimony before the Senate committee claimed that the Austrian Government's contribution to the new building was \$25 million.

Mr. DE PALMA. Yes, sir; it has gone up, the way all these estimates go up, as they refigured the cost and got closer to firm plans.

Mr. GALLAGHER. How will the \$25 million that the U.N. will contribute be raised?

Ambassador Yost. That will come out of the regular budget of the United Nations under the usual formula.

Mr. GALLAGHER. It will not be a bond issue?

Ambassador Yost. No, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. It will be paid out of ongoing costs?

What is the amount of money still owed on the original bonds?

Ambassador Yost. You mean the peacekeeping?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Yes.

Ambassador Yost. The Congo?

Mr. GALLAGHER. No.

Ambassador Yost. You mean the headquarters?

Mr. FASCELL. No; he is talking about the bond issue, a total bond issue.

Mr. GROSS. \$100 million, wasn't it?

Mr. FASCELL. \$100 million.

Ambassador Yost. The original loan for headquarters was \$65 million, of which \$40 million has been repaid.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What was the original?

Ambassador Yost. \$65 million, of which \$40 million has been repaid.

Now, the U.N. bonds, which were authorized a few years ago, to help cover costs of peacekeeping operations, primarily the Congo. Of the \$76 million total purchased by the United States, approximately \$20 million has been repaid, in addition to about \$9 million received in interest.

So, there is still an outstanding balance of about \$56 million in those bonds which is due to the United States.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And how are those bonds being amortized?

Ambassador Yost. They are being covered in the regular budget; the payments are being made on schedule through the regular budget of the United Nations.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Will the cost of those bonds and the cost of participation by the U.N. in your opinion, be able to be met by the U.N., in the event we pass this legislation?

Ambassador Yost. Yes, sir.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Out of the regular budget?

Ambassador Yost. Yes, indeed. That is a part of the package which has been approved by the General Assembly, subject to the other parts falling in line.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Now, some serious questions have been raised about the advisability of expanding the United Nations establishment in New York. It has been argued in some quarters that the United Nations should move more of its facilities abroad, where the living conditions for the delegates and staffs are considered more congenial. Would you care to comment on the advisability of moving part of the United Nations? You touched on this in your statement. There have been others who have given testimony on the United Nations who felt that Geneva might be a place to move part of it. What effect would such a move have on the general efficiency of the United Nations.

Ambassador Yost. Yes, Mr. Chairman. In view of the questions that have been raised, to which you refer, we have gone into this very carefully, and in considerable detail. As I said in my statement, a very substantial decentralization already exists. If you take the whole system into account, including the specialized agencies, more than 80 percent of the staff is outside of New York, abroad in other countries. If you take only the United Nations, plus the U.N. development program and the U.N. Children's Fund, still over 60 percent is abroad. What remains in New York is the essential management and coordination of the United Nations the policymaking functions which it would be a serious mistake to fragment and split up.

The Secretary General is responsible for coordinating this massive conglomerate that is the United Nations family. It is difficult to do under the best of circumstances. If the economic and social part of his headquarters staff, on which he relies to assist him in that coordination, were spread about the world, in the same way that the operational staff is, his power to coordinate, control, and direct, to make sense out of this elaborate mechanism, would seriously diminish. And, of course, costs would rise, as another of the consequences, in addition to the fragmentation of U.N. policy.

Also, the United Nations development program is under Paul Hoffman's direction, and Paul feels very strongly that he must maintain his central headquarters staff in New York, in close working relationship with the economic and social side of the U.N. Secretariat and close enough to Washington to insure coordination with the World Bank. He has only 475 out of a total of 2,700 UNDP employees in New York. But he thinks it is absolutely essential to maintain that central policymaking and management corps in New York.

So, this is the basic reason why we believe there should not be further fragmentation. All of the elements that could usefully be put elsewhere have been put elsewhere. To carry this process any farther, under present circumstances, would reduce, rather than increase, the effectiveness of the United Nations, and would unnecessarily increase the costs to the U.N. as a whole, and of course, to us as a major contributor.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Ambassador, or Mr. Secretary, if the Congress in its wisdom and liberality, or lack of wisdom and illiberality, fail to pass this legislation, by your June date, what would be the consequence?

Ambassador YOST. If the Congress failed to pass it by the June date, there would be a delay in getting the whole process underway. We would then be faced by those increasing construction costs, with which we are all too familiar, and the total cost might rise. Of course, if it should be impossible to get the U.S. contribution at all, I am afraid the whole project would collapse, because that contribution is an indispensable part of the package.

Mr. GALLAGHER. In your opinion, if the Congress does not appropriate the \$20 million, are there any other areas where this money could be raised?

Ambassador YOST. I don't think so, Mr. Chairman. I just don't see where it could come from. I am sure the city of New York would feel it has gone to the absolute limit; in any case, New York City would only match what the U.S. Government would do. During my testimony before the New York City officials, they were most eager that the U.S. Government make a larger contribution, in order that theirs need not be so large, because they have, as you know, a host of urban problems there, with which they are trying with the greatest difficulty to cope. I don't think that there is any possibility of getting the U.N. itself to contribute substantially more.

There is this general feeling that, unless the host government is willing to carry a substantial part of the burden, others shouldn't be expected to. There is also as I indicated, some sentiment, which we consider most unfortunate, for just moving the U.N. lock, stock and barrel out of the United States.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What has the Soviet position been on this?

Ambassador YOST. Well, they are not in favor of the necessary expansion in New York. I don't know whether you are interested in the vote on the resolution.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What was the position of—

Ambassador YOST. The Soviet bloc voted against the resolution because it has been their argument, frequently put forward, that the United States is not a proper place for the United Nations to be located, and it should be moved elsewhere.

Mr. GALLAGHER. What was the Soviet vote?

Ambassador YOST. Against.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Gross?

Mr. GROSS. Well, Mr. Yost, have you given any attention to cutting down the number of employees? How many did you say the United Nations has in New York?

Ambassador YOST. About 4,900, who require space.

Mr. GROSS. Have you ever given any thought to cutting down the number of employees?

Ambassador YOST. I have frequently called on the Secretary General, and urged him, under instructions from our Government, to exert every possible economy, both in the employment of personnel and in other respects. There is, at our suggestion, a management survey being conducted presently, in the U.N. Secretariat, to endeavor to assure the Secretary General, and all of the members, that the greatest economy—

Mr. GROSS. Well, the answer is—in order to save time, because I have several questions—the answer apparently is that you come to the conclusion that you can't cut. Is that right?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, cuts are being made in some places, but they are being balanced by necessary expansion for new programs in other places.

Mr. GROSS. I once had a directory of the United Nations. I suppose it is still available, for the asking, which listed all kinds of offices for tennis headquarters, golf headquarters, bowling headquarters, and the Lord only knows what others—separate offices for all of these deals. Do they still exist down there?

Ambassador YOST. Well, I have never run into them, Congressman.

Mr. GROSS. Well, would you see to it that I get another copy of the directory?

Ambassador YOST. Surely.

Mr. GROSS. Because I labor under no illusions. The pooh-bahs of the United Nations will do a good job selling another deal to Congress. I labor under no illusions about what is going to happen with respect to this bill, but it seems to me that some of the activities, some of the employees of the United Nations, could be eliminated in the interest of conserving space and the interest of payroll economy.

How many nations are in arrears in their assessments and their contributions? And by how much? Can you put a—

Ambassador YOST. We can put that in the record, yes.

(Assessments and contributions list follows:)

SUMMARY AS OF JAN. 1, 1970—COLLECTIONS AND ARREARAGES FOR 1969 AND PRIOR YEARS OF UNITED NATIONS ACCOUNTS FOR THE REGULAR BUDGET, WORKING CAPITAL FUND, EMERGENCY FORCE, AND THE CONGO¹

Period	Gross assessments	Credits and reductions	Net assessments	Amount received	Balance due
Working capital fund.....	\$40,064,000		\$40,064,000	\$40,064,000	
United Nations regular budget: ²					
Calendar year 1966.....	114,891,620	\$8,922,389	105,969,231	105,918,657	\$50,574
Calendar year 1967.....	118,073,337	8,654,686	109,418,651	107,648,182	1,770,469
Calendar year 1968.....	130,571,361	10,203,755	120,367,606	113,783,015	6,584,591
Calendar year 1969.....	143,467,267	12,528,441	130,938,826	81,107,545	49,821,281
Balance due.....					58,236,915
United Nations Emergency Force:					
Calendar year 1957.....	15,028,988		15,028,988	11,467,314	3,561,674
Calendar year 1958.....	25,000,000		25,000,000	17,936,833	7,063,167
Calendar year 1959.....	15,205,000	41,226	15,163,774	10,892,124	4,271,650
Calendar year 1960.....	20,000,000	3,553,223	16,446,777	11,786,519	4,660,258
Calendar year 1961.....	19,000,000	1,754,991	17,245,009	12,520,377	4,724,632
January to June 1962.....	9,750,000	1,467,296	8,282,704	6,037,298	2,245,406
July to December 1963.....	9,504,784	691,893	8,812,891	6,312,674	2,500,217
Calendar year 1964.....	17,770,056	1,656,356	16,113,700	11,627,210	4,486,490
Calendar year 1965.....	18,556,141		18,556,141	13,646,744	4,909,397
Calendar year 1966.....	18,550,000		18,550,000	13,000,714	5,549,286
Calendar year 1967.....	17,315,000		17,315,000	10,776,890	6,538,110
Balance due.....					50,510,287
United Nations Congo account:					
July to December 1960.....	48,500,000	3,900,000	44,600,000	29,348,616	15,251,384
January to October 1961.....	100,000,000	15,575,036	84,424,964	56,877,769	27,547,195
November 1961 to June 1962.....	80,000,000	11,457,858	68,542,142	44,735,145	23,806,997
July to December 1963.....	33,029,108	2,965,256	30,063,852	19,409,766	10,654,086
January to June 1964.....	15,058,090	1,207,116	13,860,974	9,018,149	4,842,825
Balance due.....					82,102,487
Total amount due, regular budget, UNEF, and UNOC.....					190,849,689

¹ Source: Information as of Dec. 31, 1969, supplied by the United Nations.

² Contributions to the regular budget prior to 1966 are fully collected.

³ Total costs, including initial airlift, amounted to \$60,000,000.

BALANCE DUE, 1969 AND PRIOR YEARS—JAN. 1, 1970

Members (126)	Regular budget	UNEF	UNOC	Balance due 1969 and prior years
Afghanistan.....		\$29,499	\$37,604	\$67,103
Albania.....	\$93,129	45,299	43,602	182,030
Algeria.....	591	8,932		9,523
Argentina.....	1,198,034	959,844		2,157,878
Australia.....		63,227		63,227
Austria.....	42,319			42,319
Barbados.....				
Belgium.....		144,583		144,583
Bolivia.....	149,003	41,905	34,833	225,741
Botswana.....	113			113
Brazil.....			248,838	248,838
Bulgaria.....	411,173	181,155	190,746	783,074
Burma.....				
Burundi.....	148,894	11,278	10,471	170,643
Byelorussian S.S.R.....	614,638	911,964	1,357,881	2,884,483
Cambodia.....	49,996	1,689		51,685
Cameroon.....		1,689		1,689
Canada.....				
Central African Republic.....	37,108	2,256	6,589	45,953
Ceylon.....				
Chad.....	39,471	8,385	9,832	57,688
Chile.....		165,903	224,847	390,750
China.....	10,908,910	5,274,569	6,687,207	22,870,686
Colombia.....	264,596			264,596
Congo (Brazzaville).....	9,459	9,249	9,938	28,646
Congo (Kinshasa).....				
Costa Rica.....	123,385	13,853	7,217	144,455
Cuba.....	450,817	249,811	260,259	960,887
Cyprus.....				
Czechoslovakia.....	1,310,709	1,814,845	2,759,408	5,884,952
Dahomey.....	134,894	5,530	6,994	147,418

BALANCE DUE, 1969 AND PRIOR YEARS—JAN. 1, 1970—Continued

Members (126)	Regular budget	UNEF	UNOC	Balance due 1969 and prior years
Denmark				
Dominican Republic	149,239	22,898	54,503	226,640
Ecuador	151,815	10,129	4,120	166,064
El Salvador	96,222	7,411	3,349	106,982
Equatorial Guinea	15,971			15,971
Ethiopia				
Finland				
France	3,529,855	765,655	17,031,152	21,326,662
Gabon	46,150			46,150
Gambia	83,011			83,011
Ghana	155,975			155,975
Greece	11,179			11,179
Guatemala			38,209	38,209
Guinea	93,684	19,410	9,938	123,032
Guyana				
Haiti	149,213	25,661	33,916	208,790
Honduras	68,287	691	5,677	74,655
Hungary	1,003,673	898,298	995,024	2,896,995
Iceland				
India	187,545			187,545
Indonesia	424,893			424,893
Iran	327,239			327,239
Iraq		100,407	22,362	122,769
Ireland				
Israel	249,938			249,938
Italy				
Ivory Coast		1,689		1,689
Jamaica	14,484			14,484
Japan				
Jordan		45,299	43,602	88,901
Kenya				
Kuwait				
Laos	96,222			96,222
Lebanon		19,850	12,108	31,958
Lesotho				
Liberia				
Libya		1,689		1,689
Luxembourg				
Madagascar				
Malawi				
Malaysia				
Maldives Islands	96,222			96,222
Mali	17,980	5,469	24,259	47,708
Malta				
Mauritania	81,418	10,673	17,215	109,306
Mauritius	41,262			41,262
Mexico	175,726	679,491	786,193	1,641,410
Mongolia	28,705	12,387	17,215	58,307
Morocco	124,968			124,968
Nepal	4,414	4,232	3,240	11,886
Netherlands				
New Zealand				
Nicaragua	112,245	1,288	33,915	147,448
Niger	7,040	1,906		8,946
Nigeria				
Norway				
Pakistan	140,000			140,000
Panama	51,222	15,648	33,915	100,785
Paraguay	124,541	31,661	24,229	180,431
Peru	151,184	77,441	89,184	317,809
Philippines	212,447	15,632		228,079
Poland	1,699,318	2,528,364	2,466,010	6,693,692
Portugal	85,733		201,673	288,406
Romania	299,095	682,212	641,015	1,613,322
Rwanda		11,278	10,471	21,749
Saudi Arabia		74,890	69,487	144,377
Senegal	59,311	9,814	20,418	89,543
Sierra Leone	99,248	5,469		104,717
Singapore				
Somalia		11,191	17,445	28,636
South Africa	302,536	80,862	1,503,337	1,886,735
Southern Yemen	16,000			16,000
Spain		1,089,981	985,159	2,075,140
Sudan	62,484	89,332	5,860	157,676
Swaziland				
Sweden				
Syria		46,654	20,379	67,033
Tanzania	2,124			2,124
Thailand		9,026		9,026
Togo	5,613	16,174	25,324	47,111

BALANCE DUE, 1969 AND PRIOR YEARS—JAN. 1, 1970—Continued

Members (126)	Regular budget	UNEF	UNOC	Balance due 1969 and prior years
Trinidad and Tobago.....				
Tunisia.....				
Turkey.....				
Uganda.....	60,725	9,589	10,471	80,785
Ukrainian S.S.R.....	1,700,754	3,476,580	5,185,697	10,363,031
U.S.S.R.....	17,642,172	27,665,631	39,223,085	84,530,888
United Arab Republic.....		351,946	48,387	400,333
United Kingdom.....		283,299		283,299
United States.....	11,000,000	1,188,096		12,188,096
Upper Volta.....	86,302	19,936	14,145	120,383
Uruguay.....	203,640	54,388	97,662	355,690
Venezuela.....	562,358	32,298		594,656
Yemen.....	146,294	45,299	43,602	235,195
Yugoslavia.....		7,598	333,269	340,867
Zambia.....				
Total.....	58,236,915	50,510,287	82,102,487	190,849,689
Members in arrears.....	71	68	57	92

¹ \$9,115,000 was paid in January 1970.

² This amount is the difference between the original apportionment for 1967 and the amount paid by the United States toward its share of revised estimates of 1967 costs.

Mr. GROSS. Put that in the record, but could you give us some estimate now of the amount that they are in arrears?

Ambassador YOST. The arrears arise almost entirely, Congressman, as you may well be aware, over the refusal of certain countries to pay some of the peacekeeping expenses.

Mr. GROSS. I understand how they get that way, Mr. Yost.

Ambassador YOST. They are contributing, for the most part, to the ordinary budget.

Mr. GROSS. Well, put it in the record, so that we will have it, if you will, please.

Ambassador YOST. Yes, indeed.

Mr. GROSS. Now if they paid up, wouldn't that make this special contribution unnecessary?

Ambassador YOST. No, it wouldn't, sir. This is—

Mr. GROSS. Well, it would make a very substantial part of it unnecessary.

Ambassador YOST. It would remove some or all of the deficit which hangs over the head of the United Nations. And, therefore, it would improve the U.N.'s overall financial position, but it wouldn't provide money for this particular—

Mr. GROSS. Doesn't the space problem arise in part from the admission of the micro states? Such as Equatorial Guinea, and Maldiv Islands, and so on and so forth?

Ambassador YOST. Well, to a very small degree. Of course, the individual members do not have office space in the U.N. building. They have to provide their own office space outside.

Mr. GROSS. You say that this is going to cost us \$20 million. That is the amount in the resolution, isn't it?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROSS. And \$25 million from the regular U.N. budget. Is that correct?

Ambassador YOST. That is correct.

Mr. GROSS. And what do we contribute to the regular budget?

Ambassador YOST. Approximately 30 percent.

Mr. GROSS. Approximately 32 percent, you mean, don't you.

Mr. DE PALMA. 31.57.

Mr. GROSS. 31.9, isn't it?

Mr. DE PALMA. 31.57.

Mr. GROSS. You can't get much closer to 32 percent than that.

Now, what about the Children's Fund, which is also scheduled to make a contribution to this. Don't we contribute to that?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, we do, Congressman.

Mr. GROSS. And don't we contribute to the U.N. development program?

Ambassador YOST. We do.

Mr. GROSS. And by a substantial percentage?

Ambassador YOST. But of course, those agencies would have to pay rent if this building is not built; therefore the cost to them and to us is the same either way.

Mr. GROSS. I am talking about how much you intend to filch out of the pockets of American taxpayers for this purpose. That is what I am talking about, and the bill, it seems to me, adds up more nearly to \$40 million than it does to \$20 million. I will shake it out later on, but—

Ambassador YOST. Well, Congressman, our contributions to UNDP and UNICEF would be the same, whether or not this building is built, because they would still have to pay rent if they are unable to move into this building. They are now paying rent in privately rented quarters, outside of the U.N. building.

Mr. GROSS. Are there no committees in the U.N. that can be gotten rid of? Are they all active and operating, and essential?

Ambassador YOST. No, Congressman, there is a constant review going on, with a view to dropping activities which are no longer essential, which are obsolete. At the same time, of course, there are new programs, approved by member governments, which are coming into being.

Mr. GROSS. Well, give us a list of those that have been dropped, the committees of the U.N. that have been dropped. Will you do that?

Ambassador YOST. Yes. Some, of course, are still on the books, but don't in fact have any staff or functions.

(The requested information follows:)

DISCONTINUED AND INACTIVE UN COMMITTEES

Of the United Nations Committees established over roughly the last decade by the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Economic and Social Council, those listed below have been discontinued or are presently inactive. They therefore require no UN staffing, funding, or conference space.

Based on information provided by the United Nations Secretariat, this listing distinguishes between 1) committees discontinued because their functions were fulfilled, 2) committees combined with or superseded by new groups, 3) committees discontinued for various other reasons and 4) inactive committees which formally remain on the UN's books but do not meet.

COMMITTEES DISCONTINUED AFTER FULFILLING THEIR FUNCTION

	Established	Terminated
Consultative Group on Planning for Economic Development.....	1960	1964
Committee on a United Nations Development Fund.....	1960	1966
Subcommittee on the Situation in Angola.....	1961	1961
Commission of Investigation into the Circumstances of P. Lumumba's Death.....	1961	1961
Commission of Investigation into the Conditions and Circumstances Resulting in the Tragic Death of Dag Hammarskjöld.....	1961	1962
Special Committee on Territories under Portuguese Administration.....	1961	1962
Special Committee of 24, Subcommittee on Good Offices on British Guiana.....	1964	1965
Special Committee for the Preparation of Plans for the Celebration of the 15th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.....	1962	1963
Ad Hoc Committee on the Improvement of Methods of Work of the General Assembly.....	1962	1963
Committee of Investigation on Southwest Africa.....	1962	1963
Ad Hoc Committee for Southwest Africa.....	1966	1967
Ad Hoc Committee of Experts to Examine the Finances of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies.....	1965	1966
Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on Human Rights.....	1965	1967
United Nations Special Mission on Aden.....	1966	1967
Consultant Experts on Effects of Possible use of Nuclear Weapons.....	1966	1967
Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Nonnuclear Weapon States.....	1966	1967
Ad Hoc Committee on Navigation Satellites.....	1966	1967
Expert Committee on the Reorganization of the United Nations Secretariat.....	1967	1967
Ad Hoc Committee on Coordination of Technical Assistance Activities.....	1961	1964
Preparatory Committee for the 2d World Population Conference.....	1961	1965
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Housing and Urban Development.....	1961	1962
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (PCUNCTAD).....	1962	1964
5 PCUNCTAD specialized subcommittees.....	1963	1963
Working Party on the International Year for Human Rights.....	1965	1966
Expert Group to Review the Draft Recommendations for the 1970 Population and Housing Censuses.....	1965	1966
Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Ministers Responsible for Social Services.....	1966	1967
Expert Group on Proposed 5-Year Program of Surveys of Natural Resources.....	1966	1966
Group of Experts to Examine Apartheid in South Africa.....	1963	1964
Expert Committee on Measures To Be Taken by the Security Council under the United Nations Charter concerning Apartheid.....	1964	1965

COMMITTEES COMBINED WITH OR SUPERSEDED BY OTHER GROUPS

Working group to examine the administrative and budgetary procedure of the United Nations.....	1961	1964
Scientific Advisory Panel.....	1961	1962
Special Committee for South West Africa.....	1961	1962
Special Committee of Twenty-four, Subcommittee on South West Africa.....	1966	1966
Advisory Committee on the Consolidation and Integration of the U.N. Special Education and Training Program for South West Africa and for Territories Under Portuguese Administration and of the U.N. Educational and Training Program for South Africans.....	1966	1967
Preparatory Committee on International Cooperation Year.....	1962	1963
Ad Hoc Committee on the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development.....	1965	1966
Ad Hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.....	1967	1968
Committee for Industrial Development.....	1959	1966
Ad Hoc Working Group on Coordination.....	1960	1962
Special Committee on Coordination.....	1962	1966
Group of Experts on Geographical Names.....	1959	1960
Expert Committee on Commodity Price Fluctuations.....	1959	1961
Committee on Periodic Reports on Human Rights.....	1961	1962
Group of Experts on International Travel and Tourism.....	1961	1962
Advisory Committee of Experts on Industrial Development Activities of the United Nations System.....	1962	1963
Expert Group on Commodity and Trade Problems of Developing Countries.....	1962	1963
Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Long-Range Program of Work in the Field of Population.....	1963	1964
Ad Hoc Working Group on Social Welfare.....	1963	1965
Committee on the International Year for Human Rights.....	1964	1965
United Nations Council for South West Africa.....	1967	1968
Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Programs in Fertility.....	1965	1966
Expert Group on Measurement of Flow of Capital and Aid to Developing Countries.....	1965	1967
Committee on Substances (Narcotic Drugs) not Under International Control.....	1966	1966
Group of Experts on Marine Science and Technology.....	1966	1968

COMMITTEES DISCONTINUED FOR VARIOUS OTHER REASONS

	Established	Terminated
Special Committee of Twenty-four, Subcommittee on British Guiana.....	1963	1963
Vietnam Mission.....	1963	1963
Ad Hoc Working Group of Specialists in Sample Survey Methods.....	1960	1961
Consultative Group of Experts on Long-term Economic Projections.....	1960	1966
Group of Experts on the Organization and Administration of Social Sciences.....	1959	1961
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Community Development.....	1961	1963
Technical Working Group on Compensatory Financing.....	1962	1962
United Nations Group of Experts on Metropolitan Planning and Development.....	1963	1963
Working Group to Prepare a Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance.....	1964	1964
Advisory Committee on Regional Development.....	1965	1966
Group of Experts on Social Policy and the Distribution of Income in the Nation.....	1965	1967
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Program in Demographic Aspects of Urbanization.....	1966	1967
Ad Hoc Expert Group on Fertilizer Production.....	1965	1966
Expert Group on Repairs and Maintenance in Industries of Developing Countries.....	1966	1966
Three Groups of Consultants in the Fields of Minerals, Water, and Energy.....	1966	1967
Expert Group on International Travel Statistics.....	1966	1967

INACTIVE COMMITTEES STILL ON THE BOOKS

	Established	Last meeting
Consultative Group on Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament.....	1960	1962
Special Committee of Twenty-four, Subcommittee on Southern Rhodesia.....	1963	1964
Committee for the International Cooperation Year.....	1963	1966
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Question of a Declaration on International Cooperation.....	1962	1963
Experts on the United Nations Programs in Public Administration.....	1962	1967
Expert Group on Revision of the System of National Accounts.....	1962	1967

Mr. GROSS. We had in this same hearing room the day before yesterday a discussion of the Military Staff Committee of the U.N., and in the meantime I dug up a statement by Vice Adm. John M. Lee, nominated to be one of the Assistant Directors of the Arms Control Agency. He recently appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. His previous assignment was Vice Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Military Staff Committee. Senator Fulbright asked him what he did in that assignment, and Admiral Lee replied:

That Committee as such, sir, is stagnant, and has been for 20 years.

Later he added,

There is nothing to the Military Staff Committee now.

Now, how many other stagnant committees are there in the U.N. that haven't done anything for 20 years, or even 10 years? How many others are there, that require space and staffs? I suppose we had a general or an admiral as Chairman of the Staff Committee as an additional cost for the staff, but nothing happening.

Ambassador Yost. The expense to either the U.N. or the U.S. of that Staff Committee is extremely slight. They meet about once or twice a month, very briefly, and occupy conference space for less than an hour.

Mr. GROSS. Why, sure, they would have to go through some motions, in order to even start to justify their presence in New York.

Ambassador Yost. Our own staff has other military duties, which occupy them fully, most of the time. The responsibilities of a U.S. member of the Military Staff Committee, are only a very tiny fraction of his normal work and duties.

Mr. GROSS. All right, could you tell this committee how much space this Military Staff Committee occupies, and how much of a staff they have? Would you put that in the record for us, please?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROSS. So that we can get some idea.

Ambassador YOST. They meet only twice a month, in an available U.N. conference room. Therefore, they occupy no assigned space. They are serviced by a single member of the U.N. Secretariat on a part-time basis.

Mr. GROSS. I suppose parking space for the various Ambassadors' Cadillacs is also an item to be considered, isn't it? Do you all have Cadillacs and drivers? Do you have a Cadillac and a driver?

Ambassador YOST. I do.

Mr. GROSS. So parking is another—

Ambassador YOST. It is parked in the cellar of our permanent building.

Mr. GROSS. This expansion would also provide more corridors. I remember a magazine article a few years ago which discussed the "Ladies of the Corridors" at the U.N. so this would provide more corridors for more ladies that patrol the corridors. Is that correct?

Ambassador YOST. I have been looking for those ladies ever since that article came out. I haven't found them yet.

Mr. GROSS. Well, maybe you haven't looked in the right place.

I will tell you what I think about this, Mr. Ambassador. It is another real gage of the American taxpayers, and I am surprised that the President of the United States, faced with rocketing inflation again this year and another 6-percent increase in the costs of living, would put us another \$20 to \$40 million in the hole for a proposition of this kind, you have made the best argument yet for sending some of these institutions of the United Nations overseas. The Austrians, you say, were and are fully prepared to put up the money. Let the foreign countries construct the buildings for them, as the Austrians, you say, are doing.

Ambassador YOST. Eighty percent is abroad, Congressman.

Mr. GROSS. Get them off our backs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fascell?

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ambassador, there might be some confusion on the record, and in the hopes of clearing it, I think you made the point that the Military Staff Committee as a U.N. committee occupies no office space. Did I get that correct?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And that the individual country members speaking specifically for the U.S. member, has his own office space in the U.S. mission, and he has other duties.

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. And that there is no specific staff, U.N. staff assignment to the Military Staff Committee.

Ambassador YOST. Correct.

Mr. FASCELL. And that any suggestion that the Military Staff Committee ought to be more active than it now is would require a fundamental policy decision and change on the part of the Congress and the U.S. Government, neither of which is about to take place, I would think.

So I am certainly not prepared to make that decision, and I wouldn't want to leave the inference that that would be the case.

Eighty percent of U.N. staff works outside the United States; is that the basis for the statement that 80 percent of U.N. activity is overseas?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. That is staff division, right?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. It doesn't necessarily relate to construction costs or facilities as such?

Ambassador YOST. No, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. Most of the U.N. effort is now in what area, in terms of people and in terms of money?

Ambassador YOST. In the economic-social area, by far the largest amount.

Mr. FASCELL. And what is the largest amount in terms of money and staff, or what is the percentage of money and staff of UNDP to the total?

Ambassador YOST. The staff—

Mr. FASCELL. What is the total amount of UNDP effort, in terms of money and staff?

Ambassador YOST. The staff, the total number of employees, is 2,700, of which 475 are in New York. The rest are scattered all over the world, in field offices of the UNDP, Resident Representatives, and so on. Do we have the UNDP expenditures?

Mr. FASCELL. It is roughly \$200 million, though, isn't it?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. DE PALMA. \$225 million is estimated for 1970.

Mr. FASCELL. Sir?

Mr. DE PALMA. \$225 million this year.

Mr. FASCELL. How does that relate to the need for expanded U.N. headquarters? How does that program specifically relate to the Secretary General, and what the United States is trying to do?

Ambassador YOST. A number of recent reports by experts, such as the Pearson report, have recommended that a larger proportion of aid to developing countries go through multilateral agencies. This includes, of course, the International Bank, and it also includes the U.N. development program.

In order that this multilateral assistance be administered efficiently, it is necessary that there be a close coordination between the U.N. development program in the first place, the staff of the Secretary General and the Economic and Social Council, which are in New York, in the second place, and the World Bank here in Washington, in the third.

There has been a recent study by Sir Robert Jackson of the capacity of the U.N. development program to take on additional responsibilities, and certain proposals were made to assist it to do so.

The Governing Council of the U.N. development program met recently in New York, went over these proposals, and asked for further consideration of many of them. They will be brought up again at an early meeting, but all of them relate to an increasing effort to coordinate the economic and social activities of the United Nations, in the development field through the U.N. development program. This coordination would take place through its system of Resident Repre-

sentatives in developing countries throughout the world, who would cooperate in developing country plans and preinvestment surveys, which could form a basis for bank loans or bilateral assistance.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ambassador, isn't it true that we have four or five reports by the General Accounting Office bearing on the same problem, and that there is a tremendous energy now within the administration to do the same thing?

Ambassador YOST. Exactly, sir. If just at this moment, it became necessary, because of lack of space, to either break up the U.N. development program headquarters or move it all away from the U.N. headquarters, and away from the World Bank, it is certainly my strong opinion, and that of the Secretary General, and of Paul Hoffman, that this would do very serious damage to this effort that we are all making.

Mr. FASCELL. And that restates your fundamental position, as I understand it, with respect to a priority need, by the United States, as a basis for this expansion program for the U.N. headquarters, and that is, keep close supervision over the major part of the activities to which the United States contributes and while 80 percent of the people are overseas, the bulk of the money is managed, controlled and supervised in the United States.

Ambassador YOST. Certainly, sir, it is infinitely easier for us to exert an influence on behalf of strict economy and the use we think should be made of these funds, if the U.N. development program is right here in New York.

Mr. FASCELL. Before the General Assembly voted on the issue overwhelmingly as it did for headquarters expansion in New York, there was considerable discussion and review on the matter in the fifth committee, which acts as the appropriations committee of the United Nations. What was the nature of the struggle in that committee? Why did it have any struggle at all?

Ambassador YOST. Well, there is, Congressman—and you, as our representative in that committee, were exposed to it very fully—there is a certain amount of sentiment, which I mentioned in my statement, for moving the whole United Nations away from New York. There are difficulties of living in New York City. There are problems, particularly for some delegations, which caused them to listen at times to the urgings of the Soviet delegation in particular that more and more of this be moved elsewhere. And unless proper facilities can be provided, unless it is possible to house these main units satisfactorily in New York, without excessive overcrowding, and without increasing payment of high rents, this pressure will grow stronger and stronger, and we will have more and more difficulty in maintaining the essential part of U.N. policymaking and management in New York City.

Mr. FASCELL. Just one final question, Mr. Ambassador. The struggle in the Fifth Committee and in the General Assembly with respect to the expansion of U.N. Headquarters and its ultimate location was not strictly a United States-U.S.S.R. confrontation. Is that true?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. FASCELL. We had other countries that were in the forefront, at least took a strong lead in this fight, for reasons which are obvious. Is that not correct?

Ambassador YOST. That is correct. However, as I mentioned in the statement, there was in the final analysis a strong vote in favor of the project.

Mr. FASCELL. Well, we reached an agreement with the others. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, and Mr. Secretary, I would like to welcome you to the committee. You have come with a very practical problem, it seems to me; our responsibility should be obvious. We should respond to the problem. The suggestion that has been made seems to me to be eminently reasonable. In fact, the suggested direct contribution of the United States is quite small, and I hope that we will move in the direction which you recommend.

The only question really, is whether or not New York is going to continue to be the central focal point of major U.N. activities, or whether substantial activities can be run from outside the United States.

From the point of view of the United Nations, it should be obvious that it really is in the best interests of the organization to retain a central focal point. It seems even more obvious that the United States has a very real interest in seeing that New York is kept as the major headquarters of the U.N., and the UNDP and the UNICEF, too.

It is as simple as that.

I would think we would be ill advised if we should count our pennies to the extent that we would not respond to this need. Obviously something must be done with respect to the crowding which is presently reaching intolerable proportions. I suppose as a resident of New Jersey, I should be in favor of decentralization, so as to perhaps persuade somebody to come across the Hudson River.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. We have an airport you might be interested in.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. We have one already, and that is enough thank you, Mr. Rosenthal.

So I hope we will respond to this recommendation, and act promptly, so there will be no undue delay in proceeding with what I consider essential activities.

I have no questions to ask of either of you.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fraser?

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Secretary, I share the sentiments of Mr. Frelinghuysen and others. The case that I have heard for this expansion program sounds good, although we might get somebody to come in and argue against it, developing the weak points in your case. But other than the general economy issue that Mr. Gross raises which I think is always important it does seem to me that this expansion is important.

I am generally in agreement with what you are trying to do and I would like to raise a different issue. The confidence of the people of the United States in the United Nations is, I think, probably not as high now as it has been in the past. This confidence has eroded particularly in the last few years, during this and the previous administrations. This is in no sense a partisan question. But, I don't know of any substantial important initiative involving the United States in which it appeared that the United States was intent on building the capacity of the United Nations to be useful in the world arena.

I am aware of the things that go on from day to day, in various specialized agencies and so on, but the United States really has not

taken any initiative to the U.N.; it hasn't come up with any useful and important proposals that I can recall—now, I may be mistaken—dealing with peacekeeping or peacemaking. Nothing beyond the Security Council resolution on the Middle East—and I don't denigrate that—but the Middle East war is still very hot today, and there is no end in sight. Is it a fair assessment that, for the foreseeable future, the United Nations is to have a very secondary role in American foreign policy—or what is the situation?

Ambassador Yost. Congressman, there was, at the General Assembly last fall, quite a general soul-searching on the part of most members on the very grounds you state. There has been some loss of public confidence in recent years, I think, since the article 19 controversy and the withdrawal of the emergency force in the Middle East, and a number of other developments, and a general determination was expressed to explore means in this 25th anniversary year of making the U.N. stronger and more effective.

We on the U.S. side are engaged, now, and have been for some months, in a very substantial enterprise, to examine all of the possibilities in the peace and security field, in the development field, in the field of environment, and in the field of peaceful settlement, for either strengthening activities which are already underway, but have declined to some extent, or developing new initiatives which would help to revive and rejuvenate the U.N. Just what we will come out with in the course of the year, it is too early to say, but I can assure you that we are working very earnestly on this. Not only we, but most of the other members are, and I feel confident that in this Assembly, in the fall, there will be a wide variety of new initiatives and of measures for strengthening old mechanisms, proposed by many, many members.

Now, just which ones of these may commend themselves to the membership as a whole, and be adopted; again, it is too early to say, but I can assure you that full advantage is being taken of this 25th anniversary year, to do everything that seems feasible and appropriate to reinforce the U.N. and increase its effectiveness. We can't expect miracles in a year, but I would expect that there would be some revival of confidence, and some new steps which will provide a basis for it.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, generally I have come to the view that the miracles are usually not the most useful advances. What is more important is the steady year-by-year accretion of new structures and procedures and practices that over a period of time yield institutional vitality and strength.

The United States recently cast its first veto in the history of the U.N. organization. Was that important? Was the security interest of the United States involved, or how did you come to cast it? Why were we unwilling to abide by the majority viewpoint?

Ambassador Yost. Well, we thought so, Mr. Fraser.

The situation was this: As you know, there are a series of situations in southern Africa of which we as a government disapprove. And we have in the case of Rhodesia, in particular, gone a long way in supporting multilateral economic sanctions, and we are continuing to support them, very firmly. They have not produced the results that almost everyone hoped they would when they were instituted. The African states are quite naturally increasingly frustrated and resentful

that that doesn't seem to be happening, and so they come in, periodically now, to the Security Council, with further resolutions in regard to Rhodesia, to South Africa, and the Portuguese territories. And it has been quite clear, for some time, that we were going to reach the point, before long, when they would propose and be able to get the necessary nine votes in the Council for actions that we thought—the United States thought—were not desirable, despite our objection to these regimes and these situations. Thus we had the case in which a proposed resolution took a clear position that the United Kingdom should have used force to overthrow the regime in Rhodesia, and we don't really think that the use of force in southern Africa is a proper way to solve the problems there.

We think if it should be attempted, it would be all too likely to open a Pandora's box, and no one knows what would finally come out.

And the second feature of that resolution would have called on all states to cut off all communications with Southern Rhodesia, postal, telegraphic, radio, and so on. We frankly didn't think that this was in the interests even of the majority of the people of Rhodesia, whose interests we would like to support, because, in effect, it would increase the ability of the minority regime there to maintain a monopoly of news. It, in a sense, would put an Iron Curtain on communications around the country.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, I understood those were the reasons why we cast a veto, although I didn't see that our security was in any way jeopardized, had we refrained from voting, for example.

Ambassador Yost. Well, not immediately.

Mr. FRASER. Can we vote "No," without a veto?

Ambassador Yost. No. We could have abstained. We always have done that in the past, but it seemed to us that here was a matter of principle about which we felt strongly on these two points, and simply to stand aside was not in keeping with our statement of principles and furthermore—

Mr. FRASER. We have very flexible principles.

Ambassador Yost. I hope not.

Mr. FRASER. We have a half million men in Vietnam to preserve the right to self-determination, and in Rhodesia we are almost indifferent.

May I ask you about South-West Africa, which poses, it seems to me, quite a different story.

Ambassador Yost. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. South-West Africa, by action of the United Nations, is no longer under control of South Africa, and yet South Africa continues to exercise de facto control, and in her own eyes, of course, de jure control. If the United States and other nations say, "Well, it doesn't really matter what the United Nations has decided," if we let things go on as they have in the past, this inaction, as with the fruitless efforts to invoke sanctions against Italy in the late 1930's, will mean a steady erosion of confidence in the U.N. People will come to believe that the United Nations never will stand up and be counted on something that involves both a clear-cut international question and the ability of the organization to be effective.

I can understand the rationale in the case of Rhodesia and South Africa. But I can't understand the rationale which leads us in South-West Africa to say, well, we have taken an action which is clearly

indicated by logic, by morality, by international law, whatever, and yet be indifferent to the failure of our action to have consequences.

At least, indifferent to the extent that we are quite prepared to do nothing about the lack of consequences and to let the United Nations demonstrate its impotence.

Ambassador Yost. Well, Congressman, we shall probably be having a Security Council meeting on this subject, another one, in the relatively near future. We in the U.S. Government are again carefully reviewing our position to see if there is anything further that we can do, or we can suggest that the U.N. do, which it hasn't done, in connection with South-West Africa. I hope that there may be some things. I would not want, however, to hold out any hope that even if we can do and the U.N. can do some additional things, that it will be sufficient to cause South Africa to evacuate and give up South-West Africa.

Mr. FRASER. Right. That is, we won't take the steps that we could take, the steps necessary to implement the decision.

Ambassador Yost. Well, once again, it is this problem. Unfortunately, despite our very best efforts, economic sanctions have not worked against a much weaker regime in Rhodesia. We see very little reason to believe that even comprehensive U.N. economic sanctions would work against South Africa, and to attempt to set them up, and apply them, and then find that they failed would just be a much more glaring demonstration of the impotence of the international community than not to make the effort.

If we had a real judgment that they might succeed, that could be different, but the examples, including the one you mentioned, the Italians in the 1930's, are not very encouraging.

Mr. FRASER. Well, do I understand that you are saying that you are unwilling to consider any other measures that might enforce the—

Ambassador Yost. No.

Mr. FRASER. There are clearly measures within the reach of the United Nations that would displace the South Africans from South-West Africa.

Ambassador Yost. We are constantly examining to see whether there aren't additional steps we can take. There may be some.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, it is clear that the power resides in the civilized world to carry out the decision of the United Nations. What you are saying in effect is that we are not considering actions outside the ambit of those that we contemplate as feasible.

Ambassador Yost. The fact is, and I am not the first to regret this, that the United Nations still does not have, has not had conferred upon it by its members, the sovereign governments that make it up, the authority and resources to enforce decisions of this kind. We see it—

Mr. FRASER. As in Korea, for example? That was a unilateral action? The United Nations was unwilling to sanction the U.N. involvement, to approve of it, to condone the use of force?

Ambassador Yost. That was a U.N. operation, and a very exceptional situation.

Mr. FRASER. Or in the Congo, where we sent forces in under the U.N. flag.

Ambassador Yost. Yes; the U.N. did, but that was a relatively modest operation. You know, it is——

Mr. FRASER. Well, the United States is unwilling to see the United Nations use whatever force might be required to carry out its decision to displace South Africa from South-West Africa, a force which the United Nations is quite capable of assembling.

Ambassador Yost. No; I am afraid I must disagree with you, sir. I don't think the U.N. is capable of assembling such a force, under present circumstances. I don't think that——

Mr. FRASER. Have we proposed it?

Ambassador Yost. No, sir.

Mr. FRASER. Would we agree to it if someone else proposed it?

Ambassador Yost. No; because we don't think it would work. We don't think——

Mr. FRASER. I can see by your definition that we accept in advance that it wouldn't work.

Ambassador Yost. I assure you, we have gone into this very carefully.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Ambassador, from the point of view of the small nations and the African nations, the disillusionment with the large white civilized powers must be very deep, indeed.

Ambassador Yost. We are——

Mr. FRASER. The United Nations has made a judgment on an international question. We will spend \$150 billion in Vietnam for 14 million people unilaterally but when there is a world consensus on a clear-cut moral and international issue, we won't do anything, and as you can tell by the tone of my voice, my disillusionment is very profound as well.

Ambassador Yost. Well, we are acutely conscious of the situation, and I would be the first to hope that the time will come and soon when the United Nations will have sufficient support from all its membership to be able to carry out much more effectively its decisions, but I am afraid that isn't the case yet.

Mr. FRASER. I am afraid I won't live long enough to see it. I hope it comes. As you say, we can't hope for miracles, it has to be a slow, year-by-year growth. We are working, for example, very hard to try to develop firmer support for U.N. peacekeeping, and we are making some progress, but it is slow.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Findley?

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Ambassador, you have pointed out quite correctly that the expansion of the U.N. headquarters under the resolution would result in some rent savings. Have you made projections showing the extent to which the investment here would be offset by rent savings?

Mr. DE PALMA. Maybe I am a little more familiar with the figures. The U.N. is already paying a million one hundred thousand dollars out of its regular budget for rented space. By 1973, when this construction would be finished, it will be paying \$2 million. The UNDP and UNICEF combined, by 1973, will be paying about \$1.2 million. This is \$3.2 million in rents, which would be paid in 1973, if we don't have accommodations in an enlarged headquarters.

Mr. FINDLEY. In that 1 year, and I presume that you are following, would it remain constant, or would it be up some?

Mr. DE PALMA. This is a calculation for that year. There will be some slight increases, and the accommodations are planned to take them into account.

Mr. FINDLEY. And the accommodations planned would take care of all of the personnel and space needs now rented by that projection?

Mr. DE PALMA. That is correct. Plus some addition planned for the next decade.

Mr. FINDLEY. So from that, what can we conclude? About \$3 million a year offset saving, against the investment of what is it, \$20 million?

Mr. DE PALMA. It is \$3.2 million annually at least, and probably more over the decade, which would have to be paid out of the budgets of these organizations, as rent, and over a period of time, depending on how far you project it, would begin to—

Mr. FINDLEY. To us, this might represent an offset saving of about a million, then, based on our 32-percent contribution.

Mr. DE PALMA. On an annual basis.

Mr. FINDLEY. So \$1 million a year against a \$20 million investment is really the question before us if we are looking only at the financial problem.

Mr. DE PALMA. Yes, sir; the rental savings in the regular U.N. budget would be reflected in a reduction in our assessment.

Mr. FINDLEY. One thing that has concerned a lot of us, and I am sure Mr. Gross spoke to this point, is that the U.S. contribution has seemed to remain constant, even though other nations have been admitted to the U.N. Why is this so? Do they get by without contribution when they become members?

Mr. DE PALMA. No, but there is a lag in recalculating the scales as a result of admissions of members. Over the years, our contribution has declined from 39.89 in the initial U.N. assessment period, 1946 through 1949, down to its present level of 31.57.

Mr. FINDLEY. But when?

Mr. DE PALMA. The 31.57 was agreed in 1967 to begin in 1968.

Mr. FINDLEY. 1968.

Mr. DE PALMA. Now, there are at present four countries, newly admitted, and paying their assessments, whose contributions have not yet been calculated into a new scale and some very tiny change could occur in this year's recalculation.

Mr. FINDLEY. Is this recalculated biennially, or annually, or what?

Mr. DE PALMA. Every 3 years.

Mr. FINDLEY. Every 3 years.

On page 3, Mr. Ambassador, you said that many others, while not prepared to go to that length, have pressed increasingly for greater and greater decentralization of U.N. offices. My feeling is that the dollars involved here, while substantial, shouldn't be the controlling factor in the decision on whether to expand headquarters here. I think the primary consideration ought to be what is best for the United Nations, as an institution, and maybe a good case could be made for a greater decentralization, instead of enlarging the plant at New York.

For example, we are the primary element in NATO, yet NATO headquarters, fortunately, are located on the continent. And I think that is good. It may be argued that the main mission of NATO is Western Europe defense, but it is much broader than that, I think

we agree. It is not to the interests of the United Nations to have too much of a "made in the United States" label imprinted on it.

And even though there are some inefficiencies in a decentralized organization, I am sure there are a lot of things to be said for decentralization to increase awareness in other areas of the world of the existence and operation and utility of the United Nations.

Ambassador Yost. Well, we agree, of course, entirely with that, but we do feel that 80 percent of the staff of the whole system and 60 percent of the staff looking at it more narrowly, the U.N. Secretariat, UNDP and UNICEF already decentralized abroad, that this is really as far as one can safely go, without eating into this central policymaking and management core.

Mr. FINDLEY. And that percentage would not be altered by the construction of this addition?

Ambassador Yost. No, sir.

Mr. FINDLEY. I think a lot of the points made, comments made by Mr. Fraser are well worth dwelling upon a bit, and in order to marshal the financial support of the United Nations it would be helpful to have some kind of a chronology of whatever incremental advances, to use Mr. Fraser's expression, have been achieved in recent years. It is a bigger organization, a bigger bureaucracy, greater demand for space, more money invested.

What new things are being done? What successes have been achieved, that we can point to?

I wouldn't ask you to go into great detail at this moment, but it would be an important item to have in the record. I would think.

Ambassador Yost. Yes, Well, I did testify before this committee not too long ago in regard to the present situation, and some of our hopes for the future in these various fields, but we would be glad to elaborate on that at any time, and I—

Mr. FINDLEY. Well, it is achievements rather than hopes, that I think we ought to be able to point to.

Ambassador Yost. Yes, sir. I shall provide a report for the record. (The requested information follows:)

THE UN—ITS PURPOSES, LIMITATIONS, AND MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS, 1945-70

Following is a brief summary of some of the main achievements of the United Nations, including quite recent achievements, as well as some of the problems it has failed to solve. This record is measured against the purposes of the organization as set forth in the Charter.

PURPOSES

The United Nations was created, as the Preamble to the Charter says, first and foremost "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." Its purposes are formally set forth in these words from article 1 of the Charter:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS—PEACE AND SECURITY

As regards the first purpose—*international peace and security*—the UN's success has been considerable, though far short of the highest hopes that attended its founding. The Charter provisions for armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council, and empowering the Council to order such forces into action to prevent or stop any breach of the peace, have been rendered ineffective by political discord among the five permanent Council members: the United States, the USSR, Britain, France, and China.

Despite this central weakness, the UN has been the instrument of a number of historic services to international peace and security. In 1950 it took an immediate stand against aggression from North Korea and, through three years of war, provided the framework for international aid to South Korea in repelling that aggression—including the service of some 33,000 combat troops from 15 members other than the United States. It has helped to halt full-scale war three times in the Middle East, and twice between India and Pakistan. It prevented the breakup of the Congo and thereby averted a threatened big-power clash in the heart of Africa. It checked civil strife in Cyprus which threatened to trigger a war between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. And it has successfully mediated a number of other potential conflicts between nations.

In several of these situations a key element of stability has been the presence of UN peacekeeping operations—ranging from a few dozen military observers in Kashmir to thousands of armed "blue helmet" troops in the Middle East (1956-67), the Congo (1960-64) and Cyprus (since 1964). These are the first such operations ever to fly the colors of a world organization. Without such an impartial international presence, it would have been far more difficult to prevent these local conflicts from drawing the major powers into direct and costly confrontation.

The UN has even proved valuable in helping defuse potentially dangerous military confrontations between the main nuclear powers. At least twice, in the Berlin crisis of 1948-49 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, messages exchanged on the neutral ground of the UN headquarters in New York played a significant part in this process.

When it comes to *settling* international disputes that may endanger the peace, the UN record is mixed. It has no power to impose settlements. Its debates and resolutions, and the "quiet diplomacy" of the Secretary-General and his emissaries, have nevertheless helped to promote agreement in several serious international disputes including those over Trieste (between Italy and Yugoslavia); West Irian (between Indonesia and the Netherlands); and South Tyrol or Alto Adige (between Italy and Austria). A number of other disputes, some of them of long duration, remain unresolved despite UN efforts. But what little progress toward peace has been made in the most difficult of them, particularly the Middle East, owes much to the UN. Its diplomatic activity continues today in this and a number of lesser disputes such as that over the future of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf.

Against this record must be set down more than one tragic episode of international importance which the UN has been powerless to prevent or cure. Among these is the war in Vietnam, one of the parties to which, North Vietnam, has rejected all proposals for discussion in the UN. Another was the civil war in Nigeria, in which neither Nigeria nor its African neighbors would consent to a UN role except for humanitarian relief. When the Soviet Union forcibly suppressed political dissent in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the UN—like the community of nations whose instrument it is—was not prepared to go beyond debate and verbal condemnation.

Of this mixed record it can be said that although the UN is far weaker as a guardian of the peace than its authors had intended, it has done much valuable work within the limits set by the willingness of its members to make use of it.

Another aspect of the United Nations role in international peace and security is its work in promoting the search for workable arms control agreements. The Charter's original concept, by which the Security Council would develop "a system for the regulation of armaments," proved unworkable, and the key arms control negotiations have taken place elsewhere—notably in the 27-member Geneva Disarmament Committee and the bilateral United States-Soviet talks on a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). However, the issues in these negotiations are extensively debated by the entire membership of the General Assembly each year. These Assembly debates have become a primary means of assuring that

arms control treaties which affect the interest of small and medium powers, and which require their cooperation, will be acceptable to those powers. In just over a decade the Assembly has contributed in this way to the framing and adoption of a series of major arms control treaties: The Antarctic Treaty of 1959; the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963; the Outer Space Treaty of 1966, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which entered into force in 1970. Undoubtedly other treaties now being discussed, such as the ban on emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor, the ban on bacteriological weapons, and whatever agreement we and the Soviet Union can reach on strategic arms limitation, will go through this same process.

SELF-DETERMINATION AND PEACE

The United Nations second purpose, quoted above, has been advanced in some areas and blocked in others. In Eastern Europe, "friendly relations among nations based on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" have been largely negated by the policy of the dominant power in that region, the Soviet Union. But in the nearly one-third of the earth which was ruled by the prewar colonial system, self-determination has resulted in the creation of 65 new independent states. This is one of the most dramatic political transformations of modern times. The United Nations, through the Trusteeship Council and in other ways, has helped to bring it about and has welcomed the great majority of the new nations to United Nations membership. It has afforded them valuable economic and technical assistance, experience in international diplomacy, and a voice in the affairs of the world community.

The UN's "measures to strengthen universal peace" include the initiation or encouragement of an impressive number of international treaties by which the community of nations seeks to substitute the rule of law for the rule of force, and to set common rules or standards of conduct for observance by all nations. UN bodies have provided much of the impetus for, and in some cases have played a significant part in negotiating, some of the most important multilateral treaties of recent years, including the Genocide Convention, the major arms control treaties mentioned above and the recently concluded Convention on the Law of Treaties. This convention, signed by the United States in April 1970, includes pioneering provisions for the settlement of disputes over the interpretation of treaties, and is one of the most basic pieces of international law ever to emerge from the United Nations.

Another famous UN document, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although it lacks the force of law, has been influential throughout the world since its adoption by the General Assembly in 1948.

The same objective of strengthening peace and the rule of international law is served by the International Court of Justice, which, although the number of issues referred to it thus far is disappointingly small, retains the potential of providing a major facility for impartial judicial settlement of legal aspects of international disputes.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

The UN's third purpose—especially the economic development of low-income nations—has absorbed a far greater share of the organization's attention and efforts than was expected at its founding. Today some 80 per cent of the money and staff in the United Nations are concentrated on economic, social and technical work. The United Nations Development Program, created by the General Assembly on an American proposal in 1957, conducts pre-investment surveys and technical assistance projects throughout the world. In the period 1959-70, under the administration of Paul Hoffman, the program's total annual contributions grew from \$55 million to an estimated \$241 million, more than a four-fold increase. (The U.S. share, by Congressional mandate, may not exceed 40% of this total, and in recent years has been less.) Over-all, the UNDP Administrator has reported the earmarking of \$1,134 million for 1,185 Special Fund projects. Of these, 465 were resource surveys, 425 were for technical education and training, 267 for applied research and 28 for economic development planning. Sixty-nine surveys and feasibility studies have directly or indirectly produced follow-up investment commitments estimated by the Administrator at \$2.8 billion.

UN agencies for humanitarian causes among children, refugees and disaster victims have also performed important work. Among these agencies, the UN Children's Fund is widely and favorably known for its health, nutrition and welfare programs for children and mothers. And the program of the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees has operated in Europe, Latin America, Africa and the Near and Far East to seek permanent solutions for refugees and to provide emergency interim assistance where necessary.

"A CENTER FOR HARMONIZING"

Finally, account should be taken of the UN's fourth purpose—"to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations." Many UN resolutions—such as those proclaiming the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, calling for an International Atomic Energy Agency, establishing the United Nations Development Program, and the International Development Association, creating the United Nations Emergency Force, and endorsing the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—have had major international results because they expressed, after thorough debate and negotiation, the overwhelming will of the membership—their will not only to adopt resolutions but to work together in giving effect to them.

In recent years major UN resolutions and decisions have begun to deal with new international concerns, arising from new technology and scarcely dreamt of when the Charter was written: for example, how to share the benefits of space satellites; how to preserve and enhance our threatened environment; how to avert the perils of too rapid population growth; how to assure peaceful exploration and use of the world's oceans and seabeds. These common problems, transcending ideology, demand a world negotiating forum for agreed solutions. Such common undertakings of the community of nations—and many others of lesser importance—have emerged from debate and negotiation in the UN's process of "parliamentary diplomacy." Despite the many imperfections of that process, it has developed much valuable common ground among nations during the UN's first 25 years, both in curbing conflict and in fostering international cooperation for human benefit.

Mr. FINDLEY. And one of the great disappointments, to me at least, has been the almost total inactivity of the International Court of Justice. That is the judicial arm of the United Nations, and yet it has no business before it whatever now, and I am informed that one of the reasons is that our Government really has not made any great effort to seek out and identify legal questions which could be presented to the Court, or which we should seek to present to the Court.

Ambassador Yost. I am glad you mentioned that. This is precisely one of the areas that we are looking at most carefully at this very moment, and may have something to say about in the very near future, where we hope there can be an advance. We are going to make some concrete suggestions, I believe, with that in view.

Mr. FINDLEY. In talking with Judge Jessup of the Court some time back, he said that one change that he felt would increase the utility of the Court would be for each member of the United Nations to have the right to request an advisory opinion of the Court. Do you have any comment on that, or suggestions?

Ambassador Yost. I have talked to him about that, too, and this is one of the possibilities we are looking into. I think that might well be a very constructive one.

Mr. FINDLEY. Is there anything you could tell us today as to proposals the United States feels would be worthwhile for the United Nations?

Ambassador Yost. Well, I would hesitate to get into detail now, because we are right in the midst of this process of examining them. It is clear enough what the fields are. We are trying to strengthen U.N. peacekeeping; we are trying to make it possible, make it easier for the U.N. to deal with Congo and Cyprus, and Middle East situations, than it is at present. We are trying to deal with the whole development program, in a more effective way. We discussed that a bit.

We are trying to handle some of these new problems of the environment, where the U.N. is very active in the seabeds question. We are trying to see that some of the new discoveries of earth surveys from outer space can be more effectively used, in a multilateral way.

We are preparing for an International Conference on the Environment in Stockholm, which will get into the whole broad question of pollution, and other environmental problems.

We are trying to do more on peaceful settlements not only as far as the Court is concerned, but in other ways, too. We are trying to find ways in which the U.N. could be more effective in dealing with human rights problems. It is very hard to get into, because all countries are very jealous of their own jurisdiction here, but we have some ideas, and we are hoping to put them forward.

Mr. FINDLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Findley.

Mr. Rosenthal?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, before I speak to another matter, I do want you to know that I agree with all Mr. Fraser said in his comments. I thought that the casting of that first veto was a very, very serious mistake. I think it is bad for our future relations with black Africa. I don't understand why we did it.

Your logic doesn't persuade me, and I would like you to know how I feel.

Returning to the more direct proposition before us, it is my present intention to offer an amendment, either in the committee, or on the floor where the chances of success might be better; an amendment that prevents any municipality from contributing to any United Nations building fund or building operation. We may start the dialog from that point.

Let me go back a step. You have told us that at least two other host governments have contributed to U.N. building fund operations. Have there been any others?

Ambassador YOST. Yes; and I promised the Congressman to put in the record a detailed account of this. I read off a number of countries, which have made such contributions.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. And you will put in the record the names of those countries and the amounts of their contribution or proposed contribution?

Ambassador YOST. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Has any municipality ever contributed to a U.N. building fund?

Ambassador YOST. Yes; the city of Vienna for one. I understand that the plan which is now being carried out involves a 65-percent contribution by the Austrian Federal Government, and 35 percent by the city of Vienna.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Have there been any other examples?

Ambassador YOST. I think—

Mr. DE PALMA. The Canton, of Geneva.

Ambassador YOST. Geneva has made contributions for the construction of the headquarters of the International Telecommunication Union and the World Meteorological Organization as well as assisting the World Health Organization by a low-interest loan and by making land available without charge.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Now, when was this agreement first made, whereby the city of New York was to match the Federal contribution?

Ambassador YOST. I am not sure when it was first made. This was in the proposed package when I came in at the beginning of last year.

Mr. DE PALMA. It has been up for discussion for almost 2 years.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. And do you know who made it?

Ambassador YOST. No, sir, I don't know. Of course, I know that the mayor and a number of the city officials have felt that New York derived important benefits from having the U.N. there and from preventing its being fragmented further.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Well, do you think the city of New York should bear an equal share with the rest of the United States in preventing the U.N. from being fragmented?

Ambassador YOST. Well, this was the feeling of the New York City authorities.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Well, very frankly, it is not my feeling. I think Mr. Findley made a partially persuasive case for dispersing U.N. functions around the world. Awareness in other countries might provide a strong movement toward peace in some areas. Aside from this, I fail to see the obligation of the city of New York to put up an equal amount of money with the Federal Government. It seems to me that if your case is legitimate, that it is in the U.S. national interest to keep the U.N. from being fragmented and to keep the U.N. in the territorial limits of the United States for other reasons; then the United States ought to bear the total cost of any contribution. To solicit the assistance of a municipality on the theory that it generates commerce within that municipality begs the question.

Many of the U.N. residents live in Westchester, in Nassau County, outside of the confines of the city. Many, many of them live in Connecticut. Some live in New Jersey. And I don't doubt for a moment that many of the restaurants on the East Side of Manhattan and the apartment houseowners there gain a certain amount of profit from having the U.N. nearby. You are asking a city in a dire financial condition to make a direct cash payment of \$20 million, to give away land worth about \$12 million, and to lose the potential tax assessment value of that land. You are asking the city of New York to contribute more than the rest of the Nation in bearing what seems to me a national responsibility. I am not persuaded that the city, given the financial crisis it is in today, can afford to put up \$20 million for a contribution equal with the U.S. Government.

It makes no sense to me whatsoever.

Ambassador YOST. Well, sir, I am a little hard put to argue the mayor's case for him, but I do think his feeling, and that of the Board of Estimate, was that there was a very substantial financial advantage to the city of New York in not having its income from the U.N. presence reduced. There is a very substantial income derived from the rents of office space and living quarters by certainly the large majority, I would judge, of both the delegations and the Secretariat people at the U.N.

There are, of course, these crowds of tourists who come in to visit the U.N. headquarters. There are the delegations who come to all these meetings, and occupy the hotel space.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In May 1961, in the 87th Congress, there were eight bills introduced to have the U.S. Government help the city of

New York defray the cost of the special police protection accorded Khrushchev and Castro when they came to the United Nations. This committee reported out a bill to have the Federal Government defray some of the unusual special costs that the city incurred because of the U.N. visits of foreign dignitaries.

There were many bills introduced, again in the 88th Congress, again in the 89th Congress, and again in the 90th Congress, and again in the 91st Congress. When the mayor was a Congressman, in 1961 he testified before Congresswoman Kelly's subcommittee—Mr. Fascell was presiding at that time.

Mr. FASCELL. Don't ask me, because you will get the wrong answer.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The mayor concurred in supporting a bill for reimbursing the city introduced by Congressman Celler, Congressman Halpern, Congresswoman Kelly and Congressman Ryan; reimbursement was supported by Mayor Wagner, Comptroller Abraham Beame, Chief of Police Michael Birmingham, Senator Keating and Senator Javits. Mr. Lindsay said at that time that this was a Federal responsibility. He stated:

I think the committee has to make up its mind, and I would urge it to make up its mind in the direction of recognizing a Federal responsibility for a unique situation.

It is nice to have the United Nations in New York. We are glad to have the tourists, we are glad to have the prestige, we are glad to have the rest of it. But the time has come to evaluate priorities. I think the Federal Government just exercised its unique leverage in trying to force the city in the past. I know you didn't do it, Mr. Ambassador; you weren't the Ambassador then.

It might be helpful, Mr. Chairman, if the mayor or those who entered into this arrangement were called before the committee. I have no notion how successful this amendment will be. I think the majority of the New York members would support the amendment, and perhaps oppose this resolution, without such an amendment; and combined with the Gross forces, might put the authorization in a precarious position.

Ambassador Yost. Mr. Rosenthal, as a resident of the city of New York, I would be delighted to see the Federal Government contribute more. I am the last to oppose that; but I do think that the Board of Estimate has by no means treated this in a casual or a cavalier fashion. They went into it very carefully, and their conclusion, the conclusion of the substantial majority was that this was in New York's interests both from the point of view of dollars and cents, and the point of view of general prestige, for New York City is in a sense the capital of the world; they felt it was justified.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think one of the weaknesses in our understanding our own institutions is that we tend to take everything for granted, and treat them in a traditional fashion. For example, we measure the accomplishments in our society by gross national product and freight carloadings and things of that sort, and all of a sudden, we find out this enormous productive capacity is destroying our environment.

Now, I think what happened here is that it is a traditional argument, that it is nice to have the United Nations or a Federal establishment within the confines of the city. But at some point, someone representing the city of New York—and I am willing to assume that modest role for the moment—has to say that, while we appreciate the fact that

we are the world's great cultural center and perhaps intellectual center, but—

Mr. GALLAGHER. I wouldn't go that far.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If it is in the U.S. national interest to maintain the United Nations within the territorial boundaries of the United States, and it happens to be in New York City, then the Federal Government must take the total responsibility. Simply acting out trite expressions like, "You have got to chip in if you want this kind of a deal," doesn't hold here.

I don't know what arguments you might want to marshal in support of opposition to any proposed amendment, but I would suggest to you that they ought to be formidable, because I think a lot of people can be persuaded there is substance in what I say.

You know, in former times when money was more plentiful, I would have said, "Well, what the heck, let's take a flier," but the resources of the city are strained today to the breaking point. We are trying every conceivable fund-raising effort to maintain our head above water. The subways run poorly; the hospitals aren't properly staffed. I don't have to tell you this. For the city to match the Federal payment on a theory that this may generate some commerce on Manhattan Island is to me foolish.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

It does seem to me—and perhaps a resident of a neighboring State shouldn't comment on this—that the Board of Estimate surely recognizes the financial condition of the city. Perhaps they recognize the benefits to New York. For the gentleman to be suggesting an amendment to kill the goose that lays golden eggs might not be a way to improve the city's finances. In other words, I would assume there are substantial financial benefits to the city, or they wouldn't be making a voluntary contribution.

Surely the Federal Government isn't twisting the city's arm to come up with this amount.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think that a certain amount of arm-twisting took place at some event in history, and that the Board of Estimate, like many local municipal bodies, does make some trades on occasion. In my own judgment, for the city to give up the potential tax possibilities of this land, and put up \$20 million in cash, Mr. Frelinghuysen, and I have read all of the testimony, is not worthwhile. The chance to recoup the economic value of that over the long term just doesn't match up to the \$20 million cash expenditure.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Where do you see any evidence one way or the other in this regard, as to what the benefits to the city would be?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Looking at the transcript of hearings before the Senate subcommittee—

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I never heard of such a thing happening, but even so do the Senate hearings give—

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Well, frequently things happen that you are not aware of.

Mr. FINDLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes.

Mr. FINDLEY. You know, there probably will be some dispute about whether New York City is the intellectual capital of the world, but I don't think there will be any dispute on the point that New York City is widely regarded, universally regarded, as the money

capital of the world. So I think the \$20 million contribution might actually be on the low side here.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The citizens in the city of New York don't share that regard at the moment.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you, Mr. Rosenthal.

We have another citizen of New York. If you will bear with us, we will recognize Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I did a good deal of talking before this subcommittee a couple of days ago, and I don't intend to take much time now.

I do hope, Mr. Ambassador, and Mr. Secretary, that you will have a chance to look at my comments before this subcommittee on various ways in which I think the United Nations can be strengthened, and will give them your serious consideration.

I must say that I am a little surprised to hear my colleague, Mr. Rosenthal, present his point of view on this. I have not made up my mind, and I don't intend to, until I have had a chance to consult with the mayor and other members of the Board of Estimate.

I think that this is a matter of very great importance to New York City, and I am not at all sure which way it runs. I am one of the supporters of the bill that was referred to about the United States picking up a good part of the expense for the special police protection that was provided for Mr. Khrushchev. I will say this: I think that is a totally different situation. There was no benefit to be gained there by the city.

Here, there is a very strong argument to be made, I presume, that this is a real benefit to the city, and I don't consider myself qualified to speak on the subject of the balance of merits, without having discussed it with the city officials concerned.

I would also like to say a word about the comments made on the subject of the Rhodesian resolution. I think it was very unfortunate that the first U.S. negative vote—and I prefer that term, because that is what it is—the first U.S. negative vote on a Security Council resolution had to be cast in this particular case. Yet I think if I had been in your shoes, I would have felt the same way that you did. I felt for a long time that we were too skittish about using the negative vote. I have criticized the State Department and, I think, to the degree that it was the mission's responsibility, the mission, for being too skittish about using the veto in the Middle East. I think we made some mistakes in the past because we were so anxious not to use the veto, and I feel a certain sense of relief that we have finally crossed this particular barrier. It is a little bit like the first scratch on a new car; you just can't stand the thought of that first scratch, and when you have had it then it doesn't seem so bad. I think that the time has passed when we can expect that we are not going to have to vote negatively, on occasion, in the Security Council, and I think that the very fact that Mr. Fraser was in doubt as to whether there was a "no" vote that was not a veto is a good indication of the fact that many people don't understand that that is all this is, it is a "no" vote. The fact that we have abstained on occasion, on many things, bothers me a great deal.

I am very unhappy about the recent vote on the Human Rights Commission, condemning Israel for a number of things, where all we

did was abstain. That comes out and is reported in U.N. publications as a vote by the Human Rights Commission. What was it—it was a vote of 12 in favor to none against, and 15 abstentions.

Now, that is an absurdity. I think it was a bad vote; I think we should have fought it, and I think the time has arrived when we should be standing up and say what we believe, even if it means being accused of vetoing.

So that I hope that as we go on down the road, that we will try our best, as we have in the past, to achieve results in the Security Council that are consonant with what we can go along with and support.

But I think there have been plenty of times when the majority of committees and organizations at the U.N. have done silly, stupid things, and I think we have to recognize that. This is something we have to live with, and we don't have to be ashamed to stand up and be counted on what we believe is practical and sensible and realistic.

In terms of the possible use of force in southern Africa, I would like to ask you this question: In your discussions with those who have supplied U.N. troops in the past, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, Ireland, have you had any indication from them how they would feel about the use of U.N. Forces in these southern African situations?

Ambassador YOST. I have certainly seen no indication at all that they would be prepared to have their forces used in such a situation. In fact, there really has been no serious, as distinguished from rhetorical, consideration given to the use of U.N. forces in South Africa.

Mr. BINGHAM. That was my impression.

I do want to say that I think there are many things we could do with regard to South-West Africa that we haven't done. I think there are many things we could do with regard to South Africa, as a matter of national policy, that we ought to be doing, and we haven't done; but I, for one, am very, very leery of the proposition that we should come out in favor of the principle of U.N. use of force in the southern African situation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Fraser?

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make clear that on the use of force, I was talking about South-West Africa, which I distinguish rather sharply from both Rhodesia and southern Africa.

South-West Africa, by U.N. action, is an international territory at this point and should be subject to international control.

I might add that I think there is much to what Congressman Bingham says about the use of the negative vote, that we used the negative vote as the veto, for the first time, on an African issue. I think many people would say, well that is about what we would expect of the United States. I think there is something to be said for this sentiment. And, there may be occasions where it seems to me that an abstention, with an indication of our position, might be useful, but in the long run, as I say, I think Mr. Bingham has a good deal of force to his logic on that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Rosenthal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Returning to the other issue for a moment, do you think that we should continue the hearings, so that we might get

some additional testimony on the point that I raised, as to the nature and extent of the city's \$20 million cash contribution?

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, I think the Chair will take that under consideration, and discuss it with the members.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, if you are going to consider that, let me say something on the record, if I may.

I am not the slightest bit interested in superimposing my judgment on the judgment of the Board of Estimate of the City of New York as to whether their contribution is financially meaningful or not. That is a matter strictly for them.

The other question is that which is inherent in the position taken by my distinguished colleague, whether we are going to increase the Federal participation in this by some \$32 million. That is the real issue.

So New York's decisions are New York's decisions. I don't know why we should interest ourselves in that, frankly.

Mr. BINGHAM. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. FASCELL. Certainly.

Mr. BINGHAM. It seems to me that the real issue for those of us who care about the United Nations is whether this building is going to be built, and what is a practical approach to the financing of that proposition.

Mr. FASCELL. I would agree with that. If New York does not want to make the contribution, then we are faced with an entirely different problem. That is all I am saying.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Well, it would be very easy for the Federal Government, I happen to think, if we may continue for just a moment, that in terms of the pain of the contribution, it would be far easier for the Federal Government to pay \$40 million instead of \$20 million than for the city of New York to pay \$20 million cash, and I think this committee should take cognizance of that fact. If the committee won't, I would hope the House will.

Mr. GALLAGHER. The subcommittee stands adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)





